1 Filed 9/18/14 P. v. Chambers CA3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT (Sacramento)

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. DUSHAWN JEROME CHAMBERS, Defendant and Appellant. C075908 (Super. Ct. No. 13F04794)

Appointed counsel for defe ndant Dushawn Jerome Chambe rs asked this court to review the record to dete rmine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. ( People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Finding no errors, we affirm the judgment. FACTUAL AND PROCEDUR AL BACKGROUND We provide the following brief description of the facts and procedural history of the case. (See People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 110, 124.) On July 26, 2013, Britney Williams, the owner of a 2012 silver Toyota Yari s with license plate number 7AYP327, returned home from the grocery store (in her car) and brought the groceries to her apartment. Williams inadvertently left he r keys in the door to her apartment when she brought the groceries inside. Later that af ternoon, when she went to collect her mail,2 Williams noticed she did not have her keys. While searching for her keys, she discovered that her car was missing from the parking lot. She reported to the highway patrol that her car had been stolen. Williams had not gi ven defendant or anyone other than her boyfriend permission to drive her car. That evening at approximately 10:00 p.m ., while responding to an unrelated call in the Oak Park neighborhood w ith his partner Officer Chri stopher Swift, Officer Mark Redlich saw defendant slowly drive by their pa trol vehicle in a silver Yaris with license plate number 7AYP327. Officer Redlich ran the license plate number and learned that the car had been reported stol en. They pursued the car and located the car parked at the curb, with defendant and a woman standing beside the car on the sidewalk. Based on defendant’s directions, officers recovered th e keys to the car fro m the fenced-in front lawn of the house next to where the car was parked. Officers plac ed defendant in the back seat of the patrol car, which they ha d previously checked for contraband. When Officer Swift removed defendant from the back se at of the patrol car at the main jail, he found a small narcotics pipe on the seat. Defendant was charged with driving a st olen vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a); count one), receiving stolen property (P en. Code, § 496d, subd. (a); count two), 1 and misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia (Health & Saf. Code, § 11364.1; count three). It was also alleged defendant had suffered two prior convictions for which he served prison terms within the meaning of se ction 667.5, subdivision (b) and that one of those convictions was for a serious felony within the meaning of section 1192.7, subdivision (c) and section 667, subdivisions (b) through (i). Defendant moved to suppress defendant’s statements and the drug paraphernalia recovered in the back seat of the patrol car because the search (via a computerized license

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.3 plate reader system in the patrol car) pursu ant to which the evid ence was obtained was conducted without a warrant and without knowledge that defendant was subject to a probation search condition. The trial cour t denied the motion, finding the officer who detained defendant obtained reasonable suspicion that the car was stolen by independently running the licen se plate of the car defendant was driving. Jury trial commenced. While the jury was deliberating, defendant moved for a mistrial based on the trial court’s response to a jury question whether, as to count two, defend ant had to know the car was stolen at the moment he received it or if it was sufficient for him to have learned the car was stolen prior to poli ce intervention. The trial cour t had responded to the jury’s question by stating that he meets the knowledge requirement “if he learns that the vehicle was stolen and remains in possession of it be fore contact with the [police]” and that “[b]eing in receipt of a stolen vehicle is not li mited to the instant he received the vehicle.” The trial court denied defend ant’s motion for a mistrial. The jury returned guilty ve rdicts for all three counts. The trial court conducted a bench trial regarding the prior conviction enhancement allegations and found both allegations true. De fendant requested that the trial court strike defendant’s prior strike convicti on pursuant to section 1385 and People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 or to reduce the current charges to misdemeanors pursuant to section 17, subdivis ion (b). The court declined to strike defendant’s prior strike conviction or to reduce the current ch arges, and it sentenced him to an aggregate term of six years: four years (double the mi d-term of two years) for count one, a stayed middle term of two years for count two, 30 da ys in county jail fo r count three to run concurrent to the sentence fo r count one, and two one-year terms for defendant’s prior convictions. The court also imposed a $ 600 restitution fine, a suspended parole revocation fine in an equal amount, a $120 court operations assessment, a $90 facility fee, a $382.22 main jail booking fee, and a $ 61.75 classification fee. The trial court4 awarded defendant 421 da ys of credit: 211 days of actua l credit and 210 days of local conduct credit. Defendant timely appealed. DISCUSSION Counsel filed an opening brie f that sets forth the facts of the case and requests this court to review the record a nd determine whether there are a ny arguable issues on appeal. ( People v. Wende, supra , 25 Cal.3d 436.) Counsel advised de fendant of the right to file a supplemental brief within 30 days of the date of filing of the opening brief. More than 30 days elapsed, and we received no communica tion from defendant. Having undertaken an examination of the entire record, we find no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant. DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed.

BLEASE , J.

We concur:

RAYE , P. J.

MAURO , J.