1 

2020 IL App (5th) 190373-U 

NO. 5-19-0373 

IN THE 

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS 

FIFTH DISTRICT 

________________________________________________________________________ 

In re MARRIAGE OF ) Appeal from the 

 ) Circuit Court of 

TONI ANDREWS, ) Jefferson County. 

 ) 

 Petitioner-Appellant, ) 

 ) 

and ) No. 18-D-59

 ) 

JOSHUA ANDREWS, ) Honorable 

 ) Timothy R. Neubauer, 

 Respondent-Appellee. ) Judge, presiding. 

________________________________________________________________________ 

 JUSTICE WHARTON delivered the judgment of the court. 

 Presiding Justice Welch and Justice Moore concurred in the judgment. 

 

 ORDER 

¶ 1 Held: Where the terms of the property division stipulation omitted real estate 

 jointly held by Toni and Joshua Andrews, we find that the trial court abused 

its discretion in denying Toni’s request to modify or vacate the judgment; 

vacate the property and debt distribution and asset equalization sections of 

the amended judgment; and remand for further proceedings. Where the trial 

court did not abuse its discretion in calculating the amount of child support, 

 we affirm that portion of the trial court’s amended judgment. 

¶ 2 After the trial court entered a judgment that dissolved the marriage and resolved 

all other issues, Toni Andrews (Toni) filed a posttrial motion asking the court to correct 

possible errors and omissions in its determination of maintenance and property 

NOTICE

Decision filed 02/19/20. The 

text of this decision may be 

changed or corrected prior to 

the filing of a Petition for 

Rehearing or the disposition of 

the same.

NOTICE

This order was filed under 

Supreme Court Rule 23 and 

may not be cited as precedent 

by any party except in the 

limited circumstances allowed 

under Rule 23(e)(1).
2 

distribution and to modify the manner in which the court calculated child support. The 

trial court agreed with some of the points Toni raised and entered its amended judgment. 

Toni appeals from the trial court’s denial of her request that the court reconsider its 

property distribution to include 22 acres of real estate she owned jointly with Joshua 

Andrews (Joshua). Toni also appeals from the trial court’s amended child support order. 

For the reasons that follow, we vacate the property distribution and asset equalization; 

affirm the child support award; and remand for further proceedings. 

¶ 3 BACKGROUND 

¶ 4 Toni and Joshua married in 2006. Three children were born during this marriage. 

R.A. was born in 2007; T.A. was born in 2010; and I.A. was born in 2012. Toni moved 

out of the marital residence in February 2018 and filed a petition for dissolution of her 

marriage to Joshua in May 2018. Joshua filed a counterpetition on August 29, 2018, and 

filed a petition seeking temporary and permanent primary parenting responsibility and

primary parenting time allocation. 

¶ 5 On October 10, 2018, the trial court entered an agreed temporary order. The 

parties had agreed that Joshua would have exclusive possession of the marital 

residence—a double wide mobile home. Toni was required to temporarily pay the 

mortgage and utilities on the residence in lieu of traditional child support or maintenance. 

Parenting time was shared with Toni having the children from Saturdays at 5 p.m. until 

Sundays at 9 a.m., then from 11 a.m. on Sundays until 5 p.m. on Tuesdays. Joshua had 

all other parenting time. 
3 

¶ 6 Both parties filed a financial affidavit with the court. In Joshua’s affidavit, he 

listed the value of his real estate asset at $130,000 subject to a mortgage with an 

unknown balance. Toni’s affidavit contained no valuation for the real estate asset and 

listed the mortgage balance at approximately $40,000. 

¶ 7 On March 27, 2019, the trial court entered an order requiring Toni to produce the 

following documents: value and payoff quote on her vehicle; a current 401(k) statement; 

the payoff quote on the mortgage; her valuation of the double wide; a proposed parenting 

time schedule; and a complete financial affidavit. 

¶ 8 Trial took place on May 1, 2019. Unfortunately, the entire trial was not recorded, 

and therefore, the record on appeal is incomplete. A court reporter was present for the 

first half of the trial. A court reporter was not available for the second half of the trial and 

the parties agreed to proceed without having the trial record preserved. The appellant has 

the responsibility for preparing a full and complete appellate record. Midstate Siding & 

Window Co. v. Rogers, 204 Ill. 2d 314, 319, 789 N.E.2d 1248, 1251 (2003). “Any doubts 

which may arise from the incompleteness of the record will be resolved against the 

appellant.” Foutch v. O’Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389, 392, 459 N.E.2d 958, 959 (1984). 

¶ 9 Before trial, the parties stipulated that all property was to be divided in half. The 

parties also stipulated to the valuations. Toni was to receive the 2017 GMC Acadia 

valued at $18,510 (subject to a $26,130 loan), and her Walgreens 401(k) account then 

valued at $50,019. Joshua was to receive a double wide valued at $21,749 (subject to a 

$45,366 loan), and his own lawn care business valued at $46,595. He was also 

responsible for a $12,000 loan balance on a piece of lawn care equipment. Based on the 
4 

asset values and remaining debt, Joshua’s attorney prepared an asset equalization 

document suggesting that Toni owed Joshua $15,710.50. 

¶ 10 The parties also stipulated to shared responsibility and duty for the children’s 

medical, education, and religious decisions. 

¶ 11 Toni and Joshua did not stipulate to parenting time allocation, maintenance, and 

child support. Testimony at the trial was connected to these three issues. 

¶ 12 Toni testified that she was a maintenance administrative specialist for a Walgreens 

Distribution Center working Wednesdays through Saturdays from 5 a.m. to 3 p.m. 

earning approximately $46,000 annually. She began a new position at Walgreens in 

November 2017 that was part of a group responsible for rebranding a Rite Aid 

distribution center in Connecticut. Toni had informed Walgreens that she would only 

travel to Connecticut one weekend per month. Toni explained that she had the ability to 

move the one weekend to different weekends in order to accommodate parenting time 

with her children but testified that Walgreens did not provide much advance notice about 

the scheduled weekend. She currently has parenting time with the children every 

weekend, which means that she has been unable to exercise her parenting time on the one 

Connecticut weekend each month. 

¶ 13 Toni testified that the income for Joshua’s business was inaccurate on their joint 

income tax returns because he did not report all income he earned. Her knowledge stems 

from the fact that she had been the bookkeeper for the business. Specifically, Toni 

testified that in 2017 Joshua earned $60,243, but only reported $35,680 as income on 

their joint income tax return. On cross-examination, she admitted that she had lied to the 
5 

Internal Revenue Service by filing the false return but stressed that the false income 

amounts were filled out at Joshua’s specific direction. 

¶ 14 Toni asked the court to award no maintenance because she and Joshua both earned 

approximately the same amount. 

¶ 15 Toni testified about the current parenting time schedule and testified that she 

would prefer having the three children for one week at a time, but also stated that she 

would be fine with any division of parenting time that was split evenly. She asked the 

trial court to award no child support if the parenting time was split evenly as she 

requested. Toni acknowledged that there have been times that she had not been able to 

control their son, and when that occurred, she contacted Joshua to pick him up. Toni 

stated that her mother had agreed to help her with the children on school days if the court 

determined that parenting time should be evenly split. 

¶ 16 At the time of the trial, Toni was living in her mother’s home, and although the 

three children did not have their own rooms, two had their own beds, and the third, the 

youngest, still wanted to sleep with Toni. Toni expressed her hope that she could 

eventually move out and have her own home. 

¶ 17 Joshua testified that the parties separated on Valentine’s Day of 2018 when Toni 

vacated the marital home. She told the family that she needed to catch up on her sleep 

and that she was going to her mother’s home, but that she would eventually move back 

home. She told the children she would stop by each day to visit with them. However, 

Toni did not return to the marital home, and she did not keep her promise of daily visits 

with the children. He confirmed that Toni frequently had difficulty with their son who 
6 

wanted little to do with his mother because of the abandonment. Joshua stated that at 

least once per month he would be called by Toni to pick up the children before her 

scheduled parenting time was over. Joshua asked the trial court to maintain the current 

parenting time schedule because the children were adjusted to the schedule. 

¶ 18 Joshua stated that he had owned his own lawn care business for 10 years. He 

works four days a week from spring to fall; plows snow when necessary in the winter; 

and otherwise is home and available to the children. He had about five steady clients but 

was always looking for additional work. Joshua denied that he underreported his income 

on the income tax returns. 

¶ 19 Joshua testified that he would not be able to continue to live in the marital 

residence without an award of maintenance. He denied having any equity in the double 

wide, in that the home was valued at approximately $20,000 less than what was owed on 

the mortgage. 

¶ 20 Toni’s mother, Cynthia A. Bevis, prepared a document, labeled “Comparable 

Market Analysis,” that contained her expert opinion as to the value of the double wide. 

Both parties stipulated to the admissibility of this exhibit. The document is dated 

Thursday, March 28, 2019, and states that it was “Prepared for 2000 Four Seasons 

FS211002 Manufactured Home.” All references to the property in this document are 

limited to the double wide, and do not reference the underlying real estate where the 

double wide was located. The Jefferson County property tax records for 2017 valued the 

double wide at $23,073. There had only been two area comparable double wide sales in 

the past two years. Based upon those two sales, Bevis determined that the going rate for 
7 

this type of property was $14.16 per square foot. Mathematically, Bevis concluded that 

“the subject property, double wide only” was valued at $21,749.75. 

¶ 21 The court entered its judgment of dissolution of marriage on June 7, 2019. The 

trial court imputed annual income of $36,000 to Joshua, and then ordered Toni to pay 

monthly child support of $702.96 until May 31, 2030, monthly maintenance of $477.18 

until September 2025, and to obtain and pay for the children’s health insurance. The trial 

court noted that the parties stipulated to the values of property and debts and incorporated 

the exhibit prepared by Joshua’s attorney into its order. The court found that in order to 

divide the assets evenly, Toni owed Joshua an equalization payment of $15,710.50. 

¶ 22 After the entry of the judgment, Toni hired a new attorney who advised her to 

transfer the utility accounts into Joshua’s name. According to Toni’s affidavit in the 

court record, she received a copy of the deed for the 22 acres from the water utility 

company, and then discovered that she jointly owned the 22 acres with Joshua. 

¶ 23 Toni’s new attorney asked the court to modify or vacate the maintenance, child 

support, parenting time, and property distribution awards. The trial court amended the 

judgment on August 1, 2019, as follows: modified the parenting time allocation to take 

into account the periodic weekends Toni was required to work; lowered the monthly 

child support amount to $600 per month; struck the maintenance award; added a Ford 

truck valued at $8000 that had been omitted from the stipulated property list; and 

modified the equalization amount that Toni owed Joshua to $11,710. 

¶ 24 Toni timely appealed from this order. 
8 

¶ 25 ANALYSIS 

¶ 26 On appeal, Toni raises two issues. First, she claims that the trial court’s property 

distribution was inequitable and was not based upon the evidence in the record because 

the distribution omitted the jointly held real estate. Second, Toni claims that the trial 

court’s child support calculation was erroneous. 

¶ 27 Property Distribution 

¶ 28 Toni claims that the trial court should have included the 22 acres of real estate in 

its property distribution. Joshua argues that the trial court’s distribution was correct 

because the parties had entered a valid stipulation and because Toni had indicated that 

she would not pursue a share of the real estate that his stepfather had given him. 

¶ 29 Settlements in cases are guided by the principles of contract law. Rose v. 

Mavrakis, 343 Ill. App. 3d 1086, 1090, 799 N.E.2d 469, 473 (2003). Marital settlement 

agreements, like the property division stipulation in this case, are considered contracts. 

In re Marriage of Haller, 2012 IL App 110478, ¶ 26, 980 N.E.2d 261 (citing In re 

Marriage of Bohnsack, 2012 IL App (2d) 110250, ¶ 9, 968 N.E.2d 692). “The best 

indicator of the parties’ intent is the language used in [the] marital settlement agreement.” 

In re Marriage of Frank, 2015 IL App (3d) 140292, ¶ 11, 40 N.E.3d 740. If the terms of 

the agreement are unambiguous, the parties’ intent must be determined from the language 

utilized. Id. ¶ 12. The language is considered ambiguous if the wording “is susceptible 

to more than one reasonable interpretation.” Id. On appeal, we review a trial court’s 

interpretation of a marital settlement agreement de novo. Id. 
9 

¶ 30 When a party asks the court to modify or vacate a property settlement, the 

presumption is that the settlement is valid. In re Marriage of Hamm-Smith, 261 Ill. App. 

3d 209, 214, 633 N.E.2d 225, 229 (1994) (citing In re Marriage of Riedy, 130 Ill. App. 

3d 311, 313, 474 N.E.2d 28, 30 (1985)). 

¶ 31 The record contains no documentary or testimonial evidence supporting Joshua’s 

claim that Toni planned to gift Joshua with her share of the 22 acres. 

¶ 32 The record contains the document Cynthia A. Bevis prepared that was entered as 

an exhibit at trial. From the express wording used in the exhibit, Bevis did not place a 

value on the 22 acres of real estate. During the hearing, the trial court stated that it 

assumed that Bevis’s valuation included the real estate because she was a real estate

expert. Then, in ruling against Toni’s modification request, the court indicated that Toni 

stipulated to the value of the “real estate” and therefore she is “stuck with it.” 

¶ 33 We find that it is difficult to square the trial court’s statement that Toni stipulated 

to the value of the real estate with the evidentiary documents before the trial court. The 

stipulation document prepared by Joshua’s attorney did not include the real estate. 

Joshua’s attorney attempts to argue that the 22 acres of real estate was included in the 

stipulation and that the value was $21,749.75. We find that this argument 

mischaracterizes the evidence. The stipulated amount matches the value Bevis placed 

only on the double wide. Looking at the stipulation, Joshua’s attorney did not specify a 

value for the underlying 22 acres. The stipulation does not state that the $21,749.75 

value is for real estate. The marital asset listed next to the $21,749.75 value is “double 

wide.” While the documentation clearly reflects that the parties stipulated to the value of 
10 

the double wide, it strains logic to accept the trial court’s implicit finding that the term 

“double wide” included the 22 acres. 

¶ 34 We also conclude that there was no evidence provided in Bevis’s valuation report 

supporting the trial court’s statement that her valuation must have included the real estate 

because her expertise was in real estate. By its express wording, the stipulated exhibit 

provided valuation only for the double wide. In addition, the claim that real estate was

included in Bevis’s valuation was directly contradicted by both the language of the asset 

stipulation (“double wide” with no mention of real estate) and the higher valuation for the 

real estate contained in Joshua’s financial statement. 

¶ 35 The language of the stipulation, coupled with the Bevis valuation of the double 

wide, is clear and unambiguous. If the terms of the stipulation are unambiguous, as we 

find that they are in this case, intent must be determined from the language of the 

agreement. Marriage of Frank, 2015 IL App (3d) 140292, ¶ 12. We find that the 

stipulation only awarded Joshua the double wide—not the double wide and the 22 acres. 

¶ 36 In addition, the record contains Toni’s affidavit in which she states that when the 

stipulation was prepared, she believed that the land was only in Joshua’s name. Toni’s 

claim is supported by her financial statement. Toni’s financial statement did not include 

the real estate as one of her assets. In contrast, Joshua’s financial statement listed the real 

estate. Both financial statements were stipulated exhibits at trial, and thus the conflicting 

evidence was before the court for consideration. 

¶ 37 Furthermore, Joshua’s attorney made statements at the motion hearing reflective 

of an intent not to list the value of the 22 acres. Joshua’s attorney stated that she did not 
11 

believe that Toni was going to make a claim against the real estate. This belief was 

apparently based upon statements made either by Toni or by Toni’s original attorney. 

And, when Toni was ordered by the court to obtain a valuation of the double wide, and 

Toni produced the valuation prepared by Bevis at $21,749.75, Joshua’s attorney stated 

that she and her client “were very pleasantly surprised *** and we accepted it.” Utilizing 

that value for the double wide, they included only the value of the double wide on the list 

of assets to be awarded to Joshua with no reference to the 22 acres. Joshua’s attorney 

stated that she would not have been properly representing her client if she had added a 

value for the 22 acres because that would have changed the equalization payment and 

would have been detrimental to Joshua. 

¶ 38 Moreover, we find that the trial court’s statement that Toni was “stuck” with her 

stipulated asset distribution to be inconsistent with the trial court’s subsequent amended 

judgment. In the amended judgment, Toni’s attorney informed the trial court of another 

omitted asset that Joshua was receiving—a Ford truck valued at $8000. This asset should 

have been included in and increased the value of his lawn care business. Despite the 

stipulation to the value of the lawn care business, the trial court stated: “[W]hat I have got 

as a record—and I am going [to] follow my record. So I am going to—the $8,000.00 is 

the value for the truck. That’s it. We know there is a recapitulation so it’s not $8,000.00, 

it’s $4,000.00.” 

¶ 39 Whether a judgment should be vacated is within the trial court’s sound discretion. 

Espedido v. St. Joseph Hospital, 172 Ill. App. 3d 460, 466, 526 N.E.2d 664, 667 (1988). 

Vacating a judgment will not be considered an abuse of discretion when doing so 
12 

promotes substantial justice between the parties. Id. We find that the trial court should 

have vacated or modified the property division stipulation in order to include the 22 acres 

of real estate owned by Toni and Joshua. The trial court modified the parties’ stipulation 

after the trial to include another omitted asset—the Ford truck; the stipulation 

unambiguously awarded only the double wide to Joshua; the stipulated financial 

statement exhibits provided by the parties reflect the omission and discrepancy in value; 

and the expert valuation expressly only valued the double wide. Even if we assume that 

this was Toni’s unilateral mistake, the stipulation could be set aside pursuant to contract 

law. See Cameron v. Bogusz, 305 Ill. App. 3d 267, 273, 711 N.E.2d 1194, 1198 (1999). 

Accordingly, we vacate the property distribution and asset equalization sections of the 

amended judgment. We remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings 

consistent with this order. 

¶ 40 Child Support

¶ 41 Toni also claims that the trial court erred in setting child support at $600 per 

month because the trial court should have applied the provisions of section 505(a)(3.8) of 

the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act. 750 ILCS 5/505(a)(3.8) (West 

2018). On appeal from a child support determination, the reviewing court will not 

overturn the trial court’s decision unless the trial court abused its discretion. In re 

Marriage of Deem, 328 Ill. App. 3d 453, 457, 766 N.E.2d 661, 665 (2002) (citing In re 

Marriage of Tietz, 238 Ill. App. 3d 965, 978, 605 N.E.2d 670, 680 (1992)). 

¶ 42 Section 505(a)(3.8) provides guidance in cases where physical care is shared 

between the parents. The section provides: 
13 

“If each parent exercises 146 or more overnights per year 

with the child, the basic child support obligation is multiplied 

by 1.5 to calculate the shared care child support obligation. 

The court shall determine each parent’s share of the shared 

care child support obligation based on the parent’s percentage 

share of combined net income. The child support obligation is 

then computed for each parent by multiplying that parent’s 

portion of the shared care support obligation by the 

percentage of time the child spends with the other parent. The 

respective child support obligations are then offset, with the 

parent owing more child support paying the difference 

between the child support amounts.” 

750 ILCS 5/505(a)(3.8) (West 2018). 

¶ 43 In this case the trial court’s concern was that Toni was not currently exercising 

146 or more overnights per year because of her work schedule, and thus application of 

section 505(a)(3.8) was inappropriate. The court stated: 

“She had a job obligation. She had to work out of town. How 

long that continues we don’t know. So the reality is that she 

hasn’t been able to exercise all of her time. *** I can’t change 

your facts in life as you go through it. Different jobs. 

Different positions. Different pay scales. It’s going to change. 

*** [W]e have the ability to modify things based upon 

the facts, and people don’t get locked in generally speaking to 

a lifetime obligation.” 

¶ 44 Toni argues that the trial court should have applied the child support calculation in 

section 505(a)(3.8) in this case because she was awarded 156 overnights per year in the 

amended allocation judgment. However, that number does not account for Toni’s one 

weekend per month that she works. When Toni is out of town, those days revert to 

Joshua, and so she falls below the 146 overnights threshold for application of the section 

505(a)(3.8) formula.
14 

¶ 45 Having reviewed the record, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in its child support determination. Marriage of Deem, 328 Ill. App. 3d at 457. 

As the trial court aptly stated, the future may mandate a change to the child support 

amount. 

¶ 46 CONCLUSION 

¶ 47 For the reasons stated in this order, we vacate the property distribution and asset 

equalization order; affirm the child support order; and remand for further proceedings. 

¶ 48 Vacated in part; affirmed in part; and remanded.