AFFIRM and Opinion Filed June 12, 2024 

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In the 

### Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-23-00017-CV ACCELERATED INVENTORY M ANAGEMENT, LLC, Appellant V. BENJAMIN MCELROY, Appellee On Appeal from the 44th Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. DC-22-01519 MEMORANDUM OPINION NUNC PRO TUNC Before Justices Reichek, Carlyle, and Miskel Opinion by Justice Carlyle Appellant Accelerated Inventory Mana gement, LLC sued appellee Benjamin McElroy for breach of contract based on McElroy’s failure to repay a loan. On appeal, Accelerated argues the trial cour t abused its discretion when it excluded Accelerated’s evidence and witnesses and granted a take-nothing judgment in McElroy’s favor. We affirm in this memorandum opinion. See T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 47.4. BACKGROUND Accelerated’s initial disclosures (1) identified appellee Benjamin McElroy and Daniel Laux, Accelera ted’s representative, as people having knowledge of–2– relevant facts and (2) included a business r ecords affidavit authenticating copies of the loan, payment schedule, and ot her documents concerning the loan. See T EX
. R. E VID
. 902(10). Neither party filed manda tory pretrial disclosures. See T EX
. R. C IV
. P. 194.4. Both parties were represented by counsel at the October 27, 2022 bench trial. McElroy timely objected to the introductio n of any testimony ba sed on Accelerated’s nondisclosure of witnesses and exhibits. See id . The trial court confirmed Accelerated had no witnesses available, gr anted McElroy’s objection, issued a takenothing judgment in his favor, and denied Accelerated’s Motion for New Trial. On appeal, Accelerated argue s in a single issue that th e trial court abused its discretion when it excluded Accelerated’s exhibits and witness testimony because (1) its exclusion amounted to a death penalty sanction; (2) Accele rated’s failure to file pretrial disclosures did not unfairly su rprise or prejudice McElroy; and (3) Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 194 does not mandate the exclusion of evidence and witness testimony. STANDARD OF REVIEW “We review a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence for an abuse of discretion.” In re J.P.B. , 180 S.W.3d 570, 575 (Tex. 2005). “A trial court abuses its discretion if it acts in an arbitrar y or unreasonable manner or acts without reference to any guiding principles.” Bocquet v. Herring , 972 S.W.2d 19, 21 (Tex. 1998); see also In re Alford , 645 S.W.3d 315, 316 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2022, no pet.)–3– (“An abuse of discretion occurs when a tr ial judge reaches a decision that is so arbitrary and unreasonable that it amounts to a clear error of law or violates a ministerial duty.”). “To determine if an abus e of discretion occurred, we must decide whether the trial court (1) had sufficient information upon which to exercise its discretion, and (2) erred in th e exercise of its discretion.” Interest of J.A.A. , No. 05- 22-00578-CV, 2023 WL 4944505, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 3, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.). APPLICABLE LAW Under the Texas Rules of Civil Procedur e, parties are required to provide opposing parties with certain information about evidence th ey may present at trial, other than solely for impeachment purpos es, at least 30 days before trial. See T EX
. R. C IV
. P. 194.4. A party may not introduce ma terial or information that was not timely disclosed unless the trial court finds that “(1) there was good cause for the failure to timely make, amend, or supplem ent the discovery response; or (2) the failure to timely make, am end, or supplement the discovery response will not unfairly surprise or unfairly prejudice the other parties.” T EX
. R. C IV
. P. 193.6(a). The party seeking to introduce the evidence carries the burden of establishing either good cause for the failure to disclose or that the failure will not unfairly surprise or prejudice the other party. T EX
. R. C IV
. P. 193.6(b). ANALYSIS–4– Accelerated first argues the trial court’ s exclusion of its witnesses constituted a death penalty sanction unde r Texas Rule of Civil Proce dure 215 and that the trial court abused its discretion when it levied th is sanction. We disagree because the trial court’s ruling was not a sanction under Rule 215. First, the trial court’s ruling followe d Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 193.6. Second, Accelerated did not fail to comply with an or der or a discovery request; instead, it failed to comply with Rule 1 94.4. Third, Rule 193.6 contains its own mandatory enforcement mechanism based on a specific condition precedent. Fourth, there is no evidence the trial court viewed its ruling as a sanction or that it predicated its ruling on Rule 215. Fifth, the trial cour t’s ruling did not eliminate Accelerated’s option to request a continuance. See T EX
. R. C IV
. P. 193.6(c). Sixth, the trial court’s ruling did not eliminate Accelerated ’s option to nonsuit its claims. See T EX
. R. C IV
. P. 162. Thus, we conclude the trial court’ s ruling was not a sanction under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 215 and that even if it was, it neither adjudicated Accelerated’s claim nor unilaterally pr ecluded Accelerated from presenting the merits of its case. See Chrysler Corp v. Blackmon , 841 S.W.2d 844, 845 (Tex. 1992). Accelerated also argues that the tria l court abused its discretion because Accelerated’s failure to file pretrial disclo sures did not unfairly surprise or prejudice McElroy. Even when we a ssume that the trial court erred, Accelerated has not preserved error. See Sink v. Sink , 364 S.W.3d 340, 346–47 (T ex. App.—Dallas 2012, no pet.). As a general rule, a party is required to presen t a timely complaint to the–5– trial court before being allowe d to raise the issue on appeal. See T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 33.1(a)(1). A timely objection is one that is made “at a point in the proceedings which gives the trial court the opportunity to cure any alleged error.” Crews v. Dkasi Corp. , 469 S.W.3d 194, 201 (Tex. App. —Dallas 2015, pet. denied). “A party may claim error in a ruling to . . . exclude evidence only if the error affects a substantial right of the party a nd . . . a party informs the court of its substance by an offer of proof, unless the substance was apparent from the context.” T EX
. R. E VID . 103(a)(2); see also Sink , 364 S.W.3d at 347 (complaining party must offer the evidence and secure adverse ruling from the trial court). “Making an offer of proof enables an appellate court to determine whether the exclusion of the evidence was erroneous and harm ful, and it allows the trial court to reconsider its ruling in light of the actual evidence.” Talabera v. State , No. 05-21-00613-CR, 2023 WL 2300540, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Ma r. 1, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.). Accelerated did not make an offer of proof or a bill of exception and the issue of whether the substance of its evidence is apparent from the context has not been briefed. See T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 38.1(i). Under these facts, we cannot determine whether the exclusion of Accelerated’s evidence wa s harmful because there is no evidence it had any evidence. See Sink , 364 S.W.3d at 347. Accord ingly, assuming error, we cannot conclude it caused the re ndition of an improper judgment. See T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 44.1(a).–6– Finally, Accelerated argues the trial cour t erred when it prohibited Accelerated and its corporate representative from tes tifying because (1) McElroy was on notice they would testify at trial and (2) Texa s Rule of Civil Procedure 193.6 excludes a named party from its prohibitions. Assuming Accelerated is correct on both counts, it nonetheless failed to demonstrate harm. See Sink , 364 S.W.3d at 346–47. Instead, the record affirmatively de monstrates that Accelerated had no witnesses available on the day of trial, th e trial court was aware of that fact, and Accelerated nonetheless failed to argue McElroy was incorrect, offer any evidence of any kind, or request statutorily authorized relief. See, e.g. , T EX
. R. C IV
. P. 193.6(c). Further, Accelerated has not shown its witnesses were ava ilable to be called that day or what those witnesses would have said if they were allowed to testify. See T EX
. R. E VID
. 103(a); see also Guidry v. State , 9 S.W.3d 133, 153 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (“Absent a showing of what such testim ony would have been, or an offer of a statement concerning what the excluded evid ence would show, nothing is presented for review.”) (citing Stewart v. State , 686 S.W.2d 118 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984), cert. denied , 474 U.S. 866 (1985)). Thus, we cannot co nclude the trial court abused its discretion because Accelerated has not shown it was harmed. Sink , 364 S.W.3d at 347; see also Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Malone , 916 S.W.2d 551, 569 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, aff’d on other grounds , 972 S.W.2d 35 (Tex. 1998) (holding appellant could not show it was harmed by the court’s exclusion of its–7– witnesses when it failed to indicate the substance of the testimony its witnesses would have provided if called). We affirm.

230017F.P05 /Cory L. Carlyle / CORY L. CARLYLE JUSTICE–8– 

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Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT NUNC PRO TUNC
ACCELERATED INVENTORY MANAGEMENT, LLC, Appellant
No. 05-23-00017-CV V. BENJAMIN MCELROY, Appellee On Appeal from the 44th Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. DC-22-01519. Opinion delivered by Justice Carlyle. Justices Reichek and Miskel participating. In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED

. It is ORDERED that appellee BENJAMIN MC ELROY recover his costs of this appeal from appellant ACCE LERATED INVENTORY MANAGEMENT, LLC.
Judgment entered June 12, 2024.