Filed 5/28/24 Huang v. Pabianova CA2/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

FANG HUANG,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

MARIE PABIANOVA,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B321951

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No.

 BD615033)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County. Michael R. Powell, Judge. Affirmed.

Maria Pabianova, in pro. per.; and Holstrom, Block & 

Parke, and Ronald B. Funk for Defendant and Appellant.

Fang Huang, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Respondent.

__________________________________________
2

This is the third time the parties, a former husband and 

wife, have come before us. Following the dissolution of their 

marriage, the parties sought mutual restraining orders under the 

Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA; Fam. Code, § 6200 

et seq.1). The trial court held a hearing on both requests that 

included live witness testimony presented over several days. At 

the conclusion of the hearing, the court granted the former 

husband’s request and denied the former wife’s request for a 

domestic violence restraining order (DVRO). The former wife 

contends the order must be reversed because the court failed to 

comply with section 6305 and conducted the hearing in violation 

of her due process rights. We affirm the order.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Marriage and Dissolution

Fang Huang (husband) and Marie Pabianova (wife)

married in January 2010. They separated in October 2014, and 

the judgment of dissolution ending their marriage was entered in 

January 2018. They have two children—C. (born in 2010) and A.

(born in 2012).

In their stipulated judgment of dissolution, wife and 

husband agreed to joint legal and physical custody of the 

children.

B. Earlier Proceedings and Existing DVRO Requests

In May 2021, the juvenile court dismissed a Welfare and 

Institutions Code section 300 petition against husband for 

insufficient evidence. Wife acknowledged she was the reporting 

1 Statutory references are to the Family Code unless 

otherwise indicated.
3

party. The petition alleged husband physically abused the 

children.

On November 18, 2021, a criminal protective order issued 

in August 2021 against husband as to his daughter A. was 

terminated.

On November 30, 2021, wife filed a request for a DVRO to 

protect herself against husband. She described harassment and 

threats texted by husband in the middle of the night, prompting 

her to go to the hospital for chest pain and medical tests.

On December 10, 2021, husband filed a request for a DVRO 

to protect himself and his children against wife. Husband 

asserted the children reported they had been forced by wife to 

make false allegations of physical and sexual abuse against him 

to authorities.

C. DVRO Proceedings

On January 27, 2022, husband appeared, represented by 

counsel and wife appeared, representing herself. Wife objected to 

husband calling the children to testify. The trial court decided to 

interview the children instead and asked the parties to submit 

questions for the court to ask.

Next, the trial court explained the parties were to adhere to 

certain rules for the contested hearing: At the court’s discretion, 

time limits would be imposed on direct and cross-examination, so 

the parties were to use their time wisely; declarations would be 

admitted to the extent they did not lack foundation or rest on 

hearsay; the court would question the parties about their 

allegations and ask if they rested on their declarations; if one 

party failed to demonstrate a prima facie case, that party’s DVRO 

request would be dismissed, otherwise the court would allow the 

parties to continue questioning the witnesses. Neither party had 
4

questions or objected to these rules or the order of the 

presentation of evidence. The hearing was subsequently 

continued to February 16, 2022.

At the continued hearing on February 16, 2022, wife was 

represented by counsel. The trial court restated its rules for the 

contested hearing, including the need to develop a prima facie 

case to avoid dismissal. The court reminded the parties it would 

first proceed with wife’s DVRO request by questioning her. 

Again, neither party objected.

The court stated it would first hear wife’s DVRO request, 

because she filed first. Wife completed her presentation of 

evidence and rested. The hearing was then continued to May 2, 

2022.

On May 2, 2022, the hearing resumed. The trial court 

questioned husband, as it did with wife prior to examination by 

counsel. Husband completed his presentation of evidence and

rested. Following argument by counsel, the trial court denied 

wife’s request. The court concluded there was no justification for 

issuing a DVRO. The court found the text messages did not 

constitute abuse. Contrary to wife’s DVRO request, there was no

admissible evidence the messages affected wife medically. The 

court discounted wife’s claim that husband’s texts were 

distressing because, rather than block the messages, she 

responded to them well after the original text from husband. The 

court found the parties’ texts reflected immaturity and poor 

communication between parents that required serious 

intervention. The court ordered the parties to use the 
5

TalkingParents app or Our Family Wizard to communicate in the 

future.2

Next was the presentation of evidence for husband’s DVRO 

request. The parties each submitted questions for their two 

children. The children separately testified in a series of questionand-answer exchanges with the trial court in chambers. The 

hearing recessed until the following day.

On May 3, 2022, the hearing resumed. The trial court 

again questioned husband and wife prior to examination by 

counsel. After husband completed his presentation of evidence, 

the parties rested. When the hearing concluded, the trial court 

granted husband’s DVRO request. The court concluded wife had 

abused husband through their children. The court found wife 

had abused her children by compelling them to falsely report 

husband as an abuser to authorities. The court believed the 

children’s testimony and disbelieved wife’s conflicting testimony. 

The court ordered sole legal and physical custody of the children 

be granted to husband. Wife timely appealed.3

DISCUSSION

I. Section 6305

Wife first contends the trial court’s failure to follow the 

dictates of section 6305 in assessing the parties’ mutual DVPO 

requests constituted reversible error.

2 TalkingParents and Our Family Wizard are both on-line 

coparenting communication tools authorized by family courts.

3 Wife was represented by appellate counsel when her 

opening brief was filed. She filed her reply brief in propria 

persona, no longer represented by counsel. Husband represents 

himself on appeal.
6

A. Governing Law

“Under the DVPA, a court may issue a restraining order to 

prevent domestic violence or abuse if the party seeking the order 

‘shows, to the satisfaction the court, reasonable proof of a past act

or acts of abuse.’ ” (Melissa G. v. Raymond M. (2018) 27 

Cal.App.5th 360, 367.) “Abuse” means intentionally or recklessly 

causing or attempting to cause bodily injury to, sexual assault, 

placing a person in reasonable apprehension of imminent serious 

bodily injury, attacking, striking, stalking, threatening, 

battering, harassing, destroying personal property, or disturbing 

the peace of the other party. (§§ 6203, 6320; see K.L. v. R.H.

(2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 965, 977–978.)

The statute at issue here is section 6305, which governs 

mutual restraining orders. Under section 6305, a court “shall not 

issue a mutual order enjoining the parties from specific acts of 

abuse” unless “(1) [b]oth parties personally appear and each 

party presents written evidence of abuse or domestic violence” 

using a mandatory Judicial Council form; and “(2) [t]he court 

makes detailed findings of fact indicating that both parties acted 

as a primary aggressor and that neither party acted primarily in 

self-defense.” (§ 6305, subd. (a)(1) & (2).) In the absence of such 

factual findings, the order is voidable. (Melissa G. v. Raymond

M., supra, 27 Cal.App.5th at p. 368.) “As used in section 6305, 

the phrase ‘mutual order’ may refer to a single order restraining

two opposing parties from engaging in the acts of abuse described 

in section 6320 or two separate orders which together accomplish 

the same result as a single order.” (Ibid.)

B. Standard of Review

On appeal “[t]he question of whether a trial court applied

the correct legal standard to an issue in exercising its discretion
7

is a question of law [citation] requiring de novo review.” (Eneaji

v. Ubboe (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1457, 1463.) If a trial court 

applies the wrong legal standard in ruling, we may nonetheless 

affirm if we determine there is no reasonable probability the 

court would have reached a more favorable result had it applied 

the correct standard. (Loeffler v. Medina (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 

1495, 1504, fn. 11.)

C. Wife’s Contentions

Because the parties’ DVPO requests were to be tried 

together on the same day, wife contends the trial court was 

required to comply with section 6305. The obvious response to 

wife’s contention is the court never issued a mutual restraining 

order. In this instance, the court denied wife’s DVPO request 

and granted husband’s DVPO request. What’s more, if both 

requests had been granted, we question whether the resulting 

restraining order would have been “mutual”—given wife was 

seeking to protect herself solely from husband and husband was 

seeking to protect himself and his children from wife.

Nonetheless, wife contends because the trial court was 

presented with what were clearly mutual DVPO requests, it had 

to apply section 6305 and make the requisite findings. Wife is 

not challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support the 

findings made. Rather she maintains at length the findings 

made are wrong, because they are based on the court’s faulty 

analysis of the evidence. As K.L. v. R.H., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th 

965 explained, “[I]n making [the findings required by section 

6305] the court ‘shall consider’ both the intent of the law 

protecting domestic violence victims and the specific 

circumstances of the history of domestic violence in the case 

before it. [Citations.] Specifically, the statute mandates that the 
8

court determine which of the parties is the ‘most significant’ 

aggressor. [Citation.] Such a determination requires that the 

acts of the parties be weighed against each other. As a result, in 

deciding whether mutual restraining orders should issue, the 

trial court must consider the parties’ respective alleged acts of 

domestic violence in concert, and not separately.” (Id. at p. 979.) 

Wife argues here, by having one DVPO request adjudicated after 

the other rather than trying them together, the court improperly 

considered the parties’ claims and history of abuse separately 

without weighing them against each other to make its findings. 

According to wife, this prevented the court from engaging in a 

thorough evaluation of the parties DVPO requests under section 

6305.

D. No Prejudicial Error

Assuming without deciding the trial court committed the 

error wife posits, she has not met her burden to show prejudicial 

error. To establish prejudice, an appellant must demonstrate 

there was a “ ‘ “reasonable probability that in the absence of . . . 

error, a result more favorable to the appealing party would have 

been reached.” ’ ” (County of Los Angeles v. Williamsburg

National Ins. Co. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 944, 955.)

If the court had conducted the hearing as urged by wife, 

there is no reasonable probability the court would have granted 

her DVPO request and denied husband’s DVPO request. The 

record shows the court did not find wife at all believable. The 

court expressly discounted her testimony that husband’s text 

messages were abusive and that she did not pressure her 

children to falsely claim husband was abusive. In terms of her 

children, the court told wife: “But the bottom line is this. I 

believe that, in fact, you are saying [husband is a sexual abuser] 
9

to the children because I believe the children. I believe what 

they’re saying. I believe your daughter saying that you’re always 

talking about [husband]. And therefore, you’re using those 

children and causing them [to lie]—their problem is you.” As 

wife’s discredited testimony was the linchpin of both DVPO 

requests, she would not have benefited from a more favorable 

outcome had the requests been tried jointly.

II. Due Process Claim

Wife asserts the trial court so restricted both the time and 

manner of the presentation of evidence that it amounted to a 

denial of her due process rights.

A. Standard of Review

“We independently review due process claims ‘because “the 

ultimate determination of procedural fairness amounts to a 

question of law.” ’ ” (Roth v. Jelley (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 655, 

666.)

B. Wife Forfeited Her Claim

“Trial courts have ‘substantial discretion in the conduct of

judicial business,’ which includes the inherent power to control

the litigation before them. [Citation.] ‘ “ ‘That inherent power

entitles trial courts to exercise reasonable control over all

proceedings connected with pending litigation . . . in order to

insure the orderly administration of justice.’ ” ’ [Citation.] ‘[O]ne

important element of a court’s inherent judicial authority in this

regard is “the power . . . to control the disposition of the causes on

its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel,

and for litigants.” ’ ” (People v. Cota (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 318,

333.)

At the outset, this trial court told the parties how it

conducted hearings on DVPO requests. The court advised it
10

would impose time limits and examine witnesses if deemed

necessary. The court e-mailed these instructions to the parties

and repeated them during the hearing. The court’s clear intent

was to manage its heavy docket by making sure the proceedings

before it would be orderly and efficient. At no time did the

parties or their attorneys object to any instructions or the way in

which the hearing was being conducted. Wife has forfeited her

due process claim by failing to raise it in the trial court. (See

People v. Cardona (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 516, 523 [“We further 

conclude appellant forfeited any due process claim by failing 

either to raise it, or to object to the procedures used, in the trial 

court”].)

C. No Due Process Violation

Wife makes conclusory assertions the trial court violated 

her due process rights. From the cases wife cites in her opening 

brief, it appears she first contends the trial court improperly 

questioned witnesses before allowing the attorneys to question 

them. “A trial judge may examine witnesses to elicit or clarify

testimony [citations]. Indeed, ‘it is the right and duty of a judge

to conduct a trial in such a manner that the truth will be

established in accordance with the rules of evidence.’ ” (People v.

Rigney (1961) 55 Cal.2d 236, 241.) Here, the trial court examined

the witnesses to elicit testimony in an organized fashion. We also

note that, not infrequently, counsel had difficulty formulating

questions to elicit certain testimony. At that point, the trial court

would intervene to rephrase the question and the witness was

able to answer. Our independent review of the record confirms 

the court’s examination was proper and did not hinder the 

parties’ ability to present their cases.
11

Wife also maintains the trial court was impatient and 

unfairly limited the parties’ time. The court was frustrated or 

critical of counsel. This occurred chiefly when counsel ignored an 

admonishment by the court, interrupted the court posed 

ambiguous questions to witnesses, misnumbered or misplaced 

documentary evidence or repeatedly failed to respond directly to 

the court’s questions. After reviewing the record, we conclude the

court’s comments did not rise to such a level that they cause us to

lack confidence in the fairness of the proceedings. (People v.

Snow (2003) 30 Cal.4th 43, 78 [“ ‘[i]t is well within [a trial court’s] 

discretion to rebuke an attorney, sometimes harshly, when that 

attorney asks inappropriate questions, ignores the court’s 

instructions, or otherwise engages in improper or delaying 

behavior’ ”].)

Nor did the trial court unfairly limit the parties’ time to

present their DVPO requests. The hearing lasted four days. Wife

had adequate time to present evidence and to provide a defense. 

She points to nothing in the record that suggests otherwise.

Lastly, wife’s contention the trial court prejudged the 

evidence has no merit. The court was the finder of fact. There 

was nothing improper about the court communicating its 

thoughts to the parties to guide them in the presentation of 

evidence so their issues could be fully addressed and fairly 

resolved.

In sum, the court did not violate wife’s due process rights. 
12

DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed. Fang Huang is to recover his costs 

on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

LUI, P. J.

We concur: 

CHAVEZ, J.

HOFFSTADT, J.