alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**Exhibit 31.2**

 

CERTIFICATION OF FINANCIAL REPORTS

PURSUANT TO SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

 

I,William S. Johnson, certify that:

 

1.     I have reviewed thisquarterly report on Form 10-Q of EARLE M. JORGENSEN COMPANY (“EMJ”);

 

2.               Based on my knowledge, this report does notcontain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a materialfact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances underwhich such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the periodcovered by this report;

 

3.               Based on my knowledge, the financialstatements, and other financial information included in this report, fairlypresent in all material respects the financial condition, results of operationsand cash flows of EMJ as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

 

4.               EMJ’s other certifying officer and I areresponsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures(as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for EMJ and have:

 

(d)                                 Designed such disclosure controls andprocedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designedunder our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to theregistrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us byothers within those entities, particularly during the period in which thisreport is being prepared;

 

(e)                                  Evaluated the effectiveness of EMJ’sdisclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusionsabout the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of theend of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

 

(f)                                    Disclosed in this report any changes inEMJ’s internal control over financial reporting that occurred during EMJ’s mostrecent fiscal quarter that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely tomaterially affect, EMJ’s internal control over financial reporting; and

 

5.                 EMJ’s other certifyingofficer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internalcontrol over financial reporting, to EMJ’s auditors and the audit committee ofEMJ’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

 

(c)                                  All significant deficiencies and materialweaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financialreporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect EMJ’s ability torecord, process, summarize and report financial information; and

 

(d)                                 Any fraud, whether or not material, thatinvolves management or other employees who have a significant role in EMJ’sinternal control over financial reporting.

 

Date: August 13, 2004

 

 
| /s/ William  S. Johnson                                |   |
|--------------------------------------------------------|--------|
| William S. Johnson                                     |
| Vice  President, Chief Financial Officer and Secretary |

 

----
Case 7:07-cv-03249-CLB     Document 4      Filed 06/26/2007     Page 1 of 1
#### MORRIS v. PERKINS

No. 64 PC.

Case below: 11 N.C. App. 152.

Petition for writ of *certiorari*to North Carolina Court of Appeals denied 10 June 1971.
#### STATE BAR v. TEMPLE

No. 91 PC.

Case below: 6 N.C. App. 437.

Petition for writ of *certiorari*to North Carolina Court of Appeals denied 2 December 1969.
#### UTILITIES COMM. v. CONSUMERS COUNCIL

No. 19 PC.

Case below: 18 N.C. App. 717.

Petition for writ of certiorari to North Carolina Court of Appeals denied 2 October 1973.
**Exhibit 31.2**

 

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO**

**SECTION 302 OF THE**

**SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

I, Martin G. Paravato, certify that: 

 

1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K/A of IRIS International,Inc.; 

 

2. Based on my knowledge, this annual report does notcontain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by thisannual report; 

 

3. Based on my knowledge, the financialstatements, and other financial information included in this annual report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this annualreport; 

 

4. The registrant’s other certifying officer andI are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-14 and 15d-14) for the registrant and we have: 

 

a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed underour supervision to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this annual report is beingprepared; 

 

b) evaluated the effectiveness of theregistrant’s disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this annual report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such valuation.

 

c) disclosed in this report any change in theregistrant’s internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or isreasonably likely to materially effect the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting. 

 

5. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting,to the registrant’s auditors and the audit committee of registrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions): 

 

a) all significant deficiencies in the design or operation of internal control which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant’sability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and 

 

b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting. 

 

Date: April 28, 2004
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jesus BELTRAN-VISCARRA, also known as Felipe Viscarro-Madrid, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 04-50951.

Conference Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Decided April 20, 2005.

Joseph H. Gay, Jr., Assistant U.S. Attorney, San Antonio, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Judy Fulmer Madewell, Federal Public Defender’s Office Western District of Texas, San Antonio, TX, for Defendant-Appellant.

*620Before SMITH, CLEMENT, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Appealing the Judgment in a Criminal Case, Jesus Beltran-Viscarra raises arguments that are foreclosed by *Almendarez-Torres v. United States,*523 U.S. 224, 235, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998), which held that a prior conviction is a sentencing factor under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2) and not a separate criminal offense. The Government’s motion for summary affirmance is GRANTED, and the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
##### 



EXHIBIT 32 WRITTEN STATEMENT PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 In connection with the Quarterly Report of Jefferson-Pilot Corporation (the Company) on Form 10-Q
for the period ending March 31, 2005 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the
date hereof (the Report), the undersigned, Dennis R. Glass, Chief Executive Officer of the
Company, and Theresa M. Stone, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, each hereby certify that, to
his or her knowledge:  (1)
    The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and(2)
    Information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the
financial condition and results of operations of the Company /s/ Dennis R. Glass Dennis R. Glass
Chief Executive Officer
May 9, 2005 /s/ Theresa M. Stone Theresa M. Stone
Chief Financial Officer
May 9, 2005
Case 1:06-cv-14951-AKH Document 4 Filed 12/08/2006 Page 1 of 1
# L_2007037EN.01001001.xml

| 9.2.2007 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 37/10 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

9.2.2007

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 37/10

---

Corrigendum to Commission Regulation (EC) No 109/2007 of 5 February 2007 concerning the authorisation of monensin sodium (Coxidin) as a feed additive

(
  Official Journal of the European Union L 31 of 6 February 2007
  )

On page 8, in the Annex, first column of the table, under the heading ‘Registration number of the additive’:

for:

‘E 1701’,

read:

‘5 1 701’.

---
Exhibit 1, CORPORATE CHARTER INFORMATION

The State of Texas
Secretary of State



CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION
	   OF
ALPHA GENERATION INCORPORATED
  CHARTER NUMBER 01301979


	THE UNDERSIGNED, AS SECRETARY OF STATE OF TH STATE OF TEXAS,
HEREBY CERTIFIES TAHT THE ATTACHED ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION FOR THE
ABOVE NAMED CORPORATION HAVE BEEN RECEIVED IN THIS OFFICE AND ARE
FOUND TO CONFORM TO LAW.

	ACCORDINGLY, THE UNDERSIGNED, AS SECRETARY OF STATE, AND BY VIRTUE
OF THE AUTHORITY VESTED IN THE SECRETARY BY LAW, HEREBY ISSUES THIS
CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION.

	ISSUANCE OF THIS CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION DOES NOT AUTHORIZE
THE USE OF A CORPORATE NAME IN THIS STATE IN VIOLATION OF THE RIGHTS OF
ANOTHER UNDER THE FEDERAL TRADEMARK ACT OF 1946, THE TEXAS TRADEMARK LAW,
THE ASSUMED BUSINESS OR PROFESSIONAL NAME ACT OF THE COMMON LAW.

DATED FED. 14, 1994
EFFECTIVE FEB. 14, 1994


SIGNED

/S/ _______________________
    John Hannah Jr.
    Secretary of State































The State of Texas
Secretary of State



CERTIFICATE OF AMENDMENT
	  FOR
ALPHA GENERATION INCORPORATED
CHARTER NUMBER 01301979


	THE UNDERSIGNED, AS SECRETARY OF STATE OF THE STATE OF TEXAS,
HEREBY CERTIFIES TAHT THE ATTACHED ARTICLES OF AMENDMENT FOR THE ABOVE
NAMED ENTITY HAVE BEEN RECEIVED IN THIS OFFICE AND ARE FOUND TO
CONFORM TO LAW.

	ACCORDINGLY THE UNDERSIGNED, AS SECRETARY OF STATE, AND BY VIRTUE
OF THE AUTHORITY VESTED IN THE SECRETARY BY LAW, HEREBY ISSUES THIS
CERTIFICATE OF AMENDMENT.


DATED JAN. 13, 1999

EFFECTIVE JAN. 13, 1999


SIGNED

SECRETARY OF STATE
#### Kenneth Gene BOYD, Petitioner, v. Carl WHITE, Respondent.

No. 89-0043-CV-W-JWO.

United States District Court, W.D. Missouri, W.D.

Jan. 26, 1989.

Kenneth Gene Boyd, Jefferson City, Mo., pro se.

ORDER

JOHN W. OLIVER, Senior District Judge.

Petitioner has filed a *pro se*petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 seeking relief from a five-year parole term imposed pursuant to repealed Section 195.221, Mo.Stat.Ann. Petitioner alleges generally that the five-year parole term was imposed after the repeal of Section 195.221 in violation of his “Constitutional Rights under the United States Constitution, Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments of due process of law and Equal protection.”

The exhibits attached to petitioner’s petition establish that petitioner filed a writ of habeas corpus in the Cole County Circuit Court. The Circuit Court denied his petition. The exhibits further establish that the Deputy Clerk of Cole County Circuit Court erroneously advised petitioner that “since your petition for habeas corpus has been denied by this Court, you can now file your petition in Federal Court.” *See*Deputy Clerk’s January 3, 1988 letter attached to federal habeas petition.

Under Missouri law, petitioner may still seek habeas relief in the appellate courts of Missouri. *See, e.g., Manning v. Swenson,*360 F.Supp. 362 (W.D.Mo.1973). Moreover, it is well settled that the petitioner must exhaust his currently available state remedy before invoking this Court's habeas jurisdiction. *See, e.g., Preiser v. Rodriquez,*411 U.S. 475, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973).

We therefore find and conclude petitioner’s Section 2254 petition should be dismissed without prejudice for failure to ex*1101haust available state court postconviction remedies.1

For the reasons stated, it is

ORDERED that petitioner’s *pro se*petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 should be and the same is hereby dismissed without prejudice.

1

. Although we do not reach the merits of petitioner’s habeas petition, denial of petitioner’s habeas petition would have been appropriate if petitioner's parole records establish that he was paroled prior to August 13, 1984, the effective date of the repeal of § 195.221. *See Gill v. Missouri Board of Probation and Parole,*656 F.Supp. 1157, 1158 (E.D.Mo.1987) (‘‘repealed § 195.221 was properly made applicable to petitioner’s length and conditions of parole because it was in effect at the time of sentencing as well as at the time petitioner was released on parole”).
#### EMANUEL v. FELLOWS

No. 289 PC

Case below: 47 NC App 340

Petition by defendant for discretionary review under G.S. 7A-31 denied 15 August 1980.
Case 1:06-cv-14954-AKH Document 4 Filed 12/08/2006 Page 1 of 1
##### Table of Contents



UNITED STATES
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20549
 FORM 10-K/A
 Amendment No. 1 to Form 10-K
 þ
    
    ANNUAL REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 13 OR 15(d) OF THESECURITIES AND EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
   o
    
    TRANSITION REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 13 OR 15(d) OF
THESECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
 
 0-10691
 DELPHAX TECHNOLOGIES INC.
  Minnesota
    
    41-1392000(State or other jurisdiction of incorporation or organization)
    
    (I.R.S. Employer Identification No.)12500 Whitewater Drive, Minnetonka, Minnesota
    
    55343-9420(Address of principal executive offices)
    
    (Zip Code)Registrants telephone number, including area code:
    
    (952) 939-9000
 
 
  o x
  o x
  x o
 o
  Large Accelerated filer o
    
    Accelerated filer o
    
    Non-accelerated filer x
  o x
   DOCUMENTS INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE




---



TABLE OF CONTENTS  EXPLANATORY NOTESIGNATURESSection 302 Certification of Principal Executive OfficerSection 302 Certification of Principal Financial Officer    Table of Contents  
 EXPLANATORY NOTE
     
 SIGNATURES
  DELPHAX TECHNOLOGIES INC.Dated: January 25, 2006
    By:
    /s/ Jay A. HermanJay A. HermanChairman and Chief Executive Officer Dated: January 25, 2006
    By:
    /s/ Jay A. HermanJay A. HermanActing Chief Financial Officer 2
Case 1:07-cr-00343-LAK Document 3 Filed 04/26/2007 Page 1 of 1
1 The Honorable Ortrie D. Smith, United St ates District Judge for the Western District of Missouri. 

## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 07-2038

___________ United States of America, * * Appellee, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the * Western District of Missouri. Flinten E. Otis, * * [UNPUBLISHED] Appellant. *

___________ Submitted: April 7, 2008 Filed: April 11, 2008

___________ Before MURPHY, COLLOTON, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

___________ PER CURIAM. Flinten Otis appeals the se ntence the district court 1 imposed after revoking his supervised release. We affirm.

We find that the revocation sentence of 24 months in prison is not unreasonable. See United States v. Tyson , 413 F.3d 824, 825-26 (8th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (revocation sentences are reviewed for unreasonableness in accordance with United States v. Booker , 543 U.S. 220, 258-63 (2005)). First, the sentence was within both-2- statutory limits and the Chapter 7 range of 21-27 months in prison. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (authorizing up to 2-year prison term upon revocation of supervised release where original offense is Cla ss D felony); U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4(a) (range for Grade B violation with Category VI criminal history is 21-27 months in prison). Second, in sentencing Otis the district cour t considered appropriate factors, including his extensive criminal history, the likeli hood he would commit further crimes, and the need to protect the public; and also stated that it was familiar with and had considered all of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B-C), (a)(4)(B), § 3583(e) (permitting imposition of revocation sentence after consideration of certain § 3553(a) factors); United States v. Larison , 432 F.3d 921, 923 (8th Cir. 2006) (district court need not mechanica lly list every § 3553(a) consideration when sentencing defendant upon revo cation of supervised release; court’s statement at sentencing that it imposed sentence “afterhaving consulted the [G]uidelines” was sufficient to show that court considered applicable Guidelines and policy statements); United States v. Franklin , 397 F.3d 604, 606-07 (8th Cir. 2005) (all that is required is evidence that court considered releva nt matters, not that court made specific findings on each § 3553(a) factor).
Accordingly, we grant counsel leave to withdraw, and we affirm. We decline to address Otis’s ineffective assistance clai m which is more appropriately raised in a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 proceeding. See United States v. Hughes , 330 F.3d 1068, 1069 (8th Cir. 2003) (ineffective-assistance claims should ordinarily be brought in 28 U.S.C. § 2255 proceeding because they normally invol ve facts outside original record).

______________________________
EXHIBIT 15

                             ARTHUR ANDERSEN LLP





To Jacobson Stores Inc.:

We are aware that Jacobson Stores Inc. has incorporated by reference in its
Form S-8 Registration Statements File Nos. 033-53469, 333-31989 and 333-59031
and Form S-2 File No. 33-10532 its Form 10-Q for the quarter ended May 1,
1999, which includes our report dated May 14, 1999, covering the unaudited
interim condensed consolidated financial information contained therein.
Pursuant to Regulation C of the Securities Act of 1933, that report is not
considered a part of the registration statement prepared or certified by our
firm or a report prepared or certified by our firm within the meaning of
Sections 7 and 11 of the Act.


                                                 Very truly yours,



                                                 /s/  Arthur Andersen LLP
                                                 ---------------------------
                                                 ARTHUR ANDERSEN LLP

Detroit, Michigan
June 11, 1999
#### CALVIN SWOPE ROWE, Appellant, v. STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent.

No. 8201

December 5, 1975

542 P.2d 1059

*Rodlin H. Goff,*State Public Defender, and *Michael R. Griffin,*Deputy Public Defender, Carson City, for Appellant.

*Robert List,*Attorney General, Carson City; *Larry R. Hicks,*District Attorney, and *Kathleen M. Wall,*Deputy District Attorney, Washoe County, for Respondent.

*773OPINION

*Per Curiam:*

An undercover agent of the Washoe County Sheriff’s Office paid Rowe $125 in exchange for 8 baggies of marijuana and 5 baggies of amphetamines. As soon as the money and contraband had been exchanged, Rowe was arrested. He was subsequently convicted, by jury verdict, of 2 counts of sale of a controlled substance. NRS 453.321.

Appellant here contends: (1) The prosecution failed to prove his awareness of the “narcotic” nature of the substances sold, and (2) the prosecution failed to prove the marijuana involved in the sale was a type prohibited by statute. Both contentions are without merit.

1. Appellant’s knowledge of the “narcotic” nature of the controlled substances is a necessary element of the offenses charged. Fox v. State, 87 Nev. 591, 491 P.2d 721 (1971); Dougherty v. State, 86 Nev. 507, 471 P.2d 212 (1970). The requisite knowledge may be shown by circumstantial evidence and reasonably drawn inferences. Woerner v. State, 85 Nev. 281, 453 P.2d 1004 (1969). Here, the actual transfer of the contraband was between appellant and a police informant who did not testify. However, the arresting officer observed the transfer and so testified. The officer also discussed the price with appellant and paid him the requested sum. We believe these circumstances were sufficient for the jury to infer the requisite knowledge. Cf. Fairman v. Warden, 83 Nev. 332, 431 P.2d 660 (1967).

2. Appellant’s second contention is equally without merit. NRS 453.096(1) (a) defines marijuana as “[a]ll parts of the plant Cannabis sativa L. . . .” On cross-examination, the chemist so identified the marijuana in question.

Affirmed.
```

[Congressional Bills 116th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 1509 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

<DOC>

116th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 1509

  To amend title 23, United States Code, to require the Secretary of 
Transportation to waive vehicle weight limitations for certain logging 
                   vehicles, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                              May 16, 2019

Mr. Johnson (for himself and Mr. Perdue) introduced the following bill; 
 which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Environment and 
                              Public Works

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
  To amend title 23, United States Code, to require the Secretary of 
Transportation to waive vehicle weight limitations for certain logging 
                   vehicles, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Safe Routes Act of 2019''.

SEC. 2. VEHICLE WEIGHT EXEMPTION FOR CERTAIN LOGGING VEHICLES.

    Section 127 of title 23, United States Code, is amended by adding 
at the end the following:
    ``(v) Certain Logging Vehicles.--
            ``(1) In general.--The Secretary shall waive, for a covered 
        logging vehicle, the application of any vehicle weight limit 
        established under this section.
            ``(2) Application of weight tolerances.--The waiver under 
        this subsection shall only apply with respect to a State legal 
        weight tolerance in effect on the date of enactment of this 
        subsection.
            ``(3) Definition of covered logging vehicle.--In this 
        subsection, the term `covered logging vehicle' means a vehicle 
        that--
                    ``(A) is transporting raw or unfinished forest 
                products, including logs, pulpwood, biomass, or wood 
                chips;
                    ``(B) is traveling a distance of not more than 150 
                air miles on the Interstate System from the point of 
                origin to a storage or processing facility; and
                    ``(C) meets applicable State legal weight 
                tolerances and vehicle configurations for transporting 
                raw or unfinished forest products within the boundaries 
                of each State in which the vehicle is operating.''.
                                 <all>
```
Case 1:06-cv-14917-AKH Document 4 Filed 12/08/2006 Page 1 of 1