### IN THE S UP REME COURT OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON Apr il 1, 200 8 S es sio n
STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. RO BER T JONA THA N H ARRISO N
App e al b y P e r m iss ion fro m th e Co ur t o f Cr im ina l A ppe als

Circuit Courtfor ChesterCounty No. 05-323 Roy B. Mor gan, Jr., Judge

No. W2006-00483-SC- R11-CD - F iled October 21, 2008

This appea l involves the proce dure for di scover ing the rec ords of a clinical psycholog ist whom the defe ndant intends to call as a n expert witness at a pre trial compet en cy hear ing in a

criminal ca se. After the def endant f iled a petition in the Circuit Court for Chester County reque sting to be decla red incompetent to stand trial, the State obtaine d a judicial subpoena under Tenn. C ode Ann. § 40-17- 12 3 ( 20 06 ) d ir e c tin gthe de fe nd ant’ s ps y c ho log ist to pr od uc e “ [a]ny and a ll re c or ds ” re late d to his
exam in ati o n o f th e d e f

e n d an t. T h e tr ia l c o urt d e c li n e d to qu a s h th e s u b p o e n a b u t g r anted the defe ndant an inter locutory appea l to the Court of Criminal Appeals. The inter mediate a p p e ll a te cour t he l d th at th e tr i a l c o urt e r r e d b y i s s u i n g a s u

b p o e n a un d e r T e n n

. C o d e A n n

. § 4 0

- 1 7

- 12 3 b ut, char acte rizing the c ompetency hear ing a s “in the nature of a c iv i l p ro ceeding ,” orde red the production of the materials sought in acc ordanc e with Tenn. R. C iv. P. 35.02. State v. Harrison , No. W2006-00483-CCA-R9-CD, 2007 WL 906730, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. M ar. 2, 2007). W e g rante d the de fe nd ant’ s a

pp lic atio n f

or pe rm iss ion

to a pp e a l to a dd

re ss t he a pp lic atio n o f T e nn . R. Civ. P. 35.02 to pretrial c ompeten cy hear ings in c riminal case s. We concur w ith the Court of Criminal Ap pe a ls’ c on c lus ion s that the tr ia l c ourt e rr e d by g ra nti ngthe jud ic ia l su

bp oe na and that th e State i s en t i t l edt o d i s co v er th e re p o rt o f th e ex p ert t es t i fy i n g fo r th e d ef en d an ti nth e c o mp et en cy

h ea ri n g. Howeve r, we have a lso determined that Te nn. R. Civ. P . 35.02 does not apply to pretrial c ompetency hear ings in c riminal case s. Ex erc ising our inhere nt supe rvisory authority over Te nnessee ’s judicial sy ste m, w e a do pt a

te mpo ra ry pr oc e dure fo r t

he dis c los ur e and use of e vid e nc e re latin gto competenc y

to stand trial in criminal ca ses.
Te nn. R . A pp. P . 1 1 A ppe al b y P e r m iss ion ; J udgm e ntof t he Co ur t o f Cr im ina l A ppe als

Aff irm ed in Par t; Re verse d in P art; and Rem anded

W I L L I AM C. K O CH , J R ., J ., delivere d the opinion of the cour t, in which, J ANI CE M. H OL DER , C.J ., W I L L I AM M. B ARKE R , C OR NE L I A A. C LARK , and G AR Y R. W ADE , J J ., joined.

Ka nd i K e lle y , A ssi sta

nt P ub lic De fe nd e r ( on

a pp e a l) ; and

Ge or g e Mo rt on

Go og e , D ist

ri c t Pu bli c Def ender , an d

Jo s e p hT

. H o w e ll , A s s is ta n t P u b li c D e f e n d e r ( at t r ia l) , Ja c k s o n , T e n n e s s e e , f o r the appellant, Rober

t J onathan Ha

rrison.T he reque st and ord er f o r f und i ng of D r. W i l son’ s ser vi ces were o b t ai ned unde r s eal i n acco rdanc e wi t h T enn. 1 Sup

. C t

. R

. 13 § 5 (a)( 1 ).
-2- Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney Gene ral a nd Reporter ; Mic hael E. Moore, Solicitor Genera l; Rachel E. Willi s, As sis tant A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l ( on

a pp e a l) ; and

Jame s G. Woo da ll, Di str ic t A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l,
an d Jo dy S. Pi c k e n s , A s s is ta n t D is tr ic t A tt o r

n e y G e n e r a l ( at tr ia l) , Ja c k s o n , T e n n e s s e e , f or the appellee , State of Tenne ssee.
OP IN ION

I.

In J une 2 0 05, a g rand jury in Chester County

indicted Robert Jonathan Harr ison on three counts of ra

pe, one c ount of rape of a child, one count of attempt to commit rape, a nd one count of incest. Sever al months later, in August 2005, Mr. Harr ison filed a stan d ard moti on for discove ry fr o m th e S t at e un d e r T e n n

. R

. C r i m

. P

. 1 6 ( a )

. A f t e r p r o v i d i n g th e r e qu e s t e d d i s c o v e r y , th e Sta te reque sted rec iproca l disclosure fr om Mr. Har rison under Te nn. R. Crim. P . 16(b).

Mr . H arr iso n’ s la

wye r r e qu e ste d a

fo re ns ic ps y c ho log ic al ex ami nati on fo r h is c lie nt i n a c c or da nc e wi th T e nn . Co de Ann. § 3 3- 7- 30 1( a )( 1) (2 00 7) . Are po rt of thi s e xami natio n, fi le d w ith the trial cour

t on Dece mber 19, 2005, conclude d that Mr. Har rison was c ompetent to stand trial and that “a de fense of insanity cannot be supported.” Following the re ceipt of this re port, Mr. Ha rrison’s lawye r o bta ine d f

un din gfo r t

he se rv ic e s o f D r. De nn is Wi lson , a pri vate c lin ic a l ps y c ho log ist prac ticing in Jackson, Tenne ssee. 1

On Janu ary 11 , 2 00 6, Mr . H arr iso n fi le d a pe tit ion re qu e sti ng the tr ia l c ourt to d e c lare him incompetent to stand trial. Attac hed to his petition was a summary repor t of Dr. Wilson’s evaluation and conc lusions dated J anuar y 5, 2006. Whil e Dr . Wil son ag ree d that his ex amination would not
su pp or t an in sanit

y de fe ns e , h e c on c lud e d that Mr. Ha rr iso n wa s not co mpe te nt to stand tr ia l be c a us e he d i d n o tun d e r s t an d

th e f un c t i o n s o f

th e p r o s e c u t i n gat t o r

n e y , th e j u d g e , o r

th e j ur y
. H e a lso conclude d that Mr. Har

rison appea

red to be “mar g inally

capa ble of assisti nghis attorney in his own defe nse.”

On Fe bruar

y 3, 2006, the State obtained a judicial subpoena in acc ordanc e with Tenn. Code Ann. § 4 0- 17 -1 23 (2 00 6) , dir e c tin g Dr

. Wils on to pr od uc e “ [a]ny and a ll re c or ds ” re ta ine d b y him related to his psy cholog ical eva luation of Mr. Ha rrison. On F ebrua

ry 9, 2006, Mr. Har

rison, joined later by Dr. Wilson, moved to quash the subpoena. The trial court de nied the motion to quash on Fe bruar y 27, 2006 and, on Mar ch 6, 2006, ente red a n order g rantingMr. Har

rison permission to seek an interloc utory

appea l. The cour

t also directe d that Dr. Wilson’s recor ds be plac ed under seal pendingthe re solution of the interlocutory appea l.

On Ap ri l 24 , 2 00 6, the Cou

rt of Cr imi na l App e a l s gr ante d M r. Ha rr iso n p e rm iss ion

to a pp e a l. Be fore the Court of Criminal Appe als, Mr. Har rison argued (1) that judicial subpoenas unde r Tenn.-3-

Code Ann. § 40-17- 123 we re n o t intended to enable the State to compel the pr oduction of the confide ntial rec ords of an expert retaine d by the def ense in a criminal ca se and ( 2) that the re ciproc al disc o v e r y r e qu ir e me n ts in

T e n n

. R. Cr im

. P. 1 6 ( b ) d id n o t r e qu ir e th e p r o d

u c ti o no f D r

. Wi lson’s
rec ords bec ause he did not intend to call Dr. Wi lson as a witness at tria l or to rely on Dr. Wilson’s
re c or ds a s e vid e nc e in h is c a se -i n- c hie f at tr ia l. Th e State re sp on de d th at th e tr ia l c ourt pr op e rl y g ra nte d th e su

bp oe na and that Mr . H arr iso n la c ke d s tand ingto c on te st i t. The Court of Criminal Appea ls filed its opini on on Marc h 2, 2007. State v. Harrison , No. W2006-00483-CCA-R9-CD, 2007 WL 906730, at *1 (Te nn. Crim. App. Mar. 2, 2007). The c ourt did not address the State’ s asser t ion that Mr. Har rison lacke d standing to quash the judicial
su bp oe na . H ow e ve r, it f

ound that the State wa s not autho ri zed to o bta in a

jud ic ia l su

bp oe na be c a us e ne it h e r a d is tr ic t att o r

n e y g e n e r a l n o r

ana s s is ta

n t d is tr ic t att o r

n e y g e n e r a l i s a

“ la we n f orce ment office r” w i t h i n t h e mea

ning of Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 17-123(a ). State v. Harrison , 2 0 0 7 WL 906730, at *3.

Even t h o u gh t h e C ourt of Criminal Appea ls had dec ided the only issue prese nted on the int e rl oc uto ry

a pp e a l – t he a pp lic atio n of jud ic ia l su

bp oe na s un de r Te nn . Co de Ann. § 4 0- 17 -1 23 to competenc y

proce eding s like this one – the court proc eede d, on its own and without further br iefing from the parti e s , to f

a s h io na d is c o v e r y p r o c e d ur e a p p li c a b le to p r o c e e d in g s r e g ar d in gthe
c omp e te nc y

of a de fe nd ant in a c ri min a l c a se to sta nd tr ia l. B a se d on its be lie f that a pr oc e e din gto deter mine competenc y

to stand trial was “ in the nature of a c ivil procee ding,” the Court of Criminal Appea ls patterned its discover y proce dure a fter T enn. R. Civ. P. 35.02. State v. Harrison , 2 0 0 7 WL 906730, at *4. We g rante d Mr. Har rison’s application for per mission t o appea l t o ad d re s s the application of Te nn. R. Civ. P. 35.02 to proce eding s to establish a defe ndant’s compe tency to stand trial in a cr iminal case.

II. As a pre liminary

matter, the State a sserts that Mr. Har rison lacks standing to challeng e the judicial subpoena i s s u ed to Dr. Wilson and that both the trial court a nd the Court of Criminal Ap pe a ls e rr e d b y

g ra nti ng Mr . H arr iso n’ s T e nn . R. Ap p. P. 9 a pp lic atio n f

or pe rm iss ion

to a pp e a l. We f ind little me ri t in

e ith e r c la im.

A. The State’s standingargument is a very narr ow, literal one . I t is based on Tenn. Code Ann. § 4 0- 17 -1 23 (k ) whic h e nti tle s “ pe rs on [s] to wh om a su bp oe na is d ir e c te d” to m ov e to q ua shor to limit a judicial subpo en a by showing that compliance would be unre asonable or oppre ssive. The State asser

ts that Mr

. Har

rison does not have standing to challeng e the subpoe na bec ause he was not the one to whom the subpoe na wa s directe d. That per son was Dr . Wil son.
The State did not question Mr. Har rison’s standing to challeng e the judicial subpoe na in the proce eding s befor e the tria l court. The tr ial court ra ised this question on its own moti on duringtheO n M a rc h 9 , 2 0 0 6 , the tria l c o u rt e n te re d a n o rd e r d e n ying the m o tio n to q u a sh fi le d b y D r. W ilso n . W h ile 2 ackno wl ed gi ng t hat D r. W i l son had s t and i ng t o f i l e t he m o t i o n t o q uash, t he co urt reaf f i rme d i t s earl i er r ul i ng t hat t he
re c o rd s w e re su b je c t t o d isc o v e ry th ro u g h a ju d ic ia l sub p o e n a . D r

. W ilso n ha s n o t so u g h t re v ie w o f t h e d e n ia l o f his
m o tio n to q u a sh

. -4- Fe bruar y 24, 2006 hear ing and based its decision to deny the motion to quash, at least in part, on the fac t that the subpoena ha d not been dire cted to Mr. Har rison. On Marc h 8, 2006, Dr. Wilson, acting
on his own behalf

, filed a document entitled “Notice of Adoption” in the trial cour t stating that “ he here by joins and adopts in the Motion to Quash the J udicial Subpoena fi led by Robert J onathan Harri son, on Fe bruar

y 9, 2006.” Unfortunately , despite the fa ct that the issue of Mr . Har rison’s 2 standing to challeng e th e s u b p o en a was square ly raised in the State’ s brief, the Court of Criminal Appea ls did not address the issue in its opinion.

I t w ou ld, of

c ours e , h ave be e n b e tte r p ra c tic e fo r M r. Ha rr iso n to have joi ne d Dr . Wil so n in his mot ion to qu a sh the jud ic ia l su bp oe na

. De sp ite thi s ano ma ly , the re c or d is su ff ic ie ntl y c omp le te to enable us to a ddress the standingissue.

Th e do c tr ine of

sta nd ingis u se d to de te rm ine wh e the r a pa rt ic ula r p la int if f is e nti tle d to judicial relief

. Knierim v. Leatherwood , 542 S.W .2d 806, 808 (Tenn. 1976). I t is the principle that c ourt s u se to d e te rm ine wh e the r a pa rt y ha s a su ff ic ie ntl y pe rs on a l st ake in a

matte r at is su e to war rant a judicial resolution of the dispute. SunTrust Bank, Nashvill e v. J ohnson , 46 S.W .3d 216, 222 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000). Per sons whose rig hts or int er es t s h av e n o t been a ffe cted have no standing and ar e, there fore , not entitled to judicial relief. Lynch v. City of Je llico , 205 S.W .3d 384, 395 (Tenn. 2006)

. “The sort of distinct and palpable injury that will crea t e standing must be an injury to a rec og nized leg al right or i ntere st.” W oo d v . M e tro . G ov ’t

of N as hv ille an d D av ids on Cou nty , 196 S.W .3d 152, 158 (Tenn Ct. App. 2005). Such a lega l rig ht or i ntere st may , but not must , be cr eate d
or de fi ne d b y

statut e . “ [I ]n c a se s w he re a pa rt y is s e e kin gto vin dic ate a statut or y ri g ht o f i nte re st, the doctrine of standingrequire s the party to demonstrate that its claim fa lls withi n the zone of interests protected or regulated by the statute in question.” W ood v. Metro. Gov’ t of Nashvill e and David so n Co un ty , 1 9 6 S

. W

. 3 d at1 5 8 (c i t i n g Fed. Elec tion Comm’n v. Ak ins , 524 U.S. 11, 20 (1998))

. Te nn . Co de Ann. § 4 0- 17 -1 23 (k ) p ro vid e s a statut or y ba sis fo r c us tod ians of reco rds to challeng e a judicia l subpoena on the ground that complianc e with the subpoena would be
unre a so na

ble or op pr e ssi ve

. Whil e the statut e c le arl y pr e sc ri be s a ba sis fo r c us tod ians of re c or ds to challeng e a judicia l subpoena, it does not purport to preve nt or to restrict the r ights of othe r per sons with a demonstrable leg al intere st in the subpoenae d rec ords to challeng e the subpoe na on g rounds other than the unrea sonablene ss or oppressivene ss of complying w ith the subpoena.

Mr. Har rison is no t ch al l en g ing the judicial subpoena in this case on the g round that complying w ith it would be unreasona ble or oppre ssive. He is cha lleng ing it on the gr ounds (1) that-5-

the per son seekingthe subpoena – a dis trict attorney g ener al or an assist ant di strict attorney g ener al – is not entitl ed to obtain the subpoena and (2) that t h e s u b p o en a see ks information to which the State is not entitled. Thus, the grounds of Mr. Harr ison’s motion t o quash g o beyond the g rounds listed in Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-17- 123(k).
The S tate asserts that Mr. Harrison does not have sta nding to c halleng e the subpoe na issued to D r. Wils on . T he State re lie s on wh at it c ha ra c te ri zes a s “ the lon g -s tand ing ru le that on ly on e to wh o ma s u

b p o en a i s d i re ct edh as s t an d i n g t o ch al l en ge th e sub p o en a, ” c i t i n g Sta tev . M c Cla in , No. E2004-01182-CCA-R3-CD, 2005 WL 1384877, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. J une 13, 2005) (No T enn. R. Ap p. P. 11 a

pp lic atio n f

ile d) ; Sta tev . H

ar t , No. E2003-00053- CCA-R3-CD, 2003 WL 22532500, at *14 (Te nn. Crim. App. Nov. 7, 2003), perm. app. denied (T e nn . M ar. 22 , 2 00 4) ; Sta tev . F e ar s , 659 S.W .2d 370, 376 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1983) ; and Sheets v. Hathcoc k, 528 S.W .2d 47, 51 (Tenn. Cr im. Ap p. 19 75 ). We h ave de te rm ine d that thi s “ ru le ,” fi rs t state d wi tho ut c itatio n to any a uth or ity by J udg e Charle s Galbre ath in Sheets v . Hathcock , is much too broad.
The c ateg orica l hold i ngin Sheets v . Hathcock that a per son cannot c halleng e a subpoe na issued to a third party

is incorre ct bec ause it fails to r ecognize that the objectingparty may have a
rec og nized, lega lly

protec table int er es t wi t h rega rd to materia ls in the hands of a third pa rty . A pe rs on wh o d oe s n ot h ave a

le g a lly pr ote c ta ble int e re st in sub po e na e d mat e ri a ls ha s no st and ingto challeng e either

the form of a subpoena issued to a third party or the manne r in which the subpoe na was issued. How ever , the pre vailing r ule today is that a person who has a pe rsonal rig ht, privileg e, or propr ietary

interest in mater ials subject to a third-pa rty subpoena has standing to challeng e the subpoena. Grave l v. United States , 408 U.S. 606, 628-29 (1972) (implicitly rec og nizi nga United States Senator’s standingby permitting him to move to quash a subpoe na is s ued to an a ssistant); Un ite d S tates v . R ain e ri , 6 70 F .2 d 7 02 , 7 12 (7 th C ir . 1 98 2) ; W as hingto n v

. Thu rg oo d Ma rs ha ll Acad. , 2 30 F .R. D. 18 , 2 1 ( D. D. C. 2 00 5) ; U n i t e d S ta t es v

. N a c ha mi e , 9 1 F. Supp. 2d 552, 558-61 (S .D .N .Y . 2 00 0) ; W

ind so r v . M ar tin da le , 175 F.R.D. 6 6 5 , 6 68 (D. Colo. 1997) (r ecognizi ng pr ivi le g e and

pr iva c y a s c on fe rr ingsta

nd ing ); Om an v . S

tate , 737 N.E.2d 1131, 1135 (Ind. 2000); Charles A. Wrig ht & Ar

thur R. Mill er, Fede ral Prac tice and Proce dure § 2459, at 435-36 (3d e d. 2008).

We a do pt thi s v ie w r e g ard ingsta nd ingto c ha lle ng e thi rd -p art y su bp oe na s a nd inc or po rate i ti n t o th e l awo f

T e n n e s s e e

. A p e r s o nh a s s t an d i n gt o c h a l l e n g e a s u b p o e n a i s s u e d t o a

th i r d p arty, as longas that per son asser ts a persona l r ight, privileg e, or proprieta ry interest in the mater ials being soug ht by the subpoena. We expressly overr ule Sheets v . Hathcock and its prog eny to the extent that they conflict with this holding. Howe ver, the primary focus of a standinginquiry is on the party , not on the likelihood that the party will succee don the merits of its claim. Am. Civil Liberti es Union of T e nn . v . D ar

ne ll , 1 95 S.W. 3d

61 2, 62 0 ( Te nn . 2 00 6) ; Metro. Air Research Testing Auth., Inc. v. Me tro . Gov ’t of N

as hv ille an d D av ids on Cou nty , 84 2 S.W. 2d 61 1, 61 5 (T e nn

. Ct. Ap p. 19 92 ). Thus , concludingthat a per son has standingto challeng e a subpoe na issued to a third pa rty does not mean that the par

ty ’s cha lleng e will ultimately be succ essful. That de cision will ultimately be made based on the substantive merits of the c halleng e to the subpoena

.In hi s p roce d ural at t ack, M r. H arri son ess ent i al l y c l ai m s t hat t he subp o ena i s f aci al l y i nval i d be cause t he 3

as s i s t an t di s t r i ct at t or n ey g en er al di d n ot h av e t h e au t h or i t y u n der T en n

. Code Ann

. § 40- 17- 123( a) t o obt ai n t he
su b p o e n a . W e a re no t p re se n te d w ith the issu e o f stan d ing to c h a llen g e p ro c e d u ra l irre g u la rities in t h e su b p o e n a it se lf
o r i n t he m anner of i t s ser vi ce. H o wever, we no t e t hat , i n t he co nt ext of a co nt em p t co n v ic tio n fo r p re vent i ng t he appe ar ance of

a w i t n es s s u bpoen ae d t o a ppea r be f or e a g r an d j u r y , w e h av e h el d t h at a c r i mi n al de f en dan t ma y n ot chal l enge t he val i d i t y of t he subp o ena i ss ued t o a t hi rd p art y on t he ground s o f al l eged t echni cal de f

ect s i n t he subp o ena itself o r in the m a n n e r o f i ts se rv ic e

. S e e S c o tt v . S ta te , 1 0 9 T e n n . 3 9 0 , 3 9 3 , 7 1 S .W . 8 2 4 , 8 2 5 (1 9 0 2 ).
-6- In this case, there is no question that Mr. Har rison has a le g itimate personal inter est in the
re po rt and re c or ds of

the cli ni cal ps y c ho log ist he re ta ine d to a sc e rt a in whe the r h e is c omp e te nt t o stand trial and whe ther he could viably asser t an insanity

defe nse. Ther e is also no question that Mr. Ha rr iso n’ s inte re sts wo uld

be a dv e rs e ly

a ff e c te d if the tr ia l court e rr on e ou sly or de re d D r. Wils on

to turn his rec ords over to the S tate. Acc ording ly , we find that Mr. Harrison’s i ntere sts in the rec ords beingsoug ht by

the State in this case a ffo rd ed him standing on his own to cha lleng e the judicial subpoena on both substantive and proce dural g rounds. We a lso find that any materia l shortcoming 3 with reg ard to statutory

standing under Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-17-123( k) was cure d when Dr . Wil son belatedly “adopte d” Mr. Ha

rrison’s motion to quash.

B.
The State a lso asserts that both the trial cour t and the Court of Crimin al Ap p ea ls erre d by g rantingMr. Har

rison’s application for an inter locutory appea l. First, it asserts th at the orde r denying the motion to quash was a fina l order that could have be en appe aled a s of rig ht under Te nn. R. A pp . P. 3. Se ns ingthe insub sta nti a lity of thi s argume nt, the State a lso argue s in an e nti re ly
c on c lus or y fa sh ion that an inte rl oc uto ry

a pp e a l w a s unn e c e ssa

ry to p re ve nt i rr e pa

ra ble inj ur y or to preve nt ne edless litigation and that the law on this pa rticular point is already

uniform and r equire s no clar ification.
We need not tar

ry long w ith the State’s argum en t that the order denying Mr . Har

rison’s motion to quash was a final order

. Whil e an order denying a

motion to quash a judicial subpoena could, in some circ umstances, be a fina l order , those circ umstances are not prese nt in this case. The judicial subpoena involved he re w as obtained f or the purpose o f d i s co v er y in the context of an ong oing c riminal prosec ution of an alre ady indicted def

endant. It was par

t of the cr iminal prosec ution, and the orde r denying the motion to quash, l ike ot her orders involvi ng the di scover y or admissibili ty

of evide nce, did not concl u d e t h e p rosecution. Theref ore, the order

denying Mr

. Har rison’s motio n t o q u as h wa s not final, and Te nn. R. App. P. 9 was an appr opriate ve hicle for seekingjudicial revie w of the or der.

Th e tr ia l c ourt

e xplic itl y

fo un d th at it s deci sion i n th is c a se , if e rr on e ou s, c ou ld r e su lt i n irrepara ble injury to Mr. Har

rison. I t noted that the re cords soug ht by the judicial subpoena

wer e c on fi de nti a l atto rn e y

wo rk pro duc t and

that if the y we re re le a se d, no e ff

e c tiv e me tho d e xiste d to
corr ect the situation shoul d the appellate court deter mine that rele ase was i mproper. The trial c ourt also found that interlocutory revie w was nece ssary to develop a uniform body of law, notingthe lack of cle ar au t h o ri t y for issuanc e of a judicial subpoena unde r these c ircumstance s. The Court of-7-

Cr imi na l App e a ls e ff

e c tiv e ly a g re e d w ith the se c on c lus ion s by g ra nti ng Mr . Harr iso n p e rm iss ion to
a pp e a l. Notwithstanding our reluc tance to gr ant interloc u t o ry appeals in criminal case s, State v. Gilley , 1 73 S.W. 3d

1, 5 ( Te nn . 2 00 5) , w e have no t he sit ated to app ro ve int e rl oc uto ry a pp e a ls i n c ri min al cases to a dd

re ss i ssu e s f

or wh ic h th e re is n o o the r p ro c e dure fo r r e vie w s pe c if ic a lly provided. See Re id v . S tate , 197 S.W .3d 694, 699 (Tenn. 2006) (proc edure for de termining
c omp e te nc y

to p ro c e e d in

a po st- c onvic tio n a c tio n) ; Sta tev . R e id , 981 S.W .2d 166, 169-70 (Te nn. 1998) (notice, examination, and disclosure require ments wher e a defe ndant int en d s t o i ntroduce expert testimony

relating to t h e m en tal condition of the def endant a s miti g ation proof dur ing the sentenc ing pha se of a

capital tr i al). The issue of which pr ocedur e should g overn discove ry of psy cholog ical evide nce r elatingto pretrial c ompetency deter minations in criminal cases satisfies the criter ia for a

n interlocutory

appea l under Te nn. R. App. P. 9(a). T h er ef o re, w e conc lude that the lower c ourts did not err in g rantingMr. Har rison’s re quest for inter locutory revie w.
III
. The a bility of a district attorney

g ener al or a

n as s i s t an t district attorney g ener al to use a j u d i ci al subpoena unde r Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-17-123( a) a s a discover y device in an ong oing
c ri min a l pr oc e e din gis a

n is su e of fi rs t im pr e ssi on . T he statut e pr ov ide s: The following procedure shall be employ ed whe n a law e nforc ement office r, as define d in § 39-11-106, se eks to obtain a subpoena for the production of books, paper s, rec ords, documents, tang ible things, or information and data elec tronically stored for

the purpose of establishing, inve stigating or g ather ing e vidence for the pr osecution of a c riminal offe nse. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 17-123(a ). The que stion be fore us is whether a district attorney

g ener al or an assistant district attorn ey gen eral is a “law e nforc ement off icer ” for the purpose of

this statute.

Tenne ssee’ s statutes ref

lect the tra ditional dist inction betwee n law enf orce ment office rs and prosec utors. As define d in Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-106( a)( 21) (2006), a “la w enf orce ment office r” is

an office r, employ ee or ag ent of g overnme nt who has a duty imposed by law to: (A) Ma intain public order; or (B ) M ake arr e sts fo r o ff e ns e s, wh e the r that du ty e xten ds to a ll offe nses or is limited to specific off enses; and (C ) I nv e sti g ate the c omm iss ion or su sp e c te d co mmi ssi on of of fe ns e s.See gener al l y St at e e x r el

. Sw an n v. P ack , 527 S. W

. 2d 99, 112 ( T enn

. 197 5) ( uphol di ng t he po wer o f a di s t r i ct 4 at t orn ey ge ner al t o f

i l e publ i c n ui s anc e a ct i ons on t he gr ound t hat di s t r i ct at t orn ey s gen er al hav e a dut y “ t o i nv es t i gat e, pr os ec u t e an d i n s u r e ag ai n s t a l l i n f r ac t i on s of

t h e pu bl i c pea ce a n d a l l a ct s w h i ch a r e ag ai n s t t h e pea ce a n d di g n i t y of t he st at e”).

Act of J u n e 29, 2002, c h

. 849, § 11, 2002 T en n

. Pub. Act s 2260, 2272- 74. 5
-8- Whil e the Code contains no simil ar definition for prosec utors, the duties of district attorne y s g ener al define d in T enn. Code Ann. § 8-7-103( 1) (2002) include the duty to “ prosec ute in the courts of the district all violations of t he st ate criminal statutes and perform a ll prosecutoria l functions attendant there to.” Maintainingpublic order, making arr ests, and investig atingcrimes a re not among the district attorney

g ener al’s duties explicitl y listed in Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-7- 103.

Othe r statut e s and ru le s a lso dif fe re nti ate be tw e e n pr os e c uto rs and law e nf or c e me nt o ff

ic e rs

. Tenn. Code Ann. § 8- 7-110(a ) (Supp. 2007) provide s that both “law e nforc emen t o ff icer [s] ” and

“ a ssi sta nt d i s tr ic t atto rn e y [s] g e ne ra l” a ssi g ne d to mul ti- dis tr ic t ta sk fo rc e s sh a ll h ave the same ri g hts and powers that they

have in their

own district. In capital c ases, ther e ar e sepa rate ag g ravating
c ir c ums tanc e s f

or mur de r o f a

“ law e nf or c e me nt o ff

ic e r” and mur de r of

a “ dis tr ic t atto rn e y

g e ne ra l” or an “ assistant district attorney g ener al.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204( i)(9), (10) (2006) . Tenn. Cod e Ann. § 3 7- 1- 61 2( c )(1) , ( 2) (S up p. 20 07 ), the statut e g ov e rn inga c c e ss t o c on fi de nti a l c hil d abuse r ecor ds, draws a

simil ar distinction betwee n a “la w enf orce ment ag enc y ” an d t he “district attorney g ener al.” Similarly , Tenn. R. Crim. P. 16(a) (2) distinguishes betwe en docume nts prepar ed by the “district attorne y

g ener al” a

nd documents pre pare d by “other state ag ents or law e nforc ement office rs.”

Inv ok ingthe dis tr ic t atto rn e y g e ne ra l’ s b ro a d d isc re tio n to a dd re ss m atte rs of

pu bli c int e re st, 4 the State asser

ts that a district attorney

g ener al’s statutory

duties fall wit hin the rubric of maintaining public order

for the pur

pose of Te nn. Code Ann. § 39-11-106( a)( 21)(A)

. The State also asser ts that the assistant district attorney g ener al was e ng ag ing in a n “investig ation” under

Tenn. Code Ann. § 39 -1 1- 10 6( a)(2 1)( C) wh e n h e ob ta ine d th e jud ic ia l su bp oe na in t his c a se . We fi nd

little me ri t to either c laim for two re asons. Fir st, while a dis t ri ct at t o rney g ener al’s per formanc e of his or he r prosec utorial duties may assist in maintaining public or der by promoting r espec t for and c ompliance wi th t he law, dis tr ic t atto rn e y s g e ne ra l are not di re c tly ta sk e d w iththe re sp on sib ili ty to m a int a in public order

. Second, for the purposes of Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-106( a)( 21)(C), a n investigation must be one involving the “commission or suspecte d commission of [ an] offense [] .” The judicial subpoena in this case was not issued for this purpose but rather to discover the re cords of

the clinical ps y c ho log ist

wh o e xami ne d M r. Ha

rr iso n to de te rm ine wh e the r h e wa s c omp e te nt t o s tand tr ia l.
The Te nnessee Ge n er al As sembly enac ted Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-17-123 a s part of the Te rr or ism Pr e ve nti on

and Re sp on se Ac t of 20 02

. Ev e n tho ug h the te rm s of the Ac t do no t e xpre ssl y 5 l i m i ti t s ap p l i ca t i o nt o ca s es i n v o l v i n g t erro ri s m , we fa i l t o d i s ce rn an y i n t en ti nth e A ct ’s l an gu age or leg islative history

to supplant the exi sting discove ry rules in cr iminal cases with judicial subpoenas. I n fac t, the Act itself disavows suc h an intent in Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 17-123(i) which states that “[n]o s ubpoena f or the produc tion of documentar y evidenc e au thorized by

this sectionT o t he ext ent t hat i t i s cont r ar y t o t hi s o pi ni on, we r ej ect as i mp r eci s e t he C our t o f Cri mi nal Ap peal s ’ bl ank et 6 charact eri zat i o n of t he d i st ri ct at t o rney general as t he “ chi ef law e nf o rcem ent o f

f i cer o f each judici al dis t ri ct ” i n M cL el l an
v . C ro c k e tt , W a sh ing to n C h

. N o

. 2 6 0 , 1 9 9 0 W L 1 4 8 , at *2 (T e n n . C rim . A p p . Ja n . 4 , 1 9 9 0 ), per m

. app. de ni ed (T enn. M a r. 2 6 , 1 9 9 0 ).

T he C o urt of C ri m i nal A p p eal s co ul d have l i m i t ed i t s d eci si o n t o a d d res si ng the i ss ue p res ent ed b y t hi s T enn. 7 R. App. P. 9 a ppea l – w h et h er t h e di s t r i ct a t t or n ey g en er al ma y u s e a ju di ci al s u bpoen a u n der T en n

. C ode Ann

. § 40- 17- 1 2 3 (a) as a di scovery d evi ce i n an o ngo i ng cri m i nal p roce ed i ng t o d et erm i ne whether a d ef end ant i s co m p et ent t o s t and t r i al

. Af t er det er mi ni ng t hat no r ul e or s t at ut e p r es cr i bed t he di s cover y p r ocedur es , t he cour t coul d hav e t hen r emanded t he cas e t o t he t r i al co ur t

. I f t he St at e p er s i s t ed i n i t s ef f ort s t o di s cover D r

. W i l s on’ s recor ds, t he t r i al cour t coul d t hen h a v e e x e rc ise d its inh e re n t p o w e r t o a d o p t ap p ro p ria te ru le s o f p ro c e d u re to a d d re ss th e issu e

. S e e S ta te v . R e id , 981 S.W

. 2 d at 17 0

. P erhap s i n an ef f o rt t o s t ave o f

f f urt her l i t i gat i o n, t he C o u rt o f C ri m i nal A p p eal s cho se t o exceed t he para met er s of

t he i nt er l ocut ory appeal “ f or pur po s es of

cl ar i f i cat i on. ”
-9- shall be direc ted to, or ser ved upon, any

defe ndant, or that de fenda nt’s counsel, to a cr iminal action in this st ate.” Seekingdiscovery from an e x pert witness re tained by an indicted de fenda

nt’s lawy er constitutes a prosecutorial ac t, not an investigative one. While the materia ls in thi s case wer e not in the phy sical possession of either Mr . Har rison or his lawy er, the issuance of the judicial subpoena amounted to an e nd-run a round Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-17-123( i)’s prosc riptions.

For these re asons, we ha

ve dete rmined that neither district attorney s g ener al nor a ssistant district attorney s g ener al ar e ac ting a s law enf orce ment office rs for the purpose of Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-17-123( a) when they seek discove ry

from an indicte d defe ndant or e x perts re tained by the de fe nd ant i n a

n ongoin gc ri min a l pr os e c uti on

. Ac c or din g ly , th e Court of Cr imi na l App e a ls 6
c or re c tly c on c lud e d th at th e tr ia l c ourt sh ou ld h ave qu a sh e d th e jud ic ia l su bp oe na at is su e in t

his c a se beca use the a ssistant dist rict attorne y g eneral did not have the authority under Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-17-123( a) to obtain it.

IV.
The fina l issue involves the proce dure c raf ted by the Court of Criminal Appea ls for dis c ov e ri ngthe mate ri a ls p re pa re d b y psy c ho log ic a l e xpe rt s r e ta ine d b y a de fe nd ant t o a sc e rt a in whether the def endant is competent to stand trial. Mr. Harrison asser ts that the Court of Criminal 7 Appea ls erre d by

basingits procedur e on Te nn. R. Civ. P. 35.02. The State asse rts that the proc edure provides a pe rmissible method for discover y in p re t ri al competency

proce eding s. We have deter mined that the Court of Criminal Appea l s ’ p rocedure doe s not appropriately balanc e the int e re sts at st ake wh e n d e te rm ini ngwh e the r a de fe nd ant i s c omp e te nt t o s tand tr ia l.

A.
Both the F ourtee nth Amendment to the Unit ed S tates C onstitut ion and ar ticle I , section 8 of the Tenne ssee Constitu t i on prohibit trying pe rsons who ar e not mentally competent. Pate v. Robinson , 3 83 U. S. 3 75 , 3 78 (1 96 6) ; State v. Black stock, 19 S.W .3d 200, 205 (Tenn. 2000) . To be found compe tent to stand trial, a criminal defenda nt must have “the c apac ity to understand the natureT e n n . R . C rim . P . 1 6 (b )( 1 )( A )( ii), 1 6 (b )( 1 )( B )( ii), (ii i). 8
-10- and objec t of the proce eding s ag ainst him [ or her ], t o consult with counsel and to assist in prepa ring his [ or her ] defense.” State v. Black , 815 S.W .2d 166, 174 (Tenn. 1991)

. In Tenne ssee, e ither the de fenda nt, the S tate, or the t rial court may reque st a psy cholog ical examination to dete rm i n e wh et h er a defe ndant is competent to stand trial or to a scer tain the defe ndant’s mental c ondition when the cr ime was committed. Tenn. Code Ann. § 33-7-301( a)( 1) (2 00 7) . In a dd iti on

to t his e va luatio n, bo th the State and the de fe nd ant may ob ta in t he ir own e xpe rt s to a dd re ss t he se qu e sti on s. I f a

ny of the se e xpe rt s det e rm ine that the de fe nd ant i s n ot c omp e te nt t o stand trial, the def

endant may , as Mr. Har

rison did in this case , reque st the trial court to dec lare that he or she is not competent to stand trial. In this circumstance , the def endant b ea rs t h e b u rd en of establishing his or her incompetenc y by a prepondera nce of the evidence. Sta tev . R e id , 164 S.W .3d 286, 307 (Tenn. 2005)

. I f t he iss ue of the de fe nd ant’ s com pe te nc y to sta

nd tr ia l is pr op e rl y ra ise d, the tr ia l c ourt mus t conduct a hear ing to de termine whe ther the defe ndant has the c apac ity to understand the nature a nd purpo s e o f th e p r o c e e d in g , to c o n s u lt w it h c o un s e l, an d to o th e r

w is e a s s is t in p r e p ar in g h is o r her defe nse. This hear ing doe s not address the de fenda nt’s g uilt or innocence or the de fenda nt’s mental condition when the of

fense was c ommitt ed. State v. Black , 815 S.W .2d at 174.

B.
We must first d e te r

mi n e wh e th e r

any exis ting statutes or

rules explicitly

g overn the proce dure for de termining whether

a def endant is competent to sta nd trial. We have a lrea dy deter mined that the judicial subpoenas under Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-17- 123(a) cannot be used in this context , and
ne ith e r t he State no r M r. Ha

rr iso n ha s c ite d us to any

oth e r s tatut e s th at c ou ld b e a pp lic a ble . B e c a us e our i nd e pe nd e nt r e se arch has lik e wi se no t id e nti fi e d a ny su c h s tatut e , w e c on c lud e that th e re is pr e se ntl y no Te nn e sse e statut e de fi nin gthe pr oc e dure fo r p re tr ia l c omp e te nc y he ari ng s.
The Te nnes s ee Rules of Criminal P roce dure c ontain both ge nera l and spec ific discover y provisions. Ho we v er , the g ener al discover y provisions in Tenn. R. Crim. P . 16 applicable to the dis c ov e ry of e vid e nc e that the de fe nd ant i nte nd s to int ro du c e “ at tr ia l” do no t, b y the ir own te rm s, 8 apply to pretrial c ompetency

hear ings. The term “at trial” nec essar ily limit s the rule’s application to e vidence introduced during the portion of the proce eding in which g uilt is deter mined. Se e Sta te v. Stephe nson , 1 95 S.W. 3d 57 4, 59 2 (T e nn

. 20 06 ) (c on str uin g the te rm “ tr ia l” in Te nn . R. Cr im. P. 12 a s “ the pr oc e e din gat w hic h guil t is de te rm ine d” ); se e als o Tenn. R. Crim. P. 43(a) ( distinguishing betwee n the ar

raig nment, “eve ry

stag e of the trial,” a

nd sentenc ing)

. In addition to Tenn. R. Crim. P . 16’s g ener al discover y rules, Te nn. R. Crim. P. 12.2 c ontains specific proce dures r equiringthe def endant to g ive notice of

expert testimony

reg ardingany

mental disease, de fec t, or condition “bea ringon the issue of [ the defendant’s] g uilt.” Tenn. R. C rim. P. 12.2 is likewise ina

p p li c a b leto p r e tria l c o mpe tency

proce eding s beca

use these pr ocee dings do not involveT e n n . R . C iv. P . 1 s ta te s, in p a rt, th a t th e T e n n e sse e R u le s o f C ivil P ro c e d u re go v e rn “p ro c e d u re s in th e c irc u it 9

or c han cer y cour t s i n a l l ci vi l ac t i ons , wh et her at l aw or i n e qui t y
. ”
-11- the iss ue of

the de fe nd ant’ s guil t. T he y are lim ite d to de te rm ini ngwh e the r t he de fe nd ant i s c omp e te nt t o s tand

tr ia l.

Af te r c or re c tly c on c lud ing that the Te nn e sse e Rul e s o f C ri min a l Pr oc e dure did no t e xplic itl y a pp ly to p re tr ia l c omp e te nc y

he ari ng s, the Court

of Cr imi na l App e a ls t

he n d e te rm ine d th at T e nn . R. Civ. P . 35.02 sh ould gove rn the discove ry and disclosure of the mate rials pre pare d by the defe ndant’s experts in a pre trial compete ncy hear ing. Tenn. R. Civ. P. 35.02 gover ns the discover

y of phy sic a l and

ps y c ho log ic a l r e po rt s o f parti es in c ivi l c a se s. Ev e n th ou g h th e ru le is e xpre ssl y lim ite d t o c ivi l pr oc e e din g s, the Court of Cr imi na l App e a ls d e te rm ine d th at it wa s a pp lic a ble to 9 pretria l competenc y

proce eding s in criminal cases because these proceeding s are “in t he natur e of a civil proc eeding .” State v. Harrison , 2007 WL906730, at *4.
We di s agre e with the Court of Criminal Appea ls that a compete ncy proce edingmay

be summarily

cate g orized as “in the nature of a civil proce eding .” We ha v e al re ad y descr ibed a competenc y

proce edingas “sui g ene ri s.” Coev . S tate , 1 7 S. W.3 d 1 93 , 2 14 (T e nn . 2 00 0) . T hu s, while compete ncy

proce eding s may

have attributes of bot h civil and cr iminal procee dings, the y are ne ith e r s tr ic tly

“ c ri min a l” no r s tr ic tly

“ c ivi l.” Th e be tte r ap pr oa c h for de te rm ini ngthe a

pp lic a bil ity
o f p r o c e d ur a l r u le s is to id e n ti f

y the r igh ts an d

inte r e s ts at i s s u e in

th e p r o c e e d in gan d

th e c o n te xt in whic h th e pr oc e e din gis t akin gpla c e and the n to de te rm ine wh e the r a pa rt ic ula r r ule is e xpre ssl y applicable to the circ umstance.
Af te r d e te rm ini ngthat T e nn . R. Civ . P. 35 .0 2 a pp lie d to pr e tr ia l c omp e te nc y hear ing s in
c ri min a l c a se s, the Court

of Cr imi na l App e a ls f

a sh ion e d th e fo llo wi ngdis c ov e ry pr oc e dure : [T] here should be disclosure to the State of th e D ef en dant’s
me nta l he a lthe xp ert ’s de ta ile d wri tte n r e po rt se tti ngout f

ind ing s, inc lud ingre su lts of

a ll t e sts c on du c te d, dia g no se s and c on c lus ion s, tog e the r w i thl i k e r e p o rt s o f

a l l e a r l i e r e xam i n at i o n s o f

th e s ame condition. After de livery

of the re port, the Def

endant sha ll be entitled upon reque st to rece ive a like repor t of any examination previously

or there afte r m ade of the De fenda nt for the same condition. The c ourt on mot ion may or de r de liv e ry of a re po rt on su c h te rm s a s are j us t, and, if the e x amining me ntal health expert fails or ref uses to make a repor t, the court may exclude testimony if offe red at the compete ncy hear ing. See ge nerally Tenn. R. Civ. P. 35.02.T e n n . R . C iv. P . 3 5 .0 2 (1 ) p ro v id e s: 10

I f

r equ es t ed by t h e par t y a g ai n s t w h om a n or der [ f or ex ami n at i on ] i s made u n der Rul e 35. 01
or t h e per s on ex ami n ed, t h e par t y ca u s i n g t h e ex ami n at i on t o be made s h al l del i v er t o h i m a copy of a d et ai l ed wri t t en repo rt of t he sui t ab l y l i censed or cert i f i ed exam i ner s et t i ng out f i nd i ngs, i ncl ud i ng
r es ul t s of

al l t es t s made, di agn ose s an d concl us i ons , t oget her wi t h l i ke r eport s of al l ea r l i er exa mi nat i ons of

t he s ame condi t i on. Af t er del i ver y t he part y ca us i ng t he exa mi nat i on s hal l be en t i t l ed up o n request t o recei ve f rom t he p a rty a g a ins t w ho m t he o rder i s m ad e a l i ke repo rt of any ex ami n at i on , pre v i ou s l y or t h er ea f t er m ade , of

t h e s ame con di t i on , un l es s , i n t h e c as e of a r epor t of
exa mi nat i on of

a per s on not a par t y , t he part y c an no t o b t ai n i t

. T he cour t on mot i on may make an order ag ai ns t a part y r equi r i ng del i ver y of a r eport on s uch t er ms a s ar e j us t , an d i f a s ui t abl y l i cen s ed
or c er t i f i ed ex ami ner f

ai l s or r ef

uses t o m ake a r eport t he cour t may ex cl ude t es t i mo ny i f of f er ed at the trial.

W h ile th e C o u rt o f C rim ina l A p p e a ls c ited se v e ra l d e c isio n s b y fed e ra l co u rts a n d o the r sta te c o u rts 11 cha r act er i zi ng pre t r i al comp et enc y procee di ng s as “ ci vi l i n n at ur e, ” St at e v. H ar r i s on , 200 7 W L 90 67 30 , at * 4 n. 4, we f i n d t h es e dec i s i on s u n per s u as i v e i n t h i s c as e f or t wo r ea s on s

. Fi r s t , a pr oceed i ng th at i s “ ci v i l i n n at u r e” i s n ot
necessar i l y a “ ci vi l a ct i o n” f o r t he p urpo se o f

T enn. R

. C i v. P

. 1

. Se co nd , no ne o f thes e cases i nvo l ved the preci se i ss ue o f d isc o v e ry o f m a te ria ls p re p a re d b y e x p e rts in p re tria l co m p e te n c y p ro c e e d ing s.

Fo r e x a mp l e , de f

e n da n t s i n c r i mi n a l pr os e c u t i on s h a v e a r i g h t a g a i n s t s e l f

- i n c r i mi n at i on. W hi l e Ten n

. R. 12 C ri m

. P

. 12

. 2 (c)( 2 ) acco m m o d at es t hi s ri ght , T enn. R

. C i v. P

. 3 5

. 0 2 d o es no t

. It requir es t hat al l exp ert repo rt s, i ncl ud i ng tho se o f no n -testifying e x p e rts, m u st b e d isc lo se d , an d T e n n . R . C iv. P . 3 5 .0 2 (2 ) re q u ire s the w a ive r o f an y a p p lica b le pri vi l ege by par t i es wh o re ques t or ob t ai n an order of ex ami nat i on un der T enn

. R. Ci v. P

. 35. 01

. T he C our t of Cri mi nal A p p ea l s d i d no t ad d ress the a p p l i ca b i l i t y of T en n. R

. C i v. P

. 3 5 .02 (2 ) t o p retri al co m p eten cy p ro ce ed i ng s. -12- State v. Harrison , 2007 WL906730, at *4 (footnote omitted). This proc edure para llels the proc edure presc ribed by

Tenn. R. Civ. P. 35.02(1). 10

We h ave de te rm ine d th at th e Cou rt of Cr imi na l App e a ls er

re d by a pp lying Te nn . R. Civ . P. 35.02 to pretrial c ompetency proce eding s in criminal case s for two re asons. Fi rs t , a pre trial
c omp e te nc y

pr oc e e din gin a

c ri min a l c a se is n ot a

“ c ivi l a c tio n” fo r t

he purp os e of

Te nn . R. Civ . P. 1. Second, the Te nnessee Rules of Civil P roce du re d o n o t ad equately balanc e the r ights a

nd 11 int e re sts of

pe rs on s w ho are be ingpr os e c ute d f or c ri min a l of

fe ns e s. 12

C. Even thoug h the gene ral and specific notice and discovery rules in the Te nnessee Rules of Criminal Procedure do not expressly apply to pretrial c ompetency

proce eding s, it does not
nece ssaril y

follow that the principles e mbodied in these rules c annot have some bea ringon the f o r mu lati o no f

th e p r o c e d

ur e s th at s h o u ld

g o v e r n d is c o v e r

y in a p r e tr ia l c o mp e te n c y h e ar in g

. We have , in oth e r c on te xts, us e d pa rt ic ula r pr oc e dura l ru le s a s te mpl ate s fo r pr oc e dure s to be us ed in circ umstances to which they did not ex plicitly

apply . For

example, we have applied the discove ry provisions in Tenn. R. Crim. P . 16(b)( 1 )( B) t o capital se ntencinghear ings e ven thoug h they wer e not part of the pr ocee ding at which the def endant’ s g uilt w as d et er mined. Sta tev . Ni c ho ls , 877 S.W. 2d 72 2, 72 9 (T e nn

. 19 94 ). De sp ite the fa c t that T e nn . R. Cr im. P. 1 6( b) (1 )( B ) d id n ot e xplic itl y-13-

apply to capital sente ncinghear ings, w e held that the rule applied beca use it “pre cisely” addr essed the issue. Sta tev . R e id , 981 S.W .2d at 170 n.1. Pretrial compe tency

hear ings a

rise in the conte x t of criminal prose cutions. When the issue of the de fe nd ant’ s c omp e te nc y is r a ise d, the se he ari ng s are an int e g ra l pa rt of the pr os e c uti on . T hu s, even if the Tenne ssee Rules of Criminal Proce dure do not e x pl i ci t l y ap p ly to pretrial c ompetency proce eding s, the principles re flec ted in these rule s provide helpful guida nce f or for mulating the pr oc e dure s f

or c omp e te nc y

pr oc eedi ngs. S pe c if

ic a lly , w e have de te rm ine d th at th e pr oc e dure s in Tenn. R. Crim. P. 16 and the rules gover ning the admissibili ty of t he defenda nt’s statements in Tenn. R. C ri m. P . 1 2. 2( c )( 2) are pa rt ic ula rl y re le va nt t o c omp e te nc y

pr oc e e din g s.
Ov e r t hr e e y e ars have e la

ps e d sin c e Mr . H arr iso n w a s in dic te d. Simp ly re mand ingthi s c a se to the trial court for further proceeding s would only eng ender additional delay should the State rene w its efforts to obt ain t he materials prepa red by Dr. Wilson as part of his examination of Mr. Har rison. Thus, to avoid further

delay and in r ecognition of the fa ct that discover y reque sts in the context of pr e tr ia l c omp e te nc y

pr oc e e din g s in

c ri min a l c a se s wi ll be ma de in futur e c a se s, we have de c ide d to exercise our

inhere nt supervisory

authority over T en nessee ’s judicial sy stem to adopt temporar y p ro ce d ure s go v ern i n g th e d i s co v ery an d d i s cl o s ure o f e v i d en ce i np re tri al co mp et en cy p ro ce ed i n gs in c ri min a l c a se s. Th e se pr oc e dure s are a s f oll ow s:
Re p orts of Co m pe te nc y Ex am ina ti ons . (a) At least fifte en (15)
wee kday s prior to any

hear in g on competenc y to stand trial, the parties sha ll permit the opposite party , on reque st, to inspect and copy or photog raph any

results or re ports of psychiatric , psy cholog ical, or
me nta l e xami natio ns and of sc ie nti fi c te sts or e xpe ri me nts ma de in
c onne c tio n w ithe va luatin gthe de fe nd ant’ s c omp e te nc y to s tand tr ia l, or copie s thereof

, if: ( a ) th e i t e m i s w i th i n th e p arty’ s p o s s e s s i o n , c u s t o dy, or control; and (b) the pa rty intends to introduc e any part of the item
as ev i d ence in the par ty ’s ca se-in-c hief at the competenc y

hear ing; or (c) the par

ty intends to call as a w i t n ess at the compet en cy

hear ing the person who pr epar ed the
re po rt , a nd the re su lts or

re po rt s r e late to t

he wi tne ss’ t e s t i m o n y. This provision does not lim it th e State’s duty to disclose such information under

other a ppropriate rules or the duty to produce exculpatory

evidenc e.-14- Ina dm is s ib il ity o f D e fe nd a nt ’ s St a t e m e nt s D ur in g C o m pe t e nc y Exa m ina ti on. No statement made by the def endant in the c ourse of any examination relat i n g t o his or her c ompetency to stand trial (whe ther c onducted with or w ithout the defendan t ’s consent), no te sti mony by any e xpe rt ba se d o n s uc h s tate me nt, and no oth e r f

ru its of the state me nt are a dmi ssi ble in e vid e nc e a g a ins t th e de fe nd ant i n any competenc y

hear ing or

criminal proc ee d i ng , except for impeachme nt purposes or on a n issue conce rning a mental condition on which the de fenda

nt has introduced evidenc e of incompetenc y or e vid e nc e re qu ir ingno tic e un de r T e nn . R. Crim. P. 12. 2( a ), Te nn . R. Crim. P. 12.2(b), or Sta tev . R e id , 981 S.W .2d 166 (Tenn. 1998)

. These te mporary

proce dures sha ll remain in eff ect until the adoption of a rule spec ifically g overning the discover

y and disclosure of evide nce in a pretria l competenc y

hear ing in a

criminal ca se.
We n ote on e signif

ic ant d if fe re nc e be tw e e n this pr oc e dure and the pr oc e dure pr e sc ri be d in Tenn. R. Crim. P. 16(b)(1)( B) . Under the proc edure ad o pted her ein, def ense disclosure does not depend on the defe ndant first re questing discovery from the State. We have deter mined that open disclosure of the experts’ repor ts enhanc es the integ rity , reliability , and ac cura cy of the truth-se eking function of a compe tency

proce eding

. See Coev . S

tate , 17 S.W .3d at 213. There fore , this procedur e applies eve n when the defe ndant does not trig g er recipr ocal discovery under Tenn. R. Crim. P . 16.

V.
We have c oncluded that the Court of Criminal Appeals cor

rec tly deter mined that the trial court e rre d by

failingto quash the judicial subpoena under Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-17- 123(a) obtained by the ass i s t an t district attorney g ener al in this case. We have also deter mined, howeve r, that the C o urto f C ri m i n al Ap p ea l s erre d b y ad o p t i n g a d i s co v ery

p ro ce d ure fo r p re tri al co mp et en cy h ea ri n gs based on Te nn. R. Civ. P . 35.02(1). Exercising our inhere nt supe rvisory authority over Te nnessee ’s judicial sy stem, we h av e adopted a temporar y proce dure, ba sed on ana logous pr ovisions of Tenn. R. Crim. P . 16(b)( 1)(B ) and Te nn. R. Crim. P

. 12.2(c) (2), to be followed for disclosure and use of
ev i d en ce re l at i n g t o co mp et en cy t o s t an d tri al

. T h i s p ro ce d

ure s h al l go v ern al l co mp et en cy h ea ri n gs he ld f oll ow ing the date of the fi lin g of thi s opin ion

. Ac c or din g ly , we a ff ir m in pa rt and re ve rs e in part the judg ment of the Court of Criminal Appeals. We rema nd the ca se to the trial cour t for fur ther proce eding s consistent with this opi nion. We tax the costs of this appea l to the State of Tenne ssee.

______________________________ WI L L I AM C. K OC H, JR., JUST I CE