67380 Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 214 / Monday, November 7, 2005 / Proposed Rules 

previously approved by OMB and 

assigned OMB Number 0581–0177. 

Reporting and recordkeeping burdens 

are necessary for compliance purposes 

and for developing statistical data for 

maintenance of the program. The forms 

require information which is readily 

available from handler records and 

which can be provided without data 

processing equipment or trained 

statistical staff. As with other, similar 

marketing order programs, reports and 

forms are periodically studied to reduce 

or eliminate duplicate information 

collection burdens by industry and 

public sector agencies. This rule does 

not change those requirements. 

AMS is committed to compliance 

with the Government Paperwork 

Elimination Act (GPEA), which requires 

Government agencies in general to 

provide the public the option of 

submitting information or transacting 

business electronically to the maximum 

extent possible. 

A 30-day comment period is provided 

to allow interested persons to respond 

to this proposal. Thirty days is deemed 

appropriate because this rule would 

need to be in place as soon as possible 

since handlers are already shipping tart 

cherries from the 2005–2006 crop. All 

written comments timely received will 

be considered before a final 

determination is made on this matter. 

List of Subjects in 7 CFR Part 930 

Marketing agreements, Reporting and 

recordkeeping requirements, Tart 

cherries. 

For the reasons set forth in the 

preamble, 7 CFR part 930 is proposed to 

be amended as follows: 

PART 930—TART CHERRIES GROWN 

IN THE STATES OF MICHIGAN, NEW 

YORK, PENNSYLVANIA, OREGON, 

UTAH, WASHINGTON, AND 

WISCONSIN 

1. The authority citation for 7 CFR 

part 930 continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 7 U.S.C. 601–674. 

2. Section 930.254 is added to read as 

follows: 

Note: This section will not appear in the 

annual Code of Federal Regulations. 

§ 930.254 Final free and restricted 

percentages for the 2005–2006 crop year. 

The final percentages for tart cherries 

handled by handlers during the crop 

year beginning on July 1, 2005, which 

shall be free and restricted, respectively, 

are designated as follows: Free 

percentage, 58 percent and restricted 

percentage, 42 percent. 

Dated: November 2, 2005. 

Lloyd C. Day, 

Administrator, Agricultural Marketing 

Service. 

[FR Doc. 05–22115 Filed 11–4–05; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 3410–02–P 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY 

COMMISSION 

10 CFR Part 73 

RIN 3150–AH60 

Design Basis Threat 

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission. 

ACTION: Proposed rule. 

SUMMARY: The Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (NRC) is proposing to 

amend its regulations that govern the 

requirements pertaining to design basis 

threat (DBT). The proposed rule would 

amend the Commission’s regulations to, 

among other things, make generically 

applicable the security requirements 

previously imposed by the 

Commission’s April 29, 2003 DBT 

orders, which applied to existing 

licensees, and redefine the level of 

security requirements necessary to 

ensure that the public health and safety 

and common defense and security are 

adequately protected. The proposed rule 

would revise the DBT requirements for 

radiological sabotage (applied to power 

reactors and Category I fuel cycle 

facilities), and theft or diversion of NRClicensed Strategic Special Nuclear 

Material (SSNM) (applied to Category I 

fuel cycle facilities). The NRC has 

developed draft Regulatory Guides 

(RGs) that provide guidance to licensees 

concerning the DBT for radiological 

sabotage and theft and diversion. These 

draft RGs have limited distribution 

because they contain either safeguards 

or classified information. The specific 

details related to the threat, which 

contain both safeguards information 

(SGI) and classified information, are 

contained in adversary characteristics 

documents (ACDs) that are not publicly 

available. These documents include 

specific details of the attributes of the 

threat consistent with the requirements 

imposed in the April 29, 2003, DBT 

orders. Additionally, a Petition for 

Rulemaking (PRM–73–12), filed by the 

Committee to Bridge the Gap, was 

considered as part of this proposed 

rulemaking; the NRC’s disposition of 

this petition is contained in this 

document. 

DATES: Submit comments by January 23, 

2006. Comments received after this date 

will be considered if it is practical to do 

so, but the Commission is able to ensure 

consideration only for comments 

received on or before this date. 

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments 

by any one of the following methods. 

Please include the following number 

RIN 3150–AH60 in the subject line of 

your comments. Comments on 

rulemakings submitted in writing or in 

electronic form will be made available 

for public inspection. Because your 

comments will not be edited to remove 

any identifying or contact information, 

the NRC cautions you against including 

any information in your submission that 

you do not want to be publicly 

disclosed. 

Mail comments to: Secretary, U.S. 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 

Washington, DC 20555–0001, ATTN: 

Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff. 

E-mail comments to: SECY@nrc.gov. If 

you do not receive a reply e-mail 

confirming that we have received your 

comments, contact us directly at (301) 

415–1966. You may also submit 

comments via the NRC’s rulemaking 

Web site at http://ruleforum.llnl.gov. 

Address questions about our rulemaking 

Web site to Carol Gallagher (301) 415–

5905; e-mail cag@nrc.gov. Comments 

can also be submitted via the Federal 

eRulemaking Portal http:// 

www.regulations.gov. 

Hand deliver comments to: 11555 

Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 

20852, between 7:30 am and 4:15 pm 

Federal workdays. (Telephone (301) 

415–1966). 

Fax comments to: Secretary, U.S. 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission at (301) 

415–1101. 

You may submit comments on the 

information collections by the methods 

indicated in the Paperwork Reduction 

Act Statement. 

Publicly available documents related 

to this rulemaking may be viewed 

electronically on the public computers 

located at the NRC’s Public Document 

Room (PDR), O1 F21, One White Flint 

North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, 

Maryland. The PDR reproduction 

contractor will copy documents for a 

fee. Selected documents, including 

comments, may be viewed and 

downloaded electronically via the NRC 

rulemaking Web site at http:// 

ruleforum.llnl.gov. 

Publicly available documents created 

or received at the NRC after November 

1, 1999, are available electronically at 

the NRC’s Electronic Reading Room at 

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/ 

adams.html. From this site, the public 

can gain entry into the NRC’s 

Agencywide Document Access and 

Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 214 / Monday, November 7, 2005 / Proposed Rules 67381 

Management System (ADAMS), which 

provides text and image files of NRC’s 

public documents. If you do not have 

access to ADAMS or if there are 

problems in accessing the documents 

located in ADAMS, contact the NRC 

Public Document Room (PDR) Reference 

staff at 1–800–397–4209, 301–415–4737 

or by e-mail to pdr@nrc.gov. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. 

Timothy Reed, Office of Nuclear Reactor 

Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission, Washington, DC 20555–

0001; telephone (301) 415–1462; e-mail: 

tar@nrc.gov or Mr. Richard Rasmussen, 

Office of Nuclear Security and Incident 

Response, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission, Washington, DC 20555–

0001; telephone (301) 415–8380; e-mail: 

rar@nrc.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Table of Contents 

I. Background. 

II. Rulemaking Initiation. 

III. Proposed Regulations. 

IV. Section-by-Section Analysis. 

V. Petition for Rulemaking (PRM–73–12). 

VI. Guidance. 

VII. Criminal Penalties. 

VIII. Compatibility of Agreement State 

Regulations. 

IX. Availability of Documents. 

X. Plain Language. 

XI. Voluntary Consensus Standards. 

XII. Finding of No Significant Environmental 

Impact: Environmental Assessment: 

Availability. 

XIII. Paperwork Reduction Act Statement. 

XIV. Regulatory Analysis. 

XV. Regulatory Flexibility Act Certification. 

XVI. Backfit Analysis. 

I. Background 

The DBT requirements in 10 CFR 

73.1(a) describe general adversary 

characteristics that designated licensees 

must defend against with high 

assurance. These NRC requirements 

include protection against radiological 

sabotage (generally applied to power 

reactors and Category I fuel cycle 

facilities) and theft or diversion of NRClicensed SSNM (generally applied to 

Category I fuel cycle facilities). The 

DBTs are used by these licensees to 

form the basis for site-specific defensive 

strategies implemented through security 

plans, safeguards contingency plans, 

and guard training and qualification 

plans. 

Following the terrorist attacks on 

September 11, 2001, the NRC conducted 

a thorough review of security to ensure 

that nuclear power plants and other 

licensed facilities continued to have 

effective security measures in place for 

the changing threat environment. In so 

doing, the NRC recognized that some 

elements of the DBTs required 

enhancement due to the escalation of 

the domestic threat level. After 

soliciting and receiving comments from 

Federal, State, local agencies, and 

industry stakeholders, the NRC imposed 

by order supplemental DBT 

requirements that contained additional 

detailed adversary characteristics. The 

Commission deliberated on the 

responsibilities of the local, State, and 

Federal governments to protect the 

nation, and the responsibility of the 

licensees to protect individual nuclear 

facilities, before reaching consensus on 

a reasonable approach to security in the 

April 29, 2003 DBT orders. After gaining 

experience under these orders over the 

past two years, the Commission believes 

that the attributes of the orders should 

be generically imposed on certain 

classes of licensees. 

The Commission’s decision was based 

on the analysis of intelligence 

information regarding the trends and 

capabilities of the potential adversaries 

and discussions with Federal, law 

enforcement, and intelligence 

community agencies. These enhanced 

adversary characteristics are reflective 

of the new threat environment. In 

general terms, DBTs are comprised of 

attributes selected from the overall 

threat environment. The ACDs set forth 

the specific details of the attributes of 

the DBTs. The DBT technical basis 

document contains a basis for the 

specific adversary characteristics. These 

supplemental documents contain 

safeguards and classified information 

that is distributed only to persons with 

authorized access and on a need-toknow basis. The NRC’s DBT takes into 

consideration actual demonstrated 

adversary characteristics as well as 

pertinent intelligence information 

applicable to domestic threats and a 

determination as to those characteristics 

against which a private security force 

could reasonably be expected to provide 

protection. 

The April 29, 2003 DBT orders 

required nuclear power reactors and 

Category I fuel cycle licensees to revise 

their physical security plans, security 

personnel training and qualification 

plans, and safeguards contingency plans 

to defend against the supplemental DBT 

requirements. The orders required 

licensees to make security 

enhancements such as increased patrols; 

augmented security forces and 

capabilities; additional security posts; 

additional physical barriers; vehicle 

checks at greater standoff distances; 

better coordination with law 

enforcement and military authorities; 

augmented security and emergency 

response training, equipment, and 

communication; and more restrictive 

site access controls for personnel, 

including expanded, expedited, and 

more thorough initial and follow-on 

screening of temporary and permanent 

workers. The NRC has reviewed and 

approved the revised security plans that 

were developed and submitted by 

power reactor and Category I fuel 

facility licensees in response to the 

April 29, 2003 orders. 

II. Rulemaking Initiation 

On July 19, 2004, the staff issued a 

memorandum entitled ‘‘Status of 

Security-Related Rulemaking’’ to inform 

the Commission of plans to close two 

longstanding security-related actions 

and replace them with a comprehensive 

rulemaking plan to modify physical 

protection requirements for power 

reactors. This memorandum described 

rulemaking efforts that were preempted 

by the terrorist activities of September 

11, 2001, and summarized the securityrelated actions taken following the 

attack. In response to this 

memorandum, the Commission directed 

the staff in an August 23, 2004, Staff 

Requirements Memorandum (SRM), to 

forego the development of a rulemaking 

plan and provide a schedule for the 

completion of 10 CFR 73.1, 73.55, and 

Part 73 Appendix B rulemakings. The 

requested schedule was provided to the 

Commission by memorandum dated 

November 16, 2004. 

III. Proposed Regulations 

The principal objectives of the 

proposed rule are, among other things, 

to make generically applicable the 

security requirements previously 

imposed by the Commission’s April 29, 

2003 DBT orders, and to define in NRC 

regulations the level of security 

necessary to ensure adequate protection 

of the public health and safety and 

common defense and security. 

The Commission continues to 

consider many factors in developing the 

proposed DBT and other security 

requirements. As directed by Congress 

under section 651(a) of the recently 

enacted Energy Policy Act of 2005, the 

NRC is giving consideration to the 

following 12 factors as part of this 

rulemaking to revise the design basis 

threats: 

1. The events of September 11, 2001; 

2. An assessment of physical, cyber, 

biochemical, and other terrorist threats; 

3. The potential for attack on facilities 

by multiple coordinated teams of a large 

number of individuals; 

4. The potential for assistance in an 

attack from several persons employed at 

the facility; 

5. The potential for suicide attacks; 

6. The potential for water-based and 

air-based threats; 

67382 Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 214 / Monday, November 7, 2005 / Proposed Rules 

1Transportation of spent nuclear fuel is subject to 

separate regulatory requirements and public 

comments will be considered. 

7. The potential use of explosive 

devices of considerable size and other 

modern weaponry; 

8. The potential for attacks by persons 

with a sophisticated knowledge of 

facility operations; 

9. The potential for fires, especially 

fires of long duration; 

10. The potential for attacks on spent 

fuel shipments by multiple coordinated 

teams of a large number of individuals; 1

11. The adequacy of planning to 

protect the public health and safety at 

and around nuclear facilities, as 

appropriate, in the event of a terrorist 

attack against a nuclear facility; and 

12. The potential for theft and 

diversion of nuclear material from such 

facilities. 

A number of these factors are already 

reflected in the text of the proposed 

rule. For example, the proposed rule 

would require protection against 

suicidal attackers, insiders, and 

waterborne threats. Some of these 

factors are not included in the proposed 

rule. For example, there is no provision 

in the proposed DBT rule for an 

attribute of air-based threats. The 

Commission invites and looks forward 

to public comment on the proposed rule 

provisions, as well as whether or how 

the 12 factors should be addressed in 

the DBT rule. The Commission will 

further consider and resolve any 

comments received in the final rule. 

The proposed rule would also revise 

certain exemptions for independent 

spent fuel storage installations (ISFSIs). 

The current DBT rule exempts ISFSIs 

from the land vehicle transport and land 

vehicle bomb threats contained in 

§§ 73.1(a)(1)(i)(E) and (a)(1)(iii), 

respectively. These exemptions should 

no longer be retained because the 

Commission issued orders to ISFSIs on 

October 16, 2002, requiring ISFSIs to 

protect against these threats. The NRC 

evaluated the need to apply waterborne 

requirements to ISFSIs and concluded 

that other means in the proposed rule 

were sufficiently protective to preclude 

the need for specific requirements 

regarding waterborne threats. 

Consequently, an exemption from the 

waterborne threat has been added for 

ISFSIs in this proposed rule. 

The proposed rule would also amend 

the exemption in the current § 73.1(a) 

for licensees subject to the provisions of 

§ 73.20. The current rule exempts these 

licensees from the requirements to 

protect against vehicles transporting 

adversary personnel and equipment and 

the land vehicle bomb. The Commission 

has determined, however, that due to 

the current threat environment certain 

licensees subject to § 73.20 (Category I 

fuel cycle facilities) need to protect 

against such threats, so the exemption 

must be amended accordingly. The 

amended exemption would continue for 

other licensees described in 10 CFR 

73.20 (e.g., fuel reprocessing plants 

licensed under Part 50). 

The approach proposed in this 

rulemaking maintains a level of detail in 

the § 73.1(a) rule language that is 

generally comparable to the current 

regulation, while updating the general 

DBT attributes in a manner consistent 

with the insights gained from the 

application of supplemental security 

requirements imposed by the April 29, 

2003, DBT orders. The result is a 

proposed rule with a level of detail that 

reflects all major features of the DBTs, 

yet avoids compromising licensee 

security by not publishing the specific 

tactical and operational capabilities of 

the DBT adversaries. The goal of this 

approach is to provide sufficient public 

notice of the upgrades to the DBTs, 

including the new modes of attack that 

facilities must be prepared to defend 

against, so that meaningful public input 

is possible regarding the proposed rule’s 

scope and content. 

The NRC recognizes that some 

stakeholders may expect more detail 

than is set forth in the current or 

proposed DBT regulations. However, the 

more detail that is made publicly 

available about the specific capabilities 

of the DBT adversaries, the greater the 

chance that potential adversaries could 

exploit that information. The disclosure 

of such details as the specific weapons, 

force size, ammunition, vehicles, and 

bomb sizes that licensees must be 

prepared to defend against could 

substantially assist an adversary in 

planning an attack. 

On the other hand, it is important for 

the public to be informed of the types 

of attacks against which nuclear power 

plants and Category I fuel cycle facilities 

are required to defend. The public has 

a vital stake in the security of these 

facilities, as well as the right to 

meaningful comment when NRC 

proposes to amend its regulations. 

Understanding the general scope of the 

proposed DBT rule is necessary if the 

public is to exercise its right to 

meaningful comment and oversight of 

NRC regulations. 

After carefully balancing these 

competing interests, the NRC arrived at 

the level of detail regarding the 

attributes of the DBT presented in the 

proposed rule. More specific details 

(e.g., specific weapons, ammunition, 

etc.) are consolidated in ACDs, which 

contain classified or safeguards 

information. The technical bases for the 

ACDs are derived largely from 

intelligence information, and also 

contain classified and safeguards 

information that cannot be publicly 

disclosed. These documents must be 

withheld from public disclosure and 

made available only on a need-to-know 

basis to those who otherwise qualify for 

access. 

The ACDs may be updated from time 

to time as a result of the NRC’s periodic 

threat reviews, which NRC has been 

conducting since 1979. Those threat 

assessments are performed in 

conjunction with the intelligence and 

law enforcement communities to 

identify changes in the threat 

environment which may in turn require 

adjustment of NRC security 

requirements. Future revisions to the 

ACDs would not require changes to the 

DBT regulations in § 73.1, provided the 

changes remain within the scope of the 

rule text. 

The NRC consulted with Federal, 

State, and local agencies, and with 

industry stakeholders in developing the 

updated DBTs. This consultation 

involved analysis of intelligence 

information regarding the trends and 

capabilities of potential adversaries, and 

discussion with Federal, law 

enforcement, and intelligence 

community agencies. Public comments 

and suggestions received in response to 

PRM–73–12, also informed the NRC’s 

development of this proposed rule. The 

resolution of PRM–73–12, which is 

being granted in part through this 

rulemaking, is more fully discussed in 

Section V of this notice. 

The Commission concludes that the 

proposed amendments to § 73.1 will 

continue to ensure adequate protection 

of public health and safety and the 

common defense and security by 

requiring the secure use and 

management of radioactive materials. 

The revised DBTs represent the largest 

threats against which private sector 

facilities must be able to defend with 

high assurance. The proposed 

amendments to § 73.1 reflect 

requirements currently in place under 

existing NRC regulations and orders. 

Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 214 / Monday, November 7, 2005 / Proposed Rules 67383 

IV. Section-by-Section Analysis 

The following table provides a 

comparison between the proposed rule 

text and the current rule text. 

Old New Change 

(a) Purpose. This part prescribes requirements 

for the establishment and maintenance of a 

physical protection system which will have 

capabilities for the protection of special nuclear material at fixed sites and in transit and 

of plants in which special nuclear materials 

used. The following design basis threats, 

where referenced in ensuing sections of this 

part, shall be used to design safeguards systems to protect against acts of radiological 

sabotage and to prevent the theft of special 

nuclear material. Licensees subject to the 

provision of § 72.182, § 72.212, § 72.20, 

§ 73.50, and § 73.60 are exempt from 

§ 73.1(a)(1)(i)(E) and § 73.1(a)(1)(iii). 

(a) Purpose. This part prescribes requirements for the establishment and maintenance of a physical protection system 

which will have capabilities for the protection of special nuclear material at fixed sites 

and in transit and of plants in which special 

nuclear material is used. The following design basis threats, where referenced in ensuing sections of this part, shall be used to 

design safeguards systems to protect 

against acts of radiological sabotage and to 

prevent the theft or diversion of special nuclear material. Licensees subject to the provisions of § 73.20 (except for fuel cycle licensees authorized under part 70 of this 

chapter to received, acquire, possess, 

transfer, use, or deliver for transportation 

formula quantities of strategic special nuclear material), § 73.50, and § 73.60 are exempt from § 73.1(a)(1)(i)(E), § 73.1(a)(1)(iii), 

§ 73.1(a)(1)(iv), § 73.1(a)(2)(iii) and 

§ 73.1(a)(2)(iv). Licensees subject to the 

provisions of § 72.212, are exempt from 

§ 73.1(a)(1)(iv). 

The proposed paragraph is modified to clarify 

that the DBTs are designed to protect 

against diversion in addition to theft of special nuclear material. 

The proposed exemptions would be updated 

based on the order requirements and conforming changes to other paragraphs of this 

part. 

(1) Radiological sabotage. (i) A determined violent external assault, attack by stealth, or deceptive actions, of several persons with the 

following attributes, assistance and equipment: 

(1) Radioloigcal sabotage. (i) A determined violence external assault, attack by stealth, or 

deceptive actions, including diversionary actions, by an adversary force capable of operating as one or more teams, attacking 

from one or more entry points, with the following attributes, assistance and equipment: 

The proposed paragraph adds new capabilities to the DBT including operation as one 

or more teams and attack from multiple 

entry points. 

(1)(i)(A) Well-trained (including military training 

and skills) and dedicated individuals, 

(1)(i)(A) Well-trained (including military training and skills) and dedicated individuals, 

willing to kill or be killed, with sufficient 

knowledge to identify specific equipment or 

locations necessary for a successful attack, 

The proposed paragraph would add to the 

DBT adversaries who are willing to kill or 

be killed and are knowledgeable about specific target selection. 

(1)(i)(B) inside assistance which may include a 

knowledgeable individual who attempts to 

participate in a passive role (e.g., provide information), an active role (e.g., facilitate entrance and exit, disable alarms and communications, participate in violent attack), or 

both, 

(1)(i)(B) active (e.g., facilitate entrance and 

exit, disable alarms and communications, 

participate in violent attack) or passive 

(e.g., provide information), or both, knowledgeable inside assistance. The reference 

to an individual would be removed and the 

paragraph reworded to provide flexibility in 

defining the scope of the inside threat. 

(1)(i)(C) suitable weapons, up to and including 

hand-held automatic weapons, equipped with 

silencers and having effective long range accuracy, 

(1)(i)(C) suitable weapons, including handheld automatic weapons, equipped with silencers and having effective long range accuracy, The phrase ‘‘up to and including’’ was 

changed to ‘‘including’’ to provide flexibility 

in defining the range of weapons licensees 

must be able to defend against. 

(1)(i)(D) hand-carried equipment, including incapacitating agents and explosives for use as 

tools of entry or for otherwise destroying reactor, facility, transporter, or container integrity or features of the safeguards systems, 

and 

(1)(i)(D) hand-carried equipment, including incapacitating agents and explosives for use 

as tools of entry or for otherwise destroying 

reactor, facility, transporter, or container integrity or features of the safeguards systems, and 

This description is not revised by the proposed rule. 

(1)(i)(E) a four-wheel drive land vehicle used for 

transporting personnel and their hand-carried 

equipment to the proximity of vital areas, and 

(1)(i)(E) land and water vehicles, which could 

be used for transporting personnel and their 

hand-carried equipment to the proximity of 

vital areas, and 

The scope of vehicles licensees must defend 

against would be expanded to include water 

vehicles and a range of land vehicles beyond four-wheel drive vehicles. 

(1)(ii) An internal threat of an insider, including 

an employee (in any position), and 

(1)(ii) An internal threat, and ............................ The current rule describes the internal threat 

as a threat posed by an individual. The language would be revised to provide flexibility 

in defining the scope of the internal threat 

without adding details that may be useful to 

an adversary. 

67384 Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 214 / Monday, November 7, 2005 / Proposed Rules 

Old New Change 

(1)(iii) A four-wheel drive land vehicle bomb. (1)(iii) A land vehicle bomb assault, which 

may be coordinated with an external assault, and 

The proposed paragraph would be updated to 

reflect that licensees are required to protect 

against a wide range of land vehicles. A 

new mode of attack not previously part of 

the DBT would be added indicating that adversaries may coordinate a vehicle bomb 

assault with another external assault. 

None ................................................................... (1)(iv) A waterborne vehicle bomb assault, 

which may be coordinated with an external 

assault. 

The proposed paragraph would add a new 

mode of attack not previously part of the 

DBT, that being a waterborne vehicle bomb 

assault. This paragraph also adds a coordinated attack concept. 

(2) Theft or diversion of formula quantities of 

strategic special nuclear material. (i) A determined, violent, external assault, attack by 

stealth, or deceptive actions by a small group 

with the following attributes, assistance, and 

equipment: 

(2) Theft or diversion of formula quantities of 

strategic special nuclear material. (i) A determined violent external assault, attack by 

stealth, or deceptive actions, including diversionary actions, by an adversary force 

capable of operating as one or more teams, 

attacking from one or more entry points, 

with the following attributes, assistance and 

equipment: 

The proposed paragraph would add new adversary capabilities to the DBT including 

operation as one or more teams and attack 

from multiple entry points. 

(2)(i)(A) Well-trained (including military training 

and skills) and dedicated individuals; 

(2)(i)(A) Well-trained (including military training and skills) and dedicated individuals, 

willing to kill or be killed, with sufficient 

knowledge to identify specific equipment or 

locations necessary for a successful attack; 

The proposed paragraph would add to the 

DBT adversaries who are willing to kill or 

be killed and are knowledgeable about specific target selection. 

(2)(i)(B) Inside assistance that may include a 

knowledgeable individual who attempts to 

participate in a passive role (e.g., provide information), an active role (e.g., facilitate entrance and exit, disable alarms and communications, participate in violent attack), or 

both; 

(2)(i)(B) Active (e.g., facilitate entrance and 

exit, disable alarms and communications, 

participate in violent attack) or passive 

(e.g., provide information), or both, knowledgeable inside assistance, 

The reference to an individual would be removed and the paragraph reworded to provide flexibility in defining the scope of the 

inside threat. 

(2)(i)(C) Suitable weapons, up to and including 

hand-held automatic weapons, equipped with 

silencers and having effective long-range accuracy; 

(2)(i)(C) Suitable weapons, including handheld automatic weapons, equipped with silencers and having effective long-range accuracy; The phrase ‘‘up to and including’’ was 

changed to ‘‘including’’ to provide flexibility 

in defining the range of weapons licensees 

must be able to defend against. 

(2)(i)(D) Hand-carried equipment, including incapacitating agents and explosives for use as 

tools of entry or for otherwise destroying reactor, facility, transporter, or container integrity or features of the safeguards system; 

(2)(i)(D) Hand-carried equipment, including incapacitating agents and explosives for use 

as tools of entry or for otherwise destroying 

reactor, facility, transporter, or container integrity or features of the safeguards system; 

This description is not revised by the proposed rule. 

(2)(i)(E) Land vehicles used for transporting 

personnel and their hand-carried equipment; 

and 

(2)(i)(E) Land and water vehicles, which could 

be used for transporting personnel and their 

hand-carried equipment; and 

The scope of vehicles licensees must defend 

against would be expanded to include water 

vehicles and a range of land vehicles beyond four-wheel drive vehicles. 

(2)(i)(F) the ability to operate as two or more 

teams. 

Deleted ............................................................. This requirement would be included in 

§ 73.1(a)(2)(i). 

(2)(ii) An individual, including an employee (in 

any position), and 

(2)(iii) A conspiracy between individuals in any 

position who may have: 

(A) Access to and detailed knowledge of nuclear power plants or the facilities referred to 

in § 73.20(a), or 

(B) items that could facilitate theft of special nuclear material (e.g., small tools, substitute 

material, false documents, etc.), or both. 

(2)(ii) An internal threat, and ............................ The current rule describes the internal threat 

as a threat posed by an individual. The language would be revised to provide flexibility 

in defining the scope of the internal threat 

without adding details that may be useful to 

an adversary. 

None ................................................................... (2)(iii) A land vehicle bomb assault, which 

may be coordinated with an external assault, and 

The proposed paragraph would be updated to 

reflect that licensees are required to protect 

against a wide range of land vehicles. A 

new mode of attack not previously part of 

the DBT would be added indicating that adversaries may coordinate a vehicle bomb 

assault with another external assault. 

None ................................................................... (2)(iv) A waterborne vehicle bomb assault, 

which may be coordinated with an external 

assault. 

The proposed paragraph would add a new 

mode of attack not previously part of the 

DBT, that being a waterborne vehicle bomb 

assault. This coordinated attack concept is 

another upgrade to the current regulation. 

Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 214 / Monday, November 7, 2005 / Proposed Rules 67385 

Additional guidance concerning the 

adversary characteristics is located in 

the corresponding draft regulatory 

guides (radiological sabotage in DG–

5017 and theft and diversion in DG–

5018). These draft RGs contain either 

safeguards or classified information and 

are not publicly available. 

V. Petition for Rulemaking (PRM–73– 

12) 

As discussed above in this notice, the 

NRC staff reviewed PRM–73–12 to 

determine whether the regulations in 

Part 73 regarding the DBT should be 

amended in response to requests in 

PRM–73–12 and public comments 

received on the petition. PRM–73–12 

was filed by the Committee to Bridge 

the Gap on July 23, 2004. The petition 

requests that the NRC amend its 

regulations to revise the DBT 

regulations (in terms of the numbers, 

teams, capabilities, planning, 

willingness to die and other 

characteristics of adversaries) to a level 

that encompasses, with a sufficient 

margin of safety, the terrorist 

capabilities evidenced by the attacks of 

September 11, 2001. The petition also 

requests that security plans, systems, 

inspections, and force-on-force exercises 

be revised in accordance with the 

amended DBT. Finally, the petition 

requests a requirement be added to Part 

73 to construct shields against air attack 

(the shields are referred to as 

‘‘beamhenge’’) which the petition 

asserts would enable nuclear power 

plants to withstand an air attack from a 

jumbo jet. 

PRM–73–12 was published for public 

comment in the Federal Register on 

November 8, 2004 (69 FR 64690). The 

public comment period expired on 

January 24, 2005. There were 845 

comments submitted on PRM–73–12, of 

which 528 were form letters. Many of 

the comments were submitted after the 

comment period expired; however, the 

staff reviewed and considered all of the 

comments. Comments were received 

from nine state attorneys general, 

approximately 20 public interest groups, 

a U.S. Congressman from 

Massachusetts, and six industry groups 

and licensees. In addition, two U.S. 

Senators and a U.S. Representative (all 

from New Jersey) requested an 

extension to the comment period. The 

bulk of the comments either supported 

the petition, requested a stronger DBT, 

or requested that NRC give 

consideration to the petition. All the 

comments from industry and licensees 

opposed the petition and indicated that 

the supplemental DBT requirements 

imposed (by order) to date were 

adequate. 

Based on a review of PRM–73–12 

public comments, the NRC staff 

prepared a summary of those comments 

in the PRM–73–12 comment summary 

table (ML053040061). The table does 

not list each individual comment. The 

staff has grouped the comments by topic 

and provided the NRC’s response. A 

review of the table shows that although 

there were a large number of comments, 

the comments fell into a relatively small 

number of topics. 

The table contains the NRC’s 

responses to the issues raised by public 

comments, but the responses to 

comments do not include a detailed 

comparison of the differences between 

the current DBT requirements (as 

imposed by the April 29, 2003 orders) 

and the requests in PRM–73–12. Such a 

comparison could compromise security. 

The NRC’s post-September 11, 2001, 

review of security requirements 

encompassed all the issues raised by the 

petitioner, and a number of the 

petitioner’s requested changes to the 

DBT have been incorporated into the 

proposed DBT amendments as 

discussed below. 

The NRC is partially granting PRM–

73–12 by conducting this proposed 

rulemaking to revise the DBT 

requirements in § 73.1(a). Some of the 

requested changes in PRM–73–12 are 

reflected in the proposed rule text. 

These changes include the proposed 

requirements in §§ 73.1(a)(1)(i) and 

(a)(2)(i) that licensees be required to 

protect against one or more teams of 

adversaries operating from multiple 

entry points. PRM–73–12 also requested 

that the DBT regulation make clear that 

adversaries are willing to kill and be 

killed. This change is reflected in 

proposed §§ 73.1(a)(1)(i)(A) and 

(a)(2)(i)(A). The proposed rule would 

also require licensees to protect against 

waterborne threats, a wider range of 

land vehicles, and coordinated attacks. 

All of these features of the proposed 

rule grant requests made in PRM–73–12. 

The NRC intends to defer action on 

the other requests in PRM–73–12, 

specifically those aspects of PRM 73–12 

which deal with the defense of nuclear 

power plants against aircraft, and to 

address those issues as part of the final 

action on this proposed rule. 

Federal and other governmental 

efforts to protect the nation from 

terrorist attacks by air have increased 

substantially since September 11, 2001. 

Those efforts already include a variety 

of measures such as enhanced airline 

passenger and baggage screening, 

strengthened cockpit doors, and the 

federal Air Marshals program. Federal 

law enforcement and intelligence 

agencies have increased efforts to 

identify potential aircraft-related threats 

before they can be carried out. Such 

improvements have already been 

exercised by the Department of Defense 

and the Federal Aviation 

Administration through responses to 

airspace violations near nuclear power 

plants that were subsequently 

determined not to be threats. These and 

other government-wide efforts have 

improved protection against air attacks 

on all industrial facilities, both nuclear 

and non-nuclear. 

Following the September 11, 2001, 

attacks in New York, the Pentagon, and 

Pennsylvania, the NRC conducted 

assessments of the potential for and 

consequences of terrorists targeting a 

nuclear power plant for aircraft attack, 

the physical effects of such a strike, and 

compounding factors such as 

meteorology that would affect the 

impact of potential radioactive releases. 

Furthermore, the NRC required existing 

nuclear power plant licensees to 

develop and implement strategies to 

mitigate potential consequences in the 

unlikely event of an attack, including an 

aircraft crash into a nuclear power 

plant. For new nuclear power plants, 

the opportunity exists to develop 

designs that provide for enhanced 

protection against potential threats. The 

NRC staff will continue to review 

intelligence and threat reporting to 

recommend any appropriate 

modifications to the DBT or NRC 

requirements to mitigate air attacks. 

PRM–73–12 also requests that nuclear 

power plants be required to defend 

against more than the number of 

attackers that carried out the September 

11, 2001 attacks, and identifies specific 

weapons that nuclear power plants 

should be able to defend against. The 

Commission cannot comment publicly 

on the precise numbers of attackers or 

types of weapons that nuclear power 

plants are required to defend against 

under the proposed DBTs and ACDs for 

reasons stated earlier in this notice. 

However, the Commission has 

conducted a thorough review of security 

to continue to ensure that nuclear power 

plants and other licensed facilities have 

effective defensive capabilities and 

security measures in place given the 

changing threat environment. An 

important part of this review was the 

consideration of a terrorist attack similar 

to that which occurred on September 

11, 2001. However, the DBT is based 

upon review and analysis of actual 

demonstrated adversary characteristics 

in a range of terrorist attacks, and a 

determination as to the attacks against 

which a private security force could 

reasonably be expected to defend. 

67386 Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 214 / Monday, November 7, 2005 / Proposed Rules 

In summary, the NRC grants PRM–73–

12 in part by conducting this proposed 

rulemaking to revise the DBT 

requirements in § 73.1(a) to reflect 

certain specific requested changes 

contained in PRM–73–12 in the 

proposed rule text, and is deferring 

action on other requests in PRM–73–12, 

specifically those aspects of PRM–73–12 

which deal with air-based attacks. 

VI. Guidance 

The NRC staff is preparing new 

regulatory guides, as listed below, to 

provide detailed guidance on the 

revised DBT requirements in proposed 

§ 73.1. These guides are intended to 

assist current licensees in ensuring that 

their security plans meet requirements 

in the proposed rule, as well as future 

license applicants in the development of 

their security programs and plans. The 

new guidance incorporates the insights 

gained from applying the earlier 

guidance that was used to develop, 

review, and approve the site security 

plans that licensees put in place in 

response to the April 2003 orders. As 

such, this regulatory guidance is 

expected to be consistent with revised 

security measures at current licensees. 

The publication of the regulatory guides 

is planned to coincide with the 

publication of the final rule. The guides 

are described below. 

1. Draft Regulatory Guide (DG–5017), 

‘‘Guidance for the Implementation of 

the Radiological Sabotage Design-Basis 

Threat (Safeguards).’’ This regulatory 

guide will provide guidance to the 

industry on the radiological sabotage 

DBT. DG–5017 contains safeguards 

information and, therefore, is being 

withheld from public disclosure and 

distributed on a need-to-know basis to 

those who otherwise qualify for access. 

2. Draft Regulatory Guide (DG–5018), 

‘‘Guidance for the Implementation of 

the Theft and Diversion Design-Basis 

Threat (Classified).’’ This regulatory 

guide will provide guidance to the 

industry on the theft or diversion DBT. 

DG–5018 contains classified 

information and, therefore, is withheld 

from public disclosure and distributed 

only on a need to know basis to those 

who otherwise qualify for access. 

VII. Criminal Penalties 

For the purposes of Section 223 of the 

Atomic Energy Act, as amended, the 

Commission is issuing the proposed 

rule to revise § 73.1 under one or more 

sections of 161 of the Atomic Energy 

Act of 1954 (AEA). Criminal penalties, 

as they apply to regulations in Part 73 

are discussed in § 73.81. 

VIII. Compatibility of Agreement State 

Regulations 

Under the ‘‘Policy Statement on 

Adequacy and Compatibility of 

Agreement States Programs,’’ approved 

by the Commission on June 20, 1997, 

and published in the Federal Register 

(62 FR 46517; September 3, 1997), this 

rule is classified as compatibility 

‘‘NRC.’’ Compatibility is not required for 

Category ‘‘NRC’’ regulations. The NRC 

program elements in this category are 

those that relate directly to areas of 

regulation reserved to the NRC by the 

AEA or the provisions of Title 10 of the 

Code of Federal Regulations, and 

although an Agreement State may not 

adopt program elements reserved to 

NRC, it may wish to inform its licensees 

of certain requirements via a mechanism 

that is consistent with the particular 

State’s administrative procedure laws, 

but does not confer regulatory authority 

on the State. 

IX. Availability of Documents 

Some documents discussed in this 

rule are not available to the public. The 

following table indicates which 

documents are available to the public 

and how they may be obtained. 

Public Document Room (PDR). The 

NRC Public Document Room is located 

at 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, 

Maryland 20852. 

Rulemaking Web site (Web). The 

NRC’s interactive rulemaking Web site 

is located at http://ruleforum.llnl.gov. 

These documents may be viewed and 

downloaded electronically via this Web 

site. 

NRC’s Electronic Reading Room 

(ERR). The NRC’s electronic reading 

room is located at http://www.nrc.gov/ 

reading-rm.html. 

Document PDR Web ERR 

Environmental Assessment ......................................................................................................................... X X ML053040039 

Regulatory Analysis ..................................................................................................................................... X X ML053040013 

Public Comments on PRM–73-12 ............................................................................................................... X X ML053040061 

Radiological Sabotage Adversary Characteristics document ..................................................................... no no no 

Theft and Diversion Adversary Characteristics document .......................................................................... no no no 

Technical Basis Document .......................................................................................................................... no no no 

Draft RG DG–5017 on Radiological Sabotage ........................................................................................... no no no 

Draft RG DG–5018 on Theft or Diversion ................................................................................................... no no no 

Memorandum: Status of Security-Related Rulemaking .............................................................................. X X ML041180532 

Commission SRM dated August 23, 2004 .................................................................................................. X X ML042360548 

Memorandum: Schedule for Part 73 Rulemakings ..................................................................................... X X ML043060572 

Letter to Petitioner ....................................................................................................................................... X X ML052920150 

Commission SRM dated October 27, 2005 ................................................................................................ X X ML053000448 

X. Plain Language 

The Presidential memorandum dated 

June 1, 1998, entitled ‘‘Plain Language 

in Government Writing,’’ published on 

June 10, 1998 (63 FR 31883) directed 

that the Government’s documents be in 

plain, clear, and accessible language. 

The NRC requests comments on the 

proposed rule specifically with respect 

to the clarity and effectiveness of the 

language used. Comments should be 

sent to the NRC as explained in the 

ADDRESSES caption of this notice. 

XI. Voluntary Consensus Standards 

The National Technology Transfer 

and Advancement Act of 1995, Pub. L. 

104–113, requires that Federal agencies 

use technical standards that are 

developed or adopted by voluntary 

consensus standards bodies unless 

using such a standard is inconsistent 

with applicable law or is otherwise 

impractical. The NRC is not aware of 

any voluntary consensus standard that 

could be used instead of the proposed 

Government-unique standards. The NRC 

will consider using a voluntary 

consensus standard if an appropriate 

standard is identified. 

XII. Finding of No Significant 

Environmental Impact: Environmental 

Assessment: Availability 

The Commission has determined 

under the National Environmental 

Policy Act of 1969, as amended, and the 

Commission’s regulations in Subpart A 

of 10 CFR Part 51, that this rule, if 

adopted, would not be a major Federal 

action significantly affecting the quality 

Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 214 / Monday, November 7, 2005 / Proposed Rules 67387 

of the human environment and, 

therefore, an environmental impact 

statement is not required. 

The determination of this 

environmental assessment is that there 

will be no significant offsite impact to 

the public from this action. However, 

the general public should note that the 

NRC is seeking public participation; 

availability of the environmental 

assessment is provided in Section IX. 

Comments on any aspect of the 

environmental assessment may be 

submitted to the NRC as indicated 

under the ADDRESSES heading. 

The NRC has sent a copy of the 

environmental assessment and this 

proposed rule to every State Liaison 

Officer and requested their comments 

on the environmental assessment. 

XIII. Paperwork Reduction Act 

Statement 

This proposed rule does not contain 

new or amended information collection 

requirements subject to the Paperwork 

Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 

et seq.). Existing requirements were 

approved by the Office of Management 

and Budget, approval number 3150–

0002. 

Public Protection Notification 

The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, 

and a person is not required to respond 

to, a request for information or an 

information collection requirement 

unless the requesting document 

displays a currently valid OMB control 

number. 

XIV. Regulatory Analysis 

The Commission has prepared a draft 

regulatory analysis on this proposed 

regulation. The analysis examines the 

costs and benefits of the alternatives 

considered by the Commission. The 

Commission requests public comment 

on the draft regulatory analysis. 

Availability of the regulatory analysis is 

provided in Section IX. Comments on 

the draft analysis may be submitted to 

the NRC as indicated under the 

ADDRESSES heading. 

XV. Regulatory Flexibility Certification 

In accordance with the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 605(b)), the 

Commission certifies that this rule will 

not, if promulgated, have a significant 

economic impact on a substantial 

number of small entities. This proposed 

rule affects only the licensing and 

operation of nuclear power plants and 

Category I fuel cycle facilities. The 

companies that own these plants do not 

fall within the scope of the definition of 

‘‘small entities’’ set forth in the 

Regulatory Flexibility Act or the size 

standards established by the NRC (10 

CFR 2.810). 

XVI. Backfit Analysis 

The NRC has determined, pursuant to 

the exception in 10 CFR 

50.109(a)(4)(iii), that a backfit analysis is 

unnecessary for this proposed rule. 

Section 50.109 states in pertinent part 

that a backfit analysis is not required if 

the Commission finds and declares with 

appropriate documented evaluation for 

its finding that a ‘‘regulatory action 

involves defining or redefining what 

level of protection to the public health 

and safety or common defense and 

security should be regarded as 

adequate.’’ The proposed rule would 

increase the security requirements 

currently prescribed in NRC regulations, 

and is necessary to protect nuclear 

facilities against potential terrorists. 

When the Commission imposed security 

enhancements by order in April 2003, it 

did so in response to an escalated 

domestic threat level. Since that time, 

the Commission has continued to 

monitor intelligence reports regarding 

plausible threats from terrorists 

currently facing the U.S. The 

Commission has also gained experience 

from implementing the order 

requirements and reviewing revised 

licensee security plans. The 

Commission has considered all of this 

information and finds that the security 

requirements previously imposed by 

DBT orders, which applied only to 

existing licensees, should be made 

generically applicable. The Commission 

further finds that the proposed rule 

would redefine the security 

requirements stated in existing NRC 

regulations, and is necessary to ensure 

that the public health and safety and 

common defense and security are 

adequately protected in the current, 

post-September 11, 2001, environment. 

List of Subjects in 10 CFR Part 73 

Criminal penalties, Export, Hazardous 

materials transportation, Import, 

Nuclear materials, Nuclear power plants 

and reactors, Reporting and 

recordkeeping requirements, Security 

measures. 

For the reasons set out in the 

preamble and under the authority of the 

Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended; 

the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, 

as amended; and 5 U.S.C. 553, the NRC 

is proposing to adopt the following 

amendments to 10 CFR Part 73. 

PART 73—PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF 

PLANTS AND MATERIALS 

1. The authority citation for part 73 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: Secs. 53, 161, 68 Stat. 930, 948, 

as amended, sec. 147, 94 Stat. 780 (42 U.S.C. 

2073, 2167, 2201); sec. 201, as amended, 204, 

88 Stat. 1242, as amended, 1245, sec. 1701, 

106 Stat. 2951, 2952, 2953 (42 U.S.C. 5841, 

5844, 2297f); sec. 1704, 112 Stat. 2750 (44 

U.S.C. 3504 note). Section 73.1 also issued 

under secs. 135, 141, Pub. L. 97–425, 96 Stat. 

2232, 2241 (42 U.S.C, 10155, 10161). Section 

73.37(f) also issued under sec. 301, Pub. L. 

96–295, 94 Stat. 789 (42 U.S.C. 5841 note). 

Section 73.57 is issued under sec. 606, Pub. 

L. 99–399, 100 Stat. 876 (42 U.S.C. 2169). 

2. In § 73.1, paragraph (a) is revised to 

read as follows: 

§ 73.1 Purpose and scope. 

(a) Purpose. This part prescribes 

requirements for the establishment and 

maintenance of a physical protection 

system which will have capabilities for 

the protection of special nuclear 

material at fixed sites and in transit and 

of plants in which special nuclear 

material is used. The following design 

basis threats, where referenced in 

ensuing sections of this part, shall be 

used to design safeguards systems to 

protect against acts of radiological 

sabotage and to prevent the theft or 

diversion of special nuclear material. 

Licensees subject to the provisions of 

§ 73.20 (except for fuel cycle licensees 

authorized under Part 70 of this chapter 

to receive, acquire, possess, transfer, 

use, or deliver for transportation 

formula quantities of strategic special 

nuclear material), § 73.50, and § 73.60 

are exempt from § 73.1(a)(1)(i)(E), 

§ 73.1(a)(1)(iii), § 73.1(a)(1)(iv), 

§ 73.1(a)(2)(iii), and § 73.1(a)(2)(iv). 

Licensees subject to the provisions of 

§ 72.212 are exempt from 

§ 73.1(a)(1)(iv). 

(1) Radiological sabotage. (i) A 

determined violent external assault, 

attack by stealth, or deceptive actions, 

including diversionary actions, by an 

adversary force capable of operating as 

one or more teams, attacking from one 

or more entry points, with the following 

attributes, assistance and equipment: 

(A) Well-trained (including military 

training and skills) and dedicated 

individuals, willing to kill or be killed, 

with sufficient knowledge to identify 

specific equipment or locations 

necessary for a successful attack, 

(B) Active (e.g., facilitate entrance and 

exit, disable alarms and 

communications, participate in violent 

attack) or passive (e.g., provide 

information), or both, knowledgeable 

inside assistance, 

(C) Suitable weapons, including handheld automatic weapons, equipped with 

silencers and having effective long range 

accuracy, 

(D) Hand-carried equipment, 

including incapacitating agents and 

67388 Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 214 / Monday, November 7, 2005 / Proposed Rules 

explosives for use as tools of entry or for 

otherwise destroying reactor, facility, 

transporter, or container integrity or 

features of the safeguards system, and 

(E) Land and water vehicles, which 

could be used for transporting personnel 

and their hand-carried equipment to the 

proximity of vital areas, and 

(ii) An internal threat, and 

(iii) A land vehicle bomb assault, 

which may be coordinated with an 

external assault, and 

(iv) A waterborne vehicle bomb 

assault, which may be coordinated with 

an external assault. 

(2) Theft or diversion of formula 

quantities of strategic special nuclear 

material. (i) A determined violent 

external assault, attack by stealth, or 

deceptive actions, including 

diversionary actions, by an adversary 

force capable of operating as one or 

more teams, attacking from one or more 

entry points, with the following 

attributes, assistance and equipment: 

(A) Well-trained (including military 

training and skills) and dedicated 

individuals, willing to kill or be killed, 

with sufficient knowledge to identify 

specific equipment or locations 

necessary for a successful attack; 

(B) Active (e.g., facilitate entrance and 

exit, disable alarms and 

communications, participate in violent 

attack) or passive (e.g., provide 

information), or both, knowledgeable 

inside assistance, 

(C) Suitable weapons, including handheld automatic weapons, equipped with 

silencers and having effective longrange accuracy; 

(D) Hand-carried equipment, 

including incapacitating agents and 

explosives for use as tools of entry or for 

otherwise destroying reactor, facility, 

transporter, or container integrity or 

features of the safe-guards system; 

(E) Land and water vehicles, which 

could be used for transporting personnel 

and their hand-carried equipment; and 

(ii) An internal threat, and 

(iii) A land vehicle bomb assault, 

which may be coordinated with an 

external assault, and 

(iv) A waterborne vehicle bomb 

assault, which may be coordinated with 

an external assault. 

Dated at Rockville, Maryland this 2nd day 

of November, 2005. 

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

Annette L. Vietti-Cook, 

Secretary of the Commission. 

[FR Doc. 05–22200 Filed 11–4–05; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 93 

[Docket No. FAA–2004–17005; Notice No. 

05–12] 

RIN 2120–AI17 

Washington, DC Metropolitan Area 

Special Flight Rules Area; Reopening 

of Comment Period and Intent To Hold 

Public Meeting 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking 

(NPRM); reopening of comment period. 

SUMMARY: In this action, the FAA 

reopens the comment period and 

announces its intention to hold a public 

meeting concerning the ‘‘Washington, 

DC Metropolitan Area Special Flight 

Rules Area’’ NPRM that was published 

August 4, 2005. In that document, the 

FAA proposed to codify current flight 

restrictions for certain aircraft 

operations in the Washington, DC 

Metropolitan Area. This reopening is in 

response to requests from Members of 

Congress and industry associations. 

DATES: The comment period for the 

proposed rule published on August 4, 

2005 (70 FR 45250) closed November 2, 

2005 and is reopened until February 6, 

2006. The date for the public meeting 

will be announced in a future 

document. 

ADDRESSES: You may send comments, 

identified by docket number, using any 

of the following methods: 

• DOT Docket Web site: Go to 

http://dms.dot.gov and follow the 

instructions for sending your comments 

electronically. 

• Government-wide rulemaking Web 

site: Go to http://www.regulations.gov 

and follow the instructions for sending 

your comments electronically. 

• Mail: Docket Management Facility; 

U.S. Department of Transportation, 400 

Seventh Street, SW., Nassif Building, 

Room PL–401, Washington, DC 20590–

0001. 

• Fax: 1–202–493–2251. 

• Hand Delivery: Room PL–401 on 

the plaza level of the Nassif Building, 

400 Seventh Street, SW., Washington, 

DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday 

through Friday, except Federal holidays. 

For more information on the 

rulemaking process, see the 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section of 

this document. 

Privacy: We will post all comments 

we receive, without change, to http:// 

dms.dot.gov, including any personal 

information you provide. For more 

information, see the Privacy Act 

discussion in the SUPPLEMENTARY

INFORMATION section of this document. 

Docket: To read background 

documents or comments received, go to 

http://dms.dot.gov at any time or to 

Room PL–401 on the plaza level of the 

Nassif Building, 400 Seventh Street, 

SW., Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. 

and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, 

except Federal holidays. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Ellen Crum, Airspace and Rules, Office 

of System Operations and Safety, 

Federal Aviation Administration, 800 

Independence Avenue, SW., 

Washington, DC 20591; telephone (202) 

267–8783. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Comments Invited 

The FAA invites interested persons to 

participate in this rulemaking by 

submitting written comments, data, or 

views. We also invite comments relating 

to the economic, environmental, energy, 

or federalism impacts that might result 

from adopting the proposals in this 

document. The most helpful comments 

reference a specific portion of the 

proposal, explain the reason for any 

recommended change, and include 

supporting data. We ask that you send 

us two copies of written comments. 

We will file in the docket all 

comments we receive, as well as a 

report summarizing each substantive 

public contact with FAA personnel 

concerning this proposed rulemaking. 

The docket is available for public 

inspection before and after the comment 

closing date. If you wish to review the 

docket in person, go to the address in 

the ADDRESSES section of this preamble 

between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday 

through Friday, except Federal holidays. 

You may also review the docket using 

the Internet at the Web address in the 

ADDRESSES section. 

Privacy Act: Using the search function 

of our docket web site, anyone can find 

and read the comments received into 

any of our dockets, including the name 

of the individual sending the comment 

(or signing the comment on behalf of an 

association, business, labor union, etc.). 

You may review DOT’s complete 

Privacy Act Statement in the Federal 

Register published on April 11, 2000 

(65 FR 19477–78) or you may visit 

http://dms.dot.gov. 

Before acting on this proposal, we 

will consider all comments we receive 

on or before the closing date for 

comments. We will consider comments 

filed late if it is possible to do so 

without incurring expense or delay. We