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_____________________________________________________________________________ 201 8 IL App ( 3d ) 1 8 0 089

Opinion filed July 11, 2018

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

2018

I

n re C.H., ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of the 12 th Judicial Circuit, a Minor, ) Will County , Illinois ) (T he P eople of the State of Illinois

, ) )

P etitioner -Appell ee
, ) )

v. ) ) Appeal No. 3-18-0089 Stephanie H., Bradley P., and Whom It ) Circuit No. 16- JA -1 May Concern, ) ) Respondents, ) ) ) (Joseph K. and Hattie K., ) ) Honorable Appellants)). ) Paula A. Gomora Judge, P residing

JUSTICE O ’BRIEN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

Justice s McDade and Wright concurred in the judgment and opinion.

O PINION

¶ 1 In the course of juvenile proceedings concerning C.H., the trial court made a finding it

was not in the best interest of or appropriate with the permanency goal that C.H. be returned tothe foster home of appellant s Joseph and Hattie K . This ruling resulted in the dismissal of the

administrative appeal Joseph and Hattie had filed with the D epartment of C hildren and Family

Services to contest the removal of C.H. from their care . Joseph and Hattie moved to intervene

and to be heard in juvenile proceedings and moved to vacate the trial court’s finding . The trial

court granted them a right to be heard but denied their motion s to intervene and to vacate. They

appealed. The State moved to dismiss the appeal based on lack of standing. We find Joseph and

Hattie lack standing and dismiss the appeal.

¶ 2 FACTS

¶ 3 On January 2, 2016, C.H., who was born November 11, 2015, was removed from the

custody of her mother and placed with Joseph and Hattie K., licensed foster parents with the

Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS). Reports filed in the juvenile proceedings

by t he DCFS caseworker in dicated C.H. was doing well in her foster placement and had bonded

with Joseph and Hattie. On April 19, 2017, C.H. and another unrelated foster child were removed

from the foster home based on allegations of animal cruelty concerning the family dog.

¶ 4 Joseph and Hattie sought a placement review appeal with DCFS

, where the decision was

made that C.H. should remain out of their foster home. They filed an administrative appeal of the

placement decision. DCFS also began an investigation regarding Joseph and Hattie’s foster

license and informed them the license was going to be revoked. Joseph and Hattie appealed the

revocation decision and sought to join the placement appeal with it. DCFS thereafter determined

not to revoke their foster license. Joseph and Hattie schedule d the administrative appeal for

November 17, 2017.

¶ 5 A DCFS report indicated that C.H. was adjusting well to her new foster home and

bonding with the foster family, who were willing to adopt her. The State filed a motion to

2terminate the parental rights of C.H.’s parents

, and based on the motion, the court found C.H.’s

parents unfit and that it was in C.H.’s best interests that their parental rights be terminated. On

November 17, 2017, during a status hearing in the juvenile proceedings, the court found that a

return of C.H. to Joseph and Hattie was not in her best interest or appropriate to achieve the

permanency goal of adoption. The order was immediately transmitted to the administrative

hearing officer, who dismissed the administrative appeal in the middle of the hearing per the

administrative rules

. See 89 Ill. Adm. Code 337.110(a)(4) (2016).

¶ 6 On December 4, 2017, Joseph and Hattie moved to be heard or to intervene in the

juvenile proceedings and moved to vacate t he November 17, 2017, order. Joseph and Hattie were

allowed to argue their positions. The trial court denied Joseph and Hattie’s motion to vacate,

fi nding the November 17 order st ood and denied their motion to intervene. They timely

appealed. The State sought to dismiss the appeal. We took the State’s motion with the case.

¶ 7 ANALYSIS

¶ 8 On appeal, Joseph and Hattie argue the trial court’s ruling violated their rights as foster

parents. We first address the State’s motion to dismiss the appeal. The State argues that Joseph

and Hattie lack standing to maintain this appeal because they were not parties in the proceedings

below.

¶ 9 Any party or an attorney representing a party may appeal an adverse final decision

entered by the trial court . Ill. S. Ct. R. 303(a)(1) (eff. July 1, 2017 ). Standing requires some

injury to a legally recognized right. Greer v. Illinois Housing Developmen t Authority , 122 Ill. 2d

462, 492 (1988). “The essence of the inquiry concerning standing is whether the litigant *** is

entitled to have the court decide the merits of a dispute or a particular issue.” Powell v. Dean

Foods Co. , 2012 IL 111714, ¶ 36. To determine standing, the court must decide whether the

3relief granted would benefit the party. In re Nitz , 317 Ill. App. 3d 119, 122 (2000). We review

de novo whether a party has standing. Powell , 2012 IL 111714, ¶ 35.

¶ 10 Former foster parents have a right to be heard in the juvenile proceedings but they do not

become parties to the proceedings . 705 ILCS 405/1

- 5(2)(a) (West 2016). Necessary parties to a

juvenile proceeding include parents or legal guardians but not foster parents. In re A.H. , 195 Ill.

2d 408, 424 (2001).

¶ 11 As former foster parents, Joseph and Hattie were entitled to a right to be heard in the

juvenile proceedings, which the trial court granted them. They were provided the opportunity

and argued their motion to vacate the trial court’s November 17 order which ruled against

returning C.H. to Joseph and Hattie’s home. The right to be heard does not afford Joseph and

Hattie ’s party status or the right to appeal the trial court’s ruling. See Nitz , 317 Ill. App. 3d at 122

(“any party to a case may seek appellate review from a final judgment that is adverse to his

interests”) ; Vece v. De Biase , 31 Ill. 2d 542, 545 (1964) (nonparty to the record must establish

his or her interest in the proceeding as a prerequisite to an appeal).

¶ 12 Nonparties may have standing where they have “a direct, immediate and substantial

interest in the subject matter of the litigation which would be prejudiced by the judgment or

benefit by its reversal.” St. Mary of Nazareth Hospital v. Kuczaj , 174 Ill. App. 3d 268, 2 71

(1988). A nonparty is prejudiced where his legal right is affected by the challenged order.

McDonald’s Corp. v. Blotnik , 28 Ill. App. 3d 732, 734 (1975). A “ ‘ speculative, theoretical,

inconsequential or remote ’ ” interest is insufficient to afford a pa rty appeal rights. Board of

Trustees of Community College District No. 508 v. Rosewell , 262 Ill. App. 3d 938, 955 (1992)

(quo ting In re Johnson , 53 Ill. App. 3d 921, 923 (1977)).

4¶ 13 Joseph and Hattie maintain they have standing even as nonparties to the trial court action

because they have a direct, immediate and substantial interest in the placement of C.H. in their

foster home. We disagree. T hey do not have any rights to continue to foster C.H. Benz v.

Dep artment of Children & Family Services , 2015 IL App (1st) 130414, ¶ 38 (foster parents do

not have a liberty interest in their foster children (citing In re A.H. , 195 Ill. 2d at 423) ) ; Johnson

v. Burnett , 182 Ill. App. 3d 574, 58 2 (1989) (foster parents do not have constitutionally protected

liberty interests in the continued care of foster children). Because they have no legal right to

foster C.H., Joseph and Hattie cannot demonstrate any prejudice they would suffer as a result of

the trial court’s ruling. Th eir foster license was back in good standing and their home was

available to shelter other foster children. As former foster parents, they do not have a direct,

immediate or substantial interest in the juvenile proceeding concerning C.H., despite their d esire

for her to return to their home.

¶ 14 Joseph and Hattie’s reliance on In re C.C.

, 2011 IL 111795

, is misplaced. The court there

did not reach the merits of a case by a previous foster parent but instead considered the status of

the children’s former gua rdian, from whom the children had been removed due to neglect. Id.

¶ 23. At issue was the former guardian’s status in the juvenile proceedings. Id. ¶ 29. The

reviewing court acknowledged the former guardian’s right to be heard based on her prior status

but concluded that she was not a party to the proceedings. Id. ¶ 35. Joseph and Hattie also rely on

the Foster Parent Law (20 ILCS 520/1 et seq. (West 2016)), which provides them certain rights

as foster parents. Those rights include the right to an administrative appeal. 20 ILCS 520/1

­

15(13) (West 2016). We acknowledge the trial court’s ruling resulted in a dismissal of the

administrative appeal , but the appeal of that decision is not before us

. We find Joseph and Hattie

lack standing to bring th is appeal and we dismiss it on that basis.

5¶ 15 CONCLUSION

¶ 16 For the foregoing reasons, t he appeal is dismissed.

¶ 17 Appeal d ismissed

.

6