DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA

SECOND DISTRICT

GALE FORCE ROOFING AND RESTORATION, LLC,

Appellant,

v.

AMERICAN INTEGRITY INSURANCE COMPANY OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

No. 2D22-4104

February 16, 2024

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Hillsborough County; Caroline Tesche 

Arkin, Judge.

Jeremy D. Bailie of Weber, Crabb & Wein, P.A., St. Petersburg, for 

Appellant.

Kimberly J. Fernandes of Kelley Kronenberg, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

KHOUZAM, Judge.

Gale Force Roofing and Restoration, LLC, appeals an order 

dismissing its complaint against American Integrity Insurance Company 

of Florida. Although Gale Force brought the action as the assignee of 

American Integrity's insured, the trial court determined that Gale Force 

lacked standing to do so on the basis that the assignment of benefits 
2

(AOB) attached to the complaint failed to satisfy the requirements of 

section 627.7152, Florida Statutes (2021).1 Because the trial court did 

not err in dismissing the complaint on the basis of an invalid 

assignment, we affirm. We write to explain our reasoning.

Gale Force contends that the trial court erred in ruling that the 

AOB is invalid and unenforceable because the court looked only to the 

first two pages of the complaint attachment to determine its validity as 

an AOB instead of considering the full six-page document.2 Had the trial 

court considered all six pages, Gale Force maintains, it would have 

concluded that the AOB complied with all applicable statutory 

requirements. American Integrity responds that the trial court correctly 

limited its review of the AOB's statutory compliance to only the first two 

pages of the complaint attachment and, further, that even if it had 

considered all six pages, the court would inexorably have found the AOB 

invalid and unenforceable due to several substantive deficiencies therein. 

In this case, we need not—and do not—decide the question of 

whether the court was required to consider all pages attached to the 

complaint to determine the validity of the AOB. That is because, even 

accepting for purposes of analysis Gail Force's primary contention that 

the court should have evaluated all six pages to determine statutory 

compliance, we reach the same result: the AOB is invalid and 

unenforceable under the plain language of section 627.7152(2). 

1 This statute has since been amended, but the parties agree that 

the 2021 version applies here. 

2 Although the six-page attachment is consecutively paginated "[#] 

of 6," it contains two separate sections under different titles: the first two 

pages are titled "Assignment Agreement," followed by a "Construction 

Services Agreement" as well as an exhibit. 
3

"The standard of review of an order granting a motion to dismiss is 

de novo." Air Quality Experts Corp. v. Fam. Sec. Ins., 351 So. 3d 32, 36 

(Fla. 4th DCA 2022) (citing Rhiner v. Koyama, 327 So. 3d 314, 316 (Fla. 

4th DCA 2021)). "Statutory interpretation and standing also receive de 

novo review." Id. (first citing Therlonge v. State, 184 So. 3d 1120, 1121 

(Fla. 4th DCA 2015); and then citing Matthews v. Fed. Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n, 

160 So. 3d 131, 132 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015)). 

"Section 627.7152 . . . was enacted by the Florida legislature in 

2019 to regulate assignment agreements that seek to transfer insurance 

benefits from the policyholder to a third party." Total Care Restoration, 

LLC v. Citizens Prop. Ins., 337 So. 3d 74, 75-76 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022); see 

also ch. 2019-57, Laws of Fla. 

To that end, "[s]ection 627.7152 establishes mandatory 

requirements which an AOB must include to be enforceable." Air Quality 

Experts, 351 So. 3d at 37. The only such provisions necessary to decide 

this appeal are as follows:

(2)(a) An assignment agreement must:

. . . .

2. Contain a provision that allows the assignor to 

rescind the assignment agreement without a penalty or 

fee by submitting a written notice of rescission signed 

by the assignor to the assignee within 14 days after the 

execution of the agreement, at least 30 days after the 

date work on the property is scheduled to commence if 

the assignee has not substantially performed, or at least 

30 days after the execution of the agreement if the 

agreement does not contain a commencement date and 

the assignee has not begun substantial work on the 

property.

. . . .
4

6. Contain the following notice in 18-point uppercase 

and boldfaced type:

YOU ARE AGREEING TO GIVE UP CERTAIN 

RIGHTS YOU HAVE UNDER YOUR INSURANCE 

POLICY TO A THIRD PARTY, WHICH MAY RESULT 

IN LITIGATION AGAINST YOUR INSURER. PLEASE 

READ AND UNDERSTAND THIS DOCUMENT BEFORE 

SIGNING IT. YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO CANCEL 

THIS AGREEMENT WITHOUT PENALTY WITHIN 14 

DAYS AFTER THE DATE THIS AGREEMENT IS 

EXECUTED, AT LEAST 30 DAYS AFTER THE DATE 

WORK ON THE PROPERTY IS SCHEDULED TO 

COMMENCE IF THE ASSIGNEE HAS NOT 

SUBSTANTIALLY PERFORMED, OR AT LEAST 30 

DAYS AFTER THE EXECUTION OF THE AGREEMENT 

IF THE AGREEMENT DOES NOT CONTAIN A 

COMMENCEMENT DATE AND THE ASSIGNEE HAS 

NOT BEGUN SUBSTANTIAL WORK ON THE 

PROPERTY. HOWEVER, YOU ARE OBLIGATED FOR 

PAYMENT OF ANY CONTRACTED WORK 

PERFORMED BEFORE THE AGREEMENT IS 

RESCINDED. THIS AGREEMENT DOES NOT 

CHANGE YOUR OBLIGATION TO PERFORM THE 

DUTIES REQUIRED UNDER YOUR PROPERTY 

INSURANCE POLICY.

§ 627.7152(2)(a) (emphasis added). The statute expressly provides that 

an assignment that fails to comply with any of the provisions of 

subsection 627.7152(2) "is invalid and unenforceable." § 627.7152(2)(d); 

see also Air Quality Experts, 351 So. 3d at 39 ("An assignee under a 

noncomplying AOB cannot enforce the contract because the Legislature 

has specifically stated that such contracts are invalid and 

unenforceable."). 

Here, even the full six-page document fails to include a provision 

containing all of the recission terms expressly required by section 

627.7152(2)(a)2. Accordingly, under the plain language of subsection 

(2)(d), the AOB is "invalid and unenforceable."
5

It is undisputed that the document attached to the complaint 

contains the uppercase and boldfaced statement required by subsection 

627.7152(2)(a)6. But that statement, by itself, does not include all of the 

terms expressly required under the parallel subsection 627.7152(2)(a)2.

In particular, subsection (2)(a)2 requires a provision that allows 

recission "without a penalty or fee," whereas the required uppercase and 

boldfaced statement in subsection (2)(a)6 mentions a "penalty," but not a 

"fee." Further, subsection (2)(a)2 expressly requires a provision that 

permits the assignor to rescind by submitting a "written notice," whereas 

the required uppercase and boldfaced statement in subsection (2)(a)6 is 

silent as to the mechanism for doing so. Thus, the required uppercase 

and boldfaced statement in subsection (2)(a)6 lacks two separate terms 

expressly required by subsection (2)(a)2.3 

Although another provision of the document attached to the 

complaint also addresses recission, it likewise does not satisfy 

subsection (2)(a)2, neither considered individually nor in concert with the 

uppercase and boldfaced statement required by subsection (2)(a)6. In 

particular, the additional provision in Gale Force's document provides:

Customer Cancellation. The Customer may cancel this 

contract by delivering to the Contractor a written, signed, and 

dated notice stating "I, [Customer's Full Name], hereby cancel 

my contractual agreement with Gale Force Roofing and 

Restoration LLC." In the event the Customer cancels this 

Agreement, Customer agrees the Contractor shall be entitled 

to payment for the work already performed on the Property. 

The Customer and the Contractor agree that neither shall be 

3 Although we have reached this conclusion through a textual 

analysis of the plain language of the statute, we also note that the 

contrary interpretation would render subsection (2)(a)2 entirely 

superfluous. If the uppercase and boldfaced statement required by 

subsection (2)(a)6 were sufficient on its own to satisfy the requirements 

of subsection (2)(a)2, then it would do so in every case. 
6

permitted to cancel/rescind this agreement after the 

commencement of substantial work on the Property; and, in 

the event that any party does cancel this agreement after 

installation has commenced, the non-canceling party shall be 

entitled to all damages, including consequential damages, 

and reasonable attorney's fees and costs. 

Unlike the required uppercase and boldfaced statement of 

subsection (2)(a)6, this provision does specify that recission is 

accomplished by "written" notice. But it nowhere mentions the fourteenday deadline required by subsection (2)(a)2, nor does it mention that 

such recission is without a penalty or fee. Thus, it also fails to satisfy 

subsection (2)(a)2 in multiple ways.

To the extent the two provisions—the required uppercase and 

boldfaced statement of subsection (2)(a)6 and the "Customer 

Cancellation" paragraph in Gale Force's document—might be considered 

together to achieve compliance with subsection (2)(a)2, the plain 

language of the statute forecloses such an analysis. In particular, 

subsection (2)(a)2 does not speak in terms of rights or duties under the 

contract; instead, it expressly requires that the AOB "[c]ontain a 

provision" setting forth the specified recission terms. (Emphasis added.) 

By specifying that the AOB must have "a" singular "provision" 

setting forth these several terms, the legislature has prohibited piecemeal 

compliance among several provisions. See, e.g., Samples v. Fla. BirthRelated Neuro. Inj. Comp. Ass'n, 114 So. 3d 912, 916 (Fla. 2013) 

(rejecting plural interpretation of statute where plain language is 

unambiguously stated in the singular). Moreover, subsection (2)(a) 

contains parallel requirements addressing the substance of the AOB's 

terms versus their presentation, showing that the legislature knows the 

difference between the two. Compare, e.g., § 627.7152(2)(a)5 (requiring 

that the AOB "[r]elate only to" certain work), with §§ 627.7152(2)(a)2, 3, 
7

4, 6, 7 (each requiring that the AOB "[c]ontain" a specified provision, a 

written estimate, or a notice). 

At bottom, nowhere in the document attached to the complaint is 

"a provision" that complies with all of the express requirements of 

subsection (2)(a)2. Thus, even considering all six pages as urged by Gale 

Force, the AOB is "invalid and unenforceable" under the plain language 

of the statute. § 627.7152(2)(d). Under this analysis, we do not reach 

the other deficiencies asserted by American Integrity. Because the AOB 

fails to comply with section 627.7152(2)(a)2, the trial court did not err in 

dismissing the complaint, and we must affirm. 

Affirmed.

LUCAS and LABRIT, JJ., Concur.

__________________________

Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.