No. 15-1160(L) & 15-1199

________________________

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

_________________________

DENNIS WALTER BOND, SR.; MICHAEL P. STEIGMAN,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

and

ROBERT J. ENGLAND; LEWIS F. FOSTER; DOUGLAS W. CRAIG,

Individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,

v.

MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL, INC.; MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL, INC. 

STOCK AND CASH INCENTIVE PLAN,

Defendants-Appellees.

_________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Maryland (Greenbelt), Case No. 8:10-cv-01256-RWT

_________________________

BRIEF FOR THE SECRETARY OF LABOR AS AMICUS CURIAE 

SUPPORTING PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS

_________________________

M. PATRICIA SMITH ELIZABETH HOPKINS

Solicitor of Labor Counsel for Appellate and 

Special Litigation

G. WILLIAM SCOTT DAVID ELLIS

Associate Solicitor for Trial Attorney 

Plan Benefits Security U.S. Department of Labor

200 Constitution Ave., N.W.,

Room N-4611

Washington, D.C. 20210

(202) 693-5688
(Caption for No. 15-1199)

DENNIS WALTER BOND, SR.; MICHAEL P. STEIGMAN,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

and

ROBERT J. ENGLAND; LEWIS F. FOSTER; DOUGLAS W. CRAIG,

Individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,

v.

MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL, INC.;

MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL, INC. STOCK AND CASH INCENTIVE 

PLAN,

Defendants-Appellants.
i 

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................... ii

QUESTION PRESENTED........................................................................................ 1 

THE SECRETARY'S INTEREST............................................................................. 1 

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS ............................................................................... 2 

A. Legal Background ...................................................................................... 2 

B. Factual Background.................................................................................... 6 

C. Procedural History...................................................................................... 9 

D. Most Recent Direct Court Decision .........................................................12

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT...............................................................................15

ARGUMENT...........................................................................................................16

TOP HAT PLANS MAY ONLY COVER MANAGERS

OR HIGHLY COMPENSATED EMPLOYEES ....................................................16

A. Application of the traditional tools of statutory construction

indicates that top hat plans may only include management

and highly compensated employees.........................................................17

B. The Department of Labor has long and consistently read the

the statute to exempt plans that contain only management and

highly compensated employees and this interpretation is

entitled to deference .................................................................................21 

CONCLUSION........................................................................................................25

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE........................................................................... 

 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE .................................................................................... 
ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504 (1981)...................................2, 3

Alexander v. Brigham and Women's Physician's Org., Inc., 513 F.3d 37 (1st Cir. 

2008).....................................................................................................................24

Barrowclough v. Kidder, Peabody, Inc., 752 F.2d 923 (3rd Cir.1985)...................16

Belka v. Rowe Furniture Corp., 571 F. Supp. 1249 (D. Md. 1983)........................13

Bell Atl. Tel. Cos. v. FCC, 131 F.3d 1044 (D.C. Cir. 1997)...................................17

Bond v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., 296 F.R.D. 403 (D. Md. 2014)....................................11

Carrabba v. Randalls Food Markets, Inc., 38 F. Supp. 2d 468 (N.D. Tex. 1999), 

aff'd, 252 F.3d 721 (5th Cir. 2001).......................................................................23

Darden v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 796 F.2d 701 (4th Cir. 1986) .... 13, 21, 23, 24

Deal v. Kegler Brown Hill & Ritter Co. L.P.A., 551 F. Supp. 2d 694 (S.D. Ohio 

2008).....................................................................................................................16

Demery v. Extebank Deferred Comp. Plan (B), 216 F.3d 283 (2d Cir. 2000). 15, 23

England v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., 764 F. Supp. 2d 761 (D. Md. 2011)........................10

Gallione v. Flaherty, 70 F.3d 724 (2d Cir. 1995) ......................................................3

Garratt v. Knowles, 245 F.3d 941 (7th Cir. 2001)...................................................18

Guiragoss v. Khoury, 444 F. Supp. 2d 649 (E.D. Va. 2006)............................ 16, 20

In re New Valley Corp., 89 F.3d 143 (3d Cir. 1996)....................................... passim

Kemmerer v. ICI Americas Inc., 70 F.3d 281 (3d Cir. 1995) .................................23

Kross v. Western Elec. Co., Inc., 701 F.2d 1238 (7th Cir. 1983)..................... 16, 20

Monahan v. County of Chesterfield, Va., 95 F.3d 1263 (4th Cir. 1996).................22

Nachman Corp. v. Pension Ben. Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359 (1980).........................2
iii

Secretary of Labor v. Fitzsimmons, 805 F.2d 682 (7th Cir. 1986) .......................1, 2

Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).......................................................22

Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472 (6th Cir.1989) .................................16

United States v. Jones, 471 F.3d 535 (4th Cir. 2006)..............................................18

United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704 (1947)..............................................................21

Statutes

Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974,

as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq:

29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. ............................................................................... passim

29 U.S.C. § 1001(a)..........................................................................................2, 20

29 U.S.C. § 1001(b)..............................................................................................20

29 U.S.C. § 1051 .......................................................................................... passim

29 U.S.C. § 1053(a)(2) ...........................................................................................7

29 U.S.C. § 1081(a)(3) ...........................................................................................3

29 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(1) ...........................................................................................3

29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B)....................................................................................11

29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) .................................................................................. 11, 24

26 U.S.C. § 415........................................................................................................18

Rules

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a).....................................................................13

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(1)................................................................13

Regulations

29 C.F.R. §2520.104-24.............................................................................................3
iv

40 Fed. Reg. 34530 (Aug. 15, 1975)........................................................................22

Miscellaneous

DOL Advisory Opinion 92-13A (May 19, 1992)........................................... 5, 6, 22

DOL Advisory Opinion 90-14A, 1990 WL 123933 (May 8, 1990)... 4, 5, 21, 22, 24

H.R. Rep. No. 93-1280 (1974) (Conf. Rep.) ...........................................................19

H.R. Rep. No. 93-533 (1974) (Conf. Rep.) .............................................................19

Letter From Department of Labor to Internal Revenue Service, dated Dec. 13, 

1985, reprinted in 13 BNA Pension Reporter 702 ...........................................4, 21

William Shakespeare, Hamlet..................................................................................17

Merriam-Webster, http://www.merriam-webster.com ............................................19
1

QUESTION PRESENTED

This appeal stems from a suit brought by participants in the Marriott 

"Deferred Stock Incentive Plan" (the "Plan"), a pension plan governed by the 

Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq., 

alleging, among other things, that the Plan violated ERISA's minimum vesting 

requirements. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the plan 

sponsor, based on its conclusion that the Plan was exempt from ERISA's vesting 

requirements as a "top hat" plan that was "maintained by an employer primarily for 

the purpose of providing deferred compensation to a select group of management 

or highly compensated employees." 29 U.S.C. § 1051(2).

The Secretary of Labor addresses the following issue in this brief: 

Whether a pension plan is exempt from ERISA's vesting requirements 

under 29 U.S.C. § 1051(2) if the plan extends coverage to participants who are 

neither management nor highly compensated.

THE SECRETARY'S INTEREST

This appeal presents an important issue concerning the legal test for 

determining whether a deferred compensation plan is exempt from most of 

ERISA's protections because it is a top hat plan, an issue the Secretary of Labor 

has addressed in several advisory letters. As the head of the federal agency with 

primary responsibility for Title I of ERISA, Secretary of Labor v. Fitzsimmons, 
2

805 F.2d 682, 692-93 (7th Cir. 1986) (en banc), the Secretary has a strong interest 

in ensuring that plan participants are afforded ERISA's full protections where they 

are entitled to those protections, including ERISA's minimum standards for vesting

under employer-sponsored pension plans. The Secretary also has a significant 

interest in ensuring that the courts apply the proper legal test for determining what 

plans are exempt from certain key ERISA protections because they meet the 

narrow exemption for top hat plans.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

A. Legal Background

Congress passed ERISA to ensure "that if a worker has been promised a 

defined pension benefit upon retirement – and if he has fulfilled whatever 

conditions are required to obtain a vested benefit – he actually will receive it." 

Nachman Corp. v. Pension Ben. Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 375 (1980). To this 

end, ERISA's vesting and non-forfeiture provisions applicable to pension plans 

were designed to serve as integral protections for the rights of United States 

workers. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) ("despite the enormous growth in [employee 

benefit] plans many employees with long years of employment are losing 

anticipated retirement benefits owing to the lack of vesting provisions in such 

plans"); Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 510 (1981) ("the 
3

concepts of vested rights and nonforfeitable rights are critical to the ERISA 

scheme"). 

Congress provided an exception to these protections, and other critical 

provisions, for any pension "plan which is unfunded and is maintained by an 

employer primarily for the purpose of providing deferred compensation for a select 

group of management or highly compensated employees." 29 U.S.C. § 1051(2)

(participation and vesting); 29 U.S.C. §§ 1081(a)(3), 1101(a)(1) (identically 

worded provisions exempting such plans from ERISA's funding and fiduciary 

responsibility provisions). See also 29 C.F.R. §2520.104-24 (exempting certain 

welfare plans from most of ERISA's disclosure and reposting requirements). Such 

plans are commonly referred to as "top hat" plans. "The dominant characteristic of 

the special top hat regime is the near-complete exemption of top hat plans from 

ERISA's substantive requirements." In re New Valley Corp., 89 F.3d 143, 148 (3d 

Cir. 1996). Congress excluded top hat plans from these requirements because 

"Congress deemed top-level management, unlike most employees, to be capable of 

protecting their own pension expectations." Gallione v. Flaherty, 70 F.3d 724, 727 

(2d Cir. 1995).

The Department of Labor has issued several key pieces of guidance relating 

to whether top hat plans may include participants who are neither management nor 

highly compensated. 
4

First, in 1985, the Department of Labor sent a letter to the Internal Revenue 

Service concerning "rabbi trusts," which it defined as a "trust maintained by an 

employer for the benefit of an employee in connection with a deferred 

compensation agreement." Letter From Department of Labor to Internal Revenue 

Service, dated Dec. 13, 1985, reprinted in 13 BNA Pension Reporter 702. While 

the letter primarily discussed the distinction between "funded" and "unfunded" for 

purposes of the statutory exemption, the letter also stated: 

With particular regard to the development of a regulation concerning 

"top hat" plans, the Department recognizes, and must ensure, that 

employers design and maintain these plans only for a select group of 

management or highly compensated employees, that is, employees 

who may not need the substantive protections of Title I of ERISA.

Id. (emphasis added).

Second, in 1990, the Department of Labor wrote a letter in response to a 

request for an advisory opinion from CSX Corporation concerning whether CSX's 

proposed deferred compensation plan would qualify for top hat status. DOL 

Advisory Opinion 90-14A, 1990 WL 123933 (May 8, 1990).

In response, the Department's letter stated that one threshold requirement for 

a top hat plan was that it had to "limit[] participation to a 'select group of 

management or highly compensated employees.'" 1990 WL 123933, at *2. In 

describing the background for top hat plans, the Department stated: "It is the view 

of the Department that in providing relief for 'top-hat' plans from the broad 
5

remedial provisions of ERISA, Congress recognized that certain individuals, by 

virtue of their position or compensation level, have the ability to affect or 

substantially influence, through negotiation or otherwise, the design and operation 

of their deferred compensation plan, taking into consideration any risks attendant 

thereto, and, therefore, would not need the substantive rights and protections of 

Title I." Id.

In a footnote, this letter also stated that the term "primarily" in the top hat 

provisions of ERISA modified the purpose of the plan, rather than the composition 

of the plan. 1990 WL 123933, at *2, n.1. More specifically, this footnote stated: 

It is the Department's position that the term "primarily," as used in the 

phrase "primarily for the purpose of providing deferred compensation 

for a select group of management or highly compensated employees"

in sections 201(2), 301(a)(3) and 401(a)(1) [of ERISA], refers to the 

purpose of the plan (i.e., the benefits provided) and not the participant 

composition of the plan. Therefore, a plan which extends coverage 

beyond "a select group of management or highly compensated 

employees" would not constitute a "top hat" plan for purposes of Parts 

2, 3 and 4 of Title I of ERISA. 

Id. 

Finally, in 1992, the Department of Labor wrote a letter in response to a 

request for an advisory opinion concerning whether a "rabbi trust" would be 

considered to be unfunded for the purpose of the top hat exemption. In a footnote, 

the Department's letter reiterated that top hat plans must be designed and 
6 

maintained only for a select group of management of highly compensated 

employees:

We note that employers must design and maintain "top hat" plans only 

for a select group of management or highly compensated employees. 

The Department has expressed the view that, in providing relief for 

"top hat" plans from the broad remedial provisions of ERISA, 

Congress recognized that certain individuals, by virtue of their 

position or compensation level, have the ability to affect or

substantially influence, through negotiation or otherwise, the design 

and operation of their deferred compensation plan, taking into 

consideration any risks attendant thereto, and, therefore, would not 

need the substantive rights and protections of Title I. 

DOL Advisory Opinion 92-13A, n.1 (May 19, 1992) (emphasis added) 

(citing DOL Advisory Opinion 90-14A, 1990 WL 123933 (May 8, 1990)). 

B. Factual Background

Marriott International is a multi-billion dollar global hospitality company 

headquartered in Bethesda, Maryland. See Marriott News Center, 

http://news.marriott.com/company-information.html. The Plan grew out of an 

informal practice first employed by one of Marriott's predecessor entities, Hot 

Shoppes, Inc.,1 in the 1960s, prior to ERISA's effective date of January 1, 1976. 

Joint Appendix ("JA") 29, 86, 1027. A written document for the Plan from 1970

stated that its purpose was to "attract, hold and reward key employees," and it 

remained largely unchanged until 1990. Id. at 93-95. Benefits under the Plan 

 

1

 In addition to Hot Shoppes, Inc., Marriott's other predecessor entities that also 

sponsored the Plan were Marriott-Hot Shoppes, Inc. and Marriott Corporation. 

This brief will refer to these collectively as "Marriott."
7 

consisted of deferred stock bonus awards, which were periodically given in the 

form of award certificates from Marriott. Id. at 1027. The awards vested on a pro 

rata basis between the date of the granting and age 65 and were to be paid in ten 

annual installments beginning either at retirement, disability, or age 65. Id. The 

awards vested on a fractional basis based on the number of years that the 

participant had until age 65. For example, a 25-year-old participant vested at 2.5% 

a year over 40 years, while a 60 year-old vested 20% a year for five years, and the 

vesting period began anew with each new award certificate. Id. at 29-30, 2227. 

This vesting regime fails to comply with ERISA's minimum vesting standards, 

which generally require that an employee who has completed five years of service 

will receive 100% of his accrued benefit. See 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a)(2). 

By the mid-1970s, Marriott distributed awards under the plan to nearly 1000 

employees with varying job titles and salaries, and the numbers continued to grow 

over the next decade. JA 1028.2

 Two years after ERISA's effective date, Marriott 

stated in its 1978 Prospectus that:

 

2

 The parties dispute whether all of the employees in the plan were either 

managers or highly compensated. According to the plaintiffs' summary judgment 

brief to the district court, two of the most-frequent recipients of deferred stock 

between 1978 and 1990 were managers at Marriott's fast-food restaurants/diners, 

and managers at Marriott's hotel/airport gift shops (over 3,000 recipients 

collectively). Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Marriott's Motion for 

Summary Judgment at 2; see also Opening Brief For Plaintiffs-Appellants at 18. 

In addition, employees with low compensation were participants in the plan. For 

every year between 1982 and 1989, between 82% and 99% of Marriott employees 
8 

The Incentive Plan is an "employee pension benefit plan" within the

meaning of [ERISA]. However, inasmuch as the Plan is unfunded and 

is maintained by the Company primarily for the purpose of providing 

deferred compensation for a selected group of management or highly 

compensated employees, it is deemed a "select plan" and thus is 

exempt from the participation and vesting, funding and fiduciary 

responsibility provisions of Parts 2, 3, and 4 respectively of Subtitle B 

of Title 1 of the Act. The reporting and disclosure provisions of Part 1 

of Subtitle B of the Act continue to apply and under Section 

2520.104–23 of the regulations, the Company has filed a statement 

with the Department of Labor providing certain information with 

respect to the Incentive Plan. The Company will not extend to 

participants any of the protective provision of the Act for which an 

exemption may properly be claimed.

JA 298. By the middle of the 1980s, several thousand Marriott employees were 

participants in the Plan. Id. at 1029. After the Department of Labor issued the

1990 advisory opinion (discussed above) addressing the requirements for top hat 

status, Marriott substantially amended the Plan to restrict membership in the new 

plan to high pay-grades.3

 Id. at 1030. The number of Marriott employees 

 

earned more salary than the lowest-paid participant in the Plan. Plaintiffs' 

Memorandum in Opposition to Marriott's Motion for Summary Judgment at 37. 

By contrast, according to Marriott's summary judgment brief to the district court, 

to participate in the plan, an "employee had to occupy a position designated by 

Marriott as a management position." Memorandum in Support of Marriott's 

Motion for Summary Judgment at 43. Marriott also asserts that Plan participants 

were usually highly compensated when compared to the rest of the company. Id. 

at 45-49. 

3

 Between 1978 and 1989, the participants had the option of taking a preretirement award payable in 10 annual installments commencing the year after the 

award. This option, which is not at issue in this case, was removed by the 

amendment in 1990, restoring the original terms, which deferred payment until 

either retirement, disability, or age 65. JA 98, 308.
9

receiving awards in the amended plan dropped from 2500 (in the pre-amended 

Plan) in 1989 to less than 100 (in the amended plan) in 1990. Id. Marriott 

informed participants of the changes in a November 1990 memorandum, and a

1991 Marriott proxy statement, which was sent to Marriott shareholders, also 

disclosed the changes. Id.

C. Procedural History

The first complaint in this case, which was subsequently withdrawn, was 

filed in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, Maryland, by plaintiff Robert 

England against Marriott and alleged state-law claims for breach of contract, 

promissory estoppel and unjust enrichment. England subsequently dismissed this 

complaint and filed the Complaint in the United States District Court for the 

District of Columbia on January 19, 2010, which was brought as a putative class 

action by England and three other named plaintiffs – Dennis Walter Bond, Sr., 

Lewis Foster, and Douglas Craig. JA 1026. In addition to a breach of contract 

claim under state law, this suit asserted claims under ERISA requesting that the 

Plan be reformed to comply with ERISA's vesting rules, and sought the benefits to 

which they would be entitled under ERISA if the plan was not exempt as a top hat 

plan. 

After the district court in the District of Columbia granted Marriott's 

unopposed motion to transfer the case to the United States District Court for the 
10

District of Maryland, id. at 1026, and the plaintiffs filed a subsequent Amended 

Complaint in that court, Marriott moved to dismiss on statute of limitations 

grounds (along with several other grounds), arguing that the vesting terms were 

included in the award certificates, which meant that plaintiffs had actual 

knowledge of the alleged ERISA violation more than six years before this suit was 

brought. England v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., 764 F. Supp. 2d 761, 769 (D. Md. 2011). 

Marriott also argued that Plaintiff England, along with similarly situated putative 

class members, lacked standing to sue. Id. at 780. In 2011, the district court in 

Maryland denied this motion, except that the court dismissed named plaintiff 

England because he left Marriott prior to ERISA's effective date; the district court 

also restricted the putative class to participants who stayed at Marriott after 

ERISA's effective date. Id. at 771, 780. The district court rejected Marriott's 

limitations argument because it concluded that there was no indication or "red flag" 

to indicate to a reasonably diligent plaintiff that their benefits under the Plan were 

governed by ERISA, particularly given Marriott's insistence that ERISA did not 

govern the awards. Id. at 770-72. The claims of plaintiffs Foster and Craig were 

voluntarily dismissed. JA 13.

Subsequently, England (despite his earlier dismissal), Bond, and one 

additional named plaintiff, Michael Steigman, filed a Second Amended Complaint 

on October 7, 2011. Id. at 29. Both Bond and Steigman worked for Marriott for 
11

many years after ERISA was enacted, and both received some benefits under the 

Plan, but also forfeited a portion of their benefits because they left Marriott prior to 

turning 65. Id. at 43-46.

The Second Amended Complaint, which is the operative complaint for 

purposes of this appeal, is styled as a class action and makes three claims. First, 

plaintiffs requested injunctive and other equitable relief pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 

1132(a)(3), requiring, among other things, that the plan be reformed to require 

Marriott to comply with ERISA's vesting provisions with regard to the Plan. 

Second, plaintiffs requested additional benefits under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B)

that they claim are owed them, again, because of ERISA's mandatory vesting. 

Third, plaintiffs sued for breach of contract under state law. JA 48-53. 

In September 2012, plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification. The 

proposed classes encompassed participants in the Plan from 1976 until 1990 who 

did not fully vest. Bond v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., 296 F.R.D. 403, 406 (D. Md. 2014). 

In January 2013, the district court denied this motion on the basis that the 

commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation elements of Federal Rule 

of Civil Procedure 23(a) had not been met, because many members of the proposed 

class had divergent interests. Id. at 408-09. The district court also found that 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(1) was not met because some putative class 
12

members had been helped by Marriott's vesting schedule, and that this fact also

presented standing issues for these class members. Id. at 409-11.

Marriott again moved to dismiss on limitations grounds, and the district 

court again denied this motion. To determine the limitations period, the court 

looked to the limitations period for the most analogous state law claim, which was 

three years for breach of contract in Maryland. JA 1037-38. The court determined 

that the limitations period never began running, however, because Marriott did not 

adopt a claims procedure until after plaintiffs brought suit, and plaintiffs were 

never expressly denied benefits and thus were not sufficiently informed that they 

had been harmed by the Plan's alleged non-compliance with ERISA. Id. at 1038-

41. The court also rejected Marriott's argument that the doctrine of laches barred 

the claims, and its argument that one of the named plaintiffs had released his 

ERISA claims via his separation agreement. Id. at 1041-45.

D. Most Recent District Court Decision 

After extensive discovery, Marriott again moved for summary judgment on

the basis that ERISA's vesting requirements were inapplicable to the Plan because 

the Plan qualified for top hat status under ERISA. In a decision issued from the 

bench at the conclusion of the summary judgment hearing, the district court agreed 

and granted this motion.
13

In analyzing whether the Plan qualified for top hat status, the district court 

asked three questions: whether the Plan was "unfunded, [and whether] its purpose 

[was] to provide deferred compensation and [whether] that purpose [was] to 

provide deferred compensation to a group that's primarily limited to a select group 

of management or highly-compensated employees." JA 3540. In answering the 

first two of these questions, the district court concluded that it was undisputed that 

the Plan was unfunded and that its purpose was to provide deferred compensation. 

Id.

In addressing the pivotal last question, the district court looked for guidance 

to a 1983 district court case, Belka v. Rowe Furniture Corp., 571 F. Supp. 1249 (D.

Md. 1983). The court described Belka as affirming top hat status for a plan where 

between 1.6% and 4.6% of the workforce was covered, and where the mean annual 

compensation of the plan ($40,000 in 1983) was significantly higher than the 

company average of $9,195. JA 3542. The court then noted that Belka was 

favorably cited by the Fourth Circuit in Darden v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 796 

F.2d 701 (4th Cir. 1986). JA 3543.

The court went on to conclude that the Plan met both "qualitative" and 

"quantitative" tests for top hat status. JA 3544-46. Quantitatively, the court found 

that the percentage of employee participation in the Plan compared to the overall 

workforce (2%), and the percentage of Marriott managers (20% of all managers) 
14

was sufficiently low that the plan could be considered to meet the "select group" 

requirement of 29 U.S.C. § 1051(2). JA 3544. The court also concluded that the 

qualitative portion of the test was met because:

The employees who received or who were invited to receive these 

benefits on the company were clearly highly-compensated employees 

by any standard in relation to the rest of the company and they 

primarily were management. Here Marriott has pointed out that it 

used a multi-part or four-part process to determine who would be 

invited to participate in the program and therefore become eligible for 

benefits under the plan which focused on a number of very selective 

criteria which produced the quantitative result that I've already 

mentioned. And it's clear from viewing this plan as a whole that it 

was primarily intended for the purpose of retention of management 

and other highly-compensated employees.

Id. at 3545. The court also concluded that Marriott had sufficiently disclosed the 

fact that the plan was a top hat plan even though there was no direct evidence that 

Marriott had filed the requisite documentation with the Department of Labor. Id.

at 3546. The court then noted that the Department of Labor's 1990 advisory letter 

"was a fairly significant expansion upon the perceived scope of the top hat 

exemption." Id. at 3546-47. Moreover, while the court recognized that Congress's 

overall intent with the top hat exemption was that there was no need to give all 

ERISA protections to employees with sufficient bargaining power to protect 

themselves, it refused to consider whether the employees at issue had sufficient 

bargaining power such that ERISA protections were not necessary for them. Id. at 

3547-48.
15

Furthermore, although this was a motion for summary judgment, the district 

court also relied entirely on Marriott's expert statistical analysis and rejected the 

analysis of the expert for plaintiffs. JA 3547-50. The court also concluded that the 

proper denominator for determining the relevant percentages was the "entire 

workforce," rather than full-time or salaried employees. Id. at 3548-49.

Finally, the court relied on Demery v. Extebank Deferred Comp. Plan (B), 

216 F.3d 283 (2d Cir. 2000), for the proposition that top hat status would not be 

eliminated if a "few positions managed to get in there that did not meet one of 

those criterion" if a plan was "principally intended for management and highlycompensated employees." JA 3549-50.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

This case concerns the circumstances under which rank-and-file workers 

will be denied ERISA's robust substantive protections for participation, funding, 

vesting, and fiduciary requirements because their plan qualifies for top hat status. 

ERISA's text, legislative history, structure, and remedial purposes make clear that 

pension plan participants may only be deprived of these key ERISA protections if 

their plan is composed exclusively of management or highly compensated 

employees.

The Department of Labor has long and consistently read the statutory 

exemption for top hat plans in precisely this manner. This narrow construction of 
16

the exemption is consistent not only with the language of the relevant provision 

and general principles of statutory construction, but also with this court's 

recognition that the primary animus behind ERISA was to protect the pension 

rights of employees who lacked the economic bargaining power to protect their 

own rights. It is therefore entitled to considerable deference. The district court's 

contrary view – that so long as an unfunded deferred compensation plan is 

primarily composed of management or highly compensated individuals it is 

exempt from ERISA's core protections as a top hat plan – does not honor the 

remedial legislation that Congress passed. 

ARGUMENT

TOP HAT PLANS MAY ONLY COVER MANAGERS OR HIGHLY 

COMPENSATED EMPLOYEES

Top hat plans are a "rare sub-species of ERISA plans" and their definition is 

"narrow." New Valley Corp., 89 F.3d at 148. See also Kross v. Western Elec. Co., 

Inc., 701 F.2d 1238, 1242 (7th Cir. 1983) (exemptions from ERISA coverage 

should be confined to their "narrow purpose"); Guiragoss v. Khoury, 444 F. Supp. 

2d 649, 659 (E.D. Va. 2006). The defendant bears the burden of demonstrating 

that a plan is a top hat plan. Deal v. Kegler Brown Hill & Ritter Co. L.P.A., 551 F. 

Supp. 2d 694, 700 (S.D. Ohio 2008) (citing Barrowclough v. Kidder, Peabody, 

Inc., 752 F.2d 923, 932 (3d Cir. 1985); Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 

1472, 1479 (6th Cir. 1989)). 
17

As noted above, the district court applied the following test to determine if a 

plan qualifies as top hat: "it must be unfunded, its purpose must be to provide 

deferred compensation and that purpose must be to provide deferred compensation 

to a group that's primarily limited to a select group of management or highlycompensated employees." JA 3540. For the reasons discussed below, this test is 

incorrect and improperly eliminates ERISA's protections for rank-and-file 

employees who are not highly compensated or management.

A. Application of the traditional tools of statutory construction indicates that 

top hat plans may only include management and highly compensated 

employees

 

The "traditional tools of statutory construction, . . . the statute's text, 

legislative history and structure, as well as its purpose," Bell Atl. Tel. Cos. v. FCC, 

131 F.3d 1044, 1047 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (citations and internal quotations omitted), 

all support that top hat plans may not include participants who are neither 

management nor highly compensated. The "top hat" provision on vesting, like the 

other statutory top hat exemptions, applies to "a plan which is unfunded and is 

maintained by an employer primarily for the purpose of providing deferred 

compensation for a select group of management or highly compensated 

employees." 29 U.S.C. § 1051(2). A straightforward reading of this provision

suggests that the term "primarily" is an adverb that modifies the prepositional 

phrase "for the purpose of providing deferred compensation" that immediately 
18

follows it, see William Shakespeare, Hamlet, III, ii, 17 ("Very like a whale" is an 

example of an adverb modifying a prepositional phrase), and does not modify the 

more remote prepositional phrase "for a select group of management or highly 

compensated employees," just as it is not naturally read to qualify the prepositional 

phrase "by an employer," which precedes it. See United States v. Jones, 471 F.3d 

535, 539 (4th Cir. 2006) ("adverbs" do not "modify the infinite hereafters of 

statutory sentences"). This means that while the most important purpose of the 

plan must be to provide deferred compensation to a select group of management or 

highly compensated employees, a top hat plan may have other, secondary purposes 

(e.g., retaining top talent, allowing highly compensated individuals to realize 

earnings in later tax years with presumably lower marginal tax rates, or avoiding 

limitations in the Internal Revenue Code that apply to tax-qualified plans). See, 

e.g., Garratt v. Knowles, 245 F.3d 941, 946-948 (7th Cir. 2001) (distinguishing an 

excess benefit plan, which must be maintained solely for the purpose of providing 

benefits in excess of contribution limitations in 26 U.S.C. § 415, from a top-hat 

plan, which can have multiple purposes). It does not mean that the "select group" 

may be primarily composed of management or highly compensated individuals. 

Nor does it mean that a top hat plan can have a secondary purpose that is 

inconsistent with the primary purpose, such as a secondary purpose of covering 

individuals who are outside the "select group" set by statute.
19

This reading of the relevant provision is further supported by its use of the 

term "select group," which indicates a limit to who is eligible for the "top hat"

provision. See Merriam-Webster, http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/select (defining "select" to mean, among other things, 

"exclusively or fastidiously chosen often with regard to social, economic, or 

cultural characteristics"). It seems unlikely that Congress would use the limiting 

term "select group" if a secondary purpose of the provision is to expand its 

coverage to employees who are not in this select group.

Similarly, the legislative history, although sparse, describes the top hat 

provision as intended for top executives and gives an example of stock plans 

established solely for officers of a corporation. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 93-1280, 

at 296 (1974) (Conf. Rep.) ("the labor fiduciary rules do not apply to an unfunded 

plan primarily devoted to providing deferred compensation for a select group of 

management or highly compensated employees. For example, if a 'phantom stock' 

or 'shadow stock' plan were to be established solely for the officers of a 

corporation, it would not be covered by the labor fiduciary rules"); H.R. Rep. No. 

93-533, at 4656 (1974) (Conf. Rep.) ("Title I would cover all private employee 

benefit plans under Commerce Clause jurisdiction except . . . Unfunded deferred 

compensation schemes of top executives."). This supports what the most natural 

reading of the statutory language suggests: that Congress understood the provision 
20

as applying only to the select group of management or highly compensated 

employees.

So too, the structure of the top hat provisions, as exemptions from ERISA's

core protections, supports the narrow reading that the text indicates. See 29 U.S.C. 

§ 1051 (vesting provisions apply to "any employee benefit plan" other than listed 

exemptions, including top hat plans). Thus, limiting the top hat exception to plans 

that extend coverage only to management or highly compensated employees is 

consistent with the general statutory principle that coverage of a remedial statute 

such as ERISA is read broadly and exceptions to coverage are read narrowly. 

Kross v. Western Elec. Co., Inc., 701 F.2d 1238, 1242 (7th Cir. 1983); Guiragoss 

v. Khoury, 444 F. Supp. 2d 649, 659 (E.D. Va. 2006). 

Finally, ERISA's primary purpose, set forth in its first section – to "protect . . 

. the interests of participants in employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries . . . 

by establishing standards of conduct, responsibility, and obligation for fiduciaries 

of employee benefit plans, and by providing appropriate remedies, sanctions and 

ready access to the Federal courts," 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) – is best served by this 

reading of the statute. See also id. § 1001(a) (congressional finding that "many 

employees with long years of employment are losing anticipated retirement 

benefits owing to the lack of vesting provisions in such plans"). Conversely, 

allowing an employer to intentionally draft or operate a top hat plan to include 
21

ordinary employees who are neither management nor highly compensated directly 

undermines these objectives by taking away core ERISA protections from 

employees who are not in a position to negotiate for a separate pension plan and 

who are thus the primary targets of the entire statutory scheme. See Darden v. 

Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 796 F.2d 701, 706 (4th Cir. 1986) (ERISA case noting 

that in "interpreting statutory language so as to define the class of persons 

protected by the statute, a court must take as its 'primary consideration' whether the 

inclusion of the disputed category of persons would effectuate the 'declared policy 

and purposes' of the statute") (quoting United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 713 

(1947)).

B. The Department of Labor has long and consistently read the statute to

exempt plans that contain only management and highly compensated 

employees and this interpretation is entitled to deference

The Department of Labor consistently has taken precisely this view of the 

statutory language. First, the 1985 "Rabbi Trust" letter states that top hat plans 

should be designed and maintained "only for a select group of management or 

highly compensated employees." Letter From Department of Labor to Internal 

Revenue Service, dated Dec. 13, 1985, reprinted in 13 BNA Pension Reporter 702.

Likewise, the 1990 CSX Letter explains that "primarily" modifies the purpose 

rather than the composition of the plan, and reiterates that a top hat plan cannot 

extend coverage beyond the "select group of management or highly compensated 
22

employees." 1990 WL 123933, at *2. While the district court found that the 1990 

CSX Letter created new law, in fact it was reiterating guidance that the Department 

had previously given, and it is entirely consistent with the statutory language. So 

too the 1992 Kilberg Letter reiterated this same point, stating that employers must 

design and maintain top hat plans "only" for management or highly compensated 

individuals. See also 40 Fed. Reg. 34530 (Aug. 15, 1975) (in declining to adopt a 

formal rule after conducting notice-and-comment, the Department noted that the 

"class of employees with respect to whom [top hat compliance exemptions] appl[y] 

– highly compensated or management employees – generally have ready access to 

information concerning their rights and obligations and do not need the protections 

afforded them by Part 1 of Title I of the Act"). 

The Department's long-standing and consistent reading of the statutory top 

hat exemption is entitled to deference. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 

134, 140 (1944). As this Court has noted, although Department of Labor "opinion 

letters" are "not binding on the courts," they are given "considerable and in some 

cases decisive weight." Monahan v. County of Chesterfield, Va., 95 F.3d 1263, 

1283 (4th Cir. 1996) (internal quotations and citations omitted). This deference is 

particularly appropriate here given that the Secretary's interpretation is supported 

by the best interpretation of the statutory provisions using the traditional tools of 

statutory interpretation. 
23 

This Court has never addressed whether a top hat plan may cover 

participants who are neither management nor highly compensated.4

 However, in 

addressing the "select group" part of the top hat test in Darden, the Fourth Circuit 

quite rightly pointed out that "implicit in the congressional statement of purpose is 

the recognition that the persons to be aided by the statute lacked sufficient 

economic bargaining power to obtain contractual rights to nonforfeitable benefits." 

796 F.2d at 706-07 ("Had they possessed such bargaining power, statutory reform 

would have been unnecessary."). Yet the reading of the statutory top hat 

exemption advocated by Marriott and adopted by the district court threatens to 

leave just such employees utterly without most of the core protections of ERISA, 

so long as they are participants in plans which are primarily composed of "high-

 

4

 Only two other Circuits have addressed the precise issue in this case even in 

passing and, at least as a matter of dicta, they came to opposite conclusions. 

Compare In Re New Valley Corp., 89 F.3d 143, 148 (3d Cir. 1996) (although 

parties agreed that plan was a top hat plan, the court noted that "[i]n character, the 

plan must cover only high level employees" (emphasis added)), with Demery v. 

Extebank Deferred Comp. Plan (B), 216 F.3d 283, 289 (2d Cir. 2000) (stating that 

the statutory language "suggests that if a plan were principally intended for 

management and highly compensated employees, it would not be disqualified from 

top hat status simply because a very small number of the participants did not meet 

that criteria, or met one of the criteria but not the other" but then concluding that all 

participants in the plan were highly compensated). See also Kemmerer v. ICI 

Americas Inc., 70 F.3d 281, 286 (3d Cir. 1995) ("Top hat plans, however, which 

benefit only highly compensated executives, and largely exist as devices to defer 

taxes, do not require such scrutiny and are exempted from much of ERISA's 

regulatory scheme."); Carrabba v. Randalls Food Markets, Inc., 38 F. Supp. 2d 

468, 477 (N.D. Tex. 1999) ("[a] legitimate top hat plan must cover a 'select group' 

of employees who are 'only high-level employees'") (citing In Re New Valley 

Corp., 89 F.3d at 148), aff'd, 252 F.3d 721, 722 (5th Cir. 2001). 
24 

echelon employees [who], unlike their rank-and-file counterparts, are capable of 

protecting their own pension interests." Alexander v. Brigham and Women's

Physician's Org., Inc., 513 F.3d 37, 43 (1st Cir. 2008). This Court should decline 

to do so.5 

 

5

 This brief takes no position on the form of equitable relief that would be 

appropriate, under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3), to redress an employer's violation of 

ERISA's vesting requirements in circumstances where the employer erroneously 

included non-management, non-highly-compensated employees in a pension plan 

that would otherwise qualify as a top-hat plan under Section 1051(2). In 

circumstances where (1) the plan included very few such employees, (2) the 

employer included such employees inadvertently, or (3) the employer had an 

objectively reasonable basis for believing that such employees qualified as 

management or highly-compensated for purposes of Section 1051(2), it may be 

that the appropriate remedy would be to provide relief only to those nonmanagement, non-highly-compensated employees who were improperly included 

in the plan – e.g., to reform the plan to exclude the non-qualifying employees and 

award them the full vesting and other protections and benefits while maintaining 

the plan in its exempt status for the management and highly-compensated 

employees who do qualify. That approach would avoid providing a windfall gain 

to the management and highly-compensated employees who could properly have 

been included in a plan covered by Section 1051(2), who possess sufficient 

economic bargaining power to protect their own rights and are not the intended 

beneficiaries of the substantive ERISA provisions at issue. See Darden, 796 F.2d 

at 706-07 ("[I]mplicit in the congressional statement of purpose is the recognition 

that the persons to be aided by the statute lacked sufficient economic bargaining 

power to obtain contractual rights to nonforfeitable benefits."); DOL Advisory

Opinion 90-14A, 1990 WL 123933, at *2 ("It is the view of the Department that in 

providing relief for 'top-hat' plans from the broad remedial provisions of ERISA, 

Congress recognized that certain individuals, by virtue of their position or 

compensation level, have the ability to affect or substantially influence, through 

negotiation or otherwise, the design and operation of their deferred compensation 

plan, taking into consideration any risks attendant thereto, and, therefore, would 

not need the substantive rights and protections of Title I.").
25

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court should hold that the district court erred 

in finding that a top hat plan may include participants who are neither management 

nor highly compensated.

Respectfully submitted,

M. PATRICIA SMITH

Solicitor of Labor

G. WILLIAM SCOTT

Associate Solicitor

Plan Benefits Security Division

ELIZABETH HOPKINS

Counsel for Appellate 

And Special Litigation

s/ David Ellis

DAVID ELLIS

Attorney

U.S. Department of Labor

200 Constitution Ave. N.W.

Rm. N-4611

Washington, DC 20210

 (202) 693-5688

 Fax: (202) 693-5610
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Dated: May 28, 2015 s/ David Ellis

David Ellis 

Attorney
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify on this 28th day of May, 2015, I electronically filed the 

foregoing amicus curiae brief with the Clerk of the Court for the United States 

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 s/ David Ellis

 David Ellis

Attorney