NUMBERS 13-23-00187-CR, 13-23-00188-CR

COURT OF APPEALS 

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

 

DANNY ACOSTA, Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.

 

On appeal from the 187th District Court

of Bexar County, Texas.

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Before Justices Tijerina, Silva, and Peña

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Silva

 Appellant Danny Acosta pleaded nolo contendere to the offense of evading arrest, 

a state jail felony enhanced to a third-degree felony due to his habitual felon status, in 

trial court cause number 2020CR5581 and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, a 
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second-degree felony, in trial court cause number 2021CR4194.

1 See TEX. PENAL CODE 

ANN. §§ 12.42, 22.02(a)(2), 38.04(a), (b)(1)(A). The trial court placed him on deferred 

adjudication community supervision for ten years in each cause number. The State later 

filed amended motions to revoke appellant’s community supervision and to adjudicate his 

guilt in each cause, alleging in its motions that appellant violated his terms and conditions 

of his community supervision. Appellant entered pleas of “true” to one violation raised in

each of the State’s amended motions. After conducting a hearing, the trial court revoked 

appellant’s deferred adjudication community supervision, adjudicated him guilty, and

sentenced him to ten years’ incarceration in cause number 2020CR5581 and fifteen 

years’ incarceration in cause number 2021CR4194. Appellant’s court-appointed counsel 

has filed an Anders brief stating that there are no arguable grounds for appeal. See 

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

I. ANDERS BRIEF

Pursuant to Anders v. California, appellant’s court-appointed appellate counsel 

filed a brief and a motion to withdraw with this Court, stating that his review of the record 

yielded no grounds of reversible error upon which an appeal could be predicated. See id.

Counsel’s brief meets the requirements of Anders as it presents a professional evaluation 

demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds to advance on appeal. See In re 

Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 406 n.9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (orig. proceeding) (“In Texas, 

1 These cases are before the Court on transfer from the Fourth Court of Appeals in San Antonio 

pursuant to a docket-equalization order issued by the Supreme Court of Texas. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. 

§§ 22.220(a) (delineating the jurisdiction of appellate courts), 73.001 (granting the supreme court the 

authority to transfer cases from one court of appeals to another at any time that there is “good cause” for 

the transfer).
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an Anders brief need not specifically advance ‘arguable’ points of error if counsel finds 

none, but it must provide record references to the facts and procedural history and set 

out pertinent legal authorities.” (citing Hawkins v. State, 112 S.W.3d 340, 343–44 (Tex. 

App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2003, no pet.))); Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 510 

n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).

In compliance with High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel 

Op.] 1978) and Kelly v. State, 436 S.W.3d 313, 319–22 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014), 

appellant’s counsel carefully discussed why, under controlling authority, there is no 

reversible error in the trial court’s judgment. Appellant’s counsel also informed this Court 

in writing that he: (1) notified appellant that counsel has filed an Anders brief and a motion 

to withdraw; (2) provided appellant with copies of both pleadings; (3) informed appellant 

of his rights to file pro se responses, to review the record prior to filing those responses, 

and to seek discretionary review if we conclude that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) 

provided appellant with a form motion for pro se access to the appellate record that only 

requires appellant’s signature and date with instructions to file the motion within ten days. 

See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; Kelly, 436 S.W.3d at 319–20; see also In re Schulman, 252 

S.W.3d at 408–09.

Appellant filed a pro se response. When appellate counsel files an Anders brief 

and the appellant independently files a pro se response, the court of appeals has two 

choices: 

[i]t may determine that the appeal is wholly frivolous and issue an opinion 

explaining that it has reviewed the record and finds no reversible error. Or, 

it may determine that arguable grounds for appeal exist and remand the 

cause to the trial court so that new counsel may be appointed to brief the 
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issues. 

Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 826–27 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (internal citations 

omitted). We are “not required to review the merits of each claim raised in an Anders brief 

or a pro se response.” Id. at 827. Rather, we must merely determine if there are any 

arguable grounds for appeal. Id. If we determine there are such arguable grounds, we 

must remand for appointment of new counsel. Id. Reviewing the merits raised in a pro se 

response would deprive an appellant of the meaningful assistance of counsel. Id.

II. INDEPENDENT REVIEW

Upon receiving an Anders brief, we conduct a full examination of all the 

proceedings to determine whether the case is wholly frivolous. Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 

75, 80 (1988). We have reviewed the record, counsel’s brief, and appellant’s pro se brief,2

and we have found nothing that would arguably support an appeal. See Bledsoe, 178 

2 Appellant does not challenge his pleas of true in each cause or the trial court’s finding of true. 

These grounds and appellant’s pleas of true are sufficient to support the trial court’s order; thus, his 

conviction stands. See Moore v. State, 605 S.W.2d 924, 926 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980) (“[O]ne 

sufficient ground for revocation will support the court’s order to revoke probation.”); see also Narvaiz v.

State, No. 04-19-00702-CR, 2020 WL 6151083, at *1 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Oct. 21, 2020, no pet.) 

(mem. op., not designated for publication) (affirming conviction where appellant did not challenge the 

grounds to which he pleaded true and which the trial court found to be true); Bravo v. State, No. 04-17-

00698-CR, 2018 WL 3129444, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio June 27, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op., not 

designated for publication) (“Proof of any one violation is sufficient to support revocation.”).

Rather, appellant argues the prosecutor inappropriately cross-examined him during punishment on 

revocation allegations abandoned prior to the hearing. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.07, § 3(a)(1)

(permitting evidence of extraneous and unadjudicated acts during punishment proceedings); see also 

Debnam v. State, No. 04-22-00177-CR, 2023 WL 4223625, at *7 (Tex. App.—San Antonio June 28, 2023, 

no pet. h.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (noting that “under the Texas Code of Criminal 

Procedure, the trial court could deem relevant and admissible a broad range of evidence in the punishment

trial phase, including evidence of an unadjudicated act”). Consequently, appellant requests a “more l[e]nient

sentence,” which “would have been handed to [him]” but for the prosecutor’s actions. Appellant was 

sentenced within the applicable punishment range for each indicted offense. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. 

§§ 12.42, 22.02(a)(2), 38.04(a), (b)(1)(A); see also Gomez v. State, No. 04-22-00198-CR, 2023 WL 

2591500, at *1 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Mar. 22, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) 

(“As a general rule, a penalty assessed within the proper punishment range will not be disturbed on 

appeal.”). 
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S.W.3d at 827–28 (“Due to the nature of Anders briefs, by indicating in the opinion that it 

considered the issues raised in the briefs and reviewed the record for reversible error but 

found none, the court of appeals met the requirements of Texas Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 47.1.”); Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 511.

III. MOTION TO WITHDRAW

In accordance with Anders, appellant’s counsel has asked this Court for 

permission to withdraw as counsel. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; see also In re 

Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 408 n.17. We grant counsel’s motion to withdraw. Within five 

days from the date of this Court’s opinion, counsel is ordered to send a copy of this opinion 

and this Court’s judgment to appellant and to advise him of his right to file a petition for 

discretionary review.3 See TEX. R. APP. P. 48.4; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 

411 n.35; Ex parte Owens, 206 S.W.3d 670, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).

IV. CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

CLARISSA SILVA

Justice

Do not publish.

TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b). 

Delivered and filed on the

10th day of August, 2023.

3 No substitute counsel will be appointed. Should appellant wish to seek further review of this case 

by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, he must either retain an attorney to file a petition for discretionary 

review or file a pro se petition for discretionary review. Any petition for discretionary review must be filed 

within thirty days from the date of either this opinion or the last timely motion for rehearing or timely motion 

for en banc reconsideration that was overruled by this Court. See TEX. R. APP. P. 68.2. Any petition for 

discretionary review must be filed with the Clerk of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. See id. R. 68.3. 

Any petition for discretionary review should comply with the requirements of Texas Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 68.4. See id. R. 68.4.