FILED

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

September 4, 2003

THOMAS K. KAHN

CLERK

[PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

___________________________

No. 02-14828

___________________________

D.C. Docket No. 8:02-cv-850-T-17-TGW

INDEMNITY INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

AMERICAN AVIATION, INC., 

Defendant-Appellee.

_____________________________

No. 02-14830

_____________________________

D.C. Docket No. 8:02-cv-851-T-17-TBM

PROFILE AVIATION SERVICES, INC.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

AMERICAN AVIATION, INC., 

Defendant-Appellee.
 Honorable Robert B. Propst, United States District Judge for the Northern District of *

Alabama, sitting by designation. 

2

________________________

Appeals from the United States District Court 

for the Middle District of Florida 

_________________________

(September 4, 2003)

Before ANDERSON and BIRCH, Circuit Judges, and PROPST , District Judge. *

PER CURIAM:

CERTIFICATION FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT TO THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA

PURSUANT TO SECTION 25.031 OF THE FLORIDA STATUTES AND RULE

9.150 OF THE FLORIDA RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE.

TO THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA AND ITS HONORABLE

JUSTICES.

Indemnity Insurance Company of North America ("Indemnity") and Profile

Aviation Services, Inc., ("Profile") appeal from the dismissal of their tort claims in

their separate complaints against American Aviation, Inc. ("American") by the United

States District Court for the Middle District of Florida. The tort claims were

dismissed on the basis that Florida's economic loss rule bars the claims. In deciding

this case, we must determine whether the district court properly interpreted and

applied Florida law. Because of substantial questions concerning the appropriate

Florida law to be applied in this case, we certify those questions of law to the

Supreme Court of Florida and postpone any further consideration of the consolidated

appeals in this case until we receive answers from that court.
 Because these claims were dismissed for failure to state a claim, the appellants' factual 1

allegations must be taken as true. 

3

Summary Of Alleged Facts And Applicable Regulations 1

This action arises from the allegedly negligent maintenance and inspection of

an aircraft's landing gear by American. All mechanics who work on aircraft must be

FAA-certified. To become certified, a mechanic must graduate from a certified

aviation maintenance technical school (or have equivalent practical experience) and

must pass a written test on the construction and maintenance of aircraft, the federal

regulations, and provisions governing mechanics. They must also pass an oral and

a practical skills test. See 14 C.F.R. §§ 65.71, 65.75, 65.77, 65.79.

A FAA-certified mechanic who performs maintenance on an aircraft, airframe,

engine, etc., must follow the methods, techniques, and practices prescribed in the

aircraft's maintenance manual and performthe maintenance in such a manner that the

condition of the aircraft will be at least equal to its original or properly altered

condition. See 14 C.F.R. § 43.13. Moreover, when maintenance has been performed,

a FAA-certified mechanic must give approval before the aircraft, airframe, etc. is

returned to service. See 14 C.F.R. §§ 43.3, 43.7, 43.13. Before returning the aircraft

to service, the certified mechanic must also make an entry into the aircraft's logbook

regarding the inspection and maintenance performed. See 14 C.F.R. § 43.5.

According to appellants, an aircraft owner relies on these records to determine,

among other things, if the required maintenance has been performed, if the aircraft

can be returned to service, and when the next maintenance is scheduled.
 There appears to be some confusion on this point. The district court's opinion (see

2

Background) seems to indicate that there was a contract between the parties. The complaints

suggest that the contract was between American and a subsidiary of Profile, but not Profile itself. 

All parties seem to agree that Profile was not a party to the contract. 

 Some of the maintenance work may have been performed by a subcontractor of American. 

3

4

On or around November 22, 1996, American's FAA-certified mechanics,

pursuant to a contract to which appellants are not parties, performed the required 30- 2

month end play maintenance and inspection on the landing gear of a Beechcraft

KingAir 100 aircraft, registration N924RM ("Aircraft"). During the course of the

inspection and repair, American's mechanics removed the Aircraft's right main

landing gear actuator and lower thrust bearing. After completing the work,

American's mechanics certified in the Aircraft's logbook that the work was done in

accordance with the Aircraft's maintenance manual and FAA regulations.3

Profile purchased the Aircraft subsequent to American's November 1996

maintenance and inspection. Appellants contend that they reasonably relied upon

American's representations in the logbook concerning the November 1996 work. On

May 14, 1999, the Aircraft was severely damaged when the right main landing gear

failed to extend during a landing. The alleged cause of the failed landing gear was

that the lower thrust bearing of the right main landing gear actuator was installed

backwards. Appellants contend that they could not have discovered American's

alleged negligence prior to the accident.

Proceedings In District Court

On May 10, 2002, Indemnity, which was the Aircraft's insurer, and Profile filed

separate four count complaints in the district court. Appellants sought to recover for
 It appears from the briefs that appellants have not appealed the dismissal of the breach of 4

warranty claim. For the purposes of this certification, we consider the interests of Indemnity and

Profile to be the same. 

5

negligence (Count I), negligence per se (Count II), negligent misrepresentation

(Count III), and breach of warranty (Count IV). American moved to dismiss the

complaints, arguing that Florida's economic loss rule barred the tort claims and that

no breach of warranty action could be maintained because of a lack of privity between

appellants and American. In a series of orders, the district court agreed with

American and dismissed both complaints. The cases were consolidated for appeal.

4

Issues

The issues are as follows:

(1) Whether the "economic loss" doctrine of Florida applies to alleged torts if

the defendant has provided services to a product rather than has sold a product.

(2) Whether the "economic loss" doctrine of Florida applies if there is no

contractual relationship between the plaintiffs and the defendant.

(3) Whether the "economic loss" doctrine of Florida applies to the facts of this

case with regard to damage to the total aircraft as opposed to mere damage to the

landing gear under the "other property" exception.

(4) Whether the providing of certified mechanical services falls under the

category of the "professional services" exception to the "economic loss" doctrine of

Florida or under some related services exception.

(5) Whether the negligent misrepresentation claim in this case provides an

exception to the "economic loss" doctrine of Florida.
6

This court will recount the respective positions of the parties without approval

or rejection of those positions.

Appellants' Positions

A. In General

Appellants start with a history of Florida's economic loss rule. "The 'economic

loss' rule is a court-created doctrine which prohibits the extension of tort recovery for

cases in which only a purchased product has been damaged and there is no personal

injury or damage to 'other property,' and the losses or damage are economic in

nature." Moransais v. Heathman, 744 So.2d 973, 979 (Fla.1999) (citation omitted).

Appellants contend that a review of the economic loss rule in the Florida courts over

the last fifteen years shows an expansion and then contraction of the rule. See

Charles R. Walker, Note, Moransais v. Heathman and the Florida Economic Loss

Rule: Attempting to Leash The Tort-Eating Monster, 52 Fla. L.Rev. 769 (2000).

A case relied upon by the district court, which appellants contend is an example

of the "expansive" period of Florida's economic loss rule, is Casa Clara Condo.

Assoc., Inc. v. Charley Toppino &Sons, Inc., 620 So.2d 1244 (Fla.1993). The factual

and procedural posture of that case was as follows:

Apparently, some of the concrete supplied by Toppino contained a high

content of salt that caused the reinforcing steel inserted in the concrete to rust,

which, in turn, caused the concrete to crack and break off. The petitioners own

condominium units and single-family homes built with, and now allegedly

damaged by, Toppino's concrete. In separate actions the homeowners sued

numerous defendants and included claims against Toppino for breach of

common law implied warranty, products liability, negligence, and violation of

the building code. The circuit court dismissed all counts against Toppino in

each case. On appeal the district court applied the economic loss rule and held

that, because no person was injured and no other property damaged, the
7

homeowners had no cause of action against Toppino in tort. The district court

also held that Toppino, a supplier, had no duty to comply with the building

code.

Id. at 1245 (footnote omitted). The homeowners argued that limiting them to a

contractual remedy against the concrete supplier was unfair because they lacked

privity of contract with the supplier. The Florida Supreme Court, by a 4-3 vote, held

that the economic loss rule applied and barred all the owners' tort claims. Id. at 1247.

The court also rejected the argument that the "other property" exception to the rule

applied, holding that "[t]hese homeowners bought finished products—dwellings—not

the individual components of those dwellings. They bargained for the finished

products, not their various components. The concrete became an integral part of the

finished product and, thus, did not injure 'other' property." Id. at 1247.

Appellants point to the dissent in Casa Clara, in which three justices reasoned

that the economic loss rule

works well when the loss is suffered by one who is privy to the contract and

involves loss that was the subject matter of the contract. It works a mischief,

however, where as in this instance the injured party is not privy to the contract

but injury to third parties is reasonably foreseeable. The condominium owners

here suffered more than the loss of concrete; they suffered the loss of their

homes, a foreseeable consequence of faulty concrete....

While I agree with the majority opinion that parties who have freely

bargained and entered a contract relative to a particular subject matter should

be bound by the terms of that contract including the distribution of loss, I feel

that the theory is stretched when it is used to deny a cause of action to an

innocent third party who the defendant knew or should have known would be

injured by the tortious conduct. Toppino knew that the concrete that was the

subject matter of the bargain between Toppino and the general contractor

would be incorporated into homes that would be bought and occupied by

innocent third parties.

Id. at 1249 (emphasis added). Appellants also cite the other dissenting opinion,
8

written by two justices, which stated:

[S]ome applications of the economic loss doctrine may have acceptable

viability. But surely it stretches reason to apply the doctrine in this context to

deny these homeowners any remedy.

....

... Moreover, I cannot subscribe to the majority's view that the defective

concrete has not damaged "other property" in the formof the houses' individual

components.

Id. at 1248. After Casa Clara, a court observed that the "economic loss rule is stated

with ease but applied with great difficulty." Delgado v. J.W. Courtesy Pontiac GMCTruck, Inc., 693 So.2d 602, 606 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1997) (citation omitted). In light

of this difficulty, appellants contend, the Florida Supreme Court began efforts to

refine or redefine the rule, which it admitted had been applied "to situations well

beyond our original intent." Moransais, 744 So.2d at 980.

In Moransais, the factual and procedural history was as follows:

In June 1993, petitioner Philippe Moransais contracted to purchase a

home in Lakeland, Florida,fromPaul S. Heathman. Moransais also contracted

with Bromwell & Carrier, Inc. (BCI), a professional engineering corporation,

to perform a detailed inspection of the home and to advise himof the condition

of the home. The contract was signed for the corporation by one of the

respondents, Lennon D. Jordan, as chief of the civil engineering division.

Although the contract was signed by Jordan, it did not name as parties the

respondents, Jordan and Larry Sauls, who actually performed the inspection in

June of 1993. Moransais alleges that he relied on the engineers' inspection and

advice to purchase the home and that after the purchase he discovered defects

in the home that should have been, but were not, discovered in the engineering

inspection, and that such defects rendered the home uninhabitable.

Moransais filed an action against BCI for breach of contract and against

Jordan and Saulsfor professional negligence as engineers licensed pursuant to

chapter 471, Florida Statutes (1993). The complaint alleged no bodily injury

or property damage other than the undisclosed and undetected defects in the

home. On the motion of Jordan and Sauls, the trial court dismissed the tort
9

actions against the two engineers with prejudice [because of the economic loss

rule].

Id. at 974. The Florida Supreme Court addressed the following two questions:

(1) Where a purchaser of a home contracts with an engineering corporation,

does the purchaser have a cause of action for professional malpractice against an

employee of the engineering corporation who performed the engineering services?

(2) Does the economic loss rule bar a claim for professional malpractice against

the individual engineer who performed the inspection of the residence where no

personal injury or property damage resulted?

Id. at 974.

In answering the first question, the court noted that engineering is a

"profession" as defined by Florida law. See Fla. Stat. § 95.11 (defining professional

as "any vocation requiring at a minimum a four-year college degree before licensing

is possible in Florida"). The court noted that under prior cases and the statutory

scheme, professionals in Florida are to be held responsible for their negligent acts.

744 So.2d at 977-79. Thus, the court concluded that the homeowners could assert

their cause of action "despite the lack of a direct contract" between the parties, and

even though the homeowners had direct contract remedies against the seller and the

engineering company that employed the individual engineers. Id. at 975, 984.

As to the second question, the court "acknowledge[d] that our prior

pronouncements on the [economic loss] rule have not always been clear, and,

accordingly, have been the subject of legitimate criticism and commentary." Id. at

980. Specifically, the court stated:
10

Unfortunately, however, our subsequent holdings have appeared to expand the

application of the rule beyond its principled origins and have contributed to

applications of the rule by trial and appellate courts to situations well beyond

our original intent.

Id. at 981. After discussing prior cases, the court went on to discuss Casa Clara,

noting that the decision "was not unanimous, especially as to our characterization of

'other property.' " Id. at 981. The court stated that "[m]ore recently this Court has

recognized the danger in an unprincipled extension of the rule, and we have declined

to extend the economic loss rule to actions based on fraudulent inducement and

negligent misrepresentation." Id. at 981. The court ultimately held that the economic

loss rule did not preclude the cause of action and noted:

Today, we again emphasize that by recognizing that the economic loss rule

may have some genuine, but limited, value in our damages law, we never

intended to bar well-established common law causes of action, such as those

for neglect in providing professional services. Rather, the rule was primarily

intended to limit actions in the product liability context, and its application

should generally be limited to those contexts or situations where the policy

considerations are substantially identical to those underlying the product

liability-type analysis. We hesitate to speculate further on situations not

actually before us. The rule, in any case, should not be invoked to bar

well-established causes of actions in tort, such as professional malpractice.

Id. at 983 (footnote omitted). Appellants also cite the concurring opinion, written by

two justices, which stated: "the economic loss rule should be limited to cases

involving a product which damages itself by reason of a defect in the product." Id.

at 984. Appellants further cite the lone dissent, which stated that the case was

"controlled" by Casa Clara and that the majority "has effectively overruled our rather

recent decision in Casa Clara without saying so." Id. at 985.

Less than four months after Moransais, the Florida Supreme Court decided
11

Comptech Int'l, Inc. v. Milam Commerce Park, Ltd., 753 So.2d 1219 (1999). The

facts and procedural history of that case are as follows:

Comptech International, Inc. (Comptech) was leasing warehouse space from

Milam Commerce Park, Ltd. (Milam). The lease wasrenewed with a provision

that Milam would renovate the warehouse and create an office for Comptech

to use for its ongoing computer business. Comptech had previously used the

warehouse to store its computers and was to continue using the warehouse for

this purpose both during and after the renovations. The renewal contract

contained an indemnity clause stating that Comptech agreed to hold Milam

harmless for "all claims of every kind" including "damaged merchandise,

equipment, fixture or other property, or damage to business or for business

interruption, arising, directly or indirectly out of, from or on account of such

occupancy and use, or resulting from present or future condition or state of

repair thereof." Comptech, 711 So.2d at 1261. The indemnity clause did not

specifically state that Milam would be held harmless for its own negligence.

Milam hired a contractorto performthe renovations; however, the renovations

were performed negligently, causing damage to the computers located in the

warehouse. In addition, the landlord failed to obtain the required building

permits for the building addition. Comptech sued Milam for: (1) negligent

selection of contractor; (2) negligent construction; (3) violation of section

553.84; and (4) return of illegally collected rent. The Third District held the

negligence claims were barred by the economic loss rule, despite the statutory

duty created by section 553.84. The court also rejected Comptech's argument

that even if the economic loss rule applied, the computers should have been

exempted from the rule under the "other property" exception.

Id. at 1221-22. The Florida Supreme Court held that the economic loss rule did not

apply, at least in part because the case involved a statutorily created cause of action.

Id. at 1223. The court then considered whether the computers were "other property"

and thus exempted from the economic loss rule. In noting the rule's origin in the

context of product liability, the court stated that "[h]ad the courts adhered to these

requirements (a product, the product damaging itself, and economic losses), the

confusion that has abounded in this area of the law would have been minimized." Id.

at 1223-24. The court then quoted extensively and approvingly from Moransais. Id.
 They also contend that prior to Moransais and Comptech, the economic loss rule, if applied 5

properly, was limited to product liability cases and cases involving an actual contract between the

parties. See Value House, Inc. v. MCI Telecomm. Corp., 917 F.Supp. 5, 7

(D.D.C.1996)(discussing Florida cases); see also Appellant Br. at 25-26. 

12

at 1224-26. Discussing the "other property" rule, the court stated:

This case is not a products liability or similar case. The subject of the contract

between the parties was not a product but a service. Thus, this case does not

involve "other property," as that term was used in East River and Florida

Power. The term is not truly applicable to a situation such as the one before

us where the subject of the contract is a service.

Id. at 1226. The court further stated that "[e]ven under a Casa Clara analysis, the

computers are 'other property' and not subject to the economic loss rule." Id. As the

court explained: "The 'product' purchased by Comptech was the renovation of the

warehouse. The computers placed in the warehouse were not an integral part of the

product and were therefore 'other property' under the Casa Clara rationale." Id. at

1226-27.

Appellants contend that after Moransais and Comptech, Florida appellate 5

courts have routinely refused to apply the economic loss rule to cases like this one,

i.e., a non-product liability tort action between parties who lack a contractual

relationship. See Appellant Br. at 23-25 (other cases, emphasizing lack of contractual

relationship). Here, the instant actions are not product liability actions. The parties

did not have a contractual relationship. Rather, appellants charge that American

negligently repaired the Aircraft and negligently misrepresented the condition of the

landing gear. Casa Clara should never apply to these cases, especially in light of the

fact that it has been severely curtailed and perhaps even overruled.

Appellants further argue, even if the economic loss rule generally applies to
13

cases of this type, there are at least three exceptions that would keep it from applying

in this particular case.

B. Other Property

Appellants contend that the damaged Aircraft was "other property" under an

economic loss rule exception. The landing gear, unlike the concrete at issue in Casa

Clara, was not an "integral part" of the Aircraft. The Aircraft's parts are independent

and distinct from one another. Although they work together, each part is

manufactured and serviced separately fromanother (airframe, powerplant, propeller,

radio, instruments, and accessories), and component parts are interchangeable and

independently certifiable as to airworthiness under the FAA regulatory scheme. See

14 C.F.R. §§ 43.3, 43.7, 145.59. Moreover, this case differs from Casa Clara, where

the court found that the homeowners had no interest in the individual components,

but rather only in the entire home. Here, appellants are vitally interested in knowing

that each and every component part was inspected, in proper working order, and

serviced in accordance with FAA regulations. Lastly, although Comptech may not

have overruled Casa Clara, it at least limited Casa Clara to its facts.

C. Professional Services

Appellants argue that this case does not fall under the economic loss rule

because it involved "professional services" and is thus controlled by Moransais. As

noted by the court in Moransais, the economic loss rule was not intended "to bar

well-established common law causes of action,such as those for neglect in providing

professional services." 744 So.2d at 983. Although the court in Moransais dealt with
14

a specific statutory definition of "professional," this is not the only definition. See

Garden v. Frier, 602 So.2d 1273 (Fla.1992), in which the court stated:

We limit the definition of "professional" set forth above to the context of the

professional malpractice statute. It is not our intent that this definition be

applied to any other reference to "professionals" or "professions" elsewhere

in the Florida statutes, regulations, or rules, or in court cases that deal with

issues other than the statute of limitations at issue here. We recognize that

there may be occasions when courts, legislators, rulemaking authorities, and

others may use the terms "profession" and "professional" more broadly or

more narrowly than we do here today.

Id. at 1277 (emphasis added). The court further stated:

We do not deem it possible to develop a comprehensive list of professions

ourselves.... Some licensing authorities, for example, merely incorporate by

reference professional standards developed by agencies or organizations that

are not even part of Florida government....

Id. at 1277 n. 9. See also Black's Law Dictionary 1226 (7th ed.1999)(defining

"professional"). Here, it is clear that FAA-certified mechanics are highly trained and

should be deemed professionals. Only mechanics who are FAA-certified are allowed

to perform the type of work at issue in this case. The district court's suggestion,

relying on Lochrane Eng'g, Inc. v. Willingham Realgrowth Inv. Fund, Ltd., 552 So.2d

228, 232 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1989), that these mechanics simply provide "manual

services" flies in the face of the FAA regulatory scheme.

D. Negligent Misrepresentation Exception

Finally, appellants contend that the negligent misrepresentation claim does not

fall under the economic loss rule because American is in the business of supplying

information as recognized by section 552 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which

provides:
15

One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment, or in any

other transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies false

information for the guidance of others in their business transactions, is subject

to liability for pecuniary loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon

the information, if he fails to exercise reasonable care or competence in

obtaining or communicating the information.

(emphasis added). See also First Fla. Bank, N.A. v. Max Mitchell & Co., 558 So.2d

9 (Fla.1990)(adopting section 552). In rejecting appellants' claim for negligent

misrepresentation, the district court relied on Palau Int'l Traders, Inc. v. Narcam

Aircraft, Inc., 653 So.2d 412 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1995). Palau also involved a suit by

a subsequent purchaser of an aircraft, and, relying on Casa Clara, the court held that

the economic loss rule barred an action for negligent inspection which caused the

purchaser to incur the expense of repairing the aircraft. 653 So.2d at 415-18.

However, as noted above, Casa Clara is of questionable authority, while in

Moransais the court stated that the rule should be limited to "actions in the product

liability context." 744 So.2d at 983. Moreover, in Palau there was no claim that

"other property" was damaged; rather, the plaintiff only sought the cost of the repairs

that should have been made. Also, the Palau court's conclusion that a FAA-certified

mechanic is "in the business of servicing airplanes ... not in the business of supplying

information," 633 So.2d at 418, ignores the FAA regulatory scheme whereby repair

stations, like American's, regularly supply information in an aircraft's logbook.

Appellee's Positions

A. In General

American notes that Florida's economic loss rule "prohibits tort recovery when

a product damages itself, causing economic loss, but does not cause personal injury
16

or damage to any property other than itself." Casa Clara, 620 So.2d at 1246. That

court further stated that "economic losses are 'disappointed economic expectations,'

which are protected by contract law, rather than tort law. This is the basic difference

between contract law, which protects expectations, and tort law, which is determined

by the duty owed to an injured party." Id. at 1246 (citations omitted). The court also

noted:

The purpose of a duty in tort is to protect society's interest in being free from

harm and the cost of protecting society from harm is borne by society in

general. Contractual duties, on the other hand, come from society's interest in

the performance of promises. When only economic harm is involved, the

question becomes "whether the consuming public as a whole should bear the

cost of economic losses sustained by those who failed to bargain for adequate

contract remedies."

Id. at 1246-47 (citations omitted). In rejecting the plaintiff's argument that an

exception should be created for homeowners, the court stated:

If a house causes economic disappointment by not meeting a purchaser's

expectations, the resulting failure to receive the benefit of the bargain is a core

concern of contract, not tort, law. There are protections for homebuyers,

however, such as statutory warranties, the general warranty of habitability, and

the duty of sellers to disclose defects, as well as the ability of purchasers to

inspect houses for defects. Coupled with homebuyers' power to bargain over

price, these protections must be viewed as sufficient when compared with the

mischief that could be caused by allowing tort recovery for purely economic

losses. Therefore, we again "hold contract principles more appropriate than

tort principles for recovering economic loss without an accompanying physical

injury or property damage." If we held otherwise, "contract law would drown

in a sea of tort."

Id. at 1247 (citations and footnotes omitted).

This case, American argues, falls squarely within the holding and rationale of

Casa Clara. Here, there has been no personal injury and no injury to other property.

Here, the public safety concerns that support tort actions are not present because only
17

the aircraft sustained damage. Thus, there is no reason to spread the cost to the public

as a whole. This is clearly a case of "disappointed economic expectations," and

appellants could have protected themselves in several ways. They could have

required a detailed and independent inspection, obtained additional insurance, or

secured a warranty under an independent warranty scheme. Also, finding for

appellants would require aviation repair stations to become guarantors to unknown

and remote third parties for routine maintenance and logbook entries. Plus, American

notes, Casa Clara has not been overruled and remains the law in Florida.

American also contends that Moransais, relied upon by appellants, explicitly

applied solely to professional negligence cases. See 744 So.2d at 974 (statement of

the issue before the court), 983-84 (holding of the case). Here, appellants have not

alleged professional negligence against American. There is no evidence that any of

American's mechanics earned "a four-year college degree before" possible licensing.

Id. at 976. American also contends that any such claim would be barred by the

applicable statute of limitations. See Appellee Br. at 17 n.3. Finally, in contrast to

Moransais, appellants cannot allege that they hired American or that American knew

that they were intending to rely on their work.

Even if Moransais did apply, American contends, appellants' tort claims would

still be barred. Appellants have alleged that there was a duty to service the Aircraft's

landing gear in a manner such that it would be reasonably safe to use, that American

breached that duty, that the breach caused the injury, and that there were damages.

Clearly, American argues, this is a products liability case under Florida law. See
18

Pritchett v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., (M.D.Fla. April 12, 1994)("In Florida

... the elements of the negligence cause of action in a product liability case are: 1.

The manufacturer must have a legal duty to design and manufacture a product

reasonably safe for use; 2. The manufacturer must fail to comply with that duty; 3.

The plaintiff must have an injury that is legally caused by the manufacturer's breach

of duty; and 4. The plaintiff must have suffered damages.").

Moreover, the policy considerations applicable in a products liability case

apply here as well. Appellants were in the best position to anticipate problems and

could have protected themselves with contract language, warranties, negotiations, and

additional insurance. A finding for appellants would spread the cost to other

consumers, even though appellants failed to avail themselves of the opportunities for

protection.

American also argues that the absence of privity does not bar the application

of the economic loss rule. Appellants should be barred from claiming that there is no

privity, since they sought to establish some type of contractual relationship with

respect to their breach of warranty claim. See Appellee Br. at 22. However, even

assuming that there is no privity, the economic loss rule would apply. American

contends that the economic loss rule can apply to situations where there is no

contractual relationship between the parties. See, e.g., Airport Rent-A-Car, Inc. v.

Prevost Car, Inc., 660 So.2d 628, 630-31 (Fla.1995); Casa Clara, 620 So.2d at 1248;

Appellee Br. at 22-23. American quotes from Florida Bldg. Inspection Servs., Inc.

v. Arnold Corp., 660 So.2d 730 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1995), in which the court stated:
19

Under limited circumstances, Florida courts have recognized exceptions to the

economic loss doctrine, and have allowed recovery from certain types of

negligent providers of services who were not in privity with the plaintiff.

However, in these cases a duty was established to plaintiffs who were

identifiable third party beneficiaries of the contract to provide services.

Id. at 732 (citations omitted). The court held that a warehouse sublessee could not

recover in tort against a roof inspector hired by the lessee because there was "no

indication that the services provided by [the inspector] to [the lessee] were intended

to primarily and directly benefit [the sublessee]." Id. at 733. The court reasoned that

the sublessee

was fully capable of assuring the condition of the roof by choosing and hiring

its own inspectors rather than relying upon CPS's inspector. The fact that

Arnold chose to accept the risk of relying upon the information supplied by

CPS does not impose a duty upon FBIS, who did not know what CPS did with

the report after it was delivered.

Id. at 733. Here, appellants conceded that they could not amend the complaint to

claim intended beneficiary status. See Appellant Br. at 9. As in Arnold, there is no

indication that American intended to primarily and directly benefit appellants. Also,

as in Arnold and as noted above, appellants had the means to protect their own

interests, but did not.

Here, Indemnity has filed suit in the United States District Court for the District

of South Carolina against Stevens Aviation, Inc., the entity that inspected the aircraft

landing gear actuators, alleging, among other things, breach of warranty. Since

Indemnity, as subrogee of Profile's interest, has a contractual remedy against another
 To support this argument, American cites Excess Risk Underwriters, Inc. v. Lafayette Life 6

Ins. Co., 208 F.Supp.2d 1310, 1314 (S.D.Fla.2002). 

20

party, the economic loss rule can apply.6

B. Other Property

American argues the landing gear is an integral part of the Aircraft. It would

be absurd to suggest that appellants bought an assortment of aircraft parts, not the

aircraft itself. American cites several cases to support its position that the landing

gear component was an integral part of the Aircraft itself. See, e.g., Casa Clara, 620

So.2d at 1247; Premix-Marbletite Mfg. Corp. v. SKW Chems., Inc., 145 F.Supp.2d

1348, 1360 (S.D.Fla.2001)(damage to finished product by component "does not come

within the economic lossrule's other property damage exception"). See Appellee Br.

at 27-28 (other cases). American contends that " 'other property' [is] such damage as

would occur if defective brakes on truck caused it to run into and damage a home."

American Univ. Ins. Group v. Gen. Motors Corp., 578 So.2d 451, 454

(Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1991)(citing American Home Assurance Co. v. Major Tool &

Machine, Inc., 767 F.2d 446 (8th Cir.1985)). Here, Profile bargained for and bought

an airplane, not an amalgamation of parts and components. The landing gear would

be useless if not integrated into the Aircraft. The Aircraft is simply not "other

property." Appellants' reliance on Comptech is misplaced, because that case clearly

involved computers which obviously were not an integral part of a warehouse in

which they were stored.

C. Professional Services
21

The "professional" exception articulated in Moransais does not apply.

Appellants have not pled a professional malpractice action and should not be allowed

to argue that exception now. Moreover, American argues, the four-year degree

requirement set out in Moransais has been consistently applied to determine whether

or not someone is a professional. See Appellee Br. at 31-33. Although the

FAA-certified mechanics do undergo extensive training, "[t]here can be no

equivalency exception" to the four-year college degree requirement. See Garden v.

Frier, 602 So.2d 1273, 1275 (Fla.1992). FAA-mechanics are not required to a have

a four-year college degree, and thus are not professionals.

D. Negligent Misrepresentation

The negligent misrepresentation exception does not apply because American

is not in the business of supplying information for the benefit of appellants. It is

undisputed that American is in the business ofmaintaining and inspecting aircraft and

that the only reason it makes entries into a logbook is because of FAA regulations.

Moreover, in First Florida Bank, N.A. v. Max Mitchell & Co., 558 So.2d 9

(Fla.1990)(adopting the exception), the court stated:

[W]e are persuaded by the wisdom of the rule which limits liability to those

persons or classes of persons whom an accountant "knows" will rely on his

opinion rather than those he "should have known" would do so because it takes

into account the fact that an accountant controls neither his client's accounting

records nor the distribution of his reports....

Id. at 15. Here, there is no evidence that American knew that appellants would rely

on the information supplied in the logbook. Indeed, appellants conceded that they

could not amend their breach of warranty claims because they could not in good faith
 American also notes that FAA regulations require an aircraft's owner to annually conduct a 7

complete inspection of the aircraft. See 14 C.F.R. § 91.409(a)(1), (d)(4). Thus, between the date

of the alleged negligence and the date of the incident, the aircraft would have been inspected at

least twice. See Appellee Br. at 39. 

22

allege that they enjoyed intended beneficiary status. The exception has been

employed in "very limited circumstances." See Palau, 653 So.2d at 417. See also

Appellee Br. at 36 (other cases).

Palau, which found that an aircraft repair station did not "supply information"

under § 552, is still good law, and nothing in Moransais or Comptech suggests that

the Florida Supreme Court would have decided the case differently. See Appellee Br.

at 37-40 (discussion of Palau ). See also Rocky Mountain Helicopters, Inc. v. Bell

7

Helicopter Textron, Inc., 24 F.3d 125, 132-33 (10th Cir.1994)(holding that § 552 did

not apply to similar FAA required information regarding a helicopter).

Conclusion

This court has summarized the positions of the parties without approval or

rejection. These summaries are not intended to limit the arguments of the parties

before the Supreme Court of Florida.

While we have summarized the respective positions of the parties, we do not

suggest how the state law(s) should be interpreted or applied. "Where there is any

doubt as to the application of state law, a federal court should certify the question to

the state supreme court to avoid making unnecessary Erie 'guesses' and to offer the

state court the opportunity to interpret or change existing law." Mosher v. Speedstar

Div. of AMCA Intern., Inc., 52 F.3d 913, 916-17 (11th Cir.1995) (citation omitted).

We have a doubt as to the correct answers to the following questions of Florida law:
23

I. WHETHER THE "ECONOMIC LOSS" DOCTRINE OF FLORIDA APPLIES

TO ALLEGED TORTS IF THE DEFENDANT HAS PROVIDED SERVICES

TO A PRODUCT RATHER THAN HAS SOLD A PRODUCT.

II. WHETHER THE "ECONOMIC LOSS" DOCTRINE OF FLORIDA APPLIES

IF THERE IS NO CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE

PLAINTIFFS AND THE DEFENDANT.

III. WHETHER THE "ECONOMIC LOSS" DOCTRINE OF FLORIDA APPLIES

TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE WITH REGARD TO DAMAGE TO THE

TOTAL AIRCRAFT AS OPPOSED TO MERE DAMAGE TO THE

LANDING GEAR UNDER THE "OTHER PROPERTY" EXCEPTION.

IV. WHETHER THE PROVIDING OF CERTIFIED MECHANICAL SERVICES

FALLS UNDER THE CATEGORY OF THE "PROFESSIONAL SERVICES"

EXCEPTION TO THE "ECONOMIC LOSS" DOCTRINE OF FLORIDA OR

UNDER SOME RELATED SERVICES EXCEPTION.

V. WHETHER THE NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION CLAIM IN THIS

CASE PROVIDES AN EXCEPTION TO THE "ECONOMIC LOSS"

DOCTRINE OF FLORIDA.

CERTIFICATION

We certify the above-styled questions to the Supreme Court of Florida. The

phrasing used in these certified questions should not restrict that Court's

consideration of the problems of state law posed by this case. This extends to any

restatement of the issues by that Court and the manner in which the answers are

given. To assist that Court's consideration of the case, the entire record, along with

the briefs of the parties, shall be transmitted to the Supreme Court of Florida.

QUESTIONS CERTIFIED.