(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2013 1 

Syllabus 

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

ABRAMSKI v. UNITED STATES 

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 

THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 12–1493. Argued January 22, 2014—Decided June 16, 2014 

Petitioner Bruce Abramski offered to purchase a handgun for his uncle. 

The form that federal regulations required Abramski to fill out (Form

4473) asked whether he was the “actual transferee/buyer” of the gun, 

and clearly warned that a straw purchaser (namely, someone buying

a gun on behalf of another) was not the actual buyer. Abramski 

falsely answered that he was the actual buyer. Abramski was convicted for knowingly making false statements “with respect to any

fact material to the lawfulness of the sale” of a gun, 18 U. S. C.

§922(a)(6), and for making a false statement “with respect to the information required . . . to be kept” in the gun dealer’s records, 

§924(a)(1)(A). The Fourth Circuit affirmed. 

Held: 

1. Abramski’s misrepresentation is material under §922(a)(6). 

Pp. 7–22.

(a) Abramski contends that federal gun laws are entirely unconcerned with straw arrangements: So long as the person at the counter

is eligible to own a gun, the sale to him is legal under the statute. To 

be sure, federal law regulates licensed dealer’s transactions with

“persons” or “transferees” without specifying whether that language 

refers to the straw buyer or the actual purchaser. But when read in 

light of the statute’s context, structure, and purpose, it is clear this 

language refers to the true buyer rather than the straw. Federal gun 

law establishes an elaborate system of in-person identification and

background checks to ensure that guns are kept out of the hands of 

felons and other prohibited purchasers. §§922(c), 922(t). It also imposes record-keeping requirements to assist law enforcement authorities in investigating serious crimes through the tracing of guns to

their buyers. §922(b)(5), 923(g). These provisions would mean little 
 

 

 

2 ABRAMSKI v. UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

if a would-be gun buyer could evade them all simply by enlisting the

aid of an intermediary to execute the paperwork on his behalf. The 

statute’s language is thus best read in context to refer to the actual

rather than nominal buyer. This conclusion is reinforced by this 

Court’s standard practice of focusing on practical realities rather 

than legal formalities when identifying the parties to a transaction. 

Pp. 7–19.

(b) Abramski argues more narrowly that his false response was

not material because his uncle could have legally bought a gun for 

himself. But Abramski’s false statement prevented the dealer from 

insisting that the true buyer (Alvarez) appear in person, provide 

identifying information, show a photo ID, and submit to a background check. §§922(b), (c), (t). Nothing in the statute suggests that

these legal duties may be wiped away merely because the actual buyer turns out to be legally eligible to own a gun. Because the dealer 

could not have lawfully sold the gun had it known that Abramski was 

not the true buyer, the misstatement was material to the lawfulness 

of the sale. Pp. 19–22.

2. Abramski’s misrepresentation about the identity of the actual

buyer concerned “information required by [Chapter 44 of Title 18 of

the United States Code] to be kept” in the dealer’s records. 

§924(a)(1)(A). Chapter 44 contains a provision requiring a dealer to 

“maintain such records . . . as the Attorney General may . . . prescribe.” §923(g)(1)(A). The Attorney General requires every licensed 

dealer to retain in its records a completed copy of Form 4473, see 27 

CFR §478.124(b), and that form in turn includes the “actual buyer” 

question that Abramski answered falsely. Therefore, falsely answering a question on Form 4473 violates §924(a)(1)(A). Pp. 22–23. 

706 F. 3d 307, affirmed. 

KAGAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which KENNEDY, 

GINSBURG, BREYER, and SOTOMAYOR, JJ., joined. SCALIA, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and THOMAS and ALITO, JJ., 

joined. 
 

 

_________________ 

_________________ 

 

Cite as: 573 U. S. ____ (2014) 1 

Opinion of the Court 

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 12–1493 

BRUCE JAMES ABRAMSKI, JR., PETITIONER v.
 

UNITED STATES
 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
 

[June 16, 2014] 

JUSTICE KAGAN delivered the opinion of the Court. 

Before a federally licensed firearms dealer may sell a

gun, the would-be purchaser must provide certain personal information, show photo identification, and pass a 

background check. To ensure the accuracy of those submissions, a federal statute imposes criminal penalties on 

any person who, in connection with a firearm’s acquisition,

makes false statements about “any fact material to the

lawfulness of the sale.” 18 U. S. C. §922(a)(6). In this 

case, we consider how that law applies to a so-called straw 

purchaser—namely, a person who buys a gun on someone

else’s behalf while falsely claiming that it is for himself. 

We hold that such a misrepresentation is punishable 

under the statute, whether or not the true buyer could 

have purchased the gun without the straw. 

I 

A 

Federal law has for over 40 years regulated sales by 

licensed firearms dealers, principally to prevent guns from 

falling into the wrong hands. See Gun Control Act of 

1968, 18 U. S. C. §921 et seq. Under §922(g), certain classes 
 

2 ABRAMSKI v. UNITED STATES 

Opinion of the Court 

of people—felons, drug addicts, and the mentally ill, to 

list a few—may not purchase or possess any firearm. And 

to ensure they do not, §922(d) forbids a licensed dealer

from selling a gun to anyone it knows, or has reasonable 

cause to believe, is such a prohibited buyer. See Huddleston v. United States, 415 U. S. 814, 825 (1974) (“[T]he

focus of the federal scheme,” in controlling access to weapons, “is the federally licensed firearms dealer”). 

The statute establishes a detailed scheme to enable the 

dealer to verify, at the point of sale, whether a potential 

buyer may lawfully own a gun. Section 922(c) brings the

would-be purchaser onto the dealer’s “business premises”

by prohibiting, except in limited circumstances, the sale of 

a firearm “to a person who does not appear in person” at 

that location. Other provisions then require the dealer to

check and make use of certain identifying information

received from the buyer. Before completing any sale, the

dealer must “verif[y] the identity of the transferee by 

examining a valid identification document” bearing a 

photograph. §922(t)(1)(C). In addition, the dealer must 

procure the buyer’s “name, age, and place of residence.” 

§922(b)(5). And finally, the dealer must (with limited

exceptions not at issue here1) submit that information

to the National Instant Background Check System (NICS) 

to determine whether the potential purchaser is for

any reason disqualified from owning a firearm. See 

§§922(t)(1)(A)–(B).

The statute further insists that the dealer keep certain 

records, to enable federal authorities both to enforce the 

law’s verification measures and to trace firearms used in 

crimes. See H. R. Rep. No. 1577, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 14 

—————— 

1The principal exception is for any buyer who has a state permit that

has been “issued only after an authorized government official has 

verified” the buyer’s eligibility to own a gun under both federal and

state law. §922(t)(3). 
 

 

Cite as: 573 U. S. ____ (2014) 3 

Opinion of the Court 

(1968). A dealer must maintain the identifying information mentioned above (i.e., name, age, and residence) in 

its permanent files. See §922(b)(5). In addition, the dealer 

must keep “such records of . . . sale[ ] or other disposition of firearms . . . as the Attorney General may by regulations prescribe.” §923(g)(1)(A). And the Attorney General (or his designee) may obtain and inspect any of those 

records, “in the course of a bona fide criminal investigation,” to “determin[e] the disposition of 1 or more firearms.” §923(g)(7).

To implement all those statutory requirements, the

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives

(ATF) developed Form 4473 for gun sales. See Supp. App.

1–6. The part of that form to be completed by the buyer

requests his name, birth date, and address, as well as

certain other identifying information (for example, his

height, weight, and race). The form further lists all the 

factors disqualifying a person from gun ownership, and 

asks the would-be buyer whether any of them apply (e.g., 

“[h]ave you ever been convicted . . . of a felony?”). Id., at 1. 

Most important here, Question 11.a. asks (with bolded 

emphasis appearing on the form itself): 

“Are you the actual transferee/buyer of the firearm(s)

listed on this form? Warning: You are not the actual buyer if you are acquiring the firearm(s) on 

behalf of another person. If you are not the actual buyer, the dealer cannot transfer the firearm(s) to you.” Ibid. 

The accompanying instructions for that question provide: 

“Question 11.a. Actual Transferee/Buyer: For 

purposes of this form, you are the actual transferee/

buyer if you are purchasing the firearm for yourself

or otherwise acquiring the firearm for yourself . . . .

You are also the actual transferee/buyer if you are legitimately purchasing the firearm as a gift for a third 
 

4 ABRAMSKI v. UNITED STATES 

Opinion of the Court 

party. ACTUAL TRANSFEREE/BUYER EXAMPLES: Mr. Smith asks Mr. Jones to purchase a firearm for Mr. Smith. Mr. Smith gives Mr. Jones the 

money for the firearm. Mr. Jones is NOT THE 

ACTUAL TRANSFEREE/BUYER of the firearm 

and must answer “NO” to question 11.a.” Id., at 4. 

After responding to this and other questions, the customer

must sign a certification declaring his answers “true, 

correct and complete.” Id., at 2. That certification provides that the signator “understand[s] that making any 

false . . . statement” respecting the transaction—and, 

particularly, “answering ‘yes’ to question 11.a. if [he is] not

the actual buyer”—is a crime “punishable as a felony 

under Federal law.” Ibid. (bold typeface deleted). 

Two statutory provisions, each designed to ensure that 

the dealer can rely on the truthfulness of the buyer’s disclosures in carrying out its obligations, criminalize certain 

false statements about firearms transactions. First and 

foremost, §922(a)(6), provides as follows: 

“It shall be unlawful . . . for any person in connection 

with the acquisition or attempted acquisition of any 

firearm or ammunition from [a licensed dealer] knowingly to make any false or fictitious oral or written 

statement . . . , intended or likely to deceive such 

[dealer] with respect to any fact material to the lawfulness of the sale or other disposition of such firearm

or ammunition under the provisions of this chapter.” 

That provision helps make certain that a dealer will receive truthful information as to any matter relevant to a 

gun sale’s legality. In addition, §924(a)(1)(A) prohibits

“knowingly mak[ing] any false statement or representation with respect to the information required by this chapter to be kept in the records” of a federally licensed gun

dealer. The question in this case is whether, as the ATF

declares in Form 4473’s certification, those statutory 
 

Cite as: 573 U. S. ____ (2014) 5 

Opinion of the Court 

provisions criminalize a false answer to Question 11.a.—

that is, a customer’s statement that he is the “actual 

transferee/buyer,” purchasing a firearm for himself, when

in fact he is a straw purchaser, buying the gun on someone 

else’s behalf. 

B 

The petitioner here is Bruce Abramski, a former police

officer who offered to buy a Glock 19 handgun for his 

uncle, Angel Alvarez. (Abramski thought he could get the

gun for a discount by showing his old police identification, 

though the Government contends that because he had 

been fired from his job two years earlier, he was no longer 

authorized to use that card.) Accepting his nephew’s offer,

Alvarez sent Abramski a check for $400 with “Glock 19 

handgun” written on the memo line. Two days later,

Abramski went to Town Police Supply, a federally licensed 

firearms dealer, to make the purchase. There, he filled 

out Form 4473, falsely checking “Yes” in reply to Question 

11.a.—that is, asserting he was the “actual transferee/

buyer” when, according to the form’s clear definition, he 

was not. He also signed the requisite certification, acknowledging his understanding that a false answer to 

Question 11.a. is a federal crime. After Abramski’s name 

cleared the NICS background check, the dealer sold him 

the Glock. Abramski then deposited the $400 check in his

bank account, transferred the gun to Alvarez, and got back 

a receipt. Federal agents found that receipt while executing a search warrant at Abramski’s home after he became

a suspect in a different crime.

A grand jury indicted Abramski for violating §§922(a)(6)

and 924(a)(1)(A) by falsely affirming in his response to 

Question 11.a. that he was the Glock’s actual buyer.

Abramski moved to dismiss both charges. He argued that

his misrepresentation on Question 11.a. was not “material 

to the lawfulness of the sale” under §922(a)(6) because 
 

 

 

6 ABRAMSKI v. UNITED STATES 

Opinion of the Court 

Alvarez was legally eligible to own a gun. And he claimed 

that the false statement did not violate §924(a)(1)(A)

because a buyer’s response to Question 11.a. is not “required . . . to be kept in the records” of a gun dealer. After 

the District Court denied those motions, see 778 F. Supp. 

2d 678 (WD Va. 2011), Abramski entered a conditional 

guilty plea, reserving his right to challenge the rulings. 

The District Court then sentenced him to five years of 

probation on each count, running concurrently.

The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the

convictions. 706 F. 3d 307 (2013). It noted a division 

among appellate courts on the question Abramski raised 

about §922(a)(6)’s materiality requirement: Of three courts 

to have addressed the issue, one agreed with Abramski

that a misrepresentation on Question 11.a. is immaterial 

if “the true purchaser [here, Alvarez] can lawfully purchase a firearm directly.” Id., at 315 (quoting United 

States v. Polk, 118 F. 3d 286, 295 (CA5 1997)).2 The 

Fourth Circuit, however, thought the majority position 

correct: “[T]he identity of the actual purchaser of a firearm 

is a constant that is always material to the lawfulness of a

firearm acquisition under §922(a)(6).” 706 F. 3d, at 316. 

The court also held that Abramski’s conviction under 

§924(a)(1)(A) was valid, finding that the statute required a 

dealer to maintain the information at issue in its records. 

Id., at 317. 

We granted certiorari, 571 U. S. ___ (2013), principally 

to resolve the Circuit split about §922(a)(6). In this Court, 

Abramski renews his claim that a false answer to Question 11.a. is immaterial if the true buyer is legally eligible 

to purchase a firearm. But Abramski now focuses on a 

—————— 

2Compare Polk, 118 F. 3d, at 294–295, with United States v. Morales, 

687 F. 3d 697, 700–701 (CA6 2012) (a misrepresentation about the true

purchaser’s identity is material even when he can legally own a gun); 

United States v. Frazier, 605 F. 3d 1271, 1279–1280 (CA11 2010) 

(same). 
 

 

Cite as: 573 U. S. ____ (2014) 7 

Opinion of the Court 

new and more ambitious argument, which he concedes no 

court has previously accepted. See Brief for Petitioner i.3 

In brief, he alleges that a false response to Question 11.a. 

is never material to a gun sale’s legality, whether or not 

the actual buyer is eligible to own a gun. We begin with

that fundamental question, next turn to what has become 

Abramski’s back-up argument under §922(a)(6), and finally consider the relatively easy question pertaining to

§924(A)(1)(a)’s separate false-statement prohibition. On 

each score, we affirm Abramski’s conviction. 

II 

Abramski’s broad theory (mostly echoed by the dissent) 

is that federal gun law simply does not care about arrangements involving straw purchasers: So long as the

person at the counter is eligible to own a gun, the sale to 

him is legal under the statute. That is true, Abramski 

contends, irrespective of any agreement that person has 

made to purchase the firearm on behalf of someone else—

including someone who cannot lawfully buy or own a gun 

himself. Accordingly, Abramski concludes, his “false 

statement that he was the [Glock 19’s] ‘actual buyer,’” as 

that term was “defined in Question 11.a., was not material” 

—indeed, was utterly irrelevant—“to the lawfulness of 

the sale.” Id., at 31 (emphasis deleted); see also post, at 4 

(opinion of SCALIA, J.). In essence, he claims, Town Police 

Supply could legally have sold the gun to him even if he had

truthfully answered Question 11.a. by disclosing that he

was a straw—because, again, all the federal firearms law 

cares about is whether the individual standing at the 

—————— 

3Reflecting that prior consensus, neither of Abramski’s principal 

amici—the National Rifle Association and a group of 26 States—joins

Abramski in making this broader argument. They confine themselves

to supporting the more limited claim about straw purchases made on 

behalf of eligible gun owners, addressed infra, at 19–22. 
 

 

8 ABRAMSKI v. UNITED STATES 

Opinion of the Court 

dealer’s counter meets the requirements to buy a gun.4 

At its core, that argument relies on one true fact: Federal gun law regulates licensed dealers’ transactions with

“persons” or “transferees,” without specifically referencing 

straw purchasers. Section 922(d), for example, bars a

dealer from “sell[ing] or otherwise dispos[ing] of ” a firearm to any “person” who falls within a prohibited category— 

felons, drug addicts, the mentally ill, and so forth. See 

supra, at 1–2; see also §922(b)(5) (before selling a gun to a

“person,” the dealer must take down his name, age, and 

residence); §922(t)(1) (before selling a gun to a “person,” 

the dealer must run a background check). Similarly,

§922(t)(1)(C) requires the dealer to verify the identity of 

the “transferee” by checking a valid photo ID. See supra,

at 2; see also §922(c) (spelling out circumstances in which

a “transferee” may buy a gun without appearing at the

dealer’s premises). Abramski contends that Congress’s

use of such language alone, sans any mention of “straw

purchasers” or “actual buyers,” shows that “[i]t is not 

illegal to buy a gun for someone else.” Brief for Petitioner 

15–16; Reply Brief 1; see also post, at 2–6. 

—————— 

4The dissent reserves the question whether the false statement 

would be material if the straw purchaser knew that the true buyer was

not eligible to own a firearm. Post, at 6, n. 2. But first, that reservation is of quite limited scope: Unlike Abramski’s back-up argument, 

which imposes liability whenever the true purchaser cannot legally buy 

a gun, the dissent’s reservation applies only when the straw has 

knowledge of (or at least reasonable cause to believe) that fact. And as 

we will later note, straws often do not have such knowledge. See infra, 

at 12–13. Second, the reservation (fairly enough for a reservation) rests 

on an uncertain legal theory. According to the dissent, a straw buyer 

might violate §922(a)(6) if a dealer’s sale to him aids and abets his 

violation of §922(d)—a provision barring knowingly transferring a gun

to an ineligible person, see infra, at 8, 17–18. But that reasoning

presupposes that a firearms dealer acting in the ordinary course of 

business can ever have the intent needed to aid and abet a crime—a 

question this Court reserved not six months ago. See Rosemond v. 

United States, 572 U. S. ___ (2014) (slip op., at 12, n. 8). 
 

Cite as: 573 U. S. ____ (2014) 9 

Opinion of the Court 

But that language merely raises, rather than answers,

the critical question: In a straw purchase, who is the 

“person” or “transferee” whom federal gun law addresses? 

Is that “person” the middleman buying a firearm on someone else’s behalf (often because the ultimate recipient 

could not buy it himself, or wants to camouflage the transaction)? Or is that “person” instead the individual really

paying for the gun and meant to take possession of it upon

completion of the purchase? Is it the conduit at the counter, or the gun’s intended owner?5 In answering that inquiry, we must (as usual) interpret the relevant words not

in a vacuum, but with reference to the statutory context,

“structure, history, and purpose.” Maracich v. Spears, 570 

U. S. ___, ___ (2013) (slip op., at 26). All those tools of 

divining meaning—not to mention common sense, which is 

a fortunate (though not inevitable) side-benefit of construing statutory terms fairly—demonstrate that §922, in 

regulating licensed dealers’ gun sales, looks through the 

straw to the actual buyer.6 

—————— 

5The dissent claims the answer is easy because “if I give my son $10 

and tell him to pick up milk and eggs at the store, no English speaker

would say that the store ‘sells’ the milk and eggs to me.” Post, at 4. 

But try a question more similar to the one the gun law’s text raises: If I

send my brother to the Apple Store with money and instructions to

purchase an iPhone, and then take immediate and sole possession of

that device, am I the “person” (or “transferee”) who has bought the 

phone or is he? Nothing in ordinary English usage compels an answer 

either way. 6Contrary to the dissent’s view, our analysis does not rest on mere

“purpose-based arguments.” Post. at 7. We simply recognize that a

court should not interpret each word in a statute with blinders on,

refusing to look at the word’s function within the broader statutory 

context. As we have previously put the point, a “provision that may

seem ambiguous in isolation is often clarified by the remainder of the

statutory scheme . . . because only one of the permissible meanings 

produces a substantive effect that is compatible with the rest of the 

law.” United Sav. Assn. of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, 

Ltd., 484 U. S. 365, 371 (1988). 
 

 

10 ABRAMSKI v. UNITED STATES 

Opinion of the Court 

The overarching reason is that Abramski’s reading

would undermine—indeed, for all important purposes,

would virtually repeal—the gun law’s core provisions.7 As 

noted earlier, the statute establishes an elaborate system

to verify a would-be gun purchaser’s identity and check on 

his background. See supra, at 2. It also requires that the 

information so gathered go into a dealer’s permanent 

records. See supra, at 2–3. The twin goals of this comprehensive scheme are to keep guns out of the hands of 

criminals and others who should not have them, and to 

assist law enforcement authorities in investigating serious

crimes. See Huddleston, 415 U. S., at 824; supra, at 2–3. 

And no part of that scheme would work if the statute 

turned a blind eye to straw purchases—if, in other words,

the law addressed not the substance of a transaction, but 

only empty formalities.

To see why, consider what happens in a typical straw 

purchase. A felon or other person who cannot buy or own 

a gun still wants to obtain one. (Or, alternatively, a person who could legally buy a firearm wants to conceal his 

purchase, maybe so he can use the gun for criminal purposes without fear that police officers will later trace it to

him.) Accordingly, the prospective buyer enlists an intermediary to help him accomplish his illegal aim. Perhaps

he conscripts a loyal friend or family member; perhaps 

more often, he hires a stranger to purchase the gun for a

price. The actual purchaser might even accompany the

straw to the gun shop, instruct him which firearm to buy, 

give him the money to pay at the counter, and take possession as they walk out the door. See, e.g., United States 

—————— 

7That reading would also, at a stroke, declare unlawful a large part

of what the ATF does to combat gun trafficking by criminals. See Dept.

of Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, Following the 

Gun: Enforcing Federal Laws Against Firearms Traffickers, p. xi (June

2000) (noting that in several prior years “[a]lmost half of all [ATF

firearm] trafficking investigations involved straw purchasers”). 
Cite as: 573 U. S. ____ (2014) 11 

Opinion of the Court 

v. Bowen, 207 Fed. Appx. 727, 729 (CA7 2006) (describing

a straw purchase along those lines); United States v. Paye, 

129 Fed. Appx. 567, 570 (CA11 2005) (per curiam) (same). 

What the true buyer would not do—what he would leave 

to the straw, who possesses the gun for all of a minute—is 

give his identifying information to the dealer and submit

himself to a background check. How many of the statute’s 

provisions does that scenario—the lawful result of 

Abramski’s (and the dissent’s) reading of “transferee” and 

“person”—render meaningless? 

Start with the parts of §922 enabling a dealer to verify 

whether a buyer is legally eligible to own a firearm. That 

task, as noted earlier, begins with identification— 

requesting the name, address, and age of the potential 

purchaser and checking his photo ID. See §§922(b)(5), 

(t)(1)(C); supra, at 2. And that identification in turn permits a background check: The dealer runs the purchaser’s

name through the NICS database to discover whether he

is, for example, a felon, drug addict, or mentally ill person. 

See §§922(d), (t)(1); supra, at 2. All those provisions are

designed to accomplish what this Court has previously

termed Congress’s “principal purpose” in enacting the 

statute—“to curb crime by keeping ‘firearms out of the 

hands of those not legally entitled to possess them.’” 

Huddleston, 415 U. S., at 824 (quoting S. Rep. No. 1501, 

90th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1968)). But under Abramski’s 

reading, the statutory terms would be utterly ineffectual, 

because the identification and background check would be 

of the wrong person. The provisions would evaluate the 

eligibility of mere conduits, while allowing every criminal 

(and drug addict and so forth) to escape that assessment

and walk away with a weapon. 

Similarly, Abramski’s view would defeat the point of

§922(c), which tightly restricts the sale of guns “to a person who does not appear in person at the licensee’s business premises.” See supra, at 2. Only a narrow class of 
 

 

12 ABRAMSKI v. UNITED STATES 

Opinion of the Court 

prospective buyers may ever purchase a gun from afar—

primarily, individuals who have already had their eligibility to own a firearm verified by state law enforcement

officials with access to the NICS database. See 27 CFR 

§478.96(b) (2014), 18 U. S. C. §922(t)(3); n. 1, supra. And 

even when an individual fits within that category, he still 

must submit to the dealer a sworn statement that he can 

lawfully own a gun, as well as provide the name and address of the principal law enforcement officer in his community. See §922(c)(1). The dealer then has to forward 

notice of the sale to that officer, in order to allow law 

enforcement authorities to investigate the legality of the

sale and, if necessary, call a stop to it. See §§922(c)(2)–(3).

The provision thus prevents remote sales except to a small

class of buyers subject to extraordinary procedures—

again, to ensure effective verification of a potential purchaser’s eligibility. Yet on Abramski’s view, a person

could easily bypass the scheme, purchasing a gun without 

ever leaving his home by dispatching to a gun store a 

hired deliveryman. Indeed, if Abramski were right, we see

no reason why anyone (and certainly anyone with lessthan-pure motives) would put himself through the procedures laid out in §922(c): Deliverymen, after all, are not so

hard to come by.

And likewise, the statute’s record-keeping provisions 

would serve little purpose if the records kept were of

nominal rather than real buyers. As noted earlier, dealers 

must store, and law enforcement officers may obtain,

information about a gun buyer’s identity. See §§922(b)(5),

923(g); supra, at 3. That information helps to fight serious 

crime. When police officers retrieve a gun at a crime 

scene, they can trace it to the buyer and consider him as a 

suspect. See National Shooting Sports Foundation, Inc. v. 

Jones, 716 F. 3d 200, 204 (CADC 2013) (describing law 

enforcement’s use of firearm tracing). Too, the required

records enable dealers to identify certain suspicious pur-
Cite as: 573 U. S. ____ (2014) 13 

Opinion of the Court 

chasing trends, which they then must report to federal

authorities. See §923(g)(3) (imposing a reporting obligation when a person buys multiple handguns within five 

days). But once again, those provisions can serve their 

objective only if the records point to the person who took

actual control of the gun(s). Otherwise, the police will at 

most learn the identity of an intermediary, who could not 

have been responsible for the gun’s use and might know

next to nothing about the actual buyer. See, e.g., United 

States v. Juarez, 626 F. 3d 246, 249 (CA5 2010) (straw 

purchaser bought military-style assault rifles, later found 

among Mexican gang members, for a buyer known “only as 

‘El Mano’”). Abramski’s view would thus render the required records close to useless for aiding law enforcement: 

Putting true numbskulls to one side, anyone purchasing a

gun for criminal purposes would avoid leaving a paper 

trail by the simple expedient of hiring a straw.

To sum up so far: All the prerequisites for buying a gun

described above refer to a “person” or “transferee.” Read 

Abramski’s way (“the man at the counter”), those terms 

deny effect to the regulatory scheme, as criminals could 

always use straw purchasers to evade the law.8 Read the 

other way (“the man getting, and always meant to get, the

firearm”), those terms give effect to the statutory provi-

—————— 

8The dissent is mistaken when it says that the ATF’s own former 

view of the statute refutes this proposition. See post, at 11–12. As we 

will later discuss, see infra, at 21–22, the ATF for a time thought that

§922(a)(6) did not cover cases in which the true purchaser could have

legally purchased a gun himself. But Abramski’s principal argument 

extends much further, to cases in which straws buy weapons for criminals, drug addicts, and other prohibited purchasers. For the reasons 

just stated, that interpretation would render the statute all but useless. 

And although the dissent appeals to a snippet of congressional testimony to suggest that ATF once briefly held that extreme view of the

statute, it agrees that by at least 1979 (well over three decades ago), 

ATF recognized the unlawfulness of straw purchases on behalf of

prohibited persons. 
 

14 ABRAMSKI v. UNITED STATES 

Opinion of the Court 

sions, allowing them to accomplish their manifest objects. 

That alone provides more than sufficient reason to understand “person” and “transferee” as referring not to the

fictitious but to the real buyer.

And other language in §922 confirms that construction,

by evincing Congress’s concern with the practical realities, 

rather than the legal niceties, of firearms transactions. 

For example, §922(a)(6) itself bars material misrepresentations “in connection with the acquisition,” and not just 

the purchase, of a firearm. That broader word, we have 

previously held, does not focus on “legal title”—let alone 

legal title for a few short moments, until another, always

intended transfer occurs. Huddleston, 415 U. S., at 820. 

Instead, the term signifies “com[ing] into possession, 

control, or power of disposal,” as the actual buyer in a 

straw purchase does. Ibid. Similarly, we have reasoned

that such a substance-over-form approach draws support 

from the statute’s repeated references to “the sale or other 

disposition” of a firearm. §922(a)(6); see §922(d) (making 

it unlawful to “sell or otherwise dispose of ” a gun to a 

prohibited person). That term, we have stated, “was 

aimed at providing maximum coverage.” Id., at 826–827. 

We think such expansive language inconsistent with

Abramski’s view of the statute, which would stare myopically at the nominal buyer while remaining blind to the 

person exiting the transaction with control of the gun. 

Finally, our reading of §922 comports with courts’ 

standard practice, evident in many legal spheres and 

presumably known to Congress, of ignoring artifice when

identifying the parties to a transaction. In United States 

v. One 1936 Model Ford V-8 Deluxe Coach, Commercial 

Credit Co., 307 U. S. 219 (1939), for example, we considered the operation of a statute requiring forfeiture of any

interest in property that was used to violate prohibition 

laws, except if acquired in good faith. There, a straw 

purchaser had bought a car in his name but with his 
Cite as: 573 U. S. ____ (2014) 15 

Opinion of the Court 

brother’s money, and transferred it to the brother—a

known bootlegger—right after driving it off the lot. See 

id., at 222–223. The Court held the finance company’s lien

on the car non-forfeitable because the company had no 

hint that the straw was a straw—that his brother would 

in fact be the owner. See id., at 224. But had the company known, the Court made clear, a different result would 

have obtained: The company could not have relied on the 

formalities of the sale to the “‘straw’ purchaser” when it 

knew that the “real owner and purchaser” of the car was 

someone different. Id., at 223–224. We have similarly 

emphasized the need in other contexts, involving both 

criminal and civil penalties, to look through a transaction’s nominal parties to its true participants. See, e.g., 

American Needle, Inc. v. National Football League, 560 

U. S. 183, 193 (2010) (focusing on “substance rather than

form” in assessing when entities are distinct enough to be

capable of conspiring to violate the antitrust laws); Gregory 

v. Helvering, 293 U. S. 465, 470 (1935) (disregarding an

intermediary shell corporation created to avoid taxes

because doing otherwise would “exalt artifice above reality”). 

We do no more than that here in holding, consistent 

with §922’s text, structure, and purpose, that using a

straw does not enable evasion of the firearms law. 

Abramski, along with the dissent, objects that such

action is no circumvention—that Congress made an intentional choice, born of “political compromise,” to limit the 

gun law’s compass to the person at the counter, even if

merely acting on another’s behalf. Reply Brief 11; post, at 

10–11. As evidence, Abramski states that the statute does 

not regulate beyond the initial point of sale. Because the 

law mostly addresses sales made by licensed dealers, a 

purchaser can (within wide limits) subsequently decide to 

resell his gun to another private party. See Reply Brief 

11. And similarly, Abramski says, a purchaser can buy a

gun for someone else as a gift. See Brief for Petitioner 26– 
 

16 ABRAMSKI v. UNITED STATES 

Opinion of the Court 

27, n. 3. Abramski lumps in the same category the transfer of a gun from a nominal to a real buyer—as something,

like a later resale or gift, meant to fall outside the statute’s (purported) standing-in-front-of-the-gun-dealer 

scope. See Reply Brief 13; see also post, at 7–9. 

But Abramski and the dissent draw the wrong conclusion from their observations about resales and gifts. Yes, 

Congress decided to regulate dealers’ sales, while leaving 

the secondary market for guns largely untouched. As we 

noted in Huddleston, Congress chose to make the dealer 

the “principal agent of federal enforcement” in “restricting

[criminals’] access to firearms.” 415 U. S., at 824. And 

yes, that choice (like pretty much everything Congress

does) was surely a result of compromise. But no, straw 

arrangements are not a part of the secondary market,

separate and apart from the dealer’s sale. In claiming as

much, Abramski merely repeats his mistaken assumption 

that the “person” who acquires a gun from a dealer in a 

case like this one is the straw, rather than the individual 

who has made a prior arrangement to pay for, take possession of, own, and use that part of the dealer’s stock. 

For all the reasons we have already given, that is not a

plausible construction of a statute mandating that the

dealer identify and run a background check on the person

to whom it is (really, not fictitiously) selling a gun. See 

supra, at 9–15. The individual who sends a straw to a gun

store to buy a firearm is transacting with the dealer, in 

every way but the most formal; and that distinguishes

such a person from one who buys a gun, or receives a gun 

as a gift, from a private party.9 The line Congress drew 

—————— 

9The dissent responds: “That certainly distinguishes” the individual

transacting with a dealer through a straw from an individual receiving

a gun from a private party; “so would the fact that [the former] has 

orange hair.” Post, at 9. But that is an example of wit gone wrong. 

Whether the purchaser has orange hair, we can all agree, is immaterial 

to the statutory scheme. By contrast, whether the purchaser has 
 

Cite as: 573 U. S. ____ (2014) 17 

Opinion of the Court 

between those who acquire guns from dealers and those

who get them as gifts or on the secondary market, we

suspect, reflects a host of things, including administrative

simplicity and a view about where the most problematic 

firearm transactions—like criminal organizations’ bulk 

gun purchases—typically occur. But whatever the reason, 

the scarcity of controls in the secondary market provides

no reason to gut the robust measures Congress enacted at

the point of sale. 

Abramski claims further support for his argument from

Congress’s decision in 1986 to amend §922(d) to prohibit a

private party (and not just, as originally enacted, a licensed dealer) from selling a gun to someone he knows or 

reasonably should know cannot legally possess one. See 

Firearm Owners’ Protection Act, §102(5)(A), 100 Stat. 

451–452. According to Abramski, the revised §922(d)

should be understood as Congress’s exclusive response to 

the potential dangers arising from straw purchases. See 

Brief for Petitioner 26–27. The amendment shows, he 

claims, that “Congress chose to address this perceived

problem in a way other than” by imposing liability under 

§922(a)(6) on a straw who tells a licensed dealer that he is 

the firearm’s actual buyer. Reply Brief 14, n. 2. 

But Congress’s amendment of §922(d) says nothing 

about §922(a)(6)’s application to straw purchasers. In enacting that amendment, Congress left §922(a)(6) just as

it was, undercutting any suggestion that Congress some-

—————— 

transacted with a licensed dealer is integral to the statute—because, as

previously noted, “the federal scheme . . . controls access to weapons”

through the federally licensed firearms dealer, who is “the principal

agent of federal enforcement.” Huddleston v. United States, 415 U. S. 

814, 824, 825 (1974); see supra, at 16. In so designing the statute, 

Congress chose not to pursue the goal of “controll[ing] access” to guns to

the nth degree; buyers can, as the dissent says, avoid the statute’s 

background check and record-keeping requirements by getting a gun

second-hand. But that possibility provides no justification for limiting

the statute’s considered regulation of dealer sales. 
 

 

18 ABRAMSKI v. UNITED STATES 

Opinion of the Court 

how intended to contract that provision’s reach. The 

amendment instead performed a different function: Rather

than ensuring that a licensed dealer receives truthful 

information, it extended a minimal form of regulation to

the secondary market. The revised §922(d) prevents a

private person from knowingly selling a gun to an ineligible owner no matter when or how he acquired the weapon:

It thus applies not just to a straw purchaser, but to an

individual who bought a gun for himself and later decided 

to resell it. At the same time, §922(d) has nothing to say

about a raft of cases §922(a)(6) covers, including all the

(many) straw purchases in which the frontman does not 

know that the actual buyer is ineligible. See supra, at 13. 

Thus, §922(d) could not serve as an effective substitute for 

§922(a)(6). And the mere potential for some transactions

to run afoul of both prohibitions gives no cause to read 

§922(d) as limiting §922(a)(6) (or vice versa). See, e.g., 

United States v. Batchelder, 442 U. S. 114, 118–126 

(1979).10 

Abramski’s principal attack on his §922(a)(6) conviction

therefore fails. Contrary to his contention, the information Question 11.a. requests—“[a]re you the actual

transferee/buyer[?]” or, put conversely, “are [you] acquir-

—————— 

10Nor do we agree with the dissent’s argument (not urged by

Abramski himself) that the rule of lenity defeats our construction. See 

post, at 12–14. That rule, as we have repeatedly emphasized, applies

only if, “after considering text, structure, history and purpose, there 

remains a grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the statute such that

the Court must simply guess as to what Congress intended.” Maracich 

v. Spears, 570 U. S ___, ___ (2013) (slip op. at 26) (quoting Barber v. 

Thomas, 560 U.S. 474, 488 (2010)). We are not in that position here: 

Although the text creates some ambiguity, the context, structure, 

history, and purpose resolve it. The dissent would apply the rule of

lenity here because the statute’s text, taken alone, permits a narrower

construction, but we have repeatedly emphasized that is not the appropriate test. See, e.g., Muscarello v. United States, 524 U. S. 125, 138 

(1998); Smith v. United States, 508 U. S. 223, 239 (1993). 
Cite as: 573 U. S. ____ (2014) 19 

Opinion of the Court 

ing the firearm(s) on behalf of another person[?]”—is

relevant to the lawfulness of a gun sale. That is because, 

for all the reasons we have given, the firearms law contemplates that the dealer will check not the fictitious

purchaser’s but instead the true purchaser’s identity and

eligibility for gun ownership. By concealing that Alvarez 

was the actual buyer, Abramski prevented the dealer from 

transacting with Alvarez face-to-face, see §922(c), recording his name, age, and residence, see §922(b)(5), inspecting his photo ID, see §922(t)(1)(C), submitting his identifying information to the background check system, see 

§922(t)(1)(B), and determining whether he was prohibited

from receiving a firearm, see §922(d). In sum, Abramski 

thwarted application of essentially all of the firearms law’s 

requirements. We can hardly think of a misrepresentation

any more material to a sale’s legality. 

III 

Abramski also challenges his §922(a)(6) conviction on a 

narrower ground. For purposes of this argument, he 

assumes that the Government can make its case when a 

straw hides the name of an underlying purchaser who is 

legally ineligible to own a gun. But, Abramski reminds us, 

that is not true here, because Alvarez could have bought a

gun for himself. In such circumstances, Abramski claims 

that a false response to Question 11.a. is not material. See 

Brief for Petitioner 28–30. Essentially, Abramski contends, when the hidden purchaser is eligible anyway to 

own a gun, all’s well that ends well, and all should be

forgiven.

But we think what we have already said shows the

fallacy of that claim: Abramski’s false statement was 

material because had he revealed that he was purchasing 

the gun on Alvarez’s behalf, the sale could not have proceeded under the law—even though Alvarez turned out to

be an eligible gun owner. The sale, as an initial matter, 
 

 

20 ABRAMSKI v. UNITED STATES 

Opinion of the Court 

would not have complied with §922(c)’s restrictions on

absentee purchases. See supra, at 11–12. If the dealer 

here, Town Police Supply, had realized it was in fact 

selling a gun to Alvarez, it would have had to stop the

transaction for failure to comply with those conditions. 

Yet more, the sale could not have gone forward because 

the dealer would have lacked the information needed to 

verify and record Alvarez’s identity and check his background. See §§922(b)(5), (t)(1)(B)–(C); supra, at 10–12. 

Those requirements, as we have explained, pertain to the 

real buyer; and the after-the-fact discovery that Alvarez

would have passed the background check cannot somehow 

wipe them away. Accordingly, had Town Police Supply

known Abramski was a straw, it could not have certified, 

as Form 4473 demands, its belief that the transfer was 

“not unlawful.” Supp. App. 3.

An analogy may help show the weakness of Abramski’s

argument. Suppose a would-be purchaser, Smith, lawfully 

could own a gun. But further suppose that, for reasons of 

his own, Smith uses an alias (let’s say Jones) to make the

purchase. Would anyone say “no harm, no foul,” just 

because Smith is not in fact a prohibited person under 

§922(d)? We think not. Smith would in any event have

made a false statement about who will own the gun, impeding the dealer’s ability to carry out its legal responsibilities. So too here. 

Abramski objects that because Alvarez could own a gun,

the statute’s core purpose—“keeping guns out of the 

hands” of criminals and other prohibited persons—“is not 

even implicated.” Brief for Petitioner 29. But that argument (which would apply no less to the alias scenario) 

misunderstands the way the statute works. As earlier 

noted, the federal gun law makes the dealer “[t]he principal agent of federal enforcement.” Huddleston, 415 U. S., 

at 824, see supra, at 16. It is that highly regulated, legally 

knowledgeable entity, possessing access to the expansive 
 

Cite as: 573 U. S. ____ (2014) 21 

Opinion of the Court 

NICS database, which has the responsibility to “[e]nsure 

that, in the course of sales or other dispositions . . . , 

weapons [are not] obtained by individuals whose possession of them would be contrary to the public interest.” 415 

U. S., at 825. Nothing could be less consonant with the

statutory scheme than placing that inquiry in the hands of 

an unlicensed straw purchaser, who is unlikely to be 

familiar with federal firearms law and has no ability to 

use the database to check whether the true buyer may 

own a gun. And in any event, keeping firearms out of the

hands of criminals is not §922’s only goal: The statute’s 

record-keeping provisions, as we have said, are also designed to aid law enforcement in the investigation of 

crime. See supra, at 2–3, 12–13. Abramski’s proposed 

limitation on §922(a)(6) would undercut that purpose 

because many would-be criminals remain legally eligible 

to buy firearms, and thus could use straws to purchase an

endless stream of guns off-the-books. See, e.g., Polk, 118 

F. 3d, at 289 (eligible gun buyer used straw purchasers to

secretly accumulate an “arsenal of weapons” for a “massive offensive” against the Federal Government). 

In addition, Abramski briefly notes that until 1995, the 

ATF took the view that a straw purchaser’s misrepresentation counted as material only if the true buyer could not 

legally possess a gun. See Brief for Petitioner 7–8; n. 8, 

supra. We may put aside that ATF has for almost two 

decades now taken the opposite position, after reflecting

on both appellate case law and changes in the statute. See 

Tr. of Oral Arg. 41; Brady Handgun Violence Prevention 

Act of 1993, §103, 107 Stat. 1541 (codified at 18 U. S. C. 

§922(t)). The critical point is that criminal laws are for 

courts, not for the Government, to construe. See, e.g., 

United States v. Apel, 571 U. S. ___, (2014) (slip op., at 9)

(“[W]e have never held that the Government’s reading of a

criminal statute is entitled to any deference”). We think 

ATF’s old position no more relevant than its current one— 
 

22 ABRAMSKI v. UNITED STATES 

Opinion of the Court 

which is to say, not relevant at all. Whether the Government interprets a criminal statute too broadly (as it sometimes does) or too narrowly (as the ATF used to in construing §922(a)(6)), a court has an obligation to correct its 

error. Here, nothing suggests that Congress—the entity

whose voice does matter—limited its prohibition of a 

straw purchaser’s misrepresentation in the way Abramski 

proposes. 

IV 

Finally, Abramski challenges his conviction under 

§924(a)(1)(A), which prohibits “knowingly mak[ing] any 

false statement . . . with respect to the information required by this chapter to be kept in the records” of a federally licensed dealer. That provision is broader than 

§922(a)(6) in one respect: It does not require that the false

statement at issue be “material” in any way. At the same 

time, §924(a)(1)(A) includes an element absent from 

§922(a)(6): The false statement must relate to “information required by this chapter to be kept in [a dealer’s] 

records.” Abramski notes that the indictment in this case 

charged him with only one misrepresentation: his statement in response to Question 11.a. that he was buying the 

Glock on his own behalf rather than on someone else’s. 

And, he argues, that information (unlike the transferee’s 

“name, age, and place of residence,” which he plausibly 

reads the indictment as not mentioning) was not required 

“by this chapter”—but only by Form 4473 itself—to be kept 

in the dealer’s permanent records. Brief for Petitioner 32. 

We disagree. Included in “this chapter”—Chapter 44 of

Title 18—is a provision, noted earlier, requiring a dealer

to “maintain such records of . . . sale, or other disposition 

of firearms at his place of business for such period, and in 

such form, as the Attorney General may by regulations 

prescribe.” §923(g)(1)(A); supra, at 3. Because of that 

statutory section, the information that the Attorney General’s regulations compel a dealer to keep is information 
 

 

Cite as: 573 U. S. ____ (2014) 23 

Opinion of the Court 

“required by this chapter.” And those regulations (the

validity of which Abramski does not here contest) demand 

that every licensed dealer “retain . . . as a part of [its]

required records, each Form 4473 obtained in the course

of ” selling or otherwise disposing of a firearm. 27 CFR 

§478.124(b). Accordingly, a false answer on that form,

such as the one Abramski made, pertains to information a

dealer is statutorily required to maintain.11 

V 

No piece of information is more important under federal

firearms law than the identity of a gun’s purchaser—the

person who acquires a gun as a result of a transaction

with a licensed dealer. Had Abramski admitted that he 

was not that purchaser, but merely a straw—that he was

asking the dealer to verify the identity of, and run a background check on, the wrong individual—the sale here 

could not have gone forward. That makes Abramski’s 

misrepresentation on Question 11.a. material under 

§922(a)(6). And because that statement pertained to 

information that a dealer must keep in its permanent 

records under the firearms law, Abramski’s answer to 

Question 11.a. also violated §924(a)(1)(A). Accordingly, we 

affirm the judgment of the Fourth Circuit. 

It is so ordered. 

—————— 

11The dissent argues that our view would impose criminal liability for 

a false answer even to an “ultra vires question,” such as “the buyer’s 

favorite color.” Post, at 15. We need not, and do not, opine on that

hypothetical, because it is miles away from this case. As we have 

explained, see supra at 9–19, Question 11.a. is not ultra vires, but 

instead fundamental to the lawfulness of a gun sale. It is, indeed, part

and parcel of the dealer’s determination of the (true) buyer’s “name, 

age, and place of residence,” which §922(b)(5) requires the dealer to

keep. That section alone would justify Abramski’s conviction under

§924(a)(1)(A) if the indictment here had clearly alleged that, in addition

to answering Question 11.a. falsely, he lied about that buyer’s “name, 

age, and place of residence.” 
_________________ 

_________________ 

 

Cite as: 573 U. S. ____ (2014) 1 

SCALIA, J., dissenting 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 12–1493 

BRUCE JAMES ABRAMSKI, JR., PETITIONER v.
 

UNITED STATES
 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
 

[June 16, 2014] 

JUSTICE SCALIA, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE, 

JUSTICE THOMAS, and JUSTICE ALITO join, dissenting. 

Bruce Abramski bought a gun for his uncle from a federally licensed gun dealer, using money his uncle gave him 

for that purpose. Both men were legally eligible to receive

and possess firearms, and Abramski transferred the gun 

to his uncle at a federally licensed gun dealership in compliance with state law. When buying the gun, Abramski 

had to fill out Form 4473 issued by the Bureau of Alcohol, 

Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF). In response to a

question on the form, Abramski affirmed that he was the 

“actual/transferee buyer” of the gun, even though the form 

stated that he was not the “actual transferee/buyer” if he 

was purchasing the gun for a third party at that person’s

request and with funds provided by that person. 

The Government charged Abramski with two federal

crimes under the Gun Control Act of 1968, as amended, 18 

U. S. C. §§921–931: making a false statement “material to

the lawfulness of the sale,” in violation of §922(a)(6), and 

making a false statement “with respect to information 

required by [the Act] to be kept” by the dealer, in violation 

of §924(a)(1)(A). On both counts the Government interprets this criminal statute to punish conduct that its plain

language simply does not reach. I respectfully dissent

from the Court’s holding to the contrary. 
 

 

 

2 ABRAMSKI v. UNITED STATES 

SCALIA, J., dissenting 

I. Section 922(a)(6) 

A 

Under §922(a)(6), it is a crime to make a “false . . . 

statement” to a licensed gun dealer about a “fact material

to the lawfulness of ” a firearms sale. Abramski made a 

false statement when he claimed to be the gun’s “actual 

transferee/buyer” as Form 4473 defined that term. But 

that false statement was not “material to the lawfulness of 

the sale” since the truth—that Abramski was buying the 

gun for his uncle with his uncle’s money—would not have 

made the sale unlawful. See Kungys v. United States, 485 

U. S. 759, 775 (1988) (plurality opinion) (materiality is

determined by asking “what would have ensued from

official knowledge of the misrepresented fact”); accord id., 

at 787 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). Therefore, 

Abramski’s conviction on this count cannot stand. 

Several provisions of the Act limit the circumstances in 

which a licensed gun dealer may lawfully sell a firearm.

Most prominently, the Act provides that no one may “sell 

or otherwise dispose of ” a firearm to a person who he

knows or has reasonable cause to believe falls within one 

of nine prohibited categories (such as felons, fugitives,

illegal-drug users, and the mentally ill). §922(d). But the 

Government does not contend that either Abramski or his 

uncle fell into one of those prohibited categories. And no 

provision of the Act prohibits one person who is eligible to

receive and possess firearms (e.g., Abramski) from buying

a gun for another person who is eligible to receive and 

possess firearms (e.g., Abramski’s uncle), even at the

other’s request and with the other’s money.

The Government’s contention that Abramski’s false 

statement was material to the lawfulness of the sale depends on a strained interpretation of provisions that

mention the “person” to whom a dealer “sell[s]” (or “transfer[s],” or “deliver[s]”) a gun. A dealer may not “sell or 
 

Cite as: 573 U. S. ____ (2014) 3 

SCALIA, J., dissenting 

deliver” a firearm to a “person” without recording “the 

name, age, and place of residence of such person.” 

§922(b)(5). He may not, without following special procedures, “sell” a firearm to a “person” who does not appear in

person at the dealer’s business. §922(c). He may not

“transfer” a firearm to a “person” without verifying that

person’s identity and running a background check. 

§922(t)(1). And he may not “sell or deliver” a firearm to a 

“person” who he knows or has reasonable cause to believe

resides in a different State. §922(b)(3). 

The Government maintains that in this case Abramski’s 

uncle was the “person” to whom the dealer “s[old]” the 

gun, and that the sale consequently violated those provisions. It bases that assertion on the claim that the Gun 

Control Act implicitly incorporates “principles of agency

law.” Brief for United States 17. Under those principles,

it contends, the individual who walks into a dealer’s store, 

fills out the requisite forms, pays the dealer, and takes 

possession of the gun is not necessarily the “person” to 

whom the dealer “sell[s]” the gun. Instead, it says, we

must ask whether that individual bought the gun as a 

third party’s common-law agent; if so, then the third party

is the “person” to whom the dealer “sell[s]” the gun within

the meaning of the relevant statutory provisions. The 

majority agrees: Although it never explicitly mentions

agency law, it declares that if an individual is “buying a

firearm on someone else’s behalf,” the “someone else” is 

the “person” to whom the dealer “sell[s]” the gun within

the meaning of the statute. Ante, at 9. 

I doubt that three of the four provisions at issue here 

would establish the materiality of Abramski’s falsehood 

even if Abramski’s uncle were deemed the “person” to 

whom the dealer “s[old]” the gun.1 But §922(b)(3) would 

—————— 

1Sections 922(b)(5), (c), and (t)(1) require the dealer to follow certain 

procedures with respect to that “person,” such as recording his name, 
 

 

4 ABRAMSKI v. UNITED STATES 

SCALIA, J., dissenting 

unquestionably do so, since it prohibits a dealer from

selling a gun to a person who resides in another State, as

Abramski’s uncle did. That is of no moment, however, 

because Abramski’s uncle was not the “person” to whom 

the gun was “s[old].” 

The contrary interpretation provided by the Government and the majority founders on the plain language of

the Act. We interpret criminal statutes, like other statutes, in a manner consistent with ordinary English usage. 

Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 556 U. S. 646, 650–652 

(2009); Jones v. United States, 529 U. S. 848, 855 (2000); 

Bailey v. United States, 516 U. S. 137, 144–145 (1995). In 

ordinary usage, a vendor sells (or delivers, or transfers) an

item of merchandise to the person who physically appears

in his store, selects the item, pays for it, and takes possession of it. So if I give my son $10 and tell him to pick up

milk and eggs at the store, no English speaker would say 

that the store “sells” the milk and eggs to me.2 And even if 

we were prepared to let “principles of agency law” trump

ordinary English usage in the interpretation of this criminal statute, those principles would not require a different 

—————— 

dealing with him in person, and checking his background. I doubt 

whether a falsehood that causes the dealer to neglect those procedures 

(here, by applying them to the wrong person) is material to the lawfulness of the sale within the meaning of §922(a)(6) if the sale could have

been executed lawfully had the truth been disclosed. Moreover, if that 

were so—if a falsehood that introduced procedural error into a gun sale 

were always material to lawfulness—then §924(a)(1)(A) (discussed in

Part II of this opinion), which prohibits making false statements with 

respect to information required to be recorded in a dealer’s records,

would be superfluous. 2The majority makes the puzzling suggestion that the answer would 

be different if the sale involved consumer electronics instead of groceries. Ante, at 9, n. 5. But whether the item sold is a carton of milk, an 

iPhone, or anything else under the sun, an ordinary English speaker

would say that an over-the-counter merchant “sells” the item to the 

person who pays for and takes possession of it, not the individual to

whom that person later transfers the item. 
 

 

Cite as: 573 U. S. ____ (2014) 5 

SCALIA, J., dissenting 

result. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Agency §366, 

Illustration 1 (1957) (“On behalf of P, his disclosed principal, A makes a written contract with T wherein A promises to buy from T, and T agrees to sell to A, certain machinery for $1000. . . . [If there is fraud in the inducement and 

A has already paid], A can maintain an action against T 

for the thousand dollars” (emphasis added)). 

Huddleston v. United States, 415 U. S. 814 (1974), on 

which the majority relies, ante, at 14, does not suggest 

otherwise. There we addressed the types of transactions 

covered by the statutory term “acquisition” in §922(a)(6) (a

term whose meaning is not at issue here), holding that

they were not limited to “sale-like transaction[s]” but 

included a “pawnshop redemption of a firearm.” 415 U. S., 

at 819. We said nothing about the distinct question of to 

whom a dealer “sell[s],” “transfer[s],” or “deliver[s]” a 

firearm in a given transaction. Nor does the case stand, as 

the majority believes, for “a substance-over-form approach,” ante, at 14. We said the term “acquisition” was

“‘aimed at providing maximum coverage,’” ibid. (quoting

415 U. S., at 826–827), not because substance over form

demands that, nor because everything in the Act must be

assumed to provide maximum coverage, but because “[t]he

word ‘acquire’ is defined to mean simply ‘to come into 

possession, control, or power of disposal of,’” which gives

“no intimation . . . that title or ownership would be necessary.” Id., at 820. 

Contrary to the majority’s assertion that the statute

“merely raises, rather than answers, the critical question” 

of whether Abramski or his uncle was the “person” to

whom the dealer “s[old]” the gun, ante, at 9, the statute 

speaks to that question directly. Giving the text its plain, 

ordinary meaning, Abramski, not his uncle, was that

“person.” That being so, the Government has identified no 

reason why the arrangement between Abramski and his

uncle, both of whom were eligible to receive and possess 
 

 

6 ABRAMSKI v. UNITED STATES 

SCALIA, J., dissenting 

firearms, was “material to the lawfulness of ” the sale.3 

B 

The majority contends, however, that the Gun Control 

Act’s “principal purpose” of “curb[ing] crime by keeping

firearms out of the hands of those not legally entitled to 

possess them” demands the conclusion that Abramski’s

uncle was the “person” to whom the dealer “s[old]” the 

gun. Ante, at 11 (internal quotation marks omitted). But 

“no law pursues its purpose at all costs,” and the “textual

limitations upon a law’s scope” are equally “a part of its

‘purpose.’” Rapanos v. United States, 547 U. S. 715, 752 

(2006) (plurality opinion). The majority’s purpose-based 

arguments describe a statute Congress reasonably might 

have written, but not the statute it wrote. 

The heart of the majority’s argument is its claim that

unless Abramski’s uncle is deemed the “person” to whom 

the gun was “s[old],” the Act’s identification, backgroundcheck, and record-keeping requirements would be “render[ed] meaningless.” Ante, at 11. That vastly overstates 

the consequences. Perhaps the statute would serve the

purpose of crime prevention more effectively if the requirements at issue looked past the “man at the counter” 

to the person “getting, and always meant to get, the fire-

—————— 

3The facts of this case provide no occasion to address whether—as

ATF maintained for many years before adopting its current position—a

misrepresentation in response to Form 4473’s “actual buyer/transferee”

question would be “material to the lawfulness of the sale” if the customer intended to transfer the gun to a person who he knew or had

reasonable cause to believe was prohibited by the Act from receiving or 

possessing firearms. A falsehood that conceals an intention of that sort 

may be material because a dealer who sold the gun knowing of that 

intention might be “unlawfully aiding” the customer’s violation of 

§924(d) (and the prohibited person’s violation of §924(g)). Cf. ATF, 

Industry Circular 79–10 (1979), in (Your Guide To) Federal Firearms

Regulation 1988–89 (1988), p. 78; infra, at 10–11. I need not decide 

that question here. 
Cite as: 573 U. S. ____ (2014) 7 

SCALIA, J., dissenting 

arm.” Ante, at 13. But ensuring that the person taking

possession of the firearm from the dealer is eligible to

receive and possess a firearm, and recording information

about that person for later reference, are by no means

worthless functions. On the contrary, they indisputably 

advance the purpose of crime prevention by making it 

harder for ineligible persons to acquire guns and easier for 

the Government to locate those guns in the future; they

simply do not advance that purpose to the same degree as

a more exacting law might have done. 

That the Act’s focus on the “man at the counter” in this 

situation does not render its requirements “meaningless”

is confirmed by the Government’s concession that the Act 

has a similar focus in many comparable situations where

the gun’s immediate purchaser is—to use the majority’s

phrase—a “mere condui[t]” for a contemplated transfer of

the gun to a different person who will “take possession of, 

own, and use” it. Ante, at 11, 16. Consider the following 

scenarios in which even the Government regards the man 

at the counter as the “person” to whom the dealer “sell[s]” 

the gun: 

	 Guns Intended as Gifts. In the Government’s view, 

an individual who buys a gun “with the intent of

making a gift of the firearm to another person” is 

the gun’s “true purchaser.” ATF, Federal Firearms 

Regulations Reference Guide 165 (2005) (hereinafter 2005 ATF Guide). The Government’s position

makes no exception for situations where the gift is

specifically requested by the recipient (as gifts 

sometimes are). So long as no money changes

hands, and no agency relationship is formed, between gifter and giftee, the Act is concerned only 

with the man at the counter. 

	 Guns Intended for Resale. Introducing money into 
 

8 ABRAMSKI v. UNITED STATES 

SCALIA, J., dissenting 

the equation does not automatically change the 

outcome. The Government admits that the man at 

the counter is the true purchaser even if he immediately sells the gun to someone else. Tr. of Oral 

Arg. 34–35. And it appears the Government’s position would be the same even if the man at the 

counter purchased the gun with the intent to sell it 

to a particular third party, so long as the two did

not enter into a common-law agency relationship. 

	 Guns Intended as Raffle Prizes. The Government 

considers the man at the counter the true purchaser even if he is buying the gun “for the purpose

of raffling [it] at an event”—in which case he can

provide his own information on Form 4473 and 

“transfer the firearm to the raffle winner without a 

Form 4473 being completed or a [background] 

check being conducted” on the winner. 2005 ATF 

Guide 195. 

If the statute’s requirements were “render[ed] meaningless” by treating Abramski rather than his uncle as the

true purchaser, then they would be every bit as meaningless in the scenarios just described. The Government’s 

concession that the statute is operating appropriately in 

each of those scenarios should cause the majority to 

reevaluate its assumptions about the type and degree of 

regulation that the statute regards as “meaningful.” The 

majority, it is clear, regards Abramski’s interpretation as

creating a loophole in the law; but even if that were a fair

characterization, why is the majority convinced that a

statute with so many admitted loopholes does not contain

this particular loophole? 

The majority’s answer to this argument is that “the

individual who sends a straw to a gun store to buy a firearm is transacting with the dealer, in every way but the 
 

 

 

 

Cite as: 573 U. S. ____ (2014) 9 

SCALIA, J., dissenting 

most formal.” Ante, at 16 (emphasis deleted). That certainly distinguishes that individual from the intended

subsequent donee or purchaser; so would the fact that he

has orange hair. But it does not establish why that individual, any more than the others, should be thought to be

covered by statutory language (the “person” to whom

a dealer “sell[s]” a gun) that does not naturally apply.

The only thing which can justify that leap is the false 

imperative to make the statute as effective as possible, 

rather than as effective as the language indicates Congress desired.4 

What the scenarios described above show is that the 

statute typically is concerned only with the man at the 

counter, even where that man is in a practical sense a 

“conduit” who will promptly transfer the gun to someone 

else. Perhaps that is because Congress wanted a rule that 

would be easy to understand and to administer, which the

Government’s proposed agency test—and the majority’s

apparent adoption of that test sans any mention of agency 

law—certainly is not. (When counsel for the Government 

was pressed about hypothetical situations not giftwrapped as neatly as this case, he said, frankly but unhelpfully, that they would turn on the “factual question” of 

“[w]hether the purchase was made on behalf of someone 

—————— 

4The majority’s claim that its analysis “does not rest on mere ‘purposebased arguments,’ ” ante, at 9, n. 6, rings hollow. The majority

says it is relying on the principle that when a statutory provision is 

“ambiguous” but “only one of the permissible meanings produces a

substantive effect that is compatible with the rest of the law,” we

should adopt that meaning. Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). 

But even if the text at issue here were ambiguous, it is clear that the 

“substantive effect” of the narrower interpretation is “compatible

with”—indeed, it is downright congenial to—“the rest of ” the Gun

Control Act. The majority’s contrary conclusion rests, not on anything 

in the text or structure of the Act, but on the majority’s guess about 

how far Congress meant to go in pursuit of its crime-prevention 

“purpose.” 
 

 

10 ABRAMSKI v. UNITED STATES 

SCALIA, J., dissenting 

else.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 49–50.) 

Or perhaps Congress drew the line where it did because 

the Gun Control Act, like many contentious pieces of 

legislation, was a “compromise” among “highly interested 

parties attempting to pull the provisions in different directions.” Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U. S. 438, 461 

(2002); see Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation 

Programs v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 

514 U. S. 122, 135–136 (1995). Perhaps those whose votes

were needed for passage of the statute wanted a lawful 

purchaser to be able to use an agent. A statute shaped by

political tradeoffs in a controversial area may appear 

“imperfect” from some perspectives, but “our ability to 

imagine ways of redesigning the statute to advance one of

Congress’ ends does not render it irrational.” Preseault v. 

ICC, 494 U. S. 1, 19 (1990). We must accept that Congress, balancing the conflicting demands of a divided 

citizenry, “‘wrote the statute it wrote’—meaning, a statute

going so far and no further.” Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community, 572 U. S. ___, ___ (2014) (slip op., at 11). 

That Abramski’s reading does not render the Act’s 

requirements “meaningless” is further evidenced by the 

fact that, for decades, even ATF itself did not read the 

statute to criminalize conduct like Abramski’s. After 

Congress passed the Act in 1968, ATF’s initial position 

was that the Act did not prohibit the sale of a gun to an 

eligible buyer acting on behalf of a third party (even an

ineligible one). See Hearings Before the Subcommittee To

Investigate Juvenile Delinquency of the Senate Committee

on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, 118 (1975).

A few years later, ATF modified its position and asserted 

that the Act did not “prohibit a dealer from making a sale

to a person who is actually purchasing the firearm for 

another person” unless the other person was “prohibited 

from receiving or possessing a firearm,” in which case the

dealer could be guilty of “unlawfully aiding the prohibited 
Cite as: 573 U. S. ____ (2014) 11 

SCALIA, J., dissenting 

person’s own violation.” ATF, Industry Circular 79–10

(1979), in (Your Guide To) Federal Firearms Regulation

1988–89 (1988), p. 78. The agency appears not to have

adopted its current position until the early 1990’s. See 

United States v. Polk, 118 F. 3d 286, 295, n. 7 (CA5 1997).

The majority deems this enforcement history “not relevant” because the Government’s reading of a criminal 

statute is not entitled to deference. Ante, at 22. But the 

fact that the agency charged with enforcing the Act read

it, over a period of roughly 25 years, not to apply to the 

type of conduct at issue here is powerful evidence that

interpreting the Act in that way is natural and reasonable

and does not make its requirements “meaningless.” 

C 

Even if the statute were wrongly thought to be ambiguous on this point, the rule of lenity would defeat the Government’s construction. It is a “familiar principle” that 

“‘ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes

should be resolved in favor of lenity.’” Skilling v. United 

States, 561 U. S. 358, 410 (2010). That principle prevents 

us from giving the words of a criminal statute “a meaning 

that is different from [their] ordinary, accepted meaning, 

and that disfavors the defendant.” Burrage v. United 

States, 571 U. S. ___, ___ (2014) (slip op., at 12). And it 

means that when a criminal statute has two possible 

readings, we do not “‘choose the harsher alternative’” 

unless Congress has “‘spoken in language that is clear and 

definite.’” United States v. Bass, 404 U. S. 336, 347–349 

(1971). For the reasons given above, it cannot be said that 

the statute unambiguously commands the Government’s

current reading. It is especially contrary to sound practice

to give this criminal statute a meaning that the Government itself rejected for years. 

The majority does not mention the rule of lenity apart

from a footnote, ante, at 18, n. 10, responding to this dis-
 

12 ABRAMSKI v. UNITED STATES 

SCALIA, J., dissenting 

sent. The footnote concedes that “the text creates some 

ambiguity” but says that “context, structure, history, and 

purpose resolve it.” Ibid. But for the reasons given above, 

context and structure do not support the majority’s interpretation, history refutes it by showing that the Government itself interpreted the statute more leniently for 

many years, and “purpose” supports it only if one imputes 

to the statute a crime-fighting purpose broader than the

text discloses (a practice that would nullify the rule of 

lenity in all cases). See Part I–B, supra.5 If lenity has no

role to play in a clear case such as this one, we ought to

stop pretending it is a genuine part of our jurisprudence.

Contrary to the majority’s miserly approach, the rule of 

lenity applies whenever, after all legitimate tools of interpretation have been exhausted, “a reasonable doubt persists” regarding whether Congress has made the defendant’s conduct a federal crime, Moskal v. United States, 498 

U. S. 103, 108 (1990)—in other words, whenever those 

tools do not decisively dispel the statute’s ambiguity. 

Skilling, supra, at 410; see, e.g., Scheidler v. National 

Organization for Women, Inc., 537 U. S. 393, 409 (2003); 

Cleveland v. United States, 531 U. S. 12, 25 (2000); Crandon v. United States, 494 U. S. 152, 158 (1990). “[W]here

text, structure, and history fail to establish that the Government’s position is unambiguously correct . . . we apply 

the rule of lenity and resolve the ambiguity in [the defendant]’s favor.” United States v. Granderson, 511 U. S. 

39, 54 (1994). It cannot honestly be said that the text,

structure, and history of the Gun Control Act establish as

“unambiguously correct” that the Act makes Abramski’s 

conduct a federal crime. 

By refusing to apply lenity here, the majority turns its 

—————— 

5The majority is thus entirely wrong to charge that I would apply the 

rule of lenity “because the statute’s text, taken alone, permits a narrower construction,” ante, at 18, n. 10. 
Cite as: 573 U. S. ____ (2014) 13 

SCALIA, J., dissenting 

back on a liberty-protecting and democracy-promoting rule

that is “perhaps not much less old than construction itself.” United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76, 95 (1820) 

(Marshall, C. J.); see, e.g., 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries 

on the Laws of England 88 (1765) (“Penal statutes must be

construed strictly”). As Chief Justice Marshall wrote, the 

rule is “founded on the tenderness of the law for the rights

of individuals; and on the plain principle that the power of 

punishment is vested in the legislative, not in the judicial 

department.” Wiltberger, supra, at 95. It forbids a court 

to criminalize an act simply because the court deems that

act “of equal atrocity, or of kindred character, with those 

which are enumerated.” Id., at 96. Today’s majority

disregards that foundational principle. 

II. Section 924(a)(1)(A) 

Under §924(a)(1)(A), it is a crime to make a “false

statement . . . with respect to the information required by 

this chapter to be kept in the records of ” a federally licensed gun dealer (emphasis added). “[T]his chapter”

refers to chapter 44 of title 18 of the United States Code, 

which contains the Gun Control Act. §§921–931. 

The question Abramski answered falsely was whether 

he was buying the gun for someone else. Did the Act itself 

require the dealer to record this information? It did not; it 

simply required him to record “the name, age, and place of

residence” of the “person” to whom the firearm was “s[old]

or deliver[ed].” §922(b)(5). As explained above, that “person” was Abramski, not his uncle. See Part I, supra. 

But, the majority says, the Act also directs dealers to

“‘maintain such records . . . as the Attorney General may

by regulations prescribe.’” Ante, at 22 (quoting 

§923(g)(1)(A)). So did a regulation require this information to be recorded? Again, no. The relevant regulation

provides that a dealer shall 

“obtain a Form 4473 from the transferee showing the 
 

14 ABRAMSKI v. UNITED STATES 

SCALIA, J., dissenting 

transferee’s name, sex, residence address (including

county or similar political subdivision), date and place

of birth; height, weight and race of the transferee; the

transferee’s country of citizenship; the transferee’s 

INS-issued alien number or admission number; the 

transferee’s State of residence; and certification by the 

transferee that the transferee is not prohibited by the 

Act from transporting or shipping a firearm in interstate or foreign commerce or receiving a firearm

which has been shipped or transported in interstate or

foreign commerce or possessing a firearm in or affecting commerce.” 27 CFR §478.124(c)(1) (2014). 

The long list of information that this regulation requires

to be kept in the dealer’s records does not include whether 

the transferee is buying the gun for an eligible third party. 

But wait! the majority says: Another provision of the

regulation requires a dealer to “‘retain . . . as part of [its]

required records, each Form 4473 obtained in the course

of ’” selling or disposing of a firearm. Ante, at 23 (quoting 

27 CFR §478.124(a)). Therefore, according to the majority,

any “false answer on that Form”—even an answer to a

question that is not among those enumerated in the regulation—necessarily “pertains to information a dealer is 

statutorily required to maintain.” Ante, at 23. 

That carries the text of the statute a bridge too far. On 

the majority’s view, if the bureaucrats responsible for

creating Form 4473 decided to ask about the buyer’s favorite color, a false response would be a federal crime. That 

is not what the statute says. The statute punishes misstatements “with respect to information required to be

kept,” §924(a)(1)(A) (emphasis added), not with respect to

“information contained in forms required to be kept.” 

Because neither the Act nor any regulation requires a 

dealer to keep a record of whether a customer is purchasing a gun for himself or for an eligible third party, that 
 

 

Cite as: 573 U. S. ____ (2014) 15 

SCALIA, J., dissenting 

question had no place on Form 4473—any more than

would the question whether the customer was purchasing 

the gun as a gift for a particular individual and, if so, who

that individual was. And the statute no more criminalizes 

a false answer to an ultra vires question on Form 4473

than it criminalizes the purchaser’s volunteering of a false

e-mail address on that form. Information regarding

Abramski’s status as a “straw purchaser” was not “information required to be kept,” and that is an end of the 

matter. In my view, that is the best—indeed, the only

plausible—interpretation of §924(a)(1)(A). But at a minimum, the statute is ambiguous, and lenity does the rest.

See Part I–C, supra.6 

* * * 

The Court makes it a federal crime for one lawful gun

owner to buy a gun for another lawful gun owner. Whether 

or not that is a sensible result, the statutes Congress

enacted do not support it—especially when, as is appropriate, we resolve ambiguity in those statutes in favor of 

the accused. I respectfully dissent. 

—————— 

6The majority professes that it “need not, and do[es] not, opine on” 

whether it would impose liability for “a false answer even to an ‘ultra 

vires question’ ” because, given its reasoning on Count One, the question at issue here was “part and parcel of the dealer’s determination of

the (true) buyer’s ‘name, age, and place of residence,’ which §922(b)(5) 

requires the dealer to keep.” Ante, at 23, n. 11. But if that is really all

the majority means to decide, then why bother to invoke the requirement that the dealer keep such records as the regulations prescribe and 

the regulation requiring the dealer to keep Form 4473? See ante, at 

22–23. If the majority’s ruling is as limited as it claims, it ought to cite 

§922(b)(5) and be done.