alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
I 

111TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 5615 

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to repeal the medical device 

tax, and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JUNE 28, 2010 

Mr. BILBRAY introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Ways and Means, and in addition to the Committee on Appropriations, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in 

each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned 

A BILL 

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to repeal 

the medical device tax, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. REPEAL OF MEDICAL DEVICE TAX. 

4 Section 1405 of the Health Care and Education Rec5 onciliation Act of 2010, and the amendments made by 

6 such section, are hereby repealed, and the Internal Rev7 enue Code of 1986 shall be applied and administered as 

8 if such section and amendments had never been enacted. 


srobinson on DSKHWCL6B1PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 5615 IH

1 SEC. 2. REVENUE OFFSET. 

2 Effective on the date of the enactment of this Act, 

3 the unobligated balance of the discretionary appropria4 tions made available by division A of the American Recov5 ery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Public Law 111–5) 

6 is hereby rescinded. 

Æ 


srobinson on DSKHWCL6B1PROD with BILLS
#### Joseph G. LANE v. MAINE CENTRAL RAILROAD.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Argued March 19, 1990.

Decided April 17, 1990.

James M. Bowie (orally), Thompson & Bowie, Portland, for plaintiff.

Glen L. Porter and William B. Devoe (orally), Eaton, Peabody, Bradford & Veag-ue, P.A., Bangor, for defendant.

Before ROBERTS, GLASSMAN, CLIFFORD, HORNBY and COLLINS, JJ.

ROBERTS, Justice.

Once again we address the propriety of the summary disposition of civil litigation on a “motion to confirm settlement.” The Superior Court, (Kennebec County, *Brody, C.J.)*granted the motion of defendant Maine Central Railroad on the grounds that settlement was agreed upon between counsel and that it is important that one lawyer be able to accept another lawyer’s representation. Although such considerations might support the imposition of sanctions, we conclude that they are insufficient to justify the use of a summary procedure to discharge plaintiff Joseph G. Lane’s claim and, accordingly, we vacate the judgment.

As we stated in *Phillips v. Fuller,*524 A.2d 1221, 1222 (Me.1987) (Ph*illips I),*“My allowing the case to be passed over without requiring any formal action to effectuate the settlement, defense counsel exposed his client and the court to the uncertainties inherent in an executory accord.” The circumstances that a jury had been selected for a trial to commence the following week does not alter the exec-utory nature of counsel’s agreement. We have previously stated, albeit in carefully considered dicta, that such an agreement could be enforced by a separate civil action or by a permissive counterclaim in a pending action. *Phillips v. Fuller,*541 A.2d 629 n. 1 (Me.1988) *(Phillips II).*We now hold not only that there are unresolved issues of fact in the case before us, but that the summary procedure utilized by the defendant is not the appropriate means of resolving the dispute.

In *Perkins v. Philbrick,*443 A.2d 73 (Me.1982), we stated, “we find a long established principle in Maine and many other *1085jurisdictions that ‘an attorney clothed with no other authority than that arising from his employment in that capacity has no power to compromise and settle or release and discharge his client’s claim.’ ” *Id.*at 74 (quoting *Pomeroy v. Prescott,*106 Me. 401, 407, 76 A. 898 (1910)). The record presented by the summary proceeding in the case before us reveals no evidence that Lane authorized his attorney to compromise his claim. In fact, at the motion hearing, Lane appeared pro se and, in an un-sworn statement to the court, denied that he authorized the settlement. By permitting the railroad to proceed on a separate action or a permissive counterclaim, we compel the railroad to bear the burden of proving that Lane’s attorney acted within his authority.

The entry is: Judgment vacated.

Remanded for entry of an order dismissing defendant’s motion with leave to proceed by way of a counterclaim or separate action.

All concurring.
WARNING: THE EDGAR SYSTEM ENCOUNTERED ERROR(S) WHILE PROCESSING THIS SCHEDULE.

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<MULTIPLIER>            1
       
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[TEXT]
Local Rule 47.5 provides: “The publication of opinions that

have no precedential value and merely decide particular cases on

the basis of well-settled principles of law imposes needless

expense on the public and burdens on the legal profession.”

Pursuant to that Rule, the Court has determined that this opinion

should not be published.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

__________________

Nos. 95-20133

95-20135

(consolidated)

__________________

IN THE MATTER OF: CENTRIZ OF

NORTH AMERICA, INC.,

Debtor,

JUAN E. JOCHAMOWITZ and

LUIS BLOMBERG,

Appellants,

versus

CARLOS E. MENDEZ-PENATE and

HOLLAND & KNIGHT,

Appellees.

__________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Texas

(CA-L-95-001)

__________________________________________

December 12, 1995

Before GARWOOD, SMITH and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.*

PER CURIAM:

We decline to reexamine our June 15, 1995 order dismissing the

appeal of Centriz of North America. It is essentially undisputed
2

that the bankruptcy court did not disqualify attorney Besing as

counsel for appellants Juan E. Jochamowitz and Luis Blomberg;

therefore, the district court erred in holding that they did not

give timely notice of appeal from the bankruptcy court’s judgment

and in dismissing their appeals for that reason. Accordingly, the

judgment of the district court dismissing, for want of timely

notice of appeal, the appeals of Jochamowitz and Blomberg is

reversed and the cause as to Jochamowitz and Blomberg is remanded

to the district court for further proceedings consistent herein.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>      5
<LEGEND>
The schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the
consolidated financial statements and is qualified in its entirety by reference
to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER>1


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<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                       JUN-30-1999
<PERIOD-START>                          JUN-30-1998
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<CASH>                                       17,700
<SECURITIES>                                      0
<RECEIVABLES>                               195,400
<ALLOWANCES>                                      0
<INVENTORY>                                       0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            273,800
<PP&E>                                    1,480,600
<DEPRECIATION>                              713,100
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                            1,286,200
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                     1,093,100
<BONDS>                                           0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                             0
<PREFERRED>                                  75,200
<COMMON>                                          0
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<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>              1,286,200
<SALES>                                   1,430,000
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                          1,430,000
<CGS>                                     1,259,500
<TOTAL-COSTS>                             1,615,400
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                  0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                  0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                           80,600
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (230,900)
<INCOME-TAX>                                  2,250
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                        (233,100)
<DISCONTINUED>                                    0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                   0
<CHANGES>                                         0
<NET-INCOME>                               (233,100)
<EPS-BASIC>                                       0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0



</TABLE>
```

[Congressional Bills 111th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 5665 Introduced in House (IH)]

111th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 5665

To prohibit the withdrawal of certain public lands and National Forest 
System lands in Arizona from location and entry under the Mining Law of 
                     1872, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                              July 1, 2010

   Mr. Franks of Arizona (for himself, Mr. Campbell, Mr. Lucas, Mr. 
Gohmert, Mr. Shadegg, Mr. Gingrey of Georgia, Mr. Pitts, Mrs. Schmidt, 
Mr. Fleming, Mr. Latta, Mr. Smith of Texas, Mr. Tiahrt, Mrs. Bachmann, 
Mr. Daniel E. Lungren of California, Mr. Brady of Texas, Mr. Akin, Mr. 
 Lamborn, Mr. Posey, Mr. King of Iowa, Mr. Boren, Mr. Bishop of Utah, 
Mr. Schock, Mr. Flake, Mrs. Lummis, Mrs. McMorris Rodgers, Mr. Conaway, 
Mr. Calvert, Mr. Herger, Mr. Hastings of Washington, Mr. Chaffetz, and 
 Mr. Simpson) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                     Committee on Natural Resources

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To prohibit the withdrawal of certain public lands and National Forest 
System lands in Arizona from location and entry under the Mining Law of 
                     1872, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. PROHIBITION ON WITHDRAWAL OF CERTAIN PUBLIC LANDS AND 
              NATIONAL FOREST SYSTEM LANDS IN ARIZONA.

    The Secretary of the Interior may not withdraw public lands or 
National Forest System lands from location and entry under the Mining 
Law of 1872 (30 U.S.C. 22 et seq.) pursuant to the notice published by 
the Secretary on July 21, 2009 (74 Fed. Reg. 35887). The lands 
described in that notice shall not be segregated from location and 
entry under the 1872 Mining Law as described in such notice, and such 
notice shall have no other force or effect.
                                 <all>
```
#### DIETRICH H. WIECHERS, Appellant, v. SHERIFF, WASHOE COUNTY, NEVADA, Respondent.

No. 8541

December 24, 1975

543 P.2d 1347

*Michael R. Specchio,*Reno, for Appellant.

*Robert List,*Attorney General, Carson City; *Larry R. Hicks,*District Attorney, and *Mills B. Lane,*Deputy, Washoe County, for Respondent.

*801OPINION

*Per Curiam:*

At the conclusion of a preliminary examination Dietrich H. Wiechers was ordered to stand trial on a six count information charging him with receiving and possessing stolen property, felonies under NRS 205.275. Wiechers then sought and was denied habeas; and, in this appeal he contends we are compelled to reverse because the state failed to produce sufficient evidence to establish probable cause that he committed the charged offenses. We agree.

The only incriminating evidence was that given by Alan Charleston, who had a felony record as a juvenile, and William Panos, an outpatient at the state mental hospital. The thrust of their testimony was (1) they would steal Volkswagen automobiles; (2) they would then remove the engines from the vehicles; and, (3) they would sell some of the stolen engines to Wiechers, who would, apparently, rebuild the engines and sell them for a profit. Both Charleston and Panos testified that at no time did they tell Wiechers that the engines were stolen.

The record shows the testimony of Charleston and Panos was given in exchange for the prosecutor’s agreement, *inter alia,*to afford them partial immunity and other special considerations.

This record is barren of any inference or suggestion that Wiechers was implicated in any manner in — or with — the Volkswagen theft ring; and, in fact, it affirmatively shows that *802he had no knowledge that the engines had been stolen.1 See Staab v. State, 90 Nev. 347, 526 P.2d 338 (1974). Furthermore, Wiechers paid for the stolen engines in the ordinary course of business with his “regular” business checks. This conduct alone appears to us to be inconsistent with the state’s argument that Wiechers knew of and participated in the charged criminal activity.

Accordingly, we conclude the state did not meet its burden of showing probable cause, as required by NRS 171.206. We reverse and remand this case to the district court with instructions to grant the petition for the writ of habeas corpus.

1

ased on statements by Charleston and Panos a search warrant issued and the authorities found that 3 of the 175 or more Volkswagen engines in Wiechers’ inventory came from cars that had been reported stolen. In the factual context of this case we deem this evidence insufficient to show that Wiechers had knowledge that he had bought stolen merchandise.
##### 



Exhibit 32.1

STATEMENT

Pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. 1350, the undersigned
officer of Mercury Air Group, Inc. (the Company)
hereby certifies that to the knowledge of the undersigned:



| |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
| | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| | (1) The Companys Quarterly Report on
    Form 10-Q for the quarter ended December 31, 2004
    fully complies with the requirements of sections 13(a) or 15(d),
    as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and
|
| | (2) The information contained in the Report
    fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial
    condition and results of operations of the Company.                                                               



| |                                     
| | ------------------------------------
| | /s/ JOSEPH CZYZYK                   
| |                                     
| | Joseph Czyzyk                       
| | Chief Executive Officer and Director

February 14, 2004
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Marilyn Kelly,

 Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Elizabeth A. Weaver

Maura D. Corrigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.

Stephen J. Markman

Diane M. Hathaway, Justices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

 _________________________________________ 

 Clerk

January 9, 2009 

1215 

Order 

 

January 9, 2009 

137515 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v SC: 137515 

 COA: 286715 

Oakland CC: 05-204178-FH 

RONALD WILLIAM ATKINSON, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/ 

 On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the August 25, 2008 

order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not 

persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court. 

 HATHAWAY, J., not participating.
**Exhibit 32.1**

 

**Written Statement of the Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer**

**Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350**

 

Solely for the purposes of complying with 18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, we, the undersigned Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of Alliant Energy Corporation (the “Company”), hereby certify, based on our knowledge, that the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the quarter ended March 31, 2009 (the “Report”) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 

/s/ William D. Harvey

William D. Harvey

Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer

 

/s/ Patricia L. Kampling

Patricia L. Kampling

Vice President-Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer

 

May 4, 2009
Exhibit 10.46



GROCERS CAPITAL COMPANY PROMISSORY NOTE



|$80,000.00 |  | Commerce, California |  | December 06, 2000
|---------- |  | -------------------- |  | -----------------



Daniel J. Murphy and Debra A. Murphy,
as Co-borrowers, promise to pay in lawful money of the United States of America, to the order of the GROCERS CAPITAL COMPANY (GCC) at its office located at 5200 Sheila Street, Commerce, California 90040, the principal sum of eighty
thousand and 00/100 ($80,000.00) with interest thereon from December 06, 2000 at the rate of seven percent (7.00%) per annum. Co-borrowers shall pay quarterly interest payments due the 25thof the last month of each calendar quarter. The whole sum of principal then unpaid, together with accrued interest thereon, is due and payable at the option
of the holder of this note.



The advance represented by this
Note has been made to facilitate the Co-borrowers relocation. This Note is not, however, and should not be construed as an employment contract between the Borrower and Unified Western Grocers, Inc. If the Borrower shall resign or be terminated
for cause from employment at Unified Western Grocers, this Note shall be due and payable sixty (60) days after such resignation or termination.



Should default be made in payment of interest, and the undersigned fail to cure such default within twenty (20) days after written notice of such default,
then the whole sum of principal and interest shall, at the option of the holder of this note, become immediately due and payable in lawful money of the United States.



Each maker will be jointly and severally liable and consents to renewals, replacements, and extensions of time for payment
hereof before, at or after maturity, and waives presentment, demand and protest and the right to assert any statute of limitations. A married person who signs this note agrees that recourse may be had against his/her separate property for any
obligation contained herein. If any action be instituted on this note, the undersigned promise(s) to pay such sum as the Court may fix as attorneys fees.



|                        |  | 
|----------------------- |  | 
|/s/    DANIEL J. MURPHY |  | 
|                        |  | 
|Daniel J. Murphy        |  |
NUMBER 13-23-00165-CV

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG 

____________________________________________________________

ALMA MARICELA CAVAZOS 

RAMIREZ, Appellant,

 v.

HOLLYWOOD DEVELOPMENT AND 

CONSTRUCTION, LLC, Appellee. 

____________________________________________________________

On appeal from the County Court at Law No. 7

of Hidalgo County, Texas.

____________________________________________________________

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Tijerina, Silva, and Peña 

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Peña 

On April 24, 2023, appellant filed a notice of appeal. On May 1, 2023, the Clerk of 

the Court notified appellant that her notice of appeal was not in compliance with the Texas 

Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.5(e) and (e)(2). See TEX. R. APP. P. 9.5(e), (e)(2).
2

Appellant was asked to remit the $205.00 filing fee within ten days from the date of the 

notice. 

Furthermore, on June 13, 2023, the Clerk of the Court again notified appellant of 

the defects and that she was delinquent in remitting a $205.00 filing fee. The Clerk of this 

Court notified appellant the appeal was subject to dismissal if the notice of appeal was 

not amended or if the filing fee was not paid within ten days from the date of the

notice. See id. R. 42.3(b), (c).

Appellant has not cured the defective notice of appeal, paid the filing fee, nor 

otherwise responded to the notices from the clerk requiring a response or other action 

within the time specified; accordingly, the appeal is dismissed for want of 

prosecution. See id.

L. ARON PEÑA JR.

Justice

Delivered and filed on the 

3rd day of August, 2023.