THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Court of Appeals 

Annie L. Myers, Billy R. Nobles, M. Elaine Nobles, 

James Lewis Willis, James and Lucille Mason, Joann 

Atkinson, Willie Clyde Smith, Clyde B. Broadwell, Jr., 

and Stephen Pettigrew of Sawney Creek Farm, LLC, 

James Tuberfille, Dean Burton, Robert W. and Minnie O. 

New, Walter L. Anders, and Mary and Homer Martin, 

Respondents, 

v. 

Town of Calhoun Falls and Savannah Valley Trails, Inc., 

Appellants. 

Appellate Case No. 2020-000578 

Appeal From Abbeville County 

Eugene C. Griffith, Jr., Circuit Court Judge 

Opinion No. 5998 

Submitted April 3, 2023 – Filed July 12, 2023 

AFFIRMED 

Douglas Lamar Bell, of McDonald Patrick Poston 

Hemphill & Roper, LLC, of Greenwood, for Appellants. 

Clarence Rauch Wise, of Greenwood, for Respondents. 

WILLIAMS, C.J.: In this property dispute involving the abandonment of a 

railway line, Annie Myers and other property owners (collectively, Respondents) 

sought a judgment against Savannah Valley Trails, Inc. and the Town of Calhoun 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Falls (collectively, SVT) declaring Respondents were the property owners in fee 

simple of their respective properties, which were each subject to an easement held 

by Seaboard System Railroad, Inc. (Railroad). On appeal, SVT argues (1) the trial 

court lacked subject matter jurisdiction; (2) the doctrine of laches barred 

Respondents' claims; and (3) the trial court erred in finding that when Railroad 

abandoned the line at issue, the rights accompanying the previously granted 

easements reverted back to Respondents. We affirm. 

FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

At trial, the parties stipulated to the following facts. The properties at issue abut a 

preexisting railway line extending approximately twenty-four miles from 

McCormick County to Abbeville County (the line). In March 1878, the State 

chartered the Savannah Valley Railroad Company (SVR) to construct the railroad. 

Respondents' predecessors in title granted SVR a right-of-way on their respective 

properties to allow the construction and operation of the railroad. The deeds 

conveying the easements stated the following or something similar.1 

[The property owner] doth give grant bargain and sell 

unto the said Savannah Valley Rail Road Company and 

their successors and assigns the Right of Way over which 

to pass at all times . . . for the purpose of running 

erecting and establishing thereon a Railroad . . . upon 

condition and it is expressly understood that should the 

said Rail [R]oad contemplated as aforesaid be not 

erected and established on and along said strip, tract or 

parcel of land described in the above and foregoing 

indenture, then, said Indenture is to be wholly null and 

void and of no effect and the said [owner] for his heirs 

and assigns will warrant and defend the Title . . . . 

(emphases added). Each successor in title received a deed subject to the easements 

held by SVR and its successors and assigns. SVR transferred its interest to 

Seaboard Coastline Railroad Company, which conveyed its interest to Railroad. 

1 The parties submitted one of the original easements, as a stipulated exhibit, to 

serve as a representative example of the easements obtained by SVR. 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

In the late 1970s, Railroad decided to close the track and seek permission from the 

Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC)2 to abandon the line. On November 21, 

1978, an ICC committee issued a decision allowing abandonment of the line. On 

March 2, 1979, the ICC issued a final decision permitting Railroad to abandon the 

line. In its decision, the ICC stated: 

(2) If the authority granted by this certificate and decision 

is exercised, [Railroad] shall submit two copies of the 

journal entries showing the retirement of the line from 

service, and shall advise this Commission in writing, 

immediately after abandonment of the line of railroad, of 

the date on which the abandonment actually took place. 

(3) If the authority granted in this certificate and decision 

is not exercised within one year from its effective date, it 

shall be of no further force and effect. 

Railroad subsequently removed the tracks. On February 25, 1980, Railroad sent a 

letter to the ICC stating, "In compliance with the second ordering paragraphs of 

this Certificate and Decision, please be advised that this track was abandoned as of 

February 15, 1980." The exact date Railroad ceased operations is unknown, but 

the parties stipulate the tracks were completely removed from the railway corridor 

by the date of the February 25, 1980 letter. 

Railroad subsequently conveyed its property interest by quitclaim deed to Clarks 

Hill – Russell Authority of South Carolina (Clarks Hill). Clarks Hill then 

conveyed its property located in McCormick County to the Ninety-Six District 

Resource Conservation and Development Council, Inc., which conveyed the 

property to SVT on June 28, 2012. Clarks Hill also conveyed its property located 

in Abbeville County, via quitclaim deed, to the Town of Calhoun Falls on April 12, 

2012. 

After the 1980 letter acknowledging compliance with the abandonment 

requirements, neither Railroad nor Respondents made any permanent 

improvements to the properties.3 On July 5, 2016, the McCormick County 

property owners filed an action seeking declaratory relief as to property rights 

2 The ICC is now called the Surface Transportation Board (STB). 

3 The parties acknowledge one of the property owners installed a minor structure 

on his property. 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

regarding the previously granted easements, after SVT began construction of a 

walking trail on the former railway line.4 The Abbeville County property owners 

similarly filed suit on March 29, 2018, and the trial court consolidated the matters 

with consent of the parties. 

On November 14, 2019, the trial court held a bench trial and took the matters under 

advisement. Following the trial, the parties submitted briefs at the request of the 

court. On February 21, 2020, the trial court issued two orders finding (1) Railroad 

abandoned the line; (2) when Railroad abandoned the line, the easements 

terminated and the associated property rights reverted to Respondents; and (3) the 

doctrine of laches did not bar Respondents' claims. This appeal followed. 

ISSUES ON APPEAL 

I. Did the trial court have subject matter jurisdiction? 

II. Did the trial court err in declaring Railroad abandoned the line and 

Respondents were the owners of the disputed property? 

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

"In an action at law, tried without a jury, the appellate court standard of review 

extends only to the correction of errors of law." Okatie River, L.L.C. v. Se. Site 

Prep, L.L.C., 353 S.C. 327, 334, 577 S.E.2d 468, 472 (Ct. App. 2003). "Questions 

regarding credibility and the weight of the evidence are exclusively for the trial 

court." Regions Bank v. Strawn, 399 S.C. 530, 537, 732 S.E.2d 230, 234 (Ct. App. 

2012). "The nature of the underlying issue determines whether a suit for 

declaratory judgment is legal or equitable." Eldridge v. City of Greenwood, 331 

S.C. 398, 416, 503 S.E.2d 191, 200 (Ct. App. 1998). The present case involves the 

determination of title to real property, which is a question of law. See id. ("The 

dispositive question in this case concerns the determination of title to real property, 

which is a legal issue."). "Moreover, while the scope or extent of an easement is a 

question in equity, the existence of an easement is a factual question in an action at 

4 The National Trail System Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1241-1251, "provides an alternative 

to abandoning a railroad right-of-way [that] allows a railroad to negotiate with a 

state, municipality, or private group (the 'trail operator') to assume financial and 

managerial responsibility for operating the railroad right-of-way as a recreational 

trail." Caldwell v. United States, 391 F.3d 1226, 1229 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

law." Id. "It follows that termination of an easement by abandonment is a factual 

question in an action at law as well." Id. 

LAW/ANALYSIS 

I. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION 

SVT argues the trial court erred in exercising subject matter jurisdiction over the 

property dispute because Respondents failed to prove Railroad abandoned the line 

in compliance with the ICC's order. Specifically, SVT asserts Respondents failed 

to present evidence showing Railroad submitted the requested journal entries 

illustrating the retirement of the line. SVT therefore contends Railroad never 

abandoned the line and the trial court's order should be vacated for lack of subject 

matter jurisdiction because the STB's jurisdiction preempts the jurisdiction of the 

trial court. We disagree. 

Subject matter jurisdiction is a court's "power to hear and determine cases of the 

general class to which the proceedings in question belong." Simmons v. Simmons, 

370 S.C. 109, 113, 634 S.E.2d 1, 3 (Ct. App. 2006) (quoting Watson v. 

Watson, 319 S.C. 92, 93, 460 S.E.2d 394, 395 (1995)). "Claims of lack of subject 

matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time, and subject matter jurisdiction may 

not be waived by filing responsive pleadings or otherwise consenting to the 

jurisdiction of a particular court." Eldridge, 331 S.C. at 408, 503 S.E.2d at 196. 

A railroad that receives authority from the Board to 

abandon a line (in a regulated abandonment proceeding 

under 49 U.S.C. 10903, or by individual or class 

exemption issued under 49 U.S.C. 10502) shall file a 

notice of consummation with the Board to signify that it 

has exercised the authority granted and fully abandoned 

the line (e.g., discontinued operations, salvaged the 

track, canceled tariffs, and intends that the property be 

removed from the interstate rail network). The notice 

shall provide the name of the STB proceeding and its 

docket number, a brief description of the line, and a 

statement that the railroad has consummated, or fully 

exercised, the abandonment authority on a certain date. 

The notice shall be filed within 1 year of the service date 

of the decision permitting the abandonment (assuming 

that the railroad intends to consummate the 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

abandonment). . . . If, after 1 year from the date of 

service of a decision permitting abandonment, 

consummation has not been effected by the railroad's 

filing of a notice of consummation, and there are no legal 

or regulatory barriers to consummation, the authority to 

abandon will automatically expire. In that event, a new 

proceeding would have to be instituted if the railroad 

wants to abandon the line. 

49 C.F.R. § 1152.29(e)(2) (emphasis added). 

"Even though preemption involves subject matter jurisdiction, the party claiming 

preemption bears the burden of proving it." Eldridge, 331 S.C. at 411, 503 S.E.2d 

at 197. Therefore, SVT bears the burden of proving Railroad's abandonment of the 

line was incomplete. We find it failed to do so. On March 2, 1979, Railroad 

received a certificate of abandonment from the ICC. In compliance with 

abandonment requirements, Railroad sent a letter to the ICC on February 25, 1980, 

including the docket number for the abandonment, a brief description of the line, 

and a statement indicating the line was officially abandoned on February 15, 1980. 

Although the record does not contain any further reference to the journal entries 

requested in the certificate of abandonment, SVT failed to show Railroad did not 

comply with the request. In fact, the record does not contain any evidence 

showing further involvement or communication from the ICC after the issuance of 

the certificate of abandonment. Thus, we hold the trial court did not err in 

exercising its subject matter jurisdiction and in finding Railroad abandoned the line 

in 1980. See Eldridge, 331 S.C. at 414, 503 S.E.2d at 199 ("The ICC's 

jurisdiction . . . terminated upon issuance of the certificate of abandonment, and 

resolution of what interests the agreements and conveyances transferred is a matter 

for state law."). 

II. DECLARATORY JUDGMENT 

A. Laches 

SVT argues the trial court erred in finding the doctrine of laches did not bar 

Respondents' claims. SVT contends the trial court erred in finding SVT failed to 

sufficiently demonstrate prejudice should Respondents be allowed to pursue their 

claims. 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

"Laches is an equitable doctrine defined as 'neglect for an unreasonable and 

unexplained length of time, under circumstances affording opportunity for 

diligence, to do what in law should have been done.'" Historic Charleston 

Holdings, LLC v. Mallon, 381 S.C. 417, 432, 673 S.E.2d 448, 456 (2009) (quoting 

Hallums v. Hallums, 296 S.C. 195, 198, 371 S.E.2d 525, 527 (1988)). "In order to 

establish laches as a defense, a party must show that the complaining party 

unreasonably delayed its assertion of a right, resulting in prejudice to the party 

asserting the defense of laches." Id. "The party seeking to establish waiver or 

laches has the burden of proof." Jenkins v. Refuge Temple Church of God in 

Christ, Inc., 424 S.C. 320, 334, 818 S.E.2d 13, 20 (Ct. App. 2018). "The failure to 

assert a right 'does not come into existence until there is a reason or situation that 

demands assertion.'" Mid-State Tr., II v. Wright, 323 S.C. 303, 307, 474 S.E.2d 

421, 423 (1996) (quoting Ex parte Stokes, 256 S.C. 260, 266, 182 S.E.2d 306, 309 

(1971)). "Moreover, the party asserting laches must show it has been materially 

prejudiced by the other party's delay." Id. 

In its order, the trial court found the issue of laches was a close question, noting 

Respondents' failure to assert their rights for approximately thirty years was 

unreasonable. However, the court ultimately found SVT failed to show it suffered 

prejudice from Respondents' delay. It stated: 

The Defendants have constructed a portion of the trail 

project, erecting signs and restoring a bridge on a portion 

of the trail. The Defendants assert that they have secured 

grants and incurred indebtedness for the project, although 

those amounts are not in evidence. Nothing is in 

evidence to show specific amounts spent or set aside for 

work on the subject property. The Defendants also assert 

in their brief that they face potential liability if the trail is 

not completed. The specifics of said liability are not in 

evidence. . . . The Court notes that a portion of the trail 

has been completed. There is no evidence of the funds 

required to complete the trail on the subject property or 

whether this money has been obtained or spent on the 

portions affected by this Order. 

Initially, we note SVT failed to plead laches as an affirmative defense in its answer 

and counterclaim. See Earthscapes Unlimited, Inc. v. Ulbrich, 390 S.C. 609, 615, 

703 S.E.2d 221, 224 (2010) ("A party in replying to a preceding pleading shall 

affirmatively set forth his or her defenses."); Rule 12(b), SCRCP ("Every defense, 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

in law or fact, to a cause of action in any pleading . . . shall be asserted in the 

responsive pleading thereto . . . ."). Thus, the trial court could have declined to 

address the defense. Nevertheless, we agree that SVT failed to present evidence 

that would equip the trial court to make a finding of prejudice beyond mere 

conjecture. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court on this issue. 

B. Declaratory Relief 

SVT argues the trial court erred in granting Respondents declaratory relief. SVT 

asserts the trial court erred in finding Railroad abandoned the line. SVT 

additionally argues the trial court erred in finding Respondents owned the disputed 

properties in fee simple because SVT owned the properties under color of title. 

SVT contends Respondents failed to show what property rights Railroad possessed 

because they only admitted one deed as an exhibit. We disagree. 

As discussed above, the trial court did not err in finding Railroad abandoned the 

line in 1980. Railroad ceased operations, sought permission for abandonment from 

the ICC, removed the tracks from the railway corridor, and transferred its property 

interests. Further, nothing in the record indicates Railroad failed to comply with 

the requirements of the certificate of abandonment. Thus, pursuant to our 

precedent, the easement rights Railroad held on Respondents' properties reverted to 

Respondents at the time of abandonment. See Eldridge, 331 S.C. at 422, 503 

S.E.2d at 203 (affirming the trial court's ruling that the railroad's abandonment of 

the railway line extinguished the easements granted for construction and operation 

of the railroad); id. ("To hold otherwise would effectively gut the longstanding rule 

that an easement is extinguished upon the railroad's abandonment of the right of 

way for railway purposes."). Therefore, the trial court properly granted 

Respondents declaratory relief as to the rights of the properties abutting the former 

railway line. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court. 

Regarding SVT's challenge to the trial court's use of the representative easement 

deed, this argument is unpreserved for appellate review as SVT failed to challenge 

the use of the deed when it was admitted by the parties as a stipulated exhibit. See 

Lucas v. Rawl Fam. Ltd. P'ship, 359 S.C. 505, 510–11, 598 S.E.2d 712, 715 (2004) 

("It is well settled that, but for a very few exceptional circumstances, an appellate 

court cannot address an issue unless it was raised to and ruled upon by the trial 

court."). 

CONCLUSION 
 

 

Accordingly, the orders of the trial court are 

AFFIRMED.5 

GEATHERS and VERDIN, JJ., concur. 

5 We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.