UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-7679

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Petitioner – Appellee,

v.

FRANCISCO CASTREJON-ALVAREZ,

Respondent - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Dever III, 

Chief District Judge. (5:08-hc-02101-D-JG)

Submitted: November 27, 2013 Decided: December 18, 2013

Before KEENAN, WYNN, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Lewis A. Thompson, III, BANZET, THOMPSON & STYERS, PLLC, 

Warrenton, North Carolina, for Appellant. Thomas G. Walker, 

United States Attorney, R.A. Renfer, Jr., Joshua B. Royster, 

Assistant United States Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for 

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Francisco Castrejon-Alvarez appeals from the district 

court’s order civilly committing him pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 

§ 4248 (2012) to the custody and care of the Attorney General. 

The United States sought to commit Castrejon-Alvarez as a 

sexually dangerous person under the Adam Walsh Child Protection 

and Safety Act of 2006, 18 U.S.C. §§ 4247, 4248 (2012) (the 

Act). On appeal, Castrejon-Alvarez contends that the Act 

violates equal protection, and is criminal and not civil in 

nature. Castrejon-Alvarez also contends that the district court 

clearly erred in finding that the Government proved by clear and 

convincing evidence that he would be unable to refrain from 

future acts of child molestation. Finding no error, we affirm.

Pursuant to the Act, after a hearing, if the district 

court finds by clear and convincing evidence that a person is a 

“sexually dangerous person,” the court must commit the person to 

the custody of the Attorney General. 18 U.S.C. § 4248(d). A 

“sexually dangerous person” is one “who has engaged or attempted 

to engage in sexually violent conduct or child molestation and 

who is sexually dangerous to others . . . .” 18 U.S.C. 

§ 4247(a)(5). A person is considered “sexually dangerous to 

others” if “the person suffers from a serious mental illness, 

abnormality, or disorder as a result of which he would have 

serious difficulty in refraining from sexually violent conduct 
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or child molestation if released.” 18 U.S.C. § 4247(a)(6). We 

review the district court’s factual findings for clear error and 

legal decisions de novo. United States v. Hall, 664 F.3d 456, 

462 (4th Cir. 2012).

Castrejon-Alvarez argues that 18 U.S.C. § 4248 

violates equal protection because it applies only to federal 

prisoners and those committed to the Attorney General under 18 

U.S.C. § 4241 (2012). He further claims that the Act is a 

criminal statute and is not civil in nature. As 

Castrejon-Alvarez recognized in his brief, this Court’s decision 

in United States v. Timms, 664 F.3d 436, 448-49 (4th Cir. 2012) 

forecloses these issues. In Timms, we applied rational basis 

review and held that “Congress rationally limited § 4248’s scope 

to sexually dangerous persons within BOP custody.” Id. As to 

Castrejon-Alvarez’s argument that the Act is a criminal statute, 

the court in Timms made clear “that § 4248 creates civil — not 

criminal — proceedings, and that [respondent’s] arguments 

relying on § 4248 being a criminal proceeding therefore fail.” 

Timms, 664 F.3d at 456. 

Castrejon-Alvarez also claims that it was error to 

find that he would be unable to refrain from sexually violent 

behavior or molestation of a child, as required by 18 U.S.C. 

§§ 4748(A)(5)-(6). In this regard, he contends that the court 

gave undue deferential weight to the opinions of the three 
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experts for the Government and essentially discounted the 

testimony of Castrejon-Alvarez’s expert, Dr. Warren. When 

“[e]valuating the credibility of experts and the value of their 

opinions,” we are “especially reluctant to set aside a finding 

based on the trial court’s evaluation of conflicting expert 

testimony.” Hall, 664 F.3d at 462 (citation omitted). It was 

within the province of the district court to determine which 

expert opinion to credit. There is nothing to indicate that 

Drs. North, Graney, and Artigues’s testimony is inconsistent 

with the evidence presented. Indeed, it appears more consistent 

with the record than Dr. Warren’s testimony, as the district 

court also found. Expert opinion is critical to determining 

whether Castrejon-Alvarez suffers from a mental illness. See

Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 429 (1979).

The serious difficulty element “refers to the degree 

of the person’s ‘volitional impairment,’ which impacts the 

person’s ability to refrain from acting upon his deviant sexual 

interests.” Hall, 664 F.3d at 463 (citing Kansas v. Hendricks, 

521 U.S. 346, 358 (1997)). Three experts testified that it was 

their expert belief that Castrejon-Alvarez would have serious 

difficulty refraining from sexually deviant conduct. Their 

expert testimony is supported by Castrejon-Alvarez’s conduct, as 

he has repeated involvement in sexually-motivated offense 

behaviors. In addition, Castrejon-Alvarez has not been 
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compliant or availed himself of sex offender treatment. As the 

experts opined, such conduct is a likely indicator that 

Castrejon-Alvarez will not be amenable to future treatment. In 

addition, the actuarial measures all indicated Castrejon-Alvarez 

has an elevated risk of reoffending. Thus, the record as a 

whole shows that Castrejon-Alvarez will have serious difficulty 

in refraining from sexually violent conduct if released.

Under the applicable clear-error standard, we will not 

reverse unless “we are left with the definite and firm 

conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United States v. 

Caporale, 701 F.3d 128, 135 (4th Cir. 2012) (internal citations 

and quotation marks omitted). We have no such conviction. We

have reviewed the record, the hearing transcript, and the 

district court’s order incorporating its ruling from the bench 

and conclude that the district court did not clearly err. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this Court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED