J-S43040-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

CHARIKA BRINSON 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2120 EDA 2021

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 9, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0003403-2018

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

CHARIKA BRINSON 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2121 EDA 2021

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 9, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0003404-2018

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and NICHOLS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED APRIL 24, 2023

Charika Brinson1 appeals nunc pro tunc from the judgments of sentence 

imposed following her convictions for two counts each of aggravated assault 

____________________________________________

1 We note that the names Charika Brinson and Chakira Brinson appear to be 

used interchangeably both throughout the record and on filings with this Court 

and the trial court. Indeed, the trial court acknowledges that Charika Brinson 

was previously known as Chakira Brinson. See, e.g., N.T. Trial, 3/27/19, at 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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of a child less than six years of age and endangering the welfare of children 

(EWOC).

2

 Appellant raises claims concerning evidentiary rulings by the trial 

court, the sufficiency and weight of the evidence, and the discretionary 

aspects of her sentence. We affirm.

The trial court summarized the underlying facts of this matter as follows:

The underlying charges stemmed from Appellant’s arrest following 

an investigation of the alleged neglect and repeated physical 

abuse of two female complainants F.B., then age three (3) years 

and C.B., then age five (5) years between June 2016 through 

August 2016. The trial evidence established that both victimized 

children had been entrusted to Appellant’s custodial care together

into Appellant’s residence located at 659 [North] 41st Street, in 

West Philadelphia by the children’s biological mother, [W.B]. 

Appellant and [W.B.] were distant relatives and close friends. 

Appellant agreed to supervise and house three of [W.B.’s] children 

while [W.B.] was serving a six-month period of incarceration

starting in June 2016. Appellant initially agreed to also care for 

[W.B.’s] then thirteen-year old son, N.B. However, this child 

initially stayed under the care of Appellant’s sister Sharee Brinson 

in a different residence. N.B. left [Sharee] Brinson’s care in late 

July 2016 to reside with his maternal great aunt [D.B.]

The cumulative trial evidence unequivocally proved that from June 

2016 through August 2016, Appellant had subjected both small 

statured girls to abhorrent conditions, by denying them 

necessities including food, forcing them to sleep on the dirty and 

cold floor, and regularly beating both children with various objects 

including belts, brushes, and shoes. Their older brother N.B. had 

been prevented from visiting his sisters until early August 2016. 

He then noticed that both girls had appeared visibly skinnier and 

covered in bug bites and unusual marks. N.B. reported his fears 

for them and described their poor appearance to his aunt [D.B.] 

Upon learning of the girls’ maltreatment, [D.B.] began valiant 

____________________________________________

6; N.T. Sentencing Hr’g at 5. For our purposes, the captions reflect the name 

that was used on both Appellant’s notice of appeal and docketing statement.

2 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2702(a)(8) and 4304(a)(1), respectively.
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efforts to retrieve her nieces along with F.B.’s biological father and 

C.B.’s stepfather, [E.A.]

Reuniting these girls with their family had proved to be most 

difficult; Appellant began a campaign to keep C.B. and F.B. away 

from their family’s view. Appellant constantly moved both girls 

and provided their family members with deliberately false

information about their location. After an extensive search and 

the intervention of third parties, both traumatized children were 

finally reunited together with [D.B.] and [E.A.] in late August 

2016.

Immediately upon recovering these two emaciated children, 

[D.B.] and [E.A.] were alarmed by both children’s poor physical 

condition and drastically negative changes in personalities. They 

testified that before June 2016 both young girls had been happygo-lucky, bright, and hopeful. After their stay with Appellant, both 

sisters had been unusually quiet, withdrawn, and skittish. [D.B.]

and [E.A.] promptly took both girls to Children’s Hospital of 

Philadelphia (hereinafter “CHOP”), for emergency treatment.

At CHOP, emergency medical examinations of [the children’s] 

bodies displayed multiple abuse sourced traumatic bruising 

including linear and belt buckle type markings. Each child also

presented [with] additional physical conditions consistent with 

significant neglect including, malnourishment, ringworm infection, 

and bed bug bites. The swelling on the girls’ stomachs had been 

so profound, the treating physicians had grave concerns that their 

spleens may have ruptured. Both girls were admitted and treated 

for at least a week in the hospital.

Shortly after arrival at CHOP, five-year-old C.B. revealed that 

Appellant had routinely physically beaten and kicked both sisters 

which had caused their injuries while they were in Appellant’s 

home. Subsequently, CHOP child abuse specialist and expert, 

Kate Henry, M.D., interviewed C.B. and conducted a physical 

exam of both girls.[fn1] During her examination of the girls, Dr. 

Henry observed rectangular discolored marks consistent with the 

shape of a belt buckle and scarring on the[] inner thighs of both 

children. At trial, Dr. Henry expertly opined that these were 

patterned injuries [that] had not been caused accidentally, but 

rather had been the result of intentional and repeated striking with 

physical objects like a belt and buckle. Dr. Henry interviewed C.B. 

who had informed her that Appellant had beaten her multiple 

times with a belt.
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[fn1] Dr. Henry did not interview F.B. due to her age.

Based on her observations and C.B.’s consistent statements, Dr. 

Henry had determined and diagnosed both girls as having suffered 

repeated physical abuse with Appellant as the named perpetrator. 

Dr. Henry reported her expert findings of neglect and physical 

abuse of both girls by Appellant to the City of Philadelphia 

Department of Human Services (hereinafter “DHS”).

* * *

Following the physician’s report to DHS social services agency, the 

matter was referred to the City of Philadelphia Police Department 

Special Victims Unit and assigned to investigator Officer Jose 

[Viera]. While the original DHS report had originally captioned 

and listed Appellant’s sister [Sharee] Brinson as the person to be 

investigated, Officer [Viera’s] investigation quickly identified 

Appellant as the primary suspect. Officer [Viera] interviewed and 

obtained signed or videoed statements from both victim children 

C.B. and F.B., their older brother N.B., father and stepfather 

[E.A.], and their aunt [D.B.]

During her interview, five-year-old C.B. described Appellant as a 

“monster” and again affirmed that Appellant forced both sisters to 

sleep on the floor and would regularly beat them with objects 

ranging from brooms to belts. Three-year-old F.B. similarly 

revealed that Appellant had repeatedly hit her with “shoes and a 

belt.”

* * *

Before trial began, Appellant’s counsel acknowledged on the 

record that he had received advance “Notice of Intent to Proceed 

by Way of the Tender Years Exception to the Hearsay Rule” from 

the Commonwealth, that had reflected the intention to introduce 

hearsay evidence in the form of C.B. and F.B.’s descriptions of 

Appellant’s abuse to their [father and] stepfather [E.A.] 

Cumulative trial evidence presented by the Commonwealth had 

included factual testimony elicited from the children’s mother, 

[W.B.], the two victims F.B., C.B., their older brother N.B., their 

father and stepfather [E.A.], their aunt [D.B.], the investigator 

Officer [Viera], and expert opinion and factual testimony of Dr. 

Kate Henry which had been corroborated by the certified medical 

records. Initially, [W.B.] testified to how she had entrusted 

Appellant to care for her daughters during her incarceration and 
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related the hasty arrangements that she had made to enable their 

stay with her close friend, Appellant.

Prior to testifying, [the trial court] engaged in mirrored dual 

colloquies with both children victims, F.B. now aged six (6) years 

and C.B. now aged eight (8) years to confirm their competency to 

testify. After the initial inquiry and absent any defense objection, 

[the trial court] found both children competent to testify. Both 

F.B. and C.B. testified quite convincingly in front of the jury [] that 

Appellant had forced them to sleep on the floor, had refused to 

feed them, and regularly beat them and mistreated them 

severely.

Their older brother, N.B., now aged [fifteen] years, their aunt 

[D.B.], and their [father and] stepfather [E.A.], credibly and 

consistently related the sequence of events including their 

discovery of abuse and the extreme endeavors that they had 

undertaken to locate and remove the girls from Appellant’s 

clutches. These three witnesses also vividly described the drastic 

and alarming changes in their physical and mental appearances 

and conduct of both traumatized children immediately after their 

rescue. [E.A.] reiterated that[ shortly after their rescue,] both 

girls fitfully and fearfully confided in him that Appellant had 

repeatedly hit them.

Dr. Henry provided the jury with thorough and cogent expert 

testimony that had been soundly based on her physical 

examinations of F.B. and C.B. and her interview with C.B. She 

thoroughly explained and described the patterned injuries that 

unequivocally had showed physical abuse, and C.B.’s statements 

that Appellant was the source of those injuries. Substantiating 

medical reports and photos of the injuries taken by doctors and 

nurses at CHOP were introduced. Officer [Viera ] testified to the 

course of his investigation, including his interview with F.B. and 

C.B., where they again repeated the allegations against Appellant.

During trial, [the trial court] sustained relevance and hearsay 

objections by the Commonwealth’s attorney when defense 

counsel attempted to discuss a DHS report filed against 

Appellant’s sister, [Sharee] Brinson, in his opening statemen[t]. 

[The trial court] also overruled defense counsel’s hearsay 

objection to [E.A.’s] testimonial recollection of what his daughters 

had told him about Appellant’s physical abuse of them, under the 

“Tender Years” hearsay exception.
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After hearing all arguments, and discussing all evidence, the jury 

returned a unanimous verdict of guilty on two counts of each 

docketed charge related to each child: aggravated assault of a 

child under [six years of age], graded as a felony of the second 

degree; and endangering the welfare of children through course 

of conduct[,] graded as a felony of the third degree.

Trial Court Op., 4/25/22, at 1-7 (citations omitted, some formatting altered).

On July 9, 2019, the trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of three 

to eleven years’ incarceration, to be followed by six years’ probation.3 

Appellant filed a post-sentence motion challenging the weight of the evidence 

and discretionary aspects of her sentence. On February 4, 2020, Appellant’s 

post-sentence motion was denied by operation of law.

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3 Specifically, the trial court imposed a sentence of two to six years’ 

incarceration and four years’ probation for each count of aggravated assault. 

The trial court also sentenced Appellant to one to five years’ incarceration and 

two years’ probation for each count of EWOC. The individual sentences at 

Docket No. 3403-2018 were structured consecutively. The trial court ordered 

the sentences imposed at Docket No. 3404-2018 to be served concurrent to 

the sentences imposed at Docket No. 3403-2018. The result was an 

aggregate sentence of three to eleven years’ incarceration followed by six 

years’ probation. 

At the time of sentencing, Appellant’s prior record score (PRS) was a zero. 

See N.T. Sentencing Hr’g. at 25. The standard minimum guideline range for 

aggravated assault was six to fourteen months’ incarceration, plus or minus 

six months for aggravating or mitigating factors. The trial court’s sentence 

for aggravated assault fell outside the aggravated range, but did not exceed 

the statutory maximum for a second-degree felony. The standard minimum 

guideline range for EWOC was three to twelve months, plus or minus six 

months for aggravating or mitigating factors. The trial court’s sentence for 

EWOC was within the standard guideline range.
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On February 11, 2021, Appellant filed a timely Post Conviction Relief 

Act4 (PCRA) petition seeking to reinstate her direct appeal rights nunc pro 

tunc. After the trial court granted Appellant’s motion on September 16, 2021, 

Appellant filed timely notices of appeal and a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) 

statement. The trial court issued a Rule 1925(a) opinion addressing 

Appellant’s claims.

Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

1. Did the trial court err in sustaining the Commonwealth’s 

objection on the grounds of relevancy, when defense counsel 

said during his opening statement that the Department of 

Human Services initially opened an investigation into 

Appellant’s sister, [Sharee] Brinson, not [Appellant], in 

violation of Appellant’s right to a fair trial and the right to 

present a complete defense pursuant to the PA Constitution, 

Article I, § 8 and the United States Constitution, 6th

Amendment[?]

2. Did the trial court err in admitting, over defense counsel’s 

objection, inadmissible hearsay, in the form of a prior 

consistent statement in violation of Pa.R.E. 613 when C.B.’s 

father testified that “[C.B.] just said that she was beaten and 

they wouldn’t feed them. They made them sleep on the cold 

floors” to bolster the complainant’s credibility after having first 

accused [A]ppellant’s sister of abuse, and which went beyond 

the scope of notice provided for the Tender Years hearsay 

exception, in violation of [A]ppellant’s right to a fair trial and 

the right to present a complete defense pursuant to the 

[Pennsylvania] Constitution, Article I, § 8 and the United States 

Constitution, 6th Amendment[?]

____________________________________________

4 See 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. Because Appellant did not file a notice of 

appeal after her post-sentence motions were denied by operation of law, her 

judgment of sentence became final for the purposes of the PCRA on March 5, 

2020. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3); Pa.R.A.P. 903(a). Accordingly, 

Appellant’s PCRA petition was timely filed.
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3. Did the trial court err in finding that the evidence at trial was 

sufficient as a matter of law to convict Appellant of the crime 

of aggravated assault as set forth in 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a)(8) 

and [EWOC] as set forth in 18 Pa.C.S. § 4304(a)(1) when the 

evidence of record does not establish that Appellant caused or 

intended to cause bodily injury to [the victims] nor did it 

establish that Appellant knowingly endangered the welfare of a 

child by violating a duty of care, protection or support, 

respectively?

4. Did the trial court err in finding that the greater weight of the 

evidence established Appellant as the perpetrator beyond a 

reasonable doubt as to the crimes of aggravated assault and 

[EWOC] where the Commonwealth did not establish each and 

every element of the times and did not meet its burden?

5. Did the trial court err in imposing a sentence that was unduly 

harsh, excessive, inconsistent with the Sentencing Code, 

contrary to fundamental norms underlying the sentencing 

process because it did not take into consideration the 

information contained in the pre-sentence [investigation (PSI)] 

report, the mental health report, arguments for mitigation, 

[A]ppellant’s lack of any prior criminal background?

Appellant’s Brief at 2-3 (formatting altered).

Evidentiary Issues

Appellant’s first two claims relate to evidentiary rulings made by the trial 

court. First, Appellant alleges that the trial court erred when it sustained the 

Commonwealth’s objection during Appellant’s opening statement after 

Appellant referenced a DHS investigative report stating that the initial focus 

of the investigation was Appellant’s sister, Sharee Brinson. Appellant’s Brief 

at 9. Appellant argues that “the preclusion of this evidence without any valid 

justification based on the rules of evidence limited Appellant’s ability to mount 

a full and fair defense.” Id. at 14.
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We review a trial court’s evidentiary rulings using the abuse of discretion 

standard of review. Commonwealth v. Luster, 234 A.3d 836, 838 (Pa. 

Super. 2020). A finding of abuse of discretion “may not be made merely 

because an appellate court might have reached a different conclusion, but 

requires a result of manifest unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice, bias, 

or ill-will, or such lack of support so as to be clearly erroneous.” 

Commonwealth v. Saez, 225 A.3d 169, 178 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation 

omitted).

With respect to opening statements, our Supreme Court has explained:

“The purpose of an opening statement is to apprise the jury how 

the case will develop, its background and what will be attempted 

to be proved; but it is not evidence.” Commonwealth v.

Montgomery, 626 A.2d 109, 113 (Pa. 1993). 

In Montgomery, we acknowledged that “as a practical matter the 

opening statement can often times be the most critical stage of 

the trial, because here the jury forms its first and often lasting 

impression of the case.” [Id. at 113]. The prosecution, as well 

as the defense, is afforded reasonable latitude in presenting 

opening arguments to the jury. Such latitude is not without 

limits.

Commonwealth v. Parker, 919 A.2d 943, 950 (Pa. 2007) (some citations 

omitted, formatting altered). Importantly, as noted by the Parker Court, 

opening statements are not evidence. Id. at 947. The Court further noted 

that, “it is legitimate during opening statements for . . . defense counsel . . . 

to verbally describe, in detail, the evidence he intends to prove, including 

tangible pieces of evidence.” Id. at 951.
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In the instant case, the trial court notes that after opening statements, 

the trial court “advised defense counsel that he would not be permitted to 

introduce evidence of the initial DHS report at trial.” Trial Ct. Op. at 24-25

(citing N.T. Trial, 3/26/19, at 31). The trial court further explained: “In terms 

of whether or not [DHS is] investigating [Sharee Brinson] . . . is one, hearsay 

and two, DHS records normally as to who they’re investigating and the source 

of the complaint is private, so that was an inappropriate reference, all right, 

so be careful.” Id. Ultimately, the trial court concluded that the DHS report 

was irrelevant pursuant to Pa.R.E. 401 because “[t]he subject of . . . DHS’s 

stated initial intention to investigate [Sharee Brinson] had zero bearing on the 

overarching question of whether Appellant’s maltreatment of C.B. and F.B. 

had satisfied the statutory elements of each conviction.” Trial Ct. Op. at 25.

The trial court also rejected Appellant’s claim that the court’s ruling 

precluded her from raising a full defense. Specifically, the trial court

explained: 

[The trial court’s evidentiary ruling] did not prevent Appellant 

from raising the theory, and introducing testimony evidence that 

Appellant was not involved with F.B. and C.B. and that [Sharee 

Brinson] had been caring for and subsequently abusing both girls. 

[Appellant’s] counsel introduced the theory in his opening 

statement, he inquired about Sharee Brinson’s involvement with 

caring for C.B. and F.B. at every opportunity on cross-examination 

and presented the same theory again in his closing. While not 

admitted into evidence, defense counsel presented Officer [Viera]

with the DHS report itself and discussed the investigation into 

[Sharee] Brinson. The jury had a full opportunity to hear the 

theory and deemed it false against the weight of the 

Commonwealth’s evidence.
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Id. at 27. 

Based on our review of the record, we discern no abuse of discretion by 

the trial court in sustaining the Commonwealth’s objection during Appellant’s 

opening statement concerning the admissibility of the initial DHS report 

implicating Sharee Brinson. See Luster, 234 A.3d at 838. The fact that 

Sharee Brinson was the initial subject of an earlier DHS report was not 

relevant to “the overarching question” concerning Appellant’s mistreatment of 

the children. See Trial Ct. Op., at 25. Further, Appellant was not precluded 

from eliciting testimony concerning Sharee Brinson’s involvement during 

cross-examination and again during closing arguments. Therefore, the trial 

court’s evidentiary ruling did not preclude Appellant from presenting a full 

defense, including the theory that Sharee Brinson was solely responsible for 

abusing C.B. and F.B. Accordingly, Appellant is not entitled to relief on this 

issue. See Saez, 225 A.3d at 178.

In her next claim, Appellant contends that the trial court erred when it 

permitted the Commonwealth to present inadmissible hearsay testimony from 

E.A. Appellant’s Brief at 15. Specifically, Appellant refers to E.A.’s testimony 

that Appellant withheld food from C.B. and F.B. and forced the children to 

sleep on the floor. Id. at 15-16. Appellant argues that this testimony was 

inadmissible hearsay because it went beyond the scope of the Tender Years 

notice that was provided to Appellant prior to trial. Id. at 16. Appellant 

further contends that the testimony was also inadmissible under Pa.R.E. 613 

because Appellant did not cross-examine C.B. or F.B. Therefore, Appellant 
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argues that E.A.’s testimony was an improper means of bolstering C.B. and 

F.B.’s credibility. Id. 

Before we review the merits of Appellant’s issue, we must first 

determine whether the issue has been properly preserved for appellate 

review. Rule 103 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence requires a party to, 

at the time of the ruling admitting evidence, make a timely and specific 

objection, stating the specific ground for the objection, unless it was apparent 

from the context of the objection. Pa.R.E. 103(a)(1). Rule 103 does not 

require a party to renew an objection once the court has ruled on the record, 

be it before or during trial. Pa.R.E. 103(b); see also Commonwealth v. 

Walter, 119 A.3d 255, 264 (Pa. 2015) (holding that objecting party must 

make a timely objection stating the specific ground for the objection unless it 

was apparent from context).

In the instant case, the following exchange occurred during the 

Commonwealth’s direct examination of E.A.:

[The Commonwealth]: What did your daughter tell you?

[Trial counsel]: Objection to hearsay.

[The trial court]: Overruled.

A: She said that –

Q: If you need time to remember – would it help to see a copy 

of your statement?

A: No. She just said that she was beaten and they wouldn’t 

feed them. They made them sleep on cold floors.

Q: Who did you understand them to be referring to when she 

said they?
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A: [Appellant] and her sister.

Q: And did she say anything else about what [Appellant] did to 

her?

A: She said that they hit her with brushes – I guess a hair 

brush, and then hit them with belts.

Q: And did you ever have any conversations with [F.B.]?

A: Yes.

Q: And what did [F.B.] tell you?

A: Sort of the same thing and was particularly disturbed about 

sleeping on the cold floor.

N.T. Trial, 3/27/19, at 13-14.

On appeal, Appellant claims that the Commonwealth elicited testimony 

that exceeded the scope of the Tender Years’ notice. Specifically, Appellant 

refers to E.A.’s testimony concerning statements from the victims in which 

they claimed that Appellant withheld food and forced the victims to sleep on 

the floor. However, although Appellant made a broad objection to hearsay 

before the testimony was elicited, that objection was denied due to the trial 

court’s pre-trial Tender Years ruling. Moreover, Appellant made no further 

objection concerning the scope of the testimony. See id. Therefore, this 

issue is waived. See Pa.R.E. 103(a)(1); Walter, 119 A.3d at 264. 

Accordingly, Appellant is not entitled to relief.

Sufficiency of the Evidence

Appellant also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence sustaining her 

convictions for aggravated assault. Specifically, Appellant contends that the 

“there was no direct evidence that Appellant caused [or] attempted to cause 
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bodily injury to either F.B or C.B. [or] that Appellant endangered the welfare 

of either child.” Appellant’s Brief at 18-19. In support, Appellant asserts that 

F.B. “denied that Appellant abused her or caused her any injury,” during her 

testimony at trial. Id. at 19. Further, Appellant contends that although C.B. 

testified that Appellant hit both victims with a hairbrush on more than one 

occasion, C.B. “previously accused Appellant’s sister, [Sharee Brinson], of 

causing her injuries when she disclosed the abuse at the hospital.” Id. 

Appellant also argues that “[d]espite the trial court’s erroneous assertion . . . 

that [F.B. and C.B.] were ‘emaciated,’ Doctor Henry testified that she 

observed no signs of malnutrition in either child” and that she could not 

determine when the injuries occurred because “they appeared to be scars, 

rather than recent injuries.” Id. Therefore, Appellant concludes that the 

evidence did not “establish that either girl sustained their injuries while in 

Appellant’s care[,] nor did the testimony preclude the possibility that the 

injuries were sustained prior to their mother turning their care over to 

Appellant and her sister.” Id.

Our standard of review when presented with a sufficiency of the 

evidence claim is as follows:

The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence 

is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light 

most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence 

to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond 

a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we may not weigh 

the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In 

addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by 

the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of 

innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may be 
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resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and 

inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be 

drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth 

may sustain its burden of proof of proving every element of the 

crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly 

circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, 

the entire record must be evaluated and all the evidence actually 

received must be considered. Finally, the trier of fact while 

passing on the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the 

evidence produced, is free to believe all, part[,] or none of the 

evidence.

Commonwealth v. Bragg, 133 A.3d 328, 330-31 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citation 

omitted). 

In order to sustain a conviction for aggravated assault of a child less 

than six years of age, the Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable 

doubt that a defendant over the age of eighteen “attempt[ed] to cause or 

intentionally, knowingly or recklessly cause[d] bodily injury to a child less than 

six years of age . . . .” 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a)(8).

The Crimes Code defines EWOC as follows: “a person supervising the 

welfare of a child under 18 years of age, or a person that employs or 

supervises such a person, commits an offense if he [or she] knowingly 

endangers the welfare of the child by violating a duty of care, protection or 

support.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 4304(a)(1).

In sufficiency of the evidence cases, this Court has crafted a three-prong 

test to determine whether a defendant is in violation of Section 4304(a)(1) of 

the Crimes Code:

(1) the accused must be aware of his or her duty to protect the 

child; (2) the accused must be aware that the child is in 

circumstances that could threaten the child’s physical or 
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psychological welfare; and (3) the accused either must have failed 

to act, or must have taken action so lame or meager that such 

actions cannot reasonably be expected to protect the child’s 

welfare.

Commonwealth v. Sebolka, 205 A.3d 329, 337 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation 

omitted).

Here, the trial court addressed Appellant’s claim as follows:

The record was replete with evidence that Appellant had adopted 

the role of the girls’ temporary caretaker from June 2016 to 

August 2016, while the girls’ mother was serving her term of 

incarceration. [W.B.] testified that she arranged for Appellant to 

care for her girls, including that she provided Appellant with the 

girls’ medical and Social Security cards. Both C.B. and F.B. 

testified that they were living with and were under the care of 

Appellant. N.B. testified that when he saw his sisters, they were 

living with Appellant. Appellant herself reached out to [W.B.], to 

inform her about [an] injury [to] C.B.’s finger, and that it required 

a trip to the hospital. When [D.B.] and [E.A.] attempted to 

recover the children, they reached out to Appellant, who promptly 

began evading the family. Appellant was clearly aware that she 

had been entrusted with a duty of care for both girls.

The cumulative evidence overwhelmingly established Appellant’s 

duty of care towards C.B. and F.B. The remaining statutory 

elements similarly were proven. Both victimized children provided 

convincing trial testimony that Appellant had forced them to sleep 

on the floor, had refused to feed them, and regularly beat and 

kicked them. The jury as factfinder evaluated a wealth of 

testimony to corroborate their testimony. [D.B.] and [E.A.] both 

testified that they noticed a drastic change in both the appearance 

and demeanor of both girls; how both C.B. and F.B. looked 

underweight after their stay with Appellant and that they were 

now skittish and unhappy.

The jury also evaluated the expert opinion of Dr. Kate Henry, who 

had described in detail the extent of C.B. and F.B.’s physical 

injuries. She described how both girls had needed a CAT scan for 

a swollen stomach, as doctors were concerned that they had 

ruptured spleens and their weeklong medical treatment in the 

hospital. She detailed that both little girls had been covered in 
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bug bites and had similarly patterned bruises and scars on their 

legs and thighs. She thoroughly opined that those injuries could 

not have occurred in a vacuum and were unmistakable indicators 

of abuse. Th[e] jury was left with no reasonable doubt that 

starvation and repeated beating of these two very young children 

to the extent that they need[ed] emergency medical treatment, 

placing them in the hospital for a week, had constituted a course 

of conduct by their caregiver that had harmed both their physical 

and psychological welfare.

* * *

It is uncontested that the children were less than six years of age 

and had suffered bodily injuries in the form of bruises, scars, and 

malnutrition. Furthermore, the record is rife with convincing 

evidence that Appellant had intentionally caused these injuries. 

Both children reported credibly . . . that Appellant had struck them 

with belts and other objects, had forced them to sleep on the floor, 

[which culminated] in a weeklong hospital stay. [D.B.] and [E.A. 

became] alarmed upon observing that both girls had considerable 

weight loss and had appeared to be psychologically scarred after 

their stay with Appellant. Dr. Henry, the Commonwealth’s expert, 

who examined F.B. and C.B., had provided clear opinion and 

factual testimony that the girls’ injuries had been intentionally 

[caused] and that their injuries had not resulted from any 

accident. The cumulative evidence proved well beyond a 

reasonable doubt that Appellant’s abhorrent conduct had been the 

rooted cause of both children’s injuries. The jury correctly 

concluded that Appellant had intentionally caused the harm.

Trial Ct. Op. at 29-31 (formatting altered).

Based on our review of the record, in viewing the evidence in the light 

most favorable to the Commonwealth, we conclude that there was sufficient 

evidence establishing Appellant’s guilt for both EWOC and aggravated assault. 

See Bragg, 133 A.3d at 330-31. As noted by the trial court, the 

Commonwealth presented evidence establishing that repeatedly hit C.B. and 

F.B. with brushes and belts, and by doing so caused injury and threatened 

both children’s physical and psychological welfare. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 
J-S43040-22

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2702(a)(8); Sebolka, 205 A.3d at 337. Although Appellant maintains that 

her sister, Sharee Brinson, was responsible for the children’s injuries, we will 

not re-weigh the evidence the evidence and substitute or judgment for the 

fact-finder.5 See Bragg, 133 A.3d at 330. Accordingly, we conclude that

Appellant is not entitled to relief on this claim.

Weight of the Evidence

Appellant next argues that the jury’s verdict was against the weight of 

the evidence. Appellant’s Brief at 20. Specifically, Appellant reiterates that 

although C.B. accused Appellant of abuse at trial, C.B. had previously 

identified Sharee Brinson as the perpetrator when she was first interviewed at 

the hospital. Id. at 21. Appellant also notes that F.B. denied that Appellant 

had abused her at trial. Id. Therefore, Appellant concludes that “the evidence 

that should have been given the most weight were C.B.’s statements at the 

hospital, which was closer in time to the abuse she endured,” and were not 

influenced by “other people’s suggestiveness.” Id.

When reviewing a challenge to the weight of the evidence, we are 

governed by the following standard:

When reviewing a challenge to the weight of the evidence, we 

review the trial court’s exercise of discretion. A reversal of a 

verdict is not necessary unless it is so contrary to the evidence as 

to shock one’s sense of justice. The weight of the evidence is 

exclusively for the finder of fact, who is free to believe all, none 

____________________________________________

5 To the extent Appellant asks this Court to focus on inconsistencies in the 

victims’ testimonies, we reiterate that any question of credibility is within the 

exclusive province of the factfinder, and this Court will not disturb the 

factfinder’s credibility determination. Bragg, 133 A.3d at 331.
J-S43040-22

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or some of the evidence and to determine the credibility of the 

witnesses. The fact-finder also has the responsibility of resolving 

contradictory testimony and questions of credibility. We give 

great deference to the trial court’s decision regarding a weight of 

the evidence claim because it had the opportunity to hear and see 

the evidence presented.

Commonwealth v. Roane, 204 A.3d 998, 1001 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citations 

omitted and formatting altered).

Here, the trial court addressed Appellant’s claim as follows:

The cumulative evidence that had been presented by the 

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania was credible, convincing, and 

compelling. Neither the conviction for the aggravated assault on 

C.B. nor any of the other verdicts shocked anyone’s sense of 

fairness or justice. The record is replete with testimonial evidence 

that thoroughly disproved Appellant’s defense theory and 

repeated attempts to pass fault onto her sister. As stated, both 

children presented credible testimony identifying Appellant as the 

source of their injuries. . . . Testimony further corroborated by 

[E.A.] and [D.B.’s] observations of the girls’ appearance, [D.B.] 

and N.B. confirming both girls were indeed in Appellant’s care, and 

expert testimony by Dr. Henry affirming that their injuries were 

caused intentionally and indicated abuse. The cumulative 

evidence of guilt was overpowering. Thus, the evidence 

sufficiently established all charges of which Appellant was found 

guilty and that no trial court error had been committed because 

none of the jury’s verdicts had been entered against the weight of 

the evidence. Since no error has been committed, no remedy is 

warranted.

Trial Ct. Op. at 34 (formatting altered).

Based on our review of the record, we discern no abuse of discretion by 

the trial court in rejecting Appellant’s weight claim. See Roane, 204 A.3d at 

1001. Although Appellant claims that C.B.’s statements at the hospital were 

“more reliable,” we will not reweigh or disturb the trial court’s credibility 
J-S43040-22

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determinations on appeal. See id. Accordingly, Appellant is not entitled to 

relief on this claim.

Discretionary Aspects of Sentence

In her final issue, Appellant raises a challenge to the discretionary 

aspects of her sentence. Appellant’s Brief at 21. Specifically, Appellant argues 

that the trial court failed to consider sentencing factors such as the protection 

of the public or Appellant’s rehabilitative needs. Id. at 23-24. Appellant also 

argues that the trial court “focused solely on the seriousness of the offenses 

and the impact of the victim to the exclusion of all mitigating factors” and did 

not give any consideration to the mitigating factors contained in the PSI 

report. Id. Additionally, Appellant contends that the trial court failed to state 

sufficient reasons for imposing Appellant’s sentence or provide an adequate 

justification for deviating from the sentencing guidelines when it imposed a 

sentence in excess of the aggravated range. Id. at 23.

“[C]hallenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing do not entitle 

an appellant to review as of right.” Commonwealth v. Derry, 150 A.3d 987, 

991 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citations omitted). Before reaching the merits of such 

claims, we must determine: 

(1) whether the appeal is timely; (2) whether Appellant preserved 

[her] issues; (3) whether Appellant’s brief includes a [Pa.R.A.P. 

2119(f)] concise statement of the reasons relied upon for 

allowance of appeal with respect to the discretionary aspects of 

sentence; and (4) whether the concise statement raises a 

substantial question that the sentence is inappropriate under the 

sentencing code. 
J-S43040-22

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Commonwealth v. Corley, 31 A.3d 293, 296 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citations 

omitted).

“To preserve an attack on the discretionary aspects of sentence, an 

appellant must raise his issues at sentencing or in a post-sentence motion. 

Issues not presented to the sentencing court are waived and cannot be raised 

for the first time on appeal.” Commonwealth v. Malovich, 903 A.2d 1247, 

1251 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citations omitted); see also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) 

(stating that “[i]ssues not raised in the trial court are waived and cannot be 

raised for the first time on appeal”).

“The determination of what constitutes a substantial question must be 

evaluated on a case-by-case basis.” Commonwealth v. Battles, 169 A.3d 

1086, 1090 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted). “A substantial question 

exists only when the appellant advances a colorable argument that the 

sentencing judge’s actions were either: (1) inconsistent with a specific 

provision of the Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary to the fundamental norms 

which underlie the sentencing process.” Commonwealth v. Grays, 167 A.3d 

793, 816 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted).

Here, the record reflects that Appellant preserved her sentencing claim 

in a post-sentence motion, filed a timely notice of appeal, and included the 

issue in her Rule 1925(b) statement. Appellant has also included a Rule 

2119(f) statement in her brief. Further, we conclude that Appellant has raised 

a substantial question for review. See Commonwealth v. Goggins, 748 

A.2d 721, 728 (Pa. Super. 2000) (en banc) (claim that trial court double-
J-S43040-22

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counted factors already taken into account in sentencing guidelines 

constitutes a substantial question); Commonwealth v. Mulkin, 228 A.3d 

913, 916 (Pa. Super. 2020) (claim that court imposed aggravated-range 

sentence without considering mitigating factors is a substantial question); 

Commonwealth v. Proctor, 156 A.3d 261, 273 (Pa. Super. 2017) 

(substantial question raised where the appellant argues that sentencing court 

failed to set forth adequate reasons for sentence imposed).

Our well-settled standard of review is as follows:

Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the 

sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal 

absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse 

of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather, 

the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, that the 

sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its 

judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or 

arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.

Additionally, our review of the discretionary aspects of a sentence 

is confined by the statutory mandates of 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9781(c) 

and (d). Subsection 9781(c) provides:

The appellate court shall vacate the sentence and remand

the case to the sentencing court with instructions if it finds:

(1) the sentencing court purported to sentencing within 

the sentencing guidelines but applied the guidelines 

erroneously;

(2) the sentencing court sentenced within the sentencing 

guidelines but the case involves circumstances where the 

application of the guidelines would be clearly 

unreasonable; or 

(3) the sentencing court sentenced outside the 

sentencing guidelines and the sentence is unreasonable.

In all other cases the appellate court shall affirm the 

sentence imposed by the sentencing court.
J-S43040-22

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42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(c).

In reviewing the record, we consider:

(1) The nature and circumstances of the offense and the 

history and characteristics of the defendant.

(2) The opportunity of the sentencing court to observe the 

defendant, including any presentence investigation.

(3) The findings upon which the sentence was based.

(4) The guidelines promulgated by the commission.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(d).

Commonwealth v. Raven, 97 A.3d 1244, 1253-54 (Pa. Super. 2014) (some 

citations omitted and some formatting altered).

“When imposing a sentence, the sentencing court must consider the 

factors set out in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b), [including] the protection of the public, 

[the] gravity of offense in relation to impact on victim and community, and 

[the] rehabilitative needs of the defendant.” Commonwealth v. Fullin, 892 

A.2d 843, 847 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citation omitted and formatting altered). 

Additionally, the trial court “must consider the sentencing guidelines.” Id. at 

848 (citation omitted). Where a PSI report exists, this Court will “presume 

that the sentencing judge was aware of relevant information regarding the 

defendant’s character and weighed those considerations along with mitigating 

statutory factors.” Commonwealth v. Watson, 228 A.3d 928, 936 (Pa. 

Super. 2020) (citation omitted). 

Additionally, this Court has explained that

the sentencing court is required to consider the sentence ranges 

set forth in the sentencing guidelines, but it [is] not bound by the 
J-S43040-22

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sentencing guidelines. The court may deviate from the 

recommended guidelines; they are “merely one factor among 

many that the court must consider in imposing a sentence.” A 

court may depart from the guidelines “if necessary, to fashion a 

sentence which takes into account the protection of the public, the 

rehabilitative needs of the defendant, and the gravity of the 

particular offense as it relates to the impact on the life of the 

victim and the community.” When a court chooses to depart from 

the guidelines[,] however, it must “demonstrate on the record, as 

a proper starting point, [its] awareness of the sentencing 

guidelines.” Further, the court must “provide a contemporaneous 

written statement of the reason or reasons for the deviation from 

the guidelines.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b).

Commonwealth v. Sheller, 961 A.2d 187, 190 (Pa. Super. 2008) (some 

citations omitted and formatting altered). “The requirement that the court 

provide a contemporaneous written statement is satisfied when the judge 

states his [or her] reasons for the sentence on the record and in the 

defendant’s presence.” Commonwealth v. Durazo, 210 A.3d 316, 321 (Pa. 

Super. 2019) (citations and quotation marks omitted).

“When reviewing a sentence outside of the guidelines, the essential 

question is whether the sentence imposed was [un]reasonable.” Id. (citations 

omitted). “A sentence may be found unreasonable if it fails to properly 

account for” the four statutory factors of Section 9781(d). Sheller, 961 A.2d 

at 191. “Even if the sentencing court relied on factors that were subsumed 

into the guideline recommendation, . . . there is no abuse of discretion when 

the sentencing court has significant other support for its departure from the 

sentencing guidelines.” Id. at 192 (citations omitted). Finally, we note that 

a sentencing court is not required to ignore context and impose a sentence in 

a vacuum, where the offense at issue and the corresponding sentencing 
J-S43040-22

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guidelines are the only factors permissibly considered by a sentencing court. 

Commonwealth v. Hardy, 939 A.2d 974, 980 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation 

omitted).

Here, the record reflects that the trial court ordered a PSI report, which 

it reviewed prior to sentencing. N.T. Sentencing Hr’g, 7/9/19, at 6. At the 

sentencing hearing, the trial court also noted that it had reviewed “extensive” 

reports from DHS, a mental health assessment, and the sentencing guidelines 

applicable to each conviction. Id. at 6, 25.

The trial court further noted the following:

The road to rehabilitation, [Appellant], beings with acceptance of 

responsibility for one’s actions and indeed remorse for one’s 

actions. I have seen zero from you. Not only that, within the DHS 

reports and assessments, the multiple comments, particularly 

yours to this day, you still deny that you even had care of these 

children, which really, really, given all that has occurred, is most 

shocking.

You have a right to a trial, absolutely. You’re not being penalized 

for a trial, but as I told you before the mitigating circumstance of 

acceptance of responsibility is not present here. More 

importantly, when I evaluate what to do here, I evaluate the 

person that is before me. I evaluate the net effect of what that 

person did. I understand that to a degree you had to have been 

overwhelmed, which, you know, identifies one of the issues here, 

but you went out of your way to take out your anger on two lovely 

little children who did absolutely nothing to deserve your wrath.

And I am struck by the fact that when the efforts of [W.B.’s] family 

members, particularly their Aunt [D.B.], after being — trying to 

locate these children, you actively hid them along with members 

of your family. There was no reason to do that except to cover 

up what you were doing. That, to me, indicates a particular 

mindset that is most disturbing. The net effect upon those two 

lovely little girls is life-lasting. You didn’t just keep them in an 

unkempt situation, their conditions were horrific. You wouldn’t 
J-S43040-22

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put any animal or any human being in those conditions. And you 

repeatedly beat them.

* * *

So I looked at the all the circumstances here from beginning to 

end. And, quite frankly, that was why, to this day, I still have a 

great concern for your children, because I do agree with your 

counsel that some of the methods of how we deal with anger are 

learned behavior. . . . 

This situation occurred because [W.B.] chose you instead of her 

family members to take care of her two girls. And the 

machinations that that family had to go through to get them back 

before something worse happened should never have occurred. I 

blame you for that. That was intentional. So for you at this point 

in time to continually say I, I, I, I, I, indicates to me you are 

nowhere near having any understanding or comprehension of 

what you did wrong, or care of others aside from yourself. That 

is most disturbing.

Because I would think that someone in your position before [the 

trial court] at this point in time would have reflected otherwise. 

So I do agree with your counsel that you do need direction, but 

for every action there is a reaction. For every form of behavior, 

there’s a consequence. And I don’t agree that we should lower 

the bar of expected behavior based upon our upbringing. Because 

if we were to lower behavior to suit bad behavior, the only thing 

that happens is it’s lowered behavior and less care. You had a 

responsibility to those children. If you couldn’t deal with the 

responsibility, all you had to do was give them back before 

something bad happened instead of taking out your rage on them. 

I do not wish to take any mom from a child. Sometimes it’s 

needed. This is one of them.

Id. at 21-25.

In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court explained:

[Appellant] has made no demonstration that [the trial court] 

abused its discretion when imposing the respective sentences. As 

the record reflected cogent sentencing factors and rationales [sic] 

reasons had been recited. [The trial court] considered the 

aggravating and mitigating circumstances after [it] acknowledged 

full review of the prepared investigatory reports and mental health 
J-S43040-22

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assessments. The gravity of the offense and the ongoing impact 

Appellant’s actions had on the children and their family and the 

recommended Sentencing Guidelines that had been applicable had 

been reviewed and incorporated. Additional conditions ordered by 

[the trial court] included that Appellant receive continual anger 

management classes, and parenting classes, to help ensure her 

ability to reemerge as a productive member of society. [The trial 

court] weighed all relevant factors required and determined a 

sentence that fell far beneath the statutory maximum.

Trial Ct. Op. at 38.

Based on our review of the record, we discern no abuse of discretion by 

the trial court. See Raven, 97 A.3d at 1253-54. The record reflects that the 

trial court considered the PSI report, the appropriate sentencing factors, and 

the mitigating evidence presented at the sentencing hearing. See Fullin, 892 

A.2d at 849-50; see also Watson, 228 A.3d at 936 (stating that, where a 

PSI report exists, this Court will “presume that the sentencing judge was 

aware of relevant information regarding the defendant’s character and 

weighed those considerations along with mitigating statutory factors” (citation 

omitted)). Additionally, we note that the record reflects that the trial court 

demonstrated that it was aware of Appellant’s sentencing guidelines, having 

explicitly referenced the mitigated, standard, and aggravated range sentence 

for each of Appellant’s offenses. See N.T. Sentencing Hr’g at 25. Ultimately, 

the trial court explained that an aggregate sentence of three to eleven years’ 

incarceration was necessary in light of the circumstances of this case and the 

ongoing impact that Appellant’s actions had on the minor victims. See
J-S43040-22

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Durazo, 210 A.3d at 321; Sheller, 961 A.2d at 190.

6

 Under these 

circumstances, because the trial court’s findings are supported by the record,

we have no basis to conclude that the trial court’s sentences or application of 

the guidelines was unreasonable. See Raven, 97 A.3d at 1253-54. For these 

reasons, Appellant is not entitled to relief. Accordingly, we affirm.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/24/2023

____________________________________________

6 Appellant’s sentencing guidelines reflect that the sentence imposed for the 

aggravated assault charges was in excess of the aggravated 

range. See Commonwealth v. Beatty, 227 A.3d 1277, 1288 (Pa. Super.

2020) (explaining that “[w]hen deviating from the sentencing guidelines, a 

trial judge must indicate that he [or she] understands the suggested ranges” 

(citations omitted)).