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Filed 10/30/15 P. v. Wilson CA1/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

ROBERT E. WILSON,

Defendant and Appellant.

 A143100

 (Alameda County

 Super. Ct. No. H55575)

Robert E. Wilson appeals from a conviction of assault by means of force likely to 

produce great bodily injury. He contends he received ineffective assistance of counsel 

due to his attorney’s failure to request a jury instruction limiting consideration of 

evidence that the victim was threatened during trial to the issue of credibility. We affirm. 

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Appellant was charged by information filed on March 17, 2014, with one count of 

second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211) and one count of assault by means of force 

likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)). After a jury trial, on August 

11, appellant was found not guilty of robbery and guilty of the charged assault. He was 

sentenced on September 9 to the middle term of three years. 

Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on September 9, 2014. 

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Zakairyyaa Al-Katib, 19 years old at the time of trial, testified that on the 

afternoon of February 6, 2014, his cousin Kiin Wood picked him up from Ohlone College 

in Newark to go to Wood’s grandmother’s house on Frederick Lane in Fremont. Al-
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Katib sat in the front passenger seat, looking at his iPhone. When they arrived, Wood

pulled into a parking spot, then said there was a car pulling up behind them. Two males 

who were strangers to Al-Katib and later identified as appellant and Jonn Johnson got out 

of the other car. Johnson punched Wood’s window while appellant punched Al-Katib’s. 

Johnson pulled Wood out of the car and began to punch and kick him. Al-Katib got out 

of the car, leaving his cell phone in the front seat, and went to join the fight in order to 

help his cousin. Al-Katib was not aware of having problems with anyone at the time, and 

was not aware of Wood having problems with anyone. 

Al-Katib fought with appellant and Wood fought with Johnson about 40 feet 

away. Al-Katib’s fight with appellant lasted about three or four minutes, ending after AlKatib picked appellant up by his legs and slammed him into the ground, falling on top of 

him.1 They both got up and appellant went to Wood’s car, grabbed Al-Katib’s iPhone, 

ran to his car and got into the front passenger seat. There was a person in the driver’s 

seat of the silver car. Al-Katib chased appellant and punched his head. Appellant 

grabbed Al-Katib’s hoodie by the “chest” and the car started moving, increasing to 40 

miles per hour, dragging Al-Katib down the block with his back and legs touching the 

ground. When the car made a right turn, Al-Katib was able to get away by ripping his 

hoodie and slipping free. He landed face-first, splitting his ear. 

Al-Katib walked back toward Wood’s grandmother’s house, wearing only his 

boxers, which were torn. His ear “was completely off, like literally off.” He had road 

rash on his back, arms and leg, bruises all over his leg, and a “huge” headache. He was 

taken to the hospital, where he underwent plastic surgery for his ear and received stitches, 

and was released four or five hours later. Al-Katib testified that his injuries, photographs 

of which were shown to the jury, all resulted from being dragged by the car. 

 

1 Al-Katib testified that he was “five foot six inches tall and weighed about 140” at 

the time of the fight. He estimated that appellant was six foot two inches and weighed 

200 to 220. 
3

That evening, around 8:00 p.m., police officers came to Wood’s grandmother’s 

house. Al-Katib said he would be able to recognize the people involved in the incident. 

While the police were there, Al-Katib saw that appellant had returned to the house with a 

group of other men. The police went after them, then returned and took Al-Katib down 

the block; he was shown two people, one at a time, and identified appellant and Johnson. 

Al-Katib was 100 percent certain that appellant was the person who grabbed and dragged 

him. 

Al-Katib never got his cell phone back. Later in the evening of February 6, the 

police showed him what they thought was his phone, but it was not. He acknowledged 

on cross-examination that he did not see his cell phone in the car where appellant was 

seated, and that he looked for it outside the house the next day. 

Al-Katib also acknowledged that he posted on his Instagram account, “ ‘I mopped 

this nigga back to his car,’ ” “ ‘@gmoney_wett this mark ass nigga from Fremont bruh 

think he hard because my hoodie got stuck in a car and he had my arm and they took off 

in a car so I was getting dragged and cut my ear,’ ” and “ ‘@gmoney_wett, ima hit you a 

clown he just going to take two ass whipping in one day.’ ” Asked what he was saying in 

the third comment, Al-Katib testified, “I told my cousin that I was going to hit him, like 

I’m going to talk to him, that’s what that means. I’m going to hit him up and tell him 

what happened. Because he didn’t know what happened. So I was going to inform him 

of the incident.” The “ ‘two ass whipping in one day’ ” referred to Al-Katib’s cousin 

coming to fight appellant. Al-Katib testified that these comments were made on the day 

of the incident, “out of anger,” and were not real threats about injuring appellant. 

Al-Katib stated at the outset of his testimony that he did not want to testify and did 

so under subpoena. The decision to show up was difficult, and he argued about it with 

his mother, who wanted him to testify. The day before his testimony, as he left court

with two of his cousins and his uncle, appellant’s mother and girlfriend approached them 

and said things including that Al-Katib was a “bitch” and a “snitch,” “ ‘[s]nitches end up 

in a grave,’ ” she “ ‘knew exactly where she could find me’ ” and she “ ‘knew where I 

got my haircut at.’ ” They took pictures of Al-Katib and his family, and of their car. Al-
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Katib returned to the court building and reported the incident. He denied that his uncle 

told appellant’s mother and girlfriend, “ ‘Fuck you, we’re going to merk your bitch ass,’ ” 

but acknowledged that his uncle said appellant’s mother “ ‘should have raised [him] 

correct.’ ” Appellant was not nearby at the time of this encounter. 

Wood testified that he had known appellant for a year or two. Wood, appellant,

and Johnson had been friends, and Wood found it difficult to testify against his former 

friend. Prior to February 6, 2014, problems had developed between Wood and Johnson 

because Wood “was talking” to Johnson’s ex-girlfriend; Johnson would drive by Wood’s 

house every day, throwing “stuff” at the window and doing “stupid stuff.” Al-Katib did 

not know about this, and had not met appellant or Johnson. 

Wood described the same basic sequence of events as Al-Katib, but differed on 

some of the details: Wood testified he did not say anything when he noticed the car 

behind his after he parked, his estimate of the distance between the two simultaneous 

fights was about five to six feet, and he said appellant grabbed Al-Katib’s hoodie “by the 

hood.” He heard appellant say, “[g]et to the car,” and saw appellant run to the car and 

grab Al-Katib’s black iPhone, then get into the other car. Al-Katib ran to the car and 

“threw a punch through the window, and that’s when he got grabbed.” Wood saw a hand 

come out the window and grab Al-Katib’s hoodie; the car drove off with Al-Katib facing 

the opposite way, feet dragging on the ground. He could see Al-Katib struggling to get 

out of his hoodie. When the car disappeared around the corner, Wood got into his own 

car and followed, then saw Al-Katib walking back toward him with “none of his clothes 

on.” He helped Al-Katib go back to the house. Al-Katib’s injuries were worse than his 

own; Wood had a hairline fracture to his nose. 

Wood spoke with a police officer at the hospital and provided appellant’s and 

Johnson’s names and descriptions. Later that evening, the same officer met with Wood 

and Al-Katib at Wood’s grandmother’s house, and still later, Wood was taken to see the 

suspects the police had apprehended. Wood identified Johnson as the person who had 

punched him in the nose and identified appellant as the person he saw drag Al-Katib. 
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Fremont Police Officer Michael Ramsey testified that he met with Wood at the 

hospital about 9:45 on the evening of February 6, 2014, then went to the grandmother’s 

house and met with Al-Katib about 11:00 p.m. While they were talking, Al-Katib 

pointed out two men on the sidewalk and said he thought it was the assailants. Ramsey 

walked toward the two, who turned and started walking away. One of the men ran and 

Ramsey chased him, but it turned out he was not involved in the incident. Meanwhile, 

other officers had stopped three people in a vehicle a short distance away. Ramsey went 

to the location and saw that two of the men matched the description of the suspects. He 

asked their names, and they identified themselves as appellant and Johnson. Wood was 

brought to the scene and identified Johnson as the person he was fighting with and 

appellant as the person fighting with Al-Katib. Al-Katib identified Johnson as the person 

fighting Wood and appellant as the person he was fighting, who stole his cell phone and 

dragged him alongside the car. Appellant and Johnson were arrested and taken to the 

police department. When they were searched, two LG cell phones were found that 

looked very similar to the one Al-Katib had reported missing; Ramsey testified that AlKatib had said he was missing an LG phone. The phones were shown to Al-Katib but he 

said neither was his. When interviewed by the police, appellant repeatedly denied having 

been in a fight. The interview was played for the jury. 

Defense

Appellant testified that on the afternoon of February 6, 2014, he was in a car with 

Johnson and Rakesh Singh, who was driving, heading from “ShopMart” or “ShopRite” to 

appellant’s cousin’s house on Norocco Circle.2 Appellant saw Wood’s car behind them 

with Wood, Al-Katib, “Dell” and a person he did not know inside; he noticed the car 

because on several occasions he had observed occupants of the car yelling swear words 

 

2 Appellant referred to these locations as being in Union City. In fact, they are in 

Newark. The two cities border each other. 
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out the windows at “everyone.” Appellant knew something was about to happen because 

the car honked and tried to cut his car off for about half a block. 

Singh turned into Frederick Lane, a circular “court,” to avoid a collision with 

Wood’s car, and stopped with the motor running. Wood pulled in on the driver’s side of 

Singh’s car and stopped, and Dell and another male got out of the back seat. Appellant 

and Johnson got out of their car and the two from Wood’s car came up to them, swearing. 

Dell swung at appellant. Al-Katib got out of Wood’s car, and Al-Katib, Dell and the 

other person started fighting appellant. Wood got out and started fighting with Johnson. 

Appellant testified that Johnson and Wood had been dating the same girl and were 

jealous of each other; each had driven by the other’s house yelling out the window, and 

Wood was mad because the girl had gotten back with Johnson. 

Appellant thought the fight lasted about five minutes. He was moving around a lot 

because he was fighting three people. Near the end of the fight, while running between 

the two cars, appellant dropped his LG cell phone. He picked up his phone and told AlKatib, who was chasing him, that he would continue to fight if Al-Katib kept trying to 

fight him. Al-Katib did not come up to him, so appellant walked to Singh’s car, which 

Singh had moved in preparation for leaving, and got into the passenger seat. Appellant 

denied taking a cell phone or anything out of Wood’s car. He had a scraped elbow and 

his head was throbbing. 

After appellant got into the car and put his seatbelt on, as he shut the door, AlKatib ran up and hit him in the head. Singh started to drive as Al-Katib was hitting 

appellant. Al-Katib’s arm slid off appellant’s head and Al-Katib grabbed hold of the 

seatbelt, which resulted in Al-Katib being dragged along as the car moved. Appellant 

denied grabbing Al-Katib’s hoodie. Once the car had passed about three houses, AlKatib let go of the seatbelt and “fell off.” Appellant and his companions drove to his 

cousin’s house, just a few minutes away. 

Sometime after dark that evening, appellant and Johnson left his cousin’s house 

with a friend and were pulled over by the police. Twice, appellant was taken out of a 

police car and had a spotlight shone on him. He was taken to the Fremont jail and 
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interviewed, the officer trying to get him to admit having started the fight and taken a cell 

phone. Appellant said he had not been in a fight because he was the victim rather than 

the aggressor, he did not like being around the police station, and he thought if he said 

nothing he would be able to go home. 

Appellant testified on cross-examination that it was a coincidence that the location

Wood’s car followed them to was Wood’s grandmother’s house, saying that the way they 

were driving was the way he went to his cousin’s house. He testified that the others cut 

them off, explaining that they would not have purposefully turned into a cul-de-sac where 

they could be “blocked off” because he knew the others had guns and he would not “put 

his life in danger.” Appellant testified that he had seen “them” wave guns in the air “a 

couple of times,” and that once, “he” pulled a gun on appellant. Asked about getting out 

of the car when he knew the others had guns, appellant said he knew they would not 

shoot him in broad daylight, that “they don’t really shoot guns, they just—they just have 

them.” He acknowledged having given a false name when apprehended for stealing a 

shirt from Macy’s when he was younger, saying he did this because he “had a warrant” 

and did not want to go to jail. 

DISCUSSION

Appellant contends he was denied effective assistance of counsel by his attorney’s 

failure to request a jury instruction limiting the evidence that Al-Katib was threatened 

outside the court to the issue of Al-Katib’s credibility. He maintains that without a 

limiting instruction, the jury was free to conclude that appellant authorized the threat, 

thereby reflecting consciousness of guilt.

“ ‘ “ ‘In order to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must 

first show counsel’s performance was “deficient” because his “representation fell below 

an objective standard of reasonableness . . . under prevailing professional norms.”

[Citations.] Second, he must also show prejudice flowing from counsel’s performance or 

lack thereof. [Citation.] Prejudice is shown when there is a “reasonable probability that, 

but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 

different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in 
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the outcome.” ’ ” [Citation.] [¶] Reviewing courts defer to counsel’s reasonable tactical 

decisions in examining a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel [citation], and there is 

a “strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable 

professional assistance.” [Citation.] Defendant’s burden is difficult to carry on direct 

appeal, as we have observed: “ ‘Reviewing courts will reverse convictions [on direct 

appeal] on the ground of inadequate counsel only if the record on appeal affirmatively 

discloses that counsel had no rational tactical purpose for [his or her] act or omission.’ ” 

[Citation.]’ (People v. Lucas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 415, 436–437.) If the record on appeal 

‘ “ ‘sheds no light on why counsel acted or failed to act in the manner challenged[,] 

. . . unless counsel was asked for an explanation and failed to provide one, or unless there 

simply could be no satisfactory explanation,’ the claim on appeal must be rejected,” ’ and 

the ‘claim of ineffective assistance in such a case is more appropriately decided in a 

habeas corpus proceeding.” (People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 264, 266–267.)” 

(People v. Vines (2011) 51 Cal.4th 830, 875-876.)

As described above, Al-Katib testified that when he left court the day before his 

trial testimony, he and his relatives were approached by appellant’s mother and girlfriend, 

who threatened Al-Katib. The prosecution moved to admit evidence of this incident as 

relevant to Al-Katib’s state of mind and credibility. Appellant argued that if this 

evidence was admitted, there was “substantial evidence” he would have to try to obtain 

indicating that the threats started with Al-Katib and his family. He pointed to statements 

by appellant’s mother, Hershey, that after the court hearing, while outside the court 

smoking a cigarette, she saw Stubbs, whom she believed to be Al-Katib’s father, yelling 

at Perez across the street. After a security guard broke up the altercation, Stubbs, who 

was with Al-Katib, started to yell at Hershey that “ ‘[y]our son is going down’ and that 

‘she should have raised him right.’ ” Hershey made no threats but told Stubbs he did not 

know her or her son and how he was raised. Leaving the parking lot, Al-Katib’s family 

“drove by flipping her . . . and Perez off” and yelling “ ‘Fuck you, we’re gong to merk 

. . . your bitch ass.’ ” It had not yet been determined whether Hershey and Perez were 

going to be charged. 
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Appellant argued that the prosecution’s proposed evidence raised issues under 

Evidence Code section 352 because it would have to be determined which family was 

telling the truth, and witnesses including Hershey, Perez, and Al-Katib’s relatives might 

have to be called. He maintained that if the prosecution was permitted to bring in 

evidence to bolster Al-Katib’s credibility, appellant’s right to a fair trial would be denied 

if he was not able to attack Al-Katib’s credibility by showing that his family threatened 

appellant’s first. 

The court agreed that litigating whether the threats were justified would be 

“getting into a 352 situation” and stated that it was “not precluding anything,” but that the 

evidence was being admitted for the limited purpose of giving the jury a factor to use in 

assessing Al-Katib’s credibility and “where that takes us, we don’t know. We’ll just have 

to see.” 

Appellant does not suggest the threat evidence was inadmissible. “ ‘ “ ‘Evidence a 

witness is afraid to testify is relevant to the credibility of that witness and is therefore 

admissible. [Citations.] Testimony a witness is fearful of retaliation similarly relates to 

that witness’s credibility and is also admissible. [Citation.] It is not necessary to show 

threats against the witness were made by the defendant personally, or the witness’s fear 

of retaliation is directly linked to the defendant for the evidence to be admissible.’ ” ’ 

(People v. Sanchez (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1435, 1449-1450; see People v. Gonzalez

(2006) 38 Cal.4th 932, 946 [‘ “An explanation of the basis for the witness’s fear is 

likewise relevant to her credibility and is well within the discretion of the trial 

court.” ’].)” (People v. Williams (2013) 58 Cal.4th 197, 270.)

The trial court had no sua sponte duty “to give a limiting instruction informing the 

jurors they could consider the evidence of the witnesses’ fear in testifying only in 

assessing credibility. [The California Supreme Court has] consistently held that where, 

as here, a defendant fails to request an instruction, a trial court ‘generally [has] no duty to 

instruct on the limited admissibility of evidence. [Citation.]’ (People v. Lang (1989) 49 

Cal.3d 991, 1020; see Evid. Code, § 355 [‘When evidence is admissible . . . for one 

purpose and is inadmissible . . . for another purpose, the court upon request shall restrict 
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the evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly.’ (Italics added.)].)” 

(People v. Valdez (2012) 55 Cal.4th 82, 139.)

Appellant’s attorney did not request a limiting instruction. Appellant contends he 

received ineffective assistance of counsel because there is no satisfactory explanation for 

his attorney’s failure to request the instruction. We disagree. “[W]hether to seek a 

limiting instruction is a tactical decision properly left to defense counsel” where the risk 

of highlighting the evidence in question may outweigh the benefit of the instruction. 

(People v. Griggs (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1137, 1141.) 

Here, at the outset of his testimony, Al-Katib stated that he was appearing under 

subpoena and did not want to testify, and briefly described the encounter with appellant’s 

mother and girlfriend. On cross-examination, defense counsel elicited Al-Katib’s 

testimony that appellant was not nearby during the exchange with appellant’s mother and 

girlfriend, and that his uncle had told appellant’s mother she should have raised him right, 

although Al-Katib denied that his uncle had used profanity and told appellant’s mother 

her son was “going down.” Defense counsel thus addressed the threat evidence by 

making clear that appellant was not directly involved in the threat incident, and 

suggesting there was mutual animosity between the families. The overall defense 

strategy was to present a version of the fight in which appellant was victim rather than 

aggressor, and to undermine Al-Katib’s version by challenging details of his description 

and pointing to his Instagram comments suggesting he was the aggressor and the 

dragging was accidental. Since the case ultimately came down to whether the jury 

believed Al-Katib and Wood or believed appellant, counsel reasonably could have 

believed his client’s interests would not be served by highlighting at the conclusion of the 

case evidence that served to bolster Al-Katib’s credibility.

Appellant’s reliance upon People v. Hussain (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 261 is 

unavailing. The Hussain court found ineffective assistance of counsel where defense 

counsel in a grand theft prosecution failed to request a jury instruction on claim of 

right—a good faith belief in the right to property taken from another—as negating 

criminal intent. (Id. at pp. 270-272.) In that case, “[c]laim of right was the core of 
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defendant’s defense to the grand theft charge” and was the theory argued by the defense; 

the court concluded “there can be no satisfactory reason not to request an instruction to 

support the core of the defense.” (Id. at pp. 270-271.) Unlike Hussain, where the 

instruction was necessary for the jury’s understanding of the “heart” of the defense, and 

there was no potential downside to it being given, here the limiting instruction addressed 

one factor bearing on witness credibility and could have harmed the defense instead of 

helping it.

In any event, appellant has not established that he was prejudiced by the absence 

of a limiting instruction. The premise of appellant’s ineffective assistance of counsel 

argument is that it “would not be unreasonable” for the jury to infer that appellant’s 

family would not threaten Al-Katib if appellant was innocent or if he had not authorized 

the threats, and therefore to infer that the threats showed appellant’s consciousness of 

guilt. “Not unreasonable,” perhaps, but certainly not an obvious inference. We see no 

basis for the assumption that appellant’s mother and girlfriend, encountering his accuser 

just outside the court on the eve of trial, would express anger and hostility only if 

previously authorized by appellant. 

The threat evidence played a minor role at trial. The testimony concerning the 

event was brief. The prosecutor mentioned it only briefly in closing argument, and only

in the context of an argument focused on Al-Katib’s credibility—precisely the purpose 

for which a limiting instruction would have told the jury it could consider the evidence.3 

 

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The prosecutor began his argument by portraying Al-Katib as an upstanding, 

honest young man with no motive to lie, and appellant as a liar with no respect for the 

court system. As part of this argument, the prosecutor stated, “[Al-Katib] has no reason 

to lie to you in this case, unlike the defendant. No reason. And, actually, every reason 

not to go through what he had to go through yesterday. He can’t go home without being 

followed, called a snitch, told he’s going to die, have pictures taken of him. ‘Snitches get 

stitches.’ ” The prosecutor pointed out that Al-Katib had no prior dispute with appellant, 

then continued, “And he told you all it’s his preference, actually, that he not be here. 

And I’ll address that later. [¶] But I ask you to consider it. Consider it in light of the 

hours of cross-examination he had to go through yesterday, at the preliminary hearing six 

months ago, and the harassment that he suffered for doing the right thing.” 
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The prosecutor made no suggestion that appellant was directly responsible for the threats 

or that they reflected any consciousness of guilt. 

Appellant portrays this as a close case in which “any error posed a high risk of 

prejudicially influencing the jury’s verdict.” He points to the fact that the jury had 

questions about the evidence—it asked to “see the police report for Al-Katib,” asked 

what type of phone the officer testified was reported missing and whether Wood testified 

that he saw appellant with the phone, and asked for a readback of unspecified 

testimony—as indicating skepticism over Al-Katib’s testimony. And the jury’s acquittal 

on the robbery, he argues, shows the jury disbelieved both appellant and Wood as to their 

seeing appellant take the phone. 

In our view, the fact that the jury found appellant not guilty of robbery says little 

about its relative assessment of Al-Katib’s, Wood’s, and appellant’s credibility. The jury 

was required to render a verdict of not guilty unless the prosecution proved the charge 

beyond a reasonable doubt. The missing phone was never found, and there was a 

discrepancy between Al-Katib’s and Wood’s description of it as an iPhone and Ramsey’s 

testimony that the phone reported missing was an LG phone. Appellant testified that at 

the end of the fight, he dropped his phone and picked it up from the ground by the cars 

before getting into Singh’s car, providing an alternative scenario suggesting Al-Katib and 

Wood might have misinterpreted what they thought was appellant taking Al-Katib’s

phone from Wood’s car. In short, the jury might have been left with a reasonable doubt 

on the robbery charge without rejecting Al-Katib’s or Wood’s credibility.

With respect to the fight, the evidence strongly favored Al-Katib’s credibility over 

appellant’s. Aside from the fact that appellant lied to the police repeatedly during the 

interview following his arrest, disclaiming any involvement in a fight, and was shown to 

have lied to police on a prior occasion when apprehended for shoplifting, some of the 

details of his version of the events were simply difficult to accept. As the prosecutor 

pointed out at trial, it was quite a coincidence that, by appellant’s description, he and his 

companions were “followed” by Wood’s car precisely to the cul-de-sac where Wood 

lived with his grandmother. Appellant’s portrayal of Al-Katib as voluntarily holding 
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onto appellant’s seatbelt and allowing himself to be dragged to the point of sustaining 

fairly severe injuries was not particularly plausible. By contrast, while one of Al-Katib’s 

Instagram messages referred to his hoodie getting “stuck in a car”—suggesting an 

accidental occurrence—the same message said, “and he had my arm and they took off in 

a car so I was getting dragged and cut my ear.” While not identical to his trial testimony 

that appellant grabbed and held onto his hoodie, the Instagram message was consistent in 

placing the blame on appellant for holding Al-Katib in the position resulting in his being 

dragged by the car. We see no reasonable probability that appellant would have achieved 

a more favorable result at trial if the jury had been instructed that it could consider the 

threat evidence only for its bearing on Al-Katib’s credibility. 

DISPOSITION 

The judgment is affirmed. 

_________________________

Kline, P.J.

We concur:

_________________________

Richman, J.

_________________________

Stewart, J.