United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 

2009-7107 

MICHAEL ARZIO, 

Claimant-Appellant, 

v. 

ERIC K. SHINSEKI, Secretary of Veterans Affairs, 

Respondent-Appellee. 

Kenneth M. Carpenter, Carpenter, Chartered, of Topeka, Kansas argued for 

claimant-appellant. 

Scott D. Austin, Senior Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil 

Division, United States Department of Justice, of Washington, DC, argued for 

respondent-appellee. With him on the brief were Tony West, Assistant Attorney 

General, Jeanne E. Davidson, Director, and Martin F. Hockey, Jr., Assistant Director. 

Of counsel on the brief were David J. Barrans, Deputy Assistant General Counsel, and 

Amanda R. Blackmon, Attorney, Office of the General Counsel, United States 

Department of Veterans Affairs, of Washington, DC. 

Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims 

Judge Robert N. Davis 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 

 

 

2009-7107 

 

 

MICHAEL ARZIO, 

 Claimant-Appellant, 

v. 

ERIC K. SHINSEKI, Secretary of Veterans Affairs, 

 Respondent-Appellee. 

Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims in 07-1844, 

 Judge Robert N. Davis. 

______________________ 

DECIDED: April 19, 2010 

_______________________ 

Before MAYER, CLEVENGER, and MOORE, Circuit Judges. 

MAYER, Circuit Judge. 

Michael Arzio appeals the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for 

Veterans Claims (“Veterans Court”) which affirmed a decision of the Board of Veterans’ 

Appeals denying his claim for disability compensation for post-traumatic stress disorder 

(“PTSD”). See Arzio v. Shinseki, No. 07-1844, 2009 U.S. App. Vet. Claims LEXIS 

438 (Vet. App. Mar. 25, 2009). We affirm. 
BACKGROUND 

 Arzio served in the United States Army from October 1959 to April 1960 and in 

the United States Navy from August 1960 to June 1962. He did not participate in 

combat. 

 In December 1960, Arzio reported to sick bay complaining of pain in his right 

foot. The examiner found no abnormalities on examination and recorded a clinical 

impression of “psychoneurosis.” Arzio was subsequently seen for an orthopedic 

evaluation of reported pain in his right leg. The examiner noted that he seemed “very 

anxious and apprehensive,” and stated that he believed Arzio had “a type of conversion 

reaction [and] possibly needs psychiatric eval[uation] since his symptoms seem . . . to 

be out of proportion to any organic difficulties he is having.” Subsequent examiners 

reported that Arzio seemed “quite nervous,” and that his claims of chest pain likely had 

a “psychogenic origin.” A January 1962 medical report indicated that his asserted 

gastrointestinal pain was likely a “psychophysical reaction.” When Arzio was 

discharged from the Navy in June 1962, however, he was evaluated as psychiatrically 

normal.

 Twenty-eight years later, in September 1990, Arzio filed a claim seeking disability 

compensation for PTSD. A Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office (“RO”) 

denied his claim, concluding that he had failed to establish that his PTSD was incurred 

in, or aggravated by, his military service. In January 2001, however, the board 

reopened the claim, concluding that Arzio had presented new and material evidence, 

including “a substantial quantity of medical documentation from private and [Veterans 

Administration] physicians relating to [Arzio’s] ongoing care for psychiatric problems 

2009-7107 2
including PTSD.” See 38 U.S.C. § 5108 (“If new and material evidence is presented or 

secured with respect to a claim which has been disallowed, the Secretary shall reopen 

the claim and review the former disposition of the claim.”). On remand, the RO 

acknowledged that Arzio was receiving treatment for PTSD and other psychiatric 

problems, but denied his claim for service-connected benefits on the ground that Arzio 

“ha[d] not provided any specific information that could be used to verify” his claimed inservice stressors. The board affirmed, concluding that “[t]he contemporaneous military 

evidence does not corroborate the veteran’s claim that he engaged in combat with an 

enemy and shows that the veteran’s claims of in-service stressors are not creditable.” 

In January 2004, the Veterans Court granted the parties’ joint motion to vacate 

the board’s decision and remanded the case for further development. On remand, the 

board again determined that Arzio had failed to show that he suffered from a verified 

stressor during his military service and that he was therefore not entitled to disability 

compensation for PTSD. 

Arzio then appealed to the Veterans Court. He did not contest the board’s 

determination that he had failed to produce credible evidence of an in-service stressor, 

but argued that service connection for PTSD could be established, pursuant to 38 

C.F.R. § 3.303, without evidence that any in-service stressor occurred. The Veterans 

Court, however, rejected this argument, concluding that a veteran cannot establish 

entitlement to service connection for PTSD without meeting the requirements of 38 

C.F.R. § 3.304(f), including credible evidence of an in-service stressor. 

2009-7107 3
DISCUSSION 

In reviewing a judgment of the Veterans Court, this court is vested with 

jurisdiction to “decide all relevant questions of law, including interpreting constitutional 

and statutory provisions.” 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(1). We conduct a de novo review of the 

court’s legal determinations. See Buchanan v. Nicholson, 451 F.3d 1331, 1334 (Fed. 

Cir. 2006); Andre v. Principi, 301 F.3d 1354, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 

Arzio challenges the Veterans Court’s interpretation of 38 C.F.R. § 3.303 and 38 

C.F.R. § 3.304(f). He contends that the court erroneously concluded that the general 

requirements for service connection contained in section 3.303 are subordinate to the 

specific requirements for establishing service connection for PTSD contained in section 

3.304(f). In essence, Arzio argues that sections 3.303 and 3.304(f) provide alternative 

methods by which a veteran may obtain service-connected benefits for PTSD. 

We find this argument unpersuasive. The plain language of section 3.304(f) 

mandates that a veteran provide credible supporting evidence of an in-service stressor 

in order to establish service connection for PTSD. It provides: 

Service connection for posttraumatic stress disorder requires medical 

evidence diagnosing the condition in accordance with § 4.125(a) of this 

chapter; a link, established by medical evidence, between current 

symptoms and an in-service stressor; and credible supporting evidence 

that the claimed in-service stressor occurred. 

38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f) (emphasis added). 

This language contains no ambiguity. Section 3.304(f) does not state that a 

veteran “may” provide credible evidence of an in-service stressor in order to establish 

service connection for PTSD. Instead, by stating that such evidence is “require[d],” 

section 3.304(f) makes clear that credible evidence of an in-service stressor is a 

2009-7107 4
mandatory or compulsory element in any claim for disability compensation for PTSD. 

See Golz v. Shinseki, 590 F.3d 1317, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“Service connection for 

PTSD is awarded when the record before VA contains . . . credible supporting evidence 

that the claimed in-service stressor actually occurred . . . .”); Stone v. Nicholson, 480 

F.3d 1111, 1114 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“Section 3.304(f)(3) requires credible supporting 

evidence of the occurrence of the in-service stressor in PTSD claims.”); Nat’l Org. of 

Veterans’ Advocates, Inc. v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, 330 F.3d 1345, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 

2003) (“Section 3.304(f) requires that, in non-combat-related PTSD claims, ‘credible 

supporting evidence’ in addition to lay evidence is needed to confirm a veteran’s 

statements as to the occurrence of an in-service stressor.”). 

This court has previously determined that section 3.304(f), including the 

requirement of credible evidence of an in-service stressor, is consistent with governing 

statutes and is a valid exercise of the authority of the Secretary of Veterans Affairs “to 

promulgate regulations with respect to the nature and extent of proof and evidence 

necessary to establish entitlement to veterans benefits.” Nat’l Org. of Veterans’ 

Advocates, 330 F.3d at 1351 (citing 38 U.S.C. § 501(a)(1)). Arzio thus does not urge us 

to declare section 3.304(f) invalid, but instead asserts that because his service records 

contain evidence that he suffered from psychiatric difficulties while on active duty, he 

should be allowed to establish service connection under section 3.303 even without 

providing credible evidence of an in-service stressor. 

The problem with this argument is that there is nothing in section 3.303—which is 

a broad regulatory provision addressing general service connection principles—that 

2009-7107 5
suggests that a veteran can establish service connection for PTSD without meeting the 

criteria enumerated in section 3.304(f). Section 3.303 provides: 

Principles relating to service connection. 

 (a) General. Service connection connotes many factors but basically it 

means that the facts, shown by evidence, establish that a particular injury 

or disease resulting in disability was incurred coincident with service in the 

Armed Forces, or if preexisting such service, was aggravated therein. 

This may be accomplished by affirmatively showing inception or 

aggravation during service or through the application of statutory 

presumptions. Each disabling condition shown by a veteran’s service 

records, or for which he seeks a service connection must be considered 

on the basis of the places, types and circumstances of his service as 

shown by service records, the official history of each organization in which 

he served, his medical records and all pertinent medical and lay evidence. 

Determinations as to service connection will be based on review of the 

entire evidence of record, with due consideration to the policy of the 

Department of Veterans Affairs to administer the law under a broad and 

liberal interpretation consistent with the facts in each individual case. 

38 C.F.R. § 3.303. 

Section 3.303 contains no language indicating that it is intended to operate 

independently of, or as an alternative to, other regulations establishing the specific 

criteria under which service connection for particular conditions, such as PTSD, can be 

established. To the contrary, section 3.303 states that it sets forth “[g]eneral” principles 

related to service connection and provides a “basic[]” definition of a service-connected 

disability. Indeed, section 3.304 specifically acknowledges that “[t]he basic 

considerations relating to service connection are stated in [section] 3.303,” but 

nonetheless provides additional prerequisites for establishing service connection for 

particular circumstances and conditions such as PTSD. Thus, when sections 3.303 and 

3.304 are read together, it is evident that they do not provide alternative methods of 

establishing service connection, but instead work in tandem to delineate the 

2009-7107 6
circumstances under which a veteran can establish service connection for PTSD. See

Barela v. Shinseki, 584 F.3d 1379, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“When interpreting a statute 

. . . courts must consider not only the bare meaning of each word but also the 

placement and purpose of the language within the statutory scheme. The meaning of 

statutory language . . . depends on context.” (citations omitted)). Simply put, while 

section 3.303 mandates that there be a link between a current disability and military 

service, section 3.304(f) sets forth the evidence necessary, in the context of claims for 

PTSD disability compensation, to establish that link. 

A basic tenet of statutory construction is that a specific statute takes precedence 

over a more general one. See Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 384 

(1992) (“[I]t is a commonplace of statutory construction that the specific governs the 

general.”); HCSC-Laundry v. United States, 450 U.S. 1, 6 (1981) (per curiam) (“[I]t is a 

basic principle of statutory construction that a specific statute . . . controls over a 

general provision . . . particularly when the two are interrelated and closely positioned.”); 

Busic v. United States, 446 U.S. 398, 406 (1980) (“[A] more specific statute will be given 

precedence over a more general one.”); Carpenter v. Principi, 327 F.3d 1371, 1374 

(Fed. Cir. 2003) (“Where there is no clear intention otherwise, a specific statute will not 

be controlled or nullified by a general one.” (citations and internal quotation marks 

omitted)). This canon of construction applies to the interpretation of regulations as well 

as statutes. See Smith v. Brown, 35 F.3d 1516, 1523 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Here, the 

specific requirements of section 3.304(f)—including the requirement of a verified inservice stressor—take precedence over the general principles related to service 

connection set forth in section 3.303. 

2009-7107 7
Combee v. Brown, 34 F.3d 1039 (Fed. Cir. 1994), upon which Arzio relies, is 

inapposite. There this court held that 38 C.F.R. § 3.311 provides for “presumptive 

service connection” when a veteran, who was exposed to radiation as a result of 

atmospheric testing or service in Hiroshima or Nagasaki, develops one of a number of 

specified “radiogenic” diseases. 34 F.3d at 1043. We determined that even if a veteran 

did not qualify for a presumption of service connection under section 3.311, he was 

entitled to attempt to establish direct service connection pursuant to section 3.303. We 

explained that section 3.311 was intended to be a “liberalization[]” of the requirements 

for establishing service connection pursuant to section 3.303 when a veteran, who was 

exposed to radiation, later developed one of several diseases which had been linked to 

radiation exposure. Id. at 1044. We noted, moreover, that section 3.311 originally 

“ensur[ed] that veterans could continue to show service connection directly” by explicitly 

stating that it should not “be construed to prevent the establishment of service 

connection for any injury or disease otherwise shown by sound scientific or medical 

evidence to have been incurred or aggravated during active service.” Id.; see also

Ramey v. Gober, 120 F.3d 1239, 1247-48 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 

The present case differs from Combee in two fundamental respects. First, there 

is no indication that section 3.304(f) was intended to be a “liberalization” of the rules 

applicable to service connection. To the contrary, instead of providing for a 

presumption of service connection, section 3.304(f) restricts the situations in which 

disability compensation can be awarded by providing very specific criteria for 

establishing that a veteran’s PTSD was incurred in service. Second, there is no 

regulatory provision stating that section 3.304(f) should not be construed to prevent a 

2009-7107 8
2009-7107 9

veteran from establishing direct service connection under section 3.303. Instead, as 

noted previously, by providing that credible evidence of an in-service stressor is 

“require[d],” section 3.304(f) makes such evidence a mandatory component in 

establishing service connection for PTSD. 

CONCLUSION 

Accordingly, the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans 

Claims is affirmed. 

COSTS 

No costs. 

AFFIRMED