NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. 

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL 

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE. 

IN THE 

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

SHAWN WAGNER, a married man, 

Petitioner/Appellee, 

v.

STATE OF ARIZONA, a body politic and ARIZONA GAME AND 

FISH DEPARTMENT, an agency of the State of Arizona, 

Respondents/Appellants. 

No. 1 CA-CV 13-0521 

 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County 

No. LC2011-000683-001 

The Honorable Crane McClennen, Judge 

AFFIRMED 

COUNSEL 

Bihn & McDaniel, PLC, Phoenix 

By Martin A. Bihn, Donna M. McDaniel 

Counsel for Petitioner/Appellee 

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix 

By Dennis D. Carpenter, Jr., Kirstin A. Story 

Counsel for Respondents/Appellants
WAGNER v. STATE, et al. 

Decision of the Court 

2 

MEMORANDUM DECISION 

Presiding Judge Patricia A. Orozco delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Judge Randall M. Howe and Judge Maurice Portley joined. 

O R O Z C O, Judge: 

¶1 Appellants the State of Arizona and the Arizona Game and 

Fish Department (AzG&F or the Department) (collectively the State) appeal 

from the superior court’s ruling that a disciplinary action against Appellee 

Shawn Wagner, a wildlife manager and law enforcement officer employed 

by the Department, violated Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S) section 38-

532.A. (West 2015),1 Arizona’s whistleblower statute. For the following 

reasons, we affirm. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

¶2 Shortly before sunset in September 2010, Wagner shot an elk 

with an arrow while bow hunting. He and Kenny Clay III, who was also a 

wildlife manager with the Department, tracked the elk until darkness 

required them to terminate the search. Because Wagner had to leave the 

hunt, Clay III and Kenny Clay Jr., a retired wildlife manager, agreed that 

they would continue to look for the elk the following day, and that if they 

found it, they would put Wagner’s tag on it.2 All present at the hunt 

believed that if they found the elk, it would be dead and that Wagner would 

have made the fatal shot. The next morning, Clay III, Clay Jr. and James 

Weeks found the elk still alive but standing in a pool of blood. Clay III shot 

the elk and because they all agreed that Wagner had inflicted the mortal 

wound, Clay Jr. attached Wagner’s tag to the elk, Clay III signed the tag, 

and Clay Jr. transported the elk for processing. 

 

1 We cite the current versions of the applicable statute because no 

revisions material to this decision have since occurred. 

2 Regulations preclude an individual from attaching his tag or 

allowing his tag to be attached to wildlife killed by someone else. Ariz. 

Admin. Code R12-4-302.E. 
WAGNER v. STATE, et al. 

Decision of the Court 

3 

¶3 Stories about the hunt circulated within the Department and 

eventually reached Leonard Ordway, the Assistant Director of Field 

Operations for the Department, and he raised questions as to whether any 

Title 173 violations may have occurred during the hunt. Ordway met with 

Department Regional Manager Jon Cooley, who thereafter asked Wagner’s 

supervisor, Bob Birkeland, to gather facts about the hunt to determine what 

course of action, if any, to pursue. Cooley told Birkeland that the inquiry 

was not a C1.10 investigation.4 When Birkeland asked Wagner to give a 

written statement about the hunt, Wagner, who had already told Birkeland 

about the hunt, asked if it was a formal investigation and was told it was 

not. Wagner refused to provide a written statement but said he would 

cooperate with a C1.10 investigation. 

¶4 On September 29, 2010, Wagner sent a memorandum to Larry 

Voyles, Director of the Department. Wagner complained about the 

decisions of “Ordway and his chain of command” in conducting an 

investigation based on rumors without interviewing anyone who was on 

the hunt and discussing the hunt up and down the chain of command, 

questioning Wagner’s integrity. Wagner explained that he refused to 

provide a written statement regarding the hunt because without a formal 

investigation, he would not receive the protections to which he was entitled 

during such an investigation. 

¶5 Voyles called Wagner and told him that he agreed with the 

memorandum in that employees should not have been treated in that 

manner. Voyles initiated a formal C1.10 investigation into the conduct of 

those on the elk hunt and into the conduct of Ordway and Cooley in 

initiating the informal investigation. At Voyles’ request, an outside agency, 

the Arizona Department of Juvenile Corrections, conducted the C1.10 

investigation. Wagner was not advised of his right to a representative 

pursuant to A.R.S. § 38-1004.A. 

¶6 Wagner inquired when the investigation would be concluded 

and Ordway told him, “it’s your fault this is taking so long, had you not 

sent your e-mail [memorandum] to the director we could have been done 

with this two months ago.” As a result of the investigation, Wagner was 

 

3 See A.R.S. § 17-101, et seq. 

4 A C1.10 investigation refers to that section of the AzG&F Operating 

Manual that governs the process for investigations into employee 

misconduct. 
WAGNER v. STATE, et al. 

Decision of the Court 

4 

suspended for sixteen hours. The report found compliance by the 

Department with internal policies and no wrongdoing by management. 

¶7 Wagner initiated the grievance process. Knowing that the 

first investigation had complied with neither AzG&F standards nor with 

A.R.S. § 38-1101, which provides protections for law enforcement officers 

under investigation, Voyles ordered a second investigation be conducted 

by another external agency, the Arizona Department of Corrections. 

¶8 The second investigation, like the first, was also intended to 

examine Ordway and Cooley’s conduct, but for unknown reasons, did not. 

The second investigation also resulted in a second letter of discipline sent 

to Wagner, dated April 22, 2011, again imposing a sixteen-hour suspension. 

The April 22 letter, prepared by Ordway and Cooley, among others, and 

signed by Voyles, included a reference to Wagner having sent his 

September 29 memorandum criticizing Ordway and his chain of command 

and explaining that he would cooperate only with a formal investigation. 

The letter found that Wagner had violated Arizona Administrative Code 

R12-4-302 by giving his hunt tag to Clay III and allowing him to use it and 

A.R.S. § 17-309.A.2. by possessing and transporting an elk he did not kill or 

tag. The letter further found that Wagner’s actions constituted 

insubordination and willful disobedience and that he failed to comply with 

Department policies and directives. 

¶9 Wagner again filed a grievance, alleging that the investigation 

violated a number of Department policies, rules and statutes, including 

A.R.S. § 38-532, the whistleblower statute. Voyles denied the grievance, 

and Wagner appealed to the Department of Administration, which upheld 

the suspension. Wagner also filed a “whistleblower” claim pursuant to 

A.R.S. § 38-532.A. After an evidentiary hearing on Wagner’s whistleblower 

complaint, the hearing officer concluded that Wagner’s September 29 

memorandum was a “disclosure of information of a matter of public 

concern” as required for A.R.S. § 38-532.A. to apply. However, the evidence 

failed to show any connection between that disclosure and Wagner’s 

suspension. Wagner’s complaint was dismissed and the disciplinary action 

was upheld. 

¶10 Wagner then filed a complaint in superior court for a trial de 

novo, alleging a violation of the whistleblower statute. After a two-day 

bench trial, the trial court found that Wagner was the subject of unlawful 

reprisal. The court ordered all references to the discipline be removed from 

Wagner’s personnel file and awarded him back pay and performance 

incentive pay lost as a result of the suspension, attorney fees, and general 
WAGNER v. STATE, et al. 

Decision of the Court 

5 

damages of $100,000. The State timely appealed. We have jurisdiction 

pursuant to Article 6, Section 9 of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. §§ 

12-913, -120.21.A.1., and -2101.A.1. (West 2015). 

DISCUSSION 

¶11 When the superior court considers an administrative action, 

this court reviews the superior court’s decision to determine whether the 

record contains evidence to support the judgment. Brodsky v. Phoenix Police 

Dep’t Ret. Sys. Bd., 183 Ariz. 92, 95, 900 P.2d 1228, 1231 (App. 1995). 

I. Did Wagner’s Memorandum Present a Matter of Public Concern? 

¶12 UnderA.R.S. § 38-532.A.: 

It is a prohibited personnel practice for an employee who has 

control over personnel actions to take reprisal against an 

employee for a disclosure of information of a matter of public 

concern by the employee to a public body that the employee 

reasonably believes evidences: 

 1. A violation of any law. 

 2. Mismanagement a gross waste of monies or an 

abuse of authority. 

¶13 The State argues that Wagner’s September 29 memorandum 

did not constitute a “disclosure of information of a matter of public 

concern” under the statute. Unlawful conduct by a government employee, 

illegal activity in a government agency, the failure of a government agency 

to perform its responsibilities, or conduct that is a breach of the public trust 

constitute matters of public concern protected under the statute. See

Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 148 (1983); Thomas v. City of Beaverton, 379 

F.3d 802, 809 (9th Cir. 2004). Individual personnel disputes irrelevant to the 

public’s evaluation of a government agency’s office are generally not of 

public concern. Desrochers v. City of San Bernardino, 572 F.3d 703, 710 (9th

Cir. 2009). “Whether an employee’s speech addresses a matter of public 

concern must be determined by the content, form, and context of a given 

statement, as revealed by the whole record.” Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48. 

We look at the plain language of the statement. Desrochers, 572 F.3d at 711. 

Whether a disclosure involves a matter of public concern is a question of 

law based on the facts of the individual case. Connick, 461 U.S. at 148 n.7; 

Roe v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 109 F.3d 578, 584 (9th Cir. 1997). 
WAGNER v. STATE, et al. 

Decision of the Court 

6 

¶14 The State does not dispute that if the memorandum disclosed 

violations of the policies and procedures governing the internal 

investigation of officers, it would present an issue of public concern. The 

State contends, however, that Wagner’s memorandum does not disclose 

such violations, but presents only a personal grievance as to how 

Wagner was treated, making only a passing reference to policy violations. 

¶15 Wagner’s memorandum does not specifically cite any statute, 

regulation, or policy violation and it addresses Wagner’s own personal 

employment dispute. However, in explaining why he declined to provide 

a written statement, Wagner wrote that he had been told there was neither 

a criminal investigation nor an investigation into employee misconduct. In 

the absence of an investigation, Wagner was “not inclined to do anything, 

[because he was] not being provided the protections provided to [him] in 

those policies and procedures.” Wagner further asserted that the 

investigation being conducted did not pass the “Headline Test.” The 

“Headline Test” was described as an internal policy to guide decision 

making by having personnel consider whether they would want to see their 

conduct on the front page of the newspaper. These statements are the only 

direct references to any policy violations. However, the memorandum 

viewed in its entirety, though personal in nature, clearly complains that 

Ordway and Ordway’s chain of command, all Wagner’s superiors, were 

engaged in an improper investigation based on rumor and gossip. This 

investigation affected both Wagner and his colleagues and denied him the 

protections of a proper investigation. Director Voyles demonstrated his 

understanding of this by discontinuing Ordway’s investigation and 

initiating a formal C1.10 external investigation of Wagner’s elk hunt as well 

as an investigation of Ordway’s conduct. 

¶16 The State argues that the fact that the memorandum was 

circulated internally militates against a finding that the disclosure was a 

matter of public concern. The memorandum was addressed to Voyles, the 

Department Director, and was also sent to the Human Resources Branch 

Chief and the Deputy Director of the Department. Disclosure to a limited 

internal audience is a factor that can weigh against finding a disclosure to 

be of public concern, but it is not determinative. Thomas, 79 F.3d at 810; Roe, 

109 F.3d at 585. Applying that factor in this case, however, would be 

inconsistent with A.R.S. § 38-532.A., which requires disclosure be made to 

a “public body.” The definition of “public body” includes “an agency 

director.” A.R.S. § 38-531.5. (West 2015). Wagner’s disclosure complied 

with the statute. 
WAGNER v. STATE, et al. 

Decision of the Court 

7 

¶17 We find that Wagner’s September 29 memorandum 

constituted a disclosure of the failure of government personel to follow 

prescribed internal investigative procedures and so disclosed a matter of 

public concern. 

II. Did the Superior Court Improperly Consider the Underlying Bases 

of the Disciplinary Action? 

¶18 The superior court considered the statute and Department 

regulations under which Wagner was disciplined and, based on the 

testimony before the court, concluded that Wagner was not guilty of the 

violations. The State argues that the superior court exceeded its jurisdiction 

by reviewing the substantive basis of Wagner’s suspension. Wagner 

argues that the court could properly consider whether a valid nonretaliatory basis existed for the discipline and that, in any event, the court’s 

ruling on Wagner’s whistleblower claim was not based on the correctness 

of the discipline. “We independently review the superior court’s subject 

matter jurisdiction as an issue of law. Glover v. Glover, 231 Ariz. 1, 6, ¶ 18, 

289 P.3d 12, 17 (App. 2012). 

¶19 When Wagner filed his complaint in superior court, a 

disciplined employee could appeal a suspension by the personnel board to 

superior court only for a suspension that exceeded forty hours. A.R.S. § 41-

785.A. (2011).5 Wagner was suspended for sixteen hours. The court 

therefore lacked jurisdiction to consider an appeal of Wagner’s suspension. 

¶20 The matter before the trial court, however, was not an appeal 

of Wagner’s suspension, but an appeal of the denial of his whistleblower 

complaint. When considering whether a disciplinary action is retaliatory, 

the court inquires into whether the employer’s proffered reason for the 

discipline was a pretext. Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 

1062 (9th Cir. 2002). Whether the reason is a pretext is based not on whether 

the reason is actually incorrect or false, but whether the employer honestly 

believed its reasons and acted on them in good faith at the time the 

discipline was imposed, even if those reasons ultimately proved to be 

incorrect or baseless. Young v. Dillon Cos., Inc., 468 F.3d 1243, 1250 (10th Cir. 

2006); Villiarimo, 281 F.3d at 1063. A plaintiff can show that the belief was 

 

5 The statute was subsequently renumbered and revised to increase 

the minimum suspension from which an appeal may be taken to eighty 

hours. See A.R.S. § 41-783.A. (West 2015). 
WAGNER v. STATE, et al. 

Decision of the Court 

8 

not honestly held by showing that the employer’s explanation was weak, 

implausible, inconsistent, or incoherent. Young, 468 F.3d at 1250. 

¶21 The court here went beyond an inquiry of the employer’s 

beliefs and affirmatively declared that Wagner had not violated R12-4-302 

or A.R.S. § 17-309.A.2., but the court did not base its decision that the 

Department had retaliated against Wagner on that finding. The court 

rejected the argument that Voyles imposed discipline based on his honest 

belief that Wagner had committed violations and instead found: 

Voyles imposed discipline on Wagner based on the letter 

drafted by Cooley and Ordway, the two individuals whose 

conduct originally led Wagner to write the September 29 

memorandum to Voyles . . . it is this Court’s opinion that the 

discipline . . . imposed on Wagner was a result of the conduct 

of Cooley and Ordway in conveying their version of the facts 

to Voyles, and in their drafting of the disciplinary letter to 

Wagner that Voyles ultimately signed. 

Even when the court cited Wagner’s non-violations to support its decision 

that Wagner was punished for the September 29 memorandum, the court 

focused on the letter drafted by Ordway and Cooley: 

Once Voyles realized at the hearing held in this matter 

Wagner did not violate the rules and regulations he was 

accused of violating, he came up with some new reasons that 

were never even mentioned in the letter. Such after-the-fact 

attempt to come up with new reasons does not change the fact 

that Ordway and Cooley drafted the letter in such a way that 

it imposed discipline on Wagner as a result of his September 

29 memorandum. 

¶22 The court’s determination that Wagner did not violate R12-4-

302 and A.R.S. § 17-309.A.2. does not constitute a decision on appeal from 

administrative discipline, so the court did not exceed its jurisdiction. 

Further, the court’s finding was not the basis of the court’s ruling on 

Wagner’s whistleblower complaint and does not provide a basis for 

reversing the court’s ruling. 

III. Did the Superior Court Properly Find that Wagner’s Discipline Was 

Caused by His Memorandum? 

¶23 Causation is generally a fact question for the fact finder. 

Barrett v. Harris, 207 Ariz. 374, 378, ¶ 12, 86 P.3d 954, 948 (App. 2004). In 
WAGNER v. STATE, et al. 

Decision of the Court 

9 

reviewing a trial to the court, we view the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the prevailing party, and we are required to affirm the trial 

court if there is any evidence to support the judgment. Inch v. McPherson, 

176 Ariz. 132, 136, 859 P.2d 755, 759 (App. 1993). We defer to the trial court’s 

determination of witness credibility. Gutierrez v. Gutierrez, 193 Ariz. 343, 

347, ¶ 13, 972 P.2d 676, 680 (App. 1998). We do not reweigh conflicting 

evidence, but determine only if the record contains substantial evidence to 

support the trial court’s decision. In re Estate of Pouser, 193 Ariz. 574, 579, ¶ 

13, 975 P.2d 704, 709 (1999). Substantial evidence is evidence from which a 

reasonable person could reach the same result as the trial court. Id. 

¶24 The superior court stated four reasons why it determined that 

Wagner was punished because of his memorandum. First, when Wagner 

asked Ordway when the investigation would be concluded, Ordway 

responded, “It’s your fault this is taking so long, had you not sent your 

[memorandum] to the director we could have been done with this two 

months ago.” Additionally, Cooley made a similar comment when 

Birkeland inquired why the investigation was taking so long. From these 

comments, the court concluded that Ordway and Cooley were “clearly 

displeased” that Wagner sent the memorandum. Second, Ordway and 

Cooley drafted the disciplinary letter to Wagner and had a motive to draft 

the letter in such a way so as to appear blameless in their own conduct while 

finding Wagner had committed violations. Third, after Voyles admitted 

Wagner had not committed violations, Voyles created new reasons for the 

discipline not contained in the disciplinary letter. Fourth, the disciplinary 

letter referred to and quoted from a portion of the memorandum as a reason 

for the disciplinary action. 

¶25 The disciplinary letter itself presents substantial evidence 

supporting the court’s causation finding. The disciplinary letter to Wagner 

imposing the sixteen-hour suspension expressly refers to Wagner’s 

memorandum. The letter states “[t]he specific reasons for your suspension 

are” followed by four paragraphs describing the hunt and statements 

Wagner made during his interview, followed by: 

Upon learning of the fact finding that your supervisor, Bob 

Birkeland was asked to conduct, you sent a memo dated 

September 29, 2010 to Director Larry Voyles. In that memo 

you admonished Assistant Director Leonard Ordway and the 

chain-of-command for not following the C1.10 process. You 

stated the following in your September 29, 2010 memo: 
WAGNER v. STATE, et al. 

Decision of the Court 

10 

“After the investigation was initiated, I was asked to provide 

a written account of my hunt. I said no. I did not think that 

was warranted and no other employees I knew had been 

asked to write an account by their supervisor of their hunt 

while off duty. I was later told there was not a criminal 

investigation nor was there an investigation into employee 

misconduct. I was then told there was not an investigation, 

but was asked to provide a verbal statement about what 

happened so my supervisor could provide it to Leonard 

Ordway at his request because he just “wants the truth.” I 

said no. If there is not an investigation, then I am not inclined 

to do anything, since I am not being provided the protections 

provided to me in those policies and procedures.” 

The issue you noted was caused by actions of your immediate 

supervisor not the chain-of-command above him. In your 

memo you went on further to criticize Assistant Director 

Leonard Ordway and his chain-of-command for being 

worried about the “Headline Test” versus finding out what 

occurred during your elk hunt instead of relying on office 

rumor. This is precisely the reason for leadership asking your 

supervisor, Bob Birkeland, to conduct a preliminary fact 

finding inquiry to determine if a formal C1.10 investigation 

was warranted. 

The letter continued with a paragraph explaining that the Department 

expected officers to conduct themselves in a lawful manner on and off duty 

and hold themselves to the same standards as the public, and asserting that 

Wagner could not put himself above the law or be “insubordinate to agency 

leadership when asked to provide pertinent information.” The letter 

concluded by identifying the regulations and statutes Wagner was found 

to have violated, and explaining the grievance process. 

¶26 The disciplinary letter itself identifies Wagner’s challenge to 

the investigative process as a reason for his suspension. Voyles testified 

that it was not a reason and that the reference was included under “reasons” 

because the letter lacked headings. This explanation seems implausible. 

The reference to the memorandum is made as part of a chronological 

statement of events with no obvious position or reason for a new heading. 

Further, the structure of this section of the letter, beginning with the 

“specific reasons” and ending with the identification of the resulting 

violations supports that the events described within it are reasons for the 

described discipline. Inserting a non-reason between the “reasons” 
WAGNER v. STATE, et al. 

Decision of the Court 

11 

heading and the imposed discipline resulting from those reasons would be 

nonsensical. 

¶27 The State argues that the reference to the memorandum was 

included to address Wagner’s “misimpression” that Ordway rather than 

Birkeland had conducted the investigation and to address Wagner’s 

“insubordinate refusal to provide information.” The State further argues 

that neither of these purposes is of public concern and thus, do not fall 

within the whistleblower statute. The State does not explain why the 

alleged misimpression needed to be addressed at all in the disciplinary 

letter. As for the insubordination, the State appears to argue that the 

reference to the memorandum is offered as evidence of Wagner’s failure to 

comply with requests for information. But Wagner’s refusal to make a 

statement was integral to his disclosure that the Department was 

conducting an improper investigation and both Cooley and Ordway 

testified that Wagner had a right to not give a statement in the absence of a 

formal investigation. Even if Wagner could be properly disciplined for his 

failure to cooperate in the investigation he challenged, the quotation from 

the memorandum and the surrounding comments go beyond merely 

addressing that failure. The comments that Wagner had “admonished” 

and “criticized” Ordway and the explanation as to why the preliminary fact 

finding was ordered imply a criticism of Wagner for having made the 

complaint and a defense of the improper procedures. Its inclusion in the 

disciplinary letter suggests a retaliatory motive. 

¶28 The superior court’s ruling is supported by substantial 

evidence and we therefore affirm the court’s decision finding that Wagner 

was disciplined for his September 29 memorandum. 

IV. Did the Superior Court Abuse Its Discretion In Awarding Wagner 

$100,000 in General Damages? 

¶29 An employee against whom a prohibited personnel practice 

is committed may recover attorney fees, costs, back pay, full reinstatement 

and general and special damages “for any reprisal resulting from the 

prohibited personnel practice.” A.R.S. § 38-532.D. General damages are 

defined as damages that “necessarily and by implication of law result from 

the act or default complained of.” Palmer v. Kelly, 54 Ariz. 466, 468, 97 P.2d 

209, 209-10 (1939). Such damages may not be determined by a fixed 

calculation, but may be left to the reason and discretion of the fact finder. 

Id.; Selaster v. Simmons, 39 Ariz. 432, 441, 7 P.2d 258, 261 (1932);. We review 

a court’s decision on damages for abuse of discretion. Gonzales v. Ariz. Pub. 

Serv. Co., 161 Ariz. 84, 90, 775 P.2d 1148, 1154 (App. 1989). We uphold the 
WAGNER v. STATE, et al. 

Decision of the Court 

12 

decision if reasonable evidence exists to support it. Wolk v. Nichols, 117 Ariz. 

352, 353, 572 P.2d 1190, 1191 (1977). To be excessive, damages must be 

“beyond all measure, unreasonable, and outrageous[.]” Flieger v. Reeb, 120 

Ariz. 31, 35, 583 P.2d 1351, 1535 (App. 1978). We reverse only if the amount 

is clearly out of reason and the result of passion and prejudice. Selaster, 39 

Ariz. at 441, 7 P.2d at 261. 

¶30 Wagner sought $250,000 in general damages, arguing that the 

experience had irreparably tarnished his reputation and caused several 

years of anguish. He testified that he believed being a game warden was 

what he was intended to do, that he prided himself on being very good at 

it, and that it was not just a job, but who he was. He described the 

accusation that he deliberately and intentionally violated the law he had 

committed his life to upholding as “tearing at the fabric that makes [him] 

up.” Wagner explained that it took some time before he felt comfortable 

wearing the uniform to go do his job, and that for two years the matter had 

been all consuming, the subject of discussion by his coworkers throughout 

the state, and the topic of daily conversation in his home, causing his wife 

to be in tears day after day. Without explanation, the court found the 

evidence supported Wagner’s claim for general damages and awarded 

$100,000. 

¶31 The State argues that Wagner’s claimed injuries are not 

directly traceable to the suspension, asserting that they arose immediately 

after the hunt and months before the suspension or were related to the 

stress of his challenge to the disciplinary action. The State contends that 

there is no support for the award of general damages. 

¶32 Wagner’s testimony described two years of stress, including 

discomfort in performing a job he loved and took great pride in, distress 

that he would be charged with violating laws he dedicated himself to 

upholding, being the subject of discussion by his co-workers, and turmoil 

at home. Although his distress began with the accusations prior to the 

suspension, it was not limited to that time. We can find no basis for 

concluding that these effects were not directly traceable to the suspension. 

¶33 The State further argues that the award is disproportionate to 

any injury Wagner suffered. Although $100,000 is a significant award, we 

see no evidence that the award is the result of passion or prejudice or that 

it is so outrageous as to compel reversal. 
WAGNER v. STATE, et al. 

Decision of the Court 

13 

V. Attorney Fees on Appeal 

¶34 Wagner seeks an award of attorney fees on appeal pursuant 

to A.R.S. § 38-532.D. We grant his request for a reasonable amount of 

attorney fees upon compliance with Rule 21 of the Arizona Rules of Civil 

Appellate Procedure. 

CONCLUSION 

¶35 For the foregoing reasons, the superior court judgment is 

affirmed.