The Honorable Russell G. Clark, Senior Judge, United States 1

District Court for the Western District of Missouri.

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No. 95-2923

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Patsy L. Conner, *

*

 Plaintiff - Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Western District of Missouri.

Reckitt & Colman, Inc., *

*

 Defendant - Appellee. * 

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 Submitted: January 12, 1996

 Filed: June 4, 1996

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Before RICHARD S. ARNOLD, Chief Judge, JOHN R. GIBSON, and BOWMAN, Circuit

Judges.

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JOHN R. GIBSON, Circuit Judge.

Patsy L. Conner appeals from an order of the district court granting 1

her former employer's motion for summary judgment in her suit alleging she

was fired because of her disability and because she filed a workers'

compensation claim. Conner argues that the statute of limitations did not

bar her disability claim and that summary judgment was inappropriate

because she had not completed discovery. We affirm.

Conner worked for Reckitt & Colman, Inc. on its second shift at its

Springfield, Missouri distribution center when she was fired on September

28, 1992. At the time she was fired, Conner was
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receiving medical treatment for her left knee, which she injured while

working at Reckitt & Colman. Eight months after she was fired, Conner

asked Reckitt & Colman to make reasonable accommodations for her disability

so she could return to work. Reckitt & Colman never responded to this

request.

Reckitt & Colman stated that it fired Conner because she worked on

its second shift, and it sold all of its second shift business. Once that

business was sold, Reckitt & Colman no longer needed its second shift

workers. Reckitt & Colman stated that Conner was one of twelve workers it

fired, and that it has not replaced Conner.

On September 2, 1993, Conner filed a charge with the Missouri

Commission on Human Rights, claiming that Reckitt & Colman discriminated

against her based on her disability. Once the commission gave Conner a

"Right-to-Sue" letter, she filed suit in federal district court. Conner

claimed that Reckitt & Colman had violated the Americans With Disabilities

Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (1994), and Missouri law, Mo. Rev. Stat. §

213.055.1(1)(a) (1994), by firing her because of her injury and by failing

to respond to her later request that it make reasonable accommodations for

her disability so she could return to work. Conner also claimed that

Reckitt & Colman violated section 287.780 of the Missouri statutes by

firing her in retaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim because

of her injured knee.

In response to Reckitt & Colman's motion for summary judgment, Conner

argued that the statute of limitations did not bar her claims. In addition

Conner stated that Reckitt & Colman had not completely answered her

interrogatories and requests for documents and that she did not have an

opportunity to schedule depositions. Despite her objections, Conner

refused to schedule depositions, and failed to file a motion to compel

Reckitt & Colman to more fully answer her interrogatories and requests for

documents.
 Conner does not appeal from the district court's grant of

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summary judgment in favor of Reckitt & Colman on her Missouri

disability discrimination claim. The district court's decision on

that claim is thus final.

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On June 22, 1995, the district court granted Reckitt & Colman's

motion for summary judgment, holding that the statute of limitations for

Conner's claims of disability discrimination was 300 days and that she

filed her charge more than 300 days after Reckitt & Colman fired her. The

district court also held that Conner had not produced any evidence to

support her claim that Reckitt & Colman fired her in retaliation for filing

her workers' compensation claim. Conner appeals.2

I.

Conner argues that she filed her disability discrimination claim in

time because she filed it within 300 days of Reckitt & Colman's failure to

respond to her May 26, 1993 request for reasonable accommodations. Conner

does not dispute that the statute of limitations bars her claim if the only

act of discrimination is her firing. Conner argues, however, that Reckitt

& Colman discriminated against her twice, first by firing her on September

28, 1992 because of her knee injury, and second by refusing to accommodate

her disability by not responding to her May 26, 1993 request. Conner also

asserts that these two acts constitute a continuing violation of the ADA.

We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo.

McKee v. Federal Kemper Life Assurance Co., 927 F.2d 326, 328 (8th Cir.

1991). Summary judgment is appropriate if there are no disputed issues of

material fact and Reckitt & Colman is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

The statute of limitations for a disability discrimination claim

under the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12117 (1994) (incorporating 42
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U.S.C. § 2000e-5), is 300 days. The statute of limitations begins to run

at the time of the discriminatory act, and not when the consequences of the

act become most painful. Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250,

258 (1980).

Ricks requires us to reject Conner's argument that Reckitt & Colman

committed unlawful discrimination by not responding to her request for

reasonable accommodations. Assuming Reckitt & Colman fired Conner because

of her disability, the firing constitutes the discriminatory act. Reckitt

& Colman's failure to consider her later request for accommodation was

merely a consequence of its discriminatory act.

We also reject Conner's argument that Reckitt & Colman's firing of

Conner and its later failure to answer her letter constitute a continuing

violation that tolls the statute of limitations. The firing of an employee

cannot be a continuing violation, Rudolph v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 586 F.2d

90, 92 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 924 (1979), even when the

effects of the firing are felt later, see Ashley v. Boyle's Famous Corned

Beef Co., 66 F.3d 164, 167 (8th Cir. 1995) (en banc). Conner's employment

relationship with Reckitt & Colman ended when she was fired. Reckitt &

Colman cannot continue to discriminate against Conner when it no longer

employs her. Additionally, allowing Conner to restart the statute of

limitations by sending a letter requesting reasonable accommodations after

she has been unequivocally fired would destroy the statute of limitations.

There is no continuing violation that tolls the statute of limitations in

this case, and the district court properly granted Reckitt & Colman's

motion for summary judgment on Conner's disability discrimination claim.

II.

Conner argues that the district court improperly granted
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summary judgment in favor of Reckitt & Colman on her claim that Reckitt &

Colman fired her in retaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim.

See Hansome v. Northwestern Cooperage Co., 679 S.W.2d 273, 275 (Mo. 1984).

Reckitt & Colman stated that it fired Conner because it sold the part of

its business involving the work that Conner used to do. Conner admits in

her brief that she has no evidence to refute Reckitt & Colman's explanation

for her firing. Because Conner has produced no facts establishing an

essential element of her claim on which she has the burden of proof,

Reckitt & Colman is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Celotex

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-25 (1986).

III.

Conner argues that summary judgment was inappropriate because she did

not have an adequate opportunity to conduct discovery before the district

court granted Reckitt & Colman's motion for summary judgment.

The party defending a motion for summary judgment may request that

the district court postpone ruling on the motion until it can conduct

further discovery. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f); Humphreys v. Roche Biomedical

Labs., Inc., 990 F.2d 1078, 1081 (8th Cir. 1993). We review the district

court's refusal to allow further discovery before ruling on the motion for

summary judgment for abuse of discretion. See Id. at 1081.

Reckitt & Colman objected to some of Conner's interrogatories and

requests for documents. Conner informed the district court of Reckitt &

Colman's objections to her discovery, but never filed a motion to compel

Reckitt & Colman to fully comply with her discovery requests. She also

advised the district court that she would not conduct any further discovery

until Reckitt & Colman fully complied with her discovery requests. Given

Conner's failure to file a motion to compel and her refusal to conduct

further
 Conner also argues that she recently discovered another

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violation of the ADA committed by Reckitt & Colman and points

particularly to an interrogatory answer in which Reckitt & Colman

stated it issued an Equal Employment Opportunity and Sex Harassment

policy statement on April 1, 1994. Conner asserts that there is no

indication in Reckitt & Colman's answer that Reckitt & Colman ever

posted a notice regarding the ADA before the date in its answer.

Conner contends that she would need to amend her complaint to

include a claim for failure to post such notices.

The record does not reflect that Conner filed a motion to

amend her complaint. She simply stated, in language much as we

have set forth above, that she would need to amend her complaint.

This is not a sufficient request for relief on which to base a

claim that the district court erred, nor do we read Conner's brief

to specifically so argue.

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discovery until Reckitt & Colman fully complied with her discovery

requests, the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to

postpone its ruling on Reckitt & Colman's motion for summary judgment.3

We affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of

Reckitt & Colman.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.