Notice: This opinion is subject to correction before publication in the PACIFIC REPORTER. 

Readers are requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk of the Appellate Courts, 

303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878, email 

corrections@akcourts.gov. 

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA 

RICHARD ROBERGE, 

Appellant, 

v. 

ASRC CONSTRUCTION HOLDING 

COMPANY and ARCTIC SLOPE 

REGIONAL CORPORATION, 

Appellees. 

) 

) Supreme Court No. S-17897 

laska Workers’ Compensation 

ppeals Commission No. 20-010 

 P I N I O N 

o. 7584 – February 4, 2022 

) 

) A

) A

) 

) O

) 

) N

) 

) 

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Appeal from the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Appeals 

Commission. 

Appearances: Eric Croft, The Croft Law Office, Anchorage, 

for Appellant. Matthew T. Findley, Ashburn & Mason, P.C., 

for Appellees. Kimberly D. Rodgers, Assistant Attorney 

General, Anchorage, and Clyde “Ed” Sniffen, Jr., Acting 

AttorneyGeneral, Juneau, for Amicus CuriaeStateofAlaska. 

Before: Winfree, Chief Justice, Maassen, Carney, 

Borghesan, and Henderson, Justices. 

WINFREE, Chief Justice. 

I. INTRODUCTION 

An Alaska Workers’ Compensation Act provision sets maximum 

compensationrates for injured employees; anotherprovisionappliesacost-of-living ratio 

only to out-of-state recipients. The parties to this appeal dispute the sequence for 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

applying the provisions when calculating compensation. We conclude that the Act 

requires first applying the cost-of-living ratio and then applying the maximum rate. 

II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 

Richard Roberge injured his shoulder in May 2014 while working for 

ASRC Construction Holding Company; he continued working with accommodations 

until the job ended in November. Roberge then returned to his Idaho residence. ASRC 

paidhim$834.85weeklyin temporarytotaldisabilitycompensation throughmid-August 

2015, calculated by adjusting the maximum weekly compensation rate by the prevailing 

cost-of-living adjustment (COLA) percentage for his residence.1 

Roberge filed a written workers’ compensation claim in November 2015, 

seeking the maximum allowable compensation rate of $1,143 weekly.2 He later filed a 

compensationrateadjustment claimseeking thesame relief. InNovember 2019 Roberge 

was released to work. The following month ASRC and Roberge settled all disputes 

except the maximum compensation rate adjustment claim through November 2019. 

The parties stipulated to relevant facts and asked the Alaska Workers’ 

Compensation Board to hear the rate adjustment claim on the written record.3 The 

parties agreed that Northern Construction v. James, an earlier Alaska Workers’ 

1 See AS 23.30.175 (setting maximum rate and providing rules for 

calculating compensation when recipient resides out of state). 

2 ALASKA WORKERS’ COMP. DIV., BULL. NO. 13-04 (Dec. 2, 2013), https:// 

labor.alaska.gov/wc/bulletins/13-04.pdf (establishing maximum weekly compensation 

rate at $1,143 relevant to this appeal). 

3 See 8 Alaska Administrative Code (AAC) 45.070(b)(1)(B) (2021) (setting 

out procedure to request hearing on written record). 

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Compensation Appeals Commission decision,4 “constrained” the Board; they asked the 

Board to apply James and deny Roberge’s claim, allowing him to appeal to the 

Commission. The Board accepted the stipulated facts, noted James was precedential for 

the Board, noted ASRC had paid compensation in accordance with James, and denied 

Roberge’s rate adjustment claim. 

Roberge appealed to the Commission. The parties agreed James was 

“dispositive” and asked the Commission either to reconsider James or apply James and 

issue a final decision denying Roberge’s claim, allowing him to appeal to us. The 

Commission decided not to reconsider the James decision and issued a final decision. 

Roberge appeals. 

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

In an appeal from the Commission, we review the Commission’s decision 

and not the Board’s.5 “We apply our independent judgment to questions of ‘statutory 

interpretation requiring the application and analysis of various canons of statutory 

construction.’ ”6 

4 AWCAC Dec. No. 251 at 18-19, 23 (July 25, 2018), https://labor.alaska. 

gov/WCcomm/memos-finals/D_251.pdf(interpretingrelevant statutes asrequiringcostof-living adjustment after calculating maximum weekly compensation rate). 

5 Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Darrow, 403 P.3d 1116, 1121 (Alaska 2017). 

6 Id. (quoting ARCTEC Servs. v. Cummings, 295 P.3d 916, 920 (Alaska 

2013)). 

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IV. DISCUSSION 

Commission decisions are binding precedent for the Board;7 the Board 

acknowledged this, then applied James. Roberge contends that the Commission 

incorrectly construed the Act and that James thus is an erroneous decision. ASRCmakes 

a novel statutory construction argument rather than asking us to construe the Act’s 

provisions in accordance with James. The parties agreed that if Roberge’s argument 

prevailed we should both overrule James and reverse the Commission’s decision in 

Roberge’s case. We are persuaded by Roberge’s argument. 

A. Statutory Construction Principles And Relevant Statutory Provisions 

“Weconstrue statutes according toreason, practicality,and common sense, 

considering the meaning of the statute’s language, its legislative history, and its 

purpose.”8 “The goal of statutory construction is to give effect to the legislature’s intent, 

with due regard for the meaning the statutory language conveys to others.”9 “We give 

unambiguous statutory language its ordinary and common meaning, but the ‘plain 

meaning rule’ is not an exclusionary rule; we will look to legislative history as a guide 

to construing a statute’s words.”10 “[W]e must, whenever possible, interpret each part 

or section of a statute with every other part or section, so as to create a harmonious 

7 AS 23.30.008(a); see Alaska Pub. Int. Rsch. Grp. v. State, 167 P.3d 27, 45 

(Alaska 2007) (construing AS 23.30.008(a) as meaning Commission decisions are legal 

precedent only for Commission and Board). 

8 Darrow, 403 P.3d at 1121. 

9 Murphy v. Fairbanks North Star Borough, 494 P.3d 556, 563 (Alaska 

2021) (quoting City of Valdez v. State, 372 P.3d 240, 254 (Alaska 2016)). 

10 Cora G. v. State, Dep’t of Health &Soc. Servs., Off. of Child.’s Servs., 461 

P.3d 1265, 1277 (Alaska 2020) (quoting Heller v. State, Dep’t of Revenue, 314 P.3d 69, 

74 (Alaska 2013)). 

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whole.”11 We also “must presume ‘that the legislature intended every word, sentence, 

or provision of a statute to have some purpose, force, and effect, and that no words or 

provisions are superfluous.’ ”12 

Calculating an injured employee’s compensation rate involves considering 

several statutory sections. “Computation of compensation . . . shall be on the basis of an 

employee’s spendable weekly wage at the time of injury.”13 Spendable weekly wage is 

derived from an employee’s gross weekly earnings.14 The legislature delegated to the 

Commissioner of Labor and Workforce Development the task of “annually prepar[ing] 

formulas that shall be used to calculate an employee’s spendable weekly wage on the 

basis of gross weekly earnings, number of dependents, marital status, and payroll tax 

deductions.”15 The Board currently uses an online benefit calculator to determine 

spendable weekly wage.16 Most statutory sections about indemnity benefits17 set the 

11 Darrow, 403 P.3d at 1127 (quoting State, Dep’t of Com., Cmty. & Econ. 

Dev., Div. of Ins. v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 165 P.3d 624, 629 (Alaska 2007)). 

12 ProgressiveCas.Ins.Co., 165 P.3d at 629 (quoting KodiakIsland Borough 

v. Exxon Corp., 991 P.2d 757, 761 (Alaska 1999)). 

13 AS 23.30.220(a). 

14 AS 23.30.220(b). The legislature provided detailed instructions about 

calculating an employee’s gross weekly earnings. See AS 23.30.220(a)(1)-(9). 

15 AS 23.30.220(b). 

16 Benefit Calculator, ALASKA WORKERS’ COMP. DIV., https://labor.alaska. 

gov/wc/benefitcalculator.htm (last visited Dec. 21, 2021). The online benefit calculator 

will also generate a “Weekly Benefit” with certain inputs, but the Board’s website does 

not fully detail how the amount is determined. Id. 

17 See Murphy v. Fairbanks North Star Borough, 494 P.3d 556, 563-64 

(Alaska 2021) (explaining indemnity benefits are “cash benefits that compensate 

(continued...) 

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compensation rate as a percentage of the employee’s spendable weekly wage.18 A 

provision also establishes minimum and maximum compensation rates without regard 

to residence.19 

Roberge’s case involves only temporary total disability benefits, generally 

calculated at 80% of the spendable weekly wage.20 But as a high-wage earner Roberge 

falls under the maximum compensation rate provision, setting the rate at 120% of the 

statewide average weekly wage.21 Based on a statewide average weekly wage of 

$952.15, the 2014 maximum compensation rate is $1,143.22 But Roberge did not reside 

17 (...continued) 

employees for losses and expenses other than the cost of medical treatment”); see also 

AS 23.30.001(1) (expressing legislative intent that Act be interpreted “to ensure the 

quick, efficient, fair, and predictable delivery of indemnity and medical benefits to 

injured workers at a reasonable cost to the employers”). 

18 See, e.g., AS 23.30.180 (setting permanent total disability at 80% of 

spendable weekly wage). Permanent partial impairment is an exception, usually paid as 

a lump sum equal to the product of a set monetary amount and a percentage of 

impairment as set out in AS 23.30.190. 

19 AS 23.30.175(a). 

20 AS 23.30.185 (“In case of disability total in character but temporary in 

quality, 80 percent of the injured employee’s spendable weekly wages shall be paid to 

the employee during the continuance of the disability.”). 

21 AS23.30.175(a)(defining maximumcompensationrateas120%ofaverage 

weekly wage under AS 23.30.175(d) on injury date); AS 23.30.175(d) (setting out 

annual calculations for statewide average weekly wage). 

22 ALASKA WORKERS’ COMP. DIV., BULL. NO. 13-04 (Dec. 2, 2013), 

https://labor.alaska.gov/wc/bulletins/13-04.pdf. 

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in Alaska, and additional “rules apply to benefits payable to recipients not residing in the 

state at the time compensation benefits are payable,” including a COLA.23 

B. Northern Construction v. James 

James presented a fact situation similar to this case. James was injured 

while working in Alaska, returned to his Idaho residence, and received compensation.24 

His employer contended his compensation rate should be his Alaska compensation rate 

—the maximumrate —multiplied by the applicable COLA, but James argued he should 

receive the maximum rate, using the same calculation method Roberge uses here.25 

The Commission began its James analysis by stating that AS 23.30.220 

authorized the online benefit calculator:26 “Under [AS 23.30.220’s] authority, the 

Division [of Workers’ Compensation] has developed an online benefit calculator to aid 

23 AS 23.30.175(b); two provisions are relevant to this appeal: 

(1) the weekly rate of compensation shall be calculated by 

multiplying the recipient’s weekly compensation rate 

calculated under AS 23.30.180, 23.30.185, 23.30.190, 

23.30.200, or 23.30.215 by the ratio of the cost of living of 

the area in which the recipient resides to the cost of living in 

this state; 

. . . . 

(5) application of . . . this subsection may not result in raising 

a recipient’s weekly compensation rate to an amount that 

exceeds the weekly compensation rate that the recipient 

would have received if the recipient had been residing in the 

state. 

24 N. Constr. v. James, AWCAC Dec. No. 251, at 2-3 (July 25, 2018), 

https://labor.alaska.gov/WCcomm/memos-finals/D_251.pdf. 

25 Id. at 3-5. 

26 Id. at 10-11. 

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in arriving at the precise weekly compensation rate for each injured worker . . . .”27 The 

Commission did not explain how AS 23.30.220’s explanation for calculating an 

employee’s spendable weekly wage also authorized calculating an employee’s “precise 

weekly compensation rate.”28 

In theCommission’s view, under AS23.30.220theonlinebenefitcalculator 

displaced the directive that an employer pay 80% of an employee’s spendable weekly 

wage.29 The Commission concluded that “the determination of what constitutes 80 

percent of spendable weekly wage [under AS 23.30.185] has already been made by the 

[D]ivision and is assessed by utilizing AS 23.30.220, its authorized benefit calculator, 

and the maximum and minimum rates under AS 23.30.175.”30 

TheCommission next considered AS23.30.175,distinguishingtwophrases 

— “weekly compensation rate”31 and “weekly rate of compensation”32 — as referring to 

different things.33 The Commission decided that an employee’s “weekly compensation 

27 Id. 

28 Cf. id. at 8, 11-12. 

29 Id. at 14 (“Only after an injured worker’s compensation rate has been 

etermined under AS 23.30.220 and AS 23.30.175, is it necessary to look at 

S 23.30.185, AS 23.30.180, AS 23.30.190, or AS 23.30.200 to identify what kind of 

enefit is due . . . depending on where the employee is in the recovery process.”). The 

ommission did not discuss the inclusion of AS 23.30.215 in AS 23.30.175(b)(1). Cf. 

d. at 12, 22. 

30 Id. at 14. 

31 AS 23.30.175(b)(1), (3)-(5). 

32 AS 23.30.175(a), (b)(1). 

33 James, AWCAC Dec. No. 251, at 18-19. 

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rate” first is calculated under AS 23.30.220; the employee’s “weekly rate of 

compensation” then is determined by applying AS 23.30.175(a).34 

Under theCommission’s analysis, AS23.30.175(b)requiresthat an out-ofstate recipient’s weekly compensation rate, derived from the online benefit calculator, 

be multiplied by the applicable COLA.35 Although interpreting AS 23.30.175(b)(5) as 

applying only to an employee “whose compensation rate is not at the cap and who moves 

out of state,” the Commission nonetheless relied on that provision’s legislative history 

when interpreting the rest of AS 23.30.175(b)’s compensation rate rules.36 The 

Commission decided that the COLA’s purpose was “to provide a non-resident recipient 

with benefits equating to the cost of living where the recipient is living.”37 But the 

Commission did not consider whether AS 23.30.175(b)(5)’s language met that purpose, 

particularly for a recipient in a location with a higher cost of living than Alaska’s.38 

TheBoard applied James to Roberge’s casebecauseCommissiondecisions 

are binding precedent for the Board and the Commission.39 The Department of Labor 

and Workforce Development published revised COLA information in 2019, and it also 

required applying the COLA in accordance with James. 

40 

34 Id. at 8, 11-12. The Commission did not explain how AS 23.30.220 

authorized calculating the weekly compensation rate. 

35 Id. at 18-19, 23. 

36 Id. at 16-17. 

37 Id. at 12-13. 

38 Id. at 12-13, 17-18. 

39 Alaska Pub. Int. Rsch. Grp. v. State, 167 P.3d 27, 45 (Alaska 2007). 

40 ALASKA WORKERS’ COMP. DIV., BULL. NO. 19-09 (Dec. 10, 2019), 

(continued...) 

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C.	 Under AS 23.30.175(b) The COLA Ratio Applies Before The 

AS 23.30.175(a) Maximum Rate. 

The parties agree on a number of facts as well as some steps in the 

compensation rate calculation. They agree that the first step in calculating the 

compensation rate is determining the spendable weekly wage under AS 23.30.220 and 

that Roberge’s spendable weekly wage is $2,190.98. They agree that the next step is 

multiplying spendable weekly wage by 80% under AS 23.30.185 and that 80% of 

$2,190.98 is $1,752.78. But the parties’ analyses then diverge. 

Roberge contends that the next step is multiplying $1,752.78 by the 

applicable COLA, and he quotes AS 23.30.175(b)(1)’s plain language that requires 

“multiplyingtherecipient’s weeklycompensation ratecalculatedunder AS. . . 23.30.185 

. . . by the ratio of the cost of living of the area in which the recipient resides to the cost 

of living in this state.” The parties agree Roberge’s COLA is 72.04% for 2017 through 

2019; $1,752.78 multiplied by 72.04% is $1,262.70. Because that amount exceeds the 

applicable maximum compensation rate, Roberge argues that he is entitled to 

AS 23.30.175(a)’s $1,143 maximum rate. 

ASRC agrees that AS 23.30.185 requires multiplying spendable weekly 

wage by 80% and that 80% of $2,190.98 is $1,752.78. But ASRC contends that 

Roberge’s compensation first should be reduced to the $1,143 maximum rate under 

AS 23.30.175(a) and that $1,143 then should be multiplied by the COLA under 

AS 23.30.175(b)(1), resulting in a weekly $823.42 benefit. 

1.	 Statutory language 

The instructions in AS 23.30.175(b)(1) — without reference to 

AS 23.30.175(a) — require first calculating a recipient’s weekly compensation rate 

(...continued) 

https://labor.alaska.gov/wc/bulletins/19-09.pdf. 

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according to the relevant statutory section and then applying the COLA; the instructions 

do not refer to “Alaska,” indicate that the base rate is the Alaska rate, or mention 

applying the maximum rate before applying the COLA. But the language in 

AS 23.30.175(a) is important because it sets the maximum compensation rate tied to 

Alaska’s average weekly wage, not to Alaska’s cost of living. 

ASRC maintains that AS 23.30.175(b)(1)’s instructions must be read to 

require calculating the compensation rate that would be paid if the recipient resides in 

Alaska because the listed statutes apply only in Alaska. ASRC’s argument relies on 

statutory amendments made decades ago, and at oral argument before us it contended 

there was no evidence the 1982 amendment first including theindemnity benefits list was 

a substantive change. We reject these arguments. 

a. 1980s amendments 

Sincestatehood theAct hassetamaximumcompensationrateon temporary 

total disability,41 but the Act has not always provided different rates for out-of-state 

recipients. In 1976 the legislature first authorized different compensation rate 

calculations for out-of-state recipients;42 it set an out-of-state resident’s rate at “the 

weekly grant he would have received if he resided in Alaska times the ratio of the 

average weekly wage of the state in which he resides and the average weekly wage of 

Alaska.”43 The 1976 statute had a maximum rate for recipients residing in Alaska.44 

41 See ch. 193, §§ 5(2), 7(2), SLA 1959 (setting maximum compensation rate 

for temporary total disability). 

42 Ch. 252, § 5(d), SLA 1976. 

43 Former AS 23.30.175(d) (1976). 

44 Former AS 23.30.175(a) (1976). 

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Taken together, the 1976 statutory language suggests that the maximumratethen applied 

before any adjustment for living out of state. 

In 1982 the Act was amended to require that an out-of-state recipient’s 

compensation rate “be calculated by multiplying the recipient’s weekly compensation 

rate calculated in accordance with AS 23.30.180, 23.30.185, 23.30.190, 23.30.200, or 

23.30.215 times the ratio of the average weekly wage of the jurisdiction in which the 

recipient resides to the average weekly wage of Alaska,”45 but it did not remove the 

maximum compensation rate for recipients living in Alaska.46 

ASRCcontends that the 1982 amendment replacing the phrase “the weekly 

grant he would have received if he resided in Alaska” by listing the indemnity benefit 

statutory sections did not change the law’s substance. ASRC asserts that the list in the 

current statute “is synonymous with” the replaced phrase and asks: “Where else would 

these named statutes apply?” But this argument is contrary to the basic statutory 

construction principle that statutory amendments change the law47 unless they can be 

shown to be clarifications.48 ASRC does not suggest that the pre-1982 statute, requiring 

45 Ch. 93, § 17, SLA 1982. 

46 Former AS 23.30.175(a) (1982). 

47 Torkko/Korman/Eng’rs v. Penland Ventures, 673 P.2d 769, 773-74 (Alaska 

1983) (“An amendment to an unambiguous statute is generally presumed to indicate a 

substantive change in the law.” (footnote omitted) (citing City of Anchorage v. Thomas, 

624 P.2d 271, 273 (Alaska 1981))); Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 641-42 (2016) (“When 

Congress amends legislation, courts must ‘presume it intends [the change] to have real 

and substantial effect.’ ” (alteration in original) (quoting Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386, 397 

(1995))). 

48 Cf. Angelica C. v. Jonathan C., 459 P.3d 1148, 1157-58 (Alaska 2020) 

(holding that amendment responding to superior court’s interpretation of statute was 

clarification and not amendment of statute). 

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a calculation of the rate the employee would receive as an Alaska resident, was 

ambiguous. And if in 1982 the legislature thought the phrase “the weekly grant he 

would have received if he resided in Alaska” needed clarification, not including the 

statutory maximum rate in a clarifying amendment would indicate a legislative 

understanding that the calculation did not include imposing the cap. If in 1982 the 

legislature thought the phrase “the weekly grant he would have received if he resided in 

Alaska” was not ambiguous and encompassed applying the maximum rate, then 

substituting the statutory list of indemnity benefit types without the maximumrate would 

indicate an intent to change the substantive law. 

ASRC’s argument about the 1982 amendments also fails to account for the 

legislature retaining a maximumrate applicable to in-state recipients.49 We “presume the 

legislature is aware of other statutory sections on the same subject . . . when enacting 

legislation.”50 The legislature presumably was aware that previous statutory language 

included a maximum compensation rate and that the subsection setting that maximum 

rate was not part of the statutory list included in the amendment. Considered together, 

these statutory construction principles and the legislature’s actions support a conclusion 

that in 1982 the legislature intended to exclude the maximum compensation rate 

subsection from the list of statutes applied before adjusting for out-of-state recipients. 

After we held unconstitutional the use of a wage-based COLA ratio,51 in 

1988 the legislature repealed and reenacted AS 23.30.175; it changed the ratio used for 

adjusting an out-of-state recipient’s compensation rate, but it did not amend the statutory 

49 Former AS 23.30.175(a) (1982). 

50 Burke v. Raven Elec., Inc., 420 P.3d 1196, 1208 (Alaska 2018). 

51 Alaska Pac. Assurance Co. v. Brown, 687 P.2d 264, 267 n.1, 274 (Alaska 

1984). 

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sectionslistusedwhen calculating out-of-statecompensation rates.52 Thelegislaturealso 

made the statutory maximum benefit applicable to all workers’ compensation recipients, 

not just those living in Alaska.53 

Roberge points to the 1988 legislative history showing that the committee 

amending the bill to apply the maximum rate to all compensation recipients had 

information about the difference in cost savings when applying the COLA before and 

after the maximum.54 In other words, although the committee considering the statutory 

language knew theremight be ambiguity about when the maximumrate would apply, the 

committee did not amend the bill to include AS 23.30.175(a) in AS 23.30.175(b)(1)’s 

list. In light of previous statutory changes, we cannot see how the legislature’s continued 

use in 1988 of the indemnity benefits list instead of the phrase “the weekly grant [an 

employee] would have received if he resided in Alaska” can demonstrate that the 

legislature understood these to be equivalent. 

b. Application of expressio unius est exclusio alterius 

As part of Roberge’s plain language argument, he invokes the statutory 

construction principle expressio unius est exclusio alterius, which “is essentially an 

52 Compare former AS 23.30.175(b)-(c) (1984) (requiring calculation of outof-state recipient’s compensation rate by applying ratio related to average weekly wage), 

with AS 23.30.175(b)(1), and ch. 79, § 30, SLA 1988 (requiring application of COLA). 

53 Ch. 79, § 30, SLA 1988. 

54 Memorandum from Chuck Caldwell, Chief, Rsch. & Analysis, to Jacque 

McClintock, Dir., Workers’ Comp. Div. 3 (Feb. 22, 1988) (in File 16, Sen. Labor & 

Com. Comm. Files on S.B. 322, 15th Leg., 2d Sess. at 203-07 (1988)), 

http://www.akleg.gov/library/worker’s%20comp/SB%20322%20(1988)/SL&C15% 

20SB%20322%20(File16).pdf. 

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application of common sense and logic”55 and “establishes the inference that, where 

certain things are designated in a statute, ‘all omissions should be understood as 

exclusions.’ ”56 He maintains that excluding AS 23.30.175(a) from the statutory list 

demonstrates legislative intent that it not be included, and he cites the 1988 legislative 

history information about differences in cost savings under each application priority as 

supporting his expressio unius argument. 

ASRC repeats its assertion that calculation under any listed section 

“inherently includes application” of AS 23.30.175(a). ASRC minimizes the importance 

of the Division’s input in 1988, arguing that information before one committee cannot 

be evidence of the whole legislature’s intent. 

“Where a statute expressly enumerates the things or persons to which it 

applies, we often invoke . . . expressio unius est exclusio alterius.”57 We have stated that 

this principle “is particularly compelling” when interpreting the Act, which “is purely 

statutory and without a basis in the common law.”58 Consistent with this principle, 

leaving AS 23.30.175(a) off the list of sections used to calculate an employee’s 

compensation rate before applying the COLA implies that the legislature intended to 

exclude it.59 The legislative history shows the drafters were aware they had a choice to 

55 Puller v. Municipality of Anchorage, 574 P.2d 1285, 1287 (Alaska 1978). 

56 Ranney v. Whitewater Eng’g, 122 P.3d 214, 218 (Alaska 2005) (quoting 

Croft v. Pan Alaska Trucking, Inc., 820 P.2d 1064, 1066 (Alaska 1991)). 

57 Id. 

58 Id. at 218-19 (quoting Croft, 820 P.2d at 1066). 

59 See Croft, 820 P.2d at 1066 (inferring that inclusion of “specified remedy 

was intended to exclude other remedies for overcompensation”). 

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include AS 23.30.175(a); its exclusion from the list supports a conclusion that the 

legislature did not intend to apply the maximum rate cap before the COLA.60 

2. Purpose and legislative history 

Under our sliding scaleapproachtostatutory interpretation, “theplainer the 

statutory language is, the more convincing the evidence of contrary legislative purpose 

or intent must be” to guide our understanding of the statute.61 

a. AS 23.30.175(a) 

In 1988 the legislature repealed and reenacted AS 23.30.175,62 changing 

the maximum compensation rate from a variable rate based on the average weekly wage 

applicable only to Alaska residents to a fixed weekly rate applicable to all recipients.63 

The legislature rewrote the minimum and maximum compensation benefit calculation 

with the specific intent of redistributing compensation dollars toward lower-paid 

60 Cf. Marx v. Gen. Revenue Corp., 568 U.S. 371, 381 (2013) (“We have long 

held that the expressio unius canon does not apply ‘unless it is fair to suppose that 

Congress considered the unnamed possibility and meant to say no to it.’ ” (quoting 

Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U.S. 149, 168 (2003))). 

61 Adamson v. Municipality of Anchorage, 333 P.3d 5, 11 (Alaska 2014) 

(quoting McDonnell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 299 P.3d 715, 721 (Alaska 

2013)). 

62 Ch. 79, § 30, SLA 1988. 

63 Compare former AS 23.30.175(a) (1984), with former AS 23.30.175(a) 

(1988). 

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workers.64 Legislative history indicates that the legislature anticipated minimal impact; 

one representative stated that only 11 “cases” exceeded the new maximum amount.65 

In 2000 the legislature amended AS 23.30.175(a), returning to a variable 

maximum compensation rate tied to the state’s average weekly wage.66 The legislative 

history shows that the legislature recognized the 1988 compensation rates had eroded in 

value due to inflation; increasing the maximum weekly compensation rate and tying it 

to the average wage addressed those concerns.67 The standard measure of inflation is 

based on consumer prices,68 but the legislature did not sanction an increase in workers’ 

64 See, e.g., H. Judiciary Comm., Sectional Analysis, House C.S. for C.S. for 

S.B. 322, 15th Legis., 2d Sess. § 29 (Apr. 6, 1988), in PAT WILSON, ALASKA 

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: WORKERS’ COMP. SB 322 (1988) (compiled 1993) (hereinafter 

WILSON). 

65 Minutes, H. Fin. Comm., Hearing on House C.S. for C.S. for S.B. 322 

(L&C), Tape HFC 88-73, side 1, 15th Leg., 2d Sess. (Apr. 29, 1988) (statement of Rep. 

John Sund), in WILSON, supra note 64. The $700 statutory cap on compensation 

remained in place until 2000. Louie v. BP Expl. (Alaska), Inc., 327 P.3d 204, 207 

(Alaska 2014). 

66 Ch. 105, § 15, SLA 2000. The maximum compensation rate was a variable 

amount tied to average weekly wage from 1975 until 1988. See former AS 23.30.175(a) 

(1975) (providing maximum compensation rate based on average wage). 

67 Minutes, H. Labor &Com. Comm., Hearing on H.B. 419, Tape 00-28, Side 

A, No. 2275, 21st Leg., 2d Sess. (Mar. 8, 2000) (testimony of Paul Grossi, Dir., Div. of 

Workers’ Comp.); id. at Tape 00-28, Side B, No. 1163-1844; id. at Tape 00-28, Side B, 

No. 0217-0350 (testimonyofWillieVanHemert,Co-chair AlaskaLabor-Mgmt.AdHoc 

Comm. on Workers’ Comp.); id. at Tape 00-28, Side B, No. 0759 (testimony of Kevin 

Dougherty, Co-chair Alaska Labor-Mgmt. Ad Hoc Comm. on Workers’ Comp.). 

68 See id. at Tape 00-28, Side B, No. 0217-0350 (testimony of Willie Van 

Hemert) (discussing use of Consumer Price Index as well as average wages in proposed 

amendments). The Consumer Price Index “is a measure of the average change over time 

(continued...) 

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compensationbenefitsifthecost ofliving increased independently ofwages. Legislative 

history from 2000 thus indicates an intent that the weekly compensation rate continue 

to correspond to employee income. 

b. AS 23.30.175(b)(1)-(4) 

The only cost-of-living adjustment for compensation rates is in 

AS 23.30.175(b). Subsections (1)-(4) were adopted in 1988,69 after our Alaska Pacific 

Assurance Co. v. Brown decision holding unconstitutional the rule adjusting an out-ofstate recipient’s compensation based on the local average weekly wage rather than the 

cost of living.70 

We recognized in Brown that “the State has important interests in avoiding 

disincentives to rehabilitation and in creating incentives for injured workers to go back 

to work” and acknowledged that paying the full Alaska rate to an employee residing in 

a location with a much lower cost of living might “discourage a return to work” because 

the “unadjusted compensation benefits may in terms of real income be in excess of the 

actual wage” the employee could earn.71 We decided that a COLA reduction based on 

68 (...continued) 

in the prices paid by urban consumers for a market basket of consumer goods and 

services.” U.S.BUREAUOF LABOR STAT.,CONSUMER PRICE INDEX,https://www.bls.gov/ 

cpi/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2021). 

69 Ch. 79, § 30, SLA 1988. 

70 687 P.2d 264, 267 n.1, 274 (Alaska 1984); see H. Judiciary Comm., 

Sectional Analysis, House C.S. for C.S. for S.B. 322, 15th Legis., 2d Sess. § 29 (Apr. 6, 

1988) (noting Brown decision’s suggestions), in WILSON, supra note 64. 

71 687 P.2d at 273. 

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the average wage “imposes a substantial penalty” on an employee’s right to travel72 and 

suggested that an adjustment that “equalize[d] the buying power of benefit dollars in 

each state” would more likely meet the means-to-end part of our equal protection test.73 

The legislature relied on Brown in 1988 when rewriting AS 23.30.175(b) 

to address these concerns.74 The legislature stated its intent “in amending AS 23.30.175 

regarding benefits payable to recipients not residing in the state” to: 

(1) recognize the levels of workers’ compensation benefits 

brought about by the high cost of living that exists in the state 

as compared to other localities; 

(2) increase the incentive to return to work; and 

(3) remove obstacles to the utilization of vocational 

rehabilitation that may be brought about by the payment of 

workers’ compensation benefits at the high levels provided 

by the Alaska workers’ compensation law to individuals 

residing in localities with living costs lower than those in 

Alaska.[75] 

The legislature also made clear its intent that the Act be construed “to ensure the quick, 

efficient, fair, and predictable delivery of indemnity . . . benefits to injured workers at a 

reasonable cost to . . . employers.”76 The legislature unquestionably intended benefits 

72 Id. 

73 Id. at 274. 

74 H. Judiciary Comm., Sectional Analysis, House C.S. for C.S. for S.B. 322, 

15th Legis., 2d Sess. § 29 (Apr. 6, 1988) (“[T]he court suggested [in Brown] that an 

adjustment based on actual cost of living may pass constitutional muster.”), in WILSON, 

supra note 64. 

75 Ch. 79, § 1(c)(1)-(3), SLA 1988. 

76 Id. § 1(a); see also AS 23.30.001(1) (identifying same purpose in codified 

(continued...) 

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to have some relationship to the cost of living where the recipient resided to ensure the 

compensation rate was not so generous that the employee would decide not to work.77 

But the legislature still based compensation on an employee’s spendable weekly wage 

at the time of injury; high-wage earners thus would be paid higher workers’ 

compensation benefits — up to the maximum amount — than lower-wage earners. 

ASRC argues that its proposed interpretation better fulfills the legislative 

purpose in circumstances like Roberge’s, implying that the relationship between the 

amount of compensation and the cost of living is the appropriate way to gauge whether 

an employee has adequate incentive to return to work. Roberge argues that under the 

Commission’s calculation method he receives only about 38% of his spendable weekly 

wage and that the maximum compensation rate is about 52% of his spendable weekly 

wage; under either scenario, he receives far less than the 80% rate the legislature deemed 

generally an adequate incentive for employees to return to work. 

The Act is to be construed so that compensation coverage is not unduly 

costly to employers,78 but it also balances the goals of “replacing enough income with 

enough money that an injured worker’s standard of living [will] not be dramatically 

reduced [and] keeping benefits low enough to provide an incentive to return to work.”79 

It seems unlikely that paying only about 38%ofspendable wages rather than 52%fulfills 

76 (...continued) 

section). 

77 Ch. 79, § 1(c)(1)-(3), SLA 1988. 

78 AS 23.30.001(1). 

79 Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Darrow, 403 P.3d 1116, 1124 (Alaska 2017). 

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the legislature’s intent that the Act be construed to ensure the fair and predictable 

delivery of compensation benefits to injured workers.80 

c. AS 23.30.175(b)(5) 

In 2005 the legislature added AS 23.30.175(b)(5), capping an out-of-state 

recipient’s compensation at the rate received in Alaska. The then-Director of the 

Workers’ Compensation Division, Paul Lisankie, testified about the amendment’s 

purpose: 

Currently . . . there’s a cost of living adjustment in the 

Workers’ Compensation Act and it only applies outside the 

state. So, people who are injured within the State of Alaska 

get a unified rate, and it’s based on a blended assessment of 

the cost of living in Anchorage, Fairbanks, and Juneau . . . . 

So, no matter where you reside in Alaska, no matter how 

expensive or inexpensive, you get the same rate. However, 

if you are a non-resident worker at the time of your injury 

working in Alaska or if you move out after you get injured 

and you go to someplace that has an arguably higher cost of 

living, my division is tasked by the current statute to do a cost 

of living analysis and . . . allow you to receive a higher 

compensation rate than you could have anywhere in the state. 

I don’t really think that that’s appropriate to pay people who 

are non-resident injured workers more than we pay our own 

injured workers. So, section 32 would preclude that and cap 

the rate that can be paid to a non-resident at the same amount 

that would be paid someone who was residing in Alaska.[81] 

Lisankie expressed concern that people living in high-cost areas of Alaska, like Bethel, 

could not receive an adjustment for their high living costs, although people residing in 

80 AS 23.30.001(1). 

81 Testimony of Paul Lisankie, Dir., Div. of Workers’ Comp. at 31:11-32:28, 

Hearing on S.B. 130 Before Sen. Labor & Com. Comm., 24th Leg., 1st Sess. (Mar. 10, 

2005). 

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areas like Orange County, California could.82 The proposed solution was to cap a 

recipient’s rate at the Alaska rate. 

In James the Commission focused exclusively on the 2005 statutory 

amendment capping COLA adjustments when interpreting the legislative intent of all the 

Act’s COLA provisions.83 The Commission quoted an analysis that concluded the 2005 

amendment capped a non-resident’s compensation rate “at the compensation rate the 

recipient would receive if residing in Alaska.”84 The Commission then discussed a postenactment Department of Law letter noting that the Alaska Constitution does not require 

that the right to travel “be rewarded by an increase in benefits over the benefit the 

employee would receive had the employee remained in Alaska.”85 The Commission 

cited this letter as supporting “an express intent not to reward an injured worker who 

lives somewhere outside of Alaska, where there is a lower cost of living, with higher 

benefits than the same category of injured worker who remains in Alaska.”86 

Neither AS 23.30.175(b)(5)’s statutory language nor its legislative history 

demonstrates “an express intent not to reward an injured worker who lives somewhere 

outside of Alaska, where there is a lower cost of living, with higher benefits than the 

82 See id. 

83 N. Constr. v. James, AWCAC Dec. No. 251, at 12-14, 16-18 (July 25, 

2018), https://labor.alaska.gov/WCcomm/memos-finals/D_251.pdf. 

84 Id. at 12 (quoting Dep’t of Law, Section by Section Analysis, CSSB 

130(FIN)am (Apr. 15, 2005), in H. Labor & Com. Comm. Files on S.B. 130, 24th Leg., 

2d Sess.). 

85 Id. at 13 (emphasis in original) (quoting Letter from Scott J. Nordstrand, 

Assistant Atty. Gen., to Governor Frank H. Murkowski 41 (on file with the Department 

of Law), 2005 WL 3734058, at *24 (July 18, 2005)). 

86 Id. 

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same category of injured worker who remains in Alaska.”87 The statutory language and 

legislative history address recipients residing in areas with a higher cost of living than 

Alaska, as the Commission itself recognized.88 Nothing supports “an intent to provide 

a non-resident recipient with benefits equating to the cost of living where the recipient 

is living” as the Commission identified.89 And the Department of Law’s sectional 

analysis summarizing the amendment’s effect to the legislature did not suggest that it 

would directly impact employees living in lower-cost areas,90 possibly because 

subsection .175(b)(1) already dealt with lower-cost areas. 

The 2005 legislative history of AS 23.30.175(b)(5) cannot displace the 

1988 legislative history enacting AS 23.30.175(b)(1)-(4). And although either party’s 

proposed construction fulfills the goal of encouraging a return to work, Roberge’s is 

more consistent with other legislative purposes identified in 1988. 

3. Policy arguments 

ASRC contends that Roberge’s proposed construction of the Act “means 

that any high[-]wage earner whose benefits are subject to the cap in Section .175(a) are 

exempt from the Act’s COLA provisions.” But Roberge’s analysis applies the COLA 

provision in all cases before considering AS 23.30.175(a)’s maximum rate cap. Under 

Roberge’s analysis, whether AS 23.30.175(a) applies when an employee moves out of 

state depends both on the spendable weekly wage and the COLA where the employee 

87 Id. (emphasis added). 

88 Id. at 22 (noting statutory intent to ensure that “compensation rate cannot 

be adjusted to a rate higher than the Alaskan maximum compensation rate” when 

employee moves to higher-cost area). 

89 Id. at 13. 

90 Dep’t of Law, Section by Section Analysis, CSSB 130(FIN)am (Apr. 15, 

2005), in H. Labor & Com. Comm. Files on S.B. 130, 24th Leg., 2d Sess. 

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resides.91 ASRC’s claim that Roberge seeks a special exemption from the COLA for 

high-wage earners who move or reside out of state is demonstrably inaccurate. 

ASRC relatedly asserts that Roberge’s analysis would lead to absurd 

results, positing a hypothetical employee with an unadjusted (or Alaska) compensation 

rate of $1,100. Using Roberge’s analysis, an employee with this unadjusted 

compensation rate who moved to the same area as Roberge would have a COLAadjusted compensation rate of $792.44. ASRC contrasts these facts with Roberge’s: 

under Roberge’s analysis he would receive $1,143, the same compensation rate as if he 

resided in Alaska, which ASRC contends is an absurd result privileging high-wage 

earners. But ASRC’s argument does not take into account the statutory provisions 

relating the employee compensation rate to wages.92 A hypothetical employee with an 

91 Hypothetically contrasting James’s and Roberge’s facts using Roberge’s 

method illustrates this point. Both were injured in 2014, so the same maximum 

compensation rate ($1,143) applies. James, AWCAC Dec. No. 251 at 2-3. Roberge’s 

spendable weekly wage was $2,190.98. James’s spendable weekly wage was $2,000.28. 

Id. at 6. Assuming both resided in the Elkhart-Goshen, Indiana, area, with a 70.69% 

COLA, ALASKA WORKERS’ COMP. DIV., BULL. NO. 19-09 (Dec. 10, 2019), 

https://labor.alaska.gov/wc/bulletins/19-09.pdf, Roberge’s rate would be subject to 

AS 23.30.175(a)’s cap but James’s would not. Roberge would have a COLA-adjusted 

rate of $1,239.04 ($2,190.98 x 80% x 70.69%), exceeding the maximum compensation 

rate. James would have a COLA-adjusted rate of $1,131.20 ($2000.28 x 80% x 

70.69%), below the applicable maximum compensation rate. 

The location where a recipient lives also can determine whether the cap 

applies. If Roberge resided in Joplin, Missouri, under his proposed method his adjusted 

rate would be $1,104.78 per week, less than the $1,143 applicable maximum rate; 

$1,104.78 is the product of Roberge’s spendable weekly wage ($2,190.98) times 80% 

times the 2017-19 COLA for Joplin, Missouri (63.03%). ALASKA WORKERS’ COMP. 

DIV., BULL. NO.19-09 (Dec. 10, 2019), https://labor.alaska.gov/wc/bulletins/19-09.pdf. 

92 AS 23.30.220(a) (basing compensation on spendable weekly wage); 

AS 23.30.185 (setting temporary total disability at 80% of spendable weekly wage). 

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unadjusted compensation rate of $1,100 would have a spendable weekly wage of 

$1,375,93 and $792.44 is 57.632% of $1,375. ASRC does not dispute that the $1,143 

maximum compensation rate is about 52% of Roberge’s spendable weekly wage; under 

Roberge’s analysis he receives a lower percentage of his wages than ASRC’s 

hypothetical employee under any scenario. Nor does ASRC dispute that its calculation 

method gives Roberge only about 38% of his spendable weekly wage. Roberge’s 

interpretation of the statute brings the percentage of spendable weekly wage available 

to high-wage earners closer to that of medium- or low-wage earners, minimizing the risk 

that the reduction could be interpreted as a penalty. 

A final hypothetical involving a move to McAllen, Texas, with 2019’s 

lowest COLA at 59.36%, illustrates a potential weakness in ASRC’s analysis.94 Under 

Roberge’s calculation method, his weekly compensation rate would be $1,040.45, equal 

to 47.488% of his spendable weekly wage and less than the maximum rate. And 

47.488%is the same wage percentage for any other McAllen recipient whose unadjusted 

compensation rate is less than AS 23.30.175(a)’s maximum rate if AS 23.30.175(a) is 

applied after making the COLA adjustment. Under ASRC’s calculation method, 

Roberge’s weekly compensation rate would be $678.48, equal to 30.967% of his 

spendable weekly wage. ASRC does not justify the difference in treatment between 

injured workers in the same out-of-state location when the explicit steps in 

AS 23.30.175(b)(1) yield a compensation rate below the AS 23.30.175(a) maximum. 

We reject ASRC’s arguments that AS 23.30.175(b)(1) requires applying 

AS 23.30.175(a)’s maximum rate before applying the COLA provision. Because 

93 $1,375.00 x 80% = $1,100.00. 

94 ALASKA WORKERS’ COMP. DIV., BULL. NO. 19-09 (Dec. 10, 2019), 

https://labor.alaska.gov/wc/bulletins/19-09.pdf. 

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ASRC’s application method mirrors James, our construction of the statute overrules 

James. But because the Commission’s James analysis differed significantly from 

ASRC’s proposed construction, we address the Commission’s analysis as well. 

D.	 The Commission Incorrectly Interpreted AS 23.30.220 And 

Consequently Misconstrued AS 23.30.175. 

James presentedthesamelegal issueaboutapplyingthestatutorymaximum 

and the COLA, but the Commission did not focus on AS 23.30.175(b) to the extent the 

parties do in this appeal. Roberge sets out three arguments about the Commission’s 

James decision. He contends that the Commission: (1) erroneously “appeared to defer 

to the results of the Board[’s] online website calculator rather than the text of the statute”; 

(2) inappropriately used 2005 legislative history when interpreting 1988 statutory 

amendments; and (3) apparently preferred a statutory interpretation “that minimizes the 

number of calculations.” ASRC’s legal argument cites James only for its discussion of 

legislative purpose. 

We agree that James failed to give appropriate weight to the statute’s text. 

The Commission’s error appears to be based on a misunderstanding of AS 23.30.220 and 

the benefit calculator. The benefit calculator generates two numbers when a user 

calculates temporary total disability: the spendable weekly wage and the “Weekly 

Benefit.” It appears that the Commissioner or the Board historically fulfilled the 

legislature’s mandate to “prepare formulas that shall be used to calculate an employee’s 

spendable weekly wage”95 by calculating compensation rates and publishing the rates in 

table form, supplemented with worksheets allowing for certain hand calculations when 

needed.96 The Division or Board later changed to a website that permits individual 

95 AS 23.30.220(b). 

96 See, e.g., ALASKA WORKERS’ COMP. BD., 2003 WEEKLY COMPENSATION 

(continued...) 

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calculations given certain inputs.97 Because AS 23.30.220 provides no instruction about 

calculating benefit amounts, the only reasonable weekly benefit calculation uses the 

applicable statutory sections to determine the appropriate percentage of spendable 

weekly wage. If the benefit amount is above AS 23.30.175(a)’s maximum rate, the 

calculator apparently limits the “Weekly Benefit” to the maximum rate.98 

The Commission implied that the benefit calculator displaced other 

statutory provisions about calculating compensation, writing about AS 23.30.185’s 

requirement that temporary total disability be 80% of spendable weekly wage that “the 

determination of what constitutes 80[%] of spendable weekly wage has already been 

made by the [D]ivision and is assessed by utilizing AS 23.30.220, its authorized benefits 

calculator, and the maximum and minimum rates under AS 23.30.175.”99 The 

Commission did not explain how the benefit calculator determined whether the 

maximum or minimum rate applied. Nothing in AS 23.30.220 authorizes the benefit 

calculator; although the Board may have hoped to minimize rate calculation disputes — 

96 (...continued) 

RATE TABLES (2003), https://labor.alaska.gov/wc/2003rate/WCR-Complete.pdf; 

Worksheet for Computation of 80% Spendable Income Compensation, 2003, 

https://labor.alaska.gov/wc/forms/2003_WC_Compensation_Worksheet.pdf. 

97 See Benefit Calculator, ALASKA WORKERS’ COMP. DIV., https://labor. 

alaska.gov/wc/benefitcalculator.htm (last visited Dec. 21, 2021). 

98 Although the website does not explicitly say this, information on the page 

about the existence of the maximum compensation rate as well as the stipulation in 

Roberge’s case that the online benefit calculator shows his “TTD Weekly Benefit is 

$1,143 per week” — coincidentally the maximum compensation rate for his injury date 

— indicates the online benefit calculator calculates an employee’s spendable weekly 

wage and Alaska compensation rate. 

99 N. Constr. v. James, AWCAC Dec. No. 251 at 14 (July 25, 2018), 

https://labor.alaska.gov/WCcomm/memos-finals/D_251.pdf. 

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a reasonable goal — creating the benefit calculator cannot alter statutory language. The 

Commission essentially decided that the calculator removed or modified AS 23.30.185’s 

statutory language about calculating temporary total disability. There is no indication 

this was the Board’s intent; even if it were, rewriting the statute would be beyond its 

power.100 

The Commission was concerned that applying the COLA before the 

maximum rate cap would render parts of the Act meaningless; it said this construction 

of the statute “ignored” AS 23.30.175(a) and “deemed irrelevant” AS 23.30.220 when 

an employee does not reside in Alaska.101 We cannot imagine how any workers’ 

compensationratecalculation candispensewith AS23.30.220; its gross weekly earnings 

and spendable weekly wages rules underlie all compensation rate calculations. As 

previously noted, the parties agree that AS 23.30.220 is used to determine an employee’s 

spendable weekly wage. And Roberge’s interpretation does not “ignore” 

AS 23.30.175(a); his method uses the explicit steps in AS 23.30.175(b)(1) then applies 

AS 23.30.175(a) if compensation exceeds the maximum rate. 

We agree with Roberge that in James the Commission inappropriately 

relied on 2005 legislative history to construe all parts of AS 23.30.175, as reflected in our 

earlier discussion. And the statutory language itself shows the Commission incorrectly 

interpreted the legislative history it discussed. The Commission identified the statutory 

purpose of AS 23.30.175(b)(5) as “to provide a non-resident recipient with benefits 

100 See Kelly v. Zamarello, 486 P.2d 906, 911 (Alaska 1971) (“[N]o regulation 

adopted is valid or effective unless consistent with the statute . . . .” (quoting former 

AS 44.62.030 (1967))); AS 44.62.030 (“[A] regulation is not valid or effective unless 

consistent with the statute . . . .”). 

101 James, AWCAC Dec. No. 251 at 15. 

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equating to the cost of living where the recipient is living.”102 This cannot be the goal 

becausesubsection .175(b)(5)limitscompensationtoan employee’s Alaskarate, thereby 

prohibiting increased benefits to those living in areas with higher living costs. 

Roberge finally objects to the Commission’s consideration of the number 

of calculations required when the COLA is applied first. This issue appears to be related 

to the Commission’s misconstruing AS 23.30.175. The Commission was concerned that 

applying the COLA first would require recalculation of “an injured worker’s base 

compensation rate when a worker moves from Alaska.”103 It is not clear what the 

Commission meant because it used the phrase “base compensation rate” on only one 

page of its decision.104 But, as we noted earlier, the Commission distinguished the 

“weekly compensation rate”105 and the “weekly rate of compensation,”106 indicating that 

an employee’s “weekly compensation rate” is calculated under AS 23.30.220 and that 

AS 23.30.175(a) then applies to determine the “weekly rate of compensation.”107 

Considering how AS 23.30.175(b)(1) uses the terms, the Commission’s 

reasoning is opaque. Subsection .175(b)(1) provides that “the weekly rate of 

compensation” —whichtheCommission saidincluded applicationofsubsection .175(a) 

to the “weekly compensation rate” derived from the benefit calculator — “shall be 

calculated by multiplying the recipient’s weekly compensation rate . . . by the ratio of the 

102 Id. at 13.
 

103 Id. at 15.
 

104 See id.
 

105 AS 23.30.175(b)(1), (3)-(5).
 

106 AS 23.30.175(a), (b)(1).
 

107 James, AWCAC Dec. No. 251 at 8, 11-12. The “base compensation rate”
 

thus may be the “weekly compensation rate.” 

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cost of living of the area in which the recipient resides to the cost of living in this state.” 

If AS 23.30.175(a) determines “the weekly rate of compensation” and applies before 

AS 23.30.175(b), why would AS 23.30.175(b)(1) require calculating an out-of-state 

recipient’s “weekly rate of compensation” based on the “weekly compensation rate” 

calculated under AS 23.30.185 in Roberge’s case? We see no difference in the number 

of calculations required under the parties’ differing interpretations. 

As previously discussed, we conclude that the statutory language supports 

Roberge’s calculation method. James’s reasoning does not provide a comprehensive 

alternative construction. 

E. Constitutional Issues 

The parties have provided briefing about constitutional issues, and ASRC 

contends that Roberge’s arguments amount to a constitutional challenge to the statutory 

COLA provision. But Roberge did not ask us to declare the COLA provision 

unconstitutional; he seeks an order that he be paid compensation consistent with his 

construction of the statute. We thus see no need to consider the constitutional issues the 

parties briefed. 

V. CONCLUSION 

We OVERRULE the Commission’s decision in Northern Construction v. 

James, REVERSE its decision in this case, and REMAND this case to the Commission 

with instructions to remand to the Board to award Roberge compensation accordingly. 

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