NO. PD-1379-14

IN THE TEXAS COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

AUSTIN, TEXAS

SAMUEL AGUILAR

Petitioner,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS

STATE’S REPLY TO PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW

STEVEN E. REIS

State Bar No. 16757960

Email: steven.reis@matagorda.tx.us

Matagorda County Courthouse

1700 7 Street, Suite 325 th

Bay City, Texas 77414

Telephone: (979) 244-7657

Telecopier: (979) 245-9409

ROBINSON C. RAMSEY

State Bar No. 16523700

Email: rramsey@langleybanack.com

LANGLEY & BANACK, INC.

Trinity Plaza II, Suite 900

745 E. Mulberry

San Antonio, Texas 78212

Telephone: (210) 736-6600

Telecopier: (210) 735-6889

ATTORNEYS FOR THE STATE OF TEXAS

______________________________________________

PD-1379-14

COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

AUSTIN, TEXAS

Transmitted 12/22/2014 2:38:00 PM

Accepted 12/29/2014 2:17:36 PM

ABEL ACOSTA

CLERK
i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv

STATEMENT OF THE CASE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v

QUESTION ONE .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . viii

Whether the trial court was within its discretion to

admit testimony about Aguilar’s assaulting his

girlfriend during an argument about her sexual

involvement with the victim.

QUESTION TWO. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . viii

Whether the trial court was within its discretion to

admit into evidence photographs describing the

nature of Aguilar’s physical assault on his girlfriend

during his argument with her about her sexual

involvement with the victim.

QUESTION THREE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . viii

Whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most

favorable to the verdict, is legally sufficient to support

Aguilar’s conviction because that evidence confirms

that a rational jury could have found him guilty of the

offense charged.
ii

ARGUMENT.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

I. The judge rightfully admitted testimony of Aguilar’s

assaulting his ex-girlfriend while arguing about her sexual

relations with the victim... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

II. The trial court rightfully admitted photographs of Aguilar’s

assault on his girlfriend, whom he accused of having had sex

with the victim... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

III. The evidence is legally sufficient to support Aguilar’s

conviction... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

PRAYER. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
iii

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

CASES:

Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) . . . . . . . . . . . . 5, 6

Butler v. State, 872 S.W.2d 227 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Heidelberg v. State, 144 S.W.3d 535 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). . . . . . . . . . . 3

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5, 6, 8

Laster v. State, 275 S.W.3d 512 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). . . . . . . . . 1-3

Shuffield v. State, 189 S.W.3d 782 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). . . . . . . . . . . 4, 5

Wilson v. State, 71 S.W.3d 346 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

STATUTES:

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.04 (Vernon 1979) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

RULES:

TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

TEX. R. EVID. 103. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

TEX. R. EVID. 401. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

TEX. R. EVID. 403. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 5

TEX. R. EVID. 404. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1, 2
iv

TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXAS:

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT

The State does not believe that oral argument would materially assist

this Court in reaching its decision. Therefore, the State does not request oral

argument,

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This is a felony case in which a jury found Appellant Samuel Aguilar

guilty of murder and assessed his punishment at life in prison. 6 RR 35–36,

144.
v

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

QUESTION ONE

(Extraneous Offense)

Whether the trial court was within its discretion to admit

testimony about Aguilar’s assaulting his girlfriend during an

argument about her sexual involvement with the victim.

QUESTION TWO

(Photographs)

Whether the trial court was within its discretion to admit into

evidence photographs describing the nature of Aguilar’s physical

assault on his girlfriend during his argument with her about her

sexual involvement with the victim.

QUESTION THREE

(Evidentiary Sufficiency)

Whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to

the verdict, is legally sufficient to support Aguilar’s conviction

because that evidence confirms that a rational jury could have

found him guilty of the offense charged.
ARGUMENT

I. The judge rightfully admitted testimony of Aguilar’s

assaulting his ex-girlfriend while arguing about her sexual

relations with the victim.

“When a party attempts to adduce evidence of ‘other crimes, wrongs or

acts,’in order to preserve error on appeal, the opponent of that evidence must

object in a timely fashion.” Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 387 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1990). Aguilar’s failure to do so waived any alleged error in the

admission of this testimony. See Butler v. State, 872 S.W.2d 227, 237 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1994) (“A reasonably specific and timely objection is necessary to

preserve error for appellate review.”).

Regardless, this testimony was relevant to demonstrate Aguilar’s state

of mind as well as his motive for murdering the victim because it showed that

he was angry over the prospect of his girlfriend’s having had sexual relations

with Sutton. See Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 382. Furthermore, this

argument took place only a shorttime before Sutton was found murdered, and

Aguilar (finally) admitted that he had been in Sutton’s house on the day of the

murder and had seen Sutton’s corpse there. 

Evidence of “other crimes, wrongs, or acts” is admissible if it has

relevance “apart from its tendency ‘to prove the character of a person in order

to show that he acted in conformity therewith.’” Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at

387 (citing TEX. R. EVID. 404(b)). Therefore, the prosecution “may introduce
2

such evidence where it logically serves to make ... more probable or less

probable an elemental fact; where it serves to make ... more probable or less

probable an evidentiary fact that inferentially leads to an elemental fact; or

where it serves to make ... more probable or less probable defensive evidence

that undermines an elemental fact.” Id.

Prime examples of permissible purposes to which extraneous evidence

of crimes, wrongs, or acts may be put include “proof of motive, opportunity,

intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or

accident.” Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 387 (citing TEX. R. EVID. 404(b)).

“Extraneous offense evidence that logically serves any of these purposes is

relevant beyond its tendency to prove the character of a person to show that

he acted in conformity therewith. It is therefore admissible, subject only to the

trial court’s discretion nevertheless to exclude it if its probative value is

substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice....” Montgomery,

810 S.W.2d at 387 (citing TEX. R. EVID. 403).

Rule 403's provision that evidence “may” be excluded if its probative

value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, “simply

means that trial courts should favor admission in close cases, in keeping with

the presumption of admissibility of relevant evidence.” Montgomery, 810

S.W.2d at 389. After conducting the probative-versus-prejudical balancing
3

test, the trial court “must be given wide latitude to exclude, or, particularly in

view of the presumption of admissibility of relevant evidence, not to exclude

misconduct evidence as he sees fit.” Id. at 390.In this regard, “[s]o long as the

trial court thus operates within the boundaries of its discretion, an appellate

court should not disturb its decision, whatever it may be.” Id.

In applying this abuse-of-discretion standard, “an appellate court should

not reverse a trial judge whose ruling was within the zone of reasonable

disagreement.” Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 391. Here, the trial judge was well

within that zone in determining that the extraneous-offense evidence was

relevant to issues such as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,

knowledge, identity, or absence of credibility. Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at

387. Therefore, the trial judge’s discretionary decision is not subject to being

second-guessed on appeal.

II. The trial court was within its discretion to admit photographs

of Aguilar’s assault on his girlfriend, whom he accused of

having sex with the victim.

Aguilar has waived his complaint about the admission of the

photographs of the physical injuries he inflicted on his ex-girlfriend because

his objection at trial (that the photographs depicted an unadjudicated offense)

does not match his complaint on appeal (that the photographs were unfairly

prejudicial). Heidelberg v. State, 144 S.W.3d 535, 537 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004)
4

(citing TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A) and TEX. R. EVID. 103(a)(1)) (“[I]t is well

settled that the legal basis of a complaint raised on appeal cannot vary from

that raised at trial.”); Wilson v. State, 71 S.W.3d 346, 349 (Tex. Crim. App.

2002) (holding that to preserve a complaint for appellate review “the point of

error on appeal must comport with the objection made at trial”).

Regardless, the photographs were not unfairly prejudicial, but instead

were relevant to demonstrate the nature of the injuries Aguilar inflicted, which

in turn was relevant to show his state of mind and motive for murdering the

victim. TEX. R. EVID. 401.

Aguilar complains thatthe photographs were notnecessary because the

jury had already heard testimony describing the injuries. But “[t]he fact that

the jury had also heard testimony regarding the injuries depicted does not

necessarily reduce the relevance of the visual depiction.” Shuffield v. State,

189 S.W.3d 782, 787 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Texas Rule of Evidence 401

defines relevant evidence as “evidence having any tendency to make the

existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action

more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Id. at

786–87 (citing TEX. R. EVID. 401). It is self-evident that seeing what

something looks like is more informative that hearing what it looks like.

Therefore, the trial court was within its discretion in admitting the
5

photographs, which provided a more accurate description of the injuries that

Aguilar had inflicted. See Shuffield, 189 S.W.3d at 386 ( “The admissibility

of a photograph is within the sound discretion of the trial judge.”).

Rule 403 “allows for the exclusion of otherwise relevant evidence when

its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair

prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations

of undue delay, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” TEX. R.

EVID. 403. However, this rule “favors the admission of relevant evidence and

carries a presumption that relevant evidence will be more probative than

prejudicial.” Shuffield, 189 S.W.3d at 787.

III. The evidence is legally sufficient to support Aguilar’s

conviction.

In a legal-sufficiency review, courts examine the evidence in the light

most favorable to the verdict to determine whether “any rational fact finder

could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443

U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (emphasis in original); see also Brooks v. State, 323

S.W.3d 893, 895 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (“[T]he Jackson v. Virginia

legal-sufficiency standard is the only standard that a reviewing court should

apply in determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support each

element of a criminal offense that the State is required to prove beyond a
6

reasonable doubt.”).

The Jackson legal-sufficiency standard requires reviewing courts to

resolve any evidentiary inconsistencies in favor of the judgment, keeping in

mind that the factfinder is the exclusive judge of the facts, the credibility of the

witnesses, and the weight to give their testimony. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.

art. 38.04 (Vernon 1979) (“The jury, in all cases, is the exclusive judge of the

facts proved, and of the weight to be given to the testimony ...”); Brooks, 323

S.W.3d at 899 (“Viewing the evidence ‘in the light most favorable to the

verdict’ under a legal-sufficiency standard means that the reviewing court is

required to defer to the jury’s credibility and weight determinations because

the jury is the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility and the weight to be

given their testimony.”). Aguilar’s highlighting the testimony he likes while

glossing over the evidence that goes againsthim contravenes these principles.

Some of the evidence he did not like included the following facts, which

connected him to the crime:

• He threatened that “before I go to court, before I go down,

somebody’s going down with me” and that he “was going to

do something bad before he went into prison” and that it

would be so shocking that it would make front-page news.

5 RR 21–23, 45, 51–52, 57–60. 5 RR 21–23.

• He knew Sutton and was at Sutton’s house frequently. 3 RR

142, 145.
7

• The bloodstains on Aguilar’s T-shirt, shoe, baseball cap, and

bike matched Sutton’s blood. 3 RR 239–40, 249–50,

259–60; 4 RR 46, 143, 146, 176, 205–06, 207–08, 229–31,

239–43.

• His bike and T-shirt were found at the house of his brother

Benny, who lived “within spitting distance” of Sutton. 3 RR

239–40, 249–50; 4 RR 46, 143, 146.

• A bloodstain on his brother Benny’s front door matched

Sutton’s blood. 3 RR 239.

• Aguilar initially lied about having been at Sutton’s house on

the day of the murder, and did not admit this until he had

been confronted with incriminating evidence. 3 RR 262,

264.

• Upon being confronted with this incriminating evidence,

Aguilar altered his story “every step of the way” in an

attempt to conform with each new evidentiary increment,

and continued to make changes in his story to dovetail with

each additional bit of information the investigating offers

fed him. 4 RR 102, 114.

• His story about having tripped over Sutton’s body in the

dark was suspect because one of the window blinds was

open and there was a streetlight right outside. 4 RR 10–11,

13.

• After allegedly discovering Sutton’s body, Aguilar fled the

house and did not tell anyone about what he had found. 4

RR 10–11.

• Aguilar claimed that the only part of the house he had been

in was the livingroom area, but there was blood all over

other parts of the house, including bloody footprints that

matched the size and configuration of his shoes. 4 RR 15–16
8

• He had no explanation for how the blood had gotten on his

baseball cap. 4 RR 8.

• He claimed that the blood on his shirt came from having

wiped his hands after touching Sutton to try to get him to

respond, but the blood on Aguilar’s shirt was in spatters, not

smears. 4 RR 59.

• The configuration and position of the blood on Aguilar’s

shirt was not consistent with his story, but was consistent

with his having struck Sutton and cast off blood onto the

back of the shirt from the object he used to beat Sutton. 4

RR 61.

• About a week before Sutton’s murder Aguilar had accused

his girlfriend of having had oral sex with Sutton for money

and had become angry and physically violent with her. 4 RR

178, 182, 184–85.

A legal-sufficiency analysis requires courts to view all of the evidence in

the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether a rational trier of

fact could have found all of the essential elements of the crime beyond a

reasonable doubt. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Laster v. State, 275 S.W.3d 512,

517 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). Aguilar tries to rearrange this standard to view

the evidence in a manner he deems most favorable to himself rather than the

verdict by downplaying—or in some cases, outright ignoring—the evidence

against him. But under the legal-sufficiency standard, appellate courts do not

re-evaluate the weight and credibility of the evidence; they only ensure that

the jury reached a rational decision. See Laster, 275 S.W.3d at 517 (“During
9

such a review, an appellate court must not usurp the role of the factfinder.

Appellate courts are ill-equipped to weigh the evidence.”). Therefore, as long

as the jury rationally arrived at its verdict, as it did here, there can be no

reversal for alleged legal insufficiency. Id.

PRAYER

For these reasons, the State asks this Court to deny the petition for

discretionary review.

Respectfully submitted,

STEVEN E. REIS

State Bar No. 16757960

Email: steven.reis@matagorda.tx.us

Matagorda County Courthouse

1700 7 Street, Room 325 th

Bay City, Texas 77414

Telephone: (979) 244-7657

Telecopier: (979) 245-9409

/s/RobinsonC. Ramsey

ROBINSON C. RAMSEY

State Bar No. 16523700

Trinity Plaza II, Suite 900

745 E. Mulberry

San Antonio, Texas 78212

Telephone: (210) 736-6600

Telecopier: (210) 735-6889

ATTORNEYS FOR THE STATE OF TEXAS
10

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

In compliance with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4(i)(3), the

State certifies that the number of words in the State’s Reply to Petition for

Discretionary Review, including its headings, footnotes, and quotations, is:

1942.

/s/Robinson C. Ramsey

ROBINSON C. RAMSEY

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

A true and correct copy of the foregoing document was deposited in an

official depository of the United States Postal Service, properly addressed to:

 

Samuel Aguilar

Coffield Unit - TDC #1631736

2661 FM 2054

Tennessee Colony, Texas 75884

Lisa McMinn

State Prosecuting Attorney

Email: information@spa.texas.gov

P.O. Box 13046

Austin, Texas 78711–3046

on 22 December 2014

/s/Robinson C. Ramsey

ROBINSON C. RAMSEY

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