### IN THE UNI TED STAT ES COURT OFAPPEALS FOR THE FIF TH CIRCU IT

No. 12-60389 Summary Calendar

LUIS CASTILLO-ENRIQUEZ, Petitioner,

versus ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., U.S. Attorney General, Respondent.

Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Before DAVIS, SMITH, and PRADO, Circuit Judges. JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge:

Luis Castillo-Enrique z petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissing his appeal of the denial of his applications for withholding of removal and Temporary Protected Status (“TPS”). He also moves for stay of deportation. The government moves for summary denial of the petition. We deny a stay of deportation and grant the motion for summary denial of the petition. U n i te d S ta te s C o u rt o f A p p ea l s F i ft h C i rc u i t 

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I. The facts are uncontested. Castillo-Enriquez illegally entered the United States in 2 0 02. In 2008, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) initiated removal proceedings; Castillo-Enriquez conceded r e m ovability but applied for relief from removal based on his fear of harm in his native El Salvador. He also sought review of DHS’s denial of his application for TPS. He testified that his parents are lawful permanent residents of the United St a t e s who had left El Salvador when he was a ch i l d

. He fears returning to El Salvador, because his grandmother received an extortionate note from anonymous individu al s i n 2 0 0 7 , demanding $6,000 and threatening harm to his family.

II. The im m i gration judge denied Castillo-Enriquez’s applications and ordered him removed to El Salvador. Castillo-Enriquez appea l ed to the BIA, which affirmed. We review the BIA’s legal determinations de novo but with “considerable deference t o the BIA’s interpretation of the legislative scheme it is entrusted to administer.” Zhu v. Gonzalez , 493 F.3d 588, 594 (5th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). Castillo-Enriquez argues that his removal should be withheld because his “life or freedom would be threatened in [El Salvador] because of the alien’s . . . membership i n a particular social group.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A). We agree with the BIA that being extorted by an anonymous group of individuals who perceive petitioner’s family to be wealthy does not require the Attorney General to withhold removal. “We do not recognize economic extortion as a form of persecution under immigr a t i o n l aw, nor do we recognize wealthy [Salvadorians] as a protected group.” Rodriguez v. Holder , 366 F. App’x 555, 557 (5th Cir. 2010); see also Thapa v. Holder , 357 F. App’x 591, 593 (5th Cir. 200 9).

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Castillo-Enriquez also contends that removal should be withheld because he is eligible for TPS. The TPS progr a m p e r m its eligible foreign nationals to remain in the United States temporarily while their home country is designated for relief under the TPS program because there is an ongoing armed conflict within the state, it has suffered a natural disaster, or it is otherwise experiencing c o n d i t i o n s preventing the safe return of aliens. See 8 U.S.C. § 1254a. An alien is eligible for TPS only if he (1) has been continually present in the United States since the most recent designation of the state, (2 ) h a s c o n tinuously resided in the United States since the designated date, (3) is a n admissible immigrant (with certain exceptions), and (4) has registered during t h e appropriate registration period. Id. at § 1254a(c)(1)(A). The Attorney General designated El Salvador for TPS o n March 9, 2001, because of devastation from a series of earthquakes, setting the date for TPS-eligibility as February 13, 2001. Because Castillo-Enriquez concededly entered the United States in July 2002, he fails to meet the first two requirements of TPS eligibility. Castillo-Enriquez maintains that he is nonetheless eligible for TPS because the regulations governing TPS allow his parents’ el i gib i lity to be imputed to him. Specifically, he points to 8 C.F.R. § 124 4

. 2 , which states that an alien may be granted TPS if he ( a) I s a national, as defined in section 101(a)(21) of the Act, of a foreign state designated under section 244(b) of the Act; (b) Has been continuously physically p r e sent in the United States since the effective date of the most recent designation of that foreign state; (c) Has continuously resided in the United States since such date as the Attorney General may designate; (d) Is admissible as an immigrant except a s p r o vided under § 1244.3;

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(e) Is not ineligible under § 1244.4; and (f)(1) Registers for Temporary Prote c ted Status during the initial registration period announced by public notice in the Federal Register, or ( 2 ) During any subsequent extension of such designation if a t t h e time of the initial registration period:

. . . (iv) The applicant is a spouse or child of an alien currently eligible to be a TPS registrant.

. . . (g) Has filed an application for late registration with the appropriat e Service director within a 60-day period immediate l y f o llowing the expiration or termination of conditions described in paragraph (f)(2) of this section.
The regulation governing TPS eligibility clos e l y m irrors the statutory requirements. Castillo-Enriquez reasons that, because his parents are eligible for TPS, he is eligible even thou gh he does not meet subsections (b) and (c). Though 8 C.F.R. § 1244.2(f)(2)(iv) grants an exten s i o n o f th e r e gi s tration requirement for the children of TPS-eligible aliens, the plain language of the regulation does not

SS as Castillo-Enriquez contends

SSmake children of TPS-eligible aliens th e m s e lv e s e li gib l e regardless of the continual-presence and continual-resid e nc e

r e quirements. Contrary to Castillo-Enriquez’s reading of the regulation, th e

w o r d “ o r” at the end of subsection (f)(1) does not mean that an alien is el i gib l e for TPS so long as any of the subsection (f)(2) requirements are met, irrespective of the requirements in subsections (a) through (e)

SS an argument easily refuted by reading the word “and” at the end of subsection (e). By rejecting Castillo-Enriquez’s interpretation of the TPS regulations, we join the two other circuit courts of appeals that have considered the argument.

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Se e de Leon-Ochoa v. Attorney Gen. of the United States , 622 F.3d 341 ( 3d Cir. 2010); Cervantes v. Holder , 597 F.3d 229 (4th Cir. 2010). The plain terms of the statute and regulation at issue dictate that Castillo-Enriquez fails to meet the physical-presence and residence requi r e ments and is thus ineligible to receive TPS. Accordingly, we need not address Castillo-Enriquez’s argument that the BIA incorrectly determined he was not a “child” under the Immigration and Nationality Act. Finally, we agree with the BIA and the Third Circuit that the waiver provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(c)(2) , b y their plain terms, apply only to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) and not to any requirement for TPS eligibility in § 1254a(c)- ( 1 ) ( A ) , i nc lu di n g th e p hy sical-presence and residency requirements. See de Leo n Ochoa , 622 F.3d at 345. Castillo-Enriquez’s motion fo r stay of deportation is DENIED. The motion for summary denial of the petition for review is GRANT E D

. The petition for review is DENIED.

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