UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

AFFINITY FINANCIAL : 

CORPORATION et al., : 

 : 

Petitioners, : Civil Action No.: 10-2055 (RMU) 

 : 

 v. : Re Document Nos.: 18, 21 

 : 

AARP FINANCIAL, INC., : 

 : 

 Respondent. : 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

GRANTING THE PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS; GRANTING THE 

PETITIONER’S SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS

This matter is before the court on the petitioners’ two motions for attorney’s fees and 

costs. The petitioners are Affinity Financial Corporation and Waterfield Financial Services. 

Pet. ¶ 1. The respondent is AARP Financial, Inc. In August 2006, Affinity entered into a 

contract with the respondent under which Affinity would provide financial services to AARP 

members. Id. ¶ 3. Affinity then assigned its contractual rights to Waterfield. Id. ¶ 4. Following 

a contractual dispute, the parties agreed to undergo arbitration. Id. ¶ 6. In October 2010, a panel 

of three arbitrators unanimously found in favor of the petitioners and awarded them a total of 

$2.75 million in damages. Resp.’s Opp’n, Ex. E at 3. 

Soon thereafter, the petitioners sought an order from this court to affirm the award, see 

generally Pet., and the respondent filed a contemporaneous motion to vacate the award, see 

generally Resp.’s Mot. to Vacate the Arbitration Award. In addition, both parties requested an 

award of reasonable attorney’s fees and costs under D.C. Code § 16-4225(c). Pet. ¶ 19; Resp.’s 

Reply at 8. In July 2011, this court granted the petition to affirm the arbitrator’s award and 
2 

denied the respondent’s motion. See generally Mem. Op. (July 1, 2011). The court also granted 

the petitioners leave to seek reasonable attorney’s fees, costs and post-judgment interest. Id. at 

9-10. Four weeks later, the respondent filed a notice of appeal. See generally Notice of Appeal. 

The petitioners have now filed two motions that collectively seek $30,419.82 in 

attorney’s fees and litigation costs.1 See generally Pets.’ Mot. for Atty’s Fees; Pets.’ Suppl. Mot. 

for Atty’s Fees. The respondent contends that the court’s underlying decision to confirm the 

arbitration award was incorrectly decided and is therefore pursuing an appeal. Resp.’s Supp. 

Opp’n at 1. For the purposes of the present motions, however, the respondent stipulates that the 

amount of attorney’s fees and costs is reasonable.2

 Id. 

 In a judicial proceeding to confirm or vacate an arbitration award, the court “may add 

reasonable attorney’s fees and other reasonable expenses of litigation incurred” to its judgment. 

D.C. CODE § 16-4425(c); Foulger–Pratt Presidential Contracting, LLC, v. Madrigal Condos., 

2011 WL 1576095, at *22 (D.D.C. Apr. 27, 2011) (granting attorney’s fees after confirming an 

arbitration award). To receive such an award, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d) requires 

that a party file a motion with the court. FED. R. CIV. P. 54(d)(2)(A). That motion “must specify 

the judgment and the statute, rule, or other grounds entitling the movant to the award.” FED. R.

CIV. P. 54(d)(2)(B)(ii). It must also state the amount sought in attorney’s fees or provide a fair 

estimate of such amount. FED. R. CIV. P. 54(d)(2)(B)(iii); see also Herbin v. District of 

Columbia, 2006 WL 890673, at *2 (D.D.C. Apr. 4, 2006). 

 

1

 The petitioners’ second motion fixes a minor error that was present in their first motion, such that 

the two motions may effectively be treated as one. 

2

 It is the court’s understanding that the respondent seeks an expeditious judgment on the 

petitioners’ motions so that the respondent may simultaneously appeal this court’s affirmance of 

the arbitration award and its award of attorney’s fees and costs. 
3 

The petitioner has filed proper motions that specify both the judgment and the statute that 

entitle the petitioners to the award of attorney’s fees and other reasonable costs. See generally

Pets.’ Mot. for Atty’s Fees; Pets.’ Supp. Mot. for Atty’s Fees. The petitioner has submitted 

affidavits and detailed billing records documenting the number of hours the petitioners’ counsel 

expended on this litigation. Pets.’ Mot. for Atty’s Fees, Ex. A, A-2; Pets.’ Supp. Mot. for Atty’s 

Fees at 4-15. In addition, the petitioners have shown that their counsel’s billing rates were 

within the range of hourly fees suggested by the Laffey Matrix, a fact that strongly suggests that 

their hourly fees are consonant with prevailing market rates.3

 See Covington v. District of 

Columbia, 57 F.3d 1101, 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Rooths v. District of Columbia, 2011 WL 

2539292, at *4 (D.D.C. Aug. 9, 2011); Pets.’ Mot. for Atty’s Fees, Ex. A-1. The court has 

reviewed these submissions and concludes that the petitioners’ request for fees and costs is 

reasonable.

 Accordingly, the court grants the petitioners’ motions and awards them $30,419.82 in 

attorney’s fees and litigation costs. An Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is 

separately and contemporaneously issued this 7th day of October, 2011. 

 RICARDO M. URBINA 

 United States District Judge 

 

3

 The “Laffey Matrix” is compiled by the Office of the United States Attorney for the District of 

Columbia, and it establishes a market rate for attorneys of various experience levels for particular 

“billing” years. It has its origin in the decision in Laffey v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 572 F. Supp. 354 

(D.D.C. 1983), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 746 F.2d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1984).