An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute 

controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in 

accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of 

Appellate Procedur e .

NO. COA13-1290

NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS

Filed: 5 August 2014

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

v. Sampson County

Nos. 11 CRS 50400—402; 12 CRS 

1596, 1599—1601 

VELETTA WILKINS EDWARDS,

Defendant.

Appeal by defendant from judgments entered 5 June 2013 by 

Judge Kenneth F. Crow in Sampson County Superior Court. Heard 

in the Court of Appeals 4 June 2014.

Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General 

Laura Edwards Parker, for the State.

Mark Montgomery for defendant-appellant.

BRYANT, Judge.

Where defendant’s cross-examination of an expert witness

invites the testimonial error about which she now complains on 

appeal, there can be no plain error in the admission of such

testimony.
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On 26 November 2012, defendant Veletta Wilkins Edwards was 

indicted on two counts of sexual offense with a child by an 

adult under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-27.4A, and six counts of felony 

child abuse inflicting serious bodily injury under N.C. Gen. 

Stat. § 14-318.4(a)(3). The charges came on for trial during 

the 28 May 2013 criminal session of Sampson County Superior 

Court, the Honorable Kenneth F. Crow, Judge presiding. At 

trial, the State’s evidence tended to show the following.

In May 2009, T.J. and her sister S.V.1 were removed from 

their mother’s home due to allegations of neglect and placed 

with defendant, their grandmother. T.J. was about eight years 

old, and her sister S.V. about nine years old, when they went to 

live with defendant. 

On 28 December 2010, the Sampson County Department of 

Social Services (“DSS”) received a report alleging emotional 

abuse and improper discipline at defendant’s home. The 

following day, DSS social workers Gilmore and Blackmon went to 

defendant’s home to investigate the allegations. Upon arriving 

at the home, the social workers found that while S.V. appeared 

to be well-dressed and healthy, T.J. was thin and unkempt, had 

wounds on her face, hand, and ear, her hair was thin and 

 

1 Initials are used to protect the identities of the juveniles 

pursuant to N.C. R. App. P. 3.1(b) (2014).
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“crispy,” and she walked with a limp. The social workers

reported that defendant’s home was very cluttered and unkempt, 

that there were no beds for either child, and that the door to 

T.J.’s room was being latched and padlocked from the outside of 

the room. 

Defendant acted agitated and frantic during the social 

workers’ visit, telling them that “This needed to happen.” When 

questioned by Blackmon about the allegations of emotional abuse 

and improper discipline, defendant stated that she had “spanked 

[T.J.] worse than she had wanted to[,]” she had stopped taking 

both girls to therapy sessions, and that she kept T.J. locked in 

her room with the padlock. Defendant then became defensive, 

telling Blackmon that “You don’t know anything about what I’ve 

been going through with [the girls.]” Defendant also stated she 

thought T.J. had multiple personalities and was schizophrenic. 

Gilmore testified that when he and Blackmon left with the girls, 

defendant told only S.V. that she loved her. 

Upon arriving at DSS, Gilmore testified that T.J. 

immediately began to ask for food, eventually consuming a piece 

of cake and two children’s meals from a local fast-food 

restaurant. Gilmore and his colleagues then performed a body 

inventory of the children. S.V. was documented as having “clear, 
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[] pretty skin” with no extant injuries. However, when Gilmore 

began to examine T.J., he found multiple injuries. T.J. was 

documented as having thin, damaged hair with a yellow, lesioncrusted scalp; injuries across her forehead; and her skin was, 

in general, dry and flaky. A bandage on T.J.’s left ear emitted 

an odor; upon removing the bandage, Gilmore noticed the ear was 

extremely swollen, with blood and pus oozing from a large 

injury. T.J. also had significant injuries to her left arm, 

front and back torso, chest, right arm, lower back, and legs; 

these injuries were described as burns in varying stages of 

healing. Gilmore found an open wound on one of T.J.’s feet, and 

noted a large, open wound on her left pinky finger. When 

asked how she received these injuries, T.J. told Gilmore that a 

boy had bitten her ear and she had accidentally burned herself 

with hot water in the shower. However, T.J. then told Blackmon 

that some of her injuries were caused by defendant hitting her 

with a belt. 

DSS took T.J. to the hospital for treatment. At the 

hospital, T.J. was found to have further injuries to her feet 

and toes. 

The next day, on 30 December, T.J. was taken to see her 

regular family doctor, Dr. Bryan. Dr. Bryan testified that when 
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she saw T.J. that day, T.J. looked “vastly different” from when 

she had last seen her. Dr. Bryan stated that T.J. was covered 

in serious injuries and was in obvious pain, and that many of 

the large scars on T.J.’s arms and torso appeared to be burns. 

T.J. became upset when she saw Dr. Bryan and told her that she 

had lied to people about her injuries. T.J. told Dr. Bryan that 

defendant had burned her with hot water in the bathtub, choked 

her around the neck, and had bitten her ear. She also told Dr. 

Bryan that defendant kept her locked in her room because she was 

stealing food and that defendant had refused to let T.J. use the 

bathroom. During a follow-up visit at DSS, T.J. told 

Blackmon that defendant had burned her with hot water, bitten 

her ear, and pinched her fingers and toes with pliers. DSS 

placed the girls with a foster family. The foster family 

testified that T.J. repeated her allegations of defendant’s 

abuse to them. 

On 7 January 2011, DSS interviewed defendant. Defendant 

was agitated during the interview and refused to let her husband 

answer any questions. Defendant told Blackmon that she kept 

T.J. locked in her room because T.J. had stolen a knife from the 

kitchen and defendant was afraid for her life. After Blackmon 
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repeatedly asked defendant to explain T.J.’s injuries, defendant 

and her husband walked out of the interview. 

On 18 January 2011, T.J. was evaluated by pediatrician Dr. 

Loughlin. Dr. Loughlin testified to what T.J. told him: that 

defendant had put T.J.’s head into the toilet and flushed it, 

making T.J. believe she would drown. Defendant would also hold 

T.J’s head under water in the bathtub until she passed out. 

Defendant would pour hot water on her and make her sit in hot 

water in the bathtub until her skin would stick to the surface 

of the bathtub. Defendant would sometimes pour hot water mixed 

with bleach or ammonia on T.J’s forehead. T.J. also told Dr. 

Loughlin about defendant biting her ear on multiple occasions, 

using pliers to pinch her fingers and toes, and hitting her legs 

and knees with pliers and a hammer. T.J. told Dr. Loughlin that 

defendant had removed T.J.’s clothes, restrained her with duct 

tape, and placed her on an ant mound so she could be, and indeed 

was, bitten by ants. 

S.V. was also evaluated by Dr. Loughlin. S.V. stated that 

she had also been beaten by defendant, had seen defendant 

“drowning” T.J., and had seen defendant sticking pushpins into 

T.J.’s thighs. S.V. told Dr. Loughlin that defendant had 
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directed S.V. to bring her boiling water when T.J. was in the 

bathtub. 

T.J. was also interviewed by Detective Godwin of the 

Sampson County Sheriff’s Department. T.J. told Detective Godwin

that defendant had put the handle of a purple hairbrush into her 

vagina and her anus several times, and that it had hurt very 

badly. T.J. told Detective Godwin that defendant also put the 

handle of a straight razor into her vagina and anus. When asked 

why she had not told anyone of those particular sexual acts

before, T.J. said that she “really just didn’t feel comfortable 

talking about it[.]” 

On 28 January 2011, Detective Godwin went to defendant’s 

house to execute a search warrant. Defendant asked Detective 

Godwin if he was looking for a purple hairbrush. She then 

stated that the hairbrush belonged to T.J., and it was in one of 

T.J.’s bags. Defendant could not find the hairbrush in the bag 

and said she must have misplaced it; the hairbrush was never 

found. A pair of pliers was removed from the home, and bottles 

of bleach and ammonia were found in the bathroom. 

Defendant was convicted by a jury on all charges. The 

trial court sentenced defendant to consecutive terms of: 300 to 

369 months for each count of sexual offense with a child by an 
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adult; and 73 to 97 months for each count of felony child abuse. 

Defendant appeals. 

_____________________________

Defendant’s sole contention on appeal is that the trial 

court allowed an expert witness to testify that children do not 

fabricate stories of abuse and, thereby, committed plain error. 

We disagree.

Defendant failed to object at trial to the witness 

testimony she now challenges on appeal. This Court reviews a 

defendant’s failure to object to evidence for plain error. See

State v. Locklear, 172 N.C. App. 249, 259—60, 616 S.E.2d 334, 

341 (2005). “[T]he plain error standard of review applies on 

appeal to unpreserved instructional or evidentiary error.” 

State v. Lawrence, 365 N.C. 506, 518, 723 S.E.2d 326, 334 

(2012). 

For error to constitute plain error, a 

defendant must demonstrate that a 

fundamental error occurred at trial. To 

show that an error was fundamental, a 

defendant must establish prejudice that, 

after examination of the entire record, the 

error had a probable impact on the jury's 

finding that the defendant was guilty. 

Id. (citations and quotations omitted); see also State v. Odom, 

307 N.C. 655, 660, 300 S.E.2d 375, 378 (1983) (citation, 

quotations, and emphasis omitted). 
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Defendant contends the trial court committed plain error in 

permitting Dr. Loughlin to testify that “children typically 

don’t just fabricate stories about -- about what’s happened to 

them.” When an expert witness testifies as to the sexual abuse 

of a victim, this Court has held that “[a]n expert may not 

testify that a child victim of abuse is believable, credible, or 

telling the truth because this violates the teachings of N.C. 

Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rules 405 and 608(a).” State v. O’Connor, 

150 N.C. App. 710, 712, 564 S.E.2d 296, 297 (2002) (citations

and quotation omitted). However, an expert may testify as to 

the credibility of children in general. State v. Oliver, 85 

N.C. App. 1, 11—13, 354 S.E.2d 527, 533—34 (1987). An expert 

may also testify "as to the profiles of sexually abused children 

and whether a particular complainant has symptoms or 

characteristics consistent therewith." State v. Stancil, 355 

N.C. 266, 267, 559 S.E.2d 788, 789 (2002) (per curiam). 

Further, an expert may, upon observing physical evidence of 

sexual abuse, testify that a child has been sexually abused. Id. 

at 266—67, 559 S.E.2d at 789.

At trial, the State tendered Dr. Loughlin as an expert 

witness and questioned him regarding his evaluation of T.J. On 
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defendant’s cross-examination of Dr. Loughlin, the following 

exchange occurred:

Q. Okay. And I believe your testimony was 

that

the examination was not consistent with 

sexual abuse or inconsistent with sexual 

abuse?

A. The way I'll frequently phrase it for the

record is that the normal exam neither 

supports nor refutes the possibility of 

sexual abuse.

Q. And in this case, it did neither?

A. That's correct.

Q. How could an examination refute?

A. There would be some who would want to 

interpret a normal physical exam as evidence 

against sexual abuse, and that's what I'm 

saying, it would not be valid in my opinion. 

Of course, a normal exam is consistent with 

a child who has been sexually abused.

Q. But there's never going to be a physical 

exam that's inconsistent with sexual abuse?

A. That's correct.

Q. Okay. You said it was not uncommon for a 

child to deny abuse?

A. That's -- that's correct.

Q. So it's also not uncommon for a child to 

wait a long time before bringing forward 

abuse; is that correct?

A. That's -- that's true. Disclosure can be 

a
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process that can start anywhere along the 

way.

Q. It would not be uncommon for a child to 

allege abuse early on?

A. No. Some children will tell right after

something happens, others will not.

Q. And it would not be uncommon to make up 

allegations of abuse?

A. I don't think I'd agree with that 

statement. I think children typically don't 

just fabricate stories about -- about what's 

happened to them.

Here, not only did defendant ask questions of the witness 

and thereby “invite” the error of which she now complains, she 

did not ask for a limiting instruction when the witness 

disagreed with the premise of her question that “it would not be 

uncommon [for children] to make up allegations of abuse[.]” See 

State v. Dew, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 738 S.E.2d 215, 221 (2013) 

("[a] defendant is not prejudiced by . . . error resulting from 

his own conduct. As a result, a defendant who invites error has 

waived his right to all appellate review concerning the invited 

error, including plain error review." (citations and quotations 

omitted)), review denied, 366 N.C. 595, 743 S.E.2d 187 (2013); 

State v. Global, 186 N.C. App. 308, 319—20, 651 S.E.2d 279, 287 

(2007) (“Statements elicited by a defendant on cross-examination 

are, even if error, invited error, by which a defendant cannot 
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be prejudiced as a matter of law.” (citations omitted)); State 

v. Payne, 280 N.C. 170, 171, 185 S.E.2d 101, 102 (1971) (“[O]ne 

who causes . . . the court to commit error is not in a position 

to repudiate his action and assign it as ground for a new trial. 

The foregoing is not intended as any intimation the court 

committed error in this instance; but to point out the legal bar 

to the defendant's right to raise the question. Invited error is 

not ground for a new trial.” (citations omitted)). 

Nevertheless, assuming arguendo we reviewed this issue for 

plain error, we would not find prejudicial error. Defendant 

asked Dr. Loughlin a series of questions regarding how children 

generally respond to abuse. When defendant asked Dr. Loughlin 

whether “it would not be uncommon to make up allegations of 

abuse,” Dr. Loughlin responded: “I think children typically 

don't just fabricate stories . . . about what's happened to 

them.” As such, Dr. Loughlin’s statement is not a statement as 

to the credibility of T.J., but rather a statement of opinion 

that “children typically don’t just fabricate stories[.]” 

Moreover, it is clear from the exchange between defendant and 

Dr. Loughlin that this line of questioning was meant to explore 

the credibility of children in general, rather than just the 
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individual credibility of T.J. See Oliver, 85 N.C. App. at 11—

13, 354 S.E.2d at 533—34. 

Further, even absent the challenged testimony of Dr. 

Loughlin, there was sufficient evidence of defendant’s guilt 

that there was no probability a different result would have been 

reached. The State presented evidence through the testimony of 

the victim, T.J.; T.J.’s sister S.V.; social workers Gilmore and 

Blackmon; Detective Godwin; T.J.’s foster family; and T.J.’s 

primary care doctor, Dr. Bryan. The testimony of torture and 

abuse was as revolting as it was overwhelming. Therefore, even 

had defendant not invited the error about which she now 

complains, we would have to find that the trial court did not 

commit plain error in admitting the challenged testimony of the 

expert witness.

No error. 

Judges CALABRIA and GEER concur. 

Report per Rule 30(e).