## In the



# U n ited S ta tes Co urt o f Ap p ea ls

F o rth eS e v e n th C ir cu it
N o. 09
- 1883 F LY I NG J, I NC ., P la intif f-A pp ellee, v. J
. B. V AN H OLLEN, A tto rney G en er al of W isc on sin , e tal ., D ef endants
. W I S CONS I N P E T R OL E U M M ARK ETERS & C ONV ENI ENCE S TORE A S S OC I A T I ON, Prop os e d Int e r ve nor-Appe l l ant
.
A pp eal from the United S t ates Di strictC our t fo r the E astern Di stricto f Wisc onsin
. No . 08- C- 110

—Rudo lphT. Rand a, Chief Ju dge .
A RG UE D J UNE 2, 2009

— D ECI DE D A UGUS T 20, 2009

Befo re P OSNER, R IPPLE, a nd K ANN E , C ircu it Judges . P O SNER, Cir cu i tJudg e . The W i sco nsi n U ni f or m S al es Act, W i s. S ta t. § 1 00
. 30 , f o rbi ds r et ai ls el l er s o fg as o l i ne to sel lthei r p ro d u ct b el ow costpl us a m ar kup equal to th e hi g he r o f6 pe r ce ntofthe re ta i l er ’ s co stor9. 18 pe r ce nt2 N o. 09
- 1883 ofthe w hol esa l e pr i ce o fthe product. The A ct a uthor i zes i nj unc ti ve an d m o ne ta r y r emedi es bo th i n su i ts by th e sta te, and i n pri vate s uit s byper sons i nj ured bya vi ol atio n o ft h e A c t. Id
. , §§ 10 0. 30( 4) , ( 5) , ( 5m )
. Flyi ng J, wh i ch se lls ga so lin e a t t ru c k s to p s, b r o u g h t t h is s u it in fede r al cou r t ag ains t th e st at e to e nj o i n the e nf o r ce m en t o fthe Act, o n the g r o und tha t i t i s pr ee m pte d b y the Sh er m a n A c t . T h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t a gr ee d th at it w as preem pted and i ssued the i nj uncti on

— w h er eupon th e s ta te th re w in t h e t ow el a n d d ec id ed n otto ap p ea l. Befo re the 30- day lim i t forfi l i ng a noti ce o fappealhad ex p ired, an association of W iscons in gasoli ne de alers m ove d fo r l eave to i nter vene in t h e dist ri ct c ourtbo th as a m att ero fr i ght under Rule 24( a) ( 2) o fth e F edera lRule s ofCi vi lP ro cedure and al ternati vel y a s a per m i ssi ve i nt er ve no r unde r Rul e 24 (b) ( 1) ( B)
. I t want ed to i nt er ve ne i n or der t o be abl e bo th to as k the di str i ct j ud ge to r econsi der h is decis i on a nd , i fhe r efused to change i t, to appe al
. The di st r i ctj udg e ex te nde d the tim e f o r fi l i ng th e not i ce o fa ppea li n o r dert o g i ve hi m se l ft i m e to c o nsi d e r th e mo t i o n . B e f o r e th e e x t e n d e d d e a d l i n e f o r fi l i ng an appealexpi re d, he deni ed t h e m oti on t o i nter vene. T h e app ealas ks us to r eve rs e that deni aland ei ther r eque stthe pa r ti es t o s ubmi t br i ef s o n the mer i ts o fthe dist ri c tc o ur t ’ s de c i s i o n, o r r e man d the c a s e wi th di r e ctio n s t h a t t h e d ist ric t jud ge rec on sid er h is d ec isio n in l i ght o fthe ar gum ents m ad e in the ass oci ati on’ s m oti on to recon side r. The j udg e den i ed i nt er ve nt i o n as o f r i g ht o n th e g r o und th atthe as so ci at i o n ( whi chi s to s ayi ts mem be r s, s i nc e th eN o. 09
- 1883 3
ass oci ati on’ s s tandi ng to l i ti gat e the cas e i s der i vati ve fr o m the i r s ta ndi ng ) l ac k s th e r equi r ed i nt er es t inthe litig at ion to au th or ize su c h in te rv en tio n, an d alt er n at ive ly th at th e m ot ion to int er ve n e w a s n o t t im ely , as t h e ru le re quir es though without s peci fyi ng a ti m e l i m i t. The j ud ge den i ed th e r eque stf o r pe r m i ss i ve in te r ve nt i o n o n the gr ound that i t was unti m el y a l so. No o ne c a n mai nt a i n a n a c t i o n i n a fe de r a lc o ur t, i nc l ud

i nga n a ppea l, unl es s he ha s st an di ngt o s ue , i n the s e ns e r e qu i r e d b y Ar t i c l e I I Io fthe Co ns t i t ut i on

— th at i s, unle ss he can show inj ury ( i n a s peci alse nse, not ed b elo w ) an d th at h e w ou ld be n efitfrom a d ec isio n in h is f avo r. But the i nter estr equi re d by Arti cl e I I Ii s no t en o ug h b y i ts el ft o a l l o w a pe r so n to i nt er ve ne i n a federa lsui t a nd th u s b eco m e a party t o i t. There m ust be m or e. Rule 24 ( a) ( 2) r equi re s that th e a pp l i cant c l ai m “a n in te re st rela tin g t o t h e p ro p er ty or tr an sa c tio n th at is th e su bj ec t o fthe a ct i o n. ” “Int er est” i s no t defi ne d, b ut th e ca se l aw mak es c l ea r tha t m o r e th anthe min i m um A rt i cl e I I Ii nter esti s r equi re d. Cases sayf orexam ple that a m er e “ ec on om ic in te re st ” is n oten ou gh . E .g., In re Lea se Oi l A n t i t r u s tL i t ig a t i on , 2 009 W L 14794 10, at * 5-6 (5th C ir. M a y 2 8 , 2 00 9); M oun t ai n Top Condom i ni um As s ’ n v . D ave Sta bbert M a ster B uild er, Inc ., 72 F.3d 36 1, 366 (3d Cir. 1995); c f. R eich v. A B C /Yo rk-E stes C o rp . , 6 4 F. 3d 316, 32 2- 23 ( 7th Cir
. 19 95)
. W hi le th at i s a co nfusing f or m ula ti on

— m ost c ivil litig at ion is ba se d on n ot h in g m or e t h an an “e c on om ic i nter est ”

— al lthatthe case s m ean i s that the f act th at you m i ght a nti cip ate a benefi t fro m a j ud gm ent in f avo r of on e of th e pa rt ies to a law su it

— m aybe you’r e a cr edi tor ofo ne o fthem

— d oe s n oten tit le yo u to in t er ve n e in th eir4 N o. 09
- 1883
su it. U nited Sta tes v. A lisa l Wa ter C o rp . , 37 0 F
. 3d 915, 92 0- 21 (9t h C ir. 20 04 ); M ot he rs i l l D
. I
. S. C. Corp. v. Pe t r ol e os M exi ca nos , S
. A
. , 831 F .2d 59, 62
- 63 ( 5th Ci r. 19 87) ; se e M e di ca l Li ab i l i ty M ut ual Ins . Co. v. Ala n Cur t i s LL C, 48 5 F.3d 100 6, 1008 -09 (8th C ir. 2007). The re aso n i s pra cti cal, and al so obvi ous: the effects o f a j ud gm en t in or a settlem en t of a law su it can ram ify thro ughout the ec onom y, i nfl i cti ng hurtdi ffi cul t t o prove o n countl ess stra nger s to the l i ti gat i on. Rem ote ness o fi nj ur y i s a st an dar d g r o und fo r de ny i nga pe r so n the rig h ts of a p ar ty to a law su it. It is on e o f th e “ p ru d en tia l” ( as di st i nc t fr o m c o ns ti tu ti o na l ) l i m it at i o ns o n s ta ndi ng to su e, e.g ., BlueShie l d of Vi rgi ni a v. M cCre ady, 457 U
. S. 46 5, 47 6-7 8 (1 98 2); M ai nSt r e e tO rganizat i on of Re al to rs v. C alum etCity, 50 5 F. 3d 742, 74 4- 47 ( 7th Ci r. 20 07) , wh er eas “a m od es t p ro b ab ility of inj u ry is e n ou gh fo r st an d in g” in th e A rt icle II I sen se . Wi e s m ue l l e rv. Kos ob uc ki, N o. 08
- 2527, 20 09 W L 19563 35, at* 3 ( 7th Ci r. J uly9, 20 09) ; se e N or t he as t e r n F l o rida Chapt e rof As s oc i at e d Ge ne r al Cont r ac t ors v. C ity of Jacksonville, 508 U .S. 65 6, 66 4-6 6 (1 99 3); Pe n n e l l v. C ityof Sa n Jo se, 485 U
. S. 1, 6-8 ( 1988 ). A n oth er dim en sion of the “interes t” req uired f or i nt erventi on a s a m att ero fr i ght, als o bor ro w ed fro m ( though not necess ar i l y i denti cal to) the prudentia l as d istinct f ro m the Ar t i c l e I I Ic o nc e pto fs t a nd i ng, i s tha tthe s ui t or b e s om eo n e w h om th e la w on w h ich h is c laim is fou n d ed w as int en d e d t o p ro te c t. New York P ubli c Inte restRese arch G roup, Inc. v. Regents of U niversi ty, 51 6 F. 2d 350, 35 2 ( 2d Cir
. 19 75) ( p er c u ri am ) ; se e All e n v . Wr ight, 46 8 U.S
. 73 7, 75 0- 51 ( 1984 )
. Tha t’s n ot a probl emN o. 09
- 1883 5 inth is c as e. W isc on sin ’s “ U n fair S a l e s A c t” is sp ec iali nter estl egi sl ati on a nd the speci ali nter esti s that ofr eta i l er s w ho wish, natur al l y e nough, to l i m i t pr i ce com peti ti on. They a re the sta tute’ s di re ct b en efici ar i es, as sh o wn bythe f ac t th atthe s ta tu te a utho r i ze s them t o s ue to enforce i t ag ains t pr i ce c ut te r s i fthe y c anpr o ve i nj ur y . Inv al i dat i o n o fthe s ta tu te woul d de pr i ve the m o fthe benefi t no t o nl y o fthatr em edy but als o ofthe pri nci pal re m edy pro vi ded bythe sta tute

— pu bl i c enf or cem ent b y a va r i ety o fmean s no ne r equi r i ngpr o o fo fi nj ur y . The state m ay s u e for civi l p en alties, W is. Stat. § 100.30(4), i m pose cease an d desi st or ders the v i ol ati on o fwh i ch in c u rs a c ivil p en alt y, § 1 00 .30 (5)( a), an d su e t o e nj oin vi ol ati ons w i thout havi ng to sho w thati ts re m edy atl aw i s inadequ ate . § 100. 30( 5) (b ). None ofthes e r em edi es i s av ai l ab l e to a pr i va te pe r so n. The i nter esto fthe p riv at e perso ns i ntended to be b enefite d b y t h e U n fair Sa les A c t in th e p re se rv at ion of th is rem ed ialsch em e is th e r e fo re suffi cientto w arran t interven tion un d er Ru le 2 4(a)( 2), prov ided that the retailers w ou l d b e di r ec tly r athe r tha n r emot ely ha r m ed bythe in va lid at ion of th e s ta tu te . T h e y w ou ld be ; th ey w ou ld lose m uc h o r e v e n a llof th eir bu siness to their l arger, m or e e ffi ci ent c om peti tor s. N ordo we thi nk the as soc i ati on’ s m oti on t o i nter vene, eve n though not fi l ed unti lthe dist ri ct j ud ge had enter ed h is fin al j u d gm en t, w as u n t i m ely

— as su m i ngtha t al lthe a ss o ci at i o n wa n t s i s t o t a k e a n a p p e a l( a qu e s t i o n we disc uss bel ow, and a nsw er i n the affi rm ati ve)
. I f i t w an ts to prese nt ev i dence, then i ts m oti on was i nd eed unti m el y.6 N o. 09
- 1883 I t was c o nt en t f o r the s ta te a ttorne y g en er alt o de fen d th e sta tu te unt i lhe de ci ded no t to a ppea l
. I ts c ha m pi o n, the a tto rneyg ener al, having l ostthe case , i t ca nnot be allo w ed to su bj ec t t h e w in n in g p ar ty to an ot h er tria l. Uni t e d S t at e s v . Ame r i c an Te l
. & Te l
. Co
. , 64 2 F
. 2d 1285 , 12 94- 95 (D .C . C ir. 19 80 ); Sm uc k v. Hob s on , 40 8 F
. 2d 175, 18 1- 82 ( D
. C
. C i r . 1 9 6 9 ) ( e n b a n c ) ; s e e D a v i d L
. S h a p i r o , “ S o me Tho ug ht s o n Int er ve nt i o n Be f ore C o ur ts , Age nc i es , a nd A rbi tr ato rs , ” 8 1 Ha rv. L. R ev . 721, 752-56 (1968 ). H ad the a sso ci ati on s ought to i nter vene ear lier, i ts m oti on would doubtl ess ( and proper l y) h ave been denie d on the gr ound that the st ate ’ s a ttorn ey ge nera l was de fen di ngthe st atut e a nd tha t a ddi nga no th erde fen d an t w ou ld sim p ly com p li cate th e li tigation. For there w as nothi ng to i nd i cate thatth e at torney g ener alwas pla nning to thro w the case

— unt i lhe di d s o b y f ai l i ng to ap p eal
. At tha t po i ntthe o bj ec ti o n t o i nt er ve nt i o n, a s l o nga s t a k i ngn e w e v i de nc e wa s no tc o nt e mpl a t e d, e v a po r a t e d. A notherr equi re m ent fori nter vent i on a s a m att ero f ri ght und er Rule 24 ( a) ( 2)

— that “the appli cant i s s o si tuate d that the di sposi ti on ofthe acti on m ay as a pract i calm att eri m pai r ori m pede the a pp l i cant’ s abi l i ty to prot ect that i nter est ”

— pr es ents a g re ate r obs tacl e t o the a sso c iat i on’ s inter veni ng as a m att ero fr i ght b ecause ther e i s nothi ng to preve nt a m em ber w ho is inj ured bypr i cingi n v i o l at i o n o fthe Un fai r S al es Actt o s ue the vi ol ato r. There would be n o d efense ofr es j ud i cata, b ec au se nei therthe ass oci ati on norany ofi ts m em ber s is (as yet) a p arty to the pres en t suit. It i s t r u e that conc ernN o. 09
- 1883 7 wi ththe st ar e dec i si s effec t o fa de ci si o n c anb e a g r o und for int er ve n tio n, Ne w York Publ i c Int e r e s tRe s e ar ch Gr oup, Inc. v. Regents o

f U niversi ty, sup ra , 51 6 F
. 2d at 352; A tl antis D evelo pm ent C o rp. v. U nited Sta tes , 37 9 F
. 2d 818, 82 6, 828 ( 5th Ci r. 19 67) , bec au se cour ts ar e r el uctant to overru le a p reced en t. B ut the d ecision of a d istri ct cou rt h as n o a u th or ity as p re c ed en t. M a t h eny v. U nited Sta tes , 46 9 F
. 3d 10 93 , 1 09 7 ( 7th Ci r . 2 00 6)
. And un l es s i nt er ve nti on i s perm itt ed , ther e i s no way i n w hi ch the dist ri ct cour t’ s deci si on i n thi s ca se coul d be a pp eal ed and thus, i fa ffi rm ed, gi v e r i s e t o a p r e c e de nttha two ul d i mpe de the a sso ci ati on’ s abi l i ty to ove rturn the i nv alid ati on o f the Unfai r Sal es A ct in another sui t. St ill, to m ak e t h e a ss oc iat ion s ta rtov er , w h en all it r e a l l y s e e k s b y wa y o fi n te r ve nt i o n ( a s we e x p l a i n b e l o w) i s an opp or tuni ty to l i ti gat e a n appeal, would i m pose su bs ta nt i ali nc o nv en i en ce o n the a ss o ci at i o n wi thno offs et ti n g g ain th at w e c an se e. T h at inc on ve n ien c e is an “i m pedim ent” that can be re m ove d, w i thout prej ud i ce to i ts opponent, byal l owing i nter venti on. S ee Nat ural R es our ce s D ef

ens e C ouncil v. C ostl e, 56 1 F
. 2d 904, 91 0- 11 (D.C
. Cir. 1977). F ur th er m o r e, e ve n i fthe “ i m pedi m en t” wer e co nsi dered i nsuffi ci ent t o j usti fy inter venti on a s a m att ero f righ t, th ere is th e assoc iation’s argum en t for pe r m i s s i ve i nter venti on to consi der. N ei therthe “i m pai r ori m pede” re quir em ent no r the “ i nter est ” r equi re m en t i s r epeate d in th e su bp art of R ule 24 th at govern s p erm issi v e in t e rventi on. A l lthati s r equ ire d b y Rule 24(b) ( 1) ( B), so f aras re l ate s t o thi s ca se, i s that the appli cant’ s cl ai m o r defe nse8 N o. 09
- 1883 and the m ai n acti on have a qu es tio n o fl aw o r f act i n c o mmo n . T h a t r e q u i r e me n t i s s a t i s fi e d b e c a u s e th e as so ci at i o n w an ts to pr es en t th e sa m e defen se tha t th e defe nd ants prese nted. Li ke anyo ne wh o w an ts to m ai ntai n an ac ti on in federa lco urt, the ass oci ati on has to have sta nd i ng i n the A rt i cl e I I Ise nse

—but i t doe s. The mot i o n t o i nt er ve ne ha s to b e ti m ely, b uta t ar g um ent w e ex tr acte d fr om the ass oci ati on a r el uctant ack no wl edg m ent tha t al li t r ea l l y want s i s a r ul i ngb y us ( f orther e i s no poi nt i n i ts see ki ng r eco nsi derat i on by th e d ist ric t c ou rton th e id en tic al re c or d ) th at t h e U n fair Sal es A ct i s no t pr eem pted. The as soc iatio n does not w ant t o p resent evi dence

— if it d id , i ts R u le 2 4(b ) cla im woul d b e u nt i m ely f o r the s ame r ea so n tha t, o n the sam e a ssum pti on, i ts Rule 24( a) cl ai m would be. W i the vi den ce no t ani ss ue , the on l y g r o und tha t th e dist ri ct j ud ge ga ve f ordenyi ng i nter venti on was that inter ve nt i o n “ woul d r es ul t i n a n a ppea ltha t i s o th erwi s e n o tf o r thc o m i ng. ” T ha ti s n o ta n a de qu a t e g r o un d, w hen the onl y r eas on there wou ld b e no appeali s that th e lo singpa r tyha d aba ndo ne d the c as e. To a l l o w the su b st itu tio n of a p ar ty th at h as a leg ally p ro te c ta b le i nter esti n the st atute enj oi ned by the di str i ct c ourti s a s pr o pera s per m itti ng a n unna m ed cl as s m embe r i n a cl ass act i on suitto inte rv ene w hen the cl ass r epres entat i ve d ro p s o u t. U nite d Airli nes, Inc. v. M cD ona ld, 4 3 2 US 3 8 5 , 3 94 -96 (19 77 ); Roge rs v. Paul, 3 8 2 U. S
. 1 9 8 , 1 9 9 ( 1 965) (p er cu ria m ); Roe v. Town of H ighl and, 909 F. 2d 1097, 10 99- 1100 ( 7th Ci r. 19 90); se e Wi e s m ue l l e rv. Kos ob uc ki, 51 3 F
. 3d 784, 786 (7th C ir. 2008). T he re i s no p rej ud ice to Fl ying J,N o. 09
- 1883 9 b ec au se it co u ld n oth a v e as su m ed th at, i f it w on in t h e d ist ric t c ou rt, th er e w ou ld be n o a p p ea l. U ni ted S t at e s v. Am e r i c an Te l
. & Te l
. Co ., sup ra , 64 2 F
. 2d at 1294

- 95; M eek v. M et ropolit an D ade Co unty, 985 F.2 d 1471, 14 78- 80 ( 11th Cir
. 19 93) ( per c u riam ) , o ver rul ed on o ther gr ou nd s by D i l l ar d v
. Chi l t on County Com m i s s i on , 49 5 F. 3d 1324 ( 11th Cir
. 2007)
. I t’ s no t a s i fi t had i ncurr ed l i ti gat i on co sts in a r eas onabl e e xpectati on that they w oul d not be m agni fi ed by an appeal
. I t m u st have bee n as su rp rised as th e a s sociation w as w he n th e attorney g ener aldeci ded notto a p p ea l a deci si on hol ding a W i sco n sin statute unconsti tuti onal
. There was, i n shor t, no r el i an ce b y F l y i ngJo n the a tt o r ne y g en er al’ s ab an doningthe case . A lth ou gh it m igh t s ee m to follow from ou r a n a l y s is that w e s houl d rem and the ca se with di re cti ons that th e di st r i ctc ou rt gr an t th e m o ti o n t o i nt er ve ne a nd ex te nd the ti m e f o r fi l i nga no ti ce o fa ppea lfr o m the j udg m en t o n the mer i ts f o r 3 0 day s fr o m the d ate o fthe m oti on, ther e i s no poi nt i n doi ng tha t, since the as soc i ati on’ s o nl y va lid go ali n i nter veni ng was to l i ti gat e the c ase o n appeal
. A nd so to sa ve ti m e w e sh al l, l i ke the El eve nth C irc uiti n the M eekcase, treat the intervenoras the appell ant fro m the j ud gm ent o n the m er i ts an d direct briefi ng to proce ed i n th e usu al m an ne r, ex c ep t t h at th e a p p ea l w i ll be d ec id ed by th is p an el. 985 F. 2d at 1480 n . 3; see a l so Edwards v. Ci ty of Hous t on , 37 F. 3d 1097, 11 08, 11 16 ( 5th Ci r. 19 94)
. ( I nd eed, we can n ot u n d er st an d w h y t h e p ar tie s d id n otbr iefth e m er its .) The pa r ti es wi l lwantt o pa y pa rti cul ara tt en ti o n t o the10 N o. 09
- 1883 bearing on th e d istri ct cou rt’s dec isi on of Exxon Corp. v. Gove r norof

M aryl and, 437 U
. S. 117 (1978). V ACATED .

8- 20- 09