alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Mary BUGGS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 04-60095.

Conference Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Decided April 20, 2005.

William Chadwick Lamar, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Northern District of Mississippi, Oxford, MS, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Kenneth Harold Coghlan, Rayburn Law Firm, Oxford, MS, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before JONES, SMITH, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Mary Buggs appeals the sentence imposed following her guilty-plea conviction *600for distribution of cocaine base in violation 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) and (b)(1)(C). Buggs argues that her sentence is illegal in view of the Supreme Court’s decision in *Blakely v. Washington,*— U.S. -, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004). Because Buggs did not raise this issue in the district court, review is limited to plain error. *See United States v. Vonn,*535 U.S. 55, 59, 122 S.Ct. 1043, 152 L.Ed.2d 90 (2002). After the district court sentenced Buggs, the Supreme Court issued its decision in *United States v. Booker,*— U.S. -, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), applying its Sixth Amendment holding in *Blakely*to the United States Sentencing Guidelines. The Supreme Court held that “[a]ny fact (other than a prior conviction) which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.” *Id.*at 756.

Even if there was *Booker*error, however, Buggs cannot show plain error. Because Buggs’s sentence was based on the 12.5 grams of cocaine base that, as part of her plea agreement, she admitted distributing, Buggs cannot demonstrate that her sentence would likely have been different if the judge had sentenced her under the *Booker*advisory regime. *See United States v. Mares,*402 F.3d 511, 515 (5th Cir.2005), *petition for cert. filed,*No. 04-9517 (U.S. Mar. 31, 2005). Therefore, Buggs’s sentence is AFFIRMED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
[Federal Register Volume 70, Number 217 (Thursday, November 10, 2005)]
[Notices]
[Page 68477]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 05-22447]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

Bureau of Labor Statistics


Federal Economic Statistics Advisory Committee; Notice of Open 
Meeting and Agenda

    The ninth meeting of the Federal Economic Statistics Advisory 
Committee will be held on December 9, 2005 in the Postal Square 
Building, 2 Massachusetts Avenue, NE., Washington, DC.
    The Federal Economic Statistics Advisory Committee is a technical 
committee composed of economists, statisticians, and behavioral 
scientists who are recognized for their attainments and objectivity in 
their respective fields. Committee members are called upon to analyze 
issues involved in producing Federal economic statistics and recommend 
practices that will lead to optimum efficiency, effectiveness, and 
cooperation among the Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics 
and the Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis and Bureau 
of the Census.
    The meeting will be held in Meeting Rooms 1 and 2 of the Postal 
Square Building Conference Center. The schedule and agenda for the 
meeting are as follows:

9 a.m. Opening session.
9:30 a.m. Measuring the cost of owner-occupied housing.
1 p.m. Report from working group on the CPS-CES discrepancy.
1:30 p.m. Service-sector expansion and non-residential construction 
initiative in the PPI.
2 p.m. Priorities for future meetings.
2:45 p.m. Treatment of catastrophic events in Federal statistical 
programs.
4:45 p.m. Conclude (approximate time).

    The meeting is open to the public. Any questions concerning the 
meeting should be directed to Margaret Johnson, Federal Economic 
Statistics Advisory Committee, on Area Code (202) 691-5600. Individuals 
with disabilities, who need special accommodations, should contact Ms. 
Johnson at least two days prior to the meeting date.

    Signed at Washington, DC the 3rd day of November 2005.
Kathleen P. Utgoff,
Commissioner of Labor Statistics.
[FR Doc. 05-22447 Filed 11-9-05; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4510-24-P
United States Department of Labor

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

__________________________________________

E.A., Appellant

and

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, 

U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION,

U.S. BORDER PATROL, Brownsville, TX, 

Employer

_________________________________________

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Docket No. 23-0199

Issued: February 22, 2023

Appearances: Case Submitted on the Record

Appellant, pro se

Office of Solicitor, for the Director

ORDER GRANTING REMAND

Before:

PATRICIA H. FITZGERALD, Deputy Chief Judge

VALERIE D. EVANS-HARRELL, Alternate Judge

JAMES D. McGINLEY, Alternate Judge

On November 25, 2022 appellant filed a timely appeal from an August 29, 2022 merit 

decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). By that decision, OWCP 

denied his traumatic injury claim (Form CA-1) asserting that he sustained a COVID-19 infection 

causally related to the accepted employment exposure as untimely filed. The Clerk of the 

Appellate Boards assigned Docket No. 23-0199 to appellant’s appeal.

On December 14, 2022 the Director of OWCP filed a motion to remand with the Clerk of 

the Appellate Boards. The Director noted that OWCP failed to consider appellant’s statement 

correcting the date of injury from August 5, 2020 to August 5, 2022, which had been confirmed 

by the employing establishment. The Director further noted that appellant had submitted the 

correction prior to the issuance of the August 29, 2022 decision. The Director also acknowledged 

that, under the facts and circumstances of this case, “where it appears that appellant’s date of injury 

was on ‘August 5, 2022’ and not ‘2020’, appellant’s claim was filed within 30 days of his date of 

injury entitling him to COP.” Consequently, the Director requested that the Board set aside 

OWCP’s August 29, 2022 decision and remand the case to OWCP. On remand, the Director 

indicated that OWCP will issue a de novo decision on appellant’s entitlement to COP for exposure 

to COVID-19 in the performance of duty, “and authorize the payment of appropriate benefits as 

claimed by appellant.”
2

The Clerk of the Appellate Boards served appellant with a copy of the Director’s motion 

to remand on December 15, 2022. No reply was received.

The Board, having duly considered this matter, grants the Director’s motion. On remand, 

OWCP shall further develop the case as set forth in the Director’s motion to remand, to be followed 

by the issuance of a de novo decision. Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the motion to remand filed by the Director of the 

Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs is granted. The August 29, 2022 decision of the 

Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs is set aside, and the case is remanded for further 

proceedings consistent with this order of the Board.

Issued: February 22, 2023

Washington, DC

Patricia H. Fitzgerald, Deputy Chief Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Valerie D. Evans-Harrell, Alternate Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

James D. McGinley, Alternate Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
United States Department of Labor

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

__________________________________________

E.A., Appellant

and

U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, POST OFFICE,

LaPuenta, CA, Employer

__________________________________________

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Docket No. 23-0495

Issued: April 12, 2023

Appearances: Case Submitted on the Record

Appellant, pro se

Office of Solicitor, for the Director

ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL

Before:

ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Chief Judge

VALERIE D. EVANS-HARRELL, Alternate Judge

JAMES D. McGINLEY, Alternate Judge

On February 21, 2023 appellant filed an appeal from an August 20, 2021 merit decision of 

the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). The Clerk of the Appellate Boards

assigned Docket No. 23-0495.

The Board has duly considered the matter and notes that the Board has jurisdiction to 

review final adverse decisions of OWCP issued under the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act

(FECA).

1

 For final adverse decisions of OWCP issued on or after November 19, 2008, the Board’s 

review authority is limited to appeals which are filed within 180 days from the date of issuance of 

OWCP’s decision.2

The 180th day following the August 20, 2021 decision was February 16, 2022. As 

appellant did not file an appeal with the Board until February 21, 2023, more than 180 days after 

the August 20, 2021 OWCP decision, the Board finds that the appeal docketed as No. 23-0495 is 

untimely filed. The Board is without jurisdiction to review the appeal. Appellant has not explained 

her failure to timely file an appeal with supporting documentation sufficient to establish 

1 5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.; 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3(a).

2 20 C.F.R. § 501.3(e) provides in pertinent part: “Any notice of appeal must be filed within 180 days from the 

date of issuance of a decision of the OWCP.”
2

compelling circumstances. Because there is no final adverse decision issued by OWCP within 180 

days of the filing of the instant appeal, the Board concludes that the appeal docketed as No. 23-

0495, must be dismissed.3 Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the appeal docketed as No. 23-0495 is dismissed.

Issued: April 12, 2023

Washington, DC

Alec J. Koromilas, Chief Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Valerie D. Evans-Harrell, Alternate Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

James D. McGinley, Alternate Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

3 The Board’s decisions and orders are “final upon the expiration of 30 days from the date of their issuance.” Id. at 

§ 501.6(d).
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

April 29, 2013

No. 04-12-00238-CR

Kimberly Clark SAENZ,

Appellant

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

Appellee

From the 217th District Court, Angelina County, Texas

Trial Court No. CR28665

The Honorable Barry R. Bryan, Judge Presiding

ORDER

 We grant the State’s motion for extension of time. We order the State to file its brief by 

July 15, 2013. Counsel is advised that no further extensions of time will be granted absent a 

showing of extraordinary circumstances.

_________________________________

Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 

court on this 29th day of April, 2013.

___________________________________

Keith E. Hottle

Clerk of Court
[Cite as State v. Winn, 2014-Ohio-3347.] 

 

Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas 

 

Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed and Cause Remanded 

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: August 1, 2014 

Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Paula E. Adams, 

Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee, 

Michael Trapp, for Defendant-Appellant. 

Please note: this case has been removed from the accelerated calendar. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO 

HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO 

STATE OF OHIO, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 vs. 

SHANAE WINN, 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

:

: 

: 

: 

: 

APPEAL NO. C-130800 

 TRIAL NO. B-1305338-B 

O P I N I O N.
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

2

DEWINE, Judge. 

{¶1} This is an appeal from a judgment entry of two convictions for burglary. 

Shanae Winn claims that the court erred when it indicated on its judgment that she had 

pleaded guilty to two counts of burglary in violation of R.C. 2911.12(A)(2). The record is 

clear that Ms. Winn pleaded guilty to and was convicted of fourth-degree burglary in 

violation of R.C. 2911.12(B), so we remand the case so that the trial court can correct its 

judgment entry. 

{¶2} Ms. Winn was indicted for two counts of second-degree burglary for her 

part in driving her boyfriend to homes of two of his uncles so that he could break into 

the homes and steal property. As a result of a plea bargain, Ms. Winn agreed to plead 

guilty to amended charges that lowered the degree of the offenses to fourth-degree 

burglary. During the plea hearing, the court acknowledged that Ms. Winn was pleading 

guilty to two counts of fourth-degree burglary. The court reiterated its understanding 

during the sentencing hearing, and sentenced Ms. Winn accordingly. But in both 

hearings, while correctly stating that Ms. Winn was pleading to fourth-degree felonies, 

the court referred to the statute sections to which Ms. Winn pleaded guilty as R.C. 

2911.12(A)(2) rather than R.C. 2911.12(B). The judgment entry repeated the mistake, 

incorrectly stating that Ms. Winn had pleaded guilty to two counts of “BURGLARY 

(AMENDED) 2911-12A2/ORCN, F4.” 

{¶3} In her sole assignment of error, Ms. Winn asserts that the court erred in 

stating on the judgment entry that she had been convicted of burglary in violation of 

R.C. 2911.12(A)(2). The state concedes the error. We conclude that the error is a clerical 

one, correctible under Crim.R. 36. See State v. Lattimore, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C010488, 2002-Ohio-723. We therefore sustain the assignment of error, and remand the 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

3

case for the trial court to correct the error in its judgment entry. The judgment of the 

trial court is otherwise affirmed. 

Judgment affirmed and cause remanded. 

HILDEBRANDT, P.J., and FISCHER, J., concur. 

Please note: 

The court has recorded its own entry on the date of the release of this opinion.
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 98-40884

Conference Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

MIGUEL ANGEL MORA-RODRIGUEZ,

Defendant-Appellant.

- - - - - - - - - -

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. M-97-CR-355-1

- - - - - - - - - -

April 16, 1999

Before JONES, SMITH, and DUHÉ, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM:*

Miguel Angel Mora-Rodriguez (“Mora”) appeals from his

conviction of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute

and importation of marijuana. Mora contends that the district

court erred by rejecting his proposed instruction addressing

possession of contraband in a hidden compartment.

The district court instructed the jury properly on

constructive possession. The rejection of Mora’s proposed

instruction therefore was not error. See United States v.

Pennington, 20 F.3d 593, 600 (5th Cir. 1994).

AFFIRMED.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the
interim consolidated financial statements of the Company for the nine months
ended September 30, 1995, and is qualified in its entirety by reference to such
financial statements.
</LEGEND>
<CIK> 0000054291
<NAME> KAISER ALUMINUM & CHEMICAL CORPORATION
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1995
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1995
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1995
<CASH>                                              11
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                      279
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                        531
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                   895
<PP&E>                                           1,099
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                   2,789
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                              524
<BONDS>                                              0
<COMMON>                                            15
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                2
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<OTHER-SE>                                          10
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                     2,789
<SALES>                                          1,647
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 1,647
<CGS>                                            1,330
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    1,330
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                   167
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                  71
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                     69
<INCOME-TAX>                                        25
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                 43
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                        43
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        


</TABLE>
# C_2007112EN.01000101.xml

| 22.5.2007 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 112/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

22.5.2007

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 112/1

---

Non-opposition to a notified concentration

(Case COMP/M.4597 — Groupe Arnault/Go Voyages)

(Text with EEA relevance)

(2007/C 112/01)

On 26 March 2007, the Commission decided not to oppose the above notified concentration and to declare it compatible with the common market. This decision is based on Article 6(1)(b) of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004. The full text of the decision is available only in English and will be made public after it is cleared of any business secrets it may contain. It will be available:

| — | from the Europa competition website (http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes, |
| --- | --- |

—

from the Europa competition website (http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes,

| — | in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website under document number 32007M4597. EUR-Lex is the on-line access to European law. (http://eur-lex.europa.eu) |
| --- | --- |

—

in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website under document number 32007M4597. EUR-Lex is the on-line access to European law. (http://eur-lex.europa.eu)

---
* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

__________________ No. 95-30675 Conference Calendar

__________________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus PATRICIA MAY SANDERS, Defendant-Appellant.

- - - - - - - - - - Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana

USDC No. 95-CR-30008
- - - - - - - - - - March 1, 1996 Before GARWOOD, JONES, and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Appellant Sanders contends that the district court erred by denying the Government's U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 motion for downward departure in sentencing her. She argues that her delay in providing financial information to the probation office is not a proper ground for the ruling. Sanders asserts that the district court denied due process to her by not giving adequate reasons for denying the motion.No. 95-30675 -2- This court lacks jurisdiction of an appeal from "the district court's refusal to grant downward departure [unless there was] a legal error or misapplication of the guidelines." United States v. DiMarco , 46 F.3d 476, 477 (5th Cir. 1995). Sanders's contention that the district court denied her due process by not stating adequate reasons for the ruling is frivolous. Assuming arguendo that the district court should not have considered Sanders's delay in providing the information, she is not entitled to relief because the court would have denied the departure even if it had not considered this factor. See Williams v. United States , 503 U.S. 193, 203-03 (1992) APPEAL DISMISSED.
AMENDMENT TO
                            STOCK OPTION AGREEMENT(S)



         WHEREAS,  SEAGULL  ENERGY  CORPORATION  (the  "Company") has previously
adopted the SEAGULL  ENERGY  CORPORATION  1981 STOCK  OPTION  PLAN,  the SEAGULL
ENERGY  CORPORATION  1981 STOCK  OPTION  PLAN  (RESTATED),  the  SEAGULL  ENERGY
CORPORATION  1983 STOCK OPTION PLAN, the SEAGULL ENERGY  CORPORATION  1983 STOCK
OPTION PLAN (RESTATED),  the SEAGULL ENERGY  CORPORATION 1986 STOCK OPTION PLAN,
the SEAGULL ENERGY  CORPORATION 1986 STOCK OPTION PLAN  (RESTATED),  the SEAGULL
ENERGY  CORPORATION 1990 STOCK OPTION PLAN, the SEAGULL ENERGY  CORPORATION 1993
STOCK OPTION PLAN and the SEAGULL  ENERGY  CORPORATION  1995 OMNIBUS  STOCK PLAN
(collectively, the "Option Plans"); and

         WHEREAS, certain nonstatutory stock options and incentive stock options
(collectively,  "Options")  have  heretofore  been  granted to the  optionee,  a
full-time  active employee of the Company (the  "Employee"),  that are currently
outstanding  under the Option  Plans,  each of such Options  being listed on the
schedule attached hereto and evidenced by a Nonstatutory  Stock Option Agreement
or an Incentive Stock Option Agreement (collectively, the "Agreements"); and

         WHEREAS, the Employee's employment with the Company has been terminated
in connection with the consummation of the merger  contemplated by the Agreement
and  Plan  of  Merger  by and  among  Seagull  Energy  Corporation,  GNR  Merger
Corporation and Global Natural Resources Inc. dated as of July 22, 1996, and the
Company desires to amend the Agreements in certain respects;

         NOW, THEREFORE,  the Agreements shall be amended as follows,  effective
as of _______________ (Employee's employment termination date):

         1.       The  vesting schedule contained  in  the  Agreements  shall be
waived and all Options outstanding under such Agreements shall be exercisable in
full.

         2.       Notwithstanding  any  provision  in   the  Agreements  to  the
contrary, all Options shall  continue to be  exercisable  by the  Employee,  his
estate or the person  who  acquires   such  Options  by  will  or  the  laws  of
descent  and distribution,  at any time on or before  the  first  anniversary of
Employee's employment termination date.

         3.       As amended hereby, the  Agreements  are specifically  ratified
and reaffirmed.



<PAGE>



         IN WITNESS  WHEREOF,  the Company has caused this  amendment to be duly
executed by one of its officers thereunto duly authorized,  and the Employee has
executed this amendment, effective as of ________________ (Employee's employment
termination date).

                                                      SEAGULL ENERGY CORPORATION



                                                      By _______________________




                                                      --------------------------
                                                      Employee