COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Decker, Malveau x and Senior Judge Annunziata

PATRICK O. GANNON MEMORANDUM OPINION * v. Record No. 1083- 18-3 PER CURIAM DECEMBER 11, 2018 CITY OF ROANOKE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ROANOKE J. Christopher Clemens, Judge (L. Brad Braford, on brief), for appellant. Appellant submit ting on brief. (Daniel J. Callaghan, City Att orney; Heather P. Ferguson, Ass istant City Attorney; Robin Dearing, Guardian ad litem for the minor child, on brief), for appellee. Appellee and Guardian ad litem submitting on brief.
Patrick O. Gannon (father) appe als an order terminating his pa rental rights and approving the foster care goal of adoption. Father argues that the circu it court erred in termi nating his parental rights because “there was insuffi cient evidence to terminate [h is] parental rights pursuant to [Code § 16.1-283(B) and (C)(2)] . . . an d to establish the goal of ad option.” Upon revi ewing the record and briefs of the parties, we conc lude that the circuit court d id not err. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the circuit court.
BACKGROUND “On appeal, ‘we view the evidenc e and all reason able inferences in the light most favorable to the prevailing part y below, in this case the Department.’” Farrell v. Warren Cty.

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this op inion is not designated fo r publication.UNPUBLISHED- 2 - Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 59 Va. App. 375, 386, 719 S.E.2d 329, 334 (2012) (quoting Jenkins v. Winchester Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 12 Va. App. 1178, 1180, 409 S. E.2d 16, 18 (1991)). Father and Kelley Gannon (mother) are married and the biologic al parents to S.G., who is the subject of this appeal. 1 S.G. was born with numerous med ical conditions, including a “smooth brain.” Due to his me dical situation, S.G. had to rema in hospitalized for several months after his birth. He require d a g-tube and oxygen machine. Bef ore his discharge in March 2017, the hospital staff tried to teach mother and father how S.G.’s equipment worked and what he needed. Despite the hospital’s recommendation that mother and father “room in” with S.G. for the weekend immediately before his discharge to learn how to op erate S.G.’s equipment, neither parent did so; however, father came for two “care times.” On t he morning of S.G.’s discharge from the hospital, mother reported that they had financial prob lems and faced the possibility of having their electricity turne d off and eviction. Both parents admitted that they were not ready for S.G. to come home, and no othe r appropriate caregivers were identified. Consequently, the City of Roanoke Department of Soc ial Services (the Department) filed a petition for an emergency removal of the child, which the City of Roanoke Juven ile and Domestic Relations District Court (the JDR c ourt) granted on March 7, 2017. The J DR court adjudicated S.G. as an abused or neglected child and enter ed a dispositional order on April 27, 2017. While S.G. was in foster care, the Department provided numerou s services to mother and father and informed them that the y had to demonstrate that they fully understood S.G.’s needs and could care for him before S .G. could return home. The Depa rtment further advised that mother and father had to be fin ancially stable and current on t heir bills. The Department also referred mother and father to aparenting class and couple’s co unseling. The Department was

1 Mother and father have an olde r child, who is not the subject of this appeal and is in the care of the maternal gra ndfather and his wife.- 3 - very concerned about mother’s subs tance abuse issues and referr ed her to random drug screens; however, mother abused an over-th e-counter drug that the drug s creens could not detect. The Department referred mother to sev eral substance abuse treatment programs, but she never completed the programs. 2 In addition, the Department requi red mother and father to parti cipate in a psychological and parental capacity evaluati on and follow through with all of the recommendations of the evaluator. On June 28, 2017, father participated in the evalua tion with Dr. Klaire Mundy. 3 Dr. Mundy opined that while father “possesses the intellectual ability necessary to take care of his high-risk infant son,” he displayed a “lack of willingness to be open to corrective criticism,” and “he can’t make rational, rea sonable decisions.” Dr. Mundy testified that father “demonstrated really poor insight and judgment into the problem s that were occurring as far as . . . his son’s medical issues a nd just his knowledge and aware ness of the impact of substance abuse and recovery and addicti on in general.” Dr. Mundy expres sed concern that since father “works a lot,” he would have t o depend on mother to be the prim ary caretaker, but mother “has too much trouble with substance abuse,” which would cause addit ional stress in the household. Dr. Mundy recommended that father b e referred to a psychiatrist for possible medication, participate in individual the rapy and couple’s therapy, and att end an anger management class. Although father participated in a n anger management class, he d id not complete Dr. Mundy’s other recommendations. The Department also arranged f or father to visit with S.G., wh ich he regularly attended as long as his work schedule permitted. During the visits, mother and father had opportunities to

2 Mother testified that as o f April 1, 2018, she had been partic ipating in a substance abuse program at Roanoke Comprehensive Treatment Center and had start ed taking suboxone.

3 Dr. Mundy evaluated mother on August 21, 2017.- 4 - feed S.G., but it usually took bot h of them to administer his g -tube feedings. Mother and father learned about S.G.’s equipment and the importance of monitoring his oxygen levels. The Department expressed concern, how ever, about father and mother’ s ability to care for S.G. because they had a “laid back attitude” toward S.G.’s oxygen le vels and disregarded the alarm when the oxygen levels got too low. The Department also required f ather and mother to have appropr iate housing for S.G. On July 20, 2017, father and mother w ere served with an eviction n otice and had to liv e with father’s mother temporarily. They subse quently moved to an efficiency a partment, which they told the Department was not suitable for S.G.’s needs. The Department a lso was concerned that an efficiency would not be large enough to store S.G.’s equipment, including a wheelchair, stroller, stander, bath seat, “a specia l bed,” fabulyzer, oxygen concentr ator, and many medical supplies. Since father and mother had not r emedied their situation, the Department filed petitions to terminate their parental rights to S.G. On February 9, 2018 , the JDR court terminated father’s parental rights and approved t he foster care goal of adoption. Father appealed to the circuit

court. 4 On June 11, 2018, the parties appear ed before the circuit cour t. The Department presented evidence about S.G.’s significant medical needs. At the time of the circuit court hearing, S.G. still needed a g- tube for feedings, but he had be gun to tolerate “smooth table food.” S.G. no longer had to wear a cran ial helmet, but was diagnosed with scoliosis, which had to be monitored. Although S.G. was appr oximately eighteen months old at the time of the circuit court hearing, his mental development was equivalent to a six month o ld, and his fine motor and gross motor developments were equivalent to a nine month old. The me dical specialists predicted that

4 The JDR court also terminated m other’s parental rights, and sh e appealed to the circuit court.- 5 - S.G. would have an intellectual disability, develo pmental delay s, and autism. S.G. also was diagnosed with a genetic dele tion. He needed oxygen, especiall y while he was sleeping or active, but he did not need it full -time. S.G. participated inoccupational therapy, speech therapy, physical therapy, and he was under th e care of a dentist, cardi ologist, pulmonologist , orthopedist, neurologist, ophthalmologist, ge neticist, “GI nutrition[ist],” and a pediatrician. The social worker testified that S.G. was doing “really well” in his foste r home and “becoming more engaging with his environment.” Father testified tha t after S.G.’s birth, he and mother receiv ed virtually no t raining from the hospital as to how to care fo r S.G. He explained that he a nd mother did not “room in” with S.G. for the weekend before S.G.’ s hospital discharge because h e and mother had upper respiratory infections and were told that they could not “be onthe Unit anytime . . . with an illness like that because it could kill a baby.” The circuit c ourt heard evidence that father previously worked as an emergen cy services provider with an amb ulance service, and father was confident that he could work S.G .’s g-tube and medical equipmen t. When asked about counseling, father admitted that he had not s tarted individual counseling, but was on a six to e ight month waiting list for se rvices. He thought that he had to participate in individual couns eling before engaging in couple’ s counseling. He also was under the impression that the Departme nt was more concerned about hou sing, so he placed more emphasis on securing better hous ing, as opposed to addressing t he counseling requirements. However, at the time of the cir cuit court hearing, he and mothe r still lived in the efficiency apartment. Father further stat ed that he worked five days per week from 7:00 a.m. until approximately 5:00 or 5:30 p.m., a nd while he was working, his plan was for family members, a child care provider, or a nurse t o care for S.G. Father explai ned that if he had to remove mother- 6 - from the home because of her substance abuse, he would do so, b ut as long as she was in treatment, they would continue to live together. After hearing all of the eviden ce and argument, the circuit co urt found that it was in S.G.’s best interest to termina te father’s parental rights purs uant to Code § 16.1-283(B) and (C)(2) and approve t he goal of adoption. 5 This appeal followed.
ANALYSIS “On review, ‘[a] trial court is presumed to have thoroughly wei ghed all the evidence, considered the statutory requirements, and made its determinati on based on the child’s best interests.’” Castillo v. Loudoun C ty. Dep’t of Family Servs., 68 Va. App. 547, 558, 811 S.E.2d 835, 840-41 (2018) (quoting Logan v. Fairf ax Cty. Dep’t of Huma n Dev., 13 Va. App. 123, 128, 409 S.E.2d 460, 463 (1991)). “Where, as here, the court hears the evidence ore tenus , its finding is entitled to great weight a nd will not be disturbed on appeal unless plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.” Fauquier Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Ridgeway, 59 Va. App. 185, 190, 717 S.E.2d 811, 814 (2011) (quoting Martin v. Pittsylvania Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 3 Va. App. 15, 20, 348 S.E.2d 13, 16 (1986)). Father argues that the eviden ce was insufficient to prove that it was in S.G.’s best interest to terminate father’s parenta l rights under Code § 16.1-283(B) and (C)(2) and approve the goal of adoption. He emphasizes that he consistently visited with S .G. and demonstrated an understanding of S.G.’s medical e quipment. He also completed t he psychological and parental capacity evaluation and the anger management class. However, f ather did not complete the individual counseling or couple’ s counseling. He testified tha t he was on a wa iting list for individual counseling.

5 The circuit court also terminate d mother’s parental rights to S.G.- 7 - Code § 16.1-283(C)(2) st ates that a court may terminate parenta l rights if: The parent or parents, wit hout good cause, have been unwilling or unable within a reasonable period of time not to exceed 12 months from the date the child was placed in foster care to remedy substantially the condi tions which led to or required continuat ion of the child’s foster care p lacement, notwithstanding the reasonable and appropriate efforts of social, medical, mental h ealth or other rehabilitative agencies to such end. “[S]ubsection C termination deci sions hinge not so much on the magnitude of the problem that created the origi nal danger to the child, but on t he demonstrated failure of the parent to make reasonable changes.” Toms v. Hanover Dep’t of S oc. Servs., 46 Va. App. 257, 271, 616 S.E.2d 765, 772 (2005). The Department presented evide nce that father did not have appr opriate housing for S.G. and all of his medical equipment. As father admitted, he had n ot followed through with the Department’s requirements fo r counseling, even though the Department listed couple’s counseling as a requirement in th e foster care plan dated April 12, 2017, prepared fourteen months before the circuit court hearing. In that same foster c are plan, the Department required father to participate in a psyc hological and parental capacity evaluation and directed him to follow through with all recommendations. Father completed the evaluation in June 2017. As part of father’s eva luation, Dr. Mundy recommended individual c ounseling, couple’s counseling, and a psychiatric referral for possible medication. One year l ater, father still had not complied with those recommendations. The Department presented evide nce that S.G. was improving in f oster care, but still had numerous medical issues. S.G. ha d been in foster care for appr oximately fifteen months, but father had not remedied the condi tions that led to S.G. remaini ng in foster care. The circuit court found that the evidence was “overw helming” that S.G. was “bette r off without you all [mother and father] right now.” The circ uit court explained that it ha d to consider the current- 8 - circumstances and could not “l ook at what might happen a year a nd a half from now, or a one year time in drug treatment f rom now, or if you all had hired a nurse, or if you had made arrangements for somebody to c ome and . . . explain what you wo uld have done.” The evidence proved that despite the Departme nt’s efforts, father was not pr epared to care for S.G. at the time of the circuit cour t hearing. “It is cl early not in the best i nterests of a child to spend a lengthy period of time waiting to find out when, or even if, a parent w ill be capable of resuming his [or her] responsibilities.” Tacket t v. Arlington Cty. Dep’t of Hum an Servs., 62 Va. App. 296, 322, 746 S.E.2d 509, 522 (2013) (quoting Kaywood v. Halifax Cty. Dep ’t of Soc. Servs., 10 Va. App. 535, 540, 394 S.E.2d 492, 495 (1990)). Accordingly, the circui t court did not err in terminating father’s parental right s under Code § 16.1-283(C)(2). 6 “When a trial court’s judgment is made on alternative grounds, we need only consider whether any one of the alternativ es is sufficient to sustain th e judgment of the t rial court, and if so, we need not address the ot her grounds.” Kilby v. Culpeper Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 55 Va. App. 106, 108 n.1, 684 S.E.2d 219, 220 n.1 (2009); see also Fields v. Dinwiddie Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 46 Va. App. 1, 8, 614 S.E.2d 656, 659 (2005) (t he Court affirmed termination of parental rights under one subs ection of Code § 16.1-283 and did not need to address termination of parental rights pursuant to a nother subsection). Therefore, we will not consider whether the circuit court erred in termina ting father’s parental rights pur suant to Code § 16.1-283(B).
CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the circuit court’s ruling is affirm ed. Affirmed.

6 With respect to father’s challe nge of the foster care goal of adoption, “[o]ur decision to affirm the termination order nece ssarily subsumes this aspect o f his appeal because a preponderance-of-the-evidence st andard governs judicial modific ations of foster care plans.” Toms, 46 Va. App. at 265 n.3, 616 S.E.2d at 769 n.3.