Third District Court of Appeal

State of Florida 

Opinion filed May 26, 2021.

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

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No. 3D20-1859

Lower Tribunal No. 18-10275

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Juan Francisco Vega,

Appellant,

vs.

Andrew Franklin Rier,

Appellee.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Veronica 

Diaz, Judge.

Juan Francisco Vega, in proper person.

Rier Jordan, P.A., and Jonathan E. Jordan, for appellee.

Before FERNANDEZ, GORDO, and BOKOR, JJ. 

FERNANDEZ, J. 
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Juan Vega appeals the trial court’s order dismissing a legal 

malpractice action in favor of Vega’s prior counsel, Andrew Rier. The 

dismissal was based on the lapse of the two-year statute of limitations,

pursuant to section 95.11(4)(a), Florida Statutes (2020). Upon finding that 

Vega filed suit well within the statute of limitations period, we reverse the 

order and remand for further proceedings.

Attorney Rier represented Vega throughout trial and on appeal in a 

criminal case brought against Vega by the State. After a decision was 

entered by this Court in favor of the State, Rier filed a motion for a written 

opinion or for certification and a motion for rehearing en banc. On March 24, 

2017, this Court entered a final order denying all post-decision motions.

Pursuant to the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, this final order is 

deemed rendered. Fla. R. App. P. 9.020(i) (“Rendition of an Appellate Order.

If any timely and authorized motion under rules 9.330 or 9.331 is filed, the 

order shall not be deemed rendered as to any party until all of the motions 

are either withdrawn or resolved by the rendition of an order.”). Afterward, 

Vega filed a writ of certiorari with the Florida Supreme Court. The Supreme 

Court entered a final order denying the petition on October 2, 2017. 

The statute of limitations in a legal malpractice action begins to run 

from the rendition of the final order on appeal and ends two years later. See
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Glucksman v. Persol N. Am., Inc., 813 So. 2d 122, 124 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) 

(“A legal malpractice cause of action accrues not necessarily when the client 

first suspects that the attorney might have committed malpractice, but rather, 

when the client incurs damages at the conclusion of the related or underlying 

judicial proceeding . . . .”); Eldred v. Reber, 639 So. 2d 1086, 1088 (Fla. 5th 

DCA 1994) (“The rule communicates clearly that rendition applies to an order 

of the court, not the issuance of the mandate. We hold that for purposes of 

determining when the statute of limitations begins to accrue in a litigational 

malpractice action when the underlying action is appealed, the time begins 

to accrue when the appellate decision is ‘rendered’ . . . .”). Additionally, if the 

losing party appeals a District Court’s decision to the Florida Supreme Court, 

“for the purposes of determining when the limitations period begins to run, ‘a 

final judgment is not final until a timely filed appeal to, or petition for review 

by, the supreme court is resolved.’” Gilbride, Heller & Brown, P.A. v. Watkins, 

783 So. 2d 224, 225-26 (Fla. 2001).

Vega filed his legal malpractice action against Rier on April 3, 2018, 

which is well within the two-year range of the statute of limitations calculated 

from either this Court’s March 24, 2017 order or from the Supreme Court’s 

October 2, 2017 order. Therefore, the trial court erred in dismissing the 
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malpractice action. We reverse the trial court’s order and remand for further 

proceedings. 

Reversed and remanded.