MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT Reporter	of	Decisions

Decision: 2020 ME	30

Docket: Pen-19-393

Submitted

On	Briefs: February 26,	2020

Decided: March	5,	2020

Panel: MEAD,	GORMAN,	JABAR,	HUMPHREY,	HORTON,	and	CONNORS,	JJ.

IN	RE	CHILD	OF	AMBER	D.

PER	CURIAM

[¶1]		Amber	D. appeals	 from a	judgment	 of	 the	District	Court	 (Bangor,	

Jordan,	J.)	 terminating	 her	 parental	 rights	 to	 her	 child pursuant	 to	22	M.R.S.	

§ 4055(1)(B)(2)(a),	(b)(i),	(ii)	(2018).		She	argues	 that	 there	was	insufficient	

evidence	 to	 support	 the	 court’s	 findings of	 at	 least	 one	 ground	 of	 parental	

unfitness	and	that	termination	was	in	the	best	interest	of	the	child.		We	disagree	

and	affirm	the	judgment.

I.		BACKGROUND

[¶2]	 	 The Department	 of	 Health	 and	 Human	 Services	 initiated	 child	

protection	 proceedings	 as	 to	 this	 child	 in	 April	 of	 2018,	 alleging	 that the	

mother’s	 rights	 to	 her	 older	 child	 were	 terminated	 in	 2013,	the	 mother	 has	

mental	health	issues	and	cognitive	limitations	that	prevent	her	from	providing

safe	 or	appropriate	care for	 the	child,	 the	mother	neglects	 the	child,	and	the	

mother	does	not	recognize	 the	risk	of	sexual	abuse	 to	 the	child	posed	by	 the	
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father’s	 diagnosis	 of	 pedophilia.1	 	 See 22	 M.R.S.	 §	 4032	 (2018).	 	 The court	

(Larson,	J.)	entered	a	preliminary	protection	order	dated	April	20,	2018,	placing	

the	child	in	the	Department’s custody.	 See 22	M.R.S.	§	4034	(2018). The	mother	

waived	her	right	to	a	summary	preliminary	hearing,	and	she	later	agreed	to	the	

entry	of	a	jeopardy	order	based	on	the	same	grounds	set	out	in	the	judgment	

terminating	 her	 parental	 rights	 to	 her	 older	 child—namely,	 that	 she is	

impulsive	and	has	an	explosive	temper,	has	borderline	dependent	personality	

disorder,	 exhibits	 poor	 judgment,	 lacks	 a	 basic	 understanding	 of	 child	

development,	and	denies	that	the	father	poses	any	risk	of	sexual	abuse	to	the	

child	 despite	 his	 diagnosis	 of	 pedophilia.	 	 See 22	 M.R.S.	 §§	 4034(3),	 4035

(2018).		

[¶3]		On	April	9,	2019,	the	Department	filed	a	petition	to	terminate	the	

mother’s	parental	rights,	alleging	that	the	mother	had	made	little	progress	in	

her	 rehabilitation	 and	 reunification	 efforts,	 had no	 stable	 place	 to	 live,	

continued to	lack	boundaries	as	to	the	father,	had a	limited	understanding	of	

 1		The	Department	also	initiated	child	protection	proceedings	as	to	the	father.		The	father	does	not	

appeal	from	the	termination	of	his	parental	rights,	and	we	therefore	confine	our	discussion	to	those	

facts	and	procedural	events	that	are	relevant	to	the	mother.		
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the	sex	offense	risk	posed	to	the	child	by	the	father,	lacked insight,	and	had been	

given	a	guarded	prognosis	for	change.2		See 22	M.R.S.	§	4052	(2018).		

[¶4]		After	a	testimonial	hearing,	by	judgment	dated	August	30,	2019,	the	

court	(Jordan,	J.)	made	 the	 following	 findings	of	 fact,	which	are	supported	by	

competent	record	evidence.		See 22	M.R.S.	§	4054	(2018).		

The	 Court	 finds	 that	 [the	 mother] has	 been	 willing	 to	 make	 all	

efforts	necessary	to address	the	jeopardy	regarding	[the	child]. .	.	.

[The	mother] has	a	long	history	with	[the	father].	 They	continued	

to	 reside	 together through	 the	 previous	 DHHS	 matter	 and	

termination	of	their	parental	rights	to	[their	older	child] at	the	end	

of	2013.	 After	that	proceeding,	[the	mother	and	father] divorced	in	

2016, but	were	living	together	until	very	recently.	 The	Court	finds	

that	[the	mother’s] recent statements	that	she	believes	[the	father]

to	be	a	threat	to	the	child's	safety	are	not sincere.	 She	has	denied	it	

too	consistently	and	for	too	long	a	period	for	the	Court	to	believe	

she	has	had	a	sudden	change	of	heart.	The	Court	acknowledges	that	

she	 has made	 substantial	 progress	 on	 her	 mental	 health	 issues.	

However,	 her	 lack	 of	 protective capacity	 continues	 as	 does	 her	

cognitive	impairment	which	makes	her	incapable	of safely	caring	

for	the	child.	Her	lack	of	protective	capacity	does	not	simply	extend	

to [the	 father] and	 his	 pedophilia,	 but	 to	 exposing	 the	 child	 to	

unsafe	individuals.		

The	 Court	 concludes	 that	 [the	 mother’s] daily	 cannabis	 abuse	

impairs	her	thinking	and exacerbates	her	significant	mental	health	

issues.	 The	Court	finds	that	[the	mother]	does	not have	the	skills	

and	intellectual	functioning	to	provide	care	for	[the	child] to	a	level	

that	is not	jeopardous.	 Her	need	for	continuous	prompts	to	be	able	

 2		The	court	maintained	the	Department’s	custody	of	the	child	in	judicial	review	and	permanency	

planning	orders	dated	December	14,	2018;	May	6,	2019;	and	October	4,	2019.		See 22	M.R.S.	§	4038	

(2018).		
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to	 properly	 care	 for	 this child	 demonstrates	 that	 she	 cannot	

provide	 safe	care	 on	her	 own.	 The	child’s	 repeated rejections	 of	

[the	 mother’s] attempts	 at	 affections	 does	 not	 contribute	 to	

jeopardy,	but	the Court	finds	that	it	does	fit	into	the	best	interest	

analysis	if	parental	rights	are terminated.		

The	 Court	 finds that	 [the	 mother’s	 therapist	 and	 psychological	

evaluator]	were	very	persuasive.	 The	Court	finds	that [the	mother]	

has	 plateaued	 in	 her	 therapy	 .	 .	 .	 .	 (She	 is	 not	 making	 further

progress	at	this	time,	so	there	is	no	way	to	know	where	she	will	go	

from	 here.)	 The Court	 also	 finds	 that	 the	 prognosis	 for	

improvement,	 to	 the	 point	 of	 being	 able	 to	 parent [the	 child]

independently,	is guarded.	 This	combination	of	facts	leads	to	the	

conclusion that	 it	 is	 very	 unlikely	 that	 she	 will	 be	 able	 to	 make	

enough	 progress	 to	 resolve	 jeopardy in	 a	 time	 reasonably	

calculated	to	meet	[the	child’s] needs.		

The	Court	finds	that	too	much	time	has	passed	to	wait	any	longer.

Although	[the	mother’s]	housing	situation	is	expected	to	improve	

in	 the	 near	 future,	 it	 still	 has	 to	 be	 considered unstable.	 [The	

mother] has	 never	 lived	 on	 her	 own	 and	 has	 had	 recurring	

problems	with maintaining	a	reasonably	clean	household	prior	to	

this	date. .	.	.	

[The	child] has	been	in	State	custody	 for	 virtually	her	entire	life.	

The	 Court	 finds	 that	 she has	 a	 very	 good	 relationship	 with	 the	

foster	parents	and	draws	the	inference	that [the	child] views	them	

as	 her	 mother	 and	 father.	 [The	 child] needs	 and deserves	 the	

assurance	and	stability	of	a	permanent	home.		

[¶5]		Based	on	these	findings,	the	court	terminated	the	mother’s	parental	

rights	to	the	child	on	the	grounds	that	the	mother	is	unable	to	protect	the	child	

from	 jeopardy	 and	 unable	 to	 take	 responsibility	 for	 the	 child	 and	 these	

circumstances	are	unlikely	to	change	in	a	time	reasonably	calculated	to	meet	
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the	child’s	needs,	and	 that	 termination	of	 the	mother’s	rights	is	in	 the	child’s	

best	interest.		See 22	M.R.S.	§	4055(1)(B)(2)(a),	(b)(i),	(ii).		The	mother	appeals.		

See 22	M.R.S.	§	4006	(2018).		

II.		DISCUSSION

[¶6]		To	terminate	parental	rights	without	the	mother’s consent,	the	trial	

court	 was	 required	 to	 find,	 by	 clear	 and convincing	 evidence,	 at	 least	 one	

ground	of	parental	unfitness	and	that	termination	is	in	the	best	interest	of	the	

child.		22 M.R.S.	§	4055(1)(B)(2)	(2018);	In	re	Child	of	Sherri Y.,	2019	ME	162,	

¶ 5,	221 A.3d	120.		The	mother	argues	that because she	“engaged	in	.	.	.	all	the	

required	 services	 for	 reunification,”	 there	 was	 insufficient	 evidence	 in	 this	

matter	to	support	both	the	parental	unfitness	and	best	interest	determinations.		

We	 review for	clear	 error	the	court’s	 findings	 of	 fact	supporting	its	 parental	

unfitness	 and	best	interest	determinations,	and	we	will	uphold	 those	 facts	if	

there	is	any	competent	evidence	in	the	record	to	support	them.	 In	re	Child	of	

Megan	 D.,	 2019	 ME	 52,	 ¶¶ 6-8,	 206	 A.3d	 899.	 	 We	 review	 for	 an	 abuse	 of	

discretion	the	court’s	ultimate	decision	regarding	the	child’s	best	interest.		Id.

¶ 6.

[¶7]		We	conclude	that	there	was	sufficient	record	evidence—including	

the	 testimony	of	 the	mother’s	 therapist,	psychological	evaluator,	Department	
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caseworker,	 visit	 supervisors,	 and	 case	 manager,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 guardian	 ad	

litem—to	support	the	court’s	findings	of	parental	unfitness	and	best	interest	by	

clear	and	convincing	evidence.		Although	the	court	found	that	the	mother	“has	

been	willing	 to	make	 all	efforts	necessary	 to	address	 the	jeopardy	 regarding	

[the	child],”	 the	court	also	credited the	 testimony	 of	multiple	witnesses	 that,	

notwithstanding	 her	 efforts, the	mother	 remains	 unable	 to	 provide	 safe	 and	

proper	care	for	the	child	and	will	be	unable	to	do	so	in	a	time	that	meets	the	

child’s	needs.		See In	re	Children	of	Tiyonie	R.,	2019	ME	34,	¶	6,	203	A.3d	824

(“[T]he	 weight	 and	 credibility	 of	 [the]	 evidence	 was	 for	 the	 trial	 court’s	

determination.”);	In	 re	 Children	 of	 Anthony	M.,	 2018	ME	 146,	 ¶	 11,	 195 A.3d	

1229 (“Marginal	progress	toward	reunification	and	a	simple	desire	to	remain	

parents	is	not	enough	to	ameliorate	jeopardy.”	(alteration	omitted)	(quotation	

marks	 omitted)).	 	 We also	 discern	 no	 abuse	 of	 discretion	 in	 the	 court’s	

determination	 that	 the	 termination	 of	 the	 mother’s	 parental	 rights	 is	 in	 the	

child’s	best	interest.

The	entry	is:

Judgment affirmed.
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Joseph	P	Belisle,	Esq.,	Bangor,	for	appellant	mother

Aaron	M.	Frey,	Attorney	General,	and	Meghan	Szylvian,	Asst.	Atty.	Gen.,	Office	

of	the	Attorney	General,	Augusta,	for	appellee	Department	of	Health	and	Human	

Services

Bangor	District	Court	docket	number	PC-2018-26

FOR	CLERK	REFERENCE	ONLY