This opinion is subject to revision before final

publication in the Pacific Reporter

2014 UT 23

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

DANA D. COLVIN and SHAWN COLVIN

Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.

JOSEPH GIGUERE,

Defendant and Appellee.

No. 20120809

Filed June 20, 2014

Fourth District, Spanish Fork

The Honorable Donald J. Eyre, Jr.

No. 110300141

Attorneys:

Kent A. Higgins, Pocatello, ID for appellants

Richard K. Glauser, Michael W. Wright, Sandy, for appellee

JUSTICE PARRISH authored the opinion of the Court, in which

CHIEF JUSTICE DURRANT, ASSOCIATE CHIEF JUSTICE NEHRING,

JUSTICE DURHAM, and JUSTICE LEE joined.

JUSTICE PARRISH, opinion of the Court :

INTRODUCTION

¶ 1 While returning to Utah from a work project in Maryland,

Kelly Colvin was killed in an automobile accident. Joseph Giguere,

Colvin’s coworker, was driving the vehicle in which Colvin was a

passenger when the accident occurred. Colvin’s widow and son

brought this action against Giguere, arguing that Giguere’s negligence caused the accident. The district court granted summary

judgment in favor of Giguere, ruling that the accident occurred in

the course of Colvin and Giguere’s employment,rendering workers’

compensation the Colvins’ exclusive remedy. The Colvins appeal.

¶ 2 Although employees are generally not within the course of

their employment while traveling to or from their place of work,

Giguere and Colvin were not merely commuting during theirreturn

trip from Maryland, but were on a special errand fortheir employer. 

Because the accident that killed Colvin occurred while he and

Giguere were carrying out the special errand, workers’ compensa-
COLVIN v. GIGUERE

Opinion of the Court

tion is the Colvins’ exclusive remedy. We therefore affirm summary

judgment dismissing the Colvins’ suit.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶ 3 Kelly Colvin and Joseph Giguere were employees of

Advanced Millwork Installation (Advanced), a custom millwork

company located in Lehi, Utah. Colvin had worked for Advanced

since 2006 and acted as Advanced’s foreman. In August of 2009,

Advanced sent Colvin and a second employee to Virginia and

Maryland to complete two cabinet-installation projects. Colvin and

the second employee drove to Virginia in a van owned by Advanced’s owner, Richard Thompson. The van had Advanced’s logo

printed on it, and Advanced paid for the van’s insurance and

claimed either the van’s mileage or its depreciation as a business

expense. Colvin was the only scheduled driver on the van’s

insurance policy, and Thompson allowed Colvin to drive the van for

both business and personal use.

¶ 4 After about a month of working on the Virginia and

Maryland projects, the second employee quit. Advanced then sent

Giguere to Virginia to assist in completing the projects. At some

point prior to departing for or after returning from the East Coast

projects, Giguere signed an employment contract with Advanced,

which provided in part that Advanced would pay for the fuel and

time it takes an employee to travel to an out-of-town job site, but

would not pay for the time it takes to travel back from the job site.

Consistent with the contract, Advanced paid for Giguere to fly to

Virginia but had not made explicit plans for Giguere’s return trip to

Utah once the projects were completed. Thompson testified,

however, that he had always intended for Giguere to return to Utah

with Colvin in the company van.

¶ 5 Shortly before Colvin and Giguere finished the Maryland

project, Thompson called Colvin and asked him if he would be

willing to fix some problems on an Advanced project in Spanish

Fork, Utah, before returning to his home in Pocatello, Idaho. Colvin

agreed. Thereafter he and Thompson decided that Colvin and

Giguere would drive to Utah together, that Colvin would drop off

Giguere at his home in Springville, Utah, and that Colvin would

then head to Spanish Fork to complete the Advanced project before

driving home to Pocatello.

¶ 6 On October 11, 2009, at around three o’clock in the

morning, Colvin and Giguere finished the project in Maryland. 

Approximately two hours later, they began theirreturn trip to Utah.

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Opinion of the Court

To facilitate a quick return, Colvin instructed Giguere that they

would drive straight through to Utah without stopping to rest and

that each would take turns driving while the other slept. At 4:36

a.m. on October 12, 2009, Giguere was driving through Kansas while

Colvin was sleeping in the passenger seat. Giguere testified that he

thought he saw something the size of a large dog entering the

highway in front of the van and swerved to miss it, causing the van

to roll one-and-a-half times before landing on the driver’s side in a

ditch. The police accident report indicates that it had been lightly

raining and that the road was wet when the accident occurred.

Colvin was fatally injured in the accident.

¶ 7 InNovember of 2009, Giguere submitted anapplication for

benefitswithAuto-Owners Insurance Company (Auto-Owners), the

company that insured Advanced’s van, to cover his accident-related

medical expenses. On the application, Giguere answered “no” to the

question of whether he was in the course of his employment at the

time of the accident. Mrs. Colvin also filed a claim with the insurance provider. Auto-Owners denied Mrs. Colvin’s claim after

concluding that her husband’s death was a work-related injury

covered under workers’ compensation. In March 2010, Thompson

prepared and submitted workers’ compensation claims on behalf of

both Giguere and Mrs. Colvin.

¶ 8 The Workers Compensation Fund (WCF) accepted

Mrs. Colvin’s claim as valid and on March 18, 2010, tendered her

workers’ compensation benefits. But Mrs. Colvin, under the advice

of counsel, refused the tender “pending final resolution of planned

civil litigation against [Giguere].” Over one year later, the WCF

informed Mrs. Colvin by letter that the fund “had been given the go

ahead by [Mrs. Colvin’s counsel] to proceed with the processing of

benefits.” Mrs. Colvin has been receiving monthly workers’

compensation benefits since that date.1

¶ 9 On February 15, 2011, the Colvins filed their complaint in

this matter. The complaint alleged that Colvin’s death was proximately caused by Giguere’s negligent driving. After some discovery, Giguere filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that he

and Colvin were coemployees in the course of their employment at

the time of the accident and that the exclusive remedy provision of

the Workers’ Compensation Act barred this suit. See UTAH CODE

1 The record does not reflect whether Auto-Owners or the WCF

accepted Giguere’s applications for benefits.

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Opinion of the Court

§ 34A-2-105. The Colvins filed a cross motion for summary judgment on the same issue. They argued that, because Giguere was

driving home at the time of the accident, he was not in the course of

his employment and the exclusive remedy provision does not apply.

¶ 10 Following a hearing, the district court granted Giguere’s

motion for summary judgment and denied the Colvins’ motion. It

recognized that Utah courts have adopted the going-and-coming

rule, which provides that workers’ compensation does not cover

accidents that occur while employees are coming to or going home

from their workplace. But it ruled that two exceptions to the rule

apply in this case. Specifically, the district court held that Colvin

and Giguere fell “squarely within” the special errand and the

continuous coverage exceptions to the going-and-coming rule and

therefore “would have been considered to be within the course and

scope of their employment” at the time of the accident. The district

court thereafter dismissed the suit, ruling that the Workers’ Compensation Act’s exclusive remedy provision barred the Colvins’

negligence action against Giguere.

¶ 11 The Colvins appeal. They argue that the district court

erred in ruling that Giguere and Colvin were in the course of their

employment at the time of the accident. We disagree and therefore

affirm the district court’s order dismissing this suit. We have

jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code section 78A-3-102(3)(j). 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 12 In this case, the district court ruled on summary judgment

that Colvin and Giguere were on a special errand fortheir employer

at the time of the accident. Summary judgment is appropriate only

when “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the

moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” UTAH R.

CIV.P. 56(c). Because entitlement to summary judgment is a matter

of law, we review a summary judgment for correctness, giving no

deference to the district court. Nyman v. Anchor Dev., L.L.C., 2003 UT

27, ¶ 7, 73 P.3d 357. We also “view the facts and all reasonable

inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Even

where the “underlying objective facts” are not in dispute, summary

judgment may not be appropriate where the inferences drawn from

the underlying facts are disputed. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc.,

426 U.S. 438, 450 (1976). However, summary judgment will still be

appropriate if “reasonable minds cannot differ”as to the inferences

to be drawn from the undisputed facts. Id.

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ANALYSIS

¶ 13 The Workers’ Compensation Act (WCA or Act) provides

that compensation under the Act is an employee’s or an employee’s

family or heirs’ “exclusive remedy against the employer . . . [and

any] employee of the employer . . . on account of any accident or

injury or death” sustained by the employee “in the course of or

because of or arising out of the employee’s employment, and an

action at law may not be maintained against an employer or . . .

[any] employee of the employer based upon any accident, injury, or

death of an employee.” UTAH CODE § 34A-2-105(1). The WCA itself

does not define the phrase “in the course of or because of or arising

out of” an employee’s employment. However, our case law has

considered whether various work-related activities are “within or

beyond aperson’s ‘course of employment,’” and we have developed

tests to assist in making such determinations. Jex v. Utah Labor

Comm’n, 2013 UT 40, ¶ 17, 306 P.3d 799. 

¶ 14 One such test is the going-and-coming rule, which

recognizes that “traveling to and from work is [generally] not part

of the employment and is not covered by Workmen’s Compensation.” Lundberg v. Cream O’Weber/Federated Dairy Farms, Inc., 465

P.2d 175, 176 (Utah 1970). We have, however, recognized certain

circumstances under whichemployees traveling to orfrom work are

in the course of their employment, and an accident occurring under

these circumstances will be within the scope of the WCA’s coverage. 

In this case, the district court concluded that two such exceptions2to

the going-and-coming rule apply. Specifically, it held that Colvin

and Giguere were on a special errand fortheir employer during their

return drive from the East Coast and were therefore within the

course of their employment at the time of the accident. See State Tax

Comm’n v. Indus. Comm’n of Utah, 685 P.2d 1051, 1054–55 (Utah 1984)

(defining the special errand exception). The district court also held

that because Colvin and Giguere’s work entailed travel away from

2

 We agree with the Arkansas Supreme Court that “[t]he ‘going

and coming’ rule is best viewed as an analytical tool” that is

“subordinate to the preeminent consideration, which is whetherthe

employee was directly or indirectly advancing the interests of the

employer at the time of the injury.” Moncus v. Billingsley Logging &

Am. Ins. Co., 235 S.W.3d 877, 881–82 (Ark. 2006). Therefore, the socalled exceptions to the going-and-coming rule simply describe

situations in which an employee’s journey to or from his place of

work advances the interests of his employer.

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Opinion of the Court

their employer’s premise, they fell within the continuous coverage

exception, rendering them “within the course of their employment

continuously during the trip” to and from Utah. Buczynski v. Indus.

Comm’n of Utah, 934 P.2d 1169, 1173 (Ut. Ct. App. 1997) (internal

quotation marks omitted). Based on these two exceptions, the

district court held that Giguere was immune from suit under the

WCA’s exclusive remedy provision. 

¶ 15 The Colvins contend that the district court erred in

applying the exclusive remedy provision. They first argue that the

district court dismissed “too swiftly” the relevance of the written

contract between Giguere and Advanced in determining whether

Giguere was in the course of his employment at the time of the

accident. The Colvins rely on a provision of Giguere’s employment

contract that states, “Advanced . . . will pay for fuel and the time it

takes to drive to [an out-of-town] job site,” but “doesn’t pay for the

time it takes to drive back.” Because Giguere was not being paid

during the return trip, the Colvins argue he could not have been in

the course of his employment. The Colvins also argue that even if

Giguere’s employment contract is not controlling, the district court

erred in holding that the special errand and continuous coverage

exceptions to the going-and-coming rule apply in this case.

¶ 16 We uphold the district court’s determination that both

Giguere and Colvin were in the course of their employment at the

time of the accident.3 Notwithstanding the language of Giguere’s

3 Under the plain language of the WCA’s exclusive remedy

provision, it could be argued that the “in the course of or because of

or arising out of” clause refers to the injured employee (in this case

Colvin) but not the fellow employee (in this case Giguere). See UTAH

CODE § 34A-2-105(1) (providing that the WCA is an injured

employee’s exclusive remedy against any fellow employee for an

accident that occurred in the course of or because of or arising out of

the injured employee’s employment). In other words, to be immune

from suit, Giguere need not show that he was in the course of his

employment at the time of the accident, but rather only that he met

the statutory definition of “employee.” See id. § 34A-2-104(1)(b)

(defining “employee” as “a person in the service of any employer. . . 

under any contract of hire”); see also Kobak v. Sobhani, No. 94764, 2011

WL 94496, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 6, 2011) (applying a similar

workers’ compensation statute and explaining that, to receive the

(continued...)

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Opinion of the Court

employment contract, Giguere and Colvin were engaged in the

important activity of returning Advanced’s assets to Utah. Furthermore, Giguere was assisting Colvin in the onerous task of driving

across the country so that Colvin could arrive at the Spanish Fork

project more quickly. Therefore, Colvin and Giguere were on a

special errand for their employer and were in the course of their

employment at the time of the accident.

4 Because we hold that

Giguere and Colvin were in the course of their employment under

the special errand exception, we need not consider whether the

continuous coverage exception also applies.

I. GIGUERE’S EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT IS NOT

DISPOSITIVE OF WHETHER HE WAS IN THE COURSE OF 

HIS EMPLOYMENT AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT

¶ 17 We first address the Colvins’ argument that whether

Giguere was in the course of his employment at the time of the

accident “hinges on [his] employment contract.” The Colvins rely

on the provision of Giguere’s employment contract that denied him

pay for time spent returning from an out-of-town job and reason

that, because Giguere was not being paid at the time of the accident,

he was not in the course of his employment. 

¶ 18 Although contractual provisions may be relevant in

assessing workers’ compensation coverage, they are not necessarily

determinative. Rather, the parties’ actual dealings are the best

3

(...continued)

protection of the exclusive remedy provision, a fellow employee

need not show that he was in the course of his employment at the

time of an accident, but only that he was an employee of the

employer at that time). Because neither party has raised this

argument and because we conclude that Giguere satisfies the more

demanding burden of showing that both he and Colvin were in the

course of their employment at the time of the accident, we need not

undertake this analysis.

4 We note that Mrs. Colvin’s receipt of workers’ compensation

benefits is consistent with our holding that Colvin was in the course

of his employment at the time of the accident. As we explained in

Stamper v. Johnson, “[b]y definition, if an employee [or his family] is

collecting workers’ compensation benefits under the Act, his injury

occurred within the course of his employment because that is a

prerequisite to the receipt of benefits.” 2010 UT 26, ¶ 16, 232 P.3d

514.

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Opinion of the Court

evidence of the scope of a worker’s employment. See, e.g., Averett v.

Grange, 909 P.2d 246, 250 (Utah 1995) (“In workers’ compensation

cases, the most important factor in determining whether an

employer-employee relationship exists is not what relationship the

parties intended to create, but what relationship was in fact created.”).

¶ 19 In Utah Home Fire Insurance Co. v. Manning, we were asked

todeterminewhether an employment contract that defined a worker

as an independent contractor was controlling for workers’ compensation purposes. 1999 UT 77, 985 P.2d 243. Manning, a temporary

employee of a general contractor, was injured on the job. Id. ¶ 3. 

After receiving workers’ compensation, Manning brought a

negligence suit against an alleged independent contractor, Green,

who had also worked for the general contractor. Id. ¶¶ 2–4. 

Manning argued that the negligence action was not barred because

Green, as an independent contractor, did not have immunity from

suit under the WCA’s exclusive remedy provision. Id. ¶¶ 5–6. We

disagreed, explaining that when determining a worker’s status, we

consider not only “whatever agreements exist” between the worker

andthe employer, but also “the actual dealings between the parties.” 

Id. ¶ 11. Thus, despite a contract provision defining Green as an

independent contractor, the actual dealings between Green and the

general contractor manifested the existence of an employer-employee relationship. Id.¶ 15. And because Green and Manning were

both employees of the general contractor,Manning’s negligence suit

against Green was barred by the exclusive remedy provision. Id.

¶¶ 18, 25. Manning thus makes clearthat, although an employment

contractmayprovide relevant information regarding an employee’s

duties and the parameters of the employment relationship, it cannot

override the actual facts and circumstances that determine the

existence of that relationship. 

¶ 20 In this case, the relevant contract provision states that

Giguere would not be paid for time spent traveling home from an

out-of-town job site. But the fact that Advanced had no contractual

duty to pay Giguere during his return trip is not dispositive of

whether Giguere was within the course of his employment during

such unpaid travel. Although pay fortravel time “is one of the most

reliable ways of making a case for the compensability of a going or

coming trip, . . . the fact that the employee is not paid for travel time

does not mean that the trip was not in the course of employment.”

1 ARTHUR LARSON, LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW

§ 14.06[3] (2012).

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Opinion of the Court

¶ 21 Instead of relying solely on evidence of pay to determine

whether travel time is within the scope of a worker’s employment,

we look to other, more persuasive factors, such as whether the

employer benefitted from the trip and the extent to which the trip

was controlled by the employer. See Jex v. Utah Labor Comm’n, 2013

UT 40, ¶ 19, 306 P.3d 799.5 And while receiving pay for travel time

provides strong evidence that an employee’s trip was under the

control and for the benefit of the employer, the lack of pay for such

travel does not necessarily suggest that the employer neither

benefitted from nor controlled the travel. And the fact that an

employment contract, like the one in this case, explicitly contemplates extended travel tends to support the conclusion that such

travel is for the benefit of the employer and is therefore within the

scope of the worker’s employment. See Madden v. Mountain W.

Fabricators, 977 P.2d 861, 864 (Colo. 1999) (en banc) (including

“whetherthe travel was contemplated by the employment contract”

as a factor in determining whether such travel fits within an

exception to the going-and-coming rule). 

¶ 22 We therefore hold that the provision of Giguere’s employment contract denying pay forthe time spent returning from an outof-town job site is not dispositive of whetherthe accident that killed

Colvin occurred in the course of Giguere’s employment.6

Instead,

we look to the circumstances surrounding the return trip and

conclude that it was within the scope of both Colvin’s and Giguere’s

5

In Jex v. Utah Labor Commission, we analyzed the instrumentality

exception to the going-and-coming rule. 2013 UT 40, ¶ 19, 306 P.3d

799. Giguere has not argued for the application of this exception,

and neither party has briefed it. Therefore, while we do not rely on

Jex in this case, we acknowledge that the two key factors of the

instrumentality exception—benefit and control—are also relevantto

other exceptions to the going-and-coming rule.

6 The Colvins also rely on the fact that Giguere answered “no” to

the question of whether he was in the course of his employment at

the time of the accident on his application for benefits with AutoOwners. But “in the course of employment” is a statutory term of

art, and we cannot impose on all employees the burden of

understanding the legal meaning of such a term. Like information

found in a contract provision, information found in an application

for benefits is less relevant to determining the scope of an

employee’s employment than the actual facts and circumstances

surrounding an accident.

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Opinion of the Court

employment because it constituted a special errand for their

employer.

II. COLVIN AND GIGUERE WERE ON A SPECIAL 

ERRAND FOR THEIR EMPLOYER AND WERE 

THEREFORE IN THE COURSE OF THEIR EMPLOYMENT 

AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT

¶ 23 In State Tax Commission v. Industrial Commission of Utah, we

described a special errand as “‘[a]n act outside an employee’s

regular duties which is undertaken in good faith to advance the

employer’s interests, whether or not the employee’s own assigned

work is thereby furthered.’” 685 P.2d 1051, 1054 (Utah1984) (quoting

1A ARTHUR LARSON, LARSON’S WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION LAW,

§ 27.00 (1982)). We held in State Tax Commission that an employee

who was driving to a job-related training program was on a special

errand for her employer and was thus in the course of her employment when she was involved in an automobile accident during that

drive. Id. at 1054–55. We found it relevant to the special errand

determination that, despite not receiving pay for hertravel time, the

employee had participated in the training “with the knowledge and

permission” of her employer, her employer “would have benefitted

from her training,” and the winter drive to and from the training

was “hazardous” and “extraordinary rather than normally incident

to the employment.” Id.

¶ 24 In Drake v. Industrial Commission of Utah, we articulated

three factors to be considered when determining whether a journey

constitutes a special errand: (1) “the relative regularity or unusualness of the particular journey,” (2) ”the relative burden or onerousness of the journey on the employee” in comparison to “the extent

of the task to be performed at the end of the journey,” and (3) “the

suddenness of the assignment from the employer.” 939 P.2d 177,

183–84 (Utah 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

¶ 25 Applying these factors to this case, it is clear that Colvin

and Giguere were on a special errand for Advanced at the time of

the accident. First, although Colvin and Giguere had traveled to the

East Coast to complete projects that were part of theirregular duties

(i.e., cabinetry work), the projects were unusual in that Advanced

worked mainly in Utah and Idaho, and the East Coast projects

required travel of a longer distance thananypriorAdvanced project.

¶ 26 Second, when considering the onerousness of the journey,

we take into account “not only the length of the journey, but also any

other circumstances under which it is made, e.g., conditions of

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Opinion of the Court

travel, time of day, or day of week.” Id. at 184. Extended overtime

work prior beginning a trip is also relevant to the onerousness

inquiry. See 1 ARTHURLARSON,LARSON’SWORKERS’COMPENSATION

LAW § 14.05[4] (2012) (explaining that the special errand exception

may apply where “the overtime work extended so farinto the night

as to transform the journey home into a substantially more inconvenient or hazardous trip”); Falls v. Union Drilling Inc., 672 S.E.2d 204,

213 (W. Va. 2008) (collecting cases that have invoked the special

errand exception where “the trip was made dangerous due to the

fact that overtime or irregular hours were required to be worked”). 

¶ 27 In this case, the journey back to Utah was onerous not only

because of its distance, but also because of the time of day (the

journey began at approximately 5:00 a.m. on October 11 and

continued until 4:26 a.m. on October 12, when the accident occurred)

and the pace of the trip (Colvin had requested that he and Giguere

drive straight through to Utah without stopping to rest). Furthermore, Colvin and Giguere had worked an approximately sixteenhour shift just prior to beginning the drive home. Such long work

hours and the resulting fatigue undoubtedly “made the homeward

trip more hazardous.” LARSON, supra, § 14.05[4]. 

¶ 28 Finally, the suddenness of the trip home is made evident

by the fact that the day before Colvin and Giguere began the return

trip, Colvin expressed his need to return quickly to the Spanish Fork

project. It was at that point that Colvin instructed Giguere that they

would begin the drive home immediately upon completing the

Maryland project and that they would not stop to rest along the way.

Therefore, although the return journey was foreseeable in that

Colvin and Giguere knew that it would take place upon finishing the

Maryland project, the decision regarding its specific timing and pace

was made hastily. 

¶ 29 In addition to satisfying the three Drake factors, the

circumstances surrounding Colvin and Giguere’s drive to Utah also

meet the State Tax Commission definition of special errand in that the

return trip advanced the interests of Colvin and Giguere’s employer.

685 P.2d at 1054. First, the return trip benefitted Advanced because

Colvin and Giguere were transporting Advanced assets—the

company van and Advanced-owned tools—to Utah from the East

Coast. See Haynes Guardian Sec. Bureau v. Jordan, 520 P.2d 1050, 1051

(Colo. App. 1974) (explaining that “the responsibility for custody of

[an] employer’s supplies and equipment and for transporting these

items . . . provide[s] a substantial service for [the] employer from

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Opinion of the Court

which the employer clearly derive[s] benefit”). Moreover, the

decision to depart immediately upon finishing the Maryland project

and to drive straight through to Utah was made to promote Advanced’s interest in having Colvin return to Utah to complete the

Spanish Fork project as quickly as possible. 

¶ 30 The Colvins argue that although Advanced may have

benefitted from Colvin’s return trip, Giguere’s involvement in the

trip did not contribute to the benefit because Giguere was merely

catching a ride home. Thus it was Giguere, not Advanced, who

benefitted from Giguere driving home with Colvin. But “[f]inding

a benefit to the employee in the trip . . . should not be decisive

against compensability, if the elements of the special errand rule are

satisfied.” LARSON, supra, § 14.05[5]. Here, the elements of a special

errand have been met. Furthermore, although Giguere personally

benefitted from driving home with Colvin, Colvin and Advanced

also expected to receive a benefit from Giguere’s assistance. Indeed,

by sharing in the task of driving back to Utah, Giguere was advancing Colvin and Advanced’s interest in completing the Spanish Fork

project as soon as possible. And “it would be contrary not only to

human nature but to the employer’s best interests” to claim that an

employee is not within the WCA’s coverage where he “undertake[s]

in good faith . . . to assist a co-employee in the latter’s performance

of his work.” Id. § 27.01[1],[2].

¶ 31 Because Advanced benefitted from both Colvin’s and

Giguere’s participation in the trip to Utah, and because the trip was

unusual, onerous, and sudden, it satisfies the requirements of the

special errand exception to the going-and-coming rule. Where the

inferences drawn from the undisputed facts so strongly support a

finding that Colvin and Giguere were on a special errand, we

conclude that reasonable minds could not differ on this issue. 

Summary judgment was therefore appropriate. We thus conclude

that the district court correctly held that the accident occurred in the

courseofbothColvin’s and Giguere’s employment and the exclusive

remedy provision of the WCA bars this suit. 

CONCLUSION

¶ 32 We affirm the district court’s dismissal of this suit under

the WCA’s exclusive remedy provision. Although an employment

contract may be relevant in defining the parameters of the employeremployee relationship, it is not determinative of whether aparticular

task arises out of or is performed in the course of a worker’s

employment for purposes of determining the existence of coverage

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Opinion of the Court

underthe WCA. The mere fact that Giguere’s employment contract

denied him pay for return travel time does not determine whether

he was in the course of his employment while he was driving home

from Maryland. Instead, the actual facts and circumstances

surrounding Colvin and Giguere’s return trip demonstrate that the

two employees were on a special errand for their employer. We

accordingly hold that they were in the course of their employment

when the accident occurred and that this action is barred under the

WCA’s exclusive remedy provision.

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