IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 14-1698

Filed August 19, 2015

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF KELLY KIRK RICHARDS

AND VALORIE JEAN RICHARDS

Upon the Petition of

KELLY KIRK RICHARDS,

Petitioner-Appellant/Cross-Appellee,

And Concerning

VALORIE JEAN RICHARDS,

Respondent-Appellee/Cross-Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Lee (North) County, Michael J. 

Schilling, Judge.

A husband appeals, and a wife cross-appeals, from spousal support and 

property distribution provisions of a dissolution decree. AFFIRMED AS 

MODIFIED ON APPEAL; AFFIRMED ON CROSS-APPEAL.

Jennifer E. Klever-Kirkman of Robberts, Kirkman & Engler, L.L.L.P., 

Burlington, for appellant.

Frank J. Nidey of Nidey Erdahl Tindal & Fisher, P.L.C., Cedar Rapids, for 

appellee.

Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Vaitheswaran and Doyle, JJ.
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DOYLE, J.

Kelly Richards appeals the spousal support provisions of the decree 

dissolving his marriage to Valorie Richards. Valorie cross-appeals a property 

distribution provision of the decree. We affirm as modified on appeal and affirm 

on cross-appeal. 

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

Kelly and Valorie married in 1998 and divorced in 2014. They have no 

minor children. 

At the time of trial, Kelly was fifty-four years old. He is a high school 

graduate and has worked as an over-the-road truck driver for Wal-Mart for over 

twenty-two years. Kelly earns between $75,000 and $81,000 per year, including 

bonuses for safety and longevity. Wal-Mart also provides Kelly with an employee 

benefits package, including medical insurance and a retirement program. Kelly is 

generally in good health. Kelly lives in the marital home in Donnellson. 

Valorie was sixty-three years old at the time of trial. She has an associate 

of arts degree and a bachelor of science degree. She worked as a social worker 

from 1996 to 1999, when she left that employment to spend time caring for 

Kelly’s now-adult children. Valorie’s social work licensure has since lapsed. 

From 2005 to 2008, Valorie worked as a teacher at a denominational school. 

She then worked as a retail store clerk from about 2008 to 2013. That position 

required Valorie to do some lifting and be on her feet up to seven hours a day, 

which usually left her exhausted at the end of the day. Valorie left this 

employment when the parties separated in August 2013, and she relocated to 

Wellman where she lives with her adult son and his family. She helps prepare 
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meals and takes care of the grandchildren. Valorie has several medical 

conditions that affect her employability, including arthritis, conditions consistent 

with fibromyalgia, anxiety, instability in her left knee, and neuropathy in her feet 

caused by her treatment for breast cancer in 2005. 

Kelly filed a petition for dissolution of marriage in August 2013. The 

district court entered an order on temporary matters, ordering Kelly to pay Valorie 

$1200 per month in temporary spousal support and $2000 of Valorie’s attorney 

fees. 

The district court entered a decree dissolving the parties’ marriage in 

September 2014. The parties had entered a pretrial stipulation which essentially 

resolved the issues of distribution of property with the exception of the equity in 

the marital home—they agreed on the value of the home ($150,000), but 

disputed what credit, if any, Kelly would receive for premarital funds he 

contributed to the purchase of the home. The court approved the settlement and 

adopted its provisions in the decree. The pretrial stipulation resulted in Valorie 

receiving half of Kelly’s 401k (after a credit to Kelly for his premarital contribution) 

and Kelly making a personal property equalization payment to Valorie in the 

amount of $23,500. 

The court credited Kelly with a “premarital contribution” of $73,500, and 

accordingly ordered Kelly be awarded the first $73,500 of equity from the marital 

home. The court divided the remaining equity in the home ($76,500) equally 

between the parties, and ordered Kelly to make an equalization payment to 

Valorie in the amount of $38,250 (resulting in a total equalization payment from 

Kelly to Valorie of $61,750). 
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The court ordered Kelly to pay spousal support to Valorie in the amount of 

$1500 per month until Kelly reached age sixty-six years ten months, and $525 

per month thereafter until the death of either party or Valorie remarried. The 

court ordered each party to pay their own attorney fees. 

Kelly appeals, challenging the amount and duration of his spousal support 

obligation. Valorie cross-appeals, challenging the amount of premarital 

contribution credit the court awarded to Kelly. Additional facts will be set forth 

below as relevant to these issues.

II. Standard of Review

We review this equity action involving the dissolution of a marriage de 

novo. Iowa R. App. P. 6.907; In re Marriage of McDermott, 827 N.W.2d 671, 676 

(Iowa 2013). Accordingly, we examine the entire record and decide anew the 

legal and factual issues properly presented and preserved for our review. 

McDermott, 827 N.W.2d at 676. We give weight to the findings of the district 

court, particularly concerning the credibility of witnesses; however, those findings 

are not binding upon us. Id.; see also Iowa R. App. P. 6.904(3)(g). Only when 

there has been a failure to do equity will we disturb the district court’s ruling. 

McDermott, 827 N.W.2d at 676. 

III. Spousal Support

On appeal, Kelly challenges the district court’s award of spousal support 

to Valorie, claiming it is inequitable under the circumstances of this case. He

takes issue with the “large” amount and “excessive” duration of support ordered 

by the court. Kelly requests the decree be modified to require him to pay Valorie 

“rehabilitative support of $500 per month for a period of five years.” 
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Spousal support is not an absolute right—it depends upon the 

circumstances of a particular case. In re Marriage of Schenkelberg, 824 N.W.2d 

481, 486 (Iowa 2012). “[P]rior cases are of little value in determining the 

appropriate alimony award.” In re Marriage of Becker, 756 N.W.2d 822, 825 

(Iowa 2008). A district court has considerable latitude when making an award of 

spousal support. Schenkelberg, 824 N.W.2d at 486. We will disturb the court’s 

ruling only when there has been a failure to do equity. Id. 

The amount of spousal support is to be calculated equitably based upon 

all the factors contained in Iowa Code section 598.21A(1) (2013).1 Here, the 

district court specifically discussed factors under section 598.21A of particular 

importance in this case including the length of the parties’ marriage (sixteen 

years), ages and health of the parties, property division, earnings and earning 

 

1 These include: 

a. The length of the marriage.

b. The age and physical and emotional health of the parties.

c. The distribution of property made pursuant to section 598.21.

d. The educational level of each party at the time of marriage and at the 

time the action is commenced.

e. The earning capacity of the party seeking maintenance, including 

educational background, training, employment skills, work experience, 

length of absence from the job market, responsibilities for children under 

either an award of custody or physical care, and the time and expense 

necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to enable the party to 

find appropriate employment.

f. The feasibility of the party seeking maintenance becoming selfsupporting at a standard of living reasonably comparable to that enjoyed 

during the marriage, and the length of time necessary to achieve this 

goal.

g. The tax consequences to each party.

h. Any mutual agreement made by the parties concerning financial or 

service contributions by one party with the expectation of future 

reciprocation or compensation by the other party.

i. The provisions of an antenuptial agreement.

j. Other factors the court may determine to be relevant in an individual 

case.

Iowa Code § 598.21A.
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capacities of the parties, tax consequences, and feasibility of self-sufficiency, and 

noted it had considered all the remaining factors “even if not specifically 

discussed.” 

Valorie was sixty-three at the time of trial, and has several medical 

conditions that affect her employability. We agree with the court’s assessment 

that Valorie’s ability to do manual work of the type she performed at her last job 

as a retail store clerk is “compromised by her physical condition.” We also agree 

Valorie’s age and “long absence” from social work “seriously diminish[ ]” her 

opportunities in that profession. 

Although Valorie will need to find some type of work—even if only parttime—to enable her to enjoy a lifestyle similar to that which the parties enjoyed 

during their sixteen-year marriage, the fact remains that Valorie is dependent 

upon Kelly for support. Kelly is able to provide support and it is equitable for him 

to do so. He was fifty-four years old at the time of trial, in good health, and has 

been steadily employed in the same position for over twenty-two years. Kelly 

earns approximately $80,000 per year, including bonuses and other benefits. 

Kelly claims the court failed to properly consider the effect of the property 

distribution upon Valorie’s need for support and his ability to pay. We 

acknowledge Kelly will likely have to take out a mortgage on his home to make 

an equalization payment to Valorie. Valorie is currently living with her adult son 

and his family and enunciated her desire to funnel that money toward purchasing 

her own home. As will be discussed more below, Kelly will retain a large portion 

of the equity in the home, even after the equalization payment is made to Valorie. 
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We further observe Kelly underestimates his net monthly income by nearly 

$2000. Kelly’s Exhibit 1, a collection of paystubs, shows that in the month 

preceding the dissolution trial, Kelly’s “net pay” was $5578.80. Even taking 

Kelly’s estimated monthly expenses of $3719.52—a number which includes

Kelly’s estimated expense for a “new mortgage obligation” he presumes he will 

have—this would leave Kelly an excess of $359.28 after he paid Valorie $1500 in 

spousal support.

After considering all the facts and circumstances of this case, and after 

taking into consideration all appropriate factors, we find the district court’s 

spousal support award of $1500 per month, although generous, is equitable. We 

therefore affirm the amount of the spousal support award.

We next consider the duration of the award. The district court ordered: 

“Kelly’s obligation to pay alimony shall terminate upon the death of either party. 

Finally, there shall be a presumption that alimony will terminate if Valorie 

remarries.” Lifetime alimony awards are typically reserved for long-term 

marriages, i.e., those marriages lasting twenty or more years. See In re Marriage 

of Gust, 858 N.W.2d 404, 410-12 (Iowa 2015). “[T]he shorter the marriage, the 

less likely a court is to award traditional spousal support.” Id. at 410. The district 

court characterized the parties’ sixteen-year marriage as a “medium-length 

marriage,” nevertheless, the court awarded lifetime spousal support to Valorie.

We agree this was not a long-term marriage. After considering all the 

facts and circumstances of this case, and after taking into consideration all 

appropriate factors, we find the lifetime award of spousal support is inappropriate

as it fails to do equity. We conclude the spousal support award should terminate 
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when Kelly reaches age sixty-six years and ten months or retires, whichever 

occurs later.2 We therefore modify the decree to provide that the spousal award 

shall terminate when Kelly reaches age sixty-six and ten months or retires 

(whichever is later), or upon the death of either party or Valorie’s remarriage if 

either occurs prior to the time Kelly reaches age sixty-six and ten months or 

retires.

IV. Premarital Contribution

On cross-appeal, Valorie challenges the premarital contribution credit of 

$73,500 of equity from the marital home the court awarded to Kelly, which the 

court based upon Kelly’s contribution of the proceeds from the sale of his 

premarital home and the proceeds from the sale of his Wal-Mart stock into the 

parties’ purchase of the marital home. Valorie claims that equity in the home 

allocated to Kelly was a marital asset that should be split between the parties, 

and she requests the court modify the decree to award her “an additional 

$36,750 property award.” 

Iowa Code section 598.21(5) requires the court to divide “all property, 

except inherited property or gifts received by one party” equitably between the 

parties. “This broad declaration means the property included in the divisible 

estate includes not only property acquired during the marriage by one or both of 

the parties, but property owned prior to the marriage by a party.” In re Marriage 

 

2 Retirement may trigger termination of alimony, even in cases of long-term marriages 

where traditional alimony is found to be appropriate. Gust, 858 N.W.2d at 414 (“There is 

also authority for the proposition that traditional spousal support may terminate upon 

reaching retirement.”).
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of Schriner, 695 N.W.2d 493, 496 (Iowa 2005) (citing Brainard, 523 N.W.2d at 

616).

In other words, premarital property is not set aside like gifted and inherited 

property. See Fennelly, 737 N.W.2d at 102; In re Marriage of Miller, 552 N.W.2d 

460, 465 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996). The district court should not separate a 

premarital asset from the divisible estate and automatically award it to the 

spouse who owned it prior to the marriage. See Fennelly, 737 N.W.2d at 102; In 

re Marriage of Sullins, 715 N.W.2d 242, 247 (Iowa 2006). Rather, property 

brought into the marriage by a party is merely a factor among many to be 

considered under section 598.21(5). See Schriner, 695 N.W.2d at 496. “This 

factor may justify full credit, but does not require it.” Miller, 552 N.W.2d at 465. 

Other factors under section 598.21(5) include the length of the marriage, 

contributions of each party to the marriage, the age and health of the parties, 

each party’s earning capacity, and any other factor the court may determine to be 

relevant to any given case. See Fennelly, 737 N.W.2d at 102.

At trial, the parties agreed on the value of the marital home ($150,000), 

but disputed what credit, if any, Kelly would receive for premarital funds he 

contributed to the purchase of the home. The court credited Kelly with a 

“premarital contribution” of $73,500, and accordingly ordered Kelly be awarded 

the first $73,500 of equity from the marital home. The parties agreed the value of 

Kelly’s Wal-Mart stock in 1998 before he cashed it out and used the proceeds 

toward the marital home was $31,744.23. And at trial, Valorie agreed some 

$30,000 of the proceeds from the sale of Kelly’s premarital home went to pay off 

a loan they used to purchase the marital home. Valorie further testified she 
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received approximately $5000 in proceeds from the sale of her premarital home, 

which she used to pay off a car Kelly purchased her for Christmas. We further 

observe the court divided the remaining equity in the home ($76,500) equally 

between the parties, and ordered Kelly to make an equalization payment to 

Valorie in the amount of $38,250 (resulting in a total equalization payment from 

Kelly to Valorie of $61,750). 

Under these circumstances, considering the applicable factors set forth in 

section 598.21(5) as well as the personal property equalization payment 

stipulated to by the parties, we believe the court’s decision to credit Kelly for his 

premarital contribution to the marital home was equitable. We affirm on this 

issue. 

V. Conclusion

We affirm as modified on appeal and affirm on cross-appeal. Costs are 

assessed equally between the parties.

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED ON APPEAL; AFFIRMED ON CROSSAPPEAL.