Filed 4/28/22 In re Camryn E. CA6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

In re CAMRYN E., et al., Persons Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

 H049340

 (Santa Clara County Super. Ct. 

 Nos. 20JD026677, 20JD026678, 

 20JD026679)

SANTA CLARA COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY AND 

CHILDREN’S SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

JAIME P.,

Defendant and Appellant.

Jaime P. (mother) appeals from a juvenile court order removing three of her 

children from her custody pursuant to a petition filed by the Santa Clara County 

Department of Family and Children’s Services (department) under Welfare and 

Institutions Code section 387.

1

 She contends the court erred in ordering the children 

removed. In particular, she argues there was insufficient evidence the children would 

1 Unspecified statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code. 
2

face substantial harm if left in her custody, and the court should have ordered alternative 

measures short of removal.

For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the order. 

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

These dependency proceedings involve three of mother’s children2: Five-year-old 

Camryn, four-year-old Liliana, and two-year-old Scarlet (together, children).3 The 

children’s father, David E., was incarcerated at the start of the dependency proceedings in 

October 2020 but was released from prison in March 2021. The court has since placed 

the children in father’s custody. He is not a party to this appeal. 

A. Department Involvement with Family Prior to Jurisdictional Proceedings

Prior to the dependency, the department had investigated a number of referrals 

related to mother’s household and had provided services to her.

Following a substantiated claim of general neglect in July 2019, mother agreed to 

participate in a voluntary family maintenance program and received informal services 

and support from the department which included child and family team meetings to 

discuss concerns and mental health services for mother. Mother engaged in mental health 

services, met with a psychiatrist, and took medication for her symptoms of anxiety and 

depression. The children also received services and entered full-time daycare. The 

department closed the case in May 2020.

In January 2020, the department substantiated a report of general neglect and 

physical abuse that included a suspicious mark on Liliana’s wrist. Mother agreed to 

extend voluntary family maintenance services for another three months “to improve 

parenting and existing mental health symptoms.”

2 To protect their privacy, we refer to the children as Camryn E. (Camryn), Liliana 

E. (Liliana), and Scarlet E. (Scarlet). (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.401(a)(2).)

3 Mother has an older child (born in 2008) with a different father. At the time of 

the dependency proceedings she did not have physical custody of that child, and he is not 

a subject of these dependency proceedings. 
3

In the summer of 2020, the department received and investigated a number of 

additional reports of mother’s general neglect of the children. In September 2020, the 

department held a child and family team meeting and mother agreed to participate in 

informal supervision services. Mother agreed to, inter alia, participate in parent 

education and therapy, have the children enrolled in “First Five” and receive a public 

health nurse, have the children receive counseling through First Five or another agency, 

and “not grab or squeeze the children to gain their attention.”

Shortly thereafter, on October 16, 2020, law enforcement placed the children into 

protective custody following allegations of physical abuse and a report that Liliana (then 

three years old) had a visible handprint bruise on her buttocks. Mother later admitted that

she had spanked the children with her hand because they would not go to sleep. Mother

told the social worker she was remorseful for having spanked the children and was 

working with her therapist on better ways to parent the children. She also reported she 

was diagnosed with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder and had used marijuana since 

high school to help her focus.

Mother reported she was receiving psychiatric care, had begun psychiatric 

treatment in 2009, took medication and that, when she did not take her medication, she 

became angered more easily and would have “extreme ‘ups and downs.’ ” Mother stated

that her mother, the children’s maternal grandmother, had moved into mother’s home for 

additional parenting support. Mother described her relationship with maternal 

grandmother as “stable and loving.”

B. Jurisdictional and Early Dispositional Proceedings

On October 20, 2020, the department filed juvenile dependency petitions under 

section 300, alleging that mother had neglected and failed to protect the children. After 

the initial hearing, mother participated in a child and family team meeting to discuss 

safety measures were the children to return to her care. Mother agreed to a safety plan

that included attending therapy, completing a parenting without violence class, and 
4

receiving as-needed respite care from her support persons, which included maternal 

grandmother. Maternal grandmother agreed to be part of the safety plan and to “coparent the children” with mother and to report any child safety concerns to the 

department. In November 2020, the juvenile court authorized the department to release 

the children to mother. 

On December 15, 2020, the juvenile court conducted a jurisdictional and 

dispositional hearing on amended section 300 petitions for the three children. Mother did 

not contest jurisdiction and disposition; the juvenile court found it had jurisdiction over 

the children and declared them dependents of the court. The juvenile court adopted the 

department’s recommendation that the children remain in mother’s custody and that she 

receive family maintenance services. The court also ordered a case plan.

Mother’s case plan required her to participate in counseling or psychotherapy 

focused on the effects of trauma and physical abuse on the children and to complete both 

a 16-week parenting without violence class and a certified 52-week child abuser’s 

treatment program. 

C. Case Plan Progress

Mother completed several aspects of her case plan. She attended a parent 

orientation class, participated in individual therapy and a domestic violence support 

group, and completed a substance abuse assessment. However, at the time of the relevant 

evidentiary hearings in August 2021, she had not begun the 52-week children abuser’s

treatment program.

D. Additional Incidents and Supplemental Petition Under Section 387

Following the jurisdiction and disposition hearing and while under family 

maintenance, mother continued to struggle with parenting the children. The department 

facilitated multiple child and family meetings to address concerns with mother’s anger, 

yelling at the children, and conflicts in her household. In April 2021, mother disclosed

she had spanked Camryn because the kids were “ ‘acting up,’ ” and Camryn did not listen 
5

when mother tried to redirect her. This incident resulted in a 10-day referral; the 

allegation of physical abuse was assessed to be inconclusive.

While maternal grandmother was supposed to be a support person for mother, 

mother and maternal grandmother had conflicts that included physical violence. Mother 

reported that maternal grandmother had physically abused her in front of the children on 

at least two occasions. 

On July 1, 2021,

4

an incident occurred at mother’s home that caused the police to 

take the children into protective custody. While the timeline and details of the events are 

not entirely clear, it is undisputed that mother was at home, and the children were 

agitated. Mother made attempts to cool down, which included placing the younger 

children, Liliana and Scarlet, with a next-door neighbor. Mother returned to the home 

with four-year-old Camryn. The situation escalated to the point that mother took a large 

kitchen knife and used it to stab and rip apart Camryn’s teddy bears while Camryn

watched. There were no reports that mother had threatened to harm Camryn. Mother 

later reported Camryn had been very upset and crying and saying “ ‘no, no, my bear.’ ” 

Mother admitted to stabbing a second bear and had also ripped up “Camryn’s fancy doll.”

Regarding whether the other two children were present when mother took out the 

knife, Camryn later told the social worker that “Lili and Scarlet were there when she 

smacked [her] mother but not when the mother stabbed the teddy bears.” Mother’s 

neighbor stated to the department that Scarlet and Liliana were in neighbor’s home 

“when the mother stabbed the bears.” Liliana reported (on July 16) to the social worker 

that “Camryn was yelling at mommy when the mother was stabbing the bears and 

Camryn was crying,” which suggests that Liliana may have been present. 

While two other persons (maternal grandmother and a friend of mother’s named 

Jason) were present in mother’s home during the stabbing of the bears, they did not 

4 Unless otherwise indicated, all dates occurred in 2021. 
6

intervene. According to mother, neither person thought what mother was doing was 

wrong. Maternal grandmother later explained to a social worker that mother had acted 

appropriately as she had been trying to explain consequences and accountability to 

Camryn, but “ ‘unfortunately [mother] selected a very bad example.’ ” 

Mother called father a number of times on July 1, and father testified at trial that

mother showed him the teddy bears in a video call. He also recalled seeing Camryn 

crying and laying in a fetal position and observed that mother was distressed and 

overwhelmed. Concerned, father called the social worker, who in turn called the police. 

Law enforcement arrived at the home and noted mother appeared to have great 

difficulty in controlling her children and her emotions. The police incident report stated

that mother admitted to having spanked the children two months earlier. According to 

the incident report as summarized by the department, the officer who spoke to mother

became “immediately concerned with the children’s welfare.” The officer “feared that 

the mother’s violent actions might turn towards the children” and also “feared that the 

mother’s extreme emotions would play a part in her reacting violently towards [the]

children.” Law enforcement placed the children into temporary protective custody. 

The assigned Court Appointed Special Advocate (CASA) for the children, who 

had a scheduled visit on the day of the incident, arrived at the home and saw “[two] big 

stuffed animals on the floor ripped apart” and observed that mother was blaming Camryn 

and pushing Camryn away when Camryn tried to hug mother. 

An emergency response social worker met with mother outside her home on July 1 

and noted that mother had difficulty controlling her emotions and went from being 

hysterical and upset to calm. Mother admitted to the emergency response social worker 

that she yelled and screamed at the children “on a daily basis” as she struggled to parent 

the children. Mother also reported she was trying to teach Camryn a “lesson” by ripping 

the stuffed animals open “in front of the children.” Mother reported she had hit the 

children in the past, but had not resorted to physical discipline “in over two months.”
7

At an emergency child and family team meeting the next day (July 2), mother 

blamed father and Camryn for mother’s behavior. Mother acknowledged that she 

struggled with anger management, marijuana use, and lack of accountability. While 

Mother denied spanking the children, she admitted that she “was still yelling at them 

almost on a daily basis.” The department asked mother what other supportive services 

she needed. Mother “reported that she has everything in place and has the support she 

needs also.” 

On July 2, the emergency response social worker reported that the police 

department had stated that it was “impossible” to make a safety plan due to “mother’s 

action of taking the knife out” and her changing moods. 

On July 3, the case social worker again spoke with mother. Mother told the social 

worker that she knew it was wrong to stab the teddy bears but denied her actions 

stemmed from anger. Rather, mother explained that her actions were due only to 

Camryn’s decision to hit mother and the emotional pain mother felt as a result. In a later 

conversation with the social worker, mother reported she had “ ‘snapped’ ” because she 

had not slept in two days and believed her medication had not been helping her to 

regulate her emotions. According to a later report by the social worker, mother had 

explained that she had “wanted to teach [Camryn] a lesson” for Camryn having slapped 

mother in the face. 

On July 6, the Department filed a supplemental petition under section 387 seeking 

to remove the children from mother’s custody. The petition alleged that the previous 

disposition had not been effective in protecting the children. The petition set forth two 

grounds for removal, alleging that (1) the children were at substantial risk of suffering 

serious physical and emotion harm in mother’s care “due to [] mother’s volatile 

behavior”; and (2) mother’s violent behavior and inability to regulate her emotions placed 

the children at substantial risk of serious physical and emotional harm in her care. 
8

The juvenile court held a hearing on the section 387 petition in early July. The 

court found the department established a prima facie case that the children were 

described by section 387 and detained the children from mother and ordered visitation. 

The trial court set the jurisdiction and disposition hearing on the section 387 petitions for 

July 28. 

In anticipation of the section 387 jurisdiction and disposition hearing, the 

department submitted a report dated July 28 (July 28 report). In that report, the 

department observed that mother expressed love for the children, had been cooperative 

with department, had maintained communication with the social worker, was engaging in 

weekly therapy, and had acknowledged she had made mistakes in the July 1 incident. 

The July 28 report noted that in the previous six months there had been multiple 

child and family team meetings to develop a safety plan to deal with mother’s anger 

issues, her continual yelling at the children, the conflicts between mother and maternal 

grandmother, and the July 1 incident. However, the department had not been able to 

develop an appropriate or effective safety plan with the mother. The assigned CASA 

described that in her few visits to the home she had observed that “mother can get ‘very 

angry quickly and anything sets her up.’ ”

The report noted that, on July 16, Liliana (then three years old) had reported that 

mother and grandmother frequently would fight and scream. She also stated that mother 

still spanked her and Camryn and that mother spanks “really hard.” Liliana stated she 

“ ‘doesn’t feel safe’ with the mother because mother ‘always yells.’ ” 

The case social worker had interviewed mother’s neighbor on July 19. The 

neighbor reported that, on July 1, she had tried to assist mother and, at one point, 

“Camryn and the mother ‘left back home and came back really quickly, [mother] had a 

butcher knife in her hand and said that she was trying to get Camryn to feel what she was 

feeling because Camryn appeared to be careless.’ ”
9

In the July 28 report, the department opined that mother had not made enough 

progress for the children to remain safely in her care. The report noted that “[m]ost 

recently the mother reported that she was feeling that her current medication was no 

longer working for her and she was also noticing her emotions being more difficult to 

regulate.” The social worker observed that mother “is very reactive and becomes easily 

triggered by the children and their behavior even while they spend most of their time in 

daycare during the week.” The social worker noted that the children “have continued to 

be exposed to the mother’s emotional outbursts, anger, [and] physical and verbal 

arguments between the mother and the maternal grandmother.” The social worker stated 

her concerns that mother’s inability to regulate her own emotions was “traumatiz[ing] 

and trigger[ing]” to the children, who were “showing aggressive behaviors toward others 

as a result of the conduct of the mother.” 

The social worker had ongoing concerns about mother’s parenting skills and 

anger, which manifested in physical abuse of the children (leaving marks on their 

bottoms from spanking them) and, most recently, the violent stabbing of Camryn’s 

stuffed animals. The social worker was “extremely concerned for the children’s 

emotional well-being, as it seems that they have normalized this type of parenting from 

the mother and have continued to act out.” Furthermore, the social worker was 

concerned that the children’s posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and behavioral 

challenges would “intensify” if they continued to be exposed to mother’s negative 

parenting behaviors. 

The department recommended that the juvenile court remove the children from 

mother’s care and place them with father on a plan of family maintenance. It further 

recommended mother receive family reunification services. 

E. Evidentiary Hearings and August 5, 2021 Rulings

The juvenile court conducted a two-day contested jurisdictional and dispositional 

hearing on the section 387 supplemental petition (on August 4 and August 5), and, on 
10

August 5, it issued the ruling that mother now challenges. The juvenile court admitted 

into evidence both the July 28 report and a letter from mother’s therapist generally 

reporting mother’s progress and positive engagement in therapy services. The court also 

heard testimony from a department social worker, mother, father, mother’s next-door 

neighbor, and maternal grandmother. 

1. Testimony

Department social worker Daisy Reyna, the family’s case worker, testified for the 

department as an expert in the provision of services in dependency cases and risk 

assessment. Reyna confirmed that Camryn and Liliana were diagnosed with PTSD in 

December 2019. Reyna testified about the progress mother had made in her case plan, 

including that mother had been engaging and progressing in therapy for almost a year and 

had completed a domestic violence program. 

However, Reyna stated that mother had yet to begin the court-ordered 52-week 

child abuser’s treatment program, although the department had made it clear that she 

needed to complete this program. 

Reyna confirmed her assessment that mother was easily upset by the children,

even though they were in daycare most of the day. Mother had recently reported that the 

medication she was taking for depression was not effective in helping her regulate her 

emotions.

A few months prior to the hearing (in April), mother had disclosed that she was 

engaging in physical discipline of the children. The children consistently reported that 

mother was still spanking them. In Reyna’s opinion, the situation with mother was 

“escalating” given the continued spankings and the recent July 1 incident. 

Mother testified that she was taking medication for depression, but she had been 

taking it for several years and it might be losing efficacy. Mother had discussed her 

medication issue with the social worker (Reyna), who had urged mother to see a 

psychiatrist. Mother had an appointment to see a psychiatrist in the near future and was 
11

open to changing her medication. Mother also admitted that she and maternal 

grandmother tended to “butt heads,” but their relationship had recently improved.

Regarding the July 1 incident, mother stated she had made a mistake in taking a 

knife to the teddy bears. She believed that the incident might not have happened if her 

“meds were working as effectively as they once were.” Mother also noted she was sleepdeprived and struggling with physical pain (which she attributed to cysts) at the time of 

the incident. Mother said that Camryn had become “cold and callous” towards her 

minutes after they had spoken with father. Mother had picked up the kitchen knife 

because four-year-old Camryn was “literally feeling nothing,” and mother wanted her to 

“feel something.” On cross-examination by children’s counsel, mother blamed father for 

failing to intervene effectively (even though not physically present). Mother conceded 

she had been “stuck in [her] emotions.” 

Maternal grandmother testified that she continued to live with mother. Their

relationship had improved, they had had significantly fewer disagreements, and no 

serious disagreement had happened in the past month. Grandmother acknowledged she 

had not intervened during the July 1 incident, even though she later admitted that mother, 

when picking up the knife, had asked grandmother what she thought. Grandmother 

stated that she did not know why she had not intervened, other than observing she 

generally disliked confrontation as she became older and was not as “feisty” as she used 

to be. Grandmother wished she had intervened and would do so next time. 

When questioned by the juvenile court about the prior safety plan, grandmother 

conceded that the purpose of the safety plan had been for her to protect the children. The 

court questioned grandmother why circumstances would be different the next time and 

asked: “What assurances can you give that things would be different the next time?” 

Grandmother responded: “I can assure you that I would not sit there and be quiet. I 

would actually speak up and do something if something needs to be done or say 

something that needs to be said.” 
12

Mother’s next-door neighbor also testified for mother. She noted mother had 

made progress, most notably in the last three months. Neighbor also confirmed that 

mother and maternal grandmother had fought in the past when the children were present. 

Father testified that he had been out of prison for about five months and the 

children were currently in his care. He described the July 1 incident. According to 

father, mother had appeared on video chat to be “exceedingly overwhelmed,” and he had 

observed Camryn crying and lying in a fetal position. Mother had shown him what she 

had done to the teddy bears. Father hung up and called the department social worker 

(Reyna) because he was concerned about the children’s safety.

2. Juvenile Court Orders

On August 5, after considering the evidence and arguments of counsel, the 

juvenile court issued its ruling. The court acknowledged that the evidence showed 

mother had made “significant and substantial progress” since the start of the dependency. 

However, the court concluded that it would be detrimental for the children to remain with 

mother. 

The juvenile court found that there continued to be “incidents” that were 

“alarming and that need to be addressed with more services.” The court noted that 

mother continued to minimize the July 1 incident. The court also expressed concern that 

mother had not started the 52-week child abuser’s treatment program, which the court 

viewed as an essential part of the court-ordered case plan. 

The juvenile court found that mother and maternal grandmother’s relationship, 

though improving, included a history of conflict, and the court had not yet seen stability 

in that relationship. The court noted that the prior safety plan was premised on maternal 

grandmother stepping in to protect the children when necessary, but this plan had not 

been effective. The juvenile court found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the 

allegations in the supplemental petition were true and sustained the supplemental section 

387 petition. 
13

Turning to the children’s removal from mother’s custody, the juvenile court 

determined by clear and convincing evidence that the facts supported removal. The court 

stated its determination was based on mother’s inability to “parent the girls safely without 

resorting to emotional and physical abuse and without becoming emotionally 

disregulated, notwithstanding more than a year of voluntary services and court[-]ordered 

services, including mental health services.” The court further stated the evidence showed 

“verbal and physical altercations between the mother and the maternal grandmother 

within this most recent period of time, which have been witnessed by the children and 

which mother has minimized.” The court found that mother’s daily marijuana use, while 

not a dipositive factor, exacerbated the emotional and physical abuse. 

The juvenile court explained that it was concerned that mother continued to blame 

others, including father and Camryn, who was then only four years old. The court found 

that mother demonstrated a “lack of insight regarding what is necessary to keep the 

children safe” and a lack of understanding as to proper coparenting. The court also 

observed the children’s “acting out behaviors” that included “a lot of yelling appear to 

mirror the mother’s own behavior.” The court found the department made reasonable 

efforts to prevent or eliminate the need for the removal, noting the department’s provision 

of voluntary services as well as court-ordered family maintenance services.

The juvenile court adopted the department’s findings and recommendations that 

the evidence supported removal of the children from mother’s custody. The court found 

there was clear and convincing evidence that the children faced a “substantial danger” to 

their “physical health, safety, protection or physical or emotional well-being” if they were 

returned to mother and that there were no reasonable means by which to protect their

“physical and emotional health without removal.” (See § 361, subd. (c)(1).) 

Additionally, the court found by clear and convincing evidence that “one or more 

children” were “suffering severe emotional damage as indicated by anxiety, depression, 

withdrawals or untoward aggressive behavior towards themselves or others and there are 
14

no reasonable means by which to protect that emotional health without a removal.” (See 

§ 361, subd. (c)(3).)

5

Mother timely appealed. 

II. DISCUSSION

Mother contends the juvenile court’s determination that the children would face a 

substantial danger to their health and safety if returned to mother’s custody is not 

supported by substantial evidence.6 She further maintains that, even assuming there was 

a risk of danger to the children, there were reasonable means other than removal that 

could have protected the children. The department counters that substantial evidence 

supports the juvenile court’s dispositional order removing the children from mother’s 

custody.

A. Governing Law and Standard of Review 

Section 387 provides “the general procedure for removing a minor from the 

current caregiver and placing the child in a more restrictive placement.” (In re N.B.

(2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 1139, 1146.) When a section 387 petition seeks to remove a child 

from parental custody, the juvenile court applies the procedures and protections of 

section 361. (In re D.D. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 985, 990 (D.D.).) 

5 The juvenile court also determined the children could be placed with father 

pursuant to section 361.2, subdivision (b), as no showing had been made that they would 

suffer detriment from such a placement. The court ordered that the department provide 

father with supervised family maintenance services. At the contested hearing on August 

5, mother stated to the juvenile court that she did not challenge placement with father 

should the children be removed from her custody and in this appeal raises no claim as to 

the children’s placement with him. 

6 Mother’s notice of appeal appears to challenge two different aspects of the 

juvenile court’s orders. The notice does not indicate the dates of the orders she 

challenges but states that she is appealing from findings and orders of the juvenile court

(1) “[d]enying [m]other the ability to present evidence at a prima facie hearing” and (2) 

“removing children from the care of their [m]other.” On appeal, mother does not raise 

any claim related to the prima facie hearings or that she was denied the ability to present 

evidence. 
15

To remove a child from parental custody, the court must conclude that one or 

more of the several specified findings has been established by clear and convincing 

evidence. (§ 361, subd. (c); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.695(c)(1); In re V.L. (2020) 54 

Cal.App.5th 147, 154 (V.L.).) In this case, the juvenile court’s order relied on two 

circumstances listed in section 361, subdivision (c). The first is that set forth in section 

361, subdivision (c)(1): “There is or would be a substantial danger to the physical health, 

safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the minor if the minor were 

returned home, and there are no reasonable means by which the minor’s physical health 

can be protected without removing the minor from the minor’s parent’s . . . physical

custody.” (§ 361, subd. (c)(1).) This provision has been understood as permitting 

removal on “broader grounds than ‘substantial danger to the physical health.’ ” (In re 

A.R. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 1102, 1115.) Section 361, subdivision (c)(1), also permits 

removal where there is clear and convincing evidence of substantial danger to the 

emotional well-being of the child. (In re H.E. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 710, 718–722

(H.E.).) “It is not required that the parent be dangerous or that the child have been 

harmed before removal is appropriate. [Citation.] ‘The focus of the statute is on averting 

harm to the child.’ ” (D.D., supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 996.) 

The second circumstance relied upon by the juvenile court is that provided in 

section 361, subdivision (c)(3): “The minor is suffering severe emotional damage, as 

indicated by extreme anxiety, depression, withdrawal, or untoward aggressive behavior 

toward himself or herself or others, and there are no reasonable means by which the 

minor’s emotional health may be protected without removing the minor from the physical 

custody of his or her parent.” (§ 361, subd. (c)(3).)

We review a juvenile court’s dispositional order of removal for substantial 

evidence. (V.L., supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at p. 154.) Our review of the evidence 

“account[s] for the level of confidence” demanded by the clear and convincing evidence 

standard. (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 995 (O.B.); see V.L., at p. 155 
16

[concluding “that O.B. is controlling in dependency cases” and applying O.B. to removal 

findings].) 

“When reviewing a finding that a fact has been proved by clear and convincing 

evidence, the question before the appellate court is whether the record as a whole 

contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could have found it 

highly probable that the fact was true. In conducting its review, the court must view the 

record in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below and give appropriate 

deference to how the trier of fact may have evaluated the credibility of witnesses, 

resolved conflicts in the evidence, and drawn reasonable inferences from the evidence.” 

(O.B., supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 1011–1012.) Further, “[t]he appellant has the burden of 

showing there is no evidence of a sufficiently substantial nature to support the findings or 

orders.” (In re E.E. (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 195, 206 (E.E.).) 

With these principles in mind, we turn to mother’s contentions. 

B. Analysis

1. Substantial Evidence for Removal

Mother argues there was no substantial evidence to support the dispositional 

removal order because there was no “substantial danger” to the children as required under 

section 361, subdivision (c)(1). Discussing the July 1 incident when mother stabbed 

Camryn’s teddy bears, mother asserts she had been “sleep deprived and overwhelmed.” 

She maintains that this incident had not resulted in any “actual harm” to the children, was

the first time mother had resorted to such “extreme behavior,” and was prompted by 

mother’s “noble desire” to parent Camryn. She asserts it was “unreasonable to remove 

the children from mother’s custody based on this one isolated incident that was unlikely 

to recur.”

At the outset, we note that the juvenile court did not rely solely on the July 1 

incident, as mother appears to claim. Rather, the juvenile court based its ruling on a 

number of “incidents” that it viewed as “alarming.” This focus was appropriate, as the 
17

juvenile court was required to consider the totality of the circumstances. (D.D., supra, 32 

Cal.App.5th at p. 995.) 

Substantial evidence in the record supports the juvenile court’s finding of 

substantial danger to the children’s physical or emotional well-being. Such evidence 

includes mother’s yelling at and spanking of the children, her inability to control her 

emotions, and the escalating nature of mother’s reactions, including the violence of the 

July 1 incident, combined with mother’s admission that her medication was no longer 

working well to keep her mood stabilized. Moreover, it is undisputed that at the time of 

the juvenile court’s ruling mother had not started an essential part of her case plan (the 

52-week child abuser’s treatment program) and that this lack of compliance with her case 

plan put the children at risk of harm. 

While it is true that there is no evidence that mother directly threatened to harm

Camryn on July 1, and some evidence suggests the other two children were not present 

when mother stabbed the teddy bears, these circumstances are not dispositive. The 

juvenile court need not find, in order to remove a child, that the parent is dangerous and 

that the child suffered actual harm. Rather, the juvenile court’s focus must be directed to 

averting harm to the child. (In re K.B. (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 593, 605; D.D., supra, 32 

Cal.App.5th at p. 996.) 

“ ‘The trial court is in the best position to determine the degree to which a child is 

at risk based on an assessment of all the relevant factors in each case.’ ” (E.E., supra, 49 

Cal.App.5th at p. 217.) The record reveals the juvenile court carefully considered all the 

evidence before it. Given the evidence and the totality of circumstances discussed above, 

we conclude ample evidence supports the juvenile court’s determination under section 

361, subdivision (c)(1), that the children were in substantial danger. Mother cites no 

authority that convinces us the evidence presented before the juvenile court was not

sufficient to support its rulings. 
18

For these reasons, we decide the record as a whole contains substantial evidence 

“from which a reasonable fact finder could have found it highly probable” (O.B., supra, 9 

Cal.5th at p. 1011) that “[t]here is or would be a substantial danger to the physical health, 

safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the minor if the minor were 

returned home, and there are no reasonable means by which the minor’s physical health 

can be protected without removing the minor from the minor’s parent’s . . . physical 

custody” (§ 361, subd. (c)(1)).

7

 We therefore reject mother’s contention that the juvenile 

court’s findings lacked the requisite evidentiary support. 

2. Alternatives To Removal

Mother also contends the juvenile court erred in not selecting less drastic 

alternatives to removal. Before removing a child under either subdivision (c)(1) or 

subdivision (c)(3) of section 361, the juvenile court must find that there are no reasonable 

means by which the child’s health can be protected without removing the child from the 

physical custody of the child’s parent. (§ 361, subds. (c)(1), (c)(3).) 

Mother suggests three avenues the juvenile court should have pursued:

(1) releasing the children to mother’s custody under an enhanced family maintenance 

plan, (2) implementing a safety plan, or (3) having the social worker visit mother’s home 

more frequently.

Regarding family maintenance, mother contends the juvenile court could have 

released the children to mother’s custody “under a family maintenance plan with an 

enhanced focus on mother’s yelling and anger issues.” She does not explain what 

7 The department further contends that mother fails to address the circumstance 

described in section 361, subdivision (c)(3) for removal based on “severe emotional 

damage” and protection of “the child’s physical or emotional health.” The department 

asserts this ground served as an independent basis for the juvenile court’s order. The 

department contends further that mother has forfeited any claim as to this basis by failing

to address that ground in her opening brief. Because we conclude the juvenile court’s 

removal order is supported by the circumstance listed in section 361, subdivision (c)(1), 

we do reach the department’s alternative argument in support of affirmance. 
19

“enhanced” services the juvenile court should have further considered. (See H.E., supra, 

169 Cal.App.4th at p. 724.) The record reflects that mother’s issues with emotional 

instability and yelling were not recent developments, and she had already received 

services, including therapy and parenting classes to address her behavior and emotional 

dysregulation. Mother offers no support for her argument that unspecified services 

would have stemmed the substantial risk to the children, at least in the near term. We 

discern no error in the court’s implied ruling that continuing to leave the children with 

mother, even with enhanced services to address yelling and anger, was not a reasonable 

means of protecting the children. 

We similarly reject mother’s argument that the juvenile court should have 

considered an alternative safety plan. She does not explain what the juvenile court could 

have done or what other safety plan might have been reasonable under the circumstances. 

To the contrary, the evidence reflects the department indeed attempted to craft a safety 

plan and, as noted in the July 28 report, there had been multiple child and family team 

meetings in the previous six months to develop a safety plan to address mother’s anger 

issues, her continual yelling at the children, the conflicts between mother and maternal 

grandmother, and the July 1 incident. However, the evidence shows that, despite the 

department’s efforts, it was not able to develop an effective safety plan with mother. 

Finally, mother’s suggestion that the juvenile court could have ordered more 

visitation by the department is unpersuasive. The department had already been doing 

monthly home visits, including unannounced home visits. Mother provides no authority 

supporting her argument that increasing the amount of department visits would have 

decreased the risk to the children. The record shows that the incidents were increasing in 

severity, mother’s medication was decreasing in efficacy, and mother was yelling at the 

children on a daily basis.

As noted by the department, the violent July 1 incident occurred even with other 

persons present in mother’s home (albeit they chose not to intervene), yet mother was 
20

still unable to control her behavior. We reject mother’s speculative assertion that 

ordering more visits by the department would have mitigated the substantial risk to the 

children under these circumstances. 

For these reasons, we decide substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s 

finding that there were no reasonable means to protect the children’s physical and 

emotional health without removing them from mother’s physical custody. (§ 361, subds. 

(c)(1), (c)(3).) 

III. DISPOSITION

The dispositional August 5, 2021 order removing the children from mother’s

custody is affirmed.
______________________________________

Danner, J.

WE CONCUR:

____________________________________

Bamattre-Manoukian, Acting P.J.

____________________________________

Wilson, J.

H049340

In re C.E., et al.; DFCS v. J.P.