alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### STATE v. JAMES L. WILLIAMS.

(Filed 12 October, 1966.)

Criminal Law § 154—

In tbe absence of assignments of error in tbe record or brief, tbe judgment below will be sustained in tbe absence of error appearing on tbe face of tbe record proper.

Appeal by defendant from *Moms, E.J.,*at April 1966 Special Criminal Session, Nash Superior Court.

This is a criminal action in which the defendant James L. Williams was charged in a bill of indictment with armed robbery.

On 8 April, 1965, two men entered Murray’s Esso Station in Sharpsburg just after midnight. The attendant, William Hatch, was in the station alone at the time. One of the men got behind Hatch and pushed what Hatch assumed to be a gun in his back and proceeded to go through the station and the cash register, taking all of the money out of the cash register and also taking Hatch’s wallet. After the men left Hatch saw a 1959 Oldsmobile drive away from the trailer park across the street from the station. He could not tell how many men were in the car at that time. He immediately notified the Eocky Mount police by telephone. A few hours later the *296police apprehended defendant and three other men in a black 1959> Oldsmobile near the city limits of Rocky Mount. In the automobile the officers found a loaded .38 caliber pistol, several cartons of cigarettes and some money. The defendant was shortly afterwards identified by Hatch as the man who held the gun on him at the time of the robbery. During the Sheriff’s subsequent investigation, the defendant admitted his participation in the robbery and went with the Sheriff to show him where various items taken from the station had been thrown from the car.

Counsel for this indigent defendant was appointed, and when the case was called the defendant pleaded not guilty. The jury returned a verdict of guilty, and from a sentence of imprisonment the defendant appealed.

*T. W. Bruton, Attorney General, and Harry W. McGalliard, Deputy Attorney General for the State.*

*B. G. Shannonhouse for defendant appellant.*

Per Curiam.

No assignments of error appear in the record or briefs filed in this Court as required by Rule 19(3), Rules of Practice in the Supreme Court. “Therefore, unless error appears on the face of the record proper, or the issues are insufficient to support the judgment entered, the judgment will be sustained.” *Trust Co. v. Henry,*267 N.C. 253, 148 S.E. 2d 7. See *Bank v. Bryant,*257 N.C. 42, 125 S.E. 2d 291; *Milling Co. v. Laws,*242 N.C. 505, 87 S.E. 2d 925; *Smith v. Smith,*242 N.C. 646, 89 S.E. 2d 255; *Hobbs v. Hobbs,*218 N.C. 468, 11 S.E. 2d 311.

We have examined the record proper, and find

No error.
Document

Exhibit 10.26

FIFTH AMENDMENT TO LEASE DATED JANUARY 13, 2020
Nancy Ridge Technology Center, L.P., a California limited partnership ("Lessor"), and Cidara Therapeutics, Inc., a Delaware corporation, ("Lessee"), hereby amend the Lease dated June 9, 2014 (as previously amended, the "Lease"), for Suites #101 through #105 at 6310 Nancy Ridge Drive, San Diego, CA 92121 ("Premises") as follows:
1)Generator: Lessee shall have the right to use Lessor's Spectrum 40DSEJ generator (serial number 706322 - the right of the three generators behind the 6330 Nancy Ridge Drive building) for the remainder of Lessee's Lease Term at Lessee's sole risk and expense. Lessee shall be responsible for all costs and liabilities relating to the generator including but not limited to licensing, inspections, fuel, maintenance, repairs and the cost of connecting it to Lessee's suite and electrical system. Lessee shall reimburse Lessor $1,260.46 for the 2020 Permit Fee and Annual Maintenance service on October 21, 2019.


2)Confidentiality: The terms of the Lease are confidential. No party to the Lease shall disclose any of the terms of the Lease to any other party, provided that Lessee may disclose such terms to Lessee's employees, directors, officers, agents and proposed transferees.


3)No Default: To each party's knowledge, neither party is currently in Default or Breach of any of the terms or conditions of the Lease.


4)Authority to Execute: Each person executing this Amendment represents and warrants to all parties that he or she is duly authorized to execute and deliver this Amendment on behalf of that party.


All other terms and conditions of the Lease shall remain in full force and effect. All capitalized terms used herein but not defined herein shall have the meanings ascribed thereto in the Lease.


Lessor:        Nancy Ridge Technology Center, L.P., a California Limited Partnership
By:        Nancy Ridge Technology Center, LLC, a California Limited Liability
Company, its General Partner




By:                                


Lessee:    Cidara Therapeutics, Inc., a Delaware corporation
By:                                
Printed:                            
Title:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the
consolidated financial statements of the Company for the nine months ended
September 30, 1997, and is qualified in its entirety by reference to such
financial statements.
</LEGEND>
<CIK> 0000054291
<NAME> KAISER ALUMINUM & CHEMICAL CORPORATION
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1997
<CASH>                                              26
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                      315
<ALLOWANCES>                                         5
<INVENTORY>                                        553
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                 1,015
<PP&E>                                           1,163
<DEPRECIATION>                                      69
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                   2,968
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                              540
<BONDS>                                            969
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                               28
<PREFERRED>                                          2
<COMMON>                                            15
<OTHER-SE>                                          88
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                     2,968
<SALES>                                          1,779
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 1,779
<CGS>                                            1,474
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    1,474
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                   163
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                    20
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                  83
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                     41
<INCOME-TAX>                                         3
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                 37
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                        37
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .00
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .00
        

</TABLE>
#### PHILIP WEBER v BUNCOMBE COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, RUSSEL KNIGHT, E.E. CALDWELL, RUEBEN CALDWELL, JOHN W. CARROLL, DR. ROGER JAMES, EDNA ROBERTS, and W. GRADY ROZZELL, Respondents

No. 256 PC

(Filed 26 August 1980)

ORDER

This matter is before us by virtue of notice of appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals recorded at 46 N.C. App. 714, 226 S.E. 2d 42 (1980). The Respondent Board of Education has moved to dismiss the appeal for lack of a substantial constitutional question. Alternatively, petitioner petitions our discretionary review of the Court of Appeals’ decision pursuant to G.S. 7A-31.

Our review of the record reveals that the Buncombe County Board of Education made no findings of fact or conclusions of law upon which to base its decision.

The decision of the Court of Appeals is therefore vacated. That court is directed to remand to the Superior Court, Buncombe County, which said court shall remand to the Buncombe County Board of Education to make findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by law.

This order shall be printed in the official reports of decisions of this Court.

Done by the Court in conference, this 15th day of August 1980.

CARLTON, J.

For the Court
#### HOWARD v. HAMILTON and HOWARD v. FAIRLEY

No. 105 PC.

Case below: 28 N.C. App. 670.

Petition for discretionary review under G.S. 7A-31 denied 1 June 1976.
|Exhibit 12.2                           
|---------------------------------------
|
|
|                                       
|
|                                       
|(thousands)                            
|Income from continuing operations      
|Add                                    
|Minority interests in subsidiaries     
|Equity investment (income) loss        
|                                       
|Income subtotal                        
|                                       
|Add                                    
|Taxes on income                        
|Kansas City earnings tax               
|                                       
|Total taxes on income                  
|                                       
|Interest on value of leased property   
|Interest on long-term debt             
|Interest on short-term debt            
|Mandatorily Redeemable Preferred       
|Securities                             
|Other interest expense and amortization
|                                       
|Total fixed charges                    
|                                       
|Earnings before taxes on               
|income and fixed charges               
|                                       
|Ratio of earnings to fixed charges     
|
#### STATE v. BOYD

No. 131 PC.

Case below: 31 N.C. App. 328.

Petition by defendant for discretionary review under G.S. 7A-31 denied 31 January 1977.
#### BARRINGER v. WEATHINGTON

No. 9 PC.

Case below: 7 N.C. App. 126.

Petition for writ of *certiorari*to North Carolina Court of Appeals denied 3 February 1970.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3. NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BULLION MONARCH MINING, INC., Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. NEWMONT USA LIMITED, a Delaware Corporation, DBA Newmont Mining Corporation, Defendant - Appellee. No. 10-17320D.C. No. 3:08-cv-00227-ECRVPC

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Nevada Edward C. Reed, Senior District Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted May 16, 2012 San Francisco, California
Before: THOMAS, McKEOWN, and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges. Appellant Bullion Monarch Mining, In c. (“Bullion”) appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendant-Appellee Newmont USA 

# FILED

JUN 13 2012 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2 Limited (“Newmont”). Bullion filed suit s eeking royalty payments which it alleges Newmont owes as a successor-in-interest to a 1979 mining contract. The district court granted summary judgment based on laches. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm the district court. Under Nevada law, laches requires a show ing that “there was an inexcusable delay in seeking the petition” and “there were circumstances causing prejudice to respondent.” Nevada v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., ex rel. Cnty. of Clark , 994 P.2d 692, 697 (Nev. 2000) (internal quota tions and citation omitted). Bullion argues that it delayed in relian ce on Newmont’s assurances that the royalties owed under the 1979 contract woul d be paid, and that its delay was therefore excusable. The district court, resolving the disputed facts in Bullion’s favor, assumed that these assurances we re made but found them insufficient to excuse Bullion’s delay. We agree with the district court that “proper diligence required some attempt to verify that Ne wmont’s actions were consistent with its counsel’s alleged verbal assurance to Bu llion, either by independent investigation or by demanding accounting from Newmont.” Bullion further argues that Newmont failed to establish that it was prejudiced by Bullion’s delay. Bullion argues that the summary judgment ruling should be limited in its scope as the laches defense can only apply to mining claims3 which Newmont has placed in production. Bullion contends that Newmont has not shown, and cannot show, any prejudice as to claims that Newmont has not yet developed. Bullion raised its prejudice argument for the first time in its Motion to Reconsider in district court, and that court found that Bullion had waived its argument by not raising it earlier. See School Dist. No. 1J v. ACandS, Inc. , 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993). The district court did not abuse its discretion in so finding. 389 Orange Street Partners v. Arnold , 179 F.3d 656, 665 (9th Cir. 1999). AFFIRMED.
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&"-,Bold"&14U.S. Department of Labor - Fall 2019 Regulatory Agenda	

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&"-,Bold"&14U.S. Department of Labor - Fall 2018 Regulatory Agenda	&D

&"-,Bold"&14U.S. Department of Labor - Spring 2020 Regulatory Agenda	

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#### Ervini SPAHO, Petitioner, v. Alberto GONZALES,* Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 04-070687.

Agency No. [ AXX-XXX-XXX ].

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted April 4, 2005.**

Decided April 11, 2005.

Philip Turtletaub, Esq., Charlotte, NC, for Petitioner.

Ronald E. LeFevre, Chief Counsel, Office of the District Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, and Aviva L. Poczter, Esq., DOJ—U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Div./Office of Immigration Lit., Washington, DC, for Respondent.

Before KOZINSKI, HAWKINS and CLIFTON, Circuit Judges.

*

 Alberto Gonzales is substituted for his predecessor, John Ashcroft, as Attorney General of the United States, pursuant to Fed. R.App. P. 43(c)(2).

**

 The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM ***

Ervini Spaho, a native and citizen of Albania, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ dismissal of his appeal from an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) denial of his applications for asylum, withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review the IJ’s order as the final agency determination. *See Falcon Carriche v. Ashcroft,*350 F.3d 845, 849 (9th Cir.2003). We review for substantial evidence, *see Gui v. INS,*280 F.3d 1217, 1225 (9th Cir.2002), and we deny the petition for review.

Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s adverse credibility determination because Spaho testified that he was arrested and beaten on two separate occasions by members of the communist Albanian government yet failed to mention these central arrests in either his application for asylum or the accompanying declaration, and when given a reasonable opportunity, was unable to offer a cogent explanation for the omission. The IJ was “not unreasonable *197in considering that, if truthful, [Spaho] would have thought to mention his most serious allegation[s] of mistreatment when he detailed the persecution he ... endured.” *Li v. Ashcroft,*378 F.3d 959, 963 (9th Cir.2004).

Without credible testimony, Spaho failed to establish eligibility for asylum or withholding of removal. *See Malhi v. INS,*336 F.3d 989, 993 (9th Cir.2003).

Because Spaho’s claims under CAT were based on the same testimonial and documentary evidence that the IJ determined to be not credible in connection with Spa-ho’s asylum claim, the IJ also properly denied Spaho protection under CAT. *See Farah v. Ashcroft,*348 F.3d 1153, 1156-57 (9th Cir.2003).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

***

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Document

Exhibit 10.63

Amended and Restated Non-Employee Director Compensation Policy
The following non-employee director compensation shall apply to all non-employee directors of the Company.
•Each non-employee director will receive an annual cash retainer in the amount of $50,000 per year.
•The Chairperson of the Board will receive an additional annual cash retainer in the amount of $40,000 per year.
•The chairperson of the audit committee will receive additional annual cash compensation in the amount of $20,000 per year for such chairperson’s service on the audit committee. Each non-chairperson member of the audit committee will receive additional annual cash compensation in the amount of $10,000 per year for such member’s service on the audit committee.
•The chairperson of the compensation committee will receive additional annual cash compensation in the amount of $15,000 per year for such chairperson’s service on the compensation committee. Each non-chairperson member of the compensation committee will receive additional annual cash compensation in the amount of $7,500 per year for such member’s service on the compensation committee.
•The chairperson of the nominating and corporate governance committee will receive additional annual cash compensation in the amount of $11,250 per year for such chairperson’s service on the nominating and corporate governance committee. Each non-chairperson member of the nominating and corporate governance committee will receive additional annual cash compensation in the amount of $5,000 per year for such member’s service on the nominating and corporate governance committee.
•Each non-employee directors will receive a stock option grant with an initial grant equal 90,000 shares of the Company’s common stock upon a director’s initial appointment or election to the Board of Directors, vesting quarterly over a 3 year period and an annual stock option grant equal 90,000 shares of the Company’s common stock on the date of each annual stockholder’s meeting thereafter, fully vesting in one year from the date of grant.
Rev Feb 25, 2021
exhibit1022kwantexecuted






AMENDMENT TO EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT FOR AN INDEFINITE PERIOD BETWEEN DIVERSEY EUROPE OPERATIONS B.V. & Sinead Kwant WHEREAS Diversey Europe Operations B.V. ("DIversey" or "Employer") and Sinead Kwant ("Employee") entered into an Employment Agreement for an Indefinite Period dated 31 August 2020 ("Employment Agreement"); AND WHEREAS the Employer has offered to pay Employee a severance payment if the Employment Agreement terminates in the future under certain circumstances and Employee has accepted the terms and conditions of the offered future severance payment; NOW THEREFORE the Parties memorialize their agreement as follows: 1. The following new clause is added as Article 15 to the Employment Agreement: Article 15 - Severance Pay 1. In the event Employee's employment ends for a reason other than for cause/serious imputable acts or omissions (and not due to her death or disability) or her resignation, then subject to Employee (a) executing a Mutual Termination Agreement (which will include clauses regarding Employee consenting to the termination, performing reasonable transition sciviccs, ongoing compliance with the restrictive covenants - under Article 6 of the Employment Agreement and any other previously executed restricted covenants between the Parties - and a general release of all claims against Di\crsey); and (b) not withdrawing her consent to the termination (within 14 days) or dissolving the tcnnination agreement, Employer will pay Employee a severance payment in an amount equal to the aggregate of Employee's then current gross annual base salary and target annual incentive ("Severance Pay"). 2. The Severance Pay will be paid either as a lump sum or in ratable installments over the 12-month period following the employment termination date, the choice of which shall bo in the Employer's sole discretion, and will be subject to all withhoidings required by law. 3. The Severance Payment will include and will not be in addition to any transitional payment that Employee might be eligible for under Dutch law, including the Work and Security Act of 2014 (IPe/ werk en zekerheid), and any other severance benefits under Diversey's policies or practices. 2. The effective date of this Amendment is 1 1 Januar>-, 2021 3. All other terms of the Employment Agreement remain unchanged and in full force and effect. MUTUALLY ACCEPTED AND AGREED TO BY THE PARTIES Annette Bergknut Sinead Kwant CHRO President, Professional Western Europe Date: 12 January 2021 Date: Sander de Deugd HR Director Benelux & Nordic
#### CBS BROADCASTING, INC., v. ECHOSTAR COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION EchoStar Communications Corporation, EchoStar Satellite Corporation, Satellite Communications Operating Corporation and DirectSat Corporation, Appellants.

No. 04-2861.

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

Argued April 7, 2005.

Decided April 21, 2005.

Cynthia A. Ricketts, (Argued), Mark A. Nadeau, Mitchell W. Fleischmann, Squire, Sanders & Dempsey, Phoenix, AZ, and David J. Hickton, John Sieminski, Burns, White *&*Hickton, Pittsburgh, PA, for Appellants.

Neil K. Roman, (Argued), Covington *&*Burling, Washington, D.C., and Michael J. Manzo, Nancy E. Rostek, Klett, Rooney, Lieber *&*Scherling, Pittsburgh, PA, for Appellees.

Before BARRY, AMBRO, and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges.

OPINION

BARRY, Circuit Judge.

Echostar Communications Corp. (“Echostar”) appeals from an award of discovery sanctions by the District Court. Although we have grave doubts as to the propriety of any such sanctions on the record presented, we need not reach that question because Echostar was denied notice and an opportunity to be heard before sanctions were ordered. *See Angelico v. Lehigh Valley Hospital, Inc.,*184 F.3d 268, 279 (3d Cir.1999). We will, therefore, vacate the District Court’s orders of April 17, 2003, May 27, 2004, and May 28, 2004 and remand this matter to the District Court for further proceedings in the event that appellee continues to press its claim for sanctions.