alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
##### 



Exhibit 32.2

STATEMENT

Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. 1350,
the undersigned officer of Mercury Air Group, Inc. (the Company) hereby
certifies that to the knowledge of the undersigned:

| |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
| | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| | (3) The Companys Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the three and nine
month periods ended March 31, 2004 fully complies with the requirements of
sections 13(a) or 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, and

| |                                                                                                                                                         
| | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| | (4) The information contained in the report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.

| |  |                                     
| |  | ------------------------------------
| |  | /s/ Robert Schlax                   
| |  |                                     
| |  | Robert SchlaxChief Financial Officer

May 14, 2004

30
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THE SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE FINANCIAL
STATEMENTS OF JOURNAL EMPLOYEES' STOCK TRUST AS OF AND FOR THE PERIOD ENDED
SEPTEMBER 30, 1997 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   OTHER<F1>
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JUL-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1997
<CASH>                                             169
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                   169
<PP&E>                                               0
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                     169
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                              169
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                           0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                       169
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                20,228<F2>
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                20,228<F2>
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                      0
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                         0
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        0<F3>
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0<F3>
<FN>
<F1>      3 accounting periods
<F2>      The only revenue and expense associated
          with the trust pertain to dividends
          received and paid out.  All dividends
          received are in turn paid out,
          accounting for net income of zero ($0).
<F3>      Earnings per share is not applicable
          as net income is zero ($0).
</FN>
        

</TABLE>
#### David RAFF, Plaintiff, v. Paul C. MAGGIO, d/b/a Patchogue Nursing Home, Defendant.

No. CV 89-3235.

United States District Court, E.D. New York.

Oct. 16, 1990.

Allegra Fishel, New York City, for plaintiff.

Block, Amelkin & Hamburger by Richard Hamburger, Smithtown, N.Y., for defendant.

ORDER

WEXLER, District Judge.

In the above-referenced case, defendant objects to a judgment entered by this Court, dated September 13, 1990. That judgment reflected the amount of $3,954.00 as attorneys’ fees awarded to plaintiff in this action. *See Raff v. Maggio,*743 F.Supp. 147 (E.D.N.Y.1990). Since the court inadvertently entered the proposed judgment prior to receiving defendant’s objections, the Court addresses them now.

First, defendant asserts that the amount of attorneys’ fees in the judgment contradicts an amount quoted by plaintiff’s counsel in a letter sent to defendant in October of 1989. In response, plaintiff’s counsel points out in an affirmation that the difference in hours between the judgment and the letter is due the fact that the *1208earlier letter was a compromise offered in the spirit of settlement. This is certainly not an unreasonable position, and in view of the fact that plaintiffs counsel adequately justified the hours submitted in support of the attorneys’ fees award, defendant’s first objection is rejected.

Second, defendant asserts that portions of the fees sought by plaintiff covered research time spent on the actual issue of attorneys’ fees. Pursuant to this Court's prior order, the attorney’s fees were granted only as to the primary claim, and time spent by plaintiff’s counsel on the first impression issue of attorneys’ fees was not to be included. *See Raff,*743 F.Supp. at 147. However, plaintiff points out that the bulk of the time to which defendant objects, (which spanned 4.8 hours on September 12, 1989 and 3.6 hours on September 16, 1989), *was*spent addressing plaintiff’s primary claim. The Court accepts counsel's affirmation as true, and accordingly, defendant’s second objection is also rejected.

Defendant’s final objection is that interest was improperly awarded on the attorneys’ fees. Although no authority is cited, defendant asserts that attorneys’ fees are considered to be a part of the costs. The case law relied upon by plaintiff indicates otherwise, and this Court finds that plaintiff may receive interest on the attorneys’ fees award where the judgment is inclusive of such an award. *See*28 U.S.C. § 1961; *Lew Wenzel & Co. of Southern California, Inc. v. London Litho Supply Co., Inc.,*563 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir.1977). However, plaintiff is not entitled to post-judgment interest at the rate of 9%. The current rate for all post-judgment interest, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1961, is 7.78%.

Plaintiff is directed to submit a judgment reflecting the amounts already submitted, with the corrected rate for post-judgment interest.

SO ORDERED.
#### ETHEL SIGLEY, DEFENDANT, v. MARATHON RAZOR BLADE COMPANY, INCORPORATED, PROSECUTOR.

Submitted January 29, 1932

Decided June 2, 1932.

Before Justices Trenchard and Donges.

*837For the prosecutor, *Joseph C. Paul.*

For the defendant, SlcejfLngton, *Walker & Corrigan.*

Pur Curiam.

This writ brings up a determination of the workmen’s compensation bureau awarding compensation to the petitioner-defendant for injuries sustained from an accident arising out of and in the course of her employment by the prosecutor. It is not denied that there was a compensable injury, but the amount of the award is questioned.

Petitioner was struck in the eye by a safety razor blade and lost the sight of the eye. Compensation for this injury was made under paragraph S of section 11, and this part of the award is admitted to be proper. However, the deputy commissioner also found that as a result of the accident petitioner had become afflicted with a neurotic condition which justified a further award of ten per cent, of total permanent disability.

Prosecutor first argues that it was improper to make the award in two amounts, *i. e.,*for the loss of the eye and for the ten per cent, permanent disability; but that the award should have been in one sum of proportionate permanent disability equal in amount to the sum of the two awards. We see no merit in this, and furthermore it is a mere matter of form.

The main point argued is that the recovery for the loss of an eye is limited to the amount specified in paragraph S, that is two-thirds of the wages for one hundred weeks. In *Nitram Co.*v. *Essex Common*Pleas, 84 *N. J. L.*243; 86 *Atl. Rep.*435, Mr. Justice Kalisch said:

“The trial judge allowed the damages fixed by the statute for the partial, but permanent, injury to the fingers, and also allowed in addition for the temporary disability arising from the infection. He based his action on paragraph 11, clause A of section 2, of the act which concerns temporary disability, and clause C of paragraph 11 which provides for disability partial in character but permanent in quality. The *838trial judge pursued the proper course. The two injuries were different in character, although the result of the same accident.

“The prosecutor’s contention is that no compensation can be awarded under more than one clause of paragraph 11 of section 2 of the act. * * ***

“We think that both the language and spirit of the act favor the construction put upon it by the trial judge.”

In *Bateman*v. Smith, 85 *N. J. L.*409; 89 *Atl. Rep.*979, which is relied on by prosecutor, the situation was somewhat different. There a man seventy-three years of age lost a fQot and the lower court held that, because of his age, this amounted to total permanent disability. The Supreme Court held that the loss of the foot must be compensated for as provided in the statute, and that the permanent disability because of age could not be considered. The question there was not of a separate injury but of the effect of the one injury.

The judgment is affirmed, with costs.
#### ANDRI LaFORGIA, PROSECUTOR, v. CITY OF HOBOKEN ET AL., DEFENDANTS.

Submitted October 16, 1931

Decided May 16, 1932.

Before Justices Trenchard and Donges.

*658For the prosecutor, *Sylvan S. Cohen.*

For the defendants, *James A. Coolahan.*

Pek Cukiam.

This writ of *certiorari*brings up the conviction of the prosecutor by the recorder of the city of Hoboken for a violation of the sanitary code of said city. Prosecutor was arrested upon a complaint charging him with having kept ice in his cellar in violation of the ordinance. He was found guilty and fined $20 in accordance with the ordinance.

The sole question here argued is that the ordinance under which the conviction was had is invalid as contrary to the legislative enactments concerning the scope of city ordinances.

The ordinance prescribed a penalty of $20 upon each conviction, and provided for no other form of punishment. Prosecutor contends that this is in violation of the provisions of the Home Rule act *(Pamph. L.*1917, *ch.*152), because that act requires the fixing of a minimum and maximum penalty and requires the exercise of the discretion of the magistrate in the imposition of the sentence.

In *Massinger*v. *Millville,*63 *N. J. L.*123; 43 *Atl. Rep.*443, an ordinance which provided for a fixed penalty was held invalid under the act of 1896 regulating city ordinances.

In *Friedman*v. *Maines,*8 *N. J. Mis. R.*703; 151 *Atl. Rep.*472, such an ordinance was held invalid as contrary to the provisions of the Home Rule act.

It seems clear that the ordinance, by its terms, comes within the scope of the Home Rule act.

However, the defendants contend that, since the ordinance was adopted in 1891, it is not affected by the act of 1917. The Home Rule act provides that ordinances in force at the time of its adoption (1917) should remain in force “except in so far as they are inconsistent herewith.” This can be construed as nothing less than a condemnation of ordinances which do not meet the limitations contained in that act.

The conviction is set aside, but without costs.
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 98-40884 Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus MIGUEL ANGEL MORA-RODRIGUEZ, Defendant-Appellant.

- - - - - - - - - - Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas USDC No. M-97-CR-355-1

- - - - - - - - - - April 16, 1999 Before JONES, SMITH, and DUHÉ, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * Miguel Angel Mora-Rodriguez (“Mora”) appeals from his conviction of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute and importation of marijuana. Mora contends that the district court erred by rejecting his proposed instruction addressing possession of contraband in a hidden compartment. The district court instructed the jury properly on constructive possession. The rejection of Mora’s proposed instruction therefore was not error. See United States v. Pennington , 20 F.3d 593, 600 (5th Cir. 1994). AFFIRMED.
# L_2007293DE.01001001.xml

| 10.11.2007 | DE | Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union | L 293/10 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

10.11.2007

DE

Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union

L 293/10

---

Berichtigung der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 557/2007 der Kommission vom 23. Mai 2007 mit Durchführungsbestimmungen zur Verordnung (EG) Nr. 1028/2006 des Rates mit Vermarktungsnormen für Eier

(
  Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union L 132 vom 24. Mai 2007
  )

Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union L 132 vom 24. Mai 2007

Seite 17, Anhang II, Ziffer 1 Buchstabe a zweiter Unterabsatz:

anstatt:

„Im Falle anderer Beschränkungen, einschließlich auf der Grundlage des Gemeinschaftsrechts verhängter Beschränkungen zum Schutz der Gesundheit von Mensch und Tier, dürfen Eier für die Dauer der Beschränkung, in keinem Fall aber länger als zwölf Wochen, weiterhin als „Eier aus Freilandhaltung“ vermarktet werden.“

muss es heißen:

„Im Falle anderer auf der Grundlage des Gemeinschaftsrechts verhängter Beschränkungen zum Schutz der Gesundheit von Mensch und Tier, die den Zugang der Hennen zu einem Auslauf im Freien einschränken, einschließlich veterinärrechtlicher Beschränkungen, dürfen Eier für die Dauer der Beschränkung, in keinem Fall aber länger als zwölf Wochen, weiterhin als „Eier aus Freilandhaltung“ vermarktet werden.“

---
#### UNITED STATES of America v. Beatriz Elena PEREZ.

No. 89 CR 901.

United States District Court, E.D. New York.

Feb. 19, 1991.

Andrew J. Maloney, U.S. Atty., Beryl Howell, Asst. U.S. Atty., E.D.N.Y., Brooklyn, N.Y., for appellant.

Casey Donovan, New York City, for defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

WEINSTEIN, District Judge.

The question posed on sentencing is whether this despondent and impecunious twenty-five year old woman, who has just experienced the sudden and unexpected death of her only child, a son born while she was in custody after her arrest for dealing in crack, may be sentenced to prison for a period less than the guidelines require — a range of 41 to 51 months. The answer is yes.

A downward departure is authorized when there is a “mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence different from that described.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b); U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0; *cf.*U.S.S.G. § 5H1.3 (mental and emotional factors on probation). The Commission did not take into account the emotional blow dealt a mother who gives birth to a child while she is in custody, gives up her infant son to relatives because she cannot adequately care for it during her incarceration, and then is informed, while still in jail, of his sudden and inexplicable death.

Even the most inhumane would consider this cruel punishment dealt by the fates sufficient retribution for her transgression. There are occasions where the law’s implacability must bend and give homage through compassion to humanity’s frailties and nature’s cruelties. This is such a case.

*699Defendant has already been held at the Metropolitan Correction Facility for 15 months awaiting trial. Now that she has pled guilty, there is no point in a prison term. Defendant is sentenced to time served, a five year term of supervised release and a fifty dollar special assessment. She will undoubtedly be deported as an illegal alien, never to return legally to her friends and relatives who are here. The government does not object.

So ordered.
#### LIVENGOOD v. RAILWAY CO.

No. 131 PC.

Case below: 18 N.C. App. 352.

Petition for writ of certiorari to North Carolina Court of Appeals denied 31 August 1973. •• -•
#### ALBERT O’NEAL SCOTT, Appellant, v. WARDEN, NEVADA STATE PRISON, Respondent.

No. 10776

December 7, 1978

587 P.2d 36

*Horace R. Goff,*Nevada State Public Defender, and *J. Gregory Damm,*Chief Trial Deputy, Carson City, for Appellant.

*Robert List,*Attorney General, Carson City; *George E. Holt,*District Attorney, and *H. Leon Simon,*Chief Deputy District Attorney, Las Vegas, for Respondent.

OPINION

*Per Curiam:*

A jury convicted Albert O’Neal Scott of the first degree murder of Lynette Blake and the attempted murder of Janice Crisp. He was sentenced to consecutive terms of life imprisonment and twenty years in state prison, with the possibility of parole. His conviction was affirmed in Scott v. State, 92 Nev. 552, 554 P.2d 735 (1976).1 Scott later sought post-conviction *727relief, pursuant to NRS 177.315-177.385, alleging certain errors were committed during the course of his trial and on appeal. The district court considered each of the assignments but denied relief on the ground that they were or could have been raised in the direct appeal and good cause has not been shown for the failure to do so. NRS 177.375(2);2 Cf. Stewart v. Warden, 92 Nev. 588, 555 P.2d 218 (1976). We agree with the district court and affirm.

Scott asserts that his prior appointed appellate counsel was inadequate and ineffective. Our examination of the record demonstrates that this contention is wholly without merit. Sullivan v. Warden, 91 Nev. 563, 540 P.2d 112 (1975); Warden v. Lischko, 90 Nev. 221, 523 P.2d 6 (1974); Sheriff v. Povey, 87 Nev. 603, 491 P.2d 84 (1971); Bean v. State, 86 Nev. 80, 465 P.2d 133 (1970), cert. denied 400 U.S. 844 (1970).

The additional issues tendered by appellant are likewise without merit.

1

Scott’s subsequent petition to the U.S. District Court for federal habeas corpus relief was dismissed without prejudice to his refiling upon the exhaustion of his state remedies.

2

NRS 177.375(2) provides:

> “If the petitioner’s conviction was the result of a trial, all claims for post-conviction relief are waived which were or could have been:

> (a) Presented to the trial court;

> (b) Raised in a prior petition for post-conviction relief; or raised in any other proceeding that the petitioner has taken to secure relief from his conviction or sentence unless the court finds good cause shown for the failure to present such claims.”
ANTIONE RONNELL

WATERS

,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA

,

Appellee

. IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO

FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND

DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

CASE NO. 1D 15

- 2047

_ ____________________________/

Opinion filed January 5, 2016.

An appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County

. Waddell A. Wallace , Judge

.

Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and Stephen J. Weinbaum, Assistant Public

Defender, Miami , for Appellant.

Pa mela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee , for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

BENTON

, LEWIS and BILBREY

, J J

. , CONCUR.
#### BURLINGTON INDUSTRIES v. FOIL

No. 29 PC.

Case below: 19 N.C. App. 172.

Petition for writ of certiorari to North Carolina Court of Appeals allowed 2 October 1973.
[Federal Register Volume 70, Number 213 (Friday, November 4, 2005)]
[Notices]
[Page 67180]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 05-21999]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

National Institutes of Health


National Cancer Institute; Notice of Closed Meeting

    Pursuant to section 10(d) of the Federal advisory Committee Act, as 
amended (5 U.S.C. Appendix 2), notice is hereby given of the following 
meeting.
    The meeting will be closed to the public in accordance with the 
provisions set forth in sections 552b(c)(4) and 552b(c)(6), Title 5 
U.S.C., as amended. The grant applications and the discussions could 
disclose confidential trade secrets or commercial property such as 
patentable material, and personal information concerning individuals 
associated with the grant applications, the disclosure of which would 
constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.

    Name of Committee: National Cancer Institute Special Emphasis 
Panel, Information Resources for Radiation Science.
    Date: December 8, 2005.
    Time: 1 p.m. to 2 p.m.
    Agenda: To review and evaluate grant applications.
    Place: National Institutes of Health, 6130 Executive Blvd., 
Rockville, MD 20852, (Telephone Conference Call).
    Contact Person: Timothy C. Meeker, MD, Scientific Review 
Administrator, Special Referral and Resources Branch, Division of 
Extramural Activities, National Cancer Institute, 6116 Executive 
Boulevard, Room 8088, Rockville, MD 20852, 301/594-1279.

(Catalogue of Federal Domestic Assistance Program Nos. 93.392, 
Cancer Construction; 93.393, Cancer Cause and Prevention Research; 
93.394, Cancer Detection and Diagnosis Research; 93.395, Cancer 
Treatment Research; 93.396, Cancer Biology Research; 93.397, Cancer 
Centers Support, 93.398, Cancer Research Manpower; 93.399, Cancer 
Control, National Institutes of Health, HHS)

    Dated: October 28, 2005.
Anthony M. Coelho, Jr., PhD.
Acting Director, Office of Federal Advisory Committee Policy.
[FR Doc. 05-21999 Filed 11-3-05; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4140-01-M