The Honora ble Russell G. Clark, United States District Judge for the Western 1 District of Missouri. United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

_____________ No. 97-1475WM

_____________ Mary Darlene Shrader, * * Appellee, * * On Appeal from the United v. * States District Court * for the Western District * of Missouri. OMC Aluminum Boat Group, Inc., * * Appellant. *

___________ Submitted: September 9, 1997 Filed: October 31, 1997

___________ Bef ore RICHARD S. ARNOLD, Chief Judge, FLOYD R. GIBSON and HEANEY , Circuit Judges.

___________ RICHARD S. ARNOLD, Chief Judge. OMC Aluminum Boat Group, Inc. appeals from the District Court's award of 1 $44,137.50 in attorneys' fees to Mary Da rlene Shrader, the plaintiff in a discrimination suit brought under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) and the-2-

Missouri Human Rights Act (MHRA). A review of the record persuades us that th e District Court did not abuse its discretion. We therefore affirm.
I. Mary Darl ene Shrader worked for OMC Aluminum Boat Group, Inc., as a “lineman” until February 24, 1993, when she began experiencing pain in her wrists. Shrader spoke with her immediate s upervisor, Jim Evans, about her condition. On the same day, Evans held a meeting with Shrader and OMC’s manufacturin g manager, Jim Buttrey, to discuss Shrader’s problem. In the meeting, Shrader informed the two that sh e had developed carpal tunnel syndrome while in her former job and had bee n diagnosedwith a 5% permanent partial disability in each wrist. At the conclusion of the meetin g, Buttrey expressed concern about Shrader’s condition and the risk o f further injury. He then told Shrader she could not continue to work at OMC.
Afterh er initial attempts to be reinstated to OMC in another position on th e “line” f ailed, Shrader sought the assistance of an attorney. Through her attorney , Shrader filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commissi on(EEOC) and the Missouri Commission on Human Rights as well as a worker’s compensation claim. Although OMC acknowledged that Shrader was eligible for rehire, the company took no action until Shrader’s lawyer and the EEOC pressed the issue. Shrader was reinstated as a lineman at OMC in June of 1994. One hundred and fourteen individuals were hired to line position s during the 15-month period before Shrader was rehired.
Based on her belief that OMC had discriminated against her by terminating her, Shrader filed suit under the ADA, 42 U.S. C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994), and the MHRA, Mo. Rev. Stat. Ch. 213 (1994). Shrader claimed that she was qualified to perfor m almostall of the lineman jobs at OMC, and that by terminating her OMC failed t o reasonably accommodate her based on its perception of her as disabled. The ADAThe Missouri Appro ved Jury Instructions provide the following explanation of 2 when withdrawal instructions may be given (in pertinent part):

“The court may properly give a withdrawal i nstruction when ithas received evidence upon an issue which is late r abandoned either by choice or by reason of inade quate proof for final submiss ion to the jury. The instruction to be given is that t he issue is no longer open for the jury’ s consideration.” MAI 34.01 (1996).
-3- claim was tried to a jury, and the MHRA clai m was tried to the district judge. At trial, the re was conflicting testimony about whether Shrader actually had a disability an d wheth er she was entitled to a reasonable accommodation. The judge issue d "withdrawal" instructions to the jury regarding both of tho se claims. The jury returned 2 a verdict in favor of Shrader on the perceived-disabi lity claim and awarded her $3,000.

Both parties moved

for attorneys’ fees. Subsequently, the District Court found that OMC had violated Shrader’s rights under the MHRA. The Court also denie d OMC’s motion for a directed verdict or, in the alternative, for a new trial. The District Court den ied OMC’s motion for attorneys’ fees. It denied in part and granted in part Sh rader’s fee motion, awarding her $44,137.50. The award was approximately 35% less than t he amount her counsel had requested. OMC appeals from only the orde r awarding Shrader attorneys’ fees and denying its own motion for fees.
II.
The ADA g ives a court discretionary authority to grant the prevailing party attorneys’ fees. 42 U.S.C. § 12205 (19 94). A plaintiff prevails “when actual relief on th e merits of his claim materially alters the legal relationship between the parties b y modifying the defendant’s behavior in a way that direc tly benefits the plaintiff.” Farrar-4-

v. Hobby , 506 U.S. 103, 111-12, 113 S. Ct. 566, 573, 121 L.Ed.2d 494 (1992). The District Court has discretion in determinin g the amount of the award because it has the great estexposure to, and therefore understanding of, the proceedings before it. Th e District Court mus t determine whether the requested fee amount is reasonable in light of the level of the success achieved. Hensley v. Eckerhart , 461 U.S. 424, 103 S. Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983). When a plaintiff obtains substantial relief and the lawsuit consists of closely related claims, the award is not reduced because plaintiff did no t prevail on every argument asserted. Id . at 435, 103 S. Ct. at 1941. Where a plaintiff obtains partial or limited success, he District Court tailors the fee to reflect a relationship to the results obtained. Id . at 435-36, 103 S. Ct. at 1940.
OMC conten ds that the District Court abused its discretion by granting a n unr easonable and excessive attorney-fee award to Shrader. OMC also argues that it, no t Shrader, obtained prevailing-party status for purposes of determining attorneys ’ fees. OMC relies primarily on the withdrawa l instructions issued by the District Court to t he jury on Shrader’s actual-disability and reasonable-accommodation claims i n supp ort of its contention that it obtained prevailing-party status. OMC asserts tha t Shrader’s withdrawn claims were “frivolous,” “unreasonable,” and “unsupported b y any evidence.” Appellant’s Br. 14-15. OMC also claims preva iling-party status on the basis that the jury awarded Shrader “minimal relief on only one claim,” and that th e award repr esents an “obvious compromise” reflecting that the “members of the jury obv iously believed that plaintiff’s single submitted claim had limited merit. ” Appellant’s Br. iv, 26.
The District Court was correct in designating Shrader as the prevailing party. A jury determined that OMC violated Shrader’s rights under the ADA and awarded her $3, 000. The jury’s decision constitutes “actual relief on the merits” of the claim an d modifies OMC’s behavior to Shrader’s direct benefit. The withdrawal in structions were forclai ms closely related to the one on which Shrader ultimately prevailed, an d therefore do not create prevailing-party status for OMC. Th e District Court, in its order-5-

on the motions for attorneys’ fees, stated that it “removed the issues of actual disability an dreasonable accommodation at defendant’s request because plaintiff’s counse l offered no objection. This does not rise to the level of a ‘judicial declaration.’ ” District Court Order, Jan. 7, 1997, at 5-6. The District Court’s denial of OMC’s motion for attorneys’ fees is affirmed.
T he District Court was also correct in deciding that Shrader’s actual-disability, re asonable-accommodation, and perceived-disability claims were interrelated. W e disagree with OMC’s interpre tation of Shrader’s testimony. Shrader’s action centered on the questi on of whether OMC terminated her employment because she complained of wrist p ain and subsequently disclosed a previous diagnosis of carpal tunne l syndrome. Shrader’s carpal tunnel syndrome, while appare ntly not severe, nevertheless existed, and she expressed fear that it would become severe. OMC was concerne d about liability

for future injury and discharged her. Throughout litigation, when OMC aske dShrader about her disability, she denied that it adversely affected her ability t o perform wor k at OMC. Shrader wanted her job back and her responses wer e forthrightly gear

ed toward getting it. Because of such responses, OMC maintains that Shrade r’s claims of actual disability and failure to reasonably accommodat e cont radictedher testimony and thereby were, among other things, groundless an d frivolous.
It is undisputed that Shrader had been diagnosed with a 5% permanent partia l disability in each wrist, and that she was discharged immediately after divulging that fact

. Thus, Shrader’s actual-disability, reasonable-accommodation, and perceived

disa bility claims were not only plausible, but raised closely related issues of fact

. While Shrader did not ultimately prevail on each of her contentions, the strategy o f arguing e ach claim was reasonable in light of the evidence and in the context o f developing a disability discrimination case . A jury did ultimately determine that OMC viola tedthe ADA by terminating Shrader based on its perception of her as disabled

. The District Court

correctly concluded that Shrader’s claims were closely related and-6-

that t hey are compensable under Hensley . The remaining question is whether the fee award was reasonable in light of the success obtained.
III.
The District Court fee award was reasonable. Th e judge correctly examined the reasonableness of the number of hours expend ed and the hourly rate charged. Plaintiff requested $69,522.50 in fees. Because it determined that the ho urly fee for the lawyers was excessive consideri ng the prevailing market rate in Springfield, the District Court awarded only 65% of the requested amount. The Court also appropriately excluded the ho urs claimed for one of the attorneys whose presence at the trial was deeme d unnecessar y. Secretarial services were excluded from the award as well. Becaus e Shrader’s claims were closely relate d, the District Court was correct that the hours for each claim should not be separated, since the time would have been spent anyway in the context of the claim that succeeded.
Nor did the Court abuse its discretion in determining that Darlene Shrade r obtained a level of success warranting this award of attorney’s f ees. We agree with the Distric t Court that the significance of Shrader’s rehiring should not be downplayed

. In the context of an employment discrimination suit under the ADA, rehir ing constitutes a great succe ss. The record below supports the conclusion that the time spent b y Sh rader’s lawyers pursuing the EEOC claim was instrumental in her rehiring

. Moreover, Shrader obtained a verdict and $3,000 judgment agains t OMC. The District Court also concluded that OMC had improperly discharged Shrader under the MHRA. The jury’s verdict and the District Court ruling not only serve to vindicate importan t per sonal rights as envisioned by the statute, but also further the public’s interest i n providing a fair playing field in the work world.
Affirmed.-7-

A true copy.

Attest:
CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.