J-S24003-20

J-S24004-20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

RONSEAN JOHNSON 

Appellant

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 3079 EDA 2019

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered September 17, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-1303639-2006

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

RONSEAN JOHNSON 

Appellant

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 3080 EDA 2019

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered September 17, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-1303640-2006

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., STABILE, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED JULY 10, 2020

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S24003-20

J-S24004-20

- 2 -

Appellant, Ronsean Johnson, appeals pro se from the post-conviction 

court’s order denying his timely-filed petition under the Post Conviction Relief 

Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.1 After careful review, we affirm.

The PCRA court summarized the pertinent facts and procedural history 

of this case in its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion, as follows:

By way of background, Appellant and his co-defendant[,]

Darrien Deans[,] appeared before this [c]ourt and a jury in

February of 2008, and were both convicted of two counts of first[-

]degree murder and a single count of criminal conspiracy. A 

penalty hearing followed and the jury could not reach a unanimous 

decision on the penalty. On April 16, 2008, this [c]ourt sentenced

Appellant to life imprisonment on both murder convictions, which 

sentences were directed to be served consecutively. Appellant 

also received a concurrent sentence of ten to twenty years’

incarceration on the conspiracy charge.

Briefly, the facts adduced at trial indicated that on October 

2, 2006, Appellant and Deans approached William Hilton and 

Darnell DeLoatch in the 1700 block of South 55th Street in 

Philadelphia and shot both of them to death. The Commonwealth 

presented numerous witnesses who implicated Appellant in the 

crime.

After being sentenced, Appellant filed a notice of appeal to 

the Superior Court, which on September 1, 2009, affirmed the 

judgment of sentence. [Commonwealth v. Johnson, 986 A.2d 

1257 (Pa. Super. 2009) (unpublished memorandum)]. 

[Appellant] did not file a petition for allowance of appeal. 

Appellant did[,] however[,] file a petition pursuant to the ... 

____________________________________________

1 Appellant was charged in two cases that were consolidated for trial. He 

properly filed separate notices of appeal at each docket number. See

Commonwealth v. Walker, 185 A.3d 969, 977 (Pa. 2018) (“[T]he proper 

practice under Rule 341(a) is to file separate appeals from an order that 

resolves issues arising on more than one docket. The failure to do so requires 

the appellate court to quash the appeal.”). As Appellant raises identical issues 

in each case, we hereby consolidate his appeals sua sponte.
J-S24003-20

J-S24004-20

- 3 -

[PCRA], the filing of which culminated in the issuance of an order 

granting him the right to file a petition for allowance of appeal 

nunc pro tunc. Appellant thereafter filed said petition and[,] on 

November 8, 2012, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied the 

petition. [Commonwealth v. Johnson, 56 A.3d 396 (Pa. 2012)].

On June 21, 2013, Appellant filed a timely[,] pro se PCRA 

petition and counsel was appointed to represent him.... On 

September 11, 2017, appointed counsel filed a no-merit letter 

pursuant to Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa.

1988), and Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super.

1988).[2] After carefully reviewing the record and counsel’s nomerit letter[,] this [c]ourt determined that the issues Appellant 

set forth in his PCRA petition did not entitle him to relief and[,] on 

November 15, 2017, this [c]ourt sent [Appellant] a Pa.R.Crim.P. 

907 notice of intention to dismiss [his petition without a hearing]. 

Appellant filed a [pro se] response to the notice on December 4, 

2017....

Although this [c]ourt had not issued an order dismissing his 

PCRA petition, on January 31, 2018, Appellant filed pro se a notice 

of appeal. On May 18, 2018, the Superior Court quashed that 

appeal because Appellant failed to file a docketing statement.

On May 23, 2018, this [c]ourt issued an order dismissing 

Appellant’s PCRA petition and grant[ing] appointed counsel’s 

petition to withdraw. On June 4, 2018, Appellant filed a motion 

requesting that this [c]ourt rescind its order dismissing his PCRA 

petition because he did not have an opportunity to file a response 

to the 907 notice or the no-merit letter counsel filed. This [c]ourt, 

on June 18, 2018, issued an order rescinding the order of May 23, 

2018, dismissing Appellant’s PCRA petition[,] and grant[ed]

Appellant the right to file a response to the [Rule] 907 notice by 

July 17, 2018. Instead of filing a response to the [Rule] 907 

notice, on June 22, 2018, Appellant filed a notice of appeal.

On September 10, 2019, the Superior Court issued a 

judgment order quashing the appeal because it had not been 

taken from a final order. ... [O]n September 17, 2019, this [c]ourt 

issued a final order disposing of Appellant’s PCRA petition.

____________________________________________

2 The record indicates that this four-year delay was due to changes in 

Appellant’s counsel, court scheduling issues, and continuance requests by 

defense counsel. We urge both counsel and the court to attempt to be more 

expeditious in handling future cases. 
J-S24003-20

J-S24004-20

- 4 -

PCRA Court Opinion (PCO), 10/28/19, at 1-3 (footnote omitted).

Appellant timely filed pro se notices of appeal at each underlying docket 

number. Herein, he raises the following three issues for our review:

I. WAS TRIAL COUNSEL INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO FILE [A]

PRETRIAL MOTION TO SEVER THE TRIALS OF [APPELLANT] AND 

HIS CO[-]DEFENDANT?

II. WAS TRIAL COUNSEL INEFFECTIVE FOR (A) FAILING TO 

MOTION FOR AN IN DEPTH PRETRIAL COMPETENCY HEARING FOR 

CHILD WITNESS[, D.D.,] AND (B) FAILING TO SUBPOENA THE 

WITNESS[’S] FATHER...?

III. WERE BOTH TRIAL AND APPELATE [sic] COUNSEL 

CUMULATIVELY INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO INVESTIGATE AND 

CLARIFY IN DISTINCTION WHO HAD THREATENED 

COMMONWEALTH WITNESS ELISSA CARTER?

Appellant’s Brief at vii.

Preliminarily, we note that “[t]his Court’s standard of review from the 

grant or denial of post-conviction relief is limited to examining whether the 

lower court’s determination is supported by the evidence of record and 

whether it is free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Morales, 701 A.2d 516, 

520 (Pa. 1997) (citing Commonwealth v. Travaglia, 661 A.2d 352, 356 n.4 

(Pa. 1995)). Where, as here, a petitioner claims that he or she received 

ineffective assistance of counsel, our Supreme Court has directed that the 

following standards apply:

[A] PCRA petitioner will be granted relief only when he proves, by 

a preponderance of the evidence, that his conviction or sentence 

resulted from the “[i]neffective assistance of counsel which, in the 

circumstances of the particular case, so undermined the truthdetermining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or 

innocence could have taken place.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2)(ii). 

“Counsel is presumed effective, and to rebut that presumption, 
J-S24003-20

J-S24004-20

- 5 -

the PCRA petitioner must demonstrate that counsel’s performance 

was deficient and that such deficiency prejudiced him.” 

[Commonwealth v.] Colavita, ... 993 A.2d [874,] 886 [(Pa. 

2010)] (citing Strickland [v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 ... 

(1984)]). In Pennsylvania, we have refined the Strickland

performance and prejudice test into a three-part inquiry. See

[Commonwealth v.] Pierce, [527 A.2d 973 (Pa. 1987)]. Thus, 

to prove counsel ineffective, the petitioner must show that: (1) 

his underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) counsel had no 

reasonable basis for his action or inaction; and (3) the petitioner 

suffered actual prejudice as a result. Commonwealth v. Ali, ... 

10 A.3d 282, 291 (Pa. 2010). “If a petitioner fails to prove any of 

these prongs, his claim fails.” Commonwealth v. Simpson, ... 

66 A.3d 253, 260 ([Pa.] 2013) (citation omitted). Generally, 

counsel’s assistance is deemed constitutionally effective if he 

chose a particular course of conduct that had some reasonable 

basis designed to effectuate his client’s interests. See Ali, supra. 

Where matters of strategy and tactics are concerned, “a finding 

that a chosen strategy lacked a reasonable basis is not warranted 

unless it can be concluded that an alternative not chosen offered 

a potential for success substantially greater than the course 

actually pursued.” Colavita, ... 993 A.2d at 887 (quotation and 

quotation marks omitted). To demonstrate prejudice, the 

petitioner must show that “there is a reasonable probability that, 

but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 

proceedings would have been different.” Commonwealth v. 

King, ... 57 A.3d 607, 613 ([Pa.] 2012) (quotation, quotation 

marks, and citation omitted). “‘[A] reasonable probability is a 

probability that is sufficient to undermine confidence in the 

outcome of the proceeding.’” Ali, ... 10 A.3d at 291 (quoting 

Commonwealth v. Collins, ... 957 A.2d 237, 244 ([Pa.] 2008) 

(citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694....)). 

Commonwealth v. Spotz, 84 A.3d 294, 311-12 (Pa. 2014).

Here, in assessing Appellant’s issues, we have reviewed the briefs of the 

parties, the certified record, and applicable case law. We have also examined 

the opinion of the Honorable Jeffrey P. Minehart of the Court of Common Pleas 

of Philadelphia County. We conclude that Judge Minehart’s well-reasoned
J-S24003-20

J-S24004-20

- 6 -

decision adequately addresses the arguments presented by Appellant herein.3 

We also observe that on direct appeal, this Court rejected claims similar to 

those that Appellant raises in this appeal. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 

No. 1517 EDA 2008, unpublished memorandum at 3-4 (Pa. Super. filed Sept. 

1, 2009) (concluding that Appellant was not prejudiced by the admission of 

Deans’ statement that he and “his bull” killed the victims because Appellant 

was not identified in that statement or referred to as Deans’ ‘bull’ at trial, and 

____________________________________________

3 We note that, in regard to Appellant’s third issue, Judge Minehart refers to 

his reasoning in a prior opinion filed on August 8, 2008, during the pendency 

of Appellant’s direct appeal. See PCO at 13 (citing Trial Court Opinion (TCO), 

8/8/08, at 6-7). Therein, Judge Minehart stated:

Under cross-examination by Deans’ counsel, Carter testified that 

the people who had threatened her were sitting on [“the wrong 

side”] of the courtroom. [See N.T. Trial, 2/19/08, at 108.] This 

[c]ourt denied [Appellant’s] motion for a mistrial, instead giving a 

cautionary instruction to the jury that there are no sides in a 

courtroom and that no inference can be made based on where 

someone in the audience is sitting. [Id.] at 121.[] Outside the 

presence of the jury, the prosecutor questioned Carter further 

about these individuals who allegedly were threatening her. 

Considering that the majority of Carter’s testimony on this matter 

was done outside the presence of the jury, any prejudice that may 

have arisen from what the jury did hear was corrected by the 

court’s instruction.

TCO at 6-7 (unnumbered).

Additionally, with respect to Appellant’s argument that his trial counsel 

acted ineffectively by not “draw[ing] out the identity of who [] Carter was 

asked to name” by the people allegedly threatening her, we point out that 

counsel for Appellant’s co-defendant asked Carter this question, and she 

replied: “They never went into detail about what to say. Just somebody else 

did it.” N.T. Trial, 2/19/08, at 109. Thus, because Carter was questioned 

about whom she was asked to name, Appellant’s counsel was not ineffective 

for not questioning her again on this same topic.
J-S24003-20

J-S24004-20

- 7 -

the court provided a cautionary instruction); id. at 5, 6 (rejecting Appellant’s 

claim that a mistrial should have been granted when Carter testified that she 

had been threatened, as Carter “never claimed that [Appellant] or Deans had 

anything to do with the threats she received[,]” and the court had provided 

an “instruction to the jury [that] was sufficient to cure any prejudice”); id. at 

6-7 (deeming meritless Appellant’s argument that D.D. was incompetent to 

testify where “both the Commonwealth and [Appellant] questioned D.D. 

regarding his ability to testify[,”] and the record supported the trial court’s 

determination that D.D. was competent). Accordingly, we adopt the PCRA 

court’s opinion as our own, and affirm its order dismissing Appellant’s petition 

for the reasons set forth therein.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/10/20