1994 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

8-10-1994

United Steelworkers of Americ. v. Crown Cork &

Seal Co., Inc.

Precedential or Non-Precedential:

Docket 93-2008, 93-7618

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Recommended Citation

"United Steelworkers of Americ. v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., Inc." (1994). 1994 Decisions. Paper 107.

http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1994/107
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

 

 Nos. 93-2008 and 93-7613 

 

 UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA, 

 AFL-CIO-CLC 

v. 

 CROWN CORK & SEAL CO., INC. 

 Appellant 

 (in No. 93-2008) 

 CHARLES A. THOMAS; DARREN BOOP; ROBERT W. BOWER; 

 WILLIAM D. BRIDGE; JAMES CLINGAN; NEAL B. HOUSNER; 

 JONATHAN L. NOAKER; WAYNE D. ORNER; 

 GERALD W. RANCK; HAROLD E. VAN SICKLE, JR.; 

 RICHARD A. WINTER; EUGENE L. WITMER, SR., 

 Appellants 

 (in No. 93-7613) 

v. 

 NORTH STAR STEEL COMPANY 

 

 On Appeal from the United States District Court 

 for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 

 (D.C. No. 92-cv-05968) 

 On Appeal from the United States District Court 

 for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 

 (D.C. No. 92-cv-01507) 

 

 Argued May 24, 1994 

 Before: Cowen and Roth, Circuit Judges

 Ackerman, District Judge* 

 (Filed August 10, 1994) 

 
* Honorable Harold A. Ackerman, United States District Judge for 

 the District of New Jersey, sitting by designation. 
Alan D. Berkowitz (argued) 

Dechert, Price & Rhoads 

1717 Arch Street 

4000 Bell Atlantic Tower 

Philadelphia, PA 19103 

 Counsel for Appellant (in No. 93-2008) 

 Crown Cork & Seal Company, Inc. 

David I. Goldman (argued) 

United Steelworkers of America 

5 Gateway Center 

Pittsburgh, PA 15222 

 Counsel for Appellee (in No. 93-2008) 

 United Steelworkers of America, 

 AFL-CIO-CLC 

Robin S. Conrad 

National Chambers Litigation Center 

1615 H Street, N.W. 

Washington, D.C. 20062 

 Counsel for Amicus-appellant 

 Chamber Commerce US 

 (in No. 93-2008) 

 Counsel for Amicus-appellee 

 Chamber Commerce US 

 (in No. 93-7613) 

Paul A. Levy (argued) 

Public Citizen Litigation Group 

2000 P Street, N.W. 

Suite 700 

Washington, D.C. 20036 

 Counsel for Appellants (in No. 93-7613) 

 Charles A. Thomas 

 Darren S. Boop 

 Robert W. Bower 

 William D. Bridge 

 James Clingan 

 Neal B. Housner 

 Jonathan L. Noaker (whose name 

 is misspelled in some pleadings as 

 "Nooker") 

 Wayne D. Orner 

 Gerald W. Ranck 

 Harold E. Van Sickle, Jr. 
 Richard A. Winter 

 Eugene L. Witmer, Sr. 

Vincent Candiello (argued) 

Morgan, Lewis & Bockius 

417 Walnut Street 

One Commerce Square 

Harrisburg, PA 17101 

 Counsel for Appellee (in No. 93-7613) 

 North Star Steel Co., Inc. 

Joseph S. Hornack 

Cynthia s. Akers 

Healey, Davidson & Hornack 

Law & Finance Building 

5th Floor 

Pittsburgh, PA 15219 

 Counsel for Amicus-appellants (in No. 93-7613) 

 Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers 

 International Union, AFL-CIO 

 United Mine Workers of America, 

 International Union 

 NLG/Sugar Law Center for 

 Economic & Social Justice 

 International Union, United Automobile, 

 Aerospace & Agricultural Implement 

 Workers of America, UAW 

 

OPINION

 

ACKERMAN, District Judge. 

 These two cases present the following discrete issue: In an 

action brought pursuant to the Worker Adjustment and Retraining 

Notification Act, 29 U.S.C. §2101 et seq. ("WARN"), a statute 

which, like so many others, fails to explicitly provide a statute 

of limitations, should we follow the general rule and borrow a 
state statute of limitations or should we instead opt for the 

six-month statute of limitations set forth in section 10(b) of 

the federal National Labor Relations Act. The two cases present 

the identical issue for review and we will consider both cases in 

this Opinion. 

 For the reasons detailed below, we find that for cases 

arising under WARN, courts should apply the most closely 

analogous state statute of limitations. Thus, we will reverse 

the decision in Thomas v. North Star Steel and will affirm the 

decision in United Steelworkers of America v. Crown, Cork & Seal. 

 Background

 Both of the underlying cases were filed pursuant to WARN, a 

federal statute which requires companies with one hundred or more 

employees to provide their workers with a minimum of sixty days 

written notice before a plant closing or mass layoff.1 Employers 

who fail to provide the requisite notice must compensate 

employees suffering an employment loss for each day of the 

violation. The statute creates a private civil action for 

damages in federal court. 

 

 1 The statute defines "plant closing" as the permanent or 

temporary shutdown of a single site of employment, which results 

in an employment loss to a certain minimum number of employees. 

29 U.S.C. §2101(a)(2). "Mass layoff" is defined as a reductionin-force, resulting from a plant closing, which results in a 

certain minimum employment loss. 29 U.S.C. §2101(a)(3). A 

layoff must last more than six months before it qualifies as 

actionable under WARN. 29 U.S.C. §2101(a)(6)(B). 
 On September 9, 1991, the United Steelworkers of America, 

AFL-CIO-CLC, filed a complaint in federal court alleging that the 

North Star Steel Company ("North Star") had violated the WARN Act 

by failing to give the union sixty days advance notice of a 

February 25, 1991 layoff of about 270 people, at the company's 

Milton, Pennsylvania plant. Although the suit was filed more 

than six months after the layoff occurred, North Star did not 

raise the statute of limitations as a defense. On April 9, 1992, 

the district court granted the union's motion for summary 

judgment on liability, holding that the layoff constituted a 

"plant closing" subject to WARN. In a separate Order, dated 

December 11, 1992, the district judge determined the number of 

days for which the company was required to pay WARN damages. 

United Steelworkers v. North Star Steel, 809 F. Supp. 5, 6-7 

(M.D.Pa. 1992), aff'd 5 F.3d 39 (1993). 

 Appellants were non-unionized employees of North Star, 

unrepresented by the union and hence unaffected by the union's 

successful lawsuit against North Star. They therefore filed a 

separate action, the instant case, also seeking damages pursuant 

to WARN. On May 25, 1993, the district court granted North 

Star's motion for summary judgment, finding that the action was 

barred under what it deemed to be the applicable statute of 

limitations. The employees' motion for reconsideration was 

denied on August 26, 1993. This appeal followed. 

 United Steelworkers of America v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 

Inc. ("Crown Cork"), arises out of an event that took place on 

September 30, 1991. On that day, the company ordered a 
reduction- in-force and shutdown of its Perry, Georgia plant. As 

a result of this reduction in force, about 85 employees were 

terminated. On October 15, 1992, the United Steelworkers of 

America (the union) filed a complaint, alleging that the company 

violated WARN by failing to give it 60 days notice prior to the 

shutdown. Crown, Cork & Seal then moved for summary judgment, 

contending that the action was barred by the applicable statute 

of limitations. The district court denied the motion on August 

24, 1993 but in an order dated September 26, 1993, certified the 

August order for immediate interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. §1292. 

 We have jurisdiction over the appeal in Thomas v. North Star 

Steel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1291. Our jurisdiction over United 

Steelworkers of America v. Crown, Cork & Seal arises from our 

October 13, 1993 Order granting the company permission to appeal 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1292(b). Our review over both cases is 

plenary. 

 Discussion

 In this case we visit a general question of federal law that 

we have repeatedly addressed: When a federal statute does not 

contain an explicit statute of limitations, when is it 

appropriate to borrow a statute of limitations from elsewhere in 

federal law rather than adopting the most closely analogous state 

statute of limitations. 

 The companies argue that in this case, a federal statute -- 

the six-month statute of limitations contained in section 10(b) 
of the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") for filing a claim 

of an unfair labor practice with the National Labor Relations 

Board ("NLRB") -- provides the most appropriate limitations 

period. The employees and the union exhort us to borrow one of 

various state statutes. Courts addressing the question have 

adopted both approaches. Some have borrowed the six-month §10(b) 

statute; see, e.g., Newspaper and Mail Delivers' Union of N.Y. 

and Vicinity v. United Magazine Co., 809 F. Supp. 185 (E.D.N.Y. 

1992) (adopting NLRA statute); Staudt v. Glastron, Inc., No. SA92-CA-1174, 1993 WL 85356, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3090 (W.D.Tex. 

February 23, 1993) (same). Other courts, including the only 

Court of Appeals to reach the question, have expressly considered 

and rejected the section 10(b) six-month period, instead opting 

for various state law limitations periods. See, e.g. United 

Paperworkers Local 340 v. Specialty Paperboard, Inc., 999 F.2d 51 

(2d Cir. 1992) (hereinafter United Paperworkers); Wallace v. 

Detroit Coke Corp., 818 F. Supp. 192 (E.D. Mich. 1993) (rejecting 

NLRA statute and adopting six-year state contract statute); 

Automobile Mechanics' Local No. 701 of the Int'l Assoc. of 

Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Santa Fe Terminal Services, 

Inc., 830 F. Supp. 432 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (rejecting NLRA statute 

and adopting, without specifying, most analogous state statute). 

 The two district court opinions before us now reached 

contrary conclusions. The district court in North Star Steel

adopted the six-month statute of limitations set forth in §10(b); 

the court in Crown, Cork & Seal rejected the §10(b) statute, and 
without deciding the appropriate statute of limitations, found 

the action timely under all of the possibilities. 

 Our analysis must begin with the general assumption that 

when a federal statute is silent as to a statute of limitations, 

the court should apply "the most closely analogous statute of 

limitations under state law." DelCostello v. International 

Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 158 (1983); see also

Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 

350, ____, 111 S.Ct. 2773, 2778 (1991); Haggerty v. USAIR, Inc., 

952 F.2d 781, 783 (3d Cir. 1992). This general rule is not set 

in stone, however. Rather, the United States Supreme Court has 

recognized that, in order to prevent frustration of federal 

policy, it is sometimes more appropriate to borrow a limitations 

period from an analogous area of federal law. DelCostello, 462 

U.S. at 162. This exception is "closely circumscribed", see Reed 

v. United Transp. Union, 488 U.S. 319, 324 (1989), and should 

only be applied "when a rule from elsewhere in federal law 

clearly provides a closer analogy than available state statutes, 

and when the federal policies at stake and the practicalities of 

litigation make that rule a significantly more appropriate 

vehicle for interstitial lawmaking". DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 

172. 

 In following the principles enunciated in DelCostello and 

Reed, we repeatedly have recognized our duty "to take seriously 

[the Supreme Court's admonition] that analogous state statutes of 

limitations are to be used unless they frustrate or significantly 

interfere with federal policies." Reed, 488 U.S. at 327. For 
instance, the mere fact that a statute touches upon issues of 

labor law does not mean that the Court must resort to the statute 

of limitations contained in §10(b) of the NLRA. Thus, in 

Eichleay Corp. v. Intern. Ass'n of Bridge, Structural and 

Ornamental Iron Workers, 944 F.2d 1047 (3d Cir. 1991), we applied 

a state statute of limitations for vacating arbitration awards to 

an action to enforce an arbitration awards pursuant to §301 of 

the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §185. Similarly, 

in Brenner v. Local 514, United Brothers of Carpenters, 927 F.2d 

1283 (3d Cir. 1991), we remanded the case to the district court 

to apply the most closely analogous state statute of limitations 

to a §301 claim of retaliation against internal union activities. 

In Grasty v. Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union, 828 

F.2d 123 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1042 (1988), we 

applied Pennsylvania's four-year breach of contract statute of 

limitations to a union member's claim that the union failed to 

rebate dues and improperly charged disabled workers. In this 

case, as in those, the federal statute may be borrowed only if it 

clearly provides a closer analogy than the available state 

statutes. Answering this question requires us to focus on the 

respective policies behind the NLRA and WARN. 

 The primary purpose of the NLRA is "to protect the right of 

workers to join together in labor organizations and collectively 

bargain for the terms and conditions of employment." United 

Paperworkers, 999 F.2d at 54; see also Fort Halifax Packing Co., 

Inc. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1987). The statute "is 

concerned with ensuring an equitable bargaining process, not with 
the substantive terms that may emerge from such bargaining." 

Fort Halifax, 482 U.S. at 20 (citing Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. 

v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985)). More specifically, as 

the Supreme Court noted in Reed, the NLRA has "effects upon the 

formation and operation of the collective-bargaining agreement 

between the employer and the bargaining representative, and upon 

the private settlement of disputes under that agreement through 

grievance-and-arbitration procedures". Reed, 488 U.S. at 329. 

The NLRA, then, is concerned with the importance and integrity of 

a process. From the NLRA's perspective, "minimum terms of 

employment" that may arise from another federal statute -- or 

from the process of collective bargaining itself -- are 

irrelevant so long as the process is fair. 

 The six-month statute of limitations set forth in §10(b) 

represents Congress's view of the proper balancing of the various 

interests involved in the process of collective bargaining. The 

six-month period takes into account "the national interests in 

stable bargaining relationships and finality of private 

settlements, and an employee's interest in setting aside what he 

views as an unjust settlement under the collective-bargaining 

system." DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 171 (quoting United Parcel 

Service, Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. at 70-71 (1980) (opinion 

concurring in the judgment)). In DelCostello itself, it was 

precisely this direct effect on the collective bargaining process 

that led the Court to invoke the §10(b) statute of limitations. 

That case involved a §301 hybrid suit (1) against an employer for 

breach of a collective bargaining agreement pursuant to the 
LMRDA, and (2) against a labor union for breach of the duty of 

fair representation. Such a hybrid action really alleges that 

the process of collective bargaining has broken down. Thus, the 

NLRA policies applied: "The employee's interest in setting aside 

the 'final and binding' determination of a grievance through the 

method established by the collective-bargaining agreement 

unquestionably implicates 'those consensual processes that 

federal labor law is chiefly designed to promote -- the formation 

of the . . . agreement and the private settlement of disputes 

under it.'" DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 171 (quoting Mitchell, 451 

U.S. at 70-71 (opinion concurring in judgment)). 

 In DelCostello, the parallels between the cause of action 

and the policies behind the NLRA were unmistakable. In Reed, 

however, the Supreme Court, while acknowledging that many 

employment-related statutes affecting labor will in some way 

affect the collective bargaining process, cautioned that even 

plausible "tangential and remote" effects upon collective 

bargaining are insufficient to warrant departure from the general 

rule. Reed, 488 U.S. at 330, 331. Thus, the Court refused to 

borrow the §10(b) NLRA statute of limitations to govern a union 

member's free speech claim against the union. 

 WARN falls into this latter category -- any effects it has 

on collective bargaining are tangential at best. The benefits of 

WARN accrue not only to unionized workers but to all workers 

alike. WARN, like dozens of other employment statutes which 

bestow substantive rights simply "gives employees something for 

which they otherwise might have to bargain." Fort Halifax, 482 
U.S. at 21 (addressing Maine plant closing law). That is why in 

that case, the Supreme Court held that the NLRA did not preempt a 

Maine statute providing protection to workers from plant 

closings. Unlike the NLRA, the Maine regulation "provide[d] 

protection to individual union and nonunion workers alike, and 

thus 'neither encourage[d] nor discourage[d] the collective 

bargaining processes . . . ." Fort Halifax, 482 U.S. at 21 

(quoting Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 755). The WARN 

protections, like the Maine plant closing law discussed in Fort 

Halifax, is also properly understood as establishing part of the 

"backdrop" of rights that the parties bring to the collective 

bargaining table, and not as affecting the substantive rights 

that may emerge from the collective bargaining discussions. Fort 

Halifax, 482 U.S. at 21. 

 WARN serves a broader purpose as well, that goes beyond the 

employer-employee relationship addressed by the NLRA. The 

statute mandates that employers planning a plant closing or mass 

lay-off must notify the "chief elected official of the unit of 

local government within which such closing or layoff is to 

occur". 29 U.S.C. §2102(a)(2) Employers who fail to comply with 

the provision are subject to civil penalties of $500 per day. 29 

U.S.C. §2104(a)(3). Thus, WARN serves very broad societal goals 

-- to protect workers, their families and their communities in 

the wake of potentially harmful employment decisions. Its 

remedial nature really has very little to do with the day to day 

process of collective bargaining. 
 To be sure, it cannot be said that WARN has no effect on 

collective bargaining. The companies point out, for example, 

that under the NLRA, an employer must provide notice to 

represented workers, in order to give the workers the opportunity 

for meaningful bargaining. See, e.g. First National Maintenance 

Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 681 (1981). This fact does present 

a superficial resemblance between the NLRA and WARN, but on 

closer inspection, it highlights the difference. The rights 

bestowed by the NLRA focus solely on the need for a meaningful 

collective bargaining process; WARN provides an across-the-board 

substantive right. The implementing regulations of the statute 

highlight this crucial distinction by providing that 

"[c]ollective bargaining agreements may be used to clarify or 

[to] amplify the terms and conditions of WARN, but may not reduce 

WARN rights." 20 C.F.R. §639.1(g) (emphasis added). In other 

words, the NLRA requires notice to protect the meaningfulness of 

the collective-bargaining process; WARN's purpose is to 

substantively protect employees and their communities. 

 The fact that courts have looked to NLRA cases in 

interpreting WARN, and the fact that there are some definitional 

overlaps, does not change this fundamental distinction between 

the two statutes. At best, WARN has a family resemblance to the 

NLRA. In Brenner v. Local 514, United Brothers of Carpenters, 927 

F.2d 1283 (3d Cir. 1991), we rejected the proposition that a 

family resemblance is sufficient to justify adopting the §10(b) 

statute of limitations. There, we held that a claim against a 

union for breach of the duty of fair representation, while having 
some effect upon the collective bargaining atmosphere, did not 

have an effect sufficient enough to counsel adoption of the 

federal statute. Id. at 1295. In order to justify departing from 

the general rule, the analogy must be more direct.2 

 As the Second Circuit pointed out in United Paperworkers, 

courts adopting the section 10(b) statute of limitations for WARN 

actions "have failed to grasp this crucial distinction between 

statutes which specifically regulate the collective bargaining 

relationship and those which remain peripheral to that concern." 

United Paperworkers, 999 F.2d at 55. 

 Nonetheless, despite the vast gulf between the respective 

policies behind the NLRA and WARN, the companies look for relief 

in our own prior decision of Haggerty v. USAir. Their reliance 

is misplaced. That case addressed the Employee Protection 

Program of the Airline Deregulation Act, 49 U.S.C. §1552(d)(1) 

(1988) ("EPP"), a federal statute which provided certain air 

carrier employees with a right of first hire against other air 

carriers. The EPP directly affected the collective bargaining 

environment by impacting on "the seniority relationships of other 

 

 

2 The lack of similarity between the NLRA and WARN becomes 

even starker when one looks at the remedies afforded by the 

respective statutes. Under the NLRA, the National Labor 

Relations Board has broad discretion to "'take such affirmative 

action including reinstatement of employees . . . as will 

effectuate the policies of [the Act]' to remedy an employer's 

unfair labor practices." Tubari Ltd., Inc. v. NLRB, 959 F.2d 

451, 453 (3d Cir. 1992). WARN by its very terms precludes such 

broad equitable relief; "[A] Federal court shall not have 

authority to enjoin a plant closing or mass layoff." (emphasis 

added). Similarly, the NLRB's discretion in awarding back pay is 

broad. See Tubari, 959 F.2d at 453. WARN, though, provides a 

strict statutory mechanism for computing damages. 
employees . . . ." Haggerty, 952 F.2d at 787. As in 

DelCostello, this direct impact on the collective bargaining 

environment required a statute of limitations that furthered the 

need for the rapid resolution of labor disputes. And since, as 

we noted in Haggerty itself, the airline industry was nearly 90% 

unionized and the right-to-hire program was inserted into the 

statute at the insistence of unions, the six-month section 10(b) 

statute of limitations was the obvious choice.3

 In determining whether to apply a federal statute of 

limitations, we also have considered whether the federal policies 

at stake and the practicalities of litigation make the NLRA 

statute "a significantly more appropriate vehicle for 

interstitial lawmaking". DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 172; Haggerty, 

952 F.2d at 786. The companies argue that WARN requires a single 

federal statute of limitations, because subjecting the companies 

to multiple state statutes of limitations would make it difficult 

for employers to calculate their contingent liabilities. 

 This case simply does not present serious uniformity 

concerns. The need for uniformity becomes real only when the 

federal statute at issue contains numerous types of claims and 

legal theories or when the prospect of multiple state statutes of 

limitation presents serious practical problems. Uniformity 

concerns motivated the Supreme Court in Wilson v. Garcia, 471 

 

 

3 We also found that "as with the NLRA, the Department of 

Labor has had a role in administering the EPP as the agency 

charged with maintaining a listing of airline vacancies for the 

use of protected employees under the EPP." Haggerty, 952 F.2d at 

787. 
U.S. 261 (1985), to apply a uniform limitations period (a state 

limitations period in that case) to claims arising under 42 

U.S.C. §1983. As the Court pointed out, claims under the broad 

civil rights statute "would encompass numerous and diverse topics 

and subtopics." Wilson, 471 U.S. at 273. Thus, "[i]f the choice 

of the statute of limitations were to depend upon the particular 

facts or the precise legal theory of each claim, counsel could 

almost always argue, with considerable force, that two or more 

periods of limitations should apply to each §1983 claim." Id. at 

273-74. The Court used similar reasoning in Agency Holding Corp. 

v. Malley-Duff & Associates, Inc., 483 U.S. 143 (1987): Since 

RICO "encompass[es] numerous diverse topics and subtopics . . . a 

uniform statute of limitations is required to avoid intolerable 

'uncertainty and time-consuming litigation.'" Id. at 149-50 

(quoting Wilson, 471 U.S. at 273, 272). 

 In Haggerty, we relied on uniformity concerns in deciding to 

apply the section 10(b) statute. Under the EPP, a protected 

employee who had been terminated or furloughed could claim a 

right of first hire with any other carrier that was hiring 

employees. We noted that airline carriers would have difficulty 

"managing a cohesive policy with respect to the EPP were they 

subject to the varying limitations periods of each of the states 

in which they operate." Haggerty, 952 F.2d at 786. Thus, 

without a uniform federal statute of limitations, the entire 

airline industry faced constant and protracted uncertainty. 

 Unlike RICO and Section 1983, WARN contains but a single 

cause of action, and all WARN claims involve nearly identical 
fact patterns and discrete inquiries. And unlike the EPP, under 

which an airline may be the fortuitous victim of events involving 

other air carriers all across the country, WARN's obligations 

simply do not implicate such geographic concerns favoring 

uniformity. As the Second Circuit put it: 

 "The term 'plant closing' as defined by the Act is limited 

to single sites of employment, and venue is limited to the 

district where the violation is alleged to have occurred or 

where the employer does business; unless a single plant site 

straddles the boundary between two states, it is unlikely 

prospective plaintiffs will have a broad choice of fora in 

which to bring their claims or that doubt will arise as to 

in which state triggering events occurred. Therefore, 

geographic considerations do not counsel for the application 

of a uniform federal limitations period for WARN Act 

claims." United Paperworkers, 999 F.2d at 56 (quoting 

district court opinion). 

Because of these same factors, "courts will have little 

difficulty in determining which state's law to apply and workers 

will gain few advantages by suing in a court far from the site of 

injury." United Paperworkers, 999 F.2d at 56.4

 

 

4 Since the Crown, Cork & Seal action occurred in Perry, 

Georgia, there is a question as to whether the statute of 

limitations should be borrowed from Georgia or Pennsylvania law. 

We have previously held that "as a general rule the governing 

statute of limitations should be that of the state in which the 

federal court sits, unless a party can make a compelling showing 

that the application of that statutory time bar would seriously 

frustrate federal labor policy or work severe hardship to the 

litigants." Consolidated Express, Inc. v. New York Shipping 

Association, Inc., 602 F.2d 494, 507-08 (3d Cir. 1979), vacated 

on other grounds, 448 U.S. 902 (1980). We need not decide 

whether the statute of limitations should be borrowed from 

Pennsylvania or Georgia law, since no party has brought to the 

lower courts' attention a statute of limitations, from either 

state, under which the instant actions would be untimely. 
 The companies' further concern about the effect of a plant 

closing on service of process, and on the mechanics of 

litigation, simply do not implicate federal concerns; rather, 

they are the same concerns at issue in every cause of action, 

whenever the statute of limitations is longer then a year or so. 

 On the other hand, a short statute of limitations could very 

well frustrate the policies behind WARN. As the Second Circuit 

found, under the complex administrative scheme of the NLRA, in 

which the NLRB plays a large and active role in prosecuting 

claims, "[t]he burden on complainants in pursuing a claim is 

minimal, justifying the short statute of limitations." United 

Paperworkers, 999 F.2d at 55. WARN does not contain those 

administrative safeguards, and a six-month statute could very 

well constitute too great a burden on the claimants. 

 Finally, cases finding that the practicalities of litigation 

favor adoption of a federal statute of limitations have focused 

on the problems with the potential state statutes. For example, 

in DelCostello, the Court pointed out that the two possible state 

statutes were inconsistent with the relevant federal policy 

favoring the finality of settlements and the opportunity to 

attack an unfair result under collective bargaining. The 

extremely short time periods in state arbitration statutes "fail 

to provide an aggrieved employee with a satisfactory opportunity 

to vindicate his rights under §301 and the fair representation 

doctrine." Id. at 166. Conversely, the relatively lengthy time 

period governing legal malpractice claims "would preclude the 

relatively rapid final resolution of labor disputes favored by 
federal law -- a problem not present when a party to a commercial 

arbitration sues his lawyer." Id. at 168. 

 Here, the state statutes of limitations brought to the lower 

courts' attention -- which range from the two-year period for 

enforcing civil penalties under 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §5524(5) 

to Pennsylvania's six-year residual statute of limitations, 42 

Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §5527 -- do not interfere with federal 

policy.5 Because of WARN's remedial nature and its limited 

effect on collective bargaining, a short statute of limitations 

is unnecessary. And none of the state statutes are so short as 

to interfere with a worker's potential for seeking or gaining 

relief. While we acknowledge that none of the possible state 

laws provide perfect analogies to WARN, the absence of a perfect 

analogy is an insufficient reason to depart from the general 

rule, particularly when federal law does not provide a 

satisfactory alternative. See, e.g., DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 

171; Gavalik v. Continental Can Co., 812 F.2d 834, 847 (3d Cir. 

1987). 

 Here, we need not decide which state statute applies, since 

the actions would be timely under any of the possible statutes of 

limitations brought to the court's attention. 

 CONCLUSION 

 

 

5 Other possible state statutes of limitations include the 

three year period set forth in 43 Pa. Stat. Ann. §260.9a(g) for 

bringing claims under the Pennsylvania Wage Payment and 

Collection Law, and the four year limitations period for breach 

of an implied contract, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §5525(4). 
 We conclude that, for the reasons detailed above, for 

actions arising under WARN, courts must apply the most closely 

analogous state statute of limitations. We therefore will affirm 

the district court's Order in United Steelworkers of America v. 

Crown, Cork & Seal denying Crown, Cork & Seal's motion for 

summary judgment. We will reverse the Order of the district 

court in Thomas v. North Star Steel granting North Star's motion 

for summary judgment in favor of North Star. These cases will be 

remanded to the respective district courts for further 

proceedings consistent with this opinion. Costs taxed against 

the appellant in 93-2008. Costs taxed against the appellee in 

93-7613.