FILED JULY 31, 2010
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
SUPREME COURT

RODNEY MCCORMICK, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v No. 136738 LARRY CARRIER, Defendant, and ALLIED AUTOMOTIVE GROUP, INC., indemnitor of GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION , Defendant-Appellee.

BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH CAVANAGH, J. The issue in this case is th e proper interpretation of th e “serious impairment of body function” threshold for non-economic to rt liability under MCL 500.3135. We hold that Kreiner v Fischer , 471 Mich 109; 683 NW2d 611 (2004), was wrongly decided because it departed from the plain language of MCL 500.3135, and is therefore overruled. Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan 

# Opinion Chief Justice: Marilyn Kelly Justices: Michael F. Cavanagh Elizabeth A. Weaver Maura D. Corrigan Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markman Diane M. Hathaway2 We further hold that, in this case, as a matter of law, plaintiff suffered a serious impairment of a body function. Accordingly, we reverse and remand the case to the trial court for proceedings consiste nt with this opinion.
I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS This case arises out of an injury that plaintiff, Rodney McCo rmick, suffered while working as a medium truck loader at a General Motors Corporation (GM) plant. 1 Plaintiff’s job mainly consisted of assisti ng in the loading of trucks, which required climbing up and around trucks and trailers, standing, walk ing, and heavy lifting. He generally worked nine- to ten-h our shifts, six days a week. On January 17, 2005, a coworker backed a truck into plaintiff, knocking him over, and then drove over plai ntiff’s left ankle. Plaintiff was immediately taken to the hospital, and x-rays showed a fracture of his left medial malleolus. 2 Plaintiff was released from the hospital that day, and two days later metal hardware was surgically inse rted into his ankle to stabilize plaintiff’s bone fragments. Plaintiff was restricted from weight-bearing activities for one month after th e surgery and then underwent multiple months of physical therapy. The metal hardware was removed in a second surgery on October 21, 2005.

1 The only defendant remain ing at this point in the case is GM’s indemnitor, Allied Automotive Group, Inc, because the parties have sti pulated the release of the other original defendants. For simp licity’s sake, the opinion will use “defendant” to refer to this entity.

2 The medial malleolus is the bony promin ence that protrudes from the medial side of the ankle. Stedman’s Medical Dictionary (26th ed).3 At defendant’s request, plaintiff underw ent a medical evaluation with Dr. Paul Drouillard in November 2005. He indicated that plaintiff c ould return to work but was restricted from prolonged standing or walking. On January 12, 20 06, the specialist who performed plaintiff’s surgeries cleared him to return to work without restrictions. The specialist’s report noted that plaintiff had an “excellent range of motion,” and an x-ray showed “solid healing with on [sic] degenerative joint disease of his ankle.” Beginning on January 16, 2 006, plaintiff returned to work as a medium truck loader for several days, but he had difficulty walking, climbing, and crouching because of continuing ankle pain. He re quested that his job duties be restricted to driving, but defendant directed him to cease work. Defendant required plaintiff to undergo a functional capacity evaluation (FCE) in March 2006. The FCE determined that plain tiff was unable to perform the range of tasks his job required, including stooping, crouchi ng, climbing, sustaine d standing, and heavy lifting. This was due to ankle and shoulder pain, 3 a moderate limp, and difficulty bearing weight on his left ankle. The report stated th at plaintiff’s range of motion in his left ankle was not within normal limits and that difficulty climbing and lifting weights had been reported and observed. In May 2006, Dr. Drouillard examined plaintiff again a nd reported that plaintiff could return to work. Dr. Drou illard’s report stated that plai ntiff complained of ankle and

3 Plaintiff had a pre-existing back and shoulder injury that is unrelated to the incident in this case.4 foot pain, but the doctor found “no objec tive abnormality to correspond with his subjective complaints.” In June 2006, pl aintiff also underwent a magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) test, which showed some postoperative scar and degenerative tissue formation around his left ankl e. At plaintiff’s request, another FCE was performed on August 1, 2006, which affirmed that plaintiff could return to work without restriction and was capable of performing the tasks required for his job. The report stated that plaintiff complained of “occasional aching” and tightness in his ankle, but it did not appear to be aggravated by activities such as prolonged st anding or walking. It also noted that plaintiff’s range of motion in his left ankle wa s still not within normal limits, although it had improved since the March 2006 FCE. Plaintiff returned to work on August 16 , 2006, 19 months after he suffered his injury. He volunteered to be a ssigned to a different job, a nd his pay was not reduced. He has been able to perform his new job since that time. On March 24, 2006, plaintiff filed suit, seeking recovery for his injuries under MCL 500.3135. In his October 2006 deposition, plaintiff testif ied that at the time of the incident, he was a 49-year-o ld man and his normal life before the incident mostly consisted of working 60 hours a week as a medium-duty truck loader. He st ated that he also was a “weekend golfer” and frequently fished in the spring and summer from a boat that he owns. He testified that he was fi shing at pre-incident levels by the spring and5 summer of 2006, but he has only golfed once since he re turned to work. 4 He stated that he can drive and take care of his person al needs without assi stance and that his relationship with his wife has not been affected . He stated that he has not sought medical treatment for his ankle since January 2006, wh en he was approved to return to work without restriction. He further testified that his life is “painful, but normal,” although it is “limited,” and he continues to experience ankle pain. The trial court granted defendant’s moti on for summary disposition on the basis that plaintiff had recovered relatively well and could not meet the serious impairment threshold provided in MCL 500.3135(1). The Court of Appeals affirmed, with one judge dissenting. McCormick v Carrier , unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued March 25, 2008 (Docket No. 275888 ). The majority held that, under

Kreiner , plaintiff’s impairment did not affect hi s ability to lead his normal life because he is able to care for himself, fish and golf, and work at the same rate of pay. The dissent disagreed, arguing that two doctors had dete rmined that the impa irment would cause

4 There are no facts in the record regarding the extent to which plaintiff fished between January 2005 and January 2006 or the ex tent to which he was able to golf in the period between the incident a nd when he returned to work, despite th e arguments to the contrary by both parties and the dissent. Defendant has alleged that plaintiff was able to fish while he was not working, but the only factual support it cites is plaintiff’s statement that he fished in the six or seven months after January 2006, which was when he was initially cleared to return to work, and when he actually returned to wo rk. Although plaintiff’s counsel agreed in the arguments before the trial court that plaintiff had been fishing, it was unclear as to what time period he was referring. In plaintiff’s brief to this Court, he alleges that by the time of his depos ition, he had “returned” to fishing with the same frequency as before the accident, which suggests that plaintiff might be arguing that his fishing activities were interrupted.6 problems over plaintiff’s entire life and his employer had determined that he could not perform his work duties, the main part of his “normal” life. After initially denying leave to appeal, th is Court granted plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration, vacated its pr ior order, and granted the applic ation for leave to appeal. McCormick v Carrier , 485 Mich 851 (2009).
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW This Court reviews a motion for summary disposition de novo. In re Smith Trust , 480 Mich 19, 23-24; 745 NW2d 754 (2008). The proper interpretation of a statute is a legal question that this Cour t also reviews de novo. Herman v Berrien Co , 481 Mich 352, 358; 750 NW2d 570 (2008).
III. ANALYSIS The issue presented in this case is the proper interpretation of MCL 500.3135. We hold that Kreiner incorrectly interpreted MCL 500.3 135 and is overruled because it is inconsistent with the statute’s plain language and this opinion. Further, under the proper interpretation of the statute, plaintiff has demonstrated that, as a matter of law, he suffered a serious impair ment of body function.
A. OVERVIEW OF MCL 500.3135 In 1973, the Michigan Legislature ad opted the no-fault in surance act, MCL 500.3101 et seq . The act created a compulsory mo tor vehicle insurance program under which insureds may recover directly from thei r insurers, without regard to fault, for qualifying economic losses arising from motor ve hicle incidents. See MCL 500.3101 and 500.3105. In exchange for en suring certain and prompt rec overy for economic loss, the7 act also limited tort liability. MCL 500.3135. See also DiFranco v Pickard , 427 Mich 32, 40-41; 398 NW2d 896 (1986 ). The act was designed to remedy problems with the traditional tort system as it re lates to automobile accidents. These included that “[the contributory negligence liability scheme] denied benefits to a high percentage of motor vehicle accident victims, minor injuries we re overcompensated, serious injuries were undercompensated, long paym ent delays were commonplace , the court system was overburdened, and those with low income and little educatio n suffered discrimination.” Shavers v Attorney General , 402 Mich 554, 579; 267 NW2d 72 (1978). Under the act, tort liability for non-economic loss arisin g out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of a qualifying motor ve hicle is limited to a list of enumerated circumstances. MCL 500.3135(3). The ac t creates threshold requirements in MCL 500.3135(1), which has remained unchanged in all key aspects since the act was adopted. That subsection currently provi des that “[a] person remains subject to tort liability for noneconomic loss caused by his or her ownershi p, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle only if the injured person has suffered death, serious impairment of body function, or permanent serious disfigurement.” The threshold requirement at issue in this case is whether plaintiff has suffered “serious impairment of body function.” The act did not originally define this phrase. Accordingly, it initially fell to th is Court to do so, and the re sult was a series of differing opinions. In Cassidy v McGovern , 415 Mich 483; 330 NW2d 22 (1982), this Court held that whether the serious impairment threshold is met is a question of law for the court to decide where there is no material disputed fact. Id. at 502. It further held that in order to8 meet the threshold, the plaintiff must show an objectively manifested injury and an impairment of an important body function, wh ich it defined as “an objective standard that looks to the effect of an in jury on the person’s general ability to live a normal life.” Id. at 505. This Court later in part modified and in part affirmed Cassidy in DiFranco , supra . The DiFranco Court agreed that a plaintiff had to su ffer an objectively manifested injury, but it rejected the Cassidy Court’s determination that the impairment needed to be “important” and its defin ition of “important.” DiFranco , 427 Mich at 61-67, 70-75. The

DiFranco Court further held that whether the thres hold is met is a ques tion of law for the court only if there are no material disp uted facts and the facts could not support conflicting inferences. Id. at 53-54. In 1995, however, the Legislature interv ened. It amended MCL 500.3135 to define a “serious impairment of body function” as “an objec tively manifested impairment of an important body function th at affects the person’s genera l ability to lead his or her normal life.” MCL 500.3135(7). The Legislat ure also expressly provided that whether a serious impairment of body function has occurre d is a “question[] of law” for the court to decide unless there is a factual dispute regard ing the nature and extent of injury and the dispute is relevant to deciding whether the standard is met. MCL 500.3135(2)(a). Thus, the Legislature incorporated some language from DiFranco and Cassidy but also made some significant changes. 5

5 Some courts have broadly stat ed that the Legislature rejected DiFranco in favor of Cassidy , see Kreiner , 471 Mich at 121 n 8, but that is an oversimplification. Some of the language adopted by the Legisl ature was used consistently in both DiFranco and9 This Court interpreted the ame nded provisions in 2004, in Kreiner . The question before this Court is whether the Kreiner majority properly interpreted the statute, and, if not, whether its interpreta tion should be overruled. B. INTERPRETATION OF MCL 500.3135 The primary goal of statutory construction is to give effect to the Legislature’s intent. Briggs Tax Serv, LLC v Detroit Pub Sch , 485 Mich 69, 76; 780 NW2d 753 (2010). This Court begins by re viewing the language of the st atute, and, if the language is clear and unambiguous, it is presumed that the Legislature intended the meaning expressed in the statute. Id. Judicial construction of an un ambiguous statute is neither required nor permitted. 6 In re MCI Tele com Complaint , 460 Mich 396, 411; 596 NW2d 164 (1999). When reviewing a statute, all non-technical “words and phrases shall be construed and understood according to the common an d approved usage of the language,” MCL 8.3a, and, if a term is not defined in the statute, a court may consult a dictionary to aid it in this goal. Oakland Co Bd of Co Rd Comm’rs v Mich Prop & Cas

Cassidy , and the Legislature clearly rejected some elements of Cassidy . The similarities and differences between DiFranco and Cassidy and the amendments to MCL 500.3135 will be discussed below to the extent that they are significant. Although the dissent disagrees in the abstract with my statement that it is an overs implification to state that the Legislature merely rejected DiFranco in favor of Cassidy , I can only conclude that it is unable to support this accusation with any sp ecific, substantive arguments, given that it fails to expressly address or reject my more nuanced analysis of each of the specific phrases that the Legislature adopted or rejected from Cassidy and DiFranco

. 6 This Court’s members disagree on wh en a statute is ambiguous. See Petersen v Magna Corp , 484 Mich 300, 310-313 (opinion by K ELLY , C.J.), 339-342 (opinion by H ATHAWAY , J.); 773 NW2d 564 (2009). We need no t address that issue here because MCL 500.3135 is unambiguous under any of the views.10 Guaranty Ass’n , 456 Mich 590, 604; 575 NW2d 751 (1998). A court should consider the plain meaning of a statute’s words and thei r “‘placement and purpose in the statutory scheme.’” Sun Valley Food s Co v Ward , 460 Mich 230, 237; 596 NW2d 119 (1999) (citation omitted). “Where the la nguage used has been subject to judicial interpretation, the legislature is presumed to have used part icular words in the sens e in which they have been interpreted.” People v Powell , 280 Mich 699, 703; 274 NW 372 (1937). See also People v Wright , 432 Mich 84, 92; 4 37 NW2d 603 (1989). 1. A QUESTION OF LAW OR FACT UNDER MC L 500.3135(2) The first step in interpreti ng MCL 500.3135 is to determ ine the proper role of a court in applying MCL 500.3135(1) and (7). The Legislature addressed this issue in the amended MCL 500.3135(2)(a), whic h states in relevant part: The issues of whether an injured person has suffe red serious impairment of body function or permanent serious disfigurement are questions of law for the court if the court fi nds either of the following: (i) There is no factual dispute conc erning the nature and extent of the person’s injuries. (ii) There is a factual dispute conc erning the nature and extent of the person’s injuries, but the dispute is not material to the determination as to whether th e person has suffered a serious impairment of body function or permanent serious disfigurement. Under the plain language of the statute, the threshold questi on whether the person has suffered a serious impairment of body func tion should be determin ed by the court as a matter of law as long as there is no factua l dispute regarding “the nature and extent of the person’s injuries” that is material to determining whethe r the threshold standards are11 met. 7 If there is a material fact ual dispute regarding the nature and extent of the person’s injuries, the court should not deci de the issue as a matter of law. 8 Notably, the disputed

7 Notably, MCL 500.3135 (2)(a) could unconstitutionally conflict with MCR 2.116(C)(10) in those cases wherein a court is required to (1) resolve material, disputed facts with regard to issues other than the nature and extent of the injury, such as the extent to which the in jury actually impairs a body functi on or the injured party relied on that function as part of his or her pre-accident life, or (2) decide whether the threshold is met even though reasonable people could draw different conclusions from the facts. See Skinner v Square D Co , 445 Mich 153, 161-162; 516 NW2d 475 (1994), and Henderson v State Farm Fire & Cas Co , 460 Mich 348, 357; 596 NW2d 190 (1999). Given that the allocation of decision-maki ng authority between a judge and a jury is “a quintessentially procedural determination,” Shropshire v Laidlaw Transit, Inc , 550 F3d 570, 573 (CA 6, 2008), this potential c onflict raises questions as to whether the Legislature may have uncons titutionally invaded this Cour t’s exclusive authority to promulgate the court rules of practice and procedure to the extent that MCL 500.3135(2)(a) is merely procedural. See Perin v Peuler ( On Rehearing ), 373 Mich 531, 541; 130 NW2d 4 (1964). We do not reach this issue today because we conclude that there are no material factual disputes af fecting the serious impairment threshold determination in this case. Notably, howeve r, the division of questi ons of law and fact between a judge and a jury is based on longstanding procedural rules, see Mawich v Elsey , 47 Mich 10, 15-16; 10 NW 57 (1881), that are intended to promote judicial efficiency. See Moll v Abbott Laboratories , 444 Mich 1, 26-28; 506 NW2d 816 (1993). Whether MCL 500.3135(2)(a) serves a purpose ot her than judicial dispatch is not clear, as the Legislature itself stated that the 1995 amendments were intended, in part, “to prescribe certain procedures for maintain ing [tort liability aris ing out of certain accidents].” See the title of 1995 PA 222. And, of course, the scope of the rules governing summary disposition are also suppor ted—if not compelled—by the right to a jury trial in civil ca ses. See, generally, Conservation Dep’t v Brown , 335 Mich 343, 346- 347; 55 NW2d 859 (1952), and Dunn v Dunn , 11 Mich 284, 286 (1863). Accord Byrd v Blue Ridge Rural Electric Coop, Inc , 356 US 525, 537-538; 78 S Ct 893; 2 L Ed 2d 953 (1958). Interestingly, the dissent states that it disagrees with the majority that there could be a conflict between the statute and the court rule, but it also approvingly quotes DiFranco for the proposition that reasonable minds can often differ over the threshold issues in these cases.

8 This plain reading of the statute is not necessarily inconsistent with the Kreiner majority’s interpretation of MCL 500.3135(2)(a), see Kreiner , 471 Mich at 131-132, but neither the majority nor dissent in Kreiner discussed the constitutionality of this12 fact does not need to be outcome determinativ e in order to be material, but it should be “significant or essential to the issue or matter at hand.” Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed) (defining “material fact”).
2. A “SERIOUS IMPAIRMENT OF BODY FUNCTION” UNDER MCL 500.3135(1) AND (7) In those cases where the court may d ecide whether the serious impairment threshold is met as a matter of law, the next issue is the proper interpretation of MCL 500.3135(7). It provides that, for purposes of the section, a “serious impairment of body function” is “an objectively manifested impair ment of an important body function that affects the person’s general ability to lead his or her normal life.” On its face, the statutory language provides three prongs that are necessary to establish a “serious impairment of body function”: (1) an objec tively manifested impairment (2) of an important body function that (3) affects the person’s general ability to lead his or her normal life. 9 Overall, because we conclude that each of these prongs’ meaning is clear from the plain and unambiguous statutor y language, judicial construc tion is neither required nor

provision. As noted in footnote 7 of th is opinion, however, the manner in which Kreiner interpreted the statute may be unconstitutional to the extent that it requires a court to usurp the role of the fact-finder. That issue is not presented on the facts of this case, however.

9 The Kreiner majority first addressed whethe r the impaired body function was important and then analyzed whether the im pairment was objectively manifested. 471 Mich at 132-133. We find it more consistent with the statutory text to first address the objectively manifested impairment requirement.13 permitted. In re MCI , 460 Mich at 411. Notably, however, a dictionary may aid the Court in giving the words a nd phrases in MCL 500.3135(7) their common meaning, and where the language used in MCL 500.3135(7) was originally adopted and interpreted in Cassidy and DiFranco , it may be presumed that the Le gislature intended the previous judicial interpretation to be relevant. Oakland Co Bd of Rd Comm’rs , 456 Mich at 604, and Wright , 432 Mich at 92. As will be discussed within, where the Kreiner majority’s interpretation of these prongs is inconsistent with the clea r language of the statute, we hold that Kreiner was wrongly decided. Most significa ntly, its interpreta tion of the third prong deviates dramatically from the statute’s text.
a. AN OBJECTIVELY MANIFESTED IMPAIRMENT Under the first prong, it must be establis hed that the injured person has suffered an objectively manifested impairment of body function. The common meaning of “an objectively manifested impairment” is a pparent from the unambiguous statutory language, with aid from a dictionary, and is c onsistent with the judi cial interpretation of “objectively manifested” in Cassidy and DiFranco . To the extent that the Kreiner majority’s interpretation of this prong differs from this approa ch, it was wrongly decided. To begin with, the adverb “objectively” is defined as “in an objective manner,” Webster’s Third New Inte rnational Dictionary (1966) , and the adjective “objective” is defined as “1. Of or having to do with a ma terial object as distinguished from a mental concept. 2. Having actual existence or reality. 3. a. Uninfluenced by emotion, surmise, or personal prejudice. b. Based on observable phenomena; pres ented factually . . . .” The American Heritage Dictionary , Second College Edition (1982). It is defined specifically14 in the medical context as “[i]ndicating a sy mptom or condition perceived as a sign of disease by someone other than the person afflicted.” Id. 10 The verb “manif est” is defined as “1. To show or demonstrate plainly; re veal. 2. To be evidence of; prove.” Id. Overall, these definitions suggest that the common me aning of “objectively manifested” in MCL 500.3135(7) is an impairment that is evid enced by actual symptoms or conditions that someone other than the injured person would observe or perceive as impairing a body function. In other words, an “objectiv ely manifested” impairment is commonly understood as one observable or perceivable from actual symptoms or conditions. Notably, MCL 500.3135(7) does not contain the word “injury,” and, under the plain language of the statute, th e proper inquiry is whether the impairment is objectively manifested, not the injury or its symptoms. 11 This distinction is important because “injury” and “impairment” have different meanin gs. An “injury” is “1 . Damage of or to a person . . . 2. A wound or other specific damage.” The American Heritage Dictionary ,

10 See also Webster’s Third New Inte rnational Dictionary (1966), defining “objective,” in relevant part, as “publicly or intersubjectively observable or verifiable especially by scientific methods: independent of what is personal or private in our apprehension and feelings: of such nature th at rational minds agree in holding it real or true or valid.” It also defines “objective” in the context “of a sy mptom of disease” as “perceptible to persons other than an affected individual.” Id. (italics omitted).

11 Accordingly, the Court of Appeals deci sions that have gone beyond the plain language of the statute and imposed an extra-textual “objectively manifested injury ” requirement, in clear contravention of Legisla tive intent, are overruled to the extent that they are inconsistent with this opinion. See, e.g., Netter v Bowman , 272 Mich App 289, 305; 725 NW2d 353 (2006) (holding that “the current meaning of ‘objectively manifested’ . . . requires that a plainti ff’s injury must be capable of objective verification”.15 Second College Edition (1982). “Impairment” is the “state of being impaired,” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1966), and to be “impaired” means being “weakened, diminished, or damaged” or “f unctioning poorly or inadequately.” Random House Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary (1998). These definitions show that while an injury is the actual damage or wound, an impair ment generally relates to the effect of that damage. Accordingly, when considering an “impairment,” the focus “is not on the injuries themselves, but ho w the injuries affected a particular body function.” DiFranco , 427 Mich at 67. Further, the pre-existing judicial interp retation of “objectively manifested” is consistent with the plain language of the later-adopted statute. In Cassidy , this Court explained that the serious impairment thres hold was not met by pain and suffering alone, but also required “injuries that affect th e functioning of the body,” i.e., “objectively manifested injuries.” Cassidy , 415 Mich at 505. In other words, Cassidy defined “objectively manifested” to mean affecting the functioning of the body. 12 DiFranco affirmed this and further explained that the “objectively manifested” requirement signifies that plaintiffs must “introduce eviden ce establishing that there is a physical basis for their subjective complaints of pain and suffering” and that showing an impairment generally requires medical testimony. DiFranco , 427 Mich at 74.

12 Although the Legislature plai nly rejected that it is the injury that should be objectively manifested, as opposed to the impairment , the previous judicial construction of “objectively manifested” is still relevant.16 The Kreiner majority’s interpretation of this la nguage was only par tially consistent with the plain language of the statute. It addressed this issue briefly, stating that “[s]ubjective complaints that are not medically documented are insufficient [to establish that an impairment is objectively manifested].” Kreiner , 471 Mich at 132. To the extent that this is inconsistent with DiFranco ’s statement that medical testimony will generally be required to establish an impairment, it is at odds with the legislative intent expressed by the adoption of the “objectiv ely manifested” language from DiFranco and Cassidy

. Thus, to the extent that Kreiner could be read to always require medical documentation, it goes beyond the legislative intent expressed in the plain statutory text, and was wrongly decided. b. OF AN IMPORT ANT BODY FUNCTION If there is an objectively manifested im pairment of body function, the next question is whether the impair ed body function is “important.” The common meaning of this phrase is expressed in the unambiguous statutory language, although reference to a dictionary and limited reference to Cassidy is helpful. The relevant definition of the adjective “important” is “[m]arked by or having great value, significance, or consequence.” The American Heritage Dictionary , Second College Edition (1982). See also Random House Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary (1998), defining “important” in relevant part as “of much or great significance or consequence,” “mattering much,” or “prominent or large.” Whether a body function has great “value,” “significance,” or “consequen ce” will vary depending on the person. Therefore, this prong is an inherently subject ive inquiry that must be decided on a case-17 by-case basis, because what may seem to be a trivial body function for most people may be subjectively important to some, depending on the relationship of that function to the person’s life. The “important body function” lang uage was originally adopted in Cassidy , where the Court stated that an “important” body function is not any body function but also does not refer to the entire body function. Cassidy , 415 Mich at 504. This pre-existing judicial construction of “important body function” is consistent with the common meaning of “important.” 13 For this prong, the Kreiner majority’s interpretation appe ars to be consistent with the plain language of the statut e, as it only briefly stated th at “[i]t is insufficient if the impairment is of an unimportant body function.” Kreiner , 471 Mich at 132. 14 If, however, the Kreiner majority’s position has been cons trued in a manner that is inconsistent with this opinion, then we disapprove of those constructions.

13 Cassidy also held that the importance of a body function is an objective standard based on its effect on “t he person’s general ability to live a normal life.” Cassidy , 415 Mich at 505 (emphasis added). As discussed below, however, the Legislature specifically rejected the idea th at the normal life ev aluation should be objective, and, thus, implicitly rejected Cassidy ’s determination that whether a body function is “important” could be objectivel y determined outside the context of the person’s actual life. Notably, DiFranco is inapposite because it rejected the “important body function” test. DiFranco , 427 Mich at 61-62.

14 The Kreiner majority also apparently agreed that this is a subjective, case-bycase inquiry. Kreiner , 471 Mich at 134 n 19.18 c. THAT AFFECTS THE PE RSON’S GENERAL ABILITY TO LEAD HIS OR HER NORMAL LIFE Finally, if the injured person has suffered an objectively manifested impairment of body function, and that body function is impor tant to that person, then the court must determine whether the impairment “affects the person’s general ability to lead his or her normal life.” The common meaning of this phrase is expresse d by the unambiguous statutory language, and its inte rpretation is aided by referen ce to a dictionary, reading the phrase within its statutory context, and limited reference to Cassidy

. To begin with, the verb “affect” is define d as “[t]o have an influence on; bring about a change in.” The American Heritage Dictionary , Second College Edition (1982). An “ability” is “[t]he quality of being able to do something,” id. , and “able” is defined as “having sufficient power, skill, or res ources to accomplish an object.” Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary , <http://www.merriam-webster.com> (accessed May 27, 2010). The adjective “general” means: 1. Relating to, concerned with, or applicable to the whole or every member of a class or category. 2. Aff ecting or characteristic of the majority of those involved; prevalent: a general discontent . 3. Being usually the case; true or applicable in most instan ces but not all. 4. a. Not limited in scope, area, or application: as a general rule. b. Not limited to one class of things: general studies . 5. Involving only the main features of something rather than details or particulars. 6. Highest or superior in rank.” [ The American Heritage Dictionary , Second College Edition (1982).] The sixth definition is obviousl y irrelevant, and the first de finition of “general” does not make sense in this context because a person ’s “whole” ability to live his or her normal life is surely not affected s hort of complete physical and me ntal incapacitation, which is accounted for in a different statutory threshol d: death. The othe r definitions, however,19 more or less convey the same me aning: that “general” does no t refer to only one specific detail or particular part of a thing, but, at least some parts of it. Thus, these definitions illustrate that to “affect” the person’s “general ability” to lead his or her normal life is to influence some of the person’s power or skill, i.e., the person’s capacity, to lead a normal life. The next question is the meaning of “to lead his or her normal life.” The verb “lead,” in this context, is best define d as “[t]o pass or go through; live.” The American Heritage Dictionary , Second College Edition (1982). Although the verb “lead” has many definitions, some of which ha ve similar nuances, this defi nition is the most relevant because it expressly applies in th e context of leading a certain type of life. Indeed, other dictionaries provide a similar definition with th e same context, using a “type of life” as an example. 15 Similarly, “life” has multiple meani ngs, but one specifically references the context of leading a particular type of life, which is “[a] manner of living: led a good life .” Id. Other definitions are similar, such as “[t]he physical, mental, and spiritual experiences that constitute a person’s existe nce,” or “[h]uman existence or activity in general.” Id. Given the contextual examples used in the dictionary, the common understanding of “to lead his or her normal life” is to live, or pass life, in his or her normal manner of living.

15 See Random House Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary (1998), defining “lead” as “to go through or pa ss (time, life, etc.): to lead a full life ,” and Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1966), defining it as “to go thr ough (life or some other period of time): PASS, LIVE <there he led a very peaceful existence>.”20 Therefore, the plain text of the statute and these definitions demonstrate that the common understanding of to “affe ct the person’s ability to lead his or her normal life” is to have an influence on some of the person’s capacity to live in his or her normal manner of living. By modifying “nor mal life” with “his or her,” th e Legislature indicated that this requires a subjective, person- and fact-s pecific inquiry that mu st be decided on a case-by-case basis. Determining the effect or influence that the impairment has had on a plaintiff’s ability to lead a normal life necess arily requires a comparison of the plaintiff’s life before and after the incident. There are several important points to note, however, with regard to this comparison. First, the statute merely requires that a person’s general ability to lead his or her normal life has been affected , not destroyed. Thus, courts should consider not only whether the impairment has led the person to completely cease a pre- incident activity or lifestyle element, but also whether, although a person is able to lead his or her preincident normal life, the person’s general ab ility to do so was none theless affected. Second, and relatedly, “general” modifies “ ability, ” not “affect” or “normal life.” Thus, the plain language of the statute only requires that some of the person’s ability to live in his or her normal manner of living has be en affected, not that some of the person’s normal manner of living has itself been affect ed. Thus, while the extent to which a person’s general ability to live his or her normal life is a ffected by an impairment is undoubtedly related to what the person’s normal manner of living is, there is no quantitative minimum as to th e percentage of a person’s normal manner of living that must be affected.21 Third, and finally, the statute does not cr eate an express temporal requirement as to how long an impairment must last in order to have an e ffect on “the person’s general ability to live his or her normal life.” To be gin with, there is no such requirement in the plain language of the statute. Further, MC L 500.3135(1) provides that the threshold for liability is met “if th e injured person has suffered deat h, serious impairment of body function, or permanent serious disfigurement. ” While the Legislature required that a “serious disfigurement” be “permanent,” it did not impose the sa me restriction on a “serious impairment of body function.” Finally , to the extent that this prong’s language reflects a legislative intent to adopt this portion of Cassidy in some measure, 16 Cassidy expressly rejected a requirement of perm anency to meet the serious impairment threshold. Cassidy , 415 Mich at 505-506 (noting that “two broken bones, 18 days of hospitalization, 7 months of we aring casts during which dizzy spells further affected his mobility, and at least a minor residual effect one and one-half years later are sufficiently serious to meet the threshold requirement of serious impairment of body function”). Despite the fact that the language of the statute was plain, the Kreiner majority deviated significantly from the statutory text in its interpre tation of this prong. To begin with, the Kreiner majority erred in its interpretati on of the phrase “that affects the person’s general ability” for two reasons. First, it selectivel y quoted only the dictionary

16 Although some of this pr ong’s text is derived from Cassidy, the Legislature made important modifications. The Cassidy Court stated that the serious impairment threshold “looks to the effect of an injury on the person’s general ability to live a normal life,” Cassidy , 415 Mich at 505, and the Legislature rejected that the standard for “a” normal life was objective.22 definitions of “general” that be st supported its conclusions. It gave one definition for this word, “‘the whole; the total; that which comprehends or relates to all, or the chief part; a general proposition, fact, prin ciple, etc.;—opposed to particular; that is, opposed to special,’” and then relied on definitions of “i n general” and “generally” to conclude that “general” means “‘for the most part.’” Kreiner , 471 Mich at 130, quoting Webster’s New International Dictionary

. Webster’s , however, offers 10 definitions of the adjective “general,” many of which are simila r to definitions quoted above from The American Heritage Dictionary . Moreover, of these 10 definitions, the majo rity chose the most restrictive, even though, as discussed above, it does not ma ke the most sense in this context. And, even then, the Kreiner majority looked to othe r forms of the word. Second, the Kreiner majority stated that “[t]he starting point in analyzing whether an impairment affects a person’s ‘general,’ i.e., ove rall, ability to lead his normal life should be identifying how his life has been aff ected, by how much, an d for how long.” Kreiner , 471 Mich at 131. Altho ugh other portions of the Kreiner majority opinion more carefully stated that the test was the effect on a pe rson’s general ability, this particular reasoning could be pulled out of contex t to suggest that courts sh ould focus on how much the impairment affects a person’s life , instead of how much it affects the person’s ability to live his or her life. Further, the Kreiner majority significantly erred in its interpretation of “to lead his or her normal life.” It relied on a dictionary to define “lead” as “to conduct or bring in a particular course.” Notably, depending on how this definitio n is interpreted, it may have a similar meaning to “live” or “pass” when “conduct” and “course” are given a certain23 meaning. “Conduct” can mean “to behave or act,” and “course” can mean “[a] mode of action or behavior” or “[a] typical or natural manner of proceeding or developing: customary passage . . . .” The American Heritage Dictionary , Second College Edition (1982). The meaning of “to behave or act in his or her typical or natural manner of proceeding” may be similar to “living in his or her normal manner of living.” Beyond this point, however, the Kreiner majority went astray and gave the statute a labored interpretation inconsistent w ith common meanings and common sense. Applying its chosen definition of “lead,” the majority concluded that “the effect of the impairment on the course of a plaintiff’s enti re normal life must be considered,” and if “the course or trajectory of the plaintiff’s normal life has not been affected, then the plaintiff’s ‘general ability’ to lead his no rmal life has not been affected . . . .” Kreiner , 471 Mich at 131. In other words, the Kreiner majority held that the “common meaning” of whether an impairment has affected “the person’s general ability to lead his or her normal life” is whether it has affected the pe rson’s general ability to conduct the course or trajectory of his or her entire normal life. This “common meaning” is quite different from the actual statutory text in form and substance. Significantly, the Kreiner majority’s interpretation of the statute interjects two terms that are not included in the statute or the dictionary definitions of the relevant statutory language: “ trajectory ” and “ entire .” Both terms create ambiguity wher e the original statutory text had none, and the Kreiner majority thus erred by selectively defining th e words used in definitions of statutory terms in order to shift away from the common meanin g that the words ha ve in the context of MCL 500.3135(7).24 As to the first addition, while “trajectory” is a synonym for “course” when “course” is defined as, for example, “[t] he direction of continuing movement,” The American Heritage Dictionary , Second College Edition (1982), it is not a synonym for the definition of “course” that makes sense in the context of defining a “general ability to lead his or her normal life.” When “conduct” is used with this defi nition of “course,” it has the very different meaning of “[t] o direct the course of; control.” Id. The plain language of the statute does no t suggest that the Legislature’ s intent was to address the effect of an impairment on the person’s ability to control the direction of their life, as opposed to its effect on the pe rson’s ability to live in his or her normal manner of living. Yet the majority managed to im ply this meaning by inserti ng “trajectory” as a synonym for “course,” thereby shifting the meaning of “course” from the most natural contextual reading of the word. The use of “trajectory” and the sugges tion that “course” should be understood to mean “the direc tion of continuing movement,” instead of “a mode of action or behavior,” creates ambiguity by implying a sense of permanence that is inconsistent with, and does not make sense in the cont ext of, the actual statutory language. As to the second addition, th e majority modified the stat utory language “his or her normal life” with “entire,” a modification that it apparently created out of thin air, 17 thereby creating an ambiguity that had not prev iously existed in the statutory text. The

17 The Kreiner majority did define “in general” as “with respect to the entirety” when interpreting “g eneral ability.” Kreiner , 471 Mich at 130. But, even assuming that it is proper to use the definition of the phr ase “in general” to define the adjective “general,” the Legislature used general to modify ability , not life.25 word “life” has more th an one meaning. As noted, it can refer to the meaning that would be commonly understood to apply in the cont ext of the statutory language, which is “a manner of living.” It also can refer to “[t] he interval of time be tween birth and death; lifetime.” The American Heritage Dictionary , Second College Edition (1982). The differences are significant: whereas the first meaning refers to the day-to-day process of living, the second is a finite measure that encompasses all of one’s time on earth. Although “entire” could modify either meaning of “life,” it is probably more commonly used to modify the second. Thus, by inserting “entire,” the Kreiner majority created an ambiguity that is not present in the original statutory text because the second, finite definition of “life” does not make sense in the context of the actual statutory language. It would be unusual to refer to someone’s general ability to lead his or her normal “lifetime” or “interval of time between life and death.” At best, this would seem to refer to an effect on the person’s life expectancy, but this would not be a subjective inquiry, and it is an impossible leap from any common understanding of the statutory language. 18 At a minimum, using the modifier “entire” reinforces the general sense of permanence that is also created by the inse rtion of “trajectory,” but which, as explained, is not in the actual statutory text. Because the Kreiner majority created ambi guity where there was none, and crafted a statutory inte rpretation that is, in effect, a judicially constructed house of cards, we hold that it incorrectly interp reted the third prong of MCL 500.3135(7).

18 It is also to some exte nt accounted for in another threshold in MCL 500.3135(1): death.26 The Kreiner majority aggravated this error, and departed even more dramatically from the statutory text, by providing an ex tra-textual “nonexhaustive list of objective factors” to be used to compare the plainti ff’s pre- and post-incident lifestyle. These factors are: “(a) the nature and extent of the impairment, (b) the type and length of treatment required, (c) the duration of the im pairment, (d) the extent of any residual impairment, and (e) the prognosi s for eventual recovery.” Kreiner , 471 Mich at 133. 19 The Legislature has unambiguously defined th e “serious impairment of body function,” and the role of this Court is to apply the plai n language of that defi nition, not to improve it with a list of judicially created factors th at are not necessarily based in the statute’s text. In fact, at least some of the Kreiner majority’s factors have no basis in the statutory text and are instead derived from its extra-te xtual and extra-definitional additions to the actual statutory language, “entire” and “traject ory,” and serve to re inforce the ambiguity that its interpretation of the third prong create d, especially given that all of the factors expressly or impliedly include a temporal co mponent. Because the factors adopted by the

Kreiner majority are not based in the statutory text , and this Court’s role is to apply the

19 The majority correctly ob serves that I do not object to courts employing factors when applying statutes in many circumstan ces. I certainly object, however, to courts doing so in a manner that not only perverts th e statutory language but is also unsupported by, and inconsistent with, the le gislative intent expressed by the statutory language, as the Kreiner majority did.27 unambiguous statutory language, not improve it, we hold that the majority erred by adopting them. 20 In summary, the Kreiner majority’s interpretation of the third prong departed from the idea that a court “should not casually read anything into an un ambiguous statute that is not within the manifest intent of the Le gislature as derived from the words of the
statute.” Kreiner , 471 Mich at 157 (C AVANAGH , J., dissenting). Inde ed, as I remarked in dissent, the Kreiner majority’s “interpretation” of the plain language of MCL 500.3135(7) was a “chilling reminder that ac tivism comes in all guises, including socalled textualism.” Kreiner , 471 Mich at 157. Therefore, we hold that the Kreiner majority’s interpretation of this prong, incl uding the list of non-exhaustive factors, is not based in the statute’s text and is incorrect.

20 Indeed, the potential for the Kreiner majority’s interpreta tion to be read in a manner that is inconsistent with the statute has been realized in lower court decisions. For example, in Gagne v Schulte , unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued February 28, 2006 (Docket No. 2647 88), the Court of Appeals held that a plaintiff had not suffered a serious impairment of body function even though her knee injury resulted in surgery and severe restri ctions on her movement for a year after the accident, indefinite continuing restrictions on her ability to perform her pre-accident job and other activities in which sh e participated before the acci dent, and a permanent loss of stability in her knee and an increased risk of osteoarthritis. The ma jority reasoned that these impairments were insufficient to meet the threshold because she might someday be able to resume some activities with a knee brac e and “there is no evid ence that this period of decreased function affected her life so ex tensively that it altered the trajectory or course of her entire normal life.” Id ., unpub op at 2. Indeed , the majority’s reasoning seemed to consider whether th e plaintiff’s ability to control the direction of her entire life had been altered, rather than her ability to live her life in a normal manner, given that it found the threshold wa s not met despite evid ence that the plaintiff had continuing restrictions on movement, activities, and work, and medically documented long-term damage.28 3. STARE DECI SIS: SHOULD KREINER BE OVERRULED? To the extent that the Kreiner majority’s interpretation of the statute was inconsistent with the foregoing approach, and departed from the legislative intent expressed in the unambiguous language of the statute, we hold that it was wrongly decided. Given this conclusi on, the question is whether it should be overruled. We hold that it should be. 21 Under the doctrine of stare decisis, “pri nciples of law deliberately examined and decided by a court of compet ent jurisdiction should no t be lightly departed.” Brown v Manistee Co Rd Comm , 452 Mich 354, 365; 550 NW 2d 215 (1996) (citations and quotation marks omitted). Inde ed, in order to “‘avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is indispensable that [courts] sh ould be bound down by strict rules and precedents which serve to define and point out their duty in every particular case that comes before them . . . .’” Petersen v Magna Corp , 484 Mich 300, 314-315; 773 NW2d

21 The dissenters’ stare decisi s protestations should taste like ashes in their mouths. To the principles of stare d ecisis, to which they paid ab solutely no heed as they denigrated the wisdom of innumerable pr edecessors, the dissenters now would wrap themselves in its benefits to save their recent precedent. Ironically, the very doctrine and approach that the dissent vehemently claims to adhere to today, from Robinson v Detroit, 462 Mich 439; 613 NW2d 307 (2000), was not so faithfully applied by the me mbers of the dissent in the pa st. Indeed, the members of the dissent have overruled caselaw w ithout even paying lip service to Robinson , see, e.g., People v Anstey , 476 Mich 436; 719 NW2d 579 (2006), or after engaging in a cursory or limited analysis of the factors that they claim fidelity to today. See, e.g., Wesche v Mecosta Co Rd Comm , 480 Mich 75, 91 n 13 (2008); Al-Shimmari v Detroit Med Ctr , 477 Mich 280, 297 n 10 ; 731 NW2d 29 (2007); Neal v Wilkes , 470 Mich 661, 667 n 8; 685 NW2d 648 (2004); People v Hickman , 470 Mich 602, 61 0 n 6; 684 NW2d 267 (2004); Mack v Detroit , 467 Mich 186, 203 n 19; 649 NW2d 47 (2002).29 564 (2009) (opinion by K ELLY , C.J.), quoting The Federalis t No. 78, p 471 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed, 1961). As the United States Supreme Court has stated, the doctrine “promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial deci sions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.” Payne v Tennessee , 501 US 808, 827; 111 S Ct 2597; 115 L Ed 2d 720 (1991). Despite its importance, stare decisis is neither an “inexorable command,”
Lawrence v Texas , 539 US 558, 577; 123 S Ct 2472; 156 L Ed 2d 508 (2003), nor “a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision . . . .” Helvering v Hallock , 309 US 106, 119; 60 S Ct 444; 84 L Ed 604 (1940). Ultimately, it is an attempt “to balance two competing considerations: the need of th e community for stability in legal rules and decisions and the need of courts to correct past errors.” Petersen , 484 Mich at 314. As a reflection of this balance, ther e is a presumption in favor of upholding precedent, but this presumption may be rebutted if there is a speci al or compelling justification to overturn precedent. Id. at 319-320. In determ ining whether a special or compelling justification exists, a number of evaluative criteria may be relevant, id ., but overturning precedent requires more than a mere belief that a case was wrongly decided. See Brown , 452 Mich at 365. 22

22 In Petersen , Chief Justice K ELLY provided a non-exhaustive list of criteria that may be considered, but none of the criteria is determinativ e, and they need only be evaluated if relevant. See Petersen , 484 Mich at 320.30 In determining whether Kreiner should be overruled, I find several evaluative criteria particularly relevant: (1) “whether th e rule has proven to be intolerable because it defies practical workability,” (2) “whether re liance on the rule is such that overruling it would cause a special hardship and inequity,” (3) “whether upholding the rule is likely to result in serious detriment prejudicial to public interests,” and (4) “whether the prior decision was an abrupt and largely un explained departure from precedent.” Petersen , 484 Mich at 320. As applied here, on the balance, these criteria weigh in favor of overturning Kreiner

. The first criterion weighs heavily in favor of overruling Kreiner because the

Kreiner majority’s departure from the plain language of MCL 500.3135(7) defies practical workability. As discussed above, th e majority took unambig uous statutory text and, through linguistic gymnastics, contorte d it into a confusing and ambiguous test. Appellate litigation arising out of MCL 500.3135(7) has greatly increased since Kreiner 23

and has resulted in confusio n. To begin with, the lower courts’ application of Kreiner has led to inconsistent interpretation of the statutory language, with similarly situated

23 In the six years since Kreiner was decided, there have been three times as many Court of Appeals cases citing MCL 500. 3135(7) as there were in the nine years between when the amendment was enacted and Kreiner was decided. In the nine years between when the amendment beca me effective and when Kreiner was decided, only 86 Court of Appeals cases cited MC L 500.3135(7). As of May 27, 2 010, in the six years since the Kreiner decision was issued, there have been 254 Court of Appeals cases citing MCL 500.3135(7).31 plaintiffs being treated diffe rently by different courts. 24 Further, some courts have interpreted Kreiner to create a threshold that is higher than that in Cassidy or DiFranco , primarily by reading the Kreiner majority’s interpretation of the statute to effectively create a permanency requirement. 25 As discussed, this is cont rary to the legislative intent expressed by the plain language of the statute. Because the Kreiner majority’s interpretation of the third pr ong of MCL 500.3135(7) has cr eated ambiguity where there was none, and increased litigation and confusion, the first factor weighs heavily in favor of overruling Kreiner

. Second, correcting the errors in the Kreiner majority’s interpretation of MCL 500.3135(7) would not present an undue hardship to reliance interests, and this factor weighs in favor of overruling Kreiner . As this Court has ex plained when evaluating a similar factor in the past, “the Court must ask whether the previous decision has become

24 For example, in Luther v Morris , unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued January 18, 2005 (D ocket No. 244483), the C ourt held that the plaintiff had suffered a serious impairment of body function where a dislocated elbow caused her to miss 52 days of work and significa ntly interfered w ith her ability to perform daily personal tasks fo r a while, but her life returned to normal within a couple of months after the accident. In contrast, in Guevara v Martinez , unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued May 24, 2005 (Docket No. 260387), the Court held that there was no serious impairment wh ere the plaintiff suffere d a dislocated right shoulder and a torn an terior rotator cuff that significan tly interfered with his ability to perform daily personal tasks for a couple of months and prevented him from continuing work as a part-time construc tion worker during at least th e surgery and multiple months of rehabilitation. The outcomes in th ese cases are difficult to reconcile.

25 See footnote 20 of th is opinion summarizing Gagne v Schulte , unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeal s, issued February 28, 2006 (Docket No. 264788).32 so embedded, so accepted, so fundamental, to ev eryone’s expectations that to change it would produce not just readjustments, but practical real-world dislocations.” Robinson v

Detroit , 462 Mich 439, 466; 613 NW2d 307 (2000). It further stated that this factor applies to cases that if overr uled “even if they were wron gfully decided, would produce chaos.” Id. at 466 n 26. Kreiner is not “so” embedded, accepted, or fundamental to expectations that chaos will result from overruling it. To begin with, Kreiner was decided only six years ago, and, while it was the first opinion from this Court interpreting MCL 500.3135(7), it was contrary to the plain te xt of the statute, wh ich had been in place since 1995. As the Robinson majority explained, people normally rely on the words of the statute itself when looking for guida nce on how to direct their actions. Robinson , 462 Mich at 467. Further, it is unlikely that mo tor vehicle drivers, and the victims of motor vehicle accidents, have altered their behavior in reliance on Kreiner

. As noted by the Robinson majority, where a statute deals with th e consequences of accidents, “it seems incontrovertible that only after the accide nt would . . . awareness [of this Court’s caselaw] come,” and “after-the-fact awareness does not rise to the level of a reliance interest because to have reliance the knowledge must be of the sort that causes a person or entity to attempt to conform his conduct to a certain norm before the triggering event.” Id . at 466-467. Similarly, this statute genera lly involves motor vehicle accidents, and it strains credibility to th ink that the average driver and the average future injured party have altered their behavior in reliance on Kreiner

. The third criterion, the effect on the publ ic interest, also weighs in favor of overruling Kreiner . Although there may be policy ar guments on both sides regarding the33 costs and benefits of having a more or le ss difficult threshold for recovery under MCL 500.3135, our interpretation of the statute in th is case is truer to the statute’s text than that of the Kreiner majority, and, thus, our interpreta tion most closely reflects the policy balance struck by the Legislature. 26 In contrast, Kreiner altered the balance from that intended by the Legislature by imposing extra- textual burdens to m eeting the threshold, and, as a result, it is diffi cult to argue that overruling Kreiner to restore the balance intended by the Legislature would hurt th e public interest (or that affirming Kreiner serves it). Finally, the fourth criterion is neutral. Kreiner was not an abrupt change from precedent, but it did provide an interpretation of the statute that was not obvious from the
statute’s text. On the basis of these evalua tive criteria, we hold that Kreiner should be overruled.
4. SUMMARY OF LE GISLATIVE TEST On the basis of the foregoing, the pr oper interpretation of the clear and unambiguous language in MCL 500.3135 creates the following test.

26 The dissent devotes a significant amount of time conducting what is essentially a policy analysis hypothesizing about the disast rous effects that th is opinion will have on the insurance industry and, thus, conclu ding that we are undoing the legislative compromise that was the genera l backdrop of the no -fault act. While I am cognizant of the legislative compromise, I am less convinced than the dissent that this Court’s role is to conduct an independent polic y analysis to determine whether the plain language of an amendment adopted by the Legi slature, 20 years after the no-fault act was originally adopted, is inconsistent with the overall ac t’s general purposes. Even assuming arguendo that it could be, I do not belie ve that broad statements rega rding the general purpose of the act’s adoption in 1 973 trump the intent expressed by the Legislature in the plain language of a later amendment to the act.34 To begin with, the court should determ ine whether there is a factual dispute regarding the nature and the extent of the pers on’s injuries, and, if so, whether the dispute is material to determining wh ether the serious impairment of body function threshold is met. MCL 500.3135(2)(a)( i ) and ( ii ). 27 If there is no factual dispute, or no material factual dispute, then whether the threshold is met is a question of law for the court. Id

. If the court may decide the issue as a ma tter of law, it s hould next determine whether the serious impairment threshold ha s been crossed. The unambiguous language of MCL 500.3135(7) provides three prongs that are necessary to establish a “serious impairment of body function”: (1) an objec tively manifested impairment (observable or perceivable from actual symptoms or conditi ons) (2) of an important body function (a body function of value, significance, or consequence to the injured person) that (3) affects the person’s general abilit y to lead his or her normal life (influences some of the plaintiff’s capacity to live in his or her normal manner of living). The serious impairment analysis is inhere ntly fact- and circumstance- specific and must be conducted on a case-by-cas e basis. As stated in the Kreiner dissent, “[t]he Legislature recognized that what is important to one is not importa nt to all[;] a brief impairment may be devastating whereas a near permanent impairment may have little

27 As discussed in footno tes 7 and 8 of this opini on, this provision may unconstitutionally conflict with MCR 2.116(C)(10) in certain cases. If it does, then a court should only apply MCL 500.3135(2) to the extent that it is consistent with MCR 2.116(C)(10). We do not reach this issue today, however, because there is no material factual dispute over any fact necessary to determining whether the serious impairment threshold has been met.35 effect.” Kreiner , 471 Mich at 145 (C AVANAGH , J., dissenting). As such, the analysis does not “lend itself to any bright-line rule or imposition of [a] nonexhaustive list of factors,” particularly where there is no ba sis in the statute for such factors. Id. Accordingly, because “[t]he Le gislature avoided drawing lines in the sand . . . so must
we.” Id.
C. APPLICATION OF MCL 500.3135 Under the facts of this case, we hold that plaintiff has met the serious impairment threshold as a matter of law. To begin with, there is no factual dispute that is material to determining whether the serious impairment threshold is met. Th e parties do not dispute that plaintiff suffered a broken ankle, was completely restricted fro m bearing weight on his ankle for a month, and underwent two surgeries over a 10-mont h period and multiple months of physical therapy. The parties do disput e the extent to which plainti ff continues to suffer a residual impairment and the potential for increased susceptibility to dege nerative arthritis. Plaintiff has provided at least some eviden ce of a physical basis for his subjective complaints of pa in and suffering, 28 but defendant disputes wh ether there is persuasive evidence of impairment beyond plaintiff’s subjective compla ints. This dispute is not significant or essential to determining whether the serious impairment threshold is met in this case, however, because plaintiff has not alleged that the residual impairment, to the

28 The FCEs report that plaintiff’s range of motion in his ankle is not within normal limits, and the MRI and two doctors’ reports suggest at least some scarring and degenerative tissue damage around plaintiff’s left ankle.36 extent that it exists, continues to affect his general ability to lead his pre-incident “normal life,” 29 the third prong of the analysis. Moreove r, it is not necessary to establish the first two prongs. Therefore, the dispute is not material and does not pr event this Court from deciding whether the threshold is met as a matter of law under MCL 500.3135(2)(a). The other facts material to determining whether the serious impairment threshold is met are also undisputed. 30 Before the incident, plain tiff’s “normal life” consisted primarily of working 60 hours a week as a medi um truck loader. Plaintiff also frequently fished in the spring and summer and was a week end golfer. After the incident, plaintiff was unable to return to work for at least 14 months and did not return for 19 months. He never returned to his original job as a medium truck loader, but he suffered no loss in pay because of the change in job. He was able to fish at pre- incident levels by the spring of 2006 and is able to take care of his person al needs at the same level as before the incident. There is no allegation that the im pairment of body func tion has affected his relationship with his significant other or other qualitative aspects of his life. Next, in light of the lack of a factual dispute that is material to determining whether the threshold is met, under MCL 500. 3135(2)(a), this Court should decide as a

29 Plaintiff stated that his life is “painful, but normal.” He does not allege that any residual impairment has a significant effect on his ability to par ticipate in or enjoy activities to the extent that he could before the accident.

30 If there had been other disputed facts that were material to this determination, we would have to reach the question whether MCL 500.3135( 2)(a) is unconstitutional to the extent that it requires a court to decide mate rial disputed facts as a matter of law. See footnote 7 of this opinion.37 matter of law whether plaintiff suffered a se rious impairment of body function under the three prongs in MC L 500.3135(7). With regard to the first prong, plain tiff has shown an objectively manifested impairment of body function. There is no di spute that plaintiff has presented evidence that he suffered a broken a nkle and actual symptoms or conditions that someone else would perceive as impairing body functions, such as walki ng, crouching, climbing, and lifting weight. Even 14 months after the inci dent, an FCE report observed that ankle pain and a reduced range of moti on inhibited these body func tions. Thus, plaintiff has satisfied this prong. With regard to the second prong, the impaired body f unctions were important to plaintiff. His testimony establishes that bein g unable to walk and perform other functions were of consequence to his ability to work. Thus, the second pron g of MCL 500.3135(7) is met. The next question in this case is whether the third prong is me t, but we hold that plaintiff has shown that the impairment affect ed his general ability to lead his normal life because it influenced some of his capacity to live in his nor mal, pre-incident manner of living. Before the incident, plaintiff’s nor mal manner of living c onsisted primarily of working, for 60 hours a week, and secondarily his hobbies of fishi ng and golfing. After the incident, at least some of plaintiff’s capacity to live in this manner was affected. Specifically, for a month after the incident, plaintiff could not bear weight on his left ankle. He underwent two surgeries over a period of 10 months an d multiple months of physical therapy. Moreover, hi s capacity to work, the central part of his pre-incident38 “normal life,” was affected. 31 Whereas before the incident he spent most of his time working, after the incident he was unable to perform functions necessary for his job for at least 14 months, and he did not return to work for 19 months. 32 On the basis of these facts, we conclude that some of plaintiff’s capacity to live in his pre-incident manner of living was affected, and the third prong of MCL 500.3135(7) is satisfied. 33 Because all three prongs of MCL 500.3135(7) are satisfied , we hold, as a matter of law, that plaintiff has met the serious impairment threshold requirement under MCL 500.3135(1).
D. RESPONSE TO THE DISSENT Despite the dissent’s length, it provides very little substantive disagreement or criticism of the statutory interpretation presen ted in this opinion and very little response to our criticisms of the statutory interpretation in Kreiner . Where the dissent does actually address the substance of the opinion, its criticisms are of ten based not on the

31 As noted, it is unclear from the record the extent to which the impairment affected plaintiff’s ability to fish in the first year after the inci dent or his ability to golf in the first year and a half after the incident, or the extent to which he actually undertook either activity in those periods.

32 It could be significant that plaintiff’s j ob has changed, even though his pay is the same, but there is no evidence suggesting th at this was an effect of impairment. Therefore, this fact is not relevant to the “normal life” inquiry here.

33 Our analysis focuses on plaintiff’s pr e- and post-incident activities and the extent to which he was able to participate in them after the incident because those are the facts in the record. The facts that the parties considered rele vant in developing the record were, no doubt, influenced by the Kreiner majority’s erroneous deviation from the statutory language. As noted , however, many other consider ations could typically be relevant to determining how an impairment affects a person’s ability to live in his or her pre-incident normal manner of living.39 actual holdings of the majority opinion but, in stead, on the dissent ’s misunderstandings or overgeneralizations of those holdings. For example, the dissent comp lains that the majority “r esuscitate[s]” my opinion
in DiFranco

. 34 As a result, the dissent re suscitates old criticisms of DiFranco and attacks the majority for failing to rec ognize the Legislature’s intent, as expressed in the statute’s legislative history, to reject DiFranco in favor of Cassidy

. 35 As is plainly evident in the analysis, however, this opinion faithfully applies the text of the statute, even where that text is inconsistent with DiFranco . The opinion fu lly recognizes the Legislature’s adoption of Cassidy where the Legislature indica ted an intent to do so through the text of the statute and “resuscitates” DiFranco only in the narrow places where, similarly, the statutory text indicates a legislative intent to do so. 36 Additionally, the dissent’s co mments on the majority’s la ck of use of legislative history are ill-founded on two levels. First, c ontrary to the dissent’s assertion that I have

34 The only explanation that I can di scover for the dissent’s reaching this conclusion is its baseless ac cusation that the majority is essentially reading the third prong out of the statute. It is unclear to me, however, how readi ng and applying the plain text of the statute, instead of enhancing an d extending the statute through creative use of a thesaurus and extra-textual factors, could e quate to reading that language out of the statute.

35 Interestingly, while criticizing th e majority for supposedly reviving DiFranco , the dissent also criticizes us for not going far enough in its revival by not adopting the factors that I used in DiFranco

. 36 It appears that the dissent itself does not actually believe that we are resuscitating DiFranco , given that it so vigorously, al beit erroneously, argues that the only difference between our decision today and Kreiner is that Kreiner adopted temporal requirements.40 “never questioned the u tility of legislative history” and that “there is no principled reason” not to use it in this case, I have rep eatedly stated that legi slative history should only be used to interpret a statute when st atutory language is ambiguous. See, e.g., People v Gardner , 482 Mich 41; 753 NW2d 78 (2008) (C AVANAGH , J., dissenting); Bukowski v Detroit , 478 Mich 268; 732 NW2d 75 (2007) (C AVANAGH , J., concurring); Lansing Mayor v Pub Service Comm , 470 Mich 154, 174; 680 NW2d 840 (2004) (C AVANAGH , J., dissenting). 37 The statutory language at issue here is not ambiguous. 38 Second, even if legislative hi story should be used, our app lication of the plain language

37 To the extent the dissent insinuates that I have relied on legislative history to interpret an unambiguous statute, it is reaching. None of the cases that the dissent cites involves instances where I reli ed on legislative history to id entify an ambiguity or give unambiguous text a meaning inconsistent with th e plain language of the statute. In most, I merely emphasized that the legislative history confirmed the meaning in the unambiguous text. See, e.g., Jackson v Green Estate , 484 Mich 209, 230; 771 NW2d 675 (2009) (C AVANAGH , J., dissenting); Koester v City of Novi , 458 Mich 1, 16; 580 NW2d 835 (1998); People v Sloan , 450 Mich 160, 183-184; 538 NW2d 380 (1995); Grand Trunk Western R Co v Fenton , 439 Mich 240, 247; 482 NW2d 706 (1992).

38 The dissent references Judge Leventhal’ s remark that using legislative history for statutory interpretation is the equivalent of walking into a crowded room and looking for one’s friends. Similar to my approach, however, this analogy has been used by justices of the United States Supreme Court to explain why le gislative history should not be used to interpret clear and unambiguous statutory language. See Exxon Mobil Corp v Allapattah Servs , Inc , 545 US 546, 568-570; 125 S Ct 2611; 162 L Ed 2d 502 (2005), using the criticism to explain that legislativ e history should not be used to determine whether Congress intended an otherwise una mbiguous statute to overrule a court’s interpretation of an earlier vers ion of the statute because “[e]xt rinsic materials have a role in statutory interpretation only to the extent they shed a reliable light on the enacting Legislature’s understanding of otherwise ambiguous terms.” See also Conroy v Aniskoff , 507 US 511, 518-519; 113 S Ct 1562; 123 L Ed 2d 229 (1993) (S calia, J., concurring) (using the criticism to explain why the majority should have stoppe d its analysis after concluding that a statut e was unambiguous).41 of the statute is consistent with the Hous e legislative analysis’s statement that the amendments were intended to return the law to a threshold “resembling” Cassidy . House Legislative Analysis, HB 4341, December 18, 1995. The di ssent’s statements to the contrary are, again, largely based on its mistaken characteri zation of the majority opinion as resuscitating DiFranco and ignoring Cassidy

. The dissent also repeatedly states that the majority op inion holds that temporal considerations are “wholly or la rgely irrelevant” to the serious impairment threshold, and, accordingly, it spends a significant amo unt of energy explaining why temporal considerations are relevant and accusing the majo rity of holding that the threshold is met if “the plaintiff’s general ability to lead his normal life has b een affected for even a single moment in time.” Contrary to the dissent’s cries, there is si mply no basis in our analysis for concluding that we hold that temporal considerations are irrelevant or that a momentary impairment is sufficient. The opin ion merely notes that there is no specific

express temporal requirement in the text of the statute and rejects Kreiner ’s strained attempts to insert what was essentially a permanency requirement into the statute. 39 The dissent’s mistaken characterizations of this opinion amount to nothing more than, like

Kreiner itself, yet another attempt to dist ract courts and parties from the actual text of MCL 500.3135.

39 Indeed, the dissent is so b lindly intent on concluding that the major ity must be rejecting temporal considerations that it fails to consider that its triumphant discovery of the majority’s “hypocrisy” in referencing time periods in our application of MCL 500.3135(2) is nothing more than a reflection of the fact that we are not holding that temporal considerations are irrelevant.42 IV. CONCLUSION We hold that Kreiner should be overruled because the Kreiner majority’s interpretation of MCL 500.3135 departed from the statute’s clear a nd unambiguous text. Applying the unambiguous statutory language, we hold that as a question of law, in this case, plaintiff established that he suffered a serious impairment of body function. Thus, we reverse the Court of Appeals and remand th e case to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

K ELLY , C.J., and W EAVER (except for the part en titled “Stare Decisis”), and H ATHAWAY , JJ., concurred with C AVANAGH , J.S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
SUPREME COURT

RODNEY MCCORMICK, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v No. 136738 LARRY CARRIER, Defendant, and ALLIED AUTOMOTIVE GROUP, INC., indemnitor of GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION , Defendant-Appellee.

W EAVER , J. ( concurring ). I concur in and sign all of the major ity opinion except part III(B)(3), regarding stare decisis. I fully suppo rt the decision to overrule Kreiner v Fischer , 471 Mich 109; 683 NW2d 611 (2004). As I wrote in Jones v Olson , 480 Mich 1169, 1173 (2008): By importing the concept of perm anency of inju ry into MCL 500.3135—a concept that is nowhere refe renced in the text of the statute— the majority of four (Chief Justice T AYLOR and Justices C ORRIGAN , Y OUNG , and M ARKMAN ), in Kreiner v Fischer , 471 Mich 109 (2004), actively and judicially legi slated a permanency and temporal requirement to recover noneconomic damages in au tomobile accident cases. The Kreiner interpretation of MCL 500.3135 is an unrestrained misuse and abuse of the power of interpretation masquerading as an exercise in following the Legislature’s intent.2 With regard to the policy of stare decisis, my view is that past precedent should generally be followed but that to serve the rule of law, in deciding whether wrongly decided precedent should be over ruled, each case should be looked at individually on its facts and merits through the lens of judicial restraint, common sense, and fairness. I agree with the sentiment recently expressed by Chief Justice Roberts of the United States Supreme Court in his concurrence to the decision in Citizens United v Fed Election
Comm , 558 US ___, ___; 130 S Ct 876, 920; 175 L Ed 2d 753, 806 (2010), when he said that

stare decisis is neither an “inexorable command,” Lawrence v. Texas , 539 U.S. 558, 577, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 156 L. Ed. 2d 508 (2003), nor “a mechanical formula of adhere nce to the latest decision,” Helvering v. Hallock , 309 U.S. 106, 119, 60 S. Ct. 444, 84 L. Ed. 604 (1940) . . . . If it were, segregation would be legal, minimum wage laws would be unconstitutional, and the Government could wireta p ordinary criminal suspects without first obtaining warrants. See Plessy v. Ferguson , 163 U.S. 537, 16 S. Ct. 1138, 41 L. Ed. 256 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Board of Education , 347 U.S. 483, 74 S. Ct. 686, 98 L. Ed. 873 (1954); Adkins v. Children's Hospital of D. C. , 261 U.S. 525, 43 S. Ct. 394, 67 L. Ed. 785 (1923), overruled by West Coast Hotel Co v. Parrish , 300 U.S. 379, 57 S. Ct. 578, 81 L. Ed. 703 (1937); Olmstead v. United States , 277 U.S. 438, 48 S. Ct. 564, 72 L. Ed. 944 (1928), overruled by Katz v. United States , 389 U.S. 347, 88 S. Ct. 507, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576 (1967). Chief Justice Roberts further called stare decisis a “principle of policy” and said that it “is not an end in itself.” Id . at ___; 130 S Ct at 920; 175 L Ed 2d at 807. He explained that “[i]ts greatest purpose is to serv e a constitutional ideal—the rule of law. It follows that in the unusual circumstance when fidelity to any particular precedent does more to damage3 this constitutional ideal than to advance it, we must be more willing to depart from that precedent.” Id at ___; 130 S Ct at 92 1; 175 L Ed 2d at 807. 1 I agree with Chief Justice Roberts that stare decisis is a policy and not an immutable doctrine. I chose not to sign Chief Justice K ELLY ’s lead opinion in Petersen v Magna Corp , 484 Mich 300, 316-320; 773 NW2d 564 (2009), because it proposed to create a standardized test for stare decisis. Likewise, I do not sign the majority opinion’s stare decisis section in this case because it applies Petersen . There is no need for this Court to adopt any standardized test regarding stare decisis. In fact, it is an impossible

1 It appears that the dissent in this case does not agree with Chief Justice Roberts. The dissent lists 12 cases that have been overru led by this Court in the past 18 months. While the dissenting jus tices may feel aggrieved by this Court overruling those 12 cases, amongst those cases were some of the most eg regious examples of judicial activism that did great harm to the people of Michigan. Those decisions were made by the “majority of four,” including the disse nting justices, under the guis e of ideologies such as “textualism” and “judicial traditionalism.” One of the dissenting justices, Justice Y OUNG , expressed his apparent cont empt for the common law and common sense in his 2004 article in the Texas Review of Law and Politics, where Justice Y OUNG stated: Consequently, I want to focus my remarks here on the embarrassment that the common law pr esents—or ought to present—to a conscientious judicial traditionalist. . . . To give a graphic illustration of my feelings on the subject, I tend to think of the common law as a drunken, toothless ancient relative, sprawled prominently and in a state of nature on a settee in the middle of one’s genteel garden party. Grandpa’s pr esence is undoubtedly a cause of mortification to the host. But since only the most ill-bred of guests would be coarse enough to comment on Gran dpa’s presence and condition, all concerned simply try ignore him. [Young, A judicial traditionalist confronts the common law , 8 Texas Rev L & Pol 299, 301-302 (2004).]4 task. There are many factors to consider when deciding whether or not to overrule precedent, and the importance of such factors often changes on a case-by-case basis. 2 In the end, the consideration of stare decisis and whether to overrule wrongly decided precedent always includes service to the rule of law throug h an application and exercise of judicial restraint, common sense, and a sense of fairness—justice for all. In serving the rule of law and applying judicial restraint, common sense, and a sense of fairness to the case at hand, I agree with and join the majority opinion’s holding that Kreiner is overruled.

Elizabeth A. Weaver

2 Over the past decade, the principal tool used by this Court to decide when a precedent should be overrule d is the set of guidelines that was laid out in Robinson v Detroit , 462 Mich 439, 463; 613 NW 2d 307 (2000), an opinion written by former Justice T AYLOR , signed by Justices C ORRIGAN , Y OUNG , M ARKMAN and myself, and that I have used numerous times. By no means do I consider the Robinson guidelines a “be-all, endall test” that constitutes precedent of this Cour t to be used whenever this Court considers overruling precedent. I view Robinson as merely providing guide lines to assist this Court in its legal analysis when pertinent.1/Jan 10—DMH

S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
SUPREME COURT

RODNEY MCCORMICK, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v No. 136738 LARRY CARRIER, Defendant, and ALLIED AUTOMOTIVE GROUP, INC, indemnitor of GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee.

H ATHAWAY , J. ( concurring ). I fully concur with Justice C AVANAGH ’s analysis and conclusi on in this matter and I support overruling Kreiner v Fischer , 471 Mich 109; 683 NW2d 611 (2004). I write separately to express my thoughts on the doctrin e of stare decisis. Any analysis of the impact of stare decisis must focus on the individual case and the reason for overruling precedent. 1 The reasons for overruling Kreiner are paramount to any articulated test, and the special and compelli ng justifications to do so are ov erwhelming in this case. I agree

1 For further discussion of my views re garding stare decisis, please see my concurring statement in U of M v Titan Ins Co , ___ Mich ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2010).1/Jan 10—DMH

2 with the well-articulated reas ons expressed by Justice C AVANAGH , and I fully support overruling Kreiner

. Diane M. HathawayS T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
SUPREME COURT

RODNEY MCCORMICK, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v No. 136738 LARRY CARRIER, Defendant, and ALLIED AUTOMOTIVE GROUP, INC, indemnitor of GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee.

M ARKMAN , J. ( dissenting ). I respectfully dissent from the ma jority’s decision to overrule Kreiner v Fischer, 471 Mich 109; 683 NW2d 61 1 (2004). The no-fault auto mobile insurance act, MCL 500.3135(1), provides that “[a] person remain s subject to tort lia bility for noneconomic loss caused by his or her ownership, maintenan ce, or use of a motor vehicle only if the injured person has suffered deat h, serious impairment of body function, or permanent serious disfigurement.” The issue here is whether plaintiff has suffered a serious impairment of body function. “‘[S]erious impairment of body function’ means an objectively manifested impairment of an impor tant body function that affects the person’s general ability to lead his or her normal life.” MC L 500.3135(7).2 In Kreiner, 471 Mich at 132-133, this Court held that in determining whether an impairment affects the plaintiff’s general abi lity to lead his normal life, “a court should engage in a multifaceted inquir y, comparing the plaintiff’s life before and after the accident as well as the significance of any affe cted aspects on the cour se of the plaintiff’s overall life.” In addition, Kreiner indicated that certain factor s, such as the duration of the impairment, may be of assistance in ev aluating whether the plaintiff’s general ability to lead his normal life has been affected. Id. at 133. The majority overrules Kreiner , rejecting these factors a nd holding that temporal considerations are wholly or largely irrele vant in determining whether an impairment affects the plaintiff’s general ability to lead his normal life. The majority instead holds that, as long as the plaintiff’s general ability to lead his normal life has been affected, apparently for even a single moment in tim e, the plaintiff has suffered a “serious impairment of body function.” This conclusion is at odds w ith the actual language of the no-fault automobile act and nullif ies the legislative compromise embodied in that act. I continue to believe that Kreiner was correctly decided, and that temporal considerations are highly relevant-- indeed necessary-- in dete rmining whether an impairment affects the plaintiff’s general ability to lead his normal life

. By nullifying the legislative compromise, which was grounded in concerns over exce ssive litigation, the overcompensation of minor injuries, and the availability of afford able insurance, the Court’s decision today will resurrect a legal environmen t in which each of th ese hazards reappear and threaten the continued fiscal in tegrity of our no-fault system.3 Because I do not believe that the lower courts erred in c oncluding that plaintiff in this case has not suffered a serious impairme nt of body function, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
I. FACTS AND HISTORY Because the majority opinion provides only a cursory pres entation of the facts, in a case requiring a fact-intensive analysis, I fi nd it necessary to set forth a more thorough discussion of these facts. Be ginning in August of 2002, plaintiff wa s employed by Allied Systems, and over the years, he has he ld various positions with the company. 1 On January 17, 2005, approximat ely six months after beginn ing his position as a medium truck loader, plaintiff was st ruck by a truck dr iven by plaintiff’s co-worker and codefendant, Larry Carrier, while shuttling vehicles at a General Motors plant. Plaintiff was knocked down, and the wheels of the truc k ran over his left ankle, fracturing his medial malleolus. Plaintiff was immediately taken to the hospital and was released that same day. Two days later, he underwent su rgery for the implantation of a device to stabilize his ankle fracture. Immediately follo wing surgery, plaintiff was on crutches and in a boot for approximately four weeks and, during this time, he was restricted from bearing weight on his left le g. Additionally, plaintiff underwent physical therapy. 2

1 Before plaintiff began working for Allied, he installed windows . When he first began working for Allied, he loaded trains, a nd after approximately six months, he took a “utility job,” providing support to other departments as need ed. In June of 2004, he began working as a medium truck loader.

2 It is not altogether clear how long plain tiff’s physical therapy actually lasted. In plaintiff’s deposition, he indicated that he underwent “many m onths” of therapy.4 On October 21, 2005, plaintiff again underwe nt surgery on his ankle, this time to remove the implanted device. The surgeon reported that plaintiff’s ankle had “healed nicely.” On November 5, 2005 , at the request of Allied, pl aintiff was exam ined by Dr. Paul Drouillard, who stated that plaintiff coul d return to work with restrictions of no prolonged standing or walking for three weeks, after which time, plaintiff could return to work with no restrictions. On November 17, 2005, plai ntiff was examined by his surgeon, who observed that pl aintiff’s “wound is healed ve ry nicely” and that plaintiff “needs to be in seat ed work for approxim ately six weeks.” On January 12, 2006, plain tiff’s surgeon examin ed him and cleared him to return to work with no restrictions. At this examinati on, plaintiff reported to his surgeon that “[h]is medial malleolus is not giving him any pain.” The surgeon observed that plaintiff had an “excellent range of motion with no spec ific tenderness.” Upon returning to work for several days, however, plaintiff indicated that performing the physical tasks that his job required, such as walking, climbing, and crouching, caused his ankle to hurt. After plaintiff’s request for a different assignment was denied, plaintiff we nt back on workers’ compensation.

However, in his response to defendant’s motion for summary disposition, plaintiff indicated that he had six weeks of therap y. And, during plai ntiff’s oral argument opposing defendant’s motion fo r summary disposition, plaintiff’s counsel claimed that plaintiff underwent 18 weeks of therapy.5 On March 16, 2006, Allied required plai ntiff to undergo a functional capacity evaluation (FCE), 3 which showed that plaintiff could no t fully perform all of his previous job duties. 4 During this evaluation, when asked wh at his goal was in returning to work, plaintiff responded, “I don’t want to go back to work; there is ta lk about a buyout and I think I want to do that.” Plai ntiff also reported th at his ankle pain was a three on a scale of zero to ten, with ten being the highest. On May 31, 2006, Dr. Drouillard again examin ed plaintiff, at the request of Allied. Dr. Drouillard found no objectiv e abnormality to co rrespond to plainti ff’s complaints and opined that plaintiff was magnifying his symp toms. Dr. Drouillard also observed that, although plaintiff claimed that he had been wearing an ankle brace for the last two weeks, the tan lines on plaintiff’s left and right feet were symmetrical, consistent with wearing flip-flops, with no break in his tan lines to indicate that he had been wearing the brace at all. Dr. Drouillard believed that plaintiff could return to work unrestricted and that plaintiff’s ankle required no further treatment. On June 12, 2006, plaintiff underwent an MRI test; the physiatrist who reviewed the MRI and performed a follow -up examination found that there was so me evidence of ligamentous injury, but he did not establish a plan to decrease plaintiff’s pain because

3 An FCE is “an all-encompa ssing term to describe the physical assessment of an individual’s ability to perform work-related activity.” Am erican Occupational Therapy Association, <http://ww.aota .org/Consumers/WhatisOT/WI/ Facts/35117.aspx> (accessed July 1, 2010).

4 This was due in part to shoulder pain resulting from a preexisting and unrelated shoulder injury.6 there was little the physiatrist could do. 5 At this examination, plaintiff reported that his pain was a six on a scale of zero to ten, th at the pain was worse with “any movement,” and that nothing alleviates that pain. On June 20, 2006, Dr. Drou illard reviewed the MRI results and found that plaintiff’s ankle had healed well and that hi s opinion from May 31, 2006 had not changed. Shortly thereafter, plaintiff’s workers’ compensation benefits were terminated. 6 At this point, plaintiff sought another FCE so that he coul d return to work. On August 1, 2006, the FCE indicated that plaintiff was able to perfo rm essential job demands without restriction. At this FCE, plaintiff reported that he experienced “occasional aching” in his ankle, and that there were no “activities that aggravated his symptoms in the left ankle (including prolonged sta nding, prolonged walking).” Plain tiff reported that his pain level was a two on a scale of zero to ten and, du ring the two weeks immediately preceding the FCE, his highest pain level had been a three a nd his lowest pain leve l had been a one. By the completion of the FCE, plaintiff reported hi s pain level at zero. On August 16, 2006, approximately 17 months afte r the accident, plaintiff re turned to work and Allied

5 A physiatrist is a medical doctor who pr actices physiatry, “a medical specialty for the treatment of disease and injury by phys ical agents, as exercise or heat therapy.” Random House Webster ’ s College Dictionary (1991).

6 Plaintiff began receiving workers’ co mpensation in January 2005. Plaintiff claims that he lost $66,000 in wages, the difference betwee n his salary and his workers’ compensation benefits for the time he was no t working. However, the instant case only involves noneconomic damages. Lost wages are economic damages and are compensable as personal protection insurance benefits, MCL 500.3107(1)(b), and/or through a tort claim against the party at fa ult to recover excess economic losses, MCL 500.3135(3)(c).7 assigned him to a new job with different physi cal requirements, and with no reduction in pay. Plaintiff volunteered to be assigned to this other job, and has been able to perform his new job duties since that time. During his recuperation, plaintiff did no t require any assistance with normal household tasks. Additionally, he was able to drive and his injuries have not affected his relationship with his wife in any way. 7 Outside of work, plaintiff was able to engage in most of the activities in whic h he was engaged be fore his injury, such as fishing. 8 Importantly, by plainti ff’s own admission at his depositi on in October of 2006, his life was “normal” despite some “occasional aching.” On March 24, 2006, plaintiff filed a third- party action against Carrier (the driver of the truck) and General Motors Corporation (GM). 9 Carrier was later released by

7 Plaintiff’s wife has not brou ght a loss-of-consortium claim.

8 Although the majority suggests that plaintiff return ed to fishing at pre-injury levels by the spring and summe r of 2006, the record indicates that plaintiff’s fishing activities had never been interrupted. Plaintiff was asked if he “[s]till fish[ed] the same amount of time as [he] fished before the acci dent when [he] get[s] a chance,” to which plaintiff replied, “When I get a chance.” Fu rthermore, defendant argued in its motion for summary disposition that plaintiff’s fishing activities were uninterr upted by the injury, and plaintiff did not dispute th is. Plaintiff essentially con ceded this fact and instead argued that the disr uption in his life as a re sult of his injuries was centered on his inability to work. Plaintiff al so was a weekend golfe r. The record reflects that since plaintiff returned to work in August 2006, he had only golfed on ce, using a golf cart. We do not know whether plaintiff was able to golf during the time between his accident in January 2005 and August 2006. De fendant argued in its motion for summary disposition that plaintiff continued to engage in his pre- accident level of golf ing activity, and again plaintiff did not argue to the contrary.

9 With GM’s bankruptcy, the parties stipul ated to a change in case caption and party, adding Allied Automotiv e Group, Inc., indemnitor of GM; plaintiff’s employer,8 stipulation of the parties, and the tria l court granted GM’s motion for summary disposition, finding that plaintiff had undergon e a relatively good recovery and could not meet the “serious impairment of body function” threshold. The Court of Appeals affirmed, with on e judge dissenting, concluding that the impairment did not affect plaintiff’s ge neral ability to lead his normal life. McCormick v
Carrier , unpublished opinion per cu riam of the Court of Appe als, issued March 25, 2008 (Docket No. 275888). The majo rity cited various facts to s upport its conclusion, such as plaintiff’s golfing, fishing, dr iving, caring for himself, a nd returning to work without restriction. The dissent would have revers ed for two reasons: firs t, on the basis that plaintiff’s entire life, including the possibility of future pr oblems, must be considered; and, second, on the basis that there was evidence to indicat e that plaintiff’s life was not currently normal. The evidence that the dissent relied on to reach this conclusion was that plaintiff was assigned to a job with reduced physical requirements and the doctors had identified “some indication of degenerative joint diseas e in [plaintiff’s] ankle.” Id., unpub op at 2 (D AVIS , J., dissenting). On October 22, 2008, this Co urt denied plaintiff’s applic ation for leave to appeal, although Chief Justice K ELLY and Justices C AVANAGH and W EAVER would have granted leave to appeal. 482 Mich 1018 (2008). However, after th e composition of this Court changed when Justice H ATHAWAY replaced former Chief Justice T AYLOR on January 1,

Allied Systems, is a subsidiary of Allied Automotive Group, In c. This Court entered an order in accordance with this s tipulation. 485 Mich 851 (2009).9 2009, this Court granted plain tiff’s motion for reconsideration, even though such motion had not raised any new legal ar guments. 485 Mich 851 (2009).
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW This case presents issues of statutory in terpretation, which this Court reviews de

novo. Dep’t of Transp v Tompkins , 481 Mich 184, 190; 749 NW2d 716 (2008). We also review rulings on motions for summary disposition de novo. Spiek v Dep’t of Transp, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998).
III. ANALYSIS
A. HISTORY OF NO-FAULT INSURANCE ACT In Michigan, before the enactment of the no-fault in surance act, the only available recourse to victims of motor vehicle accident s seeking to recover damages was to file a common-law tort action. “[ U]nder [this] tort liability system[,] the doctrine of contributory negligence denied benefits to a high percentage of mo tor vehicle accident victims, minor injuries were overcompensated , serious injuries were undercompensated, long payment delays were commonplace, the court system was overburdened, and those with low income and little education suffered discrimination.” Shavers v Attorney General , 402 Mich 554, 579; 267 NW2d 72 (1978). In response to these deficiencies, the Legislature enacted the no-fault auto mobile insurance act, MCL 500.3101 et seq. , effective March 30, 1973. The primary goal of the no-fault act is “to provide victims of motor vehicle accidents assured, adequate, a nd prompt reparation fo r certain economic losses.” Shavers, 402 Mich at 579. In order to me et this objective, the Legislature decided to make no-fault insu rance compulsory, i.e., “where by every Michigan motorist10 would be required to purchase no-fault insurance or be unabl e to operate a motor vehicle legally in this state.” Id. In addition, “[i]n exchange for the payment of . . . no-fault economic loss benefits from one’s own insura nce company, the Legislature limited an injured person’s ability to sue a negligent operator or owner of a motor vehicle for bodily injuries.” Kreiner, 471 Mich at 115. That is, with th e enactment of the no-fault act, “the Legislature abolished tort liability generally in motor vehicle accident cases and replaced it with a regime that established that a person injured in su ch an accident is entitled to certain economic compensation from his own in surance company regardless of fault.” Id.
at 114. 10 In exchange for economic loss benefits regardless of fault, “the Legislature significantly limited the injured person’s ability to sue a third party for noneconomic damages, e.g., pain and suffering.” Id. at 115. More specifically, no tort suit against a third party for noneconomic da mages is permitted unless the in jured person “has suffered death, serious impairment of body function, or permanent serious disfigurement.” MCL 500.3135(1). 11

10 The injured person’s insurance company is responsible for all expenses incurred for medical care, recovery, and rehabilitation as long as the service, product, or accommodation is reasonably necessary a nd the charge is reasonable. MCL 500.3107(1)(a). There is no monetary limit on such expenses, and this entitlement can last for the person’s lifetime. An injured person is also entitled to recover from his own insurance company up to three years of earnings loss, i. e., loss of income from work that the person would have performed if he had not been injured. MCL 500.3107(1)(b). An injured person can also recover “replaceme nt” expenses, i.e., expenses reasonably incurred in obtaining ordinary and necessary services that the injured person would otherwise have performed. MCL 500.3107(1)(c). Further, an at-fault driv er is still liable in tort for an injured person’s excess economic damages. MCL 500.3135(3)(c).

11 In its entirety, MCL 500.3135(1) provides:11 The Legislature did not initially define the language that is in dispute in this case-- “serious impairment of body function”-- and th is Court itself struggled in the process of giving reasonable meaning to this language. In Advisory Opinion re Constitutionality of 1972 PA 294 , 389 Mich 441, 481; 208 NW2d 469 (1973), we he ld that whether the plaintiff has suffered a “serious impairment of body function” is “with in the province of the trier of fact . . . .” However, in Cassidy v McGovern , 415 Mich 483; 330 NW2d 22 (1982), noting that an advisory opinion “‘is not precedentially binding in the same sense as a decision of the Court afte r a hearing on the merits,’” id. at 495 (citation omitted), this Court held: [W]hen there is no factual dispute regarding the nature and extent of a plaintiff’s injuries, the question of serious impairment of body function shall be decided as a matter of law by the court. Likewise, if there is a factual dispute as to the nature and ex tent of a plaintiff’s injuries, but the dispute is not material to the determ ination whether plaintiff has suffered a serious impairment of body function, the court shall rule as a matter of law whether the threshold requireme nt . . . has been met. [ Id. at 502.] In addition, Cassidy held that the phrase “serious impa irment of body function” refers to “objectively manifested injuries” that impair “important body functions.” Id. at 504-505. Cassidy also held that “the Legislature intended an objective standard that looks to the effect of an injury on the person’s general ability to live a normal life.” Id. at 505. Finally, Cassidy held that although “an in jury need not be permanent to be serious,”

A person remains subject to tort liability for noneconomic loss caused by his or her ownership, main tenance, or use of a motor vehicle only if the injured person has suffered death, serious impairment of body function, or permanent serious disfigurement.12 “[p]ermanency is, nevertheless, relevant” beca use “[t]wo injuries identical except that one is permanent do differ in seriousness.” Id. at 505-506. However, only four years later, in DiFranco v Pickard , 427 Mich 32; 398 NW2d 896 (1986), this Court overruled Cassidy

. DiFranco held that “[i]f reasonable minds can differ as to whether the plaintiff suffered a se rious impairment of body function, the issue must be submitted to the jury, even if the evidentiary facts are undisputed. Id. at 58. In addition, DiFranco held that the “impairm ent need not be of . . . an important body function,” and it is unnecessary to look to the effect of the inju ry on the person’s “‘general ability to live a normal life.’” Id. at 39. DiFranco also held that , although the plaintiff must prove a “medical ly identifiable injury,” this can be done on the basis of “the plaintiff’s subjective complaints or the symptoms of an injury.” Id. at 75. Finally,

DiFranco held that the following fact ors should be considered when determining whether the impairment was serious: The extent of the impairment, the pa rticular body function impaired, the length of time the impairment lasted, the treatment required to correct the impairment, and any other relevant factors. [ Id. at 69-70.] In 1995, the Legislature amended the no-fa ult act. In particular, it amended MCL 500.3135(2)(a), which provides: The issues of whether an injured person has suffered serious impairment of body function or pe rmanent serious disfigurement are questions of law for the court if the court finds either of the following: (i) There is no factual dispute conc erning the nature and extent of the person’s injuries. (ii) There is a factual dispute concer ning the nature a nd extent of the person’s injuries, but the dispute is not material to the determination as to13 whether the person has suffered a seri ous impairment of body function or permanent serious disfigurement. In addition, the Legislature defined “serious impairment of body function” to mean “an objectively manifested impairment of an impor tant body function that affects the person’s general ability to lead his or her normal life. ” MCL 500.3135(7). In other words, the Legislature essentially rejected DiFranco and, with one exception, codified Cassidy

. 12

B. KREINER V FISCHER
In Kreiner, this Court for the first time interpre ted the Legislature’s definition of “serious impairment of body fu nction.” Because “generally” means “‘for the most part,’”

Kreiner held that “determining whether a plaintiff is ‘generally able’ to lead his normal life requires considering whether the plaintiff is, ‘for the most part’ able to lead his normal life.” Kreiner, 471 Mich at 130, quoting Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (1991). In addition, because “lead” means “‘to conduct or bring in a particular course,’” Kreiner held that “the effect of the impairment on the course of a plaintiff’s entire normal life must be considered.” Id. at 130-131 , quoting Random House Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary (2001). Therefore, Kreiner concluded, “[a]lthough some aspects of a plaintiff’s entire normal li fe may be interrupted by the impairment, if, despite those impingements, the course or trajectory of the plaintiff’s normal life has not

12 That one excepti on is that while Cassidy, 415 Mich at 505, required an evaluation of “the effect of an inju ry on the person’s general ability to live a normal life,” MCL 500.3135(7) requires an evaluation of th e effect of an injury on “the person’s general ability to lead his or her normal life.” (Emphasis added.) That is, while the Cassidy test was exclusively objec tive, the MCL 500.3135(7) te st is at least partially subjective.14 been affected, then the plain tiff's ‘general ability’ to lead his normal life has not been affected and he does not meet the ‘serious impairment of body fu nction’ threshold.” Id.
at 131.

Kreiner established a “multi-step process . . . for separating out those plaintiffs who meet the statutory thres hold from those who do not.” Id. First, the court must determine whether there is a factual dispute th at is material to the determination whether the person has suffered a serious impairment of body function. 13 Second, the court must determine whether an important body function has been impaired. Third, the court must determine whether the impairment is objectively manifested. 14 Finally, the court must determine whether the impairment affects the pl aintiff’s general ability to lead his or her normal life. “In determining whether the course of the plaintiff’s normal life has been affected, a court should engage in a multifac eted inquiry, comparing the plaintiff’s life before and after the accident as well as th e significance of any affected aspects on the course of the plaintiff’s overall life.” Id. at 132-133. Kreiner indicated that the following factors may be of assistance in evaluating whether the plaintiff’s general ability to conduct the course of his normal life has been affected:

13 If there is such a dispute, the court cann ot decide the issue as a matter of law; however, if there is no such dispute, the court can so decide.

14 “Subjective complaints that are not me dically documented are insufficient.” Id. at 132.15 (a) the nature and extent of the impairment, (b) the type and length of treatment required, (c) th e duration of the impairment, [15] (d) the extent of any residual impairment, [16] and (e) the prognosis for eventual recovery. [ Id. at 133.] Although the dissent in Kreiner essentially agreed with the majority’s analysis of the language “an objectively manifested impa irment of an important body function,” it disagreed with the majority’s analysis of the language “that affects the person’s general ability to lead his or her norm al life.” Most significantly in this regard, the dissent rejected the factors set forth by the major ity on the basis that “time or temporal considerations” are inappr opriate considerations. Id. at 147 (C AVANAGH , J., dissenting).
C. MAJORITY’S NEW TEST It is appropriate that Justice C AVANAGH , the authoring justice of the majority opinion in DiFranco, which was rejected by the Legislature, and also the authoring justice of the dissent in Kreiner, which was rejected by this Court , is now the authoring justice of the majority opinion, in which Kreiner is overruled. Whil e to some, there may be a sense of justice, or at least a sense of irony, in this sequence of events, to others, including those of us in dissent in this case, such sequence embodies all that is wrong when a judiciary confuses its own preference s with those of the people’s representatives in the Legislature. While it is intriguing that Justice C AVANAGH now is able to transform his dissent in Kreiner into a majority opinion, and ther eby resuscitate his earlier opinion

15 “While an injury need no t be permanent, it must be of sufficient duration to affect the course of a plaintiff’s life.” Id. at 135.

16 “Self-imposed restrictions, as opposed to physician-imposed restrictions, based on real or perceived pain do not establish this point.” Id. at 133 n 17.16 in DiFranco , this has been achieved only after the people of this state, through their Legislature, have made clear that DiFranco did not reflect what ought to be the policy of this state. Therefore, just as he did in his dissent in Kreiner, Justice C AVANAGH , now with majority support, rejects Kreiner’s analysis of the language “that affects the person’s general ability to lead his or her normal life.” The worm has turned, and never mind what the people and their Legisl ature have sought to accomp lish in establishing as the law. Before proceeding too far into where our substantive disagreements lie, I would be remiss not to point out where we are in agreement. First, the majority, just as did the

Kreiner dissent , largely agrees with Kreiner ’s analysis of MCL 5 00.3135(2)(a), i.e., if there is no material factual di spute, whether a person has su ffered a serious impairment of body function should be determined by the court as a matter of law. 17 The majority also

17 However, the majority indicates that this statute “c ould unconstitu tionally conflict with MCR 2.116(C)(10) . . . .” Because I see no conflict between the statute and the court rule, i.e., each allows the court to determine as a matter of law whether a person has suffered a serious impairment of body function only if there are no material factual disputes, I do not believe the statute is in any way unconstitutional. Moreover, the case cited by the majority in support of its sugg estion that jury trials “promote judicial efficiency” actually stands for the exact opposite proposition. See Moll v Abbott Laboratories, 444 Mich 1, 26; 506 NW2d 816 (1993) (“Both our court rules and case law recognize the desirability of a llowing summary disposition, re gardless of a jury request, when uncontroverted facts are presented to the court. This prom otes efficiency and preservation of judicial resources.”). It is interesting that, al though the majority acknowledges that the constituti onality of MCL 500.3135(2)(a) is not at issue here, it repeatedly implies that MCL 500.3135(2)(a) “could” be unco nstitutional, thus, making it obvious that MCL 500.3135(2)( a) will also likely fall within the majority’s effort to expunge the jurisprudence of the past decade.17 largely agrees with Kreiner ’s analysis of the language, “an objectively manifested impairment of an important body function.” 18 In addition, the ma jority agrees with

Kreiner ’s conclusion that the serious impairment of body function threshold entails a subjective analysis, i.e., “[w]he ther an impairment that precl udes a person from throwing a ninety-five miles-an-hour fastball is a ‘serious impairment of body function’ may depend on whether the person is a professional baseball player or an accountant who likes to play catch with his s on every once in a while.” Kreiner, 471 Mich at 134 n 19. The

I also disagree with the majo rity that “the disputed fact does not need to be outcome determinative in order to be material . . . .” MCL 500.3135(2)(a) (ii) states, “whether an injured person has suffered serious impairment of body function . . . [is a] question [] of law for the court if the court finds . . . [that the] factual dispute . . . is not material to the determination as to whether the person has suffered a serious impairment of body function . . . .” That is, “[a]bsent an outcome-determinative genuine factual dispute, the issue of threshold injury is now a question of law for the court.” Kern v Blethen-Coluni , 240 Mich App 333, 341; 612 NW2d 838 (2000) (emphasis added). Although the majority cites Blac k’s Law Dictionary (8th ed) in support of its proposition that “the disputed fact does not need to be outcome determinative in order to be material,” Black’s Law Dictiona ry (6th ed) states the very opposite-- “[ m]aterial fact is one upon which outcome of litiga tion depends.” See also Bl ack’s Law Dictionary (8th ed), which defines “material” as “[h]av ing some logical connection with the consequential facts,” and Random House Webster’s College Dictionary, which defines “material” as “likely to influence the determinati on of a case.”

18 The majority does take issue with Kreiner ’s conclusion that “[s]ubjective complaints that are not medi cally documented are insuffici ent” to establish that an impairment is “objectively manifested.” Kreiner, 471 Mich at 132. Ho wever, given that the majority agrees that “plain tiffs must ‘introduce evidence establishing that there is a physical basis for their subjective compla ints of pain and suffering,’” quoting DiFranco, 427 Mich at 74, and I am uncertain what evidence other than medical documentation would establish such a “physi cal basis,” it is not clear why the majority objects to Kreiner ’s statement that medical documentation is required. See also DiFranco, 427 Mich at 75 (“The ‘serious impa irment of body function’ thre shold requires the plaintiff to prove that his noneconomic losses arose out of a medically identifiable injury which seriously impaired a body function.”) (emphasis added).18 majority also agrees with Kreiner ’s conclusion that determini ng whether a plaintiff’s general ability to lead his or her normal lif e has been affected “necessarily requires a comparison of the plaintiff’s lif e before and after the incident.” 19 Finally, the majority agrees with Kreiner ’s conclusion that permanency is not required. 20

1. DIFRANCO VS. CASSIDY However, this is where our agreements end. First, the major ity takes issue with
Kreiner’s statement that “the Legislature largely rejected DiFranco in favor of Cassidy. ” Kreiner, 471 Mich at 121 n 8. As explai ned earlier, the Legislature adopted Cassidy with a single exception. That single exce ption pertains to the fact that Cassidy, 415 Mich at 505, required an evaluation of “the effect of an injury on the person ’s general ability to live a normal life,” while MCL 500.3135(7) requi res an evaluation of the effect of an injury on “the person’s general ability to lead his or her normal life.” (Emphasis added.) That is, while the Cassidy test was entirely objective, the MC L 500.3135(7) test is at least partially subjective. As this Court explained in Kreiner, 471 Mich at 121 n 7: [T]he Legislature modified the entirely objective Cassidy standard to a partially objective and partially s ubjective inquiry. Thus, what is “normal” is to be determ ined subjectively on the ba sis of the plaintiff’s own life and not the life of some objective third party. However, once that is

19 The majority also indicates that “many other consider ations could typically be relevant to determining how an impairment affects a person’s ability to live in his or her pre-incident normal manner of living.” Th e majority does not offer any further explanation as to what these “many othe r considerations” might conceivably be.

20 Although Kreiner, 471 Mich at 135, specifically held that “a n injury need not be permanent,” the majority nonetheless criticizes it for “effectively creat[ing] a permanency requirement.”19 fixed as the base, it is to be objectiv ely determined whether the impairment in fact affects the plaintiff’s “g eneral ability to lead” that life. Nevertheless, given that: (a) Cassidy, 415 Mich at 505, held that courts should “look[] to the effect of an injury on the person’s general ability to live a normal life”; (b) DiFranco, 427 Mich at 39, held that courts should not look to the effect of th e injury on the person’s “‘general ability to live a no rmal life’”; and (c) the Le gislature subsequently and affirmatively directed the courts to look to the effect of an injury on “the person’s general ability to lead his or her normal life,” MCL 500.3135(7), the Le gislature obviously preferred the policy of Cassidy to that of DiFranco . In addition, in contrast to DiFranco , and consistent with Cassidy, the Legislature expressly adopted an “important body function” requirement, MCL 500.3135(7), an d amended MCL 500.3135 to make clear that whether a serious impairment of body function has occurred is a question of law unless there is a material factual dispute. MCL 500.3135(2)(a). Thus, contrary to the majority’s understandably de fensive posture, it is hardly an “oversimplification” to conclude that the Legislature essentially rejected DiFranco in favor of Cassidy

. 21 Moreover, the Legislature’s action of amending MCL 500.3135 following

DiFranco is an example of legislative history that has genuine utility in the interpretative process. This Court has emphasized that “not all legislative history is of equal value,” and has specifically noted that “[c]learly of the highest quality is legislative history that relates to an action of the Legislature from which a court may draw reasonable inferences

21 Contrary to the majority’s contention, this dissent very clearly provides in the above language “specific, s ubstantive arguments” in sup port of this conclusion.20 about the Legislature’s intent . . . .” In re Certified Question , 468 Mich 109, 115 n 5; 659 NW2d 597 (2003). The instan t case presents an ideal “[ e]xample[] of legitimate legislative history,” i.e., the recitation of “ac tions of the Legislature intended to repudiate the judicial construction of a statute . . . .” Id . And yet, not altoge ther inexplicably, the majority entirely disregards these legislative actions. Defendant and amicus curiae the Attorney General have presented the Court with legislative analyses, committee reports, and ot her materials to support their argument that, in enacting the amendments, th e Legislature intended to repudiate DiFranco and

restore Cassidy , just as Kreiner held. Even the most cursory review of these documents demonstrates that defendant an d its amicus’ reading has merit. For example, the original draft of House Bill 4341 was accompanied by a memorandum from its sponsor that stated that the bill’s first goal was to “[r]eestablish the two-part Cassidy standard of: (1) definition of ‘serious impair ment of body function,’ and (2 ) make the determination of whether an injury is a seri ous impairment of body func tion a question of law (judge) rather than of fact (jury).” Memorandum of Representative Harold Voorhees enclosing the original draft of HB 4341, February 8, 1995. Similarly, the House Legislative Analysis expressly set forth the chronology of Cassidy and DiFranco , noting that

DiFranco had “rejected” Cassidy and that the bill “would re turn to a tort threshold resembling that provided by the Cassidy ruling . . . .” House Legislative Analysis, HB 4341, December 18, 1995. The analysis pr ovided to the Senate Financial Services Committee likewise explained in the first sentence of the bill’s description that it “would put into law the Cassidy standards for meeting the serious impairment of body function21 threshold.” Department of Commerce Bill An alysis of HB 4341, February 14, 1995. And finally, it is apparent from the statements of protest of the bill’s opponents that they also clearly understood House B ill 4341 to be a “return to the Cassidy standard.” Statements of Senator Henry Stallings and Senator John Che rry, October 12, 1995. While on several occasions I have ex plained why I do not find all forms of legislative history to be useful tools in the interpretative pr ocess, see, e.g., Petersen v Magna Corp , 484 Mich 300, 381-382; 773 NW2d 564 (2009) (M ARKMAN , J., dissenting), the author of the majority opinion has never qu estioned their utility. 22 Thus,

22 The authoring justice states, “I have re peatedly stated that legislative history should only be used wh en statutory language is ambiguous.” Although, in some cases, he has asserted this, see, for example, People v Gardner , 482 Mich 41; 753 NW2d 78 (2008) (C AVANAGH , J., dissenting); Bukowski v Detroit , 478 Mich 268; 73 2 NW2d 75 (2007) (C AVANAGH , J., concurring); People v Derror, 475 Mich 316; 715 NW2d 822 (2006) (C AVANAGH , J., dissenting); Lansing Mayor v Pub Serv Comm , 470 Mich 154; 680 NW2d 840 (2004) (C AVANAGH , J., dissenting), in other ca ses, he has suggested that legislative history can be considered even th ough the statute is not ambiguous, see, for example, Jackson v Green Estate , 484 Mich 209, 230; 771 NW2d 675 (2009) (C AVANAGH , J., dissenting) (“Not only is this interpretation consistent with the plain language of the statute, it is also consistent with the legislative history of the statute.”) (emphasis added); Koester v City of Novi , 458 Mich 1; 580 NW2d 835 (1998); Elias Bros Restaurants v Treasury Dep’t , 452 Mich 144; 549 NW2d 837 (1996) (C AVANAGH , J., concurring); People v Barrera , 451 Mich 261; 547 NW2d 280 (1996); People v Sloan , 450 Mich 160; 538 NW2d 380 (1995); Orzel v Scott Drug Co , 449 Mich 550; 537 NW2d 208 (1995); Gardner v Van Buren Pub Schools , 445 Mich 23; 517 NW2d 1 (1994); Grand Trunk Western R Co v Fenton , 439 Mich 240; 482 NW2d 706 (1992); Romein v General Motors Corp , 436 Mich 515; 462 NW2d 55 5 (1990). Further, given the definition of “ambiguous” supporte d by the authoring justice, see Petersen, 484 Mich at 329 (K ELLY , C.J., lead opinion) (quoting Yellow Freight Sys, Inc v Michigan, 464 Mich 21, 38; 627 NW2d 236 [ 2001], for the proposition that “‘[w ]hen a statute is capable of being understood by reasonably we ll-informed persons in two or more different senses, [a] statute is ambiguous’”), and the different understandings given to the statute here by the majority and dissenting ju stices, I fail to see how, by his own standards , he can22 there is no apparent reason why the majority “tur n[s] a blind eye to th e wealth of extrinsic information available” on the hist ory of the 1995 amendments. Nat ’ l Pride at Work, Inc
v Governor , 481 Mich 56, 95 n 34; 748 NW2d 524 (2008) (K ELLY , J., dissenting). Rather, the only, quite obvious explanation for the majority’s selectiv e silence is that it can find nothing in this “wealth of ex trinsic information available” to support its interpretation. One of th e most common and compelling critiques of the use of legislative history is that a judge can almost always find something in the legislative history to support the interpretation he personally wishes to give to a law. To borrow an analogy invoked by United States Suprem e Court Justice Antonin Scalia, using legislative history is like entering a room, looking over the asse mbled multitudes in the crowd, and picking out your friends. See Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), at 36. In its near silence, the majority places a new twist on this analogy, a nd illustrates another fundamental problem with the use of legislative history. Here, the majo rity enters a room, and, finding no friends in sight, makes a quick exit. Considering the quality and quantity of the legislative history available here, the majority’s “quick exit” and its selective silence on the subject speaks volumes. It should not go unremarked that it is this dissent that cites legislative history-- albeit a uniquely persuasive and bona fide form of legislative history-- as a relevant factor in interpreting MCL 5 00.3135, while the justices of the majority, the supposed advocates

conclude that the statute is unambiguous, unle ss, of course, he does not believe that the dissenting justices are “reasona bly well-informed persons.”23 of this mode of interpretation, exclude th is from their consideration. Apparently, legislative history is to be considered when it supports a justice’s preferred interpretation, and ignored when it does not. Indeed, the problem with this approach of sometimes relying on legislative history and sometimes not is, as I explained in my dissent in Petersen, 484 Mich at 381-382, that it is a process in which judges in the very guise of selecting the tools and factors to be employed in “interpreting” the law are effectively its formulators-- in short, judges who ar e wielding the legislative, not the judicial, power. A critical strength of a judicial philosophy committed to exercising only the constitution’s “judici al power” is that reasonably clear rules of decision-making are established before the fact . That is, a judge essentially promises the parties that he or she will decide their case, as with all others, by attempting to discern the reasonabl e meaning of relevant statutes or contracts and that this will be done by relying upon reco gnized rules, and tools, of interpretation. By contrast , under the [majority’s] approach . . . , in which there is essentially a limitless array of rules, and tools, that may be employed for “defining” the law apar t from its language, there is no consistently applied interpretative pr ocess with which the judge promises beforehand to comply. He or she may promise to be “fair,” and he or she may seek to be fair, but there are no rules for how this fairness is to be achieved. There is only the promis e that the judge will address each dispute on a case-by-case basis, using wh atever rules, and whichever tools, he or she believes are required in that instance. And th e suspicion simply cannot be avoided that these varying and indeterminate rules, and tools, may be largely a function of the outco me preferred by the judge and by his or her personal attitudes toward th e parties and their causes. Any interpretative rules will be identified only after the fact , and these “rules” may or may not have been invoked in resolving yesterday’s dispute, and may or may not be employed in resolv ing tomorrow’s dispute. Any judge can concoct an after-the-fact rationale for a decision; the judicial process, however, is predicated upon before-the-fact rationales. An ad hoc process is not a judicial process at all. In the place of predetermined rules-- otherwise understood as the rule of law-- the [majority] would substitute rules to be determined later. [Emphasis in the original.]24 2. “TRAJECTORY” AND “ENTIRE” Next, the majority peremptorily rejects Kreiner ’s use of the words “trajectory” and “entire.” Again, the pertinent statutory language being define d here is, “that affects the person’s general ability to lead his or her no rmal life.” MCL 500.31 35(7). “Lead” is defined as “to conduct or bring . . . in a particular course,” and, as the majority acknowledges, “‘trajectory’ is a synonym for ‘course.’” Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (1991). In addition, contrary to the majority’s contention, Kreiner ’s use of the word “entire” was not “created out of thin air.” Instead, the use of the word “entire” derived from the Legislature’s use of the word “general” because “in general” means “with re spect to the entirety .” Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (1991) (emphasis added). More accurately, it is the meaning that th e majority gives to “general” that is “created ou t of thin air.” The major ity concludes that the word “general” means “some,” even though the definition that th e majority itself relies upon does not even include “some,” but instead indicates that “general” means “whole,” “every,” “majority,” “prevalent,” “usually,” “in most instances,” “not limited,” and “main features.” Nowhere among these possible meanings can a reader sight the word
“some.” 23

23 I find it interesting that the authori ng justice of the majority opinion once chastised me for “leav[ing] no di ctionary unturned,” with rega rds to an opinion in which I cited two different dictionaries, People v Raby, 456 Mich 487, 501; 572 NW2d 644 (1998) (C AVANAGH , J., dissenting), and, here, he cites seven different dictionaries and still cannot quite find a definition that serves his purpose. While considering relevant dictionary definitions can be a valuable tool of interpretation, the majority’s generous use of dictionaries here is notew orthy because the majority has questioned the propriety and25 3. TEMPORAL CONSIDERATIONS Finally, the majority rejects the non-exhaustive list of factors that Kreiner set forth for consideration in evaluating whether the pl aintiff’s general ability to lead his normal life has been affected. Th e majority asserts that Kreiner “departed . . . from the statutory text, by providing an extra-textual ‘nonexhaustiv e list of objective factors’ to be used to compare the plaintiff’s pre- and post-incident lif estyle.” This critique is quite surprising given that it is not uncommon for courts in ge neral, and for this Court in particular, to provide “extra-textual” factors to be consider ed in interpreting a statute that demands a fact-specific analysis. 24 To the best of my knowledge, members of this majority have never before complained about this practice, but consistency in th e application and nonapplication of interpretative factors is hardly a preoccupation of this majority. 25

usefulness of this tool in the past. Jones v Olson , 480 Mich 1169, 1176 (2008) (“In the legal context, using a dictionary to unwaveri ngly determine the legisl ative intent behind a statute is nothing more than barely hidden judicial activism.”) (W EAVER , J., dissenting) (Then-Justice K ELLY and Justice C AVANAGH joined Justice W EAVER ’s dissenting statement).

24 I use the phrase “extra-textual” factor s only because this is the phrase the majority uses. However, in truth, I do not believe that the factors articulated in Kreiner are at all “extra-textual,” because these have been derived directly from the text of the statute itself.

25 Indeed, as I explained in my dissent in Petersen, 484 Mich at 380, the majority’s “interpretative” process seems to consist of “picking and choosing at [its] discretion from among some uncertain array of tools lying ‘b eyond the plain language of the statute [or contract].’” (Citation omitted.) The problem with this approa ch is that “[t]he litigants will, of course, have no no tice beforehand of which tools are to be employed, for the justices themselves will not know this beforehand.” Id. The rule gleaned from the instant case is apparently that it is appropriate to employ “extra-textual” factors, but only26 Indeed, in DiFranco itself, Justice C AVANAGH provided numerous “extra-textual” factors to be considered in determining wh ether a plaintiff has established a serious impairment of body function. DiFranco, 427 Mich at 69-70, states: In determining whether the impairment of body function was serious, the jury should consider su ch factors as the extent of the impairment, the particular body func tion impaired, the length of time the impairment lasted, the treatment required to correct the impairment, and any other relevant factors. Indeed, these “extra-textual” factor s are remarkably similar to the Kreiner factors: “(a) the nature and extent of the impairment, (b) the type and length of treatment required, (c) the duration of the impairment, (d) the exte nt of any residual impairment, and (e) the prognosis for eventual recovery.” Kreiner, 471 Mich at 133. It not clear why the authoring justice thought it acceptable to list “extra-textual” factors in DiFranco , but unacceptable to cite virtua lly the same factors in Kreiner . In addition, in Wexford Med Group v City of Cadillac , 474 Mich 192; 713 NW2d 734 (2006), he listed “extra-textual” factors a court should consider in determ ining whether an entity is a “charitable institution” and thus exempt from ad valorem property taxes. Also, in Chmielewski v Xermac, Inc , 457 Mich 593, 633; 580 NW2d 81 7 (1998), the Court considered the Handicapper’s Civil Rights Act requirement that to be handicapped one must be “substantially limited in a major life activ ity.” MCL 37.1103(e )(i)(A). Then-Justice

K ELLY , joined by Justice C AVANAGH , stated in dissent:

where the majority wish es to do so. The parties will be made aware of the majority’s inclinations, but only after a decision has been issued.27 I would hold that the following factors should be considered to determine whether an individual is substantially limited in a major life activity: (1) the nature of the impairment, (2) its seve rity, (3) its duration or expected duration, and (4) its long-term effect. [ Chmielewski, 457 Mich at 63.] See, also, Wood v Detroit Auto Inter-Ins Exch , 413 Mich 573; 321 NW2d 653 (1982), listing several “extra-textual” factors a court should consider in awarding “reasonable” attorney fees under MCL 500.3148(1); 26 Workman v Detroit Auto Inter-Ins Exch , 404 Mich 477, 496-497; 274 NW2d 373 (1979), adopting a f our-factor test to determine whether for purposes of the no-fault act a pers on is “domiciled in the same household” as a relative pursuant to MCL 500.3114; Stewart v Michigan , 471 Mich 692, 698-699; 692 NW2d 376 (2004), stating “extra-textual” “f actors such as the manner, location, and fashion in which a vehicle is parked” are ma terial to determining whether the parked vehicle poses an unreasonable risk under MCL 500.3106(1); and Reed v Yackell , 473 Mich 520; 703 NW2d 1 (2005), utilizing an “extra-textu al” multi-factor economic-reality test to determine who is an employer for purposes of the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act. As should be readily apparent , the majority’s claim that Kreiner erred by including “extra-textual” factors to consider in inte rpreting a statute is a wholly manufactured concern. The statute requires a fact-specific analysis. As Justice C AVANAGH ’s

DiFranco opinion and numerous other decisions of this Court have recognized, such

26 In his dissent in Smith v Khouri , 481 Mich 519, 544; 751 NW2d 472 (2008), Justice C AVANAGH affirmed his satisfaction with the Wood “factors,” even though these factors are obviously “extra-textual.”28 factors assist courts in applying the statutor y language on a case-by- case basis. To date, none of the members of the majority have objec ted to the inclusion of such factors in any other of this Court’s decisions. Nevertheless, the majority rejects Kreiner ’s “extra-textual” factors on the basis that they all “include a temporal compon ent,” reiterating the argument made by the

Kreiner dissent that “the statute does not create an express temporal requirement as to how long an impairment must last.” Ante at __, see also Kreiner, 471 Mich at 147 (C AVANAGH , J., dissenting) (“[T]he serious impair ment of body function threshold does not suggest any sort of temporal limitation. . . . Therefore, the duration of the impairment is not an appropriate inquiry.”). Indeed, the majority now ho lds that it is unnecessary to consider whether the impairment even “ continues to affect [plaintif f’s] general ability to lead his pre-incident ‘normal lif e’ . . . .” (Emphasis added.) The majority, not surprisingly, claims that this dissent mischaracterizes its holding when we conclude that temporal considerati ons are wholly or largely irrelevant in the majority’s holding. Not only, as explained ab ove, is my characterization of their holding supported by the actual language of the majority opinion, but it is also dictated by simple logic . That is, given that the majority rejects Kreiner’s factors because they all “include a temporal component,” given that it feels passi onately enough about th is to write a lengthy opinion overruling Kreiner, and given that we ca n discern no other significant departure29 from Kreiner in the majority’s new test than that of th e temporal component, 27 it is difficult to escape the conclusion we reach here, that the majo rity believes that temporal considerations are wholly or largely irrelevant. I am reminded of a famous Sherlock Holmes line: “How often have I said to you th at when you have eliminated the impossible, whatever remains, however improbable , must be the truth?” [A. Conan Doyle, The Sign of the Four, from The Complete Sherlock Holmes (New York: Doubleday, 1890), ch 6, p 111.] That is, given that the majority esse ntially agrees with everything in Kreiner but its temporal considerations, 28 Kreiner ’s temporal considerations are all that remain as to our

27 As explained above, there are other discrepancies between Kreiner and the majority’s opinion, i.e., the DiFranco/Cassidy and the “trajectory/entire” discrepancies. However, these two discrepancies are intert wined with our disagreement about whether temporal considerations should be c onsidered. By returning our law to DiFranco, at which time the plaintiff’s “gener al ability to lead his or her normal life” was not at issue, it is much easier for the major ity to claim that temporal co nsiderations are wholly or largely irrelevant. In additio n, because the majority believe s that it is inappropriate to consider either the “trajectory” or the “en tire” person’s life, it believes that temporal considerations, such as the duration of the im pairment, are wholly or largely irrelevant. However, because we conclude that the statute clearly precludes a return to DiFranco , since the Legislature has very clearly indicated that the plaintiff’s “g eneral ability to lead his or her normal life” is at issue, we believe that temporal considerations are relevant. Similarly, because we believe that the “traject ory” or the “entire” person’s life should be considered, we believe that temporal cons iderations, such as the duration of the impairment, are, in fact, highly relevant.

28 The majority essentia lly agrees with: (1) Kreiner ’s analysis of MCL 500.3135(2)(a), i.e., if there is no material factual dispute, whether a person has suffered a serious impairment of body function should be determined by the court as a matter of law; (2) Kreiner ’s analysis of the language, “an obj ectively manifested impairment of an important body function”; (3) Kreiner ’s conclusion that the serious impairment of body function threshold entails a subjective analysis; (4) Kreiner ’s conclusion that determining whether a plaintiff’s general ab ility to lead his or her no rmal life has been affected30 disagreement. Therefore, that the majority disagrees with Kreiner ’s temporal considerations, such as the dur ation of the impairment, “mus t be the truth.” In other words, when comparing the Kreiner test and the majority’s ne w test-- whatever that is intended to be-- the only apparent su bstantive difference is that, while Kreiner expressly includes temporal considerations , the majority’s test does not . Given that the majority essentially agrees w ith everything in Kreiner but its temporal considerations, and given that the only reason it gives for rejecting these considerations is that they all “include a temporal component,” how can we deduce anything other than that the majority holds that temporal considerations, such as the duration of the impairment, are irrelevant? Furthermore, if temporal considerations are not irrelevant, why does the majority not explain in what way these are relevant, or how, in fact, the majority views the relevancy of temporal consid erations, and how these views differ from those expressed in

Kreiner ? This glaring void in explan ation of its own test in th e majority opinion can only be explained by the fact that the majority is holding that temporal considerations are wholly or largely irrelevant. In sum, if temporal consid erations are relevant: (1) why is the majority overruling

Kreiner ; (2) why does the majority reject Kreiner ’s factors, such as the duration of the impairment; (3) why does the ma jority not include temporal c onsiderations within its new test; (4) why does the majority fail to explain the relevancy of temporal considerations;

“necessarily requires a comparison of the plaintiff’s life befo re and after the incident”; and (5) Kreiner ’s conclusion that permanency is not required.31 (5) why does the majority conclude that it is unnecessary to consider whether the impairment “ continues to affect [plaintiff’s] general ability to lead his pre-incident ‘normal life’”; and (6) perhaps most tellingl y, why does not the majority clarify its position, whatever it may be, in light of this dissent? Simply saying that our conclusion is “erroneous” does not make it so, and, even more to the point, w ill hardly assist the bench and bar of this state in determini ng whether, and how, temporal considerations somehow remain relevant after today’s decision. For these reasons, we are unable to avoi d the conclusion that the majority is, indeed, holding that temporal considerations are wholly or largely irrelevant, even though this “improbable” result constitutes a departure from Cassidy , DiFranco , and Kreiner , and makes utterly no sense. How can it possi bly be determined whether an impairment “affects the person’s general ability to lead his or her normal life” without taking into account temporal considerations? As Kreiner , 471 Mich at 133 n 18, inquired: Does the dissent [now the majo rity] really believe that an impairment lasting only a few moments has the same effect on a person’s “general ability to lead his or her normal life” as an impairment lasting several years or that an impairment requiring annual treatment has the same effect on a person’s “general ability to lead his or her normal life” as an impairment requiring daily treatment? Does the majority really believe that the Le gislature intended for the serious impairment threshold to be met in every instance where an obje ctively manifested impairment of an important body function aff ected a person’s ability to lead his normal life for a mere moment in time? What if a person gets hit in the head and passes out for five minutes, but after those five minutes is completely un affected by the impairment? If all temporal32 considerations are irrelevant , would not this person satisfy the majority’s threshold, because his general ability to lead his normal life was certainly affected for those five minutes of unconsciousness? Under the majority’s rule, it is apparently irrelevant that the person arose after those five minutes and le d a completely normal life thereafter. The majority asserts that all that matters is that for that moment in time, the person’s general ability to lead his normal life had been affected. I am not sure that the majority’s new threshold can even be called a “threshold” wh en it can be satisfied in virtually every automobile accident case that results in injury. 29 As long as the plaintiff has suffered an objectively manifested impairment of an impo rtant body function, that plaintiff will have satisfied the majority’s threshold, because the majority has essen tially read the third criterion, i.e., “that affects the person’s genera l ability to lead his or her normal life,” out of the statute. The clearest illustration of the difficulty in determini ng whether an impairment “affects the person’s general ability to lead his or her normal life” without taking into account temporal considera tions is the majority’s own inability to do so. 30 In determining

29 It certainly is a “threshold” bearing no resemblance to the other two thresholds-- “permanent serious disfigurement” and “death.” See MCL 500.3135(1).

30 The majority criticizes Kreiner as “def[ying] practical workability” on the basis that “ Kreiner has led to inconsistent interpretati on of the statutory language, with similarly situated plaintiffs being treated diffe rently by different cour ts.” However, in his opinion in DiFranco, 427 Mich at 56-57, Justice C AVANAGH has already provided an explanation for why this might be the case: Conflicting results have also arisen among cases involving similarly injured plaintiffs. This is undoubtedly because no tw o plaintiffs are injured33 whether the plaintiff in the instant case suffered an impairment that affects his general ability to lead his normal life, th e majority itself re peatedly cites temporal considerations. For example, the majority indicates that “for a month after the incident, plaintiff could not bear weight on his left ankle”; “[h] e underwent two surgeries over a period of 10 months and multiple months of physical therapy”; “after the incident he was unable to perform functions necessary for his job for at least 14 months ”; “he did not return to work for 19 months ”; and “he missed fishing for a year after the incident.” (Emphasis added.) Are such temporal considerations irrelevant or relevant? Do we inte rpret the words or the actions of the majority? And, if temporal considerations are irrelevant, how are we to determine whether an impairment affects a plaintiff’s “gener al ability to lead his normal life”? The majority does not appe ar to know the answers, and it appears not to care that it does not know. Indeed, under the majority’s new thres hold, it would seem that the moment the plaintiff in this case went to the emergenc y room and it was determined that he had broken his ankle, the threshold was met. Fo r at that moment, plaintiff could not work. While at the emergency room, and for some measurable time afterwards, plaintiff’s

or recover in precisely the same ma nner. These conflicting results indicate that threshold issues are often ques tions upon which re asonable minds can differ. Moreover, if the Court of Appeals is inconsis tently or incorrectly applying Kreiner, this Court has a mechanism to rec tify such errors-- reversing su ch decisions, not overruling precedent and substituting an inco mprehensible new standard bearing no relationship to the law being interpreted.34 broken ankle affected not just some, but all, of his capacity to live hi s normal life. Under the majority’s non-temporal test, there is appa rently no need to cons ider anything beyond the emergency room visit. If this readin g of its decision is wrong, once again, the majority might wish to explain why this is so for the benefit of the bench, the bar, and the public. In crafting its new threshold, the majority would also have been wise to consider the larger no-fault statute. Re call that the Legislature has de cided that an injured plaintiff should only be allowed to sue to recover non economic damages resulting from an automobile accident where he or she has suffered: (a) d eath; (b) permanent serious disfigurement; or (c) serious impairment of body function. MCL 500.3135. It is well established that “‘[w]hen construing a series of terms . . . we are guided by the principle that words grouped in a list shoul d be given related meaning.’” In re Compla int of Rovas Against SBC Mich , 482 Mich 90, 114; 754 NW2d 25 9 (2008) (citation omitted). “In other words, this Court applies the doctrine of noscitur a sociis, which ‘stands for the principle that a word or phrase is given mean ing by its context of setting.’” Id. (citation omitted). Therefore, as this Court explained in Cassidy, 415 Mich at 503: In determining the seriousness of th e injury required for a “serious impairment of body function”, this th reshold should be considered in conjunction with the other threshold requirements for a tort action for noneconomic loss, namely, death and permanent serious disfigurement. MCL 500.3135 . . . . The Legislatur e clearly did not intend to erect two significant obstacles to a tort acti on for noneconomic loss and one quite insignificant obstacle. [31]

31 See also DiFranco, 427 Mich at 95 (W ILLIAMS , C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“In the statutory languag e, ‘serious impairment of body function’35 In addition, the Legislature defined “serious impairment of body function” to mean “an objectively manifested impairment of an impor tant body function that affects the person’s general ability to lead his or her normal life.” MCL 500.3 135(7). Obviously, in enacting this threshold language, and in joining it with “death” and “serious permanent disfigurement,” the Legislature was unlikely to have had in mi nd an impairment that only affected a plaintiff’s ability to lead his normal life for a moment in time, with no consideration being given to th e plaintiff’s general ability to lead his normal life beyond that moment. Indeed, it is quite certain that this is not what the Legislature had in mind, given that the very premise of the no-fau lt act, and the core of the accompanying legislative compromise, was that some injured persons would not be able to recover

noneconomic damages, so that all injured persons would be able to recover economic loss benefits regardless of fault.
D. APPLICATION As explained earlier, both Kreiner and the majority agree th at the court must first determine whether there is a factual dispute th at is material to the determination whether plaintiff has suffered a serious impairment of body function. Here, there are no material factual disputes. Before the accident, plai ntiff worked approximately 60 hours a week and for the six months immediately before th e accident, plaintiff’s position was that of a medium truck loader. Additionally, plaintiff fi shed and golfed. Twel ve months after the
appears with the other threshold requirements of ‘permanent serious disfigurement’ and ‘death,’ leaving the strong implication, under the rule of ejusdem generis, that while the impairment need not be permanent or fatal, it was not to be transien t or trivial either.”).36 accident, plaintiff’s surgeon cleared him to return to work with no restrictions. Seventeen months after the accident, plaintiff returned to work and has been ab le to perform all of his job duties since then . During the entire time he was recuperating, plaintiff could tend to his needs and there was no effect on hi s relationship with his then-fiancée. Additionally, plaintiff continued to fish and golf. Thus, I ag ree with the ma jority that there are no factual disputes that are materi al to the determination of whether plaintiff suffered a serious impairment of a b ody function. The facts are clear. I also agree with the major ity that the “body function” that was “impaired,” the ability to walk, was “important,” and that the impairment wa s “objectively manifested.” Although plaintiff was able to walk to some extent, his ability to do so was impaired, and his impairment, a broken ankle, was recognize d by his doctors. The final, and critical, inquiry in this case concerns whether the impairment affects plaintiff’s “general ability to lead his normal life.” This is wh ere the majority and I depart. The Kreiner analysis requires a comparison of plaint iff’s life before the accident and after the accident, including “the significance of any affected as pects on the course of the plaintiff’s overall life.” Kreiner , 471 Mich at 132-133. To aid in th is analysis, the following factors may be considered: (a) the nature and extent of the impairment, (b) the type and length of treatment required, (c) the duration of the impairment, (d) the extent of any residual impairment, and (e) the prognosis for eventual recovery. [ Id. at 133.] Plaintiff’s ability to walk, as just noted, was impaired by a broken ankle. However, once plaintiff’s ankle was placed in a cast at the emergency room, he was able37 to walk with the aid of crut ches. And, immediately follow ing his initial surgery in which a device was implanted to stabilize his ankle, plaintiff was still able to walk with crutches, although he was instru cted not to place any weight on his ankle for one month. Plaintiff underwent physical th erapy and nine months later, in October of 2005, plaintiff again underwent surgery to remove the devi ce. By January 2006 (one year after the accident), plaintiff’s surgeon had cl eared plaintiff to return to work with no restrictions. However, plaintiff claimed that he could not keep up with the demands of his job and thus was placed back on workers’ compensation. Although plaintiff’s subjective reports of his pain from January 20 06 forward varied greatly, 32 the March 2006 FCE supported plaintiff’s claim that he coul d not fully perform all of his previous job duties; however, this was due in part to a pr eexisting and unrelated shoulder injury. After plaintiff’s workers’ compensation benefits were termin ated, however, plaintiff requested another FCE, and, on August 1, 2006, the FCE showed th at plaintiff was able to perform essential job demands with no restrictions. Plaintiff returned to work on Au gust 16, 2006, and has been able to perform his j ob duties since that time.

32 As already discussed, in January 2006, plaintiff reported to his surgeon that his ankle was not giving him any pain; in Marc h of 2006, plaintiff reported during his FCE that his pain was a three out of ten; in June of 2006, plaintiff report ed to his physiatrist that his pain was a six out of ten; in August 2006, plaintiff reporte d during his FCE that his pain was as low as zero out of ten (at wh ich point, he returned to work); and in October of 2006, plaintiff reported during hi s deposition that his life was “normal” with some pain. These drastically inconsistent repo rts of pain demonstrate why, with regard to the “extent of any residual impairment,” “[ s]elf-imposed restrict ions, as opposed to physician-imposed restrictions, based on real or perceived pain do not establish this point.” Kreiner, 471 Mich at 133 n 17.38 Although plaintiff was assigned to a pos ition that was less physically demanding than the position he had been performing be fore he was injured, plaintiff did this voluntarily and he suffered no loss in pay. Moreover, at the time plai ntiff was injured, he had only been in that position for six months and, since he began to work for Allied in 2002, he had worked in thre e different positions. Thus, the fact that defendant was assigned to a different position upon his return is not particularly significant in this Court’s analysis. Plaintiff’s only argument rega rding his inability to lead hi s normal life is that he was unable to work at certain times. During the time he was recuperating, plaintiff could care for himself and tend to hi s household chores without a ssistance. His relationship with his fiancée/wife was unaffected. And he was able to enjoy his recreational activities without interruption. By plaintiff’s own admission, his life was “normal” with some “occasional aching” that was not aggravated by any activities, incl uding standing or prolonged walking. It is fair to say that by August of 2006 plaintiff had fully recovered from his broken ankle. Because only plaintiff’s ab ility to work was affected and because this only lasted, at the very lengthiest, 17 months, the lower courts did not err in concluding that the impairment did not affect plaintiff’s “general ability to lead his normal life” and, therefore, that plaintiff did not meet the “serious impairment of body function” threshold.39 E. STARE DECISIS The majority overrules Kreiner while paying its usual li p service to stare decisis. 33 My fundamental disagreement with the majority’s application of the stare decisis doctrine is quite easily summarized. In Robinson v Detroit, 462 Mich 439, 464; 613 NW2d 307 (2000), this Court drew on past caselaw and iden tified several relevant considerations in determining whether a case should be overruled under stare decisis. 34 As explained

33 It is of interest that this is the second time the authoring justice has authored an opinion overruling an earlier case making it eas ier for a plaintiff to establish a serious impairment of body function. In DiFranco , he authored an opinion overruling Cassidy

. Justice W ILLIAMS complained: “Four years after th is Court issued its opinion in Cassidy v McGovern, 415 Mich 483; 330 NW2d 22 (1982), the majority sees fit to overrule the decision of five members of a six-member c ourt and adopt the positi on of the dissent in that case.” DiFranco, 427 Mich at 92 (W ILLIAMS , J., concurring in pa rt and dissenting in part). In this case, the authoring justice agai n sees fit to overrule a case that was decided only six years ago and to adopt his own dissenting opinion from that case. While it is by now clear what the authoring justice believes the no-fault policies of this state ought to be, it is considerably less clea r what connection these views bear to those of the people and their Legislature.

34 The fact that the lead opinion relies far more on Chief Justice K ELLY ’s opinion in Petersen , which only Justice C AVANAGH joined, than on the majority opinion in Robinson should not go unno ticed. For a discussion of Chief Justice K ELLY ’s Petersen standard for overruling pre cedent, see my dissent in Petersen, 484 Mich at 350. Concerning the statements of Justices H ATHAWAY and W EAVER about stare decisis: Justice H ATHAWAY contends that stare decisis constitutes a “policy consideration” and that the “particula r analytical approach will differ from case to case.” Similarly, Justice W EAVER contends that stare decisis constitutes a “principle of policy” and that there is no need for a “standardized test for stare decisis,” as long as justices exercise “judicial restraint, common sense, and a sense of fairness.” The problem with these “approaches” is that “litigants will, of course, have no notice beforehand of which [“analytical approach”] will be employed, for the ju stices themselves40 herein, Kreiner was the first occasion on which this C ourt was called upon to interpret the 1995 amendments to MCL 500.3135. Kreiner gave effect to the legislative intent as expressed in the language of the amended st atute and was not, in my judgment, wrongly decided. Nonetheless, my disagreement with the majority on this po int is not the thrust of this section. Rather, it is to remind the majo rity “that there are larger issues at stake in this case: the rule of law, respect for preceden t, the integrity of this Court, and judicial restraint. Accordingly, larg er institutional issues are implicated in this case.” Paige v City of Sterling Hts , 476 Mich 495, 543; 720 NW2d 219 (2006) (C AVANAGH , J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Indeed, the author of the ma jority opinion, as one who subscribes to the doctrine of legislative acquiescence, has often argue d that principles of stare decisis are especially

will not know this beforehand.” Petersen, 484 Mich at 380 (M ARKMAN , J., dissenting). * * * Although Justice W EAVER is correct that “there are many factors to consider in deciding wh ether or not to overrule precedent,” and Justice H ATHAWAY is equally correct that the applic ation of stare decisis must take place on a “case-by-case basis,” this does not obviate the need to at least reasonably attempt to apprise the parties, and the citizens of this state, before the fact what some of these factors mi ght be, as this Court did in Robinson and as the Chief Justice and Justice C AVANAGH did in Petersen

. And, whatever else can be understood of Justice H ATHAWAY ’s and Justice W EAVER ’s “approaches” to stare decisi s, the application of these “approaches” has resulted in 13 preceden ts of this Court being overruled during this term alone, and 6 other precedents be ing teed up for possible overruling during the next term, doubtle ss a record pace for dismantling the caselaw of this state. [ Univ of Mich v Titan, Ins Co, __ Mich __; __ NW2d __ (2010) (M ARKMAN , J., dissenting).]41 strong in matters of statutory interpretation. 35 Accordingly, his own words are relevant here: “[T]he majority does not adequately expl ain why it disregards the doctrine of stare decisis in a matter of statutory interpretation wh en the Legislature itself has not seen fit in [six] years to correct [ Kreiner ’s] allegedly incorrect interpretation.” Id. at 536. To be

35 “[P]rinciples of stare decisis in matters of statutory interpretation, particularly where the Legislature has not resp onded to a prior interpretation, weigh against overruling precedent absent sound and specific justification.” Paige , 476 Mich at 540- 541 (C AVANAGH , concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis added); see also Devillers v Auto Club Ins Ass’n , 473 Mich 562, 613-614; 702 NW2d 539 (2005) (C AVANAGH , J., dissenting); Neal v Wilkes , 470 Mich 661, 6 76-677; 685 NW2d 648 (2004) (C AVANAGH , J., dissenting); People v Moore , 470 Mich 56, 78-79; 679 NW2d 41 (2004) (C AVANAGH , J., dissenting); Jones v Dep’t of Corrections , 468 Mich 646, 665; 664 NW2d 717 (2003) (C AVANAGH , J., dissenting); Mack v Detroit , 467 Mich 186, 221- 222; 649 NW2d 47 (2002) (C AVANAGH , J., dissenting); Robertson v DaimlerChrysler Corp , 465 Mich 732, 767-768; 641 NW2d 567 (2002) (C AVANAGH , J., dissenting). Significantly, the authoring justice has gone so far as to suggest that “when this Court first interprets a statute, then the statute beco mes what this Court has said it is,” and that, absent further legislative action, “‘[h]aving gi ven our view on the meaning of a statute, our task is concluded, absent extraordinary circumstances.’” Paige, 476 Mich at 537 (C AVANAGH , concurring in part and dissenting in part), quoting Boys Markets, Inc v Retail Clerks Union , 398 US 235, 257-258; 90 S Ct 15 83; 26 L Ed 2d 199 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted). One cann ot reconcile this view of legislative acquiescence and stare decisis with th e majority’s decision to overrule Kreiner

. Kreiner was this Court’s first interpretation of th e amended MCL 500.3135, and, although bills were subsequently introduced that would have abolished Kreiner, such bills were repeatedly rejected by the Legisl ature. See, e.g., SB 1429 (2004); SB 618, HB 4846, and HB 4940 (2005); SB 445, HB 4301, and HB 4999 (2007); and SB 83 and HB 4680 (2009). Therefore, what is th e majority’s “sound and specific justification” for departing from Kreiner ? Paige , 476 Mich at 541 (C AVANAGH , concurring in part and dissenting in part). What are the “extraordinary circumstan ces” that make it appropriate to do so? Id. at 538 (citation, quotation mark s, and emphasis omitted). Wh ile, in my view, this Court has correctly repudiated the doctrine of legislative acquiescence, see Donajkowski v Alpena Power Co , 460 Mich 243, 258-261; 596 NW2d 574 (1999), th ere is no principled reason why the majority , whose members are convinced advocates of this doctrine, chooses to ignore the Legi slature’s repeated rejection of attempts to abolish Kreiner , just as there is no principled re ason why the majority chooses to ignore the Legislature’s actions in amending MCL 500. 3135 and the other forms of available legislative history.42 fair, it is not only the author of the majority opinion, but all the justices who comprise the majority who should more clearly recognize the consequences of what they are doing. Even a cursory analysis of the majority’s treatment of precedent since it ascended to power in January 2009 reveals a lack of suffi cient regard for recent precedents that is directly contrary to their own previous asser tions of the need not to needlessly overrule cases on account of stare decisis. Past compla ints on their part th at cases should not be overruled when the only thing that has change d is the membership of the Court have gone by the wayside. 36

1. MAJORITY AND PRECEDENT IN 2009 The new majority assumed power in January 2009, a nd wasted little time in beginning its efforts to “undo” deci sions of the previous majority. 37 On December 29, 2008, the former majority issued its opinion in United States Fidelity Ins & Guaranty Co v Mich Catastrophic Claims Ass’n , 482 Mich 414, 417; 759 NW2d 154 (2008). Soon

36 Rowland v Washtenaw Co Rd Comm , 477 Mich 197, 256; 731 NW2d 41 (2007) (K ELLY , J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The law has not changed. Only the individuals wearing th e robes have changed.”); Paige , 476 Mich at 532-533 (C AVANAGH , J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The only change has been the composition of this Court. An d unfortunately, this is the on ly reasonable answer to the question why a decision from this Court decide d just eight years earlier and involving the same issue is now being overruled. But make no mistake, this answer is alarming, and it has become increasingly common.”). As obse rved, after the compos ition of this Court changed when Justice H ATHAWAY replaced former Chief Justice T AYLOR on January 1, 2009, this Court granted plai ntiff’s motion for reconsidera tion even though such motion had not raised any new legal ar guments. 485 Mich 851 (2009).

37 See Detroit Free Press, December 10, 2008, at A2, where Chief Justice K ELLY promised to “undo . . . the damage that the Republican-dominated court has done.”43 after Justice H ATHAWAY replaced former Chief Justice T AYLOR on January 1, 2009, the plaintiffs filed motions for rehearing. The new majority granted th e plaintiffs’ motions for rehearing, and the cases were resubmitt ed for decision “without further briefing or oral argument

. ” 483 Mich 918 (2009). Then, in United States Fidelity Ins & Guaranty Co v Michigan Cata strophic Claims Ass’n (On Rehearing) , 484 Mich 1, 46; __ NW2d __ (2009), the new majority reversed th e former majority’s decision.

In Bush v Shabahang , 484 Mich 156, 175 n 34; 772 NW2d 272 (2009), the majority stated that it “question[ed] whether Roberts I [ Roberts v Mecosta Co Gen Hosp , 466 Mich 57; 642 NW 2d 663 (2002)] and Boodt [ v Borgess Med Ctr , 481 Mich 558; 751 NW2d 44 (2008)] were correctly decided . . . .” And, in Potter v McLeary, 484 Mich 397, 424 n 32; 774 NW2d 1 (2009), th e majority said: “W e question whether Roberts II [ Roberts v Mecosta Co Gen Hosp , 470 Mich 679; 684 NW2d 711 (2004)] was correctly decided . . . .” The majority’s treatment of precedent in the seven-month period from when it took power until the end of the Court’s term in July 2009 was well explained in earlier statements of mine and of Justices C ORRIGAN and Y OUNG . For example, in Henry v Dow Chem Co , 484 Mich 483, 528 n 28; 77 2 NW2d 301 (2009), Justice Y OUNG observed in his partial dissent: The majority’s determination to ignore facts and precedent inconvenient to its desired outcome has become its modus operandi . See, e.g., Vanslembrouck v Halperin , 483 Mich 965; 763 NW2d 919 (2009), where the new majority ignored Vega v Lakeland Hosp itals at Niles & St Joseph, Inc , 479 Mich 243, 244; 736 NW2d 561 (2007); Hardacre v Saginaw Vascular Services , 483 Mich 918 (2009), where it failed to follow Boodt v Borgess Med Ctr , 481 Mich 558; 751 NW2d 44 (2008); Sazima v44 Shepherd Bar & Restaurant , 483 Mich 924; 762 NW2d 924 (2009), where it failed to follow Chrysler v Blue Arrow Transport Line s, 295 Mich 606; 295 NW 331 (1940), and Camburn v Northwest School Dist , 459 Mich 471; 592 NW2d 46 (1999); Juarez v Holbrook , 483 Mich 970 (2009), where it failed to follow Smith v Khouri , 481 Mich 519; 751 NW2d 472 (2008) [38] ; Chambers v Wayne Co Airport Auth , 483 Mich 1081 (2 009), where it failed to follow Rowland v Washtenaw Co Rd Comm , 477 Mich 197; 731 NW2d 41 (2007); [39] and Scott v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co , 483 Mich 1032 (2009), where it failed to enforce Thornton v Allstate Ins Co , 425 Mich 643; 391 NW2d 320 (1986), and Putkamer v Transame rica Ins Corp of America , 454 Mich 626; 563 NW2d 683 (1997). And, as Justice C ORRIGAN stated in her dissenting statement in Beasley v Michigan , 483 Mich 1025 (2009): [T]he new majority’s failure to abide by Rowland continues a growing and troubling trend. Rather than forthrightly overruling that decision, it is increasingly becoming th e practice of this Court to simply ignore precedents with which it disagrees. . . . * * * On this Court, the new majority offers no articulable reasons whatsoever for its apparent detours from stare decisis. In stead, the majority declines to explain whether--and, if so, why--it is overruling precedent despite the obvious appearance that it is doing so. If it intends to alter legal principles embedded in this Court’s d ecisions, then the new majority should explain its reasons clearly and intellig ibly. Instead, the new majority

38 I dissented in Juarez v Holbrook , 483 Mich 970 (2009), stating: [T]he majority’s disdain for Smith [ v Khouri , 481 Mich 519; 751 NW2d 472 (2008)] is apparently view ed as adequate justification for ignoring Smith . Rather than forthrightly overruling this decision, something the new majority is apparen tly loathe to do (perhaps because several majority justices repeatedly and loudly proclaimed fealty to stare decisis, and dissented, whenever the former majority overruled a precedent), it is increasingly becoming the modus operandi of this Court that relevant precedents si mply be ignored.

39 The majority also failed to follow Rowland in Ward v Michigan State Univ , 485 Mich 917 (2009).45 overrules by indirection, or at least le aves the impression that it is doing so, thereby sowing the seeds of confus ion and making it difficult for the citizens of this state to comprehend pr ecisely what our caselaw requires. This appears to be an unfortunate retu rn to our predece ssors’ past practice of “frequently pa[ying] little attention to the inconsistencies among its cases and declin[ing] to reduce confusion in [the Court’s] jurisprudence by overruling conflicting decisions.” Devillers v Auto Club Ins Ass’n , 473 Mich 562, 571 n 19 [702 NW2d 539] (2005). [40] Additionally, in Petersen , 484 Mich 300, Chief Justice K ELLY authored an opinion, joined only by Justice C AVANAGH , in which she indicate d that she wanted to overrule Robinson v Detroit , 462 Mich 439; 613 NW 2d 307 (2000), and Lansing Mayor v Pub Serv Comm , 470 Mich 154; 680 NW2d 840 (20 04). In my dissent, I stated: Given that in this case the Chie f Justice would expressly overrule, not one, but two of this C ourt’s prior decisions, “one is naturally tempted to re-inquire, see Rowland v Wash tenaw Co Rd Comm , 477 Mich 197, 223-228; 731 NW2d 41 (2007) (M ARKMAN , J., concurring), whether the ongoing disp ute between the [fo rmer] majority and Justice K ELLY over overrulings of preced ent truly concerns attitudes toward stare decisis or merely attitude s toward particular previous decisions of this Court.” [ People v Smith , 478 Mich 292, 322- 323 n 17; 733 NW2d 351 (2007).] “A justice’s perspective on stare decisis is not evidenced by her willingness to maintain pr ecedents with which she agrees , but by her willingness to maintain pr ecedents with which she disagrees .” Rowland, 477 Mich at 224-225 n 3 (M ARKMAN , J., concurring). Now that the Chief Justice is positioned to overrule decisi ons with which sh e disagrees, her

40 On the other hand, as I stated in Rowland, 477 Mich at 226-227: [T]he [former] majo rity has been disciplined in stating expressly when a precedent has been overruled. The [form er] majority has never attempted to obscure when a preceden t was overruled or to minimize the number of such precedents by dubious “distinguishing” of prior caselaw. Rather, it has been forthright in id entifying and critiquing precedents that were viewed as wrongly deci ded and warranting overruling.46 actions increasingly demons trate that her former claims of fealty toward stare decisis were considerably overs tated. Despite all her rhetoric concerning the importance of stare decisi s for the exercise of the judicial power, see, e.g., her hollow claim that she possessed a “differing [and elevated] esteem for stare decisis” than another justice, People v Gardner , 482 Mich 41, 88 n 31; 7 53 NW2d 78 (2008), such rh etoric was in reality little more than a means of communicating her opposition to overruling particular past decisions with which she agreed. [ Petersen , 484 Mich at 389-390 (M ARKMAN , J., dissenting) (emphasis in the original).] One other practice to which the new ma jority began to adhere in 2009 was requesting that the parties br ief whether a decision of the former majority should be overruled. See, e.g., Justice Y OUNG ’s partial dissent in Potter, 484 Mich at 450 n 43, in which he stated: It is quickly becoming a new favored practice of the majority to flag decisions of the past decade and invite challenges to those decisions. It is difficult to reconcile this practice with the majority’s pr evious claims of fidelity to stare decisis. See, e.g., . . . Pohutski v City of Allen Park , 465 Mich 675, 712; [6 41] NW2d 219 (2002) (K ELLY , J., dissenting) (“[I]f each successive Court, believing its reading is correct and past readings wrong, rejects precedent, then the law will fluctuate from year to year, rendering our jurisprudence dangerously unstable.”); Devillers, supra at 620 (W EAVER , J., dissenting) (“Under the doctrine of stare decisis, it is necessary to follow earlier judicial decisions when the same points arise again in litigation.”); Rowland v Washtenaw Co Rd Comm , 477 Mich 197, 278; 731 NW2d 41 (2007) (C AVANAGH , J., dissenting) (“Under the doctrine of stare decisis, principles of law deliberately examined and decided by a court of competent juri sdiction become precedent and should not be lightly departed. Absent the ra rest circumstances, we should remain faithful to established precedent.”) . . . . See also Todd C. Berg, Esq., Hathaway Attacks , Michigan Lawyers Weekly, October 27, 2008, in which Justice H ATHAWAY was quoted: “I believe in stare decisis. Something must be drastically wrong for the court to overrule”; Lawyers’ Election Guide: Judge Diane Ma rie Hathaway , Michigan Lawyers Weekly, October 30, 2006, in which Justice H ATHAWAY , then running fo r a position on the Court of Appeals, was quoted: “Too many appellate decisions are being decided by judicial activists who are overturning precedent.” [Citations omitted.]47 Thus, from January 2009 thro ugh July 31, 2009, the ne w majority reversed an opinion on rehearing, sowed seeds of confus ion by questioning three cases decided by the former majority, i.e., Roberts I , Roberts II, and Boodt, failed to follow numerous other precedents as cited above, and began to issue orders reques ting that the parties brief whether decisions made by the form er majority shou ld be overruled. 41 And Chief Justice

K ELLY and Justice C AVANAGH went on record urging the express overruling of two

cases: Robinson and Mayor of Lansing

. 2. MAJORITY AND PRECEDENT IN 2010 In 2010, the majority has acc elerated efforts to “undo” numerous cases decided by the former majority th rough express overrulings and additio nal orders asking parties to brief whether a case should be overruled.

In People v Feezel , 486 Mich 184; 783 NW2d 67 (2010), the majority expressly overruled People v Derror , 475 Mich 316; 715 NW2d 822 (2006). In Lansing Sch Educ

41 The Detroit Free Press took note of the majority’s actions and stated as follows in an October 11, 2009 editorial, Restoring judicial restraint : Even before the new term began, the new Democratic majority (buttressed by the renegade W EAVER ) had signaled its own impatience to begin dismantling the Engler Court’s le gacy when it agreed to reconsider an appeal the court reject ed just a month before T AYLOR ’ S departure. The revived appeal appears to hinge on th e court’s willingness to reverse two of the Engler court’s more recent decisions. * * * Democrats can hardly reinvigorate stare decisis – the reasonable conviction that the rules of the game shouldn’t change every time a new referee takes the field – by reve rsing every questionable call its predecessors made.48 Ass’n v Lansing Bd of Edu , __ Mich __; __ NW2d __ (2010), the majority overruled Lee v Macomb Co Bd of Comm’rs , 464 Mich 726; 629 NW2d 900 (2001), Crawford v Dep’t of Civil Serv, 466 Mich 250; 64 5 NW2d 6 (2002), Nat ’ l Wildlife Federation v Cleveland Cliffs Iron Co , 471 Mich 608; 684 NW2d 800 (2004), Associated Builders & Contractors v Dep’t of Consumer & Indus Servs Dir , 472 Mich 117, 124-127; 693 NW2d 374 (2005), Mich Chiropractic Council v Comm’r of the Office of Fin & Ins Servs , 475 Mich 363; 716 NW2d 561 (2006), Rohde v Ann Arbor Pub Sch , 479 Mich 336; 737 NW2d 158 (2007), and Mich Citizens for Water Conservation v Nestlé Waters North America Inc , 479 Mich 280, 3 02-303; 737 NW2d 447 (2007), and Manuel v Gill , 481 Mich 637; 753 NW2d 48 (2008). In Bezeau v Palace Sports , __ Mich __; __ NW 2d __ (2010), the majority expressly overruled the limited retroactive effect of Karaczewski v Farbman
Stein & Co , 478 Mich 28; 732 NW2d 56 (2007). In Univ of Mich v Titan Ins Co , __ Mich __; __ NW2d __ (2010), the majority expressly overruled Cameron v Auto Club Ins
Ass’n , 476 Mich 55; 718 NW 2d 784 (2006). In O’Neal v St. John Hosp, __ Mich __, __ n __; __ NW2d __ (2010), the lead opinion authored by Justice H ATHAWAY indicated its agreement with Justice C AVANAGH ’s partial dissent in Wickens v Oakwood Healthcare Sys, 465 Mich 53; 631 NW2d 686 (2 001), which already had the support of three Justices (Chief Justice K ELLY and Justices C AVANAGH and W EAVER ). And, of course, in the case at bar, the majority has expressly overruled Kreiner . Finally, by amending MCR 2.112 and MCR 2.118 to allow amendments of affidav its of merit to relate back to the of the original filing of the affidavit, the majority effectively overruled Kirkaldy v Rim, 478 Mich 581; 734 NW2d 201 (2007) . 485 Mich ___ (2010).49 3. REVERSALS OF PRECEDENT TO COME The majority’s work, however, has apparently only just begun. It has already teed up six more cases in its grant orders for possible overruling. These include: Mich Citizens v Nestlé Waters , 479 Mich 280; 737 NW2d 447 (2007); 42 Preserve the Dunes, Inc v Dep’t of Environmental Quality , 471 Mich 508; 684 NW2d 847 (2004); 43 Trentadue v Buckler Automatic Lawn Sprinkler Co , 479 Mich 378; 738 NW2d 664 (2007); 44 Griffith
v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co , 472 Mich 521; 697 NW2d 895 (2005); 45 Rory v

42 This Court’s grant order in Anglers of the AuSable, Inc v Dep’t of Environmental Quality , 485 Mich 1067 (2010), inquired whether Mich Citizens v Nestlé Waters , 479 Mich 280; 737 NW2d 447 (2007), was correctly de cided, and the majority denied a motion to dismiss in that case even though that case is now clearly moot. See Anglers, __ Mich __ (2010) (Y OUNG , J., dissenting), order ente red June 18, 2010 (Docket Nos. 138863 to 138866). Appare ntly, the majority just coul d not wait until next term to overrule Nestlé Waters, because it appears already to have done so in Lansing Sch Educ Ass’n v Lansing Bd of Educ , __ Mich __; __ NW2d __ (2010).

43 This Court’s grant order in Anglers also inquired whether Preserve the Dunes was correctly decided, and, as noted, the majo rity denied the motion to dismiss in that case even though it is no w clearly moot. See Anglers, __ Mich at __ (2010) (Y OUNG , J., dissenting), ordered entere d June 18, 2010 (Docket Nos. 138863 to 138866).

44 Colaianni v Stuart Frankel Dev Corp , 485 Mich 1070 (2010 ), inquired “whether Trentadue v Buckler Auto matic Lawn Sprinkler Co , 479 Mich 378, was correctly decided.”

45 This Court’s grant order in Wilcox v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co , 486 Mich 870 (2010), inquired “whether Griffith v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co , 472 Mich 521 (2005), was correctly decided.” This order is the majority’s second tee-up of Griffith. The majority first requested that the parties brief whether Griffith was correctly decided in Hoover v Mich Mut Ins Co , 485 Mich 881 (2009), but th at case was subsequently dismissed after a settlement, Hoover v Mich Mut Ins Co , 485 Mich 1036 (2010). However, the majority wasted little time in fi nding another case to us e as a vehicle for reconsidering Griffith.50 Continental Ins Co , 473 Mich 457; 703 NW2d 23 (2005); 46 and Rowland v Washtenaw Co Rd Comm , 477 Mich 197; 731 NW2d 41 (2007). 47 The new majority once purpo rted to be concerned about the stability of the law, 48 but that concern appears to have passed with the passing of the former majority. Indeed, it is difficult to consider anything more destab ilizing to the law than to have the majority issue multiple orders continually requesti ng that the parties brief whether recently decided cases have been properly decided. Justices who once postured as champions of stare decisis now cannot act quickly enough to reverse disfavored precedents. The majority’s past claims of fealty to stare de cisis were greatly exaggerated, and obviously nothing more than a func tion of their opposition to particular decisions being decided by the Court at the time.
4. HYPOCRISY AND STARE DECISIS The majority accuses the dissent ing justices of hypocrisy with regard to our stare decisis criticisms of the majority.

46 This Court’s grant order in Idalski v Schwedt , 486 Mich 916 (2010), inquired “whether Rory v Continental Ins Co , 473 Mich 457 (2005), shou ld be reconsidered.”

47 This Court’s grant order in Pollard v Suburban Mobility Auth, 486 Mich 963 (2010), inquired “whether th is Court should reconsider Rowland v Washtenaw Co Rd Comm , 477 Mich 197 (2007).”

48 See, e.g., People v Davis , 472 Mich 156, 190; 695 NW2d 45 (2005), where then-Justice K ELLY opined in dissent that overrulin g cases “destabilizes our state’s jurisprudence. It suggests to the public that the law is at the whim of whoever is sitting on the Supreme Court bench. Surely, it erode s the public’s confiden ce in our judicial system.”51 The dissenters’ stare decisis prot estations should taste like ashes in their mouths. To the principles of stare decisis, to which they paid absolutely no heed as they denigrated the wisdom of innumerable predecessors, the dissenters now would wr ap themselves in its benefits to save their recent precedent. [ Ante at __.] However, the position of the dissenting justices on stare decisis has not changed a whit since we were in the majority; by contrast , the position of the majority justices is unrecognizable. It has always been our position that star e decisis is not an “inexorable command,” and that a judge’s primary obligation is to the law and the cons titution, not to the judgments of his or her predecessors. To that end, we have always a sserted that there are multiple judicial values that must be assesse d in any case in which previous decisions of the Court are implicated. In every such case, a judge mu st respectfully consider the interests served by stare d ecisis-- predictability and certainty in the law, and the uniformity of its application. However, in ev ery such case, a judge must also consider the interests served by interp reting the law correctly-- regard for the lawmaker, adherence to constitutional dictates concerning the “judi cial power” and the separation of powers, and competing predictability a nd certainty interests that ar e served where the law means what it plainly says. Robinson, 462 Mich at 464-468. As we explained in Robinson : [I]t is well to recall in discussing re liance, when dealin g with an area of the law that is statutory . . . , that it is to the words of the statute itself that a citizen first looks for guidance in directing his actions. This is the essence of the rule of law: to know in advance what the rules of society are. Thus, if the words of the statute are clear, the actor shou ld be able to expect, that is, rely, that they will be carried out by all in society, including the courts. In fact, should a cour t confound those legitimate citizen expectations by misreading or misconstrui ng a statute, it is that court itself that has disrupted the reliance interest . When that happens, a subsequent52 court, rather than holding to the distor ted reading because of the doctrine of stare decisis, should overrule the ea rlier court’s misconstruction. The reason for this is that th e court in distorting the statute was engaged in a form of judicial usurpation that runs counter to the bedrock principle of American constitutionalism, i.e., that the lawmaking power is reposed in the people as reflected in the work of the Legislature, and, absent a constitutional violation, the courts ha ve no legitimacy in overruling or nullifying the people’s representativ es. Moreover, not only does such a compromising by a court of the citizen’s ability to re ly on a statute have no constitutional warrant, it can gain no higher pedigree as later courts repeat the error. [ Id. at 467-468.] That has been the consistent a pproach of the dissenting justic es, and this continues to be our approach. Respect for stare decisis is a cr itical judicial value, but so is a regard for the constitutional processes of government by wh ich a judge strives to interpret the law in accordance with its actual language. Balanci ng these values is sometimes difficult, and reasonable people can often disagree as to how this balance should be struck. Robinson supplies one attempt at identifyi ng the factors that courts have traditionally looked to in striking this balance in a consistent and re asonable manner. Despite suggestions to the contrary, Robinson does not establish a “mechanical” process, but simply attempts to afford reasonable guidance in achieving a fair equilibrium between stare decisis and getting the law right. 49 However, as explained above, the justi ces now in the major ity who were on the Court at the time took a quite different appro ach to stare decisis wh en they we re in the minority. As Justice Y OUNG has explained:

49 Given that it has always been our position that Robinson does not establish a “mechanical” process, it is not surprising that the majority has been able to identify a single case in which we overruled preced ent without specifically citing Robinson

.53 [Our] position on stare decisis ha s not changed, and the [the majority] attempts to shift focus to [us] in order to avoid confronting [their] own inconsistency. The public shou ld understand when Justices’ positions on important matters shift. And that is the focus of this dissen t: when the [majority] justice[s] [were] in the minor ity, [they] liked st are decisis a lot; now that [they are] in the majority, it is not an issue. That is the “irony” the public should understand. [ Anglers, __ Mich at __ (2010) (Y OUNG , J., dissenting), order entered June 18, 2 010 (Docket Nos. 138863 to 138866).] The majority entirely misapprehends our criticism of its record on stare decisis if it thinks that we are simply counting the number of occasions on which they have reversed precedent over the past term and a half. That is not our in tention at all. We freely acknowledge that we too reversed precedent s when we were in the majority-- although hardly at their remarkab le pace. That is not the nub of our critique. Rather, the nub is: (a) that the majority justices have demonstrat ed a remarkably inconsistent and “flexible” attitude toward stare decisis, in which thei r views on the subject a ppear to be nothing more than a function of whether they are in the majority or the mi nority; and (b) that the majority justices equate their own revers als of precedent, in which they have widened the distance between the law of the lawmaker and the law of the court, with the previous majority’s reversals in which we did the opposite. “[N]o meaningful discussi on of a court’s attitude towa rd precedent can be based solely on an arithmeti cal analysis in which raw numb ers of overrulings are simply counted. Such an analysis obs cures that not all precedents are built alike, that some are better reasoned than others, that some are gr ounded in the exercise of discretionary judgments and others in the interpretation of plain language, that some are thorough in their analyses and others superficial.” Rowland v Washtenaw Co Rd Comm, 477 Mich54 197, 226; 731 NW 2d 41 (2007) (M ARKMAN , J., concurring). The chart set forth in Rowland demonstrates, we believe, that the ove rrulings of precedent that occurred between January 1, 2000 until Rowland was decided on May 2, 2007 “overwhelmingly came in cases involving what the justices in th e majority [at that time] view[ed] as the misinterpretation of straightfo rward words and phrases in statutes and contracts, in which words that were not there were read into the law or words that were there were read out of the law.” Id. That is, these reversals of precedent sought more closely to equate our state’s caselaw with our statut es, while the reversals of pre cedent of the pr esent majority have achieved exactly the opposite. Thus, the present majority has regard neither for precedent nor for the most significant competing value that would so metimes warrant overturning a precedent, to wit , that it is not in accord w ith the words of the lawmaker. In the e nd, the majority’s approach to stare decisis is empty and in coherent. The majority has unsettled the precedents of this Court at a Guinness world’s record pa ce, and it has done so while disserving both the values of stare decisis and that of a court acting in accordance with the constitutional separation of powers to re spect the decisions of the lawmaker. The majority has run amuck in service of values th at have no grounding in either stare decisis, or in any other conception of the “judicial power,” other th an that they comprise an arithmetical majority of this Court. In th is regard, the majority confuses power and authority. The majority un settles and confuses the law both in its disregard for this Court’s previous decisions and in its equal di sregard for the language of the law. It compounds the confusion it fosters in one real m with the confusion th at it fosters in the55 other. 50 There is no saving grace in its reversal s of precedent, no ba lancing of difficult judicial principles, no apparent recognition of the values served by either of the competing considerations involved where precedents are at issue, and no thoughtful effort to articulate even the roughest principles for its actions. In its destruc tive march through the caselaw of this state to identify surviving and straggling decisions that need to be “taken out,” the majority fu rthers no discernible legal va lue of any kind, other than litigation and still more litigation. In the end, there is no le gal core to the majority’s approach to stare decisis, and it is left with nothing other than a feeble effort to equate its own actions with those of the dissenting justic es when they were in the majority. “We are no worse than you,” is the majority’s banner, when in truth the majority has not the slightest conception of our approach to stare decisis, a nd not the slightest conception of the damage that their own approach to stare decisis is doin g to the citizens of this state who wish to act in accordance with the law and who wish to understand their rights and obligations under that law.
F. UNDOING THE LEGI SLATIVE COMPROMISE As discussed earlier, although virtually all legislation involves some sort of compromise, the no-fault act, in particula r, entailed a substantial and well-understood

50 See, for example, The Detroit News, Ruling Clouds Pot Smok ing, Driving Law, July 29, 2010 (indicatin g that the majority’s recent overruling of Derror in Feezel “has police officers scratching thei r heads in confusion”; “The ruling mostly leaves law enforcement officers in a legal limbo, said Sg t. Christopher Hawkins, legislative liaison for the state police.”). <http://www.detn ews.com/article/201 00729/METRO/7290387# ixzz0v6dvSnGK> (accesse d July 29, 2010).56 compromise. In exchange for the paymen t of economic loss benefits from one’s own insurance company (first-party benefits), th e Legislature limited an injured person’s ability to sue a negligent oper ator or owner of a motor ve hicle for noneconomic losses (third-party benefits). Kreiner , 471 Mich at 114-115. As stated in Stephens v Dixon , 449 Mich 531, 541; 536 NW2d 75 5 (1995): “It was a specific purpose of the Legislature in enacting the Michigan no-fault act to partially abolish tort remedies for injuries sustained in motor vehicle accidents and to substitute for those remedies an entitlement to firstparty insurance benefits.” At least two reasons are evident concerning why the Legislature limited recovery for noneconomic lo ss, both of which relate to the economic viability of the system. First, there was the problem of the overcompensation of minor injuries. Second, there were the problems incident to the excessive litigation of motor vehicle accident cases. Regarding the second problem, if none conomic losses were always to be a matter subject to adjudication under the act, the goal of reducing motor vehicle accident litigation would likely be illusory. The co mbination of the costs of continuing litigation and c ontinuing ove rcompensation for minor injuries could easily thr eaten the economic viability, or at least desirability, of providing so many benefits without regard to fault. If every case is subject to the potential of litigation on the question of noneconomic loss, for which recovery is still predicated on negligence, perh aps little has been gained by granting benef its for economic loss with out regard to fault. Regarding the trade-off involved in no-fault acts, 7 Am Jur 2d, Automobile Insurance, § 340, p 1068, contains the following: “It has been said of one such plan that the practical effect of the adoption of personal injury protection in surance is to affo rd the citizen the security of prompt and certain rec overy to a fixed amount of the most salient elements of his out-of-pocket ex penses * * *. In return for this he surrenders the possibly minima l damages for pain and suffering recoverable in cases not marked by serious economic loss or objective indicia of grave injury, and also surre nders the outside ch ance that through a generous settlement or a liberal award by a judge or jury in such a case he57 may be able to reap a monetary windfa ll out of his misfortune.” (Footnotes omitted.) Thus, it is apparent that the threshol d requirements for a traditional tort action for noneconomic loss play an impo rtant role in the functioning of the no-fault act. [ Cassidy, 415 Mich at 500-501.] Accordingly, there is no ques tion that the legislative comp romise that produced the nofault act recognized that some injuries would not be consid ered sufficient to meet the nofault threshold. While ever y injury resulting fro m a motor vehicle accident certainly has adverse consequences, and may involve medical costs, treatment, and bodily pain, not all injuries rise to the level of the no-fault threshold of a “serious impairment of a body function.” Some injured persons are able to recover noneconomic damages, so that all injured persons are able to recover economic loss benefits regardless of fault. Otherwise, “little has been gained by granting benefits for economic loss without regard to fault.” Id. at 500. Indeed, “the excessive litigat ion of motor vehicle accident cases” would continue, and, yet, economic loss benefits woul d have to be paid regardless of fault. Id. In other words, plaintiffs w ould be able to recover economi c loss benefits regardless of fault and without having to go to a jury, while these same plain tiffs would also be able to go to a jury and seek noneconomic benefits as well. That is not the compromise reached by the Legislature. In particular, it is a lose-lose proposition for those funding the nofault system, i.e., all in sured Michigan drivers. 51

51 The majority argues that the legislativ e compromise of 1973 which led to the adoption of the no-fault act it self cannot be cited to trum p the 1995 enactment of MCL 500.3135(7). We agree, but it is our position that the 1995 enactment of MCL 500.3135(7), which in large measure rejected DiFranco , and made it more difficult for58 In addition, it has been repeatedly recogni zed that, due to the mandatory nature of no-fault insurance, the Legislature inte nded that its cost be affordable. Shavers, 402 Mich at 599 (“The Legislature has . . . fost ered the expectation th at no-fault insurance will be available at fair and equitable rates.”). 52 Indeed, because it is mandatory, it must be affordable. Id. at 600 (“We therefore conclude that Michigan motorists are constitutionally entitled to have no-fault insurance made availa ble on a fair and equitable basis.”). It is a matter of economic logic th at in order to mainta in a system in which motor vehicle accident victims are able to receive economic loss benefits regardless of fault, drivers must be required to purchase in surance, and in order to ensure that drivers purchase this insurance, it must be kept a ffordable. The majority ’s decision, however, very considerably “lowers the bar” that an in jured plaintiff must satis fy in order to meet the serious impairment of body function thres hold, making it significantly easier for a

plaintiffs to prevail in nonec onomic loss benefit cases, is entirely consistent with the compromise. The majority’s opi nion is not in accord with either the compromise or MCL 500.3135(7).

52 See, e.g., Tebo v Havlik , 418 Mich 350, 366; 343 NW2d 181 (1984) (opinion by B RICKLEY , J.) (recognizing that a primary goal of the no-fault act is to “provid[e] an equitable and prompt method of redressing injuries in a way which made the mandatory insurance coverage affordab le to all motorists”); Celina Mut Ins Co v Lake States Ins Co, 452 Mich 84, 89; 549 NW2d 834 (1996) (holding that “the no -fault insurance system . . . is designed to provide victims with assured, adequate, and prompt reparations at the lowest cost to both the indivi duals and the no -fault system”); O’Donnell v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co , 404 Mich 524, 547; 273 NW2d 8 29 (1979) (recognizing that the Legislature has provided for setoffs in the no-fa ult act: “Because the first-party insurance proposed by the act was to be compulsory, it was important that the premiums to be charged by the insurance companies be maintained as low as possible[;] [o]therwise, the poor and the disadvantaged people of the stat e might not be able to obtain the necessary insurance”).59 plaintiff to recover for noneconomic losses. This means insurance companies that issue no-fault policies will be financia lly obligated in more cases, and, as a result, will be required to pass along their increased cost s to policyholders by way of increased premiums charged to Michigan drivers. 53 Today’s decision, just as last term’s decision by the new majority in United States Fidelity Ins & G uaranty Co v Mich Catastrophic Claims Ass’n (On Rehearing) , 484 Mich 1; __ NW2d __ (2008), 54 will eventually result in a substantial increase in premiums paid for their mandatory no-fault policies. 55

53 In Univ of Mich v Titan Ins Co , __ Mich __; __ NW2d __ (2010), the majority has overruled Cameron v Auto Club Ins Ass’n , 476 Mich 55; 718 NW2d 784 (2006). This overruling will also lead to significant cost increases to no-fault policies. Indeed, defendant Titan Insurance Comp any argued that overruling Cameron would have “devastating affects” on the or derly adjustment of no-fault claims and “threaten the viability” of the Michigan Assigned Claims Facility and the Mi chigan Catastrophic Claims Association because the gutting of the one-year back ru le will lead to a flood of decades old no-fault claims seeking expensive fa mily attendant care be nefits. In addition, in Hoover v Mich Mut Ins Co , 485 Mich 881 (2009 ), the majority has asked the parties to brief whether Griffith v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 472 Mich 521; 697 NW2d 895 (2005), “was correctly decided.” No-fault insurance costs can be expected to rise even further if the majority overrules Griffith, which considered the parameters of an “allowable expense” under MCL 500.3107(1)(a).

54 As a consequence of the majority’s decision in United States Fidelity Ins & Guaranty Co (On Rehearing) , the Michigan Catastr ophic Claims Association substantially increased the ma ndatory annual assessment no-fa ult policy holders must pay to the Association. According to the MC CA’s own website, the annual assessment has increased forty percent in th e last two years (from $104.58 per insured vehicle effective July 1, 2008 to June 30, 2009 to $143.09 per insured vehicl e effective July 1, 2010 to June 30, 2011.). <http://www.michigancatast rophic.com> (accessed June 28, 2010).

55 As stated in Justice Y OUNG ’s dissent in United States Fidelity Ins & Guaranty Co , 484 Mich at 26, this increase in premiums is not pe rtinent to our an alysis of the substantive issue beyond making the point th at the majority is undoing the compromise embodied by the no-fault act. But having lost th e battle with the majority over the legal60 Every owner of a car that is driven on a public highway must buy certain basic coverages in order to register the vehicle and obtain license plates. MCL 500.3101(1). The Legislature has provided two incentives to ensure that owners purchase the required insurance. First, it is a misdemeanor to drive a motor vehicle without basic no-fault coverage. Under MCL 500.3102(2), if someone is convicted of driving without basic nofault insurance coverage, he or she can be fine d up to $500, incarcerat ed in jail for up to one year, or both. Second, the no-fault act precludes receipt of no-fault personal protection benefits if at the time of the acci dent the person was the ow ner or registrant of an uninsured motor vehicl e involved in the accide nt. MCL 500.3113(b). Notwithstanding this criminal sanction, and th is potential preclusion of no-fault benefits, it is estimated that 17 percent 56 of Michigan’s approxima tely eight million motor vehicles 57 are still operated without a no-fault polic y in effect. With such mandatory

analysis of the no-fault statute, the financia l consequences of the majority’s decision should not go unremarked.

56 According to the Insura nce Institute of Michigan ’s 2009 Fact Book, the Insurance Research Council (IRC) released a study in 20 08 estimating Michigan’s uninsured motorists rate at 17 percent. <http://www.iiminfo.org/Portals/44/Fact% 20Book%204%20Auto%20(19-29).pdf> (accessed June 28, 2010). In deed, according to a July 11, 2010 editorial in the Detroit News, “Sta tistics suggest more than half the drivers in Detroit ignore stat e law by driving without covera ge because they can’t afford the premiums. That’s a problem for thei r fellow motorists an d for the state.” <http://detnews.com/article/20100711/OP INION01/7110316/1008 /OPINION01/Withcredit-scoring-issue-decided--policymakers- should-explore-othe r-ways-to-trim-autoinsurance-costs#ixzz0 tUKFqijI> (accessed July 14, 2010).

57 According to the In surance Institute of Michigan, as of 2008, Michigan had 8.2 million registered motor vehicles. <http ://www.iiminfo.org/ Portals/44/registered% 20vehicles%2008.pdf> (accessed June 28, 2010).61 policies now becoming even more expensiv e, one can also reasonably anticipate a corresponding increase in the al ready large number of uninsured vehicles being driven on our roads and highways. The majority’s decision w ill not only result in increased automobile insurance premiums, and more uninsured vehicles on our roads and highways, but it will also mean that substantially more lawsuits will be filed, even though an express goal of the no-fault act was to reduce “excessive litigation of motor vehicle accident cases.” Cassidy, 415 Mich at 500. Yet, under the majority’s opi nion, more lawsuits will make their way to juries for the consideration of noneconom ic loss benefits, straining our already overburdened courts. 58 As it is, no-fault automobile ne gligence cases remain a dominant

58 If one reviews the new majority’s decision s, it is difficult not to conclude that the only coherent theme of thei r jurisprudence is the fosteri ng of litigation. They have virtually guaranteed as much by introducing uncertainty, d oubt and confusion into the law, and by gratuitously interjecting irrelevant considerations into their opinions. See, e.g., O’Neal , __ Mich at __ (gratuitously calli ng into question the viability of Wickens v Oakwood Healthcare Sys, 465 Mich 53; 631 NW2d 68 6 (2001), a case having no relevance to that dispute); Zahn v Kroger Co , 483 Mich 34; 764 NW2d 207 (2009) (gratuitously observing that th e parties to the contract were business entities “with equal bargaining power,” as if the latter circumstance , not at all relevant in that case, might be relevant in a different case); Anglers, __ Mich at __, order ente red June 18, 2010 (Docket Nos. 138863 to 13 8866 (refusing to dismiss a moot case); Scott v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co , 483 Mich 1032; 766 NW2d 273 (2009) (relaxing the causal connection that must exist between an inju ry sustained and the ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle in no-fault cases); Decosta v Gossage , 486 Mich 116; __ NW2d __ (2010) (refusing to enforce notice-of-intent re quirements under MCL 600.2912b(2); Chambers v Wayne Co Airport Auth , 483 Mich 1081; 76 5 NW2d 890 (2009), Beasley v Michigan , 483 Mich 1025, 1025-1027; 765 NW2d 608 (2009), and Ward v Michigan State Univ , 485 Mich 917; 773 NW2d 666 (2009) (refusing to enforce pre-litigation notice requirements); Adair v Mich , __ Mich __; __ NW2d __ (2010) (reducing a Headlee Amendment plaintiff’s burden of proof); Lansing Sch Educ Ass'n v Lansing Bd of Educ , __ Mich __ ; __ NW2d __ (2010) (nullifying histor ic standards for determining whether a62 factor in Michigan civil filings every year. Indeed, of the 47,300 new civil case filings in Michigan circuit courts in 2009, 9,067-- appr oximately 20 percent of all civil cases-- were automobile related. 59 Given that many no-fault claims are settled without the filing of a lawsuit, the number of claims potentia lly affected by the majo rity’s ruling is even higher. The majority’s decisi on will also increase costs incurred by the state of Michigan itself (and, of course, the taxpayers who fund t hose costs). In the course of arguing that

Kreiner should not be overruled because it “clari fies rather than e xpands the statutory language,” the Attorney General’ s amicus brief warns that if Kreiner is overruled, as a

plaintiff has “standing” to bring a lawsuit); Univ of Mich v Titan Ins Co , __ Mich __; __ NW2d __ (2010) (eroding the no-fa ult act’s one-year-back rule); O’Neal , supra (concluding that whichever lost -opportunity formula benefits th e plaintiff the most in any particular case is the correct formula to be utilized); Vanslembrouck v Halperin , 483 Mich 965; 763 NW2d 919 (2009) (incorre ctly characterizing MCL 600.5851(7) as a statute of limitations that can be tolled rath er than a savings prov ision that cannot be tolled); Sazima v Shepherd Bar & Restaurant , 483 Mich 924; 762 NW2d 924 (2009) (expanding what injuries ca n be considered to have occurred “in the course of employment” for purposes of worker’s comp ensation); and the 2010 amendments of MCR 2.112 and MCR 2.118 (undermining affidav it of merit requirements). In the instant case, of course, the majority, by undermining the no-fault compromi se struck by the Legislature, makes it easier for plainti ffs to sue for noneconomic loss benefits.

59 See 2009 Annual Report of the Michigan Supreme Court, pps 35-36. <http://www.courts.mich igan.gov/scao/resources/publicati ons/statistics/2009/2009execsu m.pdf> (accessed June 28, 2010).63 self-insured entity, the state will realize “a direct, significant increase in the cost of its litigation and covera ge obligations.” 60 Finally, and as a consequence of all of the above, the major ity’s decision will almost certainly call into qu estion the long-term economic integrity of the present nofault system in Michig an. By nullifying the legislative co mpromise that wa s struck when the no-fault act was adopted -- a compromise grounded in concerns over excessive litigation, the over-compensation of minor in juries, and the availa bility of affordable insurance-- the Court’s decisi on today will restore a legal e nvironment in which each of these hazards reappear and threaten the continued fiscal soun dness of our no-fault system. 61

IV. CONCLUSION The no-fault automobile in surance act, MCL 500.3135(1 ), provides that “[a] person remains subject to tort liability for noneconomic loss caus ed by his or her ownership, maintenance, or us e of a motor vehicle only if the injured person has suffered death, serious impairment of body function, or permanent serious disfigurement.” The issue here is whether plaintiff has suffere d a serious impairment of body function.

60 It was reported that, as of 2007, th e state vehicle fleet totaled 11,856. <http://www.greatlakeswiki.or g/index.php/Michigan_state_f leet_efficiency> (accessed June 28, 2010).

61 I reiterate that expected increases in no-fault premiums are not pertinent to our analysis of the legal issues in this case, be yond making the point that the majority is undoing the legislative compromise embodied by the no-fault act and that there will be significant practical conseque nces to doing this.64 “‘[S]erious impairment of body function’ mean s an objectively manifested impairment of an important body function that affects the person’s general ability to lead his or her normal life.” MCL 500.3135(7).

In Kreiner, 471 Mich at 132-133, this Court held that in determining whether the impairment affects the plaintiff’s general abi lity to lead his normal life, “a court should engage in a multifaceted inquir y, comparing the plaintiff’s life before and after the accident as well as the significance of any affe cted aspects on the cour se of the plaintiff’s overall life.” In addition, Kreiner indicated that certain factor s, such as the duration of the impairment, may be of assistance in ev aluating whether the plaintiff’s general ability to lead his normal life has been affected. Id. at 133. The majority overrules Kreiner , rejecting these factors and holding that temporal considerations are wholly or largely irrele vant in determining whether an impairment affects the plaintiff’s general ability to lead his or her normal life. The majority apparently holds instead that as long as a pl aintiff’s general ability to lead his normal life has been affected for even a single moment in time, the plaintiff has suffered a serious impairment of body function. Th is conclusion is at odds wi th the actual language of the statute and nullifies the legislative compromise embodied in the no-fault act. Because I believe that Kreiner was correctly decided and that tempor al considerations are, in fact, highly relevant, and indeed necessary, in de termining whether an im pairment affects the plaintiff’s general ability to lead his normal life, I would sustain Kreiner. By nullifying the legislative compromise ove r the no-fault act-- a compro mise grounded in concerns over excessive litigation, the over-compensation of minor injuries, an d the availability of65 affordable insurance- - the Court’s decision today will revive a legal environment in which each of these hazards reappear and thr eaten the continued fisc al integrity of our no-fault system. Because I do not believe that the lower courts erred in concluding that plaintiff has not suffered a serious impairment of body f unction, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

C ORRIGAN and Y OUNG , JJ., concurred with M ARKMAN , J.