PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-1608

ANDREW ADAMS,

Plaintiff − Appellant,

v.

ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOLS,

Defendant – Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

Maryland, at Baltimore. Marvin J. Garbis, Senior District 

Judge. (1:11-cv-02876-MJG)

Argued: May 13, 2015 Decided: June 15, 2015

Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, and WILKINSON and FLOYD, Circuit 

Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Wilkinson wrote the 

opinion, in which Chief Judge Traxler and Judge Floyd joined.

Joyce E. Smithey, RIFKIN, LIVINGSTON, LEVITAN & SILVER, LLC, 

Annapolis, Maryland, for Appellant. Jay Creech, ANNE ARUNDEL 

COUNTY OFFICE OF LAW, Annapolis, Maryland, for Appellee. 
2

WILKINSON, Circuit Judge:

Andrew Adams contends that the Board of Education of Anne 

Arundel County violated his rights under the Family and Medical 

Leave Act of 1993 (“FMLA”) and the Americans with Disabilities 

Act of 1990 (“ADA”). His allegations include interference with 

his medical leaves, retaliation for taking those leaves, 

discrimination and retaliation on the basis of his disability, 

and a failure to accommodate his condition. We find no merit to 

these related claims and affirm the judgment of the district 

court.

I.

A.

On January 19, 2010, Adams was involved in an incident with 

a student in a hallway at MacArthur Middle School in Fort Meade, 

Maryland, where he was an assistant principal. Although witness 

accounts differed significantly, the student initially claimed 

that Adams “grabbed [her] by the arms, shook her, and pinned her 

against a wall.” J.A. 145. As a result of the incident, Child 

Protective Services (“CPS”) launched a child abuse 

investigation, and the matter was also referred to the school 

Board’s Employee Case Management committee. CPS acts to prevent 

and investigate incidences of child abuse under the auspices of 

the Department of Social Services (“DSS”), whereas the Board’s 

Employee Case Management committee has as its focus conduct 
3

detrimental to the proper functioning of the school system.

Adams was temporarily reassigned from MacArthur in the meantime.

On February 24, Adams met with Board investigators. Adams 

contends that at that meeting he was shown a document stating he 

was completely cleared of all charges. The Board denies Adams 

was shown any such document and claims its independent 

investigation, which focused on school district policy 

violations, continued on a parallel track. In all events, the 

Board transferred Adams back to MacArthur on February 25. That 

same day, however, he went on medical leave upon the 

recommendation of Dr. Kim Bondurant, an internal medicine 

specialist, because he suffered from stress, anxiety, and high 

blood pressure, presumably related to the January 19 incident 

and the child abuse allegation. Adams returned to MacArthur on 

March 3, but had a panic attack, during which he claims he was 

berated by Principal Reginald Farrare. Adams took a second 

medical leave, and Dr. Bondurant referred him to a psychiatrist, 

Dr. Lawrence Adler. Adams claims that when he came back to work 

on March 8, Farrare again berated him, this time in front of 

other staff.

Two weeks later, Adams began his third and final medical 

leave after Dr. Adler diagnosed him with acute stress disorder. 

Dr. Adler informed the Board that, when Adams returned from 

leave, “he will require assignment to another school,” because 
4

being at MacArthur could spur “panic attacks and other 

manifestations of his illness.” J.A. 36. Dr. Adler later updated 

the diagnosis to post-traumatic stress disorder, as reflected in 

the FMLA paperwork that he submitted on May 5. The Board 

required Adams to attend three sessions during the summer with a

specialist of its choosing, psychologist Dr. Anthony Wolff. Dr. 

Wolff cleared Adams to work on July 28.

The Board’s investigative process continued while Adams was 

on that extended leave. The Board sent a letter to Adams on 

April 12, notifying him that a pre-disciplinary conference had 

been scheduled for May 6. The meeting was delayed by four days 

so that Adams’s attorney could attend. Two weeks after the 

conference, Adams received a letter from the Board formally 

reprimanding him for “engag[ing] in physical contact by using a 

technique that escalated a situation that could have been 

handled differently.” J.A. 584.

Adams began working at a new school, J. Albert Adams 

Academy (“JAA”), on August 4. The Board had first informed Adams 

in early June that it intended to transfer him to JAA. However, 

Adams agrees that the transfer did not occur in practice until 

August, as he was on leave until late July. In the spring, Dr. 

Adler had recommended a transfer, and Dr. Wolff later agreed 

that Adams “would best be assigned to a supportive, lower-stress 

school environment.” J.A. 194. “Mr. Adams,” Dr. Wolff stated, 
5

“is not averse to the possibility of being assigned to a 

specialized program such as the J. Albert Adams Academy, which 

has been mentioned as a possibility.” J.A. 194.

The student population of JAA, a specialized middle school 

for children with behavioral issues, used to reach 120, but now 

is capped at 80. In contrast, MacArthur has more than 1,000 

students and a less favorable staff-to-student ratio. In 

accordance with a union contract, Adams’s salary remained the 

same for two years and then was reduced by less than one percent 

because of JAA’s smaller size. JAA employees are also ineligible 

for certain discretionary bonuses available at other schools.

Adams has reportedly excelled at JAA. He has received 

exceptional performance reviews, has served as acting principal 

for a month, and has not been subject to any further discipline. 

He has not requested a transfer from JAA.

B.

Adams filed this lawsuit in Maryland state court, and the 

Board removed the case to federal court. Adams alleged various 

violations of the FMLA, the ADA, Title VII of the Civil Rights 

Act of 1964, and Maryland state law. After allowing Adams to 

amend his initial complaint, the district court dismissed all of 

the allegations in the Second Amended Complaint for failure to 

state a claim, except for Adams’s FMLA interference and 

retaliation claims and his ADA discrimination and retaliation 
6

claims. See J.A. 61-126. After discovery, the district court 

granted the Board’s motion for summary judgment on those 

remaining claims. See J.A. 625-55.

On appeal, Adams presses his various FMLA and ADA claims, 

all of which arise from the same set of operative facts. We 

review de novo both the grant of a motion to dismiss for failure 

to state a claim and the grant of a motion for summary judgment. 

Bland v. Roberts, 730 F.3d 368, 373 (4th Cir. 2013); E.I. Du 

Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d 435, 400 

(4th Cir. 2011). Under our summary judgment standard, of course, 

the facts are generally viewed in the light most favorable to 

the plaintiff. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio 

Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); see Dennis v. Columbia Colleton 

Med. Ctr., Inc., 290 F.3d 639, 645 (4th Cir. 2002). Summary 

judgment is appropriate only if there is “no genuine dispute as 

to any material fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). For the following 

reasons, we affirm the judgment.

II.

Adams contends that the Board both interfered with his FMLA 

rights and retaliated against him for taking medical leave.

A.

The FMLA grants employees the prescriptive right to take up 

“to a total of 12 workweeks of leave during any 12-month period” 

when, inter alia, an employee is burdened with “a serious health 
7

condition that makes the employee unable to perform” his job. 29 

U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D). When returning from FMLA leave, an 

employee is also entitled to be restored to his previous 

position or an equivalent position, so long as he would have 

retained that position or an equivalent one absent the taking of 

leave. Yashenko v. Harrah’s NC Casino Co., 446 F.3d 541, 546-47 

(4th Cir. 2006) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)). That is, there is 

“no absolute right to restoration to a prior employment 

position.” Id. at 549. Nonetheless, it is “unlawful for any 

employer to interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or 

the attempt to exercise” an employee’s FMLA rights. 29 U.S.C. 

§ 2615(a)(1).

To make out an “interference” claim under the FMLA, an 

employee must thus demonstrate that (1) he is entitled to an 

FMLA benefit; (2) his employer interfered with the provision of 

that benefit; and (3) that interference caused harm. See

Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 535 U.S. 81, 89 (2002) 

(citing 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(1)); Wonasue v. Univ. of Md. Alumni 

Ass’n, 984 F. Supp. 2d 480, 495 (D. Md. 2013).

We begin by noting one salient fact: Adams was not denied 

FMLA leave. In fact, he took three separate medical leaves 

totaling well over twelve weeks. The Supreme Court has observed 

that the “purpose of [an interference claim] is to permit a 

court to inquire into matters such as whether the employee would 
8

have exercised his or her FMLA rights in the absence of the 

employer’s actions.” Ragsdale, 535 U.S. at 91. Adams has not 

suggested that the Board denied him any FMLA leave he requested. 

On the contrary, Adams received more than the statutorily 

guaranteed amount.

Nevertheless, Adams argues that the Board interfered with 

his leave in a variety of ways that stopped short of actually 

denying him leave. In particular, he asserts that the Board took 

adverse employment actions against him, which interfered with 

his FMLA rights by discouraging the taking of leave. See 29 

C.F.R. § 825.220(b) (“‘Interfering with’ the exercise of an 

employee’s rights would include, for example, not only refusing 

to authorize FMLA leave, but discouraging an employee from using 

such leave.”).

Adams first objects that the Board required him to submit 

to three unnecessary examinations by a Board-chosen specialist. 

But the FMLA and the applicable regulation explicitly allow 

employers to seek a second opinion and even a third, if the 

first two opinions conflict. 29 U.S.C. § 2613(c), (d); 29 C.F.R. 

§ 825.307(b), (c). Such medical opinions allow an employer to 

verify the claimed medical condition, to assess how long the 

employee might be out of work, and to fashion the best 

environment for the employee upon his return to the workplace.
9

The regulation concerning the “authenticity” of the initial 

certification by a medical professional, 29 C.F.R. § 825.307(a), 

is not applicable here. Employers may order a second or third 

medical evaluation out of concern that the original 

certification of a serious medical condition is invalid, not 

that it is inauthentic. See 29 U.S.C. § 2613(c) (allowing a 

second evaluation where “the employer has reason to doubt the 

validity of the certification”). Employers are entitled to seek 

a second opinion regardless of whether the certification notice 

proffered by the employee is real or not. In requiring Adams to 

attend the sessions with Dr. Wolff, the Board simply exercised 

its statutory right to seek another professional medical 

opinion.

Second, Adams argues that the Board’s pre-disciplinary 

conference interfered with his leave by forcing him to “work.” 

Appellant’s Br. at 32. In certain circumstances required 

meetings may unlawfully interrupt an employee’s leave. Here, 

however, the one-time conference was a legitimate piece of an 

ongoing investigation into the January 19 incident between Adams 

and the student. Adams argues more broadly that the Board’s 

continued disciplinary investigation ran contrary to the 

understanding reached at the February 24 meeting with school 

officials, during which they allegedly indicated the entire 

matter had been wrapped up. He also submits several deposition 
10

statements from MacArthur staff to the effect that his 

reinstatement at MacArthur indicated everything was fine. See

J.A. 481 (statement of Reginald Farrare) (“When he returned to 

school it signified to me that he had been cleared of those 

allegations. . . . [S]omeone informed me that he had been 

cleared of the allegations . . . .”); J.A. 592 (statement of 

Deanna Natarian) (“[U]pon his return I assumed everything was 

fine. He wouldn’t have returned if it wasn’t.”). The staff 

members had not been at the February 24 meeting and relayed 

general information apparently conveyed by unspecified other 

persons.

For several reasons, we do not believe Adams’s proffers 

suffice to create an issue of triable fact as to the events 

surrounding the February 24 meeting, or in a larger sense the 

Board’s continuation of its own investigation. See Celotex Corp. 

v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (finding summary judgment 

proper, “after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, 

against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to 

establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s 

case”). Although the DSS committee by early February had cleared 

Adams in its child abuse investigation, there is little evidence 

that the Board in some way closed and then reopened its own 

investigation into whether Adams had violated school district 
11

policies, much less that its actions had anything to do with 

Adams’s FMLA leave. 

Indeed, the evidence overwhelmingly points to the contrary 

conclusion that the Board’s separate investigation into school 

district policy violations was continuous. The only document in 

the record that resembles what Adams claims was a fully 

exculpatory resolution of the January 19 incident is the 

February 4 decision by a five-member committee of the DSS to 

“rule[] out” the child abuse allegation. J.A. 604-05. By 

contrast, the Employee Case Management log shows that the 

Board’s own investigation report was not completed on February 

24, the date on which Adams claims the investigation was closed. 

In fact, the school district’s interview of Adams about the 

incident was not even scheduled until that same day, because DSS 

had just completed and finalized its investigation of the child 

abuse allegations and the school district investigation could

thereafter proceed unfettered. The draft report was not finished 

until March 23, and the report was not finalized until April 8. 

The Board then notified Adams of the pre-disciplinary conference 

by letter. The conference was postponed for several days so that 

Adams’s counsel could attend.

It is surely true that the investigative processes of any 

institution are open to abuse, but the record here points to a 

standard procedure during which due process was accorded to 
12

Adams every step along the way. Adams does not dispute that the 

Board was entitled to conduct its own investigation into the 

January 19 incident. Indeed, school districts must often engage 

in investigations like this one or else face accusations and 

lawsuits for not looking promptly into allegations of improper 

teacher contact with students or violations of school district 

policies. The pre-disciplinary conference was part of the 

investigatory and disciplinary process, which Adams has not 

adequately linked to his ample FMLA leaves, and seeking the 

participation of Adams and his attorney in that process did not 

constitute an impermissible interference with Adams’s FMLA 

leave. And Adams never objected or sought a continuance he did 

not get.

Third, Adams asserts that Farrare’s alleged verbal 

“attacks” and the written reprimand constituted adverse 

employment actions. Appellant’s Br. at 11. But however bad the 

relationship between Adams and Farrare, Adams cannot demonstrate 

that these verbal and written reprimands in fact discouraged him 

from taking FMLA leave. Indeed, Adams began his second medical 

leave the same day as the first alleged verbal attack. Nor did 

the written reprimand inhibit Adams’s final medical leave -- he 

did not return to work until more than two months after the 

reprimand was issued.
13

Regardless, neither the written nor the verbal reprimands 

qualify as adverse employment actions, because they did not lead 

to further discipline. See, e.g., Hopkins v. Balt. Gas & Elec. 

Co., 77 F.3d 745, 754-55 (4th Cir. 1996); Jeffers v. Thompson, 

264 F. Supp. 2d 314, 330 (D. Md. 2003). The written reprimand, 

in particular, was the final step in the Board’s legitimate 

ongoing investigation. These incidents were what the Board said 

they were -- reprimands, not signposts on a predetermined path 

to a true adverse employment action. In fact, Adams has received 

excellent reviews of his performance since returning from the 

third and final FMLA leave.

B.

Adams also contends that the Board retaliated against him 

for exercising his FMLA rights. See 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2) 

(making it “unlawful for any employer to discharge or in any 

other manner discriminate against any individual for opposing 

any practice made unlawful by” the FMLA); see also 29 C.F.R. 

§ 825.220(c) (noting that “employers cannot use the taking of 

FMLA leave as a negative factor in employment actions”).

Retaliation claims brought under the FMLA are analogous to 

those brought under Title VII. Laing v. Federal Express Corp., 

703 F.3d 713, 717 (4th Cir. 2013); Yashenko, 446 F.3d at 550-51. 

Plaintiff must prove three elements to establish a prima facie

case of retaliation: (1) “she engaged in a protected activity”; 
14

(2) “her employer took an adverse employment action against 

her”; and (3) “there was a causal link between the two events.” 

Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp., No. 13-1473, slip op. at 

36 (4th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (quotation marks omitted). If the 

defendant advances a lawful explanation for the alleged 

retaliatory action, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the 

defendant’s reason for taking the adverse employment action was 

pretextual. See Laing, 703 F.3d at 717, 719 (citing McDonnell 

Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973)).

Many of the Board’s actions here were simply not 

retaliatory. As noted above, the Board’s disciplinary 

investigation into Adams’s conduct was never concluded, and thus 

it could not have been reopened in order to retaliate against 

Adams. The Board’s review, including the pre-disciplinary 

conference and the written reprimand, observed due process 

requirements. Other Board decisions fail to qualify as adverse 

employment actions. The eventual result of the Board’s 

investigation -- the reprimand letter -- did not adversely 

affect Adams’s employment position or his pay and benefits. 

Similarly, Farrare’s verbal reprimands did not adversely affect 

Adams’s employment. Although the Board required the medical 

examinations in reaction to Adams’s taking of FMLA leave, such a 

request for a second medical opinion is expressly allowed under 

the applicable statutory and regulatory provisions.
15

Nor was Adams’s transfer from MacArthur to JAA in 

retaliation for his exercise of FMLA rights. Crucially, both Dr. 

Adler and Dr. Wolff recommended that Adams be transferred to a 

different and less stressful school, and Adams reportedly was 

“not averse to the possibility of being assigned to” JAA. J.A. 

194. The Board effectuated the transfer promptly -- Adams’s 

first day at JAA came merely a week after Dr. Wolff had cleared 

him as fit to work. Adams’s salary remained at the same level 

for two years before being reduced by less than one percent, and 

as a JAA employee he was no longer eligible for some 

discretionary bonuses. The salary reduction was mandated by the 

union contract because JAA has a much smaller student population 

than MacArthur.

Although JAA is a school for children with behavioral 

issues, it has no more than ten percent the number of students 

as MacArthur and also has a more favorable staff-to-student 

ratio. Moreover, Adams seems to have done well at JAA. He has 

received superb reviews and has not requested a transfer from 

JAA, despite having the opportunity to do so.

There simply is no retaliatory animus at work here. By 

transferring Adams to JAA in a timely manner, on the 

recommendations of both Dr. Adler and Dr. Wolff, to a school 

with fewer students and more staff per student, the Board 

essentially fashioned an accommodation for his disability. See
16

infra Section III.B. Such reasonable accommodations under the 

ADA are not likely to be retaliatory under the FMLA, and they 

were plainly not under the circumstances presented here.

III.

Adams mounts a separate set of claims under the ADA. He 

asserts that the Board discriminated and retaliated against him 

based on his disability and also failed to accommodate his 

condition.

A.

The ADA forbids employers from discriminating against 

persons with disabilities. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)-(b). The Act 

also bars employers from retaliating against employees for 

seeking these statutory protections. Id. § 12203(a)-(b). 

Congress passed the ADA “to provide a clear and comprehensive 

national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against 

individuals with disabilities,” id. § 12101(b)(1), through 

“clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards,” id.

§ 12101(b)(2). A “qualified individual” with a disability under 

the ADA is someone “who, with or without reasonable 

accommodation, can perform the essential functions” of the job. 

Id. § 12111(8). The Act contains a “detailed description of the 

practices that would constitute the prohibited discrimination,” 

and it “speaks in clear and direct terms to the question of 
17

retaliation.” Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 

2517, 2531 (2013).

In Adams’s view, the Board’s alleged ADA violations

included Principal Farrare’s verbal “attacks,” the Board’s

continued investigation of the student hallway incident, the 

written reprimand, and the mandated medical examinations. In 

addition, Adams argues that the Board retaliated against him for 

requesting a disability accommodation. The Board’s retaliatory 

measures, he asserts, included the written reprimand, the 

medical examinations, and the reduced pay at JAA.

Adams’s discrimination and retaliation claims at this stage 

are subject to similar though not identical legal standards.

Compare Haulbrook v. Michelin N. Am., Inc., 252 F.3d 696, 702 

(4th Cir. 2001) (discrimination), with A Soc’y Without a Name v. 

Virginia, 655 F.3d 342, 350 (4th Cir. 2011) (retaliation). These

two tests share a common element, however: the plaintiff must 

have suffered an adverse employment action of some kind. See

Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 562 U.S. 170, 173-74 (2011); 

Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 63-64 

(2006).

The requirement of an adverse employment action seeks to 

differentiate those harms that work a “significant” detriment on 

employees from those that are relatively insubstantial or 

“trivial.” White, 548 U.S. at 68. As the Supreme Court has 
18

explained in the analogous Title VII context: “The substantive 

[discrimination] provision seeks to prevent injury to 

individuals based on who they are, i.e., their status. The 

antiretaliation provision seeks to prevent harm to individuals 

based on what they do, i.e., their conduct.” Id. at 63 (emphasis 

added). Pointedly, the antiretaliation provision “covers those 

(and only those) employer actions that would have been 

materially adverse to a reasonable employee.” Id. at 57. The 

analysis depends on the particular circumstances of the case. 

Id. at 71. All the tests, however, require that there be an 

adverse employment action, which denotes some direct or indirect 

impact on an individual’s employment as opposed to harms 

immaterially related to it. See Thompson, 562 U.S. at 173-74; 

White, 548 U.S. at 63-64.

Many of the harms alleged by Adams do not rise to the level 

of an adverse employment action. It is surely true that Farrare 

and the Board did things that Adams personally did not like. But 

dislike of or disagreement with an employer’s decisions does not 

invariably make those decisions ones that adversely affected 

some aspect of employment.

Moreover, reprimands and poor performance evaluations occur 

with some frequency in the workplace. While the analysis of them 

is necessarily dependent on the circumstances, see White, 548 

U.S. at 69, they are much less likely to involve adverse 
19

employment actions than the transfers, discharges, or failures 

to promote whose impact on the terms and conditions of 

employment is immediate and apparent. Here, Adams has failed to 

link such matters as the upbraiding by Farrare, the Board’s 

pursuit of its obligation to investigate the hallway incident, 

and the statutorily permitted medical examinations to some 

material change in the conditions of his employment. See James 

v. Booz-Allen & Hamilton, Inc., 368 F.3d 371, 375 (4th Cir. 

2004). Even assuming the unlikely presence of an unlawful 

discriminatory intent for any of the above actions, they did not 

cross the threshold that courts have traditionally required for 

a personnel matter to be actionable. See, e.g., Cepada v. Bd. of 

Educ., 974 F. Supp. 2d 772, 788 & n.51 (D. Md. 2013) (yelling by 

an assistant principal at a teacher insufficient); Jeffers v. 

Thompson, 264 F. Supp. 2d 314, 330 (D. Md. 2003) (an oral or 

written reprimand, without some actual injury, does not 

qualify); Settle v. Balt. Cnty., 34 F. Supp. 2d 969, 992 (D. Md. 

1999) (“inconvenience” or “emotional anxiety” resulting from “a 

disciplinary investigation [that] is reasonably rooted in 

articulable facts justifying such an investigation” not 

sufficient), aff’d sub nom. Harris v. Earp, 203 F.3d 820 (4th 

Cir. 2000), and Settle v. Balt. Cnty. Police Dep’t, 203 F.3d 822 

(4th Cir. 2000).
20

B.

The transfer of Adams from MacArthur to JAA belongs in a 

rather different category from that of the actions discussed 

above. Adams claims here that the Board failed to provide a 

reasonable accommodation for his disability. In particular, he 

contends that the Board “made no effort” to reassign him “to a 

less stressful school where he would not suffer a reduction in 

pay,” and that the Board did not transfer him until four months 

after he had initially requested an accommodation. Appellant’s 

Br. at 46.

The ADA forbids an employer from discriminating against an 

individual with a disability who, with “reasonable 

accommodation, can perform the essential functions” of the 

position. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8); see US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett,

535 U.S. 391, 393 (2002); Rhoads v. FDIC, 257 F.3d 373, 387 n.11 

(4th Cir. 2001). An employer that fails to make “reasonable 

accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an 

otherwise qualified individual with a disability” has engaged in 

impermissible discrimination, unless the employer can show that 

the accommodation imposed an “undue hardship” upon its 

operations. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). A “reasonable 

accommodation” may include “job restructuring, part-time or 

modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position,” and 

other appropriate changes. Id. § 12111(9)(B). 
21

Here, the Board did not outright deny Adams’s requests to 

accommodate his disability. Rather, Adams questions the adequacy 

of the Board’s efforts. We think, however, that the Board’s 

accommodations were plainly reasonable. Many of the 

justifications are similar to those already touched upon in our 

discussion of Adams’s FMLA claims. See supra Part II.

First, Adams’s transfer to JAA was consistent with the 

recommendations of the doctors who had examined him. Adams’s 

psychiatrist, Dr. Adler, emphasized that Adams “must be 

reassigned to another location,” away from the “site of 

psychological trauma.” J.A. 38-39. The Board’s psychologist, Dr. 

Wolff, agreed that Adams “would best be assigned to a 

supportive, lower-stress school environment.” J.A. 194. Dr. 

Wolff noted that Adams was “not averse to the possibility of 

being assigned to a specialized program such as the J. Albert 

Adams Academy, which has been mentioned as a possibility.” J.A. 

194. The professional advice of both doctors, in short, supports 

the basic reasonableness of the Board’s reassignment decision.

Second, the Board acted on Adams’s request in a timely 

manner. Adams requested an accommodation in late March. He gave 

the Board a note from Dr. Adler stating that he “require[d] 

temporary medical leave,” and that, “[w]hen he is stabilized, he 

will require reassignment to another school.” J.A. 36 (emphasis 

added). The Board informed Adams of the reassignment to JAA on 
22

June 2, and after his extended leave ended on July 28, he began 

work there on August 4. The Board addressed this task during his 

leave and executed the reassignment within a week of his return. 

Under the circumstances, that seems a quite reasonable interval.

Third, in light of Adams’s disability, the Board sensibly 

sought a “less stressful environment” for him. J.A. 202. 

Regardless of whether comparable positions at other schools were 

available at the time, the Board’s reassignment decision was 

based not only on the advice of medical professionals, but also 

on the particular characteristics of JAA, after consultation 

with Adams. As noted earlier, the Board moved him to a school 

with a far smaller student population (by a factor of ten), a 

more favorable staff-to-student ratio, and a sizable support 

staff. The Board appears to have weighed those features in 

conjunction with the fact that many students at JAA have a 

history of behavioral problems. An array of legitimate 

considerations entered into what frankly was for the Board a 

judgment call. As Dr. Wolff observed, “It is difficult to define 

what may constitute a lower-stress school environment, given the 

unpredictable nature of student behavior.” J.A. 194.

Fourth, Adams did not object to his reassignment to JAA at 

the time, and he has not requested a transfer since then. The 

Board has posted openings for other schools during the interim, 

but Adams has not asked to leave his position at JAA to work 
23

elsewhere. Indeed, as noted, he has thrived there: he has 

received ratings of “outstanding” on his annual evaluations and 

briefly served as acting principal. Adams does allege that JAA 

students have threatened him on two occasions since his 

transfer. Although such behaviors are always troubling, they 

must be considered in context. Aside from his own affidavit and 

deposition, Adams has not offered any evidence to bolster his 

argument that JAA is an equally or more stressful work 

environment than MacArthur. The record does not specifically 

indicate what else the Board could have done or where else he 

would prefer to work. Indeed, Adams has never requested a 

transfer or had any further work-related medical problems.

Fifth, the eventual decrease in Adams’s salary stemmed from 

a systemwide collective-bargaining agreement. The agreement 

between the teachers’ union and the Board determines salaries on 

the basis of schools’ populations, and JAA has far fewer 

students than MacArthur. The resulting $1,031 decrease 

constituted less than one percent of his salary. Moreover, Adams 

held the same position, assistant principal, at the two schools. 

For his first two years at JAA, Adams in fact earned the same 

salary as he had at MacArthur, as stipulated in his transfer 

letter. It is true that Adams did become ineligible for certain 

discretionary bonuses awarded at other schools. The fact 

remains, however, that less stressful jobs may on occasion be 
24

less remunerative. That tradeoff does not invalidate the Board’s 

action in these circumstances.

In sum, there is nothing in this entire sequence of events 

to indicate that the Board’s efforts to accommodate Adams were 

anything but reasonable.

IV.

The FMLA and the ADA impose important obligations on 

educational, and indeed all, covered employers. What they do not 

impose, however, are extra statutory obstacles to the 

investigation of what in other cases might be serious instances 

of child abuse. Schools have an obligation to safeguard the 

safety and welfare of those students in their charge. A proper 

reading of the FMLA and ADA does not impair the ability of 

school systems to responsibly exercise this duty.

The Board of Education faced a further predicament here. 

Had it failed or refused to reassign Adams from his positon at 

MacArthur, its inaction would have courted ADA litigation. That 

statute, moreover, requires a “reasonable” accommodation, not a 

perfect one. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(8)-(9), 12112(b)(5)(A)-(B). 

Hindsight must not underestimate hard choices that employers, in 

consultation with their employees and medical professionals, 

confront at the time. The record before us plainly indicates 

that the Board did what it could to alleviate an unfortunate 

situation. It should not incur liability for its efforts.
25

V.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district 

court is

AFFIRMED.