United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

 

GUARDIAN ANGELS MEDICAL SERVICE DOGS, 

INC.,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________ 

2015-5058

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Federal 

Claims in No. 1:14-cv-00020-MCW, Judge Mary Ellen 

Coster Williams.

______________________ 

Decided: January 8, 2016 

______________________ 

 JOSEPH A. DAVIDOW, Willis & Davidow, LLC, Naples, 

FL, argued for appellant.

 ROBERT C. BIGLER, Commercial Litigation Branch, 

Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, 

Washington, DC, argued for appellee. Also represented by 

DEBORAH A. BYNUM, ROBERT E. KIRSCHMAN, JR.,

BENJAMIN C. MIZER. 

______________________ 

Before REYNA, MAYER, and CHEN, Circuit Judges.
2 GUARDIAN ANGELS MED. SERV. v. US

MAYER, Circuit Judge. 

Guardian Angels Medical Service Dogs, Inc. (“Guardian Angels”) appeals a final judgment of the United States 

Court of Federal Claims dismissing its claim as timebarred. Guardian Angels Med. Serv. Dogs, Inc. v. United 

States, 118 Fed. Cl. 87, 88 (2014) (“Trial Court Decision”). 

We reverse and remand.

I. BACKGROUND

Guardian Angels entered into a firm fixed-price blanket purchase agreement, Contract No. VA248-BP-0218 

(“BPA 218”), with the Department of Veterans Affairs 

(“VA”) on June 26, 2011. Pursuant to this agreement, 

Guardian Angels agreed to furnish service dogs trained to 

meet the needs of disabled veterans and to provide health 

insurance for the dogs it supplied. On August 5, 2011, the 

parties executed a modification to BPA 218 which required Guardian Angels to provide an increased number 

of service dogs.

Approximately one year later, the contracting officer 

sent Guardian Angels an email stating that “some questions ha[d] been raised” about its performance under the 

contract. On August 31, 2012, the contracting officer sent 

Guardian Angels a notice terminating BPA 218 for default and suspending any open delivery orders issued 

under the contract. The default termination notice informed Guardian Angels that it had the right to appeal 

the termination under the disputes clause of the parties’ 

contract. This disputes clause incorporated by reference 

Federal Acquisition Regulation (“FAR”) 52.233-1, a 

lengthy provision which states, among other things, that 

“[t]his contract is subject to 41 U.S.C. chapter 71,” and 

that a “Contracting Officer’s decision shall be final unless 

the Contractor appeals or files a suit as provided in 41 

U.S.C. chapter 71.” 48 C.F.R. § 52.233-1(a), (f).
GUARDIAN ANGELS MED. SERV. v. US 3

On December 21, 2012, Guardian Angels sent a letter 

to Dr. Sunil Sen-Gupta, an official at the VA’s Rehabilitation Research & Development Service. In this letter, 

Guardian Angels argued that it had fulfilled its duties 

under BPA 218 and that the default termination should 

be converted to a termination for the convenience of the 

government. On February 28, 2013, Guardian Angels 

sent a letter to the contracting officer, stating that it was 

making a “formal demand against the [VA]” and that it 

“materially disagree[d]” with the decision to terminate 

BPA 218 for default. Guardian Angels further asserted 

that because BPA 218 should have been terminated for 

convenience rather than cause, it was entitled to be paid 

“a percentage of the contract price reflecting the percentage of work performed prior to the notice of termination, 

plus reasonable charges that have resulted and will 

continue to result from the termination.” 

On March 21, 2013, the contracting officer sent 

Guardian Angels a letter stating that she had received 

the claim that it had submitted on February 28, 2013, but 

that she could not “reasonably evaluate or respond to 

[that] claim due to the lack of supporting documentation 

provided with the claim.” The contracting officer directed 

Guardian Angels to “provide all expense documentation” 

supporting its claim at its “earliest convenience,” and 

explained that once the VA had received this documentation it could “proceed with a review of the material and 

provide a response as required by the [FAR].” 

Guardian Angels then began compiling documentation supporting its claim. On May 3, 2013, however, the 

contracting officer sent Guardian Angels another letter, 

stating that she had not yet received the documentation 

she had requested in her March 2013 letter and that she 

had not reconsidered, and would not reconsider, her 

August 2012 default termination decision. The contracting officer advised Guardian Angels that it had “the right 
4 GUARDIAN ANGELS MED. SERV. v. US

to appeal [the default termination] decision at the U.S. 

Court of Federal Claims pursuant to 41 U.S.C. § 7104(b).” 

On January 7, 2014, Guardian Angels brought suit in 

the Court of Federal Claims. In its complaint, it alleged 

that it had fulfilled its contractual obligations under BPA 

218 and that the contract should have been terminated 

for convenience rather than cause. Guardian Angels 

sought damages of $1,046,474.30, asserting that it was 

entitled to be paid for work performed under the contract 

prior to the notice of termination and to be compensated 

for the “reasonable charges” resulting from that termination. 

On August 29, 2014, the Court of Federal Claims 

dismissed Guardian Angels’ complaint for lack of jurisdiction. In the court’s view, Guardian Angels’ claim was 

time-barred because it “failed to file its complaint within 

12 months of receiving the Contracting Officer’s August 

31, 2012 decision to terminate the contract for default.” 

Trial Court Decision, 118 Fed. Cl. at 90. In rejecting 

Guardian Angels’ argument that it was required to file a 

written claim with the contracting officer prior to filing 

suit, the court explained that a default termination is a 

government claim which is “immediately appealable.” Id.

at 91. The court found no merit in Guardian Angels’ 

assertion that the formal dispute letter it sent to the 

contracting officer in February 2013 extended the statutory appeal period, concluding that this contention was 

premised on a “fundamental misunderstanding of the 

nature of a termination for default under the procedural 

regime established by the Contract Disputes Act.” Id.

On September 18, 2014, Guardian Angels filed a 

motion for reconsideration. It argued that the Court of 

Federal Claims erred in dismissing its complaint as 

untimely because it was not until it received the contracting officer’s May 3, 2013 letter that its “rights . . . were 

terminated, thereby triggering the twelve (12) month 
GUARDIAN ANGELS MED. SERV. v. US 5

statute of limitations under [41 U.S.C. § 7104(b)(3)].” 

The trial court rejected this argument. See Guardian 

Angels Med. Serv. Dogs, Inc. v. United States, 120 Fed. Cl. 

8, 9–10 (2015) (“Reconsideration Decision”). The court 

determined that Guardian Angels’ February 2013 formal 

dispute letter qualified as a request for reconsideration of 

the contracting officer’s August 2012 decision to terminate 

BPA 218 for default. Id. at 10. It further acknowledged 

that, under certain circumstances, “a request for reconsideration of a contracting officer’s final decision may toll 

the statute of limitations.” Id. The court concluded, 

however, that because the contracting officer “spent no 

time reviewing” Guardian Angels’ request for reconsideration, that request did not suspend the running of the 

twelve-month appeal period. Id. According to the court, 

because the contracting officer “did not reconsider her 

decision, the statute of limitations was never tolled, and 

the appeal period expired 12 months after [Guardian 

Angels] received the Contracting Officer’s August 31, 

2012 decision to terminate for default.” Id.

Guardian Angels then appealed to this court. We 

have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3). 

While we review the legal conclusions of the Court of 

Federal Claims de novo, we review its factual findings for 

clear error. Sikorsky Aircraft Corp. v. United States, 773 

F.3d 1315, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Raytheon Co. v. United 

States, 747 F.3d 1341, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 

II. DISCUSSION

A. The Requirement of a Final Decision from the

Contracting Officer

Under the Contract Disputes Act (“CDA”), a contractor has the option of appealing a contracting officer’s 

decision either to the appropriate board of contract appeals or the Court of Federal Claims. See 41 U.S.C. 

§ 7104. Regardless of which forum a contractor elects, 

however, only final contracting officer decisions may be 
6 GUARDIAN ANGELS MED. SERV. v. US

appealed. See M. Maropakis Carpentry, Inc. v. United 

States, 609 F.3d 1323, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (emphasizing 

that the Court of Federal Claims’ authority to adjudicate 

a CDA claim “requires both a valid claim and a contracting officer’s final decision on that claim”); James M. Ellett 

Constr. Co. v. United States, 93 F.3d 1537, 1541 (Fed. Cir. 

1996) (explaining that the CDA extends to “actions 

brought on claims within twelve months of a contracting 

officer’s final decision”); Reflectone, Inc. v. Dalton, 60 F.3d 

1572, 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (“Board jurisdiction 

is grounded in the CDA which authorizes Board review 

only of a contracting officer’s final decision on a ‘claim.’”). 

Accordingly, although a termination for default is deemed 

to be a government, rather than a contractor, claim, see 

Malone v. United States, 849 F.2d 1441, 1443–44, modified on other grounds, 857 F.2d 787 (Fed. Cir. 1988), the 

linchpin for the start of the statutory appeal period is a 

final decision by a contracting officer terminating a contract for cause. See Placeway Constr. Corp. v. United 

States, 920 F.2d 903, 906 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (“Generally, 

exhaustion of administrative remedies should occur before 

a case is ripe for judicial review.”); see also Pathman 

Constr. Co. v. United States, 817 F.2d 1573, 1579 (Fed. 

Cir. 1987) (“Compelling the contractor to file suit at what 

may be a relatively early stage of its negotiations and 

discussions with the contracting officer is likely to impede 

the free exchange of vital information between the contractor and the contracting officer that is necessary for a 

settlement.”).

Resolution of the present appeal turns on when the 

contracting officer issued a final decision terminating 

BPA 218 for default. The government argues that the 

contracting officer’s August 2012 default termination 

notice was a final decision, and that Guardian Angels’ 

claim is time-barred because it failed to file suit within 

twelve months of receiving that notice. See 41 U.S.C. 

§ 7104(b)(3) (requiring a contractor to bring suit in the 
GUARDIAN ANGELS MED. SERV. v. US 7

Court of Federal Claims “within 12 months from the date 

of receipt of a contracting officer’s decision”). The government does not dispute that Guardian Angels had the 

right to seek reconsideration of the contracting officer’s 

August 2012 default termination decision. See Tokyo 

Kikai Seisakusho, Ltd. v. United States, 529 F.3d 1352, 

1360 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“The power to reconsider is inherent in the power to decide. . . . For this reason, the courts 

have uniformly concluded that administrative agencies 

possess inherent authority to reconsider their decisions, 

subject to certain limitations, regardless of whether they 

possess explicit statutory authority to do so.”); Dayley v. 

United States, 169 Ct. Cl. 305, 308 (1965) (“[U]nless there 

is legislation to the contrary it is the inherent right of 

every tribunal to reconsider its own decisions within a 

short period after the making of the decision and before 

an appeal has been taken or other rights vested.”); see 

also Summit Contractors v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 806, 

808 (1988) (explaining that although the CDA does not 

explicitly provide for reconsideration of a contracting 

officer’s decision, it is firmly established that “an administrative agency may reconsider its own decisions” (citations 

and internal quotation marks omitted)). It argues, however, that because the contracting officer “did not spend 

any time considering [Guardian Angels’] request for 

reconsideration,” that request did not abrogate the finality of the August 2012 default termination notice or suspend the running of the twelve-month limitations period. 

We disagree with the government. Under the facts of 

this case, we hold that whether the contracting officer 

“spends time” considering the request is not the proper 

standard. On February 28, 2013, Guardian Angels sent a 

letter to the contracting officer requesting reconsideration 

of her August 2012 default termination decision and 

asserting that BPA 218 should have been terminated for 
8 GUARDIAN ANGELS MED. SERV. v. US

convenience rather than cause.* In response, the contracting officer, in a letter dated March 21, 2013, directed 

Guardian Angels to provide documentation supporting its 

claim at its “earliest convenience” and stated that she 

would then “proceed with a review of the material and 

provide a response as required by the [FAR].” J.A. 71. If 

the August 2012 termination for default had been a final 

and irrevocable decision, there would have been no reason 

for the contracting officer to request—or agree to evaluate—additional documentation supporting Guardian 

Angels’ claim that BPA 218 should have been terminated 

for the convenience of the government. See, e.g., Crippen 

& Graen Corp. v. United States, 18 Cl. Ct. 237, 240 (1989) 

(concluding that a government demand letter seeking the 

return of unliquidated progress payments was not a final 

contracting officer decision because “[t]he clear intent of 

the letter was to allow the contracting officer to gather 

and consider all relevant information concerning the 

dispute in rendering a final decision”); Summit Contractors, 15 Cl. Ct. at 807 (concluding that the finality of a 

decision was suspended where the contracting officer 

* Although we can imagine letters from a contractor 

to a contracting officer that would not provide sufficient 

information and therefore could not be properly characterized as a complete request for reconsideration, the government does not challenge the trial court’s determination

that Guardian Angels’ February 2013 letter qualified as a 

valid request for reconsideration of the contracting officer’s August 2012 default termination decision. See 

Reconsideration Decision, 120 Fed. Cl. at 10 (“Because the 

Contracting Officer had to reverse the default termination 

to provide [Guardian Angels] its requested relief on 

reconsideration, [its] February 28, 2013 letter qualifies as 

a request for reconsideration.”). Nor does the government 

object to the timeliness of Guardian Angels’ request for 

reconsideration.

 
GUARDIAN ANGELS MED. SERV. v. US 9

“reviewed the record” in response to a contractor’s request 

for reconsideration, notwithstanding the fact that the 

contracting officer ultimately affirmed his original termination decision); Devi Plaza, LLC v. Dep’t of Agric., CBCA 

No. 1239, 09-1 BCA ¶ 34033 (2008) (concluding that there 

was no “final decision” and that the appeal period did not 

commence where a contracting officer “indicated that he 

was willing to continue a meaningful and productive 

dialogue” with the contractor after issuing the decision); 

Nachtmann Analytical Labs., ASBCA No. 35037, 88-1 

BCA ¶ 20229 (1987) (explaining that where a contracting 

officer issues a default termination notice but, in response 

to a contractor’s request for reconsideration, undertakes a 

“review of the facts surrounding the default termination,” 

the finality of the original termination decision is vitiated); Johnson Controls, Inc., ASBCA No. 28340, 83-2 BCA 

¶ 16,915 (1983) (concluding that a contracting officer’s 

initial decision was “not truly final” where he subsequently granted the contractor an audience to discuss the 

“merits” of that decision and did not “make it very clear” 

that the original appeal period was running).

The situation here parallels that presented in RoscoeAjax Construction Co. v. United States, 458 F.2d 55 (Ct. 

Cl. 1972). There, a contracting officer issued a decision 

adverse to the contractor, but subsequently agreed to 

meet with the contractor to “discuss and consider the 

problem further.” Id. at 61. Although the contracting 

officer ultimately declined to modify his original decision, 

the United States Court of Claims, one of our predecessor 

courts, held that his willingness to meet with the contractor to discuss his original decision “served to keep the 

matter open and necessarily destroyed any finality [the 

original] decision theretofore had.” Id. at 63. The court 

explained that “[t]he Contracting Officer’s agreement to 

meet for further discussions of the disputed subject would 

have been meaningless unless the purpose was to give 

[the contractor] further opportunity to be heard, and if 
10 GUARDIAN ANGELS MED. SERV. v. US

persuaded as to the correctness of [the contractor’s] 

position, to change his position.” Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 

A similar analysis applies here. The contracting officer’s decision, in March 2013, to obtain and review 

additional documentation on the question of whether BPA 

218 should have been terminated for convenience rather 

than cause “served to keep the matter open,” id., and 

vitiated the finality of her original default termination 

notice. An agency decision will be deemed final only if it 

“mark[s] the consummation of the agency’s decisionmaking process.” Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 178 (1997) 

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Because the contracting officer’s March 2013 letter evinced a 

clear willingness to consider additional evidence, it was 

reasonable for Guardian Angels to conclude that the VA 

had not yet made any definitive determination on whether to terminate BPA 218 for default and that the twelvemonth statutory appeal period therefore had not yet 

begun to run. See Zomord Co., ASBCA No. 59065, 14-1 

BCA ¶ 35626 (2014) (explaining that the limitations 

period does not begin to run if a contractor “present[s] 

evidence showing that it reasonably could have concluded 

that the [contracting officer’s] decision was being reconsidered”); Royal Int’l Builders Co., ASBCA No. 42637, 92-

1 BCA ¶ 24684 (1992) (“While receipt by the contracting 

officer of a request for reconsideration of a decision in 

itself does not serve to vacate a decision or the period in 

which to appeal, reconsideration of a decision by the 

contracting officer or creation of a reasonable appearance 

that the decision is being reconsidered both serve to vacate 

the earlier decision along with the accompanying appeal 

period.” (emphasis added)). This is particularly true 

given that the August 2012 default termination notice did 
GUARDIAN ANGELS MED. SERV. v. US 11

not explicitly state that the time period for appeal began 

to run on the date it was issued.**

The fact that in May 2013 the contracting officer reversed course—sending a letter to Guardian Angels 

stating that she had not yet received the additional documentation she had requested and that she had not reconsidered and would not reconsider her original default 

termination decision—does not alter this result. In evaluating whether the August 2012 default termination 

notice qualified as a final contracting officer decision

sufficient to trigger the twelve-month statutory appeal 

period, our focus must be on the contracting officer’s 

actions, not on her own after-the-fact characterization of 

those actions. See ICC v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 482 

U.S. 270, 281 (1987) (“Locomotive Eng’rs”) (explaining 

that it is an agency’s “action, rather than its discussion, 

that is dispositive”); VWP of Am., Inc. v. United States, 

163 F. Supp. 2d 645, 655 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2001) (“Actions 

speak louder than words . . . . In the case of inconsistency, conduct controls.”). Although the contracting officer 

stated in May 2013 that she had not reconsidered her 

August 2012 default termination decision, this statement 

cannot override or erase the fact that in March 2013 she 

** The August 2012 default termination notice did 

inform Guardian Angels that it had the right to appeal as 

provided in the disputes clause of BPA 218. J.A. 67. This 

disputes clause incorporated by reference FAR 52.233-1, 

which provides that “[t]he Contracting Officer’s decision 

shall be final unless the Contractor appeals or files a suit 

as provided in 41 U.S.C. chapter 71.” Significantly, 

however, FAR 52.233-1 does not address the issue of 

whether a contractor’s timely request for reconsideration 

vitiates the finality of a contracting officer’s original 

decision or extends the time deadline for challenging that 

decision in the Court of Federal Claims.

 
12 GUARDIAN ANGELS MED. SERV. v. US

agreed to review and respond to additional evidence on 

the question of whether BPA 218 should have been terminated for convenience. See Vepco of Sarasota, Inc. v. 

United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 639, 645 (1992), aff’d without 

opinion, 6 F.3d 786 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (concluding that the 

fact that the contracting officer unequivocally stated that 

he did not reconsider his original decision was not determinative on the question of whether the finality of that 

decision was suspended); see also Ralph C. Nash & John 

Cibinic, Reconsideration of Final Decisions: It’s Not Over 

Until It’s Over, 3 No. 2 Nash & Cibinic Rep. ¶ 13 (1989) 

(explaining that if a contracting officer wishes to avoid a 

determination that a decision has been reconsidered he or 

she “should refrain from any discussions, negotiations, 

review of documents or other actions which could be 

considered to be a de facto reconsideration”). The contracting officer’s March 2013 letter vitiated the finality of 

her August 2012 default termination notice and it was not 

until May 2013—when she unequivocally denied Guardian Angels’ request for reconsideration—that the VA 

issued a final decision terminating BPA 218 for cause. 

See Dayley, 169 Ct. Cl. at 309 (“The general rule is that 

the period for appeal or review does not begin to run until 

the disposition of a timely request for reconsideration, 

rehearing, or new trial, because such a request suspends 

the finality of the decision pending a ruling on the application.”); see also B.D. Click Co. v. United States, 225 Ct. 

Cl. 605, 607 (1980). Because Guardian Angels submitted 

its complaint to the Court of Federal Claims within 

twelve months of the VA’s May 2013 final decision, its 

suit was timely filed.

B. The Effect of a Motion for Reconsideration

In many situations, a timely request for reconsideration is sufficient to render an agency decision non-final 

and thereby suspend the running of the appeal period. 

See, e.g., Locomotive Eng’rs, 482 U.S. at 284–85 (explaining that under the Hobbs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2344, a petition 
GUARDIAN ANGELS MED. SERV. v. US 13

for administrative reconsideration stays the running of 

the limitations period until the petition has been acted 

upon by the agency); Clifton Power Corp. v. FERC, 294 

F.3d 108, 110 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (“A request for administrative reconsideration renders an agency’s otherwise final 

action non-final with respect to the requesting party.”); 

V.I. Conservation Soc’y, Inc. v. Virgin Is. Bd. of Land Use 

Appeals, 881 F.2d 28, 31 (3d Cir. 1989) (“We think that 

the federal law is clear that a pending petition for agency 

reconsideration, timely filed, renders the underlying 

agency action nonfinal and thus nonreviewable with 

respect to the filing party. Thus, the statute of limitations for judicial review is tolled until the agency decides 

the petition for reconsideration.”); see also United States 

v. Dieter, 429 U.S. 6, 8 (1976) (noting “that the consistent 

practice in civil and criminal cases alike has been to treat 

timely petitions for rehearing as rendering the original 

judgment nonfinal for purposes of appeal for as long as 

the petition is pending”). Indeed, although the Administrative Procedure Act specifically states that “agency 

action otherwise final is final for the purposes of this 

section whether or not there has been presented . . . an 

application for . . . any form of reconsideration,” 5 U.S.C. 

§ 704, the Supreme Court has made clear that this language serves “merely to relieve parties from the requirement of petitioning for rehearing before seeking judicial 

review . . . but not to prevent petitions for reconsideration 

that are actually filed from rendering the orders under 

reconsideration nonfinal.” Locomotive Eng’rs, 482 U.S. at 

284–85; see also Am. Farm Lines v. Black Ball Freight 

Serv., 397 U.S. 532, 541 (1970).

Here, however, we need not—and therefore do not—

decide whether under section 7104(b)(3) a request for 

reconsideration vitiates the finality of a contracting 

officer’s decision only if the contracting officer actually 

“spends time” considering that request. For example, we 

do not hold, at this point, that all communications from a 
14 GUARDIAN ANGELS MED. SERV. v. US

contracting officer after receipt of a request for reconsideration will be sufficient to evince the necessary willingness to entertain the request for reconsideration. Given 

this recognition, we do not address the question of whether, in the absence of any indication that the contracting 

officer is open to reconsidering, the finality of the original 

decision may be suspended if the contracting officer 

nevertheless “spends time” considering the request. See 

Reconsideration Decision, 120 Fed. Cl. at 10; Arono, Inc. v. 

United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 544, 550 (2001) (“[A] reaffirmation of a final [contracting officer’s] decision does not, per 

se, constitute reconsideration of that decision. Instead, it 

is the amount of time, if any, a contracting officer spends 

reviewing a [contractor’s] request for reconsideration that 

suspends the finality of the decision regardless of whether 

that decision is ultimately reconsidered or reversed.”). 

Rather, we hold only that because the contracting officer 

agreed in March 2013 to obtain and evaluate additional 

evidence on the question of whether BPA 218 should have 

been terminated for convenience rather than cause, her 

August 2012 default termination notice was not a final 

decision sufficient to trigger the twelve-month statutory 

appeal period. Thus, the twelve-month statutory appeal 

period did not begin to run until the contracting officer 

rejected Guardian Angels’ request for reconsideration on 

May 3, 2013.

Nor need we decide whether compliance with the 

twelve-month filing period set out in section 7104(b)(3) is 

a jurisdictional requirement. The Supreme Court in 

recent years has repeatedly emphasized that “filing 

deadlines ordinarily are not jurisdictional.” Sebelius v. 

Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 817, 825 (2013); see 

United States v. Kwai Fun Wong, 135 S. Ct. 1625, 1632 

(2015) (“[T]he Government must clear a high bar to 

establish that a statute of limitations is jurisdictional.”);

Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 

439–42 (2010) (concluding that the 120-day deadline for 
GUARDIAN ANGELS MED. SERV. v. US 15

filing a notice of appeal with the United States Court of 

Appeals for Veterans Claims is a claim-processing rule 

rather than a jurisdictional requirement). Accordingly, 

we held in Sikorsky that the failure to comply with 41 

U.S.C. § 7103(a)(4)(A), which requires a claim related to a 

government contract to be submitted within six years of 

the date it accrues, does not create a jurisdictional bar. 

773 F.3d at 1322 (explaining that section 7103(a)(4)(A)

“does not have any special characteristic that would 

warrant making an exception to the general rule that 

filing deadlines are not jurisdictional”). Here, however, 

the dispositive issue is not whether the twelve-month 

appeal period set out in section 7104(b)(3) is a jurisdictional prerequisite, but instead when that appeal period 

begins to run. See Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386, 395 (1995) 

(explaining that “[f]inality is the antecedent question” in 

assessing the timeliness of an appeal).

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the judgment of the United States Court 

of Federal Claims is reversed and the case is remanded 

for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

REVERSED AND REMANDED 

COSTS

No costs.