[Cite as Sharif v. Sharif , 2022

- Ohio

- 2856.]



### IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

BRIDGETTE C. SHARIF , Plaintiff

- Appell ee ,

VS

.

ZULFIKAR A. SHARIF , Defendant

- Appellant

. :

:

:

:

:

: APPEAL NO. C

- 210472 TRIAL NO. DR

- 130 0044

O P I N I O N.

Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas , Domestic Relations

Division Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed in P art, Re versed in P art, and C ause R emanded Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: August 17, 2022

Taft, Stettinius & Hollister and Aimee L. Keller , for Plaintiff

- Appellee , Barbara J. Howard Co., LPA , and Barbara Howard , for Defendant

- Appellant.OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF AP PEALS

2 C ROUSE , Judge. 

### {¶1} Defendant

- appellant Zulfikar A. Sharif (“father”) app eals the judgment
of the Hamilton Cou nty Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Divis ion , raising three assignments of error for the court’ s review. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the domestic relations court in part, reverse it in part, and remand the
matter for further proceedings consistent with the law and this opinion.

Factual and Procedural Background 

### {¶2} Plaintiff

- appellee Bridgette C. Sharif (“mother”) filed a complaint for
divorce from father in 2013. In 2014 , t h e court journalized a decree of divorce and a decree of shared parenting , which named both parents as residential parent and legal
custodian of their two children. 

### {¶3} Parenting time and child support were established through a joint plan
for shared parenting , though b oth have been modified several times since. Per a 2015 agreed entry, father’s child support was set at $4,845 per month payable to mother. Before this litigation, father had alternating weekends with the children, and Monday evenings until Wedne sday morning each week

. 

### {¶4} On November 20, 2020 , father filed a “motion to modify child support
and to terminate reimbursement for childcare expenses
. ” On April 2, 2021, father filed

a motion to modify parenting time. Essentially, he sought to add additional parenting time on Mondays in the summer af ter his weekend parenting time. 1 

### {¶5} On April 9, 2021 , m other filed a motion to modify parenting time

. Mother moved the court to “ order that the children remain with Mother Monday

1 Father’s motion also asked for modifications to the holiday

- time arrangement , though father onl y appeals the denial of his motion to modify “the routine parenting time schedule.”OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF AP PEALS

3 overnights during the summer and on school holidays .” 2 Mother also requested attorney fees. 

### {¶6} On May 25, 2021, a hearing was held before a magistrate. On July 2, 2021, the magistrate entered a decision on all the pending motions

. The magistrate

r ecommended denying mother’s motion to modify parenting time ; granting father’s
motion to modify parenting time in part such that the children would stay with father all day on Mondays in the summer; denying father’s motion to terminate
reimbursement for ch ildcare expenses ; and granting father’s motion to modify child
support. The magistra te did not award attorney fees. 

### {¶7} Mother timely objected to the magistrate’s decision , raising five objections

. First, mother argued that it was error for the magistrate to grant the motion to modify child support because the parties had already come to an agreement on that
issue and had informed the magistrate of their agreement at the hearing. Mother attached two unsigned agreed entries t o her objections , along with emails regarding the agreement that had been exchanged by the parties’ attorneys. Mother further argued
that her motion to modify parenting time should have been granted ; father’s motion should have been denied; the holiday sc hedule was not in the children’s best interest ; and father should have been ordered to pay attorney fees. 

### {¶8} On Septembe r 3, 2021, the court sustained all five objections

. In sustaining the objections, the court stated that it “adopts the Agreed Entry deta iling the parties’ child support agreement attached to Plaintiff’s Objection and effective April 1,
2021” and ordered t he parties to “submit the finalized and signed support agreement.”

2 Mother’s motion also discussed holiday time

.OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF AP PEALS

4 The court also modified the parenting

- time schedule in favor of mothe r and ordered
father to pay $20,000 towards mother’s attorney fees. 

### {¶9} Father timely appealed from th at order , raising th ree assignments of error for our review concerning parenting time, attorney fees, and child support. Parenting Time 

### {¶10} In his first assignme nt of error, Father contends that the trial court
erred by modifying the parenting

- time schedule in favor of mother

. T he parenting

- time issue relevant to this appeal is rather narrow and involves only Mondays in the summer
and when the children do not have school. In short, both mother and father wanted parenting time on Mondays during the summer. 

### {¶11} The court added Mondays during the summer to mother’s schedule and ordered that father’s weekday parenting time be modified so that it now begins on Tuesday morning, rather than Monday evening. Previously, the children went to mother on Monday morning after father’s weeke nds wit h them, before returning to father that evening for his weekday parenting time which continued until Wednesday morning. 

### {¶12} Father’s motion asked the court to modify the schedule so that the children stayed with him all day Monday following his weeken ds, lea ding into his weekday parenting time. He argues that his proposed change would have reduced transitions and allowed each parent to spend quality time with the children. Mother counters that the schedule modification ordered by the court actually ac complis hed that goal. 

### {¶13} We review modifications to shared

- parenting plans for an abuse of
discretion. Dennis v. Dennis , 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C

- 210370, 2022
- Ohio

- 1216, ¶ 14, citing Marimon v. Marimon, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C

- 210137, 2021
- Ohio

- 3437, ¶ 23,OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF AP PEALS

5 c iting H all v. Hall , 4th Dist. Adams No. 16CA1030, 2017

- Ohio

- 8968, ¶ 19. An abuse of discretion “implies that the trial court’s decision was unreasonable or arbitrary.” Kane

v. Hardin , 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C

- 180525, 2019
- Ohio

- 4362, ¶ 6, citing Blakemore v. Blak emore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983). 

### {¶14} A modification to parenting time is a modification to a shared

- parenting plan. See Bruns v. Green , 163 Ohio St.3d 43, 2020
- Ohio

- 4787, 168 N.E.3d 396, ¶ 19 (explaining that shared

- parenting plans “[i] n clude agreements concerning parenting time, holiday visitation, school and daycare placement, and payment of childcare

expenses ”). And s hared

- parenting plans are modified pursuant to R.C. 3109.04(E)(2)(b)

. See Fisher v. Hasenjager , 116 Ohio St.3d 53, 200 7
- Ohio

- 5589, 876
N.E.2d 546 (holding that “R.C. 3109.04(E)(2)(b) permits a court to modify the terms of
the plan for shared parenting ”)

. 

### {¶15} R.C. 3109.04(E)(2)(b) provides that the terms of the plan for shared parenting may be modified so long as the modific ation is in the best interest of the
children. W

hile a court must consider the children’s best interest under R.C. 3109.04(E)(2)(b), it is “not required to specifically consider the factors enumerated in
R.C. 3109.04(F)(1).” Marimon v. Marimon , 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C

- 210137, 2021
- Ohio

- 3437, ¶ 22 ( “[N] othing in R.C. 3109.04(E)(2)(b) explicitly requires the trial court

to examine the factors in R.C. 3109.04(F )(1), and R.C. 3109.04(F)(1) by its terms applies

to ‘ an original decree allocating parental rights and responsibilities for the care of
children or a modification of a decree allocating those rights and responsibilities ’

— not
modifications of terms of the shared

- parenting plan. ”). 

### {¶16} The trial court found that mother “showed that it is in the best intere st of the children to be with [her] overnight on weekends they are not in school to provideOHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF AP PEALS

6 continuity and reduce transitions.” The court noted that mother does not work on Mondays, but father does, albeit remotely, and concluded that the children could d o more activities with mother. The court concluded that “[ i ]t is in the best interest of the children to minimize parenting time exchanges ” and “to be with a parent who does not work on Mondays during the summer for maximum quality time rather than with a parent who is working , even remotely.” 

### {¶17} Father testified that his new job, which began in September 2020 , gave him significant flexibility, such that he now works remotely with flexible hours, “wherever [he has a ] secured internet connection and a computer .” Father went on to testify that with his new job, “[t]he hours are flexible. It’s more a matter of completing the workload for any one particular day

. ” So, if father wanted to take time off on a Monday, he “would finish h alf of the claims that needed t o be finish ed on Sunday night. And then, you know, finish that Monday morning early in the morning, and then do what I wanted for the rest of the day.” 

### {¶18} He testified that, for the sake of “continuity,” the schedule would be
easier on the children because t hey could stay in one place during the day, rather than going to their mother’s house, before returning to his house at 4 :00 p.m. Father
testified tha t this would be a return to the same continuity that the children have dur ing the school year, because d uring that time, the children leave his house Monday morning, go to school, and return to his house after school

. 

### {¶19} Father testified that he was not tryi ng to take any time away from mother, stating: I think having them stay at the parent’s house on Monday where they were the weekend before is clearly in their best interest because it allowsOHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF AP PEALS

7 less transition for the children. It allows them to sleep in at both houses, if that is able to happen. It allows them to stay up later at night on the night before a d ay off. * * * [S]o I think from those standpoints, it would be less transition and allowing the children more freedom to do something on Sunday night, I think, is in their best interest. 

### {¶20} Mother is a pharmacist who works on Tuesdays, Wednesdays, and Friday s . She testified that she has had that schedule for approximately se v en years, which allows her to focus on the children all day Monday without any othe r priorities. Mother testified that she has “a hundred percent of [her] time devoted to the children

on Mondays. Zero commitment.” She testified that she was concerned that if father’s motion was granted then “the kids would be stuck * * * at home * * * b ecause even though he has flexibility, he is still working.” 

### {¶21} Mother testified that the children do not normally sleep in because they have early morning swim practice and “thrive on maintaining a routine

. ” She stated that on those Mondays, she picks the children up in the morning from father and either takes them straight to swim practice, or they do acti vities together . Mother testified that “[t]he only problem is that it is always cut short because the end time is 4:00 [p.m.] ” which requires them to “leave friends or leave activities early because of that time.” 

### {¶22} Based on this testimony, the court’s deci sion to modify the schedule in
favor of mother was not an abuse of discretion. The testimony at the hearing
demons trate d that while father does have flexibility with his work schedule, his work would need to be done at some point

— typically on Sunday or ea rly Monday morning before the children woke up

. On the other hand, mother does not work at all on Mondays, and can dedicate the entire day to the children. The court’s conclusion thatOHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF AP PEALS

8 father’s remote work would still take time away from the children was n ot un reasonable,
as is it difficult to imagine that father could consistently complete such a significant
amount of work outside of normal business hours and while the children were sleeping. Overall, the court’s conclusion that quality time would be maxi mized by spending all day Monday with mother was not an abuse of discretion. 

### {¶23} The court’s finding on minimizing p arenting

- time exchanges is less
clear , but is not unreasonable . While the court does not explain how parenting

- time exchanges are minimized, the modified schedule does reduce the number of exchanges taking place on Mondays over a short period of time. 

### {¶24} The first assignment of error is overruled. Attorney Fees 

### {¶25} In his second assignment of error , father argues that the trial court erred
in orde ring him to pay mother attorney fees because mother did not present evidence of
the reasonableness of the fess. Father contends that mother “presented no evidence regarding attorney fees beyond the income of the parties and Mother’s identification of
her a ttorney fee statement. ” 

### {¶26} Mother counters that the court properly relied on the income of the parties and took judicial notice of counsel’s qualifications. Mother contends that the
court could determine reasonableness based on “its years of experience with all cases
and all atto rneys.” 

### {¶27} This court reviews a trial court’s award of attorney fees for an abuse of
discretion. Rummelhoff v. Rummelhoff , 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C

- 210112 and

C

- 210176, 2022

- Ohio

- 1224, ¶ 46, citing Burroughs v. Burroughs , 1st Dist. Ha milton

Nos. C

- 990001 and C

- 990031, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 868 (Mar. 10, 2000)

.OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF AP PEALS

9 

### {¶28} R.C. 3105.73(B) provides that:

In any post

- decree motion or proceeding that arises out of an action for divorce * * * the court may award all of part of reasonable attorney’s fee s and litigation expenses * * * if the court finds the award equitable * * * consider[ing] the parties ’ income, the conduct of the parties, and any other relevant factors the court deems appropriate [not including the parties ’ assets]

. 

### {¶29} Local Rule 17.1 of t he Ham ilton County Rules of Practice of the Court of
Common Pleas for the Domestic Relations Division (“Loc.R. 17.1”) also requires specific testimony prior to the awarding of attorney fees on issues such as the complexity of the case, attorney experience, and t he parties’ income

. 3 

### {¶30} This court has previously held that prior to awarding fees pursuant to R.C. 3105.73(B) , the trial court must hold a hearing to determine the reasonableness of
those fees. Rummelhoff at ¶ 47, citing Hubbard v. Hubbard , 3d Dist . Def iance No. 4

- 08

- 37, 2009
- Ohio

- 2194, ¶ 12 ; see Bagnola v. Bagnola , 5th Dist. Stark No. 2004CA00151, 2004
- Ohio

- 7286, ¶ 36 (holding trial court abused its discretion when it
awarded attorney fees without holding a hearing to determine reasonableness). “S imply submitting itemized bills, without an y evidence that the adverse party has been billed

3 Loc.R. 17.1 provides that , in addition to an itemized bill , the attorney seeking fees shall present : Testimony as to wheth er the case was complicated by any or all of the following: New or unique issues of law [;] d ifficulty in ascertaining or valuing the parties assets [;] p ro blems with completing discovery [;] a ny other factor necessitating extra time being spent on the case

. T estimony regarding the attorney ’ s years in practice and experience in domestic relations cases . E vidence of the parties ’ respective income and expenses, if not otherwise disclosed during the hearing. The rule goes on to provide that “[f] ailure to comply with the provisions of this rule shall result in the denial of a request for attorney fees, unless jurisdiction to determine the issue of fees is expressly reserved in any order resulting from the hearing. ”OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF AP PEALS

10 for, or paid, the fees, is insufficient and constitutes an abuse of discretion.” Id

. , citing
Hubbard at ¶ 12. 

### {¶31} Counsel did not testify , nor di d she submit an affi davit establishing the
reasonableness of the fees

. The only evidence on the attorney

- fee issue was an itemized billing statement, totaling $26,618.75, submitted at the end of the motions hearing before the magistrate and testimony from the mother that she “ spent ” those fees. The following is the entire exchange regarding attorney fees that occurred at the hearing : COUNSEL FOR MOTHER: And last question, please look at Exhibit 18. Are these the attorney fees you’ve spent on this matter?

MOTHER: Yes

. COUNSE L FOR MOTHER: I think we’re at noon. THE COURT: Yes. Ms. Howard, did you have any questions?

* * * COUNSEL FOR FATHER: You know, your Honor, I’m mindful of the time, and I think I can handle all of it in closing.

* * *

THE COURT: Okay. All right. Do you want to talk about exhibits?

* * * COUNSEL FOR MOTHER: * * * I’m also moving in [Exhibits] 13, 17, 18. COUNSEL FOR FATHER: * * * 18, I guess for what it’s worth I guess is
in. COUNSEL FOR MOTHER: My client just testified to it
COUNSEL FOR FATHER: Yeah. I mean, for what it’s worth. That’s fine.OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF AP PEALS

11 

### {¶32} Given the lack of evidence demonstrating the reasonableness of the
attorney fees, we hold that the court’s attorney

- fee award was an ab use of discretion. The second assignment of error is sustained. Child Support 

### {¶33} In his third assignment of error, f ather contends that the trial court erred by “adopting and ordering [him] to sign an unsigned draft Agreed Entry on child support.” 

### {¶34} We revie w a domestic relations court’s adoption of settlement agreements for an abuse of discretion. Federle v. Federle , 1st Dist. Hamilton No.
C

- 180171, 2019

- Ohio

- 2565, ¶ 8; Rulli v. Fan Co. , 79 Ohio St.3d 374, 376, 683 N.E.2d 337 (1997). 

### {¶35} The parties do not di spute that at the beginning of the May 25, 2021 hearing before the magistrate , both parties indicated they had reached an agreement on child support. The following exchange took place: THE COURT: * * * I have a couple of motions scheduled today. One was child support, but it sounds like that has

– you’ve reached an agreement
as fa r as that goes. Is that correct? [COUNSEL FOR MOTHER]: Correct, [COUNSEL FOR FATHER]: Yes, your Honor. 

### {¶36} Nonetheless, without explanation, the magistrate’s decision included a
dec ision on child support and r educ ed father’s obligation to $2,028.49 due to his
reduced income. 

### {¶37} Mother filed objections to the magistrate decision, arguing that the parties had agreed on child support in mediation and it was error for the magistrate toOHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF AP PEALS

12 ru le on the child

- support motion. In support, she attached emails between couns el and unsigned agreed entr ies that, among other things, reduced child support to $2,805 until March 2023, and then to $2,550 going forward. 

### {¶38} In an email attached to mother’s ame nded objections, father’s counsel wrote that father “will wait for the Judge t o rule on your Objections as to child support, parenting time and attorney fees.” Counsel noted that father was only agreeable to signing an entry that pertained to issues other than child support, parenting time and attorney fees. 

### {¶39} Complicating the issue further, mother filed objections to the magistrate’s decision, and amended objections to the magistrate’s decision. Each filing
include d two different versions of the agreement , with various terms including
child

- support terms, modified with redlined tex t. 

### {¶40} I n his memorandum opposing mother’s objections , Father contended that while the parties had hoped to settle the issue in mediation, the documents attached to mother’s objections “were drafts and no Agreed Entry had been signed by either party.” Never theless , the court sustained mother’s objection and “ adopt [ ed ] the

ag reed entry .” 

### {¶41} On appeal, father again argues that the document s attached to mother’s objections to the magistrate’s decision were working draft s of a tentative agreement

. 

### {¶42} Mother counters that the child

- support issue was not litigated before the magistrate because the parties agreed that the issue had been settled. She contends
that the terms of the agreement are not legitimately in dispute and that father is simply “tr[ying] to capitaliz e on the magistrate’s error despite there being no genuine issue as

t o the terms of the agreement.”OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF AP PEALS

13 

### {¶43} While settlement agreements and agreed entries are favored in the law,

“ c ourts should be particularly reluctant to enforce ambiguous or incomplete contracts that aim to memorialize a settlement agreement between adversarial l itigants.” Rulli , 79 Ohio St.3d at 376 , 683 N.E.2d 337 . For instance, in Rulli , the Ohio Supreme Court held
that “[w] here the meaning of terms of a settlement agreement is disputed, or w here there is a dispute that contests the existence of a settlement a greement , a trial court must conduct an evidentiary hearing prior to entering judgment. ” Id. at paragraph one of the syllabus. In that case, the agreement was read into the record, but a signed entry was not submitted as ordered by the trial court because the parties could not agree on the meaning of the terms

. Id. at 376 . The court concluded that “[g] iven the lack of finality and the dispute that evolved subsequent to the initial settle ment hearing ” there should have been an evidentiary hearing “ to resolve the parties ’ dispute about the existence of an agreement or the meaning of its terms * * * before reducing the matter to judgment. ”
Id. ; c ompare Federle , 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C

- 18017 1, 2019
- Ohio

- 2565 , at ¶ 22 (holding that because “each of th e essential terms of the in

- court agreement [were] substantially included” in the agreement adopted by the court, and the parties agreed to
the terms in open court, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in adopting a settlement agreement); Kohler v. Kohler , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 2009 CA 3,

2009
- Ohio

- 3434 (holding that an agreed entry was properly adopted where “[t]he essential terms” were clear and the agreement was read into the record). 

### {¶44} Given the ambiguity surrounding the agreed entry, we hold that the trial
court abused its discretion in adopting and ordering the parties to sign it

. The third assignment of error is sustained.OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF AP PEALS

14 Conclusion 

### {¶45} For the foregoing reasons, we overrule father’s fi rst assignm ent of error, but sustain his second and third assignments of error

. We remand the cause so the trial court can hold a hearing on the reasonableness of the attorney fees and the agreed entry on child support.

Judgment affirmed in part, revers ed in part, and cause remanded.



### Z AYAS 

### , P. J., and B OCK 

### , J., concur.

Please note : The court has recorded its entry on the date of the release of this opinion

.