### The Honorable Russell G. Clark, Senior Judge, United States 1 

### District Court for the Western District of Missouri. ___________ No. 95-2923

___________ Patsy L. Conner, * * Plaintiff - Appellant, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the * Western District of Missouri. Reckitt & Colman, Inc., * * Defendant - Appellee. *

___________ Submitted: January 12, 1996 Filed: June 4, 1996

___________ Before RICHARD S. ARNOLD, Chief Judge, JOHN R. G IBSON, and BOWMAN, Circuit Judges.

___________ JOHN R. GIBSON, Circuit Judge.
Patsy L. Conner appeals from an order of the distric t court granting 1 her former employer's motion for summary judgmen t in her suit alleging she
was fired because of her disability and because she filed a workers ' compensation claim. Conner argues that the stat ute of limitations did not bar he r disability claim and that summary judgment was inappropriat e because she had not completed discovery. We affirm.

Conner wo rked for Reckitt & Colman, Inc. on its second shift at its Springfield, Missouri distribution center when she was fired on September 28, 1992. At the time she was fired, Conner was

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receiving medical treatment for her left knee, which she injured whil e working at Reckitt & Colman. Eight months after she was fired, Conne r asked Reckitt & Colman to make reasonable accommodations for her disabilit y
so she c ould return to work. Reckitt & Colman never responded to thi s request.

Reckitt & Colman stated that it fired Conner because she worked o n its second shift, and it sold all of its second shift business. Once that business w as sold, Reckitt & Colman no longer needed its second shif t workers. Reckitt & Colman stated that Conner wa s one of twelve workers it fired, and that it has not replaced Conner.

On September 2, 1993, Conner filed a charge with the Missour i Commission on Human Rights, claiming that Reckitt & Colman discriminated against h er based on her disability. Once the commission gave Conner a "Right-to-Sue" letter, she filed suit in federal district court. Conner claimed that Reckitt & Colman had violated the A mericans With Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C . § 12112 (1994), and Missouri law, Mo. Rev. Stat. § 213.055.1(1)(a) (1994), by firing her because of her injury and by failing to respond to her later request that it make rea sonable accommodations for her disability so she could return to work. Conner also claimed tha t Reckitt & Colman violated section 287.780 of the Missouri statutes b y firing her in retaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim because of her injured knee.
In response to Reckitt & Colman's motion for summary judgment, Conner argued that the statute of limitations did not bar her claims. In additio n Conner stated that Reckitt & Colman had not completely answered he r interrogatories and requests for documents and that she did not have a n op portunityto schedule depositions. Despite her objections, Conne r refus ed to schedule depositions, and failed to file a motion to compe l Reckitt & Colman to more fully answer her interr ogatories and requests for documents.

### Conner does not appeal from the district court's grant o f 2 

### summaryjudgment in favor of Reckitt & Colman on her Missour i disability discrimination clai m. The district court's decision on that claim is thus final. -3- On June 2 2, 1995, the district court granted Reckitt & Colman' s motion for summary judgment, holding that the statute of limitations for Conner's claims of disability discrimination was 300 days and that sh e filed her charge more than 300 days after Reckit t & Colman fired her. The district c ourt also held that Conner had not produced any evidence t o support her claim that Reckitt & Colman fired her in retaliation for filin g her workers' compensation claim. Conner appeals. 2

I.

Conner ar gues that she filed her disability discrimination claim in time because she filed it within 300 days of Rec kitt & Colman's failure to respond to her May 26, 1993 request for reasonab le accommodations. Conner does not dispute that the statute of limitations bars her claim if the onl y act of discrimination is her firing. Conner arg ues, however, that Reckitt & Colman discriminated against her twice, first by firing her on September 28, 1992 because of her knee injury, and second by refusing to accommodate her disability by not responding to her May 26, 1993 request. Conner also asserts that these tw o acts constitute a continuing violation of the ADA.

We re view the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo

. McKee v. Federal Kemper Life Assurance Co. , 927 F.2d 326, 328 (8th Cir

. 1991). Summary judgment is appropriate if there are no disputed issues of material fact and Rec kitt & Colman is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

The statute of limitations for a disability discrimination clai m under the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12117 (1994) (incorporating 42

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U.S.C. § 2000e-5), is 300 days. The statute of limitations begins to run at the time of the discriminatory act, and not when the consequences of th e act become most painful. Delaware State College v. Ricks , 449 U.S. 250, 258 (1980).

Ricks requires us to reject Conner's argument that Reckitt & Colman commit ted unlawful discrimination by not responding to her request fo r reasonable accommodations. Assuming Reckitt & C olman fired Conner because of her disability, the firing constitutes the di scriminatory act. Reckitt & Colman's failure to consider her later request for accommodation wa s merely a consequence of its discriminatory act.

We also reject Conner's argument that Reckitt & Colman's firing o f Conner and its later failure to answer her letter constitute a continuing violation that tolls the statute of limitations. The firing of an employe e cannot be a continuin g violation, Rudolph v. Wagner Elec. Corp. , 586 F.2d 90, 92 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied , 441 U.S. 924 (1979), even when the effects of the firingare felt later, see Ashley v. Boyle's Famous Corned Beef Co. , 66 F.3d 164, 167 (8th Cir. 1995) (en b anc). Conner's employment relations hip with Reckitt & Colman ended when she was fired. Reckitt & Col mancannot continue to discriminate against Conner when it no longe r employs her. Additionally, allowing Conner to restart the statute o f limitations by sending a letter requesting reaso nable accommodations after she has been unequivocally fired would destroy t he statute of limitations. There is no continuin g violation that tolls the statute of limitations in this ca se, and the district court properly granted Reckitt & Colman' s motion for summary judgment on Conner's disability discrimination claim.

II.
Conner argues that the district court improperly granted

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summary judgment in f avor of Reckitt & Colman on her claim that Reckitt & Colman fired her in r etaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim. See Hansome v. Northwestern Cooperage Co. , 679 S .W.2d 273, 275 (Mo. 1984). Reckitt & Colman stated that it fired Conner because it sold the part of its business involvin g the work that Conner used to do. Conner admits in her brief that she has no evidence to refute Reckitt & Colman's explanatio n for her fi ring. Because Conner has produced no facts establishing a n essent ial element of her claim on which she has the burden of proof , Reckitt & Colman is e ntitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 322-25 (1986).

III.
Conner argues that summary judgment was inappropriate because s he did not have an adequate opportunity to conduct discovery before the district court granted Reckitt & Colman's motion for summary judgment.

The part y defending a motion for summary judgment may request tha t the distri ct court postpone ruling on the motion until it can conduc t further discovery. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f); Humphreys v. Roche Biomedical Labs., Inc. , 990 F.2d1078, 1081 (8th Cir. 1993). We review the district court's refusal to allow further discovery befor e ruling on the motion for summary judgment for abuse of discretion. See Id. at 1081.

Reckitt & Colman objected to some of Conner's interrogatories an d requests for documents. Conner informed the district court of Reckitt & Colman's objections to her discovery, but never filed a motion to compel Reckitt & Colman to fully comply with her discovery requests. She als o advised the district court that she would not conduct any further discover y until Reckitt & Colma n fully complied with her discovery requests. Given Conner's failure to file a motion to compel and her refusal to conduc t further

### Conner also argues that she recently discovered anothe r 3 

### violation of the ADA committed by Reckitt & Colman and point s particularly to an interrogatory answer in which Reckitt & Colman stated it issued an Equal Employment Opportunity and Sex Har assment policy statement on April 1, 1994. Conner asserts that ther e is no indication in Reckitt & Colman 's answer that Reckitt & Colman ever posted a notice regarding the ADA before the date in its answer

. Conner contends that she would need to amend her complaint t o include a claim for failure to post such notices.
The record does not reflect that Conner filed a motion t o amend her complaint. She simply stated, in language much as w e have set forth above, that she would need to amend her complaint. This i s not a sufficient request for relief on which to base a claim that the district court erred, nor do we read Conner's brief to specifically so argue. -6- discov eryuntil Reckitt & Colman fully complied with her discover y requests, the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to postpone its ruling on Reckitt & Colman's motion for summary judgment. 3
We affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Reckitt & Colman.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.