[Cite as State v. Poythress, 2024-Ohio-2911.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

CITY OF CLEVELAND, :

Plaintiff-Appellee, :

No. 113482

v. :

MARKEETA POYTHRESS, :

Defendant-Appellant. :

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: August 1, 2024

Criminal Appeal from the Cleveland Municipal Court

Case No. 2022-TRD-018340

Appearances:

Mark Griffin, Cleveland Director of Law, Aqueela Jordan, 

Chief Prosecutor, and Kevin Burns, Assistant Prosecuting 

Attorney, for appellee. 

Cullen Sweeney, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and 

Thomas T. Lampman, Assistant Public Defender, for 

appellant. 

KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, A.J.:

Defendant-appellant, Markeeta Poythress, appeals from the trial 

court’s judgment ordering her to pay restitution to the owner of the car she rearended. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. 
I. Background

On April 27, 2021, Poythress rear-ended the victim’s car. Poythress 

and the victim stepped out of their cars and observed the damage to the victim’s car. 

The victim handed his driver’s license and insurance card to Poythress and told her 

that he needed the same information from her. Poythress told the victim that she 

would get the information from her car, walked back to her car, got in, and drove 

away from the scene. Poythress did not have insurance on her vehicle at the time of 

the accident. 

On September 26, 2022, the City of Cleveland charged Poythress with 

violation of Cleveland Cod.Ord. 435.15 for her failure to remain on the scene after 

an accident and provide her name, address, and the registered vehicle number of 

her vehicle to the victim. A violation of Cleveland Cod.Ord. 435.15 is a first-degree 

misdemeanor with a six-point penalty applied to the offender’s driver’s license. 

Poythress entered a not guilty plea, and the public defender’s office 

represented her throughout the proceedings. The trial court held numerous 

pretrials in the matter because discovery was ongoing. At a pretrial on May 17, 2023, 

defense counsel told the judge the parties would get the case “resolved sooner than 

later” but asked for another pretrial, stating that the victim had filed a claim with his 

insurance company and that defense counsel had been in communication with the 

victim’s insurance company and was “just getting some paperwork to verify some 

things there.” (Tr. 3.) 
At the next pretrial, on May 31, 2023, the prosecutor informed the 

court that in exchange for a plea of guilty, the city would amend the charged offense 

to a violation of Cleveland Cod.Ord. 435.16(a)(1), a first-degree misdemeanor, and 

that restitution would be part of the plea agreement. (Tr. 4.) Defense counsel again 

told the court that the parties would “probably get it resolved soon,” id., but that 

counsel wanted to confirm that the victim’s insurance company had denied the claim 

submitted by the victim. Upon questioning by the judge, the victim informed the 

court that his insurance company had denied his claim for $2,997, the amount he 

incurred to fix the damages to his car. When the court asked, “[W]ell, when we say 

get it resolved, is the victim going to be made whole?” defense counsel responded:

“[W]ell, I just want to make sure that they’re denying — that they’re not going to pay 

anything out here. Just basically I don’t want an issue where [the victim] is 

recovering twice.” (Tr. 6.) The court noted that there was an offer for Poythress to 

plead to a reduced charge but that “there’s no assurance that [the victim’s] going to 

be made whole.” Id. The court again questioned the victim, who confirmed that his 

insurance company was not going to pay the claim. In response, defense counsel 

stated: “[I]f that’s the case, I say then restitution. I just want to cross all my T’s, dot 

all my I’s. I have had — like I said, I’m not accusing [the victim] of anything.” (Tr. 

7.) The court set the matter for another pretrial. 

On June 27, 2023, at the next pretrial, defense counsel informed the 

court that the parties had reached a resolution on the case and wanted to set the 

matter for sentencing and a restitution hearing after Poythress entered her plea. (Tr. 
4.) The prosecutor then explained that under the plea agreement, Poythress would 

plead guilty to a violation of Cleveland Cod.Ord. 435.16, colloquially known as a 

“hit/skip,” which prohibits a driver in the case of an accident or collision that results 

in damage to another’s person or vehicle from leaving the scene without providing 

their name, address, vehicle registration number, and driver’s license information 

to the injured party. A violation of Cleveland Cod.Ord. 435.16 is a first-degree 

misdemeanor but only two points are applied to the offender’s license as a result of 

the offense. The trial court accepted Poythress’s plea to the reduced charge and 

confirmed with her that she understood that the matter would be set for sentencing 

and a restitution hearing. (Tr. 10.) 

Despite defense counsel’s representation to the court before 

Poythress entered her plea that Poythress would pay restitution to the victim 

because the victim’s insurance company had denied his claim, and Poythress’s 

acknowledgement at the plea hearing that the specific amount of restitution she 

would pay would be determined at a later restitution hearing, five days after the plea 

hearing, defense counsel filed a motion to deny restitution. In the motion and at the 

hearing regarding the motion, defense counsel argued that restitution can only be 

imposed for economic loss suffered as a direct and proximate result of the 

commission of the offense for which the defendant was convicted and that Poythress

did not cause any economic loss to the victim as a result of the commission of the 

hit/skip offense to which she pleaded guilty because any damages to the victim’s car 

were caused before she left the scene of the accident. The city opposed the motion. 
The trial court denied the motion, stating:

The hit/skip ordinance, Cleveland Codified Ordinances 435.16(a)(1) 

states, “In case of accident or collision resulting in injury or damage to 

persons or property.” It is the court’s opinion that based on the 

ordinance’s language, the “hit” is a crucial element of the hit/skip which 

allegedly occurred in this case and is therefore the direct and proximate 

cause of the victim’s damages. Therefore a restitution hearing shall be 

scheduled to determine the amount of damages. 

At the subsequent restitution hearing, the victim submitted proof of the damages he 

incurred to repair his vehicle after Poythress rear-ended it, and the court ordered 

Poythress to pay $2,997 in restitution.1 The court sentenced Poythress to one year 

of probation, a $1,000 fine with $500 suspended, and the payment of court costs. 

This appeal followed.

II. Law and Analysis

In her single assignment of error, Poythress argues that the trial court 

unlawfully ordered her to pay restitution for damages that were not the result of her 

offense because any damages to the victim’s car had already occurred before she 

committed the offense, i.e., before she left the scene of the accident she caused 

without providing the required information to the victim. 

We review misdemeanor restitution orders for an abuse of discretion. 

Cleveland v. Figueroa, 2022-Ohio-4012, ¶ 8 (8th Dist.). An abuse of discretion is 

an “unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable use of discretion.” State v. Kirkland, 

1 At the hearing, the court said it intended to order that Poythress pay $3,000 in 

restitution, but its journal entry of sentencing ordered that she pay $2,997, the amount of 

damages substantiated by the repair receipt the victim provided to the court. Poythress 

raises no challenge to this discrepancy. 
2014-Ohio-1966, ¶ 67. An abuse of discretion includes a ruling that lacks a sound 

reasoning process. State v. Morris, 2012-Ohio-2407, ¶ 14. With respect to 

restitution, “[a] trial court abuses its discretion by ordering restitution in an amount 

that does not bear a reasonable relationship to the actual loss suffered.” In re A.B., 

2021-Ohio-4273, ¶ 8 (1st Dist.), citing In re M.N., 2017-Ohio-7302, ¶ 8 (1st Dist.). 

“In addition, a court abuses its discretion if the award of restitution is not supported 

by competent, credible evidence in the record from which the court can discern the 

amount of restitution to a reasonable degree of certainty.” State v. Caldwell, 2023-

Ohio-355, ¶ 14 (4th Dist.). 

As an initial matter, we note that although the specific amount of 

restitution to be paid was not specified in the plea agreement, Poythress agreed to 

pay restitution as part of her plea to the reduced charge. Thus, we find Poythress’s 

motion to deny restitution, which was filed in the trial court almost immediately

after her guilty plea, and her assertion on appeal that the trial court erred in ordering 

restitution, to be wholly disingenuous. We are cognizant, however, that a defendant 

cannot plead to an illegal sentence, State v. Underwood, 2010-Ohio-1, ¶ 16, and thus 

we consider Poythress’s argument that the trial court’s restitution order was 

unlawful. 

We begin with R.C. 2929.28, the statute governing financial sanctions 

and restitution for misdemeanor offenses. The statute limits restitution in such 

cases to “the amount of the economic loss suffered by the victim as a direct and 

proximate result of the commission of the offense.” R.C. 2929.28(A)(1). Poythress 
contends that an injury cannot be caused by a later event and, citing Black’s Law 

Dictionary, notes that “proximate cause” is “[a] cause that directly produces an event 

and without which the event would not have occurred,” or otherwise “result[s] in a 

consequence.” Black’s Law Dictionary (11th Ed. 2019). Thus, she asserts that 

leaving the scene of an accident cannot be the proximate cause of any losses already 

incurred at the time of departure and, accordingly, the trial court erred in ordering 

her to pay restitution for the damages to the victim’s car incurred before she left the 

scene of the accident. 

Elaborating on her argument, Poythress contends that “[a] sentence 

of restitution must be limited to the actual economic loss caused by the illegal 

conduct for which the defendant was convicted.” State v. Labghaly, 2007-Ohio-73, 

¶ 13 (8th Dist.). See also State v. Rivera, 2004-Ohio-6648, ¶ 12 (8th Dist.) (“Thus, 

restitution can be ordered only for those acts that constitute the crime for which the 

defendant was convicted and sentenced.”). She contends she was convicted only of 

leaving the scene of an accident and, therefore, because the preceding accident was

not the illegal conduct of which she was convicted, it cannot be the proximate cause 

of the victim’s damages, as the trial court found. 

Poythress cites Columbus v. Cardwell, 2008-Ohio-1725 (10th Dist.), 

as support for her argument. In Cardwell, the defendant was found guilty of the 

misdemeanor offenses of failing to maintain an assured clear distance and of failing 

to stop after an accident. Among other penalties, the trial court ordered her to pay 

restitution. On appeal, Cardwell made the same argument that Poythress makes 
here — that the trial court erred in ordering restitution on the charge of leaving the 

scene of an accident because the accident victim’s loss was not a direct and 

proximate result of the commission of the offense, as required by R.C. 

2929.28(A)(1). 

The appellate court agreed, finding that 

[j]ust because there must be an accident or collision before a hit-skip 

violation can occur, does not establish that the property damage 

resulted from the hit-skip violation. . . . [T[he property damage from 

the collision existed regardless of whether the appellant subsequently 

left the scene of the accident. Therefore the property damage could not 

have been a direct and proximate result of the hit-skip violation. 

Id. at ¶ 13. 

Poythress fails to mention, however, that in Columbus v. Wood, 2016-

Ohio-3081 (10th Dist.), the Tenth District found that Columbus Traffic Code 

2135.12, regarding leaving the scene of an accident, was amended after the Cardwell 

decision and now provides that if the defendant convicted of leaving the scene of an 

accident fails to provide proof of financial responsibility to the court, the court may 

impose restitution pursuant to R.C. 2928.28 “for any economic loss arising from an 

accident or collision that was the direct and proximate result of the offender’s 

operation of the vehicle before, during, or after committing the offense for which 

the offender is sentenced under this section.” (Emphasis in original.) Id. at ¶ 9, 

quoting Columbus Traffic Code 2135.12(b)(1). The Cardwell Court found that the 

trial court had not determined before ordering restitution that the damage to the 

victim’s vehicle was a direct and proximate result of the defendant’s operation of his 
vehicle. Accordingly, it reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded the matter 

with instructions for the court to consider whether the accident or collision for which 

it found economic loss was the direct and proximate result of the defendant’s 

operation of his vehicle. Id. at ¶ 12. 

Cleveland Cod.Ord. 435.16(b)(2) similarly provides that if a 

defendant convicted of violating Cleveland Cod.Ord. 435.16(a)(1) — the offense to 

which Poythress pleaded guilty — fails to provide the court with evidence of financial 

responsibility, the trial court may order restitution pursuant to R.C. 2929.28 in an 

amount not exceeding $5,000 “for any economic loss arising from an accident or 

collision that was the direct and proximate result of the offender’s operation of the 

motor vehicle before, during, or after committing the offense charged under this 

section.”2 

The trial court denied Poythress’s motion to deny restitution because 

it found that an accident or collision is a “crucial element” of a violation of Cleveland 

Cod.Ord. 435.16(a)(1) and that Poythress’s rear-ending the victim’s car was the 

direct and proximate cause of his damages. We agree that an accident or collision is 

an element of a violation of Cleveland Cod.Ord. 435.16(a)(1).

3 The accident or 

2 Although the ordinance is inartfully drafted, we read it as allowing restitution for 

economic loss caused by the offender’s operation of their vehicle and incurred by the 

victim either before, while, or after the offender committed the offense. 

3 The ordinance states that “[i]n case of accident or collision resulting in injury or 

damage to persons or property . . . due to the driving or operation thereon of any motor 

vehicle, the person driving or operating the motor vehicle, having knowledge of the 

accident or collision, shall stop, and upon request of the person injured or damaged . . . 

shall give that person the driver’s or operator’s name and address . . . together with the 
collision itself, however, is insufficient to allow the court to order restitution. 

Rather, under the ordinance, the court must determine whether the defendant’s 

operation of their vehicle was the direct and proximate cause of the victim’s 

economic loss.

Poythress contends that Cleveland’s ordinance is at odds with R.C. 

2929.28(A)(1) because R.C. 2929.28(A)(1) limits restitution to those losses that 

were “a direct and proximate result of the commission of the offense” and leaving 

the scene of an accident cannot be the proximate cause of losses already incurred 

before the time of departure. Poythress fails to appreciate, however, that as the trial 

court found, the “hit” of a “hit/skip” offense is an essential element of the offense of 

leaving the scene of an accident. There can be no offense of leaving the scene of an 

accident without a precipitating accident or collision. Indeed, the colloquial

identification for a violation of the ordinance as a “hit/skip” makes this clear. 

Poythress would have us simply read this element of the offense out of the 

ordinance. 

Furthermore, Poythress fails to recognize that a defendant can cause 

economic losses to a victim while the defendant is leaving the scene of an accident 

if, for example, the defendant hits the victim or their car while the defendant is 

driving away from the accident scene, even if the defendant did not cause the initial 

accident. Fleeing the scene of an accident can also cause economic loss to the victim 

registered number of that motor vehicle, and, if available, exhibit the driver’s . . . license.” 

(Emphasis added.) 
after the offender leaves the scene. For example, if a driver fails to stop after an 

accident and provide the required information, the injured party may have to pay 

their medical expenses and car repair costs out-of-pocket. And even if they

ultimately recover from their own insurance company, they may have to pay a 

deductible or higher premiums in the future. Accordingly, contrary to Poythress’s 

argument, not all of a victim’s losses resulting from the defendant’s offense of 

leaving the scene of an accident are necessarily incurred before the defendant leaves 

the scene. 

Just like Cleveland Cod.Ord. 435.16(b)(2), R.C. 4549.02, the State of 

Ohio’s statute regarding stopping after an accident and exchanging identity and 

vehicle registration information, provides that if the offender fails to provide proof 

of financial responsibility to the court, the court may, in addition to any other

penalties imposed by law, order restitution pursuant to R.C. 2929.28 in an amount 

not exceeding $5,000 “for any economic loss arising from an accident or collision 

that was the direct and proximate result of the offender’s operation of the motor 

vehicle before, during, and after the commission of the offense charged under this 

section.” Both the ordinance and state law authorize payment of restitution 

pursuant to R.C. 2929.28. Accordingly, we find Poythress’s equal protection 

argument — that hit/skip offenders paying restitution will be treated differently

under Cleveland’s hit/skip ordinance as opposed to localities that simply apply the 

state law — to be without merit. 
It is undisputed that Poythress rear-ended the victim’s car, causing 

the damages to his vehicle. The trial court ordered Poythress to pay restitution of 

$2,997 to the victim after determining, consistent with Cleveland Cod.Ord. 435.16 

and R.C. 2929.28, that Poythress’s operation of her vehicle in rear-ending the 

victim’s car before leaving the scene of the accident was the direct and proximate 

cause of the victim’s economic loss. Accordingly, the trial court did not unlawfully 

order Poythress to pay restitution, and the assignment of error is overruled. 

Judgment affirmed.

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

municipal court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s conviction 

having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the 

trial court for execution of sentence.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE

SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., and

ANITA LASTER MAYS, J., CONCUR