CLD-023 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________ No. 10-3074

___________ ALEX T. MCKAY, Appellant

v. THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; US ATTORNEY GENERAL; THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS; H. WATT

___________________ _________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey (D.C. Civil No . 10-cv-0888) District Judge: Honorable Jerome B. Simandle

___________________ _________________ Submitted for Possible Dismissal Purs uant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or Summary Action Pursuant to Th ird Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 October 28, 2010 Before: RENDELL, FUENTES and SMITH, Circuit Judges (Opinion filed: November 4, 2010)

_________ OPINION OF THE COURT

_________ PER CURIAM Alex T. McKay, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se , appeals from the District Court’s dismissal of his complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e ). For the reasons2 stated below, we will summarily affirm. McKay filed a complaint in the United Stat es District Court for the District of New Jersey alleging that he was entitled to relief under Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents , 403 U.S. 388 (1971), because he had been approved for a pa y increase for a prison job but had never received the raise. 1 The District Court grante d McKay’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis and later dismissed his complaint pursuant to 28 U. S.C. § 1915(e).
II. We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We may summarily affirm if the appeal pr esents no substantial question. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4;
I.O.P. 10.6.
III. We agree with the District Court’s dete rmination that McKay’s civil rights claim was without merit.

1 McKay also alleged that non-defendant pr ison officials verbally harassed him and were unhelpful in his efforts to file a grievance, specifically that they attempted to deny him required forms and called him a “faggot.” If these allegations are accepted as true, they may be relevant to whether McKay sa tisfied the exhaustion requirement imposed by the Prison Reform Litigation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Brown v. Croak , 312 F.3d 109 (3d Cir. 2002). As the District Court dismis sed McKay’s complaint under the auspices of § 1915(e), his failure to exhaust available pr ison remedies was never reached. We note that if his allegations of harassment and deni al of access were properly raised in an amended complaint naming the in volved parties, McKay would be unlikely to prevail as there is no constitutional right to a prison grievance system, see Flick v. Alba , 932 F.2d 728 (8th Cir. 1991), and verbal harassment doe s not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See, e.g. , McBride v. Deer , 240 F.3d 1287, 1291 n.3 (10th Cir. 2001); DeWalt v. Carter , 224 F.3d 607, 612 (7th Cir. 2000).3 As the District Court noted, a government official sued in an individual capacity in a civil rights action cannot be he ld liable under a theory of respondeat superior

. Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009); see also Sutton v. Rasheed , 323 F.3d 236, 249 (3d Cir. 2003) (“a defendant in a civil rights action mu st have personal involvement in the alleged wrongs to be liable.”). McKa y failed to allege the personal involvement of any of the named defendants. While he included the Unite d States Department of Justice (“D.O.J.”) and the Federal Bureau of Pris ons (“B.O.P.”) in the caption of his initial complaint, the body of the complaint as we ll as McKay’s subsequent supp lemental filing make it clear that he wished to assert claims only agains t two defendants: Eric M. Holder, Attorney General of the United States, and an Admini strative Remedy Coordinator, H. Watts. We agree with the District Court that becaus e McKay does not allege either of these defendants were responsible for determining his salary grade or directly affected his raise, he may not recover against them. The District Court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing McKay’s complaint without providing leave to amend. If Mc Kay had sought to na me alternative or additional defendants, his Bivens claim would have still fa iled on its merits. Prison inmates simply have no cons titutionally protected intere st in retaining prison employment—let alone in promotions. See James v. Quinlan , 866 F.2d 627, 629-630 (3d Cir. 1989) (holding that prisoners have no liberty interest in their prison jobs). 2 Because

2 The District Court went further, analyz ing the viability of McKay’s claim under contract principles. While such claims ar e properly brought in the Court of Federal4 any amendment of McKay’s co mplaint would have been fu tile, the District Court’s dismissal without leave to amend was appropriate. See Foman v. Davis , 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). For the reasons given, McKay’s appeal presents no substantial question. We will therefore summarily affirm th e District Court’s order dismissing McKay’s civil suit.

Claims, see 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1), the District C ourt correctly noted that because there is no indication that McKay was provided an express promise that the United States would hold itself liable, he cannot prevail on a breach of contract claim for damages. Sanders v. United States , 252 F.3d 1329, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2001).