The Honor able Ave rn Cohn, United States District J udg e for the Easter

n District of * Michig an, sitting by

desig nation. NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 08a0337n.06 F iled: Jun e 13, 2008 No. 07-3922 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
A TO Z , I NC.; XTREME DVD, I

NC., dba Video Superstore , Pla int if fs -A pp e lla nts , v. CI TY OF CL EVELAND; CI TY OF PARMA, De fe nd ants -A

pp e lle e s. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEALFROM THE U NI TED STATES DI STRI CT COURT FOR THE N O R T H E R

N D IS T R IC T O F O H IO

Be fore : GI L MAN and COOK , Circuit J udg es; and COHN, District J udg e. *
P E R C U R IA M
. T w o a d

u l tb u s i n e s s e s , A t o Z , In c . , an d X tr e m e D V D , In c . ( c o l l e c t i v e l y, “Xtre me”) , appea l the district court’s gr an t o f summary judgme nt to the cities of Cleveland a nd Parma on res-judicata and st atute-of -limitations grounds, as w ell as the de nial of their own motion fo r s umm ary

jud g me nt c ha lle n g i n g

C l e v e l a n d ’ s a d u l t - b u s i n e ss zo nin g or din anc e a s unc on sti tut ion a l. Be cause the two-y ear statute of l imitations applicable to Xtreme ’s l awsuit has i ndeed expi red, w e aff irm.
I.No. 07-3922

A to Z, Inc. v. City of Cleveland

- 2 - Xtreme operates a g ener al vi d eo rental store ne ar Cleve land’s borde r with Parma, a
so uthwe ste rn

su burb . T his dis pute be g an in F e br ua ry 20 02 , w he n X tr e me a

pp lie d f or a pe rm it t o
conver t its ex isting video re ntal store into an adult video store , bookstore, and vide o arc ade.
The ne x t month, C leveland de nied the per mit application o n

tw o gr o u n d s : Xtr eme’ s proposal fe a tur e d a tr io o f a du lt e nte rt a inm e nt u se s, wh e n Cl e ve lan d’s ord in anc e s a llo we d o nly on e a du lt enter tainme nt u s e p e r lot; and it encroa ched—just bar ely —on the ordinanc es’ 1,000- foot buffe r fr om
re sid e nti a l di str ic ts.
I n J uly 2002, Cleveland a

nd Parma e ntere d into a use-r ecipr ocity ag ree ment requiringeac h city to “consider

the lots and uses ac ross [the] com m on border ” for “all instance s where [a city ’s zoning code ] requires a se paration of lots or uses.” The re citals explained that the Parma side of the border was “ zoned pri m arily

for c ommercia l and re sidential uses,” while the Cleveland side wa s “zoned primarily

for industrial uses” ; theref ore, the ag ree ment stated, “[ i ] t is desirable f or the municipalities to consider uses a cross their c ommon bor der beca use of the inconsistencies of zoned
uses ac ross that border .”
Meanwhile, Xt re m e s u b d i v i ded its lot to set the store beyond 1,000 fee t from the nea rby Cleveland re sidential district and scal ed b ac k i ts business plan to a single adult video store. Be lie v i n g t h at i t now merited a permit, Xtreme re- applied in J une 2003. B ut by then, the
use-r ecipr ocity

ag ree ment betwee n Cleveland a nd Parma ha d been in e ffe ct for ne arly a y ear . Be cause Xtreme was a g ain within 1,000 fee t of a r e s id e ntial district—this time in Parma—ClevelandNo. 07-3922

A to Z, Inc. v. City of Cleveland

- 3 - de nie d th e pe rm it a

pp lic a tio n. Sin c e the pe rm it d e nia l, P arm a re du c e d it s b uf

fe r zo ne to 20 0 f

e e t in Fe bruar y 2005, but Cleveland has maintaine d its 1,000-foot restriction.
Xtre me br ou g ht uns uc c e ssf ul ap pe a ls in the B oa

rd of Z on ing Ap pe a ls, the Cuyaho g a County Court of Com mon Ple a s, and

the Ei g hth

Di str ic t Co ur

t of Ap pe a ls. Aft er Xtre me ’s a dv e rs e Oh io appellate judgme nt, it filed a complaint in the Norther n Di s trict of Ohio on September 8, 2005, alleg ing that Cleveland Codified Ordina nce § 347.07, the ordinanc e creating the 1,000-foot buffe r from residential are as, violates the First, Fifth, and Four teenth Amendments of th e U n i t ed S t ates Constit ution, as well as Ar ticle 1 of the O hio Consti tution. The complaint soug ht to invalidate the
use-r ecipr ocity

ag ree ment beca

use of its failure to comply with Ohio proce dural law s, to recoup the compliance exp en s es t h at Xt reme incurre d afte r the fir st permit denial, and to enjoin any further
e nf or c e me nt a g a ins t an a du lt u se on Xtre me ’s lot
. Cle ve land

and Parm a re sp on de d wi th a batte ry of de fe ns e s, and

the dis tr ic t c ourt

a g re e d w ith two of them: expiration of the statute of limitations and res judicata
. II.
On re view of a

g rant of summar

y judgme nt, “[thi s court] appl[i es] a de novo standa rd of
re vie w, vie w[s ] t

he e vid e nc e in t

he lig ht m os t f

avo ra ble to t he no n- mov ingpa

rt y , a nd wi ll a ff ir m a g rant of summ ar y j u d gm ent if the re cord e vidence does not establish a g enuine issue of materia l fac t.” Jones v . Rey nolds , 438 F .3 d 685 , 689 (6 th Cir . 2 00 6) (i nte rn a l c itatio ns omi tte d) ; see also Fe d.No. 07-3922

A to Z, Inc. v. City of Cleveland

- 4 - R. Civ. P . 56(c)
. We revie w de novo a dis trict court’s application of a statute of limitations. Banks v. City of W hite ha ll , 344 F.3d 550, 553 ( 6th Cir. 2003). This court an al o gi z es § 1983 claims to state-law persona l injury

claims and e mploy s the limit ations period fr om the forum state ’s law. Browning v. Pendleton , 869 F.2d 989, 991 (6 t h C i r. 1989). The parties a g ree that Ohio’s two-y ear statute of limit ations for persona l injury claims go v erns, see Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2305.10(A ), but they dispute when the c laim acc rued.
Fe dera l la w, rathe r than Ohio law, deter mines claim ac crua l. Cooey v . Strickland , 479 F.3d 4 1 2 , 4 1 6 (6 t hC i r. 2 0 0 7 ) ( ci t i n g W all ac e v . Ka to , 127 S. Ct . 1091, 1095 (2007)) . “Unde r fe dera l law, the limitations period be g ins to run when a pla intiff knew or should ha

ve known of

the injury

that forms t he basis of t he cla im.” Fo xv . D e So to , 4 8 9 F
. 3 d

2 2 7 , 2 3 3 ( 6 thC i r . 2 0 0 7 )
. P u tan o th e r w ay, “we have looke d to what event should have alerte d the ty pical lay person to prote ct his or her rig hts.” Hughes v . Vanderbilt Univ. , 215 F.3d 543, 548 (6th Cir. 2000) (interna l quotation marks omitted).
Cle ve land

and Parm a argue tha t X tr e me ’s c la im a c c ru e d w he n th e B oa rd of Z on ingAp pe a ls iss ue d its fi na l or de r de nying the se c on d pe rm it a pp lic a tio n on June 20 , 20 03
. At that po int , X tr e me kn e w that Cle ve land

wo uld no t a llo w i t to op e n an a du lt b us ine ss a t it s d e sir e d lo c a tio n a

nd that on ly a judicial re medy

could cha

ng e that re sult. There fore , the citi es say two y ear s expi red on June 20, 2005—approximately

three months before Xtreme broug ht this action.No. 07-3922

A to Z, Inc. v. City of Cleveland

- 5 - Xt re m e t ri es t o s i d es t ep t h e s t at u t e o f l i m i t at i o n s b y p o i n t i n g t o a d i s t an ce -r es tri ct i o nch an ge by the City of Parm a

that oc c ur

re d a ft e r t he se c on d p e rm it d e nia l. O n F e br ua ry 7, 20 05 , Pa

rm a reduc ed it s 1,000-foot residential buffe r z one to 200 fee t. Acc ording to Xtreme, this cha ng e—not the permit denial—ale rted it to constit utional violations. Xtreme posits that this chang e destroyed the equipoise be tween Cleve land and Par ma t hat ex isted while each maintained identical distance restric tions and marked the start of Cleveland’s “enf orcing its z oning la

ws outside of its municipal limit s.”
We a g re e wi th C le ve land and the dis tr ic t c ourt

tha t Pa rm a ’s c ha ng e d dis tanc e re g ulatio n is irrele vant t o Xtreme ’s claims beca use onl y a chang e in use reg ulations could bear on this action. As the dis tr ic t c ourt ob se rv e d, Xtre me ’s argume nt is “ an ina rt fu l atte mpt

to b oo tst ra p th is l a te r d a te on to
ear lier eve nts in an attempt to avoid dismis sal for untimeliness.” F u rther suppor ting the district court’s judgment, Xtreme’s complaint never mentions or ref

ers in any manner to Parma’s distance
ame ndme nt, un de rm ini ngits a lle g e d im po rt anc e to t

he a c c ru a l of

Xtre me ’s c on sti tut ion a l c la ims
. We thus ag ree with the judgme nt of the d i s t ri ct court in gra nting Cleve land’s motion for
summa ry jud g me nt b a se d o n th e un tim e lin e ss o f X tr e me ’s c omp la int , a nd a c c or din g ly

fi nd it
unnece ssary

to examine res judicata a s an alter native basis for

aff irming.
AFF I RMED.