MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT Reporter	of	Decisions

Decision: 2020 ME	28

Docket: Ken-19-447

Submitted

On	Briefs: February	26,	2020

Decided: March	5,	2020

Panel: MEAD,	GORMAN,	JABAR,	HUMPHREY, HORTON,	and	CONNORS, JJ.

IN	RE	CHILD	OF	AMELIA	C.	

PER	CURIAM

[¶1]	 Amelia	C. appeals	from a	judgment	of	the	District	Court	(Augusta,	

Nale,	 J.)	 terminating	 her	 parental	 rights	 to	 her	 child.1	 	 See 22	 M.R.S.

§ 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i)-(ii),	 (iv)	 (2018).	 	 The	 mother	 argues	 that	 there	 was	

insufficient	evidence	to	support	the	court’s	findings	of	parental	unfitness.	 She	

also	asserts	that	the	Department	of	Health	and	Human	Services	did	not	make	

reasonable	 efforts	 to	 reunify	 and	 rehabilitate	 her	 family.	 	 See 22	 M.R.S.	

§ 4041(1-A)(A)(3)	(2018).		We	affirm	the	judgment.	

I.		BACKGROUND

[¶2]	 	 In	 January	 2018,	 the	 Department of	 Health	 and	 Human	 Services

filed	a	petition	for	a child protection	order for	the	child,	who	at	that	time	was	

two	years	old.		Three months	later,	the	court	(E.	Walker,	J.)	entered	agreed-to	

 1 The	mother	has	another	child	but	that	child	is	not	the	subject	of	this	child	protection	action.		

References	in	this	opinion	to	“the	child” mean	the	child	as	to	whom	the	mother’s	rights	have	been	

terminated.		
2

jeopardy	orders	as	 to both	parents.		In	 January	2019,	 the	Department	 filed	a	

petition	 to	 terminate	 the	 mother’s	 and	 father’s	 parental	 rights.2	 	 After	 a	

two-day	 hearing	 in	 May	 and	 September	 2019,	 the	 court	 (Nale,	 J.)	 entered	 a	

judgment	terminating	the	parental	rights	of	both	parents.3		

[¶3]		The	court	made	the	following	findings	of	fact,	which	are	supported	

by	competent	record	evidence.		See In	re	Children	of	Danielle	M.,	2019	ME	174,	

¶ 6,	222 A.3d 608.	

[T]he	 minor	 child	 has	 been	 in	 State	 custody	 approximately	 21	

month[s].		The	child	is	44	months	old.	.	. . [T]he	mother	has	made	

no	 significant	 effort	 to	 correct	 the situation	 which	 led	 to	 the	

jeopardy	finding.		

.	 .	 .	 [S]ince	 the	 Jeopardy	 order,	 the	 mother	 has	 been	

discharged	three	times .	.	.	after	attempting	to	complete	the	Maine	

Enhanced	 Parenting	 Program.	 	 The	 discharges	 were	 all	 for	 nonattendance.	 	 [The]	 [m]other	 has	 failed	 to	 maintain	 consistent	

contact	 with	 her	 providers,	 including	 the	 [Department] and	 her	

adult	case	manager;	her	lack	of	contact	has	caused	suspension	of	

her	 visits	 with	 her	 [child]	 for	 3	 plus	 weeks;	 [the]	 mother’s	

participation	in	the	drug	testing	line	was	unsuccessful	because	of	

her	 failure	 to	 follow	 through.		Because	 [of	 the] mother’s	inability	

to	 participate	 in	 her	 [intensive	 outpatient	 program],	 she	 was	

offered	 individualized	 substance	 abuse	 treatment	 where	 she	

struggled	to	attend	as	scheduled.	 The	mother’s	signed	medication	

agreement	was	suspended	for	her	failure	to	maintain	contact	with	

the	 [D]epartment. Subsequently,	 [the]	 mother	 signed	 a	 second	

medication	 agreement	 only	 to	 be	 discharged	 6	 weeks	 later	 for	

 2		An	amended	petition	was	filed	on	February	1,	2019.		

3 The	child’s	father	did	not	appeal	the	court’s	judgment.		
3

failing	 to	be	consistent	with	her	call	in	schedule.		[The]	 [m]other	

did	 access	 the	 .	 .	 .	[s]helter	 and	 all	 of	 the	 programs	 through	 the	

shelter	but	did	not	adhere	to	the	evening	curfew.		[The]	[m]other	

did	not	spend	a	night	at	the	shelter.		[The]	[m]other	continued	to	

reside	with	[the	child’s	father].	

.	 .	 . The	 mother	 was	 to	 participate	 in	 drug	 therapy	 for	 a	

5 week period.	 	 The	 mother	 attended	 14	 of	 24 sessions.	 	 [The]	

[m]other	 tested	positive	 for	cocaine 3	of	 the	4	 tests	given.	 [The]	

[m]other	did	not	complete	the	program.	

.	 .	 .	[F]or	 the	entire	 first	 year	 that	her	 special	 needs	 [child]	

was	 in	 State	 care	 [the]	 mother	 failed	 to	 engage	 with	 the	

[Department],	 the	 services	being	 offered	 or	have	 any	meaningful	

contact	with	 her	 [child].	 	 The	minor	 child	 has	 been	in	 State	 care	

since	 January	 2018.	 .	 .	 .	 [T]he	 mother	 has	 only	 recently	 (April	

2019)	 started	 being	 involved	 with	 mother-child	 visits.	 	 These	

visits,	 after	 nearly	 two	 years	 of	 separation[,] have	 progressed	 to	

two	weekly	supervised	visits.		

.	.	.	[The]	mother	attended	[mental	health]	counselling	for	4

months,	 one	 visit	 each	 week.	 	 The	 mother’s	 last	 visit	 was	 July

2019.	 	 The	 mother	 was	 discharged	 from	 the	 program	 after	 her	

failure	to	show	for	the	last	3	scheduled	visits.		

.	.	.	.

There	is	much	left	for	the	mother	to	do	to	alleviate	jeopardy.		

She	 has	 [not] yet	 addressed	 her	 mental	 health	 issues	 in	 any	

meaningful	way.		Since	being	 discharged	 from	her	mental	health

sessions	for	her	failure	to	stay	engaged,	she	has	not	addressed	the	

mental	health	issues	which	placed	her	child	in	jeopardy.	

Although	 the	 mother	 has	 made	 some	 progress	 in	 the	 past	

few	 months	 regarding	 her	 substance	 abuse	 she	 has	 never	 been	

able	to	sustain	the	effort	to	address	her	mental	health	issues	and	

to	truly	separate	from	[the	child’s	father].		
4

.	.	. .

Based	on	the	evidence	before	it,	the	court	finds	by	clear	and	

convincing	 evidence,	 that	 [the	 mother]	 meets	 two[4] of	 the	 four	

definitions	 of	 parental	 unfitness.	 	 Her	 history	 demonstrates	 that	

she	is	unable	or	unwilling	to	protect	her	child	from	jeopardy	or to	

take	 responsibility	 for	 [the	 child] and	 these	 circumstances	 are	

unlikely	to	change	within	a	time	which	is	reasonably	calculated	to	

meet	her	[child’s]	needs.		She	has	failed	to	make	a	good	faith	effort	

to	rehabilitate	and	reunify	with	her	[child];	not	only	has	she	been	

unable	 or	 unwilling	 to	 address	 her	 mental	 health	 issues,	 she	

elected	 to	 stay	 with	 her	 abuser	 long	 after	 the	 Summary	

Preliminary	 Order	 and	 the	 Jeopardy	 order	 addressed	 the	

relationship	 as	 an	 impediment	 to	 her	 reunification	 with	 her	

[child].		

II.		DISCUSSION

A. The	Mother’s	Unfitness	

[¶4]		The	mother	asserts	that	there	was	insufficient	evidence	to	support	

the	court’s	judgment	terminating	her	parental	rights.		

[¶5]		“In	order	to	terminate	parental	rights,	the	court	must	find,	by	clear	

and	convincing	evidence,	at	least	one	of	the	four	statutory	grounds	of	parental	

unfitness.”	 	 In	 re	 Child	 of	 Katherine	 C.,	 2019	 ME	 146,	 ¶	 2,	 217	 A.3d	 68

(alterations	omitted)	(quotation	marks	omitted).		“We	will	set	aside	a	finding	

of	parental	unfitness	 only	if	 there	is	 no	 competent	evidence	in	 the	 record	 to	

 4 Although	 the	 court	 found	 that	 the	 mother	 meets	 “two	 of	 the	 four	 definitions	 of	 parental	

unfitness,”	 it	 discusses	 three	 grounds	 on	 which	 it	 found parental	 unfitness.	 	 See 22	 M.R.S.	

§ 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i)-(ii),	(iv)	(2018).		
5

support	 it,	 if	 the	 fact-finder	 clearly	 misapprehends	 the	 meaning	 of	 the	

evidence,	or	if	 the	 finding	is	so	contrary	 to	 the	credible	evidence	 that	it	does	

not	represent	the	truth	and	right	of	the	case.”		Id. (quotation	marks	omitted).		

“Evidence	is	clear	and	convincing	when	 the	trial	court	could	have	reasonably	

been	 persuaded	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 evidence	 in	 the	 record	 that	 the	 required	

factual findings	 were	 highly	 probable.”	 	 In	 re	 Child	 of	 Corey	 B.,	 2020	 ME	 3,

¶ 4, --- A.3d --- (quotation	marks	omitted).	

[¶6]	 	 Viewing	 the	 record	 in	 its	 entirety,	 we	 conclude	 that	 competent	

evidence	 in	 the	 record	 supports	 the	 court’s	 finding	 that	 the	 mother	 is	

parentally	unfit.		See In	re	Children	of	Danielle	M.,	2019	ME	174,	¶ 14,	222 A.3d	

608.		

B. Reunification	and	Rehabilitation	Services	

[¶7]		 The	mother	 further	contends	 that	 the	court	erred	in	 finding	 that	

the	Department	 had	made	 reasonable	 efforts	 to	 reunify	 and	 rehabilitate	 her	

family.		See 22	M.R.S.	§	4041(1-A)(A)(3).		

[¶8]	 	 “The	 Department’s	 compliance	 with	 its	 rehabilitation	 and	

reunification	duties	as	outlined	in	section	4041	does	not	constitute	a	discrete	

element	 requiring	 proof	 in	 termination	 proceedings,	 nor	 does	 the	 failure	 of	

the	 Department	 to	 comply	 with	 section 4041	 preclude	 findings	 of	 parental	
6

unfitness.”	 	In	 re	 Doris	 G.,	 2006	 ME	 142,	 ¶	 17,	 912	 A.2d	 572.	 	“Instead,	 the	

court	should	consider	 the	lack	of	reunification	efforts	as	one	of	many	 factors	

in	evaluating	the	parent’s	fitness.”		In	re	Daniel	H.,	2017	ME	89,	¶	15,	160	A.3d	

1182.	

[¶9]	 	 Here,	 the	 court	 specifically	 found	 that	 the	 mother	 failed	 to	

consistently	 attend	 different	 types	 of	 programming	 provided	 by	 the	

Department	 such	 as	 drug	 therapy,	 mental	 health	 counseling, and	 parenting	

classes.		The	court	also found	that	when	one	type	of	substance	use	treatment	

was	unsuccessful,	the	mother	was	offered	individualized	treatment,	which	she	

also	 did	 not	 consistently	 attend.	 	 Therefore,	 we	 cannot	 conclude	 that	 the	

Department	 failed	 to	“[m]ake	good	 faith	efforts	 to	cooperate	with	 the	parent	

in	the	pursuit	of	the	plan.”		22	M.R.S. §	4041(1-A)(A)(3).	

The	entry	is:

Judgment affirmed.

David	Paris,	Esq.,	Bath,	for	appellant	Mother

Aaron	 M.	 Frey,	 Attorney	 General,	 and	 Hunter	 C.	 Umphrey,	 Asst.	 Atty.	 Gen.,	

Office	of	the	Attorney	General,	Augusta,	for	appellee	Department	of	Health	and	

Human	Services

Augusta	District	Court	docket	number	PC-2018-3

FOR	CLERK	REFERENCE	ONLY