UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 06-1896

KODOR ASSOCIATES LIMITED PARTNERSHIP; EDWARD

J. KOPPEL; GRACE ANNE DORNEY KOPPEL,

Plaintiffs - Appellants,

versus

PETER D. ROSE, d/b/a Office of Peter Rose,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

Maryland, at Greenbelt. Alexander Williams, Jr., District Judge.

(8:06-cv-01256-AW)

Submitted: February 23, 2007 Decided: March 20, 2007

Before NIEMEYER, KING, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Thomas D. Murphy, James A. Mood, Jr., MURPHY & MOOD, P.C.,

Rockville, Maryland, for Appellants. John S. Vander Woude,

ECCLESTON & WOLF, P.C., Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Kodor Associates Limited Partnership, a Maryland limited

Partnership, Edward J. Koppel, and Grace Koppel (collectively the

“Koppels”) appeal the district court’s dismissal of their action

for breach of contract against Peter D. Rose (“Rose”), a

Massachusetts architect, on the ground that the action was filed

beyond the applicable Maryland three-year statute of limitations

period. None of the facts of the case are in dispute. The subject

contract provided that Rose design and draft complete and

coordinated architectural drawings for a projected $4.2 million

residence, identify a builder for the construction of the

residence, deliver those drawings to the builder, and supervise

construction through completion of the project, in exchange for a

fee of $840,000. Construction commenced in the summer of 2002.

Rose was paid in full prior to commencement of construction. At

various times, beginning the date construction began until the

termination of the agreement on March 6, 2003, construction was

held up as a result of delays caused by Rose’s failure to provide

architectural plans to the builder. The Koppels were forced to

expend additional funds, over the estimate, because Rose failed to

deliver the drawings to the builder in a timely fashion and needed

to revise several of the drawings that were delivered. In February

2003 construction was discontinued due to Rose’s failure to produce

drawings necessary for construction to continue. 
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On February 24, 2003, Grace Koppel sent Rose a letter

demanding full performance of Rose’s obligations under the

agreement, stating that the Koppels had incurred damages solely as

a result of the delays caused by Rose’s failure to provide timely

documents and plans to the builder, and requesting that he notify

his insurance carrier of the Koppels’ claims against him. On

February 28, 2003, Grace Koppel sent Rose an email requesting

assurance of full and complete performance under the contract by

March 3, 2003, and requesting written confirmation that Rose would

promptly notify his insurance carrier of the Koppels’ claimed

damages. On March 3, 2003, Grace Koppel sent Rose a letter

requesting a meeting on March 6, 2003. In this letter, she stated

that Rose was in material breach due to his failure to fulfill his

obligations for months, and reiterated the request of assurance of

performance under the contract, as well as verification that Rose

had notified his insurance carrier of the Koppels’ claims. On

March 6, 2003, Grace Koppel sent Rose a letter terminating their

agreement on the basis that Rose had been in material breach “for

some time.” The letter included a request for the delivery of all

files and drawings pertaining to the Koppel residence so

construction could continue with another architect. On March 20,

2003, Rose delivered the requested items. 

The Koppels filed their complaint alleging breach of

contract on March 17, 2006. Rose filed a motion to dismiss or, in
1

Pursuant to Maryland law:

A civil action at law shall be filed within three years

from the date it accrues unless another provision of the

Code provides a different period of time within which an

action shall be commenced.

Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-101 (2004).

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the alternative, for summary judgment, together with a memorandum

in support, to which was attached a number of exhibits. The

district court granted Rose’s motion to dismiss on the ground that

the claim was barred by the applicable Maryland statute of

limitations.1

The sole issue on appeal is whether the district court

erred in determining that the date for accrual of this action for

breach of contract was the date of the Koppels’ letter terminating

Rose, rather than the later date when Rose delivered construction

drawings that were substantially incomplete. Specifically, the

Koppels challenge the district court’s determination that they were

on notice of their claims against Rose by March 6, 2003, at the

latest, when they terminated their contract with him due to the

delay damages they had incurred as a result of Rose’s alleged

failure to provide timely and complete construction drawings for

the construction of the Koppels’ residence, pursuant to the terms

of the contract between them.

The statute of limitations in Maryland begins to run when

a party has knowledge of facts sufficient to put an ordinarily
2

See Poffenberger v. Risser, 431 A.2d at 681; Doe v.

Archdiocese of Washington, 689 A.2d 634, 644 (Md. App. 1997).

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prudent person on inquiry, prompting such reasonable person to

inquire further. See Poffenberger v. Risser, 431 A.2d 677, 681

(Md. 1981). The parties do not dispute that the trial court was

legally correct in applying Maryland’s discovery rule2 to the

statute of limitations analysis, and determining that the statute

of limitations began to run when the breach was readily

discoverable, not at the moment when the extent of the damages was

ascertainable. 

The Koppels assert on appeal that their cause of action

did not accrue until delivery of the drawings by Rose because “Rose

could have provided substantially complete drawings on that day,

vitiating any claim for breach of his agreement to provide them.”

They contend that prior to March 20, 2003, when Rose delivered the

drawings, Rose’s breach was not “reasonably ascertainable.” 

We find that the district court correctly held that the

Koppels’ action was barred by the statute of limitations. It is

undisputed that the Koppels sustained monetary damages beginning in

the summer of 2002, when construction commenced. It is undisputed

that those damages were sustained by the failure of Rose to timely

provide the agreed-upon drawings. It is also undisputed that Rose

fulfilled some of the terms of the contract, such as assisting in

the selection of a builder for the subject residence and producing
3

We find to be without merit the Koppels’ contention that Rose

could have “vitiated” his nonperformance under the contract had he

produced complete drawings on March 20, 2003, given that they would

still have had a potentially viable cause of action against Rose

for breach of contract based on the damages sustained by the

Koppels because of Rose’s failures to timely deliver the drawings

to the builder and the need to revise several of the drawings that

were delivered. Such cause of action would still have had to have

been filed within the applicable three-year statute of limitations

period, however.

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partial drawings prior to March 6, 2003, the date of his

termination, but that he failed to fully perform under the

agreement. As the district court found, the extent of the damages

sustained by the Koppels, which did not occur until after Rose

delivered the incomplete drawings on March 20, 2003, was not the

lynchpin for the accrual of the Koppels’ cause of action.3 Rather,

it was the point at which a reasonable person could have discovered

that a breach had occurred. See Lumsden v. Design Tech Builders,

Inc., 749 A.2d 796, 804 (Md. 2000). As the district court held,

this point was no later than March 6, 2003, the date the Koppels

terminated their contract with Rose, and prior to which they had

sustained ongoing damages related to the construction delays caused

by Rose’s failure to perform under the contract. Hence, the

Koppels’ action for breach of contract, having been filed more than

three years after March 6, 2003, was untimely.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of

the Koppels’ action. We dispense with oral argument because the

facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
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materials before the court and argument would not aid the

decisional process.

AFFIRMED