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STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

UNPUBLISHED 

August 23, 2016 

v No. 323886 

Jackson Circuit Court 

TARIK DEBRONTE SCOTT, LC No. 13-004975-FC 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

AFTER REMAND 

Before: SHAPIRO, P.J., and O’CONNELL and BORRELLO, JJ. 

PER CURIAM. 

 Defendant, Tarik Debronte Scott, appeals as of right his convictions, following a jury 

trial, of attempted murder, MCL 750.91, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a 

felony (felony-firearm), MCL 750.227b. The trial court sentenced Scott to serve consecutive 

terms of 17 to 30 years’ imprisonment for his attempted murder conviction and two years’ 

imprisonment for his felony-firearm conviction. This Court previously remanded for a hearing 

on newly discovered evidence regarding a previously unavailable witness’s recantation 

testimony. People v Scott, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, January 26, 2016 (Docket 

No. 323886). We now affirm. 

I. BACKGROUND FACTS 

A. PRETRIAL PROCEEDINGS 

 On September 6, 2013, a minor was shot in the back after a high school football game. 

At a preliminary examination, the victim’s 14-year-old friend testified that Scott was the shooter. 

The witness testified that on the day of the shooting, two gangs had an argument. She left the 

football game a few minutes before it ended, and she noticed that members of a rival gang had 

also left. As the witness and her friend crossed the street, members of the gang came out of an 

alley and began an argument. 

 According to the witness, during the argument, Scott said “I’m going to air this b**** 

out” and started shooting into the crowd. When she heard the shots, she looked toward them and 

saw fire coming from Scott’s hand. She dropped to the ground next to the victim. During cross-
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examination, the witness admitted that she had several prior arrests, including for felonious 

assault, malicious destruction of property, disturbing the peace, retail fraud, and breaking and 

entering. The witness also admitted that she left a residential treatment program and had been 

detained at a group home. 

 Detective Holly Rose served the witness with a subpoena through her school liaison 

officer. Detective Rose received the impression that the witness was willing to testify at trial. 

However, the prosecutor stated that subsequent attempts to contact the witness, including leaving 

her mother several messages a day, were unsuccessful. 

 Before the trial was scheduled to begin, the prosecution requested an adjournment to 

determine whether the witness would be available to testify. The prosecutor stated that the 

witness’s mother had moved the witness to Colorado and expressed concern that the mother 

would not make the witness available to testify. The prosecutor served a subpoena on the 

witness’s mother and telephoned several times to make travel arrangements but received no 

reply. 

 The prosecutor requested to use the witness’s pretrial examination testimony during trial. 

Defense counsel argued that the prosecution had not used due diligence to attempt to secure the 

witness and that Scott would be prejudiced if the jury could not assess the witness’s credibility. 

The judge reserved a ruling while further attempts were made, including that the judge 

personally called the witness’s mother and threatened to hold her in contempt of court if the 

witness did not appear. 

 The prosecutor’s office manager, Sierre Howard, testified that she began making 

numerous calls to the witness’s mother in April 2014. According to Howard, she received a 

voicemail on May 29, 2014, from a sheriff’s office in Colorado confirming that they had served 

the subpoena on the witness’s mother. The trial court found that the prosecution had acted 

“probably above and beyond” to secure the witness’s presence and allowed the witness’s 

preliminary examination testimony to be read at trial. 

B. TRIAL TESTIMONY 

 At trial, the victim testified that her friends belonged to a gang. Following a high school 

football game, a rival gang confronted her friends. She identified Scott as one of the members of 

the rival gang. During an argument between two boys, the victim heard gunshots and started 

running. The victim ran through some houses to a store and only later noticed that blood was 

running down her neck. The victim did not see who shot her. Following the victim’s testimony, 

the 14-year-old witness’s preliminary examination testimony was read to the jury. 

 Scott’s friend testified that he was present at the shooting but Scott was not present. 

Scott’s cousin testified that he and Scott were not members of a gang and Scott left the game 

early to get something to eat. After about 10 or 15 minutes, they went to a friend’s house. They 

did not ride their bicycles near the area of the shooting. 

 On rebuttal, Detective Rose testified that Scott’s cousin was a member of the rival gang 

and, during a previous interview, he did not claim to be with Scott on the night of the shooting. 
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According to Detective Rose, Scott’s phone was located in the area of the shooting from 7:50 

until after 9:00 p.m., but it was not located in the area of the shooting at the time of the 911 call. 

It was unknown how much time passed between the shooting and the 911 call, and a person on a 

bicycle could travel the distance from where Scott’s cell phone was after 9:00 p.m. to where it 

was at 9:25 p.m. in a very brief time. Additionally, Scott called his cousin at 9:25 p.m., a time 

that they were supposedly together. 

II. USE OF PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION TESTIMONY 

A. CONFRONTATION 

 Scott contends that the prosecution’s use of the 14-year-old witness’s preliminary 

examination testimony violated his right to confront the witnesses against him. 

 This Court reviews for an abuse of discretion whether the prosecution diligently 

attempted to secure an unavailable witness. People v Starr, 89 Mich App 342, 345; 280 NW2d 

519 (1979). The trial court abuses its discretion when its outcome falls outside the principled 

range of outcomes. People v Reese, 491 Mich 127, 139; 815 NW2d 85 (2012). 

 Both the United States and Michigan constitutions protect a defendant’s right to confront 

the witnesses against him or her. US Const, Am VI; Const 1963, art 1, § 20. Hearsay is “a 

statement, other than the one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, 

offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” MRE 801(c). The improper 

admission of hearsay may implicate the defendant’s constitutional rights. People v Dendel (On 

Second Remand), 289 Mich App 445, 452-453; 797 NW2d 645 (2010); Crawford v Washington, 

541 US 36, 50-51; 124 S Ct 1354; 158 L Ed 2d 177 (2004). 

 However, the trial court does not violate the defendant’s right to confrontation by 

admitting the prior testimony of an unavailable witness if the prosecution made good-faith 

efforts to obtain the witness’s presence at trial and the testimony is sufficiently reliable. Barber 

v Page, 390 US 719, 724-725; 88 S Ct 1318; 20 L Ed 2d 255 (1968); People v Bean, 457 Mich 

677, 684; 580 NW2d 390 (1998). Generally, testimony taken at a preliminary examination is 

sufficiently reliable. Id.; MCL 768.26. 

 Whether the prosecution made good-faith efforts to secure a witness depends on the 

circumstances of each case. Bean, 457 Mich at 684. The prosecution must inquire of persons 

who could help them locate the witness, check out specific leads, and attempt to locate witnesses 

in foreign jurisdictions. See Bean, 457 Mich at 689-690. Tardy or incomplete efforts to locate 

the witness are not sufficiently reasonable. People v Dye, 431 Mich 58, 68; 427 NW2d 501 

(1988) (opinion by LEVIN, J.). 

 We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that the 

prosecution engaged in reasonable efforts to secure the unavailable witness. Detective Rose 

indicated that the witness initially stated that she would testify in the trial. The prosecution 

served the witness with a subpoena, but the witness failed to respond. Subsequently, the 

prosecution engaged in frequent telephone contacts to attempt to secure the witness, calling 
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“sometimes several times a day.” After those contacts were not returned, the prosecution sought 

an adjournment to secure the witness. 

 The prosecution discovered that the witness was located out of state, and it served a 

subpoena on the witness’s mother. From April 10 to May 27, 2014, the prosecution’s assistant 

left numerous voicemails for the witness’s mother. Only after its efforts were unsuccessful did 

the prosecution move the trial court to allow it to use the witness’s preliminary examination 

testimony. The trial court reserved its ruling, and the judge himself telephoned the witness’s 

mother, threatening to hold her in contempt of court if she did not produce the witness. The 

mother did not respond. 

 The prosecution’s efforts were not tardy in comparison to the trial date, since it adjourned 

the trial in order to secure the witness. Additionally, the prosecution’s efforts were not 

incomplete. It subpoenaed the witness, located the witness after the witness left the state, and 

subpoenaed the witness’s mother. Despite these efforts and a contempt threat, the mother still 

refused to produce the witness. The trial court need only find that the prosecution engaged in 

reasonable efforts. See People v Eccles, 260 Mich App 379, 391; 677 NW2d 76 (2004). We 

conclude that the trial court’s determination that the prosecution engaged in reasonable efforts in 

this case did not fall outside the range of principled outcomes. 

B. NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE 

 Additionally, the recantation evidence did not make it more likely that a different result 

would have occurred on retrial. The trial court may grant a new trial on the basis of newly 

discovered evidence when (1) the evidence itself, not merely its materiality, is newly discovered, 

(2) the evidence is not cumulative, (3) the evidence is likely to render a different result probable 

on retrial, and (4) the defendant could not have produced the evidence at trial. People v Canter, 

197 Mich App 550, 559; 496 NW2d 336 (1992). Recantation testimony “is traditionally 

regarded as suspect and untrustworthy.” Id. Whether to grant a new trial on the basis of 

recantation testimony is subject to the trial court’s discretion. Id. at 560. This Court must give 

regard to the trial court’s superior ability to consider the credibility of the recanting witness. Id. 

 This Court remanded for the trial court to consider whether a telephone conversation after 

trial between the witness and Scott’s mother, in which the witnesses recanted her pretrial 

examination testimony, was newly discovered evidence.1

 Following remand, the trial court 

issued an opinion in which it concluded that the conversation between the witness and Scott’s 

mother was newly discovered evidence but it would not render a different result probable on 

retrial. The trial court found that the witness’s recantation testimony 

is highly suspect and without much weight. She gives no explanation for her 

sudden about-face and it appears highly likely that she is changing her story in 

response to multiple threats from Defendant’s associates urging her to recant. As 

 

1 People v Scott, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, January 26, 2016 (Docket No. 

323886). 
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this Court thus finds that the testimony is not credible and does not make a new 

result probable at retrial, Defendant’s motion for a New Trial is DENIED. 

 We conclude that the trial court’s decision did not fall outside the range of principled 

outcomes. The witness testified that her memory was not better at the time of the time of the 

evidentiary hearing than at the time of the preliminary examination, and that what she said at the 

preliminary examination was not knowingly false. She testified that individuals within the 

community threatened her if she testified. Given the opportunity to view the witness’s demeanor 

at the evidentiary hearing, the trial court found that her recantation was influenced by something 

other than an honest belief that her initial identification of Scott was mistaken. 

III. GREAT WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE 

 Scott also contends that his verdict was against the great weight of the evidence. 

Specifically, Scott contends that the vast majority of the evidence conflicted with the testimony 

of the sole witness who placed him at the scene, and that the witness’s testimony was so 

thoroughly impeached that it had no probative value. We disagree. 

 The prosecution has the constitutionally based burden to prove each element of an 

offense beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Ericksen, 288 Mich App 192, 196; 793 NW2d 120 

(2010). Generally, courts review a defendant’s claim that the jury’s verdict was against the great 

weight of the evidence to determine whether “the evidence preponderates so heavily against the 

verdict that it would be a miscarriage of justice to allow the verdict to stand.” People v 

Lacalamita, 286 Mich App 467, 469; 780 NW2d 311 (2009). 

 Conflicting testimony alone does not provide a sufficient ground to discard a verdict as 

against the great weight of the evidence. Id. at 469-470. This Court does not resolve credibility 

questions on appeal. Id. at 469. We must defer to the trier of fact’s credibility determinations 

unless directly contradictory testimony was so far impeached that it was deprived of all probative 

value that it was unbelievable, or testimony contradicted physical facts or defied physical 

realities. People v Lemmon, 456 Mich 625, 643-644; 576 NW2d 129 (1998). 

 In this case, there was extensive testimony that rival gangs had a confrontation at the 

football game immediately preceding the shooting. While Scott’s friend and cousin testified that 

he was not present at the scene, both the victim and the 14-year-old witness testified that Scott 

was present. The witness also testified that Scott was the one who shot into the crowd. While 

the witness was allegedly a member of one of the gangs and had an extensive criminal history for 

her age, her testimony did not contradict physical facts, and it was not so far impeached that it 

had no probative value. 

 The victim and witness both placed Scott at the scene of the shooting. Additionally, 

Scott called his cousin on the telephone even though they were allegedly together in a different 

location at the time. While Scott’s phone was no longer in the area at the time of the 911 call, 

the call occurred sometime after the shooting, and it would only have taken Scott a short time to 

travel between the locations. We conclude that the evidence does not preponderate so heavily in 

the opposite direction that it would be a miscarriage of justice to allow the verdict to stand. 
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 We affirm. 

/s/ Douglas B. Shapiro 

/s/ Peter D. O’Connell 

/s/ Stephen L. Borrello