By order of the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel, the precedential effec t of this dec ision is limi ted to the case and parties pu rsuant to 6t

h Cir. BAP LB R 8013 -1(b). Se e also 6th C ir. B AP LBR 8010- 1(c).

File Name: 06b0004n.06 BANKRU PTCY APPELLATE P ANEL OF THE SIXTH CIRC UIT In re : LI SA BARCLAY , ) ) Debtor. ) ____________________________________) ) LI SA BARCLAY , ) ) Appellan t, )

) v. ) No. 05-8019 ) REIME R & LO RBER CO. L

PA , et al., )

) Appellee s. ) ____________________________________)

Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Ohio, Eastern Division, at Columbus

. No. 02-50794

. Submitted : November 9, 2005 Decided and Filed: February 1, 2006 Befor e: LATTA, PARSONS, and SCOTT , Bankr uptcy Appellat e Panel Judg es.

____________________ COUNSEL ON BRIE F: Jeffrey T. Ka lniz, REIMER & LORB ER CO., LPA, Twinsburg, Ohio, for Appe llees. Lisa Barcla

y, Gahanna , Ohio, pro se.2 ____________________ OPINION

____________________ MAR CIA PH ILL IPS PAR SONS, Ba nkruptcy Appellat e Panel Judg e. The de

btor appe als the bankruptcy c ourt’s order deny ing her motion to impose sanctions on the appellees fo r thei r alleged violations of the automatic stay, which motion was filed almost two years a

fter the alleged violations occurred and

more than a year a

nd one-half after the debtor’s chapte r 11 case was dismissedfor cause. The debtor also appeals the bankruptcy court’s subsequent order deny ing her motion to vacate the initial order. Because the bankruptc y court did not abuse its discretion in these matters, we conclude that the bankruptcy court decisions should be AFFI RMED

. I. ISSUES ON APPEAL
The debtor raises two issues on appeal. First, whether the bankruptcy c ourt properly de nied her motion for s anctions for violations of the automatic stay and her motion to vacate. Second, whether the bankruptcy

judge should be recused from hear ing the motions because of an alleged bia s against the debtor.
II. JURISD ICTION AND STANDARDOF REVIEW
The Bankru

ptcy Appellat e Panel of the Sixth Circuit (“BAP”) has jurisdict ion to dec ide this appeal. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio ha s authori zed appea ls to this Panel. Th e BAP ha s jurisdic tion over core pr oceedin gs and is sues rel ated to th e automa tic stay are core proceedings pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A), (E), and (O). In re Hug hes-Bec htol, Inc. v. Constr. Mgmt., Inc., (In re Hughes-Bechtol, Inc .) , 132 B.R. 339, 348-49 (S.D. Ohio 1991).
Findi ngs of

fact by the ba

nkruptcy court are reviewed under the c learly er roneous standard. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8013. A finding of fact is clear ly e rroneou s “when a

lthough t here is e vidence to support it, the reviewing court, on the entire evidenc e, is left with the definite and firm conviction tha t a mistake has been committed.” Andersonv. Besse mer City , 470 U.S. 5 64, 573, 10 5 S. Ct.3

1504, 1511 (1985). Conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. See In re Downs , 103 F.3d 472, 476-77 (6th Cir. 1996).
The sanction or remedy

imposed by the bankruptcy c ourt for violation of the automatic stay is reviewed de novo for abuse of discretion. In re Del Mission Ltd. , 98 F.3d 1147, 1152 (9th Cir. 1996). “An abus e of discretion occurs only when the [trial] court ‘relies upon clearly erroneous findi ngs of fact or

when it improperly applies the la w or uses an

erroneous legal standard.’” Corzin

v. Fordu (In re Fordu) , 209 B.R. 854, 857 (B.A.P. 6t h Cir. 1997) (quoting In re Downs , 103 F.3d at 480-81). A cour

t a lso abuses its discretion “if the reviewing court has a de finite and firm convictionthat the trial court committed a clear error of judgment in the conclusion that it reached based on all of the appropriate factors.” Belfance v. Black River Petroleum, Inc. ( In re Hess) , 209 B.R. 79, 80 (B.A.P . 6th Cir. 1997) (citi ng Bowling v. Pfizer, Inc. , 102 F.3d 777 (6th Ci r. 1996)). “T h e question i s not how th e revie wing co urt would have rule d, but rat her whether a r

easonab le person could agree with thebankrup tcy court’s decision ; if

reasonable persons could differ as to the issue, then there is no abuse of discretion.” In re M.J. Waterman & Assocs., Inc. , 227 F.3d

604, 608 (6th Cir. 2000).
III. FAC TS
The debtor Lisa Barc lay filed a voluntar y petition for bankruptcy

relief under chapter 11 on January 23, 2002. Four

months later, the United States trustee filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b) (1), (2) , and (3) , assert ing con tinuing l oss to or di

minution of

the esta te and absence o f a reasonable likelihood of rehabilitation, an inability to effectuate a plan, and
unreasonabledelay

by t he debtor that is prejudic ial to cre ditors. Af ter an e videntia ry hearing on July 9 and 11, 20 02, the ba

nkruptcy court br iefly took the ma

tter unde r advise ment and s

ubseque ntly entered an opinion and order on July 15, 2002, gr anting the motion to dismiss for all the reasons argued by the United States trustee. In its ruling, the bankruptcy court observed that the debtor, who
was procee ding pro se , had sch eduled a pproximate ly $ 35,400 in u nse c ured credit card debt and $1,378,000 in secur

ed debt, c onsisting

of oblig ations to 15 different creditors relating to 19 rental properties and one Florida timeshare. The c ourt noted that even though none of the secu red debt s had been scheduled as disputed, contingent, or unliquidated, the debtor be gan challenging the4

validity of the secured debts after filing he r petition. According to the court, the debtor responde d to multiple requests for relief from the automatic stay with a barrage of discovery requests directed toward the lenders; she argued that the notes and mortga ges we re not va lid and that there had been
no perfection by

possession; she alleged violations of the FederalFair De bt Collect ion Pract ices Act , which was inapplicable since the secured de bts were not consumer in nature; and she attacked the banking syste

m and how loan funds were disbursed.
Based on the evidence presented reg arding the debtor’s challeng es to the various secured claims, th e bankru

ptcy court re ached the followi ng conc lusions:
The diatribe s about the “validity” of the notes a nd mortgages aga

inst the various rental propert

ies appe ar to th e C ourt to be without merit and designed to delay the procee dings as long as possible. . . . The challenges we re notto any calc

ulations by creditors of amounts due under the notes, but were to the valid

ity o f all such

debts. A review by the

Court of the claims filed by the va r ious cre dit ors reveals no bases whatsoever

for such challenges. There ar e copies attached

to these proofs of

claims of executed notes and mortgages with evidenc es of recordation data. The debtor’s argume nts are, frankly

, a scheme to attem

pt to avoid

her debt s. Withrespec t to the specific allegations of the United States trustee’s motion to dismiss, the bankr uptcy cou rt’s f

indi ngs of f

act and concl usio ns of l aw inc luded the fo llow ing:
Sinc e t his case was filed there have been thousa nds of dollars collected as rents from the v arious pr opertie s. Altho ugh some of the properties do not have tenantsor have tenants who do not pay rent, the ope

rating report for May

2002, for example, shows $9,317.00 collected in rents. No pay

ments hav e been ma

de to any of the lenders since the case was filed, howeve r, and most of

the rent monies appear to have been turned over to the debtor’s boy friend, A. Kafe le. Althou gh Mr. K afele was called

as a witness, he refused to disclose how any of the rent monies were used.

. . . . The evidence introduc ed by the UST clear ly established “ca

use” as contemplated

by 11 U.S. C. § 1112(b)(1-3). The debtor was not able to satisfy any of the concerns raised by

the UST which established such cause. Thedebtor and her boyfriend, whose ro le in this case is still unclear, exhibited no understanding of the duties imposed on a debtor-in-possession under § 1107 of the Bankruptcy Code. The actions of the de

btor and M

r. Kafe le since

this case was file d have re sulted in massive diversio n of esta te propert y (rent from the properties) for which the pa rties refused to give any

explanations. . . .5 There was not testimony about, and appa rently no contemplation of, an y reorganization

plan. There also was no comprehension of the re quireme

nt and duty to accoun t for esta te prope rty . There

was evid ence th at a group with which Mr. Kafele may be assoc iated occupies one of the properties rent-f ree. Questions about management of the properties wer e answered only

in an evasive manner. Fr an kl y, this Court is greatly conc erned that a debtor and her “friend” would use a federal court

in the man

ner exhibi ted. The debtor a nd Mr. Kafele ar

e both we lleducated people who appear to the Court to be quite aware of what t hey are doi ng. It is unfortunate they

have chosen such a path. This case will be, and the same is, hereby DISMI SSED. OnJuly 24, 2002, shortly after e ntry of the dismissal order, the de btor filed motions seeking to vacate the dismissal and for the bankruptcy judge to disqualify

or recu se herse lf. Both o f these motions were denied by

the bankruptcy c ourt. In its order on the motion for rec usal, the bankruptcy court noted that the debtor’s motion appeared to be premised on 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), which re quires
a federa l judge t o “disqua lify himself in

any procee ding in w

hich his imp artiality

might re asonably be qu es ti on ed .” Th e b an kr up tc y ju dg e f ou nd no re as on ab le ba si s f or qu es ti on in g h er im pa rt ia li ty, observing that judicial rulings al o ne almost never constitute a valid bas is for a b ias or pa rtiality motion. The ju dge als o not ed tha t she h ad no e xtra judi cial k nowle dge and no predetermined notions relatingto the validity of the debtor’s position, being unawar e of thes e positions until the hearing on the motion to dismiss. As explained by the bankruptcy judge:
The Court listened to the debtor’s arguments and decided that

such arguments did not have legal merit. The Court then further determined

that the debtor’s pursuit of such theories was causing unreasonable dela y in this cas e. Th e Court was further disturbed by the relucta

nce of the debtor and her friend to explain the disposition of large sums of money in which cre ditors of this estate claimed an

interest and which were pr operty of this bankruptcy e state. Such conclusions are not the result of any resistance to a f

ai r i nq ui ry w hi ch mi gh t p ro du ce co nc er n f or th e i mp ar ti al it y o f t he process , but come

from an evaluation

of the testimony and evidenc e presented at the hearin g. The debtor a

ppealed the dismiss al of her

case but did not appeal the order deny

ing the recusal motion. By orde

r entered Septem

ber 30, 2003, the district court dismissed the appeal due to the1 The debtor’s brief on appeal was un ti me ly, and she failed to file a transcript of the ba nk ruptcy

court proceedings designa ted by her in the a

ppellate record. I

n its opinion and order, the district court detailed in great length the proc edural history of the case beforethe distri ct court , whichin its estimation demonstrated the debtor’s “extreme” and “complete indifference to the rules of this proceeding .” The district c ourt obse rved tha t during the cour se of fiv e extensions of time i n whichto file her opening brief, the debtor sou ght both f rom the Cou

rt of Appe als for the Sixth Circuit and the U nited State s Supreme

Court a wr

it of mandamus directing the district court to vacat e the bankruptcy

court’s order dismissing her bankruptcy case and to stay

all fo reclos ure pro ceedin gs in the state court. According to the district court, both of these pe titions were denied.

6 debtor’s failure

to comply

with Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure 8006 and 8009. 1 The debtor appealed this dismissal to the Court o f Appea ls for the SixthCircuit, w

hic h affirmed the district court on June 16, 2004. The debtor’s subsequent petition for en banc rehearing was denied by the Court of Appeals on October 18, 2004.
All of this procedural history provides the setting for the debtor’s current appeal before this bankruptcy

appellate panel. On

January 22, 2004, while her a ppeal was pending before the Court of Appeals, the debtor filed in the bankruptcy court (in her

dismissed but still open chapter 11 case)
a motion for

sanction s for willf

ul violations of the a

utomatic stay agains t the appellees for two mortga ge foreclosure actions instituted by them on March 7 and April 23, 2002. The debtor alleged inthe motion that the appellees were on notice of her ban kruptcy at the time they initiated the foreclosure actions, that she was forced to pre pare an d file plead ings to have the actions dismissed, and that as a consequence of the appellee s’ actions, she was “intentionally and willfully harasse d, suffered undue mental anguish, stress, and humiliation (private and public)” and was “defamed and libeled” by

“[t]he filing of the unlawful civil foreclosure actions.” The debtor reque sted actual and punitive damages in the amount of $2.5 million.
Ina one-page order e

ntered February

9, 2004, the bankr

uptcy court denie d the debtor’s motion for san ction s wit hout a heari ng. The court stated in its order that the motion had been filed nearly a y ear and

a half after the case had been dismissed on July 15, 2002, and that, “[i]n all of the hearin gs and pr oceedi ngs before this Court, there was nothing to sugg est any willful violation of the automatic stay by these respondents. Rather, it was the debtor’s own lack of good faith which was the cornerstone of her bankruptcy case throughout these proceeding s.”2 In the ir appel late brie f, the ap pellees state tha t after t his appeal was initiated by the debtor, she filed a subsequent

bankruptcy c ase under

chapter 7 on June 8, 2005. Although not raised by the parties and

not otherwise dispositive of the issues before this panel, we question whether the debtor has standing to p ursue this appe al since her cla im for san

ctions ar ising out of her chapter 1 1 case would constitute an asset of

her chapter 7 bankruptcy

estate until abandoned by the chapter

7 trustee.

7 Dissatisfied

with this conclusion, the debtor filed on February 19, 2004, a

motion to va

cate the order deny

ing her motion for sanctions. The bankruptcy c ourt summarily denied the motion by order entere d Febru

ary 17, 2005. I

t is this order, i

n addition

to the original February

9, 2004 order denying the sanctions motion, that the debtor has timely appeale d. 2 See BAP order entered June 3, 20 05 de nyi ng ap pe ll ee s’ mo ti on to di sm is s t hi s a pp ea l a s u nt im el y.
IV. DISCU SSION
The debtor argue s that because she adequately pled a cause of action for violation of the automatic stay, the bankruptc

y court was r

equired to hear, consider, an d award damage s. With regard to the ban

kruptcy court’s refer ence to t he debtor ’s delay

in filing th e sancti o ns motion and the debtor’s failure to ra ise th e stay violations in other hear ings before the bankruptcy court, the debtor responds that there is no statute of limitations to a 11 U.S.C. § 362(h) action and that other procee dings were ir

releva nt since a motion for

violation o f the aut

omatic sta

y is a separat e core matter. Finally, the debtor a rgues that there was no evidence for the court’s conclusion that her actions were in bad faith or frivolous.
Section 362(h) pr

ovides tha

t “[a]n indiv

idual injured by any

willful violation of a stay provided by t his se ction sha ll recov er actu al damag es, inclu

ding co sts and at

torney s’ fees , and, in appropr iate circumstances, may

recover punitive damages.” In or der to re cover un

der thisstatute,
anindividual must establish three elements: (1) that a violation of the autom ati c stay occ urred; (2) that the violation was committed willfully; and (3) that the violation injured the individual seeking damages. See In re Skeen , 248 B.R. 312, 316 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2000). A review of the debtor’s sanctions motion indicates that she sufficiently pled a § 362 (h) ca

use of action as she asserts. An allegation that the appellees co mmenced foreclosure actions against the debtor’ s real propert y instate court after her bankruptcy filing indicates that a stay violation may have occ

urred.8

See 11 U.S.C. § 3 62(a)(4) (a ba nkruptcy filing st ay s “any act to cr eate, pe rfect, or enforce any lien agains tproperty of the

estate”). The allegation that the ap pellees were notified of the debtor’s bankruptcy

filing and nevertheless proceede d with foreclosure supports a finding of willfulness. See In re Skeen , 248 B. R. at 317 (“The willfulness requirement refers to the deliberateness of the conduct and the knowledge of the bankruptcy filing, not to a spe cific int e nt to violate a court order.”). And as quoted above, the debtor alleged tha t she suffered injuries as a result of the appellees’s forecl osure ac tions. Id. As a ge

neral pr oposition, upon a fin

ding tha t a willful violation of the stay has occ

urred and that damages resulted, an awa rd of damages is mandatory

. In re Taylor , 884 F.2d 478, 483 (9th Cir.1989). Furthermore, the debtor is correct that there is no statute of

limitations for § 362(h) and that suchactions survive dismissal of the bankruptcy c ase. See In re Javens , 107 F.3d 359, 364 n. 2 (6th Cir. 1997) (citi ng Price v. Rochford , 947 F.2d 829, 830-31 (7th Cir.1991)). “Since dismissal of an unde rl ying

bankrup tcy

case doe s not automatically strip a fe deral c ourt of r

esidual ju risdiction to dispose of matters after the underly ing bankruptcy

case ha s been dismissed, exercise of such jurisdiction is left tothe sound discretion of the trial court.” Id. (quoting In re Lawson , 156 B.R. 43, 45 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1993) (internal citations omitted)).
Nevertheless, inthis reg ard, “[a] bankrupt cy court, a s a court

of equity , . . . must be guided by equitable principles in exercising its jurisdiction.” Matthews v. Rosene , 739 F.2d 249, 251 (7th Cir. 1984). See also Bank of Marin v. England, 385 U.S. 99, 103, 87 S. Ct. 274, 277 (1966) (“There is an overriding considera tion t hat equitable principles govern the exercise of ba nkruptcy jurisdict ion.”); Pepper v. Litton , 308 U.S. 295, 304, 60 S. Ct. 238, 244 (1939) (bankru ptcy courts
are courts of

equity and law) . On occa sion, the c ourts have “applied equitable principles to protect creditors from unwarranted liability arising from a

pplication of Section 362.” Matthews v. Rosene , 739 F.2d at 251 (c itin g In re Smith Corset Shops, Inc. , 696 F.2 d 971 (1st Cir. 1982)). See alsoIn

r e Soares , 107 F.3d 969, 977 (1st Cir. 1997) (suggesting that the de btor’s bad faith is a relev an t consideration

in determining requests for retroactive stay relief) ; In re Albany Partners, Ltd. , 749 F.2d 670, 675 (11th Cir. 1984) (debtor’s lack of g ood faith in f iling ch apter 11 petition w as a relevant factor in court’ s retroa

ctiv e stay annulment); Adams v. H artconn A ssocs., I

nc. (I n re9

Adams) , 212 B.R. 703, 711-12 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1997) (based on the totality of the ci rcumstan ces, in cluding a nineteen-month delay in bringing the action, the court concluded tha t the deb tor wa s barred fromrecove

ring for the stay

violation) ; Nelson v. Post Falls Mazda (In re Nelson) , 159 B.R. 924, 925 (D. Idaho 1993) (noting in dicta that l aches may

be an appropriate defense to a § 362(h) action brought after dismissal of the bankruptcy case). As stated by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appe als in Matthews : Section 362 is desi gned to benefit a debtor

by preventing

harassment and

frustration of rehabilitation efforts through pursuit by creditor s in individua l actions. Suspension of Section 362 automatic stay provisions may be consonant with the purpo ses of the B ankruptc y A ct when e quitable

consider ations we igh hea

vil y in favo r of the cr editor a nd the deb tor bears some re sponsibilit y f or crea ting the problems

. Matthews v. Rosene , 739 F.2d at 251. In this regar d, one court has cautioned that: “there must be compelling equitable considerations which outweigh the court’s

need for enforc ement of

an order ly administration of the bankruptcy e state. Such determination must be made on a case by c ase basi s to insure that there is no suffocation of the stay ’s intended policy.” Taxel v. Elec. Sports Research (In re Cinematronics, Inc.) , 111 B.R. 892, 901 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1990).
Inthe instant case, the bankrupt cy court plainly concluded that equitable considerations outweighed the debtor’s statutory right to recovery

under § 362(h). A review

of the re cord in th

is
casereveals no basis for determining that the court a bused its discret ion in th is matter. As the bankruptcy

court observed, the motion was filed more than a yea r and one-half after the case was closed. Thus, there was no risk that denial of the motion would adversely impact the administration of the debtor’s estate. The court had already conducted an extensive hearing in connection with the United States trustee’s motionto dismiss, from which the court overwhelmingly concluded that the debtor was intentionally and d

elib erately a

busing the bankruptcy

process in order to avoid pay ing her debts and that

the actions of the debtor and her boy friend had resulted in massive diversions of estate property. Contrar

y to the ar

gu ment of the

debtor, t he bankr uptcy court wa s not requ

ired to divorce itself from the evidence presented at the earlier hearing in ruling on the debtor’s sanctions motion. Similarly, in determining whethe r to exercise its jurisdiction, the bankruptcy c ourt was free to consider the fact that no sugge stion of any stay violation had ever

come up in any

of the myriad3 The docket in this case indic ates t

hat the bankruptcy

court held numerous hearings on motions for

relief f rom stay and the de

btor’s ob jections t o the motion s, althoug

h the tra nscripts of these hearings have not been included in the r ecord.

10 other hearings and proceeding s before the court in this case. 3 Notwithsta nding the debtor’ s claim of error in the bankruptcy

court’s ruling, nothing i

nthe rec ord defi

nitely and firml y c onvinces

this panel that the bankruptcy court erred in deny

ing the debtor’s sanctions motion.
The panel turns now to the bankruptcy court’s denial of the debtor’s motion to vacate the
o rder denying the sanctions motion. The debtor did not identify the rule unde r which she wa s proceeding

in the moti on and mer ely rea rgued the merits of the original motion. “Courts have gener ally viewed any

motion which seeks a substantive change in a judgment as a Rule 59(e ) motion if it is made w

ithin ten days of the e

ntry of the judg

ment challenged.” In re Barger , 219 B.R. 238, 244 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 1998). Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, made applica ble by FederalRule of B ankruptc y Pr ocedure 9023, allows a cour

t to consider

a “motion to alter or amend
a judgment.” The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that “a court should grant such a motion only ‘if there is a clear error of

law, newly discove

red evidence, an

inter venin g change in controlling law, or to prevent manifest injustice.’” Keenan v. Bagley , 262 F . S upp 2d 826, 830 (quoting GenCorp, Inc. v. A m. Int’l U nderwrite rs Co ., 178 F.3d 804, 834 (6th Cir. 1999)). The rule “is not designed to give an unhappy

litigant an opportunity to relitig ate matters already decided, nor

is it a
s ubstitu te for appeal.” Sherwood v. Royal Ins. Co. , 290 F. Supp 2d 856, 858 (N.D. Ohio 2003) (citing Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians v. Engler , 146 F.3d 367, 374 (6th Cir. 1998)). The debtor bore the bu

rden of showing “

that alte ration or amendme

nt of the orig inal judg ment is appropriate.” Regions Bank v. W achovia Bank, NA (

In re Goldberg) , 248 B.R. 209, 211 (S.D. Ga. 2000).
Inth is appe al, the debtor has not articulated a separate a rgument as to why

the court erred indeny ing the motion to vacate, other than her original a rgument that the court erred in deny ing the sanctions motion. This panel having concluded that the bankruptcy c ourt did not abuse its discretion
as to the sanctions motion, it similarly finds no error in the bankruptc y court’s denial of the debtor’s motion to vacate.11

The final ar

gument r aised by the debtor in this ap

peal is that if thi s matter i s remanded for
a hearing on the san

ctions moti on, the ba

nkruptcy judge sh ould be requi red to re cuse herself

for bias

. Becau se remand is not warranted, the debtor’s rec usal request is moot, except to the exten t th e debtor’s assertion is a separate basis for appeal of the bankruptcy

court’s decision. To the extent the debtor is challenging the court’s ref usal to recuse itself, this panel has no jurisdiction since the debtor did not appeal the bankruptcy c ourt’s order deny ing the debtor’s recusal motion. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8002(a) (“The notice of appeal sha ll be filed with the clerk within 10 day s of the date of the entry of the judgment, order, or decree appealed from.”); see also In re Owens , 1997 WL 693555 at *1 (6th Cir. Octo ber 31, 1 997) (or

der) (“ Cases inte

rpreting Rule 8002 hold that the

rule sha ll be strictly construed and that timely filing is a jurisdictional requirement.”). Furthermore, even if this panel were to entertain a review of the merits of the debtor’s recusal request , it would find no error in the bankruptcy court’s ruling. The debt or’s sole basis for recusal is that the bankruptcy judg e was biased and prejudiced ag ainst the debtor as s hown by the court’ s conclusionthat the debtor was acting in bad faith. Howeve r, as the bankr

up tc y court not

ed in denying the debtor’s motion, “Judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for

a bias
or partiality motion.” Liteky v. United States , 510 U.S. 540, 555, 114 S. Ct. 1147, 1157 (1994). As further explained

by t he United States Supr

eme Court : [O]pinions formed by th e judge on the bas is of fac

ts introduced

or events occurring inthe cour se of the current proceedings, or of pr ior proceedings, do not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion unless the y d isplay a deep- seated favoritism or antagonism

t hat wou ld make fair judgment impossible. Thus, judicial remarks during the course o f a trial that are critica l or disap proving of, or ev en hostile

to, counse l, the parties, or their cases, ordinarily do not support a bias or partiality cha llenge. Th ey may do so if they reve al an opinion that derives from an extrajudicial source; and th ey will do so if they reve al such a high degree of favoritism or

antagonism as to make fair judgment impossible. Id. There is nothingin the re cord whi ch would i ndicate that the bankruptcy judg e’s opinion of the debtor was derive d from an extrajudicial source or that the judge possessed such a hig h degree of antagonism as to make fair judgment impossible. As such, the pane l finds no abuse of discretion.12 V. CONCLU SION
The bankruptcy c ourt did n ot abuse its discreti on in deny

ing both t he debtor ’s motion to impose sanction s on the ap pellees for their allege d violations of the automatic stay and he r subsequent

motion to va

cate. The debtor ’s arg

ument con

cerning recusa l of the ba nkruptcy judge is likewise withoutmerit for

the rea sons discu ssed. Ac cordingly, the bankr uptcy court is AFFI RMED in all aspe cts of this

appeal.