J-S56018-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

LINWOOD CHESTER COPELAND

Appellant No. 575 MDA 2014

Appeal from the PCRA Order of March 4, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County

Criminal Division at No.: CP-22-CR-0005742-2012

BEFORE: PANELLA, J., WECHT, J., and PLATT, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY WECHT, J.: FILED OCTOBER 23, 2014

Linwood Chester Copeland appeals from the order dismissing his first 

petition pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§§ 9541-46. Specifically, he claims ineffective assistance of plea counsel. 

We affirm.

On June 10, 2013, following oral and written guilty plea colloquies, 

Copeland entered a negotiated guilty plea to indecent assault, unlawful 

contact of a minor, and corruption of minors.1 The same day, he was 

sentenced to not less than two and a half nor more than five years’ 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3126(a)(7), 6318(a)(1), and 6301(a)(1)(ii), 

respectively.
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incarceration each for indecent assault and corruption of minors, and two 

years’ supervision for unlawful contact with a minor, all to be served 

consecutively, for an aggregate sentence of five to ten years’ incarceration 

plus two years’ supervision. Copeland did not file post-sentence motions or 

a direct appeal. Following evaluation by the Sexual Offender Board, on 

September 4, 2013, Copeland was determined to be a sexual offender 

subject to registration upon release. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.12.

On December 4, 2013, Copeland filed a pro se PCRA petition, claiming 

ineffective assistance of counsel because his sentences were ordered to be 

served consecutively instead of concurrently and because counsel failed to 

correct this oversight upon Copeland’s request. The PCRA court appointed 

counsel, who filed a Turner/Finley no-merit letter2on January 24, 2014, 

stating that, upon her independent review, Copeland’s petition had no merit. 

On February 3, 2014, the PCRA court granted counsel’s motion to withdraw 

and issued notice pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 907 

of its intent to dismiss Copeland’s petition without a hearing. Copeland 

responded pro se on February 21, 2014, stating that he wished to proceed 

with his petition and that he “[did] have merit in [his] complaints.” Reply to 

Order of Intention to Dismiss, 2/21/2014. On March 4, 2014, the PCRA 

court dismissed Copeland’s petition. 

____________________________________________

2 See Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988), and 

Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc).
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Copeland timely filed a pro se notice of appeal, and pursuant to the 

PCRA court’s order, a timely concise statement of errors complained of on 

appeal on April 16, 2014. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). The PCRA court entered 

its opinion pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(a) on 

April 23, 2014, incorporating by reference its memorandum opinion of 

February 3, 2014.

Copeland raises one issue for our review: “Was [Copeland] denied the 

effective assistance of counsel where trial counsel refused to file withdrawal 

of [his] plea, reconsideration, and modification of the 5-10 year sentence[?]” 

Copeland’s Brief at 7 (unnumbered).

On appeal from the denial of PCRA relief, our standard of review 

calls for us to determine whether the ruling of the PCRA court is 

supported by the record and free of legal error. The PCRA 

court’s findings will not be disturbed unless there is no support 

for the findings in the certified record.

Commonwealth v. Lewis, 63 A.3d 1274, 1278 (Pa. Super. 2013).

To prevail on a claim alleging counsel’s ineffectiveness under the 

PCRA, Appellant must demonstrate (1) that the underlying claim 

is of arguable merit; (2) that counsel’s course of conduct was 

without a reasonable basis designed to effectuate his client’s 

interest; and (3) that he was prejudiced by counsel’s 

ineffectiveness, i.e. there is a reasonable probability that but for 

the act or omission in question the outcome of the proceeding 

would have been different.

It is clear that a criminal defendant’s right to effective counsel 

extends to the plea process, as well as during trial. However, 

[a]llegations of ineffectiveness in connection with the entry of a 

guilty plea will serve as a basis for relief only if the 

ineffectiveness caused the defendant to enter an involuntary or 

unknowing plea. Where the defendant enters his plea on the 

advice of counsel, the voluntariness of the plea depends on 
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whether counsel’s advice was within the range of competence 

demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.

Commonwealth v. Wah, 42 A.3d 335, 338-39 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citations 

and quotation marks omitted).

Copeland contends that his plea was involuntary because counsel led 

him to believe that if he pleaded guilty to the felony charges he would 

receive a sentence of two and a half to five years each, to run concurrently. 

Copeland’s Brief at 8. This claim is belied by the record.

On June 10, 2013, Copeland submitted a written guilty plea colloquy, 

in which he acknowledged that his attorney had explained the charges and 

associated maximum penalties, that he was satisfied with his attorney and 

his representation, and that his plea was voluntarily made and in his best 

interests. Written Plea Colloquy, 6/10/2013. At the plea hearing, the court 

conducted an additional oral colloquy, at which the following was elicited:

[The Commonwealth]: . . . It is my understanding the defendant 

is prepared to enter a guilty plea pursuant to a negotiated 

plea agreement in this matter; specifically, the defendant 

would receive a sentence of five to ten years in a State 

Correctional Institut[ion] and that he would receive a 

consecutive two years of probation.

* * *

In addition, the defendant would be subject to the 

standard conditions for sexual offenders.

It’s my understanding further, Your Honor, that he is 

willing to be sentenced today so that he can be transferred 

to SCI, and that we would do the Megan’s Law hearing 

during a subsequent proceding. And we would just submit 

a court order to Your Honor for the evaluation.

The Court: Excellent.
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[The Commonwealth]: Sir, is that your understanding of the 

agreement in this case?

[Copeland]: Yes.

Notes of Testimony (“N.T.”) Guilty Plea, 6/10/2013, at 2-3. Additionally, the 

Commonwealth asked Copeland, “Do you understand that by signing this 

colloquy that you are indicating you understand everything in it, you’ve 

reviewed it with your attorney, and it is your intention to enter a guilty plea 

to the charges pursuant to the negotiated guilty plea agreement?” to which 

he responded, “Yes.” Id. at 5. The court accepted the guilty plea and 

counsel for Copeland requested that the court “impose the negotiated 

agreement in this case.” Id. at 7. Thus, the court structured Copeland’s 

guilty pleas to Count 1 and Count 3 to two and a half to five years each, to 

be served consecutively, for an aggregate sentence of the agreed-to five- to 

ten-year sentence. Id. at 12.

It is well-settled that “[a] defendant is bound by the statements he 

makes during his plea colloquy, and may not assert grounds for withdrawing 

the plea that contradict statements made when he pled.” Commonwealth 

v. Stork, 737 A.2d 789, 790-91 (Pa. Super. 1999). Consequently, where 

Copeland agreed with the Commonwealth that he had knowingly and 

voluntarily negotiated a sentence of five to ten years’ incarceration, N.T. at 

2, he cannot now claim that he believed the two-and-a-half to five year 

sentences on Counts 1 and 3 would be ordered to be served concurrently. 

Therefore, there is no underlying merit to his claim that his negotiated guilty 
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plea was involuntary or unknowing, and his claim of ineffective assistance of 

counsel on this ground fails. Wah, 42 A.3d at 338-39. The record supports 

the findings of the PCRA court, and Copeland is not entitled to relief on this 

claim.

Additionally, Copeland contends that counsel was ineffective for failing 

to file a motion to correct his sentence. 

“Counsel’s failure to file post-sentence motions [does] not fall within 

the narrow ambit of ineffectiveness claims requiring no finding of prejudice.” 

Commonwealth v. Corley, 31 A.3d 293, 296 (Pa. Super. 2011); cf. 

Commonwealth v. Ousley, 21 A.3d 1238, 1245 n.8 (Pa. Super. 2011) 

(“Inasmuch as the filing of a post-sentence motion is not necessary in order 

to preserve a legality of sentencing claim for direct appeal, and there is no 

merit to Appellant’s underlying legality of sentencing claim, we find no relief 

is due.”). 

Here, Copeland was informed of his post-sentencing rights in his 

written guilty plea colloquy, and agreed that “the only things that can be 

raised on appeal are the voluntariness of the plea, the jurisdiction of this 

court to hear the plea, and the legality of whatever sentence is imposed.” 

Written Plea Colloquy, 6/10/2013, at 2-3; see also Commonwealth v. 

Stewart, 867 A.2d 589, 591 (Pa. Super. 2005) (“A plea of guilty forecloses 

challenges to all matters except the voluntariness of the plea, the 

jurisdiction of the court, or the legality of the sentence.”).
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Copeland’s only challenge to his guilty plea is on the grounds of 

involuntariness, a claim which, as previously discussed, lacks merit. 

Therefore, Copeland has not proven that he was prejudiced by counsel’s 

failure to file a post-sentence motion to correct his sentence.3 See Corley, 

31 A.3d at 296; Ousley, 21 A.3d at 1245 n.8. Thus, Copeland’s allegation 

of ineffective assistance of counsel on this ground does not merit relief. 

Wah, 42 A.3d at 338-39. Accordingly, the PCRA court did not err in 

dismissing his petition. Lewis, 63 A.3d at 1278.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 10/23/2014

____________________________________________

3 We further observe that there is no support in the record for 

Copeland’s claim that he, in fact, requested that counsel file post-sentence 

motions or a direct appeal. See Lewis, 63 A.3d at 1278.