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No. 13-3827
 

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
 

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
 

SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,
 

Plaintiff-Appellee
 

v. 

JOHN J. KORESKO, 

Defendants-Appellant 

On Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 

BRIEF FOR THE SECRETARY OF LABOR 

M. PATRICIA SMITH ELIZABETH HOPKINS 

Solicitor of Labor Counsel for Appellate and Special Litigation 

G. WILLIAM SCOTT EDWARD D. SIEGER 

Acting Associate Solicitor Senior Appellate Attorney 

 U.S. Department of Labor 

 200 Constitution Ave., N.W., 

Rm. S-2007 

 Washington, D.C. 20210 

 (202) 693-5771 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

TABLE OF CONTENTS
 

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................iv
 

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT.......................................................................1
 

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES............................................................................2
 

STATEMENT OF RELATED CASES AND PROCEEDINGS .........................3
 

STATEMENT OF THE CASE...............................................................................4
 

A.	 Koresko's Death Benefits Operations ...................................................4
 

B.	 The Secretary's 2009 Litigation Against the Koresko Defendants ......6
 

C.	 The Secretary's 2012 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment .............8
 

D.	 The Secretary's 2013 Motion for a TRO and Preliminary
 

Injunction ............................................................................................11
 

E.	 The District Court's Initial Response to the Secretary's Motion ........12
 

F.	 Koresko's Actions After the District Court's Freeze Orders ..............13
 

G.	 The District Court's Order of Appeal..................................................15
 

H.	 The Florida Bankruptcy Filings and Continuing Proceedings in 

District Court.......................................................................................16
 

THE DISTRIC COURT ACTED WELL WITHIN ITS DISCRETION IN
 

REMOVING THE KORESKO DEFENDANTS AND APPOINTING THE 

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT.............................................................................18
 

STANDARD OF REVIEW ...................................................................................21
 

ARGUMENT..........................................................................................................21
 

INDEPENDENT FIDUCIARY.............................................................................21
 

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TABLE OF CONTENTS—(continued)
 

A.	 The Secretary Is Likely to Prevail on the Merits ................................22
 

1.	 ERISA plans participate in the Koresko death benefit
 

arrangement...............................................................................24
 

2.	 The REAL VEBA and SEWBPT Trusts Hold Plan Assets......25
 

3.	 Koresko is an ERISA Fiduciary who violated ERISA .............28
 

4.	 Removing Koresko and appointing the Independent Fiduciary is
 

appropriate equitable relief under ERISA ................................29
 

B.	 The Other Preliminary Injunction Factors Support the District Court's 

Order 30
 

1. The Secretary showed irreparable harm.........................................30
 

2.	 The order will not result in greater harm to other parties.........31
 

3.	 The public interest supports the district court's order...............32
 

C.	 Koresko's Defenses Confirm the Wisdom of the District Court's Order
 

32
 

1. The 2009 amendment did not eliminate Koresko's ERISA
 

problems....................................................................................33
 

2.	 The Secretary has Article III standing ......................................36
 

3.	 The District Court's withdrawal of the bankruptcy references 

and stay of bankruptcy proceedings provides no basis to upset 

the order at issue here ...............................................................38
 

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TABLE OF CONTENTS—(continued)
 

CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................43 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

CERTIFICATE OF IDENTICAL COMPLIANCE 

OF BRIEFS AND VIRUS CHECK 

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 

Federal Cases: Page 

Adams v. Freedom Forge Corp.,
 

204 F.3d 475 (3d Cir. 2000)..........................................................................21
 

Bd. of Trs. of Bricklayers Local 6 Welfare Fund v. Wettlin Assocs, Inc.,
 

237 F.3d 270 (3d Cir. 2001)....................................................................23, 28
 

Casey v. Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa.,
 

14 F.3d 848 (3d Cir. 1994)..............................................................................2
 

Cent. States, Se & Sw Areas Pension Fund v. Central Transp., Inc.,
 

472 U.S. 559 (1985)......................................................................................35
 

Chao v. Malkani,
 

452 F.3d 290 (4th Cir. 2006)...................................................................29, 30
 

Chevron, USA, Inc. v. Natural Res. Defense Council,
 

467 U.S. 837 (1984)......................................................................................26
 

City of New York v. Golden Feather Smoke Shop, 

597 F. 3d 115 (2d Cir. 2010)...................................................................31 n.3 

Confer v. Custom Eng'g Co.,
 

952 F.2d 34 (3d Cir. 1991)............................................................................34
 

Confer v. Custom Eng'g Co.,
 

952 F.2d 41 (3d Cir. 1991)................................................................34 n.5, 35
 

David v. Alphin,
 

704 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 2013).........................................................................38
 

Delgrosso v. Spang & Co.,
 

769 F.2d 928 (3d Cir. 1985)....................................................................29, 30
 

Edmonson v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co.,
 

725 F.3d 406(3d Cir. 2013),(cert. denied),
 

2014 WL 469647 (U.S. May 19, 2014) ............................................23, 33 n.4
 

iv
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Federal Cases-(continued): Page 

Elliott v. Kiesewetter,
 

98 F.3d 47 (3d Cir. 1996)..............................................................................31
 

Fechter v. HMW Indus., Inc.,
 

879 F.2d 1111 (3d Cir. 1989)........................................................................31
 

Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, No. 12-1751,
 

2014 WL 2864481 (U.S. June 25, 2014) ......................................................35
 

Glanton ex rel Alcoa Prescription Drug Plan v. Advance PCS, Inc.,
 

465 F.3d 1123 (9th Cir. 2006).......................................................................38
 

Government of Virgin Islands v. Virgin Islands Paving, Inc., 

714 F.2d 283 (3dh Cir. 1983)..................................................................31 n.3 

Graden v. Conexant Sys., Inc.,
 

496 F.3d 291 (3d Cir. 2007)..........................................................................36
 

Gruber v. Hubbard Bert Karle Weber, Inc.,
 

159 F.3d 780 (3d Cir. 1998)......................................................................9, 24
 

Herman v. South Carolina Nat'l Bank,
 

140 F.3d 1413 (11th Cir. 1998).....................................................................37
 

In re Koresko, 

No. 13-mc-0294 (E.D. Pa. June 19, 2014) (appeal pending)....................5 n.1 

In re Pasquariello,
 

16 F.3d 525 (3d Cir. 1994)......................................................................39, 40
 

In re Penn-Mont Benefit Servs., Inc.,
 

No. 14-1933 (3d Cir.) (appeal pending)..........................................................4
 

In re Penn-Mont Benefit Servs., Inc.,
 

2013 WL 6405046 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2013) ..................................................6
 

In re Pressman-Gutman Co., Inc.,
 

459 F.3d 383 (3d Cir. 2006)............................................................................1
 

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Federal Cases-(continued): Page 

In re Pruitt, 

910 F.2d 1160 (3d Cir. 1990)..................................................................39, 41 

Johnson v. Couturier, 

572 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2009).......................................................................32 

Kauffman v. Dreyfus Fund, Inc., 

434 F.2d 727 (3d Cir. 1970)..........................................................................40 

Kershner v. Mazurkiewicz, 

670 F.2d 440 (3d Cir. 1982) (en banc)..........................................................22 

Langlais v. Penn-Mont Benefit Servs., Inc., 

No. 14-1940 (3d Cir.) (appeal pending)..........................................................4 

Liberty Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 

562 F.3d 553 (3d Cir. 2009)..........................................................................22 

Martin v. Nat'l Bank of Alaska, 

828 F. Supp. 1427 (D. Alaska 1992).............................................................27 

Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 

508 U.S. 248 (1993) ................................................................................34 n.5 

Musmeci v. Schwegmann Giant Super Markets, Inc., 

332 F.3d 339 (5th Cir. 2003)...................................................................34 n.5 

Nat'l Sec. Sys., Inc. v. Iola, 

700 F.3d 65 (3d Cir. 2012)............................................................................26 

Osei-Afriyie v. Med. Coll. of Pa., 

937 F.2d 876 (3d Cir. 1991)..........................................................................40 

Rosa v. Resolution Trust Corp., 

938 F.2d 383 (3d Cir. 1991)....................................................................31 n.3 

Rowland v. California Men's Colony, 

506 U.S. 194 (1993)......................................................................................40 

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Federal Cases-(continued): Page 

SEC v. Byers,
 

609 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2010)............................................................................42
 

Secretary of Labor v. Doyle,
 

675 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2012)..............................................................10, 27, 28
 

Secretary of Labor v. Fitzsimmons,
 

805 F.2d 682 (7th Cir. 1986) (en banc).........................................................37
 

Secretary of Labor v. Koresko, 

377 Fed. Appx. 238 (3d Cir. 2010) .....................................................5, 14 n.2 

Simbraw, Inc. v. United States,
 

367 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1996)..........................................................................40
 

Solis v. Koresko,
 

2009 WL 2776630 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 31, 2009)..............................................5, 7
 

Solis v. Koresko,
 

884 F. Supp. 2d 261 (E.D. Pa. 2012) ..............................................................5
 

Solis v. Wallis,
 

2012 WL 3779065 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 30, 2012)................................................38
 

United States v. American Bell Tel. Co.,
 

128 U.S. 315 (1888)......................................................................................37
 

United States v. Raines,
 

362 U.S. 17 (1960)........................................................................................37
 

Vermont Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens,
 

529 U.S. 765 (2000)......................................................................................37
 

Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council,
 

555 U.S. 7 (2008) ....................................................................................21, 22
 

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Federal Statutes: Page 

Title 11 Bankruptcy Code: 

11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4)............................................................................................38
 

Title 28 Judicial and Judiciary Review: 

28 U.S.C. § 157(d) ................................................................................................17
 

28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1)............................................................................................1
 

28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)(1)............................................................................................2
 

28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)(2)............................................................................................2
 

Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Title I
 

as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq.:
 

Section 2(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) ...........................................................31 n.3
 

Section 2(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b)...........................................................31 n.3
 

Section 3(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1)...........................................................24, 25
 

Section 3(21)(A)(i), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)(i)..........................................23
 

Section 3(42), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(42).............................................................25
 

Section 3(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(b).................................................................26
 

Section 4(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1003(a).................................................................22
 

Section 401(b)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(2) .............................................33 n.4
 

Section 404(a)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A)...................................22, 29
 

Section 404(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B).........................................22
 

Section 404(a)(1)(D), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D).........................................35
 

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Section 404(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(b).............................................................29
 

Federal Statutes-(continued): Page 

Section 406(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1106(b).......................................................23, 29
 

Section 409(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a).............................................................29
 

Section 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B).........................................36
 

Section 502(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2)................................................1, 36
 

Section 502(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(5)....................................1, 31 n.3, 36
 

Section 502(e)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1)......................................................1
 

Federal Rules: 

29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-3(b)..........................................................................................8
 

29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-101(h)(2) .........................................................................10, 25
 

29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-101(j)(12)..............................................................................25
 

Miscellaneous: 

Fed. R. App. P. 21.................................................................................................39
 

50 Fed. Reg. 961, 967 (1985) .........................................................................26, 27
 

16 Charles Wright, et al., Federal Practice & Procedure § 3922 (2d ed. 2012).....2
 

Helene S. Shapo & George T. Bogert, The Law of Trusts and 

William B. Stoebuck & Dale A. Whitman, The Law of Property § 5.2
 

Trustees § 181 (3d ed. 2012).........................................................................28
 

(3d ed. 2000) ................................................................................................26
 

DOL Advisory Op No. 93-14A (May 5, 1993) ....................................................27
 

DOL Advisory Op No. 94-31A,
 

1994 WL 501646 (Sept. 9, 1994)..................................................................27
 

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Black's Law Dictionary 1604 (9th ed. 2009)........................................................26
 

Miscellaneous--(continued): Page 

Black's Law Dictionary 885 (9th ed. 2009)..........................................................27
 

http://www.padisciplinaryboard.org/look-up/pa-attorneypublic.php?id=42795&attname=John+J.+Koresko+V&violations=10....5 n.1 

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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 

The Secretary of Labor brought this action under sections 502(a)(2) and 

(a)(5) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 

1132(a)(2), (a)(5). The district court had jurisdiction under 29 U.S.C. § 

1132(e)(1). The district court order on appeal was dated September 16, 2013 

and entered on September 17, 2013. Appellant's Appendix (App.) 2-8. The 

appeal was timely filed on September 19, 2013. App. 1. 

The order on appeal is not a final order, but this Court has jurisdiction 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) because the order effectively grants a preliminary 

injunction. An injunction under this section "is an order [1] directed to a party, 

[2] enforceable by contempt, and [3] designed to accord or protect some or all 

of the substantive relief sought by the complaint in more than a [temporary] 

fashion." In re Pressman-Gutman Co., Inc., 459 F.3d 383, 392 (3d Cir. 2006) 

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The order on appeal removes 

John Koresko and related defendants from the positions they hold in two trusts 

and with related welfare benefit plans, appoints an independent fiduciary to 

administer the trusts and the plans, and enjoins the Koresko defendants from 

interfering with this transfer of authority. App. 2-3, 6-7, ¶¶ 1, 10. The order is 

enforceable through contempt. See District Court Document (Doc.) 522 (Order 

for Koresko defendants to show cause why they should not be held in contempt 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

for failure to comply with the order on appeal). The September 17, 2013 order 

also grants some of the relief sought by the Secretary. See Supplemental 

Appendix (SA) -173 (Doc. 1) (complaint, prayer for relief, seeking among other 

things an order removing the Koresko defendants from their positions, 

appointing an independent fiduciary, and enjoining the Koresko defendants 

from exercising any custody, control, or decision-making authority with respect 

to the assets of any ERISA plan); SA-281 (Doc. 349) (supplemental complaint, 

same relief). The order is also not "temporary" for purposes of defining an 

injunction because it has lasted substantially longer than the period of a 

temporary restraining order. See Casey v. Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa., 14 

F.3d 848, 855 (3d Cir. 1994); 16 C.Wright, et al., Federal Practice & Procedure, 

§ 3922, at 72 n.5 (2d ed. 2012). 

Because the Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)(1), it is 

unnecessary to decide whether jurisdiction exists under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)(2) 

on the theory that the order under review appoints a receiver. 

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 

Whether the district court acted within its discretion in removing the 

Koresko defendants from their positions of authority in two trusts and related 

welfare benefit plans, appointing an independent fiduciary to administer the 

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trusts and the plans, and enjoining the Koresko defendants from interfering with 

this transfer of authority. 

STATEMENT OF RELATED CASES AND PROCEEDINGS 

In earlier proceedings in this case, this Court denied the Koresko 

defendants' request for a stay of the order on appeal and their challenge to the 

order through a petition for a writ of mandamus. Order, No. 13-3827 (Dec. 26, 

2013); Order, No. 13-4617 (Dec. 26, 2013). The Court also denied as moot 

Koresko's pro se motion to stay the trial held from June 9-11, 2014. Order, No. 

13-3827 (June 17, 2014). The Court dismissed the Koresko defendants' attempt 

to appeal a district court order denying reconsideration of the order on appeal, 

Order, No. 13-3890 (Dec. 3, 2013), and their attempts to appeal six other 

district court orders against them. Order, No. 13-3359 (Dec. 3, 2013) (order 

scheduling depositions); Order, No. 13-3358 (Dec. 3, 2013) (order permitting 

Secretary's lawsuit to continue despite bankruptcy filings); Order, Nos. 13­

3102, 13-3103, 13-3104, 13-3130 (Aug. 19, 2013) (orders granting partial 

summary judgment to Secretary, ordering Koresko to support his claim of 

medical impairment, and temporarily freezing trust assets). Koresko's appeal 

from an order setting a trial date and restricting the use of frozen funds to pay 

Koresko's attorneys fees is pending in this Court in No. 14-1934. 

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The cases listed as related in appellant's brief do not arise out of the 

Secretary's litigation against the Koresko defendants. They are appeals by 

Koresko from orders granting relief from a bankruptcy stay to the United States 

to seek tax penalties, In re Penn-Mont Benefit Servs., Inc., No. 14-1933 (3d 

Cir.), and to a private plaintiff to seek death benefits, Langlais v. PennMont 

Benefit Servs., No. 14-1940 (3d Cir.) . On February 25, 2014, this Court issued 

an Order in the instant case stating that because it appears the automatic stay 

does not apply, the appeal here (No. 13-3827) will not be stayed. See infra, 

note 2 and Statement Section H (discussing history of bankruptcy proceedings). 

STATEMENT OF THE CASE 

A. Koresko's Death Benefits Operation 

Appellant John Koresko has been marketing and running a death benefit 

insurance arrangement through a number of entities controlled by him. SA-125 

(Doc. 474), at 1. These entities include Penn-Mont Benefit Services, Inc., Penn 

Public Trust, two Koresko law firms, and two trusts called the Regional 

Employers' Assurance Leagues Voluntary Employees' Beneficiary Association 

Trust (REAL-VEBA) and Single Employer Welfare Benefit Plan Trust 

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(SEWBPT). Id. at 1 n.1; SA-024 (Doc. 314), at 5-9 (Solis v. Koresko, 884 F. 

Supp. 2d 261, 266 (E.D. Pa. 2012)) .

1 

Koresko's arrangement involves a prototype death benefit plan, a 

corresponding trust, and an unincorporated association of employers. Secretary 

of Labor v. Koresko, 377 Fed. Appx. 238, 239 (3d Cir. 2010). Penn-Mont 

markets the arrangement to employers, who, in order to participate, are required 

to become members of the association, adopt the prototype plan, and subscribe 

to one of the trusts. SA-024 (Doc. 314), at 5-6. Penn-Mont has no 

employees of its own and operates through the Koresko law firms. Id. at 8. 

Employers who adopt the prototype plan can select the type and amount 

of benefits offered and set eligibility requirements for their employees. SA-024 

(Doc. 314), at 6; see SA-215 (Doc. 268-17) (GX 14, prototype plan for REAL 

VEBA). Eligible employees of these adopting employers may then sign 

1 Koresko purported to appeal on behalf of himself, all of these entities, and an 

attorney who formerly worked for Koresko's law firms (Jeanne Bonney). His 

appeal on behalf of the trusts is improper because he has no authority to act on 

their behalf. SA-136 (Doc. 509), at 3. Although his law license in 

Pennsylvania has been suspended, http://www.padisciplinaryboard.org/lookup/pa-attorneypublic.php?id=42795&attname=John+J.+Koresko+V&violations=10, and he 

admits that he was recently disqualified from being trial counsel for Bonney 

and filed his brief pro se, he asserts that he is representing his affiliates, 

Appellants Br. Cover page *, and that he is a member in good standing of the 

bar of this Court. Id., Local Rule 46.1(e) Certification. See also In re Koresko, 

No. 13-mc-0294 (E.D. Pa. Jun 19, 2014) (temporary suspension of Koresko 

pending further definitive disciplinary action by the Pennsylvania Supreme 

Court). 

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agreements to participate in the arrangement. SA-024 (Doc. 314), at 6; see, 

e.g., SA-264 (Doc. 268-48) (GX 44, Castellano Adoption Agreement); SA-271 

(Doc. 268-50) (GX 46, Castellano Participation Agreement). 

The prototype plan document, which governs the benefit arrangement, 

requires employers to contribute all amounts necessary to provide all benefits. 

SA-215 (Doc. 268-17), at 23 (GX 14, § 4.01(a)(1)). Penn-Mont also charges 

additional annual trustee fees and administrative fees. See, e.g., SA-387-458 

(Doc. 377-58, 377-64, 377-70, 377-71, 377-72, 377-74to 75, 377-76 to 78, 377­

80 to 81, 377-82) (GX 25b, 25g, 25l, 25m, 25n, 25o, 25p, 25r, 25s). Employer 

contributions are received into a trust, and may be used to purchase insurance 

policies on the lives of participating employees to fund benefits. SA-201 (Doc. 

268-14) (GX 11, Master Trust Agreement Whereas Cl., § 4.2); SA-215 (Doc. 

268-17) (GX 14, § 7.05(a)). The assets and earnings of the trust are to be used 

only for the benefit of persons designated as employees or beneficiaries of 

adopting employers. SA-201 (Doc. 268-14) (GX 11, §§ 2.1, 2.3); see also SA215 (Doc. 268-17) (GX 14, §§ 2.01, 2.03). 

B. The Secretary's 2009 Litigation Against the Koresko Defendants 

In a March 2009 complaint, the Secretary alleged, in relevant part, that 

Koresko and entities he controlled were ERISA fiduciaries with respect to at 

least 126 employer-sponsored plans that participated in this multiple-employer 

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death benefit arrangement. SA-173 (Doc. 1) (complaint), ¶¶ 9-13. They 

violated their fiduciary duties, the Secretary alleged, by failing to hold ERISA 

plan assets in trust and by using the assets for purposes other than to provide 

benefits under the terms of the plans. SA-173 (Doc. 1), ¶¶ 29-39. Penn-Mont, 

as plan administrator, also set its own fees without approval by an independent 

fiduciary and directed the payment of these fees from plan assets. Id. ¶ 34. The 

Secretary further alleged that, contrary to plan terms requiring full payments of 

death benefits, eligible beneficiaries under at least three of the employersponsored plans did not receive full payment of these benefits. Id. ¶¶ 25-28. 

Among other things, the Secretary sought an order removing the Koresko 

defendants from their positions as fiduciaries and appointing an independent 

fiduciary in their place. Id. p. 19-20 (Prayer for Relief). 

In May and June 2009, the Koresko defendants directed a bank acting as 

trustee for the plans to use trust assets to pay legal fees to Koresko's law firm 

and other law firms that were defending various plan sponsors in litigation with 

the Internal Revenue Service. See SA-001 (Doc. 107), at 9 (Solis v. Koresko, 

2009 WL 2776630 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 31, 2009)). The bank refused to do so, and 

Koresko, through Penn-Mont, gave notice that he was firing the bank. SA-001 

(Doc. 107), at 9. The Secretary then sought a temporary restraining order and 

preliminary injunction. Docs. 63, 65. The district court (Jones, J.) denied the 

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application for a temporary restraining order, Doc. 71, and the Koresko 

defendants filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that ERISA does not apply to the 

plans at issue here. Doc. 69. They also argued that on July 29, 2009, they had 

amended the terms of the death benefit arrangement to eliminate coverage for 

non-owner employees, thereby leaving only plans with owners, which are not 

covered by ERISA. App. 175-178 (Doc. 139 at 28-42, transcript of October 6, 

2009 afternoon hearing); see, 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-3(b) (plan under which no 

employees are participants is not an ERISA plan). 

On August 31, 2009, Judge C. Darnell Jones II denied the Koresko 

defendants' motion to dismiss, reasoning in relevant part that whether the plans 

at issue are covered by ERISA is not a question of subject matter jurisdiction 

SA-001 (Doc. 107) at 12-13. In January 2010, the district court concluded that 

the Secretary had not made the high showing for injunctive relief at that stage 

of the case and denied the Secretary's motion for a preliminary injunction 

without prejudice. App. 187-188 (Doc. 195, at 2-3). 

C. The Secretary's 2012 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 

In March 2010, the district court granted the Koresko defendants' motion 

to stay proceedings due to a medical condition of one of the defendants, Jeanne 

Bonney. Doc. 210. The case was transferred to Judge Mary A. McLaughlin 

and after further proceedings the case was removed from the court's suspense 

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calendar in January 2012. Doc. 260. In February 2012, the Secretary filed a 

motion for partial summary judgment, which focused on defendants' ERISA 

violations related to three plans that had beneficiaries who had not been paid the 

full death benefits owed under the plans' terms. Doc. 267. 

In August 2012, the district court (McLaughlin, J.) granted the 

Secretary's motion in part. Doc. 315. In an accompanying memorandum, the 

court initially concluded that although the Koresko-run trust that held employer 

contributions was not itself an ERISA plan, the three employer-sponsored plans 

at issue were ERISA plans. SA-024 (Doc. 314), at 20-32. The court relied 

largely on Gruber v. Hubbard Bert Karle Weber, Inc., 159 F.3d 780 (3d Cir. 

1998), and Department of Labor opinion letters for this conclusion. SA-024 

(Doc. 314), at 20-27. 

The court gave three reasons for rejecting the Koresko defendants' 

argument that the purported July 29, 2009 amendment SA-273 (Doc. 285-2, pp. 

4-5) had eliminated ERISA coverage by eliminating benefits for non-owner 

employees. SA-024 (Doc. 314), at 32-37. First, the court concluded that the 

entity executing the amendment (PennMont, the plan administrator) did not 

have authority under the governing plan document to amend the plans. SA-024 

(Doc. 314), at 34-36. Second, the court concluded that the amendment violated 

a provision in the governing plan document prohibiting discrimination in favor 

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or highly compensated employees. Id. at 36. Finally, the court reasoned that it 

would be wholly contrary to ERISA's purposes to allow a plan to avoid 

enforcement of otherwise applicable ERISA requirements simply by an 

amendment that eliminates ERISA coverage. Id. at 37. 

The court also rejected the Koresko defendants' argument that the REALVEBA trust held no ERISA plan assets. SA-024 (Doc. 314), at 45-58. 

Applying the test established in Secretary of Labor v. Doyle, 675 F.3d 187 (3d 

Cir. 2012), the court concluded that the trust held ERISA plan assets because 

the ERISA plans contributing funds to the trust had an undivided beneficial 

interest in the trust's assets. Id. at 46-56. The court also found support for its 

conclusion in a Department of Labor regulation defining plan assets, 29 C.F.R. 

§ 2510.3-101(h)(2). SA-024 (Doc. 314), at 56-58. 

Based on these determinations and the conduct at issue, the district court 

concluded, in relevant part, that three of the Koresko defendants (Koresko, 

PennMont, and Bonney) are ERISA fiduciaries and that they violated ERISA 

by failing to keep the assets of the three employer-sponsored plans in trust, and 

by diverting plan assets into accounts subject to their sole control. SA-024 

(Doc. 314), at 58-70. The court concluded that there was insufficient evidence 

to show that the diverted plan assets were used for non-trust purposes, however. 

Id. at 72. Accordingly, the court denied summary judgment on the Secretary's 

10
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

claim of self-dealing and deferred a decision on relief, stating that ongoing 

discovery may reveal additional facts that could bear on the court's exercise of 

discretion. Id. at 75-76. 

D. The Secretary's 2013 Motion for a TRO and Preliminary Injunction 

After the district court's August 2012 decision, the Secretary discovered 

that the Koresko defendants had diverted more than $2,500,000 in death benefit 

proceeds for their own use and benefit, diverted at least $35,000,000 in loans on 

insurance policies owned by the REAL VEBA and SEWBPT trusts to accounts 

not owned by the trusts, and misappropriated at least $3,500,000 of these loan 

proceeds for their own use and benefit. Doc. 377-2 at 2 (Pls. Mem. in Support 

of Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction). 

This evidence shows that he misappropriated loan proceeds and death benefits 

have been used for non-trust puposes to purchase, among other things, 

Caribbean condominiums for Koresko and to pay his law firm and personal 

expenses. Id. at 2-3. The Secretary alleged that the Koresko defendants may 

lack sufficient domestic assets to make the plans whole for their losses. Id. at 3. 

Based on this newly discovered evidence, on June 19, 2013, the Secretary 

again sought a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction and an 

order removing the Koresko defendants from their fiduciary positions and 

11
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

appointing an independent fiduciary to administer the plans and hold plan 

assets. Doc. 377. 

E. The District Court's Initial Response to the Secretary's Motion 

The district court initially scheduled an evidentiary hearing on the 

Secretary's motion for July 8, 2013. SA-102 (Doc. 379). On June 26, 2013, the 

district court ordered that similar motions filed in three cases brought by private 

parties against the Koresko defendants also be heard on July 8, 2013. SA-103 

(Doc. 385). In response to a motion by the Koresko defendants for a 

continuance of the hearing based on Mr. Koresko's health, Doc. 387, the court 

changed the July 8 hearing from an evidentiary one to a hearing on the 

temporary restraining order motions and a status hearing on Mr. Koresko's 

health. Doc. 391, at 2. The court also directed the Koresko defendants to 

provide medical information on Mr. Koresko's health. Id. at 2-3. With the 

consent of the parties, including counsel for Koresko, the court froze money in 

certain Koresko-controlled bank accounts pending the July 8 hearing and 

enjoined the Koresko defendants from taking actions affecting the accounts 

except as ordered by the court. SA-106 (Doc. 392), at 2. 

On July 8, 2013, neither Koresko nor any of the other defendants 

appeared at the district court hearing on the Secretary's motion, and their 

counsel moved to withdraw. SA-109 (Doc. 407) at 2 n.1. The district court 

12
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

addressed the withdrawal issue without reaching a decision on it and contacted 

Koresko by telephone. Id. Koresko then participated in the discussion of the 

substantive issues in court. Id. In response to Koresko's claim of prejudice, the 

district court issued an order on July 9, 2013, modifying the freeze on bank 

accounts to remove three accounts subject to the freeze, and granted the 

Koresko defendants' request for a continuance of the evidentiary hearing until 

August 12, 2012. SA-109 (Doc. 407), at 2-3, 6-7. The court found that the 

Secretary and private plaintiffs "have established a substantial likelihood of 

success on the merits," and irreparable injury to the public, the plans, and their 

participants and beneficiaries without relief to preserve plan assets. Id. at 4-6. 

The court declined, however, to appoint an independent fiduciary without first 

holding a full evidentiary hearing, however. Id. at 7. 

F. Koresko's Actions After the District Court's Freeze Orders 

Koresko responded to the district court's orders by filing a series of 

appeals in this Court that have since been dismissed. See Nos. 13-3102, 13­

3103, 13-3104, 13-3130, 13-3358, 13-3359. While these appeals were pending 

and the district court's freeze orders were in effect, Koresko tried to withdraw 

funds from five insurance policies insuring the lives of individuals who had 

participated in litigation against him. SA-161 (Doc. 458) at 28, 35-37 

(transcript of July 22, 2013 telephone hearing). He also requested withdrawals 

13
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

and obtained some funds from 50 insurance products owned by the trusts and 

deposited the resulting cash into his "vault." Id. at 28-29. The district court 

responded by prohibiting Koresko from taking any further action to remove 

cash from the trust-owned insurance policies and ordering him to return money 

he had received. SA-118 (Doc. 436) (July 23, 2013 Interim Order). 

Less than 24 hours after the district court ordered him not to take further 

money from the insurance policies and to return the money he had taken, Mr. 

Koresko filed bankruptcy petitions on behalf of the trusts, his law firms, Penn 

Mont, and Penn Public Trust in the Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of 

Pennsylvania.2 Koresko then attempted to drain the assets from an account 

frozen by the district court's July 8, 2013 order, citing the bankruptcy filings as 

authority for doing so. See SA-476 (Doc. 491-5). Koresko also sent letters to 

plan sponsor employers stating that if they did not send him a cash "special 

assessment" to fund the bankruptcies by September 3, 2013, he would cancel 

the benefits of their employees "forever." SA-133 (Doc. 489), at 2; SA-468-2 

to SA-468-8 (Doc. 472-2 to 472-8). The district court then ordered Koresko 

2 The district court held that the Secretary's action was exempt from the 

automatic stay resulting from this bankruptcy filing, SA -125 (Docs. 446, 474), 

and this Court dismissed the Koresko defendants' appeal from that decision 

after the Pennsylvania bankruptcy court dismissed the Koresko-filed 

bankruptcy petitions. Order, Secretary of Labor v. Koresko, No. 13-3358 (3d 

Cir. Dec. 3, 2013); see App. 19-21 (discussing bankruptcy court's dismissal). 

14
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

not to withhold benefits or deny services based on anyone's response to those 

letters or failure to forward money to Koresko. SA-133 (Doc. 489), at 1. 

Koresko also resisted attempts by the Secretary and district court to hold 

an evidentiary hearing on the Secretary's application for a temporary restraining 

order and preliminary injunction. He did not provide medical information 

requested by the district court, but then told the district court that he was unable 

to comply with a court order to propose a new date for an evidentiary hearing 

due to illness. App. 19, 23. At a September 16, 2013 hearing, Koresko again 

said he was ill and opposed appointment of an independent fiduciary without an 

evidentiary hearing. SA-167 (Doc. 515), at 71-72. He admitted that he had 

taken assets out of the trusts and used trust assets to purchase real estate in 

South Carolina and Caribbean condominiums but contended that they were "an 

investment on behalf of the trust." Id. at 89-90; see SA-145 (Doc. 429), at 59­

61, 191 (transcript of July 8, 2013 hearing). 

G. The District Court's Order on Appeal 

In light of this history, the district court concluded that it had no choice 

but to appoint an independent fiduciary over the trusts at issue. App. 23. The 

court reasoned that it had attempted to maintain the status quo until Koresko's 

alleged health problems improved, but he "continued to violate the spirit of the 

Court's orders at every turn." Id. The court was "greatly concerned" about its 

15
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

inability to inventory any diverted assets and all other assets of the trusts and to 

maintain those assets for the benefit of participants and beneficiaries of the 

employer-level plans. Id. at 24. 

Accordingly, the court's September 16, 2013 order appoints Wagner Law 

Group as an independent fiduciary to accomplish those tasks with oversight by 

the court. App. 2-3. The court's interim order removes the Koresko parties 

from their positions in the two trusts and related plans, enjoins them from 

serving in such positions, orders them to turn over all assets that have not been 

frozen and relevant documentation to the independent fiduciary, prohibits them 

from interfering with the independent fiduciary, and orders them to cooperate 

with the independent fiduciary. Id. at 1-8. 

H.	 The Florida Bankruptcy Filings and Continuing Proceedings in 

District Court 

After the dismissal of the Pennsylvania bankruptcy cases, Koresko met 

with a Florida attorney who then filed involuntary bankruptcy petitions in 

Florida against the entities whose Pennsylvania bankruptcy petitions had been 

dismissed. Doc. 858, at 4-5. Koresko also refused to cooperate with the 

independent fiduciary, which led the Secretary to ask the district court to hold 

him in contempt. Doc. 518. 

In October and November 2013, the district court held contempt hearings 

and enlisted the aid of a magistrate judge in attempts to get Koresko to comply 

16
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

with the order on appeal here. See Docs. 530, 532, 534, 536, 553, 582, 615, 

616. In December 2013, the Florida bankruptcy court transferred the Florida 

petitions to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania Bankruptcy Court, stating that 

the filing of the Florida cases "is tantamount to an impermissible change of 

venue for the [Department of Labor] Enforcement Action," and "an 

impermissible end-run around the dismissals of the Debtors' voluntary 

bankruptcy cases in the dismissal Pennsylvania Bankruptcy Court." In re PennMont Benefit Sers., Inc., 2013 WL 6405046, at *10 & n.48 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 

2013). 

In February 2014, the district court learned that the Pennsylvania 

bankruptcy court had scheduled a hearing that would require the independent 

fiduciary to submit financial information regarding the REAL VEBA and 

SEWBPT Trusts. SA-140 (Doc. 709), at 1. Because the bankruptcy court order 

conflicted with an order of the district court restricting disclosure of similar 

information, the district court found cause pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(d) to 

withdraw the cases from the bankruptcy court. Id. at 4; see Docs. 566 (order 

that initial report from Independent Fiduciary be filed under seal), 567 (initial 

report, filed under seal). The court further found that withdrawal would reduce 

forum shopping and confusion, promote uniformity of trust administration, 

conserve the assets of debtors and creditors, promote efficiency, and expedite 

17
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

administration of the trusts' assets. SA-140 (Doc. 709) at 4-5. Koresko 

challenges the withdrawal in this case. Appellant's Br. 16-23. 

In March 2014, the independent fiduciary filed additional reports under 

seal. Docs. 739, 760. The district court set a trial schedule for June 9 through 

June 20, 2014 and stated that Koresko could not use frozen funds to pay an 

attorney to represent him at trial, although the court had allowed Koresko to use 

those funds to pay for an attorney in the contempt proceedings. Doc. 720. 

Koresko has appealed this district court order in a separate appeal, No. 14-1934. 

The district court held a trial on June 9, 10, and 11, 2014, without thes 

participation of Koresko or any of the other defendants, and on June 17, 2014 

this Court denied as moot a Koresko motion filed on Saturday, June 7, 2014 to 

stay the trial. 

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 

A. The district court acted well within its discretion in removing the 

Koresko defendants from their positions of authority over the trusts and 

appointing an independent fiduciary. The removal was necessary to preserve 

the assets of the trusts after Koresko admittedly took millions of dollars in 

assets out of the trusts to buy, among other things, Caribbean condominium and 

obtain loans he has not fully repaid, and attempted to obtain more trust assets by 

18
 
 

 

 

 

repeatedly violating the spirit of district court orders freezing assets. Courts 

have upheld removal of ERISA fiduciaries on less egregious conduct. 

All of the considerations for a preliminary injunction support the district 

court's order. The Secretary has a high probability of prevailing on the merits 

because he established that Koresko's death benefit arrangement includes 

ERISA plans, that these plans have undivided interests in the trusts' assets, that 

Koresko and other defendants are ERISA fiduciaries because of their control 

over plan assets, and that they breached their fiduciary duties by failing to hold 

plan assets in trust and by using them for prohibited purposes. Koresko's 

continuing attempts to obtain trust assets and refusal to comply with court 

orders shows that the plans will be irreparably harmed if he has authority over 

the trusts. Other interested parties, including employers and employees who 

participate in Koresko's death benefit arrangement and their beneficiaries, will 

be helped, not harmed by the order removing the Koresko defendants from their 

positions of authority over the trusts and appointing an independent fiduciary. 

Any harm to Koresko from the order is speculative, largely a result of his 

refusal to cooperate with the independent fiduciary, and far outweighed by the 

harm the order avoids. The public interest embodied in ERISA also outweighs 

any harm to Koresko. 

19
 
 

 

B. Koresko ignores the district court's reasons for removing him, and 

presents arguments that confirm the wisdom of the district court's decision. He 

argues that ERISA does not apply because a July 2009 amendment to the 

Master Trust Agreement between Penn-Mont and the bank that was trustee at 

the time (unsigned by the bank) removed all ERISA plans from his death 

benefit arrangement. The governing documents did not authorize the 

amendment and in any event the amendment does not retroactively excuse the 

pre-2009 ERISA violations, including Koresko's use of trust assets to buy 

Caribbean condominiums, or Penn-Mont's continuing administration of ERISA 

plans and collection of contributions from them after the amendment. Koresko 

also argues incorrectly that the Secretary lacks Article III standing to sue him, 

contrary to established law and based on a misapplication of ERISA principles 

applicable to participants and beneficiaries. In pursuit of his admitted goal of 

using bankruptcy to avoid further proceedings in the Secretary's ERISA 

enforcement action and eliminate all claims against the trusts by the plans that 

participate in the trusts, he also attacks a February 2014 district court order 

withdrawing the bankruptcy cases to district court. The order is not part of this 

appeal, Koresko lacks standing to assert the rights of the entities in bankruptcy, 

and the order was well within the district court's discretion to avoid conflicts 

between its orders and bankruptcy proceedings. 

20
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

A preliminary injunction is reviewed for abuse of discretion, with 

findings of fact reviewed for clear error and legal issues reviewed de novo. 

See, e.g., Adams v. Freedom Forge Corp., 204 F.3d 475, 484 (3d Cir. 2000). 

This standard of review is narrow, and the district court's judgment is 

presumptively correct absent a clear abuse of discretion, obvious error in the 

application of the law, or a serious and important mistake in the consideration 

of the proof. Liberty Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 562 F.3d 553, 

556 (3d Cir. 2009). 

ARGUMENT 

THE DISTRICT COURT ACTED WELL WITHIN ITS 

DISCRETION IN REMOVING THE KORESKO DEFENDANTS 

AND APPOINTING THE INDEPENDENT FIDUCIARY 

A party seeking a preliminary injunction must show that it is likely to 

experience irreparable harm without an injunction and is reasonably likely to 

succeed on the merits. Adams, 204 F.3d at 484. If relevant, the court also 

examines the likelihood of irreparable harm to the non-moving party and 

whether the injunction serves the public interest. Id. ; see Winter v. Natural 

Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 21 (2008). Here, the district court repeatedly 

found that these factors supported its order removing Koresko and related 

parties from their positions of authority in the trusts and plans and appointing 

21
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

the independent fiduciary. SA-109 (Doc. 407) at 5; SA-118 (Doc. 436) at 2; 

App. 23. The court's findings are based on the series of events starting in June 

2013, when the Secretary and private parties sought a preliminary injunction, 

and on the court's 2012 partial summary judgment decision. App. 11-12. This 

Court may consider these events and the summary judgment decision to the 

extent necessary to assess whether the order on appeal is within the district 

court's discretion. Liberty Lincoln-Mercury, 562 F.3d at 556-57; Kershner v. 

Mazurkiewicz, 670 F.2d 440, 448-50 (3d Cir. 1982) (en banc). Considering the 

relevant facts as found by the district court (many of which are largely 

undisputed), the Court should uphold the district's order removing Koresko and 

related parties and appointing the independent fiduciary. 

A. The Secretary Is Likely to Prevail on the Merits 

ERISA sets exacting standards for fiduciaries of employee benefit plans 

that include, among other things, requirements for a fiduciary to hold plan 

assets in trust, to act solely in the interest of plan participants and beneficiaries 

and with a high degree of prudence, and not to deal with plan assets in his own 

interest or for his own account. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1003(a), 1104(a)(1)(A), (B), 

1106(b); see Edmonson v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 725 F.3d 406, 413 (3d 

Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 2014 WL 469647 (U.S. May 19, 2014). It broadly 

defines the term "fiduciary" in functional terms, to include, among other things, 

22
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

any person to the extent "he exercises any discretionary authority or 

discretionary control respecting management of such plan or exercises any 

authority or control respecting management or disposition its assets " 29 U.S.C. 

§ 1002(21)(A)(i). Thus, a person who manages or disposes of plan assets is a 

fiduciary whether or not the person exercises discretion. Bd. of Trs. of 

Bricklayers Local 6 Welfare Fund v. Wettlin Assocs., Inc., 237 F.3d 270, 273­

75 (3d Cir. 2001). 

The Secretary has a high probability of prevailing in this case because the 

evidence shows: (1) ERISA plans participate in Koresko's death benefit 

arrangement; (2) the trusts controlled by Koresko and related parties until the 

district court removed their authority held and continue to hold plan assets; (3) 

Koresko took millions of dollars from the trusts and spent large amounts of 

these funds to benefit himself and his law firms and thereby violated his 

fiduciary duties under ERISA; and (4) removing the authority of Koresko and 

other defendants over the trusts and plans and holding them personally liable 

for their misconduct is appropriate relief. 

1.	 ERISA plans participate in the Koresko death benefit 

arrangement 

In Gruber v. Hubbard Bert Karle Weber, Inc., 159 F.3d 780, 788-90 (3d 

Cir. 1998), this Court agreed with the Secretary that individual employers who 

participate in a benefits arrangement such as the one at issue here, may establish 

23
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

separate, single-employer ERISA plans even if the overall arrangement is not 

itself an ERISA plan. The Court reasoned that the test for a single-employer 

plan is whether a reasonable person can ascertain the intended benefits, a class 

of beneficiaries, the source of financing, and procedures for receiving benefits. 

Id. at 789. The crucial factor, the Court explained, is whether the employer 

expressed an intention to provide benefits on a regular and long-term basis. Id. 

The Secretary established at the summary judgment stage that at least 

three employers (Decor Coordinates, Cetylite Industries, and Domenic M. 

Castellano, D.D.S.)had established ERISA plans by participating in the Koresko 

death benefit arrangement even though the overall arrangement was not itself an 

ERISA plan. SA-024 (Doc. 314), at 24-32; see also 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) 

("welfare benefit plan" include plans that provide, "through the purchase of 

insurance or otherwise . . . benefits in the event of . . . death"). In addition, in 

seeking a preliminary injunction in June 2013, the Secretary presented evidence 

that more single-employer ERISA plans participate in the arrangement. See 

SA-371 (Doc. 377-56), GX 25 (Sweeting Declaration with supporting exhibits). 

At the June 2014 trial, the Secretary presented uncontested evidence that 

employer plans currently participate in the arrangement. The Secretary has 

thus established that ERISA plans participated and continue to participate in 

Koresko's death benefit arrangement. 

24
 
2. The REAL VEBA and SEWBPT Trusts Hold Plan Assets 

Under ERISA, the term "plan assets" is generally defined by the 

Secretary's regulations. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(42). The Secretary's regulations 

provide that when an ERISA plan acquires or holds an interest in an entity that 

is established or maintained for the purpose of offering or providing benefits 

described in ERISA's definitions of welfare and pension plans to participants or 

beneficiaries of the investing plan, "its assets will include its investment and an 

undivided interest in the underlying assets of that entity." 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3­

101(h)(2). That regulation applies here because the single-employer ERISA 

plans that participate in the Koresko arrangement acquire or hold an interest in 

the trusts that are to provide the death benefits to their employees, a form of 

benefits described in ERISA's definition of "welfare plan," 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1). 

See also 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-101(j)(12) (when a medical benefit plan acquires a 

beneficial interest in a trust that will provide the benefits, its assets include this 

beneficial interest "and an undivided interest in each of [the trust's] underlying 

assets"); 50 Fed. Reg. 961, 967 (1985) (preamble to proposed rule, explaining 

that rule applies to participation in multiple employer trusts, including trusts 

that are not ERISA plans). 

Because the Secretary's regulation is an exercise of delegated rulemaking 

authority, it is entitled to controlling weight unless it is arbitrary, capricious, or 

25
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

manifestly contrary to the statute. Chevron, USA, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. 

Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984); see, e.g., Nat'l Sec. Sys., Inc. v. Iola, 700 

F.3d 65, 96 (3d Cir. 2012). The Secretary's regulation easily satisfies this test. 

First, the Secretary’s rule is entirely consistent with background principles of 

property law, under which tenants in common, the most common form of joint 

ownership, each have an undivided right in the property. See Stoebuck & 

Whitman, The Law of Property § 5.2 (3d ed. 2000); Black's Law Dictionary 

1604 (9th ed. 2009) (definition of tenancy in common). It also promotes 

ERISA's overriding purpose of protecting the interests of ERISA plan 

participants and beneficiaries, 29 U.S.C. § 1002(b), by ensuring that even when 

a plan has placed its assets in a common trust fund that holds both plan and 

non-plan assets, those who manage the fund remain plan fiduciaries subject to 

ERISA. 50 Fed. Reg. 961, 967 (1985). The alternative would allow ERISA 

plans to "put all their assets beyond the protection of ERISA by the simple act 

of placing the assets in a common trust fund." Martin v. Nat'l Bank of Alaska, 

828 F. Supp. 1427, 1432 (D. Alaska 1992). 

Moreover, the trusts hold ERISA plan assets under ordinary notions of 

property rights that this Court uses to identify plan assets in the absence of 

specific statutory or regulatory guidance. Secretary of Labor v. Doyle, 675 

F.3d 187, 203 (3d Cir. 2012). Under this approach, plan assets generally 

26
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

"'include any property, tangible or intangible, in which the plan has a beneficial 

ownership interest.'" Id. (quoting DOL Advisory Op. No. 93-14A (May 5, 

1993)). A plan obtains a beneficial interest in particular property if "the 

property is held in trust for the benefit of the plan or its participants and 

beneficiaries." DOL Advisory Op. No. 94-31A, 1994 WL 501646, at *2 (Sept. 

9, 1994); see also Black's Law Dictionary 885 (9th ed. 2009) ("beneficial 

interest" means "[a] right or expectancy in something (such as a trust or an 

estate), as opposed to legal title to that thing"). Documents governing the plan 

may establish such beneficial interests. Doyle, 675 F.3d at 204. 

The Master Trust Agreement SA-201 (Doc. 268-14, § 2.1) and Adoption 

Agreement SA-215 (Doc. 268-17, §§ 2.01, 2.03, 2.04) require employer 

contributions to be held in trust and require all trust assets and earnings to be 

used exclusively for the benefit of the employees and beneficiaries of 

employees that participate in the Koresko death benefit arrangement. See also 

SA-024 (Doc. 314) at 48-52 (district court summary judgment decision). 

Because the trust assets and earnings are to be used for the benefit of plan 

participants and beneficiaries, the ERISA plans that participate in this 

arrangement have a beneficial interest in them. The interest is undivided 

because the assets of ERISA plans were comingled with the assets of nonERISA plans. SA-024 (Doc. 314) at 52-53; see also Helene S. Shapo & 

27
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

George T. Bogert, The Law of Trusts and Trustees § 181, at 299 (3d ed. 2012) 

(general rule in trust law is that beneficiaries have undivided interests in the 

entire trust property). 

3.	 Koresko is an ERISA fiduciary who violated ERISA 

There is no serious dispute that Koresko's exercise of control over the 

trusts' assets, in which ERISA plans held undivided interests, made him an 

ERISA fiduciary, see Wettlin, 237 F.3d at 273-75, and that he breached his 

duties to the plans by admittedly taking money from the trusts to purchase 

Caribbean condominiums and a property in South Carolina and by taking more 

than $34,000,000 in loans from trust-owned insurance policies. SA-145 ( Doc. 

429) at 59, 180-86, 191. His assertion that the condominium purchases were 

investments on behalf of the trust, SA-167 (Doc. 515), at 89-90, is contrary to 

evidence that he purchased the condominiums for himself, in his name. See 

SA-305 -324 (Docs. 377-18, 377-22, 377-26) (GX 14, 18, 22) It is also 

contrary to an ERISA prohibition against maintaining plan assets outside the 

jurisdiction of federal district courts. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(b). This misuse of plan 

assets is a clear violation of ERISA's duty of loyalty in 29 U.S.C. § 

1104(a)(1)(A) and prohibition against self-dealing in 29 U.S.C. § 1106(b). 

4.	 Removing Koresko and appointing the Independent Fiduciary 

is appropriate equitable relief under ERISA 

28
 
 

 

 

 

ERISA provides that a breaching fiduciary is personally liable for plan 

losses and profits the fiduciary made through misuse of plan assets "and shall 

be subject to such other equitable or remedial relief as the court may deem 

appropriate, including removal of such fiduciary." 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a). 

"Removal and replacement of a fund administrator under ERISA has been 

found appropriate where the administrator has been in substantial violation of 

his fiduciary duties." Delgrosso v. Spang & Co., 769 F.2d 928, 937 (3d Cir. 

1985); see, e.g., Chao v. Malkani, 452 F.3d 290, 293-94 (4th Cir. 2006). 

The district court's removal of Koresko and related defendants and 

appointment of the independent fiduciary was appropriate because Koresko's 

misappropriations and diversions in this case far exceed the misconduct found 

sufficient to remove the fiduciaries in Delgrosso and Malkani. Moreover, 

Koresko compounded his misappropriations and diversions by circumventing 

the district court's initial freeze order when he extracted cash value out of 

insurance policies, filed bankruptcy proceedings to avoid the district court's 

orders and evidentiary hearing, and threatened to cut off plan participants' 

benefits unless they paid fees to fund the bankruptcy actions. App. 23-24; SA468, 476 (Docs. 472-2, 491-5). The district court's removal of the Koresko 

defendants as plan fiduciaries was a necessary response to a "real emergency" 

intended, among other things, to allow the district court to inventory any 

29
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

diverted assets and all other assets of the trusts and the employer-level plans or 

arrangements. App. 24. 

B.	 The Other Preliminary Injunction Factors Support the District 

Court's Order 

1. The Secretary showed irreparable harm 

The order removing the Koresko defendants from their positions in the 

trusts and plans and appointing the independent fiduciary protects the 

participating plans and their participants from the Koresko defendants' 

diversion and dissipation of plan assets. The threat of such diversion and 

dissipation, which, in fact, has already happened in this case, is irreparable 

harm. See Elliott v. Kiesewetter, 98 F.3d 47, 57-58 (3d Cir. 1996); Fechter v. 

HMW Indus., Inc., 879 F.2d 1111, 1121 (3d Cir. 1989). Thus, to the extent the 

Secretary was required to show irreparable harm, he did so.3 

3 The Secretary was not required to show irreparable harm beyond the ongoing 

ERISA violations because, "when a statute contains, either explicitly or 

implicitly, a finding that violations will harm the public, the courts may grant 

preliminary equitable relief on a showing of a statutory violation without 

requiring any additional showing of irreparable harm." Government of Virgin 

Islands v. Virgin Islands Paving, Inc., 714 F.2d 283, 286 (3d Cir. 1983); see 

also City of New York v. Golden Feather Smoke Shop, Inc., 597 F.3d 115, 120­

21 (2d Cir. 2010) (discussing presumption of irreparable harm based on a 

statutory violation). ERISA contains an express finding that violations will 

harm the public. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (Congressional findings that employee 

benefit plans "are affected with a national public interest"); id. §§ 1001(a), (b) 

(findings that ERISA's requirements are necessary to protect public interest as 

well as the interests of participants and beneficiaries in those plans). ERISA 

also authorizes preliminary injunctive relief to redress ERISA violations. 29 

30
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

2. The order will not result in greater harm to other parties 

The district court's order aids rather than harms employers, participants, 

and beneficiaries of the trusts by allowing the independent fiduciary to take 

necessary steps to preserve trust assets, recover diverted assets, and prepare an 

inventory of assets for the district court. Any harm to Koresko from not being 

able to use trust assets is not legally cognizable because the order simply 

prevents him from doing what he had no right to do in the first place. Koresko 

also told the district court, "I don't have a problem" with a four to six week 

appointment of the independent fiduciary. SA- 167 (Doc. 515), at 102. 

Koresko's allegations of harm from having to cooperate with the independent 

fiduciary are therefore meritless. Any complaint about the length of the 

independent fiduciary's service is meritless because the independent fiduciary's 

extended service is largely the result of Koresko's refusal to cooperate with the 

independent fiduciary. 

3. The public interest supports the district court's order 

The public interest, as protected by ERISA, holds plan fiduciaries to high 

standards to protect plans and their participants and beneficiaries and "far 

outweigh[s]" the Koresko defendants' interests in their corporate businesses. 

See Johnson v. Couturier, 572 F.3d 1067, 1082 (9th Cir. 2009); Fechter, 879 

U.S.C. § 1132(a)(5); see Rosa v. Resolution Trust Corp., 938 F.2d 383, 400 (3d 

Cir. 1991). 

31 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

F.2d at 1121. That ERISA interest is a further reason the order on appeal 

should be upheld.. 

C.	 Koresko's Defenses Confirm the Wisdom of the District Court's 

Order 

Koresko does not dispute that he used trust funds to purchase Caribbean 

condominiums in his own name and has still not explained what happened to all 

of the $34,000,000 in loans he took from trust-owned insurance policies. See 

SA- 145 (Doc. 429), at 59-61, 180-86. He also does not dispute the district 

court's findings that, despite the court's attempts to maintain the status quo until 

his alleged health problems improved, he "continued to violate the spirit of the 

Court's orders at every turn." App. 23. Instead, he argues that: (1) ERISA does 

not apply to his operation because a 2009 amendment removed all ERISA plans 

(Br. 33-40): (2) the Secretary has no Article III standing to bring this suit (Br. 

23-33); and (3) the district court erroneously withdrew the involuntary 

bankruptcy cases originally filed in Florida and transferred to Pennsylvania (Br. 

16-23). Koresko's arguments are meritless and show a fundamental 

misunderstanding or disregard of ERISA requirements that make him unfit to 

serve as an ERISA fiduciary.4 

4 Koresko also argues that the ERISA plans that participate in his insurance 

scheme have no beneficial interest in the trusts' assets. Br. 41-47. For reasons 

discussed in Argument A.2, the plans do have beneficial interests. Koresko's 

contrary view is based on the incorrect and unsupported assertion that 

32
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1.	 The 2009 amendment did not eliminate Koresko's ERISA 

problems 

After the Secretary had sued him, Koresko tried to eliminate his ERISA 

problems through a July 2009 amendment to the Master Trust document that 

purported to eliminate benefits for non-owner employees and their 

beneficiaries. SA-273 (Doc. 285-2), at 4-5. The amendment did not save 

Koresko from his ERISA liabilities for three reasons. 

First, the amendment does not excuse the fiduciary breaches that 

occurred before the amendment, such as the 2008 purchases of Caribbean 

condominiums with plan assets. SA-305, 320 (Docs. 377-18, 377-19) (GX 14, 

15). By its terms, the amendment is effective only from April 2009. SA-273 

(Doc. 285-2), at 2 ("NOW THEREFORE" clause). Even that retroactive 

effective date is invalid because, as this Court recognized in Confer v. Custom 

Eng'g Co., 952 F.2d 41, 43 (3d Cir. 1991), where a plan sponsor attempted to 

amend a plan retroactively to eliminate coverage for motorcycle accidents after 

"beneficial interest" means a vested remainder estate. Br. 42. He also 

incorrectly states that if an insurance company's general account does not 

include plan assets, then cash value rights attributable to insurance policies and 

funds derived from the policies also are not plan assets. Id. Insurance policies, 

however, are plan assets, 29 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(2), as are funds derived from 

those policies. Edmonson, 725 F.3d at 423. 

33
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

5 

an employee had been in such an accident, the change "could operate only 

prospectively."5 

Second, the amendment did not actually eliminate coverage of non-owner 

employees. The Secretary presented evidence that Koresko's operation 

continued to include and charge fees to employers that sponsored plans that 

included non-owner employees after the amendment. SA-387 -458 (Docs. 377­

58, 377-64, 377-70, 377-71, 377-72, 377-74 to 75, 377-76 to 78, 377-80 to 81, 

377-82) (GX 25b, 25g, 25l, 25m, 25n, 25o, 25p, 25r, 25s). Given this 

continuing ERISA coverage, and the requirement in 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D) 

that fiduciaries follow plan documents only to the extent they are consistent 

with ERISA's requirements, the "'trust documents cannot excuse trustees from 

their duties under ERISA.'" Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, No. 12-751, 

Koresko also incorrectly relies on the holding in Confer v. Custom Eng'g Co., 

952 F.2d 34, 37 (3d Cir. 1991), that an individual officer acting on behalf of a 

corporate fiduciary is not liable as a fiduciary unless the officer has an 

individual discretionary role. Br. 48. This holding is inapplicable because 

Koresko was not acting on behalf of a corporation when he diverted plan assets 

from the trusts and used them for his own purposes. In particular, at times 

when F&M Bank was the trustee, see SA-018 (Doc. 165), ¶ 6, he falsely 

claimed to be a trustee to get loans. See, e.g. SA-335-364 (Docs. 377-38, 377­

46, 377-53) (GX 24j-1, 24o, 24v). Confer's holding is also questionable 

because it predates the Supreme Court's recognition that ERISA defines a 

"fiduciary" in "functional terms," Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 262 

(1993) (Court's emphasis), and has been rejected by post-Mertens decisions. 

See, e.g., Musmeci v. Schwegmann Giant Super Markets, Inc., 332 F.3d 339, 

350-51 (5th Cir. 2003). 

34
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

2014 WL 2864481, at *8 (U.S. June 25, 2014) (quoting Cent. States, SE & SW 

Areas Pension Fund v. Cent. Transp.., Inc., 472 U.S. 559, 568 (1985)). 

Finally, the amendment was not "executed in accordance with the Plan's 

own procedure for amendment" and was therefore invalid. Confer, 952 F.2d at 

43. The Master Trust Document allows the Regional Employer Assurance 

Leagues to amend the document. SA-201 (Doc. 268-14), § 9.1; see id. § 1.10 

(defining "League"). The July 2009 amendment was signed by Penn-Mont 

Benefits Services, the plan administrator, through its Vice-President Lawrence 

Koresko and President John Koresko. SA-273 (Doc. 285-2), at 9. None of the 

sections cited by Koresko (Br. 35-38) gives Penn-Mont the authority to amend 

the document. Instead, they address Penn-Mont's authority to act as plan 

administrator SA-201 ((Doc. 268-14), §§ 11.2, 11.3 and recital clauses) or as 

attorney in fact for employers regarding all matters pending before the 

Department of Labor and IRS. SA- 215 (Doc. 268-17), § 10.21. Additionally, 

the amendment is invalid because it contradicts provisions in the governing plan 

document prohibiting amendments that discriminate in favor of highly 

compensated employees, officers, or owners. SA-215 (Doc. 268-17), § 

9.03(c)(3). 

35
 
 

 

 

 

2. The Secretary has Article III standing 

Koresko recognizes that the Secretary has standing to sue under ERISA, 

29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2), (a)(5), but argues incorrectly that the Secretary lacks 

Article III standing. Citing a section of ERISA that applies to benefit claims by 

a participant or beneficiary (29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B)), he asserts that a 

plaintiff seeking to recover for a fiduciary breach must demonstrate that 

benefits are actually due (Br. 25), contrary to the well-established rule that 

participants and beneficiaries need only a colorable claim for benefits. See, 

e.g., Graden v. Conexant Sys., Inc., 496 F.3d 291, 296 (3d Cir. 2007). He then 

asserts that because no participant has a claim to any particular assets in defined 

benefit pension plans, the plan administrator in this case can remove "excess 

amounts" not necessary for death benefit obligations by classifying them as 

"surplus." Br.28. Ignoring the many private party lawsuits against him and 

related entities, he then asserts that his death benefit arrangement has "no 

economic value," that the plan documents allow him to reduce death benefits if 

insurance proceeds are not collected, that claimants who do not receive benefits 

all at once can "arrive at an 'agreed' lump sum" with the administrator, and the 

Secretary is therefore bound by the principle that a beneficiary can waive rights 

to benefits. Br. 30-31. 

36
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The short answer to Koresko's dubious assertions is that the Secretary's 

Article III standing does not rest on the rights of a participant or beneficiary. 

The Secretary represents the public interest in ERISA enforcement and is not 

bound by private party ERISA settlements. See, e.g., Secretary of Labor v. 

Fitzsimmons, 805 F.2d 682, 687-94 (7th Cir. 1986) (en banc); Herman v. South 

Carolina Nat'l Bank, 140 F.3d 1413, 1423 (11th Cir. 1998). Like other 

governmental entities enforcing the government's own laws, the Secretary has 

an injury sufficient for Article III standing when a law the Secretary is charged 

with enforcing is violated. See, e.g., Vermont Agency of Natural Res. v. United 

States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 771 (2000); United States v. Raines, 362 

U.S. 17, 27 (1960); United States v. American Bell Tel. Co., 128 U.S. 315, 366­

36 (1888). Thus, even courts that have limited private party standing under 

ERISA in some circumstances recognize that the Secretary "always remains 

empowered" to enforce ERISA. David v. Alphin, 704 F.3d 327, 339 (4th Cir. 

2013); see also Glanton ex rel Alcoa Prescription Drug Plan v. Advance PCS, 

Inc., 465 F.3d 1123, 1126 (9th Cir. 2006) ("government entities have a concrete 

stake in the proper application of the laws of their jurisdiction"). 

37
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

3.	 The District Court's Withdrawal of the Bankruptcy References 

and Stay of Bankruptcy Proceedings Provides No Basis to 

Upset the Order at Issue Here 

This Court has already recognized that the bankruptcy automatic stay 

does not apply to the Secretary's action because it is a governmental 

enforcement action exempt from the stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4). Order, 

No. 13-3827 (3d Cir. Feb. 25, 2014); accord, SA-125 (Doc. 474); Solis v. 

Wallis, 2012 WL 3779065, at *7-*8 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 30, 2012), and cases cited. 

Koresko nevertheless asserts that the Secretary's case has to stop so that matters 

concerning the trusts can be resolved in bankruptcy court. Br. 31-33. His goal 

here is to turn all the ERISA plans and other employer arrangements that 

participate in the trusts into "executory contracts," and then reject them so that 

they no longer have any claims in bankruptcy against the trusts. Br. 31-32. In 

pursuit of this goal, he attacks the district court's withdrawal of the bankruptcy 

references and stay of bankruptcy proceedings. This Court should reject 

Koresko's arguments because the Court lacks jurisdiction to review the order 

withdrawing the references, and the district court acted well within its 

discretion in withdrawing them. 

This Court lacks jurisdiction to review the withdrawal order SA-140 

(Doc. 709) because the order is reviewable only through mandamus, In re 

Pruitt, 910 F.2d 1160, 1165-67 (3d Cir. 1990), and Koresko failed to file a 

38
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

separate petition for mandamus as required by Fed. R. App. P. 21. See Clerk's 

Order, No. 13-3827 (3d Cir. April 21, 2014) (rejecting Koresko's attempt to file 

a "Petition for Extraordinary Relief" in this appeal and informing him that "[a] 

mandamus petition cannot be filed in an existing appeal. It must be filed as an 

original proceeding").6 

Moreover, Koresko's arguments are meritless. Mandamus is a drastic 

remedy available only in extraordinary situations where the petitioner 

establishes a clear and indisputable right to the writ and lack of adequate 

alternative means to obtain the relief it seeks. Id. at 1167; In re Pasquariello, 16 

F.3d 525, 528-29 (3d Cir. 1994). Koresko fails to show either prerequisite. 

Koresko has no clear and indisputable right to overturn the withdrawal 

order because he lacks standing to challenge it. He does not represent the 

creditors who filed the involuntary bankruptcy proceedings. He cannot 

represent the interests of the debtors because he appears pro se in this Court and 

therefore has authority to represent only himself. See, e.g., Rowland v. 

6 Koresko also did not challenge the withdrawal order in the brief he filed on 

May 6, 2014 in response to this Court's order to file by then or have the appeal 

dismissed. See Appellant's Br. 12 (stating that "if the District Court has 

effectively destroyed the opportunity of the Appellants to participate in Chapter 

11, and the district should not have with withdrawn the reference without cause 

from the Bankruptcy Court, it has nothing more to do in this case"). By raising 

new issues and rewriting the substance of his May 6 brief, Koresko violates the 

spirit of this Court's May 14, 2014 order giving him two weeks to correct the 

deficiencies in the May 6 brief. 

39
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

California Men's Colony, 506 U.S. 194, 202 (1993); Osei-Afriyie v. Med. Coll. 

of Pa., 937 F.2d 876, 882-83 (3d Cir. 1991); Simbraw, Inc. v. United States, 

367 F.2d 373, 374 (3d Cir. 1996); see also SA-136 (Doc. 509), at 3 (Koresko 

lacks authority to represent the trusts). He also cannot assert harm to himself 

based on possible harm to the entities in bankruptcy. Cf. Kauffman v. Dreyfus 

Fund, Inc., 434 F.2d 727, 732 (3d Cir. 1970) (shareholder lacks standing to sue 

for diminution of the value of his shares in a corporation). 

Even if Koresko had standing, he has no right to mandamus because the 

district court acted well within its discretion in withdrawing the references. A 

district court may find cause to withdraw a reference after considering "the 

goals of promoting uniformity in bankruptcy administration, reducing forum 

shopping and confusion, fostering the economical use of the debtors' and 

creditors' resources, and expediting the bankruptcy process," as well as the 

stage of the bankruptcy proceedings. Pruitt, 910 F.2d at 1168. The district 

court considered these goals and reasonably found cause for the withdrawal. 

SA-140 (Doc. 709), at 4-5. The withdrawal promotes uniformity by preventing 

a conflict between the district court's orders restricting the independent 

fiduciary's disclosure of financial information and a bankruptcy court order 

requiring disclosure. Id. at 4. It reduces forum shopping and confusion by 

coordinating all issues regarding the independent fiduciary's report in the 

40
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

district court. Id. It conserves the assets of debtors and creditors by preventing 

the trusts from having to expend funds in coordinating conflicting obligations 

between two courts. Id. It expedites administration of the trusts' assets by 

coordinating the bankruptcy cases with the Secretary's case. Id. at 4-5. The 

bankruptcy proceedings were also in early stages, so possible harm from a 

removal at a late stage, see Pruitt, 910 F.2d at 1168, is not present here. 

Mandamus is also inappropriate because Koresko has a remedy in district 

court. This is not a case where a withdrawal prevents a creditor from obtaining 

immediate relief it seeks. See Pruitt, 910 F.2d at 1165 (mortgagee appealed 

after district court withdrew reference and stayed state foreclosure 

proceedings). Instead, the district court is moving expeditiously to determine 

rights to trust assets in the Secretary's action, a necessary predicate to 

determining rights in the bankruptcy proceedings. Koresko's rights and the 

rights of other interested parties are adequately protected by allowing the 

Secretary's action to proceed first, rather than having bankruptcy proceedings 

running at the same time. Cf. SEC v. Byers, 609 F.3d 87, 91-93 (2d Cir. 2010) 

(upholding district court injunction against involuntary bankruptcy proceedings 

as part of the district court's broad equitable power during SEC receivership). 

41
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

CONCLUSION 

The district court's order should be affirmed. 

Respectfully submitted, 

M. PATRICIA SMITH 

Solicitor of Labor 

G. WILLIAM SCOTT 

Acting Associate Solicitor 

ELIZABETH HOPKINS 

Counsel for Appellate and Special 

Litigation 

/s/ Edward D. Sieger 

EDWARD D. SIEGER 

D.C. Bar No. 405219 

Senior Appellate Attorney 

U.S. Department of Labor 

200 Constitution Ave., N.W., S-2007 

Washington, D.C. 20210 

(202) 693-5771 

JUNE 2014 

42
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
 

1. This brief complies with the type-volume limitation of Fed. R. App. P. 

32(a)(7)(B) because it contains 9624 words, excluding the parts of the brief 

exempted by Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(B)(iii). 

2. This brief complies with the typeface requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 

32(a)(5) and the type style requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(6) because it 

has been prepared in 14-point Times New Roman font, a proportionally spaced 

typeface, using Microsoft Word 2010. 

3. The text of the electronic brief is identical to the text in the paper 

copies. 

4. A virus detection program, McAfee Security Virus Scan Enterprise 8.0, 

was run on the brief and no virus was detected. 

/s/ Edward D. Sieger 

EDWARD D. SIEGER 

Senior Appellate Attorney 
 

 

 

 

 

 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
 

I hereby certify that on this 27th day of June 2014, the Brief for the 

Secretary of Labor was served on counsel of record through the Court's CM/ECF 

system. Ten paper copies are being mailed by express mail to the Court and two 

copies are being mailed by express mail to the following counsel of record: 

John J. Koresko, V 

200 W. Fourth Street 

Bridgeport, PA 19405 

Ira B. Silverstein 

Hargraves, McConnell & Costigan, P.C. 

230 Park Avenue, Suite 630 

New York, NY 10169 

Aaron Krauss 

Cozen O'Connor 

1900 Market Street 

Philadelphia, PA 19103 

/s/ Edward D. Sieger 

EDWARD D. SIEGER 

Senior Appellate Attorney