2024 UT App 16

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

JOSEPH EARL LAMB,

Appellee,

v.

SONYA ELIZABETH LAMB,

Appellant.

Opinion

No. 20210787-CA

Filed February 8, 2024

Third District Court, Salt Lake Department

The Honorable Robert P. Faust

No. 174904728

Mary Deiss Brown, Attorney for Appellant

Gregory G. Skordas, Gabriela Mena, and Allison R. 

Librett, Attorneys for Appellee

JUDGE DAVID N. MORTENSEN authored this Opinion, in which 

JUDGES RYAN M. HARRIS and AMY J. OLIVER concurred.

MORTENSEN, Judge:

¶1 Joseph Earl and Sonya Elizabeth Lamb’s divorce was 

decided at a bench trial.

1 As relevant here, Joseph was awarded 

custody of their children, ownership of a family business, and half 

the equity of the marital home. Sonya now challenges the court’s 

custody determination and the award of the business. She also 

challenges the manner in which the court determined the equity 

in the marital home. We affirm the district court’s rulings in all 

aspects.

1. Because the parties share a surname, we refer to them by their 

given names. 
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BACKGROUND2

¶2 Joseph and Sonya married in 2007 and separated in July 

2017. We address separately each of the district court’s 

determinations with which Sonya takes issue.

The Custody of the Children

¶3 Joseph and Sonya have three children, all of whom 

were minors when they divorced in August 2021. In 

November 2017, at a hearing for temporary orders, Sonya’s 

counsel told the court that Sonya had been the children’s primary 

caregiver “until recently.” Sonya also admitted that she was 

arrested in July 2017 and was facing charges for possession and 

use of drugs, but she asserted that she had “taken responsibility,” 

had “stopped using drugs,” was “sober and more than capable of 

caring for the children and continuing on as their primary 

caregiver,” and had “been attending Narcotics Anonymous and 

Al-Anon meetings.” Sonya asserted that Joseph had a “serious 

drug addiction problem.” Joseph claimed that Sonya had 

vacated the marital home shortly before her arrest, and he

revealed that he obtained a protective order against her. The court 

acknowledged the allegations both sides made against the 

other but noted that Joseph currently had the children in his care 

and was living in the marital home. The court then determined

that Joseph should maintain “custody of the children on a 

temporary basis.”

2. As addressed below, neither party’s briefs included sufficient

citations to the record. This shortcoming has necessitated us 

combing the record to establish some semblance of a background, 

something we are not obligated to do. See State v. Wright, 2019 UT 

App 66, ¶ 47 n.6, 442 P.3d 1185 (explaining the parties’ duty to cite 

the record in appellate briefs), cert. denied, 456 P.3d 391 (Utah 

2019). Accordingly, our recitation of the facts is necessarily 

minimal as we limit it to what is essential to resolve the issues on 

appeal.
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¶4 Apparently, the children remained in the temporary 

custody of Joseph until the parties’ divorce trial, where the court

received the testimony of a “reunification therapist” (Family 

Therapist), who had been hired by the parties after the custody 

evaluator had been “unable to perform an evaluation due to the 

children spending less than minimum time” with Sonya. 

¶5 Based on the testimony of Family Therapist, which we 

recount when relevant in our analysis below, the court found that 

“unification” between Sonya and the two older children was 

“lacking” because of acrimonious relationships. The court noted 

that Family Therapist had testified that progress in reunification 

therapy would “influence what possible custody” Sonya might 

have in the future relative to the older children. The court 

determined that it was “in the best interest of the children that 

reunification therapy” continue to allow Sonya the opportunity

“to reunify her relationship with the children.” 

¶6 Accordingly, the court found that it was in the children’s 

best interest that Joseph be “awarded sole physical custody and 

final decision making authority,” with both parties being 

awarded joint legal custody. With regard to the youngest child, 

the court awarded supervised parent-time to Sonya one night a 

week. The court awarded Sonya no parent-time with the older 

two children. The court noted that supervised parent-time for 

Sonya would “be flexible” and might “increase after the current 

reunification issues” and Sonya’s “medical issues” were 

addressed. The court also stated that Sonya’s “non-use of 

cannabis” needed to be verified because marijuana use was “a 

contributing factor” that brought on her mental health episodes.

The Business 

¶7 During their union, the parties were financially supported, 

at least in part, by a business that distributed supplies to gas 

stations. During the divorce proceedings, Joseph maintained that 

he was in the process of purchasing the business from his father

but that he did not have the money to pay for it. Joseph explained 
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20210787-CA 4 2024 UT App 16

that he drew a salary for his work with the business. In contrast, 

Sonya maintained that she and Joseph agreed to buy the business 

in 2010 and that they completed paying off the business in 2016. 

Sonya claimed that she and Joseph signed a document “to take 

over the business” but that she did “not have the document.” 

Sonya did produce a different document that explicitly stated the 

business was being sold only to Joseph. 

¶8 The district court awarded the business to Joseph, along 

with all its debts and obligations. In addition, the court, 

apparently recognizing that the business was possibly still owned 

by Joseph’s father, ordered that any money Joseph borrowed 

against the marital home to purchase the business would “not be 

used to reduce the total equity in the home” so as to reduce 

Sonya’s share of the home’s value. In making this award to 

Joseph, the court was clear that it was basing its decision “on the 

testimony” provided by Joseph. 

The Marital Home

¶9 Based on a Zillow estimate3 provided by Sonya, the court 

determined the value of the marital home to be $998,659, but the 

equity in the home was reduced by mortgages and liens on the 

property. Joseph testified that three mortgages, totaling $402,000, 

3. Neither party produced an appraisal of the home or an 

appraisal witness at trial, leading the court to ask the parties, 

“Does anybody have any valuation [of the home] at all?” Sonya’s 

counsel answered, “Well, we could do it [with] Zillow.” At this 

point, while in court, Sonya’s counsel looked up the value and 

reported, “According to Zillow as of today, the estimated value is 

$998,659.” No objection was lodged at trial to the court receiving 

this information. “Zillow is a commercial website that provides, 

among other things, an estimated market value for many 

residential properties.” Chaudry v. Chaudry, No. 1794, 2021 WL 

2910977, at *9 n.7 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. July 12, 2021). 
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20210787-CA 5 2024 UT App 16

were on the property.

4 And the home was additionally 

encumbered by eleven liens. Two of these liens, totaling $2,414, 

were attributed to Sonya and Joseph. The remaining nine, totaling 

$256,521, were tax liens and civil judgments incurred by the 

previous owner of the home.5

¶10 The court received evidence that when Joseph and Sonya 

purchased the home in November 2009, it was subject to some 

existing debt. Joseph testified as follows:

Counsel: “Was there anything particular about that 

purchase [of the home]?”

Joseph: “We didn’t have the credit or the means to get into 

a home at the time, so my brother is a real estate agent 

and he’s good friends with [the previous owner] and 

said, ‘Hey, this house is available. If you like it, I can 

probably get you into it.’ And so we took him up on 

that and (inaudible) that we had to take on (inaudible).”

Counsel: “So there were other debts on that house when 

you purchased it?”

Joseph: “Yes. . . . . I didn’t know about all of them at the time, 

but yes.”

Counsel: “What are those debts?”

4. This number reflected the amount owing at the time of 

separation. At the bench trial, Joseph testified that the amount was 

currently about $298,000.

5. Joseph’s counsel provided a LexisNexis report as evidence of 

the liens on the home. This report was admitted as evidence with 

no objection.
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Joseph: “There’s a lot of tax liens from [the previous owner]

throughout the years. There’s a couple of (inaudible) 

from Sonya and I, medical bills that weren’t paid. . . .” 

Counsel: “And have you paid off the tax liens? The liens on 

the house?” 

Joseph: “No.”

Thus, in a somewhat unusual arrangement, the parties appear to 

have purchased the home subject to certain liabilities, even if they 

did not know the precise extent of those liabilities. Presumably, 

these liabilities would have been offset by a reduction in the 

purchase price, making the home more affordable.

¶11 Adding the mortgages and liens together for an amount of 

$660,935, the court determined that equity in the home was 

$337,724. The court ordered Joseph to pay Sonya $168,862 as her 

share of that equity. 

¶12 Sonya appeals. 

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶13 Sonya identifies multiple ways in which she believes the 

district court erred. But “[f]or the sake of brevity,” we

“consolidate these grounds” and “set out in the opinion only so 

much . . . as we deem necessary to a decision of the questions 

involved herein.” Patterick v. Carbon Water Conservancy Dist., 145 

P.2d 503, 505 (Utah 1944), overruled on other grounds by Timpanogos

Plan. & Water Mgmt. Agency v. Central Utah Water Conservancy

Dist., 690 P.2d 562 (Utah 1984). 

¶14 Sonya first contends that the district court abused its 

discretion in making custody and parent-time decisions because 

it lacked sufficient information to make those decisions. “We 

review custody determinations deferentially, and so long as the 

district court’s discretion is exercised within the confines of the 
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20210787-CA 7 2024 UT App 16

legal standards we have set, and the facts and reasons for the 

decision are set forth fully in appropriate findings and 

conclusions, we will not disturb the resulting award.” Kingston v.

Kingston, 2022 UT 43, ¶ 20, 532 P.3d 958 (cleaned up).

¶15 Sonya next contends that the district court’s findings were 

“entirely inadequate to explain” its reasoning for awarding 

ownership of the business to Joseph. “We review the legal 

sufficiency of factual findings—that is, whether the trial court’s 

factual findings are sufficient to support its legal conclusions—

under a correction-of-error standard, according no particular 

deference to the trial court.” Brown v. Babbitt, 2015 UT App 161, 

¶ 5, 353 P.3d 1262 (cleaned up). 

¶16 Lastly, Sonya argues that the district court’s “procedures 

and decisions regarding the division of equity in the marital home 

were illogical and manifestly unjust.” “Determining and 

assigning values to marital property is a matter for the trial court, 

and an appellate court will not disturb those determinations 

absent a showing of clear abuse of discretion.” Mintz v. Mintz, 

2023 UT App 17, ¶ 12, 525 P.3d 534 (cleaned up), cert. denied, 531 

P.3d 730 (Utah 2023). 

ANALYSIS

I. A Note on Briefing

¶17 Sonya’s briefing is plagued by significant deficiencies and 

does not comply with the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure for 

appropriate briefing. First, excluding the cases cited for the 

standards of review, Sonya cites only a single case in her opening 

brief, and she does so in a perfunctory fashion—making only a 

shallow attempt to explain its relevance to the issues. Sonya 

continues this trend in her reply brief, where she cites no cases at 

all. In this regard, she falls far short of appellate expectations. “A 

party may not simply point toward a pile of sand and expect the 

court to build a castle. In both district and appellate courts, the 

development of an argument is a party’s responsibility, not a 
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20210787-CA 8 2024 UT App 16

judicial duty.” Salt Lake City v. Kidd, 2019 UT 4, ¶ 35, 435 P.3d 248; 

see also Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(8) (“The argument must explain, 

with reasoned analysis supported by citations to legal authority 

and the record, why the party should prevail on appeal.”); id. R. 

24(b)(3).

¶18 Second, in her statement of the case, Sonya fails to include 

a single citation to the record. This is in contravention of our 

clearly stated rule. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(6) (“The statement of 

the case must include, with citations to the record: (A) the facts of 

the case, to the extent necessary to understand the issues 

presented for review; (B) the procedural history of the case, to the 

extent necessary to understand the issues presented for review; 

and (C) the disposition in the court or agency whose judgment or 

order is under review.” (emphasis added)). We note that Sonya

somewhat more adequately cites the record in the argument 

section of her brief, but that is not what the Utah Rules of 

Appellate Procedure require, and by ignoring the rules to suit her 

briefing preferences, she does little to bolster judicial efficiency.6

¶19 We point out these deficiencies not to ridicule, disparage,

or shame counsel, but to provide warning that future briefing of 

this nature will likely be deemed inadequate and that any 

arguments on the merits may not be substantively considered by 

this court. This court receives hundreds of briefs each year. They 

vary in quality and in their adherence to the rules. We recognize 

that members of the bar have a lot on their plates and occasionally 

miss a typo or overlook a citation. But wholesale disregard of 

briefing rules is quite beyond the pale and can have unwelcome

6. Nor did Joseph’s counsel provide a single citation to the record

in his brief. This shortcoming is most unhelpful. While an appellee 

is not required to file a brief, see, e.g., AL-IN Partners, LLC v. 

LifeVantage Corp., 2021 UT 42, ¶ 19, 496 P.3d 76, we observe that if 

a brief is filed, it would behoove counsel to provide record 

citations. After all, and at the risk of stating the obvious, record 

citations are required because in their absence it’s difficult, and at 

times impossible, to figure out what the parties are referencing.
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20210787-CA 9 2024 UT App 16

consequences for attorneys (and their clients) who choose this 

risky path. See Ostler v. Department of Public Safety, 2022 UT App 

6, ¶ 27, 505 P.3d 1119 (“We . . . retain discretion to not address an 

argument that is inadequately briefed.” (cleaned up)); accord State

v. Schwenke, 2007 UT App 354U, para. 2; State v. Garner, 2002 UT 

App 234, ¶¶ 8–13, 52 P.3d 467. And we hasten to point out that 

the risk of ignoring briefing requirements should come as no 

surprise to any attorney in Utah owing to our multiple references 

to the issue over the years. See Trees v. Lewis, 738 P.2d 612, 612–13 

(Utah 1987) (stating that the merits of a dispute need not be 

reached if an appellant “has not supported the facts set forth in [a] 

brief with citations to the record” as required by rule 24(a)(6) of 

the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure); State v. Price, 827 P.2d 

247, 249 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (“We have routinely refused to

consider arguments which do not include a statement of the facts

properly supported by citations to the record.”); Koulis v. Standard

Oil Co. of Cal., 746 P.2d 1182, 1184 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (“If a party 

fails to make a concise statement of the facts and citation of the 

pages in the record where those facts are supported, the court will 

assume the correctness of the judgment below.”). That we have 

exercised our discretion to address the merits of the issues on 

appeal here should not be taken as an imprimatur sanctioning 

inadequate briefing but as a conduit to raise awareness of the risk 

of ignoring the rules. 

¶20 We take this occasion to recall the advice offered by our 

supreme court several decades ago:

If the questions involved in a case are of sufficient 

importance to justify asking this court to decide 

them, they are worthy of the careful consideration 

of counsel presenting them. It is the duty of 

attorneys practicing in this court to present to the 

court the authorities supporting their views and to 

assist the court in reaching a correct conclusion.

State v. Thomas, 1999 UT 2, ¶ 13, 974 P.2d 269 (cleaned up). With 

that, we remind counsel of their responsibility to assist the 
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20210787-CA 10 2024 UT App 16

judiciary in advancing jurisprudence through diligent advocacy, 

adherence to our rules, and competent representation. 

II. Custody and Parent-Time

A. Disclosure 

¶21 Sonya argues that the district court erred in admitting 

Family Therapist’s testimony when Joseph had not timely 

disclosed him as an expert witness pursuant to rule 26 of the Utah 

Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires disclosure “within 14 

days after the close of fact discovery.” Utah R. Civ. P. 26(4)(C)(i). 

Sonya’s briefing on this point leaves much to be desired. She 

entirely ignores what happened at trial, instead substituting her 

own retrospective take on what she believes should have 

happened without attempting to explain why her timeliness 

argument should now be considered. Providing some persuasive

caselaw—which may or may not exist—would have gone far to 

support her argument. But like the rest of her briefing, this part is 

inadequate.

¶22 A review of the record shows that Sonya did not object to 

Family Therapist’s testimony on the grounds of untimely

disclosure. Instead, Sonya argued that Family Therapist had “far 

exceeded any kind of mandate,” that he had not signed 

confidentiality waivers, and that allowing his testimony created 

patient privacy and ethical violations. In her objection at trial, rule 

26 was mentioned only in passing and not in a way that would 

suggest she was objecting on timeliness grounds. It certainly 

would not have been clear to opposing counsel that a rule 26 

timeliness issue was being raised such that he would have known 

to argue a harmlessness or good-cause defense for the failure to 

disclose, which would have been an easy argument to make given 

that both Joseph and Sonya had jointly retained Family Therapist

and Sonya knew about Family Therapist several years before trial.

And it would not have been clear to the district court that it was 

being asked to rule on a timeliness-based objection. For these 

reasons, Sonya did not preserve any such objection for appellate 
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20210787-CA 11 2024 UT App 16

review. See State v. Centeno, 2023 UT 22, ¶ 57, 537 P.3d 232 (“It is 

well established that we will not address the merits of an 

unpreserved issue absent a showing that an exception to the 

preservation rule applies.”).

B. Hearsay

¶23 Sonya additionally argues that Family Therapist’s 

testimony, insofar as he testified as a fact witness, “was 

inadmissible hearsay and based entirely on his conversations with 

the parties and their children as their reunification therapist.” 

Sonya’s hearsay argument is difficult to follow and poorly 

briefed. Instead of analysis in support of her hearsay argument, 

she provides scant and unsupported assertions. 

¶24 Sonya objected below to Family Therapist’s testimony on 

the grounds that it was hearsay. But the court ruled that it was not 

hearsay, concluding that Family Therapist’s testimony was not

offered “for the truth of the matter asserted.” Rather, the court 

ruled that the “focus of [the] questioning” was, first, to allow the 

court “to find out how [the children were] doing, if they’re 

capable of going forward” and, second, to identify the present 

“obstacles” to “structuring visitation with [Sonya].” On appeal, 

Sonya makes no attempt to engage with the court’s reasoning, 

instead limiting her analysis to a blanket assertion that “it [was]

evident” Family Therapist was “allowed to testify as an expert, 

offering hearsay, opinions and recommendations in [a] manner 

that simply is not permitted by the Rules of Civil Procedure.”

Such superficial and undeveloped argument is simply not 

persuasive, most especially because it does not address the 

alleged error in the court’s reasoning. It is well settled that 

appellants who fail to “address the district court’s reasoning” also 

fail to carry their “burden of persuasion on appeal.” See Federated

Cap. Corp. v. Shaw, 2018 UT App 120, ¶ 20, 428 P.3d 12; see also

Spencer v. Spencer, 2023 UT App 1, ¶ 27, 524 P.3d 165; Bad Ass Coffee

Co. of Haw. v. Royal Aloha Int’l LLC, 2020 UT App 122, ¶ 48, 473 

P.3d 624.
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20210787-CA 12 2024 UT App 16

C. Custody Factors

¶25 Sonya next argues that the court did not address the 

custody factors outlined in section 30-3-10 of the Utah Code, 

making its custody findings insufficient. More specifically, Sonya 

argues that the court’s factual findings were deficient due to the 

court’s reliance on the testimony of Family Therapist in making 

those findings.

¶26 Section 30-3-10 states that in “determining any form of 

custody and parent-time . . . , the court shall consider the best 

interest of the child and may consider . . . other factors the court 

finds relevant,” including factors for each parent articulated in the 

code. Utah Code § 30-3-10(2) (emphasis added). These factors a 

court may consider are “not on equal footing.” Hudema v.

Carpenter, 1999 UT App 290, ¶ 26, 989 P.2d 491. Instead, “it is 

within the trial court’s discretion to determine, based on the facts 

before it and within the confines set by the appellate courts, where 

a particular factor falls within the spectrum of relative importance 

and to accord each factor its appropriate weight.” Id. (emphasis 

added). “And where significant evidence concerning a particular 

factor is presented to the district court, findings that omit all 

discussion of that evidence must be deemed inadequate.” 

Twitchell v. Twitchell, 2022 UT App 49, ¶ 21, 509 P.3d 806. Thus, to 

“ensure that the trial court’s custody determination, discretionary 

as it is, is rationally based, it is essential that the court set forth in 

its findings of fact not only that it finds one parent to be the better 

person to care for the child, but also the basic facts which show 

why that ultimate conclusion is justified.” Id. ¶ 24 (cleaned up).

¶27 Here, the factors about which the court received significant 

evidence concerned Sonya’s ability to function as a parent, which 

the court received as testimony from Family Therapist. As we 

have explained above, Sonya’s challenges to the admissibility of 

Family Therapist’s testimony fail, and we accordingly conclude 

that the district court acted well within its discretion in relying on 

his testimony. 
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20210787-CA 13 2024 UT App 16

¶28 Regarding Sonya’s ability to parent the two older children, 

Family Therapist testified that they were “very angry” with Sonya 

and “announced that they would never see or talk to her again.”

Their anger was due to their religious sensibilities and Sonya’s

announcement that she was pregnant by a man other than their 

father during the pendency of the divorce.

¶29 With regard to Sonya’s parenting, Family Therapist stated 

that the youngest child was very frightened after “his last visit 

with [Sonya] when she was struggling psychiatrically.”

Moreover, Family Therapist also testified the youngest child was 

beginning to see himself as Sonya’s “partner,” resulting in the 

child “becoming parentified.”7

¶30 Family Therapist further indicated that while he was 

unaware of Sonya’s “current condition or functioning,” Sonya 

had been “hospitalized and diagnosed with some issues.” He 

asserted that “safety” needed to be addressed, meaning that 

Sonya required a psychiatric evaluation to demonstrate that her 

“situation” was “under control.” He also indicated that Sonya 

needed to work on “being forthright with medications.” Sonya, 

by her own admission, had “suffered an isolated manic episode” 

related to bipolar disorder and “called the police for assistance” 

because she was suffering from “visual and auditory 

hallucinations.”

¶31 Sonya’s briefing on this point misses the mark because it 

entirely relies on the assumption that Family Therapist’s 

testimony was inadmissible, an assumption we conclude is

7. “Parentification is often referred to as growing up too fast. 

Typically, it occurs when a child takes on parental responsibility 

for their siblings or even their parents, taking care of a sibling or 

parent physically, mentally, or emotionally. This can damage a 

child’s mental well-being and lead to long-term mental health 

conditions such as depression and anxiety.” Amber Felton, What 

Is Parentification, Web MD, https://www.webmd.com/parenting

/what-is-parentification [https://perma.cc/N6TT-Y7QN].
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without foundation. See supra ¶¶ 21–24. She does not explain why, 

in light of Family Therapist’s admissible testimony, the court’s 

consideration of the statutory custody factors was insufficient. 

Sonya’s briefing makes no attempt to explain why the court is not 

allowed to rely on the evidence it receives when making custody 

decisions. 

¶32 Moreover, Sonya does not identify any “significant 

evidence,” see Twitchell, 2022 UT App 49, ¶ 21, as to the other 

factors in section 30-3-10 that the court received but left 

unaddressed. Instead, her briefing advances an argument that is 

entirely conclusory and unsupported by record citation or legal 

authority: 

Although § 30-3-10 gives broad discretion to the 

court as to the relevance and appropriate weight to 

give each factor, the district court in this case simply 

did not have any information that would allow it to 

make findings as to most of the statutory factors. For 

instance, the district court did not know who the 

primary caretaker of the children during the

marriage was. The district court did not know 

anything about the marriage. The district court 

would not permit any testimony relevant to 

Joseph’s moral character or his history of drug 

abuse and sexual proclivities. The Court would not 

allow any testimony as to Joseph’s inability and 

unwillingness to co-parent with Sonya. At the end 

of the day, the Court simply sidestepped its 

responsibility as an independent factfinder and 

deferred to [Family Therapist].

This might be a good argument if Sonya had supported it with 

citations to the record and to legal authority. As this argument 

stands before us, we are unable to verify what it asserts. But we 

suspect that Sonya might be indulging in hyperbole here. Indeed, 

Sonya’s assertion that “the district court did not know anything 
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about the marriage” is patently false. Our review of the record 

indicates that the court, in fact, knew quite a bit about the 

marriage, such as its financial situation, issues related to the 

children, and the problems that led to its demise, to name just a 

few topics within its familiarity. And with regard to Joseph’s 

alleged use of illegal drugs, we found only one instance

(subsequently echoed by Sonya’s attorney) in the record where 

Sonya asserted before the district court that Joseph had a “cocaine 

habit.” But the district court was free to “disregard such testimony 

if it [found] the evidence self-serving and not credible,” since the 

factfinder “is in the best position to judge the credibility of

witnesses.” See Clark v. Clark, 2023 UT App 111, ¶ 37, 537 P.3d 633 

(cleaned up). An isolated allegation made in passing certainly 

does not amount to “significant evidence,” see Twitchell, 2022 UT 

App 49, ¶ 21, especially given the district court’s role as the 

factfinderto judge the credibility of witnesses, see Ouk v. Ouk, 2015 

UT App 104, ¶ 14, 348 P.3d 751. And as to the other statutory 

custody factors that Sonya asserts the court left unaddressed, she 

has not pointed us to any significant evidence that the court 

received with respect to those factors. 

¶33 Thus, unlike the situation in Twitchell, where we concluded 

“that the district court exceeded its discretion by failing to include 

in its findings any discussion of the evidence relating to the abuse 

allegations against [the mother], her alleged neglect of [the child,] 

and her moral character, as well as the effect that evidence had on 

its best-interest analysis,” see 2022 UT 49, ¶¶ 22–23, 25, here there 

simply wasn’t significant evidence presented regarding section 

30-3-10’s other custody factors. This lack of evidence—insofar as 

there was a lack—was not the court’s fault; it was Sonya’s fault 

for not presenting it. After all, a court cannot be faulted for failing 

to consider evidence that was not presented to it. In contrast,

given the substantial evidence the court did receive about the 

serious mental health issues Sonya faced, we conclude that the 

district court did not abuse its discretion in its consideration of the 

statutory factors when determining that awarding physical 

custody to Joseph was in the best interest of the children. 
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¶34 In sum, Sonya has failed to show that the district court 

abused its discretion in accepting and relying on the testimony of 

Family Therapist in making custody determinations or that the 

district court did not properly address the statutory factors in 

determining custody of the children. 

III. Ownership of the Business

¶35 Both parties agree that the district court concluded that the 

business was not a joint marital asset. The district court awarded 

the business to Joseph “[b]ased on [Joseph’s] testimony.” Along 

with awarding the business to Joseph, the court stated that Joseph 

was “responsible for payment of the purchase price of the 

business.”

¶36 Sonya’s briefing on this point is challenging because it 

consists largely of recounting financial matters pertaining to the 

marriage but unrelated to the ownership of the business. She then

asserts, with no discernible effort to explain why, that the 

“findings/conclusions were entirely inadequate to explain the 

Court’s reasoning for giving ownership” of the business to 

Joseph. Her argument is difficult to follow, but its essence, insofar 

as we can tell, appears to be that the court erred in believing 

Joseph’s testimony over hers. 

¶37 We disagree with Sonya that the court erred in crediting 

Joseph’s testimony regarding the ownership of the business over 

Sonya’s. Again, the court stated in its factual findings that its 

award of the business to Joseph was “[b]ased on [his] testimony.” 

In making this credibility determination, the court acted well 

within its discretion. “[W]here there exists evidence sufficient to 

support a court’s rulings regarding a divorcing couple’s finances, 

that ruling will be upheld on appeal, even if evidence was 

presented that might have cut the other way.” Clarke v. Clarke, 

2023 UT App 160, ¶ 27. This is because “the fact-finder is in the 

best position to judge the credibility of witnesses and is free to 

disbelieve their testimony. Even where testimony is 

uncontroverted, a trial court is free to disregard such testimony if 
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20210787-CA 17 2024 UT App 16

it finds the evidence self-serving and not credible.” Ouk v. Ouk, 

2015 UT App 104, ¶ 14, 348 P.3d 751 (cleaned up); see also Kimball 

v. Kimball, 2009 UT App 233, ¶ 20 n.5, 217 P.3d 733 (“[I]t is the trial 

court’s singularly important mission to consider and weigh all the 

conflicting evidence and find the facts.”). 

¶38 Here, the district court was in the best position to judge the 

credibility of the parties. It clearly found Joseph’s testimony 

regarding the ownership of the business to be more credible. 

Sonya has provided no reasoned argument—apart from her 

assertion that she disagrees with it—as to why the district court’s 

conclusion that the business was not marital property was 

erroneous. Accordingly, Sonya has failed to meet her “burden on 

appeal to show that no reasonable person would take the view 

adopted” by the district court, and we therefore conclude that the 

district court did not err in awarding the business, along with its 

liabilities, to Joseph. See Ouk, 2015 UT App 104, ¶ 14.8

IV. Equity in the Marital Home

¶39 Sonya’s final claim is that the district court abused its 

discretion in dividing equity in the marital home. “In divorce 

8. Sonya also argues that the district court violated her 

constitutional due process rights by its “ongoing interference” 

with her counsel’s presentation of her case. Quite frankly, apart 

from a litany of complaints about the court requiring counsel to 

keep her questioning relevant, the contours of her argument on 

appeal are difficult to discern, and she fails to cite a single case in 

support of the argument. Accordingly, we decline to consider her 

due process argument because it is inadequately briefed. See Utah 

R. App. P. 24(a)(8) (“The argument must explain, with reasoned 

analysis supported by citations to legal authority and the record, 

why the party should prevail on appeal.”); see also Orlando

Millenia, LC v. United Title Services of Utah, Inc., 2015 UT 55, ¶ 30 

n.3, 355 P.3d 965 (“The briefing on this claim . . . is inadequate. 

[The appellant’s] briefing on this issue fails to cite any authority

and makes no attempt to connect the law to the facts of this case.”).
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20210787-CA 18 2024 UT App 16

actions, a district court is permitted considerable discretion in 

adjusting the financial and property interests of the parties, and 

its actions are entitled to a presumption of validity.” Gardner v. 

Gardner, 2019 UT 61, ¶ 18, 452 P.3d 1134 (cleaned up). Thus, in 

such proceedings, 

we will reverse only if (1) there was a 

misunderstanding or misapplication of the law 

resulting in substantial and prejudicial error; (2) the 

factual findings upon which the award was based 

are clearly erroneous; or (3) the party challenging 

the award shows that such a serious inequity has 

resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion. 

Because we can properly find abuse only if no 

reasonable person would take the view adopted by 

the trial court, appellants have a heavy burden to 

show that an alleged error falls into any of these 

three categories. 

Id. (cleaned up).

¶40 Sonya’s claim focuses on three aspects of the court’s 

valuation of the home: (1) the mortgage amount, (2) the use of the 

Zillow estimate, and (3) the amount of the liens on the home. We 

address each in turn. 

¶41 The Mortgage Amount. Sonya complains that the district 

court, based on Joseph’s testimony, should have used $298,000 as 

the amount owing on the mortgages rather than $402,000, an 

adjustment that would have benefitted her by increasing the 

equity she would have received. “Generally, the marital estate is 

valued at the time of the divorce decree or trial. However, in the 

exercise of its equitable powers, a trial court has broad discretion

to use a different date, such as the date of separation, when 

circumstances warrant. If the trial court uses a date other than the 

date of the divorce decree, it must support its decision with 

sufficiently detailed findings of fact explaining its deviation from 

the general rule.” Rothwell v. Rothwell, 2023 UT App 50, ¶ 39, 531 
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20210787-CA 19 2024 UT App 16

P.3d 225 (cleaned up), cert. denied, 537 P.3d 1011 (Utah 2023). In 

response to Sonya’s motion for amended findings, the court 

explained, “[Joseph’s] statement of the mortgage balance of 

$298,000 was referring to the total amount of all three (3) 

mortgages. The Court also took that into evidence taking into 

account that it was [Joseph’s] best estimate according to what his 

monthly mortgage payments are and how much was deducted 

from the principal each month.” We understand this to mean that 

the court took into consideration that it was through Joseph’s 

extraordinary post-separation payment efforts that the mortgage 

amount had been reduced. Moreover, Sonya concedes in her reply 

brief that it was within the district court’s discretion to use the 

earlier mortgage total. Accordingly, we see no abuse of discretion 

in the court’s use of the date of the separation to determine the 

amount of the mortgages.

¶42 The Zillow Estimate. Sonya next complains that the home 

should have been valued at about $260,000 more than was 

indicated by the Zillow estimate the court used. The glaring 

problem with this aspect of Sonya’s complaint is that it was her 

counsel’s idea to use the Zillow estimate. In open court, her 

counsel looked up the estimate and announced it to the court. And

the court proceeded to base its calculations on the very data 

Sonya’s counsel supplied. We simply will not countenance

Sonya’s assertion that the district court erred in proceeding to use 

the estimate that Sonya herself, through counsel, provided. Sonya 

invited any error in this regard. See Somer v. Somer, 2020 UT App 

93, ¶ 14, 467 P.3d 924 (“Where a party makes an affirmative 

representation encouraging the court to proceed without further 

consideration of an issue, an appellate court does not consider the 

party’s objection to that action on appeal.” (cleaned up)). In her 

briefing on appeal, Sonya points to nothing in the record that 

would have allowed the court to value the home using anything 

other than the Zillow estimate. Sonya does not challenge that the 

court acted on the only information it had and that Sonya herself 

provided. Accordingly, “given the absence of any expert financial 

testimony, . . . the paucity of assistance the parties offered the 

court,” and the representations made by Sonya’s counsel 
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20210787-CA 20 2024 UT App 16

regarding the marital home’s value, we conclude that “the court 

in this instance made findings within its discretion and supported 

by the evidence it was given.” Clarke v. Clarke, 2023 UT App 160, 

¶ 55.

¶43 The Liens. Sonya argues that the district court abused its

discretion in counting third-party liens against the equity in the 

home. Given the evidence the court received, we see no error on 

the part of the court in this regard. Indeed, there was evidence to 

support the court’s determination that the third-party liens 

should be included in the calculation of the home’s equity. Joseph 

testified that when he and Sonya purchased the home, they did so 

knowing that they were assuming responsibility for some of the 

previous owner’s debts. This is an admittedly odd arrangement, 

but Joseph testified that they were willing to accept it because they 

were not in a financial position to purchase the home otherwise. 

Sonya offered no testimony or other evidence to contradict 

Joseph’s assertion, and she still points to nothing presented at trial 

that contradicted this evidence. Accordingly, we conclude that the 

factual findings that included the liability associated with the 

third-party liens were not clearly erroneous and that the court did 

not abuse its discretion in calculating the home’s equity. 

CONCLUSION

¶44 Sonya has not demonstrated that the district court abused 

its discretion in its custody determination, in awarding the 

business to Joseph, or in its division of equity in the marital home. 

Affirmed.