T hi s opi ni on i s s ubj e ct t o r e vi s i on b e f or e f i nal p u bli ca tion i n th e P ac i

f i c R ep orter 2015 UT 26

I N T HE 

### S UPR EM E 

### C OU RT OF TH E 

### S TA TE O F 

### U TAH

R ON H EAPS and P H I LLI P SYKES ,

Appe lla nts,

v. N U R I C HE , LL C, D AVI D H EAPS , L AVOR N S P AR KS , N O R M C LY DE ,

B R AD H OLI DAY , and D AVI D P ARKER ,

Appe lle es.

No. 20130132 Filed January 30, 2015

Third D is tric t, S al t La ke Th e H ono rab le Kate A. T oom ey No. 110909892

Att or neys: Rober t H. Wilde, Bruce M. Fr anson, Michael S . Wilde,

S al t La ke C ity, fo r ap pe ll ants Mark D . T olm an, P au l R . S mi th, S al t La ke C ity, fo r ap pe ll ees J UST I CE P ARRIS H authore d the opinion of the Co urt, in which C H IEF J UST I CE D UR R ANT , A S S OC I ATE C H IEF J UST I CE N EHR I NG ,

J UST I CE D UR HAM , and J UST I CE L EE joined.
J UST I CE P ARRIS H , op inion of the Cou rt:
INTRODUCTION ¶1 This appeal req ui r e s us to decide whether t he Utah Payment of Wages Act (UPWA) imposes personal liability on the

man a ge rs of a l i m i te d l i a b i l i ty c omp a ny f or u np a i d w a ges . The UPWA i mp os es li ab il ity f or u np ai d wa g es on al l e mp loye rs . On

s umma ry j ud gm ent, th e d is tric t c ou rt fo und tha t LL C m an age rs qualify as employer s un der t he UPWA, but nev ert heless held that the y are not li ab le fo r unpa id w age s . W e a ffirm the di s tric t c ou rt’s ruling on the alt ernativ e gr ound that LLC managers do notqualify

as empl oyers un de r the UPWA.
BACKGROUND ¶2 In 20 08 , Ron He ap s an d Phi ll ip Sykes (c oll ec tive ly, Employees), along with other s, founde d N ur iche, LLC, a n owde fu nc t li mi ted li ab il ity c om pa ny f orm ed in Ne vad a a nd regi s tere dH EAPS v. N U R I C HE , LLC Opi ni on o f the Cou rt

In addition to being a member o f the board o f managers, David 1 P arke r w as al s o a m embe r an d offi c er of Nu ric he

. Initi al ly, D avi d Pa rker did not j oin the oth er m an age rs ’ m otio n 2 fo r s umma ry j ud gm ent, p res um ab ly b eca us e h e w as the ma na ger
w ho e xten de d th e empl oym ent offe r to Empl oyee s. The othe r managers were simply memb ers of the boar d of manag ers, whic h (continued...)

2 to do bus iness i n U t ah. Employees allege that t he other founding members promised them c ompensation a nd other benefits in connection with their employment by Nur iche, b ut that Nuriche and the rem ai ni ng m an age rs refus ed to pro vid e th e p rom is ed compens ation upon Employees’ t ermination in 2011. ¶3 Shortly after being ter minated, Employees filed t he ir complaint in this matter . The compl a int alleged thatNuriche and tho s e on its bo ard of ma na gers , D avi d H ea ps , L avorn S pa rks , N orm Clyde, Brad Ho liday, and David Parker (collectively Manag ers), 1 breached their agr eement to p a y E mp loyee s $150,000 in annual salaries and b en e fi t s. Emp loyee s als o asserted a claim und er t he UPWA for failure to pay past-due wag e s follo wing their ter mination. ¶4 Four of the five M ana g e rs—David Heaps, Lavorn Sparks, Norm Cl yde , and Bra d Hol id ay— s ou ghts umma ry j ud gm ent. T he y argu ed fi rs t th at N eva dali mi ted -l ia bi li ty- c om pa ny la wc ont roll ed Employees’ claim f or unpaid w ages an d that, under Nev ada law, LLC managers could not be held personally liab le for unpaid wages. Alter natively , they ar gued that U tah wage law does not impose personal liability on manager s for unpaid w ages. ¶5 Follo wing a hearing, the district co ur t gr anted Manage rs’

mo tion fo r s umma ry j ud gm ent. T he c ou rt fi rs t un de rtook a c onfli c tof-l aw s an al ys is an d c onc lu de d th at U t a h l a wa p p l i e sb e c a us e, un de r the mo s t s ignific ant rel ati ons hi p te s t, “ the ma j ority of [the rel eva nt]

c ont ac ts w ere i n U tah .” Ap pl yin g Uta h l aw , th e d is tric t c ou rt ru le d that M anagers were employ ers as def i ne d by the UPWA, but that the UPWA d oes not extend w age liab ility to in dividual ma na g ers. The dis tr ict court explained that “[t]here is simply no indic ation in the UPWA tha t it is inten de d to i mp os e i nd ivi du alli ab il ity o n offi c ers or age nts of

a b us ine ss.” S ub s eque ntl y, th e d is tric t c ou rt gr anted summ ary judgment in favor of Manager David Parker , who served as CEO o f Nurich e, reasoning t hat, like t he other managers, Parker could not be held personally liable fo r unpaid w ages. 2Cite as: 2015 UT 26 Opi ni on o f the Cou rt

(...continued) 2

was n ot in ex istence at the time Employees were hire d.

3 Becaus e ther e were additional claims p ending, Employees sought and obtaine d r ul e 54(b) certification of both summary judgment rul in gs an d fil ed a ti me ly n otic e of ap peal . W e h ave j uri s di c tion pursuant to Ut ah Code section 78A-3-102(3) (j)

.

STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶6 Summary ju dgment is appropr iate only where “ther e is no genuine iss ue as to any mate r i a l fact and . . . the mov ing part y is entitled t o judgment as a m atte r o f law.” U T A H R. C IV

. P. 56(c ). In this case, the is sue b efore t he distr ict court o n su mmary judgment was a matter of statuto ry interpr etat ion, whic h pr esents a leg al question. Sta tev. Bl uff

, 2002 UT 66, ¶ 37, 52 P.3d 1210. We therefor e rev iew the d i st r i ctco ur t ’ s d e ci si o n f o r co r r e ct ness

. B a s ic Research, L LC v. Admi ral Ins. Co. , 2013 UT 6, ¶ 5, 297 P.3d 578.
AN AL YSI S ¶7 On ap peal, Employees arg ue that the distr ict court er red in gr anting Manag ers’ mo tions for summary judgment becau se the UPWA imposes p ersonal liability on L LC managers for unpaid wages. Ma n a ge rs re s p on d th a t N e va d a w a ge l a ws h ou l d a p ply becau se Nurich e is a Nevada LLC and that, under Nev ada law, LLC managers are not p ersonally liab le for unpaid wages. A nd i f U tah la wap pl ie s , Ma na gers argu e th at th e UPWA s hou ld not be rea d to impose personal liabil ity o n the m b e c a u s ethe statute do es not ev ince

an exp res s le gis la tive intent to overrid e l ong-s tan di ng p rinc ip le s of corpor ate law. We address these arguments in turn.

I. UTAH WAGE LAW CONTROLS ¶8 In arg uing that Nev ada law appl ies, Managers r ely on t he governin g la wprovi s ion of the Uta h R evi s ed Un iformLi mi ted Liability Company Act (URULLCA ), wh ich provides that “[t]he law of the j urisdic tion of formatio n of a foreig n limited liab ility company gov erns . . . the liability of a member as memb er and a mana ger as
ma na ger f or a d eb t, ob li gati o n, o r oth er l ia bi li ty o f t heco mpa ny .” U T A H C ODE § 48-3a-901( 1) (emphas is added) . Manager s argue that unpaid w ages are lik e any ot her debt, o bligation, or liability of an LLC. Therefore , becau se Nurich e was f or med in Nevada, the URULLCA r equires that we apply Nevada law in determining whether Manag ers are per sonally liable for unpaid w ages.H EAPS v. N U R I C HE , LLC Opi ni on o f the Cou rt

4 ¶9 W hi le it may be the case that Nev ada law gover ns M ana g er s’ l ia bil it y fo r t he o bli g at io ns o f Nur iche , E mpl o y ee s are not

s eek in g to h old Man age rs li ab lefo r an ob li g at io n of

Nu ric he

. In s tea d, Empl oyee s argu e th at th e UPW A imp os es di rec t li ab il ity o n Man age rs . T he ref ore, unli ke c la im s tha t rel y on de riva tive li ab il ity to r ender individual offic ers responsible for an obligatio n of a company, see

, e .g ., Jo nes & Trev o r M k tg ., In c. v . Lo wr

y, 2012 UT 39, ¶ 13, 28 4 P .3 d 6 30 , E mp loye es ’ c la im s are pre mi s ed on athe ory of di rec t li ab il ity. Be caus e th e UR UL LC A’s governin g la wprovi s ion li mi ts its ap pl ic ab il ity t o tho s e c as es impl ic ati ng offi c er li ab il ity f or the obligat ions of the company, it does not apply here. ¶10 Mor eov er, t he URULLCA prov ides t hat “[r]egistrat ion of a fo rei gn l im ite d l ia bi li ty c om pa ny t o do b us in es s in thi s s tate doe s not

a ut ho rize t he foreig n limited liab ility company to engage in any

ac tivi tie s or affa irs or exe rc is e a ny p o wer t hat a li mi ted li ab il ity

c omp a ny m a y n ot e n ga ge i n or e xe rc i s e i n th i s s ta te.” U T A H C ODE § 48

- 3 a
- 9 0 1(3). Bec ause a f or eign LLC employing individuals in Utah is requi red to f oll owUta h w age la w , a ny c la im of il le galw age pra c tic es fi le d b y a U tah empl oyee w il l b e gove rne d b y Uta h w age law. Acc or dingly, the question o f M a na g e rs’ liability for unpaid wages is gover ned by Utah law.

II. TH E U PWA D OESNOTIMP OS E C IV IL O R CRI MIN ALLIA BIL ITY ONIND IV ID UALMAN AG ERS ¶11 Ha vin g c onc lu de d th at U tah la wap pl ie s , w e n owtu rn to the la ngu age of

the UPWA t o de term in e w he the r it impos es in d i vi d u a l l i a b i l i ty on N u ri c h e ’s m a n a ge rs f or u np a i d w a ges. To ensure that e mp l oye es wh o ar e disc harged r eceive unpaid w ages, the UPWA imposes c ivil and criminal penalties wh en employer s fail to ful fi l l their wage o bligations. The UPWA prov ides that an

“ emp loye r

s ha llpa y [ unpa id ] w a ges to [ an ] e mp loye e w ith in 24 hou rs of the time o f separation.” U T A H C ODE § 34 -28-5( 1)(a) (emphas is ad de d)

. An d “ [a ]n

y emp loye r w ho s ha llviol ate , or f ai l to c om pl y w ith any of the pr ov isions of this chapter shall be guilty o f a misd emeanor.” Id. § 3 4- 28 -1 2( 1) . In s hort, th e UPWA re nd ers employer s both civilly and crimin ally liable for unpaid w ages. ¶12 Be c aus e th e UPWA i mp os es li ab il ity f or u np ai d w age s on emplo y ers, we mus t dete rmine whether Manag ers qualify as employer s. Under the UPWA, the t erm emp loye r inclu des ever y person, firm, partner ship, as sociation, corpor ation, receiver or other officer of a court o f this

s t a t e , a n d a ny agen t o r o ffi cer of an y of the ab ove-Cite as: 2015 UT 26 Opi ni on o f the Cou rt

5 mentioned class es, employing any per son in this state

. Id. § 34-28-2( 1 )( c) (emphas is added) . Employees arg ue that Manager s, as agents or officers of Nuriche, ar e employer s un der t he statute and as suc h are p e r so nally liable for unpaid w ages. But Managers a rg u e th a t th e y d o n ot q u a l i fy a s e m p l oy e rs u n d e r t he pla i n l a ng uage of the stat ute. They further arg ue that Employees’ propo sed constr uction o f t he statute conflicts w ith ot her pro visions of Utah law that limit the liability o f LLC and c or porat e officers. We agr ee with Manager s. ¶13 “When interpre ting stat utes, our primary goal is to ev ince the true intent and purpose of the L e g i slature.” Sta tev. W a tkins , 2013 UT 28, ¶ 18, 309 P.3d 2 0 9 (internal quotat ion marks omitt ed). Th e b es t ava il ab le evi de nc e of the Legi s la tu re’s intent is the s tatu te’s plain language. Ma rio n Ene rgy, In c. v. KFJ R a nch P ’sh ip , 2011 UT 50, ¶ 14, 267 P.3d 863. ¶ 1 4 Th e st a t ut o r y d e fi ni t i o n o f e mpl o ye r inclu des “every person, fi rm, pa rtne rs hi p, as s oc ia tion , c orpora tion

, re c ei ver or oth er offi c er of a c ou rt of thi s s tate , a nd any age nt o r offi c er of any of the ab ovementioned classes, employing any per son in this state .” U T A H C ODE § 3 4- 28 -2 (1 )( c ) ( emph as is ad de d)

. Wh il e the phras e “ age nt o r offi c er of any of the abov e-mentioned clas ses” enc ompasses a large gr oup of individuals , that phrase is narro wed by the last clau se of the de f i ni ti on

. T h e l a s t c l a u s e
— “ e m p l oy i n g a ny p e rs on i nthis state”—modifies each of the terms i n t he preceding list. Thus , the statute limits the definition of emp loye r to o ne wh o employs. We

mu s tt h e r e f o r e d e t e r m i n e t h e i d e n t i ty o f E m p l o y e e s ’ e m p l oyer
un de r the fa c ts of

thi s c as e. ¶15 In this cas e, Employees concede they were employ ed by Nuriche, not by Manager s in their individual c apacities. Although, Manager s may have exer cis ed supervisory power o ver Employees, any su p e r visor y power aro se from their po sitions as officers and agents of Nuriche—not as direct employ ers. Becaus e Manager s did notpe rs ona ll y empl oy Emp loye es , they a re n ot pe rs ona ll y li ab le fo r
unpa id w age s un de r the s tatu te. ¶16 Thisc onc lu s ion

is bu ttres s ed bylon g- ac c ep ted pri nc ip le s of Ut a h c or p or a te l a w

. “ T h e ge n e ra l ru l e i s th a t a c or p or a tion is an entity separate and di st i nct fr om its officers, s hareholder s and directo r s and thatthey will not be held personally liable for t he corpor ation’s debts and obligations.” Sa lt La ke Cit y Co rp

. v. Big Di tch Irr. Co. , 2 01 1 UT33 , ¶ 2 7, 25 8 P .3 d 5 39 (i nte rna l quo t at ion m arksH EAPS v. N U R I C HE , LLC Opi ni on o f the Cou rt

Seea lsoU T A H C ODE § 48-2c- 601 (expl aining that under the 3 URLLCA, “no o rg anizer, member , manag er, o r employ ee of a [l im ite d l ia bility] c om pa ny i s pe rs ona ll y li ab le

. . . f or a d eb t, obligatio n, or liability o f the company”). The S upreme Courtof the State o f Color ado expr essed s imilar 4

c onc ern s w he n i t he ld tha t th e s im il arl y- w orde d C olor ad o Wa ge Claim Act did not impose personal civil liabi lity. Le on ard v. M cMo rri s , 63 P.3d 323, 333 (Colo. 2003).

6 om itte d)

. The Le gis la tu re h as impos ed in divid ua l l ia bi li ty on

3 bus iness officers and agents in some context s. But wh en it has, it has done so expr essly. For example, the Insurer Receiver ship Ac t exp la in s t hat any “p ers on a c tin g on be ha lf of the in s ure r w ho” in ap prop ria tel y give s pre fe renc e “ is p ers o na lly lia bl e

. ” U T A H C ODE § 31A-27a-504(11) (a) ( emphas is added) . Sim ilarly, t he Alcoholic Bever a g e Contr ol Act pr ov ides that “a manager o r member of [a] limited liabil ity company i n charge of the pr emisesin wh ich [ a violat ion of the Ac t] is c ommitted is

. . . pe rso na lly lia bl e .” Id. § 32B-4- 302(2)( a) (emp hasis a d d ed). In each of these c ontex ts, when the Legislature has imposed personal liab ility o n corpor ate o ffic ers and agents, it has done so expr essly. We are there fore reluctant to r ead personal liability i nt o the UPWA, which contains no su ch express la ngu age . H ad the Le gis la tu re i nte nd ed to impos e p ers ona l l ia bi li ty in contrav ention of long -standin g principles of corpor ate law, it

w ou ld ha ve d one s o exp res s ly a s it h as in oth er sec tion s of the c ode

. 4 ¶17 Our conclusi on i s furt her buttr essed by the fact thatthe UPWA imposes criminal liability on employer s. An d “ a criminal statute must give fair warning of the conduct that it makes a crime.” Bo uie v . Ci ty

o f Co lumb ia , 378 U.S. 347, 350 (1964). For t he same

re a so ns t hat the UPWA is not clear eno ugh to upset ge nerally accepted principl e s of limi ted liability for corpor ate o ffic ers and age nts, it does notc ons titu te “ fa ir w arnin g” of c rim in alli ab il ity be c au s e offi c ers and ag ents w ou ld “b e requi red at p eri l of li fe , l iberty or proper ty t o speculate as to [its] m eaning.” Id. a t 3 51 (internal quotat ion marks omitt ed). ¶18 In summary, we hold th a t M a nag ers are no t per sonally li ab le un de r t he UPWA b ec au s e th ey d id notpe rs ona ll y empl oy Empl oyee s . In s tea d, Man age rs w ere a c tin g as age nts of Nu ric he

. III. AL TE RN AT E R EA D ING SOF T HE UPWA A RE UNSUPP ORTED BY THE STATUTORY LANGUAGE ¶19 Employees raise two alte rnativ e constructions of theCite as: 2015 UT 26 Opi ni on o f the Cou rt

7 UPWA’s defini tion o f employe r tha t w ou ld ren de r Man age rs pe rs ona ll y li ab le . Whi le t he fi rs t ha s s om e s up port i n th e s tatu tory language, it would dictate an absurd result. W hi l e the second alter native constr uction has anarg uable b asis in pub lic polic y, it fi nd s no s up port w ha ts oeve r in the s tatu tory l an gu age

. ¶20 Empl oyee s fi rs t argu e tha t the UPWA i mp os es li ab il ity o n all offic e r s and agents of a bus iness entity . Under t he statute, t he ter m emp loye r inclu des “ever y person, fi r m, p a rt nership,

c or p or a ti on ” a nd “ any age nt o r offi c er of any of the ab ovementi o ne d clas ses.” U T A H C ODE § 34-28-2( 1)(c ) (emp hasis added). Employees assert that t he UPWA renders Manag ers liable for their

un pa i d w a g e s s i m p l y b e c a u s e M a n a g e r s a r e a g e n t s a n d o ff i c e r s of Nuriche. ¶ 2 1 Not o nly does Employ e e s’ p r o p o se d co nstruction ignor e the modifying language limiting an empl o yer to o ne “employing any p e r so n in t his s tate ,” Id. § 3 4

- 2 8

- 2 ( 1 ) ( c ) , i tw o u l d l e a d t o a b s urd

res ul ts . Un de r trad iti ona l princ ip al -a gent the ory, allempl oyee s are considered agents of their employer . R ES TATE M ENT (T H I RD ) OF A GE NC Y § 1.01 c mt . c (2 00 6) . T hu s , u nd er E mp loy ee s’ pro pos ed interpr etat ion, the U PW A would impose strict liability for unpaid

w age s o n all e mp loye es of a c ompa ny— be the y exe c ut ive -l evel employees, adminis tr ative assi stants, or custodial staff. And all employees would likewis e be sub ject to criminal liabil i t y fo r t heir employer ’s failure to pay wages wh en due. SeeU T A H C ODE § 34-28- 12(1) ( “Any employe r who shall violate, o r fai l to comply with any of the pro visions of this c hapter shall be g uilty of a misdemeanor.”). In de ed , this prop os ed c o ns tru c tion w ou ld even

ren de r Empl oyee s t he mselve s crimin ally liable for Nuriche’s fail ure to pay their own
w age s . B uts uc h a n i nt erpreta tion is c ont rary to b as ic not ion s of agency law under whic h “a principal i s liab le for t he acts of his agent within t he sc ope of t he agent’s author ity,” and notthe ot her way

aro und. Ga rla nd v . Fl eis chm a nn , 831 P.2d 107, 110 (Utah 1992); seea lso R ES TATE M ENT (S E C O ND ) O F A GE NC Y § 140 (1958). And s uch a result i s so a bs ur d that itcould not possibl y have been t he intent of our Legislature. See Tschaggeny v. Millbank Ins. Co. , 2007 UT 37, ¶ 28, 163 P.3d 615; Sa va

gev. Uta h Yout

h V ill

. , 2004 UT 102, ¶ 18, 104 P.3d 1242. ¶22 Employees also pr opose a second, more-modest construction of the UPWA t hat would limi t the ty pes of agents and officers w ho qualify as emp loyer s un d e r t he statute t o tho se wh o
exer cis e some contro l ove r t he payment o f wages. Under this prop os ed interp reta tion , onl y th os e a gents an d offi c ers w ho h aveH EAPS v. N U R I C HE , LLC Opi ni on o f the Cou rt

43 P A

. S T AT

. A NN . § 26 0. 2a(d efinin g emp loye r as “every person, 5 fi rm, pa rtne rs hi p, associ ati on, c orpora tion

. . . a nd any age nt o r offi c er of any of the ab ove- me nti one d cl as s es empl oyin g any pe rs on in this Commonw ealth”). We acknowledge that t he Penns ylvania appro ach address es the 6 possib le criticism that our i nterpr etat ion intro duces some r e d undancy into the UPWA’s definition of emp loye r . Indeed, becaus e (continued...)

8 decis ion-making authorit y to “separate[] a n e mplo yee fro m the employer ’s payro ll,” U T A H C ODE § 34-28-5( 1)(a), could be held personally liable for unpaid wages. This inte r p r e tatio n would absolve any officers o r a g e nts without contro l from personal li ab il ity. ¶ 2 3 Th i s a p p r o a c hh a s b e e ne n d o r s e d b y P e nn s y l v a n i a c o u r ts in interpre ting a wage stat ute that defines emp loye r in a similar manner to t he UPWA. In Mo hney v . McClure, the Su pe rior Cou rt of 5 Pen ns y lvania held that individual offic ers and agents qualified as emplo y e r s and thus c ould be personally liable for unpaid w ages. 568 A.2d 682, 683 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990), aff'd, 604 A.2d 1021 (Pa. 1992)

. Bu t it l im it ed tha t li ab il ity t o th os e offi c ers an d a gents “w ho m ake the decisions as to the manner in which the [compan y] is man aged.” Id. a t 6 8 5 ( e mp h a s i somi tt ed) (inter nal quotatio n marks omitte d). Th e court ex plained that the legislature had“ s omep u rpose for inclu ding an agent o r officer” in the definition of employer and reasoned that “th e only a pp are nt p urp os e w as to s ub j ec t th es e p ers ons to li ab il ity in the event th at a c orpora tion or s im il ar e nti ty f ai le d to m ake w age p ayme nts

. ” Id. (i nt e r na l q uo t a t i o n m a r k s o mi t t e d ). R e l y ing on public policy support in its analysis, the co urt r easoned that imposing liability on those “invo lved in the policy-making decisions ” would encourage str uggling companies to re duce t he i r wor kfor ce wh ile the y are “s till cap ab le of me eti ng [ the ir] ob li gati ons to [ the ir] employees” and would enc ourag e insolvent companies to use their “limited fun ds. . . . to pay wages.” Id. (i nte rna l quo tat ion ma rks omitte d); s e e a ls o B e lc uf ine v. Aloe , 112 F.3d 633, 639 (3d Cir. 1997). Court s in S outh Car olina and Wash ing t o n hav e also adopted t his approach when interpr eting simi l a r statutes. SeeDuma s v . I nfo Sa fe Corp. , 463 S.E.2d 641, 645 ( S.C. Ct. App. 1995); El lerma n v. Centerp o int Prep res s, In c. , 22 P.3d 795, 799– 800 (Wash . 2001). ¶24 While the Penns ylvania appro ach is arg uably cons istent wi th public policy, it is not consistent with the language of t he UPWA. An d th e P enns ylva ni a a pp roac h w ou ld requi re c ou rts to

6Cite as: 2015 UT 26 Opi ni on o f the Cou rt

(...continued) 6 bus iness entities, by their ver y nature , can only act thro ugh their officers and agent s, t he inclu sion o f t he phrase “officers and agents”

seems to g ive no additio nal me aning to t he definition of emp loye r that would not hav e existed had the p hr a se been left out. But we

rec ogni z e t h a ts o m e r e d u n d a n c y i ns t a t u t o r y l a n g u a g e i s a r e a li ty. See Richard A. Posner, Sta tu to ry In te rp reta ti o n—i n t

heCla ssro o m a nd in the Courtroom , 5 0 U. C HI

. L. R EV

. 800, 812 (1983) ( “There is no evidence for this improbable propo sition [of no redundancy]; w hat evidence we have, muc h of it from the statute s themselves, is to t he

c ont rary. ”) . An d a lth ou gh w e ge ne ral ly a ttempt to interp ret s tatu tes to avoi d s urp lu s la ngu age an d to g iv e everyw ord i n th e s tatu te

me anin g, w e rec ogn iz e th at i n s om e i ns t a nc e s , th el e gis la tu re u til iz es statuto ry redundancies to emphas ize a point or to “repeat [] itself out of an abun dance of c aution.” In re E sta teo f Na sh , 220 S.W.3d 914, 918 (Tex. 2007) (inter nal quotatio n marks omitte d); see also Sabre, Inc. v. Dep’t of Transp. , 4 29 F.3 d 1 11 3, 11 22(D .C . C ir. 20 05 ) ( “L egi s la tive dra ft ers often

us e a pp are ntl y red un da nt l an g uag e in ord er to emp has iz e th at abro ad de le gati on m ay n ot [ be ] e vad ed s o as to frustrate a statute’s purpose.”).

9 engage in a free -standin g public policy an a l ysis to deter mine pre c is el y w hi c h a gents of an empl oyer s hould be he ld li ab le fo r unpaid w ages. But deter minin g wh e r e t o draw such a line is gener ally the r ole of t he Legi sl a t ur e , not t his c ourt

. See Jones v. Barlow , 2 00 7 UT20 , ¶ 34 , 154 P .3 d 808 . Th is is pa rtic ul arl y tru e w he re the pol ic y de term in ati on a t is s ue “re qu ire s pl ac in g a p rem iu m o n one societal inter est at t he expense of another .” Id. (internal qu otati on marks o mit t ed ). B eca use no t hin gin t he st atutory l an gu age
s ug ges ts a b as is fo r di s tin gu is hi ng b etween t hose age nts w ho a re li ab le fo r unpa id w age s an d th os e a gents w ho a re n ot, w e refus e to create such a dis tinction out o f wh ole cloth. W e there fore r eject Employees’ pro posed construction. ¶25 In summary, we find Emp loyee s’ propo sed readings of the U PW A unw or kable. The first reading absurdly results in ci vil and

c rim in alli ab il ity for all empl oyee s . And the s ec ond rea di ng re qu ire s policy-bas ed line drawing not supporte d by the l a ng uag e of the statue.
CONC LUSION ¶26 W e affirm the ruling of the district court . The indi vidual managers of Nuriche cannot be held personally liab le for t he unpaidH EAPS v. N U R I C HE , LLC Opi ni on o f the Cou rt

10 w age s c la im ed by Emp loyees un de r the Uta h P aym ent of Wa ges Act. This i nterpr etat ion of the stat ute is dic tate d by its language and is c ons is tent b othw ith the pa ttern

s et by t he Le gis la tu re i n othe r
s tatu tes an d w ith lon g- s tan di ng not ion s of li mi ted pe rs ona l l ia bi li ty under Utah cor porat e law.