Filed 8/10/15 In re Amaya B. CA2/7

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

In re AMAYA B., a Person Coming Under 

the Juvenile Court Law.

 B259770

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. TJ21473)

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

AMAYA B.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 

Catherine J. Pratt, Juvenile Court Referee. Affirmed as corrected with directions.

Mary Bernstein, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant 

and Appellant.

No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.

__________________________________
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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

After Amaya B. (then 13 years old) punched, kicked, and hit a middle school 

classmate with a belt, the People filed a petition alleging that she had committed assault 

by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(4)). 

Amaya denied the allegation and filed a motion pursuant to Welfare and Institutions 

Code section 700.1 to suppress her statements to David Llamas, a Los Angeles School 

Police Officer, in which she admitted beating up J.J. (then 12 years old) after school. 

Amaya argued that Officer Llamas obtained her statements in violation of the Fourth 

Amendment. 

The court heard the suppression motion in conjunction with the jurisdiction 

hearing. Officer Llamas testified that he interviewed J.J. the day after the incident. J.J. 

said he saw his attacker during the assault but did not know her name. Nor was he able to 

find her photograph in the school yearbook. J.J. explained to the officer, however, that he 

had since learned from others that his attacker’s name was Amaya. 

Officer Llamas testified that he spoke to Amaya on the campus of the middle 

school. Before commencing the interview, Officer Llamas advised Amaya of her right to 

remain silent, to the presence of an attorney and, if indigent, to appointed counsel. 

(Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [16 L.Ed.2d 694, 86 S.Ct. 1602].) Amaya 

waived her rights and made incriminating statements.

Following argument by counsel, the juvenile court denied the motion to suppress

and Officer Llamas’ testimony resumed. He testified Amaya admitted to him that she 

had beat up J.J. because he had called her names, and she described the assault in detail. 

J.J. also testified about the attack. Amaya presented no evidence in her defense. 

At the conclusion of the jurisdiction hearing, the juvenile court found the 

allegation true, declared the offense a felony, and sustained the petition. The court 

ordered Amaya home on probation and awarded her one day of predisposition credit. 

Amaya filed a timely notice of appeal, challenging the denial of her suppression motion.
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DISCUSSION

We appointed counsel to represent Amaya on appeal. After examination of the 

record counsel filed an opening brief raising no issues. On April 29, 2015 we advised 

Amaya that she had 30 days within which to submit any contentions or issues she wanted 

us to consider. We have received no response. 

We have examined the record and are satisfied Amaya’s attorney on appeal has 

fully complied with the responsibilities of counsel and there are no arguable issues.1(See 

Smith v. Robbins (2000) 528 U.S. 259, 277-284 [120 S.Ct. 746, 145 L.Ed.2d 756]; People 

v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 112-113; People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 441.) 

When the juvenile court sustained the delinquency petition and placed Amaya on 

probation, however, the court did not adjudicate her a ward of the court. Although the 

clerk’s minute order indicates Amaya was declared a ward of the court, “[w]hen there is a 

discrepancy between the oral pronouncement of judgment and the minute order, the oral 

pronouncement controls.” (People v. Morales (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1587, 1594.) 

“‘The clerk cannot supplement the judgment the court actually pronounced by adding a 

provision to the minute order. . . . [Citation.] . . . [T]he clerk’s minutes must accurately 

reflect what occurred at the hearing.’” (Ibid., quoting People v. Zackery (2007) 147 

Cal.App.4th 380, 387.) In addition, the minute order does not reflect that the juvenile 

court orally awarded Amaya one day of predisposition credit. (See In re A.M. (2014) 225 

Cal.App.4th 1075, 1085 [“[i]n a juvenile delinquency proceeding, ‘a minor is entitled to 

credit against his or her maximum term of confinement for the time spent in custody 

 

1 Amaya did not argue in her suppression motion that the waiver of her Miranda

rights was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. (See People v. Scott (2011) 52 

Cal.4th 452, 482 [Miranda claim forfeited where “Miranda was not one of the several 

grounds upon which defendant challenged the admissibility of this statement below,” and 

“[a]s a result, the trial court had no opportunity to resolve material factual disputes and 

make necessary factual findings”]; People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 667 [“[h]aving 

failed to make [Miranda as a] basis for exclusion clear either in his written motion or at 

the hearing on that motion, defendant has waived the right to assert error on those 

grounds now”].)
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before the disposition hearing,’” and “‘[i]t is the juvenile court’s duty to calculate the 

number of days earned, and the court may not delegate that duty’”].) 

DISPOSITION

The cause is remanded for the juvenile court to declare Amaya B. a ward of the 

court and to prepare a corrected disposition order reflecting an award of one day of 

predisposition credit. In all other respects, the order is affirmed. 

SEGAL, J. 

We concur: 

PERLUSS, P. J. 

ZELON, J.