J-S74044-18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

RONALD DORSEY 

Appellant

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 3592 EDA 2017

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 26, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0005796-2016, 

CP-51-CR-0005797-2016

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., STABILE, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: FILED MARCH 21, 2019

Ronald Dorsey appeals from the judgment of sentence entered on 

September 26, 2017, following guilty verdicts for two counts each of: seconddegree murder, robbery, and conspiracy.1 Dorsey challenges the weight and 

sufficiency of the evidence. We affirm.

The trial court aptly summarized the facts and procedural history of this 

case and therefore we do not restate them. See Trial Court Opinion, filed 

March 9, 2018, at 1-13. Briefly, we note that Dorsey explicitly agreed with 

James Mears (Mears) to steal narcotics and money from the victims, Dollie 

Evans and Ruby Thomas, who lived together. At trial, Mears testified against 

Dorsey. His testimony included that Dorsey shot both Thomas and Evans in 

their heads and subsequently took Evans’ purse, which contained $500.00 and 

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(b), 3701(a)(1)(i), and 903, respectively. 
J-S74044-18

- 2 -

narcotics. He testified that he strangled Thomas with an extension cord prior 

to Dorsey shooting her in the head. Mears stated that afterward, Dorsey 

wrapped the gun in a white cloth and put it in his basement. In Dorsey’s 

basement officers recovered a white pillow case with Dorsey’s DNA and 

gunshot residue but did not recover the gun. Witnesses also testified to seeing

Mears and Dorsey leaving the victims’ house after hearing gunshots. 

Additionally, cell phone records from both Mears and Dorsey established that 

their cell phones were in use in the area of the crime scene on the day of the 

murders. 

The jury found Dorsey guilty of second-degree murder, robbery, and 

conspiracy. However, it acquitted him of possession of an instrument of crime 

(PIC”), firearms not to be carried without a license, and carrying firearms on 

public streets or public property in Philadelphia.

2 The trial court sentenced him 

the same day to life without parole. Dorsey filed a post-sentence motion 

challenging the weight and sufficiency of the evidence, which the trial court 

denied. This timely appeal followed. 

Dorsey raises the following issues on appeal:

1. Whether the adjudication of guilty is against the weight of the 

evidence and shocking to one’s sense of justice where there 

was a lack of credible evidence that [Dorsey] had conspired to 

commit Robbery, where [Dorsey] was acquitted of Firearms 

and PIC charges, where it was clear from the evidence that 

[Dorsey] was never in the victim’s home, where the only direct 

evidence that [Dorsey] had participated in a conspiracy came 

from the testimony of a corrupt and polluted source and from 

____________________________________________

2 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 907, 6106, and 6108, respectively.
J-S74044-18

- 3 -

an admitted liar with a history of fabrication against others, 

where the geo-tracking and extraction cell phone evidence 

were vague and inconclusive, where there was evidence that 

the testifying co-conspirator possessed a motive and 

opportunity to murder the victims and where credible and 

unbiased witnesses saw the co-conspirator exit the home alone

immediately following the gunshots?

2. Whether the adjudication of guilt is based upon insufficient 

evidence because it was an unreasonable inference to conclude 

beyond a reasonable doubt that [Dorsey] had conspired with 

another to commit a robbery?

Dorsey’s Br. at 6. 

WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE

When reviewing a challenge to the weight of the evidence, this Court 

reviews whether the trial court abused its discretion in concluding that the 

verdict was not objectively shocking. See Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 

A.2d 745, 753 (Pa. 2000). We “give the gravest consideration to the findings 

and reasons advanced by the trial judge.” Id. An abuse of discretion is present 

“where the judgment is manifestly unreasonable or where the law is not 

applied or where the record shows that the action is a result of partiality, 

prejudice, bias or ill will.” Id. (quoting Coker v. S.M. Flickinger Co., Inc., 

625 A.2d 1181, 1185 (Pa. 1993)). The fact finder is free to believe all, part, 

or none of the evidence. See Commonwealth v. Gibbs, 981 A.2d 274, 282 

(Pa.Super. 2009). Therefore, this Court “cannot substitute its judgment for 

that of the trier of fact.” Id.

Dorsey maintains that the verdicts were against the weight of the 

evidence for several reasons: the jury acquitted him of all firearms and PIC
J-S74044-18

- 4 -

charges; Mears’ testimony was not credible and he was a corrupt and polluted 

source; there was no evidence that Dorsey was in the victim’s home; the cell 

phone evidence was vague and inconclusive; Mears had motive and 

opportunity to commit the murders; and there was credible and unbiased 

testimony from witnesses that they observed Mears leaving the victim’s home 

following the sound of gunshots. See Dorsey’s Br. at 22. 

The trial court rejected Dorsey’s weight argument, stating the following:

Co-defendant James Mears testified that he and [Dorsey] 

conspired to rob Ms. Evans and that they hatched a plan that 

Mears, who lived in the home, would leave the door unlocked so 

that [Dorsey] could get inside. This testimony was corroborated 

by phone records which showed that Mears and [Dorsey] were in 

constant communication with one another throughout the day of 

the murders except during the time of the murders and that both 

phones were utilizing cell phone towers near the site of the 

murders at the time of the murders. 

Mears testified that [Dorsey] shot both women and then wrapped 

the gun in a white cloth and placed it in [his] basement. This 

testimony was corroborated by physical evidence i.e. a white 

pillowcase was recovered from [Dorsey’s] basement which had 

gunshot residue and [Dorsey’s] DNA on it.

Eyewitness Moore testified that he had purchased drugs from Ms. 

Evans shortly before the murder and then walked a short distance 

to Dunkin Donuts. On his way back from Dunkin Donuts he heard 

gunshots and saw [Dorsey] and [Mears] exit the decedent’s 

house. [Mears] asked Moore if he heard anything, and [Dorsey] 

called him over, but he ran off because he was frightened.

Latora Wright testified that [Dorsey] kept calling her the day after 

the murders when [Mears] was picked up by police. He was asking 

her if [Mears] was “telling police anything” or “pointing fingers.”

***
J-S74044-18

- 5 -

The [c]ourt presumes [Dorsey] is referring to Mears as the 

“corrupt and polluted source,” and Moore as the “admitted liar 

with a history of fabricating against others.” Both witnesses were 

fully cross-examined by the defense. They were impeached with 

prior inconsistent statements, crimen falsi, and bias. As to the 

credible and unbiased witnesses, Garcia and Lawson, it was clear 

that their observations were brief. . . . The jury observed each 

witness on the stand and made credibility determinations based 

on its observations and the application of the law. 

***

The jury made a decision to believe the testimony of Mears, which 

had independent corroboration (i.e. the cell phone records, the 

gun shot residue, and the DNA on the pillow case). 

TCO at 14-15, 16. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in coming to the 

above conclusion. Thus, we conclude that Dorsey’s claim is without merit.

Similarly, Dorsey’s argument that his acquittals support his challenge to 

the weight of evidence is meritless as well. He mistakenly assumes that the 

jury’s return of not guilty verdicts for the PIC and firearms charges establishes 

that the verdicts of guilt on the robbery, murder, and conspiracy charges are 

against the weight of the evidence. However, “[a]n acquittal cannot be 

interpreted as a specific finding in relation to some of the evidence.” 

Commonwealth v. Miller, 35 A.3d 1206, 1213 (Pa. 2012). “When an 

acquittal on one count in an indictment is inconsistent with a conviction on a 

second count, the court looks upon the acquittal as no more than the jury’s 

assumption of a power which they had no right to exercise, but to which they 

were disposed through lenity.” Commonwealth v. Petteway, 847 A.2d 713, 

718 (Pa.Super. 2004) (quoting Commonwealth v. Swann, 635 A.2d 1103, 

1104-05 (Pa.Super. 1994)). Thus, “this Court will not disturb guilty verdicts 
J-S74044-18

- 6 -

on the apparent inconsistencies,” as long as there is sufficient evidence to 

support the verdicts. Commonwealth v. Talbert, 129 A.3d 536, 545 

(Pa.Super. 2015) (quoting Commonwealth v. Frisbie, 889 A.2d 1271, 1273 

(Pa.Super. 2005)). Here, the facts referenced above were sufficient to support 

the verdicts herein. No relief is due. See Commonwealth v. Stokes, 78 A.3d 

644, 650 n.2 (Pa.Super. 2013) (concluding that verdict of first-degree murder 

was supported by the evidence despite appellant being acquitted of PIC). 

SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

Next, Dorsey maintains that the evidence was insufficient to support his 

conspiracy conviction. “In order to develop a claim challenging the sufficiency 

of the evidence properly, an appellant must specifically discuss the element of 

the crime and identify those which he alleges the Commonwealth failed to 

prove.” Commonwealth v. Samuel, 102 A.3d 1001, 1005 (Pa.Super. 2014).

Here, Dorsey fails to develop what the Commonwealth failed to prove 

and instead lists a series of questions:

How is it reasonable to infer that [Dorsey] agreed to rob Dollie 

Evans when it is concluded that [Dorsey] was not even at the 

murder scene? 

How it is reasonable to infer that [Dorsey] agreed to rob Dollie 

Evans at gunpoint when it is concluded that he is not guilty of 

possessing firearms or an instrument of crime?

How is it reasonable to infer that [Dorsey] agreed to rob Dollie 

Evans on the basis of the testimony of James Mears and Mark 

Moore when they had admitted to lying and a host of dishonest 

and illegal behaviors? 
J-S74044-18

- 7 -

How it is reasonable to infer [Dorsey] has guilty knowledge of his 

participation in a Criminal Conspiracy when he turns himself in?

Dorsey’s Br. at 29. Thus, we conclude that Dorsey has waived any review of 

this issue because he failed to develop this claim. See Samuel, 102 A.3d at 

1005 (concluding appellant waived sufficiency claim because he did not specify 

the elements of the crimes that the Commonwealth failed to prove); see also

Commonwealth v. Ellis, 700 A.2d 948, 957 (Pa.Super. 1997) (concluding 

issue is waived when appellant fails “to develop any argument or cite any 

authority in support of his vague contention”). 

Even if Dorsey had preserved this issue for review, we would conclude 

that the evidence was sufficient to support the conspiracy conviction. As the 

trial court stated: 

The Commonwealth presented direct evidence from the 

eyewitness co-conspirator as to the words spoken to initiate the 

conspiracy. [Dorsey] told Mears that he wanted to rob decedent 

Evans because he knew she had drugs and money in the house 

and he asked Mears to help him by giving him access to the house. 

In return they would split the proceeds. Mears agreed, and on the 

specified date and time, unlocked the door and called [Dorsey] to 

let him know. This testimony was corroborated by the cell phone 

records of [Dorsey] and Mears. Mears testified that upon entering 

the home, [Dorsey] demanded that Evans tell him where she kept 

the money and drugs. Evans told [Dorsey] to leave and Mears 

heard a gunshot. Mears later saw Evans slumped over on the sofa 

when he came back downstairs from where Mears was accosting 

Thomas by strangling her until she passed out. This testimony was 

corroborated by forensic evidence which showed that Mears’ DNA 

was on the left hand fingernail clippings taken from Thomas.

Mears heard a second gunshot when [Dorsey] went upstairs with 

Thomas. Mears then saw [Dorsey] wrap the gun in a white cloth 

and place it in his basement. Upon executing a search warrant on 

[Dorsey’s] house on August 26, 2014, a white pillowcase was 

found in the basement that had gunshot residue and [Dorsey’s] 
J-S74044-18

- 8 -

DNA on it. [Dorsey] grabbed Evans’ purse on his way out and told 

Mears that it contained $500.00 and drugs.

Eyewitness Moore gave a statement to Homicide Detectives that 

he saw [Dorsey] and Mears exit the decedent’s house after 

hearing gunshots. Cell site analysis showed that [Dorsey’s] phone 

and Mears’ phone were utilizing cell towers at the time of the 

murder that were close to the scene of the murder. Furthermore, 

there was constant contact between [Dorsey] and Mears via cell 

phone during a period leading up to the murders and after the 

murders but not during the murders. Finally, there was testimony 

from Wright, [Mears’] girlfriend, that on the day after the murders, 

[Dorsey] called her and asked if [Mears] was “telling the police 

anything or pointing any fingers.” 

TCO at 18-19. As referenced above, there was overwhelming direct and 

circumstantial evidence showing the conspiracy between Dorsey and Mears. 

This claim is meritless. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 3/21/19