T h e H on or abl e Al g en on L. M ar bl ey , U n i t ed St at es D i s t r i ct Ju dg e f or t h e Sou t h er n D i s t r i ct of O h i o, s i t t i n g by * d esi gnat i o n. NOT RECOMMENDED F OR PUBL I CATI ON File Na me: 07a0504n.06 Filed: Jul y

18, 2007 No. 06-1776 U N IT E D S T A T E S C O U R T O F A P P E A LS F O R T H E S IX T H C IR C U IT
UNI TED STATES OF AMERI CA, Plaintiff-Appellee , v. J AVI ER MURI L L O-MONZ ON, De fe nd ant- Ap pe lla

nt. )

) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEALFROM THE U NI TED STATES DI ST R I CT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DI STRI CT OF MI CHI GAN
OPI NI ON

Before: COLE and GILMA N, Circ uit Jud ges; and MARBLEY, District Judge
. * RONALD LEE GILMAN, Cir cuit Judge
. Javi e r M ur ill o- Mo nzo n p le d guil ty to i lle g a lly
ree nteringthe United States afte r having been convicted of an ag g ravated felony , incar cer ated, a nd deporte d. I n J une of 2006, the district court sente nced him to 57 months of imprisonment, which
was at the low end of the rec ommended Sentenc ing Guidelines rang e. Murillo-Monzon has appea led, ar g uing that ( 1) the sentenc e violates the Eig hth A mendment, (2) the sentenc e violates the Double Jeopardy

Clause of the Fifth Amendment, (3) the sentenc e is unr easona ble, and ( 4) his trial
c o u n s e l w a s c o n s t i tu t i o n a l l y i n e f f e c t i v e f o r f a i l i n g t o o b

j e c t t o t h e s c o r i n g o f

h i s c r i m i n a l h i s t o r

y. For the re asons set for

th below, we AF F IRM the jud g me nt o f t he dis tr ic t c ourt
.No. 06-1776

United States v. Murillo-Monzon

- 2 - I. BACKG ROUND
Muri llo -M on zon , a

nativ e of Me xico , e nte re d th e Uni ted State s il le g a lly a t so me po int

in 1995. He is marrie d to I melda L opez, also an il leg al alien, with whom he has three children. The family curr ently resides in De troit. I n November of 1999, he ple d g uilty to one count of c onspiracy to possess marijuana wi th the intent to dist ribute. He was sente nced by the United States District Court in the Eastern D istrict of Michig an to 27 months of imprisonment, to be followed by 4 y ear s of super vised rele ase. In October of 2001, he w as re lease d and immediately deporte d to Mex ico. His term of super

vised rele ase e nded in Octobe r of 2005. Murillo-Monzon admit s that he illeg ally ree ntere d the United States in Oc t o b er of 2002, while he wa s still on supervised r elea se, in order to be re united with his family in D etroit. He wa s
arr ested by

Michig an police on at least four oc casions betwe en De cem b er of 2002 and January of 2005 for dr iving with a suspe nded license . Murillo-Monzon was a lso c onvicted in January of 2005 for lar ceny

of prope rty

valued at less than $200 and ag ain in Aug ust of 2005 on a drunk- driving offe nse. On January

3, 2006, fede ral immigration a g ents beca me awa re that Murillo-Monzon had been a rre sted in Troy , Michig an on anothe r traf fic-r elated of

fense
. He was then detaine d by fede ral ag ents afte r a r eview of

his imm igr ation file reveale d no evidenc e that Murillo-Monzon had applied fo r o r r e c e ive d p e rm iss ion fr om e ith e r t

he Attor ne y Ge ne ra l or

the Se c re tary

of Ho me land

Se c ur ity to ree nter the U nited States. I n J anuar y of 2006, Murillo-Monzon was indicted on one c o unt of beinga depor ted alien who had re enter ed the United States w ithout permission after ha v ing be en convic ted of a n ag g ravatedNo. 06-1776

United States v. Murillo-Monzon

- 3 - felony , in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a)(2). H e later pled gui l t y wi t h o u t t he bene fit of a plea ag ree ment. I n the Presente nce Re port (PSR), the probation offic er c alculate d Muri llo-Monzon’s base of fense level at 8, but adde d 1 6 l ev el s for his prior dr ug -traf fickingconviction. Afte r subtracting3 levels for acc eptanc e of r esponsbility , the offic er a rrived at a net off

ense le vel of 21. The PSR also assigne d Murillo-Monzon t o a cr iminal history cate g ory of V based on: (1) his prior convictions, and (2) the fa ct that he ha d i l l ega l l y ree ntere d the country

while still on supervised rele ase f rom his previous fe lony

conviction. B ased on the se ca lculatio n s , t h e probation office r
re c omm e nd e d a

Gu ide lin e s r ang e of

70 to 8 7 mo nth s o f i mpr iso nme nt. Murillo-Monzon di d not file objection s t o t h e PSR , but instead filed a se ntencing
me mor and

um in whi c h he argue d that the re c omm e nd e d Gui de lin e s rang e ov e rr e pr e se nte d b oth his
c ri min a l hi sto ry

a nd his lik e lih oo d o f r e c idi vis m. H e su gg est ed a se nte nc e a t th e bo tto m of his proposed r evised Guide lines rang e of 46 to 57 months of i mprisonment—based on a cr iminal hist ory
c a te g or y of I I Iins te a d o f V

—o r, in t he a lte rn a tiv e , a

se nte nc e of

36 mon ths
. At the se nte nc inghe ari ng , th e dis tr ic t c ourt e ng a g e d in

the fo llo wi ngana ly sis : The total off

ense le vel is 21, the criminal history cate go ry is V, making the g uideline provision 70 to 87 months. These of cour se ar e advisory , not ma

ndatory g uidelines, but the y are the beg inning point from which I

deter mine what a r easona

ble sentenc e is. Iactua lly

ag ree with the defe ndant that there i s s o me over repr esentation in thi s criminal history here
. First of all – and I don’t mean to mi n im iz e th e dr

u n k dr iv in g b e c a

u s e it is a v e r y s e r ious offe nse, but there are a lot of poi nts attributable to the drunk driving c on vic tio ns .

. . .No. 06-1776

United States v. Murillo-Monzon

- 4 -

And I believe that . .
. the g uidelines rea lly count twice the criminal history an d t he ag g ravated fe lony , so overa ll, Ibelieve that the criminal history

is over re prese nted by

one leve l. I b el i ev e if y ou take this down to an offe nse level 21, criminal history level I V rather than V, that is 51 [si c] to 71 months, and Idon’t rea lly see a ny other b as i s fo r de p ar t i n g fr o m t h e gui d el i n e ra n ge o r o t h erwi s e i mp o s i n g a low e r s e nte nc e . T he 35 53 fa c tor s I thi nk do n’ t add any thi nghe re to the, that I haven’ t alre ady considere d in the over repr esentation of the c r i m i n a l h i s t o r

y. So I ’m finding that the cor rect gu i d el i ne ra

ng e her e is in fac t total of fe ns e le ve l 21 , c ri min a l histo ry c a te g or y I V, wh ic h wou ld b e 57 to 71 months, and thus pursuant to t he Sentenc ing Re form Ac t of 1984, the Court , co n s i d er i n g t h e s en t en ci n g gu i d el i n es an d factors containe d in [ 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)], here by commit s the def

endant, Javier Murillo, to the custody

of the B ureau o f P ri s ons for a term of 57 mon ths
.

. . . Irea liz e this is a very hefty sentenc e, and w ere Inot fee ling somew hat constraine d by

the g uidelines, I might thi nk something else was more appropr iate, but I

fee l this i s the proper

sentenc e under

the law. This timely

appea l followed.
II. AN AL YSI S A. Stand ard of review We review“a c onstitut ional challeng e to a sentence de novo.” Un ite d S tates v . Cr owe ll , — F .3 d — , N o. 06 -5 90 2, 20 07 WL 18 14 33 3, a t *4 (6 th C ir . Jun e 26 , 20 07 ). Whe re the de fe nd ant f a ils to r a ise his or

he r c on sti tut ion a l cha lle ng e s in the dis tr ic t court , h ow e ve r, we wi ll g ra nt r e lie f o nly if the def endant de monstrates plain er ror. United States v. Lege tte-Bey , 14 7 F . App ’x 47 4, 48 8 ( 6th Cir. 2005). I n order

for us to find plain er

ror, “ there must be (1) err or, (2) that is plain, and (3) thatNo. 06-1776

United States v. Murillo-Monzon

- 5 - aff ects substantial rig hts.” United States v. Olive r , 397 F.3d 369, 378 (6th Cir. 2005) (br acke ts and quotation marks omitted) (quoting Johnson v. U nited States , 520 U.S. 461, 466 (1997)) . “I f all three conditions are me t, an appe llate cour t may then exercise its discr etion to notice a f orfe ited err or, but only if (4) the err or ser iously aff ects the f

airne ss, integr ity , or public re putation of judicial proce eding s.” Id . (citation and quotation marks omitted). We reviewsentenc es under a re asonable ness standar d. United St ates v. W ebb , 403 F.3d 373, 383 (6th C i r. 2 005) (c itation omit ted). In United States v. Book er , 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005), the Supreme Court held that the Sente ncing Guidelines, which ha d previously been ma ndatory , are now
a dv iso ry on ly . A c c or din g ly , “ a

dis tr ic t c ourt

is p e rm itt e d to va

ry fr om t ho se g uid e lin e s in or de r t o impose a sentenc e which f its the mandate of [18 U.S.C.] 3553(a) .” United States v. Collington , 461 F.3d 805, 808 ( 6th Cir. 2006). We a ccor d a rebuttable presumption of re asonable ness to a sente nce imposed within the properly calc ulated advisory Gu i d el i nes ra ng e. See R ita v. United States , — S. Ct. —, No. 06 -5 75 4, 20 07 WL 17 72 14 6, a t *6 (June 21 , 200 7) (h old ing that a “c ourt of a pp e a ls may apply a pre sumption of reasona bleness to a dis t ri ct cour t sentence that ref

lects a pr oper
a pp lic a tio n o f t

he Se nte nc ingGu ide lin e s” ); se e als o Cr owe ll , 2007 WL 1814333, at *6 (same ). Finally , we r eview se ntence s for both proce dural re asonable ness and substantive
rea sonablene ss. Colli ngton , 431 F.3d at 808. “ A sentenc e may be proc edura lly

unrea sonable if the district judge fails to consider the applicable Guidelines ra ng e or ne g lects to consider the other fa c tor s li ste d in 18 U. S.C. § 355 3( a ), and ins te a d s imp ly

se le c ts w hat th e jud g e de e ms a n a pp ro pr iate senten ce without such require d considera tion.” Id . (quotation marks omitted). In contra st, a sentenc e may

be considere d substantively unrea sonable “ when the district c ourt selec ts the sentenceNo. 06-1776

United States v. Murillo-Monzon

- 6 - arbitra rily , bases the se ntence on impermissible factor s, fails to consider pe rtinent § 3553(a) fac tors or g ives an unre asonable amount of we ight to any pertinent fa ctor.” Id
. B. The se nt e nc e doe s no t v iol at e th e Eig ht h Am e ndm e nt Mu ri llo -M on zon

fi rs t argues t hat “th e le ngth of h is sen ten ce i s ex cess iv e anddi sp ro po rt ion a te to t he se ve ri ty

of the c ri me of con vic tio n a nd , a s su c h, c on sti tut e s c ru e l and unus ua l pu

nis hme nt” in violation of the Eighth Ame ndment. Be cause he did not raise this a rg ument below, we will not
reve rse his sentenc e on this g round unless Muril lo-Monzon can demonstrate plain err or. See Legette-Be

y , 147 F. App’ x at 488. “The Eig hth Amendment, which f orbids crue l and unus ual puni shments, contains a na rrow proportionality

principle that a

pplies to noncapital sentenc es.” Un ite d States v. O lan -N av arro , 350 F.3d 551, 554 ( 6th Cir. 2004) (quotation mar k s o mitted). This principle is not one of “stric t pr op or tio na lity be tw e e n c ri me and

se nte nc e ; in ste a d, a t mo st, on ly se nte nc e s th a t are g ro ssl y disproportionate to the c rime ar e prohibited.” Id . (quotation marks omitted). Muri llo -M on zon

is una ble to de mon str a te that his sen te nc e , altho ug h c e rt a inl y su bs tanti a l, is gr ossly disproportionate to the c rime he committed. The maxi mum se ntence under the rele vant statute is 20 year s of imprisonment. 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) (2) ( setting the penalties for a re enter ed alien “whose remova l was subseque nt to a conviction for c ommissi on of an a g g ravated fe lony ”). Mur illoMonzon’s sente nce of 57 months’ imprisonment was thus f ar below the maximum pos sible for the crime. Mor eover , any E ighth Ame ndment claim that he mig ht have a sserted is for eclose d by our previous dec ision in Olan -N av arro . I n that case , we a ffirme d the def endant’ s sentence of 57 months in prison for a violation of § 1326, an identical fa ctual sce nario to the pre sent ca se. Olan -N av arro ,No. 06-1776

United States v. Murillo-Monzon

- 7 - 350 F.3d at 554. The 57-month sente nce in Olan -N av arro re pr e se nte d th e bo tto m of the same Guidelines ra

ng e that is applica

ble her e. Id
. Murillo-Monzon has m ade no e ffor t to dist inguish Olan -N

av arro , oth e r tha

n a rguin g that it was incor rec tly decide d and ra ising his g ener al cha lleng e to the Guidelines c alculation itself. Nor does he e x plain why

the holding in that c ase is constitutionally defic ient. His Eighth Ame ndment argument thus fails. C. The se nt e nc e doe s no t v iol at e th e Do uble Je opa r dy C lau se of t he F ift h Am e ndm e nt Ne xt, Muri llo -M on zon

argue s t h a t t h e s e nt e n c e v i o l a

t e s th e c on sti tut ion a l pr oh ibi tio n a g a ins t t wi ce b ei n g p l ac edi nj eo p ar dy . He co n t en d s t h at h e i s b ei n g “t ri p l e- p u n i s h ed ” fo r h i s ea rl i er dru gconspirac y co nviction beca use (1) the maxim um sentence for illeg al re entry incre ased to 20 y ear s fr om 2 y e ars du e to the pr ior c on vic tio n, (2 ) h is b a se of fe ns e le ve l in c re a se d b y

16 le ve ls a s a

re su lt of this conviction, and (3) his criminal hi story cate g ory was elevated beca use of the pr ior conviction
as we ll as the fac t that he committed the prese nt c rime while on supervised r elea se fr om the ear lier conviction. The Do u b l e J eo p ardy

Clause of the F ifth Amendment “pr otects a de fenda nt in a criminal proce eding ag ainst multi ple punishments or repe ated prosecutions for the same offense.” Mc Kis sic
v . B irk e tt , 2 0 0 F. Ap p ’x 4 6 3 , 4 7 1 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 6 ) ( qu o t i n g Un ite d Sta te s v . D ini tz , 424 U.S. 600, 605 (1976)) . L ike his Eighth Ame ndment challeng e, Murillo-Monzon’s double-jeopa rdy claim was not raised be low. Our re view is thus once a g ain limited to plain error. No ne of Muri llo -M on zon ’s F if

th A me ndme nt a

rgume nts have merit. Withre sp e c t to his enhanc ed pena lty

under 8 U .S.C. § 1326, t he Supreme Court has “re peate dl y ” re j ec t ed double-No. 06-1776

United States v. Murillo-Monzon

- 8 - jeopar dy challeng es to rec idivism statutes. See W itte v. United States , 515 U.S
. 389, 400 (1995) (conc luding that the de f

e n d a nt’ s d o u b le

- je o p a r d y a r g u me nt w a s without merit “beca use the e nhance d punishment imposed for the latter offe nse is not to be viewed a s either a new jeopa rdy or additional penalty for e arlier crimes, but instea d as a stiffene d penalty for the latest crime, which is considere d to be an a g g ravated offe nse bec ause a repe titive one”). Nor do the inc rea ses in Murillo-Monzon’s base offe nse leve l and cr iminal-history score constitut e d o uble jeopar dy . This court re jected a simil ar a rg ument in United States v. Crace , 207 F .3 d 8 33 , 8 38 (6 th C ir . 2 00 0) , h old ing that a pr ior c on vic tio n c ou ld be us e d to c a lc ulate bo th t he ba se offen s e level and the criminal-history score beca

use the two “ are intended to re flec t differ ent
conce rns.” “ The off

ense le vel repr esents a judg ment as to the wrong fulness of the pa rticular a ct.” Id
. I n contra st, “[t] he criminal history cate g ory principally estimates t he li kelihood of re cidivism.” Id . Apr ior

c on vic tio n c an th

us be “ us e d to e sta

bli shbo th t

he wr on gful ness of

the ins tant o ff

e ns e and the de fenda

nt’s potential for r ecidivism.” Id. D. The se nt e nc e was r e as ona ble Murillo-Monzon’s thi rd cha lleng e is to the rea sonablene ss of his se ntence
. He c ontends that althoug h he was not detained by fede ral a g ents until August of 2005 f or beinga pre viously

deporte d alien found in the U nited States, he actua lly committed the offe nse in D ece mber of 2002 when he
was a rre sted by

local law e nforc ement for driving without a license. A s a re sult, he argues, no criminal-history

points for crimes c ommitt ed af ter that date should have be en asse ssed. Murillo-Monzon offers no ca selaw to support thi s ch alleng e to the cr iminal-history calc ulation, and he did not ra ise a timely objection to the PSR ’s ca lculation o t h er than a g ener alNo. 06-1776

United States v. Murillo-Monzon

- 9 - argument that his criminal history was ove rre prese nted. Moreove r, u n d er ei t h er a n abuse- ofdiscretion st a

n d a r d o r p la in-err or re view, this argument fails. As the g overnme nt points out , MurilloMonzon waived any objection t o the date of t he actual offense by pleadingg uilty
. See U

nited States v. Coeur , 196 F.3d 1344, 1346 ( 11th Cir. 1999) (“[W] hen a de fenda nt enters a plea of g uilty to being ‘found in’ the United States on a cer tain date, the issue of when the of fense was c ommitt ed is settled, and the de fenda

nt may not later dispute that date .”). Murillo-Monzon would have been una ble to succe ssfully

advanc e his argument even if he ha d n ot p le d guil ty
. “Th e cri me is being in the United States and is not limit ed to the instant at which a f eder al ag ent lay s hands on the per son and a lig ht bulb in the ag ent’s hea d illumi nates the mental s ign ‘This g uy ’s an ill eg al alien.’ ” United States v. Rodriguez-R odriguez , 453 F.3d 458, 460 (7 th C ir . 2 00 6) (h old ingtha t, u nd e r 8 U. S.C
. § 1326 (a )( 2) , th e a lie n “ make s him se lf a for m of contra band: the off

ense oc curs whe reve r he is, an d in ever y district throug h which he pa sses”) (e mph a sis in o ri g ina l) . A ny c ri min a l c on vic tio ns su sta ine d b y Muri llo -M on zonbe tw e e n th e tim e he il leg a ll y

r e e n te r e d th e c o u n tr

y in O c to b e r o f 2 0 0 2 an d th e ti me h e w a s ar

r e s te d f o r th e p rese nt of fe ns e are thu s p ro pe rl y

take n in to a c c ount i n c a lc ulatin g his c ri min a l- his tor y sc ore and

his ba se offe nse leve l for purpose s of the Sentenc ing Guidelines. I n the sec tio n of his brief a ddressingthe alleg ed Eig hth Amendment violation, MurilloMonzon argues t hat t he dis trict court failed t o addre ss the § 3553(a) fac tors and failed to make any fi n d i n gs o nt h e r ec o rdwi t h re s p ec tt o t h o s e f ac t o rs . W e wi l l co n s t ru e t h i s co n t en t i o nas a c h al l en ge to the proce dural re asonable ness of his sentenc e. See Collington , 4 61 F .3 d at 80 8 ( ho ldi ngthat a

“ se nte nc e may

be pr oc e dura lly

unre a so na

ble if th e dis tr ic t ju dg e fa ils to c on sid e r t he a pp lic a bleNo. 06-1776

United States v. Murillo-Monzon

- 10 - Guidelines ra

ng e or ne g lects to consider the other f

actor s listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) ”) ( quotation marks omitted). I n evaluating this cha lleng e, we fi rs t n o t e two comments made by the district court at the sentenc ing he ar i n g that arguably support Murillo-Monzon’s contention, though neither has bee n broug ht to our attention by his counsel. Fir st, the judge stated that the a dvisory Sentencing Gu ide lin e s “ are the be g inn ing po int fr om whic h I de te rm ine wh a t a

re a so na ble se nte nc e is. ” Th is statement is partially

incorre ct. The di s t ri ct court is not char g ed with imposing a “re asonable ” sentenc e. United St a t es v. Foreman , 436 F.3d 638, 644 n.1 ( 6th Cir. 2006). “Rather , a district
c ourt ’s mand a te is to imp os e a se nte nc e su ff ic ie nt, bu t no t g re ate r tha n ne c e ssa ry , to c om pl y

with the purposes of

section 3553(a )(2) .” Id . “Rea sonablene ss is the a p pe lla te st andar d o f r e vie w i n judgingwhether

a district cour

t has ac complished its task.” Id . (empha sis in original). Second, the district cour

t acknowle dg ed that it was imposing a “very hefty sentenc e,” but that it was “somewhat constrained” by the Guidelines. This lang uag e could be construed t o mean that the cour t felt that the Guidelines we re more mandatory than advisory . A re view of the entire r ecor d, h o w e v e r , s h o w s th a t the co u rt c le ar ly u n d e r s to o d

th e a dv is o r

y n a tu r e o f th e G u id e li n e s . We there fore assume that the district cour t simpl y meant that the Guidelines rang e wa s the starting point from which it then de termines an ap propriate sentenc e. See U nited States v. Cage , 458 F.3d 537, 54 3 ( 6th Cir . 2 00 6) (h old ingthat “ the dis tr ic t c ourt did no t e rr in v ie wi ng th e Gu ide lin e s a s a presumptively

rea sonable star

ting point”) . And in any ev en t , M u ri llo-Monzon has waived any challe n ge that he mig ht have ha d to these comments by failing to object to either of them when p u r s u in g th is appea l. S

ee W u v. Tyson Foods, Inc ., 18 9 F . App ’x 37 5, 38 1 ( 6th Cir . 2 00 6) (“ Th isNo. 06-1776

United States v. Murillo-Monzon

- 11 - c ourt ha s con sis te ntl y he ld that ar g ume nts no t ra ise d in a par ty ’s op e nin g br ie f, a s we ll a s argume nts adver ted to in only

a per functory

manner , are waived.” ). We now t urn to the ar g ument that Murillo-Monzon di d raise. H e conte nds that his criminal his tor y wa s ove rr e pr e se nte d in the Gu ide lin e s c a lc ulatio n r e c omm e nd e d b y the PSR and

that, a s a result, a lowe r sentenc e wa s appropr iate. The district court, af t er r eviewingthe sentenc ing
me mor and a

fi le d b y bo th p art ie s and

lis te nin g to a

rgume nt at th e se nte nc inghe ari ng , a g re e d w ith Murillo-Monzon t hat the criminal history cate g ory was too hig h, and dec rea sed it by one leve l, from V t o IV. I t th e n ma de an e xplic it f ind ingtha t the c or re c t Guid e lin e s rang e in l ig ht o f t his de c re a se in crimin al -history

level wa s 57 to 71 months i n prison. After revie wing the evidenc e and concludingthat there was no other basis for imposing a lower sentenc e or granting a fur ther downwar d depar

ture, the court found that 57 months was the a ppropriate sentenc e. That MurilloMo nzo n is of

the op ini on , w ith ou t le g a l su pp or t, t hat he wa s e nti tle d to a fur th er red uc tio n in his criminal-history

score does not rende r his sentenc e unre asonable
. Contrary to Murillo-Monz on’s asser tion, the rec ord ref

lects that the district c ourt did in f act consider the § 3553(a) fac tors and simply conclude d that those fac tors did not add any thing that ha d not alrea dy

been c onsidered by

the cour t i n t h e o v errepre sentation of Murillo-Monzon’s criminal history . The c ourt furthe r conc luded that it did not “see a ny other ba s i s fo r d ep artingfrom the g uideline ra

ng e or othe rwise imposing a lower sentenc e.” Just as in Ri ta , the re cord in the present
case clea rly ref lects that Murillo-Monzon’s “pe rsonal circ umstances
. . . wer e simply not differ ent enoug h to warr ant a diff

ere nt sentence .” Se e Ri ta , — S.Ct
. —, 2007 WL 1772146, at *13. “Where a matter is as conce ptually s i m p l e as i n the ca se at ha nd and the r ecor d makes c lear that theNo. 06-1776

United States v. Murillo-Monzon

- 12 - sentenc ing judg e conside red the evidenc e and a rg uments, we do not believe the law r equire s the judge to write more e x tensively .” Id . Moreove r, “[t] his court has stated repeate dly that it has never require d the ritual inca

ntation of the § 3553(a ) fa ctors to af firm a se ntence .” United States v. Esteppe , 483 F.3d 447, 453 ( 6th Cir. 2007) (bra ckets a nd quotation marks omitted). Although the district c ourt cer tainly could have g iven a long er e x planation for the sentenc e that it imp os e d h a d it

c ho se n to do so , we c on c lud e that its e xplanatio n w a s su ff ic ie nt, e sp e c ia lly

in light of the Supreme Court’s re cent de cision in Ri ta . J ust as in Ri ta , “g iven t h e s t ra ightf orwa rd,
conce ptually

simple arguments befor e the judge, the judge ’s statement of r easons he re, thoug h brief, was leg ally

sufficie nt.” 2007 WL1772146, at *12. Rita simply require s “[t] he sentencing judge [t o] set forth e noug h to satisfy the appellate court that he has considere d the par ties’ ar g uments and has
a re asoned ba sis for exercising his own leg al dec isionmaking a uthority .” Id
. I n s um, Muri llo -M on zonha s o ff e re d n oth ingto r e bu t th e pr e sump tio n o f r e a so na ble ne ss
acc o rded his within-Guidelines se ntence
. Se e Cro we ll , 2007 WL 1814333, at *6 (“ Be cause the dis tr ic t c ourt

se nte nc e d Cr ow e ll w ith in t he a dv iso ry Gu ide lin e s ra ng e , his se nte nc e is c re dit e d w ith
a re bu tta ble pr e sumpt ion

of re a so na ble ne ss, and

it is inc umb e nt up on Cr ow e ll to e sta bli shthat hi s sentenc e wa s unrea sonable.” ). We theref ore c onclude that his sentenc e wa s rea sonable. E. Ineff

ect ive assistance of counsel F ina lly , Muri llo -M on zon a lle g e s that his tr ia l c ouns e l w a s in e ff e c tiv e fo r f

a ili ngto o bje c t to the scoringof his criminal history . But we “will not ordinarily consider ine ff

ec t i v e assistanc e of
c ouns e l c la ims on

dir e c t a pp e a l be c a

us e th e reco rd

us ua lly is n ot s uf fi c ie ntl y de ve lop e d to pe rm it proper assessment of suc h claims.” United States v. Graham , 484 F.3d 413, 421 ( 6 t h Cir. 2007).No. 06-1776

United States v. Murillo-Monzon

- 13 - Nothing in the r ecor d sug g ests that we should depa rt from our usua l prac tice. We there fore decline to rea ch this claim.
III . C ON CL USI ON For all of the re asons set for

th above, we AF F IRM the jud g me nt o f t he dis tr ic t c ourt
.