ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Taffanee L. Keys Gregory F. Zoeller

Fishers, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana

Jodi Kathryn Stein

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

______________________________________________________________________________

In the

Indiana Supreme Court

_________________________________

No. 29S02-0811-CR-590

THOMAS A. ARMFIELD,

Appellant (Defendant below),

v.

STATE OF INDIANA,

Appellee (Plaintiff below).

_________________________________

Appeal from the Hamilton Superior Court, No. 29D03-0509-FC-384

The Honorable William Greenaway, Judge Pro Tempore

_________________________________

On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 29A02-0802-CR-101

_________________________________

December 18, 2009

Sullivan, Justice.

This case requires us to resolve the issue of when an officer has reasonable suspicion to 

initiate a traffic stop after a routine status check of a license plate reveals that the driver‟s license 

of the registered owner of the vehicle is suspended. We provide the analytical framework to resolve the issue presented here and in another case we decide today, Holly v. State, – N.E.2d –, 

No. 49S02-0811-CR-591, slip op. (Ind. Dec. 18, 2009).
2

Background

At approximately 12:30 a.m. on September 12, 2005, Carmel Police Officer Brian 

Schmidt was patrolling the roads during the night shift verifying vehicle registrations and running checks on license plates. Officer Schmidt ran a license plate check on a 1992 blue GMC, 

which was traveling in the same direction ahead of him. While waiting on the results, Officer 

Schmidt passed the GMC. The license plate check indicated that Thomas Armfield was the registered owner and that he had a lifetime suspension of his driving privileges. Officer Schmidt 

verified that the license plate, make, model, and color of the GMC matched the results from the 

check. He did not have the opportunity to verify anything about the identity of the driver in the 

short time it took for him to pass the GMC.1 Officer Schmidt then asked Officer Michael Flynn, 

who was driving behind him, for assistance with initiating a traffic stop in order to identify the 

driver. Prior to the stop, he provided Officer Flynn the following information: the GMC‟s license plate number, a physical description of the vehicle, and the fact that the registered owner 

had a lifetime suspension of driving privileges.

After Officer Flynn initiated the stop, Officer Schmidt approached the vehicle and asked 

the driver if his name was Tom. The driver replied in the affirmative. Even though the driver 

did not have a physical form of identification, he again stated that he was Thomas Armfield and 

gave Officer Schmidt his date of birth. Officer Schmidt then arrested Armfield and transported 

him to the Hamilton County Jail. The State subsequently charged Armfield with Operating a 

Motor Vehicle After Forfeiture of License for Life, a Class C felony under Indiana Code Section

9-30-10-17. Challenging the validity of the traffic stop, Armfield filed a motion to suppress, 

which the trial court denied after an evidentiary hearing. At trial, the court overruled Armfield‟s 

objection to the testimony from Officer Schmidt regarding the traffic stop. The jury found Armfield guilty, and the trial court sentenced him to six years in the Indiana Department of Correction, with two years to be executed on work release and four years suspended to probation. 

 

1

In addition, Armfield testified at his suppression hearing that “[t]he window tint on that vehicle is dark 

tint, to where at night you would not be able to see through.” (Tr. 13.)
3

Armfield appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the stop was valid 

and that the trial court properly admitted the evidence resulting from the stop because “knowledge that the registered owner of the vehicle has a suspended license is enough to constitute reasonable suspicion for an officer to take the minimal action of initiating a traffic stop.” Armfield 

v. State, 894 N.E.2d 195, 198 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).2 Armfield petitioned for, and we granted, 

transfer, Armfield v. State, 898 N.E.2d 1229 (Ind. 2008) (table), in order to resolve a split in the 

Court of Appeals on the issue of whether a police officer‟s knowledge that the registered owner 

of a vehicle has a suspended license constitutes reasonable suspicion to initiate an investigatory 

traffic stop. 

Discussion

I

Armfield challenges the trial court‟s denial of his motion to suppress the evidence that 

was gathered from the traffic stop (i.e., Officer Schmidt‟s testimony regarding the stop). He argues that the stop violated his Fourth Amendment3

rights because Officer Schmidt‟s knowledge 

that Armfield had a lifetime suspension of driving privileges did not constitute reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to initiate a stop.

4

 His specific contention is that the stop was “imper-

 

2 On appeal, Armfield also raised the issue of whether there was sufficient evidence to support his conviction. The Court of Appeals held that there was sufficient evidence to support Armfield‟s conviction. 

Armfield, 894 N.E.2d at 199. We summarily affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals on this point. 

Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A)(2). 

3 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution states: “The right of the people to be secure in 

their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” This provision applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Krise v. State, 746 N.E.2d 957, 961 (Ind. 2001)

(citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 650 (1961)).

 

4 Armfield also contends for the first time in his petition to transfer that the traffic stop “infringed upon 

[his] privacy rights under Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution.” (Appellant‟s Pet. to Transf.

10.) He presents no arguments in his briefs to support this contention. We thus address his contentions in 

light of federal, not state, constitutional law. See Myers v. State, 839 N.E.2d 1154, 1158 (Ind. 2006) 

(“Where a party, though citing Indiana constitutional authority, presents no separate argument specifically 

treating and analyzing a claim under the Indiana Constitution distinct from its federal counterpart, we resolve the party‟s claim „on the basis of federal constitutional doctrine and express no opinion as to what, 
4

missible” because “Officer Schmidt did not obtain any physical description or other information 

which would have indicated Armfield was the driver” prior to initiating the stop. (Appellant‟s 

Pet. to Transf. 8.) 

The U.S. Supreme Court has declared that the Fourth Amendment‟s “protections extend 

to brief investigatory stops of persons or vehicles that fall short of traditional arrest.” United 

States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968)). Under 

Terry, an officer is permitted to “stop and briefly detain a person for investigative purposes if the 

officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity „may be 

afoot,‟ even if the officer lacks probable cause.” United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) 

(quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 30); see also United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981) (“An 

investigatory stop must be justified by some objective manifestation that the person stopped is, 

or is about to be, engaged in criminal activity.”). 

We review trial court determinations of reasonable suspicion de novo. State v. Bulington, 802 N.E.2d 435, 438 (Ind. 2004) (citing Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273-74). The U.S. Supreme 

Court has also directed reviewing courts to “make reasonable-suspicion determinations by 

look[ing] at the „totality of the circumstances‟ of each case to see whether the detaining officer 

has a „particularized and objective basis‟ for suspecting legal wrongdoing.” Id.

The issue presented here is whether a police officer is required to verify that the driver of 

the vehicle matches the physical description of the registered owner obtained from the license 

plate check before there is reasonable suspicion to initiate a Terry stop. 

Two strands of case law from the Court of Appeals address this question. One strand 

stands for the proposition that a police officer must verify that the driver of the vehicle matches 

the description of the owner obtained from the license plate check in order to have reasonable 

suspicion to initiate a Terry stop. In Wilkinson v. State, 743 N.E.2d 1267 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), 

trans. denied, the court held that the stop of a vehicle whose license plate indicated the owner 

 

if any, differences there may be‟ under the Indiana Constitution.” (quoting Williams v. State, 690 N.E.2d 

162, 167 (Ind. 1997))). 
5

was a habitual traffic violator was proper where the officer could see the driver and determine 

that the driver matched the description of the owner. Id. at 1271. An often-cited footnote in 

Wilkinson stated: “We note that had the officer not obtained a physical description or other information indicating Wilkinson was the driver of the car, we would find the stop impermissible . . . .” Id. at 1271 n.2. In Holly v. State, 888 N.E.2d 338 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), aff‟d on other 

grounds, – N.E.2d – (the companion case to this one), the court explicitly adopted the reasoning 

from Wilkinson and held that “[a] police officer‟s knowledge that an owner of a vehicle may not 

lawfully drive creates reasonable suspicion of criminal activity only where the officer has reason 

to believe that the owner is actually driving the vehicle.” Id. at 343. The court found the stop in 

Holly to be improper because “the officer ha[d] observed absolutely nothing that would indicate 

that the driver of the vehicle [wa]s the owner[.]” Id. 

The second strand of Court of Appeals case law holds a police officer‟s knowledge that 

the registered owner of a vehicle has a suspended license constitutes reasonable suspicion to initiate a Terry stop without matching the driver with the owner‟s physical description. In Kenworthy v. State, 738 N.E.2d 329 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), trans. denied, the court concluded that the 

officer had “reasonable suspicion to stop and approach the truck to investigate” the identity of 

the driver because he had personal knowledge of the registered owner‟s license suspension, was 

aware that the vehicle he observed belonged to the registered owner, and confirmed his suspicions through a radio check. Id. at 331. The court found the stop to be proper even though 

“[d]ue to the late hour, [the officer] could not readily determine who was driving the truck[]” before he initiated the stop. Id. at 330. In State v. Ritter, 801 N.E.2d 689 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), 

trans. denied, the court explicitly rejected Wilkinson and followed Kenworthy. The court held 

that “[the officer] had a reasonable suspicion to stop Ritter‟s car in order to determine whether it 

was Ritter who was driving it[]” because his license plate check revealed that Ritter was its registered owner and that Ritter had a suspended license. Id. at 693. The fact that “[the officer] could 

not see the person driving the vehicle and could not verify if the driver matched the description 

of Ritter” did not make the stop improper. Id.5 

 

5 The court noted that “[h]ad [the officer] been able to see the driver of the vehicle, and been able to discern that the person driving the car did not match the description of Ritter, our result might have been different. However, we are not faced with that situation.” Ritter, 801 N.E.2d at 693.
6

In the case before us, the court explicitly agreed with Ritter and Kenworthy “that knowledge that the registered owner of the vehicle has a suspended license is enough to constitute reasonable suspicion for an officer to take the minimal action of initiating a traffic stop.” Armfield, 

894 N.E.2d at 198.

II

In Bannister v. State, 904 N.E.2d 1254 (Ind. 2009), Officer Myers saw a pickup truck 

pass in front of him at an intersection, proceeded to follow the truck, and then conducted a license plate check. The check indicated that Bannister was the registered owner, and that his 

driver‟s license had been suspended for life because he was a habitual traffic offender. The 

check also indicated Bannister‟s gender, height, weight, and hair color. Id. at 1255. Based on 

this physical description and his unobstructed view of the driver as the truck passed in front of 

him,6the officer stopped the vehicle to determine whether the driver was Bannister. Id. On appeal, Bannister argued that the officer‟s knowledge that the registered owner of the vehicle was a 

habitual traffic offender did not constitute reasonable suspicion to initiate a Terry stop. He specifically contended that the stop was improper because it was the first time Officer Myers had 

ever seen his vehicle and that Myers was unable to identify any characteristics of the driver. Id.

at 1256.

Contrary to Bannister‟s contentions, this Court noted the officer‟s trial testimony that the 

driver was a male with brown hair, which closely matched the physical description of Bannister 

obtained prior to the stop. Id. We also credited the officer‟s testimony that he saw the driver at a 

lighted intersection in clear weather. We analogized the facts in Bannister to those in Wilkinson, 

where the officer making the Terry stop could see the driver and determine that the driver 

matched the description of the owner. Based on these similar facts, we arrived at the same result 

as the court in Wilkinson, and held that “[u]nder this evidence, we conclude that [the officer] had 

 

6 The officer‟s testimony at trial was that he saw the driver at a lighted intersection in clear weather and 

that the driver “closely matched the description of Mr. Bannister [that he received from the license 

check].” Id. at 1256.

 
7

reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop to determine whether it was Bannister driving the vehicle. The stop was not a violation of Bannister‟s Fourth Amendment rights.” Id. We 

also discussed Ritter, which, as noted above, held that it had been proper to stop a vehicle to determine whether it was being driven by its owner, but had also said, “„Had [the officer] been able 

to see the driver of the vehicle, and been able to discern that the person driving the car did not 

match the description of Ritter, our result might have been different.‟” Id. (quoting Ritter, 801 

N.E.2d at 693).

Bannister did not, however, explicitly provide the rule for the question presented here: 

whether a police officer is required to verify that the driver of the vehicle matches the physical 

description of the registered owner obtained from the license plate check before there is reasonable suspicion to initiate a Terry stop. In this regard, state courts in other jurisdictions have provided helpful guidance. State supreme courts that have addressed this issue uniformly hold that 

an officer has reasonable suspicion to initiate a Terry stop when (1) the officer knows that the 

registered owner of a vehicle has a suspended license and (2) the officer is unaware of any evidence or circumstances which indicate that the owner is not the driver of the vehicle. See State 

v. Tozier, 905 A.2d 836, 838-39 (Me. 2006); Commonwealth v. Deramo, 762 N.E.2d 815, 818 

(Mass. 2002); State v. Pike, 551 N.W.2d 919, 922 (Minn. 1996); State v. Halvorson, 997 P.2d 

751, 753 (Mont. 2000); State v. Richter, 765 A.2d 687, 689 (N.H. 2000). State intermediate 

courts of appeal that have contended with this issue have reached the same conclusion. See Village of Lake in the Hills v. Lloyd, 591 N.E.2d 524, 526 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992); State v. Mills, 458 

N.W.2d 395, 397 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990); People v. Jones, 678 N.W.2d 627, 631 (Mich. Ct. App. 

2004); State v. Howard, 766 N.E.2d 179, 183 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001); State v. Panko, 788 P.2d 

1026, 1027 (Or. Ct. App. 1990).

The safety of Indiana‟s roadways strongly points toward initiating a Terry stop when the 

police officer knows that the registered owner of a vehicle has a suspended license. But this legitimate public safety concern is, of course, subject to the Fourth Amendment right to be secure 

from unreasonable searches and seizures. We believe that this right is vindicated by requiring 
8

that officers must be unaware of any evidence or circumstances which indicate that the owner is 

not the driver of the vehicle before initiating a Terry stop.7

We hold that an officer has reasonable suspicion to initiate a Terry stop when (1) the officer knows that the registered owner of a vehicle has a suspended license and (2) the officer is 

unaware of any evidence or circumstances which indicate that the owner is not the driver of the 

vehicle. This rule does not require officers to match the physical description of the registered 

owner from the license plate check to the driver of the vehicle before initiating a Terry stop. We 

agree with the State that “requiring the officer to verify the driver of the vehicle strikes against 

basic principles of safety [because it] puts the onus on the officer to maneuver himself into a position to clearly observe the driver in the midst of traffic.” (State‟s Resp. to Accept Transf. 5.) 

In addition, we acknowledge the difficulty that the driver verification requirement would impose 

on officers during late night hours and in situations where car windows are darkly tinted, as was 

the case here. 

To the extent that prior opinions of the Court of Appeals are inconsistent with our holding today, we disapprove those decisions. See Holly, 888 N.E.2d 338, aff‟d on other grounds, –

N.E.2d –; Wilkinson, 743 N.E.2d 1267.

 

7 Courts in other jurisdictions have provided helpful examples of evidence or circumstances which indicate that the owner is not the driver of the vehicle. The Minnesota Supreme Court posited this hypothetical: 

[I]f the officer knows that the owner of a vehicle has a revoked license and further, that 

the owner is a 22-year-old male, and the officer observes that the person driving the vehicle is a 50- or 60-year-old woman, any reasonable suspicion of criminal activity evaporates. Absent other articulable facts which would give rise to such suspicion, it would be 

unconstitutional for the officer to make a stop in such a situation.

Pike, 551 N.W.2d at 922. The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine has noted that “if the driver were of a 

different gender than the owner, the officer would lack reasonable grounds to assume the owner was driving.” Tozier, 905 A.2d at 839 n.1 (citing Jones, 678 N.W.2d at 631 n.4 (“[I]f the registered owner was a 

male and the driver was a female, the officer would not have reasonable grounds to assume that the driver 

was the owner.”)). We agree with these courts that under such circumstances, the officer would lack reasonable suspicion to initiate a Terry stop.
9

III

Here, while driving behind Armfield‟s vehicle, Officer Brian Schmidt conducted a license plate check at approximately 12:30 a.m. After he passed the vehicle, the results from the 

check revealed that its registered owner, Thomas Armfield, had a lifetime suspension of driving 

privileges. Officer Schmidt did not remember if the vehicle had tinted windows or anything that 

would prevent him from seeing inside the vehicle prior to the stop, but Armfield testified at his 

suppression hearing that “[t]he window tint on that vehicle is dark tint, to where at night you 

would not be able to see through.” (Tr. 13.) Officer Schmidt confirmed that the license plate, 

make, model, and color of the vehicle matched the information from the license plate check before initiating the stop. He testified that the check also provided him with the registered owner‟s 

name, address, and physical description. Officer Schmidt made the stop in order to determine 

whether the information he received from the check matched that of the driver. He approached 

the vehicle and asked if the driver was Tom, to which the driver affirmatively responded. Even 

though he had no physical form of identification at the time of the stop, the driver further identified himself as Thomas Armfield and provided his date of birth. Officer Schmidt then arrested 

Armfield and transported him to the Hamilton County Jail.

Under the two-prong test that we adopt today, we conclude that Officer Schmidt had reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry stop of Armfield‟s vehicle because (1) he had knowledge 

that Armfield was the registered owner of the vehicle and that Armfield had a lifetime suspension of driving privileges and (2) he was unaware of any evidence or circumstances which indicated that Armfield was not the driver of the vehicle. Officer Schmidt also acted properly after 

initiating the stop when he first ascertained the registered owner‟s name, address, and physical 

description before he approached the vehicle and then verified that the name of the driver 

matched that of the registered owner.
10

Conclusion

The investigatory Terry stop of Armfield‟s vehicle was proper. We therefore affirm the 

trial court‟s denial of Armfield‟s motion to suppress the evidence gathered during the stop. The 

trial court properly admitted this evidence, and we affirm its judgment. 

Shepard, C.J., and Dickson, Boehm, and Rucker, JJ., concur.