alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Affirmed as Modified and Opinion Filed July 25, 2014 

In The 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-13-00020-CR 

STEPHEN LEN HEJNY, Appellant 

V. 

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee 

On Appeal from the 282nd Judicial District Court 

Dallas County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. F12-58342-S 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Before Justices Bridges, Francis, and Lang-Miers 

Opinion by Justice Bridges 

Stephen Len Hejny appeals following his conviction for theft. In a single issue, appellant 

contends the judgment should be modified to reflect he entered an “open” plea of guilty. The 

State agrees the judgment should be modified as appellant asks. We modify the trial court’s 

judgment and affirm as modified. 

Appellant waived a jury, entered an open guilty plea to theft of property valued at $1,500 

or more but less than $20,000, and true to two enhancement paragraphs alleging prior state jail 

felony convictions. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 31.03(a), (e)(4), 31.07(b), 32.31(d) (West 
‐2‐ 

2011 & Supp. 2013). After finding appellant guilty and the enhancement paragraphs true, the 

trial court assessed punishment at five years’ imprisonment. 

The judgment states there were terms of a plea bargain agreement. Additionally, the 

judgment indicates no plea or finding on the second enhancement paragraph. Thus, the judgment 

is incorrect. We sustain appellant’s sole issue. 

We modify the judgment to show: (1) the terms of plea bargain were “open;” (2) the plea 

to second enhancement paragraph is true; and (3) the finding on the second enhancement 

paragraph is true. See TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(b); Bigley v. State, 865 S.W.2d 26, 27–28 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 1993); Asberry v. State, 813 S.W.2d 526, 529–30 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1991, pet. 

ref’d). As modified, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

Do Not Publish 

TEX. R. APP. P. 47 

130020F.U05 

/David L. Bridges/ 

DAVID L. BRIDGES 

JUSTICE 
‐3‐ 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

JUDGMENT 

STEPHEN LEN HEJNY, Appellant 

No. 05-13-00020-CR V. 

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee 

 Appeal from the 282nd Judicial District 

Court of Dallas County, Texas (Tr.Ct.No. 

F12-58342-S). 

Opinion delivered by Justice Bridges, 

Justices Francis and Lang-Miers 

participating. 

Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the trial court’s judgment is MODIFIED to 

show: 

The section entitled “Terms of Plea Bargain” is modified to show “Open.” 

The section entitled “Plea to 2nd Enhancement/Habitual Paragraph” is modified to show 

“True.” 

The section entitled “Findings on 2nd Enhancement/Habitual Paragraph” is modified to 

show “True.” 

As modified, we AFFIRM the trial court’s judgment. 

Judgment entered July 25, 2014
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-21-00162-CV

Jordan GUNTER,

Appellant

v.

CARROLL & HINOJOSA PLLC,

Appellee

From the 285th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2018-CI-07466

Honorable Cynthia Marie Chapa, Judge Presiding

PER CURIAM

Sitting: Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice

Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice

Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice

Delivered and Filed: August 18, 2021

DISMISSED FOR WANT OF PROSECUTION

On June 3, 2021, we ordered appellant to provide written proof to this court within ten days 

of the date of the order that he had requested the reporter’s record and that he had paid the reporter’s 

fee or was entitled to appeal without paying the reporter’s fee. We further ordered that, if appellant 

failed to respond to our order, his brief would be due within thirty days of the date of the order and 

we would consider only those issues or points raised in appellant’s brief that do not require a 

reporter’s record for a decision. See TEX. R. APP. P. 37.3(c). By July 12, 2021, appellant had not 

responded to our order and had not filed a brief. We, therefore, ordered appellant to file his brief 
04-21-00162-CV

- 2 -

and to show cause in writing by July 27, 2021, why this appeal should not be dismissed for want 

of prosecution. See id. R. 38.8(a); see also id. R. 42.3(c) (allowing involuntary dismissal if an 

appellant fails to comply with a court order). Appellant did not respond to this court’s order, and, 

to date, appellant has not filed a brief. Because appellant failed to timely file a brief in this appeal, 

this appeal is dismissed for want of prosecution. See id. R. 38.8(a), 42.3(b).

PER CURIAM
<PAGE>
<TABLE>
                                                            Exhibit 11.3

                                 EARNINGS PER SHARE
                                PRIMARY COMPUTATION
                ($ in millions except share and per share amounts)



 <CAPTION>
                                                            Quarter Ended
                                                             December 31,
                                                          1995         1994
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
<S>                                                       <C>          <C>
Basis for computation of earnings per 
  common and common equivalent shares:
    Earnings from continuing operations                   $ 38.3       $ 35.3
    Deduct dividends on 4 Percent 
      cumulative preferred stock                             (.1)         (.1)
                                                          -------      -------
  Earnings from continuing operations
    available to common shareholders                        38.2         35.2
  Discontinued operations                                   19.0          4.5
                                                          -------      -------
  Available for common shareholders                       $ 57.2       $ 39.7
                                                          =======      =======


Number of shares:
  Weighted average shares outstanding                     75,484,367   76,616,993
  Shares issuable upon exercise of stock options,
    net of shares assumed to be repurchased                  913,383      632,325
                                                          ----------   ----------
                                                          76,397,750   77,249,318
                                                          ==========   ==========



Earnings per common share:
  Continuing operations                                   $  .52       $  .45
  Discontinued operations                                    .25          .06
                                                          -------      -------
  Net earnings                                            $  .75       $  .51
                                                          =======      =======
</TABLE>
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

FRANCISCO BELTRAN-FLORES,

 Petitioner,

 v.

LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General,

 Respondent.

No. 13-71828

Agency No. A087-595-599

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted February 24, 2016**

Before: LEAVY, FERNANDEZ, and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.

Francisco Beltran-Flores, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for 

review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order dismissing his appeal from an 

immigration judge’s decision denying his application for asylum, withholding of 

removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We 

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

MAR 4 2016

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 13-71828

have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence the 

agency’s findings of fact. Nagoulko v. INS, 333 F.3d 1012, 1015 (9th Cir. 2003). 

We deny the petition for review. 

Although Beltran-Flores argues he has a well-founded fear of persecution, 

he does not challenge the agency’s dispositive finding that his asylum application 

was untimely and that he did not qualify for any exception to the one-year bar. 

See Martinez-Serrano v. INS, 94 F.3d 1256, 1259-60 (9th Cir. 1996) (issues not 

specifically raised and argued in a party’s opening brief are waived). Thus, we 

deny the petition as to his asylum claim.

Beltran-Flores does not challenge the agency’s finding that he failed to 

establish past persecution, and substantial evidence supports the agency’s finding 

that he failed to establish a nexus between his feared future harm and a protected 

ground. See Parussimova v. Mukasey, 555 F.3d 734, 740 (9th Cir. 2009) (under 

the REAL ID Act, applicant must prove a protected ground is at least “one central 

reason” for persecution); see also Pagayon v. Holder, 675 F.3d 1182, 1191 (9th 

Cir. 2011) (a personal dispute, standing alone, does not constitute persecution 

based on a protected ground). Thus, we deny the petition as to Beltran-Flores’ 

withholding of removal claim. 
3 13-71828

Finally, substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial of Beltran-Flores’ 

CAT claim because he failed to establish that it is more likely than not that he 

would be tortured by or with the consent or acquiescence of the government if 

returned to Mexico. See Silaya v. Mukasey, 524 F.3d 1066, 1073 (9th Cir. 2008).

PETITITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
**Exhibit 23.1**

**CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM**

To the Board of Directors and Shareholders 

of IRIS International, Inc. 

Chatsworth, California 

We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements on Form S-3(File No’s. 333-27189, 333-37946, 333-86617, 333-48097, 333-110826, 333-115393, 333-118577, 333-135442 and 333-147618) and Form S-8 (File Nos. 33-10631, 33-56772, 33-82560, 333-19265, 333-31391, 333-45348, 333-31393, 333-63304, 333-65547,333-103462, 333-122501, 333-127952 333-137738 and 333-145635) of IRIS International, Inc. of our reports dated March 14, 2008, relating to the consolidated financial statements and the effectiveness of IRIS International, Inc.’s internalcontrol over financial reporting, which appear in this Form 10-K. 

BDO SEIDMAN, LLP 

/s/ BDO Seidman, LLP 

Los Angeles, California 

March 14, 2008
##### 





Exhibit 10.8


IRWIN FINANCIAL CORPORATION
2001 STOCK PLAN
STOCK OPTION AGREEMENT (CANADA)


1. Grant of Option




2. Exercise of Option


(a) Right to Exercise










(b) Method of Exercise






---



##### 









3. Method of Payment






(c)








4. Restrictions on Exercise


5. Termination of Relationship


(a) Termination of Employment Due to Death


(b) Termination of Employment due to Disability or Retirement.


- 2 -



---



##### 



(c) Resignation or Termination Without Cause
 (d) Termination for Cause
 6. Effect of a Change in Control. Upon the occurrence of a Change of Control, the Company
 7. Non-Transferability of Option
 8. Term of Option
 9. Withholding Tax Obligations
 - 3 -




---



##### 



- 4 -
        IRWIN FINANCIAL CORPORATIONBy:Name:(print)Title:   Dated:[Name of Participant]
  - 5 -
I 

111TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 4821 

To amend title 5, United States Code, to make stillborn children eligible 

for optional life insurance coverage. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MARCH 11, 2010 

Mr. BURTON of Indiana introduced the following bill; which was referred to 

the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

A BILL 

To amend title 5, United States Code, to make stillborn 

children eligible for optional life insurance coverage. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Kaytlynn Noggle Fed5 eral Life Insurance Equity Act’’. 

6 SEC. 2. INCLUSION OF STILLBORN CHILDREN FOR PUR7 POSES OF LIFE INSURANCE PAYMENTS. 

8 Section 8701(d)(1)(B) of title 5, United States Code, 

9 is amended by— 


pwalker on DSK8KYBLC1PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 4821 IH

1 (1) striking ‘‘(other than a stillborn child)’’; 

2 and 

3 (2) inserting ‘‘stillborn child,’’ after ‘‘adopted 

4 child,’’. 

Æ 


pwalker on DSK8KYBLC1PROD with BILLS
# C_2007125EN.01000501.xml

| 6.6.2007 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 125/5 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

6.6.2007

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 125/5

---

Non-opposition to a notified concentration

(Case COMP/M.4562 — S&B/Halliburton/Cebo JV)

(Text with EEA relevance)

(2007/C 125/09)

On 18 April 2007, the Commission decided not to oppose the above notified concentration and to declare it compatible with the common market. This decision is based on Article 6(1)(b) of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004. The full text of the decision is available only in English and will be made public after it is cleared of any business secrets it may contain. It will be available:

| — | from the Europa competition website (http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes, |
| --- | --- |

—

from the Europa competition website (http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes,

| — | in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website under document number 32007M4562. EUR-Lex is the on-line access to European law. (http://eur-lex.europa.eu) |
| --- | --- |

—

in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website under document number 32007M4562. EUR-Lex is the on-line access to European law. (http://eur-lex.europa.eu)

---
# C_2007137EN.01000601.xml

| 21.6.2007 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 137/6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

21.6.2007

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 137/6

---

Non-opposition to a notified concentration

(Case COMP/M.4656 — Deutsche Bank/Aviva/Blackstone/Vitus)

(Text with EEA relevance)

(2007/C 137/04)

On 12 June 2007, the Commission decided not to oppose the above notified concentration and to declare it compatible with the common market. This decision is based on Article 6(1)(b) of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004. The full text of the decision is available only in English and will be made public after it is cleared of any business secrets it may contain. It will be available:

| — | from the Europa competition website (http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes, |
| --- | --- |

—

from the Europa competition website (http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes,

| — | in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website under document number 32007M4656. EUR-Lex is the on-line access to European law. (http://eur-lex.europa.eu) |
| --- | --- |

—

in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website under document number 32007M4656. EUR-Lex is the on-line access to European law. (http://eur-lex.europa.eu)

---
<PAGE>

                                                                   EXHIBIT 23.1









THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS
GREASE MONKEY HOLDING CORPORATION:


We consent to incorporation by reference in the registration statement (No.
33-80376) on Form S-8 and the registration statement (No. 33-79616) on Form
S-3 of Grease Monkey Holding Corporation of our report dated March 12, 1998,
relating to the consolidated balance sheets of Grease Monkey Holding
Corporation and subsidiaries as of December 31, 1997 and 1996, and the
related consolidated statements of operations, stockholders' equity, and cash
flows for each of the years in the three-year period ended December 31, 1997,
which report appears in the December 31, 1997, annual report on Form 10-KSB
of Grease Monkey Holding Corporation.




                            KPMG PEAT MARWICK LLP




Denver, Colorado
March 26, 1998
United States Department of Labor

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

__________________________________________

K.B., Appellant

and

U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, POST OFFICE,

Cleveland, OH, Employer

__________________________________________

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Docket No. 23-1069

Issued: September 6, 2023

Appearances: Case Submitted on the Record

Appellant, pro se

Office of Solicitor, for the Director

ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL

Before:

JANICE B. ASKIN, Judge

VALERIE D. EVANS-HARRELL, Alternate Judge

JAMES D. McGINLEY, Alternate Judge

On August 8, 2023 appellant filed an appeal from a February 10, 2022 merit decision of 

the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). The Clerk of the Appellate Boards

assigned the appeal Docket No. 23-1069.

The Board has duly considered the matter and notes that the Board has jurisdiction to 

review final adverse decisions of OWCP issued under the Federal Employees’ Compensation 

Act.1 For final adverse decisions of OWCP issued on or after November 19, 2008, the Board’s 

review authority is limited to appeals which are filed within 180 days from the date of issuance 

of OWCP’s decision.2

The 180th day following the February 10, 2022 decision was August 9, 2022. As 

appellant did not file an appeal with the Board until August 8, 2023, more than 180 days after the

February 10, 2022 OWCP decision, the Board finds that the appeal docketed as No. 23-1084 is 

untimely filed. The Board is without jurisdiction to review the appeal. Appellant has not 

1

5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.; 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3(a).

2

20 C.F.R. § 501.3(e) provides in pertinent part: “Any notice of appeal must be filed within 180 days from the 

date of issuance of a decision of the OWCP.”
2

explained her failure to timely file an appeal with supporting documentation sufficient to 

establish compelling circumstances. Because there is no final adverse decision issued by OWCP 

within 180 days of the filing of the instant appeal, the Board concludes that the appeal docketed 

as No. 23-1069, must be dismissed.3 Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the appeal docketed as No. 23-1069 is dismissed.

Issued: September 6, 2023

Washington, DC

Janice B. Askin, Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Valerie D. Evans-Harrell, Alternate Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

James D. McGinley, Alternate Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

3 The Board’s decisions and orders are “final upon the expiration of 30 days from the date of their issuance.” Id.

at § 501.6(d).
Exhibit 32





CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Ameriprise Certificate Company (the “Company”) for the quarterly period ended September 30, 2022, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), Abu M. Arif, as Chief Executive Officer of the Company, and James R. Hill, as Chief Financial Officer of the Company, each hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:


(1)    The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and


(2)    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.











Date:November 2, 2022By:/s/ Abu M. ArifAbu M. ArifChief Executive Officer


Date:November 2, 2022By:/s/ James R. HillJames R. HillChief Financial Officer
#### Alson Knight *vs.*Alexander Mann.

Suffolk.

March 16.

April 6, 1876.

Colt & Lord, JJ., absent.

By the terms of a contract of sale of goods, the purchaser was to send for the goods and take them away. The purchaser went to the store of the seller, took the bill of parcels of the goods, asked if they were ready, and was told that they were, and the goods were pointed out to him lying in the doorway of the store. He said he would send for them. *Held,*in an action for goods sold and delivered, that these facts did not necessarily show an acceptance and receipt of the goods within the statute of frauds.

Contract for rough calf skins, of the value of $1035, sold and delivered to the defendant. The answer contained a general denial, and set up the statute of frauds.

After the former decision, reported 118 Mass. 143, the case was tried in the Superior Court, without a jury, before *Pitman,*J. The facts proved were substantially the same as at the former trial, except that the judge further found that the defendant came into the plaintiff’s store about noon on November 9,1872, and took the bill of parcels of the calf skins, and asked if his *220skins were ready; was told by the plaintiff that they were ready, and they were then pointed out to him, lying in the door way of the store, near which the parties were standing, and the defendant then passed out of the door where the skins were lying, saying he would send his wagon for them. The plaintiff requested the judge to rule that this was a sufficient acceptance of the goods to take the case out of the statute of frauds; but the judge declined so to rule, and ruled “ that there was not such an unequivocal act of acceptance on the part of the defendant as would take the case out of the statute, and found for the defendant ; ” and the plaintiff alleged exceptions.

*JEL. L. Hazelton,*for the plaintiff,

cited *Hardy*v. Potter, 10 Gray, 89.

*0.*Robinson, Jr., for the defendant.

Erjdicott, J.

This case was before the court at a previous stage. 118 Mass. 143. The only additional fact proved at the second trial was, that after the defendant was told that the skins were lying in the doorway, they were pointed out to him, and he passed out of the door where they were lying, and said he would send for them. That there was sufficient evidence of delivery has been conceded throughout this controversy; the question being whether, on the facts reported, there was evidence of acceptance within the statute of frauds. It is enough to say that the additional fact does not necessarily show an acceptance, and the presiding judge could not properly have ruled as requested by the plaintiff; and, having found for the defendant, he must necessarily have found that there was “ not such an unequivocal act of acceptance as would take the case out of the statute.” The plaintiff therefore has no ground of exception. ■ As it was part of the contract that .the defendant should send for the skins, the fact that he said he would do so, when he left the store, does not add to the effect of the evidence.

*Exceptions overruled.*