alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 95-7366
ROY DAVID PILKENTON, Plaintiff - Appellant, versus DAVID K. SMITH, Warden; DOCTOR ROSTRAFENSKI, Psychologist; LOUISE DIXON, Medical Department Supervisor; ELIZABETH WAGNER, LPN; AMY WOOTEN, LPN, Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at Roanoke. J ames C. Turk, District Judge. (CA-94-116-R) Submitted: December 14, 1995 Decided: January 17, 1996 Before ERVIN, Chief Judge, and WIDENER and WILKINS, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Roy David Pilkenton, Appellant Pro Se. Mark Ralph Davis, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia; Leigh Thompson Hanes, Peter Duane Vieth, WOOTEN & HART, P.C., Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellees. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: Appellant appeals from the district court's order granting judgment as a matter of law for the Defendants after a bench trialon Appellant's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) claim that they were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. We have reviewed the record and the district court's opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court. Pilk enton v. Smith , No. CA-94-116-R (W.D. Va. Aug. 22, 1995). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
#### GERALD WOOD and VIRGINIA WOOD, Appellants, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Respondent.

No. 18522

December 27, 1988

766 P.2d 269

*Joseph P. Reynolds,*Reno, for Appellants.

*Georgeson, McQuaid, Thompson & Angaran,*Reno, for Respondent.

2

The Honorable David Zenoff, Senior Justice, participated in this appeal in the place of Chief Justice E. M. Gunderson pursuant to this court’s general order of assignment filed September 14, 1988.

OPINION

*Per Curiam:*

On August 1, 1981, Mr. Raul Raya caused an automobile accident in which appellants were injured. Raya held a State Farm automobile insurance policy which provided third-party liability coverage on the car he was driving at the time of the accident. State Farm paid appellants the $100,000 coverage limit under that policy.

Raya also owned two other vehicles, each of which was covered by a separate State Farm third-party liability policy. Appellants brought this action, claiming, among other things, that State Farm should have paid them the liability coverage limits under all three of Raya’s automobile insurance policies because the policies’ antistacking provisions were not “in clear language” and “prominently displayed” as required by NRS 687B. 145(1).1

*736The district court correctly determined that NRS 687B. 145(1) does not apply to third-party liability coverage and granted State Farm’s motion for summary judgment on that issue.

This court has determined “that stacking of . . . automobile coverage for bodily injury liability is inappropriate.” Rando v. Calif. St. Auto. Ass’n, 100 Nev. 310, 313, 684 P.2d 501, 503 (1984). Because automobile liability coverage is not stackable, a “prominent” and “clear” policy anti-stacking provision pursuant to NRS 687B. 145(1) would serve no purpose. The statute can have meaning only when applied to insurance coverage, such as uninsured motorist coverage, which is otherwise stackable. *See*Neumann v. Standard Fire Ins., 101 Nev. 206, 699 P.2d 101 (1985). Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s grant of partial summary judgment.

Young, A. .C. J., Steffen, Springer and Mowbray, JJ., and Zenoff, Sr. J.,2 concur.

1

NRS 687B. 145(1) provides:

> Any policy of insurance or endorsement providing coverage under the provisions of NRS 690B.020 or other policy of casualty insurance *736may provide that if the insured has coverage available to him under more than one policy or provision of coverage, any recovery or benefits may equal but not exceed the higher of the applicable limits of the respective coverages, and the recovery or benefits must be prorated between the applicable coverages in the proportion that their respective limits bear to the aggregate of their limits. Any provision which limits benefits pursuant to this section must be in clear language and be prominently displayed in the policy, binder or endorsement. Any limiting provision is void if the named insured has purchased separate coverage on the same risk and has paid a premium calculated for full reimbursement under that coverage.
#### Lamont WILSON, Petitioner—Appellant, v. G.J. GUIRBINO, Warden, Respondent—Appellee.

No. 04-55711.

D.C. No. CV-03-00742-RGK.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted Feb. 7, 2005.*

Decided Feb. 11, 2005.

Lamont Wilson, Norco, CA, pro se.

Warren P. Robinson, DAG, Office of the California Attorney General, San Diego, CA, for Respondent-Appellee.

Before FERNANDEZ, GRABER, and GOULD, Circuit Judges.

*

This panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

California prisoner Lamont Wilson appeals pro se the district court’s judgment denying his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition challenging his conviction for forcible rape. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2253, and we affirm.

Wilson contends that the trial court judge’s comments on the evidence after the jury announced a deadlock violated his right to a fair trial. We conclude that the *112California Court of Appeal’s determination that the trial court did not overstep the bounds of its constitutional privilege was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States. *See*28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); *cf. Quercia v. United States,*289 U.S. 466, 469-470, 53 S.Ct. 698, 77 L.Ed. 1321 (1933).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### BLACKLEY v. BLACKLEY

No. 129 PC.

Case below: 18 N.C. App. 535.

Petition for writ of certiorari to North Carolina Court of Appeals allowed 31 August 1973.
.- :-- T..-,. 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT ,I 8. 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 

............................................................... S 

IN RE: Fosamax Products Liability : 

Lltlgation 

1:06-md-1789 (JFK) 

Order -------.--------------------------- X 

This Document Relates to: All Actions : 

--.--------.----------------.-.---- X 

JOHN F. KEENAN, United States District Judge: 

Anthony G. Brazil's application for admission pro hac 

vice is DENIED because the applicant has not submitted a 

certificate of good standing "which has been issued within thirty 

(30) days" by a court in the state to which he is a member of the 

bar, as requlred by Rule 1.3(c) of the Local Rules of the United 

States District Courts for the Southern and Eastern Districts of 

New York. 

SO ORDERED. 

Dated: New York, New York 

November LL, 2007 

JOHN F. KEENAN '. 

United States District Judge 

Case 1:07-cv-03295-JFK Document 14 Filed 11/26/2007 Page 1 of 1
Case 1:07-cv-03308-TPG     Document 29      Filed 05/14/2007     Page 1 of 2

Case 1:07-cv-03308-TPG     Document 29      Filed 05/14/2007     Page 2 of 2
**Exhibit32.1**

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO**

**18 U.S.C.SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

In connection withthe Quarterly Report of K-tel International, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Qfor the period ended March 31, 2007, as filed with the Securities and ExchangeCommission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Philip Kives, certify,pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of theSarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

1.               The Report fullycomplies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the SecuritiesExchange Act of 1934; and

2.               The informationcontained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, thefinancial condition and results of operations of the Company.

A signed originalof this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to theCompany and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities andExchange Commission or its staff upon request.
| By                                    |   /s/ PHILIP KIVES |   |
|---------------------------------------|------------------------------|--------|
| Philip Kives                          |
| President and Chief Executive Officer |
| May 14, 2007                          |

 

----
The Honorable James Maxwell Moody, United States District

1

Judge for the Eastern District of Arkansas.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

________

No. 96-3730

___________

Mary V. Meckel, *

*

Appellant, *

*

v. *

*

University of Arkansas, at *

Monticello, *

* Appeal from the United States

Appellees, * District Court for the

* Eastern District of Arkansas.

Jack Lassiter, Executive *

Vice Chancellor, * [UNPUBLISHED]

* 

Appellees, *

*

John N. Short, Chairman, *

Division of Social Sciences *

*

Appellees. *

___________

 Submitted: May 2, 1997

 Filed: May 20, 1997

___________

Before McMILLIAN, FAGG, and LOKEN, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Mary V. Meckel appeals from the final order entered in the District

Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas denying her Fed. R. Civ. P.

1

60(b)(2) motion for relief from judgment. The 
-2-

district court found that Meckel's proffered expert testimony did not

constitute newly discovered evidence which could not have been timely

discovered by due diligence. We conclude that the district court did not

abuse its discretion in denying the motion. See Mitchell v. Shalala, 48

F.3d 1039, 1041 (8th Cir. 1995) (standard of review; movant must show due

diligence, among other things). Accordingly, we affirm.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff—Appellee, v. August W. HUEBNER, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 04-30153.

D.C. No. CR-03-00046-DWM.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

*768Submitted Jan. 11, 2005.*

Decided Jan. 28, 2005.

Kris A. McLean, Office of the U.S. Attorney, Missoula, MT, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Michael Donahoe, Federal Defenders, Helena, MT, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before SCHROEDER, Chief Judge, GRABER and FISHER, Circuit Judges.

*

This panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM**

Huebner appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to a warrantless search of his trailer. Officers Burt and McDermott mistakenly searched Huebner’s Trailer # 7 in response to a 911 call reporting an overdosing woman at Unit # 7 (a cabin) in the same trailer park.

The officers’ initial search met all three of our requirements for a warrant-less emergency search. *See United States v. Cervantes,*219 F.3d 882, 888 (9th Cir.2000). First, the 911 call gave the officers reasonable grounds to believe there was an emergency at hand and an immediate need for their assistance. Second, there is no evidence that the officers’ search was primarily motivated by an intent to seize evidence. Finally, the officers made a reasonable mistake of fact in arriving at Trailer # 7 rather than Cabin #7. *Cf. Maryland v. Garrison,*480 U.S. 79, 107 S.Ct. 1013, 94 L.Ed.2d 72 (1987) (upholding search of wrong apartment where officers’ mistake of fact was reasonable given the objective facts known to them at the time). They therefore had “some reasonable ba*769sis, approximating probable cause, to associate the emergency with the area or place to be searched.” *Cervantes,*219 F.3d at *888.*

While searching Huebner’s trailer for the overdosing woman, the officers saw evidence of Huebner’s marijuana growing operation. After leaving his trailer and reporting to Cabin # 7 to check on the woman, the officers returned and obtained Huebner’s written consent for a second warrantless search of the trailer. This search was not fruit of the poisonous tree because the first search was lawful under the emergency doctrine; and, the second search was itself lawful because Huebner signed the consent form voluntarily and intelligently. *See United States v. Torres-Sanchez,*83 F.3d 1123, 1129 (9th Cir.1996).

We AFFIRM the district court’s order denying Huebner’s motion to suppress.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**UN PUBLISHED** 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 15**  **- 7566** 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

- Appellee ,

v.
REGINALD LEVI AVENT , Defendant

- Appellant

.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia , at Norfolk

. Raymond A. Jackson , District Judge. ( 2:99

- cr - 00011

- RAJ

- 1 )

Submitted : February 5 , 2016 Decided: February 25, 2016

Before KEENAN and HARRIS , Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by un published per curiam opinion

.
Reginald Levi Avent, Appellant Pro Se. Dana James Boente, Acting United States Attorney, Kevin Michael Comstock, Assistant United States Attorney, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not bindi ng precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Reginald Levi Avent appeals the district court ’ s order denying his 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (2012) motion for a sentence
reduction pursuant to U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual , App. C. Amend. 782 (2015) . We have reviewed the record and find no
reversible error because Amendment 782 is not applicable to sentences, such as Avent’s sentence, derived from the career offender provisions in the Sentencing Guidelines . Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. United

States v. Avent , No. 2:99

- cr - 00011

- RAJ

- 1 (E.D. Va. Feb. 27 , 2015) . We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before th is court and argument would not aid the d ecisiona l

process.
AFFIRMED
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
COMPANY'S FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED SEPTEMBER 30, 1998, AND
IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          SEP-30-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             OCT-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1998
<CASH>                                          70,125
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  740,822
<ALLOWANCES>                                    23,808
<INVENTORY>                                  1,926,925
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             2,920,469
<PP&E>                                       2,258,443
<DEPRECIATION>                               1,015,809
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               4,578,383
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<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 4,578,383
<SALES>                                      5,002,489
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             5,002,489
<CGS>                                        2,623,271
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                2,623,271
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             3,801,497
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              55,916
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (1,453,544)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                        (1,453,544)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
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<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                               (1,453,544)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (.52)
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</TABLE>
Exhibit 99


                CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                    AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE
                           SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


         In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Jaclyn, Inc.
(the "Company") for the fiscal quarter ended December 31, 2002 (the "Report"),
the undersigned each hereby certifies that: (1) the Report fully complies with
the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, as amended; and (2) the information contained in the Report fairly
presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of
operations of the Company.



Dated: February 13, 2003                    /s/ Robert Chestnov
                                            ----------------------------------
                                            Robert Chestnov, President
                                            (Chief Executive Officer)


Dated: February 13, 2003                    /s/ Anthony Christon
                                            ----------------------------------
                                            Anthony Christon, Chief Financial
                                            Officer

                                       24
**Exhibit 32.2**

 

**CERTIFICATIONPURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

 

In connection with theQuarterly Report of K-tel International, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q forthe period ended September 30, 2003, as filed with the Securities and ExchangeCommission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Dennis Ward, Chief FinancialOfficer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adoptedpursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

 

1.               The report fully complies with therequirement of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;and

 

2.               The information contained in the Reportfairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and resultsof operations of the Company.

 

A signed original of thiswritten statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the Company andwill be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and ExchangeCommission or its staff upon request.

 

 
| By                                                                   |   /s/  DENNIS WARD |   |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------|--------|
| Dennis Ward                                                          |
| *Chief Financial Officer (principal financial officer)and  Director* |
| November 14,  2003                                                   |

 

----
```

[Congressional Bills 111th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 5341 Referred in Senate (RFS)]

111th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 5341

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             July 26, 2010

Received; read twice and referred to the Committee on Homeland Security 
                        and Governmental Affairs

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 
 To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located 
at 100 Orndorf Drive in Brighton, Michigan, as the ``Joyce Rogers Post 
                           Office Building''.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. JOYCE ROGERS POST OFFICE BUILDING.

    (a) Designation.--The facility of the United States Postal Service 
located at 100 Orndorf Drive in Brighton, Michigan, shall be known and 
designated as the ``Joyce Rogers Post Office Building''.
    (b) References.--Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document, 
paper, or other record of the United States to the facility referred to 
in subsection (a) shall be deemed to be a reference to the ``Joyce 
Rogers Post Office Building''.

            Passed the House of Representatives July 22, 2010.

            Attest:

                                            LORRAINE C. MILLER,

                                                                 Clerk.
```
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Federal Maritime Commission

Notice is hereby given that the following applicants have filed with the Federal Maritime Commission an application for license as a Non-Vessel—Operating Common Carrier and Ocean Freight Forwarder—Ocean Transportation Intermediary pursuant to section 19 of the Shipping Act of 1984 as amended (46 U.S.C. app. 1718 and 46 CFR part 515). 

Persons knowing of any reason why the following applicants should not receive a license are requested to contact the Office of Transportation Intermediaries, Federal Maritime Commission, Washington, DC 20573.

Non-Vessel—Operating Common Carrier Ocean Transportation Intermediary Applicants 

Ambiorix Cargo Express, Inc., 1416 Fulton Avenue, Bronx, NY 10456. Officers: Victor Rodriguez, President, (Qualifying Individual); Ambiorix Rodriguez, Secretary. 

Atlantic Freight Services, Inc., 1068 Road, 28 Ports Zone Pueblo Viejo, San Juan, PR 00920. Officer: Ruben A. Rodriguez, President, (Qualifying Individual). 

Ocean Freight Forwarder—Ocean Transportation Intermediary Applicant 

JK Trading, Inc. dba Envios, 1756 SW 8th Street, Suite #207, Miami, FL 33135, Officers: Karen Duarte, President, (Qualifying Individual); Herbeth F. Duarte, Vice President. 

Dated: November 10, 2005. 

Bryant L. VanBrakle, 

Secretary. 

[FR Doc. 05-22745 Filed 11-15-05; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 6730-01-P