NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE

.

IN THE 

# A RIZONA 

# C OURT OF 

# A PPEALS

D IVISION O NE

STATE OF ARIZONA
, Appellee
,

v.

JERAD COMAYAN WOODLEY
, Appellant

.

No. 1 CA

- CR 21

- 0131

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR2017

- 159217

- 001 The Honorable Suzanne E. Cohen
, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL
Arizona Attorney General’s Office
, Phoenix By Jana Zinman Counsel for Appellee

Maricopa County Public Defender’s Office
, Phoenix By Mikel Steinfeld C ounsel for Appellant FILED 7-19-2022STATE v. WOODLEY Decision of the Court

2 MEMORANDUM DECISION
Judge D. Steven Williams delivered the decision of the c ourt, in which Presiding Judge Cynthia J. Bailey and Judge Peter B. Swann joined.

W I L L I A M S , Judge:

¶1 Jerad Comayan Woodley appeals his convictions and
sentences for second

- degree burglary and possession of burglary tools. He argues the superior court erred in granting the State’s motion to consolidate his two cases into a single jury trial

. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTUAL 1 AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 In November 2017, law enforcement officers stopped Woodley, searched his car
, and found stolen items from a burglary that occurred days prior

. Woodley was released but the stolen items were seized. Police began investigating Woodley for a string of burglaries occurring in Maricopa County

. At the same time, p olice conducted a separate investigation into Trevin Island
, who they also believed was involved in the burglaries . Police placed a GPS tracking device on Island’s BMW

. ¶3 O n December 23 rd
, detectives watched as Island met Woodley at a gas station in Mesa. Woodley g o t into the passenger seat of Island’s BMW
, and the y drove off together

. Detectives surveilled the two as they drove around a gated residential neighborhood , making stops along the way. One of the stops at a residence lasted about forty

- five minutes. D etectives watched as Island got out of the BMW and walked towards the residence

. Ten minutes later d etectives heard a loud bang or crashing noi s e

. Roughly half

- an

- hour after that Island returned to the BMW and th e two drove off

. Detectives then went to the residence where they saw a broken glass door leading into the garage
, a damaged (and open) door leading into the home , and the appearance that things in the home were rummaged through , including open drawers in the primary bedroom

.

1 “We view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the convictions with all reasonable inferences resolved against the defendant.” State v. Valencia , 186 Ariz. 493, 495 (App. 1996).STATE v. WOODLEY Decision of the Court

3 ¶4 Police continued to surveille Woodley and Island. After Island cut hi mself at another residence, the two drove back to the gas station. Woodley exited the dr iver’s seat of the BMW

. Island then got into the driver’s seat and drove away. When police announced their presence, Woodley attempted to run
, but was immediately forced to the ground and arrested. Island was arrested a couple of hours later while leaving an urgent care facility where he was treated for injuries from his cut

. At the time of arrest, Woodley had jewelry and a loaded handgun, which were stolen items from previous burglaries

. Police also searched Woodley’s car and found other stolen items such as purse s and a backpack that contained fifteen to twenty pounds of jewelry.

¶5 Woodley was indicted for second

- degree burglary, possession of burglary tools, and misconduct involving weapons related to the residen tial burglary on December 23 rd

. 2 Months later, he was separately indicted on one count of first

- degree burglary, six counts of second

- degree burglary, and three counts of possession of burglary tools, all relating to several other burglaries that occurred between November and December 2017

. ¶6 I n July 2019, t he State move d to consolidate Woodley’s two

cases for trial

. A t a final management conference on August 12 th
, Woodley
, through counsel, acknowledged he was late in filing a written response to the State’s motion , indicated his objection orally, and asked the court for a
two

- day extension to file a written re s ponse . The court instructed Woodley
to respon d in writing before the morning of August 19 th

. By August 26 th
, the court still had not received Woodley ’s written objection and so prepared an order granting the State’s motion to consolidate . The order was not filed with the clerk’s office, however, until the following day. In the meantime, also on August 26 th , Woodley filed his written response objecting to consolidation. T hough the record suggests the superior court may have
, at least in part, joined the indictments after considering Arizona Rule of Evidence 404 , something which the court and parties briefly discussed on August 12 th
, the written order stated “[n]o response having been recei ved,”

as its basis for consolidation

. The case s remained consolidated for trial

. ¶7 T he jury was presented with the following twelve counts at trial : seven counts of second

- degree burglary (Counts 1, 2, 4, 6, 8, 9, 11)
, four

2 T he misconduct involving weapons count was later dismissed upon the State’s motion.STATE v. WOODLEY Decision of the Court

4 counts of possession of burglary tools (Counts 3, 5, 10, 12 ), 3 and one count of first

- degree burglary (Count 7).

¶8 T he jury convicted Woodley of the charges relating to the residen tial burglary on December 23 rd (Counts 11 and 12 ) but was unable to reach a verdict on all remaining counts arising on dates other than December 2 3rd and occurr ing at different locations

. The superior court declared a mistrial on all remaining counts.

¶9 As to Counts 11 and 12, t he jury found the following aggr avating circumstances: (1) t he offenses involved the presence of an accomplice ; (2) the offenses were committed as consideration for the receipt, or in the expectation of the receipt, of anything of pecuniary value; and (3) the offense caused physical, emo tional, or financial harm to the victim. Based upon Woodley ’s three prior felony convictions, t he court sentenced Woodley to slightly aggravated concurrent prison terms of thirteen years for second

- degree burglary and four years for possession of burglary tools, with 1,203 days of presentence

- incarceration credit for each
count.
¶10 Woodley timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. §§ 12

- 120.21(A)(1), 13

- 4031, and

- 4033(A)( 1).

DISCUSSION

¶11 Woodley argues the superior cour t erred in granting the State’s motion to consolidate his two case s for trial because he offered different defenses in the two cases (mere presence for the case arising December 23rd and denial of his presence altogether in the other case) and the primary reasons for joinder applied to Island, not to Woodley. 4 The State cont end s the court did not err because the cases were properly joined under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 13.3(a)(1)

- (2)
, Woodley’s defenses were not antagonistic
, and he suffered no harm from any alleged error as “the evidence of the crimes in either case would have been

3 Count 5 was later dismissed on the State’s motion.

4 Woodley also argues the superior court erred when it “made no findings of fact or conclusions of law” in granting th e motion to consolidate

. But Woodley provide s no legal authority suggesting the court was obligated to do so

. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.10(7) (requiring appellant provide citations to legal authorities for each contention made on appeal).STATE v. WOODLEY Decision of the Court

5 cross

- admissible in separate trials under Arizona Rul e of Evidence 404(b) and the evidence overwhelmingly supported his conviction

. ”

¶12 We will not disturb a superior court’s ruling regarding joinder or severance absent a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Prince , 204 Ariz. 156, 159, ¶ 13 (2003). In consideri ng whether the superior court erred, “we are mindful that the [ superior ] court exercises considerable discretion in determining whether, in light of the evidence then before the court
, the defendant has made the requisite showing of prejudice.” State v. Va n Winkle , 186 Ariz. 336, 339 (1996).

¶13 Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 13.3(a) provides offenses may be joined in to one proceeding “ if they: (1) are of the same or similar character; (2) are based on the same conduct or are otherwise connected together in their commission; or (3) are alleged to have been a part of a common scheme or plan.” “If the offenses fit into one or more of these categories, Rule 13.3(c) authorizes consolidation of separately charged cases in whole or in part ‘ provided that the ends of justice will not be defeated thereby. ’ ” State v. Williams , 183 Ariz. 368, 375 (1995) ( quoting State v. Martinez

- Villareal , 145 Ari z. 441, 445 (1985) )

. However, because the rules governing joinder and severance must be read together, State v. Curiel , 130 Ariz. 176, 183 (App. 1981), a defendant is entitled to have the offenses severed as a matter of right when they are joined by virtue of Rule 13.3(a)(1) “unless evidence of the other offense or offenses would be admissible if the offenses were tried separately.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 13.4(b).

¶14 Here, the State argued in their motion to consolidate
, and now again on appeal
, that the offenses f rom the two cases (1) were of the same or similar character and that (2) the offenses were “otherwise connected” in their commission. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 13.3(a). Record evidence supports th e State ’s position that the two cases were of the same or similar character . For example, they involved similar burglaries in affluent homes in Maricopa County, late in the evening while the owners were away, and the ransacking of the same parts of the home ( primary bedroom area) for similar items.

¶15 The State fur ther argued the offenses were “otherwise connected” in their commission. “ O ffenses are considered otherwise connected when ‘ the offenses arose out of a series of connected acts, and the evidence as to each count, of necessity, overlaps; ’ ‘ where most of the evidence admissible in proof of one offense [ is ] also admissible in proof of the other ; ’ or ‘ where there [ are ] common elements of proof in the joinedSTATE v. WOODLEY Decision of the Court

6 offenses.” State v. Garland , 191 Ariz. 213, 217, ¶ 14 (App. 1998) ( quoting Martinez

- Vill areal , 145 Ariz. at 446).

¶16 Here, e vidence of the two cases would be cross

- admissible under Arizona Rule of Evidence 404(b). For example, r ecord evidence i ncludes that at the time of his arrest following the burglary charged from December 23 rd , Woodley had items report ed stolen from some of the burglaries charged in the other case , including jewelry and a loaded hand gun. U pon searching his car, police also found other stolen items charged in the other case , including purses and a backpack that contained fifteen to twent y pounds of jewelry. See Garland , 191 Ariz. at 217, ¶ 14.

¶17 Moreover, the jury instructions mitigated any risk of prejudice that might have resulted from consolidation. See Prince , 204 Ariz. at 160, ¶ 17 ( providing a defendant is not prejudiced by the denial of a

severance “ where the jury is instructed t o consider each offense separately and advised that each must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt” ). Here, the jury was instructed that each count is a separate and distinct offense, that they must decide each count separately on the evidence with the law applicable to it, “uninfluenced by [their] decision on any other count.”

¶18 Woodley has failed to show where the superior court abuse d its discretion in consolidating for trial the charges from hi s two cases. See State v. Johnson , 212 Ariz. 425, 430, ¶ 14 (2006).

CONCLUSION

¶19 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Woodley’s convictions and sentences.