DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, 

o/b/o JORDYN BAKER,

Appellant,

v.

GUSTAVUS BAKER,

Appellee.

Nos. 4D16-3129, 4D16-3131, 4D16-3132, 4D16-3175, 4D16-3176, 

4D16-3179, 4D16-3180, 4D16-3183, 4D16-3184, 4D16-3185, 4D16-

3186, 4D16-3189, 4D16-3192, 4D16-3194, 4D16-3298, 4D16-3300, 

4D16-3302, 4D16-3316, 4D16-3317, 4D16-3325, 4D16-3332, 4D16-

3335, 4D16-3336, 4D16-3338, 4D16-3342, 4D16-3344, 4D16-3346 and 

4D16-3352

[December 13, 2017]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, 

Broward County; John Patrick Contini, Judge; L.T. Case Nos. FMCE-11-

008949 (44), FMCE-05-12631 (44), FMCE-14-005105 (44), FMCE-11-

006661 (44), FMCE-15-0000137 (44), FMCE-15-010832 (44), FMCE-13-

007427 (44), FMCE-14-004080 (44), FMCE-10-004790 (44), FMCE-14-

010763 (44), FMCE-13-000070 (44), FMCE-14-007341 (44), FMCE-11-

005723 (44), FMCE-14-009785 (44), FMCE-08-014480 (44), FMCE-04-

000962 (44), FMCE-13-011756 (44), FMCE-10-000480 (44), FMCE-15-

012067 (44), FMCE-97-013149 (44), FMCE-15-007907 (44), FMCE-15-

014176 (44), FMCE-14-011745 (44), FMCE-12-006618 (44), FMCE-15-

004297 (44), FMCE-15-013294 (44), FMCE-15-000801 (44), FMCE-15-

005923 (44) and CSE Nos. 1377877591, 1218304448, 2000779290, 

1359455256, 1383799431, 2000862932, 1279881925, 1346389080, 

1296667308, 2000047883, 2000251912, 2000579476, 1266397060, 

2000372682, 1296243419, 1044341327, 2000734800, 1313712507, 

2000786720, 1041650141, 2000322284, 1222113945, 2000004279, 

1242567712, 2000827215, 2000767855, 2000811717, 2000807160.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Carrie R. McNair, Assistant 

Attorney General, Tallahassee, for appellant.

No appearance for appellee.
2

DAMOORGIAN, J.

In this consolidated appeal, the Department of Revenue (the “DOR”) 

appeals the trial court’s denial of its motion for civil contempt due to failure 

to pay child support in twenty-eight separate cases.1 In each case, the 

court’s denial was based on its conclusion that the DOR’s service of its 

motion via U.S. Mail was insufficient. Because this method of service is 

legislatively authorized and satisfies due process concerns, we reverse and 

remand. 

In each of the underlying cases, the DOR filed a motion for civil 

contempt based on each appellee’s non-payment of court-ordered child 

support. Some of the appellees were ordered to pay child support in 

conjunction with final dissolutions of marriage entered pursuant to 

Chapter 61 of the Florida Statutes and others were ordered to pay child 

support in conjunction with paternity judgments entered pursuant to 

Chapter 742 of the Florida Statutes. In each case, the DOR attached a 

certificate of service representing that a copy of its motion was served on 

the appellee “by regular US Mail.” Similarly, the DOR sent a notice of 

hearing to each appellee “by regular US Mail.” The notices provided that 

“FAILURE TO APPEAR AT THE HEARING MAY RESULT IN THE COURT 

ISSUING A WRIT OF ATTACHMENT FOR YOUR ARREST. IF YOU ARE 

ARRESTED, YOU MAY BE HELD IN JAIL UP TO 48 HOURS BEFORE A 

HEARING IS HELD.” 

Each of the appellees failed to appear at their respective hearings, 

which took place in front of a hearing officer. Each hearing officer 

recommended that the court grant the DOR’s motion for contempt and 

issue a writ of bodily attachment with varied purge amounts based on the 

individual facts of the case. Despite the foregoing, the trial court entered 

a blanket order rejecting each hearing officer’s recommendations and 

denying the DOR’s motions. In its order, the court found that, although 

permitted by statute, notice of a civil contempt proceeding provided by mail 

was constitutionally inadequate. This was incorrect.

 

1 The other appellees and their case numbers are listed as follows: 4D16-

3131/Paretty, 4D16-3132/Pierre, 4D16-3175/Philius, 4D16-3176/Muse, 4D16-

3179/Henderson, 4D16-3180/Williams, 4D16-3183/Puckett, Jr., 4D16-

3184/Guerrier, 4D16-3185/Justafort, 4D16-3186/Sanders, III, 4D16-

3189/Thompkins, 4D16-3192/Davis, 4D16-3194/Sheppard, 4D16-

3298/Brown, 4D16-3300/Brown, Jr., 4D16-3302/Sobush, 4D16-

3316/Dawson, 4D16-3317/Forrest, 4D16-3325/Hall, 4D16-3332/Colson, 

4D16-3335/Bent, 4D16-3336/Griffin, 4D16-3338/Williams, 4D16-

3342/Fraser, 4D16-3344/Martinez, 4D16-3346/Dardy and 4D16-3352/Jean.
3

Family Law Rule of Procedure 12.615(b) governs the service of motions 

for civil contempt in support matters, and provides:

(b) Motion and Notice. Civil contempt may be initiated by 

motion. The motion must recite the essential facts 

constituting the acts alleged to be contemptuous. No civil 

contempt may be imposed without notice to the alleged 

contemnor and without providing the alleged contemnor with 

an opportunity to be heard. The civil contempt motion and 

notice of hearing may be served in accordance with Florida 

Rule of Judicial Administration 2.516 provided notice is 

reasonably calculated to apprise the alleged contemnor of the 

pendency of the proceedings. The notice must specify the time 

and place of the hearing and must contain the following 

language: “FAILURE TO APPEAR AT THE HEARING MAY 

RESULT IN THE COURT ISSUING A WRIT OF BODILY 

ATTACHMENT FOR YOUR ARREST. IF YOU ARE ARRESTED, 

YOU MAY BE HELD IN JAIL UP TO 48 HOURS BEFORE A 

HEARING IS HELD.” This notice must also state whether 

electronic recording or a court reporter is provided by the 

court or whether a court reporter, if desired, must be provided 

by the party.

Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.516(b)(2), in turn, states:

Service on and by all parties who are not represented by an 

attorney and who do not designate an e-mail address, and on 

and by all attorneys excused from e-mail service, must be 

made by delivering a copy of the document or by mailing it to 

the party or attorney at their last known address or, if no 

address is known, by leaving it with the clerk of the court. 

Service by mail is complete upon mailing. 

Based on the foregoing, in a civil contempt proceeding for failure to pay 

child support, “service by mail is sufficient.” Pennington v. Pennington, 

390 So. 2d 809, 810 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980).

Additionally, both Chapter 61 (governing dissolution of marriages) and 

742 (the paternity chapter) expressly provide that service of process via 

mail in child support actions comports with due process. In order to 

receive certain federal funding, the Legislature enacted sections 

742.032(1) and 61.13(7)(a) of the Florida Statutes, wherein it created a 

State Case Registry system which requires “each party to any paternity or 
4

child support proceeding” to file “information on location and identity of 

the party” with the tribunal and update that information as appropriate. 

Because the parties are statutorily required to keep their contact 

information current and accurate, the Legislature also provided that in 

any child support enforcement action, “the court of competent jurisdiction 

shall deem state due process requirements for notice and service of 

process to be met with respect to the party upon delivery of written notice 

to the most recent residential or employer address filed with the tribunal 

and State Case Registry.” § 742.032(2), Fla. Stat. (2016); see also § 

61.13(7)(c), Fla. Stat. (2016).

Despite this authority, the trial court found that notice of a motion for 

civil contempt by U.S. mail is constitutionally insufficient and, in doing so, 

also implicitly found that sections 742.032(2) and 61.13(7)(c) were 

unconstitutional. “The constitutionality of a state statute is a pure 

question of law subject to de novo review.” Fla. Dep’t of Revenue v. Am. 

Bus. USA Corp., 191 So. 3d 906, 911 (Fla. 2016).

When considering the constitutionality of a statute, including a notice 

statute, courts “have a ‘duty if reasonably possible . . . to adopt a 

reasonable interpretation of a statute which removes it farthest from 

constitutional infirmity.’” State ex rel. Pittman v. Stanjeski, 562 So. 2d 673, 

677 (Fla. 1990) (quoting Corn v. State, 332 So. 2d 4, 8 (Fla. 1976) (footnote 

omitted)). “In interpreting a statute under constitutional challenge, we 

also have a responsibility to ‘avoid declaring a statute unconstitutional if 

such statute can be fairly construed in a constitutional manner.’” Id.

(quoting Sandlin v. Criminal Justice Standards & Training Comm’n, 531 So. 

2d 1344, 1346 (Fla. 1988)). 

“While a person facing civil contempt is not entitled to all of the due 

process rights afforded to a person facing indirect criminal contempt, he

or she is nonetheless entitled to a proceeding that meets the fundamental 

fairness requirements of the due process clause of the Fourteenth 

Amendment.” Woolf v. Woolf, 901 So. 2d 905, 911 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005). 

“This requires that the alleged contemnor be provided with adequate notice 

and an opportunity to be heard.” Id. “Determining whether a particular 

method of notice is ‘reasonably calculated’ to provide adequate notice

requires ‘due regard for the practicalities and peculiarities of the case.’” 

Vosilla v. Rosado, 944 So. 2d 289, 294 (Fla. 2006) (quoting Mullane v. Cent.

Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)). “Subject to this 

limitation, the legislature has the authority to determine the extent and 

character of the notice which shall be given by the state” before adverse 

action is taken against a party. Dawson v. Saada, 608 So. 2d 806, 808 
5

(Fla. 1992) (noting that the legislature has authority to determine notice 

requirements for tax deed sale). 

The Florida Supreme Court’s holding in Stanjeski is illustrative of these 

principles. 562 So. 2d at 677–78. There, the court considered whether a 

provision within chapter 61 which allowed the clerk of court to 

automatically enter a judgment for unpaid child support after providing 

notice via certified mail complied with due process. Id. It held that it did, 

“find[ing] no due process problem with the utilization of certified mail as a 

means to give notice under the circumstances where the obligor (a) was 

served personally in the original proceedings and (b) was directed to 

provide the clerk with his mailing address and any subsequent changes to 

that address.” Id. at 679. Considering similar notice issues in the context 

of a tax deed sale, the Florida Supreme Court recognized that service of 

notice of a tax deed sale via mail to the titleholder’s last known address 

does not violate due process, even when the titleholder does not actually 

receive the notice, so long as the property appraiser has no reason to know 

or suspect that the address was no longer the titleholder’s correct address. 

Vosilla, 944 So. 2d at 296−99. Collectively, these cases provide that notice 

by mail is sufficient for due process purposes when the party being notified 

has an ongoing duty to maintain its correct address with the notifying 

agency and the notifying agency has no indication that the address is 

incorrect. See also § 456.035, Fla. Stat. (providing that persons licensed 

by the Florida Department of Health are required to notify the Department 

of any change in address and, because of this requirement, service by 

regular mail to licensee’s last-known address of record constitutes 

sufficient notice).

In the instant cases, the DOR sent appellees a copy of its contempt 

motion as well as the notice of hearing containing the required language 

outlined in Family Law Rule of Procedure 12.615(b) via U.S. mail to each 

appellees’ last known address. Each appellee was personally served in the 

underlying dissolution or paternity action giving rise to the judgment 

requiring the payment of child-support and thereby knew that he or she 

had a continuing obligation to pay child support. Further, each appellee 

was required by statute to keep his or her mailing address updated in the 

State Court Registry. Under these circumstances, we hold that the trial 

court erred in ruling that notice by mail was inadequate and reverse and 

remand each case for further proceedings. 

Reversed and remanded.

WARNER and TAYLOR, JJ., concur.
6

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.