IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI NO. 2018-CA-00436-COA DEVONTA PIPKIN APPELLANT

v. STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE DATE OF JUDGMENT: 03/14/2018 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. SMITH MURPHEY COURT FROM W HICH APPEALED: TATE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: IMHOTEP ALKEBU-LAN ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: BARBARA W AKELAND BYRD NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - POST-CONVICTION RELIEF DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 10/01/2019 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED: BEFORE J. WILSON, P.J., McDONALD AND McCARTY, JJ. McCARTY, J., FOR THE COURT: ¶1. Devonta Pipkin pleaded g uilty to deliberate-design m urder and was sentenced to lif e in t he custody o f t h e Mississippi Departm e nt of Corrections. He f iled a petition f

or postconviction relief (PCR), which the trial court d enied. Pipkin now a ppeals, a rguing that there

was no f actual basis to s upport his guilty plea and t hat his trial coun s e l was inef f ective. Finding no error, we af

f irm

. STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶2. “W hen reviewing a trial court’s denial or dism issal of a PCR [ petition], we will only disturb the trial court’s f

actual f indings if t hey are clearly erroneous; however, we r eview the trial court’s legal conclusions under a de novo standard of r eview.” Bass v. State , 237 So.3d 172, 173 (¶4) (Miss. Ct. App. 2017). DISCUSSION I. The factual basis supported the guilty plea. ¶3. Pipkin f

irst challenges the f

actual basis f

or his guilty plea. Bef

ore accepting a guilty
p l e a , t h e t rial court m

ust d eterm ine there is a f actual basis supporting the plea. Pegues v
. State , 65 S o. 3 d 3 5 1, 3 58 (¶25) (Miss. Ct. App. 2 011). The trial court m u st also have bef

ore it “ substantial evidence that the accused [ com m itted] the legally def ined of f ense to which he is of f ering the plea.” Burrough v. State , 9 S o. 3d 368, 373 (¶14) (Miss. 2009). Ultim ately , “there m ust be enough that the court m ay say with conf

i dence the prosecution could prove the accused guilty o f the crim e charged

. . . .” Corley v. State , 58 5 S o. 2d 765, 767 (Miss. 1991). ¶4. Pipkin pleaded guilty to d eliberate-design m urder, which is def

ined as the “killing of

a h um a n being without the authority of law

. . . [ w]hen done with deliberate design to ef f ect the death of the person killed, o r of any hum an being

. . . .” Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-19(1)(a) (Supp. 2018). 1 During the p l ea colloquy , the State recited the f acts and circum stances under which Pipkin com m itted the m urder. The State was prepared to prove bey ond a r easonable doubt t hat Pipkin and f our others k illed Em anuel Gom e z while r obbing h im

. Most im p ortantly , Pipkin agreed under oath to the f actual basis recited by the S tate. He was given the opportunity

to disagree with t he f

a ctual basis but did not. Pipkin stated, “I’m sorry f or the way it happened.

. . . I guess I was a t t h e w r o ng place at the wrong tim e. It wasn’t

1 T h e v ersio n o f th e statu te in ef f ect at th e tim e o f t h e crim e d ef in e d d elib erate-d esig n m u rd e r sim ilarly

. 2s u p posed to happen like that is all I got to s a y .” T h e trial court f ound that a f

a c t u a l b a s i s supported Pipkin’s guilty plea. W e agree and f

ind no error. 2
II. Trial counsel w as not ineffective. ¶5. Pipkin next argues t hat his trial c ounsel was inef f e ctive f or f a iling to interview two of his co-def

endants, Nicholas Sledge and Quinn McNeal. Pipkin claim s that both Sledge and McNeal recanted their statem ents t o law enf orcem ent about Pipkin’s involvem ent in Gom ez’s m

urder. Pipkin contends that if his t rial counsel had discovered this f act, then he would not have pleaded guilty

. ¶6. To succeed in a challenge t o the ef f e ctiveness of counsel, Pipkin m ust prove (1) his counsel was def

icient a nd (2) this def

iciency prejudiced him

. Strickland v
. W a shington , 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). In t he con t e x t of his g uilty plea, he “m ust show that there is a reasonable probability that, but f or counsel’s errors, [ he] would n o t h a v e pleaded guilty , would h ave insisted on going to trial, and the outcom e would have been dif f erent.” Hannah

v. State , 943 So. 2d 20, 2 4 (¶7) (Miss. 2006). “[ A ] reasonable probability ari s e s w h e n the inef f ectiveness is of such suf f icient m om ent that the integrity of t he p roceeding or our conf idence in the outcom e has been shaken.” Id

. ¶7. Pipkin attached two docume n t s t o h i s PCR petition. One was an af f idavit Sledge signed stating that Pipkin did not conspire to com m it the arm ed robbery

. The other was an unsigned docum ent purportedly by McNeal also stating that Pipkin was not involved. Pipkin

2 T o th e ex ten t th at P ip k i n arg u es h e d id n o t actu ally sh o o t G o m ez, w e n o te th at an accesso ry b ef

o re th e f act is co n sid ered a p rin cip al an d p r o secu ted as su ch

. S ee M iss. C o d e A n n . § 9 7 -1 -3 (R e v . 2 0 1 4 ); K in g v. S ta te , 4 7 S o . 3 d 6 5 8 , 6 6 3 (¶1 2 ) (M iss. 2 0 1 0 ).

3argues that i f his a ttorney h a d d i s covered this, then Pipkin would not have pleaded guilty

.

But the State had statem ents f rom all f our of Pipkin’s co-def

endants, a ll of whom indicated Pipkin’s involvem ent in the crim e i n v a r y i ng degrees. But all f our, including Sledge and McNeal, agreed that P ipkin was i nvolved in the decision to rob Gom ez. Even if Sledge and McNeal recanted, the two other c o-def endants gave statem ents i ndi c a t ing that Pipkin was involved a n d was carry ing a gun. A nd Pipkin swore under oath that he was guilty of

m urdering Gom ez. ¶8. During his plea h earing, Pipkin insisted that h e was satisf ie d w i t h h i s a t t o r n ey ’s representation. W hen asked by the trial court if he had any c om plaints abo u t h i s a t torney , Pipkin said, “No, s i r.” W e have long held that “ [ s]olem n declarations in open court carry a strong presum

ption of verity .” Mitchener v. State , 964 So. 2d 1188, 1194 ( ¶15) (Miss. Ct. App. 2007). Even if Pipkin’s trial counsel had interviewed these particular co-def endants, Pipkin does not show h o w the outcom e of h i s c a s e would have b een dif f e rent. As such, Pipkin’s claim

that he received inef

f ective assistance of counsel is without m erit. ¶9. AFFIRMED. BARNES, C.J., C ARLTON AND J. WILSON, P.JJ., GREENLEE, WESTBROOKS, TINDELL, McDO N A L D , LAWRENCE AND C. WILSON, JJ., CONCUR.

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