UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Criminal No. 12-65 (CKK) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

(October 9, 2012) 

 Defendant Paul David Hite is charged by superseding indictment with two counts of 

attempted coercion and enticement of a minor in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). Superseding 

Indictment, ECF No. [10], at 1-2. The Defendant previously moved to dismiss both counts of the 

superseding indictment on the grounds that the statute prohibits attempted enticement by way of 

direct communications with a minor only, but does not prohibit attempted enticement through an 

adult intermediary. See generally Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. [11]. The Court denied the 

Defendant’s motion, but granted the Defendant an opportunity to further develop the 

constitutional issues that were raised but not effectively briefed in his initial motion. 6/30/12 

Mem. Opin., ECF No. [15], at 30-31. Presently before the Court is the Defendant’s [16] 

Supplemental Memorandum in Support of His Motion to Dismiss Counts One and Two of the 

Superseding Indictment. Upon consideration of the parties’ pleadings,1

 the relevant legal 

standards, and the record as a whole, the Court finds Defendant’s constitutional arguments lack 

merit. Accordingly, the Defendant’s motion to dismiss is DENIED. 

 1

 See Def.’s Suppl. Mem., ECF No. [16]; Gov’t’s Opp’n, ECF No. [17]; and Def.’s 

Suppl. Reply, ECF No. [18]. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 v. 

PAUL DAVID HITE, 

 Defendant. 
2 

I. BACKGROUND 

 The Court detailed the factual allegations against the Defendant at length in its initial 

Memorandum Opinion, 6/30/12 Mem. Opin. at 1-13, and that discussion is incorporated by 

reference into this Memorandum Opinion. In short, the Defendant initiated a conversation via 

instant message with District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department Detective Timothy 

Palchak, who posed as “JP” in a chat room on a social networking site. Id. at 2. The 

Government alleges that over the course of several days, the Defendant and JP had a series of 

sexually explicit conversations through instant message and over the telephone regarding JP’s 

three year old nephew and JP’s girlfriend’s twelve year old daughter. Id. at 2-13. The parties 

discussed meeting in person to engage in sexual activity with both the three-year old and twelveyear old. E.g., id. at 6-7. The Defendant and JP arranged for the Defendant to travel to JP’s 

apartment in the District of Columbia on Friday, February 17, 2012. Id. at 9. JP explained that 

his nephew would arrive on Saturday, and the parties had explicit discussions regarding the 

sexual acts they planned to engage in with JP’s nephew. Id. During later discussions regarding 

logistics for the meeting, the Defendant claimed that all of their prior conversations were mere 

fantasies, and that they were simply two consenting adults meeting without the intent to engage 

in any illegal activity. E.g., id. at 12. On Friday February 17, the Defendant indicated he was 

paranoid about the planned meeting, and stated he needed “a little bit more confirmation” before 

traveling to JP’s apartment. Id. The Government filed a criminal complaint against the 

Defendant that same day, and the Defendant was arrested on February 21, 2012. Id. at 13. 

 In his initial motion to dismiss, the Defendant argued that as a matter of law, the 

Government could not show the Defendant acted with the requisite intent to persuade, induce, 

entice, or coerce a minor to engage in illicit sexual activity, or that the Defendant had taken a 
3 

substantial step towards commission of the offense proscribed in Section 2422(b). The 

Defendant specifically argued, in relevant part, that Section 2422(b) prohibits only direct 

communication between a defendant and a minor with the intent to persuade the minor to engage 

in illicit sexual activity, but does not criminalize communication between a defendant and 

another adult. In the alternative, the Defendant asserted that at most, Section 2422(b) prohibits 

communications between a defendant and the parent or legal guardian of a minor made with the 

intent to persuade the minor to engage in illicit sexual activity. 

The Court rejected both arguments, holding that under the plain language of the statute 

“[i]t is sufficient that the defendant communicate with an adult intermediary with the intent that 

the end result be the enticement of the minor to engage in illegal sexual activity.” 6/30/12 Mem. 

Opin. at 18.2

 As for the relationship between the adult intermediary and the minor, the Court 

explained that that the relevant question is whether the defendant thought the adult intermediary 

had sufficient influence or control over the minor to succeed in enticing the desired illicit 

behavior. Id. at 20-21. Although other courts have found a parent/guardian relationship to be 

sufficient to show such influence or control, the adult intermediary did not necessarily have to be 

a parent or guardian in order to have such influence or control. Id. The Court left it to the jury to 

determine whether the Defendant thought JP had sufficient influence or control such that the 

 2

 In a rather blatant attempt to re-argue his initial motion to dismiss beyond his 

constitutional claims, the Defendant cites a number of statutes purportedly interpreted to include 

only “direct” conduct even though the word “direct” is absent from the statute. Def.’s Suppl. 

Mem. at 10 n1. The Court declines to waste its and the parties’ time distinguishing a litany of 

non-criminal statutes, particularly in light of the D.C. Circuit’s opinion in United States v. Love, 

593 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2010), which employed the same approach used by the Court in its prior 

opinion to interpret strikingly similar language in the United States Sentencing Guidelines. Id. at 

8. 
4 

Defendant had the requisite intent to persuade the minors in question. Id. at 21.3

The Defendant purported to raise a constitutional challenge to Section 2422(b), but did 

not articulate the argument until his reply brief, at which time the Government had no 

opportunity to respond. 6/30/12 Mem. Opin. at 29-30. Pursuant to the Court’s July 2, 2012 

Minute Order, the Defendant filed the present supplemental memorandum regarding his 

constitutional arguments. 

III. DISCUSSION 

 Although the Defendant’s supplemental pleadings are not the model of clarity---and for 

the most part fails to fully articulate the Defendant’s theory until the reply brief---the thrust of 

the Defendant’s argument appears to be that Section 2422(b) is unconstitutional for two reasons: 

(1) the statute criminalizes speech that is not imminently related to the harmful conduct the 

statute seeks to prevent; and (2) the statute provides insufficient notice to the public and law 

enforcement as to what type communication is prohibited. In light of these arguments, the 

Defendant urges the Court to adopt one of two proposed alternative constructions of the statute 

pursuant to the doctrine of “constitutional avoidance”: one that criminalizes only 

communications made directly with a minor, and one that criminalizes only communications 

made directly with a minor or with the minor’s parent or guardian. Finding no constitutional 

infirmities with the statute, the Court declines the Defendant’s invitation to revisit the Court’s 

earlier opinion and adopt one of his proposed limits on the statute. 

 3

 Defendant’s citation to a law review note critical of a similar decision notwithstanding, 

Def.’s Suppl. Mem. at 2 n1., across four separate briefs, the Defendant has been unable to cite a 

single case in which any federal court has rejected the interpretation of the statute employed by 

the Court. The Court is treading on new ground in this Circuit, but does so consistent with 

extensive case law from other Circuits, which have universally rejected similar constitutional 

challenges to Section 2422(b). 
5 

 A. Direct/Imminent Connection to Harmful Activity 

 Although framed as a vagueness argument, the Defendant’s first contention is that the 

statute is unconstitutionally overbroad. 

The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines are related but distinct. A vague law 

denies due process by imposing standards of conduct so indeterminate that it is 

impossible to ascertain just what will result in sanctions; in contrast, a law that is 

overbroad may be perfectly clear but impermissibly purport to penalize protected 

First Amendment activity. 

Hastings v. Judicial Conference of the U.S., 829 F.2d 91, 105 (D.C. Cir. 1987). “The 

overbreadth doctrine prohibits the Government from banning unprotected speech if a substantial 

amount of protected speech is prohibited or chilled in the process.” Ashcroft v. Free Speech 

Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 255 (2002). 

Numerous Courts of Appeals have rejected overbreadth challenges to Section 2422(b). 

E.g., United States v. Gagliardi, 506 F.3d 140, 147-48 (2d Cir. 2007); United States v. Tykarsky, 

446 F.3d 458, 473 (3d Cir. 2006); United States v. Meek, 366 F.3d 705, 721 (9th Cir. 2004); 

United States v. Bailey, 228 F.3d 637, 639 (6th Cir. 2000). The Defendant attempts to 

distinguish these cases on the grounds that none of them addressed the use of an adult 

intermediary as alleged in this case. The thrust of the Defendant’s argument is that unless a 

defendant communicates directly with a minor---or with the minor’s parent or guardian---Section 

2422(b) “criminalize[s] speech that may have little direct and immediate causal relation to the 

harm that such criminalization is intended to prevent.” Def.’s Suppl. Mem. at 12-13; see also id.

at 9. Defendant’s argument is misplaced. 

First, as the Second, Third, and Ninth Circuits noted, Section 2422(b) criminalizes the act 

of attempting to entice a minor, not speech. Gagliardi, 506 F.3d at 148 (“The statute punishes 

the act of enticing or attempting to entice a minor when it is knowingly done; it does not 
6 

implicate speech.”); Tykarsky, 446 F.3d at 473 (“Section 2422(b) regulates only conduct, not 

speech.”); Meek, 366 F.3d at 721. “[T]here is no otherwise legitimate speech jeopardized by 

§ 2422 because the statute only criminalizes conduct, i.e. the targeted inducement of minors for 

illegal sexual activity. Here, speech is merely the vehicle through which a pedophile ensnares 

the victim.” Meek, 366 F.3d at 721. For that reason, neither Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 

(1972), nor Free Speech Coalition v. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. 234 (2002), are relevant; Section 

2422(b) does not criminalize protected speech as a means to prohibit certain conduct, it directly 

prohibits certain conduct. The Defendant’s reliance on United States v. Gladish, 536 F.3d 646 

(7th Cir. 2008), for this same argument is inapposite. The Seventh Circuit in Gladish did not 

address a constitutional challenge to Section 2422(b), but rather opined on the requirement that 

the defendant take a “substantial step” toward completion of the offense to be found guilty of 

attempt. What constitutes a substantial step for purposes of attempted enticement is irrelevant to 

the question of whether or not the statute criminalizes a substantial amount of protected speech. 

Second, to the extent Section 2422(b) in fact proscribes speech but not conduct, that 

speech is not protected by the First Amendment. Bailey, 228 F.3d at 639. “Offers to engage in 

illegal transactions are categorically excluded from First Amendment protection.” United States 

v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 297 (2008). In Williams, the Supreme Court found that “offers to 

provide or requests to obtain child pornography are categorically excluded from the First 

Amendment.” Id. at 299. The Williams Court explicitly found that the criminalization of certain 

speech (an offer or request for child pornography) made with a particular intent (that the subject 

of the proposed transaction depict real children) was not unconstitutionally overbroad. Id. at 

303. Section 2422(b), which proscribes only speech made with the intent to actually induce a 

minor to engage in illicit sexual activity, is similarly “well within constitutional bounds.” Id. at 
7 

299. 

The Government noted in its opposition that in terms of the “direct connection” to 

harmful conduct, there is no basis to distinguish between communications with an adult 

intermediary that is the parent/guardian of a minor, and communications with an adult 

intermediary that has some other relationship with a minor. The only explanation offered by the 

Defendant comes in a footnote in the Defendant’s reply, wherein he argues that 

The difference is that in the absence of such a relationship of control between the 

adult recipient of the communication and the minor who the sender of the 

communication is intending to persuade, induce, entice or coerce, there is no 

reason for fear that the speech will result in imminent conduct that can 

constitutionally be proscribed. When a speaker attempts directly to persuade, 

induce, entice or coerce a minor, there is the direct imminent connection between 

the speech and unlawful conduct of sexual relations with the minor. . . . A 

communication with a minor’s adult babysitter, teacher, or neighbor that is 

intended to persuade, induce, entice or coerce that adult to procure the minor for 

unlawful sexual relations may be odious, but it is nonetheless speech that lacks a 

direct imminent connection to the unlawful conduct that speaking to the minor’s 

parent would presumably have. 

Def.’s Suppl. Reply at 12 n.1. This argument assumes the fact the Defendant must prove in 

order to show the statute is overbroad. An adult babysitter’s communication with a minor may 

have “a direct imminent connection to the unlawful conduct,” while a conversation with an 

estranged parent may not. Courts have often found that the parent/guardian relationship is 

sufficient to show a certain level of control over a minor, but that legal relationship is by no 

means necessary to show that same level of influence or control. 6/30/12 Mem. Opin. at 20-21; 

cf. United States v. Nitschke, 843 F. Supp. 2d 4, 13-14 (D.D.C. 2011) (noting the detective 

posing as the adult intermediary “did not claim to be the minor’s parent or guardian, which many 

cases have presumed establishes sufficient influence or control over a minor”) (citations 
8 

omitted).4

 The Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Muentes, 316 F. App’x 921 (11th Cir. 2009), 

specifically upheld the defendant’s conviction under Section 2422(b) for attempting to entice a 

minor through communications with the minor’s pimp. Id. at 924. The Muentes court explained 

that “although Muentes negotiated with a purported pimp rather than a purported father, this 

distinction does not change the outcome. By negotiating with a purported pimp, an adult who 

presumably exercised influence over prospective minor prostitutes, Muentes attempted to 

stimulate or cause a minor to engage in sex with him.” Id. It is the level of influence the 

relationship provides, not the legal relationship between the intermediary and the targeted minor, 

that is relevant to whether or not the defendant acted with the requisite intent. Ultimately, 

whether or not a defendant thought an adult intermediary---be it a parent, babysitter, or other 

adult---had sufficient influence or control to effect the attempted enticement is a question of fact 

for the jury. See infra. 

B. Vagueness Challenge 

The Defendant’s second challenge, also framed as a vagueness challenge, alleges that the 

public lacks adequate notice of what conduct is criminalized by the statute by “leaving it to the 

jury to decide whether Dr. Hite intended to use the Internet to persuade the minor via the adult 

intermediary and believed the intermediary possessed sufficient control over the minor that he 

could induce the desired behavior.” Def.’s Suppl. Mem. at 14. This issue, once again, is not one 

of vagueness. “What renders a statute vague is not the possibility that it will sometimes be 

 4

 Contrary to the Defendant’s assertion, the Court’s opinion is entirely consistent with 

that of Judge James E. Boasberg in Nitschke. Judge Boasberg found in Nitschke that “[t]here is 

nothing in these communications to suggest that Defendant would think he could induce the 

minor through [the adult intermediary’s] influence or control.” 843 F. Supp. 2d at 13-14. In its 

June 30, 2012 Memorandum Opinion, the Court likewise noted that the Government would have 

to prove that Defendant Hite thought JP could induce the minors through JP’s influence or 

control. 
9 

difficult to determine whether the incriminating fact it establishes has been proved; but rather the 

indeterminacy of precisely what that fact is.” Williams, 553 U.S. at 306. 

Whether someone held a belief or had an intent is a true-or-false determination, 

not a subjective judgment such as whether conduct is ‘annoying’ or ‘indecent.’ . . 

. To be sure, it may be difficult in some cases to determine whether these clear 

requirements have been met. But courts and juries every day pass upon 

knowledge, belief and intent—the state of men's minds—having before them no 

more than evidence of their words and conduct, from which, in ordinary human 

experience, mental condition may be inferred. 

Williams, 553 U.S. at 306. 

The intent requirement for Section 2422(b) in this case is clear: the Government must 

prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant communicated with “JP” with the intent that 

the end result be the enticement of the minors to engage in illegal sexual activity. As part of this 

element, the Government must show the Defendant thought JP had sufficient influence or control 

over the fictitious minors to succeed in enticing the desired illicit behavior. Whether the 

Government can prove that fact remains to be seen, but at the point it is clear what fact the 

Government must show, the statute is not vague. Thus, the Defendant’s contention that Section 

2422(b) “gives law enforcement officials ‘virtually unfettered discretion’ has no merit. No more 

here than in the case of laws against fraud, conspiracy, or solicitation.” Williams, 553 U.S. at 

306. Congress could have drafted a narrower statute, that is, by limiting Section 2422(b) to 

“direct” communication with a minor, or communications with the minor’s parent or guardian. 

Nevertheless, the route Congress took in drafting Section 2422(b) as it exists today is not 

unconstitutional. 

For the first time in his reply, the Defendant asserts a new vagueness challenge, arguing 

that the plain meaning of “persuades, induces, entices, or coerces” does not place the public on 

notice that “indirect” communication with a minor by way of an adult intermediary other than a 
10 

parent/guardian, with the requisite intent, is criminalized. Numerous Courts of Appeals have 

rejected similar vagueness claims, noting that “persuade,” “induce,” “entice,” and “coerce” have 

their plain and ordinary meanings, which are “sufficiently precise to give a person of ordinary 

intelligence fair notice as to what is permitted and what is prohibited.” Tykarsky, 446 F.3d at 

473; see also Gagliardi, 506 F.3d at 147 (“The words attempt, persuade, induce, entice, or 

coerce, though not defined in the statute, are words of common usage that have plain and 

ordinary meanings ... sufficiently definite that ordinary people using common sense could grasp 

the nature of the prohibited conduct.”); United States v. Panfil, 338 F.3d 1299, 1301 (11th Cir. 

2003). The Court agrees. The words “persuade,” “induce,” “entice,” and “coerce” have their 

plain and ordinary meanings, which include indirect communications with a minor, providing 

clear notice of what conduct is prohibited by the statute and preventing arbitrary enforcement. 

6/30/12 Mem. Opin. at 15-17. 

C. Constitutional Avoidance 

The Defendant devotes most of his Reply brief to describing the doctrine of constitutional 

avoidance and defending the plausibility of his proposed alternative constructions of the statute. 

The crux of the Defendant’s argument in support of his claim that the statute is ambiguous is that 

if two jurists (this Court and Judge Brown) can read the statute two different ways, the statute by 

definition must be ambiguous. If that were true, then the Supreme Court could (and would) 

never find any statute has a plain meaning in the face of a disagreement amongst the Courts of 

Appeals. Disagreements amongst learned jurists do not demonstrate the statute has no “plain 

meaning.” See, e.g., Abbott v. United States, 131 S.Ct. 18, 23 (2010) (finding 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) 

was not ambiguous, despite differing interpretations by the Courts of Appeals). As explained 

above, and in the Court’s prior opinion, the plain text of Section 2422(b) is unambiguous, and 
11 

neither vague nor overbroad. “A clear statute and a weak constitutional claim are not a recipe for 

successful invocation of the constitutional avoidance canon.” Cubaexport v. Dep't of Treasury, 

638 F.3d 794, 801 (D.C. Cir. 2011). The constitutional avoidance canon is not, as the Defendant 

claims, triggered by the existence of “multiple plausible readings of the statute.”5

 Def.’s Suppl. 

Reply at 2. The Court does not look beyond the plain text of the statute unless the Defendant 

raises a “serious” constitutional question. Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 381 (2005). The 

Defendant’s supplemental briefing failed to raise such a serious question. Accordingly, the 

canon of constitutional avoidance provides no basis for the Court to reconsider its earlier 

decision adopting the plain reading of the statute at issue. Rural Cellular Ass’n v. Fed. 

Commc’ns Comm’n, 685 F.3d 1083, 1091-92 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 

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 5

 Nor does the Court take any position on the plausibility of Defendant’s proposed 

alternative interpretations of the statute. 
12 

IV. CONCLUSION 

 For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds the Defendant’s constitutional challenges are 

unpersuasive. Section 2422(b) is not overbroad, as it criminalizes only conduct, and does not 

suppress any protected speech. Furthermore, Section 2422(b) is not void for vagueness; as 

numerous Courts of Appeals have found, the plain and ordinary meaning of the statute provides 

clear notice of what conduct is prohibited and what intent is required. Whether the Defendant 

acted with the requisite intent is a factual question for the jury to decide, not a vague aspect of 

the statute. With a clear statute and no serious constitutional concerns, the canon of 

constitutional avoidance is inapplicable, and the Court does not reach the Defendant’s proposed 

alternative constructions of Section 2422(b). Accordingly, the Defendant’s motion to dismiss is 

DENIED. 

An appropriate Order accompanies this memorandum opinion. 

 /s/ 

 COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE