Filed 10/17/22 In re Reagan W. CA2/7

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

In re REAGAN W., a Person 

Coming Under the Juvenile 

Court Law.

 B317561

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No.

 19CCJP07459B)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 

AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

SADE H.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, Tara Newman, Judge. Conditionally 

affirmed, remanded with directions. 
2

Richard L. Knight, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. 

Dawyn R. Harrison, Acting County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, 

Assistant County Counsel, and William D. Thetford, Principal 

County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 

____________________

On December 28, 2021 the juvenile court terminated 

Sade H.’s parental rights to her two-year-old daughter, 

Reagan W., and transferred the child’s care, custody and control 

to the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family 

Services for adoptive planning and placement. (Welf. & Inst. 

Code, § 366.26.) On appeal Sade contends that the Department 

violated Welfare and Institutions Code section 224.2, 

subdivision (e), and California Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a)(4),1

adopted to implement the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978

(ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.), by failing to make an adequate 

“further inquiry” after she advised the Department and the court 

she and Reagan may have Muscogee (Creek) Nation tribal

ancestry and that the juvenile court erred in not ensuring the 

Department complied with its ICWA-related obligations and in 

ruling ICWA did not apply. We agree and remand the matter for 

full compliance by the Department and the juvenile court with 

the inquiry and, if appropriate, notice provisions of ICWA and

California law.

1 Statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions 

Code unless otherwise stated. References to rules are to the 

California Rules of Court.
3

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

1. The Dependency Petition and Termination of Parental 

Rights

On June 24, 2020 the juvenile court sustained a 

dependency petition pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) 

(failure to protect) and (j) (abuse of sibling), finding true the 

allegations that Reagan had been born with a positive toxicology 

screen for methamphetamine; Sade had a history of substance 

abuse and was a current abuser of methamphetamine, 

amphetamine and opiates, which rendered her incapable of 

providing regular care of infant Reagan and her then-two-yearold sibling, Rylee H.; and Reagan and Rylee’s siblings, Sarai H. 

and Mackenzie H., were prior dependents of the juvenile court in 

Riverside County due to Sade’s substance abuse and had received 

permanent placement services. The court declared both children 

dependents of the court; removed them from Sade’s custody; and 

ordered family reunification services for Sade, including a 

substance abuse program, individual counseling and monitored 

visitation.2 The whereabouts of Reagan’s alleged father, Daniel 

W., were unknown, and the court declined to order reunification 

services or visitation for him. 

At a combined six- and 12-month review hearing in 

January 2021 (§ 366.21, subds. (e), (f)), the court found Sade had 

failed to participate or make substantial progress in her courtordered programs. (She consistently failed to appear for drug 

testing and had not enrolled in a 12-step program.) The court 

terminated reunification services and set a selection and 

2 Sade’s parental rights to Rylee (and those of Rylee’s 

presumed father, David H.) were terminated on May 24, 2021. 

Neither parent appealed that order.
4

implementation hearing pursuant to section 366.26 for May 24, 

2021. That hearing was continued several times after Daniel was 

located. Although Daniel requested a DNA test to determine 

whether he was Reagan’s biological father, he never completed 

testing and never achieved a status other than alleged father.3

On December 22, 2021 Sade filed a petition pursuant to 

section 388 to modify the order terminating her reunification 

services and setting the section 366.26 hearing. Sade alleged as

changed circumstances that she had enrolled in a drug program 

and individual counseling and had been consistently visiting with 

Reagan. Sade asked that Reagan be placed in her home under 

the supervision of the Department or, alternatively, she be 

provided six more months of reunification services.

At a hearing on December 28, 2021 the court denied the 

section 388 petition based on the papers submitted and found 

Reagan was adoptable and Sade had failed to establish the 

beneficial parental relationship exception to adoption. The court 

terminated the parental rights of Sade and Daniel, freed Reagan 

from their custody and control and transferred custody and 

control to the Department for adoptive planning and placement. 

Sade filed a timely notice of appeal. 

2. The Department’s ICWA Investigation and the Juvenile 

Court’s ICWA Findings

The Indian Child Inquiry Attachment (ICWA-010(A)) forms 

filed with the dependency petition on November 19, 2019 

reported that Sade had said her great-grandmother Nancy C. had 

3 Given Daniel’s status as an assumed father only, Sade does 

not argue on appeal the Department’s investigation of Reagan’s 

possible Indian ancestry through her paternal relatives was 

inadequate.
5

Muscogee (Creek) Nation of Oklahoma ancestry. The same 

information was included in the detention report filed by the 

Department, which also stated Sade had said neither she nor her 

child was registered with the tribe. 

With her appearance at the detention hearing on 

November 20, 2019, Sade filed a Parental Notification of Indian 

Status (ICWA-020) form that also indicated Creek tribe ancestry. 

At the hearing the court, observing that the detention report 

indicated the great-grandmother4 was registered with the 

Muscogee (Creek) Nation of Oklahoma, ordered the Department

to follow up with further interviews, to send appropriate notices 

to the tribe and to provide the court with copies of any responses 

received. The court did not ask Sade if she had contact 

information for the great-grandmother or other relatives who 

might have knowledge of the family’s ancestry or direct her to 

provide that information to the Department. 

The ICWA section of the jurisdiction/disposition report filed 

January 2, 2020 did not indicate the Department had begun any 

investigation of Reagan’s possible Creek ancestry. In its 

summary of an interview with Sade concerning her 

methamphetamine use, however, it was reported that Sade had a 

brother. 

A last minute information report for the court filed by the 

Department on January 17, 2020 stated Sade had indicated 

Creek tribal ancestry may be associated with both her maternal 

4 Nancy is sometimes referred to as Sade’s greatgrandmother and Reagan’s great-great-grandmother; at other 

times as Sade’s grandmother and, therefore, Reagan’s greatgrandmother. At the detention hearing the court simply 

identified her as “the great-grandmother.” 
6

and paternal lineage. The report attached copies of the Notice of 

Child Custody Proceeding for Indian Child (ICWA-030) forms 

sent to the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), the Secretary of the 

Interior, the Muscogee (Creek) Nation and four additional Creek 

tribes, as well as return receipts from the BIA, the Muscogee 

(Creek) Nation and the Creek Thlopthlocco Tribal Town. The 

ICWA-030’s gave Sade’s mother’s name, stated her mother was 

deceased (date and place unknown) and provided no other 

information about her mother; stated her father’s name and 

included no other information; identified Nancy as Sade’s 

grandmother, gave Nancy’s date of birth, stated Nancy was 

deceased (date and place unknown) and provided no other

information about Nancy or any information about Sade’s other 

grandparents. 

A subsequent last minute information report, dated 

June 24, 2020, attached a May 19, 2020 letter from the Muscogee 

(Creek) Nation stating that Reagan was not an Indian child as 

defined by ICWA.5 (Similar letters had been received from the 

Thlopthlocco Creek Tribal Town and the Alabama-Quassarte 

Tribal Town.) At the jurisdiction/disposition hearing on June 24, 

2020 the juvenile court found it did not have a reason to know 

Reagan was an Indian child.

Notwithstanding the June 2020 no-ICWA finding, at the 

review hearing on January 25, 2021 the court ordered the 

Department to conduct additional interviews of available

maternal family members concerning possible American Indian 

5 The tribe’s letter included the following admonition in bold 

font: “This determination is based on the information exactly as 

provided by you. Any incorrect or omitted family documentation 

could invalidate this determination.” 
7

ancestry and to provide a detailed update to the court. The court 

reiterated its order to interview maternal relatives on March 11, 

2021 and directed the Department to provide the court with 

“detailed information regarding Creek ancestry as to mother.”6

An April 16, 2021 last minute information report explained 

that the social worker had reviewed information from 2006 and 

2013 dependency proceedings involving Sade in Riverside 

County.

7 In 2006 Nancy (described as Sade’s paternal 

grandmother) advised the investigating agency her father (name 

not indicated in the document reviewed) and her father’s mother 

(name not disclosed) were part of the Creek Indian Tribe of 

Oklahoma and Nancy believed she was registered with the tribe. 

In 2013 Debra C., Sade’s paternal aunt, told the investigating 

agency she (Debra) was a registered member of the Muscogee 

(Creek) Nation, but that Sade and Sade’s children were not 

registered members of the tribe. The report also described two 

unsuccessful attempts made by the social worker on April 13 

and 14, 2021 to contact Sade by telephone to follow up on the 

issue of possible Indian ancestry and the social worker’s

unsuccessful attempts on April 14, 2021 to reach Nancy and 

6 In a last minute information report dated March 11, 2021, 

the Department stated Sade, in contrast to her earlier assertions 

of Creek ancestry, had informed the social worker she had no 

Indian ancestry. According to the report, Sade was relying on the 

juvenile court’s determination that ICWA did not apply to her in 

a case in which she had been a minor dependent. No details 

concerning the ICWA investigation conducted in that proceeding 

were included with the report.

7 The social worker was unable to locate documents from a 

Los Angeles County dependency case involving Sade as a minor. 
8

Debra by telephone, apparently using telephone numbers 

retrieved from the state’s child welfare services/case management 

system (CWS/CMS). 

The Department sent new ICWA-030 notices to the BIA, 

the Muscogee (Creek) Nation and other Creek tribes. These 

notices gave Sade’s mother’s date of birth and no longer reported 

she was dead, stating that was unknown, but included no other 

information. Sade’s father’s date of birth was now also included 

on the form, but no other information about him was provided. 

Whether Nancy was deceased was now said to be unknown 

(notwithstanding the attempts to reach her by telephone); her 

date of birth was again provided, but no other information; and 

the names and other information about Sade’s other 

grandparents were all listed as unknown. 

As reflected in the May 24, 2021 report for the 

section 366.26 selection and implementation hearing, over the 

next several weeks multiple response letters were received from 

the noticed tribes stating Reagan was not eligible for 

membership. In addition, the May 24, 2021 report described a 

telephone conversation between the social worker and the 

Muscogee (Creek) Nation’s intake specialist responsible for 

reviewing eligibility of potential tribal members residing outside 

Oklahoma. The specialist said it had been determined that 

Reagan was not enrolled or eligible for enrollment in the tribe 

and that a letter reflecting that decision had been mailed. The 

letter explained that Reagan “cannot be traced within our tribal 

records based upon the information provided regarding bloodrelated immediate family members,” but cautioned any “omitted 

family documentation could invalidate this determination.”
9

The juvenile court again found it had no reason to know 

that Reagan was an Indian child as defined by ICWA at the 

section 366.26 hearing on May 24, 2021 and yet again on 

August 30, 2021 after Daniel had appeared and ICWA-030 

notices had been sent to, and negative responses received from,

tribes indicated on Daniel’s Parental Notification of Indian 

Status form. 

DISCUSSION

1. ICWA and the Duties of Inquiry and Notice

ICWA and governing federal regulations (25 C.F.R. 

§ 23.101 et seq. (2022)) set minimal procedural protections for 

state courts to follow before removing Indian children and placing 

them in foster care or adoptive homes. (In re Y.W. (2021)

70 Cal.App.5th 542, 551.) The statute authorizes states to 

provide “‘a higher standard of protection’” to Indian children, 

their families and their tribes than the rights provided under 

ICWA. (In re T.G. (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 275, 287-288; 

see 25 U.S.C. § 1921.) In addition to significantly limiting state 

court actions concerning out-of-family placements for Indian 

children (see In re T.G., at pp. 287-288), ICWA permits an Indian 

child’s tribe to intervene in—or, where appropriate, exercise 

jurisdiction over—a child custody proceeding (see 25 U.S.C. 

§ 1911(c); In re Isaiah W. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1, 8). 

To ensure Indian tribes may exercise their rights in 

dependency proceedings as guaranteed by ICWA and related 

state law, investigation of a family member’s belief a child may 

have Indian ancestry must be undertaken and notice provided to 

the appropriate tribes. (§ 224.2, subd. (a) [imposing on the court 

and child protective services agencies “an affirmative and 

continuing duty to inquire whether a child . . . is or may be an 
10

Indian child”]; see In re Benjamin M. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 735, 

741-742.) The duty to inquire “begins with initial contact 

(§ 224.2, subd. (a)) and obligates the juvenile court and child 

protective agencies to ask all relevant involved individuals 

whether the child may be an Indian child.” (In re T.G., supra, 

58 Cal.App.5th at p. 290; accord, In re Antonio R. (2022) 

76 Cal.App.5th 421, 429; see § 224.2, subds. (a)-(c).) 

In addition, section 224.2, subdivision (e), imposes a duty of 

further inquiry regarding the possible Indian status of the child

“[i]f the court, social worker, or probation officer has reason to 

believe that an Indian child is involved in a proceeding, but does 

not have sufficient information to determine there is reason to 

know that the child is an Indian child.” Rule 5.481(a)(4) provides 

that further inquiry must be conducted if the social worker 

“knows or has reason to know or believe that an Indian child is or 

may be involved.” Further inquiry includes, “but is not limited 

to,” interviewing, as soon as practicable, extended family 

members to gather the biographical information required by 

section 224.3, subdivision (a)(5), to be included in ICWA notices, 

contacting the BIA and contacting “the tribe or tribes and any 

other person that may reasonably be expected to have 

information regarding the child’s membership, citizenship status, 

or eligibility.” (§ 224.2, subd. (e)(2); see In re Rylei S. (2022) 

81 Cal.App.5th 309, 316-317.) 

If those inquiries result in reason to know the child is an 

Indian child,8 notice to the relevant tribes is required. (25 U.S.C. 

8 “For purposes of ICWA, an ‘Indian child’ is an unmarried 

individual under age 18 who is either a member of a federally 

recognized Indian tribe or is eligible for membership in a 

federally recognized tribe and is the biological child of a member 
11

§ 1912(a); Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224.3; see In re J.S. (2021) 

62 Cal.App.5th 678, 686; In re T.G., supra, 58 Cal.App.5th at 

p. 290.) The governing federal regulations require ICWA notices 

to include, if known, the names, birthdates, birthplaces and tribal 

enrollment information of all direct lineal ancestors of the child. 

(25 C.F.R. § 23.111(d)(3) (2022).) State law mandates inclusion of 

“[a]ll names known of the Indian child’s biological parents, 

grandparents, and great-grandparents, or Indian custodians, 

including maiden, married, and former names or aliases, as well 

as their current and former addresses, birth dates, places of birth 

and death, tribal enrollment information of other direct lineal 

ancestors of the child, and any other identifying information, if 

known.” (§ 224.3, subd. (a)(5)(C); see In re A.M. (2020) 

47 Cal.App.5th 303, 317 [“‘If the notice duty is triggered under 

ICWA, the notice to a tribe must include a wide range of 

information about relatives, including grandparents and greatgrandparents, to enable the tribe to properly identify the 

children’s Indian ancestry. [Citation.] Any violation of this 

policy requires the appellate court to vacate the offending order 

and remand the matter for further proceedings consistent with 

ICWA requirements’”].)

“The duty to develop information concerning whether a 

child is an Indian child rests with the court and the Department, 

not the parents or members of the parents’ families.” (In re

Antonio R., supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 430; accord, In re 

Benjamin M., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 742 [“the agency has a 

of a federally recognized tribe.” (In re T.G., supra, 58 Cal.App.5th 

at p. 287, fn. 10; see 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4) [definition of “‘Indian 

child’”] & (8) [definition of “‘Indian tribe’”]; see also Welf. & Inst. 

Code, § 224.1, subd. (a) [adopting federal definitions].)
12

duty to gather information by conducting an initial inquiry, 

where the other party—here a parent . . . —has no similar 

obligation”]; see also In re K.R. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 701, 706 

[“[t]he court and the agency must act upon information received 

from any source, not just the parent [citations], and the parent’s 

failure to object in the juvenile court to deficiencies in the 

investigation or noticing does not preclude the parent from 

raising the issue for the first time on appeal”].)

2. Remand Is Necessary for Compliance with the 

Department’s and the Juvenile Court’s ICWA-related 

Inquiry Obligations

The Department unquestionably made some effort to

investigate Sade’s understanding that her family was affiliated 

with the Muscogee (Creek) Nation, as the juvenile court ordered 

it to do. And it appears Sade’s level of cooperation with the 

Department was not high. But given the very clear assertion of 

possible Indian ancestry from Sade, as well as the reported 

statements from Nancy and Debra, all of which related to the 

Muscogee (Creek) Nation, more than was done here was 

necessary to constitute sufficient further inquiry as mandated by 

section 224.2, subdivision (e), and rule 5.481(a)(4). 

In concluding the Department failed to meet its obligation 

of further inquiry, we need not find inadequate, as Sade urges us 

to do, the Department’s limited attempts to contact Nancy and 

Debra, although it is troubling those efforts were first made 

nearly 18 months after initiation of the dependency proceedings 

using what may have been outdated telephone numbers gleaned 

from the state CWS/CMS database, rather than asking other 

family members for Nancy’s and Debra’s contact information. 

And we certainly agree with Sade it would have been reasonable 

for the social worker to make more of an effort to interview those 
13

two individuals who had unequivocally identified themselves as

Muscogee (Creek) Nation tribal members.9

But even accepting the Department’s outreach to Nancy 

and Debra as minimally satisfactory, the record reflects no 

attempt to identify and interview other members of Sade’s 

extended family, as required by both statute and rule 5.481. 

Sade’s parents, perhaps most prominently, are nowhere 

mentioned in the Department’s description of its ICWA-related 

investigation (other than including their names on the ICWA-030 

forms). Nor are her siblings. As discussed, the 

jurisdiction/disposition report stated Sade had a brother, but 

were there other siblings? Was there an effort to contact any of 

them? Debra was Sade’s paternal aunt. Even if the single effort 

to contact her was sufficient, did Sade’s father have other siblings 

as well? We do not know because the Department did not 

inquire, at least as reflected in the record before us.

9 The Department asserts Sade provided no explanation why 

the social worker should make more than one attempt to contact 

a relative whose ICWA information it had and who had not 

returned an initial telephone call. One attempt may be sufficient 

for a relative who gave only a vague indication of some remote 

Indian ancestry—an issue we need not decide. But these 

relatives described themselves on separate occasions in separate 

proceedings as registered members of the Muscogee (Creek) 

Nation. Surely a social worker with a good faith interest in 

determining whether Reagan may be an Indian child would have 

believed it appropriate to make more of an effort than was done

here. To suggest further inquiry of Nancy and Debra was 

“impossible and unnecessary,” as the Department does, is not 

only inaccurate but also at odds with the Legislature’s clear 

expression of the importance of thorough ICWA-related 

investigations by child protective agencies. 
14

In addition, although the Department sent formal 

ICWA-030 notices to the Muscogee (Creek) Tribe, section 224.2, 

subdivision (e)(2)(C), requires the Department to have informal 

contact and to share information with a tribe in which a 

dependent child may be a member in order to develop the 

pertinent information—not simply to send a formal (and, here, 

largely incomplete) ICWA-030 notice. (See In re T.G., supra, 

58 Cal.App.5th at p. 290 [“[t]his informal contact with the tribe 

must include ‘sharing information identified by the tribe as 

necessary for the tribe to make a membership or eligibility 

determination’”]; see also In re D.S. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1041, 

1049 [“[t]he sharing of information with tribes at this inquiry 

stage is distinct from formal ICWA notice”].) To be sure, the 

Department’s report for the May 24, 2021 selection and 

implementation hearing described a telephone conversation 

between its social worker and a Muscogee (Creek) Nation tribal 

eligibility representative, but nothing in the report suggests 

compliance with the Department’s information-sharing obligation 

imposed by section 224.2, subdivision (e)(2)(C), rather than an 

inquiry as to the status of the response to the Department’s 

ICWA-030 notice, which the Department needed for the hearing 

scheduled to take place in two days.10

The Department’s argument as to why it was in substantial 

compliance with its duty of further inquiry is not persuasive. The 

Department is correct that it is “not required to ‘cast about’ for 

information or pursue unproductive investigative leads” (In re 

D.S., supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 1053); but in the paragraph 

10 In its respondent’s brief the Department confirms the social 

worker contacted the tribe to obtain an expedited delivery of the 

response letter. 
15

from In re D.S. the Department quotes for this adage, 

Justice Guerrero, writing for her then-colleagues in Division One 

of the Fourth Appellate District, described the duty of further 

inquiry by citing to, and quoting from, In re K.R., supra,

20 Cal.App.5th at page 709: “[A] social services agency has the 

obligation to make a meaningful effort to locate and interview 

extended family members to obtain whatever information they 

may have as to the child’s possible Indian status.” (In re D.S., at 

p. 1053.) Attempting to identify Reagan’s maternal relatives (her 

maternal grandparents, aunts, uncles, great-uncles and greataunts other than Debra) and to interview them concerning the 

family’s relationship to the Muscogee (Creek) Nation about which 

Sade, Debra and Nancy all spoke is far from “casting about” for 

information. 

The Department points out that Sade, when questioned 

several months after the detention hearing, contradicted her 

earlier statements and denied any Indian ancestry based on the 

juvenile court’s finding in a prior dependency case that ICWA did 

not apply. But neither that finding nor any details of the ICWA 

investigation conducted in that prior case, if one was in fact 

undertaken, were provided to the court here. Sade’s apparent 

reliance on that phantom finding to retract her assertion of 

Indian ancestry does not relieve the Department of its statutory 

responsibilities.

In response to Sade’s argument that no effort was made to

obtain contact information for her parents or her brother (or to 

learn if she had other siblings) or for Reagan’s other family 

members—other aunts, uncles, great-aunts and great-uncles—in 

addition to Debra in order to interview them regarding Reagan’s 

possible Indian status, the Department feebly responds that, 
16

when the social worker asked Sade for her relatives’ contact 

information for placement purposes, she provided no information. 

That Sade apparently did not want Reagan placed with one of her 

relatives did not mean she did not know how to contact them. 

And even if it did, the Department apparently did not access the 

CSW/CSM database or the Riverside County juvenile court 

records to determine contact information for any of Sade’s 

relatives other than Nancy and Debra. Why not remains 

unexplained. 

Finally, recycling an argument we have repeatedly rejected,

the Department suggests it did all it needed to do for us to affirm 

the no-ICWA finding by faulting Sade and her appellate counsel 

for not describing what other relatives would have said if the 

Department had complied with its statutory obligations. This 

contention is no more persuasive now than when we first 

dismissed it in In re Y.W., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at page 556: “It 

is unreasonable to require a parent to make an affirmative 

representation of Indian ancestry where the Department’s failure 

to conduct an adequate inquiry deprived the parent of the very 

knowledge needed to make such a claim.” (Accord, In re Rylei S., 

supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at pp. 320-321.)

Similarly unpersuasive is the Department’s argument that 

any errors in failing to comply with its obligation to conduct a 

further inquiry regarding Reagan’s possible Indian status were

harmless. The Department emphasizes that it sent ICWA-030 

notices to the Muscogee (Creek) Nation, as ordered by the 

juvenile court—the only tribal affiliation at issue. The tribe 

responded that Reagan was not a member, eligible for 

membership or an Indian child. As such, the Department 
17

contends, any antecedent error in the extent of its investigation 

was necessarily harmless.

This analysis ignores that the express purpose of

interviewing extended family members once there is reason to 

believe the child may be an Indian child, as set forth in 

section 224.2, subdivision (e)(2)(A), is to gather the extensive 

biographical information required by section 224.3, 

subdivision (a), as well as by federal law, for inclusion in the 

ICWA notice to tribes—information that was almost entirely 

missing from the ICWA-030 notices prepared by the Department. 

And it disregards the Muscogee (Creek) Nation’s admonition that 

its determination as to Reagan’s status was based upon the 

information provided and omitted information could alter that 

determination.

As we recently explained in In re Rylei S., supra, 

81 Cal.App.5th 309, a case like the one at bar involving a failure 

to make further inquiry of extended family members as required 

by section 224.2, subdivision (e), we have never held any misstep 

by the Department in the process of investigating a child’s 

possible Indian status, however minor, requires reversal of a nonICWA finding. Rather, the failure, as here, to fully comply with a 

mandatory duty is properly found to be harmless if the record 

affirmatively reflects that “the protections intended to be afforded 

through the exercise of that duty have been provided.” (In re 

Rylei, at pp. 324-325.) No such showing appears in the record 

here.11 A remand for further inquiry is required in this case.

11 The Department appears to suggest, if we find error, that 

we adopt the “reason to believe” harmless error standard 

articulated by Division Two of this court in In re Dezi C. (2022) 

79 Cal.App.5th 769, review granted September 21, 2022, 
18

DISPOSITION

The December 28, 2021 order denying Sade’s section 388 

petition and terminating Sade’s parental rights is conditionally 

affirmed. The matter is remanded to the juvenile court for full 

compliance with the inquiry and notice provisions of ICWA and 

related California law and for further proceedings not 

inconsistent with this opinion.

PERLUSS, P. J. 

We concur:

SEGAL, J. 

FEUER, J.

S275578. Whatever else we may think of the analysis in In re 

Dezi C., that decision concerned the Department’s failure to 

conduct the inquiry required by section 224.2, subdivision (b), 

and posited the failure to conduct a proper “initial inquiry” was 

harmless “unless the record contains information suggesting a 

reason to believe that the child may be an ‘Indian child’ within 

the meaning of ICWA.” (In re Dezi, at p. 779.) The Department’s 

duty of further inquiry—at issue in this case—was triggered 

precisely because Sade’s, Nancy’s and Debra’s statements about 

the family’s affiliation with the Muscogee (Creek) Nation 

provided reason to believe Reagan may be an Indian child.