[Cite as State v. McLean, 2020-Ohio-4893.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

State of Ohio, : 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, : 

 No. 19AP-626 

v. : (C.P.C. No. 18CR-2139)

Terrence R. McLean, : (REGULAR CALENDAR) 

 Defendant-Appellant. : 

 

D E C I S I O N 

Rendered on October 13, 2020 

 

On brief: Ron O'Brien, Prosecuting Attorney, and Daniel J. 

Stanley, for appellee. 

On brief: Yavitch & Palmer Co., L.P.A., and Jeffery A. 

Linn, II, for appellant. 

 

APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas 

KLATT, J. 

{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Terrence R. McLean, appeals from a judgment of the 

Franklin County Court of Common Pleas convicting him, pursuant to jury verdict, of one 

count of failure to comply with an order or signal of a police officer. Finding no merit to the 

appeal, we affirm. 

{¶ 2} By indictment filed May 3, 2018, plaintiff-appellee, State of Ohio, charged 

appellant with one count of failure to comply with an order or signal of a police officer in 

violation of R.C. 2121.331 as a third-degree felony. Appellant entered a not guilty plea and 

the case proceeded to jury trial in July 2019. 
No. 19AP-626 2 

{¶ 3} According to the state's evidence, at 3:20 and 3:26 a.m. on April 26, 2018, the 

Columbus Police Department ("CPD") received 911 calls from LaVint Walton about a 

domestic dispute with an ex-boyfriend. Walton reported that the dispute occurred at his 

home on 1401 East 20th Avenue, that the man "smacked" him during the dispute, and that 

Walton maced him in retaliation. (Tr. at 121, State's Ex. A, Apr. 26, 2018 911 calls.). Walton 

further reported that the man displayed a gun during the dispute, told Walton he would 

return to Walton's home, and then drove away in a silver car in the direction of Cleveland 

Avenue. Walton did not identify the man by name; however, he described the man as "a 

black guy * * * wearing a doo-rag * * * and [dressed in] all black." Id. at 122, State's Ex. A. 

{¶ 4} Because the 911 caller alleged that the incident involved a firearm, a CPD 

helicopter unit was dispatched to locate the vehicle. At approximately 3:33 a.m., several 

CPD officers, all in marked CPD police cruisers, responded to a report from the helicopter 

unit that a silver vehicle matching the description provided by the 911 caller had been 

located in the area of East 20th and Cleveland Avenues. The responding officers included 

Lieutenant Robert Sagle,1 Officers Benjamin Mackley and Brady Rich,2 Officer William 

Phillips, and Officer Russell Redman. 

{¶ 5} When Lieutenant Sagle first observed the vehicle, he noted that its headlights 

were not illuminated. He activated his cruiser's emergency lights and siren and pursued 

the vehicle. Although he was at times close to the vehicle, he could not see inside it. 

Likewise, the other officers pursued the vehicle with their cruisers' emergency lights and 

sirens activated. During the pursuit, Lieutenant Sagle saw the vehicle nearly lose control 

when it hit a bump in the road while traveling at a high rate of speed. He also observed the 

vehicle run a stop sign at a major intersection. When Lieutenant Sagle stopped at the stop 

sign, the vehicle was able to increase its distance from his cruiser. Although he still could 

see the vehicle ahead of him, he de-activated his cruiser lights and siren and terminated his 

pursuit because it was too dangerous to continue, and he knew the helicopter unit would 

continue to track the vehicle. Lieutenant Sagle eventually lost sight of the vehicle; he then 

assumed the role of managing the pursuit. 

 

1 At the time of the events at issue, Sagle was a lieutenant. He was promoted to commander approximately 

one week prior to the commencement of trial. 

 

2 Officers Mackley and Rich were in the same police cruiser. 
No. 19AP-626 3 

{¶ 6} Through radio transmissions, Lieutenant Sagle kept track of the other officers 

involved in the pursuit. Those radio transmissions revealed that the vehicle traveled at high 

rates of speed, at times in excess of 80 m.p.h., failed to stop at several stop signs and red 

lights, and traveled left of center and in the wrong direction on one-way streets. Much of 

the area where the high-speed pursuit occurred was predominately residential, with speed 

limits of 35 m.p.h. or lower, and with cars parked on both sides of the street. (State's Ex. 

B1, B2, B3; cruiser video from Officers Phillips, Mackley, and Redman cruisers, 

respectively.) 

{¶ 7} During the course of the pursuit, Officers Mackley and Rich came within 25 

to 50 yards of the vehicle; however, they were unable to see inside it. Officer Phillips 

observed the vehicle as it passed by his cruiser driving in the opposite direction. He noted 

that it contained only one occupant–the black male driver–but he could not see well enough 

inside the vehicle to identify him. At some point, the vehicle drove slowly, between 15 to 

20 m.p.h., toward Officer Redman in the opposite direction and passed "within inches" of 

the left side of his cruiser. (Tr. at 213.) As a result, Officer Redman's cruiser was "window 

to window" with the vehicle, and he was within "a few feet" of the driver. Id. at 215. Video 

from Officer Redman's cruiser corroborates this testimony. (State's Ex. B3.) Officer 

Redman flashed his cruiser spotlight at the vehicle and noted that the driver was a middleaged black male. Due to the spotlight and the proximity of the cruiser to the vehicle, he was 

able to see the driver's face "pretty well." (Tr. at 217.) He did not see anyone else in the 

vehicle. Officer Redman testified that the streetlights, cruiser emergency lights and 

spotlight, and helicopter spotlight caused the area to be "very well lit." Id. at 215. 

{¶ 8} Due to the perilous nature of the high-speed pursuit, Lieutenant Sagle 

ultimately terminated it. Although the high-speed aspect of the pursuit ended, the officers 

continued to follow the vehicle, with their lights and sirens de-activated, and the helicopter 

unit continued to track and report its location. 

{¶ 9} A short time later, Officers Mackley and Rich observed and reported that the 

vehicle had just crashed into a building near Main Street in Bexley. The two officers 

approached the vehicle; it was unoccupied. Officer Rich remained with the vehicle while 

Officer Mackley searched the area for the driver. Several additional officers, including 

Officers Phillips and Redman, arrived and joined in the search. At approximately 3:43 a.m., 
No. 19AP-626 4 

the officers received a radio transmission from Officer Ward reporting that an individual, 

later identified as appellant, had been detained approximately one block from the crash 

site. Officer Rich left the crash site and joined the other officers in searching the area where 

appellant had been detained. That search yielded no weapons or additional suspects. 

{¶ 10} Officer Redman recognized appellant as the same person he had seen pass 

closely by his cruiser during the police pursuit. When Officer Redman asked appellant why 

he did not stop his vehicle during the pursuit, appellant claimed he did not see the police 

behind him. However, appellant did not assert that he was not driving the vehicle, that his 

car had been stolen, or that he had been maced. 

{¶ 11} Officer Redman's body camera video revealed that when asked if he knew 

"what red and blue lights mean," appellant responded "yes." (Tr. at 226; State's. Ex. D.) 

Redman then asked, "[w]hy didn't you know what they mean tonight?"; appellant replied 

"what [do] you mean?" Id. at 226, State's Ex. D. Officer Redman continued, "[w]hen all 

those cruisers - - when I came up to the front of you and turned my red and blue lights on 

and tried to stop you and you drove right past me?" Id. at 226-27, State's Ex. D. Appellant 

averred that he "didn't see no red and blue lights." Id. at 227, State's Ex. D. The body 

camera video does not depict an assertion by appellant that he had been maced and 

abducted by an unknown assailant who stole his car and then engaged in a high-speed car 

chase with CPD officers. 

{¶ 12} Because appellant emitted a strong odor of alcohol, Officer Rich asked if he 

would submit to a field sobriety test; appellant declined, stating that he had been maced 

and his car had been stolen. Appellant was subsequently arrested and placed in the back of 

Officer Phillips' cruiser. Officer Phillips could not recall if appellant stated that his car had 

been stolen; however, he did recall that appellant claimed that he had been maced. 

Appellant's vehicle was subsequently impounded and searched. Several open liquor 

containers, as well as a few personal items, were found inside. 

{¶ 13} Appellant testified that he and Walton were drinking and watching movies at 

Walton's home until the conversation "went south" and Walton asked him to leave. Id. at 

250. Walton eventually called 911; appellant told him he would sit in his car (which was 

parked on the street in front of Walton's home) and wait for the police to arrive. Walton 

then maced appellant and closed the front door. 
No. 19AP-626 5 

{¶ 14} Appellant walked to his car and soon realized he had left his glasses in 

Walton's house; he did not retrieve them. As he opened the driver's door, a man 

approached him from behind, maced him, and pushed him onto the floor of the front 

passenger seat. Because appellant had left the key in the car's ignition, the man was able to 

start the car and drive away. The man then led the police on a "high speed chase" during 

which appellant could hear police sirens. Id. at 254. Appellant was "a little nervous" and 

"fearful" and pleaded with the man to let him out of the car. Id. The man said nothing 

during the entire ordeal. 

{¶ 15} The man eventually stopped the vehicle and got out. When appellant exited 

the vehicle, he did not know where he was and did not see anyone in the vicinity. Because 

it was dark and he was disoriented, he began walking toward a lighted area. He soon was 

approached by the police and ordered to get on the ground. He refused police requests to 

take a field sobriety test because he had not been driving the car. He told the police "50 

times or more" that his car had been stolen. Id. at 255. The police impounded his car and 

had not returned it to him as of the date of trial. 

{¶ 16} On cross-examination, appellant acknowledged that at no time during his 

three-hour encounter with the police that evening did he mention that an unknown 

assailant abducted and forced him inside his car, where he remained during the course of 

the police pursuit. He explained that he did not do so because he was "highly intoxicated" 

and did not understand what was happening. Id. at 263. He attributed his calm demeanor 

at the time of his arrest (which was captured by Officer Redman's body camera), to his belief 

that the police had caught the person who stole his car and that he was being detained only 

until the police were able to determine exactly what had happened. When asked why he 

waited until 3:52 a.m., nearly 10 minutes after he was detained, to tell the police that he had 

been maced, he responded, "I'm not sure." Id. at 264. When asked why he waited until 4:09 

a.m. to tell the police that his car had been stolen, he again responded, "I'm not sure." Id. 

He explained that he did not know the precise times he mentioned those facts to the police 

but was certain that he stated them "repeatedly." Id. He acknowledged that it was not until 

police informed him that he was going to be charged with OVI and was asked to take a field 

sobriety test that he stated the car had been stolen and he was not driving it. He further 

testified that he did not provide the police with any details beyond the fact that his car had 
No. 19AP-626 6 

been stolen because he "wasn't asked." Id. at 265. He admitted that he had never filed a 

police report alleging that he had been abducted and his car stolen. He further admitted 

that he could not identify the person who had maced and abducted him and stolen his car. 

{¶ 17} In addition to the witness testimony and documentary evidence presented 

at trial, the parties entered into three stipulations: (1) authenticity of the 911 calls; (2) the 

vehicle involved in the police pursuit was registered to appellant; and (3) when interviewed 

by the police, Walton acknowledged that he never saw appellant holding a gun and that he 

believed the object he thought was a gun was actually a watch. 

{¶ 18} At the conclusion of trial, the jury returned a verdict finding appellant guilty 

as charged in the indictment. The trial court ordered and received a pre-sentence 

investigation report and thereafter held a sentencing hearing on August 20, 2019. At the 

conclusion of that hearing, the trial court sentenced appellant to an 18-month term of 

incarceration. The court memorialized appellant's conviction and sentence in an 

August 22, 2019 judgment entry. 

{¶ 19} In a timely appeal, appellant advances the following two assignments of 

error: 

[I]. The trial court erred and thereby deprived appellant of 

due process of law as guaranteed by the Fourteenth 

Amendment to the United States Constitution and 

comparable provisions of the Ohio Constitution by overruling 

appellant's Crim.R. 29 motion for judgment of acquittal, as 

the state failed to offer sufficient evidence to prove each and 

every element of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. 

[II]. The trial court erred by finding appellant guilty and 

thereby deprived appellant of due process of law as 

guaranteed by provisions of the Ohio Constitution because the 

verdict of guilty was against the manifest weight of the 

evidence. 

{¶ 20} In his first assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court erred by 

denying his Crim.R. 29 motion for acquittal. A Crim.R. 29 motion for acquittal tests the 

sufficiency of the evidence. State v. Reddy, 10th Dist. No. 09AP-868, 2010-Ohio-3892, 

¶ 12, citing State v. Knipp, 4th Dist. No. 06CA641, 2006-Ohio-4704, ¶ 11. In determining 

whether a trial court errs in denying a Crim.R. 29 motion, we employ the same standard 
No. 19AP-626 7 

applicable to a sufficiency of the evidence review. Id., citing State v. Darrington, 10th Dist. 

No. 06AP-160, 2006-Ohio-5042, ¶ 15. 

{¶ 21} Sufficiency of the evidence is a legal standard that tests whether the evidence 

introduced at trial is legally adequate to support a verdict. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio 

St.3d 380, 386 (1997). Whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support a verdict is a 

question of law. Id., citing State v. Robinson, 162 Ohio St. 486 (1955). An appellate court 

examines the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution and concludes whether 

any rational trier of fact could have found that the prosecution proved the essential 

elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 (1991), 

paragraph two of the syllabus. We will not disturb the verdict unless after viewing the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, it is apparent that reasonable minds 

could not reach the conclusion reached by the trier of fact. State v. Treesh, 90 Ohio St.3d 

460, 484 (2001). In determining whether a verdict is based on sufficient evidence, we do 

not assess whether the evidence is to be believed, but whether, if believed, the evidence 

against the accused would support the verdict. Jenks at paragraph two of the syllabus. 

{¶ 22} Appellant was convicted of the third-degree felony offense of failure to 

comply with an order or signal of a police officer in violation of R.C. 2921.331(B) and 

(C) (5)(a)(ii). R.C. 2921.331(B) provides that "[n]o person shall operate a motor vehicle so 

as to willfully elude or flee a police officer after receiving a visible or audible signal from a 

police officer to bring the person's motor vehicle to a stop." R.C. 2921.331(C)(5)(a)(ii) states 

that "[a] violation of [R.C. 2921.331(B)] is a felony of the third degree if the jury or judge as 

trier of fact finds * * * by proof beyond a reasonable doubt * * * [t]he operation of the motor 

vehicle by the offender caused a substantial risk of serious physical harm to persons or 

property." 

{¶ 23} Though appellant argues that the trial erred in denying his Crim.R. 29 motion 

because the state failed to present sufficient evidence to prove the elements of the charged 

offense, his entire argument under this assignment of error relates to the credibility of his 

testimony versus that of the state's witnesses. However, " 'in a sufficiency of the evidence 

review, an appellate court does not engage in a determination of witness credibility; rather, 

it essentially assumes the state's witnesses testified truthfully and determines if that 

testimony satisfies each element of the crime.' " State v. Scott, 10th Dist. No. 18AP-964, 
No. 19AP-626 8 

2019-Ohio-4175, ¶ 12, quoting State v. Bankston, 10th Dist. No. 08AP-668, 2009-Ohio754, ¶ 4. Appellant does not raise any arguments related to the state's alleged failure to 

prove any specific element set forth in R.C. 2921.331(B) and (C)(5)(a)(ii). Rather, he argues 

that the testimony he presented denying that he was the driver of the vehicle was more 

credible than the evidence presented by the state identifying him as the driver. Thus, we 

address appellant's credibility arguments in our analysis of his second assignment of error, 

which argues that his conviction was against manifest weight of the evidence. 

{¶ 24} In contrast to the sufficiency of the evidence, the weight of the evidence 

concerns the inclination of the greater amount of credible evidence offered to support one 

side of the issue rather than the other. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387. Although there 

may be sufficient evidence to support a judgment, a court may nevertheless conclude that 

a judgment is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Id. 

{¶ 25} When presented with a manifest weight challenge, an appellate court engages 

in a limited weighing of the evidence to determine whether sufficient competent, credible 

evidence supports the jury's verdict. State v. Salinas, 10th Dist. No. 09AP-1201, 2010-

Ohio-4738, ¶ 32, citing Thompkins at 387. "When a court of appeals reverses a judgment 

of a trial court on the basis that the verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence, 

the appellate court sits as a 'thirteenth juror' and disagrees with the factfinder's resolution 

of the conflicting testimony." Thompkins at 387, quoting Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 42 

(1982). However, "in conducting our review, we are guided by the presumption that the 

jury, or the trial court in a bench trial, 'is best able to view the witnesses and observe their 

demeanor, gestures and voice inflections, and use these observations in weighing the 

credibility of the proffered testimony.' " State v. Cattledge, 10th Dist. No. 10AP-105, 2010-

Ohio-4953, ¶ 6, quoting Seasons Coal Co. v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80 (1984). 

Accordingly, this court affords great deference to the jury's determination of witness 

credibility. State v. Redman, 10th Dist. No. 10AP-654, 2011-Ohio-1894, ¶ 26, citing State 

v. Jennings, 10th Dist. No. 09AP-70, 2009-Ohio-6840, ¶ 55. 

{¶ 26} An appellate court considering a manifest weight challenge "may not merely 

substitute its view for that of the trier of fact, but must review the entire record, weigh the 

evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses, and determine 

whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact clearly lost its way and 
No. 19AP-626 9 

created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a 

new trial ordered." State v. Harris, 10th Dist. No. 13AP-770, 2014-Ohio-2501, ¶ 22, citing 

Thompkins at 387. An appellate court should reserve reversal of a conviction as being 

against the manifest weight of the evidence for only the most " 'exceptional case in which 

the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.' " Thompkins at 387, quoting State v. 

Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist.1983). 

{¶ 27} Appellant argues that his conviction was against the manifest weight of the 

evidence because Officer Redman's testimony identifying him as the driver of the vehicle 

was not credible. As noted above, Officer Redman testified that he saw appellant driving 

the vehicle as it slowly passed by him in the opposite direction. He further testified that he 

saw appellant's face "pretty well" as the vehicle passed "within inches" of his cruiser in an 

area well-lit by streetlights and his cruiser's emergency lights and spotlight. (Tr. at 213, 

217). Appellant does not challenge this testimony, other than to generally dispute Officer 

Redman's identification of him as the driver. Rather, appellant argues that Officer 

Redman's testimony was not credible because, as he acknowledged on cross-examination, 

he did not inform any of the other officers at the time appellant was detained that he could 

positively identify appellant as the driver of the vehicle. However, the jury reasonably could 

have accepted Officer Redman's explanation that he did not think it was necessary to do so 

because he "believe[d] that it was understood based on the questions that I was asking that 

he was identified at that point." Id. at 234. We also note that Officer Redman's trial 

testimony regarding his questioning of appellant about whether he saw the "red and blue" 

police lights when he passed by him was consistent with the questioning captured on his 

body camera video. 

{¶ 28} Appellant also challenges the credibility of Officer Redman's testimony on the 

basis of his admission that he did not inform the prosecutor's office of his identification of 

appellant until the morning he was scheduled to testify. Defense counsel conducted a 

thorough and extensive cross-examination of Officer Redman on this point, which sought 

to expose concerns about the veracity of his identification testimony. The jury was at liberty 

to ascribe less significance to the testimony regarding his failure to report his identification 

of appellant to the prosecution than to his testimony that he saw appellant's face "pretty 

well" as he passed closely by Officer's Redman's cruiser during the police pursuit. This is 
No. 19AP-626 10 

especially true given that the jury was able to view Officer Redman's cruiser video and 

assess for itself the veracity of his testimony regarding his identification. The jury was free 

to believe all, part or none of the testimony provided by Officer Redman. State v. Johns,

10th Dist. No. 11AP-203, 2011-Ohio-6823, ¶ 17, citing Hill v. Briggs, 111 Ohio App.3d 405, 

412 (10th Dist.1996). 

{¶ 29} Moreover, to the extent appellant argues that the jury lost its way in believing 

Officer Redman's identification testimony and disbelieving his own testimony 

contradicting Officer Redman, we are mindful that the presence of conflicting testimony 

does not render a conviction against the manifest weight of the evidence. State v. Johnson,

10th Dist. No. 19AP-296, 2020-Ohio-4077, ¶ 20, citing State v. Lindsey, 10th Dist. No. 

14AP-751, 2015-Ohio-2169, ¶ 43. Further, " a conviction is not against the manifest weight 

of the evidence because the trier of fact believed the state's version of the events over the 

defendant's version." State v. Lipkins, 10th Dist. No. 16AP-616, 2017-Ohio-4085, ¶ 39, 

citing State v. Gale, 10th Dist. No. 05AP-708, 2006-Ohio-1523, ¶ 19. As noted above, the 

jury may believe all, part or none of the testimony of each witness appearing before it, 

including that of Officer Redman and appellant. Johns at ¶ 17. Mere disagreement over 

witness credibility is not a sufficient reason to reverse a judgment as against the manifest 

weight of the evidence. Id., citing State v. Wilson, 113 Ohio St.3d 382, 2007-Ohio-2202, 

¶ 24 

{¶ 30} Appellant maintains that the jury should have believed his testimony that he 

was maced, abducted, and forced to the floor of the passenger side of his vehicle by an 

unknown assailant who then led the police on a high-speed chase through the streets of 

Columbus. Appellant claims his testimony that he was highly intoxicated, disoriented from 

having been maced, and not wearing his glasses demonstrated that he was incapable of 

successfully maneuvering his vehicle during a high-speed car chase so as to both avoid 

hitting pedestrians and/or other vehicles and elude police officers trained in high-speed 

pursuit techniques. The jury heard all of this testimony and was free to accept all, part, or 

none of it. Johns at ¶ 17. Moreover, we note that the jury also heard testimony from the 

state's witnesses that appellant never mentioned that he had been maced and abducted by 

an unknown assailant who forced him to the floor of his vehicle where he remained 

throughout the entire high-speed police chase, as well as appellant's cross-examination 
No. 19AP-626 11 

testimony admitting the same. In addition, appellant did not effectively dispute the 

prosecution's queries about waiting ten minutes after he was arrested to even allege that he 

had been maced and another ten minutes to claim that his car had been stolen. Appellant's 

failure to relay these critical details to the police at the time he was detained permitted the 

jury to question the veracity of appellant's trial testimony. 

{¶ 31} Finally, with respect to appellant's argument that the police failed to conduct 

a thorough investigation into his claim that he was not the driver, both by making a "snap 

judgment that they had their driver" and failing to check the vehicle for fingerprints other 

than his own, we note that Officer Redman's identification of appellant as the driver was 

sufficient to support the conviction. (Appellant's Brief at 14.) "The testimony of even 'one 

witness, if believed by the jury, is enough to support a conviction.' " State v. Loomis, 10th 

Dist. No. 17AP-843, 2019-Ohio-2576, ¶ 54, quoting State v. Strong, 10th Dist. No. 09AP874, 2011-Ohio-1024, ¶ 42. As explained above, the jury was in the best position to view 

appellant and the testifying police officers, including Officer Redman, and decide who was 

more credible. It appears as though the jury simply did not believe appellant's version of 

the events. "It is generally 'the province of the factfinder to determine the truth from 

conflicting evidence, whether the conflicting evidence comes from different witnesses or is 

contained within the same witness's testimony.' " State v. McGowan, 10th Dist. No. 18AP467, 2019-Ohio-5319, ¶ 56, quoting State v. Oteng, 10th Dist. No. 14AP-466, 2015-Ohio1231, ¶ 72. On this record, we simply cannot conclude that the jury did not fairly consider 

appellant's testimony or that it lost its way when it found the state's witnesses, including 

Officer Redman, more credible than appellant. 

{¶ 32} After reviewing the entire record, weighing the evidence and all reasonable 

inferences, and considering the credibility of witnesses, we cannot find that the jury clearly 

lost its way when it discounted appellant's testimony in favor of the other evidence at trial, 

including Officer Redman's identification of appellant as the driver of the vehicle involved 

in the high-speed police pursuit. Accordingly, we find sufficient evidence to support 

appellant's conviction and that the conviction was not against the manifest weight of the 

evidence. We thus overrule appellant's first and second assignments of error. 
No. 19AP-626 12 

{¶ 33} Having overruled appellant's two assignments of error, we affirm the 

judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas. 

Judgment affirmed.

BROWN and DORRIAN, JJ., concur.