[Cite as Ishaq v. Ameen, 2012-Ohio-4445.]

 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR GREENE COUNTY, OHIO 

ZUBEIDA S. ISHAQ : 

Plaintiff-Appellee : C.A. CASE NO. 2012 CA 21 

v. : T.C. NO. 10DR163 

MOHAMED R. AMEEN : (Civil appeal from Common 

 Pleas Court, Domestic Relations) 

Defendant-Appellant : 

 : 

 . . . . . . . . . . 

O P I N I O N

Rendered on the 28th day of September , 2012. 

 . . . . . . . . . . 

KEITH R. KEARNEY, Atty. Reg. No. 0003191 and DAVID M. PIXLEY, Atty. Reg. No. 

0083453, 2160 Kettering Tower, Dayton, Ohio 45423 

Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellee 

MITCHELL W. ALLEN, Atty. Reg. No. 0052661, 5947 Deerfield Blvd., Suite 201, Mason, Ohio 

45040 

Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 

 . . . . . . . . . . 

DONOVAN, J. 

{¶ 1} This matter is before the Court on the Notice of Appeal of Mohamed R. 
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Ameen, filed February 15, 2012. Ameen and Zubeida S. Ishaq were divorced on January 17, 

2010, and Ameen appeals from the final judgment and decree of divorce issued by the trial court. 

 We hereby affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

{¶ 2} Ishaq filed her five-paragraph complaint for divorce on May 18, 2010, in which 

she asserted that the parties were married on January 11, 2001 in Columbo, Sri Lanka, and that 

one child was born as issue of the marriage. According to the Complaint, Ameen is guilty of 

extreme cruelty and gross neglect of duty, and the parties are incompatible. Ameen’s answer 

provides that he admits the allegations in paragraphs one to five of the complaint with the 

specific exception that he denies being guilty of extreme cruelty and gross neglect of duty. 

{¶ 3} After a settlement conference on February 10, 2011, the court ordered the parties 

to mediation. A pretrial conference scheduled for April 20, 2011 was rescheduled for May 25, 

2011, and then for July 8, 2011, at the joint request of the parties for the purpose of continuing 

mediation. Ishaq then requested another continuance for the reason that she filed a petition in 

bankruptcy. The court granted the motion. 

{¶ 4} On August 1, 2011, the trial court set the matter for a final hearing on October 

25, 2011. The order provides: “The Plaintiff shall be responsible for obtaining the relief from 

stay order in her bankruptcy case so the Court can proceed. No further continuances will be 

granted for the parties to obtain the relief from stay.” 

{¶ 5} On October 17, 2011, counsel for Ameen filed a motion to withdraw. The 

motion provides that after “several mediation sessions,” the parties and their attorneys met for a 

final session on October 7, 2011. The motion further provides that after the final session, the 

parties and their attorneys signed a Mediation Agreement, but that Ameen subsequently decided 
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that “he wants to contest the divorce case generally.” Finally, the motion indicates that Ameen 

“has been advised and is aware of the Court date and been advised of the consequences of his 

decision.” Attached to the motion is an email from Ameen to his counsel, dated October 17, 

2011, which provides that he intends to contest his divorce. The email further provides that he no 

longer needs counsel’s services, that he decided to either “seek other attorney” or proceed pro se, 

and that he is “aware of the court date set for October 25th.” 

{¶ 6} Also on October 17, 2011, the court granted the motion to withdraw. Its order 

provides in part: 

It is the further Order of the Court that should the Defendant seek to obtain 

new counsel to represent him that he shall present a copy of this ORDER to the 

proposed new counsel prior to that new counsel entering an official notice of 

appearance on behalf of the Defendant. The proposed new counsel must be 

prepared to enter the case and be ready and willing to proceed with the already 

scheduled hearing on October 25, 2011 at 1:30 p.m. No continuances will be 

granted without a showing of good cause and specifically for the reasons that new 

counsel has a conflict with another court hearing or to allow for additional time 

for the attorney to prepare for a hearing. 

{¶ 7} On October 20, 2011, Ameen filed a Suggestion of Stay, asserting that Ishaq 

failed to file a motion for relief from the bankruptcy stay as ordered by the court, and arguing that 

“no further action can be taken until relief from said stay is obtained or the stay is otherwise 

terminated.” Ameen asked the court to cancel the final hearing and stay the proceedings. 

{¶ 8} On October 25, 2011, substitute counsel for Ameen filed a “Limited Notice of 
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Appearance to File Motion to Continue Trial and Raise Certain Issues for the Record” (“Limited 

Notice”). According to the Limited Notice, Ameen “wishes to have paternity tests to establish 

the paternity of the child.” The notice further asserts that Ameen “has been unemployed for a 

significant amount of time and a motion to reduce temporary spousal support should have been 

filed in this case.” According to the notice, there is a “mahr provision” in the parties’ 

“marriage contract,” which “acts as a pre-nuptial agreement,” and this “issue needs to be litigated 

and briefed.” The notice also asserts that the bankruptcy stay is still pending and that any 

judgments entered in connection with the divorce would be void. Finally, the motion requested 

a continuance to prepare for trial. 

{¶ 9} At the final hearing, the court first addressed the issues raised by counsel for 

Ameen in his Limited Notice. Ameen acknowledged that he sent the email attached to the 

Limited Notice regarding withdrawal of counsel, and further that the court clearly indicated to 

him that he needed to retain an attorney prepared to go to trial, and finally that current counsel’s 

representation was limited to the filing of the Limited Notice. 

{¶ 10} The court advised the parties as follows: 

There was a suggestion of bankruptcy. I have in my possession a copy of 

the Agreed Relief from Stay signed by * * * the trustee, Attorney Zeigler on 

behalf of the Petitioner, Mr. Kearney, Mr. Tarazi, and both parties in the case. 

In addition to that, I had a telephone conversation with the attorney and he 

anticipates the discharge of the bankruptcy to be filed within a matter of date (sic) 

in the bankruptcy court * * * . 

{¶ 11} Ishaq then testified that the parties participated in four mediation sessions, the 
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last of which occurred on October 7, 2011. Ishaq stated that she, Ameen, counsel for both 

parties, and the mediator were present, and they resolved the issues of custody, spousal and child 

support, division of assets and allocation of debts. Ishaq identified the original mediation 

agreement entered into by her and Ameen as well as their signatures thereon. Ishaq requested that 

the court approve the mediation agreement and make it an official court order. Finally, 

regarding the bankruptcy action, Ishaq acknowledged signing the original Agreed Relief from 

Stay, she stated that Ameen also signed it in her presence, and she stated that it was then 

presented to her bankruptcy lawyer to obtain the signature of the bankruptcy trustee. The 

document is not part of the record. Regarding the bankruptcy, Ishaq acknowledged that any of 

her surviving debt therefrom would be her responsibility. On cross-examination, Ameen raised 

the issue of his child’s paternity, and the court advised him that he “had almost 18 months” to ask 

the Court to order paternity testing, and that he further admitted paternity in his answer to the 

complaint. 

{¶ 12} Ishaq then called Ameen to the stand, and he admitted participating in mediation, 

during which he, his counsel, Ishaq, her counsel, and the mediator were present. He identified 

his signature on the Mediation Agreement of October 7, 2011. In an exchange with the court, 

Ameen asserted that there “was a prenuptial agreement in the marriage,” that is a “civil contract,” 

and “that is the condition that Sri Lanka courts are going by.” The court indicated that Ameen 

failed to raise the issue, and that the court could not apply Sri Lanka law. Finally, in response to 

questions from the court, Ameen indicated that the inventory of household goods attached to the 

mediation agreement was “incomplete,” specifically regarding tools and paintings in the marital 

residence. After a discussion with both parties, the court resolved the issue of household goods 
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to their satisfaction. 

{¶ 13} The following exchange occurred at the conclusion of the hearing: 

THE COURT: Is there anything else in that agreement that you somehow 

want to tell me I need to know something about? 

MR. AMEEN: Not really. 

THE COURT: So I think we’ve covered all of your concerns. 

MR. AMEEN: Yes. I’m sorry, the only thing - - 

THE COURT: The legal ones I can’t do anything about. 

MR. AMEEN: Yes. 

THE COURT: You didn’t raise the issue of the parentage and you didn’t 

bring me anything about the prenuptial agreement from Sri Lanka. I can’t do 

anything about those. 

Once again, between you and your attorney and whoever else you might 

want to get involved, but there doesn’t seem to be any reason for me not to 

divorce you folks and accept that agreement and add to it these two paintings that 

you’re getting, and get you two separated legally. 

Any other reason you could think of why I shouldn’t do that? 

MR. AMEEN: Not really. 

The court indicated that it granted the divorce and that the Mediation Agreement would be 

incorporated into the final decree, “with the addition of the two paintings that the Plaintiff is 

going to let the Defendant have at her choice.” 

{¶ 14} Ameen asserts two assignments of error herein which we will consider together. 
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They are as follows: 

“THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING TO GRANT 

DEFENDANT’S REQUEST FOR A CONTINUANCE AND, WITHOUT JURISDICTION TO 

DO SO, DIVIDED MARITAL PROPERTY AND DEBT.” 

And, 

“THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THE MAHR PROVISION OF 

THE PARTIES’ MARRIAGE CONTRACT AND TO ENFORCE THE SAME AS AN 

ANTE-NUPTIAL AGREEMENT.” 

{¶ 15} According to Ameen, Ishaq’s pending bankruptcy petition “brought into effect the 

automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362 which ‘stays the equitable distribution in a divorce case of the 

debtor’s interest in marital assets.’ State ex rel. Miley v. Parrott (1996), 77 Ohio St.3d 64, 66.” 

Ameen asserts that the court lacked jurisdiction to divide the marital assets and debts. Ameen also 

asserts that he was unable to adequately prepare for the final hearing, since the court “released” his 

counsel “a mere eight days prior to trial” and did not afford him “a proper opportunity to litigate the 

issues in his case.” Ameen asserts that he is entitled to the enforcement of the the alleged “Mahr 

provision.” 

{¶ 16} Ishaq responds that Ameen “had eighteen months to prepare for the final hearing, 

he signed an agreed order to remove the stay, and no assets of the bankruptcy estate were divided 

until after the Appellee was granted a discharge in her bankruptcy case.” 

{¶ 17} “The standard of review of a trial court’s decision on a motion for continuance 

of a trial is an abuse of discretion.” Hoening v. Frick, 187 Ohio App.3d 139, 2010-Ohio-1788, 

931 N.E.2d 211, ¶ 10 (2d Dist.) As the Supreme Court of Ohio determined: 
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“Abuse of discretion” has been defined as an attitude that is unreasonable, 

arbitrary or unconscionable. (Internal citation omitted). It is to be expected that 

most instances of abuse of discretion will result in decisions that are simply 

unreasonable, rather than decisions that are unconscionable or arbitrary. 

A decision is unreasonable if there is no sound reasoning process that 

would support that decision. It is not enough that the reviewing court, were it 

deciding the issue de novo, would not have found that reasoning process to be 

persuasive, perhaps in view of countervailing reasoning processes that would 

support a contrary result. AAAA Enterprises, Inc. v. River Place Community 

Redevelopment, 50 Ohio St.3d 157, 161, 553 N.E.2d 597 (1990). 

{¶ 18} As this Court noted in Hoening: 

“In evaluating a motion for continuance, a court should note, inter alia: * * 

* the length of the delay requested; whether other continuances have been 

requested and received; the inconvenience to litigants, witnesses, opposing 

counsel and the court; whether the defendant contributed to the circumstances 

which give rise to the request for a continuance; and other relevant factors, 

depending on the unique facts of each case. * * * .” Id., ¶ 12 (citation omitted). 

{¶ 19} We agree with Ishaq that the court did not abuse its discretion in failing to grant 

Ameen a continuance. While the filing of a bankruptcy petition does stay the equitable 

distribution of the debtor’s interest in marital property (Miley, id.), the court indicated that it 

possessed a copy of the “Agreed Relief from Stay,” signed by both parties, their counsel, and the 

bankruptcy trustee, and Ameen did not dispute the existence of the document. Regarding 
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Ameen’s assertion that he lacked time to prepare for trial, Ameen contributed to the 

circumstances giving rise to the need for a continuance when he terminated his relationship with 

his counsel a little over a week before the final hearing. 

{¶ 20} Further, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Ohio 

issued a “Discharge of Debtor” regarding Ishaq’s petition on October 26, 2011, and on November 

16, 2011, the Bankruptcy Court closed the matter, in Case No. 3:11-bk-33609. The parties’ 

marital assets were divided by court order on January 17, 2012, when the Final Decree was 

issued. “It is well known that a court speaks through its journal entry.” Brookville National 

Bank v. Credit Bureau of Dayton, Inc., 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 6301, 1980 WL 352479, * 3 

(May 21, 1980). In other words, Ameen has not established that the court lacked jurisdiction 

when it issued its final decree. 

{¶ 21} Finally, regarding the “Mahr provision,” Ameen did not raise the issue until the 

date of the final hearing, in his “Limited Notice,” almost a year and a half after the complaint was 

filed. Civ.R. 10(D) provides: “When any * * * defense is founded on an account or other written 

instrument, a copy of the account or written instrument must be attached to the pleading.” If the 

written instrument is not attached, “the reason for the omission must be stated in the pleading.” 

Id. There is no evidence of the alleged “antenuptial agreement” in the record, nor has the reason 

for its omission been stated. Accordingly, Ameen’s assertion that he is entitled to its 

enforcement fails. 

{¶ 22} There being no merit to Ameen’s assigned errors, they are overruled, and the 

judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 

 . . . . . . . . . . 
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FAIN, J. and HALL, J., concur. 

Copies mailed to: 

Keith R. Kearney 

David M. Pixley 

Mitchell W. Allen 

Hon. Steven L. Hurley