J-A26009-22

J-A26010-22

2023 PA SUPER 47

JENNIFER SANTIAGO AND SAMUEL 

SANTIAGO

v.

PHILLY TRAMPOLINE PARK, LLC I/P/A 

SKY ZONE, D/B/A SKY ZONE 

TRAMPOLINE PARK D/B/A SKY ZONE 

PHILADELPHIA, SKY ZONE 

PHILADELPHIA, INC., SKY ZONE 

TRAMPOLINE PARK A/K/A SKY ZONE 

PHILADELPHIA 

Appellants

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2615 EDA 2021

Appeal from the Order Entered August 23, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at 

No(s): February Term, 2021, No. 021

ALESSANDRA SHULTZ, 

INDIVIDUALLY AND AS P.N.G. FOR 

ROCCO SHULTZ, A MINOR

v.

SKY ZONE, LLC 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 664 EDA 2022

Appeal from the Order Entered January 25, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at 

No(s): 200701660

BEFORE: BOWES, J., KING, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

OPINION BY BOWES, J.: FILED MARCH 21, 2023

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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In these separate appeals, we are tasked with deciding an issue of first 

impression in Pennsylvania: whether a parent’s role as natural guardian 

entitles the parent to bind a minor child to an arbitration agreement and waive 

that child’s right to seek redress for injuries in a court of law. Answering that 

question in the negative and concluding that the respective trial courts 

likewise properly resolved whether the parents’ claims were subject to 

arbitration, we affirm both of the appealed-from orders that ruled upon 

motions to compel arbitration filed by Appellant, Sky Zone.1

I. Facts and Procedural History2

A. The Shultz Plaintiffs

In August 2018, Ryan Shultz took two minors, including his son Rocco, 

to Sky Zone, a Philadelphia trampoline park. In order for the children to use 

the facilities, Mr. Shultz was required to execute a six-page document entitled 

“Participant Agreement, Release and Assumption of Risk (The Agreement).” 

Petition to Compel Arbitration, 1/21/21, Exhibit B at 1. In addition to, among 

other things, recognizing a voluntary assumption of risk, allowing Sky Zone to 

____________________________________________

1

In one case, the plaintiffs brought their claims against Philly Trampoline 

Park, LLC I/P/A Sky Zone, D/B/A Sky Zone Trampoline Park D/B/A Sky Zone 

Philadelphia, Sky Zone Philadelphia, Inc., and Sky Zone Trampoline Park 

A/K/A Sky Zone Philadelphia, while in the other, Sky Zone, LLC is the named 

defendant. For ease of discussion, we refer to the appellants in both cases, 

who are all represented by the same counsel, as “Sky Zone.” 

2 We derive the underlying facts by accepting as true the allegations of the 

plaintiffs’ complaints and from the record created for adjudication of the 

motions to compel arbitration.
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use the children’s’ images on social media, agreeing to receive e-mail 

promotions, and broadly acknowledging “that if I or any of my children are 

injured in any way, this waiver prevents and prohibits any recovery of money 

from any Sky Zone related entity,” id. at 6 (emphasis omitted), the 

Agreement contained the following arbitration provision:

ARBITRATION OF DISPUTES; TIME LIMIT TO BRING CLAIM

 I understand that by agreeing to arbitrate any dispute as set 

forth in this section, I am waiving my right, and the right(s) of 

the minor child(ren) above, to maintain a lawsuit against SZ 

and the other Releasees for any and all claims covered by this 

Agreement. By agreeing to arbitrate, I understand that I will 

NOT have the right to have my claim determined by a jury, 

and the minor child(ren) above will NOT have the right to have 

claim(s) determined by a jury. Reciprocally, SZ and the other 

Releasees waive their right to maintain a lawsuit against me 

and the minor child(ren) above for any and all claims covered 

by this Agreement, and they will not have the right to have 

their claim(s) determined by a jury. ANY DISPUTE, CLAIM 

OR CONTROVERSY ARISING OUT OF OR RELATING TO 

MY OR THE CHILD’S ACCESS TO AND/OR USE OF THE SKY 

ZONE PREMISES AND/OR ITS EQUIPMENT, INCLUDING 

THE DETERMINATION OF THE SCOPE OR APPLICABILITY 

OF THIS AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE, SHALL BE 

BROUGHT WITHIN ONE YEAR OF ITS ACCRUAL (i.e., the 

date of the alleged injury) AND BE DETERMINED BY 

ARBITRATION IN THE COUNTY OF THE SKY ZONE 

FACILITY, PENNSYLVANIA, BEFORE ONE ARBITRATOR. 

THE ARBITRATION SHALL BE ADMINISTERED BY JAMS 

PURSUANT TO ITS RULE 16.1 EXPEDITED ARBITRATION 

RULES AND PROCEDURES. JUDGMENT ON THE AWARD 

MAY BE ENTERED IN ANY COURT HAVING 

JURISDICTION. THIS CLAUSE SHALL NOT PRECLUDE 

PARTIES FROM SEEKING PROVISIONAL REMEDIES IN 

AID OF ARBITRATION FROM A COURT OF APPROPRIATE 

JURISDICTION. This Agreement shall be governed by, 

construed and interpreted in accordance with the laws of the 

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, without regard to choice of 

law principles. Notwithstanding the provision with respect to 
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the applicable substantive law, any arbitration conducted 

pursuant to the terms of this Agreement shall be governed by 

the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C., Sec. 1-16). I understand 

and acknowledge that the JAMS Arbitration Rules to which I 

agree are available online for my review at jamsadr.com, and 

include JAMS Comprehensive Arbitration Rules & Procedures; 

Rule 16.1 Expedited Procedures; and, Policy On Consumer 

Minimum Standards Of Procedural Fairness.

Id. at 3-4 (emphases in original). Mr. Shultz identified Rocco as one of the 

minor participants in the Sky Zone activities, and electronically executed the 

Agreement below the following provision:

By signing below, I represent and warrant that I am the parent, 

legal guardian, or power-of-attorney of the above listed Child(ren) 

and have the authority to execute this Agreement on his/her or 

their behalf and to act on his/her or their behalf. I have read each 

paragraph in this document and I and they agree to be bound by 

the terms stated therein, including the release of liability 

contained therein. I further agree to indemnify and hold harmless 

the Releasees from any and all claims which are brought by or on 

behalf of this or these minor Child or Children, or any of them, 

which are in any way connected with, arise out of, or result from 

their use of the Sky Zone Facility. I am 18 years of age or older. 

I am entering this agreement on behalf of myself, my spouse or 

domestic partner, the Child, and our respective and/or collective 

issue, parents, siblings, heirs, assigns, personal representatives, 

estate(s), and anyone else who can claim by or through such 

person or persons (collectively, the "Releasing Parties").

Id. at 5-6. While utilizing the facilities, five-year-old Rocco was injured when 

an older, larger child jumped on the same trampoline as Rocco. See

Complaint, 7/24/20, at ¶ 8. 

On July 24, 2020, Alessandra Shultz, who is Rocco’s mother, filed a 

complaint in her own right and on behalf of Rocco in the Court of Common 

Pleas of Philadelphia County, seeking personal injury damages related to 
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Rocco’s injury and for Ms. Shultz to recover the costs of his medical treatment. 

Sky Zone filed a petition to compel arbitration and stay the litigation. 

Following discovery on the matters raised in Sky Zone’s petition, the trial court 

denied it by order of January 25, 2022. The Honorable Stella M. Tsai ruled 

that Ms. Shultz was not bound by Mr. Shultz’s execution of the agreement 

because he was not acting as her agent when he signed it, and that parents 

lack the authority to waive their children’s rights to file a lawsuit for their 

injuries. See Order, 1/25/22, at 2, 5. 

On February 24, 2022, Sky Zone filed a notice of appeal, and both Sky 

Zone and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. Sky Zone states the 

following questions in the Shultz appeal:

1. Whether the trial court erred in finding that the arbitration 

provision set forth in the waiver signed by [Mr. Shultz] has 

no binding effect on the claims of [Ms. Shultz] who was his 

wife—and therefore, acting as her agent—at the time he 

signed the waiver.

2. Whether the trial court erred in finding that the claims made 

by [Rocco] are not subject to the arbitration provision set 

forth in the waiver signed by [Mr. Shultz], such that minor 

[Rocco] may now disavow this waiver and bring his claims 

—which fall squarely within the scope of the arbitration 

provision—before a court of law.

Sky Zone’s brief (Shultz) at 12 (cleaned up). 

B. The Santiago Plaintiffs

In February 2019, Jennifer Santiago took her two minor daughters to a 

different Sky Zone location. Prior to their admittance to the play area, 

Ms. Santiago executed the same six-page digital Agreement as did Mr. Shultz, 
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acknowledging that she was waiving her rights, as well as those of her spouse 

and children, to seek redress in a jury trial for any injuries sustained or to 

recover any damages for such an injury, and agreeing to arbitrate any 

disputes. 

Isabella Santiago, then three years old, proceeded to play on a 

trampoline during designated “toddler time” in a “toddler zone.” Complaint, 

2/23/21, at ¶ 23. In the absence of any Sky Zone employee monitoring the 

area, an adult male elected to use the same trampoline as the child. Id. at 

¶¶ 23-24. The man’s jumping threw Isabella toward another trampoline, 

causing her to fracture her knee on the seam in between and to require 

immediate and future medical care. Id. at ¶¶ 23, 27, 29. 

Ms. Santiago and her husband, Samuel Santiago, individually and on 

Isabella’s behalf, filed a complaint in the Court of Common Pleas of 

Philadelphia County seeking to recover money damages related to Isabella’s 

injury. Sky Zone moved to stay the court proceedings and to compel 

arbitration, contending that the Agreement was a valid arbitration agreement 

and that all three plaintiffs’ claims were within its scope. The Santiagos 

responded, acknowledging that Ms. Santiago executed the Agreement, but 

denying its validity to compel arbitration of the claims of Mr. Santiago or 

Isabella. Specifically, they contended that Ms. Santiago’s unilateral execution 

of the Agreement was ineffective to bind her spouse or her child. 
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The trial court ordered discovery limited to Sky Zone’s petition, after 

which the parties filed supplemental briefs. On August 23, 2021, the

Honorable Angelo J. Foglietta denied Sky Zone’s petition. Sky Zone filed a 

motion for the trial court to amend its order to certify it as immediately 

appealable pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 702(b) and to stay the action pending 

appeal. The trial court denied the motion to amend by order of October 12, 

2021. 

On November 4, 2021, Sky Zone filed in this Court a petition for 

permission to appeal, which we denied as moot because an order denying an 

application to compel arbitration is immediately appealable as of right 

pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 7320(a)(1). Instead, we treated Sky Zone’s petition 

as a notice of appeal in accordance with Pa.R.A.P. 1316(a) (“The appellate 

court shall treat a request for discretionary review of an order that is 

immediately appealable as a notice of appeal if a party has filed a timely 

petition for permission to appeal[.]”). Thereafter, both Sky Zone and the trial 

court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Sky Zone presents this Court with the following questions in the 

Santiago appeal:

1. Whether the trial court erred in denying [Sky Zone’s] motion 

to amend order and stay litigation, where amending and 

certifying the order denying [Sky Zone’s] motion to compel 

arbitration and stay litigation for immediate appeal would 

materially advance the ultimate termination of this matter 

and involves a controlling question of law as to which there 

is substantial ground for difference of opinion? 
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2. Whether the trial court erred in denying [Sky Zone’s] motion 

to compel arbitration and stay litigation thereby allowing 

Plaintiffs to continue to litigate their respective claims before 

the trial court, where the participant agreement, release and 

assumption signed by [Ms. Santiago] included a provision 

that clearly and unambiguously required that any and all 

disputes, claims, or controversies arising out of or relating 

to [Isabella’s] use of [Sky Zone’s] premises and equipment 

be submitted to and settled by binding arbitration?

Sky Zone’s brief (Santiago) at 7-8 (re-ordered and cleaned up).

II. Applicable Legal Principles

We begin our examination of Sky Zone’s issues with a review of the 

governing legal principles. “An order denying a petition to compel arbitration 

is an interlocutory order appealable as of right.”

3

 Fineman, Krekstein & 

Harris, P.C. v. Perr, 278 A.3d 385, 389 (Pa.Super. 2022) (cleaned up). 

“[W]e employ a two-part test to determine whether the trial court should have 

compelled arbitration. First, we examine whether a valid agreement to 

arbitrate exists. Second, we must determine whether the dispute is within 

the scope of the agreement.” Id. (cleaned up). 

Our standard of review “is limited to determining whether the trial 

court’s findings are supported by substantial evidence and whether the trial 

court abused its discretion in denying the petition.” Id. (cleaned up). 

However, “[w]hether a claim is within the scope of an arbitration provision is 

____________________________________________

3 This resolves Sky Zone’s first question in the Santiago appeal: because Sky 

Zone had a statutory right to immediately appeal from the order denying its 

petition to compel arbitration, there was no need for the trial court to certify 

it for immediate appeal pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 702(b).
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a matter of contract, and as with all questions of law, our review of the trial 

court’s conclusion is plenary.” Id. (cleaned up). 

When addressing the issue of whether there is a valid agreement 

to arbitrate, courts generally should apply ordinary state-law 

principles that govern the formation of contracts, but in doing so, 

must give due regard to the federal policy favoring arbitration. 

However, the mere existence of an arbitration provision and a 

liberal policy favoring arbitration does not require the rubber 

stamping of all disputes as subject to arbitration.

Adams v. Mt. Lebanon Operations, LLC, 276 A.3d 1203, 1206 (Pa.Super. 

2022) (cleaned up). 

As a general rule of contract law, only the parties to an arbitration 

agreement may be compelled to arbitrate. See, e.g., Humphrey v. 

GlaxoSmithKline PLC, 263 A.3d 8, 14 (Pa.Super. 2021) (“[A] party cannot 

be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so 

to submit.” (cleaned up)). “Nevertheless, a party can be compelled to 

arbitrate under an agreement, even if he or she did not sign that agreement, 

if common law principles of agency and contract support such an obligation 

on his or her part.”4 Id. at 15 (cleaned up). 

____________________________________________

4 We observe that a third-party beneficiary to a contract may also be bound 

by an arbitration agreement contained therein. See, e.g., Pisano v. 

Extendicare Homes, Inc., 77 A.3d 651, 661 (Pa.Super. 2013) (“[A] 

nonparty, such as a third-party beneficiary, may fall within the scope of an 

arbitration agreement if that is the parties’ intent.”). Sky Zone does not 

contend that the minors are bound as third-party beneficiaries to the 

Agreement. Accordingly, we do not consider third-party-beneficiary status as 

a basis for deciding whether the minors are bound by the arbitration provision 

of the Agreement. 
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The existence of an agency relationship is a factual question for which 

the party asserting an agency relationship has the burden of proof. See, e.g., 

McIlwain v. Saber Healthcare Grp., Inc., LLC, 208 A.3d 478, 485 

(Pa.Super. 2019). There are four ways to create an agency relationship: “(1) 

express authority, (2) implied authority, (3) apparent authority, and/or (4) 

authority by estoppel.” Id. (cleaned up). As this Court has summarized:

Express authority exists where the principal deliberately and 

specifically grants authority to the agent as to certain matters.

Implied authority exists in situations where the agent’s actions are 

proper, usual and necessary to carry out express agency.

Apparent authority exists where the principal, by word or 

conduct, causes people with whom the alleged agent deals to 

believe that the principal has granted the agent authority to act. 

Authority by estoppel occurs when the principal fails to take 

reasonable steps to disavow the third party of their belief that the 

purported agent was authorized to act on behalf of the principal.

Id. (cleaned up, emphases added). Hence, in determining whether a person 

is the agent of another, the focus is on the conduct of the principal, not on 

that of the purported agent. See, e.g., id. at 486 (“[A]n agent cannot simply, 

by her own words, invest herself with apparent authority.”). 

Critically, “[a]gency cannot be inferred from mere relationships or family 

ties, and we do not assume agency merely because one person acts on behalf 

of another.” Wisler v. Manor Care of Lancaster PA, LLC, 124 A.3d 317, 

323 (Pa.Super. 2015). See also US Coal Corp. v. Dinning, 222 A.3d 431, 

441 (Pa.Super. 2019) (“The relationship of agency cannot be inferred from 

mere relationship or family ties unattended by conditions, acts or conduct 

clearly implying an agency.” (cleaned up)). Specifically, “[i]t is well settled 
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that neither a husband nor wife has the power to act as agent for the other 

merely due to the marriage relationship.” Washburn v. N. Health Facilities, 

Inc., 121 A.3d 1008, 1014 (Pa.Super. 2015). “Rather, we look to facts to 

determine whether the principal expressly or impliedly intended to create an 

agency relationship. To that end, family ties may be relevant when considered 

with other factors evincing agency.” Wisler, supra at 323 (emphasis added). 

III. Analysis

With the above principles in mind, we turn to Sky Zone’s appellate 

issues, beginning with its claims that the trial courts improperly ruled that the 

parent signing each Agreement was not the agent for his or her absent spouse 

for purposes of agreeing to arbitrate any claims arising from the children’s use 

of the facilities. 

A. Mr. Santiago 

Sky Zone asserts that the evidence demonstrated that Ms. Santiago had 

apparent and implied authority to sign the Agreement as Mr. Santiago’s agent. 

Sky Zone’s brief (Santiago) at 24. Sky Zone observes that it is undisputed 

that the Santiagos were married at the time Ms. Santiago signed the 

Agreement purporting to bind herself and spouse. Id. at 22. Sky Zone argues 

that, “by nature of their marital relationship and her role as [Isabella’s] 

mother, [Ms.] Santiago had apparent authority to bind [Mr.] Santiago to the 

terms of the Agreement,” and “caused [Sky Zone] to believe that she had 
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authority to sign the Agreement on both her own and [Mr.] Santiago’s behalf.” 

Id. at 23. 

Sky Zone further posits that it “cannot possibly be expected to ask each 

and every patron, in signing the agreement, if they have actual authority to 

sign on behalf of their spouse.” Id. at 24. It maintains that, “[i]nstead, it 

was reasonable for [Sky Zone] to rely upon the representations of the signing 

spouse as to her authority to sign on behalf of her husband.” Id. 

We find Sky Zone’s arguments wholly unavailing. Sky Zone improperly 

focuses on the actions of the purported agent, not that of the non-signing 

principal, in asserting implied and apparent authority in this case. As noted 

above, implied authority only pertains where the agent’s actions are necessary 

to carry out express agency. See McIlwain, supra at 485. Here, the 

certified record contains no evidence that Mr. Santiago deliberately and 

specifically granted his wife authority to sign as his agent, defeating any claim 

of either express or implied agency. 

Similarly, apparent authority is present “where the principal, by word 

or conduct, causes people with whom the alleged agent deals to believe that 

the principal has granted the agent authority to act.” Id. (emphasis added). 

Sky Zone cites no evidence that Mr. Santiago had any interaction at all with 

Sky Zone, let alone that he caused it by his word or deed to believe that Ms. 

Santiago was his agent. Rather, it relies solely upon the familial relationship 

and the conduct of the purported agent to support its assertion of agency, 
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which is a meritless argument. See, e.g., US Coal Corp., supra at 441 (“The 

relationship of agency cannot be inferred from mere relationship or family ties 

unattended by conditions, acts or conduct clearly implying an agency.” 

(cleaned up)). Absent verbal or nonverbal communication 

from Mr. Santiago that caused Sky Zone to believe that he authorized 

Ms. Santiago to agree on his behalf to arbitrate any claims, Sky Zone has 

failed to establish that Ms. Santiago had apparent authority to act as her 

husband’s agent. 

We further reject Sky Zone’s lament that it “cannot possibly be 

expected” to make sure that a person executing its digital Agreement had the 

authority to agree on her own behalf as well as that of her “spouse or domestic 

partner, the Child, and our respective and/or collective issue, parents, 

siblings, heirs, assigns, personal representatives, estate(s), and anyone else 

who can claim by or through such person or persons.” Petition to Compel 

Arbitration, 1/21/21, Exhibit B at 6. It is well-settled that a third party must 

exercise reasonable diligence to determine the authority of an apparent agent, 

and “can rely on the apparent authority of an agent when this is a reasonable 

interpretation of the manifestations of the principal.” Bolus v. United 

Penn Bank, 525 A.2d 1215, 1222 (Pa.Super. 1987). Sky Zone has presented 

no evidence of any diligence in learning whether Mr. Santiago authorized his 

wife to bind him to arbitration and no indication that Mr. Santiago otherwise 
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manifested such an intent to Sky Zone prior to her execution of the 

Agreement. 

It is axiomatic in the law of contracts that only parties to the agreement 

are bound thereby. See, e.g., Humphrey, supra at 14 (“[A] party cannot 

be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so 

to submit.” (cleaned up)). If Sky Zone wishes to create enforceable 

agreements to arbitrate from the laundry list of people it seeks to preclude 

from filing claims against it in a court of law, then obtaining the assent of each 

of those persons, directly or through the recognized principles of agency, is 

precisely what it must do.

B. Ms. Shultz

Sky Zone’s arguments as to Ms. Shultz are nearly identical to those it 

proffered as to Mr. Santiago. Sky Zone maintains that, given their marital 

relationship and his role as Rocco’s father, and Mr. Shultz’s representation 

that he had authority to sign for his spouse and anyone else associated with 

Rocco, Mr. Shultz had the apparent authority to bind Ms. Shultz to the 

arbitration agreement. See Sky Zone’s brief (Shultz) at 29. 

Sky Zone offers two additional facts in the Shultz case to support its 

agency contentions. First, it asserts that Ms. Shultz offered testimony 

indicating that her husband had authority to sign the Agreement on her behalf. 

Id. at 28. Specifically, Sky Zone represents that Ms. Shultz testified that 

Mr. Shultz “would have been the parent to sign any contracts for the both of 
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them on behalf of their children,” and that, while she recalled no specific 

instances of that happening, “it would not have been surprising to her if he 

had done so.” Id. at 28-29. Sky Zone suggests that this evinces that 

Mr. Shultz “had implied and apparent authority to sign the Agreement on 

[Ms.] Shultz’s behalf and bind her to the terms of this Agreement.” Id. at 29. 

Indeed, Sky Zone goes so far as to say that Ms. Shultz “affirmatively testified” 

that Mr. Shultz had her “approval to execute a contract on her behalf as it 

relates to their children” and that he “exercised this authority on a regular 

basis.” Id. at 29-30. 

These assertions are not supported by the certified record. The two 

pages of Ms. Shultz’s deposition transcript upon which Sky Zone relies neither 

contains any such testimony nor supports the representations made by Sky 

Zone.5 One begins mid-question with “to is, would it have surprised you if 

[Mr. Shultz] had signed that?” to which Ms. Shultz answered, “No. I guess 

not, no.” and contains no other pertinent testimony. Supplemental Brief in 

Support of Response to Motion to Compel Arbitration, 6/29/21, at Exhibit B 

(Deposition of Ms. Shultz, 5/19/21, at 28). The other contains the following,

abruptly-ending excerpt:

Q Do you know if [Mr.] Shultz has ever signed any contracts 

or agreements on behalf of you as a couple?

____________________________________________

5 Sky Zone did not include the entirety of the transcript of Ms. Shultz’s 

deposition, but rather excerpts of a page here and a page there lacking 

context. 
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A No, I don’t believe so.

Q Does Rocco go to school?

A Yeah.

Q Does Rocco play any sports?

A No.

Q I think you mentioned soccer at some point before this.

A He has been unable to since this happened.

Q But prior to this, he did play soccer?

A Yeah.

Q Did you ever have to sign anything in connection with that?

A I’m sure Ryan did. I don’t think I did.

Q So Ryan Shultz signed something, you think, on behalf of 

Rocco in order to allow him to play soccer?

[Counsel for Ms. Shultz]: If you know. I’m fine with [. . . .]

Supplemental Brief in Support of Motion to Compel Arbitration, 6/29/21, at 

Exhibit 1 (Deposition of Ms. Shultz, 5/19/21, at 45). 

This evidence suggests that Mr. Shultz might have signed some 

undisclosed paperwork at some indefinite time for Rocco to play soccer. It 

comes woefully short of indicating that Ms. Shultz gave her husband blanket 

authority to bind her to contracts and that he exercised that authority 

frequently. Moreover, nothing Ms. Shultz stated in her May 2021 deposition 

suggests that she caused Sky Zone to believe that Mr. Shultz was authorized 

to sign the Agreement on her behalf in August 2018. 
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The second fact cited by Sky Zone that distinguishes this case from the 

Santiago case is that Rocco had been to Sky Zone prior to the date he was 

injured there. See Sky Zone’s brief (Shultz) at 20 (indicating that Rocco “had 

been to [Sky Zone’s] trampoline park prior to the date of the alleged 

accident.”); id. at 30 (stating that Rocco had been to Sky Zone “multiple times 

without any objection” from Ms. Shultz). It is unclear when these visits 

occurred or whether Ms. Shultz or someone else accompanied Rocco on the 

prior occasions, as Sky Zone does not cite where this fact is documented in 

the certified record. Presumably, if Ms. Shultz had herself signed an 

arbitration agreement on a prior visit, Sky Zone would assert that as a basis 

to compel her to arbitrate her claims. Likewise, if a witness had seen 

Ms. Shultz engage in conduct at a prior visit indicating that her husband was 

authorized to act as her agent in the future, we would expect Sky Zone to 

have produced testimony from that person. Instead, we have no information 

whether Ms. Shultz was even aware that Rocco had visited Sky Zone before, 

let alone that she caused Sky Zone to believe, prior to Mr. Shultz’s execution 

of the Agreement on the day in question, that Mr. Shultz was her authorized 

agent for purposes of agreeing to arbitration. 

Accordingly, Sky Zone’s arguments in support of compelling Ms. Shultz 

to arbitrate her claims fail for the same reasons we discussed in connection 

with Mr. Santiago: without any conduct by Ms. Shultz that suggested to Sky 

Zone that she had authorized Mr. Shultz to agree on her behalf to arbitrate 
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any of her potential claims, Sky Zone failed to establish that Mr. Shultz had 

apparent authority to act as her agent. 

C. Rocco and Isabella

Finally, we reach the novel question of Pennsylvania law common to 

both of these appeals: whether a parent, in the role of natural guardian, as 

opposed to a court-appointed guardian, is the equivalent of being the child’s 

agent for purposes of making a minor child a party to an arbitration

agreement, thereby waiving the child’s right to a jury trial. In resolving this

issue, we begin with a discussion of some principles pertinent to a child’s legal 

status. 

We observe at the outset that Rocco and Isabella could not have 

themselves agreed to arbitrate any potential claims against Sky Zone. Minors

lack the capacity to agree to an arbitration agreement or any other contract 

in their own right. Rather, it has long been the law that minors lack capacity 

to contract. See, e.g., In re O’Leary’s Estate, 42 A.2d 624, 625 (Pa. 1945)

(“An infant is not competent to contract.”). A contract executed by a minor is 

not void ab initio, but is voidable such that the minor may, upon reaching 

majority, avoid any contract other than for necessaries. See, e.g., Wharen 

v. Funk, 31 A.2d 450, 452 (Pa.Super. 1943) (“[I]nfants may avoid their 

contracts on reaching majority.”). 

As such, minors lack the capacity to grant express authority to an agent 

to contract on their behalves, rendering any such resulting contracts voidable. 
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See Rest. (2d) Agency § 20 cmt. c (1958) (“The contract of an infant to 

employ an agent is voidable by him, as is any contract made for him by such 

agent, except a contract for necessaries.”). Rather, minors act through their 

guardians. 

We have explained that “Pennsylvania law defines a guardian as a 

person lawfully invested with the power, and charged with the duty, of taking 

care of the person and/or managing the property and rights of another person, 

who, for defect of age, understanding or self-control is considered incapable 

of administering his own affairs.” Rock v. Pyle, 720 A.2d 137, 141 (Pa. 

Super. 1998). “Two classes of guardians have long been recognized at law: 

(1) guardian of the person being invested with the care of the person of the 

minor, and (2) guardian of the estate being entrusted with the control of the 

property of the minor.” Id. “The spheres of authority of a guardian of the 

person and of a guardian of the estate are distinct and mutually exclusive.” 

Id. 

Statutory mechanisms exist for the court appointment and supervision 

of guardians for minors. See 20 Pa.C.S. §§ 5101-5167. However, “parents 

have intrinsic rights and responsibilities as the natural guardians of their minor 

children.” Rehrer v. Youst, 91 A.3d 183, 192 (Pa.Super. 2014). Natural 

guardianship grants a parent “primary physical responsibility for the care and 

custody of the minor child.” Rock, supra at 141. Yet “natural guardianship 

confers no inherent right to intermeddle with the property of the minor child, 
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and the natural guardian has no inherent authority to demand or power to 

receive, hold or manage the minor’s property unless the natural guardian has 

also been appointed as guardian of the minor’s estate.” Id. See also Rehrer, 

supra at 192 (“[N]atural guardianship confers no right to intermeddle with 

the property of the infant . . .; a natural guardian has no authority whatever 

to exercise any control over the estate of the minor.” (cleaned up)). Rather, 

by statute, “[l]egal title to all real and personal property of a minor shall 

remain in him, subject, however, to all the powers granted to his guardian by 

this title and lawfully by a governing instrument and to all orders of the court.” 

20 Pa.C.S. § 303. 

Pennsylvania courts have observed that “[a] cause of action is 

property[.]” Tri-State Asphalt Corp. v. Dep’t of Transp., 875 A.2d 1199, 

1202 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2005) (citing Fejerdy v. Fejerdy, 437 A.2d 1244 

(Pa.Super. 1981)). In situations when a minor is injured, two distinct causes 

of action arise, “one the parents’ claim for medical expenses and loss of the 

minor’s services during minority, the other the minor’s claim for pain and 

suffering and for losses after minority.” Hathi v. Krewstown Park 

Apartments, 561 A.2d 1261, 1262 (Pa.Super. 1989) (cleaned up). 

A parent obviously may pursue his or her own cause of action in tort in 

connection with the child’s injury, subject to a two-year statute of limitations. 

See 42 Pa.C.S. § 5524(2). However, “children have a distinct legal disability, 

as they are prohibited from personally bringing a cause of action before 
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reaching the age of majority.” Nicole B. v. Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia, 237 

A.3d 986, 993 (Pa. 2020). Accordingly, “to safeguard certain minors’ rights 

during their period of legal disability,” 42 Pa.C.S. § 5533 “exempt[s] children 

from the operation of statutes of limitations during their period of legal 

disability, and enabl[es] them to bring a civil action on their own behalf upon 

reaching the age of majority.” Id. 

Alternatively, a parent “has the natural and primary right to bring an 

action, as guardian, on behalf of his or her child,” Dengler by Dengler v. 

Crisman, 516 A.2d 1231, 1234 (Pa.Super. 1986). Nonetheless, “[a] minor’s 

representation is subject to the trial court’s control and supervision, and it has 

the right in each case to determine whether the litigation is in the minor’s best 

interests.” Rehrer, supra at 193. Furthermore, “[n]o action to which a minor 

is a party shall be compromised, settled or discontinued except after approval 

by the court pursuant to a petition presented by the guardian of the minor.” 

Pa.R.C.P. 2039(a).

With these principles in mind, we turn to the rulings at issue in these 

cases. The Santiago trial court, citing the tolling of the statute of limitations 

for Isabella’s personal injury claims, concluded that Ms. Santiago “could not 

legally sign away [Isabella’s] future claim for any injuries sustained while in 

[Sky Zone]’s facility.” Trial Court Opinion (Santiago), 7/1/22, at 4. The Shultz 

trial court likewise ruled that Mr. Shultz lacked the authority to bind Rocco to 

arbitration of his claim, but relied upon federal district court decisions 
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purporting to apply Pennsylvania law. Specifically, the Shultz trial court cited 

cases premised generally upon a child’s right to avoid contracts entered during 

the child’s minority, and, particular to arbitration agreements, discussed the 

ruling in Troshak v. Terminix Intern. Co., L.P., CIV. A. 98–1727, 1998 WL 

401693 (E.D. Pa. July 2, 1998) (unpublished decision).

In Troshak, the father signed a “Termite Service Plan” agreement in 

connection with Terminix’s provision of termite control services at the Troshak 

home in Pennsylvania. Alleging that Terminix’s service caused personal injury 

and property damage, the family brought a civil action that was removed to 

federal court. There, Terminix sought to enforce an arbitration agreement 

contained in the service plan contract. The trial court was thus tasked with 

determining which family members were bound by the contract entered into 

by the father. Regarding the personal injury claims of the minor child, 

Terminix argued that the father had waived the child’s right to proceed in 

court. Noting the lack of Pennsylvania authority on the issue, the court 

examined two other district court decisions, which it summarized as follows:

In Apicella v. Valley Forge Military Academy and 

Junior College, 630 F.Supp. 20, 23 (E.D.Pa.1985), the court 

ruled that “under Pennsylvania law, Parents do not possess the 

authority to release the claims or potential claims of a minor child 

merely because of the parental relationship.” In Apicella, the 

parents of Jerry Apicella enrolled their minor son as a student at 

Valley Forge. At that time, Valerie and John Apicella informed 

school officials that Jerry Apicella suffered from hemophilia. To 

persuade the school to enroll their son, the Apicella[s] signed a 

document releasing Valley Forge “from all claims and damages 

arising from or related to or in any way connected with their son 

Jerry’s hemophilic condition.” School officials permitted Jerry to 
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attend the school. Subsequently, Valerie and John Apicella, as the 

parents of Jerry Apicella, and Jerry Apicella on his own behalf, 

brought suit against Valley Forge claiming that the school and its 

employees were negligent in their care of Jerry Apicella. Valley 

Forge asserted that Jerry was estopped from asserting his cause 

of action because his parents signed a document releasing it from 

claims and damages arising from Jerry’s hemophilic condition. 

The court rejected that argument. Based on analogous 

Pennsylvania case law, the court held that “John and Valerie 

Apicella released the defendants from potential claims which they 

had the right to assert but did not release the defendants from 

claims or potential claims which Jerry Apicella might assert upon 

reaching the age of majority.” This ruling was adopted in 

Simmons by Grinnel v. Parkette Nat’l Gymnastic Training 

Ctr., 670 F.Supp. 140 (E.D.Pa.1987).

In Simmons, a minor and her parent sued a gymnastic 

organization for personal injuries suffered by the minor while the 

minor was participating as a gymnast at the defendant training

center. The defendant training center asserted the signing of a 

release as an affirmative defense. The release was signed by the 

minor and by the minor’s mother. The release was prospective in 

nature and was intended to release the defendant from future 

liability as opposed to an already existing claim for damages. The 

court found that the minor’s parent was bound by the release. 

The defendant asserted, inter alia, that the minor’s claim was 

barred because the parent signed the release for the minor. 

Relying on Apicella, the court found that the minor’s parent could 

not release the defendant from the potential claims that 

eventually accrued to the minor. 

Id. at *4–*5 (some citations omitted). The Troshak trial court acknowledged 

that Apicella and Simmons were not precisely on point, but concluded that, 

“under the reasoning and holdings interpreting Pennsylvania law contained in” 

those cases, “a parent cannot bind a minor child to an arbitration provision 

that requires the minor to waive his or her right to file potential claims for 

personal injury in a court of law.” Id. at *5. The court explained that, since 

a parent could not prospectively release a minor’s potential claims, it follows 
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that “a parent does not have authority to bind a minor child to an arbitration 

provision that requires the minor to waive their right to have potential claims 

for personal injury filed in a court of law.” Id. 

Adopting this reasoning, the Shultz trial court concluded that Mr. 

Shultz’s execution of the Agreement was not effective in waiving Rocco’s right 

to file the instant action in court. Trial Court Opinion (Shultz), at 5. The court 

further ruled that, to the extent that Rocco was required to disaffirm the 

voidable contract made on his behalf by Mr. Shultz, Rocco’s action of bringing 

this suit constituted such disaffirmance. Id. (citing Haines v. Fitzgerald, 

165 A. 52, 55 (Pa.Super. 1933) (holding that bringing suit three months after 

reaching majority constituted disaffirmance of contract made during plaintiff’s 

minority). Accordingly, the Shultz court denied Sky Zone’s petition as to 

Rocco’s claims. 

Sky Zone proffers the same basic argument for reversal in both of these 

cases. It argues that Troshak, which is not binding on this Court, improperly 

conflates the release of a minor’s personal substantive claims with a mere 

“agreement to litigate a dispute in a specific forum.” Sky Zone’s brief (Shultz) 

at 34. Sky Zone asserts that the more persuasive non-binding authority is 

found in the decisions of our sister states that recognized that distinction: 

Hojnowski v. Vans Skate Park, 901 A.2d 381 (N.J. 2006), and Cross v. 

Carnes, 724 N.E.2d 828 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998). 
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In Hojnowski, a twelve-year-old boy was injured at a skate park 

operated by defendant Vans. Before using the park, the boy’s mother had 

executed a release and waiver that included an arbitration clause. When the 

boy sued through his parents as guardians ad litem, Vans moved to compel 

arbitration. The trial court granted Vans’s motion, declining to rule on the 

validity of the release because it was an issue for the arbitrators to decide. 

The appellate court unanimously affirmed a parent’s ability to “enter into an 

enforceable contract, binding on the parent’s minor child, that waives the right 

to trial by jury of the minor’s bodily injury claims and requires submission of 

‘any dispute’ to arbitration.” Hojnowski, supra at 385 (cleaned up). The 

panel also fully agreed that the court should have considered whether the 

substantive waiver violated public policy, but divided on the answer to that 

question. 

The New Jersey Supreme Court held that the exculpatory provision was 

invalid given “the protections that our State historically has afforded to a 

minor’s claims and the need to discourage negligent activity on the part of 

commercial enterprises attracting children,” noting that it was in that regard 

consistent “with the overwhelming majority of other jurisdictions.” Id. at 388-

89 (citing, inter alia, Simmons and Apicella). 

However, the Court found no such public-policy reason to invalidate the 

waiver’s arbitration clause. The Court explained: “As opposed to a pre-injury 

release of liability, a pre-injury agreement to arbitrate does not require a 
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minor to forego any substantive rights. Rather, such an agreement specifies 

only the forum in which those rights are vindicated.” Id. at 392. Further, the 

Court held that a parent is “permitted to bind a minor child to arbitration,”

holding that, unless general contract defenses such as “fraud, duress, or 

unconscionability in the signing of the contract or that the agreement to 

arbitrate was not written in clear and unambiguous terms,” then “a parent’s 

agreement to arbitrate is valid and enforceable against any tort claims 

asserted on a minor’s behalf.” Id. at 393-94. 

The Hojnowski Court cited as persuasive the decision of the Ohio Court 

of Appeals in Cross. In that case, the minor’s mother executed, on her own 

behalf and on behalf of her daughter, a consent and release that permitted 

her daughter to appear on a television talk show. The document contained 

an agreement to arbitrate any disputes arising from the minor’s appearance 

on the show. Displeased with her portrayal on the program, the minor, 

through her mother, sued the show for defamation. The show moved to 

enforce the arbitration agreement, and the trial court granted the motion, 

staying the court proceedings pending arbitration. The appellate court 

affirmed. It first noted that the Ohio Supreme Court had recently ruled that 

“public policy justifies giving parents authority to enter into . . . binding [preinjury exculpatory] agreements on behalf of their minor children” that further 

the public policy of making non-profit recreational sporting activities 

affordable. Zivich v. Mentor Soccer Club, Inc., 696 N.E.2d 201, 205 (Ohio 
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1998). The Cross Court indicated that the Zivich “holding leads us to believe 

that our conclusion, that a parent has the authority to bind his or her child to 

a resolution of the child’s claims through arbitration, is correct under Ohio 

law.” Cross, supra at 836. The Court continued: 

In so holding, we note that the parent’s consent and release 

to arbitration only specifies the forum for resolution of the child’s 

claim; it does not extinguish the claim. Logically, if a parent has 

the authority to bring and conduct a lawsuit on behalf of the child, 

he or she has the same authority to choose arbitration as the 

litigation forum.

Id.

6

We are unpersuaded by Sky Zone’s arguments in general and its 

reliance upon the Hojnowski and Cross decisions in particular. We reiterate 

that the issue before us is whether there exists in each case an agreement to 

arbitrate to which the minor child was a party or otherwise bound. See 

Humphrey, supra at 14 (“[A] party cannot be required to submit to 

arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit.” (cleaned up)). 

It is only if “common law principles of agency and contract” render the 

respective parents capable of contracting on behalf of their children that the 

children are bound to arbitrate in these cases. Id. at 15 (cleaned up). 

____________________________________________

6 As the Hojnowski Court relied upon Cross in reaching its conclusion, the 

Cross Court in turn relied upon Leong by Leong v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 

788 P.2d 164, 169 (Hawaii 1990), and Doyle v. Giuliucci, 401 P.2d 1, 3 (Cal. 

1965). See Cross v. Carnes, 724 N.E.2d 828, 836 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998). 

We observe that both of those cases affirmed a parent’s ability to bind a child 

to an arbitration provision in a contract of which the child is a third-party 

beneficiary. As noted above, Sky Zone has never posited that Rocco and 

Isabella were bound by the Agreement as third-party beneficiaries. 
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The foundation of the Cross ruling, which informed the Hojnowski

decision, is that, because parents can choose to sue in court on behalf of their 

minor children, they are just as authorized to choose to arbitrate the claims 

instead. However, as discussed above, a parent’s right to pursue litigation on 

behalf of a minor child “is subject to the trial court’s control and supervision, 

and it has the right in each case to determine whether the litigation is in the 

minor’s best interests.” Rehrer, supra at 193. Concomitantly, a parent suing 

on a child’s behalf as natural guardian nonetheless lacks authority to settle or 

discontinue without court approval. See Pa.R.C.P. 2039(a). Moreover, no 

Pennsylvania court has ruled that a parent has a right to enter a pre-injury 

release of a child’s right to bring substantive claims as did the Ohio Supreme 

Court, and the above-referenced law protecting minors’ substantive legal 

claims suggests to us that the federal district courts accurately predicted that 

Pennsylvania would reject that proposition as did the Hojnowski Court. See

Simmons, supra and Apicella, supra.

In our view, the court involvement in a parent’s litigation of a minor 

child’s claims has the significant effect of transforming the parent’s role from 

that of a natural guardian into, in essence, a court-approved guardian who 

has authority to make decisions about the minor’s estate, not merely the 
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child’s person.7 An agreement executed by natural guardian purportedly on 

the minor’s behalf without any court involvement, however, has none of the 

legal safeguards attendant to the appointment of a guardian of the minor’s 

estate. Consequently, the parents in their pre-litigation state of natural 

guardianship lacked any authority to manage the estate of their minor 

children. See, e.g., Rock, supra at 141 (“[N]atural guardianship confers no 

inherent right to intermeddle with the property of the minor child, and the 

natural guardian has no inherent authority to demand or power to receive, 

hold or manage the minor’s property unless the natural guardian has also 

been appointed as guardian of the minor’s estate.” (emphasis added)). 

Therefore, we conclude that, in the absence of any suggestion that 

Rocco and Isabella were third-party beneficiaries of the Agreement, or that 

their respective parents were authorized to sign the agreements on their 

behalves, the statuses of Mr. Shultz and Ms. Santiago as natural guardians

did not ipso facto grant them the authority to bind their minor children to an 

arbitration agreement. Consequently, we hold that the trial courts properly 

denied Sky Zone’s petitions to compel arbitration of the claims of Rocco and 

Isabella.

____________________________________________

7 See 20 Pa.C.S. §§ 5111-5116 (concerning appointment of guardians for 

minors). See also 20 Pa.C.S. § 5101 (indicating certain circumstances when 

a guardian of minor with small estates is unnecessary); 20 Pa.C.S. § 5102 

(providing that a court may authorize a parent as natural guardian to execute 

certain documents). 
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IV. Conclusion 

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the respective trial courts 

properly ruled that no agreements bound the children or non-signing spouses 

to resolve the alleged negligence claims in arbitration rather than in the 

courts. Specifically, we agree with the trial courts that Sky Zone failed to 

meet its burden to show that the signatory spouses were the agents of the 

non-signing spouses. Further, we hold that the parent-child relationship did 

not empower the signatory parents to waive their minor children’s rights to 

have their claims resolved in a court of law. Therefore, we affirm.

Orders affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 3/21/2023