No. 3–08–0403

______________________________________________________________________________ File d Decem

ber 4, 2009 IN THE A

PPELL ATE C OURT

OF IL LINO IS THIRD DI STRICT A.D., 2009 THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Ap peal f rom th e Ci rcui t Court ILLINO IS, ) of th e 1 0th Judi ci al Ci rc ui t, ) Pu t na m Co un t y, I llino is Plai ntif f-A ppelle e, ) ) No. 07-CF-21 v. ) ) JARED WILLMER, ) Honorable ) Ke vinR. Ga lley, De f en da n t-A pp el l an t. ) Judge, Presi din g.

______________________________________________________________________________ JU STI CECA

RT ER de l i v ered th e op i n i on of th e c our t:

______________________________________________________________________________ Af ter a j ury trial , de f en da nt, Ja red W i l l mer, wa s c onv

i cte d of aggravated crim

in al sex ual abuse (720 ILCS 5/12– 16(d) (W est 200 8)) and was sent ence d t o 4 years ’ pr oba t ion and 120 days in t he
cou n ty jail. Defend ant app eals his co nvictio n, a rg uing t ha t : ( 1) t he t r ial c o ur t er r ed in d en ying his
m oti on to dec lare a mistr ial, which a lleged t hat t he jury was hopelessl

y de adl ocked; and (2) the trial
cou rt er red i n d en y i ng hi s p osttri al moti on f ornew trial

, which al le ged that t he jur y had impr o pe r ly consi dered

extraneous i

nf ormation i

n reach in g a verdi ct. We aff

irm the trial court ’s denia l o f defendant’s motion f

or mi strial

and rem and f or t he trial

court to take the f

oll owi n g acti on s: (1 ) to hold an evide nt iary hear ing t o d et er mine th e s pe ci f i c n atu reof th e extra n eou s i n f orm ati on to whi ch t he jur y wa s e xp o se d d ur ing it s d elib erations; and (2) to reco nsider this one aspec t o f defendant’s postt rial motion f or new trial

based upon the e

vi dence el ic ited at the evi

dentia ry h earin g.1 There was a dispute as to whether the sexual in tercour se was conse

nsual or whether defend ant had fo rc ed himself upo n A.M. R. Tha t issue, how ever , w as no t an element of t he off ense wi th which def

endan t was charged. 2

FA CTS InAugu st of

2007, defen

dant was cha

rged with one c ount o f aggrav ated crim in al sexual abuse, a Class 2f

el ony . The c ha rgi ng i ns trum en t al l eg ed tha t on June 1, 2007, def

endan t commi tt ed t he offense by committ ing an ac t of se xual pe net ra t ion wit h A.M. R. , w ho was at least 13 ye ars of age butless t han 17 years of a ge w hen t he ac t was co mmi t t ed, in that defend ant put his penis in t he vagina of A.M.R., and defendant was more than 5 years older than A.M.R. The cas e proce eded

to a ju ry t r ial in F eb rua ry o f 20 08 . All o f t he ev ide nc e w as pr es en t ed in
a si ngle day . The undisputed evidence at trial establ is hed tha t on June 1, 2007, when

defen dant was 20 years old an d A.M.R. was 15, def

endan t and A.M.R. had

sexual i nter cou rse at A.M.R. ’s mother ’s resi dence. A .M. R.’ s m

othe r wa s n ot home at the time . The onl

y di sputed iss ue at tr ia l pe rtained to t he defens e r aised by

defendan t–t hat he reasonably

bel iev ed that A.M.R. wa s o f leg al a ge at t he t ime that t he act was comm

itted. 1 Confl

ictin g evidence was presented o n that issue from b ot h sides. The Sta te pr ese nt ed e vidence t hat t ende d t o ind icat e t hat defend ant knew that A.M.R. was 15 wh en they had sexual in tercour se. The def

ense pres ented

ev i den ce th at te n de d to i n di ca te tha t de f en da nt d i d n ot kn owA.M.R.’s true age when they had sex ual in tercour se and that def

endan t beli eved A.M. R. t o be 18. I n a ll, si

x wi tnesses were pres ented, three for the state (A.M.R., A.M.R.’s mother, and the of fi cer who took d

ef en da n t’s sta t eme nt ) a nd t hre e fo r t he de fense ( defend ant , d efenda nt ’s fat her , a nd defendant’s mot her ). In a ddit ion, t wo of t he State ’s ea rl i er w i tne ss eswere rec al

l ed f orbrief reb

utt al testi m ony af ter the d ef en se h ad res ted.3

The jury b e gan i

ts deli berations in this case at 10:31 a.m. on Fe bruary 27, 2008. At about 1:20 p.m., the j ury s ent the trial judge a note in

dic ating tha

t it was deadlocked and aski ng fo r tra n scri pts of some of the w itnes ses ’ t est imonies. The t rial judg e disc uss ed t he no t e wit h t he at t o rne ys and a response was de ci ded upon. The trial judg e dir ect ed t he jur y to co nt inue de liberat ing
and told i t that he would not prov

i de the j ury

wi th transcri pts. At about 3:01 p.m., the jury sent the trial

judge a second note. The second n ot e provided a

n up da te as to th e j ur y ’s progres s, appa

re n tl y wi th tall y resu l ts attach ed. No que st ion wa s po sed by t he jury in the second note and the n ot e di d not contain the wo rd “ de ad l oc k.” The trial judge dis cussed th e s ec on d n

ote w i th th e a tto rney s and listene d t o t heir r esp ect ive po sitio ns re gar ding whether the c ourt shou ld res

pond to the second note. The State argued t hat a Pr im i ns tructi on ( Pe o ple v. Pr im , 53 Ill . 2d 62, 289 N.E. 2d 601 (1 972); Ill i

noi s Pattern

Ju ry In st ruc t io ns, Cr iminal, No . 26 . 07 ( 4t h e d. 20 00 ) ( he r ein aft er I PI Cr iminal 4 t h) ) sho uld be gi ven an d a ss er ted th at th e n ote was an indicat ion t hat t he jur y was, in fact , d ead lock ed. Defend ant objec t ed t o t he giv in g of a Pr im i ns tructi on and argued that the j ury

should si mpl y b e allowed to continuedelib erating. The trial judge fou nd th at th e s ec on d n

ote was an i

ndication that the jury h

ad made f urt her prog ress to ward a verdict and el ected, over defenda

nt’s obj ection, to give the jury a Pr im i nstructi on. At ab o ut 4: 14 p. m. , t he jur y wr o t e t he t r ia l j udge a thi

rd note stat in

g that t he j ury was “hop elessly dea dlo cke d” a nd t hat t he jur or s did no t believe t hat t hey co uld co me to a ver dict . T he trial j udge di scu sse d the

thi rd n ote w i th th e a ttorn ey s a n d l i ste n ed to their respe ctive

argumen ts as to th e prop er

cou rs e of acti on f or th e c our t to tak e. The S tate

ask ed the court to di sch

arge th e j ury f ort he night and to instruct the jurors t o ret urn the foll owing day

for further delib erations. Defend ant move d for a m is trial , based upon the j ury deadl ock. Defendan

t po in ted out to t he

courtthat the

j ury4

had been d eliberat ing in the cas e fo r a ppr oximat ely six hour s and not ed c onc er ns t hat exi ste d
re gar ding ext er nal co mmunicatio ns if the jury were allowed to go home for the ni ght. The trial

judge deni ed defend ant ’s mot ion fo r a mistr ial and elected i nstead to di sch

arge th e j ury f or the ev en i ng. The trial judge to ld the jury to return for further delib erations at 9:30 th e f oll owi ng m orni ng. The trial judge instr uct ed t he jur y pur sua nt to IPI C ri m i na l 4th No. 2 6.0 9 re ga

rdi ng prop er proce dur

e f ort he j urors to f

oll ow upon cea si ng th ei r del i berati ons f

or the ev en i ng. The jury re t ur ned t he fo llowing mo rning an d w as di re cte d b y th e tr i al j udge to co n ti n ue i ts deli berations. At 11: 15 a.m. the j ury returned a v erdict, fi ndi ng def endan t guil ty of aggrav

ated crim in al sexual abuse. A pre sente nc e i nv es ti ga ti on re po rt was or der ed a nd

t he ca se w as sc hedu led fo r a sent encing heari ng. Pri or to th e s en

ten ci ng he ari ng , de f en da nt f i l ed a p osttri al moti on f or new tri al . That m

oti on was l ate r a men de d. I n th e am en ded m

ot ion, def endan t alleged, among other thi ngs, that the trial courterred

i n n ot gra nti ng hi s m oti on f ora m is trial after t he jur y had ind ica t ed t ha t it wa s ho pe les sly deadlocked and that a new trial was requi

red because

the jury had consi

dered and b ased i

ts verdi ct upon i m proper extra

ne ou s infor matio n. At t ache d t o t he mot ion, was t he affidavit of o ne o f the jurors, j uror Bax

ter. In t he affidavit, juro r Ba xt er at t est ed t hat aft er t he jur y was d ischar ged for t he
n i gh t, he wen t home an

d asked hi

s wi fe to fi

nd on the com

puter, t he Il

li nois la w “def in in g th e [o]ffen se”with wh

ic h def endan t had been charged. Bax

ter re ad t hat “sect ion” o n t he co mput er and dis cussed t hat informat ion wi

thth e jury

the foll owing day

after it had resumed i

ts delib erations. Ba xt er als o at t es t ed t ha t an o t he rjur o rbr o ug ht co pie s o f Bib le ver ses int o t he jur y ro om d ur ing t he
sec ond day o f delibera t ions a nd dis cussed those vers es wit h t he o t her juro rs d ur ing t heir d eliberat ions that da y .5

The trial j udg e h ea rd a rgu men ts on the moti on f or new tri al . The Sta

te a rgued f ordeni al of t he motion f

or various reasons. Def

endan t argued, among other thin gs, that at the very

le ast, the tr ia

l courtshould hold a hearing t o de ter mi ne whether the ext raneo us inf or mation tainted the jury’s
v erdi ct. Af ter hearin g the argumen

ts of the atto rney

s, the trial j udg e den

i ed the m oti on f orne w t r ial. S pe cif ica lly, as t o t he cla im

t hat t he jur y had impro per ly conside re d ext ra neo us infor matio n, t he trial judge f ound t hat defendant had f ail ed to establi sh

t hat he was subst antiall

y prejudiced by

the jury’s so doi ng. Af ter t he mot ion fo r ne w t rial was denied , a sent encing he ari ng wa s h el d. A t the con cl us i on of the sen tenci ng he arin g, the trial

court sentence d

de fe nd an t t o 4 ye ar s’ pr o ba t io n a nd 12 0 d ays in the county j ai l. Thi

s appeal followed.

AN

AL YSIS Defend ant ar gu es firs t o n app ea l t ha t t he t r ial c o ur t er r ed in d en ying his motion to declarea mist r ial, whi

ch al le ged that the jury

was hope l ess l

y dead l ocked. D ef

endan t asse rts tha t the trial court comm itted an abu se o f discr et ion, unde r t he fact s o f this ca se, by denying t he mot ion fo r mist rial and dire ct ing the j ury to retu rn f ora second day

of del ib erations. Def

endan t not es thatat t hat po int, t he j ury had already

deli berated for six hours, had been giv en the Pr im

i n str uc ti on , a n d h ad i n di ca ted to t he trial court three tim

es that it wasdeadlocked, t he l ast of whi ch was an exp re ss indicat ion t hat t he j ury was “h opeless ly deadlocked.” Defen

dant asserts further

that un der the pres en

t facts, the

re was a signifi cant ris k that t he verdict resul

ted form the press

ure in herent i n the si tuation, that is, that t he verdict was coerced or hastened by the trial court ’s conduct. See Peop l e v . Huds on , 171 Ill . App. 3d 102 9, 1040 , 526 N .E.2d 164 , 170 (1 987).6

The State arg ues t hat t he t rial co ur t ’s r uling did no t co nst itu t e an a buse of d iscre t ion and sho uld be affirmed. The St at e as ser t s t hat t he t rial judg e pr op er ly f ou nd t hat t he jur y was mo ving cl oserto a verdi

ct and allowed the j ury to continue to de l i b erate to do so. T he State asserts further that ther e is no indi

cat ion in the r eco rd t hat t he tr ial

cou rt ’s act ions p re ssu re d t he jury in to a hastene d
v erdi ct. A t r ial c o ur t ha s br o ad dis cr et io n in r ulin g u po n a mo t io n fo rmist r ial. Peop l e v . Log ston , 196 I ll. App. 3d 30, 33, 552 N.E.2d 1266, 1268 (1990). “The court's judgm ent wi ll not be dis

turbed unless t his d isc r et io n is s ho wn t o be cle ar ly abus ed, even t hou gh t he jury had earl ie r in dic ated it was ho pe les sly

deadlocked.” Log ston, 196 Il l . Ap p. 3d a t 33, 552 N .E.2d at 12 68. The tria l courti s n ot required to accept a jury ’s ass essm ent of i ts own abili

ty to reach a verdi

ct or to decl are a m

is trial
mer ely be caus e the

j urors ha ve not be en ab l e to come to a unan

i mous verdi

ct i m medi atel y . Log ston , 196 Ill . App. 3d at 33, 55 2 N . E . 2d at 12 68 . “I n d et er mining ho w lo ng a ju ry sho uld b e p er m i tted to de l i b erate befo re a mistr ial is declar ed a nd the jury is dis charged, no f

ix ed tim e can be pr esc ribed , a nd great latitude must

b e acc orded

to the trial

court in the exercise of i

ts in form ed di scretion.” Pe o ple
v. Wo lf , 178 Ill . App. 3d 1064, 1066, 534 N.E. 2d 204, 205 (1989 ). T he r e is no mec ha nic al fo rmula that can be appl

ie d because

a trial cou rt’ s r ul i ng on a m oti on for m is trial is grounded in

the uni que fact s o f the par t icular cas e in which t he r ulingwas m ade. See People v . Andrews , 364 Ill . App. 3d 253, 26 6, 845 N .E.2d 974 , 986 (2 006). Having reviewed the record in the present case, we can

not say that

the tri al courtcomm

itted
an abus e o f discr et ion in denying de fen da nt ’s mo t io n fo rmist r ial. Al though the jury

had i ndicated
r ep ea t ed ly

th at i t wa s deadl

ock ed , the tr i al cou rt f oun d th at th e j ur y ’s se con d n ote had sh

owed that t he jury had m ade some prog ress i

n m ovi ng towa rd a v erdi ct. Wh il e the case was

not o verl y c omplex7

and the evidence was p resent ed in a si ngle day, the charge all

eged wa s a seriou s one and t he jury’s de term i na ti on involved a ver y diff

icult asse ssment of w hich witne sses t o be lieve andwhat i nf erences to draw f rom th e ev i den ce pre sen ted. Co nt r ar y t o d efenda nt ’s as ser t ion o n app eal, t her e is no i nd i ca ti on in the r eco rd t hat jury’s ve rd ict w as c oe rc ed o r ha st ened by the t rial co ur t ’s r uling denying the motion for mi strial an d directing the j ury to r etur n f or a seco nd day of

deli berations. A s his nex

t poin t of con tention on a

ppea l , def endan t argues that the tria l courterred i n denying hi s m

ot ion f or new trial , which al

le ged that the jury

had b ased i

ts verdi ct on prejudi

ci al ext raneous in fo rma t io n. De fend ant as se rt s t hat jur o r B axt er ’s a ffida vit wa s s uffic ient t o sa t isfy defendant’s bur

den to show pr

ej udice, a n d th at i f i t was not suff

ic ie nt, that defense

counsel was ineffect ivein

fai li ng to call Baxter and the other j urors t o t est ify. D efenda nt asse rt s fur t her t hat t he trial co ur t er r o ne o us ly de nie d h is r eq ue st fo ran ev ide nt iar y hea r ing t o de t er mine if the jury ’s verdict was tain ted and asks this court t o remand thi s case f or such a heari

ng to t ake pl ace. The St at e ar gue s t hat t he t rial co ur t ’s r uling was pr op er and s hou ld be affirmed. The Sta te as se rtst ha t t he r e is no ev ide nc e t ha t t he jur y wa s p r eju dic ed by an y ext r an eo us info rmat io n t ha t it
ma y have heard, especi

ally si nce the tria

l cou rt i n str uc ted th e j urorsto base

the i r de ci si on on l y upon the evi dence presented

in this case. The State asserts further that sin ce prej udic e cann

ot be sh own ba se d u po n t his r ec o r d, de fen da nt ’s alle ga t io n o f ine ffec t ive as sis t an ce o f co un se l mus t als o fail. A tri al cou rt’ s r ul i ng on a moti on f ornew t rial will not be r ever sed on a ppe al absent an abuse of di scre tion
. People v . Abdul

la h , 336 Ill . App. 3d 940, 949, 78 5 N.E.2d 863, 87 1 (200 2). I llino is la wis very restrictiv e as to t he m

ann er in whi ch a j ury v

erdict m ay be i mpe ached. See Peo ple v. Hoble y , 182 Ill . 2d 404, 457-58, 696 N. E.2d 313, 339 (19 98) ; People v . Holm es , 69 Ill . 2d 507, 511- 16, 372N.E .2d

656 , 65 8-6 0 (1 978 ). A

pa rty may not ad mit a j uror ’s

tes ti mony or af f i da vi t to sh ow8

t he motiv e, method, or proc ess

by whi ch the j ury reache d i ts ve rdict. Hoble

y , 182 Ill . 2d at 457, 696 N.E.2d at 339. Such evidence ma y b e admitted , howev er , to sh ow th at th e j ur y wa s ex pos ed to i m proper extran

eous i nf orma tion
. Hoble

y , 182 Il l . 2d at 45 7-58, 6 96 N.E.2 d at 339
. Wh erea j ury has b een e

xp ose d to i m

pro per ext raneo us inf

or mation, re versal of the jury’s verdict i s n

ot automatic. See Holm

es , 69 Ill. 2d a t 5 18, 372 N.E .2d at 661 ; Peo ple v. Co lli ns , 351 I ll. App. 3d 175, 179, 813 N. E. 2d 2 85, 289 (2 004 ). The par t y challenging the verdict must establi sh prejudi ce by showi ng that the in

form ation relates directl

y to somethi

ng at is sue in

the case an

d that it may ha ve i nf l uen ced th e v erdi ct. Co lli ns , 351 Ill . App. 3d at 179, 813 N.E.2d at 289. The burden then shifts to the nonmovi

ng party to establi sh

that the i nc i den t is ha rm l ess . Co lli ns , 351 Ill . App. 3d at 179, 813 N.E.2d at 289. The verdi ct may s t an d o nly if it i s ob vi oustha t the m ovi ng pa rty wa s n ot prejudi ced by the extraneous i

nf orma tion
. Co lli

ns , 351 Ill . App. 3d at 179-80, 813 N.E .2d at 289-90. The st anda rd t o be app lied is whet her t he co nduc t at issue invo lved su ch a p ro bability of re sult ing prejudi ce that the verdi ct must be deem ed inherent ly l

ack ingi n du e proce ss. Hoble

y , 182 Ill . 2d at 458 , 69 6 N. E. 2d at 339 ; Co lli ns , 351 Ill . App. 3d at 180, 813 N.E .2d at 290. In the pre sent c as e, def

en da nt e sta bl i sh ed tha t the j ury ha d b een e xp ose d to s ome f

orm of im proper ex trane ous i nf orma tion . As the p arti es c orrectl

y note, h owever, based

upon the record t hat is currently

bef ore t hi s court, the true nature o f that inf ormation cannot be clearly ascertained because t he trial cou rt d en i ed de f en da n t’s re qu est to hold a

n ev i den ti ar y h ea ri n g on th e m atter . Thus , t he mainquestion b efore thi s court as t o t hi s particul ar is sue i s whether the i

nstant def

endan t had presented a s uffic ien

t sh ow ing t o r equ ire t he t rial co ur t t o ho ld an evide nt iary hear ing, w her e t he j urors wo uld be q ues t ioned , t o d et er mine if t he ver dict had be en t ainte d. We bel ie ve that t he inst ant defen dant ma de a suf fi ci ent showi

ng to require an ev

ide ntiary heari ng i n thi s case.9

Al thoughno t dir ec t ly

on p oint , w e find

t he su pr eme co ur t ’s ana lysis in Pe opl e v . K un tu , 188 I ll. 2d 157, 720 N.E.2d 1047 (1 999 ), t o be helpful in ou r d ecisio n her e. In K un tu , ou r sup re me c our

t, face d wit h a po st t r ial c laimo f ju r o rpa rt iali t y, st at ed t hat a po st t rial evident iary hear ingwas requi red in those circum

stances i f the def endan t pro duced “ ‘ specifi

c, detailed an d n o nc o nje ct ur al e vid en ce in supp ort of his position.’ ” K un tu , 1 88 I ll. 2d a t 161 , 7 20 N .E .2 d at 104 9, quo t ing Pe o ple v. T ow ns , 157 Ill . 2d 90, 102, 623 N.E .2d 269, 27 5 ( 19 93 )
. We findt ha t t he sa me r ule wo uld app ly under t he f acts of the i nstant ca se. In ap plying t ha t rule her e, we no t e t hat juro r Ba xt er ’s affidavit pr ovid ed s pec ifi c, det ailed and nonconj ecturalevidence i

n suppo rt of defendant’s p osition t hat t he jury’s verdict had been

tainted by t he j ury ’sex

posure to extran eous prej udi

cial i nf orma tion
. Thu s, u nd er t he abo ve r ule, defend ant provided suf fi ci ent evi dence to require the trial

court to conduct an evi

dentia ry h earin g. See K un tu , 188 Ill . 2d at 16 1, 720 N .E.2d at 10 49. We m ust con cl ude, there fore, t ha t t he t r ial c o ur t er r ed in denying defend ant ’s r equ est for an evide nt iary hear ing o n t he mat t er in the inst ant case. See K un tu , 188 Ill. 2d at 161 , 7 20 N .E .2 d at 104 9. Having r eac hed t hat co nc lusion, w e need not addr ess defen dant’s al ternative c la

im that defen

se counsel

was ineffect ive in fail

ing t o c all juro r Ba xt er and t he o t her juro rs t o t est ify

at t he hea ring o n t he po st t rial mot ion. For t he f oreg oi ng reasons, we a f

f i rm the tri al cou rt’ s den i al of de f en da nt’ s m oti on for m is trial and reman

d for the trial

court to take the foll

owing a ctions: (1) to hold an ev

i den tia ry h ea ri n g to det er mine t he spe cif i c nature of

the extran

eous i nf orma tion to whi ch the j ury wa s ex pos ed du ri n g i ts deli berations; and ( 2) t o r eco nsider t his one aspect of defendant’s postt rial motion f or new trial

based upon the evi dence el ic ited at the evi

dentia ry h earin g. We reem

phasi ze to all those in volv ed that wh ile j urors may

b e q ue sti on ed as to the specifi

c nature of the ex

traneous i nf orma tion to which they were10

exposed, t hey may not be qu est ioned abo ut t he ef f ec t of that inf ormation on thei

r deli berations . See Hoble y , 182 Ill . 2d at 457, 696 N.E .2d at 3 39. Un

der th e e sta

bl i sh ed l aw i n th i s a rea , th e e f f ec t of t hat info r mat io n on t he jur y’s verd ict may o nly be analyzed in an abs t ra ct sense as t o w het her t he conduct at issue

involved s uch a pr oba bili t y of re sult ing pr ejudice t hat t he verdict must be deem ed in herentl y l acki ng i n dueprocess. See Hoble y , 182 Ill . 2dat 458 , 69 6 N. E. 2d at 339 ; Co lli ns , 351 Ill . App. 3d at 180, 813 N.E .2d at 290. Af fi rmed i n part and remanded in

part with di

rections. LYTTO N an d W RIGH T J. J. c oncu

rri ng.