Filed 1/2/14 Marriage of Saadian CA2/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

In re Marriage of KATHRIN and GEORGE SAADIAN. B227708
(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BD479011)

KATHRIN SAADIAN,
Respondent,

v.
GEORGE SAADIAN,
Appellant.

Appeal from orders of the Superior Cour t of Los Angeles. David S. Cunningham III, Judge. Affirmed. The Samoska Law Firm, William M. Samo ska; Law Offices of Bruce Altschuld and Bruce Altschuld for Appellant Landmark West Enterprises, LLC. Turner, Aubert & Friedmen, Steven Mo rris; R. Michael Co llum for Respondent
Kathrin Saadian.

_____________ __________2 This appeal arises from a September 23, 2010 order of the family law department of the Los Angeles Superior Court (the Order) in a dissolution proceeding between petitioner Kathrin Saadian (Kathrin) and re spondent George Saadian (George), along with a number of entities join ed as parties, including Land mark West Enterprises, LLC (Landmark West); Shenanwood Development, Inc. (Shenanwood); Branmark Trust; and David Pasternak, temporary trustee of the Branmark Trust (Pasternak). 1 The challenged portions of the Order awarded substantial attorn ey fees and costs to be paid to Kathrin’s attorneys.

Statement of Facts George and Kathrin married in August 19 91. They have two sons, born in June 1993 and May 1999. The par ties separated and Kathrin file d for dissolution in January
2008. The September 23, 2010 Order After seven days of hearings on issues raised by five pend ing motions concerning support and fees, the trial court filed the Or der, supported by factua l findings. It found (in par. 7) that during his marriage to Kath rin, George had “formed a labyrinth of companies and trusts and exercised do minion and control over them, including
distributions of monies for those entities for his personal use.” It found that during the marriage George had contro lled a number of entities, including Landmark West, Shenanwood, and the Branmark Trust (until Pasternak’s March 2010 appointment as temporary trustee); that shor tly before Kathrin’s January 2008 dissolution petition, these entities had a net worth exceeding $23 million; and that George’s av ailable monthly cash flow exceeded $62,400. The court went on to find (in par. 12) that Shenanwood—not

1 We refer to Kathrin and Ge orge by their given names for the sake of clarity. ( Marriage of Murray (2002) 101 Cal.App.4t h 581, 584, fn. 1.)3 Landmark West—was entitled to specified proceeds from sales of a condominium project, identified as “the Frozen Funds at Mara Escrow Company.” 2 Based on these and other findings, the c ourt rendered detailed orders for payment, of certain support arrearages to Kathrin, a nd for payment of penden te lite fees and costs to Kathrin’s attorneys. Paragraph 4 of the Order specified that support arrearages of $75,142 “shall be paid from the ‘frozen account’ on deposit at Mara Escrow Company, . . . reflecting the net sales pro ceeds from [specified property] in the amount of $568,668.79,” and ordered Mara Escrow to immediately remit that amount to Kathrin. Paragraph 6 of the Order requi red George to pay Kathrin’s attorneys $1 million for fees and costs, without prejudice to future requests. And in paragraph 7, the court ordered that $493,526.79 of that $1 million payment woul d be paid from the balance of the frozen

escrow account. The Order was expressly intended by the co urt to maintain the status quo between the parties, leaving for future determination the appropriat e division and characterization
of the involved entities and asse ts as community, quasi-commun ity, or separate property. Appeals from the Order There were four timely notices of appeal from the Order (or specified portions of it): on behalf of George; on behalf of Shenan wood; on behalf of Past ernak, as temporary trustee of Branmark Trust; and on behalf of Landmark West. 3 Landmark West’s notice of appeal limits its appeal to paragraphs 7 and 12 of the Or der’s findings, and paragraphs
4 and 7 of the court’s Order.

2 On March 4, 2009, the court designated the proceedings as a complex case under Family Code section 2032 based on the parties’ stipulation.

3 Because Landmark West’s notice of appeal is not included in the clerk’s transcript, we have supplemented the record fro m this court’s files. The notice of appeal was filed on behalf of Landmark West on Nove mber 18, 2010, by the same a ttorneys that had filed Pasternak’s October 28, 2010 appe al on behalf of the Branmark Trust.4 The settlement deal memorandum On February 3, 2012, while this appeal was pending, Kathrin and George entered into a five-page “Deal Memorandum In Respect To Re solving All Disputes, Known Or Unknown, Between George Saadian and Kathri n Saadian.” The memorandum recites the parties’ intentions that their agreement woul d result in release of all claims by and among the parties and “their entities”; that the partie s would “be legally bou nd by this agreement and that it be enforceable on its terms pursu ant to CCP Sec. 664.6” (although further “boilerplate and technical language” would be added to a final document); and that any dispute arising under the deal memorandum or the final se ttlement “shall be submitted to binding arbitration” before a specified retir ed judge of the superior court. Following their deal memorandum, th e parties were unable to agree on the meaning of the memorandum’s term “their entities,” however. Although the deal memorandum provided that George would qu itclaim (or would cause Landmark West to quitclaim) specified properties to Kathrin, Ge orge contended that because of his April 2010 suspension as a trust ee of Branmark Trust (which owned 85 percent of Landmark West), his signature on the deal memorandum could not have bound Landmark West to
the settlement’s terms and could not bind it to transfer any of its share of the properties. On March 21, 2012, the parties s ubmitted their disput e over the deal memorandum’s meaning to binding arbitration before the specified retired judge, the Honorable Robert A. Schneider. Judge Schn eider’s April 4, 2012 ruling holds that the agreement requires George to execute, “or, in the case of properties owned by Landmark West Enterprises, LLC, to cause Landmark We st Enterprises, LLC to execute” quitclaim deeds conveying the listed properties to Kathri n. The arbitrator’s ruling was expressly “without prejudice to the partne rs (including individual memb ers of partner entities) of Landmark West Enterprises, LLC to raise a ny objections that they wish to raise in Probate Court or any other court.” The record contains no indication of any objection to that ruling by Landmark West or any partner or member of a partner entity of Landmark
West.5 Requests for extension of time to file opening brief On February 17, 2012, George, Shenan wood, Landmark West, Pasternak, and Branmark Trust filed a request in this court for a 60-day extension of time to file their opening brief, unopposed by Kathrin. In suppo rt of the request they advised the court of George and Kathrin’s February 3, 2012 deal memorandum for a “global settlement of all outstanding issues,” which they anticipated “will result in a motion to dismiss this appeal”—but that additional time was required “t o be certain that the global settlement of all outstanding issues will indeed result in a di smissal of this appeal .” The extension was granted. On April 17, 2012, George , Landmark West, Pasternak, and Branmark Trust filed requests in this court for a “t hird unopposed 60-day extension of time to file their opening brief.” Citing their previous extension requ est that had anticipated a dismissal of the appeal, they sought the additional extension “to obtain required appr ovals of parties and courts concerned,” due to one di sputed provision of the agreem ent. They attached copies of the February 3, 2012 deal memoran dum and Judge Schneider’s April 4, 2012 arbitration ruling order interpreting the deal memorandum’s disputed term. This court granted 60-day extensions to file appella nts’ opening briefs, to June 18, 2012. Stipulated probate court an d family law court orders In May 2012, the parties and their attorn eys executed a Stipulation For Entry Of Judgment, seeking the probate court’s approval of the settlement in three cases pending before it (case nos. SP007767 , SP008227, and SP008228), and en try of judgment in the family law case. 4 The stipulation provides (among many other things) that Kathrin is to receive title to the seven properties listed in the deal memorandum. It provides that (subject to the probate court’s discretion ), George, acting on behalf of Shenanwood,

4 According to George, case no. SP007767 arose from a March 2009 petition he filed as trustee of the Branmark Trust, s eeking characterization of properties held by Landmark West as community or separate prope rty assets. In that case, and in the other two probate cases (involving the children’s trus ts) the probate court suspended George as trustee and appointed David Pasternak as te mporary trustee of the Branmark Trust and the children’s trusts.6 would quitclaim two of those prop erties to Kathrin; that Pasternak, acting on behalf of the Branmark Trust, would quitclaim one of those properties to Ka thrin; and that Pasternak, acting on behalf of Landmark West, would quitclaim the remaining four of those properties to Kathrin. 5 Upon the family law court’s orde r based on the stipulation (to be obtained following the probate court’s approval ), the stipulation provides that the probate
court would cause Pasternak to make the ordere d distributions to Kath rin, and would then cause Pasternak’s discharge as temporary trus tee of the Branmark Trust, and George’s
reinstatement as trustee. On June 8, 2012, the probate court en tered an order approving “with conditions” the parties’ stipulation for en try of judgment based on th eir settlement agreement. Pursuant to the parties’ sti pulation, the probate court orde r provides that Kathrin will receive title to seven listed properties. It re quires Pasternak, as “Managing Member” of Landmark and of an entity known as Branmark Group, to quitclaim five of those properties to Kathrin “in their entirety.” And it requires George, acting on behalf of Shenanwood, to quitclaim th e remaining two of those properties to Kathrin. The probate court order provides that upon the family law court’s approval of the stipulation and the ordered dist ributions to Kathrin by Paster nak, it will cause Pasternak’s discharge as temporary trustee of the Bran mark Trust and George’s reinstatement as trustee. The probate court or der was approved as to form by counsel for Kathrin, George, and Pasternak (as well as by the guardian ad litem for the parties’ minor child), and was entered by the probate court (Lawrence Cho, Ju dge) on June 8, 2012. The order was to become effective immediately upon the entry of judgment in the family law court based on the parties’ stipulation. On June 11, 2012, the family law depa rtment of the superior court entered judgment in accordance with the parties’ Stipulation For Entry Of Judgment.

5 Pasternak was then temporary trustee of the Branmark Trust, which owned an 85 percent interest in Landmark West, and of th e children’s trusts, which together owned a 15 percent interest in Landmark West.7 Appellants’ opening brief On July 23, 2012 , attorney William M. Samoska substituted in this court as attorney for Shenanwood, Br anmark Trust, and Landmark West. (He also moved to vacate this court’s July 12, 2 012 dismissal of Shen anwood’s appeal for failure to timely file an opening brief.) On August 8, 20 12, attorney Samosk a filed Appellants’ Consolidated Opening Brief, its cover page identifying the appellants as Shenanwood and Landmark West. Although the brief’s cove r identifies neither George nor Branmark Trust as parties to the brief, its text identif ies George as a party, with whom Branmark Trust, Shenanwood, and Landm ark West, “have joined in this consolidated opening brief”—all represented by attorney Samoska. In 27 pages of the 70-page opening brief the appellants argue five issues: that the trial court erred by relying on evidence from Kathrin’s forensic experts about the funds available to pay her attorneys’ fees; that La ndmark West did not cause or incur much of the awarded fees; that the court wrongly applied the decision in Marriage of Dick (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 144; that the court abused its discretion by using assets of “joined entities” to pay attorneys’ fe es; and that the court erred in finding that Shenanwood,
rather than Landmark We st, owned the funds in th e Mara Escrow account. 6
Kathrin’s motion to dismi ss the appeals, and George’s opposition to dismissal On October 25, 2012, Kathrin moved to dismiss the appeal as moot, due to the parties’ settlement of all disputes and release of all claims. On November 9, 2012, a ttorney Samoska filed oppositio n to the motion on behalf of George (but not on behalf of Landmark West or the other joined parties). 7 George argued that the settlement ag reement does not require him to dismiss Landmark West’s

6 The opening brief’s certifica tion of compliance with California Rules of Court, rule 8.204(c)(1) states that it contains “not more than 15,0 00 words,” and that a motion “is filed concurrently” to exceed the rule’s 14 ,000 word limit. Th e docket reflects no such motion.

7 George’s Opposition to the Motion To Di smiss was filed by a ttorney Samoska, who by then also represented Landmark We st, the Branmark Trust, and the children’s trusts.8 appeal from the September 23, 2010 order, nor could it, because La ndmark is not bound by the settlement. George contended that the settlement agreem ent required him to quitclaim to Kathrin only his own interests in the specified properties, but not the shares held by Landmark West, beca use when the settlement agreement was signed, Pasternak
controlled Landmark West as trustee of Br anmark Trust (which owned 85 percent of Landmark West) and as trustee of the children’s trusts (whi ch together owned 15 percent of Landmark West). According to George, La ndmark West therefore retains an interest in this appeal despite George and Ka thrin’s settlement of all disputes. George concedes in the concluding para graphs of his nine-page opposition to the motion to dismiss, however, th at the settlement requires both George and Shenanwood to withdraw their appeals. 8 Kathrin’s November 14, 2012 reply to George’s opposition to the motion to dismiss notes that while George admitted he ha s no standing in this appeal, only he—and neither Landmark West nor any other a ppellant—opposed the dismissal motion. Kathrin’s reply also cited the inconsistency of George’s contention that he did not and
could not bind Landmark West to the settlement , with his earlier representations to this court that he anticipated th e settlement agreement would result in a dismissal of this appeal on behalf of all par ties. If George never intended the settlement to bind Landmark West, he could not also have anticipated (as he and Landmark West both represented)
that the settlement would result in dism issal of the appeal by all parties.
This court denied the motion to dismiss the appeal on February 20, 2013. (On June 6, 2013, this court dismis sed George’s appeal for his failu re to file an opening brief.) Respondent’s brief and appellant’s reply brief Respondent’s brief was filed May 15, 2 013. On September 4, 2013, attorney Samoska filed Appellant’s Repl y Brief on behalf of Landmark West alone. It chastises Kathrin for her motion to dismiss; it reaf firms that dismissal of George’s and

8 Although his opposition represents that “Appellants have filed concurrently herewith a stipulation to withdr aw the appeal as to George and Shenanwood,” neither this court’s docket nor the superior court docket reflect any such stipulation or withdrawal.9 Shenanwood’s appeals is required; and it agai n represents that George and Shenanwood filed a stipulation to withdraw their appeal s “concurrently herew ith”—again without any such filing appearing in this c ourt’s records. The last 8 pa ges of the 35-page reply brief repeat the opening brief’s arguments on the merits. The appellants reflected by this cour t’s docket are Landmark West, Branmark Trust, and Shenanwood. George (who ad mittedly controls Shen anwood, and who has
been restored as trustee of Branmark Trus t, the owner of an 85 percent interest in Landmark West) has represented to this court that Branmark Trust and Shenanwood must be dismissed as parties to the appeal. As of the time briefing was completed, neither
Branmark Trust nor Shen anwood (who were represented in the opening brief by George’s attorney) had advised this court to the contra ry. We therefore will dismiss the appeals of
Branmark Trust and Shenan wood, leaving Landmark West as the sole appellant.

Discussion
1. Standing and Standard of Review A direct appeal lies from interim orders granting support and attorney fees, which direct the payment of money or the performan ce of an act by or against an appellant. ( Marriage of Skelley (1976) 18 Cal.3d 365, 368-369; Alicia R. v. Timothy M. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1232, 1234 [pendente lite order for child support and attorney fees].)
When an action is within a trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction, its decision will be affirmed unless there has been a prejudicial abuse of the court’s discretion. On appeal the court will interfere only if no judge reas onably could have reached the challenged result under all the evidence, view ed most favorably in support of the trial court’s action. ( Smith v. Smith (1969) 1 Cal.A pp.3d 952, 958; Marriage of Laursen & Fogarty (1988) 197 Cal.App.3d 1082, 1086-1087.) It is the appellant’s burden to affirmatively demonstrate error in the challenged order, an d to demonstrate the error’s prejudicial impact on the appellant. ( Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) The only cognizable issues raised by Landmark West’s appeal arise from the portions of the Order identified in its noti ce of appeal, “regarding the amount of the10 award of [Kathrin’s] attorney fees and th e source from which the court ordered them paid”—specifically, paragraphs 7 and 12 of the trial court’s findings, and paragraphs 4 and 7 of its order—and only to the extent that Landmark West has an interest in those funds. (Code Civ. Proc., § 902; County of Alameda v. Carleson (1971) 5 Cal.3d 730, 737 [only parties aggrieved by the judgme nt have standing to appeal]; Gonzales v. R.J. Novick
Construction Co. (1978) 20 Cal.3d 798, 805-806 [issues on appeal from severable judgment are limited by appellant’s notice of appeal].) We conclude in this appeal that the reco rd justifies the trial court’s conclusion that
Landmark West owns no interest in the funds ordered to be paid from the Mara Escrow Company account, and therefore that the portions of the order affecting Landmark West
reflect no abuse of the trial court’s disc retion or prejudice to Landmark West.
2. Landmark West’s appeal fails to de monstrate that the Order abused the
trial court’s discretion.
The fundamental contention in Landmark We st’s appeal is that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering payment of fees to Kathrin and he r attorneys from funds held by Mara Escrow Company. The use of those funds, its appeal contends, rests on an erroneous finding that those funds belong to Shenanwood (an entity that George admittedly owns and controls), rather than to Landmark West, which George cont ends he
does not own or control. Landmark West c ontends also that use of its funds to pay Kathrin’s attorney fees was error because La ndmark West did not cause or incur much of those fees, and that these errors came about because the trial court wrongly applied the
decision in Marriage of Dick
, supra , 15 Cal.App.4th 144, to justify its reliance on evidence provided by Kathrin’s forensic experts about George ’s financial resources and
control of Landmark West. 9

9 Appellants’ Opening Brief (purportedly f iled on behalf of George, as well as Landmark West and Shenanwood) identifies two overlapping issues involving Landmark West’s interests: that the trial court a bused its discretion by using Landmark West’s funds for its attorney fee awar d; and that Landmark West has priority over Shenanwood to the frozen escrow funds.11 These issues are governed by the familiar rule affording every presumption in
favor of determinations su pported by substantial evidence. “On appeal, when the evidence is contradictory, conflicting interpre tations are presented thereby, or conflicting inferences may be drawn therefrom, that wh ich favors the judgment must be accepted as true, and that which is unfavorable must be discarded as not having had sufficient verity for acceptance by the trial court.” ( Ross v. Lawrence (1963) 219 Cal.App.2d 229, 232; Estate of Teel (1944) 25 Cal.2d 5 20, 527 [“All of the eviden ce most favorable to the respondent must be accepted as true, and that unfavorable discarded as not having sufficient verity to be accepted by the trier of fact.”].)

a. Landmark West has standing to a ppeal from the Order only to the extent it has an interest in the awarded funds.
In a determination that is fully supported by evidence in the re cord, the trial court
found that Landmark West lacked any interest in the funds in the Mara Escrow account. For that reason alone, Landmark West’s a ppeal from the Order’s use of those funds flounders. Landmark West’s standing to ch allenge the trial court’s fee award derives wholly from its claim of owne rship of the funds in the frozen escrow account from which the award is to be paid. Because Landma rk West has been fo und upon substantial evidence to have no interest in those funds, it is not aggrieved by th e Order. (Code Civ. Proc., § 902; County of Alameda v. Carleson
, supra , 5 Cal.3d at p. 737 [only parties aggrieved by the judgment ha ve standing to appeal].) The record fully su pports the trial court’s conclusi on that Landmark West was not
entitled to the funds frozen in the Mara Escrow account.
b. Landmark West’s appeal fails to demonstrate error in the trial court’s determination that it was no t entitled to any portion of the funds ordered to be paid from the escrow account.
Paragraph 4 of the challenge d Order awards payment of $75,142 in arrearages in support for Kathrin “from the ‘frozen account’ on deposit at Mara Escrow Company, . . . reflecting the net sales proceeds from [the Sh enandoah Street condominium sales] in the12 amount of $568,668.79.” Paragraph 7 of th e Order awards payment of $493,526.79 from
the frozen Mara Escrow acco unt to Kathrin’s attorneys, out of a total award of $1 million. In support of these orders, the trial c ourt found that if La ndmark West had any
interest in the loan transaction between it and Shenanwood for Shenanwood’s acquisition of the property for the Sh enandoah Street condominium project, “Landmark West’s interests, if any, were not properly secured and perfe cted.” The trial court’s determination that Shenanwood—admittedly wholly owned and co ntrolled by George— is entitled to the proceeds of the Shenandoah Street cond ominium sales frozen in the Mara Escrow account, and therefore that Land mark has no interest in them, is supported by substantial evidence. The initial order freezing the funds, filed September 17, 2009 (Jill Robbins, Judge Pro Tem), required Mara Es crow Company to hold sp ecified condominium sales proceeds in its account pending further c ourt order, and prohibited the parties from interfering in any manner with the escrow process. 10 On November 16, 2009, the court revised its freezing order to find that the escr ow funds resulting from the sale of one of
the condominium units then to taled $568,668.79, and to ex tend the restraining orders with respect to those funds. Landmark West (and George ) contend that Landmark We st is neither owned nor controlled by George; that Landmark West, not Shenanwood (or Geor ge), is contractually entitled to the frozen escrow funds; and theref ore that the court abused its discretion by ordering those funds to be us ed to pay the fees of Kathri n’s attorneys. However, those contentions are dispelled by evidence that: George had exercised substantial control over
both Shenanwood and Landmark West in th e Shenandoah Street condominium project and other circumstances; by evid ence that Landmark West record s indicate the absence of any bona fide debt owed to Landmark West by Shenanwood; by the court’s conclusions

10 Accusations that George tried to ci rcumvent this order by creating frivolous litigation between Landmark West and Shen anwood over the funds, without informing the family law court, led to his suspensi on as trustee of the Branmark Trust and Pasternak’s appointment as temporary trustee.13 that George “was not credib le” regarding his cash flow and management of assets acquired and under his control during the marr iage; by the finding that George had used “a labyrinth of companies and trusts” to obtain funds for his personal use while concealing their sources; and that during the marriage he had controlled not just Shenanwood, but also Landmark West and the Branmark Tr ust, which owned 85 percent
of Landmark West. It was in this respect that the court found this case to be similar to the
circumstances in Marriage of Dick
, supra , 15 Cal.App.4th 144, a conclusion that Landmark West contends is unjustified. In Marriage of Dick , the trial court had found, upon substantial eviden ce, that the husband had the ability to pay the amounts ordered for temporary support and attorney fees, despite his denials. “It is clear that the trial court utterly disbelieved him, and its assessment of husband’s credibility is binding on this court.” ( Id. at p. 160.) The cited supporting ev idence included the husband’s apparent control of entities in which he denied any inte rest, and his denials of ownership of assets that he elsewhere treated as his. ( Id. at pp. 162-165.) George distinguishes Marriage of
Dick on the ground that there the evidence suggested illegality and fraud by the husband.
But the trial court in this case was entitled to disbelieve Geor ge, and to find that his use of various entities to hold his assets, with or without fraud or illegality, did not deprive him of the resources or ability to ca use payment of th e funds awarded.
The trial court’s conclusions in this case are supported by evidence that George
formed Shenanwood in 2005 in order to develop the Sh enandoah Street property, which
was then held in the name of Landmark We st. According to George, he purchased the property from Landmark with a bank loan, along with a loan of about $4.1 million from Landmark West secured by the property, and th at Shenanwood eventua lly sold or leased (at a loss) all of the condomin ium units it had built. If it were true that Shenanwood had a legitimate outstanding debt of $4.1 million to Landmark West on Shenanwood’s note, (and if Landmark West was not an entity controlled by George), then Landmark West, not Shenanwood, would be en titled to the proceeds of the condominium sales—the funds14 that the Order required to be paid to Kathrin and her attorneys. However, the trial court,
based on the evidence fo und to the contrary. In connection with its orders freezing th e escrow funds, however, the trial court had before it ample evidence indicating that the transacti on between Landmark West and Shenanwood was not an arms-length sale be tween independent entities. Evidence and previous court findings indicated that in purchasing the properties from Landmark, Shenanwood had executed two different prom issory notes for the same property, dated two days apart, with different terms; that th e deed had not been exec uted at the same time as the purported note; and th at by the time the deed was ac tually executed, it had been clear that the condominium project could not be a financial success, based on the parties’ own figures. The evidence show ed, in addition, that in mid- 2007 (about 6 months before Kathrin filed her dissolution petition) Landma rk West had issued checks to George totaling $250,000. 11 And as of September 30, 2007, George prepared a consolidated financial statement claiming that his net worth—combined with Landmark West and other entities—was over $29 million, his conso lidated financial statement dated August 30, 2006 showed a net worth of more than $23 million, a nd his consolidated financial statement dated March 19, 2008 showed a net worth of more than $21 million. George signed the purchase agreement and escrow inst ructions for the Shen andoah property on behalf of both the seller and the purchaser, a nd the promissory note on behalf of both the
borrower and lender. Despite the purported January 31, 2007 sale of the Shenandoah Street property by
Landmark West to Shenanwood , George’s financial statem ent dated August 30, 2008
identifies the Shenando ah Street property as being ow ned “100%” by Landmark West. Moreover, Landmark West’s general ledger as of December 31, 2007 showed the balance owed by Shenanwood on th e note as zero. The note was not recorded. Based on these and other facts, Kathrin’s expert witness testified that George had
created a sham loan to Land mark West in order to shif t condominium sales proceeds

11 Kathrin testified that George had initially moved out of the fa mily residence in August 2007, but that she let him return in mid-September 2007.15 from Shenanwood to Landmark West, both of which George controlled, and that the proceeds from the condominiu m sales—the funds in the Mara Escrow account—“should belong to the owner of the property, Sh enanwood, and not the fictitious lender, [Landmark West].” 12 The Order concludes that “Lan dmark West’s interests [in the proceeds of the Shenandoah Stre et condominium project], if any, were not properly secured and perfected.” It is true, as George argues at length, th at he offered evidence and explanations for many of these circumstances, which, if cr edited, might have ju stified conclusions contrary to those reached by the trial court. 13 However, this court is bound to credit the evidence that supports the trial court’s order, and to disregard that which does not. ( Ross
v. Lawrence , supra , 219 Cal.App.2d at p. 231; Estate of Teel
, supra , 25 Cal.2d at p. 524.)

12 On May 19, 2010 (about 6 weeks after Kathrin had moved for payment of her attorneys from the fro zen escrow funds)—Landmark We st’s attorney filed a UCC-1 Financing Statement on Landmark West’s behalf, for Shenanwood’s rights, interests, and profits from the Shenandoah Street property. As the opening brief points out in a footnote, that put third partie s on notice of Landmark West’s claim to a security interest in that collateral; however th e opening brief provides no auth ority for its apparent claim that the filing has any impact on this case. ( Dabney v. Dabney (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 379, 384 [court need not consider argument for which no authority is furnished].)

13 The appellants’ opening br ief and Landmark West’s reply brief argue the existence of many facts and propositions for which they provide no record citations (or for which record citations are to supposed f acts stated in their trial court points and authorities). These purported facts, for the most part, we disregard. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C); Dominguez v. Financial Indem. Co. (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 388, 391.) We also disregard the citations to exhi bits for which no transcript volume or page is provided. And because the briefs’ citations to transcripts by date a nd page of daily trial transcripts (over a hundred such citations on more than 30 pages of the opening brief alone) provide this court with no clue as to the volume and page of the Reporter’s Transcript on appeal, we disreg ard those references as well.16 The trial court’s determination that Landmark West is not entitled to the funds frozen in the Mara Escrow account is suppo rted by substantial evidence. 14

Conclusion
Because Landmark West has no interest in the funds aw arded by the trial court for the payment of attorney fees to Kathrin’s atto rneys, it lacks standing to challenge the trial court’s determinations that George exercised control over Landmark West’s affairs, that
Landmark West did not cause or incur the or dered fees, that Landmark West was not an alter ego of George, or that the fee award was in any way improper or unjustified. The outcome of those challenges could not entitle La ndmark West to the funds that the Order requires Mara Escrow to pay to Kathrin’s attorneys.

14 In a January 6, 2010 hearing, George’s counsel went so far as to argue to the trial court that Landmark West’s joinder as a party was unnecessary because the court could order George to take any required acti on, while making no clai m that George could not control Landmark West. He argued, “Landmark West. It’s an LLC owned 85 percent by the Branmark Trust, 15 percent by the children’s trust[s]. If the court is inclined to join . . . the Branmark Trust, what’s the need to join, also, Landmark West? . . .” “If the owners [of the Branmark Trust and Landmark West] are here, you can tell the owners what to do. . . . You don’t ha ve to have every entity that [George], for example, owns. If he’s here, you have jurisd iction over him. You say, ‘Mr. Saadian, here’s what you’re going to do with these properties.’”17 Disposition The Order of September 23, 2010 is affirm ed, without prejudice to the trial court’s
discretion to determine the extent to which any party to the unde rlying action has been prejudiced by the filing and maintenance of appe als in this matter by or on behalf of any party that knew or should ha ve known that it lacked either reasonably arguable standing to maintain its appeal, or reasonably arguabl e grounds for appeal; and to order payment of reasonable fees and costs arising from such determination. Respondent is entitled to her costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

CHANEY, J.

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, Acting P. J.

MILLER, J. *

* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Cour t, assigned by the Ch ief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.