IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Robert Duncan, :

Appellant :

: v. : No. 2230 C.D. 2015 : Submitted: May 20, 2016 City of Philadelphia, Bureau of : Administrative Adjudication :

BEFORE: HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President Judge

HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge HONORABLE DAN PELLEGRINI, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY PRESIDENT JUDGE LEAVITT FILED: August 26, 2016

Robert Duncan , r epresenting himself, appeals an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County (tr ial court) affirming, in part, a decision by the City’s Bureau of Administrative Adjudication (Bureau) finding Duncan liable for two parking tickets. Duncan assigns various errors and raises constitu tional
issues related to the issuance of the tickets and the Bureau ’s hearing process. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

On September 12, 2013, Duncan was issued parking ticket number 593856107 (Ticket One) for parking at an expired meter on the 50 0 block of South
10 th Street, Philadelphia . On September 19, 2013, Duncan was issued parking ticket number 595150244 (Ticket Two) for making a prohibited stop of his vehicle at 1401 Arch Street, Philadelphia

. Duncan appealed Ticket One and Ticket Two to
the Bureau . On February 24, 2015, a Bureau hearing examiner conducted a hearing and found Duncan liable for both tickets. Duncan appealed to the trial

court. Following oral argument, the trial court entered an order affirming the2

Bureau ’s decision as to Ticket One and Ticket Two

. 1 Duncan ’s appeal to this
Court followed

.

On appeal, 2 Duncan raises several issues, which we consolidate and
reorder to facilitate our review . First, Duncan argues that the trial court erred in finding that the ticket s conform ed with the requirements in The Traffic Code (Traffic Code) Section 12

- 2804(3). 3 This Code provision states, in relevant part,
that [t]he parking ticket shall also contain other sufficient

information to identify the vehicle and to inform the person of the nature, date, time and location of the violation alleged.

P HILA

. C ODE §12

- 2804(3). Duncan argues that th e tickets were deficient becaus e they did not contain sufficient information to notify him of the actual location of the vehicle on a particular bl ock . We disagree.

Ticket One stated that the offense occurred on September 12, 2013 , at 5:22 p

. m

. on the west side of the 500 block of South 10 th Street. The ticket further identified the make, color and plate number of the vehicle . The offense was
identified as a meter violation and included the meter number. Ticket Two stated that the offense occurred on September 19, 2013 , at 11:29 a

. m

. at the north side of
1401 Arch Street . This ticket also identified the make, color and plate number of

1 A third ticket was remanded to the Bureau for a full hearing and is therefore not addressed in the instant appeal

. 2 Where the trial court does not take any additional evidence, our scope of review over the decision of a local agency is limited to determining whether constitutional rights were violated, whether an error of law was committed, whether the procedure before the local agency was contrary to statute, and whether necessary findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence. Kovler v. Bureau of Administrative Adjudication , 6 A.3d 1060 n.1 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010) (citing Section 754 of the Local Agency Law, 2 Pa. C.S. § 754). 3 The Traffic Code is set forth at Title 12 of The Philadelphia Code.3

the veh icle . The offense was identified as a stop violation at the aforementioned
address. Both tickets satisfied the identification and information requirements set
forth in Section 12

- 2804(3) of the Traffic Code

.

In his second issue, Duncan alleges that th e trial court erred in finding
that the ticket s conformed to the requirements of Traffic Code Section 12

- 28 04(5) , which states that

[t]he original parking ticket shall be signed by the issuing officer who shall affirm the truth of the facts set forth there in.

P HILA

. C ODE § 12

- 2804(5). Duncan contends that t he issuing officers failed to comply with Section 12

- 2804(5) because they electronically signed the tickets

. We dis agree. Ticket One was electronically signed by Officer M. Rivera. Bureau Hearing, 2/24 / 20 15, Exhibit 1. Ticket Two was electronically signed by Officer K.
Holtzman. Bureau Hearing, 2/24/ 20 15, E xhibit 2

. It has long been held in the
First Judicial District that e lect ronic signatures satisfy Section 12

- 2804(5). See, e.g., Pavlock v. Bureau of Administr a tive Adjudication, ex rel. Philadelphia Parking Authority (Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, August Term 2011, No. 01049, filed October 2, 2012). We discern no reason to depart fro m this long

- held precedent. Further, D uncan has not explained why an electronic signature is less reliable than a signature on a paper ticket. Such is the reality of our digital age. We agree with the trial court that both tickets complied with
Section 12

- 2804(5) of the Philadelphia Code

.

In his third issue , Duncan raises various due process issues. First, he argues that the Bureau’s hearing examiner assumed the role of the Philadelphia Parking Authority in the hearing, thereby commingling prosecutorial and4

adjudicative function s . While Du ncan does not develop t his argument beyond stating it , 4 we presume he takes issue with the hearing examiner ’ s statu s as a C ity employee. This Court rejected this identical argument in Kovler v. Bureau of Administrative Adjudication , 6 A.3d 1060 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010), where a motorist challenged a Bureau hearing examiner’s impartiality because he was a City employee. T his C ourt held that “ [ Bureau of Administrative Adjudication ] hearing examiners are not constitutionally disqualified from presiding over parking violations based solely on their status as employees of the City.” Id. at 1064 n .6. Accordingly, we hold that Duncan’s right to due process was not violated by virtue
of the hearing examiner ’ s status as a City employee.

Next, Duncan assert s that the hearing examiner tainted the proc edure by commenting “well, [this matter is ] going to go back, but we will go through
each ticket.” Bureau Hea ring, 2/24/2015, at 3. Duncan provides no explanation
for how this statement prejudiced his case or d emonstrated the hearing examiner ’s impartial ity

. 5 It is well settled that an appellate court will not consider issues that are not properly raised and developed in a brief. Boniella , 958 A.2d at 1072 n.8

. See also Pa. R.A.P. 2119(a) (requiring argument of issues to be “ followed by such discussion and citation of authorities as are deemed pertinent. ”)

. Duncan has failed

4 As a general rule, “[w]hen issues are not properly raised and developed in briefs, when the briefs are wholly inadequate to present specific issues for review, a court will no t consider the merits thereof.” Boniella v. Commonwealth , 958 A.2d 1069, 1072 n.8 ( Pa. Cmwlth. 2008 ) (quoting Commonwealth v. Feineigle , 690 A.2d 748, 751 n.5 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997) )

. “Mere issue spotting without analysis or legal citation to support an assertion precludes our appellate review of [a] matter.” Boniella , 958 A.2 d at 1072 n.8 (quoting Commonwealth v. Spontarelli , 791 A.2d 1254, 1259 n.11 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002) )

. See also Pa. R.A.P. 2119 ( a) (requiring argument of issues to be “ followed by such discussion and citation of authorities as are deemed pertinent. ”)

. 5 This issue was mentioned preliminarily in Duncan’s argument summary, but is entirely absent from the argument section of his brief.5

to develop any argument as to how the hearing examiner was bia s ed against him , and this C ourt will not invent one. Moreover, t he recor d reflects that th e hearing
examiner went t hrough each ticket individually to ensure that they complied with
the Philade lphia Code. W e reject this basis for Duncan’s due process claim

.

In his final due process argument , Duncan asserts that the trial cour t erred in ignoring his request to cross

- examine the issuing officers of the tickets. Specifically, Duncan asserts that “the ticket should be dismissed because of the failure of the ticket writer to appear at the hearing, in violation of Pennsylvania
Admi nistrative Agency Law.” Duncan Brief at 6. 6 There are multiple issues with this argument; we address them in turn.

Section 554 of the Local Agency Law provides, in relevant part, that
“reasonable examination and cross

- examination shall be permitted ” in a local agency proceeding. 2 Pa. C.S. §554. The Bureau has promulgated regulations governing the conduct of its hearing s . Section 5.02(f) of the Bureau’s regulations provides :
T he Respondent shall have the right to present witnesses, to

conduct examinat ions and to introduce documentary evidence....The participation in the hearing of the issuing officer shall not be required except as follows: (i) The R espondent may request examination of the issuing officer, provided that the Respondent first presents all issu es and defenses at the initial scheduled hearing. Such request shall set forth all of the following:

6 Duncan’s brief cites to 2 Pa. C.S. §544 , which does not exist. We presume from the context of the question presented that Duncan intended to cite to Section 554 of the Local Agency Law, dealing with cross

- examination under local agency procedure.6 (.1) The facts the Respondent expects the testimony of the issuing officer would provide. (.2) The reasons why such facts are material to the adjudicat ion of the violation charged. (.3) The reasons why the most reasonable means of establishing such facts is through testimony of the issuing officer. (ii) If the Parking Hearing Examiner finds that the most reasonable means of establishing facts necessary to a djudication of the violation charged is through testimony of the issuing officer, the hearing may be continued to a date when the issuing officer will be present.

R EGULATIONS OF THE B UREAU OF A DMINISTRATIVE A DJUDICATION , § 5.02(f)

. Thus, absent a finding that the issuing officer’s presence is the most reasonable means of establishing necessary facts, the officer’s presence is not required.

In Kovler , t his C ourt addressed the argument that due process guaranteed the right to cross

- examin e a ticket

- issuing officer and rej e cted it; we
concluded that there is no right to confront witnesses in civil cases. Kovler , 6 A.3d
at 1064. Further, Kovler did not request the officer ’s attendance at the hearing and did not raise any is sue that might require the presence of that officer

. Because Kovler did not challenge the time, date, location, reason, or any other information provided on the ticket, the issuing officer’s presence was unnecessary in order to
establish the facts necessa ry for adjudication of the parking ticket

.

In the present case, although Duncan requested to examine the issuing
officer s at the hearing, the hearing examiner concluded that Duncan failed to make7

a persuasive case that their presence would be necessary to adjudicate the matter. Here, as in Kovler , Duncan does not deny the locatio n of his vehicle at the time the
tickets were issued or contend that the officers lacked valid reasons for issuing the
tickets . Instead he argues that Ticket One and Ticket Two f ailed to conform with certain technical requirements of the Philadelphia Code , as discussed above

. Because the issuing officer s ’ presence was unnecessary to determine w hether each ticket complied with the Philadelphia Code , Duncan’s third due process argument
fails

. In his final argument, Duncan asserts the trial court failed to enforce a settlement agreement reached in Pavlock . The City of Philadelphia and the Philadelphia Parking Authority appealed the trial court’s order of July 9, 2012, in
Pavloc k to this Court. Pavlock v. Bureau of Administrative Adjudication ex rel.
Ph i ladelphia Parking Authority (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 1474 C.D. 2012). The appeal to this Court was discontinued on June 4, 2013, following a joint motion of the parties based on a sett lement agreement. Specifically, Duncan contends the
Bureau failed to comply with the settlement terms in paragraphs 2(A), 2(C)(ii), and (7). These paragraphs deal with the issuance of proposed regulations, the posting of regulations online, and the enfor ceabilit y o f the agreement. Duncan offers no evidence or argument as to how the Bureau violated the settlement agreement, or how the Bureau’s compliance with the agreement could have possibly affected his

case . Accordingly, Duncan’s final argument fails.

For all of the reasons discussed above, we affirm the trial court’s
order.

_____________________________________ MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President JudgeIN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Robert Duncan, :

Appellant :

: v. : No. 2230 C.D. 2015
: City of Philadelphia, Bureau of : Administrative Adjudication :
O R D E R

AND NOW, this 26 th day of August , 2016, the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County dated October 8, 2015, in the above

captioned matter is AFFIRMED.

_____________________________________ MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President Judge