alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**EXHIBIT 31.2**

 

**CERTIFICATION**

 

I, Stephen A. Thorington, Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of Plains Resources Inc., certify that: 

 

1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K of Plains Resources Inc.;

 

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untruestatement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report; 

 

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial informationincluded in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report; 

 

4. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I are responsible forestablishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) [omitted in accordance with section III.E. of SEC Release No. 34-47986] for the registrant and we have: 

 

a. designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused suchdisclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularlyduring the period in which this report is being prepared; 

 

b. [omitted in accordance with section III.E. of SEC Release No. 34-47986]; 

 

c. evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about theeffectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report, based on such evaluation; and 

 

d. disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant’smost recent fiscal quarter (the registrant’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’s control over financial reporting; and

 

5. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed,based on our most recent evaluation, to the registrant’s auditors and the audit committee of registrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent function): 

 

a. all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal controls over financialreporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and 

 

b. any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrant’s internalcontrols over financial reporting.
# EXHIBIT  99.1

# Certification
Of Chief Executive Officer Of Ocean Energy, Inc.Pursuant To 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, As
Adopted Pursuant ToSection 906 Of The SarbanesOxley Act Of 2002

I,
James T. Hackett, Chairman of the Board, President and Chief Executive Officer
of Ocean Energy, Inc. (the Company), hereby certify that the
Companys amendment to its annual report on Form 10K for the period ended December 31, 2002
and filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on April 24, 2003
pursuant to Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the
Report) by the Company fully complies with the requirements of that
section.

I
further certify that the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in
all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.

/s/ James T.
HackettName: James T. Hackett Title: Chairman of the Board, President and Chief
Executive Officer Date: April 24, 2003
IIB 

111TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 5307 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

SEPTEMBER 24, 2010 

Received; read twice and referred to the Committee on Finance 

AN ACT 

To amend the Tariff Act of 1930 to include ultralight vehicles under the definition of aircraft for purposes of the 

aviation smuggling provisions under that Act. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 


emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with BILLS
2 

HR 5307 RFS

1 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

2 This Act may cited as the ‘‘Ultralight Smuggling Pre3 vention Act of 2010’’. 

4 SEC. 2. DEFINITION OF AIRCRAFT UNDER AVIATION SMUG5 GLING PROVISIONS OF THE TARIFF ACT OF 

6 1930. 

7 (a) IN GENERAL.—Section 590 of the Tariff Act of 

8 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1590) is amended— 

9 (1) by redesignating subsection (g) as sub10 section (h); and 

11 (2) by inserting after subsection (f) the fol12 lowing: 

13 ‘‘(g) DEFINITION OF AIRCRAFT.—As used in this sec14 tion, the term ‘aircraft’ includes an ultralight vehicle, as 

15 defined by the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Ad16 ministration.’’. 

17 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by 

18 subsection (a) apply with respect to violations of any pro19 vision of section 590 of the Tariff Act of 1930 on or after 

20 the 30th day after the date of the enactment of this Act. 

21 SEC. 3. PAYGO COMPLIANCE. 

22 The budgetary effects of this Act, for the purpose of 

23 complying with the Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Act of 2010, 

24 shall be determined by reference to the latest statement 

25 titled ‘‘Budgetary Effects of PAYGO Legislation’’ for this 

26 Act, submitted for printing in the Congressional Record 


emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with BILLS
3 

HR 5307 RFS

1 by the Chairman of the House Budget Committee, pro2 vided that such statement has been submitted prior to the 

3 vote on passage. 

Passed the House of Representatives September 23, 

2010. 

Attest: LORRAINE C. MILLER, 

Clerk. 


emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with BILLS
## NO. 12-09-00231-CV IN THE COUR T OF APP EALS TWELFTH COURT OF APP EALS D ISTR ICT

TYLER, TEXA S

§ IN RE: CONTRAC TOR’S SUPPLIES, I NC., RELATOR § ORIGINAL PROCEE DING § MEMORA NDUM OPIN ION PER CU RIAM On August 17, 2009, this court delivered an opinion conditionally g rantingthe petition for wr it o f m and amus fi le d b y JohnOa ks a s r e lator . T hat opi nio n o rd e re d Re sp on de nt t o v a c ate his order g rantingJ ohn Oaks’s pe tition for presuit deposition a nd reque st to shorten the requir ed notice pe ri od , s ig ne d o n July

24 , 2 009, and

iss ue an o rd e r d e nyingJohnOa ks ’s pe tit ion

fo r p re su it de po sit ion . O n Se pte mbe r 1 , 2 00 9, thi s c ourt re c e ive d a

n o rd e r fr om Re sp on de nt that c omp lie d w ith this court’s orde r and opinion of July 24, 2009. All i ssues attenda

nt to this orig inal proce edinghavingbeen disposed of , this mandamus pr oc e e din gha s n owbe e n r e nd e re d mo ot; th eref or e , th e wr it n e e d n ot i ssu e . A c c or din g ly , th is or ig ina l pr oc e e din gis dism issed
. Opinion delivere d September 2, 2009. P an elconsi s t ed of

W ort hen, C. J. , G r i

f f i t h, J. , and H oyl e, J.

(PUBL I SH)
#### CLARK v. CLARK

No. 92 PC.

Case below: 44 N.C. App. 730.

Petition by defendant for discretionary review under G.S. 7A-31 denied 6 May 1980.
#### STATE v. STANLEY

No. 587P82.

Case below: 59 N.C. App. 238.

Petition by defendant for discretionary review under G.S. 7A-31 denied 26 October 1982.
Case 1:07-cv-03312-PAC Document 7-4 Filed 08/31/2007 Page 1 of 2
Case 1:07-cv-03312-PAC Document 7-4 Filed 08/31/2007 Page 2 of 2
# United States Court of Appeals For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 23-3220

___________________________ Michael McKinney lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellant

v. Martin O’Malley, 1 Commissioner of the Social Security Administration

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellee

____________ Appeal from United States District Court for the District of Minnesota

____________ Submitted: March 20, 2024 Filed: March 28, 2024 [Unpublished]

____________ Before SHEPHERD, KELLY, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.

____________ PER CURIAM.

1 Martin O’Malley has been appointed to serve as Commissioner of Social Security, and is substituted as appellee pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c).Michael McKinney appeals the district court’s 2 order affirming the denial of

supplemental security income. We agree with the court that substantial evidence in the record as a whole supports the adverse decision. See Kraus v. Saul, 988 F.3d 1019, 1023-24 (8th Cir. 2021) (standard of review). The administrative law judge (ALJ) was not required to adopt the exact limitations set forth in the opinions she found partially persuasive, and her residual functional capacity (RFC) determination regarding McKinney’s abilities to interact with others was supported. See Webster v. Kijakazi, 19 F.4th 715, 719 (5th Cir. 2021) (while ALJ did not adopt verbatim opinion which limited claimant to minimal interaction with others, ALJ incorporated limitation by limiting claimant to occasional public contact, and RFC assessment was supported by substantial evidence); Page v. Astrue, 484 F.3d 1040, 1043 (8th Cir. 2007) (RFC determination was supported by substantial evidence, including medical evidence, state agency consultants’ opinions, and claimant’s subjective statements). As the ALJ did not err in formulating the RFC assessment, she also did not err in relying on the vocational expert’s (VE’s) testimony based on that assessment. See Lacroix v. Barnhart, 465 F.3d 881, 889 (8th Cir. 2006) (ALJ’s hypothetical question to VE need only include limitations that ALJ finds are substantially supported by record as whole). The judgment is affirmed.

______________________________

2 The Honorable Paul A. Magnuson, United States District Judge for the District of Minnesota. -2-
#### UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Miguel MARTINEZ, Defendant-Appellant, Mark Rodriguez, Ramon Luis Martinez, Jamie Coburn, Defendants.

No. 03-1643.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

April 12, 2005.

Tina Schneider, Portland, ME, for Appellant.

John-Claude Charbonneau, Assistant United States Attorney (David V. Kirby, Acting United States Attorney for the District of Vermont, on the brief), United States Attorney’s Office for the District of Vermont, Rutland, VT, for Appellee.

Present: KEARSE, CABRANES and SACK, Circuit Judges.

SUMMARY ORDER

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that this case be and hereby is REMANDED.

Defendant Miguel Martinez appeals from a judgment in a criminal case, entered on September 29, 2003, following his plea of guilty to one count of possessing with intent to distribute heroine and cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). The District Court sentenced defendant principally to a term of 151 months’ imprisonment, in part by finding the defendant to be a career offender pursuant to United States Sentencing Guidelines § 4B1.1. Defendant argues that the Supreme Court’s decision in *Blakely v. Washington,*— U.S.-, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004), rendered his sentence constitutionally infirm. We now remand this case to the District Court for two determinations.

We note first that defendant filed his notice of appeal in the District Court on October 15, 2003, and therefore failed to meet the ten-day deadline prescribed by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure *3744(b)(1)(A). The District Court deemed defendant’s notice of appeal to be *“a*motion for extension of time for filing the notice of appeal,” granted the motion, and thus concluded that the notice of appeal was duly filed. The District Court may not, however, extend the time to file a notice of appeal without first making *“a*finding of excusable neglect or good cause.” Fed. R.App. P. 4(b)(4). Because no such finding was made here, we remand the case to the District Court for a determination whether defendant can demonstrate “excusable neglect or good cause” for failure to file his notice of appeal within the ten-day period provided in Rule 4(b)(1)(A).

Furthermore, on the day we heard the oral argument in defendant’s appeal, the Supreme Court clarified the application of *Blakely*to the Sentencing Guidelines in *United States v. Booker,*— U.S. -, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005). This ease is remanded to the District Court for further proceedings in conformity with *Booker,*and with this Court’s decision in *United States v. Crosby,*397 F.3d 103 (2d Cir.2005).

Within ten days after the District Court concludes proceedings pursuant to this remand order, either party may restore jurisdiction to this panel by giving notice to the Clerk of Court. *See United States v. Jacobson,*15 F.3d 19, 22 (2d Cir.1994).

A party will not waive or forfeit any appropriate argument on remand or on any appeal post-remand by not filing a petition for rehearing of this remand order.
Order entered July 22, 2014

In The 

## Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05

- 14

- 00216

- CR

NATHAN EARL BURGESS, Appellant

V.

STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 1

Collin County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 001

- 86625

- 2012



### O RDER

The Court has received a supplemental clerk’s record containing the trial court’s order granting Alan Kramer Taggart’s motion to withdraw and the order appointing William Schultz to
represent appellant. Accordingly, we DIREC T the Clerk to substitute William Schultz as appellant’s appointed attorney of record in place of Alan Kramer Taggart.

We ORDER Mr. Schultz to file appellant’s brief within THIRTY DAYS of the date of

this order.

The Court DENIES appellant’s July 17, 2014 pro se motion to extend time to file his

brief. See Rudd v. State , 616 S.W.2d 623 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1981).

We DIRECT the Clerk to send copies of this order, by electronic transmission, to
William Schultz, Alan Taggart, and the Collin County Distri ct Attorney’s Office.

/s/ LANA MYERS JUSTICE
#### STATE v. PATTON

No. 12 PC.

Case below: 5 N.C. App. 164.

Petition for writ of *certiorari*to North Carolina Court of Appeals denied 29 August 1969.
#### STATE v. FELIX HECKSTALL.

(Filed 28 September, 1966.)

Searches and Seizures § 8—

Efficacy of a valid search warrant is not affected by the fact that service of the warrant is made on the granddaughter of the owner of the premises who was the sole person there at the time, since the warrant gives the officers authority to search the described premises irrespective of anyone’s consent, and the duty of the officers to disclose their authority to the owner or the person in charge before beginning the search is solely to show that they are not trespassing.

Appeal by defendant from *Cohoon, J.,*February, 1966 Session, BeRtie Superior Court.

The defendant, Felix Heckstall, was arraigned, pleaded not guilty, was tried and convicted of the unlawful possession of “Two one-gallon glass jugs, containing two gallons of intoxicating nontaxpaid whisky.”

The evidence disclosed that the officers, pursuant to a search warrant, went to the specifically described dwelling house and premises of the defendant and read the warrant to the granddaughter who was the only member of the household present. The officer failed to find any contraband in the house. “Then we went out in the back yard and there was a wash pot sitting 16 steps from the door, turned bottom upwards. . . . There was two gallons of whisky in a burlap bag sitting on the ground . . . These are the same two jugs we found.” The State offered the search warrant, the jugs and contents in evidence. The defendant objected and moved to suppress the evidence on the ground the search warrant was defective and the attempted service on the granddaughter was improper; that there was no service on him. The court, over objection, admitted the evidence and overruled the defendant’s motion for a directed verdict of not guilty. From a verdict of guilty and judgment thereon, the defendant appealed.

*T. W. Bruton, Attorney General, George A. Goodwyn, Assistant Attorney General for the State.*

*Jones, Jones ■& Jones; Pritchett, Cooke & Burch by Stephen R. Burch for defendant appellant.*

Per Curiam.

The search warrant was based on a proper affidavit of the officer who stated that he had information from three previously reliable sources that on that day Felix Heckstall had whisky in his house and had sold whisky to numerous persons on Friday and Saturday nights; that affiant has “personally seen crowds *209accumulating, and numerous vehicles going to and from Felix Heck-stall’s house on Friday and Saturday nights.”

The warrant gave the officers authority to search the described premises. Hence the right to make a reasonable search did not depend on anyone’s consent. It was the duty of the officers to disclose their authority to the owner, or to the person in charge, before beginning the search in order that they might escape treatment as trespassers. The officers fulfilled the requirement when they read the warrant to the only member of the household present — the owner’s granddaughter.

The evidence discovered as the result of the search was properly admitted. It was sufficient to warrant the verdict and the judgment. The defendant’s assignments of error are not sustained.

No error.
| (1)   | The      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of      the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;and |
|-----------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| (2)   | The      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of      NFC. |
|-----------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| Date:  September      3, 2008 |   | /s/    | PAMELA J.      TURBEVILLE        |
|-----------------------------------------|--------|--------|----------------------------------|
|                                    |   |   | Pamela      J. Turbeville        |
|                                    |   |   | Principal      Executive Officer |

| Date:      September 3, 2008 |   | /s/    | JOHN      V.  MULVANEY,      SR. |
|------------------------------|--------|--------|--------------------------------------------|
|                         |   |   | John      V. Mulvaney, Sr.                 |
|                         |   |   | Principal      Financial Officer           |

| Date:      September 3, 2008 |   | /s/    | DAVID L.      DERFELT             |
|------------------------------|--------|--------|-----------------------------------|
|                         |   |   | David      L. Derfelt             |
|                         |   |   | Principal      Accounting Officer |

----
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOHN ALLEN RAINWATER,

 Plaintiff - Appellant,

 v.

JOHN McGINNESS, Sheriff,

 Defendant - Appellee.

No. 12-16961

D.C. No. 2:10-cv-01727-GGH

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California

Gregory G. Hollows, Magistrate Judge, Presiding**

Submitted February 18, 2014*** 

Before: ALARCÓN, O’SCANNLAIN, and FERNANDEZ, Circuit Judges.

John Allen Rainwater appeals pro se from the district court’s summary

judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging constitutional violations during

FILED

MAR 03 2014

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

 * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

 

** The parties consented to proceed before a magistrate judge. See 28

U.S.C. § 636(c).

 *** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
his detention in the Sacramento County Jail pursuant to California’s Sexually

Violent Predator Act (“SVP Act”). We review de novo, Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d

918, 926 (9th Cir. 2004), and we affirm. 

The district court properly granted summary judgment because, even

assuming that a constitutional deprivation occurred, Rainwater failed to raise a

genuine dispute of material fact as to whether any such constitutional deprivation

resulted from an official county custom or policy, whether McGinness was

personally involved in any constitutional violation, or whether there was a causal

connection between McGinness’s conduct and any such violation. See Monell v.

Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978) (requirements for municipal

liability); Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011) (requirements for

supervisory liability); see also Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989)

(party opposing summary judgment must present “significant probative evidence

tending to support its claim that material, triable issues of fact remain” (citation

and internal quotation marks omitted)).

We reject Rainwater’s contention that his detention in a jail pursuant to the

SVP Act is unconstitutional. See Jones, 393 F.3d at 932 (declining to hold that

involuntary civil commitment detainees cannot be housed in jail).

2 12-16961
We also reject Rainwater’s contention that he raised a genuine dispute of

material fact based on the “totality of conditions” of his confinement. Hoptowit v.

Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1246 (9th Cir. 1982), abrogated on other grounds by Sandin

v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995) (courts generally may not find constitutional

violations based on the totality of conditions of confinement).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued

in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on

appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam). 

AFFIRMED.

3 12-16961