****************************************************** The ‘‘officially released’’ date that appears near the beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the ‘‘officially released’’ date appearing in the opinion. In no event will any such motions be accepted before the ‘‘officially released’’ date. All opinions are subjectto modification andtechnical correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the electronic version of an opinion and the print version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest print version is to be considered authoritative. The syllabus and procedural history accompanying the opinion as it appears on the Commission on Official Legal Publications Electronic Bulletin Board Service and in the Connecticut LawJournal andboundvolumes of official reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced and distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut.

******************************************************ENRICO VACCARO v. SHELL BEACH

CONDOMINIUM, INC., ET AL.

(AC 37811)
Sheldon, Prescott and Bear, Js. Argued May 17—officially released October 18, 2016 (Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of New

Haven, Wilson, J.)
Enrico Vaccaro, self-represented, with whom, on the brief, was Emily A. Gianquinto, for the appellant (plaintiff).
SharonBaldwin, fortheappellee (nameddefendant).
DanielJ. Krisch, with whom wasJoshuaM. Auxier, for the appellees (defendant Andrew Hames et al.).Opinion BEAR, J. The plaintiff, Enrico Vaccaro, appeals from the summary judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of the defendants, Shell Beach Condominium, Inc. (association), and certain individual members of its board of directors, Andrew Hames, Frank Meolli, MichaelGagliardi, MichelleAugliera, andRaymondVermette (individually named defendants), on the basis that all ofthe plaintiff’s claims arising from the deprivation ofthe use of a particular garage were time barred. The plaintiff argues that the court erred in rendering summaryjudgment infavor ofthe defendants, because, inter alia: (1) the trial court applied the wrong statute of limitations to count one of his complaint, which sought to enforce the condominium instruments; and (2) genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether the applicable statutes of limitations were tolled by virtue ofthe continuing course ofconduct doctrine. We affirm the judgment of the court.1
Evidence concerning the following facts and procedural history appears inthe record. Shell Beach Condominium (condominium) is a condominium complex located in East Haven and organized pursuant to the CondominiumActof1976 (CondominiumAct), General Statutes § 47-68a et seq. It is comprised of forty-seven residential units and fifty-two garages,2 and includes a number of open-air parking spaces. The association is
a nonstock corporation, owned by the unit owners of the condominium; membership in the association
occurs immediately upon acquisition of title in a unit. The affairs of the condominium are conducted by a board ofdirectors (board), all ofwhomare unitowners. See General Statutes § 47-80 (c) (1) (bylaws required to contain, inter alia, ‘‘[t]he election from among the unit owners of a board of directors’’). Each ofthe individually named defendants was a member ofthe board when the plaintiff commenced this action.
In 1999, the plaintiff became a unit owner in the condominium when he purchased his individual unit from Salvatore Amendola, who was assisted in the sale by his daughter, Rosalie Porrello. The warranty deed, dated May 26, 1999, and recorded May 27, 1999, purported to convey unit 14 and garage 49.3 During this transaction, the plaintiff was informed that garage 49
was the garage that would be conveyed with unit 14. Neither Amendola nor Porrello, however, discussed with the plaintiffany use ofor ownership in garage 14.4 Further, althoughAmendolawas amemberoftheboard at the time ofthe transaction, he was selling a unit that he personally owned.5 Apart from his conversations with Amendola, the plaintiff did not speak with any member on the board at the time of the conveyance, nor did he speak with any of the individually named defendants, at or before the time of the closing.6The plaintiffdid not receive the condominium declarationpriortoorduringtheclosing; instead,theassociation mailed it to him at some point thereafter. Although the plaintiffreceived a copy ofthe declaration in 1999, he admittedly did not review that document until 2009.
In January, 2009, the plaintiff received a tax assessment that he believed to be substantially higher than prior assessments. He contacted the assessor, and was informed that he was being assessed for both garage 14 and garage 49. After this conversation, the plaintiff examined the condominium instruments7 and came to believe that he was entitled to the exclusive use of garage 14, not garage 49.8 The plaintiff contacted the board and demanded that it, on behalf of the association, take action to provide him with use of garage 14 pursuant to the applicable statutory authority and provisions of the condominium instruments. After the board denied the plaintiff’s request, the plaintiff commenced this action by summons and a seven count complaint9 on each of the defendants in July, 2009, in which he alleged, inter alia, that the defendants had deprived him ofthe use ofgarage 14 in violation ofthe condominium instruments and the Condominium Act.
The defendants filed amotionforsummaryjudgment
on January 23, 2012, in which they claimed, inter alia, that the statutes of limitations had run on all seven counts of the plaintiff’s complaint.10 After the court allowed additional time for the parties to conduct discovery, and the parties had filed additional briefs, the court heard argument on October 20, 2014. In a memorandum of decision dated February 9, 2015, the court granted the defendants’ motion for summaryjudgment
asto all counts, making several determinationsrelevant to this appeal. First, it determined that, pursuant to the declaration, garages are limited common elements of the condominium,11ratherthanunits12asthedefendants had contended. Second, it also determinedthatthe declaration did not require that particular garages or parking areas be assigned to any particular units, and the defendants therefore had no ongoing duty to ensure that the plaintiff, as title owner of unit 14, be assigned garage 14. Having already concluded that there was no genuine issue of material fact concerning whether the applicable statute of limitations as to each count had run, the court accordingly rendered judgment for the defendants on all counts.13 The plaintiff filed a motion forreargument and/orreconsideration, whichthe court denied. This appeal followed.14
I
The plaintiffargues that the court erred in rendering summaryjudgment on the first count ofhis complaint, in which he claimed that the defendants, by their conduct, had violated General Statutes § 47-75 (a),15 because itimproperlyrelieduponthewronglimitationsperiod in ruling on the timeliness of that claim. In this respect, the plaintiff makes two separate and distinct claims. First, he arguesthatthe courterredin determining that any statute oflimitations applies to count one because a claim under § 47-75 is equitable in nature. Second, he argues that, even ifthe courtproperly determinedthatthe claimpleadedinhis first countis subject toastatute oflimitations, the courterredindetermining that the applicable limitations period is the three year limitations period for tort actions.
The determination of which statute of limitations applies to agiven action is aquestion oflaw overwhich
ourreviewisplenary. SeeFleetNationalBankv.Lahm, 86Conn.App. 403, 405, 861A.2d545 (2004), cert. denied, 273 Conn. 904, 868 A.2d 744 (2005). We address each of the plaintiff’s claims in turn. A
With respect to his first claim, the plaintiff argues that the court improperly determined that count one is subject to any statute of limitations because an action pursuant to § 47-75 is equitable, and equitable proceedings are not subject to statutes of limitations.16 We disagree.
The following facts are relevant to the resolution of this claim. In the first count ofthe complaint, the plaintiff alleges that the defendants, pursuant to both § 47- 75 and article 15 of the declaration,17 are required to complywith and enforcethe condominiuminstruments andthe CondominiumAct. Pursuantto the declaration, the plaintiff alleges that garages are limited common elements, and that he, as the title owner of unit 14, is entitled to an exclusive easement in garage 14. He further alleges that the declaration forbids any attempt to conveyormortgagethetitleto aunitwithout conveying all appurtenant interests or any attempt to sell ortransfer an appurtenant interest except as part of the unit to which it is attached, and that the defendants, ‘‘in violation ofthe condominium instruments andthe CondominiumAct,’’have ‘‘wilfullyallowedand/orpermitted and/or caused’’ the interest in garage 14 to be severed from unit 14 and unit 14 to be sold to the plaintiff without the exclusive use of garage 14, and have ‘‘wilfully allowed and/or caused and/or permitted and/or continue to permit’’ another unit owner to use garage 14. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Further, the plaintiff alleges that the defendants have failed to correct this situation, despite demands bythe plaintiffthat they‘‘complywithandenforcethecondominiuminstruments, the Condominium Act

. . . and the easement in favor of the plaintiff for the exclusive use of’’ the garage. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) As a result ofthe defendants’ actions, theplaintiffalleges anumber of injuries, including that he has been denied the use of garage 14 and has suffered financial harm because, inter alia, he has been assessed for and has paid taxeson that garage, paid for electricity for that garage, and the fair market value ofhis property has been substantially reduced. Counts two through seven of his complaint rely on most ofthe same operative facts as count
one. In his prayer for relief, he seeks, inter alia, various forms of injunctive reliefpursuant to § 47-75 and compensatory damages, but does not attempt to allocate any particular relief to any particular count. Our case law draws a distinction where statutes of limitationsareconcernedbetweenpurelyequitableproceedings and actions where aparty can seek both legal and equitable relief. ‘‘[I]n an equitable proceeding, a court mayprovide aremedy even though the governing statute of limitations has expired, just as it has discretion to dismiss for laches an action initiated within the period ofthe statute.

. . . Although courts in equitable proceedings often look by analogy to the statute of limitations to determine whether, in the interests of justice, aparticular action should be heard, they are by
no means obliged to adhere to those time limitations.’’ (Citations omitted.) Dunham v. Dunham, 204 Conn. 303, 326–27, 528 A.2d 1123 (1987), overruled in part on other grounds bySantopietro v. NewHaven, 239 Conn. 207, 213 n.8, 221, 682 A.2d 106 (1996).
The situation is different, however, where a party asserts a cause ofaction, pursuantto which it rightfully could seek both legal and equitable relief. ‘‘[W]here a partyseeksequitablereliefpursuanttoacauseofaction that would also allow that party to seek legal relief, concurrent legal and equitable jurisdiction exists, and the statute of limitations that would be applicable to bar the legal claim also applies to bar the equitable claim.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gager v. Sanger, 95 Conn. App. 632, 641–42, 897 A.2d 704, cert. denied, 280 Conn. 905, 907A.2d 90 (2006). Forinstance, in Dowling v. Finley Associates, Inc., 49 Conn. App. 330, 334–35, 714A.2d694 (1998), rev’donothergrounds, 248 Conn. 364, 727 A.2d 1245 (1999), this court held that the plaintiff’s claims for equitable relief pursuant to a provision of the Connecticut Uniform Securities Act, General Statutes § 36b-29 (a), were barred by the time limitation set forth in that statute. A party asserting a claim pursuant to the Condominium Act can seek either legal or equitable relief; see General Statutes § 47-75 (a); and a fair reading ofcount
one ofthe plaintiff’s complaint and the prayer for relief therein suggests that the plaintiffsought both. Further, the plaintiff has pleaded the same essential facts in each of the counts on which he bases his claims for legal and equitable relief. See Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London v. Cooperman, 289 Conn. 383, 411, 957 A.2d 836 (2008) (affirming trial court’s determination that, where legal claims for statutory theft and conversion were time barred, ‘‘the plaintiffs’ equitable claims based on the same facts also [were] time barred’’[emphasis added]). Under these circumstances, the court has concurrent equitable and legal jurisdiction, and the running of the applicable limitation period wouldbarboththe plaintiff’s legal and equitable claims brought pursuant to § 47-75.18
B
The plaintiffnext argues that, even ifthe court properly determined that count one alleging a violation of § 47-75 is subject to a statute of limitations, it improperly determinedthat count one was subjectto the three year limitations period set forth in General Statutes § 52-577,19 which governs torts generally. Noting ‘‘the unique nature of condominiums,’’ he asserts that the Condominium Act is concerned with property rights and that the declarationprovides that both the relevant statutoryprovisions and the condominium instruments
are covenants that run with the land.20 Arguing that the appropriate limitations period therefore must be grounded in property law and asserting that his claims
are similar to adverse possession claims, the plaintiff contendsthatthe onlypotentiallyapplicablelimitations period is the fifteen year period prescribed for such an action by General Statutes § 52-575 (a).21
The individually named defendants and the association disagree with the plaintiff and with each other as towhichstatute oflimitations appliesto claimsbrought pursuantto § 47-75. The individually named defendants assert that, because the plaintiff repeatedly contends that the defendants violated the Condominium Act, count one asserts a claim for a statutory violation and, thus, is subject to § 52-577. In contrast, the association claims that the plaintiff’s first cause of action asserts
a violation of the defendants’ duties pursuant to the declaration and, therefore, is governedby General Statutes § 52-576 (a),22 or, ifinterpreted as asserting aviolation ofthe CondominiumAct, by § 52-577. We conclude that either § 52-576 or § 52-577 would apply to bar this
cause of action. ‘‘[W]hen a statute includes no express statute oflimitations, we should not simply assume that there is no limitation period. Instead, we borrow the most suitable statute of limitations on the basis of the nature of the
cause of action or of the right sued upon.’’ Bellemare

v. Wachovia Mortgage Corp., 284 Conn. 193, 199, 931 A.2d 916 (2007); see also 51 Am. Jur. 2d 533, Limitation of Actions § 129 (2000) (‘‘The nature of the cause of action or of the right sued upon is the test by which to determine which statute of limitations applies and whethertheactionisbarredbytherunningofthelimitation period. Thus, for an action under a state statute that lack[s] an express limitations period, the courts look to analogous causes of action for which express limitations periods are available, either by statute or by case law.’’ [Footnote omitted.]).Anumber ofcases have addressedwhether an action soundsin contractorintort. See, e.g.,Meyersv.Livingston, Adler, Pulda, Meiklejohn & Kelly, P.C., 311 Conn. 282, 290–93, 87 A.3d 534 (2014); Bellemare v. Wachovia Mortgage Corp., supra, 284 Conn. 200–204; Gazo v. Stamford, 255 Conn. 245, 262–67, 765 A.2d 505 (2001). ‘‘[T]he fundamental difference between tort and contract lies in the nature of the interests protected.

. . . The duties of conduct which give rise to [a tort action]
are imposed by the law, and are based primarily upon socialpolicy, andnotnecessarilyuponthe will orintention of the parties.

. . . Furthermore, other courts have held that, when a plaintiff seeks to recover damages for the breach of a statutory duty, such an action sounds in tort.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Bellemare v. Wachovia Mortgage Corp., supra, 200. ‘‘Onthe otherhand, [c]ontractactions
are created to protect the interest in having promises performed. Contract obligations are imposed because of [the] conduct ofthe parties manifesting consent, and
are owed only to the specific individuals named in the contract.

. . . In short, [a]n action in contract is for the breach ofa duty arising out ofa contract; an action intortis forabreach ofdutyimposedbylaw.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
In this case, we are not required to resolve whether count one sounds in contract or in tort. The court in its memorandum ofdecision determined that the applicable statute oflimitations for each count ofthe plaintiff’s complaint began to run in May, 1999, when the plaintiffpurchasedunit 14in adeed datedMay26, 1999, and recorded on May 27, 1999. The plaintiff has not argued on appeal that the court erred in relying on this date. Thus, as it also is uncontested that this action
was commenced in July, 2009, count one would be outside the limitations period provided under either §§ 52-576 or 52-577 and, in the absence of an equitable basis fortollingthe limitationsperiod, wouldbe barred.
In this light, we now consider the plaintiff’s arguments that the most applicable limitations period is not
one governing claims sounding in tort or in contract, but rather the time period provided in § 52-575, which defines a claimant’s right to title based on adverse possession. ‘‘[T]o establish title by adverse possession, the claimant must oust an owner of possession and keep such owner out without interruption for fifteen years by an open, visible and exclusive possession under a claim ofright with the intent to use the property as his
own and without the consent ofthe owner.

. . . A finding of adverse possession is to be made out by clear and positive proof.

. . . The burden ofproof is on the party claiming adverse possession.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Caminis v. Troy, 300 Conn. 297, 311, 12 A.3d 984 (2011). The courts of this state frequently have referredtothe fifteenyearperiodprovidedin § 52-575 (a) asastatute oflimitations. See, e.g., id.;Pollansky

v. Pollansky, 162 Conn. App. 635, 654, 133 A.3d 167 (2016); Eberhart v. Meadow Haven, Inc., 111 Conn. App. 636, 645–46, 960A.2d 1083 (2008). Adetermination that an adverse possessor meets the requirements of § 52-575 (a)preventstheoriginaltitleownerfromrecovering on equitable claims based on title to the property. See Caminis v. Troy, supra, 299–300 (affirming trial courtjudgmentagainstplaintiffseekingdeclaratoryand injunctive reliefon alternative ground that claims were ‘‘barred because they were brought outside the fifteen year limitations period’’).
Aproper framing ofthe plaintiff’s theory ofrecovery and ofthe relationships among the parties reveals compelling reasons to reject the plaintiff’s proposal to use the limitations period set forth in our adverse possession statute. In the plaintiff’s analogy, he is the rightful
owner orpossessor ofgarage 14 byvirtue ofthe condominium instruments; therefore, if the analogy were to hold, he would be suing the defendants as the adverse possessors of the property. He does not allege or present any evidence, however, that the association or the individually named defendants, in their roles as directors oftheboardofthe condominium, are inactual possession, or have been in possession, of garage 14 since the allegedly impermissible severance of that interest from unit 14, and no evidence in the record supports such a finding. Nor does he allege in his complaint orpresent any evidence showing thatthe current
owner and user ofgarage 14, who has neverbeen made
a party to this action, is using it pursuant to the type of agreement or relationship with the defendants from which it could be inferred that the defendants, through that occupant, have been making the type of adverse and hostile use of the property in derogation of the plaintiff’sinterestthatwouldconstituteadversepossession. Cf. Richmond v. Stahle, 48 Conn. 22, 23 (1880) (possession by tenant ofadversely possessing landlord may be tacked onto landlord’s use when determining whether landlord has held property against third parties’ possessory interest for statutory period). Instead, the plaintiff’s entire theory of recovery against the defendants rests on the assertion that they breached theirstatutory and contractual duties to him by causing
or failing to prevent the severance of garage 14 from unit 14 and by failing thereafter to take any action to return possession of the garage to him.23 Actions that assert a breach of a duty sound in contract or tort, depending on the source of the duty alleged. See Bellemare v. Wachovia Mortgage Corp., supra, 284 Conn. 200.
It is undisputed that the court is required in cases such as this one to determine what is the most analogous statute of limitations, given the ‘‘nature of the
cause ofaction or ofthe right sued upon.’’ Id., 199. The analysis employed by our Supreme Court in Bellemarecould support the application in this case of either the general tort or written contract statute of limitations. Determining that an action seeking damages for violation of General Statutes § 49-8, the mortgage release statute, sounded in tort, our Supreme Court noted that, despite the presence of a contract, the duty contemplated arose entirely by statute and would exist even without any specific terms in a mortgage contract. Id., 200–201 (‘‘the mortgage contract may be silent with regard to the issuance of a release, may provide for a longer or shorter time period for the issuance of a release, or may be vague or uncertain as to the period for the issuance of a release’’). Unlike this case, however, the court in Bellemare also noted that ‘‘[t]here [was] no allegation in this count of the complaint that
a term of the mortgage contract had been breached’’; id., 201; andthat ‘‘therecordandcasefile donotcontain
a copy of the mortgage contract’’ at issue there. Id., 201 n.8.24 Additionally, acceptingthe plaintiff’s adverse possession argument would result in one of two unfavorable outcomes. First, at a bare minimum, it would require the courts to apply different limitations periods to a single duty, which is something that we generally seek to avoid because it would lead to an unpredictable result. See id., 201–202 (rejecting interpretation of § 49- 8 that would, inter alia, result in different limitations periods depending on specific claim brought). Alternatively, it would necessitate that we apply a fifteen year statute of limitations period to all claims pursuant to § 47-75 (a), regardless ofthe type ofclaim asserted, the
source of the right sued upon, or the particular relief requested. ‘‘[I]t is axiomatic that those who promulgate statutes

. . . do not intend to promulgate statutes

. . . that lead to absurd consequences or bizarre results.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Courchesne, 296 Conn. 622, 710, 998 A.2d 1 (2010). Although
we note that the plain language of the statute might support an argument forthe application oftwo statutes of limitations—one for those coming from the condominium instruments, another for those duties specifically arising from the Condominium Act; see General Statutes § 47-75 (a) (liabilityresultsfromfailureto comply ‘‘with [the Condominium Act], the condominium instruments, andthe rules and regulations adoptedpursuant thereto’’); we conclude that the plaintiff has not presented anyreasonforusto risk eitherfurther confusion or a patently absurd result by applying yet a third potential limitations period that finds no explicit support within the section’s text. Finally, although the nature of the relief requested
can be indicative of the nature of the right or cause of action at issue; see Gazo v. Stamford, supra, 255 Conn. 265–66 (action seeking damages for, inter alia, pain and suffering sounded in tort, not contract); it is by no means determinative in every case. See Bellemare v.Wachovia Mortgage Corp., supra, 284 Conn. 200–204 (relying on numerous factors, including source of underlying duty, desirability of having one statute of limitations for duty created by statute, and similarity of claim pursuant to § 49-8 to common-law action for slander of title, to determine that § 49-8 claim sounds intort); seealsoBellemarev. WachoviaMortgageCorp., 94 Conn. App. 593, 600–605, 894A.2d335 (2006) (relying
on additional factors, such as structure of complaint’s allegations, ‘‘distinct relief’’ requested for each count, and legislative history and statutory scheme of § 49-8), aff’d, 284 Conn. 193, 931 A.2d 916 (2007). The nature of the right or cause of action alleged by the plaintiff in count one is not similar in its essence to an adverse possession claim, andwe rejectthe plaintiff’s argument that the only appropriate statute of limitations for that
cause of action is that set forth in § 52-575.25 Accordingly, the trial court properly concluded that the first count of the plaintiff’s complaint was time barred.
II
The plaintiff next argues that the court improperly rendered summary judgment because it erroneously determinedthatfive counts ofhis complaint26weretime barred due to his failure to demonstrate agenuine issue ofmaterial fact as to the applicability ofthe continuing
course of conduct doctrine. We disagree. ‘‘Practice Book [§ 17-49] providesthatsummaryjudgmentshallberenderedforthwithifthepleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled tojudgment as a matter oflaw.

. . . In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.

. . . The party seeking summaryjudgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue [of] material facts which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to ajudgment as a matter oflaw

. . . and the party opposing such a motion must provide an evidentiary foundation to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact.

. . . A material fact

. . . [is] a fact which will make a difference in the result of the
case.

. . . Finally, the scope of our review of the trial court’s decision to grant the [defendant’s] motion for summary judgment is plenary.

. . . Summary judgment may be granted where the claim[s] [are] barred by the statute of limitations.

. . . Summary judgment is appropriate on statute of limitations grounds when the material facts concerning the statute of limitations [are] not in dispute

. . . . ‘‘[I]n the context of a motion for summaryjudgment based on a statute of limitations special defense, a defendant typically meets its initial burden of showing the absence ofa genuine issue ofmaterial fact by demonstrating that the action had commenced outside ofthe statutory limitation period.

. . . When the plaintiff asserts that the limitations period has been tolled by
an equitable exception to the statute oflimitations, the burden normally shifts to the plaintiff to establish a disputed issue ofmaterial fact in avoidance ofthe statute.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Flannery v. Singer Asset Finance Co., LLC, 312 Conn. 286, 309–310, 94 A.3d 553 (2014).
The plaintiff does not argue that the court erred in relying upon the transfer of the unit from Amendola to the plaintiff in May, 1999, as the relevant point for determining when the various statutes of limitations began to run. Additionally, beyond his arguments concerning the appropriate statute of limitations, if any, governing count one, he does not contest that, without the application of a ground tojustify the equitable tolling of the statute of limitations, each of the five remaining counts would be barred as beyond the applicable limitations period. See Rickel v. Komaromi, 144 Conn. App. 775, 782, 73A.3d851 (2013) (trespass claims subject to three year limitations period in § 52-577); Blinkoffv. O & G Industries, Inc., 113 Conn. App. 1, 8, 965 A.2d 556 (‘‘General Statutes § 42-110g [f], which governs CUTPA claims, provides: An action under this section may not be brought more than three years after the occurrence of a violation of this chapter’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]), cert. denied, 291 Conn. 913, 969A.2d 175 (2009);Ahernv. Kappalumakkel, 97 Conn. App. 189, 192 n.3, 903 A.2d 266 (2006) (‘‘[b]reach of fiduciary duty is a tort action governed by the three year statute of limitations contained within

. . . § 52- 577’’); Bellemare v. Wachovia Mortgage Corp., supra, 94 Conn. App. 610 (‘‘a claim brought pursuant to a contract, alleging a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, sounds in contract

. . . [and] isthereforesubjecttothesixyearcontractstatute of limitations as provided in § 52-576);27 see also part I B ofthis opinion (determining whether §§ 52-577 or 52- 576is applicable statute oflimitationsto cause ofaction in count one unnecessary under facts of this case). Instead, the plaintiff asserts that these limitations periodsweretolledbythe continuing course ofconduct doctrine. ‘‘In certain circumstances

. . . we have recognized the applicability of the continuing course of conduct doctrine to toll a statute oflimitations. Tolling does not enlarge the period in which to sue that is imposed by a statute of limitations, but it operates to suspend or interrupt its running while certain activity takes place.

. . . Consistent with that notion, [w]hen the wrong sued upon consists of a continuing course of conduct, the statute does not begin to run until that
course of conduct is completed.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Flannery v. Singer Asset Finance Co., LLC, supra, 312 Conn. 311. ‘‘[I]n order [t]o support a finding of a continuingcourse ofconductthatmaytollthestatute oflimitations there must be evidence of the breach of a duty that remained in existence after commission ofthe original wrong related thereto. That duty must not have terminated prior to commencement of the period allowed for bringing an action for such a wrong

. . . . Where
we have upheld a finding that a duty continued to exist after the cessation of the act or omission relied upon, there has been evidence ofeither a special relationship between the parties giving rise to such a continuing duty or some later wrongful conduct of a defendant related to the prior act.

. . . Therefore, a precondition for the operation of the continuing course of conduct doctrine is that the defendant must have committed an initial wrong upon the plaintiff.

. . . A second requirement forthe operation ofthe continuing course ofconduct doctrine is that there must be evidence of the breach of a duty that remained in existence after commission ofthe original wrong related thereto.

. . . The doctrine of continuing course of conduct as used to toll a statute of limitations is better suited to claims where the situation keeps evolving after the act complained ofis complete

. . . .’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Targonski v. Clebowicz, 142 Conn. App. 97, 108–09, 63 A.3d 1001 (2013). ‘‘Insum, [i]ndecidingwhetherthetrialcourtproperly granted the defendant’s motion for summaryjudgment,
wemustdetermineifthereisagenuineissue ofmaterial factwith respectto whetherthe defendant: (1) committedaninitialwrongupontheplaintiff; (2) owedacontinuing duty to the plaintiffthat was related to the alleged originalwrong; and (3) continuallybreachedthat duty.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Flanneryv. Singer Asset Finance Co., LLC, supra, 312 Conn. 313. ‘‘[I]f there is no genuine issue of material fact with respect to any one ofthe three prongs

. . . summaryjudgment is appropriate.’’ Cefaratti v. Aranow, 154 Conn. App. 1, 11, 105 A.3d 265 (2014), rev’d on other grounds, 321 Conn. 593, 141 A.3d 752 (question certified in plaintiff’s petition), aff’d, 321 Conn. 637, 138 A.3d 837 (question certified in defendants’ petition) (2016).
In support of his claim that the continuing course of conduct doctrine applies, the plaintiff makes the following contentions. First, he asserts that, pursuant to the declaration, garage 14 is assigned as a limited
common element to unit 14. Other provisions of the declaration, he contests, forbid the severance of the garagefromtheunit, and,pursuanttothe Condominium Act and the condominium instruments, the defendants hadthepowerandobligationtobothpreventthis severance and take the necessary actions to correct the continuance thereof.28 Thus, although the plaintiffasserted varying theories of recovery in his complaint, some of which do not require the existence of a duty of care,29 the central underlying ground for each ofthe plaintiff’s arguments concerns the duties owed to the plaintiff‘‘from the [Condominium] Act and the condominium instruments, which place the obligation of enforcing their provisions on the association.’’30 ‘‘Duty is a legal conclusion about relationships between individuals, made after the fact

. . . . The nature of the duty, and the specific persons to whom it is owed, are determined by the circumstances surroundingthe conductoftheindividual.’’ (Internalquotation marks omitted.) Lawrence v. O & G Industries, Inc., 319 Conn. 641, 649, 126 A.3d 569 (2015). ‘‘A duty

. . . may arise from a contract [or]

. . . from a statute

. . . .’’ Coburn v. Lenox Homes, Inc., 186 Conn. 370, 375, 441 A.2d 620 (1982). Reviewing the plaintiff’s claims requires us to consider and interpret those provisions of the Condominium Act and the condominium instruments relevant to the issues raised; we restate the principles that govern this analysis. ‘‘[C]onstruing a statute is a question of law.’’ Somers West Towne Houses, Inc. v. LASProperties Ltd. Partnership, 108 Conn. App. 426, 432, 949 A.2d 483 (2008). ‘‘The principles that govern statutory construction are well established. When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent ofthe legislature.

. . . In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as appliedto the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply.

. . . In seeking to determine that meaning, General Statutes § 1-2z directs us first to consider the text ofthe statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning ofsuch text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered.

. . . When a statute is not plain and unambiguous, we also look for interpretive guidance tothelegislativehistoryandcircumstancessurrounding its enactment, tothelegislativepolicyitwas designedto implement, andto its relationship to existinglegislation and commonlawprinciples governingthe same general subject matter

. . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)Mickeyv. Mickey, 292 Conn. 597, 613–14, 974A.2d 641 (2009). Determining the defendants’ responsibilities under the condominium instruments on which the plaintiff relies—specifically, the declaration and the bylaws— also requires resolution of questions of law. Oronoque Shores CondominiumAssn. No. 1, Inc. v. Smulley, 114 Conn. App. 233, 237, 968 A.2d 996 (‘‘The interpretation of a condominium’s declaration presents a question of law.

. . . We also conduct plenary review of corporate articles and bylaws.’’ [Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.]), cert. denied, 292 Conn. 922, 974 A.2d 722 (2009). ‘‘Because the [condominium] declara-tion operates in the nature of a contract, in that it establishes the parties’ rights and obligations, we apply the rules of contract construction to the interpretation of [the declaration].’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)HarbourPointe, LLCv. HarbourLanding Condominium Assn., Inc., 300 Conn. 254, 259, 14 A.3d 284 (2011). ‘‘[W]e first attempt to ascertain the parties’ intent from the language they used in their contract, looking at the contract as a whole and giving the contract’s words their ordinary meaning and one that renders its provisions consistent.

. . . Only if the language in the contract is truly capable of more than one reasonable interpretation will we lookto evidence beyondthe contract language for guidance as to what the parties intended.’’ (Citation omitted.) C & H Electric, Inc. v. Bethel, 312 Conn. 843, 853, 96 A.3d 477 (2014). ‘‘The rules of construction dictate giving effect to all the provisions of a contract, construing it as a whole and reconciling its clauses.

. . . Where two clauses which
are apparently inconsistent maybe reconciled by areasonable construction, that construction must be given, because it cannot be assumed that the parties intended toinsertinconsistentandrepugnantprovisions.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Regency Savings Bank

v. WestmarkPartners, 59 Conn. App. 160, 166, 756 A.2d 299 (2000). ‘‘[A] contract is unambiguous when its language is clear and conveys a definite and precise intent.

. . . The court will not torture words to impart ambiguity where ordinary meaning leaves no room for ambiguity.

. . . Moreover, the mere fact that the parties advance different interpretations of the language in question does not necessitate a conclusion that the language is ambiguous.

. . . In contrast, a contract is ambiguous ifthe intent ofthe parties is not clear and certain from the language of the contract itself.

. . . [A]ny ambiguity in a contract must emanate from the language used by the parties.

. . . The contract must be viewed in its entirety, with each provision read in light of the other provisions

. . . and every provision must be given effect if it is possible to do so.

. . . If the language of the contract is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, the contract is ambiguous.’’ (Internal quotationmarks omitted.)HarbourPointe, LLCv.Harbour Landing Condominium Assn., Inc., supra, 300 Conn. 260–61.
Even if we were to accept the plaintiff’s argument thatthe declaration, atitsinception, requiredtheallocation of garage 14 to unit 14, and unit 14 alone, and that the defendantshadbreachedthe declarationbycausing
or permitting the garage to be severed from that unit, the plaintiff still would have to prove that any duty owed by the defendants to the plaintiffwas continuing. Aspreviouslynoted, theplaintiffreliesontheapplicableprovisions ofthe Condominium Act and the condominium instruments as the sources of that alleged duty of care. Section47-75 (a) providesinrelevantpart: ‘‘Eachunit owner, andthe association ofunit owners, shall comply with this chapter, the condominium instruments, and the rules and regulations adopted pursuant thereto. Failure to so comply shall be ground for an action to
recoverdamages orforinjunctiverelief, orforanyother relief to which the party bringing such action may be entitled. Such action maybe broughtbythe association ofunit owners against any unit owner or owners or, in anyproper case, by one or more aggrieved unit owners on their own behalf or as a class action.

. . .’’ Article 15 ofthe declaration contains very similar language to § 47-75. See footnote 17 of this opinion. Turning to the bylaws, § 4 (b) provides in relevant part: ‘‘The Board ofDirectors shallhave thepowers and duties necessary forthe administration ofthe affairs of the Association and shall do all such acts or things except as by law or by the Declaration or by these Bylaws may not be delegated to the Board ofDirectors by the Unit Owners.

. . . The Board of Directors shall have the power to enforce the obligations of the Unit Owners

. . . and to do anything and everything else necessary andproperforthe sound management ofthe Association.’’31 That section also contains a number of illustrative ‘‘powers and duties’’ of the board. Examining these provisions, none of them defines how the board of directors or association is to execute its power in any enforcement action, or when, if ever, itrightlymaychoosenottoactatall; rather, theymerely provide that the defendants ‘‘shall have the powers’’ to enforce the Condominium Act or the condominium instruments.32 Thus, any duty owed by the association isnotanabsolute dutyto actinall cases.33Furthermore,
we note that these provisions stand in stark contrast tootherprovisionsofthe CondominiumAct,34thedeclaration,35 and the bylaws36 that affirmatively require certain actions be taken or the manner in which those actionsaretobetaken. Finally, none oftheseprovisions establishesanyrequirementthattheassociationredress priorbreaches ofits duty to enforce the Condominium Act or the condominium instruments.
In support of his claim that the defendants had an ongoing responsibility to remedy a past breach of its duties, theplaintiffalsorelies on § 10 (g) ofthebylaws.37 That subsection provides: ‘‘The violation of any rule or regulation adopted by the Association, or the breach of any Bylaw contained herein, or the breach of any provision ofthe Declaration, shall give the Association the right, in addition to any other rights set forth in these Bylaws: ‘‘i. [T]o enter the Unit in which, or as to which, suchviolation or breach exists and to summarily abate and remove, at the expense of the defaulting Unit Owner, any structure, thing, or condition that may existtherein contrary to the interest and meaning of the provisions hereofandtheAssociationshallnotbetherebydeemed guilty of trespass; or ‘‘ii. [T]o enjoin, abate, or remedyby appropriate legal proceedings, either at law or in equity, the continuance ofanysuchbreach.’’ Thisprovision, however, likethose previously discussed, givestheboard ‘‘the right’’ totake action, but does not dictate the manner in which that right is to be exercised or the circumstances under which the board may refrain from acting. The subsection cannotbe readto impose an absolute ongoing duty
on the defendants to remedy any and all breaches of the CondominiumAct or condominiuminstruments, no matterhow minorthe breach orhow distant inthe past the violation occurred.
Evenmore damagingtotheplaintiff’s argument, however, is that the basic nature of the continuing course ofconduct doctrine counsels strongly againstthe plaintiff’s position that whatever duty that the association might have had was ongoing. ‘‘[T]he continuing course of conduct doctrine reflects the policy that, during an ongoing relationship, lawsuits are premature because specific tortious acts or omissions may be difficult to identify and may yet be remedied.’’ (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Flannery v. Singer Asset Finance Co., LLC, supra, 312 Conn. 312. This court has similarly observed that ‘‘[t]he doctrine

. . . is better suited to claims where the situation keeps evolving after the act complained of is complete

. . . rather than one where the situation cannot change

. . . .’’ Sanborn v. Greenwald, 39 Conn. App. 289, 297– 98, 664 A.2d 803 (1995).
We also note our Supreme Court’s statements in the recent case of Watts v. Chittenden, 301 Conn. 575, 22 A.3d 1214 (2011). There, ‘‘examining the use ofthe continuing course ofconduct doctrine, [ourSupreme Court was] mindful of the nature of the doctrine as [then] ChiefJudgeRichardPosneroftheSeventhCircuitCourt of Appeals has explained

. . . [that] [a] violation is called continuing signifying that a plaintiff can reach back to its beginning even ifthat beginning lies outside thestatutorylimitationsperiod,whenitwouldbeunreasonable to require or even permit him to sue separately
over every incident of the defendant’s unlawful conduct. The injuries aboutwhichthe plaintiffis complainingin [these] case[s] aretheconsequenceofanumerous and continuous series of events.

. . . When a single event gives rise to continuing injuries

. . . the plaintiff
can bring a single suit based on an estimation of his total injuries, and that mode of proceeding is much to bepreferredtopiecemeallitigation despitethepossible loss in accuracy. But in [cases in which the continuingcourse of conduct doctrine is applicable, each incident increases the plaintiff’s injury]. Not only would it be unreasonable to require him, as a condition ofpreserving his right to have [the full limitations period] to sue

. . . to bring separate suits [during the limitations period] after each [incident giving rise to the claim]; but it would impose an unreasonable burden on the courts to entertain an indefinite number of suits and apportion damages among them.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fradianni v. Protective Life Ins. Co., 145 Conn. App. 90, 98–99, 73 A.3d 896, cert. denied, 310 Conn. 934, 79 A.3d 888 (2013). Rather, the doctrine applies to cases ‘‘that involv[e] a continuing course of conduct which over a period of years cause[s] injury. Since usually no single incident in a continuous chain oftortiousactivitycanfairlyorrealisticallybeidentified
as the cause of significant harm, it seems proper to regard the cumulative effect of the conduct as actionable.’’ (Internalquotationmarksomitted.) Wattsv. Chittenden, supra, 592, quoting Twyman v. Twyman, 790 S.W.2d 819, 821 (Tex. App. 1990), rev’d on other grounds, 855 S.W.2d 619, 620 (Tex. 1993).38
In the present case, the original wrong, if any, was completed either upon the 1986 purported conveyance of garage 14 separate from the like numbered unit or, at the absolute latest, upon the 1999 transfer ofunit 14 to the plaintiff without garage 14. All of the injuries claimed by the plaintiff arise from either, or both, of those acts or occurrences, and the plaintiffhas pointed to no separate injuries that have arisen as a result of any ongoing failure by the defendants to enforce his alleged rights under the documents. These circumstances do not present the type of case that merits the application of the continuing course of conduct doctrine. Additionally, the plaintiff has not produced any evidence that the defendants have breached any ongoing dutytoenforcethecondominiuminstruments. Inparticular, wenotethat, althoughtheprovisions ofthe Condominium Act and condominium instruments delineate the defendants’ powers to address violations, no evidence or law has been presented by the plaintiff in support of his claims that there are genuine issues of material fact or that summaryjudgment is incorrect as a matter of law, from which we could conclude that the defendants’ failure to do so under the facts of this
case is an abuse of their discretion. No evidence or law has been presented concerning the circumstances under which the choice not to enforce a provision of the condominium instruments constitutes a breach of the association’s duty. Further, we also note that there is evidence that the deed purporting to convey garage 14 separately from unit 14 was executed in 1986 by the developer; see footnotes 23 and 25 ofthis opinion; and
no evidence has been submitted that the garage and unit, ifthey were originally required by the declarationto be conjoined, ever have been conjoined in the
same owner. In summary, the plaintiff has not raised a genuine issue ofmaterial fact in this case that requires orjustifies application of the continuous course of conduct doctrine, and we therefore decline the plaintiff’s invitation to apply it.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 Because we affirm the judgment on the basis that the plaintiff’s claims

are time barred, we do not consider the plaintiff’s arguments that the court improperly determined that other grounds existed for granting the motion forsummaryjudgment as to his claims oftrespass andunfairtradepractices inviolation ofthe ConnecticutUnfairTrade PracticesAct (CUTPA), General Statutes § 42-110a et seq.
2 Although a point of contention in the trial court, we do not need to determine conclusively whether the court properly determined that, pursuant to the terms of the condominium declaration, garages are limited common elements and not separate units. Even ifwe were to conclude that the courtproperly determined that garages are limited common elements under the declaration, the plaintiff cannot prevail on the remaining aspects of his claim that the defendants owed, and continuously breached, any duty they hadasto him. Consequently, we also donotaddresstheplaintiff’sarguments thatcertainactionsbythe defendantsin2009tolledthe statute oflimitations,

astheplaintiffexplicitlypremisesthesearguments onthiscourt’s determination that, contrary to the trial court’s memorandum ofdecision, the garages
are separate units.
3 Pursuant to the warranty deed, the plaintiff received ‘‘all that certain real property

. . . known as 2 Old Town Highway, Unit #14, and Garage #49, East Haven, CT

. . . .’’ On the date of this conveyance, however, Porrello, and not Amendola, was the record owner of garage 49.

4 There is no indication in the record that Amendola or Porrello ever had used or owned garage 14, which, from April 1, 1986, appears to have been owned and used by the owner of unit 19. See footnotes 23 and 25 of this opinion.
5 Indeed, Amendola was not a party to the underlying action, and the court noted in its memorandum of decision granting summary judgment that ‘‘the plaintiff has not alleged any legal relationship or agency between the defendants and Amendola.’’

6 In fact, most ofthe individually named defendants were not unit owners when the plaintiff purchased his unit.

7 Pursuant to General Statutes § 47-68a (d), ‘‘ ‘[c]ondominium instruments’ ’’ include: the declarations, bylaws, survey maps, and plans recorded and filed pursuant to chapter 825 of the General Statutes; any exhibit, schedule, or certification appended to, and recorded or filed with, any declaration, bylaw, surveymap, orplan; and any amendment or certification of a declaration, bylaw, survey map, or plan made in accordance with the Condominium Act.
8 Certain otherfacts informedtheplaintiff’sbeliefthathe had an exclusive righttogarage 14. Garage 14isattachedtothebuildinginwhichtheplaintiff’s unitislocated; howevergarage49 is considerablyfartheraway. Additionally, at least some of the garages do not have separate meters for electricity, but, instead, are metered through the like numbered unit to which they

are attached.
9 In this complaint, the plaintiff asserted the following causes of action against the defendants: violation of General Statutes § 47-75 (count one); breach of fiduciary duty (count two); fraudulent misrepresentation (count three); trespass (count four); CUTPA (count five); negligent infliction of emotional distress (count six); and ‘‘tortuously’’ breaching the implicit covenant of good faith and fair dealing (count seven).
10 Atthetimethatthe defendantsfiledtheirmotionforsummaryjudgment, the defendantswererepresentedjointlybythesamelawfirms. Subsequently,

onAugust31, 2012, counselforthe associationwithdrewrepresentationasto the individually named defendants, and the association and the individually named defendants are represented separately in this appeal.
11 Pursuant to § 47-68a (g), a limited common element within the meaning of the Condominium Act ‘‘means and includes those common elementsdesignated in the declaration as reserved for the use of a certain unit or units to the exclusion of other units.’’ A common element, in turn, is any part of a condominium that is not a unit. General Statutes § 47-68a (e). Subsections (d) and (h) ofthe declaration explicitlyincorporatethese definitions, but then each provide specific examples ofwhat shall be considered

acommon element andlimited common element, respectively, inthe condominium.
12 A ‘‘unit’’ in the Condominium Act is defined by § 47-68a (b) as ‘‘a part of the property including one or more rooms or designated spaces located

on one or more floors or a part or parts thereof in a building, intended for any type of independent use, and with a direct exit to a public street or highway orto common elements leading to such street or highway.’’ In light of our decision, it is not necessary for us to determine ifgarage 14 is a unit

or a limited common element. Article 2 (b) of the declaration defines a unit as ‘‘a part of the property including one or more rooms or enclosed spaces or recessed balconies and recessed decks located on one or more floors or parts thereofin a building intended for the uses as are more particularly defined in Article 9 of this Declaration, and with a direct exit to a common element leading to a public street or highway. It shall comprise one ofthe separate and numbered units which are designated in Schedule C attached hereto and made apart hereof, each of which is more particularly described in the Floor Plans of the building referred to in Article 4 hereof, excluding, however, all spaces and improvements lying beneath the undecorated and/or unfinished inner surfaces of the perimeter walls, trim, and floors, and above the undecorated and/or unfinished inner surfaces of the ceilings, and further excluding all spaces and improvements lying beneath the undecorated and/or unfinished inner surfaces of all interior bearing walls and/or bearing partitions, and partition walls between separate Units and between Units and the Common Elements and Facilities, and further excluding all pipes, ducts, wires, conduits and other facilities running through any interior wall or partition for the furnishing of utility services to other Units or Common Elements. A [U]nit shall include all doors installed within or providing access to a Unit andthe heatingfacilityand allwindowglass installedin anywall orpartition in or adjacent to a Unit.’’
13 Although disposing ofthe entire case by determining that there was not
a genuine issue of material fact and that the defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law with respect to their statutes of limitations defenses, the court also determined that separate grounds existed for granting the motion as to the fraudulent misrepresentation, trespass, CUTPA, and negligent infliction ofemotional distress claims. On appeal, the plaintiff doesnotchallengethecourt’sdecisionastohisfraudulentmisrepresentation and negligent infliction of emotional distress claims.
14 We address a preliminary matter before considering the merits of the plaintiff’s arguments. It is uncontested that the condominium in question

was created prior to January 1, 1984, and, therefore, generally is governed by the terms ofthe Condominium Act and not the Common Interest Ownership Act, General Statutes § 47-200 et seq. (Common Interest Ownership Act). See General Statutes § 47-214. Despite this uncontested fact, certain defined provisions of the Common Interest Ownership Act are applicable to preexisting common interest communities. See General Statutes § 47-216. Because the parties generally have neither raised nor briefed the potential applicability ofthese provisions, however, we will analyze the issues raised primarily pursuant to the applicable provisions of the Condominium Act.

15 General Statutes § 47-75 (a)provides: ‘‘Eachunit owner, andthe association ofunit owners, shall complywiththis chapter, the condominium instruments, and the rules and regulations adopted pursuant thereto. Failure to

so complyshall be groundfor an actionto recover damages orforinjunctive relief, or for any other relief to which the party bringing such action may be entitled. Such action may be brought by the association of unit owners against any unit owner or owners or, in any proper case, by one or more aggrieved unit owners on their own behalf or as a class action. If any such action results in a finaljudgment or decree in favor of the party instituting suchaction, suchjudgmentordecreemayincorporateaprovisionforreasonable attorney’s fees, as specified in suchjudgment or decree, to be paid by the party against whom such judgment or decree is entered.’’

16 To supporthis claimthataclaimbroughtpursuantto § 47-75 is equitable in nature, the plaintiffurges us to take cognizance ofthe ‘‘unique amalgamation ofproperty, contract, and tort law’’ at work in the Condominium Act. Thus, he asserts that an action to enforce the condominium instruments and the Condominium Act is akin to an action to enforce a restrictive covenant, which may be enforced by an injunction, and relies upon both the nature of the relief that he seeks as well as the equivalent provision inthe Common Interest Ownership Act to show that a § 47-75 action is equitable. See General Statutes § 47-278 (a) (‘‘A declarant, association, unit owner
or any other person subject to this chapter may bring an action to enforce

a right granted or obligation imposed by this chapter, the declaration or the bylaws. The court may award reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.’’).

17 The pertinent language ofarticle 15 ofthe declaration essentially incorporates the text of § 47-75 (a) and broadens its application. Article 15 providesinrelevantpart: ‘‘Allpresentandfuture Owners,tenants, andoccupants of Units and the Association of Unit Owners shall be subject to and shall comply with [the CondominiumAct], the provisions ofthis Declaration, and the Bylaws, attached hereto and as they maybe amended from time to time,

as well as to such regulations as may be adopted by the Board of Directors of the Association, pursuant thereto. Failure to so comply shall be ground for an action to recover damages or for injunctive relief or for any other relief to which the party bringing such action may be entitled. Such action may be brought by the Association against any Unit Owner or Owners, or, in any proper case, by one or more aggrieved Unit Owners on their own behalf or as a class action.’’

18 Because of this determination, the plaintiff’s remaining arguments require little attention. We note that the plaintiff’s contention that his action is similar to one to enforce a restrictive covenant would not necessarily exempt his cause of action from being time barred. See General Statutes § 52-575a(‘‘[n]o actionoranyothertype ofcourtproceedingshallbebrought to enforce aprivate restrictionrecordedinthe landrecords ofthe municipality in which the property is located or a notation on a filed map pertaining to the use of privately owned land

. . . unless such action or proceeding shall be commenced within three years ofthe time that the person seeking to enforce suchrestrictionhadactualorconstructive knowledge ofsuchviolation’’).

19 General Statutes § 52-577provides: ‘‘No actionfounded upon atort shall be brought but within three years from the date of the act or omission complained of.’’ ‘‘[T]he three-year limitation of § 52-577 is applicable to all actions founded upon a tort which do not fall within those causes of action carved out of § 52-577 and enumerated in [General Statutes] § 52-584 or another section.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Rubin, 209 Conn. 437, 441, 551 A.2d 1220 (1988). ‘‘The date of the act or omission complained of is the date when the

. . . conduct of the defendant occurs

. . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London v. Cooperman, supra, 289 Conn. 408; see also Farnsworth v. O’Doherty, 85 Conn. App. 145, 150, 856 A.2d 518 (2004) (‘‘[t]he three year limitation period of § 52-577 begins with the date of the act oromission complained of, notthe date whenthe plaintifffirst discovers

an injury’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]).

20 Giventhischaracterization, aswellasthe clearcentralitytotheplaintiff’s claim ofthe provisions in the declaration that forbid the severance ofinterests appurtenant to a unit, we note the failure ofthe parties to consider the potential applicability of General Statutes § 52-575a. See footnote 18 ofthis opinion. Because the parties have limited their arguments to three potential statutes of limitations, however, and have not briefed this issue, we do not consider whether this statute of limitations governs the plaintiff’s claim.

21 General Statutes § 52-575 (a) provides: ‘‘No person shall make entry into any lands or tenements but within fifteen years next after his right or title to the same first descends or accrues or within fifteen years next after such person or persons have been ousted from possession of such land or tenements; and every person, not entering as aforesaid, and his heirs, shall be utterly disabled to make such entry afterwards; and no such entry shall be sufficient, unless within such fifteen-year period, any person or persons claiming ownership of such lands and tenements and the right of entry and possession thereof against any person or persons who are in actual possession ofsuch lands or tenements, gives notice in writing to the person
or persons in possession of the land or tenements of the intention of the person giving the notice to dispute the right ofpossession of the person or persons to whom such notice is given and to prevent the other party or parties from acquiring such right, and the notice being served and recorded

as provided in sections 47-39 and 47-40 shall be deemed an interruption of the use and possession and shall prevent the acquiring of a right thereto by the continuance ofthe use and possession for any length oftime thereafter, provided an action is commenced thereupon within one year next after the recording of such notice. The limitation herein prescribed shall not begin to run against the right ofentry ofany owner ofaremainder or reversionaryinterest in real estate, which is in the adverse possession of another, until the expirationoftheparticularestateprecedingsuchremainderorreversionary estate.’’

22 General Statutes § 52-576 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘No action

. . . on any contract in writing

. . . shall be brought but within six years after the right of action accrues

. . . .’’ ‘‘[I]n an action for breach of contract

. . . the cause ofactionis complete atthe time the breach ofcontract occurs, that is, when the injury has been inflicted.

. . . Although the application of this rule may result in occasional hardship, [i]t is well established that ignorance of the fact that damage has been done does not prevent the running of the statute, except where there is something tantamount to a fraudulent concealment ofa cause ofaction.

. . . While the statute oflimitations normally begins to run immediately upon the accrual of the cause of action, some difficulty may arise in determining when the cause or right of action is considered as having accrued.

. . . The true test for determining the appropriate datewhenastatute oflimitationsbeginstorunisto establish the time when the plaintiff first successfully could have maintained an action. That is, an action cannot be maintained until a right of action is complete and hence, the statute of limitations cannot run before that time.

. . . A cause of action does not accrue for the purposes of a statute of limitationsuntilallelementsarepresent, includingdamages, howevertrivial. However, the occurrence of an act or omission

. . . that causes a direct injury, however slight, may start the statute of limitations running against the right to maintain an action even ifthe plaintiffis not aware ofthe injury, and even if all resulting damages have not yet occurred; it is sufficient if nominal damages are recoverable forthebreach orforthewrong, andwhere that is the case, it is unimportant that the actual or substantial damage is not discovered or does not occur until later. The fact that the extent ofthe damages cannot be determined at the time of the wrongful act does not postpone the running ofthe statute oflimitations.’’ (Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Rosenfield v. I. David Marder&Associates, LLC, 110 Conn. App. 679, 685–86, 956A.2d 581 (2008).

23 In a warranty deed dated April 1, 1986, however, the developer, Shell Beach, Inc., purportedly conveyed garage 14 to the purchaser of unit 19, George J. Lepofsky, trustee. The deed provided that ‘‘Residential Unit No. 19 of Shell Beach Condominium

. . . and Garage Unit Nos. 14 and 15 of Shell Beach Condominium

. . . are conveyed

. . . .’’

24 We reiterate that we do not determine which of these two statutes of limitations—§§ 52-576 (a) or 52-577—definitively applies to count one. 25 Even ifwe were to accept the plaintiff’s invitation and apply the limitations period within § 52-575 to count one of the plaintiff’s complaint, his claim still would be time barred. The developer assigned the interest in garage 14 separately from unit 14 in 1986, when it included garage 14 in the deed conveying unit 19. See footnote 23 of this opinion. No evidence has been presented that, since 1986, garage 14 was ever used or owned by an
owner of unit 14, or that any of the defendants have had a possessory interest in that garage. Further, the deed transferring unit 14 to the plaintiff in 1999 did not make any reference to garage 14. Thus, this action, commenced in 2009, would have occurred twenty-three years after the ‘‘wrong’’ committed in 1986 by the developer, e.g., the definitive act, occurrence, or breach for the purpose ofbeginning the limitations period within §§ 52-575, 52-576, or 52-577.

26 See footnote 13 of this opinion.
27 We note that the plaintiff alleges that the defendants ‘‘tortiously’’ breachedthe covenantofgoodfaithandfairdealingincountseven. Although the court does not have to accept the label that aparty appends to its cause ofaction; see, e.g., Meyers v. Livingston, Adler, Pulda, Meiklejohn & Kelly, P.C., supra, 311 Conn. 290 (‘‘[O]ne cannot bring an action [under both theories, however] merely by couching a claim that one has breached a standard of care in the language of contract.

. . . [T]ort claims cloaked in contractual language are, as amatter oflaw, not breach ofcontract claims.’’ [Internal quotation marks omitted.]); we recognize that ‘‘the same course ofconduct may sound both in tort and in contract

. . . and the court should apply the relevant statute of limitations to each claim.’’ (Citation omitted.) Hill v. Williams, 74 Conn. App. 654, 660, 813 A.2d 130, cert. denied, 263 Conn. 918, 822 A.2d 242 (2003). Nevertheless, even if we were to accept that this count sounds in tort, and not in contract, it would not help the defendant. If § 52-576 is inapplicable, this claim would be governed then by General Statutes §§ 52-577 or 52-584, both of which are subject to a three year repose period.28 During oral argument before this court, the plaintiff referred to the ongoing duty of the defendants as a ‘‘continuing duty of disclosure.’’ The plaintiff did not brief this theory, however, instead asserting that the duty ofthe defendants was to enforce the condominium instruments and remedy any breaches thereof. ‘‘[I]t is well settled that arguments cannot be raised for the first time at oral argument.’’ J.E. Robert Co. v. SignatureProperties, LLC, 309 Conn. 307, 328 n.20, 71 A.3d 492 (2013).

29 For instance, ‘‘in Connecticut, [t]he essentials of an action for trespass

are: (1) ownership orpossessoryinterestinlandbytheplaintiff; (2) invasion, intrusionorentrybythe defendantaffectingtheplaintiff’s exclusivepossessory interest; (3) done intentionally; and (4) causing direct injury.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Boyne v. Glastonbury, 110 Conn. App. 591, 601, 955 A.2d 645, cert. denied, 289 Conn. 947, 959 A.2d 1011 (2008).

30 We note that, although the plaintiff contends that ‘‘Connecticut courts have concluded that condominium associations owe duties to unit owners

. . . [and] [s]everal courts have expressly concluded that condominium instruments create duties owed to unit owners,’’ he does not attempt to define more specifically, in either analysis or through citation to relevant authority, the particular type of duty that he contends exists in this case. (Citations omitted.) Rather, the plaintiff grounds his entire argument as to both the existence and ongoing nature of the defendants’ duty strictly on the applicable statutory authority and provisions of the condominium instruments.
31 An amendment, executed subsequent to the commencement of this action, modifies the language in § 4 (b) (14) ofthe bylaws in ways nonmaterial to this analysis.
32 Indeed, § 47-75 (a) itself suggests that the responsibility to enforce the Condominium Act or the condominium instruments is not exclusively in the associationin all cases, as it explicitlyallows aunit ownerto enforce the condominium instruments and the Condominium Act ‘‘in any proper case.’’

33 In another context, our Supreme Court has opined as to the proper method for appraising a decision by an association: ‘‘When a court is called upon to assess the validity of [an action taken] by a board of directors, it first determines whether the board acted within its scope of authority and, second, whether the [action] reflects reasoned or arbitrary and capricious decision making.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Weldy v. Northbrook CondominiumAssn., Inc., 279 Conn. 728, 734, 904 A.2d 188 (2006). Further, various provisions ofthe Restatement (Third) of Property similarly suggest that the association and the board, although owing duties to unit owners in the exercise oftheir authority, are not required to take action in all cases. See 2 Restatement (Third), Property, Servitudes § 6.13 (1), p. 233 (2000) (‘‘[i]n addition to duties imposed by statute and the governing documents, the association has the following duties to the members of the commoninterest community

. . . to act reasonably in the exercise ofits discretionary powers including

. . . enforcement’’ [emphasis added]); see also id., § 6.14, p. 268 (‘‘[t]he directors and officers of an association have a duty to act in good faith, to act in compliance with the law and the governing documents, to deal fairly with the association and its members, and to use ordinary care and prudence in performing their functions’’). Finally, certain provisions ofthe Common Interest Ownership Act clarify which actions by an association are mandatory and which are discretionary, and support a clear inference that enforcement, on the whole, is generally subject to the association’s and the directors’ discretion. See General Statutes § 47-244 (a); see also Public Acts 2009, No. 09-225, § 20 (clarifications making more explicit which duties are discretionary and which are mandatory in § 47-244 [a], applicable as of date of passage, July 8, 2009). Other provisions provide that the board of directors is not required to take any enforcement action ifit determines that one offour specified circumstances is met; General Statutes § 47-244 (g); and allows the board to choose to take an enforcement action in one case, but not another, as long as the choice is not arbitrary or capricious. General Statutes § 47-244 (h). These latterprovisions, whichwouldgenerallybe applicableto condominiumsthat

were created before 1984; see General Statutes § 47-216 (a); are technically inapplicable in this case, as they became effective after this case had commenced. See Public Acts 2009, No. 09-225, § 21 (added subsections [g] and [h] to § 47-244, effective July 1, 2010). Nevertheless, their existence provides further support for our position, in that they demonstrate legislative affirmance of preexisting common law principles.
34 For instance, General Statutes § 47-84 (a) provides in relevant part that ‘‘damage to or destruction of any building or improvement located on thecondominiumparcel orservingthe condominium shallbepromptlyrepaired and restored by

. . . the association, using the proceeds of insurance, if any, on such building or improvement for that purpose

. . . .’’ See also General Statutes § 47-71 (h) and (i) (requiring associationtorecordspecified information on annual basis).

35 Article 25 (e) of the declaration requires the association to provide its books and records to a first mortgagee when the request is received reasonably in advance of the examination and in writing. Article 26 provides that the association ‘‘shall at all times keep an adequate reserve fund for the replacement ofcommon elements’’ and that the fund be maintained through monthly payments rather than special assessments. Prior to an amendment in 1987 that removed the article from the declaration, article 27 required that the association maintain a separate budget for the operation, care, and upkeep of the swimming pool, tennis court, and community building that would have been built on a separate tract.
36 Section 4 (i) of the bylaws requires that the board must elect certain officers at the annual organization meeting of each new board. Section 5 (d) makes it ‘‘the duty of the Secretary to mail a notice for each annual or special meeting’’ to all unit owners and dictates the timing and contents of such notice. Section 10 (f) requires the association to provide various information to any unit owner that requests it in writing and, depending on the information requested, requires that information be delivered either promptly or within fifteen days of the association’s receipt of the request.
37 An amendment, executed subsequent to the commencement of this action, modifies the language in § 10 (g) (iv) ofthe bylaws in ways nonmaterial to this analysis.
38 Indeed, circumstances falling between these two extremes generally will not merit the application ofthe continuing course of conduct doctrine. See Brusby v. Metropolitan District, 160 Conn. App. 638, 664, 127 A.3d 257 (2015) (‘‘In between the case in which a single event gives rise to continuing injuries and the case in which a continuous series of events gives rise to a cumulative injury is the case in which repeated events give rise to discrete injuries

. . . . [In such a case] the damages from each discrete act

. . . would be readily calculable without waiting for the entire series of acts to end. There would be no excuse for the delay. And so the violation would not be deemed continuing.’’ [Internal quotation marks omitted.])