NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

In re the Matter of:

LISA SWANSEN, Petitioner/Appellee,

v.

JOEL BALL, Respondent/Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CV 21-0075 FC

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. FC 2015-054409

The Honorable Dawn M. Bergin, Judge (Retired)

AFFIRMED

APPEARANCES

Joel Ball, Scottsdale

Respondent/Appellant

Thomas A. Morton PLLC, Phoenix

By Thomas A. Morton

Counsel for Petitioner/Appellee

FILED 11-30-2021
SWANSEN v. BALL

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Michael J. Brown delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Randall M. Howe and Judge Brian Y. Furuya joined.

B R O W N, Judge:

¶1 Joel Ball (“Father”) appeals the family court’s rulings

modifying legal decision-making, parenting time, and child support.

Because Ball failed to provide a trial transcript, and the remainder of the 

record supports the court’s decisions, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 Father and Lisa Swansen (“Mother”) divorced in 2017. They 

have one minor child (“C.B.”), born in 2004, and two older children. The 

dissolution decree, entered in February 2017, provided for joint legal 

decision-making and equal parenting time, with no child support 

obligations. 

¶3 In September 2019, Mother petitioned to modify legal 

decision-making, parenting time, and child support. Mother alleged that 

since the dissolution decree was entered, Father’s substance abuse had

become more serious, and he was frequently “unable to supervise the 

children.” She further asserted that due to Father’s poor behavior,

including substance abuse, the Department of Child Safety had initiated a

dependency case as to one of the older children, who was a minor at the 

time. When the juvenile court determined that dismissal of the dependency 

was appropriate, the court returned jurisdiction to the family court but

exercised temporary jurisdiction to enter temporary orders relating to legal 

decision-making and parenting time for the older child. 

¶4 After a trial on Mother’s petition to modify, the family court 

awarded Mother sole legal decision-making authority, with Father’s 

parenting time to be determined at C.B.’s discretion.

1 The court also 

1 Because Father failed to develop any meaningful argument

challenging the scope of the parenting time order, he has waived and 

abandoned any issue on appeal as to whether the superior court erred in 
SWANSEN v. BALL

Decision of the Court

3

ordered Father to pay child support in the amount of $802 per month. The 

court found that Mother presented sufficient evidence of Father’s substance 

abuse to trigger the rebuttable presumption against joint legal decisionmaking under A.R.S. § 25-403.04. The court then concluded that Father 

failed to rebut the presumption because he had never acknowledged

abusing alcohol or sought treatment. The court also reasoned that “the 

hostility between the parties has reached a point where joint legal decisionmaking is no longer possible.” It also expressed concern over Father’s 

“particularly aggressive” communications with Mother, and items he 

posted on social media, which gave the court “great pause in allowing him 

any legal decision-making authority” over the child. 

¶5 Father filed several post-trial motions, asserting in part that 

the family court erred by taking judicial notice of a report by the Foster Care 

Review Board (“FCRB”) indicating Father had not participated in services 

or submitted drug screens for over a year. The court acknowledged it erred 

by taking judicial notice of the report without allowing Father an 

opportunity to be heard. The court then explained that it heard 

“overwhelming evidence of Father’s consistent and long-term alcohol 

abuse and credible evidence that he has used cocaine on more than one 

occasion.” The court therefore reasoned that even if it erred in finding 

Father abused substances within the last 12 months, “it would have made 

no difference to its determination that it was in the child’s best interest to 

award Mother sole legal decision-making authority.” The court amended 

its modification order by striking the reference to the FCRB report. It then 

dismissed as moot Father’s motion to be heard and rejected all other 

arguments Father made in his motion for a new trial and motion for 

reconsideration. Father filed an “amendment to appeal,” and we have 

jurisdiction over Father’s appeal under A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1).

2

giving the child authority to decide what parenting time he receives. See 

MacMillan v. Schwartz, 226 Ariz. 584, 591, ¶ 33 (App. 2011).

2 In his amendment, Father did not specify which rulings he was 

appealing, which means the notice technically failed to comply with

ARCAP 8(c)(3). However, because Mother was not misled or prejudiced by 

the lack of detail in Father’s amendment, we have jurisdiction over the posttrial motions. See Hill v. City of Phoenix, 193 Ariz. 570, 572–73, ¶ 10 (1999) 

(explaining a defective notice of appeal does not deprive this court of 

jurisdiction and is generally sufficient if it is not misleading or prejudicial 

to the appellee). 
SWANSEN v. BALL

Decision of the Court

4

DISCUSSION

¶6 We review the family court’s rulings on legal decisionmaking, parenting time, and child support for an abuse of discretion.

Engstrom v. McCarthy, 243 Ariz. 469, ¶ 4 (App. 2018). An abuse of discretion 

occurs when the court commits an error of law in drawing a discretionary

conclusion or where no competent evidence supports the court’s decision. 

Id. We view the record in the light most favorable to sustaining the court’s 

rulings, which we will affirm “if there is any reasonable supporting 

evidence.” Garlan v. Garlan, 249 Ariz. 278, 280–81, ¶ 4 (App. 2020). 

A. Legal Decision-Making, Parenting Time, and Child 

Support

¶7 Father argues the family court abused its discretion in 

applying A.R.S. § 25-403.04, which establishes a rebuttable presumption 

against joint legal decision-making that may also arise if the court 

determines a parent abused drugs or alcohol within 12 months before the 

petition for legal decision-making or parenting time is filed. Father 

contends the court erred by finding he abused drugs and alcohol, given that 

he has not been convicted of any substance abuse related crimes in the last 

five years, the court relied on events that occurred outside the one-year 

statutory time frame, and he has had many negative drug tests. A criminal 

conviction, however, is not a prerequisite to a finding of substance abuse.

Although the court noted events outside the statutory time frame, it also 

relied on an event within the 12-month time frame where Father appeared 

to be under the influence of drugs. Additionally, nothing in the record 

supports Father’s contention that he has had many negative drug tests. 

¶8 Father asserts the court violated his rights under the 

Confrontation Clause by “convict[ing]” him of several crimes without 

allowing him the opportunity to confront his accusers. This argument is 

without merit because this is not a criminal proceeding, and the family

court could not have convicted Father of any crime. Thus, the 

Confrontation Clause has no application here. 

¶9 According to Father, the court erred in not applying the child 

support guidelines to this case and ordering him to pay child support. 

Given that Father failed to file an updated affidavit of financial information, 

the court did not abuse its discretion in relying on the most recent evidence 

of his financial circumstances in the record when it relied on the child 

support guidelines to calculate Father’s obligation. 
SWANSEN v. BALL

Decision of the Court

5

¶10 Father contends the court abused its discretion in taking 

judicial notice of the FCRB report without providing him an opportunity to 

be heard. But the court struck that reference from its order, noting that the 

record contained more than sufficient evidence to support its findings 

without the report. Thus, Father’s argument regarding the FCRB report is 

also meritless.

¶11 Father also argues his due process rights were violated 

because the court had insufficient evidence to terminate his parental rights. 

However, the record confirms that Father’s parental rights were not 

terminated. Instead, the court ruled on Mother’s petition to change legal 

decision-making, parenting time, and child support. Father does not 

dispute that he was given notice of the relief Mother was seeking, or that he 

had the opportunity to be heard at trial. Thus, no due process violation 

occurred, and Father’s complaint regarding the same is without any basis 

in fact or law.

¶12 Father asserts that the court erred in its determination of the 

child’s best interests because it failed to consider the child’s wishes to live 

with him, and the court failed to consider findings made by the best interest 

attorney (“BIA”). In weighing best interests, a court considers “all factors 

that are relevant to the child’s physical and emotional well-being . . . ,”

including the child’s wishes as to legal decision-making and parenting time. 

A.R.S. § 25-403(A). What the child desires is merely one factor of many the 

court must consider. Concerning the BIA, she was appointed in October 

2016, and discharged from her duties in December 2016. Father does not 

explain how any previous opinion or finding from the BIA would be 

relevant here. 

¶13 More generally, Father argues that no evidence supported the 

court’s findings and conclusions, and he suggests he objected to Mother’s 

exhibits because they were not timely disclosed to him before trial. We 

cannot consider these arguments, however, because Father failed to 

provide us with a trial transcript, which was his obligation. See ARCAP

11(c)(1)(B) (“If the appellant will contend on appeal that a judgment, 

finding or conclusion, is unsupported by the evidence or is contrary to the 

evidence, the appellant must include in the record transcripts of all 

proceedings containing evidence relevant to that judgment, finding or 

conclusion.”). Without a transcript, we presume the evidentiary record 

supports the court’s decision. See Kline v. Kline, 221 Ariz. 564, 572, ¶ 33

(App. 2009). 
SWANSEN v. BALL

Decision of the Court

6

B. Motion for New Trial

¶14 Father contends the family court ignored his motion for a new 

trial and the evidence he submitted. The record shows otherwise. In 

January 2021, the court noted it was about to rule on Father’s motion for 

new trial when Father filed a notice of appeal. Father then filed an amended 

motion. The court then dismissed Father’s amended motion for new trial

because it lacked jurisdiction due to the pending appeal. After this court 

entered a stay permitting the family court to consider Father’s motions, the 

court denied Father’s motion for new trial, specifically rejecting each of 

Father’s arguments, except for reliance on the FCRB report, which the court 

corrected. 

C. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs

¶15 Mother requests her attorneys’ fees on appeal under A.R.S.

§ 25-324, which authorizes a fee award after consideration of the parties’ 

financial resources and the reasonableness of positions taken during the 

litigation. Given that Father has raised several issues on appeal that lack 

any merit, in our discretion we award attorneys’ fees to Mother in the 

amount of $3,000 to account for the additional fees she incurred in 

addressing Father’s meritless claims. As the prevailing party, Mother is 

also entitled to taxable costs subject to compliance with ARCAP 21.

CONCLUSION

¶16 We affirm the family court’s order granting Mother’s petition 

to modify. We deny as moot Mother’s motion for sanctions and motion to 

strike Husband’s reply brief.