J-S18017-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 

Appellant

v.

JESUS MARTINEZ-LOPEZ

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1540 MDA 2021

Appeal from the Order Entered October 26, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-06-CR-0002043-2021

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., McLAUGHLIN, J., and McCAFFERY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: FILED: SEPTEMBER 21, 2022

The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania appeals the order granting Jesus 

Martinez-Lopez’s motion to suppress. The Commonwealth argues the court 

erred in concluding the police lacked authority to stop the vehicle MartinezLopez was driving and that the police were required to give Martinez-Lopez

Miranda warnings1 before questioning him. We reverse and remand.

Following a traffic stop in December 2020, described in greater detail 

below, the Commonwealth charged Martinez-Lopez with two counts of driving 

under the influence of a controlled substance (“DUI”) and one count of 

required financial responsibility.

2 Martinez-Lopez filed a pre-trial motion to 

suppress “all evidence seized from Martinez-Lopez after his illegal detention 

____________________________________________

1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

2 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3802(d)(1)(i), (d)(2); 1786(f).
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and arrest . . . including the observations of the trooper during the interaction, 

the field sobriety test results, the statements made by Martinez-Lopez, and 

the blood test results[.]” Omnibus Pre-Trial Motion, 8/10/21, at ¶ 23.

The evidence presented at a hearing on the motion established the 

following. On December 22, 2020, Pennsylvania State Trooper Nathan Klinger 

was on patrol on the south side of Reading City. N.T., Pretrial Hearing, 

10/15/21, at 7. Trooper Klinger observed the vehicle driven by MartinezLopez, a white Ford sedan, and “ran a PennDOT[3] query” on the registration

number. Id. According to Trooper Klinger, 

our computers are directly linked to JNET.[4] So, basically we have 

the ability to run any license plate in our vehicle. And we have the 

ability to run any person as well. So if you gave me a name, date 

of birth, OLN number, which we do all the time, basically, any 

applicable tag I see, I basically try to run because you never know. 

You could get warrants. You can have drivers that are suspended. 

So any tag that I see, I will attempt to run that registration plate 

to see who is driving the vehicle and if anything is wrong with the 

vehicle and/or warrants.

Id. at 8.

Trooper Klinger followed the vehicle for approximately four blocks, 

during which he did not observe any moving or traffic violations. Id. at 17. 

The PennDOT report gave Trooper Klinger the name of the registered owner, 

the make and model of the vehicle, and the title number, tag number, and 

____________________________________________

3 Referring to the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation.

4 Referring to the Pennsylvania Justice Network.
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VIN. Id. at 10; Commonwealth’s Ex. 1 at 1. The owner of the vehicle was 

listed as Karen Villavicencio. N.T. at 20.

The report also informed Trooper Klinger that the vehicle’s registration 

was suspended, effective September 30, 2020, due to a lack of insurance, in 

violation of Section 1786(f) of the Pennsylvania Vehicle Code. Id. at 7, 9, 10; 

75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1786(f). Trooper Klinger testified that the PennDOT records 

accessible to the police are generally correct and reliable. Id. at 28-29. 

Trooper Klinger stopped the vehicle. Id. at 12. Trooper Klinger did not 

testify whether he discerned the sex of the driver prior to initiating the stop. 

Martinez-Lopez was driving, and there was a second person in the passenger 

seat. Id. Martinez-Lopez rolled down the window, and Trooper Klinger could 

smell a strong odor of burnt marijuana emanating from inside the vehicle. Id.

at 12, 13. He asked Martinez-Lopez to present his license, registration, and 

proof of insurance. Id. at 12. Martinez-Lopez responded that he did not have 

a license or insurance. Id. at 12, 13. He presented Officer Klinger with an ID 

card. Id. at 12. 

Trooper Klinger then asked Martinez-Lopez about the odor of marijuana, 

and whether he had a medical marijuana card. Id. at 14. Trooper Klinger 

acknowledged that Martinez-Lopez was not free to drive away during the 

questioning, and that he did not read Martinez-Lopez the Miranda warnings. 

Id. at 26. Martinez-Lopez responded that he did not have a medical card, and 

that he had smoked marijuana approximately an hour before driving. Id. at
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14. Trooper Klinger noticed that Martinez-Lopez’s eyes were bloodshot. Id. at 

25. 

Trooper Klinger called for backup. Id. at 14. Once other officers arrived, 

Trooper Klinger had Martinez-Lopez perform field sobriety tests. Id. at 14-15. 

After the tests, Trooper Klinger handcuffed Martinez-Lopez, put him in the 

police car, and took him to a hospital, where he submitted to a blood draw.

Id. at 15.

The vehicle’s owner, Villavicencio, testified for the defense. She stated

she never allowed her insurance to lapse for more than “a couple of days or 

so,” and that she had paid her premium and reinstated her policy prior to the 

date of the traffic stop.

5 Id. at 33. She admitted that she had continued to 

drive her car while it was uninsured and testified that she had given MartinezLopez permission to drive it. Id. at 34, 36. She stated that she had received 

notification from PennDOT that her insurance had lapsed, but not that her 

registration had been suspended. Id. at 30, 33, 34. Villavicencio testified that 

she was unaware that she was required to report to PennDOT when her 

insurance had been reinstated. Id. at 35. 

The trial court granted the motion. The court held Trooper Klinger had 

lacked authority to legally stop the vehicle for two reasons. First, the financial 

responsibility statute, which provided the basis for the stop, criminalizes the 

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5 Martinez-Lopez introduced a reinstatement notice for the vehicle, generated 

by Villavicencio’s insurance company, which stated the insurance policy had 

been canceled on November 12, 2020, due to lack of payment, and reinstated 

on December 12, 2020. N.T. at 20-21.
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conduct of the owner of the vehicle, and before he stopped the vehicle, 

Trooper Klinger could have observed that the registered owner was female 

and the driver was male. Second, the information in the PennDOT system 

regarding the insurance status of the vehicle was incorrect, and the 

Pennsylvania constitution does not incorporate a “good faith” exception to the 

exclusionary rule. Trial Court Opinion, filed 1/6/22, at 3-4. 

In addition, the court determined that Trooper Klinger had illegally 

questioned Martinez-Lopez, because he had stopped Martinez-Lopez for a 

traffic violation, Martinez-Lopez was not free to leave, and Trooper Klinger had

questioned him about the smell of marijuana without reading him Miranda

warnings. Id. at 5. The court concluded that the inculpatory statements, field 

sobriety tests, and results of the blood draw must be suppressed as the 

products of an illegal stop and custodial interrogation. Id.

The Commonwealth appealed,6 and presents the following issues:

A. DID POLICE HAVE REASONABLE SUSPICION AND/OR 

PROBABLE CAUSE TO BELIEVE THAT MARTINEZ-LOPEZ 

OPERATED A MOTOR VEHICLE WITHOUT THE REQUISITE 

INSURANCE COVERAGE, IN VIOLATION OF 75 Pa. C.S.A. §

1786(f)?

B. DID THE TRIAL COURT RESPECTFULLY ERR IN SUPPRESSING 

STATEMENTS MADE DURING A LAWFUL TRAFFIC STOP 

SUPPORTED BY REASONABLE SUSPICION AND/OR PROBABLE 

CAUSE, AS MARTINEZ-LOPEZ WAS NOT IN CUSTODY WHEN THE 

STATEMENTS WERE MADE? 

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6 The Commonwealth’s notice of appeal included a certification “that the ruling 

terminated or substantially handicaps the prosecution of [the] case.” Notice 

of Appeal, 12/2/21; Pa.R.A.P. 311.
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Commonwealth’s Brief at 4 (answers below omitted).

The Commonwealth argues Trooper Klinger had reasonable suspicion 

and/or probable cause to stop the vehicle for violating Section 1786(f) of the 

Vehicle Code. It points out that we have previously held that National Crime 

Information Center (“NCIC”) records can provide a basis for probable cause 

to believe a defendant is driving a motor vehicle without the requisite financial 

responsibility. Commonwealth’s Br. at 13 (citing Commonwealth v. Bolton, 

831 A.2d 734, 737 (Pa.Super. 2003)). The Commonwealth stresses that 

although Villavicencio’s insurance had been reinstated before the stop, she

admitted that she did not notify PennDOT when her insurance was reinstated, 

see 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1786(e)(1), such that “the information contained in the 

PennDOT database complied with the law.” Id. at 15.

The Commonwealth also argues Trooper Klinger was not required to 

Mirandize Martinez-Lopez because “Pennsylvania jurisprudence has never 

equated a traffic stop with a custodial arrest absent additional, objective 

factors” lacking in this case. The Commonwealth notes, for example, MartinezLopez “was not forced into a patrol car, transported from the scene or 

physically restrained.” Id. at 17, 19. The Commonwealth thus contends the 

court erred in suppressing any evidence.

We review the grant of a motion to suppress to determine “whether the 

record supports the suppression court’s factual findings and the legitimacy of 

the inferences and legal conclusions drawn from those findings.” 

Commonwealth v. Dix, 207 A.3d 383, 387 (Pa.Super. 2019) (quoting 
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Commonwealth v. Griffin, 24 A.3d 1037, 1041 (Pa.Super. 2011)). “[W]e 

consider only the evidence of the defendant’s witnesses and so much of the 

prosecution’s evidence that remains uncontradicted when fairly read in the 

context of the record as a whole.” In re V.H., 788 A.2d 976, 978 (Pa.Super. 

2001). We employ a de novo standard of review to questions of law. 

Commonwealth v. Shaffer, 209 A.3d 957, 969 (Pa. 2019).

Trooper Klinger stopped the vehicle Martinez-Lopez was driving because 

the PennDOT records showed the vehicle’s registration was suspended due to 

a lack of insurance, in violation of Section 1786(f) of the Vehicle Code. That 

provision states,

(f) Operation of a motor vehicle without required financial 

responsibility.--Any owner of a motor vehicle for which the 

existence of financial responsibility is a requirement for its legal 

operation shall not operate the motor vehicle or permit it to be 

operated upon a highway of this Commonwealth without the 

financial responsibility required by this chapter. In addition to the 

penalties provided by subsection (d), any person who fails to 

comply with this subsection commits a summary offense and shall, 

upon conviction, be sentenced to pay a fine of $300.

75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1786(f). 

Subsection 1786(a) requires every registered vehicle to be insured to 

compensate victims in the event of an accident. Id. at § 1786(a). Vehicles’ 

owners are deemed to have consented to provide proof of insurance to the 

police upon request, and if a vehicle’s insurance has lapsed, the owner may 

not operate it or allow it to be operated until both the insurance has been 

reinstated and poof of reinstatement has been provided to PennDOT. Id. at 
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§§ 1786(c), (e)(1). If PennDOT discovers an insurance lapse, it will suspend 

the vehicle’s registration for three months and until a fee is paid. Id. at §§ 

1786(d)(1), (d)(2).7 If it determines the registered owner has permitted the 

operation of the vehicle while uninsured, it will suspend the operating privilege 

of the owner for three months and impose a fee. Id. at § 1786(d)(1).

A police officer may stop a vehicle to check a vehicle’s proof of financial 

responsibility, if the officer has reasonable suspicion:

(b) Authority of police officer.--Whenever a police officer is 

engaged in a systematic program of checking vehicles or drivers 

or has reasonable suspicion that a violation of this title is occurring 

or has occurred, he may stop a vehicle, upon request or signal, 

for the purpose of checking the vehicle’s registration, proof of 

financial responsibility, vehicle identification number or engine 

number or the driver’s license, or to secure such other information 

as the officer may reasonably believe to be necessary to enforce 

the provisions of this title.

75 Pa.C.S.A. § 6308(b).8 Reasonable suspicion is defined as follows.

Reasonable suspicion exists only where the officer is able to 

articulate specific observations which, in conjunction with 

reasonable inferences derived from those observations, led him 

reasonably to conclude, in light of his experience, that criminal 

activity was afoot and that the person he stopped was involved in 

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7 PennDOT may waive the fee if the owner proves the lapse was for less than 

31 days and the owner did not permit operation of the vehicle during the 

period of lapse. 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1786(d)(2)(i).

8 Prior to its amendment in 2004, the statute required that an officer have 

“articulable and reasonable grounds” to suspect a violation, which the 

Pennsylvania Supreme Court interpreted as requiring probable cause. See 

Commonwealth v. Feczko, 10 A.3d 1285, 1287-88 (Pa.Super. 2010) (en 

banc). The lower standard embraced by the current version brings 

Pennsylvania in line with constitutional protections. Id.; see also 

Commonwealth v. Sands, 887 A.2d 261, 268 (Pa.Super. 2005)
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that activity. Therefore, the fundamental inquiry of a reviewing 

court must be an objective one, namely, whether the facts 

available to the officer at the moment of intrusion warrant a 

[person] of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken 

was appropriate.

Commonwealth v. Chambers, 55 A.3d 1208, 1215 (Pa.Super. 2012)

(quoting Commonwealth v. Jones, 874 A.2d 108, 116 (Pa.Super.2005)) 

(alteration in original).

However, a traffic stop based on reasonable suspicion of a Vehicle Code 

violation “must ‘serve an investigatory purpose relevant to the suspected 

violation.’” Commonwealth v. Ruffin, No. 1913 EDA 2021, 2022 PA Super 

146, at *2 (Aug. 23, 2022) (quoting Feczko, 10 A.3d at 1291). If the 

suspected violation is one that requires no additional investigation, the officer 

must have probable cause. Id. Police may rely on the records returned from 

a database search to perform a vehicle stop for a Section 1786(f) violation.

See Bolton, 831 A.2d at 736-37.

9

Here, the trial court concluded Trooper Klinger lacked authority for the 

stop, for two reasons. The trial court first observed that Section 1786(f) 

criminalizes conduct by the registered owner of the vehicle, and Trooper 

Klinger could have observed that the registered owner of the vehicle—

Villavicencio—was female, and the driver—Martinez-Lopez—was male. Trial 

____________________________________________

9 Bolton was decided when probable cause was required to justify a traffic 

stop and held that NCIC records can provide probable cause. See above, note 

8.
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Ct. Op. at 3, 4. The trial court relied on the following passage from Kansas v. 

Glover, 140 S.Ct. 1183 (2020):

the presence of additional facts might dispel reasonable suspicion. 

For example, if an officer knows that the registered owner of the 

vehicle is in his mid-sixties but observes that the driver is in her 

mid-twenties, then the totality of the circumstances would not 

raise a suspicion that the particular individual being stopped is 

engaged in wrongdoing.

Glover, 140 S.Ct. at 1191 (quotation marks and citations omitted).

In Glover, the police discovered that the owner of a vehicle had a 

revoked driver’s license and initiated a vehicle stop on that basis. See

Commonwealth v. Jefferson, 256 A.3d 1242, 1249 (Pa.Super.) (en banc), 

appeal denied, 268 A.3d 1071 (Pa. 2021). Glover was the owner of the vehicle 

and argued the police did not possess reasonable suspicion to believe that he 

was the person driving the vehicle at the time of the stop. Id. The United 

States Supreme Court rejected this argument and held that “when the officer 

lacks information negating an inference that the owner is the driver of the 

vehicle, the stop is reasonable.” Glover, 140 S.Ct. at 1186. Thus, Glover

“clearly dictates” that the owner/driver inference provides reasonable 

suspicion to support a stop, assuming “that the police have reason to believe 

that the registered owner is involved in criminal conduct” and “[lack]
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information negating [the] inference that the owner is the driver of the 

vehicle.” Jefferson, 256 A.3d at 1249-50.10

Glover is inapplicable in this case, because the suspected offense, under 

Section 1786(f), not only prohibits the registered owner from driving the 

vehicle during an insurance lapse, but also prohibits the owner from allowing 

someone else to drive it. 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1786(f). Even an equitable owner of 

a vehicle may be held liable for violating Section 1786(f). See Habbyshaw 

v. Com., Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 683 A.2d 1281, 

1284 (Pa.Cmwlth. 1996).

11 Therefore, even though Trooper Glover may have 

observed that the driver was male before making the stop, this fact would not 

have negated his reasonable belief, based on the PennDOT inquiry, that a 

violation of the statute was taking place.

Second, the trial court held the stop was unlawful because the defense 

presented persuasive evidence at the suppression hearing that Villavicencio 

had reinstated the vehicle’s insurance prior to the stop. According to the trial 

court, this vitiated Trooper Klinger’s reliance upon the PennDOT record 

because Pennsylvania does not allow for “a ‘good faith’ exception to the 

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10 In Commonwealth v. Jefferson, we further held it reasonable to assume 

the registered owner could be found in her vehicle, even if she is not the 

person driving it. Jefferson, 256 A.3d at 1250, 1250 n.6.

11 We may rely on decisions of the Commonwealth Court for their persuasive 

value. Commonwealth v. Fitzpatrick, 159 A.3d 562, 571 n.7 (Pa.Super. 

2017).
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exclusionary rule.” Trial Ct. Op. at 4 (citing Commonwealth v. Johnson, 86 

A.3d 182 (Pa. 2014)).

In other jurisdictions, the “good faith exception” permits the admission 

of evidence gained following the execution of a warrant lacking in probable 

cause when the officers executing the warrant relied in good faith on its 

issuance by a magistrate. Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887, 905-

06 (Pa. 1991). Pennsylvania does not allow the exception, because the 

exclusionary rule under the Commonwealth’s constitution acts not only as a 

deterrent, but to vindicate an individual’s right to privacy. Id. at 901; see 

Johnson, 86 A.3d at 188. Our Supreme Court has applied this principle in 

holding that evidence is inadmissible when obtained after police officers, in 

good faith, execute a warrant that has expired but not been purged from the 

police’s record system. Johnson, 86 A.3d at 187. Application of the 

exclusionary rule in this scenario not only serves a “privacy-based function,”

but also acts as a deterrent to “encourage the executive to adopt more 

efficient measures to purge executed arrest warrants[.]” Id. at 190.

Pennsylvania’s rejection of the good faith exception to the warrant 

requirement has no bearing here. Trooper Klinger was not executing a 

warrant. Rather, he was acting upon information in records maintained by a 

third party—PennDOT—that gave him reasonable suspicion that the vehicle 

lacked insurance and had a suspended registration. Trooper Klinger had 

statutory authority to stop the vehicle to investigate these violations. See 75 

Pa.C.S.A. § 6308(b).
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Furthermore, while the trial court was convinced that Villavicencio had 

reinstated her insurance policy before the stop, the defense presented no 

evidence regarding whether the vehicle’s registration was still suspended on 

the date of the stop. See 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1786(d)(1). Villavicencio also testified 

she had not notified PennDOT after she reinstated her policy, in violation of 

Section 1786(e)(1). See 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1786(e). Therefore, the fact that 

Villavicencio had reinstated her insurance prior to the stop does not require 

suppression of the evidence.

The court next held that Martinez-Lopez’s statement that he had smoked 

marijuana an hour before driving was suppressible because Trooper Klinger 

did not read Martinez-Lopez his Miranda rights before asking him about the 

odor of marijuana and whether he had a medical marijuana card. The court 

found the exchange was a custodial interrogation because Martinez-Lopez had 

not been free to leave, and the questions had been intended to elicit 

incriminating responses. Trial Ct. Op. at 5 (citing Commonwealth v. 

Williams, 220 A.3d 1086 (Pa.Super. 2019) and Commonwealth v. Graul, 

912 A.2d 252, 255 (Pa. 2006)). The court also found the questioning improper 

because Trooper Klinger had pulled Martinez-Lopez over for a traffic violation, 

and not suspicion of DUI. See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 

10/26/21, at 5-6.

“The law recognizes three distinct levels of interaction between police 

officers and citizens: (1) a mere encounter; (2) an investigative detention . . 

. ; and (3) a custodial detention.” Dix, 207 A.3d at 388 (quoting 
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Commonwealth v. Mackey, 177 A.3d 221, 227 (Pa.Super. 2017) (footnote 

omitted)). The levels involve an increasing level of restraint by the police and 

therefore require escalating levels of suspicion of criminal activity:

A mere encounter can be any formal or informal interaction 

between an officer and a citizen. The hallmark of this interaction 

is that it carries no official compulsion to stop or respond. A mere 

encounter does not need to be justified by any level of police 

suspicion.

An investigative detention carries an official compulsion to stop 

and respond. Because an investigative detention has elements of 

official compulsion it requires reasonable suspicion of unlawful 

activity. . . .

A custodial detention occurs when the nature, duration and 

conditions of an investigative detention become so coercive as to 

be, practically speaking, the functional equivalent of an arrest. A 

custodial detention requires that the police have probable cause 

to believe that the person so detained has committed or is 

committing a crime.

Id. (quotation marks, ellipses, brackets, and citations omitted). Miranda

warnings are required whenever the police interrogate a suspect who is in 

custody. Williams, 220 A.3d at 1091.

“The usual traffic stop constitutes an investigative rather than a 

custodial detention, unless, under the totality of the circumstances, the 

conditions and duration of the detention become the functional equivalent of 

arrest.” Commonwealth v. Mannion, 725 A.2d 196, 202 (Pa.Super. 1999)

(en banc). Coercive conditions, such as where a suspect is forced into a patrol 

car, may transform an ordinary traffic stop into custodial interrogation. Id. To

determine whether the conditions of the detention are the functional 
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equivalent of an arrest, the court considers, “the basis for the detention; its 

length; its location; whether the suspect was transported against his or her 

will, how far, and why; whether restraints were used; whether the law 

enforcement officer showed, threatened or used force; and the investigative 

methods employed to confirm or dispel suspicions.” Id. at 200.

“Authority for the seizure . . . ends when tasks tied to the traffic 

infraction are—or reasonably should have been—completed.” 

Commonwealth v. Malloy, 257 A.3d 142, 149 (Pa.Super. 2021) (quoting 

Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 354 (2015)). However, new 

information obtained during the natural course of the stop can provide a basis 

to extend the stop or escalate the encounter. Commonwealth v. Chase, 960 

A.2d 108, 115 n.5 (Pa. 2008); accord Commonwealth v. Wright, 224 A.3d 

1104, 1109 (Pa.Super. 2019).

Trooper Klinger stopped the vehicle Martinez-Lopez was driving on 

suspicion of suspended registration for failure to maintain insurance. MartinezLopez remained in the driver’s seat while Trooper Klinger asked him questions 

directed to that offense. During the interaction, Trooper Klinger smelled burnt 

marijuana emanating from the vehicle. Trooper Klinger then asked MartinezLopez questions aimed at investigating a DUI offense. Martinez-Lopez 

remained seated in his vehicle. 

This was not the functional equivalent of an arrest. Trooper Klinger 

therefore did not need to read Miranda warnings before asking MartinezLopez questions related to his use of marijuana. This was an investigatory 
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detention, and it was supported by reasonable suspicion that Martinez-Lopez 

had been driving under the influence of a controlled substance. See

Commonwealth v. Cauley, 10 A.3d 321, 327 (Pa.Super. 2010) (finding 

mere encounter transformed into an investigative detention when officer 

asked appellant to perform field sobriety tests; investigative detention was 

supported by reasonable suspicion because officer had noticed the odor of 

alcohol on appellant’s breath, his bloodshot eyes, and his slurred speech);

Commonwealth v. Sierra, 723 A.2d 644, 646 (Pa. 1999) (holding officer’s 

continued questioning of driver after issuing traffic citation was an 

investigative detention).

Furthermore, Trooper Klinger did not unconstitutionally prolong the 

investigation into the traffic offense. He testified that he detected the smell of 

marijuana immediately. See Commonwealth v. Rogers, 849 A.2d 1185, 

1189-90 (Pa. 2004) (rejecting appellant’s argument that officer should have 

ceased traffic stop after issuing citations, as officer had gained reasonable 

suspicion to extend the stop). We reverse the order granting Martinez-Lopez’s 

motion to suppress and remand for further proceedings.

Order reversed. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 9/21/2022