IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

Assigned on Briefs August 1, 2017

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. MONTREKUS LAMON TILLER

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Hardeman County

No. 16-CR-30 J. Weber McCraw, Judge

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No. W2017-00093-CCA-R3-CD

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Defendant, Montrekus Lamon Tiller, was convicted of aggravated assault. He received a 

sentence of six years’ incarceration to be suspended after 350 days. On appeal, he argues 

that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. After review, we find that 

the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction. The judgment of the trial court is 

affirmed. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed

TIMOTHY L. EASTER, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JAMES CURWOOD 

WITT, JR., and ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, JJ., joined.

Billy G. Burk, District Public Defender; Periann Houghton (on appeal), Assistant Public 

Defender; and George D. Norton, Jr. (at trial), Selmer, Tennessee, for the appellant, 

Montrekus Lamon Tiller.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Benjamin A. Ball, Senior Counsel;

D. Michael Dunavant, District Attorney General; and Joe Van Dyke, Assistant District 

Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

Factual and Procedural History

A Hardeman County grand jury indicted Defendant with one count of aggravated 

assault. The following facts were adduced at trial. 

10/09/2017
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On April 26, 2014, Troy Turner, the victim, drove to a BP gas station in 

Whiteville, Tennessee, with his friend, Jerron Warren, and the victim’s son as passengers. 

Once at the gas station, the victim got out of the vehicle and began filling it with gas. Mr. 

Warren went inside the gas station to pay for the gas. During this time, Defendant, his 

two sons, and a man named “Jerome” approached the victim. The victim is married to 

the mother of Defendant’s two sons, and it appears that one of Defendant’s sons was the 

topic of a discussion between Defendant and the victim. After a brief exchange of words, 

Defendant punched the victim in the face. 

Mr. Warren witnessed Defendant punch the victim, and Mr. Warren retrieved his 

Glock 17 pistol from the glove compartment of the car. According to Mr. Warren, he 

was unable to cock the pistol or point it at anyone before he received a strike to the 

temple and fought with one of the men who had approached the victim. During this 

tussle, Mr. Warren received a second strike to the temple and lost consciousness. Once 

Defendant emerged with possession of the Glock 17, Defendant returned to his truck, and 

the victim returned to the vehicle that he was filling with gas. As they left the gas station

in their respective vehicles, the victim turned and headed west while Defendant turned 

and headed east. When their paths crossed, the victim claims Defendant had the gun in 

his hand, held the gun out the window of the vehicle, and fired a shot. Even though the 

shot did not hit the victim or his vehicle, he feared for both his life and the life of his 

child. 

Upon regaining consciousness, Mr. Warren stood up and attempted to get away, 

but he was hit by a pick-up truck in the parking lot of the gas station. After getting hit by 

a truck and picking himself up from the ground for a second time, Mr. Warren heard a 

gunshot as he ran to safety. Eventually, he was able to run across the highway in front of 

the gas station and hide in the woods until the police arrived. While waiting in the 

woods, Mr. Warren heard a second gunshot. 

Defendant gave inconsistent statements to police. Defendant’s first statement 

depicted the events as resulting from a harshly worded conversation between Defendant 

and the victim. As that conversation progressed, the victim approached one of 

Defendant’s sons with “his hand down like he was finna [sic] hit him.” At this point, 

Defendant hit the victim. Subsequently, Defendant heard one of his sons say, “[D]on’t 

shoot me.” Then, Defendant fought Mr. Warren for possession of the Glock 17. As 

Defendant made his way back to his vehicle with the Glock 17, the victim “ran him 

over.” Defendant told his sons to leave and “was finna [sic] kill him, but [Defendant] 

turned around and got in the car.” 

Defendant’s two statements to the police, which were presented at trial, differ with 

regard to what happened when the Glock 17 was in his possession. In his first statement, 

Defendant states that he only heard the shot. In his second statement, Defendant recounts
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that the gun was on the seat beside him in his vehicle. When he thought that the victim 

was going to run into him, he grabbed the gun, and “the gun went off after [Defendant] 

started turning.” Then, at a later point, Defendant “started trying to figure out how to use 

the gun.” He did not think that the gun was loaded because he moved the slide rearward 

and “did not see a bullet go in.” However, he claimed “it went off again.” 

After Defendant left the BP gas station, he took his children to a friend’s house 

and left the Glock 17 at that location. At some point in the night, Defendant returned to 

the BP gas station and spoke with the police. 

The Whitesville Police Department conducted an investigation and found that 

there were no bullets lodged in the car, there were no bullet holes in the car, and the 

victim’s body was not hit by a bullet. Lieutenant Ben Davis testified that if the events 

occurred in the way that they were described by the victim, then it is likely that a bullet 

would have hit the victim or the car driven by the victim. The police also found no bullet 

holes in the Defendant’s vehicle, but the windows were down on Defendant’s vehicle at 

the time that it was inspected. During the investigation, police discovered video cameras 

at the BP gas station. However, on April 26, 2014, the police were unable to retrieve the 

video footage because the clerk at the gas station did not have access to the footage. 

Because the BP gas station was undergoing a change in ownership, the police never 

retrieved the video footage. 

A considerable amount of testimony was devoted to whether Defendant could 

have accidently fired the Glock 17. A good portion of that testimony can be adequately 

distilled to one line from the testimony of Special Agent Kasia Lynch with the firearms 

identification unit of the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation. With regard to the Glock 17 

pistol involved in this case, she said, “Nothing can make this gun fire if the trigger is not 

being pulled to the rear.” Lieutenant Davis also testified that he had not witnessed an 

accidental discharge of a Glock firearm where the trigger had not been pulled. However, 

neither Special Agent Lynch nor Lieutenant Davis could rule out the possibility that the 

trigger could have been accidentally pulled by Defendant. 

The jury convicted Defendant as charged of aggravated assault. Defendant filed a 

motion for a new trial and a judgment of acquittal. The trial court denied Defendant’s 

motion, and this timely appeal followed.

Analysis

On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his 

conviction for aggravated assault because “[t]he record is replete with inconsistent 

testimony” and “[i]n light of the many inconsistencies, justice requires a trier of fact to 

utilize a videotape that would have without bias or prejudice shown the true facts leading 
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up to the shooting[.]” The State disagrees and argues that the evidence is sufficient to 

support Defendant’s conviction. Further, the State argues that it had no duty to acquire 

the videotape footage and that the videotape footage is irrelevant to determining the 

sufficiency of the evidence supporting Defendant’s conviction. We agree with the State.

When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court is obliged 

to review that claim according to certain well-settled principles. The relevant question is 

whether any rational trier of fact could have found the accused guilty of every element of 

the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e); Jackson v. Virginia, 

443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). The jury’s verdict replaces the presumption of innocence with 

one of guilt; therefore, the burden is shifted onto the defendant to show that the evidence 

introduced at trial was insufficient to support such a verdict. State v. Reid, 91 S.W.3d 

247, 277 (Tenn. 2002). The prosecution is entitled to the “‘strongest legitimate view of 

the evidence and to all reasonable and legitimate inferences that may be drawn 

therefrom.’” State v. Goodwin, 143 S.W.3d 771, 775 (Tenn. 2004) (quoting State v. 

Smith, 24 S.W.3d 274, 279 (Tenn. 2000)). Questions concerning the “‘credibility of the 

witnesses, the weight to be given their testimony, and the reconciliation of conflicts in the 

proof are matters entrusted to the jury as the trier of fact.’” State v. Wagner, 382 S.W.3d 

289, 297 (Tenn. 2012) (quoting State v. Campbell, 245 S.W.3d 331, 335 (Tenn. 2008)). 

“‘A guilty verdict by the jury, approved by the trial court, accredits the testimony of the 

witnesses for the State and resolves all conflicts in favor of the prosecution’s theory.’” 

Reid, 91 S.W.3d at 277 (quoting State v. Bland, 958 S.W.2d 651, 659 (Tenn. 1997)). It is 

not the role of this Court to reweigh or reevaluate the evidence, nor to substitute our own 

inferences for those drawn from the evidence by the trier of fact. Id. The standard of 

review is the same whether the conviction is based upon direct evidence, circumstantial 

evidence, or a combination of the two. State v. Dorantes, 331 S.W.3d 370, 379 (Tenn. 

2011); State v. Hanson, 279 S.W.3d 265, 275 (Tenn. 2009).

Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-101(a) sets forth the criminal offense of 

assault as follows:

A person commits assault who:

(1) Intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to another;

(2) Intentionally or knowingly causes another to reasonably fear imminent 

bodily injury; or 

(3) Intentionally or knowing causes physical contact with another and a

reasonable person would regard the contact as extremely offensive or 

provocative. 
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An aggravated assault is committed when a defendant intentionally or knowingly 

commits an assault that involved the use or display of a deadly weapon. T.C.A. § 39-13-

102(a)(1)(A)(iii). 

Without specifically mentioning an inconsistency, Defendant argues that Mr. 

Warren’s testimony is inconsistent with Mr. Warren’s written statement, the victim’s 

statement, and Defendant’s written statements. Further, Defendant argues that the 

victim’s testimony was inconsistent with Defendant’s written statements. Inconsistencies 

in the testimony are to be resolved by the jury. Wagner, 382 S.W.3d at 297. When the 

jury in this case issued a guilty verdict, the jury accredited the testimony of the State’s 

witnesses, the victim and Mr. Warren, and any conflict or inconsistency in the testimony 

of Mr. Warren or the victim was resolved in favor the prosecution’s theory. 

“Innumerable cases” have stated that this Court is not free to re-evaluate evidence as it 

pleases. State v. Cabbage, 571 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Tenn. 1978) (quoting State v. Grace, 

493 S.W.2d 474, 476 (Tenn. 1973)). Thus, we decline to re-evaluate the testimony in this 

case after the jury has accredited the testimony of the State’s witnesses. 

Next, we turn to the question of whether the evidence was sufficient to support a 

conviction for aggravated assault with the inconsistencies resolved in favor of the State. 

The victim testified that Defendant had the gun in his hand, held the gun out the window 

of the vehicle, and fired a shot. As a result, the victim feared for his life. Mr. Warren 

corroborated this testimony when he testified that his gun had been taken from him and 

that he heard a shot fired. Based on the testimony of the victim alone, a reasonable juror 

could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant intentionally or knowingly caused 

the victim to reasonably fear imminent bodily injury by the use or display of a deadly 

weapon. See T.C.A. § 39-13-101(a)(2), -102(a)(1)(iii).

Defendant argues that justice required the jury to rely on a videotape in order to 

avoid the bias and inconsistencies in testimony and have a foundation for determining the 

truth. Our rules of evidence provide the means for establishing the proper foundation for 

determine the truth; it is called impeachment. See Tenn. R. Evid. 607. Defendant, via 

counsel, was free to obtain the videotape and introduce it as evidence at trial, but he 

declined to do so. Further, Defendant had the many avenues of impeachment set forth by 

Article VI of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence available to challenge the veracity of the 

State’s witnesses’ testimony. Having found the evidence sufficient to support a 

conviction for aggravated assault, we refuse to entertain the argument that a specific 

piece of evidence was required for the evidence to be sufficient. 

Defendant also argues that the evidence is insufficient as plain error because a 

clear and unequivocal rule of law was breached when the State failed to preserve 

exculpatory evidence pursuant to State v. Ferguson, 2 S.W.3d, 912 (Tenn. 1999). We 

refuse to allow Defendant to use a sufficiency of the evidence challenge to backdoor a 
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preservation of exculpatory evidence issue into the courtroom, especially after Defendant 

failed to put this issue in his motion for a new trial. Even if we conducted a plain error 

review, Defendant’s argument is meritless because the State must first obtain the 

evidence before the State has a duty to preserve it. See State v. Yevette Somerville, No. 

W2001-00902-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 WL 1482730, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 11, 2002) 

(citing State v. Marshall, 845 S.W.2d 228, 233 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992)), no perm. app. 

filed. In this case, there is no indication that the State ever possessed the videotape from 

the BP gas station. 

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

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TIMOTHY L. EASTER, JUDGE