### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 9 -00041-CR

Lawr e nc e Cha r le s A nde r so n , A ppe lla nt

v. The State of Texas, App ellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF B ELL COUNTY , 264TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. 63,4 40 , HO NORAB LE MARTH A J. TRUDO , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N Ap p el l an t L awr ence Charles Ande rson pleade d g uilty to the offe nse of dr iving while intox icated. See Tex. P enal Code A nn. § 49.04 (a ) (W est 2003). The trial court a ssessed punishment, enhanc ed by a pre vious felony

conviction, at 1 8 y ear s’ imprisonment. On appea l An de rs on c omp la ins that (1 ) the tr ia l c ourt e rr e d by ov e rr uli nghis pr e tr ia l mo tio n to su pp re ss t e st results of blood dra

wn when A nderson wa s taken to a hospital after crashing his car into two other
c ar s o n a s t r e e t i n K i l l e e n ; an d ( 2 ) t h e t r i a l c o u rte r r e d b y f a i l i n g t o c o n d

u c ta c o mp e t e n c y i n qu i r

y. We will affirm the judg ment of convic tion.
BACK GR OUND At about 7:00 p.m. on October 21, 2007, office rs Robert Mac k and James Craig g of the Killeen police depar tment happene d upon the sce ne of a traff ic ac cident
. An d erson wa s identified to them as the driver of a vehicle that had collided with two other vehic les as they waited2

in a left turn lane . Offic er Cra iggadmi n i s t er ed a fi eld sobriety test and dete rmined Ande rson was intox icated. A nderson wa s arr ested a nd taken into custody

by Craig g . Ander son was take n t o t h e K i l l ee nci t y

j ai l wh er e h e e x p er i en ce d ch es tp ai n s an d

re qu es t edm ed i ca l a t t en t i o n . C ra i gg
acc ompanied Ande rson i n an ambulance to a hospi tal. At the hospital, Craig g direc ted Tra cy Taylor,
a re g ist e re d nur se , to dr aw a blo od sampl e fr om A nd e rs on

to t e st f or the pr e se nc e of

a lc oh ol. After Ander son was indicted for the offe nse of dr iving while intoxicated, he f iled a pretria l motion t o suppress evide nce of the blood test results. The trial court he ld a hea ring on the motion, at which both office rs Mac k and Craig g testified about the arr est and the events surr ounding the taking of t he blood sample at the hos pital. Anderson a lso testified at the hea ring . The trial c ourt denied the motion to suppress and A nderson plea ded guilty to driving w hile i n tox icated. A t the punishment phase, the tria l court hea rd testimony

from the drivers of

eac h of the ve hicles Ande rson hit as we l l as fr om one of Ande rson’s co- worke rs. The c ourt also re viewed a prese ntence investigation report. Punishm ent was assessed at 18 y ear s’ imprisonment. The trial cour t gr anted Ander son’s reque st for per mission t o appea l and this appea l followed.

DI SCU SSIO N Supp re ssion I ssu e I n his fir s t i s s u e , A n derson c ontends that the district court e rre d by denying his motion to s up pr e ss the blo od te st re su lts . We re vie w a ru lin g on a mot ion to s up pr e ss e vid e nc e fo r a bu se of discre tion. Sh e

ph e rd v . S tate , 2 7 3 S
. W
. 3 d 6 8 1 , 6 8 4 (T ex . C ri m . Ap p . 2 0 0 8 ) ( ci t i n g State v. Dixon , 206 S.W .3d 587, 590 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)). We g ive almost total defe renc e to the trial c ourt’s deter mination of historical fac ts and revie w the cour t’s applicatio n o f s ear ch and se izure law thatBe cause the trial cour t denied appe llant’s motion to suppress, we are require d to view the 1 evidenc e in the light most fa vorable to the State, not Anderson. Sta te v . Ke lly , 204 S.W .3d 808, 818 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). 3 does not turn upon cr edibility and deme anor de no v o. Ba le nti nev . S tate , 7 1 S. W. 3 d

7 6 3 , 7 6 8 ( T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 02 ); J

oh ns on v . S

tate , 68 S.W .3d 644, 652-53 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). When the trial court fa ils to m ake e x plicit findings of f act, we revie w t he facts i n the l ight most favor able to the trial court’s de cision and imply fac t findings that support the tr ial court’s r uling so long as the evidenc e
su pp or ts the fi nd ing s. Sta te v . Ke lly , 2 04 S.W. 3d 80 8, 81 8- 19 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 06 ). We m us t 1 aff irm the trial cour

t’s ruling on a motion to suppress if it ca n be upheld on a

ny valid theory

of law
a p p l i c a b l e t o t h e c a s e
— e v e ni f t h e t r i a l c o u rtd i d

n o tb a s e i t s d e c i s i o no nt h a tt h e o r y. State v. Stee lman , 93 S.W. 3d 10 2, 10 7 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 02 ); Ro me ro v . S tate , 800 S.W .2d 539, 543-44 (Te x . Crim. App. 1990).

Ander son contends on appea l that the bl ood sample, which he cla ims was draw n afte r he had f allen asle ep, wa s taken without his co n s en t an d without a war rant. The taking of a blood specimen is conside red a

sear ch and se izure within the meani n g o f t he F ourth Amendment to the United States Constit ution. Se e Sc hm e rb e r v . Ca lif or nia , 384 U.S. 757, 76 6 -6 9 (1 9 6 6); Al iff v . S tate , 6 27 S.W. 2d

16 6, 16 9 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 82 ). Th e Texa s Co ns tit uti on pr oh ibi ts
unre a so na

ble se arches and sei z ur e s. Te x. Con st. art . I , § 9; Re as or v . S tate , 12 S.W .3d 813, 818 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). I n deter mining the r easona

bleness of a s ea rch or seizure, the ac tions of police ar e judg ed by

balanc ing the individual’ s p ri vacy interest ag ainst the State’s intere st in law enfor ceme nt. Gu tie rre

z v . S tate , 221 S.W .3d 680, 685 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Ther e is a “ strong pref ere n ce ” fo r sea

rche s and seizures to be a dminist ere d pursuant to a wa rra nt. Id. (citing4

United States v. Ve ntresca , 3 80 U. S. 1 02, 106 (1 96 5) ). Ho we ve r, “ if po lic e have pr ob a

ble c a us e
c ou ple d w ithan e xig e nt c ir c ums tanc e , o r t he y have ob ta ine d vo lun tary c on se nt, or

the y c on du c t a
sear ch incident to a la

wful ar rest, the F ourth Amendment will tolerate a wa rra ntless searc h.” Id. (c i t i n g Mc Ge e v . S

tate , 105 S.W .3d 609, 615 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003)). The issue be fore the trial cour t was whe ther Ande rson conse nted to the bl ood draw , and whe ther that c onsent was va lid. Consent is valid when it is voluntarily g iven. Ha rri

so n v . S tate , 205 S.W .3d 549, 552 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). The validit y of conse nt is a question of fac t, and the State bear s the burden to pr ove by clea r and c onvinci n g ev i d en ce that consent wa s obtained voluntarily
. Gutierrez , 221 S.W .3d at 686. This burden inc ludes proving that consent wa s not the result of dure ss or coe rcion. Id. To deter mine whether

this burden is met, the court e x amines the totality of the c ircumstance s. Harrison , 205 S.W .3d at 552. I n a suppre ssion h ea ri n g, t h e t rial cour t is the sole trier of f

act a nd judge of the
cre dibilit y

of the witnesses and the weig ht to be g iven their testimony
. Ro me ro , 800 S.W .2d at 543. The trial c ourt may

acc ept or re

ject any or all of a

ny witness’s test i mony . Al v arad o v . S tate , 853 S.W .2d 17, 23 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). At the hearing on the motion to suppress, both officer s inv olv e d in And e rs on ’s arr e st te sti fi e d. Ma c k tes tif ie d that, wh ile he wa s at the ho sp ita l r oo m w ith Ander son, Craig g , and a hospital nurse , Craig g asked A nderson f or consent to dr aw his blood. Mack testified that he he ard A nderson or ally consent to the reque st. Acc ording to Mack, Ande rson was coher ent and a

ble to answe r questions. Mack te stified that “Craig g rea d Ander son his statutory
war nings,” obtained Ande rson’s conse nt, a nd direc ted the nurse to take a blood sample. He stated that ne ith e r h e nor Cr aigg e ithe r t hr e a te ne d A nd e rs on

or pr omi se d h im a

ny thi ngto o bta in h is
co n s en t
. M ac k

t es t i fi edt h a t h e d i d

n o th ea r A n d er s o nwi t h dra w o r r ev o k e h i s co n s en t
. C ra i gg5

testified that he spoke to Anderson at the hospital and obtained his ora l consent to draw a blood sample. He stated that he did not threate n or promise Ande rson any thing to obtain his consent, a nd that Ander son did not revoke his oral consent to provide the sample. By the t ime the officers ha d provided the hospital nurse with the blood draw kit, Ande rson had fallen asleep and was a sleep whe n the sample wa s taken.

An de rs on te sti fi e d that th e of

fi c e rs ne ve r a sk e d h im t o c on se nt t o g ive a blo od sampl e and t h at h e n ever

g ave his c onsent. Ander son testified that he wa s “out the whole time fr om the jailhouse” a

nd had no memory of t alking to the officers at the hos pital. Accor ding to Ande rson, no
on e a sk e d h is p e rm iss ion

to t a ke a blo od sampl e un til the mor

nin g a ft e r h is a

rr e st. The trial c ourt was f

ace d with conflicting testimony reg ardingwhether

or not Ander son consented to the blood dr aw be fore falling aslee p. I f t h e t ri al court’s f indings a re supported by

the re cord, w e will not disturb those findings a bsent an a

buse of discr etion. Can tu v . S

tate , 8 1 7 S
. W
. 2 d 7 4 , 77 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). Havingrevie wed the e vidence , we conclude that it supports the trial c ourt’s implied f inding that Ander son in f

act c onsented to the blood draw
. Although Ander son fell aslee p and was aslee p when the blood was ac tually draw n, he neve r wi thd re w h is c on se nt. Th e tr ia l court did no t abu se its dis c re tio n by de nyingthe mot ion to s up pr e ss. The re cord a lso supports the trial court’s decision on a sepa rate g round. The blood draw was authorized under section 724.011 of the transportation c ode. See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 724.011(a) (West 1999). That section provides that a pe rson ar rested f or driving while intox icated is deemed to have conse nted to the taking of a br eath or blood sample to determine the alcohol
conce ntration in the person’ s body
. Id. An de rs on c on c e de s in

his br ie f t

hat he was un der

arr e st when the blood sa

mple was take n. Even thoug h Ander son fell aslee p afte r the a rre st, the blood draw6

was still authorized. See id. § 724 .0 14 (“ A pe rs on wh o is de a d, un c on sc iou s, or oth e rw ise inc a

pa ble of re fusal is consider ed not to have w ithdrawn the c onsent provided by Section 724.011.”). Ander son contends on appea l that transportation code sections 724.011 and 724.014 as applied to him violate both the United S tates and Texas Cons tituti ons beca use they permitted a blood sample to be dra

wn in violation of his right to privac y , and bec ause the y authoriz e “a

n
unre a so na

ble us e of the po we r t o s e arc h a

nd se ize .” Ad dr e ssi nga

sim ila r argume nt, the Sup re me Court in Schme rber v. California he ld t hat w he n the re is pr ob a

ble c a us e fo r an arr e st, the same fa c ts that established proba

ble ca use j ustify the pol ice in re quiring the per son arr ested to submit a blood
sampl e to t e st h is b loo d- a lc oh ol c on te nt. 38 4 U .S. a t 77 0- 71
. Th e Sup re me Court re a so ne d th a t, i n vie w o f t he c on se qu e nc e s o f d e lay in t a kin g a

blo od te st f or a lc oh ol, and

the tim e ne e de d to investigate the acc ident scene , there was no time to secure a wa rra nt. The Supreme Court c oncluded that when there is a cle ar indication that evidence of intox ication would in fac t be found, the se arc h is an a p p r o p r iate in c id e n t o f the ar rest. Id. The Supreme Court held that a sea rch c onducted by taking a blood sample is re asonable beca use it is an eff

ective me ans of de t er m i ning intoxication, i mp o s e s v i rtu a l l y n o r i s k , t r a u m a , o r p a i n , an d

m ay b e p e r f

o r m e d i na r e a s o n a b l e m an n e r

b y a phy sician or he alth car e p ro v i d er in a hospital. Id. The same result obtains under the Texas Constit ution. Se e Al iff

, 6 27 S.W. 2d

a t 17 0 ( sc op e of

Ar tic le I , Se c tio n 9 of

Te xas C on sti tut ion

is
c oe xten siv e with t

hat of F ourt h A me ndme nt t o U nit e d St a te s Co ns tit uti on ); Kni

sle yv . S tate , 81 S.W .3d 478, 483 (Tex. A pp.—Dallas 2002, pet. re f’d) (statutes dictatingrequire ments nece ssary for law ful taking of blood construe d to supplement, not reduce , constitutional constraints). Under the Texas Constit ution, the warrantless taking of a blood sample i s not an unreasonable sear ch and seizure so long as proba

ble ca use to a rre st e x ists, the method of extraction is rea sonable, a nd thereWe view appe llant’s complaint as cha lleng ing the trial court’ s failure to, on its own motion, 2 sug g est that he may

be incompete nt to stand trial. SeeTex. Code Crim. P roc. A nn. art. 46B .004(b) (West 2006). 7 are exigent cir cumstance s—in this case t he consequenc es of a delay in taking the blood sample. See Al iff , 627 S.W .2d at 170. We r ejec t Anderson’ s constitutional challeng e to these pr ovisions of the transportation code. Ande rson’s first issue is over ruled.
Anderson ’s Com

petency I nh i s s ec o n d

i s s u e, An d er s o ncl ai m s t h at d u ri n g t h e p l eaan d

s en t en ci n g h ea ri n g, evidenc e wa s broug ht to the trial court’s attention reg arding his mental incompetenc e. He contends that the trial court err ed by not c onducting a “full and suff icient inquiry

into whether or

not [ he] was competent to stand trial.” T h e c o d e o f cr i m i n al p ro ce d u re p ro h i b i t s a t ri al co u rt fr o m ac ce p t i n g a 2 g uilty plea “ unless it appear s that the defe ndant is mentally competent.” Tex. Code Crim. P roc. A nn. art. 26.13(b) (West 2009). A def endant must also be menta lly competent to b e s en t en ce d
. See Cas e yv . S tate , 924 S. W .2d 946, 949 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (sentenc ing is pa rt of trial a

nd competenc y considerations a pply). A defe ndant is pr esumed competent and shall b e f o und competent to stand trial unless proven incompetent by a preponde ranc e of the e vidence
. See T e x. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. ar t. 46B.003 (West 2 0 0 6 ). A defe ndant is incompetent to stand trial if he does not have (1) suff

icient pre sent ability

to consult with his attorney with a re asonable deg ree of
ratio na l un de rs tand ing , o r ( 2) ra tio na l a s w e ll a s f

a c tua l un de rs tand ingof th e proc e e din g s a g a ins t him. Id. art. 46B .003(a)
.

I f, duringtrial, evidenc e is broug ht to the attention of the trial cour t from any

source rais in g a b o n a f id e d o u b t a s to th e d e f

e n d an t’ s c o mp e te n c y , th e c o u rt m u s t, o nit s o w nmo ti on,8

sug g est that the def

endant may

be incompete nt to stand t ri al an d deter mine by informal inquiry whether there is some evidence to support a finding of incompete nce. Id. art. 46B.004( b ), (c ); Mo nto y a v . S tate , 2 91 S .W .3d 4 20 , 4 25 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 09 ). A tri a l ju dg e mus t c on du c t a competenc y

inquiry only if sufficie nt evidence exis ts to create a bona fide doubt in the judg e’s mind
as to whether the acc used meets the test of leg al compete nce. Montoya , 291 S.W .3d at 425. A bona fide doubt may exis t if the defendant ex hibits truly bizarre behavior or has a rec ent hi story of seve re mental illness or at lea st moderate me ntal reta rdation. Id. We r e vie w a tr ia l c ourt ’s fa ilure to conduct a competenc y

inquiry under a n abuse of discretion standa rd. Mo or e v . S

tate , 999 S.W .2d 385, 393 (Tex. Crim. App. 1 9 9 9 ). A t ri al court a buses its discretion if its decision is arbitrar y or
unrea sonable. Le wis v . S tate , 911 S.W .2d 1, 7 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). Ander son claims that the following should ha ve raised a bona fide doubt in the trial court’s mind as to his competenc y : (1) Ande rson’s own de nial when a sked by the cour t whether he
w a s me n ta ll y

c o mp e te n t t o p r o c e e d

an d w h e th e r h e b e li e v e d

h e w a s me n ta ll y sound; (2) a prese ntence investigation report indicatingthat a psy chiatrist had diag nosed Ande rson with att e ntion defic it hy pera ctivity

disorder a

nd that Ander son had take n various medica tions; and (3) Ande rson’s behavior at the sente ncing hear ing which he c ontends was “ bizarre a nd showed that he was c onfused and unce rtain what was g oing on.”

We first consider A nderson’ s claim that he de nied his competenc y to proce ed. The fo l l o wi n g co l l o qu y

t o o k p l ac e du ri n g t h e p l eah ea ri n g:
The Court: A n d

ar e yo um e n t a l l y c o mp e t e n tt o p r o c e e d t o c o u rtt o d ay? Defendan t: No.9

The Court: Me nta lly

c omp e te nt? No t inc omp e te nt. Ar e y ou me nta lly so un d, me nta lly sane? Are y ou insane? Defendan t: No. No. The Court: Start

—s top the re . L e t’ s sta

rt a g a in. Do y ou be lie ve y ou are me nta lly sound? Defendan t: No. The Court: No. Okay . Do y ou believe that y ou are insane? Defendan t: No. The Court: Do y ou believe that y ou are incompetent? That means that y ou don’t

have the us e of

y our m e nta l f

a c ult ie s, y ou ’r e no t a

ble to d isc us s w ith y our lawy er thi s ca s e, y ou don’t understa nd what y ou’re char g ed with? Are y ou—are y ou not of sound mind? Okay
. Do y ou have a ny me nta l di ff

ic ult ie s o r i mpa ir

me nt? Defendan t: No . N o, ma ’a m. The Court: Do y ou understand what y ou are char g ed with? Defendan t: Ye s, ma ’a m. The Court: You understand and are able to communicate with y our lawy er a bout any possible defe n s es y ou might have , about y our rig hts to have a tr ia l, t o p art ic ipate . Y ou

un de rs tand

a ll o f t hat? Defendan t: Ye s. The Court: I s there a

ny rea son to t h i n k t h at y o u are not mentally sound or of s o u n d m i n d t o d ay? Defendan t: No.
Con sid e re d in

c on te xt, A nd e rs on ’s state me nt t hat he is n ot c omp e te nt a pp e ars to r e su lt f

ro m hi s confusion about the qu es t i o n . After further inquiry , Ander son stated that he ha d no mental imp a ir me nt, tha t he un de rs too d w hat he wa s c ha rg e d w ith , a

nd wa s a ble to c omm

un ic a te wi th h is10

lawy er. A t t h e end of

the questioning , he conf

irmed that there was no re ason to think he was not mentally sound or of sound mind at the ti me of the ple a hea ring . After

questioning A nderson, the
c ourt a sk e d A nd e rs on ’s a tto rn e y wh e the r h e a g re e d th a t And e rs on wa s me nta lly

so un d a nd me nta lly
c omp e te nt. An de rs on ’s a tto rn e y a g re e d th a t he wa s, a ft e r whic h th e c ourt fo un d A nd e rs on

me nta lly competent. Eve n if Ander son had co n t i n u ed t o i nsist that he was not compete nt, that assertion, unsupported by any fac ts or evidenc e, is not sufficient by itself to require a compe tency inquiry
. See Mc Da nie l v . S

tate , 98 S.W .3d 704, 711 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). Ander son next argues that there was suff icient evidenc e of i n co m p etency in the prese ntence investigation report to require the judge to hold a compe tency inquiry . The pre sentenc e investigation report wa s not made par t of the re cord. Howeve r, even assuming the repor t included
e vid e n c e t h a tA n d e r s o nh a d b e e nt r e a t e d

b y a p s y c h i a t r i s t , d i a g n o s e d

w i t h a t t e n t i o nd e f

i c it hy pera ctivity

disorder, a

nd had taken various medications, such evidence does not raise a bona f ide doubt as to his competency . The mer e fac t that a defe ndant has been tr eate d by a psy chiatrist does not constitute evidence of present incompetenc y

to stand trial. Montoya , 291 S.W .3d at 425 (noting that st a tut e fo c us e s o n d e fe nd ant’s pr e se nt a bil ity ); Thomson v . S

tate , 915 S.W .2d 897, 902 (Tex. App.—Houston [1s t Dist.] 1996, pet. ref’d). The re levant conside rations ar e the de fenda nt’s level of under standing of the proc eeding s and ability to consult with counsel. Montoya , 291 S.W .3d at 425. Past mental hea lth i s s u es , i n cl u d ing pr ior issues with side eff ects of me dication, ra ise the iss ue of inc omp e te nc y

on ly if there is evide nc e of

re c e nt s e ve re me nta l il lne ss, a t le a st m od e rate mental reta

rdation, or bizarre acts by the defe ndant. Id. The re cord in this case includes no such
e v i d e n c e r a i s i n g a

b o n a f i d e d o u b ta b o u tA n d e r s o n ’ s c o mp e t e n c y.11 Finally , we consider Anderson’s conduc t at the sentenc ing he aring . At the hea ring An de rs on state d th a t he was “ti red, ” that he did no t be lie ve that th e c ourt c ou ld e nh anc e his punishment with a prior fe lony , that h e d i d not rea liz e that evide nce w ould be pre sented at the
se nte nc inghe ari ng , a

nd that he int e nd e d to fi le an ap pe a l eve n thou g h he ha d p re vio us ly a g re e d to waive that rig ht. A nderson’ s conduct and comments wer e neither bizarre nor evidenc e of c onfusion
or unce rtainty

sufficie nt to raise a bona fide doubt about his mental compe tency
. R at her, the y demonstrate f

rustration with the proce ss and dissatisfaction with a long er se ntence than anticipate d. Ander son did not demonstrate an ina bility to co n s u l t wi t h his lawy er w ith a rea sonable de g ree of
ra t i o n al u n d er s t an d i n g o r c re at e are al d o u b tt h ath e p o s s es s ed an u n d er s t an d i n g o f t h e p ro ce ed i n gs ag ainst him. Unde r these f acts, the tria l court did not err in failing to conduct a f

ormal compe tency inquiry . We overrule Ander son’s second issue.
CO NC LU SION Havingoverr

uled Ander son’s two appe llate iss u es , we a ffirm the judg ment of conviction.

_______ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _____________ David Pury ear , J ustice Be fore Chief J ustice Jones, J ustices Pury ear and He nson Affir med Filed: August 26, 2010 Do No t Pu

bli sh