IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

26 CAPITAL ACQUISITION CORP., and 

26 CAPITAL HOLDINGS LLC,

Plaintiffs and

Counterclaim-Defendants,

v.

TIGER RESORT ASIA LTD, TIGER 

RESORT LEISURE AND 

ENTERTAINMENT, INC., and PROJECT 

TIGER MERGER SUB, INC.,

Defendants and

Counterclaim-Plaintiffs.

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C.A. No. 2023-0128-JTL

OPINION REGARDING AVAILABILITY OF SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE

Date Submitted: August 25, 2023

Date Decided: September 7, 2023

A. Thompson Bayliss, J. Peter Shindel, Jr., Eric A. Veres, ABRAMS & BAYLISS LLP, 

Wilmington, Delaware; Rollo C. Baker, IV, Robert S. Loigman, Jesse Bernstein, Todd 

Beattie, Jonathan Feder, Danielle Lazarus, Edgar Aliferov, Miriam Bial, Aaron Lawrence, 

QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART & SULLIVAN, LLP, New York, New York; Samuel 

J. Lieberman, SADIS & GOLDBERG LLP, New York, New York; Counsel for Plaintiffs

and Counterclaim-Defendants.

T. Brad Davey, Matthew A. Golden, Daniel M. Rusk, IV, Abraham C. Schneider, Hayden 

J. Driscoll, POTTER ANDERSON & CORROON LLP, Wilmington, Delaware; Daniel 

M. Perry, Grant R. Mainland, Jed M. Schwartz, Andrew L. Porter, Christopher Almon, 

Alison S. Markowitz, Ashley A. Satterlee, Alexander B. Cogut, MILBANK LLP, New 

York, New York; Counsel for Defendants and Counterclaim-Plaintiffs.

LASTER, V.C.
This is a broken deal case involving a de-SPAC transaction.

1 This decision 

addresses whether the SPAC can obtain a decree of specific performance compelling the 

target to use its reasonable best efforts to close. In many broken-deal cases, specific 

performance is the first-choice remedy. Yes, it is an extraordinary remedy—in the sense of 

out of the ordinary because it departs from the ordinary contractual remedy of money 

damages, but broken deal cases are out of the ordinary. They involve either a unique 

opportunity to acquire a unique asset at a unique point in time or, conversely, a unique 

opportunity to be acquired on unique terms at a unique point in time. Transaction 

agreements generally provide for specific performance, revealing the parties’ clear-day 

remedial preference. But even when a transaction agreement calls for specific performance 

as the preferred remedy, the decision to grant specific performance always remains with 

the court. 

The transaction agreement in this case calls for specific performance, and this 

decision assumes that the target breached its obligation to use its reasonable best efforts to 

close, that the SPAC is ready, willing, and able to close, and that money damages will not 

1 At this point, “SPAC” and “de-SPAC transaction” are likely familiar terms. For 

the uninitiated, a “SPAC” is a special purpose acquisition company—a shell company that 

goes public without an operating business, but with a plan to find and merge with an 

operating business within a fixed period, usually two years. The de-SPAC transaction is 

the merger in which the SPAC combines with the operating business. In that transaction, 

the SPAC brings to the table the cash it has raised from its investors plus its public listing. 

The target brings the operating business. After the transaction, the target has a public listing 

and additional capital. The SPAC’s former stockholders receive equity in the posttransaction entity. If the SPAC fails to find a merger partner, then the SPAC’s stockholders 

get back the money that the SPAC raised in its initial public offering, less expenses.
2

provide an adequate remedy. Despite those favorable assumptions, the court will not award 

specific performance. Multiple factors lead to that result.

First, a decree enforcing a reasonable best efforts obligation is not self-executing. 

Fulfilling the obligation requires identifying tasks that need to be accomplished and 

deploying the resources necessary to carry them out. The tasks that remain would not pose 

an impediment to an award of specific performance in a domestic transaction, but in this 

case, the target is a Philippine corporation that owns a casino in Manila. The corporation 

has a history of poor governance and last year suffered a forcible takeover that was only 

resolved through a dodgy bargain to secure political intervention. The nature of the 

counterparty increases the degree of difficulty exponentially, and the events necessary to 

get to closing will take place halfway around the world.

Second, to the extent there is a need to back up the decree with coercive sanctions, 

all roads lead to Manila. When parties are domiciled or have significant assets in the United 

States, this court can pick from a menu of sanctions. No one has identified any sanction 

that could be deployed effectively in the Philippines. 

Third, closing the transaction could violate a status quo ante order issued by the 

Philippine Supreme Court. Both sides of the deal think that the litigation that gave rise to 

the order is meritless and that the order was improvidently granted. They originally sought 

to convince the Philippine Supreme Court to reconsider it. When traditional avenues failed, 

they resorted to a dodgy bargain, in which they offered substantial personal benefits to 

powerful figures in return for ex parte efforts to influence the justices. But instead of 

playing ball, the justices issued a clarifying order which made clear that they were 
3

concerned about the de-SPAC transaction. As a matter of comity, a Delaware court should 

hesitate before directing a Philippine corporation to take action that risks violating an order 

issued by that nation’s highest court.

Finally, the SPAC has engaged in conduct that should not be rewarded with a decree 

of specific performance. The target contracted with a New York hedge fund to act as its 

exclusive advisor for the purposes of finding a SPAC partner and negotiating and 

completing a de-SPAC transaction. Unbeknownst to the target, the hedge fund leveraged 

its exclusive relationship to secure a 60% ownership interest in the SPAC’s sponsor. That 

meant the hedge fund would profit if the SPAC got a better deal, and it put the hedge fund 

in a position to work as a double agent. To be clear, the hedge fund did not work both sides 

of the deal in the sense of helping both parties. The hedge fund partnered with the SPAC.

Unbeknownst to the target, the hedge fund helped the SPAC draft a term sheet 

favorable to the SPAC. When the SPAC sent the term sheet to the target, the hedge fund 

pretended not to have seen it before. The hedge fund then advised the target to accept it. 

Unbeknownst to the target, the hedge fund helped the SPAC draft a merger 

agreement favorable to the SPAC. When the SPAC sent the merger agreement to the target, 

the hedge fund pretended not to have seen it before. The hedge fund then advised the target 

that the terms were market or otherwise advantageous such that the target should not 

counter. During the ensuing negotiations, the hedge fund participated in calls with the 

SPAC, ostensibly as the advisor to the target. During those calls, the hedge fund texted 

secretly with the SPAC and gave the SPAC advice on what positions to take. 
4

Not knowing that its contractual advisor was playing for the other team, the target 

entered into the merger agreement. After signing, the target hired the hedge fund to assist 

with a series of deal-related tasks. When pursuing those tasks, the hedge fund continued to 

work as the SPAC’s partner and against its client. It was not until this litigation that the 

target learned the truth. 

The SPAC has attempted to disclaim responsibility for the hedge fund’s actions, but 

the SPAC and the hedge fund worked as partners. The SPAC kept the hedge fund’s doubledealing secret and lied about its relationship to the hedge fund. Late in the deal process, 

when the target became suspicious about the hedge fund, the SPAC allowed the hedge fund 

to participate secretly in calls so that the SPAC could get real time advice. The hedge fund’s 

actions are properly attributed to the SPAC, and their joint behavior is sufficiently 

egregious to warrant denying the remedy of specific performance.

There is also the balance of the equities. To issue a decree of specific performance, 

the equities must clearly and convincingly favor that outcome. Here, they do not. 

The denial of specific performance does not mean that no remedy is available. 

Money damages may be an inadequate remedy relative to the possibility of specific 

performance, but it is still a possible remedy. The court has scheduled a follow-up trial on 

the issue of damages. If the SPAC proves breach, and if the defendants fail to establish 

their affirmative defenses, and if the SPAC properly supports a sum of causally related 

damages, then the SPAC may be able to recover. If it does, then the SPAC can seek to 

monetize the judgment using customary collection mechanisms that do not involve the 

same complications that a decree of specific performance carries.
5

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Trial took place over five days. Thirteen fact witnesses and four expert witnesses 

testified. The parties introduced 2,281 exhibits, including deposition transcripts from 

twenty-nine individuals.

In the pre-trial order, the parties agreed to seventy-four stipulations of fact.2 The 

court thanks litigation counsel for preparing those stipulations as officers of the court. This 

decision relies on them when applicable. Having weighed the record and evaluated the 

credibility of witnesses, the court makes the following findings of fact by a preponderance 

of the evidence. 

A. Universal Seeks A Public Listing For CasinoCo.

Universal Entertainment Corporation (“Universal,” “UEC,” or “Parent”) is a 

Japanese gaming company whose shares trade publicly on the Tokyo Stock Exchange. 

Kazuo Okada founded Universal and previously served as its Chairman and CEO. Through 

Okada Holdings Ltd., he controlled two-thirds of Universal’s equity. JX 2026 at 3. In 2017, 

Okada was accused of embezzling funds from Okada Holdings. Litigation in Japan resulted 

in Okada’s son taking over Okada Holdings and Okada being ousted from all of his 

2 Citations in the form “PTO ¶ —” refer to stipulated facts in the pre-trial order. See

Dkt. 318. Citations in the form “[Name] Tr.” refer to witness testimony from the trial 

transcript. Citations in the form “[Name] Dep.” refer to witness testimony from a 

deposition transcript. Citations in the form “JX — at —” refer to a trial exhibit, with the 

page designated by the internal page number. If a trial exhibit used numbered paragraphs 

or sections, then references are by paragraph or section. 
6

positions with Okada Holdings and Universal. That historical vignette matters because 

Okada returns later in the story. 

Universal’s most valuable asset is the Okada Manila Resort & Casino (the 

“Casino”). Located in the Philippines, the multi-billion-dollar property includes a hotel 

with dual towers connected by a skybridge, an indoor beach and night club, 3,000 gaming 

machines, 300 gaming tables, and 993 guest rooms, plus the world’s largest dancing 

fountain.

Universal owns the Casino through Tiger Resorts Leisure & Entertainment, Inc. 

(“TRLEI” or “CasinoCo”). An intervening subsidiary, Tiger Resort Asia Ltd. (“TRA” or 

“Holdings”), owns 99.99% of the stock of CasinoCo. CasinoCo is a Philippine entity, and 

under Philippine law, a director must own stock in the company she serves. Each director 

of CasinoCo owns one share of its stock, and those are the only shares of stock of CasinoCo

that Holdings does not own. 

Beginning in 2018, Universal explored the possibility of CasinoCo conducting an 

initial public offering that would result in its shares trading on a public exchange. The IPO

would generate an initial pool of capital, and Universal could use CasinoCo’s listed 

security to raise additional capital through follow-on offerings. Universal wanted to raise 

capital to pay off $750 million in publicly traded debt. The debt was expensive, requiring 

interest payments of $70 million per year, and Universal anticipated that it would be 

difficult to refinance. 

Universal investigated listings in Hong Kong, Singapore, the Philippines, and the 

United States. The effort proceeded slowly. Reputable underwriters were skeptical about a 
7

Philippine-based gaming company, and they questioned Universal’s association with 

Okada. The COVID pandemic negatively affected the Casino’s operations and delayed the 

process. 

B. Eiseman And Zama Enter The Scene.

Alex Eiseman is the founder of a New York-based hedge fund that operates under 

the tradename Zama Capital (“Zama”).

3 After working as an analyst for over a decade, he 

started Zama in 2017 with $20 million under management. One of Zama’s first investments 

was a block of shares in Universal. Zama continues to own the investment, which it carries 

at a loss. 

After Zama purchased its shares, Eiseman contacted Universal’s head of investor 

relations, claiming to be a major investor in Universal. In truth, Zama never held more than 

144,100 shares, those shares were never worth more than $2.5 million, and the block 

3 The Zama hedge fund complex consists of an on-shore fund organized as a 

Delaware limited partnership, Zama Capital Advisors LP, and an off-shore fund organized 

as a Cayman limited partnership, Zama Capital Master Fund, LP. The investment advisor 

for the funds is Zama Capital Strategy Advisors LLC, a Delaware limited liability 

company.

Eiseman was a troubling witness. In his contemporaneous communications, he 

regularly misrepresented facts, omitted material information, or flat-out lied. At trial, 

however, he acknowledged that, contending that his desire to make a profit for Zama’s 

stockholders justified his actions. So on the one hand, he testified honestly about engaging 

in dishonesty. On the other hand, Eiseman only owned up to his dishonest actions when 

the defendants had access to contemporaneous texts or emails that he could not deny. When 

that level of direct evidence was unavailable, Eiseman gave testimony that was not 

credible. At bottom, he seems fundamentally amoral and willing to say anything that might 

be personally advantageous. This decision has largely discounted Eiseman’s testimony.
8

represented a microscopic fraction of Universal’s float. Eiseman is a prolific 

communicator, and he engaged regularly with Universal’s head of investor relations.

C. The Idea For A De-SPAC Transaction

Toji Takeuchi is an executive officer at Universal who served as head of corporate 

planning.

4 When Universal began considering a public listing for CasinoCo, Takeuchi was 

charged with exploring possibilities in the United States. After Universal’s head of investor 

relations left, Takeuchi added that function to his portfolio. In September 2018, when 

Eiseman could not reach the former head of investor relations, he obtained Takeuchi’s 

contact information and began an ongoing dialogue with Takeuchi. 

In July 2020, the financial markets remained captivated by SPACs. Eiseman read in 

the news that a SPAC named Leisure Acquisition Corp. (“Leisure”) lost its de-SPAC 

transaction partner. Eiseman contacted Takeuchi about the possibility of CasinoCo using a 

merger with a SPAC to bypass the underwriting process. Eiseman knew an investor in 

Leisure and thought he could make an introduction. 

4 Takeuchi was a perplexing witness. He was credible in the sense that he truly 

believed what he said when testifying. But he also seemed strangely naïve and out of his 

depth, and he appeared to have swallowed hook, line, and sinker anything that Eiseman 

and his colleagues fed him. He also unfortunately believed that everyone was on the same 

team and working together to accomplish the transaction, including CasinoCo’s 

transactional counterparty. Eiseman consistently manipulated Takeuchi, sometimes by 

leading him by the nose, other times by browbeating him. Because Takeuchi viewed the 

world through such strangely tinted glasses, this decision does not rely on his assessments, 

even though he seems to have believed them sincerely.
9

Takeuchi asked Eiseman if he had any relationship with Leisure. Eiseman told 

Takeuchi: “We are completely independent . . . . We are Universal shareholders, and we 

hope to benefit by Universal’s share price going up a lot if there is a deal. . . .” JX 23 at 2.

Takeuchi presented the idea to Jun Fujimoto, Universal’s President.

5 He liked the 

concept and authorized Takeuchi to proceed. Eiseman made the introduction, and Leisure 

sent Universal an indication of interest in August 2022. After conducting due diligence,

Leisure provided a revised indication of interest in December for a transaction that valued 

CasinoCo at $2.268 billion, excluding land that CasinoCo owned. Leisure anticipated 

bringing $163 million in cash to the deal, consisting of $13 million on its books plus $150 

million to be raised through a private investment in public equity (a “PIPE”). See JX 31. 

Takeuchi was ready to sign an agreement in principle with Leisure based on the 

term sheet.

6 Eiseman, however, recommended against it. Eiseman had spoken to other 

SPACs, and he told Takeuchi that he was using Leisure’s proposal as a valuation floor and 

inviting other SPACs to beat it. He advised Takeuchi that the other SPACs he was talking 

to had much more cash, ranging from $150 million to $400 million. JX 34.

5 Fujimoto testified at trial. He was generally credible, except when discussing his 

involvement in a dodgy bargain involving a senior Philippine official.

6 Takeuchi’s willingness to sign an agreement in principle with Leisure (the first 

SPAC to come along and a weak one at that), provides an early sign of his naïveté. 
10

D. Universal Engages Zama.

In January 2021, Takeuchi suggested a formal advisory relationship with Zama. 

Eiseman again represented to Takeuchi that their interests were aligned. See JX 38 at 3. 

Eiseman had Akin Gump draft a bespoke engagement letter that he sent to Takeuchi. See 

id. at 2; JX 51 (the “First Engagement Letter”).

The First Engagement Letter provided that Zama would 

provide services with respect to analyzing special purpose acquisition 

companies, blank check companies, “shell company” [sic] (as defined Rule 

405 under the Securities Act of 1933) or similar companies (collectively, 

“SPACs”) as possible counterparties to a Transaction (as defined below)

with the Company. . . . As we have discussed, we will work to make 

prospective introductions to SPACs and provide our assistance with respect 

to Transaction advice and Transaction negotiations with potential SPAC 

counterparties.

JX 51 at 4. The First Engagement Letter defined a Transaction as “any merger, share 

exchange, asset acquisition or other acquisition, share purchase, reorganization or business 

combination between [CasinoCo] (or part of its business) and a SPAC.” Id. The First 

Engagement Letter made Zama the exclusive representative of CasinoCo and its affiliates 

for purposes of any Transaction. Id. (providing that CasinoCo would not “independently 

(not in conjunction with Zama) directly or indirectly solicit, commence or continue 

negotiations regarding any Transaction . . . or enter into any Transaction or agreement with 

any SPAC . . . .”).

At trial, Eiseman claimed that Zama was only a finder and fulfilled all of its 

obligations by introducing Universal to a SPAC. That was untrue. The First Engagement 

Letter obligated Zama “to make prospective introductions to SPACs” and to “provide []
11

assistance with respect to Transaction advice and Transaction negotiations with potential 

SPAC counterparties.” Id. Zama also committed to “provide services with respect to 

analyzing [companies] as possible counterparties to a Transaction.” Id. 

At trial, Eiseman and the plaintiffs’ witnesses emphasized language in the First 

Engagement Letter which stated that when providing services, Zama would act as “an 

independent contractor” and would not act “in any other capacity including as a fiduciary

. . . .” Id. They also relied on the following text:

The Company acknowledges that it is not relying on the advice of Zama for 

general business, investment advice, financial, tax, legal or accounting 

matters as it is seeking and will rely on the advice of its own professionals 

and advisors for such matters, and that the Company will be solely 

responsible for finally considering and approving the terms and provisions 

of any Transaction. In recognition of the foregoing, the Company agrees that 

Zama and its affiliates . . . is not required to restrict its activities as a result 

of this engagement. 

Id. Based on this language, Eiseman and the plaintiffs’ witnesses maintained that Zama 

had authorization to invest in the sponsor of a SPAC that would be the counterparty in a 

Transaction. Nothing in the First Engagement Letter says that. Eiseman also maintained

that under the terms of the letter, Universal agreed not to rely on Zama for anything. To 

the contrary, Universal only disclaimed reliance on Zama for “general” advice on a list of 

topics, while also making clear the final decision about whether to enter into a transaction 

was Universal’s to make.

At trial, Eiseman and the plaintiffs’ witnesses also emphasized language buried in 

the last substantive paragraph of the First Engagement Letter, after a sentence addressing 

indemnification, a sentence waiving trial by jury, a sentence designating the New York 
12

courts as the exclusive forum for disputes, a sentence disclaiming third party beneficiaries, 

and a sentence disclaiming responsibility for any information provided by any SPAC. The 

pertinent sentences stated:

Neither this agreement nor the receipt of Zama of confidential information 

nor any other matter shall give rise to any fiduciary, equitable or contractual 

duties (including without limitation any duty of trust or confidence) that 

would prevent or restrict [Zama] from acting on behalf of other customers or 

for its own account. Furthermore, [Universal] agrees that neither [Zama] nor 

any member or business of [Zama] is under a duty to disclose to [Universal] 

or use on behalf of [Universal] any information whatsoever about or derived 

from those activities or account for any revenue or profits obtained in 

connection with such activities.

Id. at 5. The paragraph continued with four more sentences: one authorizing signatures by 

counterparts, one prohibiting assignment, one requiring amendments in writing, and a final 

sentence stating that “or” meant “and/or.” Id. Eiseman and the plaintiffs’ witnesses insisted 

that because of this language, Zama could not have acted as a fiduciary to Universal. 

Whether Zama acted as a fiduciary notwithstanding this language does not affect the 

outcome of this case, so this decision expresses no view on that issue. 

E. Eiseman Misleads Takeuchi About Zama’s Interests.

After receiving a draft of the First Engagement Letter, Takeuchi observed that it did 

not contain any provision that called for Zama to be paid. That was surprising, and 

Takeuchi emailed Eiseman about it. JX 40 at 1. Before responding, Eiseman and another 

Zama employee debated whether to be candid with Takeuchi and disclose that Zama 

planned to invest in the SPAC sponsor and be on the other side of the transaction. 

Eiseman’s colleague told him to “be honest.” JX 42 at 2. Eiseman was not. 
13

Eiseman told Takeuchi that Zama did “not need any fees from Universal.” JX 41 at 

1. He offered the following explanation: “We have been shareholders since 2017 following 

the departure of Mr. Okada and believe that the stock price will more than double with the 

right deal, and secondly, we might want to participate in the SPAC deal.” Id.

That was misleading. It was not true that Zama “might want to participate in the 

SPAC deal.” Id. Zama indisputably planned to participate economically in the SPAC’s side 

of the deal. Ten days earlier, one of Eiseman’s colleagues had been upfront about that fact. 

When pitching to a banker who represented SPACs, he stated openly that Zama “expects 

to participate in the SPAC sponsor economics.” JX 37 at 3. The banker was surprised by 

the request and asked to discuss “the notion that your economics would need to come from 

the Sponsor promote (vs generally dilute everyone incrementally).” Id. at 1. The banker 

wrote back that he did not think he would “get a positive response” from a SPAC if the 

proposed deal “comes with an ask to [sic] share promote.” Id. Eiseman intervened and 

confirmed that Zama wanted “to share in the sponsor promote as we’re bringing a fully 

baked deal to the table at an excellent valuation.” JX 39 at 2. 

Eiseman’s email to Takeuchi was also misleading in its reference to Zama’s 

stockholdings in Universal. Eiseman had been making that claim since originally 

contacting Universal, and he had repeated it six months before when Takeuchi asked 

Eiseman if he had any relationship with Leisure and Eiseman responded that Zama was 

“completely independent...” JX 23 at 2. Based on Eiseman’s comments, Takeuchi would 

later suggest that Zama capital held about two million shares, or 2-3% of Universal’s 

outstanding stock. See JX 730 at 3. In reality, Zama never held more than 144,100 shares. 
14

Eiseman claimed at trial that the combination of the First Engagement Letter and 

his email made it clear that he would be investing in the SPAC. That is not so. A reasonable 

reader would understand that Zama might want to “participate in the SPAC deal” on 

Universal’s side through an award of post-transaction equity or similar arrangement that 

aligned Zama’s interests with Universal’s. That is precisely the type of arrangement that 

Zama later secured for itself from Universal. See JX 228. As shown by the SPAC banker’s 

reaction when Eiseman’s colleague was candid about investing in a SPAC, that was not 

customary, and a reasonable reader would not expect it. See JX 37 at 1.

Takeuchi could not recall any discussion about Eiseman’s response about 

participating in the deal. He testified that he “wasn’t really all that interested or didn’t care 

very much.” Takeuchi Tr. 1315. That was because it never occurred to him that Zama 

would be investing in the SPAC’s sponsor and taking a position across the table from 

Universal. From Takeuchi’s demeanor, it was clear that until his testimony, he had no idea 

that Zama had invested in the SPAC and was on the other side of the deal. He then showed 

no understanding of the implications of Zama’s conflict by dismissing it as irrelevant unless 

Zama had steered Universal away from a SPAC offering better terms. He did not appreciate 

that Zama’s conflict permeated the negotiation of the SPAC deal. Either he was too naïve 

or he was in denial. 

Universal’s legal team reviewed the First Engagement Letter. Their only comment 

was to request a non-disclosure provision. JX 43 at 1. Zama added one. See JX 44. 
15

F. Zama Brings A SPAC To The Table.

On February 12, 2021, Universal issued a press release announcing that it was 

formally exploring a public listing of CasinoCo through “the use of a Special Purpose 

Acquisition Company.” JX 46 at 1. Five days later, Universal and Zama executed the First 

Engagement Letter. See JX 48.

Before the issuance of the press release, the senior managers of CasinoCo did not 

know that a SPAC deal was under consideration. Both Byron Yip, CasinoCo’s CEO, and 

Hans Van Der Sande, CasinoCo’s CFO, learned about the effort from the press release.7

On March 1, 2021, Takeuchi informed Yip about the SPAC project and told him 

that “UEC wants all of you to cooperate.” JX 53 at 1. He attached a working group list that 

identified Takeuchi as the project leader. Id. at 2. There were two “sub-leaders”: Van Der 

Sande and Kenshi Asano, the CFO of Universal.8 A working group list for the project 

identified Universal’s “Advisor” on the “Japan Side” as “Baker & McKenzie” and its 

“Advisor” on the “US Side” as “Zama Capital Advisors LP.” Id. at 2. Takeuchi’s working 

group list thus treated Zama’s role on par with Universal’s lawyers. Reflecting their close 

collaboration, Takeuchi and Eiseman set up a weekly update call. JX 58. 

7 See JX 51; JX 53. Yip and Van Der Sande each testified at trial. Both are former 

investment bankers and financially sophisticated. Yip was highly credible. Except for Dan 

Jones, a non-party accountant, Yip was the most credible fact witness in the case. By 

contrast, Van Der Sande’s credibility was destroyed at trial. Only Eiseman was less 

credible.

8

JX 54. Asano testified at trial. Like Fujimoto, he was generally credible, except 

when discussing his involvement in a dodgy bargain involving a senior Philippine official. 
16

The SPAC project was a big opportunity for Takeuchi, and successfully completing 

a SPAC deal became his main priority. Takeuchi already trusted Eiseman, and he naïvely 

took comfort in Eiseman’s eagerness to see CasinoCo go public through a SPAC, believing 

that because Eiseman shared that high-level goal, their interests were aligned. Takeuchi 

never perceived that Eiseman wanted to use the SPAC to generate profits for Zama or that 

Eiseman did not care if those profits came at Universal’s expense.

Takeuchi and Eiseman agreed that Zama would try to locate SPACs whose sponsors 

could add value to a casino business. In March 2021, a mutual acquaintance connected 

Eiseman with Jason Ader, the co-founder and CEO of SpringOwl Asset Management.9

Ader’s claim to fame was serving for eight years as a director of Las Vegas Sands Corp. 

Through 26 Capital Acquisition LLC (the “Sponsor”), Ader controlled a SPAC named 26 

Capital Acquisition Corp. (“26 Capital”).

Eiseman sent Ader information about CasinoCo. He noted that based on peer 

company multiples, CasinoCo had an enterprise value of approximately $5.6 billion and 

that its equity would be worth $6 billion by 2024. JX 60 at 4. He explained that the SPAC 

could invest at the Casino’s construction cost of approximately $3 billion, giving the SPAC 

a built-in gain of 100%, plus additional upside. JX 58. 

9

JX 56. Ader gave a mixed performance on the stand. He is clearly a savvy operator, 

and he was well prepared. He testified credibly on some matters but was impeached on 

others. His memory often failed him on difficult issues.
17

Before introducing Ader to Universal, Eiseman demanded that Zama be allowed to 

purchase a 50% interest in the Sponsor. JX 61. Zama made similar requests when 

contacting other SPACs. Ader countered with a lower percentage. Meanwhile, a SPAC 

backed by baseball superstar Alex Rodriguez was more generous and had more cash, so 

Eiseman went with Rodriguez. See JX 73 at 2, 3. 

At trial, Eiseman implied that he retained Milbank LLP, the defendants’ counsel in 

this action, to advise on Zama buying an interest in a SPAC. That was not so. Eiseman 

engaged Milbank to address a narrower issue: Whether a buy-side interest would cause 

Zama to qualify as a broker-dealer for purposes of the securities laws. Milbank advised 

that it was unlikely that Zama would be treated as a broker-dealer if Zama only acquired a 

passive economic interest. JX 72; JX 73. Milbank gave that advice over a weekend, then 

withdrew from representing Zama the next day because of a conflict. See JX 74; Eiseman 

Tr. 1142–43. Milbank did not give a blanket blessing to Zama’s buyside interest. 

The deal with Rodriguez fell through when he broke up with Jennifer Lopez. The 

additional value that his SPAC could bring to CasinoCo was a concert by Lopez, so without 

that tie in, Universal lost interest.

In June 2021, Eiseman went back to Ader. This time, Eiseman asked to invest 

$5,000,000 in the Sponsor for 5,000,000 Founder Shares and 5,000,000 warrants. JX 84 at 

3. Ader countered, and they compromised at 4,000,000 Founder Shares and 4,500,000 

warrants. JX 87 at 1; JX 89 at 5. On July 12, 2021, Zama and the Sponsor executed a 

subscription agreement. Before Zama’s purchase, Ader owned a total of 6.875 million 

Founder Shares and 7.5 million warrants. The equity that Zama purchased from Ader 
18

comprised 58% of the Founders Shares and 60% of the warrants. Zama thus acquired a 

majority of the economics, but Zama did not gain control over the Sponsor; Ader retained 

control over both the Sponsor and the SPAC. 

At trial, Ader and Eiseman stressed that Zama’s investment was not tied to a specific 

deal. True, but immaterial. Zama had the inside track with Universal, and the investment 

gave Zama an economic incentive to get the best terms possible for the SPAC. For Ader, 

having Zama on board gave him an advantage with Universal that he could not expect with 

any other counterparty. Not surprisingly, Ader shut down his consideration of other targets. 

At trial, Ader and Eiseman testified that it is common for SPAC sponsors to sell 

equity in the sponsor entities, often to fund the expenses of forming the SPAC. Maybe so. 

No one claimed that it was common for the target’s contractual advisor to invest in the 

Sponsor and be on both sides of the deal.

At trial, Ader testified that he only agreed to let Zama invest because Eiseman gave 

him the First Engagement Letter, which authorized the investment. Ader and Eiseman both 

testified that Ader asked whether Universal had approved the investment and Eiseman said 

yes. Ader also testified that he relied on Zama’s representation in the subscription 

agreement that its investment did not violate any agreements to which it was a party. 

It is plausible that when Ader permitted Zama to invest, he had a reasonable belief 

that Universal had signed off. But Eiseman quickly began acting in ways profoundly 

inconsistent with that notion, and by August 2021, it was necessarily apparent to Ader that 

Eiseman was concealing his investment from Universal. Ader, however, played along, and

he and Eiseman worked together to conceal Zama’s investment and the assistance he gave 
19

26 Capital. To cite just one example, Ader did not disclose Zama’s investment in 26 

Capital’s Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2021.

G. The Letter of Intent 

Immediately after Zama bought into the Sponsor, Ader’s assistant sent Eiseman a 

draft letter of intent for a deal with Universal. Ader’s draft specified that the Sponsor would 

receive two board seats and that “Zama and 26 Capital will each appoint a director.” JX 

105 at 2. That term would have revealed Zama’s investment. Eiseman told Ader not to 

mention the board seats. JX 107. Eiseman then revised the letter of intent. JX 108. 

After getting Ader’s signoff on the revised letter of intent, Eiseman sent it to 

Takeuchi. His cover email stated, “I just received an LOI from Jason Ader, the CEO of a 

SPAC named 26 Capital.” JX 113. That was misleading. Eiseman had received a draft of 

the letter of intent, rewritten it for Ader, and then had Ader send it to him, so it looked like 

he had not been involved. 

Eiseman provided Takeuchi information about Ader and 26 Capital. Eiseman did 

not mention that Zama had purchased a 60% interest in the Sponsor.

Eiseman set up a call between Ader and Takeuchi. In advance of the call, Ader sent 

Takeuchi materials about 26 Capital and the potential deal. Eiseman reviewed the 

presentation and had a prep call with Ader. The presentation did not disclose Zama’s 

investment in the Sponsor, and Eiseman and Ader did not disclose it during the meeting. 

The letter of intent contemplated that 26 Capital would bring cash to the deal and 

that the funds “will come from a combination of (i) cash held in trust at 26 Capital of 

$275M and/or, (ii) a contemplated Private Investment in Public Equity (‘PIPE’) of 
20

approximately $200M.” JX 113 at 2. Ader simultaneously sent an email to his investment 

bankers at Cantor LLP, told them about the deal with Universal, and noted that that 

“Brookfield Properties will be providing $200 [mm] in structured PIPE and a $50mm 

forward purchase at $10.” JX 115 at 1. At trial, Ader and Eiseman claimed that there was 

never any plan for the SPAC to bring cash to the deal. That was not true. 

Ader noted in his email to Cantor that he had copied Eiseman, whom he described 

as “our partner in pursuit of closing this transaction with Universal quickly.” JX 115 at 1; 

see Ader Tr. 192. That was an unwittingly candid assessment of the relationship that Ader 

and Eiseman had established. Regardless of the formal legal structure of Zama’s 

investment, Ader and Eiseman had formed a common law partnership, defined as a joint 

enterprise in pursuit of profit. Their goal was to profit by closing a deal with Universal on 

the best possible terms for themselves. 

The Universal team thought Ader was an exciting partner who could help create 

value for CasinoCo because of his experience at Las Vegas Sands. Universal decided to 

move forward with 26 Capital. 

H. The Deal Negotiations 

The next step was to negotiate a merger agreement. During that process, Eiseman 

and his colleague, Christian Littlejohn, secretly advised Ader on how to get better terms 

for 26 Capital.

10 Then they turned around and advised Universal to accept those terms. 

10 Littlejohn testified at trial by video. His testimony had the same hallmarks as 

Eiseman’s, and this decision treats his testimony similarly. 
21

Eiseman and Littlejohn first met with Ader and one of his colleagues to develop a 

list of SPAC-favorable deal points that they wanted included in the merger agreement. See 

JX 123. Eiseman and Littlejohn then spent two weeks working with 26 Capital and its 

lawyers on what terms to propose. On August 3, 2021, Eiseman and Littlejohn participated 

in a call with Ader and 26 Capital’s lawyers. During the call, Eiseman texted Ader to push 

the lawyers to draft a SPAC-friendly agreement, writing: “Definitely they should do very 

pro spac.” JX 125. Ader responded: “Yes. Most stuff may get missed.” Id. Eiseman later 

reiterated the point, writing: “We can actually be fairly aggressive re: pro spac in my 

opinion.” Id. 

Eiseman also sought to influence Universal’s choice of counsel. A few days after 

the August 3 meeting, Eiseman told Ader that he was going to steer Universal away from 

using Milbank and toward using a less sophisticated firm. He explained that Milbank 

“[w]ill be smarter and might push back on some of our sponsor friendly stuff.” JX 126.

Eiseman and his colleagues reviewed and commented on three turns of the draft 

merger agreement before Ader sent it to Universal. After reviewing a draft, Eiseman 

recommended that they “be silent in the merger doc re: B share conversion and redemptions 

inclusive of anti-dilution provisions.” JX 128 at 1. Those concepts affected how the 

Sponsor would benefit from the transaction, including being protected against dilution 

from a PIPE. Littlejohn separately advised 26 Capital’s lawyers to omit language on issues 

such as board composition that might reveal Zama’s involvement. See JX 131.

On August 16, 2021, Eiseman participated in a call between Ader and Universal 

about the governance structure of the post-transaction company. Before the call, Eiseman 
22

sent Ader a list of talking points with pro-SPAC positions he should take on various issues. 

JX 133. During the call, Ader noted that Universal’s lawyers “don’t understand SPACs.” 

JX 135 at 3. Eiseman texted back, “Agree.” Id. Shortly thereafter, he texted: “It’s excellent 

the other lawyers don’t understand spacs. / Although makes it a bit of a pain to structure 

[it] lowers risk of push back on key items.” Id. 

During a subsequent call between 26 Capital and Universal on August 19, 2021, 

Eiseman gave Ader advice in real time. During the call, one of 26 Capital’s lawyers began 

talking about the Class B shares and redemptions. Eiseman sent Ader a rapid-fire series of 

texts: “Have him stop / Now / Don’t bring up different shareholder classes / Let’s pray this 

class b comment doesn’t lead down a bad path / They had never brought up in front of 

Japan before.” JX 141. Ader responded, “Told him to shut up.” Id. Eiseman followed up 

with another string of texts: “Good, could really screw is [sic] with those comments worked 

hard to bury b shares in the doc, now it’s out of the box / Let’s just never bring up again 

and hope they forget.” Id.

Also on August 19, 2021, Eiseman chastised a law clerk who circulated a working 

group list for the SPAC project which listed Zama as an advisor to 26 Capital. That was 

understandable, because that was what Zama was doing, but Eiseman accused him of 

making a “very serious mistake.” JX 144. He insisted that the law clerk immediately 

circulate a revised list that put his name and Littlejohn’s name under Takeuchi’s and did 

not identify Zama separately. He instructed the law clerk to provide the following 

explanation: “Please note the mistake in the prior draft working group list, [sic] Zama is 

not part of 26 Capital, it’s an investor in Universal and is working with it on the 
23

transaction.” JX 143 at 1. That was false. Zama was part of 26 Capital, and Zama was 

acting as an advisor to Universal, not merely as an investor to Universal. See JX 142. The 

law clerk complied with Eiseman’s instructions. See JX 139. 

Ader did not send a draft of the merger agreement to Universal until August 27, 

2021. See JX 149. Eiseman advised Ader to “address email sending it over to Takeuchi and 

myself, and then I can reach out to Takeuchi on Sunday with my take on the doc, etc.” JX 

2087. When Ader sent the email, he followed Eiseman’s advice and addressed it to “Alex 

and Mr. Takeuchi,” as if Eiseman was seeing it for the first time. JX 149 at 1. In reality, 

Eiseman and Littlejohn had been commenting on drafts all along. Takeuchi and Universal 

did not learn until this litigation about how Zama helped 26 Capital. 

Having advised 26 Capital on how to get a better deal out of Universal, Eiseman 

switched sides and pitched Universal on why “this transaction is great for UEC.” JX 155

at 1. He told Takeuchi off the bat that the draft merger agreement “appears to be standard 

except for the inclusion of modifications made to accommodate Philippine corporate law.” 

JX 2088. That was not true. Eiseman had worked with Ader and 26 Capital’s lawyers to 

make the draft—in his words—“very pro SPAC.”

Universal had its counsel at Baker & McKenzie prepare an issues list. The list 

consisted of a matrix that identified a series of points in the merger agreement where 

Universal could push back. See JX 154. Belying his claim that Zama was only a finder, 

Eiseman received a copy of this privileged document so that he could offer input. He added 

his comments to the matrix, then emailed his version of the matrix to Takeuchi, claiming 

that his comments “focus on achieving two key objectives: i.) preventing immaterial issues 
24

from causing delays and ii.) not risking the deal by trying to renegotiate business points at 

this stage in the process.” Id. at 1. That was false. Eiseman was attempting to convince 

Universal not to counter on a series of material and open issues by claiming that that many 

of them were (i) immaterial or (ii) previously agreed-upon business points. Id.

To sell Takeuchi on the deal, Eiseman advised him that “the three most important 

items in the agreement” were “i.) valuation, ii.) securing exclusivity (e.g. making sure the 

SPAC can’t back out post signing), and iii.) allowing for enough time to insure [sic] deal 

completion.” JX 154 at 1. All three were skillful distractions. 

The valuation in the draft merger agreement was the minimum that Universal 

wanted. Universal could have bargained for a higher valuation, but that would have been 

bad for 26 Capital. Eiseman told Takeuchi that Universal should not counter on valuation 

because the deal valued the Casino “at a very attractive price.” Id. It valued the Casino at 

its construction cost. 

Securing exclusivity was a non-issue because both Eiseman and Ader dearly wanted 

to complete a deal with Universal. They were not going anywhere. Immediately after Zama 

purchased its interest in the Sponsor, Ader abandoned 26 Capital’s pursuit of a competing 

deal. Eiseman did not mention Zama’s buyside interest, which was material to Universal’s 

decision on granting exclusivity.

Allowing enough time to ensure deal completion was not a negotiating priority; it 

was something both sides wanted. An early drop-dead date would let either side walk. 

Because both sides wanted the deal, neither needed to expend bargaining leverage on the 

timeline. 
25

In contrast to Eiseman’s efforts at misdirection, Baker & McKenzie flagged points 

that Universal should have addressed. Baker & McKenzie highlighted the absence of either 

a minimal cash condition or an obligation on 26 Capital’s part to complete a PIPE to make 

up any capital shortfall. Id. at 5, 9. Having those provisions would be bad for 26 Capital, 

and Eiseman advised Takeuchi against countering on either point. On the PIPE, he told 

Takeuchi:

Business understanding is that no PIPE is required. Postsigning the Sponsor may present additional financing 

proposals to UEC that may be accepted at UEC’s discretion 

(e.g. new equity issuance by SPAC post-signing requires UEC 

consent). Business side priority is locking-in the SPAC and the 

valuation as quickly as possible.

Id. at 5. On the absence of a minimum cash condition, he said the same thing. Id. at 7. In 

reality, there was no business understanding on either point; Eiseman simply claimed there 

was. And Universal’s business priority was not locking-in the SPAC or the valuation. That 

was Ader and Eiseman’s priority. 

Baker & McKenzie also flagged the possibility of asking for limitations on the 

Sponsor’s equity participation, such as a cutback if the Sponsor did not bring sufficient 

cash to the deal. Id. at 8. Eiseman again advised against countering on this issue, stating: 

“Business understanding is that there will be no conditions placed on Sponsor’s equity 

other than those already in place (e.g. the Lock-up).” Id. There was no business 

understanding on that point either.

Eiseman did not stop with his initial comments. Again belying his claim that Zama 

was only a finder, he participated in a call between Takeuchi and Baker & McKenzie about 
26

Universal’s counter. Eiseman again advised Takeuchi that he should not push back on the 

points Baker & McKenzie had identified. See JX 159. Eiseman also headed off Van Der 

Sande when he argued a merger agreement without a minimum cash condition or a PIPE 

contingency was a bad idea. Eiseman told Van Der Sande: “[T]his is the business 

agreement . . . . You can’t touch any of these.” JX 1558 at 97. That was not true. 

By pretending to be Universal’s advisor, Eiseman and Littlejohn convinced 

Takeuchi not to counter on a series of pro-SPAC points and to overrule changes that Baker 

& McKenzie proposed. See JX 164. For example, Baker & McKenzie wanted Universal to 

have sole control over the terms of the PIPE. See id. at 1. Littlejohn argued that the terms 

of the PIPE should be mutually acceptable and that such a term “give UEC the ability to 

control the outcome but not limit the ability of 26 Capital to discuss different PIPE 

options.” Id. at 1. That made no sense. Universal could not “control the outcome” if 26 

Capital’s consent was required. And nothing prevented 26 Capital from discussing 

different PIPE options in a world where Universal controlled the decision. 26 Capital 

simply had to convince Universal that its proposal made sense. But Takeuchi trusted 

Eiseman and Littlejohn, and he believed their doubletalk. Along similar lines, Littlejohn

convinced Takeuchi to restore a representation by Universal that Baker & McKenzie 

deleted, add back in covenants that Baker & McKenzie had removed, and agree that 

Universal would bear fees rather than having 26 Capital bear them. See id. at 1–2.

At trial, Eiseman insisted that he also helped improve the deal for CasinoCo. He 

points out that he secured a higher valuation than either Leisure or SLAM had offered and 

that Universal’s shares were not subject to a lockup. The fact that the merger agreement 
27

was not all bad does not mean that Eiseman did good. A double agent who wants to keep 

being a double agent must not to be too blatant in their betrayal. 

26 Capital’s lawyers have stressed that Universal also had other advisors. That is 

true, just as it was true that were other FBI agents besides Robert Hansen, other CIA 

officers besides Aldritch Ames, and other MI6 officers besides Kim Philby. Over thirty 

Baker & McKenzie lawyers worked on the transaction, and Van Der Sande was also a 

member of the team. But Eiseman was the man whom Takeuchi trusted, and he gave the 

critical advice about what should be in the agreement. See, e.g., JX 160 at 1; JX 2089. 

I. The Merger Agreement

On October 14, 2021, CasinoCo’s board of directors unanimously approved the 

merger agreement. On October 15, the Universal board of directors approved it.

Zama did not participate in either meeting. At trial, Ader and Eiseman stressed that 

fact, but it made no difference. Takeuchi made the presentation, and he had internalized 

Eiseman’s palaver. Takeuchi trusted Eiseman and thought he was getting advice from a 

firm that had committed contractually to help Universal negotiate with a SPAC 

counterparty. He had no idea that Zama owned 60% of the equity in the Sponsor and was 

working with Ader to get the best possible terms for 26 Capital. 

Takeuchi’s report to the Universal directors showed that he did not know that Zama 

was working as a double agent. He told the directors that Ader owned 6.875 million Class 

B shares, when in fact Zama owned 58% of those shares. JX 206 at 23. He also told the 

directors that 26 Capital would bring $275 million to the deal, when 26 Capital actually 

had no obligation to bring any funds to closing at all. Id. 
28

Later that month, Universal and Zama entered into a new engagement letter. JX 228

(the “Second Engagement Letter”). 26 Capital’s counsel helped Eiseman draft it. This time, 

Universal agreed to make an upfront payment of $2.5 million in cash plus a deferred 

payment of $7.5 million in cash and stock if CasinoCo achieved a public listing. Id. at 2. 

Zama agreed “to provide strategy and business consulting services, including services 

related to [the transaction] as described in the attached Appendix.” Id. The appendix listed 

forty-two areas where Zama would provide advice. The list basically encompasses the steps 

necessary to standup CasinoCo as a public issuer.

At trial, Eiseman argued that Universal agreed to pay Zama contingent 

compensation of $7.5 million to incentivize Zama to get the transaction closed. Of course, 

he also claimed that Universal knew he had an interest in the Sponsor, and that interest 

already gave him an even greater economic incentive to get the deal closed. Eiseman’s 

claim that Universal knew about his buyside interest was false. He only obtained the 

contingent compensation arrangement because he had successfully concealed his interest 

in the Sponsor from Universal. The Second Engagement Letter also exemplifies what a 

reasonable observer would have understood Eiseman meant when he emailed Takeuchi 

that Zama “might want to participate in the SPAC deal.” JX 41 at 1. A reasonable observer 

would have understood that Eiseman meant some form of transaction-based compensation 

that aligned Zama’s interests with Universal’s. No one would have suspected that he meant 

buying an interest in the Sponsor.

26 Capital has claimed in this litigation that the Second Engagement Letter gave 

Zama authority to carry out each of the forty-two categories of tasks identified in the 
29

appendix. That is not so. None of the tasks were assigned to Zama alone. All were 

designated for either “UEC/Zama,” “UEC/Zama/26 Capital,” or “UEC/Zama/26 

Capital/Legal.” JX 228 at 11–14. The Second Engagement Letter did not give Zama any 

authority to act unilaterally. 

J. Ader Enriches Himself.

Shortly after the merger agreement was signed, Ader used the pending transaction 

to address a personal problem. Ader’s mother was an investor in SpringOwl and wanted to 

exit. She retained Proskauer Rose LLP to represent her and put pressure on Ader.

To solve his personal problem, Ader pitched an investment in the Sponsor to the 

family office of a billionaire investor (the “Family Office”). Ader told Universal that the 

Family Office was a potential PIPE investor and should be given access to the data room 

set up for PIPE investors. See Ader Tr. 219–221; JX 242. In reliance on Ader’s 

representation, Universal signed a non-disclosure agreement with the Family Office, and 

the Family Office accessed the data room. 

But the Family Office was not a PIPE investor. Ader pitched the Family Office on 

a direct investment in the Sponsor that would give him liquidity to buy out his mother. 

Through an entity called Rimu Capital Ltd., the Family Office paid $25,000,000 to the 

Sponsor to purchase 2,500,000 of the Sponsor’s Class B Founders Shares (approximately 

36% of the total) and warrants to purchase 2,500,000 Class A shares (approximately 33% 

of the total). JX 1646 at 8. Ader immediately distributed the money to himself, paid his 

mother $16 million, and pocketed the rest. Universal did not learn of Rimu’s interest in the

Sponsor until this litigation. 
30

After the Rimu transaction closed, Ader retained only 875,000 Class B shares in the 

Sponsor and 1.5 million warrants. He had sold 6 million of the Sponsor’s 6.875 million 

Class B Founders Shares (87%) and 6 million of the Sponsor’s 7.5 million warrants (80%). 

K. Progress Toward Closing

After the signing of the merger agreement, Universal and its subsidiaries worked 

diligently to get to closing. They made rapid progress. The Philippine Amusement and 

Gaming Commission signed off on the transaction in November 2021. The Philippine 

Bureau of Internal Revenue and the Philippine Central Bank granted their approvals in 

March 2022. The Philippine Securities and Exchange Commission granted its approval in 

April 2022.

The parties also made progress on the Form F-4. They filed a confidential draft with 

the SEC on December 13, 2021, and the SEC provided comments on January 16, 2022.

The Form F-4 was filed publicly on February 22, 2022. The parties twice amended the 

Form F-4 in response to additional comments from the SEC. See JX 1652.

Despite the objective evidence of progress, 26 Capital tried to prove that CasinoCo’s 

two top managers—Yip and Van Der Sande—opposed the deal unless they obtained 

bonuses and employment agreements for themselves. That is not what the evidence shows. 

Yip and Van Der Sande did think that they should receive transaction bonuses. They 

thought that was standard, and they wanted what management usually got. See JX 210; see 

also Yip Tr. 686–88. 
31

Yip was also concerned for his job. He had been left off the deal team, and he 

understood that Fujimoto, Universal’s CEO, wanted to replace him with Asano, 

Universal’s CFO. See JX 200; Yip Tr. 690. 

Eiseman was interacting with Yip and Van Der Sande and learned about their 

concerns. He caucused with Ader. They thought Yip and Van Der Sande were making 

reasonable requests and that having their support would help get the deal closed, so they 

went to bat for them. 

Eiseman and Ader argued to Universal that Yip and Van Der Sande should get 

transaction bonuses. JX 2291 at 5; Yip Tr. 688. They also tried to protect Yip’s job. They 

had a call with Fujimoto, who made clear that he wanted to replace Yip with Asano. See 

JX 2097. After the call, Ader emailed a letter to Fujimoto, copying Eiseman and Takeuchi, 

to express his “strong recommendation that Byron [Yip] remain as President of [CasinoCo] 

at least until the close of the SPAC merger.” JX 356 at 2. 

Fujimoto would not back down and insisted on, at a minimum, Asano having a 

position at Holdings that gave him authority over Yip. See JX 362; JX 367. Ader called 

Yip, referenced “combat pay,” and asked what type of employment agreement he would 

need to feel secure working towards the closing, even if it meant that he was terminated 

afterward. See Yip Tr. 839–40. Yip responded that both he and Van Der Sande needed 

employment agreements, and he sent Ader an email outlining the provisions he thought his 

agreement should contain. Yip did not make any increased demands, only what he had 

previously asked for and what Eiseman and Ader thought would be reasonable. See JX 367 

at 12. Eiseman and Ader agreed with his request. See JX 368; see also JX 379. Ader
32

testified at trial that Yip demanded the agreement as a quid pro quo for supporting the deal. 

That testimony was not credible. Ader was the initiator, not Yip. 

The employment agreements, however, were not forthcoming. In April 2022, Van 

Der Sande had the creative idea that Ader could join CasinoCo’s board and approve the 

employment agreements. Ader and Eiseman were ready to give it a try. See JX 1667. But 

26 Capital’s lawyers stepped in and told Ader that it was a terrible idea. See JX 473; JX 

1668. Ader followed his lawyers’ advice, and the idea died. 

L. The Status Quo Ante Order

At the end of April 2022, a surprise ruling from the Philippine Supreme Court threw

a wrench into the deal process. Since his ouster from Okada Holdings, Okada had 

challenged his removal through litigation in Japan, Hong Kong, and the Philippines. 

Okada’s lawsuits in Japan and Hong Kong had failed. In the Philippines, a trial court had 

ruled against Okada, and the intermediate appellate court affirmed that ruling. 

Okada appealed to the Philippine Supreme Court. On April 27, 2022, the Philippine

Supreme Court issued an order which directed CasinoCo, without further explanation, “to 

observe the status quo prevailing prior to the removal of [Okada] as stockholder, director, 

chairman, and CEO of [CasinoCo] in 2017.” JX 504 (the “Status Quo Ante Order”). 

On May 1, 2022, CasinoCo learned that Okada planned to hold a meeting of 

stockholders and install a new board of directors. The next day, a group loyal to Okada, 

escorted by a local sheriff, visited the Casino and demanded control. When Van Der Sande 

refused, the group left after threatening that everyone was in contempt.
33

Initially, the parties thought Okada’s litigation was frivolous and that the Status Quo 

Ante Order had been granted improvidently. CasinoCo filed an emergency motion for 

reconsideration, which everyone expected to set matters straight. See JX 512. In the 

meantime, the parties disagreed about what the Status Quo Ante Order meant for the 

transaction. Ader and Eiseman wanted to move rapidly to closing. See JX 521; JX 526. 

They argued that 26 Capital should provide minimal additional disclosure, such as through 

a Form 8-K or an additional risk factor in the Form F-4, and that nothing else was 

necessary. See JX 535; JX 536. 

The Universal side was more cautious. They thought that more detailed disclosure 

was necessary. They also worried about closing without first convincing the Philippine

Supreme Court to modify or lift the Status Quo Ante Order. See JX 544 at 1; JX 546; JX 

554; JX 1698; JX 1700; JX 2109. Not surprisingly, the Universal parties received extensive 

legal advice on the implications of the Status Quo Ante Order. See JX 1577. 

Eiseman caucused with Ader, and they decided that 26 Capital should ask Universal 

to amend the merger agreement to extend the outside date for completing the deal to 

October 1, 2022. Eiseman and Ader co-wrote a letter, and Ader sent it. See JX 525; JX 533. 

Eiseman then advised Takeuchi to push Fujimoto to accept the extension. JX 528; JX 529. 

Eiseman told Ader that he wanted “to raise hell to close by 6/30” and “to be in a super 

strong position to make sure that they can’t terminate.” JX 536 at 2. When Eiseman referred 

to “they,” he meant Universal, his contractual client. 

Eiseman began raising hell. To put pressure on Universal, he claimed that 26 Capital 

would sue if they did not move quickly to closing. See JX 552; JX 553; JX 2270; JX 2111.
34

Although Zama had contractually agreed to act as Universal’s advisor, Eiseman accused 

Universal of inventing pretexts. See JX 543; JX 1830. Despite not being a lawyer, despite 

having no expertise in Philippine law, and despite never having been involved in a capital 

markets transaction, Eiseman claimed that the Status Quo Ante Order posed no impediment 

to closing, and he accused Universal of “attempting to use the Status Quo Order as a legal 

excuse.” JX 546 at 2. 

Van Der Sande could not understand Eiseman’s behavior and began to suspect that 

he was working with Ader. JX 541 at 4. In a particularly egregious incident, Eiseman

secretly joined a call between Ader and Van Der Sande about closing. JX 541. During the 

call, Eiseman texted advice to Ader about what to say. When Van Der Sande asked Ader 

if he was working with Eiseman, Ader lied. He told Van Der Sande that he had not talked 

to Eiseman for days. Id.

On May 20, 2022, Universal received a no-comment notice from the SEC indicating 

that the Form F-4 would be declared effective as soon as it was resubmitted with a risk 

factor disclosing the Status Quo Ante Order. JX 537. The SEC approved the revised Form 

F-4 on May 27, permitting the transaction to proceed. JX 571. 

M. The Takeover

On May 31, 2022, a platoon of local police entered the Casino, gained physical 

control of the premises, and forcibly ejected CasinoCo’s management. They were led by 

Dindo Espelata and Antonio “Tonyboy” Cojuangco, two of Okada’s lieutenants.

Universal no longer had access to CasinoCo’s finance, accounting, and legal 

departments. CasinoCo’s local auditor refused to do any additional work. UHY LLP, which 
35

had audited CasinoCo’s financial statements for purposes of the Form F-4, withdrew its 

consent to use its opinion letter for the transaction. 

CasinoCo presented videos at trial that showed the violent nature of the takeover. 

Even Ader and Eiseman found the videos shocking. See JX 583. Everyone’s immediate 

priority became ensuring the safety of their employees and regaining control of the Casino. 

Except, that is, for Ader, Zama, and Takeuchi. Ader and Zama seemed not to care 

about the fate of the employees and remained laser focused on closing the transaction. See 

JX 575; JX 579; JX 581; JX 582; JX 585; JX 588; JX 592. Takeuchi followed their lead 

and instructed Van Der Sande to sign a filing with the SEC. When Van Der Sande told him 

that the takeover made that impossible, Takeuchi insisted: “They are clearly breaking laws 

and terrorists. We will shut them out and Okada Manila will just keep business as usual. 

Also we will continue SPAC transaction.” JX 580 at 4.

On June 1, 2022, Universal received a memorandum from Baker & McKenzie’s 

Tokyo office providing expedited advice about whether to try to close the transaction,

notwithstanding the takeover and the Status Quo Ante Order. The memorandum described 

the language of the Status Quo Ante Order as “unclear” and noted that it was “difficult to 

accurately determine the scope of the Order.” JX 595 at 3. The lawyers suggested that any 

change to CasinoCo would likely constitute a violation of the Status Quo Ante Order, but 

that because the transaction contemplated the creation of a new intermediate holding 

company that was technically not subject to the order, and because that entity would issue 

only a minority of its shares to the public, proceeding with the transaction was “low risk.” 
36

Id. The lawyers nevertheless recommended waiting to close the transaction until the 

Philippine Supreme Court had clarified or lifted the Status Quo Ante Order. Id. at 4. 

With the benefit of this advice, the parties believed that the transaction could close 

in June 2022. See, e.g., JX 602 at 1. By that time, they expected to have regained control 

of the Casino and to have clarification that the Status Quo Ante Order did not prevent 

closing. That is not what happened. 

N. The Dodgy Bargain

Universal and CasinoCo initially tried to regain control of the Casino using the 

judicial process. CasinoCo had already filed an emergency motion for reconsideration with 

the Philippine Supreme Court. After the takeover, CasinoCo filed a supplement on June 9, 

2022. The Philippine Supreme Court took no action. 

Meanwhile, on June 3, 2022, Michelle Lazaro suggested an alternative to the 

judicial process. Lazaro was a director of CasinoCo and its Corporate Secretary. She and

another director, James Lorenzana, moved in elite circles in the Philippines.

In an email to Asano, Takeuchi, and a Universal director, Lazaro explained that she 

and Lorenzana had a relationship with a “common friend” who was a “key person” in the 

Philippines, who had “helped UEC in the past,” and who was “the best option to lead UEC 

out of this current disturbing situation.” JX 605 at 1. She also said that “the key person (our 

common friend) feels that my involvement moving forward is indispensable” such that he 

was “reluctant to provide further assistance or to pursue any potential partnership” unless 

her “concerns” were addressed. Id. at 2. 
37

The “common friend” was Martin Romualdez, Speaker of the House for the 

Philippines, a nephew by blood of former Philippine First Lady Imelda Marcos, nephew 

by marriage of former Philippine President Ferdinand Marcus, cousin of Philippine Senator 

Imee Marcos, and cousin of then President-elect Ferdinand “Bonbong” Marcos. JX 674. 

To confirm her connections, Lazaro texted Takeuchi two pictures of herself with 

Romualdez. She noted that a third individual in one of the pictures was the chair of the 

Philippine Gaming Commission. See JX 641. 

Lazaro’s email led to a term sheet. It provided as follows: 

• Lazaro and Lorenzana would receive payments from CasinoCo of $35,000 per 

month (net of taxes).

• The board of CasinoCo would be expanded to thirteen members with Lazaro and 

Lorenzana having the right to designate six.

• The Casino Committee’s key officers, including Yip and Van Der Sande would 

receive three-year, evergreen employment agreements.

o The new agreements would more than double their compensation.

o The new agreements would only permit them to be terminated for cause by 

a supermajority of the board, which would require consent from Lazaro, 

Lorenzana, and their designees. 

JX 656. Ader approved the term sheet. See JX 655 at 1. Fujimoto signed it. JX 656.

The plan for moving forward also involved delivering something to Romualdez. 

The head of Universal’s overseas operations would make a “business trip to the 

Philippines” carrying “heavy luggage” that included an “item” for “No. 2.” JX 725 at 4. 

Once “the actual item arrives safely,” then a different senior Universal executive would 
38

“set up an interview with Martin.” Id. Asano noted that at that point, “[s]ince we have kept 

our promise, it is No. 2’s turn to keep the promise.” Id.

Ader testified that he was unaware of any scheme involving Romualdez, but that 

testimony was not credible. See Ader Tr. 282–84. Both Ader and Eiseman understood the 

strategy and were on board. For example, on the same day Lazaro sent her email, Eiseman’s 

partner Littlejohn texted Ader that “UE has enlisted significant political support from a 

VERY high level of the Philippine government with compensation of the arrangement all 

tied to taking back control of the casino.” JX 647. Two days later, Van Der Sande texted 

Ader and told him that the information he received was “very highly confidential” and 

“very sensitive” and could not be discussed publicly. JX 665. Eiseman then researched 

Romualdez and sent the information to Ader and Littlejohn. JX 674. Ader admitted that 

hearing about “No. 2” and knew that it was an alias for a high-ranking Philippine official.

Ader Tr. 280. Although he claimed at trial to have thought “No. 2” meant Lazaro, that was 

not credible. Compare Ader Tr. 280 with Ader Dep. 238–41.

Ader and Eiseman supported the plan by writing letters designed to create the 

impression that the deal would fall apart unless the Philippine Supreme Court lifted the 

Status Quo Ante Order. Ader sent a letter asserting that Universal and CasinoCo had 

breached the merger agreement. See JX 720. Eiseman sent a letter from Zama questioning

what Universal was doing to address the takeover. See JX 719.

On July 27, 2022, Universal executive Sato Nobuki traveled from Japan to the 

Philippines. Another Universal executive, Hajime Tokuda, scheduled a meeting with 

Romualdez for the next day. JX 730. 
39

The meeting lasted ninety minutes. To accommodate the meeting, Romualdez

returned from inspecting an earthquake disaster area in Luzon. JX 731 at 3. The Universal 

executives gave Romualdez the letters from 26 Capital and Zama to show that “it would 

be a huge problem if the ruling by the Supreme Court was prolonged any longer.” Id. Then 

they told Romualdez that they “wanted to ask a favor of an early resolution.” Id. Romualdez

“then and there” made ex parte calls and sent a text to several members of the Philippine 

Supreme Court, including its “chairman.” Id. at 4. The Universal executives understood 

that there were three judges involved, with “one judge on the other side” and two judges 

“[o]n our side.” Id. The Universal executives reported to their colleagues that “the pressure 

by No. 2 must be working.” Id.

Expecting that Romualdez’s intervention would end the takeover, the parties 

executed an amendment to the merger agreement. It extended the outside date for closing 

the transaction to October 1, 2022. JX 685.

No one addressed the legality of this type of arrangement in the Philippines. It 

nevertheless appears that Lazaro and Lorenzana brokered a dodgy bargain in which they 

offered to have Romualdez intervene in return for (i) increased control over CasinoCo’s 

board, (ii) compensation of $35,000 per month (net of taxes), (iii) employment agreements 

for the local executives like Yip and Van Der Sande, and (iv) an “item” for Romualdez.

At trial, Universal’s witnesses offered a series of implausible explanations for the 

dodgy bargain. They claimed that the “heavy luggage” referred to original documents from 

the lawsuits against Okada in Japan and Hong Kong that had to be transported by hand, 

either because the takeover had deprived CasinoCo of access to its printers, Asano Tr. 794, 
40

812, or because Philippine law required the submission of originals in court filings, Van 

Der Sande Tr. 534. That testimony was not credible. 

First, CasinoCo had lawyers, and their lawyers had printers. Second, Philippine law 

permits the use of electronic versions. Third, Universal had already filed documents from 

those lawsuits as part of its original efforts to lift the Status Quo Ante Order. Fourth, a 

senior Universal executive would not be tasked with carrying documents when a courier 

would do. Fifth, the internal Universal emails referred to an “item,” which is an odd word 

to use for documents. Sixth, the internal Universal emails spoke in code, referring not only 

to the “item” and “heavy luggage,” but also to “Martin” and “No. 2.” Discussions about 

court filings do not require that type of subterfuge. Finally, when the Universal executives 

met with Romualdez, they showed him the letters from 26 Capital and Zama about the deal 

being in jeopardy. Those letters were not heavy. 

O. The Clarifying Order

After meeting with Romualdez, CasinoCo made an additional filing with the 

Philippine Supreme Court seeking vacatur of the Status Quo Ante Order. JX 733. The filing

included the letters from 26 Capital and Zama. Id. at 9, 11. Everyone expected that the 

Status Quo Ante Order would soon be lifted. 

To Universal’s consternation, the Philippine Supreme Court did not play ball. 

Instead, on August 10, 2022, the Philippine Supreme Court issued a clarifying order that

explained that Okada was an “indirect or beneficial” owner of CasinoCo’s equity and 

therefore was entitled to “preserve the corporate assets” of CasinoCo against “dissipation” 

while the lawsuit challenging his ouster worked its way through the Philippine courts. JX 
41

753 (the “Clarifying Order”). Okada’s claims of dissipation included a challenge to the deSPAC transaction itself, which Okada claimed would “bankrupt” CasinoCo. Id. at 5. The 

Clarifying Order remanded the matter to an intermediate appellate court to evaluate, among 

other things, whether CasinoCo intended to list its shares in the United States. Id. at 19. 

The Clarifying Order made clear that the Status Quo Ante Order remained in effect pending 

the outcome of that inquiry. But the Clarifying Order also stated that the intent of the order 

was not to cause “disruption” and that the order did not “direct the doing or undoing of 

acts.” Id. at 12–13.

Through these statements, the Clarifying Order seemed to reaffirm the Status Quo 

Ante Order and to confirm that it applied to the de-SPAC transaction. There was now 

greater risk that closing would violate the Status Quo Ante Order, not less. 

P. The Forcible Retaking Of The Casino

After the Philippine Supreme Court left the Status Quo Ante Order in place, the 

executive branches came to Universal’s aid. The Philippine Department of Justice and the 

Philippine Gaming Commission declared the takeover illegal. See JX 778. On September 

2, 2022, the Philippine National Police helped Universal regain control of the Casino. Id.

For CasinoCo, retaking the premises was only the first step in righting the ship. 

Management had to recreate the Casino’s security team, because some of its members had 

assisted with the takeover. Management had to check for stolen assets. They had to review 

all of the contracts that Okada and his group had executed. Management also faced the 

Herculean task of preparing the Company’s financial statements. 
42

Meanwhile, the extended outside date was less than a month away. Ader had asked 

Universal to extend the outside date further so that the transaction could close. See JX 757. 

What to do about the extension request was not obvious. Takeuchi wanted to extend. 

JX 793. The SPAC market, however, had deteriorated, and Yip and Van Der Sande were

concerned that 26 Capital would face a high level of withdrawals. Regardless of the amount

of cash that it brought to the transaction, 26 Capital would receive the same equity stake in 

the post-transaction entity. A high rate of redemptions simply meant that the Sponsor 

would receive a greater share. Not knowing about Zama’s involvement, Yip and Van Der 

Sande thought that Ader would receive a windfall. They both thought Universal should not 

extend the outside date and should let the transaction lapse. Van Der Sande Dep. 101. For 

help in evaluating Universal’s options, they turned to Milbank, which prepared memoranda 

analyzing the legal risks associated with various options. See JX 797 at 12–21, 27–31. 

Ader and Eiseman wanted Universal to agree to an extension then close as quickly 

as possible. Zama began pressuring CasinoCo’s auditors at UHY to complete its work on 

the financial statements. See JX 771; JX 787. Through Takeuchi, Ader and Eiseman began 

to hear that Yip and Van Der Sande had grown skeptical about the transaction. See JX 799; 

JX 800. Ader and Eiseman inferred that Yip and Van Der Sande felt empowered by the 

dodgy bargain and no longer wanted a U.S. listing. JX 803 at 2–3. They decided to hire a 

private investigator to find dirt on Van Der Sande. See JX 879; JX 894.

During a call on September 12, 2022, Eiseman and Littlejohn advised Takeuchi that 

Universal should agree to an extension because otherwise 26 Capital would sue and 

discovery would be very bad. JX 2031 at 9, 14. As part of an effort to seem credible, 
43

Eiseman falsely reassured Takeuchi that he was “not part of . . . Jason [Ader].” Id. at 70. 

He repeatedly told Takeuchi “I work for you” and “I think it’s clear that I work for you.” 

Id. at 71. Eiseman recorded the call, so he could not deny making those false statements. 

See JX 1628. During the call, Eiseman and Littlejohn did everything they could to benefit 

26 Capital.

On September 16, 2022, Ader sent Universal a letter alleging breaches of the merger 

agreement. JX 828. Universal responded and contested the allegations of breach. JX 840. 

On September 20, 2022, Takeuchi learned about legal memoranda that Milbank had 

prepared to analyze Universal’s options. Takeuchi felt betrayed by his colleagues. Still 

thinking that Zama was Universal’s contractual advisor, Takeuchi forwarded the

memoranda to Eiseman. JX 866. 

Eiseman reviewed the memoranda and sent Takeuchi a set of points to make at an 

upcoming Universal board meeting. JX 844. In one of his points, he asserted, “Zama is 

not an agent of 26 Capital. Zama has no contractual relationship with 26 Capital . . . . Our 

focus from the beginning had been on creating value for Universal shareholders.” Id. at 2. 

That was misleading. Zama had invested in the Sponsor under a subscription agreement 

and was a party to its LLC agreement. Ever since that investment, Zama had been working 

as 26 Capital’s partner to maximize its returns at Universal’s expense. Eiseman then 

forwarded his email to Ader. JX 844. 

Q. The Universal Directors Flip Flop.

Universal’s board of directors held a meeting on September 22, 2022 to consider 

whether to extend the outside date. JX 889. The meeting was videotaped. JX 1721. 
44

During the meeting, the directors reviewed an analysis from Yip and Van Der Sande

showing that 26 Capital was unlikely to bring cash to closing. The analysis calculated that 

closing the de-SPAC transaction would require a net outlay of $92 million, plus annual 

costs of approximately $10 million. 26 Capital would receive shares worth $69 million. JX 

1639. The directors also discussed that CasinoCo’s auditors were unlikely to be able to 

complete their audit work for months, plus the risks posed by the Status Quo Ante Order. 

JX 889 at 8.

The directors decided not to approve an extension. Violating a directive from 

Fujimoto not to share the results of the meeting, Takeuchi texted Ader and Eiseman and 

recounted each director’s vote and reasoning for opposing an extension. Takeuchi asked 

Ader and Eiseman to pretend that they were unaware of the decision. JX 893; JX 900. 

Takeuchi also emailed Eiseman and asked him how many shares of 26 Capital were owned 

by Ader. Eiseman sent back a misleading response: “The sponsor (e.g. Jason) of 26 Capital 

owns 6.9mm shares of stock which is 20% of the total shares outstanding.” JX 890 at 1. 

He did not mention that Zama owned five million of those shares. That night, Ader and 

Eiseman decided that they needed “to get rid of Hans [Van Der Sande].” JX 902 at 2. 

Meanwhile, Ader and Eiseman had flown to Tokyo to meet with Fujimoto in an 

effort to save the deal. Before the meeting, they coordinated their message, with Eiseman 

laying out points they would make. See Ader Tr. 307–08. The meeting took place on 

September 26, 2022. Eiseman secretly recorded the meeting. 

The meeting was generally businesslike, but Ader and Eiseman were forceful. At 

one point, Ader threated the Universal directors with liability. JX 2001 at 68. At another, 
45

Ader lied about having met with the Philippine Gaming Commission about the Status Quo 

Ante Order and claimed that as a result of the fictitious meeting, he had “a very high degree 

of confidence that the situation will be resolved presently for Universal in the Philippines.”

Id. at 10. Eiseman accused Van Der Sande of working with Okada and seeking to block 

the deal. Id. at 50–51. He also referenced the legal analyses that Milbank had prepared and 

claimed they were “conclusory and done with malicious intent.” Id. at 72. By the end of 

the meeting, Fujimoto had agreed to reconvene the board and propose a one-year extension. 

Id. at 90.

That night, Ader, Eiseman, and Takeuchi went to dinner. Ader told Takeuchi that if 

the merger agreement was extended, then he was confident that less than 50% of 26 

Capital’s stockholders would redeem their shares. JX 1558 at 330. Takeuchi later asked 

Eiseman if that representation could be put in writing, but Eiseman said no. JX 910 at 2; 

see JX 912. 

The Universal directors reconvened on September 29, 2022. Several directors 

emphasized the importance of keeping the redemption rate below 50%, so there would be 

some capital at closing and the transaction would not result in a net loss. Both Asano and 

Takeuchi reported on Ader’s assurance about the level of redemptions. JX 927. 

After the meeting, Asano emailed Ader to report that the Universal directors had 

voted to extend the merger agreement if 26 Capital accepted certain conditions, including 

not more than 50% redemptions. JX 921. Ader responded with what he described as 

“minor” edits, but which actually made the conditions meaningless. JX 922. The parties 
46

then executed an amendment to the merger agreement that extended the expiration date to 

October 1, 2023. JX 935.

R. The Effort To Prepare Financial Statements

One of the post-takeover tasks that CasinoCo’s management had to accomplish was 

securing a new Philippine auditor. After extensive efforts, CasinoCo hired Reyes 

Tacandong & Co. to work on its financial statements. Management also had to convince 

UHY to issue an opinion certifying CasinoCo’s financial statements. UHY had withdrawn 

its earlier certification of CasinoCo’s 2020 and 2021 financial statements, and UHY was 

not willing to review Universal’s 2022 financial statements until after completing its 

review of the earlier financial statements. CasinoCo needed certified financial statements 

for use in Universal’s securities filings and eventually for a revised Form F-4.

Both Reyes Tacandong and UHY asked management to make extensive 

representations on which they could rely. Before management could make those 

representations, they had to understand what happened during the takeover. 

Yip and Van Der Sande prioritized the investigation into the takeover and the work 

necessary to help Universal with its securities filings. Universal could be delisted if it did 

not make the required filings, and the deadlines were only months away. Completing the 

investigation was a prerequisite. By contrast, the new outside date meant that the parties 

had a full year to close the merger. UHY understood management’s priorities and agreed 

with them. So did Asano. JX 948 at 2.

Zama and 26 Capital had different ideas. On October 7, 2022, one week after 

obtaining the extension, Ader sent a letter to the Universal threatening “grave 
47

consequences” if the Form F-4 was not filed by the end of November 2022 and the deal 

did not close by the end of the year. JX 955 at 2. Ader claimed that two of 26 Capital’s 

board members were asking about the transaction status. That was not true. Ader had 

prompted them to send him emails so he could make that claim. See JX 950. Takeuchi 

nevertheless bought it. JX 960.

On October 18, 2022, Van Der Sande responded with a letter that laid out 

management’s expectations for closing the transaction. JX 998. Because Ader had 

mentioned his directors and Takeuchi had circulated their emails, Van Der Sande copied 

the directors on the letter.

Ader and Eiseman seized on Van Der Sande’s letter as a vehicle for getting him 

fired. They decided to have Ader pretend he was furious that the letter was sent to his 

directors, and Eiseman told Ader to threaten that unless Van Der Sande was removed, he 

“will take them to court.” JX 1013 at 3. Ader told Eiseman to tell Takeuchi that Ader was 

“more upset than you’ve ever seen.” Id. Takeuchi believed their ruse and viewed the letter 

as Van Der Sande’s “way of completely trying to sabotage the SPAC.” Takeuchi Tr. 1302. 

Takeuchi did his best to mollify Ader’s imitation ire. See JX 1731 at 1. 

Ader also pressured UHY to accelerate its work. During November 2022, Zama and 

26 Capital held weekly audit update calls with UHY, without any member of CasinoCo’s

management team present. UHY repeatedly asked to have management included, yet Zama 

and 26 Capital kept leaving management off the calls. From these meetings, Ader knew 

that UHY’s engagement partner did not believe that CasinoCo’s management team was 
48

engaged in delay, but rather that they were understandably prioritizing their statutory audit 

and the filings necessary for Universal’s public listing. JX 1064 at 2.

Still unsatisfied with the pace at which events were moving forward, Zama and 26 

Capital brought on Calabrese Consulting LLC to prepare the financial statements for the 

first half of 2022 without any involvement from management.JX 2059. Relying on its status 

as a contractual advisor to Universal, Zama instructed UHY to provide Universal’s 

confidential information to Calabrese. JX 2063. Eiseman told Dan Jones, the lead partner 

for UHY, that he would make Yip sign the financial statements that Calabrese prepared.11

In a model of understatement, Jones observed that “Eiseman did not have an appreciation 

for the process that . . . would need to be undertaken by the company to prepare their 

financials.” Jones Tr. 1462.

When Yip learned about Calabrese’s retention, he reported it to CasinoCo board. 

The directors resolved to investigate how Calabrese had been retained, how it secured 

access to CasinoCo’s non-public financial information, and how it was preparing financial 

statements without management’s involvement. JX 2066 at 329. That was a perfectly 

reasonable response. 

Eiseman, Ader, and their colleagues fell back on their standard strategies of 

concealment and misrepresentation. When Takeuchi asked Eiseman about Calabrese, 

Eiseman replied that Zama “did not authorize the sharing of financials.” JX 1157. That was 

11 Jones was a wholly credible witness and easily the most credible witness in the 

case.
49

not true. Ader was aware of and complicit in this deception. See JX 1157. Eiseman also 

tried to justify Calabrese’s actions by telling Takeuchi that Calabrese was performing work 

similar to the preparation of pro forma financials. JX 2057; JX 2058. That was nonsense. 

Calabrese was not using existing financial statements to prepare a set of pro forma 

statements. Calabrese was preparing the financial statements themselves. 

Eiseman also told UHY to advise Universal that for a SPAC to retain an accountant 

to help with financial statements was not unusual. JX 1224. That was misleading. A SPAC 

might hire outside assistance for its own financial statements, or a SPAC might do so with 

the consent of its counterparty. It was highly unusual—and unprecedented in the 

experience of 26 Capital’s expert—for a SPAC to hire an accountant to prepare financial 

statements for its counterparty without its counterparty’s permission.

While this was happening, UHY told Zama and 26 Capital that it would not review 

the Calabrese-created financial statements. So Zama and 26 Capital found a small firm in 

Lakewood, Colorado—B.F. Borgers—and decided to “position it as doing 1H 2022 review 

in tandem with UHY to be able to move faster.” JX 1003 at 2. Borgers lacked any 

comparable auditing experience, and its principal’s testimony calls into question the firm’s 

competence and integrity. 

On January 25, 2023, Fujimoto approved the sending of a letter to UHY questioning 

Calabrese’s retention, asking about the sharing of information, and requesting a response 

within 10 days. Yip sent the letter on January 31, 2023. JX 1329. Van Der Sande and Yip 

celebrated, believing that it would help stop 26 Capital and Zama’s meddling. See JX 1308. 

51

26 Capital contends that since UHY’s resignation, CasinoCo has failed to use its 

best efforts to hire a replacement auditor. CasinoCo’s situation makes for an unattractive 

engagement, and the evidence on CasinoCo’s efforts is mixed. This decision makes no 

finding on the issue.

Because 26 Capital has emphasized it so heavily, this decision does address one 

email sent by a Millbank partner during CasinoCo’s efforts to find an auditor. The email 

stated, “I think it is important that we look like we are maximizing chances of actually 

getting an auditor.” JX 1352 at 2. 26 Capital interprets the email as saying, in substance, “I

think we need to look like we are trying to get an auditor even though we really aren’t.” 

The choice of the words “look like” was unfortunate, but after considering the email in 

context, I am convinced that what the partner meant was, “I think we need not only to 

maximize our chances of actually getting an auditor but also document the efforts we are 

making so that we have a record that reflects that.” Management eventually identified a 

firm that was both qualified and willing to perform the audit: RSM, the U.S. affiliate of 

CasinoCo’s current auditor, Reyes Tacandong.

U. Universal Terminates The Merger Agreement.

On June 30, 2023, CasinoCo and Holdings terminated the merger agreement based 

on material breaches by 26 Capital. This decision does not reach those issues. 

II. LEGAL ANALYSIS

26 Capital seeks a decree of specific performance requiring CasinoCo to close the 

de-SPAC transaction. 26 Capital asked for a prompt, post-trial decision on the availability 
52

of that remedy, and the court held an expedited trial so that specific performance could be 

ordered if warranted. On the facts of this case, that form of relief is not available.

Specific performance is a specialized form of mandatory injunction that requires a 

party to fulfill its contractual obligations. Certainteed Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 2005 WL 

217032, at *6 (Del. Ch. Jan. 24, 2005); Moore Bus. Forms, Inc. v. Cordant Hldgs. Corp., 

1998 WL 71836, at *9 (Del. Ch. Feb. 4, 1998). Specific performance is a remedy for a 

proven breach of contract. The parties dispute whether 26 Capital has met this requirement, 

but for simplicity, this decision assumes without deciding that CasinoCo failed to use its 

reasonable best efforts to close the transaction. 

The ordinary remedy for breach of contract is an award of damages. Morabito v. 

Harris, 2002 WL 550117, at *3 (Del. Ch. Mar. 26, 2002). A party seeking specific 

performance must show that a “not typical” remedy is warranted. See In re IBP, Inc. 

S’holders Litig., 789 A.2d 14, 52 (Del. Ch. 2001). If damages would provide adequate

relief, then specific performance is not available. Osborn ex rel. Osborn v. Kemp, 991 A.2d 

1153, 1158 (Del. 2010); Morabito, 2022 WL 550117, at *3. This decision assumes that the 

transaction provides 26 Capital with a unique investment opportunity such that a damages 

award would not provide adequate relief.

12

12 That does not mean that damages are unavailable. “[S]pecific performance might

be the preferred remedy because the contract relates to a unique property right. But if a 

court lacks the ability to order specific performance, it does not mean that the plaintiff is 

out of luck. The plaintiff instead must consider other, less ideal remedial options.” In re 

Orchard Enters., Inc. S’holder Litig., 88 A.3d 1, 53 (Del. Ch. 2014). 
53

By definition, the remedy of specific performance contemplates that the parties will 

perform the contract, so the party seeking that remedy must be ready, willing, and able to 

perform. Osborn, 991 A.2d at 1158. The parties dispute whether 26 Capital can fulfill its 

obligation to maintain a public listing.13 This decision assumes that 26 Capital can satisfy 

that requirement.

Meeting these prerequisites makes it possible for a court to award specific 

performance, but whether to issue the decree is always a matter of equity. Because specific 

performance is an equitable remedy, its application must be warranted on the facts and 

consistent with equitable principles. “[S]pecific performance is a matter of grace that rests 

in the sound discretion of the court.” Peden v. Gray, 2005 WL 2622746, at *3 (Del. Oct. 

14, 2005) (TABLE). Ultimately, the party seeking specific performance must make a clear 

and convincing showing that the remedy is warranted.14

13 Nasdaq rules require each Global Market-listed security to have at least 400 

round-lot holders at the time listing and at least 400 total holders at all times post-listing.

It has been unclear since March 2022 whether 26 Capital could meet that requirement. In 

December 2022, after holders of more than 87% of 26 Capital’s shares opted for 

redemption, 26 Capital had fewer than 300 stockholders.

14 See IBP, 789 A.2d at 52 (“Delaware law . . . requires that a plaintiff demonstrate 

its entitlement to specific performance by clear and convincing evidence.”). The clear and 

convincing standard does not increase the burden of proof on issues of fact, which remain 

subject to proof by a preponderance of the evidence. United Rentals, Inc. v. RAM Hldgs., 

Inc., 937 A.2d 810, 834 n.112. (Del. Ch. 2007). The standard rather reflects the expectation 

that a court will be reluctant to grant the atypical remedy of specific performance unless a 

sufficiently persuasive showing has been made. IBP, 789 A.2d at 52.
54

That remains true even if a contract provides for specific performance. Delaware is 

strongly contractarian, and the presence of a provision calling for specific performance in 

the event of breach is sufficient to support a decree. See Williams Cos., Inc. v. Energy 

Transfer Equity, L.P., 2016 WL 3576682, at *2 (Del. Ch. June 24, 2016), aff’d, 159 A.3d 

264 (Del. 2017). But a court is not required to enforce a specific performance provision.15

The existence of such a provision is sufficient to support a decree of specific performance 

but does not mandate its issuance. 

Here, after weighing the evidence and balancing multiple considerations, the court 

exercises its discretion against awarding specific performance.

15 See Morabito, 2002 WL 550117, at *2 (“[S]pecific performance is considered 

extraordinary, awarded on a discretionary basis by courts of equity. Thus . . . there is no 

‘entitlement’ to specific performance . . . . Specific performance is available when it is 

equitable, and in this case specific enforcement (to repeat) would be inequitable.”); Godwin 

v. Collins, 1868 WL 1255, at *1 (Del. Ch. Mar. 1, 1868).) (“It is the established rule that 

‘a specific performance of a contract of sale is not a matter of course, but rests entirely in 

the discretion of the court upon a view of all the circumstances.’” (internal citation 

omitted)); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 359 cmt. a (Am. L. Inst. 1981), Westlaw 

(database updated June 2023) [hereinafter Restatement of Contracts] (“Because the 

availability of equitable relief was historically viewed as a matter of jurisdiction, the parties 

cannot vary by agreement the requirement of inadequacy of damages, although a court may 

take appropriate notice of facts recited in their contract.”); 3 Dan B. Dobbs, Law of 

Remedies § 12.9(6), at 819 (2d ed. 1993) (“[T]he court may consider the contract provision 

in favor of specific performance, not as binding, but as an important influence on the 

exercise of discretion.”); see also Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Common Law 301 (1881) 

(“The only universal consequence of a legally binding promise is, that the law makes the 

promisor pay damages if the promised event does not come to pass.”).
55

A. The Complexity Of Completing The Transaction And Supervising A 

Reasonable Best Efforts Obligation

One factor that counsels against specific performance is the complexity of the 

undertaking and the associated difficulty of providing meaningful judicial oversight. “A 

promise will not be specifically enforced if the character and magnitude of the performance 

would impose on the court burdens in enforcement or supervision that are disproportionate 

to the advantages to be gained from enforcement and to the harm to be suffered from its 

denial.”

16

26 Capital asks the court to enforce Section 6.4 of the merger agreement, which

requires that “each of the Parties shall use reasonable best efforts to take, or cause to be 

taken, all actions and to do, or cause to be done, all things reasonably necessary, proper or 

advisable under applicable Laws to consummate and make effective as promptly as 

practicable the Transactions.” JX 192 at § 6.4 (the “Reasonable Best Efforts Covenant”). 

A decree of specific performance enforcing the Reasonable Best Efforts Covenant will not 

be self-executing, and monitoring compliance with such a provision is more difficult than 

a provision that requires a party to take specific action. An order directing a party to comply 

with a best-efforts provision may result in a decree of such “vague generality as to give 

little or no specific direction to the person or entity subject to the order or would involve 

the court in the detailed administration of an ongoing, complex transaction.” Carteret 

16 Restatement of Contracts, supra, § 366; accord 71 Am. Jur. 2d Specific 

Performance § 108; Dobbs, supra, § 12.8(3), at 207.
56

Bancorp, Inc. v. Home Gp., Inc., 1988 WL 3010, at *1 (Del. Ch. 1988). If there are many 

steps remaining and many transactional approvals to obtain, then “[t]he shadings of 

conduct that are possible when exercising judgment” give rise to “countless opportunities 

to try to impede completion of a complex deal.” Id. at *8. In the Carteret case, Chancellor 

Allen declined to order specific performance of a best efforts obligation, precisely because 

of the complexities involved in completing the transaction. Id. at *9.

In other cases, the court has assessed the facts differently. In Snow Phipps, for 

example, Chancellor McCormick entered a decree of specific performance enforcing a 

reasonable best efforts provision requiring a financial buyer to secure alternative financing 

and close. See Snow Phipps Gp., LLC v. Kcake Acq., Inc., 2021 WL 1714202, at *55–56

(Del. Ch. Apr. 30, 2021). Other Delaware decisions have also ordered transactional 

counterparties to close where the court could oversee and enforce compliance.17 A court 

can also mitigate the difficulties involved in overseeing compliance with a complex 

undertaking by appointing a judicial agent, such as a receiver or monitor.

18

17See, e.g., Bardy Diagnostics, Inc. v. Hill-Rom, Inc., 2021 WL 2886188, at *42 

(Del. Ch. July 9, 2021); Level 4 Yoga, LLC v. CorePower Yoga, LLC, 2022 WL 601862, 

at *31 (Del. Ch. Mar. 1, 2022), aff’d, 287 A.3d 226 (Del. 2022); Channel Medsystems, Inc. 

v. Boston Sci. Corp., 2019 WL 7293896, at *4 (Del. Ch. Dec. 26, 2019); Hexion Specialty 

Chems., Inc. v. Huntsman Corp., 965 A.2d 715, 763 (Del. Ch. Sept. 29, 2008, revised Nov. 

19, 2008); IBP, 789 A.2d at 87.

18 See Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115, 1161 (5th Cir. 1982) (explaining that a court 

has “inherent equitable power to appoint a person, whatever be his title, to assist it in 

administering a remedy.”), amended and vacated in part on other grounds, 688 F.2d 266 

(5th Cir. 1982); Schwimmer v. U.S., 232 F.2d 855, 865 (8th Cir. 1956) (same); 1 Dobbs, 

supra, § 1.4, at 20 (discussing the court’s authority to appoint a post-judgment receiver); 1 

Ralph Ewing Clark, The Law and Practice of Receivers § 240, at 349 (3d ed. 1959) 
57

The principal tasks that must be completed before the transaction can close are the 

preparation of audited financial statements and the filing of a registration statement for the 

shares that will be issued. Much of the work has already been done, and the court would 

not ordinarily view those tasks as so complex as to counsel against a decree of specific 

(explaining that a receiver can be appointed “after judgment . . . either for the purpose of 

carrying the judgment into effect, or for the preservation of the property until judgment 

shall be executed.”); 2 John Norton Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence, § 1335, at 931 (5th 

ed. 1941) (noting that a court has the power to appoint a receiver “after judgment” in order 

“to carry into effect a special decree, which could not otherwise be efficiently executed by 

ordinary process”); Wayne D. Brazil, Special Masters in Complex Cases: Extending the 

Judiciary or Reshaping Adjudication?, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 394, 414 (1987) (“Masters have 

long been used to monitor compliance with injunctions or to administer funds.”); Ellen E. 

Deason, Managing the Managerial Expert, 1998 U. Ill. L. Rev. 341, 352 (1998) (“After a 

finding of liability, masters are often appointed at the remedial stage of complex cases to 

aid in formulating the decree, assist the court in implementing it, and monitor compliance. 

In fact, these new roles are reportedly now more commonplace than traditional references 

to masters.” (footnote omitted)); Veronica Root, Modern-Day Monitorships, 33 Yale J. 

Reg. 109, 116–17 (2016) (“One type of posttrial matter with which court-appointed agents 

assisted courts was to ensure that parties complied with a court’s order of specific 

performance.”). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53 codifies the court’s inherent authority. 

See Irving R. Kaufman, Masters in the Federal Courts: Rule 53, 58 Colum. L. Rev. 452, 

462 (1958) (“[R]ule 53 was intended merely as a codification of pre-existing procedures, 

and it may be assumed that references sanctioned by long usage and practice in the federal 

courts were not intended to be forever foreclosed by the rule.”); Elizabeth Montgomery, 

Comment, Force and Will: An Exploration of the Use of Special Maters to Implement 

Judicial Decrees, 52 U. Colo. L. Rev. 105, 111 (1980) (“[Rule 53] embodies the case law 

that was established by the Supreme Court in Ex Parte Peterson.” (footnote omitted)). The 

rule empowers the courts to appoint a master to “address . . . post-trial matters that cannot 

be effectively and timely addressed by an available district judge or magistrate judge of the 

district.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 53(a)(1)(C); see also 9C Arthur R. Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ.

§ 2602.1 (3d ed.), Westlaw (database updated Apr. 2023) (discussing reliance on the rule 

“when a complex decree requires administration or complex policing, particularly when a 

party has proved resistant or intransigent or special skills are needed.”); see generally 

Wayne D. Brazil, Referring Discovery Tasks to Special Masters: Is Rule 53 a Source of 

Authority and Restrictions?, 8 Am. Bar Found. Res. J. 143, 176 (1983).
58

performance. In an ordinary case, the court also could mitigate any complexity by 

appointing a receiver or monitor. 

Here, however, dealing with the SEC will be more complex than usual, because the 

transaction does not contemplate the issuance of securities by an already listed domestic 

issuer, or even a domestic entity. The Form F-4 must address the securities of a Philippine 

corporation engaged in the gaming industry, which suffered a forcible takeover last year, 

and which has a history of internal corporate governance issues. E.g., Takeuchi Dep. 97–

98 (citing CasinoCo’s weak governance practices).

Those governance problems only became worse as a result of the dodgy bargain that 

enabled CasinoCo to regain control over the Casino. It will be awkward, to say the least, 

to craft disclosures that truthfully describe the agreement under which (i) Lazaro and 

Lorenzana each received $35,000 per month net of taxes and gained the right to appoint 

six members of a seven member board, (ii) CasinoCo’s senior officers received new 

employment agreements under which they can only be removed by supermajority vote, and 

(iii) Universal delivered an item to Romualdez to secure his intervention in Universal’s 

favor. 

And that is only one side of the transaction. On the other side are 26 Capital and 

Zama. Both have proven exceedingly aggressive, demonstrated terrible judgment, knew 

about the dodgy bargain, and engaged in other questionable transactions of their own.

There are considerable challenges involved in completing a multi-jurisdictional 

transaction, even a transaction—like this one—where much of the work has been done. 

Those challenges increase exponentially on the facts of this case. Given the factual 
59

landscape and the parties involved, those challenges counsel against a decree of specific 

performance. 

B. The Inadequacies Of The Court’s Coercive Sanctions

A second factor that a court may consider in determining whether to award specific 

performance is whether the order can be enforced. “[C]ourts will not specifically enforce 

contracts if they regard enforcement as futile.” Dobbs, supra, § 12.8(3), at 808. 

No matter how inadequate the remedy at law may be, a court of equity will 

not exercise its jurisdiction to grant the remedy of specific performance if the 

contract is of such a nature that the decree for its specific performance cannot 

be enforced, and obedience to it compelled, by the ordinary processes of the 

court.

71 Am. Jur. 2d Specific Performance § 111, Westlaw (database updated June 2023). The 

court’s ability to enforce the merger agreement in a meaningful way has been an open issue 

since the start of the case. See Dkt. 18 at 12–14. 

The coercive sanctions that a state judge can deploy can be highly effective when 

the defendants or their assets are located in the United States. The court can impose 

coercive fines. Gandhi-Kapoor v. Hone Cap. LLC, 2023 WL 4628782, at *3 (Del. Ch. July 

19, 2023). It can seize or retitle property within its jurisdiction. See In re Stream TV 

Networks, Inc. Omnibus Agreement Litig., 283 A.3d 1183, 1193–94 (Del. Ch. 2022). It can 

appoint receivers to take control of entities or assets. See Hone, 2023 WL 4628782, at *9. 

It can issue writs of civil capias. See Arbat Cap. Gp. Ltd. v. Artificial Life, Inc., 2020 WL 

1811696 (Del. Ch. Apr. 8, 2020) (ORDER); see also Palma Cap. Ltd. v. Westergaard.com, 

Inc., 2020 WL 2495979, at *1 (Del. Ch. May 13, 2020); Deutsch v. ZST Digit. Networks, 

Inc., 2018 WL 3413362, at *2 (Del. Ch. June 12, 2018) (ORDER). It can find a party in 
60

civil contempt or initiate proceedings for criminal contempt. See 10 Del. C. § 7129; 11 Del. 

C. § 1271. A court can also exercise its inherent authority to impose other sanctions as the 

situation warrants, because “[c]ourts have . . . inherent power to provide themselves with 

appropriate instruments required for the performance of their duties.” In re Peterson, 253 

U.S. 300, 312 (1920); see also id. at 309–10 (“New devices may be used to adapt the 

ancient institution to present needs and to make of it an efficient instrument in the 

administration of justice.”).

These tools have less purchase when a defendant and its assets are located overseas. 

The sun has set on the era in which a nation might send gunboats to enforce a judgment 

issued by its courts.19 Delaware has no blue water navy to send, and the United States 

Constitution confers authority over international affairs on the federal government, not the 

19 In the past, powerful nations enlisted the help of their militaries to intimidate less 

formidable nations into complying with foreign judgments. See, e.g., Theodore Roosevelt’s 

Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine (1905), Nat’l Archives (Feb. 8, 2022), 

https://www.archives.gov/milestone-documents/roosevelt-corollary (“European 

intervention in Latin America . . . resurfaced as an issue in U.S. foreign policy when 

European governments began to use force to pressure several Latin American countries to 

repay their debts. For example, British, German, and Italian gunboats blockaded 

Venezuela’s ports in 1902 when the Venezuelan government defaulted on its debts to 

foreign bondholders.”); Greg Rosalsky, ‘The Greatest Heist in History’: How Haiti Was 

Forced To Pay Reparations For Freedom, NPR Planet Money (Oct. 5, 2021, 10:25 AM), 

https://www.npr.org/sections/money/2021/10/05/1042518732/-the-greatest-heist-inhistory-how-haiti-was-forced-to-pay-reparations-for-freed (“In July 1825, the French 

King, Charles X, sent an armed flotilla of warships to Haiti with the message that the young 

nation would have to pay France 150 million francs to secure its independence, or suffer 

the consequences. That sum was 10 times the amount the United States had paid France in 

the Louisiana Purchase, which had doubled the size of the U.S. Almost literally at gunpoint, 

Haiti caved to France’s demands in order to secure its independence.”). 
61

several states. U.S. Const. art. I, § 10. Here, the Casino is located in the Philippines, and 

CasinoCo is a Philippine entity. Universal, the ultimate parent, is a Japanese entity 

headquartered in Tokyo. The court could issue bench warrants directed at individuals who 

failed to cause the entity defendants to comply with the court’s decree, and those 

individuals would face arrest and extradition to Delaware if and when they travel to the 

United States, but if they were content to treat the rest of the world as their oyster, they 

would remain beyond this court’s authority. 

26 Capital might ask a Philippine court to enforce this court’s decree as a matter of 

comity, but the dodgy bargain again casts a long shadow. It reveals that outcomes in the 

Philippines may turn on political influence, and the individuals who orchestrated that 

bargain are now entrenched on CasinoCo’s board. Closing the transaction would threaten 

their positions because CasinoCo would become subject to American law, including the 

Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. Having deployed political influence to achieve the dodgy 

bargain, they might be expected to deploy political influence to protect their gains.

The court does not take this consideration into account happily, because it 

acknowledges the limitations on its power as a court of equity and the possibility that some 

parties or actions may be beyond its reach. That is literally true in this case. The court is 

not dealing with an obstreperous billionaire or other headstrong individual whose body and 

assets are subject to coercive sanction through the American justice system. In this case, 

the defendants are, quite literally, outside the range of the court’s armamentarium. Firing 

at such a target just wastes ammunition. 
62

A decree ordering the foreign entities in this case to close the transaction is likely a 

nullity. That consideration counsels against issuing the decree.

C. The Status Quo Ante Order

A third factor that counsels against a decree of specific performance is the existence 

of the Status Quo Ante Order. “Courts of equity will only order specific performance when 

performance of the contract by the defendant is possible.” 71 Am. Jur. 2d Specific 

Performance § 58. A court must also consider the consequences of issuing a remedy, and 

in some cases those consequences may warrant withholding equitable relief. See N. Ind. 

Pub. Serv. Co. v. Carbon Cnty. Coal Co., 799 F.2d 265, 280 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J.); 

see also Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982) (“In exercising their 

sound discretion, courts of equity should pay particular regard for the public consequences 

in employing the extraordinary remedy of injunction.” (citation omitted)).

The Status Quo Ante Order, which remains in effect, decrees that

effective immediately and continuing until further orders from this Court . . 

. petitioner and respondents, your agents, representatives, or persons acting 

on [sic] your place or stead, are hereby required to observe the status quo 

prevailing prior to petitioner’s removal as stockholder, director, chairman, 

and CEO of [CasinoCo] in 2017.

JX 500 at 6.

To be sure, the defendants did not originally view the Status Quo Ante Order as a 

meaningful impediment to closing the transaction, and with good reason. Okada had been 

trying to set aside his removal for five years. The courts of Japan denied him relief. The 

courts of Hong Kong denied him relief. When he turned to the courts of the Philippines, 

the trial court and the intermediate court denied his requests for interim relief. With that 
63

backdrop, the defendants understandably believed that the Status Quo Ante Order resulted 

from a misunderstanding. They thought they could clarify the situation for the Philippine 

Supreme Court, and the justices would vacate the order.

But that did not happen. On May 2, 2022, CasinoCo filed an Extremely Urgent 

Motion for Reconsideration of the Status Quo Ante Order. JX 2025. CasinoCo stressed that 

[u]nless reconsidered, the SQAO creates a grave and imminent risk of 

causing the default and bankruptcy of the UEC group. The UEC Notes issued 

by UEC and guaranteed by [CasinoCo] include a provision that essentially 

prohibits the voting by a shareholder in favor of or electing Petitioner Okada 

or his representative as a Board Director of UEC or [CasinoCo]. If that 

happens, it is likely that international creditors will try to force UEC and 

[CasinoCo] into bankruptcy, which could result in the loss of jobs of almost 

6,000 Filipino employees of [CasinoCo] and 1,000 Japanese employees of 

UEC. These job losses would be a result of the SQAO and/or Petitioner 

Okada’s actions. The Honorable Court is urgently and respectfully asked not 

to let this happen and immediately reconsider the SQAO.

Id. at 4. After not receiving a response, CasinoCo filed supplements on May 13 and June 

10. The Philippine Supreme Court never responded to those findings. 

After conventional methods failed, Lazaro and Lorenzana proposed the dodgy 

bargain, which included the unconventional method of delivering an “item” to Romualdez

to bring his influence to bear. See JX 725; Asano Tr. 794–95. He did, but without success.

Instead, the Philippine Supreme Court issued the Clarifying Order. It did not modify 

the Status Quo Ante Order. See JX 753 at 10–13 (finding “no merit” in CasinoCo’s 

arguments challenging the scope and legal basis of Status Quo Ante Order). It made clear 

that the Philippine Supreme Court was aware of the de-SPAC transaction and CasinoCo’s 

argument that it would not violate the Status Quo Ante Order. See id. at 4, 18. But the 

Philippine Supreme Court did not decide that issue. Instead, the Court left the Status Quo 
64

Ante Order in place and instructed the intermediate court of appeals to determine whether 

CasinoCo intended to list its shares in the United States. Id. at 18.

At trial, CasinoCo proffered the testimony of Francis Jardeleza, a former Associate 

Justice of the Philippine Supreme Court who served before his appointment as Solicitor 

General of the Philippines. In addition to his government service, Justice Jardeleza worked 

in private practice for over two decades, and he has taught courses at the University of the 

Philippines College of Law since 1993. 

Justice Jardeleza opined that closing the transaction could violate the Status Quo 

Ante Order, and he explained the potential consequences. Jardeleza Tr. 1253–54.

[CasinoCo] is specifically a party to the suit and therefore it is subject to the 

status quo order. In the case of [CasinoCo], it is my opinion that it cannot do 

anything to implement the agreement defined in this litigation to have this 

SPAC transaction and that if [CasinoCo] or any party would violate the 

SQAO order, they run the risk that the Supreme Court of the Philippines may 

hold it in contempt or the Supreme Court of the Philippines may, after notice 

and hearing, order restitution or damages.

Id. at 1254. Criminal contempt in the Philippines is punishable by up to six months in 

prison. Paraiso Tr. 1389. 

In response, 26 Capital presented the testimony of Joshua Paraiso, a Philippines 

lawyer who opined that the Status Quo Ante Order allows the transaction to close. He 

emphasized that “a status quo ante order does not direct the doing or undoing of a certain 

act.” Id. at 1340. Under Paraiso’s interpretation, significant transactions like filing for 

bankruptcy or a sale of all or substantially all of CasinoCo’s assets would not violate the 

Status Quo Ante Order either. Id. at 1359, 1361, 1364, 1372–74. 
65

Paraiso also suggested that if the Philippine Supreme Court had intended to prevent 

the transaction from closing, the justices would have issued a preliminary injunction. Id. at 

1344–45. Rather, in his view, the Status Quo Ante Order merely returns matters “to a time 

when Kazuo [Okada] was a stockholder, director, chairperson, and CEO of [CasinoCo]” 

and instructs the parties to “pretend as if he was still occupying those positions.” Id. at 

1371. Paraiso reasons that the Status Quo Ante Order therefore only permits Okada to 

protect his beneficial interest in CasinoCo using whatever powers he would have had based 

on those positions. Id. But as Paraiso admitted, that interpretation would mean the Status 

Quo Ante Order lacks any practical effect, because those positions did not give Okada the 

power to take action or block a vote. Id. at 1372. It seems unlikely that the Philippine 

Supreme Court intended to issue an order that accomplished nothing at all. 

Justice Jardeleza’s testimony was persuasive. Paraiso’s was not. As Justice 

Jardeleza explained, closing the transaction could violate the Status Quo Ante Order. 

Complying with a decree of specific performance could expose CasinoCo and its affiliates, 

including the directors and officers of those entities, to a finding of contempt. The conflict 

between this court’s decree of specific performance and the Status Quo Ante Order would 

create a Catch-22. 

As a matter of comity, a court should be reluctant to issue an order that would cause 

a citizen of a foreign country to risk violating an order issued by that country’s highest 

court. This concern is amplified where complying with the decree of specific performance 

may cause a party to take action that could subject it to criminal contempt. Perhaps there 

are circumstances where a court would view that step as warranted. This is not that case. 
66

D. Inequitable Conduct 

A fourth factor that counsels against specific performance is 26 Capital’s inequitable 

conduct. A plaintiff “seeking the aid of equity’s extraordinary remedies [does] so subject 

to the maxim that he who seeks equity must do equity.” Richard Paul, Inc. v. Union 

Improvement Co., 91 A.2d 49, 54 (Del. 1952). Specific performance “is a purely equitable 

remedy,” Chavin v. H. H. Rosin & Co., 246 A.2d 921, 922 (Del. 1968). Specific 

performance therefore may be denied when “the ‘equities’ or ethical considerations favor 

the defendant.” Dobbs, supra, § 12.8(1), at 805. A request for specific performance 

will always be refused when the plaintiff has obtained the agreement by sharp 

and unscrupulous practices, by overreaching, by concealment of important 

facts, even though not actually fraudulent, by trickery, by taking undue 

advantage of [its] position, or by any other means which are unconscientious.

. . . It may be that the contract is not illegal; that no defense could be set up 

against it at law; and even that it possesses no features or incidents which 

could authorize a court of equity to set it aside and cancel it. Specific 

performance is refused simply because the plaintiff does not come into court 

with clean hands.

Pomeroy, supra, § 400, at 100–01, quoted in Turchi v. Salaman, 1990 WL 27531 (Del. Ch. 

Mar. 14, 1990), at *8.

26 Capital engaged in the type of conduct that should not be rewarded with a decree 

of specific performance. Ader and Eiseman reached a de facto agreement to leverage 

Eiseman’s position of trust with Universal to enrich themselves. They acted as partners to 

gain and exploit their inequitable advantage over Universal and its subsidiaries. They 

concealed their relationship and misled Universal about its existence.

• Within a twenty-four-hour period, Zama acquired an interest in the Sponsor, then 

Ader worked with Eiseman to prepare a letter of intent that favored 26 Capital. 
67

When Ader sent it to Universal, Eiseman pretended he had never seen it before and 

advised Universal to accept it.

• Eiseman and Littlejohn worked with Ader and 26 Capital’s counsel to draft a proSPAC merger agreement. Eiseman then pretended never to have seen it and advised 

Universal to accept it.

• Eiseman participated in discussions with Universal and its counsel as a trusted 

advisor. During those discussions, he asserted that terms were business 

understandings that could not be revisited, when they were not, and he argued that 

provisions that were advantageous to Universal should not be included. 

• Eiseman participated in calls during the negotiation of the merger agreement as a 

contractual advisor to Universal. During those calls, he secretly texted with Ader 

and gave him advice.

• After the merger agreement was signed, Eiseman secured a second engagement 

from Universal that included contingent compensation to incentivize him to work 

to close the transaction, when he already had an overriding economic incentive to 

complete the transaction and favor 26 Capital because of his interest in the Sponsor.

26 Capital’s counsel advised Ader on the Second Engagement Letter. 

• After the merger agreement was signed, Eiseman secretly worked hand in hand with

Ader to pressure Universal and achieve an outcome favorable to 26 Capital.

• After Universal agreed to extend the outside date for the transaction, Ader and 

Eiseman interfered in CasinoCo’s internal operations by giving instructions to its 

auditors, unilaterally hiring Calabrese and giving instructions to Calabrese. Both 

lied about their involvement. 

• Eiseman frequently drafted communications for Ader to send to Universal. They 

kept Eiseman’s role as ghostwriter secret. 

• 26 Capital and Zama have collaborated on this litigation, which Zama is co-funding.

26 Capital tries to dodge these unfavorable facts by arguing that they “center on 

Zama.” Pl. Br. at 38. But the record is clear that 26 Capital and Zama, through their 

principals Ader and Eiseman, acted as partners in a joint effort to force through a deal on 

their terms. Put more pejoratively, they engaged in a conspiracy to mislead Universal and 
68

CasinoCo. The actions taken by Zama to advance their joint cause are therefore properly 

attributed to 26 Capital.

26 Capital argues in response that Ader had no reason to think Eiseman was doing 

anything wrong, and that he reasonably relied on the First Engagement Letter and a 

representation from Eiseman that Universal had approved Zama’s investment in the 

Sponsor. Pl. Reply Br. at 24. At best for Ader, he might have reasonably believed at the 

outset that Zama received permission to invest in the Sponsor. But after that, he was 

confronted with a ceaseless parade of indications to the contrary. He received ongoing, 

covert advice from Eiseman and Littlejohn, and he participated in secret conversations 

where Eiseman and Littlejohn demonstrated that they were working with Ader and against 

Universal. Eiseman repeatedly instructed Ader to take steps to keep his involvement secret, 

and Ader followed those instructions. Later on, Ader misrepresented his relationship with 

Eiseman by denying there was one, and 26 Capital did not disclose Zama’s investment in 

its 2021 Form 10-K. See, e.g., JX 141; JX 2087 & JX 149; JX 541. By the end of August, 

Ader had seen enough that he could not have believed that Eiseman was acting legitimately. 

Ader’s insistence that he thought that what he and Eiseman were doing was legitimate is 

not a defense, but rather self-indictment. 

26 Capital and Zama engaged in the type of behavior that makes it inequitable to 

reward them with a decree of specific performance. 

E. The Balance of the Equities

When determining whether to award equitable relief, the court always considers the 

balance of the equities. That is true for specific performance as well. Morabito, 2002 WL 
69

550117, at *2 (“[T]he Court must determine whether the ‘balance of equities’ tips in favor 

of specific performance.”). For a decree of specific performance to issue, the equities must 

favor that outcome clearly and convincingly. IBP, 789 A.2d at 52. In this case, the equities 

do not favor a decree of specific performance. 

26 Capital’s strongest equity is the specific performance provision in the merger 

agreement. “To say that Delaware prides itself on the contractarian nature of its law risks 

understatement.” New Enter. Assocs. 14, L.P. v. Rich, 295 A.3d 520, 565 (Del. Ch. 2023).

The court has taken seriously Delaware’s policy interest in upholding contracts and 26 

Capital’s interest in having the specific performance provision upheld. In this case, the 

other factors that this decision has discussed outweigh those interests. 

26 Capital’s other meaningful equity is the interests of its unaffiliated stockholders. 

They face a risk of harm if the deal does not close, but that factor does not carry the day. 

First, 26 Capital’s stockholders cannot truly claim the status of innocent victims. 

They invested in 26 Capital, backed Ader and his management team, and undertook to 

benefit from the gains or suffer the losses that Ader and his team delivered. This decision 

has chronicled the many missteps that Ader and his team committed, and they had the bad 

luck to enter into a deal that was disrupted by the Status Quo Ante Order and the takeover. 

The stockholders signed up for the ride. If they think they have claims against Ader and 

other members of 26 Capital’s management, then they can bring them. What 26 Capital 

cannot do is wrap itself in the mantle of its stockholders to pretend that none of the events 

described in this case ever happened. That argument recalls the frequent claims that Ader 

and Eiseman made on the stand to the effect that they were justified in doing outrageous 
70

things because they were obligated to serve their stockholders. That assertion is a 

perversion of the fiduciary regime. Fiduciary duties exist to check management 

misbehavior. They are not a license for management to misbehave.

On a more granular level, 26 Capital’s appeal to the interests of its stockholders 

invokes the minority to benefit the majority. Nearly 88% of Universal’s public stockholders 

have redeemed, so the Sponsor’s Founder Shares now represent 68% of the SPAC’s equity. 

Ader has largely sold out to Zama and Rimu, so they will be the principal beneficiaries of 

the deal. Zama owns 60% of the Sponsor economics, so Zama is by far the largest 

beneficiary. Yet Zama is one of the principal wrongdoers. 

26 Capital is also not the only entity with stockholders. Universal has stockholders 

too. If we assume that stockholders are innocent, there will be losses imposed on innocent 

victims no matter the outcome. 

Another equity that 26 Capital can cite is Universal’s own misconduct. This decision 

has assumed that CasinoCo breached its efforts obligation, and Universal also entered into 

the dodgy bargain. That said, Ader and Eiseman knew about and condoned the dodgy 

bargain, which seemed at the time to be the only path to regain control of the Casino. At 

best for 26 Capital, both sides behaved badly, but that does not mean that the penalties 

offset and we pretend no one did anything wrong. The actions of both sides have tainted

the transaction, making it one where the balancing of the equities counsels against a 

specific performance decree. 
71

III. CONCLUSION

26 Capital has failed to demonstrate clearly and convincingly that an award of 

specific performance is warranted. Exercising its discretion, the court holds that specific 

performance is unavailable. 

This ruling does not mean that 26 Capital will not be entitled to any remedy. To the 

extent 26 Capital has proven a breach of contract and Universal has not proven any of its 

affirmative defenses, then 26 Capital may be able to recover damages. This decision has 

only addressed the availability of specific performance. It has not ruled on the existence of 

breach, nor on Universal’s affirmative defenses. The issue of damages also must be 

addressed, and the court has scheduled a second-phase trial to address that issue.