[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 

v. Pribble, Slip Opinion No. 2019-Ohio-4808.] 

NOTICE 

This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 

advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to 

promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 

South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 

formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 

the opinion is published. 

SLIP OPINION NO. 2019-OHIO-4808

THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. PRIBBLE, APPELLEE.

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 

may be cited as State v. Pribble, Slip Opinion No. 2019-Ohio-4808.] 

Criminal law—Sentencing—Trial court correctly sentenced defendant convicted of 

illegal assembly or possession of chemicals for manufacture of 

methamphetamine under R.C. 2925.041(C)(1) to mandatory five-year 

prison term rather than under R.C. 2929.14(A)(3)(b) to one to three years 

in prison—Court of appeals’ judgment reversed and sentence reinstated. 

(No. 2017-1758—March 6, 2019—Decided November 26, 2019.) 

APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Adams County, 

No. 17CA1041, 2017-Ohio-8499. 

_________________ 

KENNEDY, J.

{¶ 1} This is a discretionary appeal from the Fourth District Court of 

Appeals concerning which of two sentencing statutes applies to violations of R.C. 
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2925.041(A)—knowingly assembling or possessing one or more chemicals that 

may be used to manufacture a controlled substance with the intent to manufacture 

a controlled substance—when the drug in question is methamphetamine and the 

defendant has committed certain prior offenses. R.C. 2925.041(C)(1) specifies a 

mandatory punishment for violations of R.C. 2925.041(A) by certain repeat 

offenders: “one of the prison terms prescribed for a felony of the third degree that 

is not less than five years.” But R.C. 2929.14(A)(3)(b), a sentencing statute that 

applies more broadly to third-degree felonies, caps sentences at 36 months in prison 

for third-degree felonies not listed in R.C. 2929.14(A)(3)(a), and a violation of R.C. 

2929.041(A) is not included in that list. The court of appeals held that R.C. 

2925.041(C)(1) and 2929.14(A)(3)(b) are in conflict, and applying the rule of 

lenity—codified in R.C. 2901.04(A) (“sections of the Revised Code defining 

offenses or penalties shall be strictly construed against the state, and liberally 

construed in favor of the accused”)—determined that R.C. 2929.14(A)(3)(b) and 

its lesser, three-year maximum penalty prevails. 

{¶ 2} We agree that the two statutes conflict, but applying the rule of 

statutory construction codified in R.C. 1.51, we conclude that the mandatory fiveyear sentence prescribed by R.C. 2925.041(C)(1) is a special provision that prevails 

as an exception to the general statute, R.C. 2929.14(A)(3)(b). Because applying 

R.C. 1.51 resolves the conflict between the two statutes, it is unnecessary to invoke 

the rule of lenity. We therefore conclude that R.C. 2925.041(C)(1) applies to the 

defendant in this case and reverse the judgment of the court of appeals. 

I. THE TEXT AND HISTORY OF R.C. 2925.041 AND 2929.14(A)(3) 

{¶ 3} R.C. 2925.041(A) defines the offense at issue in this case: “No person 

shall knowingly assemble or possess one or more chemicals that may be used to 

manufacture a controlled substance in schedule I or II with the intent to manufacture 

a controlled substance in schedule I or II in violation of section 2925.04 of the 

Revised Code.” Under R.C. 2925.04, “[n]o person shall knowingly cultivate 
January Term, 2019 

3

marihuana or knowingly manufacture or otherwise engage in any part of the 

production of a controlled substance.” R.C. 2925.04(A). Absent certain 

circumstances not at issue here, a violation of R.C. 2925.041(A) is a third-degree 

felony pursuant to R.C. 2925.041(C). If the drug involved is methamphetamine 

and the offender previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to a felony 

drug-abuse offense two or more times, R.C. 2925.041(C)(1) requires a prison 

sentence of at least two years. And if the offender two or more times previously 

has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to a felony drug-abuse offense, at least one 

of which involved the manufacture of methamphetamine or another controlled 

substance, the penalty increases to a mandatory prison term of at least five years: 

If the violation of division (A) of this section is a felony of the third 

degree under this division and if the chemical or chemicals 

assembled or possessed in violation of division (A) of this section 

may be used to manufacture methamphetamine, there either is a 

presumption for a prison term for the offense or the court shall 

impose a mandatory prison term on the offender, determined as 

follows: 

(1) Except as otherwise provided in this division, there is a 

presumption for a prison term for the offense. If the offender two or 

more times previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to a 

felony drug abuse offense, except as otherwise provided in this

division, the court shall impose as a mandatory prison term one of 

the prison terms prescribed for a felony of the third degree that is 

not less than two years. If the offender two or more times previously 

has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to a felony drug abuse 

offense and if at least one of those previous convictions or guilty 

pleas was to a violation of division (A) of this section, a violation 
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of division (B)(6) of section 2919.22 of the Revised Code [allowing 

a child to be in the vicinity of a controlled-substance-manufacturing 

offense under R.C. 2925.04 or 2925.041], or a violation of division 

(A) of section 2925.04 of the Revised Code [engaging in the 

production of a controlled substance], the court shall impose as a 

mandatory prison term one of the prison terms prescribed for a 

felony of the third degree that is not less than five years. 

(Emphasis added.) R.C. 2925.041(C). 

{¶ 4} R.C. 2925.041 first included a specific penalty for methamphetamine 

manufacturing in 2006. See Am.Sub.S.B. No. 53, 151 Ohio Laws, Part I, 806, 835-

836. It prescribed “as a mandatory prison term one of the prison terms prescribed 

for a felony of the third degree that is not less than five years” if a violator of R.C. 

2925.041(A) had one prior conviction of a drug-manufacturing offense. Former 

2925.041(C)(1), 151 Ohio Laws, Part I, at 835. 

{¶ 5} The other statute at issue in this case is R.C. 2929.14(A)(3), which 

sets forth the prison terms applicable to third-degree felony convictions. In 2006, 

when R.C. 2925.041 first addressed methamphetamine manufacturing, R.C. 

2929.14(A)(3) read, “For a felony of the third degree, the prison term shall be one, 

two, three, four, or five years.” Am.Sub.H.B. No. 473, 150 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 

5707, 5731. 

{¶ 6} In 2011, R.C. 2929.14(A)(3) was amended by 2011 Am.Sub.H.B. No.

86 (“H.B. 86”), which enacted substantial changes to Ohio’s felony-sentencing 

scheme. H.B. 86 divided R.C. 2929.14(A)(3) into subdivisions (a) and (b). Under 

the amendment, R.C. 2929.14(A)(3)(a) narrows the applicability of third-degreefelony sentences longer than three years; it specifically identifies violations for 

which a judge may impose prison terms from 12 to 60 months. As amended, R.C. 

2929.14(A)(3)(b) limits sentences to three years for third-degree felonies to which 
January Term, 2019 

5

division (A)(3)(a) does not apply. The version of R.C. 2929.14(A)(3) that is 

applicable in this case read: 

 

(a) For a felony of the third degree that is a violation of 

section 2903.06, 2903.08, 2907.03, 2907.04, or 2907.05 of the 

Revised Code or that is a violation of section 2911.02 or 2911.12 of 

the Revised Code if the offender previously has been convicted of 

or pleaded guilty in two or more separate proceedings to two or more 

violations of section 2911.01, 2911.02, 2911.11, or 2911.12 of the 

Revised Code, the prison term shall be twelve, eighteen, twentyfour, thirty, thirty-six, forty-two, forty-eight, fifty-four, or sixty 

months. 

(b) For a felony of the third degree that is not an offense for

which division (A)(3)(a) of this section applies, the prison term shall 

be nine, twelve, eighteen, twenty-four, thirty, or thirty-six months. 

2014 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 234. 

{¶ 7} H.B. 86 also amended R.C. 2925.041(C)(1). That amendment added

a requirement for imposing the mandatory five-year sentence, restricting its 

application to certain third-strike offenders: the offender must have committed two 

prior felony drug-abuse offenses, one of which involved the manufacture of a 

controlled substance. 

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

{¶ 8} In May 2016, defendant-appellee, Darian J. Tribble, was indicted in 

the Adams County Court of Common Pleas on one count of illegal assembly or 

possession of chemicals for the manufacture of a controlled substance—

specifically, methamphetamine—in violation of R.C 2925.041(A), a third-degree 

felony. On February 3, 2017, a jury convicted Pribble of the charge. 
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{¶ 9} There is no dispute that given Pribble’s prior convictions of a felony 

drug-manufacturing offense in 2009 and a felony drug-possession offense in 2015, 

he met the prior-convictions requirement that triggers sentencing pursuant to the 

third-strike provision in R.C. 2925.041(C)(1). The issue here is whether the 

mandatory five-year sentence prescribed by R.C. 2925.041(C)(1) applies to anyone

given the limits established by R.C. 2929.14(A)(3) regarding the imposition of fiveyear sentences for third-degree felonies. The trial court determined that R.C. 

2925.041(C)(1) prevailed over R.C. 2929.14(A)(3)(b) and sentenced Pribble to a 

five-year prison term. Pribble appealed the sentence. 

{¶ 10} Citing its decision in State v. Clark, 4th Dist. Highland No. 14CA20, 

2015-Ohio-5003, the Fourth District Court of Appeals reversed Pribble’s sentence. 

The court held that R.C. 2929.14(A)(3)(b) conflicts with R.C. 2925.041(C)(1) and 

that pursuant to the rule of lenity, R.C. 2929.14(A)(3)(b), the less punitive 

sentencing statute, applies. We accepted the state’s jurisdictional appeal. 152 Ohio 

St.3d 1442, 2018-Ohio-1600, 96 N.E.3d 298. The state asserts a single proposition 

of law: 

When a defendant is convicted of a third-degree felony 

charge of illegal assembly of chemicals for the manufacture of drugs 

pursuant to R.C. 2925.041(A), the chemicals could have been used 

to manufacture methamphetamine, and the defendant has two or 

more prior felony drug abuse convictions, at least one of which is 

listed in R.C. 2925.041(C)(1), the trial court is required to sentence 

the defendant under R.C. 2925.041(C)(1) to a mandatory prison 

term of “not less than five years.” 

 
January Term, 2019 

7

III. LAW AND ANALYSIS 

{¶ 11} Both R.C. 2925.041(C)(1) and R.C. 2929.14(A)(3) address 

sentencing for third-degree felonies. R.C. 2925.041(C)(1) is clear in its 

requirement that two-time felony drug-abuse offenders with at least one prior 

conviction involving the production of methamphetamine receive five-year prison 

terms. Neither party argues that R.C. 2925.041(C)(1) fails to establish that 

legislative intent. Although R.C. 2925.041(C)(1) does not itself set forth the fiveyear sentence, it states that “the court shall impose as a mandatory prison term one 

of the prison terms prescribed for a felony of the third degree that is not less than 

five years.” (Emphasis added.) A five-year prison term is indeed an available termof-years sentence in the sentencing scheme for third-degree felonies. The question 

before us is whether R.C. 2929.14(A)(3)—and its limitation of the third-degree 

felonies for which sentences greater than three years may be imposed—somehow 

foils the plain legislative intent behind R.C. 2925.041(C)(1). 

{¶ 12} “It is a well-settled rule of statutory interpretation that statutory 

provisions be construed together and the Revised Code be read as an interrelated 

body of law.” State v. Moaning, 76 Ohio St.3d 126, 128, 666 N.E.2d 1115 (1996). 

“ ‘This court in the interpretation of related and co-existing statutes must harmonize 

and give full application to all * * * statutes [concerning the same subject matter] 

unless they are irreconcilable and in hopeless conflict.’ ” United Tel. Co. of Ohio 

v. Limbach, 71 Ohio St.3d 369, 372, 643 N.E.2d 1129 (1994), quoting Johnson’s 

Mkts., Inc. v. New Carlisle Dept. of Health, 58 Ohio St.3d 28, 35, 567 N.E.2d 1018 

(1991); State v. Cook, 128 Ohio St.3d 120, 2010-Ohio-6305, 942 N.E.2d 357, ¶ 45. 

But when statutes conflict, as R.C. 2925.041(C)(1) and 2929.14(A)(3)(b) do in this 

case, “we must resort to statutory interpretation and construe the statutes so as to 

give effect to the legislature’s intent.” Summerville v. Forest Park, 128 Ohio St.3d 

221, 2010-Ohio-6280, 943 N.E.2d 522, ¶ 24. 

 
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A. Application of R.C. 1.51 

{¶ 13} “It is a well-settled principle of statutory construction that when an 

irreconcilable conflict exists between two statutes that address the same subject 

matter, one general and the other special, the special provision prevails as an 

exception to the general statute.” State v. Conyers, 87 Ohio St.3d 246, 248, 719 

N.E.2d 535 (1999). R.C. 1.51, the statutory version of this general/specific canon, 

recognizes that optimally, conflicting statutes should be construed “so that effect is 

given to both” but provides that “[i]f the conflict between the provisions is 

irreconcilable, the special or local provision prevails as an exception to the general 

provision, unless the general provision is the later adoption and the manifest intent 

is that the general provision prevail.” The rationale behind the general/specific 

canon is that “ ‘the particular provision is established upon a nearer and more exact 

view of the subject than the general, of which it may be regarded as a correction.’ 

Or think of it this way: the specific provision comes closer to addressing the very 

problem posed by the case at hand and is thus more deserving of credence.” Scalia 

& Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 183 (2012), quoting 

Jeremy Bentham, General View of a Complete Code of Laws, reprinted in 3 The 

Works of Jeremy Bentham 210 (John Bowring Ed.1843). 

1. R.C. 2925.041(C)(1) is the more specific statute 

{¶ 14} Here, R.C. 2925.041(C)(1) purports to address “the very problem

posed by the case at hand,” Scalia & Garner at 183—the methamphetamine crisis, 

a specific problem caused by a specific drug—and is thus more deserving of 

credence.1

 

1. A compelling moment from Pribble’s trial demonstrates why the General Assembly might seek 

a mandatory lengthy sentence for repeat methamphetamine manufacturers. The trial judge spoke 

eloquently about the large number of potential jurors who could not serve on the jury in this case, 

because they could not be fair to Pribble given the effect that drug abuse had had on their own lives. 
January Term, 2019 

9

{¶ 15} R.C. 2925.041(C)(1) is the more specific of the two statutes. It 

addresses sentencing for violations involving the manufacture of a specific drug, 

methamphetamine, by a narrow group of offenders, two-time felony drug-abuse 

offenders with at least one conviction or guilty plea involving the manufacture of a 

controlled substance. R.C. 2929.14(A)(3), on the other hand, is a general 

sentencing statute for third-degree felonies. 

{¶ 16} R.C. 2925.041(C)(1) is also more specific as to the sentence 

prescribed—five years—as opposed to the sentencing options available under R.C. 

2929.14(A)(3), which run from nine months to five years. If the General Assembly 

had wanted the five-year sentence prescribed by R.C. 2929.14(A)(3)(a) to be 

available under R.C. 2925.041(C)(1), why would it not simply add R.C. 

2925.041(C)(1) to the third-degree felonies listed in R.C. 2929.14(A)(3)(a) for 

which a five-year sentence may be imposed? Because that would defeat the 

purpose of instituting a mandatory five-year sentence for certain 

methamphetamine-production offenses—penalties for the offenses listed in R.C. 

2929.14(A)(3)(a) have a range of discretionary sentences available that begin at 12 

months. And unlike R.C. 2925.041(C)(1), which prescribes a mandatory five-year 

sentence, the statutes listed in R.C. 2929.14(A)(3)(a) at the time of Pribble’s offense 

did not themselves specify sentencing ranges for violations; the most specific 

statute simply stated that “[t]he court shall impose * * * a mandatory prison term 

equal to one of the prison terms prescribed in section 2929.14 of the Revised Code 

for a felony of the third degree,” 2007 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 10, former R.C. 

2907.05(C)(2). 

{¶ 17} Because it includes wide, discretionary sentencing ranges, R.C.

2929.14(A)(3) could not accommodate the General Assembly’s intent specifically 

regarding punishment for third-strike methamphetamine manufacturers—namely, 

to withhold from trial courts the discretion to impose a sentence of less than five 

years on two-time felony drug-abuse offenders convicted of this particular crime. 
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The General Assembly reflected that specific intent by separately prescribing the 

penalty in a more specific statute. R.C. 2925.041(C)(1) is a clear exception to R.C. 

2929.14(A)(3)(b). 

2. The applicable portion of R.C. 2929.14(A)(3) was not enacted later in time 

{¶ 18} Still, under R.C. 1.51, when a specific and a general provision are in 

irreconcilable conflict, the general provision prevails if it was enacted later in time 

“and the manifest intent is that the general provision prevail.” The general 

provision here, however, was not enacted later than the specific provision. 

{¶ 19} As discussed above, special penalties for methamphetamine 

production were first instituted in 2006. However, in 2011, R.C. 2925.041(C)(1) 

was amended in the same bill, H.B. 86, that amended R.C. 2929.14(A)(3), the thirddegree-felony-sentencing provision. H.B. 86 constrained the already limited 

application of R.C. 2925.041(C)(1)—before 2011, that statute also limited the 

number of third-degree felonies to which the mandatory five-year sentence 

applied—by adding the requirement that an offender have at least two prior felony 

drug-abuse convictions, including one conviction involving drug manufacturing. 

The change to R.C. 2925.041(C)(1) happened at the same time as the relevant 

changes to R.C. 2929.14(A)(3), and therefore, the general provision was not the 

later adoption. Further, there was no change to R.C. 2929.14(A)(3) from the 

enactment of H.B. 86 until the time of Pribble’s offense.2

 Therefore, we need not 

address what would be the next consideration under R.C. 1.51—whether “the 

manifest intent is that the general provision prevail.” See, e.g., State ex rel. Dublin 

Securities, Inc. v. Ohio Div. of Securities, 68 Ohio St.3d 426, 431, 627 N.E.2d 993 

(1994). We note, however, that even if that analysis were necessary, “[i]t has been 

 

2. Effective March 21, 2017, 2016 Sub.H.B. No. 470 added assisting suicide, R.C. 3795.04, to the 

offenses listed in R.C. 2929.14(A)(3)(a). Effective March 22, 2019, Am.Sub.S.B. No. 201 added 

certain child-pornography offenses, R.C. 2907.321, 2907.322, and 2907.323, to the offenses listed 

in R.C. 2929.14(A)(3)(a). 
January Term, 2019 

11 

a long-standing rule that courts will not hold prior legislation to be impliedly 

repealed by the enactment of subsequent legislation unless the subsequent 

legislation clearly requires that holding,” State v. Frost, 57 Ohio St.2d 121, 124, 

387 N.E.2d 235 (1979).

{¶ 20} Upon applying R.C. 1.51, R.C. 2925.041(C)(1) prevails over R.C.

2929.14(A)(3)(b). R.C. 2925.041(C)(1) provides an exception to general thirddegree-felony sentencing. 

B. R.C. 1.47(C) provides an additional relevant consideration

{¶ 21} “In enacting a statute, it is presumed that * * * [a] just and reasonable 

result is intended.” R.C. 1.47(C). Here, an incongruous result would occur if R.C. 

2929.14(A)(3)(b) applied to offenders like Pribble who are eligible to be sentenced 

under the third-strike provision in R.C. 2925.041(C)(1). Under R.C. 

2925.041(C)(1), a defendant with two prior felony drug-abuse offenses that do not

include a previous drug-manufacturing offense faces a mandatory prison term of 

“not less than two years.” If R.C. 2929.14(A)(3)(b) controlled the sentencing of a 

defendant convicted under R.C. 2925.041(A) whose two prior offenses do include 

drug manufacturing, that defendant could be sentenced to as little as nine months 

in prison, given the discretionary range available under that provision. Therefore, 

the defendant without the prior conviction for drug manufacturing could end up 

with a harsher sentence than the defendant who did have a previous drugmanufacturing conviction. The legislature could not have intended that result. 

C. The rule of lenity does not apply 

{¶ 22} In holding that R.C. 2929.14(A)(3)(b) prevails over R.C. 

2925.041(C)(1), the court of appeals relied on another rule of construction, the rule 

of lenity. “The rule of lenity is a principle of statutory construction that provides 

that a court will not interpret a criminal statute so as to increase the penalty it 

imposes on a defendant if the intended scope of the statute is ambiguous.” State v. 

Elmore, 122 Ohio St.3d 472, 2009-Ohio-3478, 912 N.E.2d 582, ¶ 38. The 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

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codification of the rule in R.C. 2901.04(A) states that “sections of the Revised Code 

defining offenses or penalties shall be strictly construed against the state, and 

liberally construed in favor of the accused.” 

{¶ 23} Are we again at odds, this time between statutes that instruct us how 

to construe statutes? No, because the rule of lenity is not the first place to turn when 

interpreting conflicting criminal statutes. The rule of lenity is properly applied 

when, “after all the legitimate tools of interpretation have been applied, ‘a 

reasonable doubt persists.’ ” Scalia & Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of 

Legal Texts, at 299, quoting Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 108, 111 S.Ct. 

461, 112 L.Ed.2d 449 (1990). The United States Supreme Court has also noted the 

limited applicability of the rule of lenity: “That rule, as we have repeatedly 

emphasized, applies only if, ‘after considering text, structure, history and purpose, 

there remains a grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the statute such that the Court 

must simply guess as to what Congress intended.’ ” Abramski v. United States, 573 

U.S. 169, 188, 134 S.Ct. 2259, 189 L.Ed.2d 262 (2014), fn. 14, quoting Maracich 

v. Spears, 570 U.S. 48, 76, 133 S.Ct. 2191, 186 L.Ed.2d 275 (2013). We agree that 

if other principles of construction resolve a conflict between two criminal statutes, 

there is no need to apply the rule of lenity. “ ‘ “The rule comes into operation at 

the end of the process of construing what Congress has expressed, not at the 

beginning as an overriding consideration of being lenient to wrongdoers.” ’ ” 

Elmore at ¶ 40, quoting Gozlon-Peretz v. United States, 498 U.S. 395, 410, 111 

S.Ct. 840, 112 L.Ed.2d 919 (1991), quoting Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 

587, 596, 81 S.Ct. 321, 5 L.Ed.2d 312 (1961). There is no need to perpetuate the 

idea that there is an intractable conflict requiring application of the rule of lenity 

when another rule of statutory construction resolves the conflict, as R.C. 1.51 does 

here. 

 
January Term, 2019 

13 

IV. CONCLUSION 

{¶ 24} The trial court followed the applicable statute, R.C. 2925.041(C)(1), 

in sentencing Pribble. That statute conflicts with R.C. 2929.14(A)(3)(b), but we 

conclude that the rule of statutory construction codified in R.C. 1.51 resolves the 

conflict: the mandatory five-year sentence prescribed by R.C. 2925.041(C)(1) is a 

special provision that prevails as an exception to the general statute, R.C. 

2929.14(A)(3)(b). Because applying R.C. 1.51 resolves the conflict between the 

two statutes, it is unnecessary to invoke the rule of lenity. R.C. 2925.041(C)(1) 

applies to Pribble, and the court of appeals therefore erred in reversing his sentence. 

Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals’ judgment and reinstate the sentence 

imposed by the trial court. 

Judgment reversed 

and sentence reinstated. 

FRENCH and STEWART, JJ., concur. 

O’CONNOR, C.J., and FISCHER, J., concur in judgment only. 

DEWINE, J., dissents, with an opinion. 

DONNELLY, J., dissents, with an opinion. 

_________________ 

DEWINE, J., dissenting. 

{¶ 25} We are confronted with conflicting statutory directives as to the 

permissible punishment for a crime. One statute says a judge must impose a prison 

sentence of 9 to 36 months; another statute ordains a flat five-year sentence. The 

lead opinion applies a tool of statutory construction to conclude that the longer 

sentence must be imposed. But in my view, that tool fails to provide a satisfactory 

answer in this case. I would turn to the rule of lenity and hold that the shorter 

sentencing range applies. 

{¶ 26} The crime here is the assembly or possession of chemicals for use in 

making methamphetamine, codified in R.C. 2925.041 (“the illegal-assembly 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

14 

statute”). A provision of that statute (“the illegal-assembly provision”) provides 

that for certain third-time drug offenders, the punishment shall be “one of the prison 

terms prescribed for a felony of the third degree that is not less than five years.” 

R.C. 2925.041(C)(1). 

{¶ 27} The above language was added to the illegal-assembly statute in

2006. See Am.Sub.S.B. No. 53, 151 Ohio Laws, Part I, 806, 835. At the time, R.C. 

2929.14—the statute that prescribes offenses for felonies (“the felony-sentencing 

statute”)—authorized a sentence of one to five years for third-degree felonies. See 

Am.Sub.H.B. No. 473, 150 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 5707, 5731. Thus, in 2006, a fiveyear sentence was permissible under both statutes and there was no real dispute that 

the law required that sentence to be imposed. 

{¶ 28} Some years later, the General Assembly changed tack and rewrote

the felony-sentencing statute. It reduced the sentencing range for most third-degree 

felonies to 9 to 36 months and enumerated certain offenses eligible for a heightened 

sentence of 12 to 60 months. See R.C. 2929.14(A)(3) (“the sentence-shortening 

provision”); 2011 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 86 (“H.B. 86”). Illegal assembly was not 

among the enumerated offenses subject to the longer sentencing range. Thus, 

beginning in 2011, a trial court confronted with a third-time felony drug offender 

convicted of illegally assembling chemicals to produce methamphetamine was 

instructed to impose a term of 9 to 36 months under the sentence-shortening 

provision and to impose a term of “not less than five years” under the illegalassembly provision. 

{¶ 29} The lead opinion looks to R.C. 1.51 to resolve the conflict between 

the two statutes. That section instructs that in the event of an irreconcilable conflict, 

a “special” provision applies over a “general” provision, unless the general 

provision was adopted later in time and the General Assembly manifested an intent 

that the general provision prevail. The lead opinion ultimately concludes that the 

illegal-assembly provision is a special provision that takes precedence over the 
January Term, 2019 

15 

general sentence-shortening provision. Thus, the lead opinion applies the five-year 

term set forth in the illegal-assembly provision. Lead opinion at ¶ 2. 

{¶ 30} I am not convinced. As I see it, the general/special rule does not 

persuasively resolve the conflict between the statutes. First, as Justice Donnelly 

illustrates in his dissenting opinion, it is by no means clear that the lead opinion has 

correctly labeled these statutes as “specific” and “general.” A strong argument can 

be made that both are specific. The illegal-assembly provision can be said to be 

specific in that it explicitly names the illegal-assembly offense and sets forth a 

minimum penalty for the offense. But the sentence-shortening provision can also 

be said to be specific in that it explicitly lists every third-degree felony for which a 

judge may impose a sentence longer than three years. 

{¶ 31} If both provisions are specific, then R.C. 1.51 does not apply and, 

under R.C. 1.52, the more recently enacted provision prevails. The lead opinion 

says that both the felony-sentencing statute and the illegal-assembly statute were 

amended as part of the same bill and, therefore, neither can be said to be the later 

enactment. Lead opinion at ¶ 19. See 2011 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 86. The problem 

with this assertion is that the illegal-assembly provision was not among the 

provisions of the illegal-assembly statute amended in 2011. . We are told that “[a] 

statute which is reenacted or amended is intended to be a continuation of the prior 

statute and not a new enactment, so far as it is the same as the prior statute.” R.C. 

1.54. The “key language” in the illegal-assembly statute—that imposing “one of 

the prison terms prescribed for a felony of the third degree that is not less than five 

years,” R.C. 2925.041(C)(1)—was untouched by the amendments enacted as part 

of H.B. 86. See In re Petition to Annex 320 Acres to the Village of S. Lebanon, 64 

Ohio St.3d 585, 595, 597 N.E.2d 463 (1992). That provision therefore dates back 

to the time of its original enactment in 2006. Conversely, the pertinent provision 

in the felony-sentencing statute—the sentence-shortening provision—was 

substantively amended by H.B. 86 in 2011. Thus, it seems only fair to view the 
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16 

sentence-shortening provision as the later adoption. If both provisions are 

considered to be specific, then the later-enacted sentence-shortening provision 

applies. See R.C. 1.51; R.C. 1.52. 

{¶ 32} But even if we accept the lead opinion’s characterizations of the 

illegal-assembly provision as specific and the sentence-shortening provision as 

general, we must still grapple with the manifest-intent portion of R.C. 1.51. If the 

general provision is the later adoption, R.C. 1.51 requires us to examine whether 

the General Assembly revealed a manifest intent that the general provision prevail. 

The lead opinion does not reach this issue, but there is some evidence of such an 

intent. H.B. 86—the bill creating the new felony-three sentencing range—states 

that it was enacted in part “to revise some of the penalties * * * for all third degree 

felony drug offenses that currently have mandatory prison terms” and “to change 

the sentencing structure * * * for felonies of the third degree that are not specified 

types of offenses.” That statement of intent directly addresses enactments such as 

the illegal-assembly provision. . Thus, I am not persuaded that R.C. 1.51 supports 

the result reached by the lead opinion. 

{¶ 33} There is an additional problem with the lead opinion’s logic. Even 

if we accept its questionable conclusions that (1) the illegal-assembly provision is 

specific and the sentence-shortening provision general and (2) the sentenceshortening provision is not the later enactment, the lead opinion still fails to account 

for the ambiguity within the text of the illegal-assembly provision itself. By its 

terms, the illegal-assembly provision requires both that the trial court impose “one 

of the prison terms prescribed for a felony of the third degree” and that the court 

impose a prison term of “not less than five years.” R.C. 2925.041(C)(1). This 

directive made sense under the prior version of the felony-sentencing statute when 

all third-degree felonies were subject to a maximum five-year prison term. Under 

the current version, however, different third-degree felonies are subject to different 

sentencing ranges, and a five-year sentence is no longer prescribed for the third-
January Term, 2019 

17 

degree felony offense of illegal assembly. Thus, for a court to follow the statute’s 

directive and impose one of the penalties “prescribed for a felony of the third degree 

that is not less than five years,” it would need to impose a penalty “prescribed” for 

a different felony of the third degree—that is, it would need to impose a penalty 

that was specifically not prescribed for the illegal-assembly offense. 

{¶ 34} All of this is a long way of saying that the rule of statutory 

construction relied on by the lead opinion doesn’t convincingly answer the question 

in front of us. Nor do any of our other ordinary tools of statutory construction. In 

such a situation, the legislature has instructed that “sections of the Revised Code 

defining offenses or penalties shall be strictly construed against the state, and 

liberally construed in favor of the accused.” R.C. 2901.04(A). This statutory 

provision is a codification of the rule of lenity, the idea that “ambiguous criminal 

laws [are] to be interpreted in favor of the defendants subjected to them,” United 

States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 514, 128 S.Ct. 2020, 170 L.Ed.2d 912 (2008) 

(Scalia, J.). There are good reasons for such a rule: 

This venerable rule not only vindicates the fundamental principle 

that no citizen should be held accountable for a violation of a statute 

whose commands are uncertain, or subjected to punishment that is 

not clearly prescribed. It also places the weight of inertia upon the 

party that can best induce Congress to speak more clearly and keeps 

courts from making criminal law in Congress’s stead. 

Id.

{¶ 35} It is true that we employ traditional methods of textual interpretation 

to determine at the outset whether the provision at issue is truly ambiguous; the rule 

of lenity “operates only at the end of the process of construction.” (Cleaned up.) 

United States v. R.L.C., 503 U.S. 291, 311, 112 S.Ct. 1329, 117 L.Ed.2d 559 (1992) 
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(Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). But when those 

methods fail to yield a satisfactory construction, the rule of lenity instructs that we 

must choose the construction that favors the criminal defendant. 

{¶ 36} That is precisely the situation here. Our well-established methods of 

statutory construction do not convincingly resolve the conflict between the statutes, 

nor do they clarify the ambiguous language regarding punishment within the 

illegal-assembly provision. The rule of lenity compels us to opt for the shorter 

sentencing range. Because the lead opinion concludes otherwise, I respectfully 

dissent. 

_________________ 

DONNELLY, J., dissenting. 

{¶ 37} I dissent. The Fourth District Court of Appeals got it exactly right 

when it held that the General Assembly created an irreconcilable conflict between 

R.C. 2929.14(A)(3) and 2925.041(C)(1), and frustrating as it may be, courts are 

obligated to strictly construe those statutes against the state until the General 

Assembly reconciles their discordant language. The conflict between the statutes 

cannot be resolved as the majority has decided without contorting the nature of the 

conflict, the text of the statutes themselves, and the role of strict construction in the 

process. The correct outcome here is to affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 

I. Introduction 

{¶ 38} Before I enter into the jumble of numbers and letters that inevitably 

piles up when picking apart statutory provisions, I want to frame this conflict in 

plain English. This matter does not actually involve a clean conflict; it does not 

involve two statutes that independently prescribe conflicting sentences. The two 

statutory provisions at issue in this case are interrelated. One statute used to 

prescribe a range of prison sentences. The other statute incorporated that 

sentencing range but added an extra requirement. Subsequently, the sentencing-
January Term, 2019 

19 

range statute changed in a way that made it impossible to satisfy the extra 

requirement. 

{¶ 39} One solution to this problem would be to pretend that the extrarequirement statute is actually a stand-alone sentencing provision that no longer 

incorporates the sentencing-range statute (despite the fact that the extrarequirement statute still says that it incorporates the sentencing-range statute) and 

that the specific nature of the extra requirement indicates that the General Assembly 

meant for it to be a stand-alone exception to the sentencing-range statute. Another 

solution would be to modify the extra requirement so that it can remain at least 

partially effective in light of the sentencing-range statute that the extra-requirement 

statute expressly incorporates. 

{¶ 40} The lead opinion concludes that the former solution is the only

possible choice when considering the canon of statutory construction that favors a 

specific over a general provision. I would hold that the latter solution is the better 

choice, even when using the lead opinion’s chosen analytical tools. I would also 

hold that the appropriate analytical tool for this conflict in penal statutory language 

is the rule of strict construction, also called the rule of lenity. And under the rule 

of lenity, the latter solution is all but required. 

II. A proper understanding of the statutes involved 

{¶ 41} The allegedly general statute in this conflict is R.C. 2929.14(A)(3) 

(“F3 statute”), which prescribes a range of prison sentences for third-degree 

felonies. It is divided into one general and one specific provision. For most thirddegree felonies, it prescribes prison terms of “nine, twelve, eighteen, twenty-four, 

thirty, or thirty-six months.” R.C. 2929.14(A)(3)(b) (“general F3 provision”). For 

a special subset of enumerated third-degree felony offenses, it prescribes prison 

terms of “twelve, eighteen, twenty-four, thirty, thirty-six, forty-two, forty-eight, 

fifty-four, or sixty months.” R.C. 2929.14(A)(3)(a) (“specific F3 provision”). 
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{¶ 42} The allegedly specific statute in this conflict is a provision within 

R.C. 2925.041, which governs the offense of illegal assembly or possession of 

chemicals for the manufacture of drugs. The specific provision at issue provides 

that for certain third-strike offenders who have violated the statute, “the court shall 

impose as a mandatory prison term one of the prison terms prescribed for a felony 

of the third degree that is not less than five years.” R.C. 2925.041(C)(1) (“thirdstrike provision”). 

{¶ 43} The plain language of the foregoing statutes, as well as their 

interrelationship, reveal that the F3 statute is not necessarily a general statute, the 

third-strike provision is not an independent specific statute, the third-strike 

provision conflicts with both the general and specific F3 provisions, and the true 

conflict lies within the third-strike provision itself. . 

A. R.C. 2929.14(A)(3) is no longer just a general statute 

{¶ 44} When the third-strike provision was added to R.C. 2925.041 in 2006, 

the version of the F3 statute that was in effect could fairly be characterized as a 

general statute, with nothing in particular to prevent the judiciary from inferring 

special exceptions in other statutes that address specific offenses. At that time, it 

stated: “For a felony of the third degree, the prison term shall be one, two, three, 

four, or five years.” Former R.C. 2929.14(A)(3), Am.Sub.H.B. No. 473, 150 Ohio 

Laws, Part IV, 5707, 5731. 

{¶ 45} But in 2011, the General Assembly revamped the F3 statute to 

prescribe a range of definite sentences from 9 to 36 months for most third-degree 

felony offenses in the general F3 provision, R.C. 2929.14(A)(3)(b). 2011 

Am.Sub.H.B. No. 86 (“H.B. 86”). The General Assembly also created an exception 

for certain specified felonies, prescribing a range of 12 to 60 months in the specific 

F3 provision, R.C. 2929.14(A)(3)(a). 

{¶ 46} The specific F3 provision, R.C. 2929.14(A)(3)(a), lists many 

offenses for which a sentence of up to five years may be imposed, including 
January Term, 2019 

21 

vehicular homicide (R.C. 2903.06), aggravated vehicular assault (R.C. 2903.08), 

sexual battery (R.C. 2907.03), unlawful sexual conduct with a minor (R.C. 

2907.04), gross sexual imposition (R.C. 2907.05), and certain types of robbery and 

burglary offenses (R.C. 2911.02 and 2911.12). It is quite a variety. But it is not a 

variety wide enough to characterize R.C. 2929.14(A)(3)(a) either as a general 

statute, or as anything other than a specific exception to the general F3 provision, 

R.C. 2929.14(A)(3)(b), for particular offenses deemed by the General Assembly to 

be more severe in nature than most third-degree felonies. 

{¶ 47} To remove any suspicion that the specific F3 provision could 

somehow be generally applied to other unenumerated offenses by judicial inference 

alone, the F3 statute further specifies that the general F3 provision—and not the 

specific F3 provision—must apply to any “felony of the third degree that is not an 

offense for which division (A)(3)(a) of this section applies.” (Emphasis added.) 

R.C. 2929.14(A)(3)(b). 

{¶ 48} The F3 statute is no longer the general statute that it was in 2006. It 

is now bifurcated into two separate provisions. Even assuming that R.C. 

2929.14(A)(3)(b) is a general statutory provision, R.C. 2929.14(A)(3)(a) remains a 

specific provision of limited application. 

B. R.C. 2925.041(C)(1) is not an independent variable 

{¶ 49} The third-strike provision in R.C. 2925.041(C)(1) is not a standalone sentencing provision. Rather than prescribing a definite sentence or range 

for repeat offenders, the third-strike provision states that “one of the prison terms 

prescribed for a felony of the third degree” applies. R.C. 2925.041(C)(1). In other 

words, the third-strike provision does not prescribe the prison terms involved; the 

F3 statute does. 

{¶ 50} What makes the third-strike provision an allegedly specific statute is 

that it narrows the sentencing range prescribed in the F3 statute by raising the floor 

of that range to “not less than five years,” R.C. 2925.041(C)(1). It is not a full 
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22 

exception: it does not purport to alter the ceiling of the range provided in the F3 

statute, and it does not provide its own sentence or range of sentences independent 

of the F3 statute. 

{¶ 51} Without using a sentencing range prescribed by the F3 statute, the 

third-strike provision in R.C. 2925.041(C)(1) would have no independent force; it 

would impose a five-year minimum on nothing. 

C. The five-year minimum in R.C. 2925.041(C)(1) conflicts with both the 

specific and the general sentencing provisions in R.C. 2929.14(A)(3) 

{¶ 52} There was no conflict between the third-strike provision of R.C. 

2925.041(C)(1) and the F3 statute, R.C. 2929.14(A)(3), in 2006. The five-year 

minimum in the third-strike provision made some sense when it was enacted in 

2006, because the F3 statute provided a general range of one to five years for all 

third-degree felonies at the time. I stress that it made only some sense. This is 

because the practical result of combining a five-year minimum in the third-strike 

provision with a five-year maximum in the F3 statute in 2006 was the requirement 

of a sentence of exactly five years, with no discretion left to the sentencing court. 

{¶ 53} Why the General Assembly decided to add the aura of judicial 

discretion to the third-strike provision when none existed is unclear. What matters, 

though, is that the General Assembly did not choose to simply state in the thirdstrike provision of R.C. 2925.041(C)(1) that a mandatory five-year sentence—no 

more and no less—applied; it chose to make the third-strike provision dependent 

upon the range permitted in the F3 statute.3 

 

3. It is at this point that the justices joining the lead opinion most deviate from the text of the statutes 

to achieve their desired result. The lead opinion characterizes R.C. 2925.041(C)(1) as imposing a 

singular, independent “mandatory five-year sentence,” lead opinion at ¶ 16, despite the fact that the 

actual text provides only a minimum and is entirely dependent upon the sentences prescribed in R.C. 

2929.14(A)(3). The lead opinion also claims that the “purpose” behind R.C. 2925.041 is 

inconsistent with linking division (C)(1) to an entire range of sentences in R.C. 2929.14(A)(3), lead 

opinion at ¶ 16, despite the fact that the text of R.C. 2925.041(C)(1) expressly creates that exact 

link. 
January Term, 2019 

23 

{¶ 54} In 2011, the five-year floor in the third-strike provision ceased to 

make any sense at all. The five-year minimum is not allowed by the general F3 

provision, R.C. 2929.14(A)(3)(b), because the new general range allows sentences 

of up to only three years. And the five-year minimum is not allowed by the specific 

F3 provision, R.C. 2929.14(A)(3)(a), because the plain language of that provision 

prohibits the application of its 12-to-60-month sentencing range to offenses that are 

not listed. As noted above, the offenses listed in the specific F3 provision are 

diverse. But they do not include the offense defined in R.C. 2925.041, nor do they 

include any offenses that are similar to that offense. 

{¶ 55} This court has already held that if an offense is not listed in the 

specific F3 provision, R.C. 2929.14(A)(3)(a), then the 9-to-36-month range in the 

general F3 provision—and not the five-year range in the specific F3 provision—

applies. State v. South, 144 Ohio St.3d 295, 2015-Ohio-3930, 42 N.E.3d 734, ¶ 18. 

In South, the court considered a sentencing provision, R.C. 2929.14(B)(4), 

prescribing a discretionary sentencing range of “ ‘any duration specified’ ” in the 

F3 statute for certain offenses for operating a vehicle while under the influence of 

alcohol or drugs (“OVI”). South at ¶ 18. Similarly to this case, the reference in 

R.C. 2929.14(B)(4) to the F3 statute signified a potential sentence of “one, two, 

three, four, or five years” prior to 2011, former R.C. 2929.14(A)(3), Am.Sub.H.B. 

No. 473, 150 Ohio Laws, Part IV, at 5731, but when the F3 statute was amended in 

H.B. 86, the meaning of the reference changed. 

{¶ 56} There was no statutory conflict for this court to resolve in South, 

because the language of R.C. 2929.14(B)(4) was flexible and still had meaning, 

albeit a different meaning, after H.B. 86 became effective in 2011. See South at 

¶ 7. The court was able to harmonize the language in the specific OVI-sentencing 

provision with the general sentencing range in R.C. 2929.14(A)(3)(b), leaving no 

reason to further discuss the significance of the 12-to-60-month sentencing range 

in the specific F3 provision, R.C. 2929.14(A)(3)(a). 
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24 

{¶ 57} Unlike the language of R.C. 2929.14(B)(4) at issue in South, the 

language of the third-strike provision of R.C. 2925.041(C)(1) is not flexible and 

cannot be harmonized with the general F3 provision, R.C. 2929.14(A)(3)(b). Also 

unlike in South, our consideration of the statutory language here does not stop at 

the general F3 provision. We must also consider the exception provided in the 

specific F3 provision, R.C. 2929.14(A)(3)(a). The additional consideration is 

significant to how we must resolve the conflict between the third-strike provision 

and the F3 statute. The majority cannot conclude merely that the third-strike 

provision is intended to be an exception to the general F3 provision, R.C. 

2929.14(A)(3)(b); it would also have to determine that the third-strike provision is 

intended to be an exception to the exclusive nature of the exception created by the 

specific F3 provision, R.C. 2929.14(A)(3)(a). 

III. The applicable tools of interpretation 

{¶ 58} Given the context provided above regarding the nature of the statutes 

and the conflict, I disagree with the lead opinion’s conclusion that “the mandatory 

five-year sentence prescribed by R.C. 2925.041(C)(1) is a special provision that 

prevails as an exception to the general statute, R.C. 2929.14(A)(3)(b),” lead opinion 

at ¶ 24. Instead, the third-strike provision of R.C. 2925.041(C)(1) does not 

independently prescribe a five-year sentence, the analysis does not stop at the 

general F3 provision, R.C. 2929.14(A)(3)(b), and the appropriate canons of 

statutory interpretation must be applied to the conflict between the third-strike 

provision and the specific F3 provision, R.C. 2929.14(A)(3)(a).

A. The general/specific canon and R.C. 1.51 

{¶ 59} The lead opinion primarily relies on the general/specific canon of 

interpretation articulated in R.C. 1.51 and Scalia & Garner, Reading Law: The 

Interpretation of Legal Texts 183 (2012). In the event of an irreconcilable conflict 

between statutory provisions, the canon instructs that “the special or local provision 

prevails as an exception to the general provision, unless the general provision is the 
January Term, 2019 

25 

later adoption and the manifest intent is that the general provision prevail.” R.C. 

1.51. With a proper understanding of the statutes involved, it is doubtful that the 

general/specific canon is particularly relevant to the conflict. But even if we 

consider it to be the most relevant rule, the application of this rule renders a result 

different from the one reached by the lead opinion. 

1. R.C. 2925.041(C)(1) is not the more specific statute 

{¶ 60} As explained above, the third-strike provision in R.C. 

2925.041(C)(1) is not a stand-alone sentencing provision. Thus, it is not quite 

accurate to characterize the third-strike provision as a specific statute that can apply 

instead of the F3 statute. Even assuming that it is proper to call the third-strike 

provision a specific statute in this context, it is not more specific than provisions 

within the F3 statute. 

{¶ 61} R.C. 2925.041(C) addresses the punishments that may be applicable 

to the specific offense of illegal assembly or possession of chemicals for the 

manufacture of methamphetamine. It is certainly more specific than R.C. 

2929.14(A)(3)(b), which prescribes sentences for third-degree felony offenses in 

general. But the specific F3 provision, R.C. 2929.14(A)(3)(a), enumerates specific 

offenses that are considered to be more severe in nature than most third-degree 

felonies and allows a special range of more severe punishments to apply to those 

enumerated offenses. 

{¶ 62} The specific F3 provision, R.C. 2929.14(A)(3)(a), is, at the very 

least, on equal footing with the third-strike provision in R.C. 2925.014(C)(1) in 

terms of specificity. The exclusivity of the enumerated list of offenses in the 

specific F3 provision, as well as the instruction in R.C. 2929.14(A)(3)(b) that the 

12-to-60-month sentencing range is unavailable for any “felony of the third degree 

that is not an offense for which division (A)(3)(a) of this section applies,” prohibits 

the inference that the third-strike provision is an exception to division (A)(3)(a) or 
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26 

(A)(3)(b). Accordingly, the third-strike provision cannot prevail as the more 

specific statute. 

2. The sentencing ranges of both the specific and the general provisions of R.C. 

2929.14(A)(3) were enacted later in time 

{¶ 63} The offense of illegal assembly or possession of chemicals for the 

manufacture of drugs, R.C. 2925.041, was first established in 2001. Sub.H.B. No. 

7, 149 Ohio Laws, Part II, 4000, 4012-4013. Originally, any violation of R.C. 

2925.041 was a third-degree felony. Id. In 2004, the legislature added a felonylevel enhancement to R.C. 2925.041(C): the offense remained a third-degree felony 

but was raised to a second-degree felony for violations committed near a juvenile 

or a school. Am.Sub.S.B. No. 58, 150 Ohio Laws, Part V, 7494, 7504-7505.

{¶ 64} In 2006, the General Assembly added sanction-level enhancements

for violations involving methamphetamines by requiring certain sentencing 

minimums: under R.C. 2925.041(C)(1) for third-degree felony offenses and under 

division (C)(2) for second-degree felony offenses. Am.Sub.S.B. No. 53, 151 Ohio 

Laws, Part I, 806, 834-836. Each subdivision had two enhancement steps: the first 

step applied to any violation involving methamphetamine manufacturing and the 

second step applied if the offender also had a prior conviction for certain drug 

offenses—specifically, drug manufacturing or drug-related child endangerment. 

The sentencing minimums for the first and second steps were two and five years 

for third-degree felonies and three and five years for second-degree felonies. 

{¶ 65} In 2011, the General Assembly changed the aggravating 

circumstances that qualified for the enhancement steps in R.C. 2925.041(C)(1). 

2011 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 86. Now, the first step for third-degree-felony violations 

applies if the offender has two or more prior convictions for any felony drug 

offense, and the second step applies if at least one of those convictions was for drug 

manufacturing or drug-related child endangerment. But the sentencing structure 

for the steps remained the same; the sentencing minimums for the first and second 
January Term, 2019 

27 

steps are still two and five years for third-degree felonies, and they are still three 

and five years for second-degree felonies. 

{¶ 66} Meanwhile, for decades, R.C. 2929.14(A)(3), the F3 statute, had

provided the same sentencing structure for third-degree felony offenses: a simple 

range of one to five years. See Am.Sub.S.B. No. 2, 146 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 7136, 

7464. But in 2011, the General Assembly completely overhauled the sentencing 

structure for third-degree felonies in the F3 statute, creating the bifurcated special 

and general sentencing ranges described above. 

{¶ 67} The statutory conflict here is not related to the nature of an offender’s 

violation of R.C. 2925.041 or what the offender has done to qualify for certain 

felony or sanction enhancements within R.C. 2925.041. The conflict arises from 

the structure of the sanctions imposed on those felony-enhancement or sanctionenhancement steps. Although some aspects of R.C. 2929.041 have changed, the 

actual sentencing structure and minimum terms for the enhancement steps in R.C. 

2929.041(C) have remained the same since 2006. See R.C. 1.54 (“A statute which 

is reenacted or amended is intended to be a continuation of the prior statute and not 

a new enactment, so far as it is the same as the prior statute”). The significant 

changes to the sentencing structure of the F3 statute were enacted later in time. 

3. The result of employing the general/specific canon 

{¶ 68} Because R.C. 2929.14(A)(3)(a) is a specific statute and prohibits the 

inference that the third-strike provision is an exception to division (A)(3)(a) or 

(A)(3)(b), the third-strike provision of R.C. 2925.041(C)(1) cannot prevail as the 

more specific statute. Because the prison-term ranges in the F3 statute were enacted 

later in time than the minimum ranges in the third-strike provision, the ranges in 

the F3 statute must prevail. 

{¶ 69} Irrespective of the result, though, application of the general/specific 

canon of interpretation (and its later-in-time exception) do not truly address the 

conflict in this case. This is not the kind of case in which we must resolve a conflict 
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between two completely separate statutes that make no reference to each other and 

that prescribe conflicting penalties of independent force. The conflict that needs to 

be resolved is actually within the third-strike provision itself. The language of the 

third-strike provision at issue here is: “the court shall impose as a mandatory prison 

term one of the prison terms prescribed for a felony of the third degree that is not 

less than five years,” R.C. 2925.041(C)(1). The first part of this provision indicates 

that the general rule for third-degree felonies applies, and the second part states a 

number that cannot apply under the general rule for third-degree felonies. When 

an irreconcilable conflict of this nature “occurs with penal provisions, the result 

should favor the accused.” Scalia & Garner at 190. In other words, the rule of 

lenity must apply. 

B. The rule of lenity and R.C. 2901.04(A) 

{¶ 70} Contrary to the lead opinion’s representation, when it comes to

criminal statutes, the rule of lenity is not always the last kid picked in gym class. 

As the lead opinion notes, see lead opinion at ¶ 23, some leading authorities have 

advised that the rule of lenity can apply only “after all the legitimate tools of 

interpretation have been applied, ‘a reasonable doubt persists.’ ” Scalia & Garner 

at 299, quoting Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 108, 111 S.Ct. 461, 112 

L.Ed.2d 449 (1990). But those same authorities have also argued that many tools 

of interpretation are not appropriate in the context of criminal statutes. See, e.g.,

Moskal at 132 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (inferences regarding legislative purpose 

should not be used to construe an ambiguous penal statute against a criminal 

defendant); United States v. R.L.C., 503 U.S. 291, 307, 112 S.Ct. 1329, 117 L.Ed.2d 

559 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (legislative history should not be used to construe 

an ambiguous penal statute against a criminal defendant). Further, the same 

authorities have argued that the rule of lenity is not limited to instances of 

“ ‘grievous ambiguity,’ ” Scalia & Garner at 299, quoting Muscarello v. United 
January Term, 2019 

29 

States, 524 U.S. 125, 139, 118 S.Ct. 1911, 141 L.Ed.2d 111 (1998). Instead, they 

have argued, the breadth of the rule’s use should be increased:

On the whole, it might fairly be said that the rule of lenity is 

underused in modern judicial decision-making—perhaps the 

consequence of zeal to smite the wicked. The defendant has almost 

always done a bad thing, and the instinct to punish the wrongdoer is 

a strong one. But a fair system of laws requires precision in the 

definition of offenses and punishments. The less the courts insist on 

precision, the less the legislatures will take the trouble to provide it. 

(Footnote omitted.) Id. at 301. 

{¶ 71} I think the rule of lenity ought to apply to the interpretation of 

criminal statutes far more than it has been applied in recent years. Although 

criminal laws should not be “construed so strictly as to defeat the obvious intention 

of the legislature,” we should first and foremost value the fact that the age-old rule 

of lenity “is founded on the tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals [as 

well as] the plain principle that the power of punishment is vested in the legislative, 

not in the judicial department.” United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. 76, 77, 95, 5 

L.Ed. 37 (1820). And if we are to say with a straight face that ignorance of the law 

is no excuse, then we must insist that lack of clarity in the law is no excuse either. 

See McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27, 51 S.Ct. 340, 75 L.Ed. 816 (1931) 

(“it is reasonable that a fair warning should be given to the world in language that 

the common world will understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line is 

passed”). 

{¶ 72} Further, even if the rule of lenity is considered a last resort by some 

conservative modern authorities on statutory interpretation, it cannot be considered 

a last resort in Ohio criminal law, because our General Assembly has specifically 
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instructed otherwise in R.C. 2901.04(A): “[S]ections of the Revised Code defining 

offenses or penalties shall be strictly construed against the state, and liberally 

construed in favor of the accused.” The instruction in R.C. 2901.04(A) is a 

“specific” rule that prevails over other general rules of construction in R.C. Chapter 

1 by the very terms of one of those rules. See R.C. 1.51 (general/specific canon). 

{¶ 73} The lead opinion dismisses the General Assembly’s own instruction 

on its intent by invoking judicially created canons of statutory interpretation and by 

citing cases suggesting that the rule of lenity should be applied only as a last resort 

after considering all other canons of interpretation. As a general notion, I disagree 

that there is a hierarchy of canons of interpretation that is as immutable as the lead 

opinion and its cited cases let on. Regardless, the alleged hierarchy of canons of 

interpretation does not trump the legislature’s clear expression of its intent to us in 

R.C. 2901.04(A): “Dear judicial branch, if there is an ambiguity or conflict in these 

statutes, our intent was to take the more lenient course of action.” That is as crystal 

clear as legislative intent can get. Canons of statutory interpretation are certainly 

not more authoritative than the statutes themselves and therefore cannot undo the 

explicit intent of the legislature. 

{¶ 74} Accordingly, the rule of lenity is the appropriate canon of 

interpretation to use in attempting to resolve the conflicting language in the thirdstrike provision, R.C. 2925.041(C)(1). 

IV. Resolution of the conflict through the rule of lenity 

{¶ 75} The nature of the conflict here is clear: the General Assembly made 

a mistake. Either it meant (but failed) to reduce the minimum prison term in the 

third-strike provision of R.C. 2925.041(C)(1) to match the new, lesser maximum 

prison term permitted by the 9-to-36-month range in the general F3 statute, R.C. 

2929.14(A)(3)(b), or it meant (but failed) to either divorce the third-strike provision 

from the F3 statute or include it in the list of exceptions in the specific F3 provision. 

We should not fix the mistake for the General Assembly; it is not our place to step 
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into the shoes of the legislature to speak on its behalf. See Bell v. United States, 

349 U.S. 81, 83, 75 S.Ct. 620, 99 L.Ed. 905 (1955) (the rule of lenity, rather than a 

judicial fix, must apply “when Congress leaves to the Judiciary the task of imputing 

to Congress an undeclared will”). We must therefore strictly construe the thirdstrike provision in R.C. 2925.041(C)(1) until the General Assembly provides 

language that is capable of being harmonized within the criminal code. 

{¶ 76} In order to strictly construe R.C. 2925.041(C)(1), we would not need 

to invalidate the third-strike provision in its entirety. When invalidation becomes 

necessary, a court “ ‘should refrain from invalidating more of the statute than is 

necessary.’ ” Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684, 107 S.Ct. 1476, 94 

L.Ed.2d 661 (1987), quoting Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 652, 104 S.Ct. 

3262, 82 L.Ed.2d 487 (1984) (plurality opinion). The portion of the third-strike 

provision that incorporates the F3 statute but raises the mandatory minimum 

sentence to the maximum sentence allowable by the F3 statute is just as valid now 

as it was before the F3 statute was amended. The only part of the third-strike 

provision that cannot currently be applied is the extent to which it exceeds the threeyear maximum in the general sentencing range in R.C. 2929.14(A)(3)(b). 

Accordingly, to strictly construe the third-strike provision while preserving it to the 

extent that it can be applied, we need only reduce the number five to the number 

three. 

{¶ 77} Because the rule of lenity allows for a reasonable resolution of the 

internal conflict within the language of the third-strike provision of R.C. 

2925.041(C)(1) and its external conflict with the general and specific provisions of 

the F3 statute, the lead opinion’s appeal to the absurd-result principle, embodied in 

R.C. 1.47(C), is unavailing. Although the terms of the F3 statute prevail over the 

terms of the third-strike provision, they do not render the third-strike provision 

completely inoperative. A defendant facing punishment pursuant to the third-strike 

provision of R.C. 2925.041(C)(1) would be sentenced to a mandatory prison term 
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of not less than three years and could not be sentenced to as little as nine months in 

prison as the lead opinion claims. 

{¶ 78} Finally, it bears noting that the lead opinion’s solution requires 

deletion of most of the relevant language in the third-strike provision of R.C. 

2925.041(C)(1): “the court shall impose as a mandatory prison term one of the 

prison terms prescribed for a felony of the third degree that is not less than five 

years.” My solution of changing the number five to the number three is far simpler. 

It also reflects the fairest possible reading of the applicable statutes and does the 

least violence to the language. Thus, in addition to providing a just and logical 

result, applying the rule of lenity to this particular conflict provides the simplest, 

most straightforward solution. 

V. Conclusion 

{¶ 79} Although the lead opinion implies otherwise, its objective cannot be 

to allow the third-strike provision of R.C. 2925.041(C)(1) to independently apply 

as its own specific sentencing provision to the exclusion of the provisions of R.C. 

2929.14(A)(3), the F3 statute. Quite the opposite; the justices joining the lead 

opinion know that the F3 statute must apply: the third-strike provision in R.C. 

2925.041(C)(1) expressly requires as much. The problem is that the lead opinion 

is trying to insinuate the third-strike provision into the special, harsher sentencing 

range permitted in the later-enacted R.C. 2929.14(A)(3)(a) despite the fact that the 

plain language of R.C. 2929.14(A)(3)(a) does not allow the third-strike provision 

of R.C. 2925.041(C)(1) to be included. 

{¶ 80} It is possible that the General Assembly’s intent was exactly as the 

justices joining the lead opinion infer, and it is just as possible that its intent was 

otherwise. Regardless, we should not speculate to resolve this kind of conflict, 

especially in the context of penal statutes. Until the General Assembly makes its 

intent clear in the general and specific sentencing provisions of the F3 statute and 

the third-strike provision of R.C. 2925.041(C)(1), we should strictly construe the 
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33 

third-strike provision so that its sentencing minimum does not exceed the maximum 

allowed by the general sentencing provision in R.C. 2929.14(A)(3)(b). The Fourth 

District Court of Appeals understood this quite well, and I would therefore affirm 

its judgment. 

_________________ 

David C. Kelley, Adams County Prosecuting Attorney, and Mark R.

Weaver, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant. 

Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Allen Vender, Assistant Public 

Defender, for appellee. 

_________________