Filed 5/13/22 In re I.O. CA2/8

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

In re I.O., a Person Coming Under 

the Juvenile Court Law.

 B312673

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 

AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

LAZARO O.,

Defendant and Appellant.

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. 17CCJP02464F)

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles 

County. Annabelle G. Cortez, Judge. Affirmed. 

Gina Zaragoza, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,

for Defendant and Appellant.

Rodrigo A. Castro-Silva, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, 

Assistant County Counsel, and Jacklyn K. Louie, Deputy County 

Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

_________________________
2

Lazaro O., the father (Father) of I.O., appeals from the 

juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings and a dispositional order. 

I.O.’s mother (Mother) does not appeal. Father argues that 

substantial evidence does not support the jurisdictional findings 

and orders that I.O. is a person described by Welfare and 

Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b), due to 

Father’s actions.1 He further contends that the juvenile court 

abused its discretion in ordering him to attend a domestic 

violence counseling program as part of his reunification plan. 

We find Father’s challenges to the juvenile court’s 

jurisdictional findings as to him justiciable. We hold that

substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s jurisdictional 

findings based on domestic violence and, alternatively, on 

Father’s failure to protect I.O. from Mother’s drug abuse. 

Finally, we hold that the juvenile court did not abuse its 

discretion by requiring Father to attend domestic violence 

counseling as part of its dispositional order. We affirm. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

I. Procedural Background 

In October 2020, when I.O. was approximately five months 

old, the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family 

Services (Department) filed a petition under section 300. The 

Department had received a referral in connection with an open 

case for I.O.’s half-sibling alleging drug use and domestic violence

by both of I.O.’s parents. 

1 All subsequent statutory references are to the Welfare and 

Institutions Code.
3

That same month, the Department also filed a request for 

removal of I.O. from both parents. The juvenile court authorized 

the removal. Subsequently, the court ordered I.O. to remain 

detained from her parents. 

The section 300 petition alleged jurisdiction pursuant to 

subdivision (a), “Serious Physical Harm,” subdivision (b)(1),

“Failure to Protect,” and subdivision (j), “Abuse of Sibling.” The 

petition alleged that I.O’s parents had a history of engaging in 

violent altercations, including a specific incident where Father 

assaulted Mother, causing I.O.’s basinet to fall to the ground with 

I.O. inside. Second, the Department further claimed that Mother 

had a history of substance abuse, was a current abuser of 

methamphetamine and amphetamine, had a positive drug test 

for methamphetamine and amphetamine in September 2020, and 

that Father knew or should have known of Mother’s substance 

abuse but failed to protect I.O. The Department additionally 

alleged that two of I.O.’s half siblings received permanent 

placement services and three others were prior dependents of the 

court due to Mother engaging in violent altercations with her 

former companions and prior drug use. 

In April 2021, the court held a combined adjudication and 

disposition hearing. The court found that, as to Father, I.O. was

a person described by section 300, subdivision (a) and subdivision 

(b)(1), due to his engaging in domestic violence and his failure to 

protect I.O. from Mother’s drug abuse. The court declared I.O. a 

dependent of the court and removed her from her parents. 

The court ordered reunification services for Father only, 

consisting of six months of drug and alcohol tests, individual 

counseling to address “case issues, including [domestic violence] 

and parenting,” and a separate domestic violence program. 
4

Father timely appealed from the juvenile court’s two 

jurisdictional findings as to him under section 300 and from the 

court’s dispositional order requiring him to attend domestic 

violence classes. 

II. Evidence of Domestic Violence

There is no evidence that I.O. has suffered any physical 

harm or illness from the alleged domestic violence. 

The evidence as to domestic violence in the Department’s 

initial petition is as follows: An unidentified reporter stated that 

“[M]other shared that father is violent and hit her all the time.” 

I.O.’s sibling’s designated adoptive parent told the social worker 

that Mother stated that Father attacked her and “accidentally 

dropped the bassinet with [I.O.] inside it.” Mother reported that 

I.O. was not injured, and the adoptive parent knew of no other 

domestic violence incidents between the couple. Mother told the 

adoptive parent about the bassinet incident a few days prior to 

September 1, 2020, but it is not clear exactly when this incident 

took place. 

In subsequent interviews by the social worker, all prior to 

the juvenile court’s combined jurisdictional and dispositional

hearing, I.O.’s sibling’s adoptive parent told the social worker 

that a neighbor “has told her in the past during domestic violence 

incidents she’d run inside the family home to grab [the] child 

during the physical incidents.” The social worker spoke with that 

neighbor who reported that the parents argue but the neighbor 

did not hear the parents engage in “physical altercations.” The 

sibling’s adoptive parent also told the social worker that Mother 

said that father wants to kill her and makes “signs” at her 

indicating that he will shoot her. Both parents denied any 

domestic violence. 
5

III. Evidence of Mother’s Drug Use and Father’s 

Knowledge

Both Mother and Father have a history of drug use. 

When the social worker first visited Mother in this matter, the 

social worker observed a broken glass pipe on the couch that

Mother stated she used for tobacco and then later said Father 

used for tobacco. Then, during the social worker’s initial 

investigation, Mother failed a drug test just days after telling the 

social worker she no longer used drugs (the test was positive for 

amphetamine and methamphetamine). Mother failed to appear 

for subsequent drug tests during the pendency of this case. 

A witness told the social worker about an incident where Mother 

appeared under the influence of drugs. The witness also said 

that Mother admitted to the witness that she was still using 

drugs. After her drug test came back positive, Mother told the 

social worker that it was very hard to stop using 

methamphetamine. 

Father was a former user of methamphetamine, which he 

said he used for about three years and went to a drug treatment 

program to address. Father could not recall whether he had used 

methamphetamine with Mother, but said that they may have 

used it together once. Father was aware that Mother had a 

history of using marijuana and methamphetamine.

IV. Prior Interactions with the Department 

Before the referral to the Department regarding I.O., 

Mother had a lengthy history with the Department. According to 

the Department’s petition, Mother has five other children that 

had been involved in dependency proceedings. In total, from 

2007 to 2017, the Department received eight referrals regarding 

Mother’s first five children. 
6

Father has no prior history with the Department as a 

parent. I.O. is not his biological child, but he has been with 

Mother since she was pregnant with I.O. and he signed I.O.’s 

birth certificate. The juvenile court found Father I.O.’s presumed 

father. 

DISCUSSION

I. Father’s Appeal Is Justiciable 

An appellate court need not address jurisdictional findings 

as to one parent when the findings as to the other parent are not 

challenged. (In re Briana V. (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 297, 308–

310 (Briana V.).) Such challenges are generally nonjusticiable

because a juvenile court may assert jurisdiction over a child 

based upon finding that only one parent’s conduct triggers section 

300. (Id. at p. 308; In re I.A. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1484, 1489–

1495.) Accordingly, a reversal as to one parent, even if sustained, 

would not require reversal of the jurisdictional findings. (Id. at 

p. 1489.) 

Nevertheless, we have discretion to address the merits of a 

jurisdictional challenge by only one parent if the findings: 

(a) serve as the basis for dispositional orders challenged on 

appeal, (b) could be prejudicial to the appellant or potentially

impact current or future dependency proceedings, or (c) could 

have other consequences for the appellant beyond jurisdiction. 

(In re Drake M. (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 754, 762 (Drake M.); 

Briana V., supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at p. 309.) 

Father argues that because the juvenile court’s finding of 

domestic violence serves as the basis for the dispositional order 

that he challenges in this appeal, we should address the merits. 

We agree. “Although a dispositional order may reach both 

parents . . . the order must nevertheless be ‘reasonable’ and 
7

‘designed to eliminate [the] conditions that led to the court’s 

[still valid jurisdictional] finding.’ [Citations.]” (In re D.M. 

(2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 634, 639 [jurisdictional finding that 

mother intentionally inflicted serious physical harm was 

justiciable where it served as the basis for two of three case plan 

requirements].) 

II. Substantial Evidence Supports the Juvenile Court’s 

Jurisdiction as to Father Due to Domestic Violence 

Father contends there is insufficient evidence supporting 

the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings as to him under section 

300, subdivisions (a) and (b). We disagree. There is substantial 

evidence of domestic violence involving a substantial risk of 

serious harm to I.O.

Under section 300, subdivision (a), a juvenile court may 

assert jurisdiction over a child if a “child has suffered, or there is 

substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm 

inflicted nonaccidentally upon the child by the child’s parent.” 

(Ibid.) 

Under section 300, subdivision (b)(1), a juvenile court may

also assert jurisdiction over a child if the “child has suffered, or 

there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious 

physical harm or illness, as a result of the failure or inability of 

his or her parent . . . to adequately supervise or protect the 

child . . . .” (Ibid.) 

“ ‘In reviewing the jurisdictional findings . . . , we look to 

see if substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, 

supports them. [Citation.] In making this determination, we 

draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the 

findings . . . of the dependency court; we review the record in the 

light most favorable to the court’s determinations; and we note 
8

that issues of fact and credibility are the province of the trial 

court.’ ” (In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622, 633.) 

Father makes two arguments. First, Father argues that 

because the evidence of domestic violence is uncorroborated 

hearsay, it cannot, by itself, constitute substantial evidence. 

The Department does rely on hearsay evidence of Father’s 

domestic violence. Yet, as Father admits, he failed to specifically 

object to the admission of this hearsay. This failure to object is 

fatal to his claim that we should reverse because the evidence 

was hearsay and “[m]ere uncorroborated hearsay does not 

constitute substantial evidence.” (Kevin R. v. Superior

Court (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 676, 689, citing In re Lucero

L. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1227, 1243.) At the jurisdictional hearing, 

the “social study prepared by the petitioning agency, and hearsay

evidence contained in it, is admissible and constitutes competent 

evidence upon which a finding of jurisdiction pursuant to Section 

300 may be based.” (§ 355, subd. (b), italics added.) Only if “a 

party to the jurisdictional hearing raises a timely objection to the 

admission of specific hearsay evidence contained in a social study, 

the specific hearsay evidence shall not be sufficient by itself to 

support a jurisdictional finding or any ultimate fact upon which a 

jurisdictional finding is based . . . .” (§ 355, subd. (c)(1), italics 

added.) 

Accordingly, because Father, while represented by counsel,

did not object to the hearsay evidence in the social study, the 

juvenile court was entitled to rely on it. (See § 355, subd. (c)(1); 

In re E.B. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 568, 577, disapproved on other 

grounds in Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989 [father

failed to object to the hearsay in the social workers report, so

juvenile court was entitled to rely on it]); In re Tracy Z. (1987)
9

195 Cal.App.3d 107, 113 [“If there is any substantial evidence,

contradicted or uncontradicted, which will support the judgment,

we must affirm. This is so even if the judgment is supported by

incompetent or otherwise inadmissible evidence admitted

without objection”]; cf. In re B.D. (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 975, 981

[describing what constitutes a specific hearsay objection].)

Second, Father argues in the alternative that the physical 

altercation between the parents resulting in Father accidentally 

knocking over I.O.’s bassinet is an isolated incident that is 

insufficient to support the juvenile court’s jurisdiction based on 

domestic violence. We disagree. “Under certain circumstances 

incidents of domestic violence between a child’s parents, if they 

occur in the child’s immediate presence, may support a 

jurisdiction finding under section 300, subdivision (a).” (In re

Cole L. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 591, 603 (Cole), citing In re

Giovanni F. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 594, 598–599.) “The nature 

and circumstances of a single incident of harmful or potentially 

harmful conduct may be sufficient, in a particular case, to 

establish current risk depending upon present circumstances.” 

(In re J.N. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1010, 1026.)

Here, the incident of domestic violence that the juvenile 

court mainly relied upon is sufficient evidence. Jurisdiction 

“under section 300, subdivision (a), requires evidence of a risk of 

physical injury ‘inflicted nonaccidentally upon the child.’ ” 

(Cole, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 603.) It is the risk of injury 

that is required, not actual infliction of injury. Where a parent 

strikes the other parent while that parent is holding the child, 

causing that child to fall, the Courts of Appeal have found this 

standard is met. As Division Seven of our court recently noted, 

“[f]or example, if a father strikes an infant’s mother while she is 
10

holding the child or an older child intervenes during a fight to 

protect her mother from her father’s abuse, the risk of harm to 

the child may be properly viewed as nonaccidental.” (Ibid., citing 

In re M.M. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 703, 720 [substantial evidence 

supported juvenile court’s finding where parents engaged in a 

physical altercation with child at their feet].) Similar 

circumstances were present here. 

Moreover, the social worker’s report cites additional 

evidence, described above, as to domestic violence, which the 

court cited for its jurisdictional finding, along with what the 

juvenile court characterized as “severe minimizing” of the 

incident where the bassinet was knocked over by both parents.

The juvenile court “need not wait until a child is seriously abused 

or injured to assume jurisdiction and take the steps necessary to 

protect the child.” (In re R.V. (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 837, 843.) 

In sum, substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s 

finding of jurisdiction based upon risk to I.O. from Father’s 

domestic violence. 
11

III. Substantial Evidence Supports the Juvenile Court’s 

Jurisdiction Due to Father’s Failure to Protect I.O. 

from Mother’s Drug Use2

Father also challenges the juvenile court’s jurisdictional 

finding under section 300(b)(1) due to his alleged failure to 

protect I.O. from Mother’s drug use. 

2 Having found substantial evidence to support the juvenile 

court’s jurisdiction based on Father engaging in domestic 

violence, we are not required to address the second reason the 

court found jurisdiction. (See In re Alexis E. (2009) 171 

Cal.App.4th 438, 451 (Alexis E.) [noting that because it upheld 

the juvenile court’s finding of jurisdiction on the basis of father’s 

domestic violence, it need not review the additional basis for 

jurisdiction of father’s drug use]; see also Randi R. v. Superior 

Court (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 67, 72; In re Jonathan B. (1992) 5 

Cal.App.4th 873, 875–876.) To conserve judicial resources in the 

event of any further review of this case, we exercise our 

discretion to address the second basis for jurisdiction. Courts of 

Appeal may review the merits of a second jurisdictional finding

as to one parent even after first upholding the juvenile court’s 

jurisdiction regarding that same parent on another basis. 

(See, e.g., Alexis E., supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at p. 451 [upholding 

finding of jurisdiction as to father based on domestic violence, 

and additionally reviewing appeal of jurisdiction based on 

father’s drug use]; In re L.O. (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 227, 238 

[upholding jurisdictional finding that father failed to protect 

children from domestic violence, and also choosing to review 

second jurisdictional basis of sexual abuse].) This court has also

reviewed challenges by one parent as to two different findings of 

jurisdictions against that same parent. (In re Christopher M.

(2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 1310, 1316–1317 [reviewing one parent’s 

challenges to findings of failure to provide for child generally and 

of failure to provide for child only at time of hearing].) 
12

Subsection (b)(1) applies to the failure of a parent to protect 

a child from another parent’s substance abuse, providing for 

jurisdiction where “[t]he child has suffered, or there is a 

substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm 

or illness, as a result of . . . the willful or negligent failure of the 

child’s parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the 

child from the conduct of the custodian with whom the child has 

been left.” (§ 300, subd. (b)(1).) “The provision of a home 

environment free from the negative effects of substance abuse is 

a necessary condition for the safety, protection and physical and 

emotional well-being of the child.” (§ 300.2.) 

The record supports the juvenile court’s finding of 

jurisdiction based upon on Father’s failure to protect I.O. from 

substantial risk of harm from Mother’s use of controlled 

substances. There is substantial evidence that Mother abused 

controlled substances and Father failed to protect I.O. Mother 

failed a drug test and failed to appear for subsequent tests during 

the investigation in this case. A witness stated that Mother 

appeared under the influence and that she admitted to still using 

drugs. 

Father’s contentions that he did not know or should not 

have known of Mother’s drug use are unpersuasive. Father was 

a former user of the same substance, methamphetamine, for

about three years. He could not recall whether he had used 

methamphetamine with Mother, but he said they may have used 

it together once. Father stated he was aware that Mother had a 

history of using marijuana and methamphetamine. Thus, Father 

knew what indications to look for given his own experience, and 

he should have been on alert that Mother could have been using 

given her past and taken steps to ensure I.O. was not being left 
13

alone with an impaired parent. He was not entitled to turn a 

blind eye to the information he had about Mother and simply 

hope that I.O. would be safe.

Moreover, given I.O.’s young age, Mother’s drug abuse 

created a substantial risk to I.O.’s safety. (Drake M., supra, 211 

Cal.App.4th at p. 767.) The risk of a parent’s substance abuse is 

very different when the child is of particularly young age, when 

“drug abuse presumptively constituted neglect. [Citation.]”

(In re J.M. (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 913, 922, fn. 7.)

For these reasons, substantial evidence supports the 

juvenile court’s finding of jurisdiction based upon Father’s failure 

to protect I.O. from Mother’s drug use. 

IV. The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in 

Ordering Father to Attend a Domestic Violence 

Program 

Finally, Father argues that the juvenile court abused its 

discretion in ordering him to complete a separate domestic 

violence counseling program as part of his case plan. Father’s 

counsel preserved this objection. 

We review a dispositional order for abuse of discretion. 

(Briana V., supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at p. 311.) The court has 

broad discretion to fashion dispositional orders for the child’s 

well-being. (In re Corrine W. (2009) 45 Cal.4th 522, 532.) While

reunification services need not be tied to a sustained allegation, 

they must be reasonable, and they must be designed to eliminate 

the conditions that led to the dependency. (Briana V., supra, 236

Cal.App.4th at p. 311; In re Nolan W. (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1217, 

1229.)
14

The juvenile court’s order that father complete a domestic 

violence program is designed to eliminate the conditions that led 

to the dependency, which are detailed above and supported by 

substantial evidence. The court did not abuse its discretion. 

DISPOSITION

We affirm the jurisdictional and dispositional orders. 

HARUTUNIAN, J.*

We concur:

STRATTON, Acting P. J.

WILEY, J.

* Judge of the San Diego Superior Court, assigned by the 

Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California 

Constitution.