NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
VALERIE LOPEZ; DAVID WELLINGTON,

Plaintiffs

- Appellants,

v. DOANTRANG DANG, an individual; et al.,

Defendants

- Appellees. No. 22

- 55495
D.C. No. 8:21

- cv - 00353

- JVS

- KES

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California James V. Selna, District Judge, Presiding Submitted February 15, 2023 * * Pasadena, California
Before: WALLACE, HURWITZ, and BADE, Circuit Judges. Valerie Lopez and David Wellington ( “Appellants”) appeal from the district
court’s dismissal of their cla im s under (1) 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ; (2) the federal RICO
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1962 ; and (3) California law

. We have jurisdiction under 28

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

MAR 1 2023
MOL LY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2

U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
1. Appellants fail ed to state a § 1983 claim in their first amended complaint
because the y did not plausibly allege that the defendants were acting “under color
of law.” Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co. , 398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970). Appellants
contend that the appellees acted under color of law by utilizing state

- court foreclosure and wrongful detainer proceedings

. But the mere “fact that a s t ate permits the use of foreclosure procedures and subsequent sheriff sales as the execution of a judgment is not sufficient to constitute state action” under § 1983

. Harper v. Fed. Land Bank of Spokane , 878 F.2d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 1989).
2. To state a federal RICO claim , a plaintiff must allege that the defendant participated in “(1) the conduct of (2) an enterprise that affects interstate commerce (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity” that was “(5) the proximate cause
of harm” to the plaintiff. Eclectic Props. E

. , LLC v. Marcus & Millichap Co. , 751 F.3d 990, 997 (9th Cir. 2014). The district court correctly determined that the “racketeering activity” alleged in the second amended com p laint

— foreclosing on properties for which mort gage debt had been discharged in bankruptcy proceedings,

—

was not actionable

. Although “sham” litigation can be a “predicate act” under RICO, Sosa v. DIRECTV, Inc. , 437 F.3d 923, 9 40

– 41 (9th Cir. 2006), the plaintiff must show that (1) “ the lawsuit is objectively baseless and the defendant’s motive in bringing it was unlawful ” ; (2) the conduct involves a series3

of lawsuits “brought pursuant to a policy of starting legal proceedings without regard to the merits and for an unlawful purpose” ; or (3) the co nduct “ consists of making intentional misrepresentations to the court .” Id. at 938 ( internal quotation
marks and citations omitted )

. Because the bankruptcy discharge did not discharge
the underlying mortgage lien s , see Johnson v. Home State Bank , 501 U.S . 78 , 83 (1991), A ppellants have not plausibly alleged that the foreclosure and eviction proceedings were shams. Appellants’ allegations regarding other acts of extortion also either lacked a sufficient nexus to the alleged RICO enterprise, see Sun Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Dierdorff , 825 F.2d 187, 194

– 95 (9th Cir. 1987), or did not proximately harm Appellants.
3. T he district court did not err by declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Appellants’ state

- law claims. A district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over pendent state

- law claims if it “has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction,” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) , and “in the usual case in which all federal

- law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors to be considered under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine . . . will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the rem aining state

- law
claims.” Carnegie

-

Mellon Univ. v. Cohill , 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988).
4. Finally, the district court did not abuse its “particularly broad” discretion by4

denying leave to file a third amended complaint

. See Chodos v. W est Publ’g Co. , 2 92 F.3d 992, 1003 (9th Cir. 2002). Given the deficiencies in Appellants’ federal claims, the district court correctly concluded that any amendment would be futile

. AFFIRMED
.