alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### JAMES E. BOTTORFF, Petitioner, v. THOMAS J. O’DONNELL, DISTRICT JUDGE, EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent.

No. 12431

July 29, 1980

614 P.2d 7

*L. Earl Hawley,*Las Vegas, for Petitioner.

*Donald W. Haley,*Las Vegas, for Respondent.

*607OPINION

*Per Curiam:*

In this original proceeding, petitioner seeks a writ of mandate directed to the district court requiring that summary judgment in his favor be granted. *See*Dzack v. Marshall, 80 Nev. 345, 393 P.2d 610 (1964); NRAP 3A(b)(5).

From the limited record before us, it appears that petitioner and his ex-wife, while married, purchased a home. As part of the subsequent divorce decree, the ex-wife was awarded the house and agreed to assume all the obligations on it. However, no effort was made to change the title.

Subsequently the house was sold. Due to a failure to detect a mortgage on the house, First American Title Company of Nevada, the escrow agent/title insurance company, issued a check made out to both petitioner and his ex-wife for an amount approximately $15,000 in excess of the correct payment. Upon discovery of the outstanding obligation, the title insurance company paid off the amount due and thereafter brought an action against petitioner and his ex-wife, as co-defendants, to recover the sum.

Petitioner moved the district court for summary judgment. In support of the motion, petitioner filed an affidavit stating in essence that while he was required to sign papers in order to complete the sale, he had received none of the sale proceeds. The motion was also supported by a copy of the divorce decree. In opposition to the motion, the title insurance company submitted the affidavit of one of its officers which stated that the check issued by the insurer was made out to and endorsed by both defendants.

Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy. The normal judicial process is trial and appeal, not final adjudication on pre-trial writs. Generally, a petitioner must show that continuation of the proceedings would be an exercise in futility, and that the litigation, irrespective of what may transpire at trial, is foreordained to its inevitable conclusion. Where such a showing is made, this court will not hesitate to cut off the district court proceedings, the continuation of which would be both expensive and meaningless. But the burden on the petitioner is a *608heavy one; where such a petition is granted, the relevant facts are not in dispute and a clear question of law, dispositive of the suit, is presented. *See, e.g.,*Ash Springs Dev. v. O’Donnell, 95 Nev. 846, 603 P.2d 698 (1979) (writ granted where it was determined that action, on agreed facts, was barred by the statute of limitations), Dzack v. Marshall, *supra*(dispositive facts deemed admitted). Such is not the case here.

Writ denied.
#### ATKINS v. BURDEN

No. 14 PC.

Case below: 31 N.C. App. 660.

Petition by respondent for discretionary review under G.S. 7A-31 denied 31 January 1977.
#### John M. VOLKERT, Appellant, v. Michael O. LEAVITT, Secretary of Health and Human Services,1 Appellee.

No. 04-1691.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted April 7, 2005.

Decided April 12, 2005.

Wayne B. Holstad, Holstad & Knaak, St. Paul, MN, for Appellant.

Perry F. Sekus, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Minneapolis, MN, for Appellee.

Before MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, FAGG, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

1

. Michael O. Leavitt has been appointed to serve as Secretary of Health and Human Services, and is substituted as appellee pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c).

PER CURIAM.

In this action for Medicare reimbursement for home health care expenses for periods in 1996 and 1998, John Volkert appeals the district court’s2 order granting summary judgment in favor of the Secretary of the United States Department of Health and Human Services. Following careful review, we agree with the district court that Volkert cannot seek review in federal court of unexhausted Medicare claims for reimbursement for his home health care expenses for the period April 18 to November 30, 1996. *See Weinberger v. Salfi,*422 U.S. 749, 764, 95 S.Ct. 2457, 45 L.Ed.2d 522 (1975); *Anderson v. Sullivan,*959 F.2d 690, 692-93 (8th Cir.1992). Jurisdiction to review Volkert’s related due process argument is also lacking, because it is inextricably intertwined with, if not identical to, his claim for benefits. *See Heckler v. Ringer,*466 U.S. 602, 605, 610-15, 104 S.Ct. 2013, 80 L.Ed.2d 622 (1984). As to Volkert’s unsuccessful claim for Medicare benefits for November 1998 home health care services, we decline to consider his constitutional challenge, raised for the first time on appeal, to the definition of “intermittent” found in 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(m). *See Liberty State Bank v. Minn. Life and, Health Ins. Guar. Ass’n,*149 F.3d 832, 834 (8th Cir.1998).

Like the district court, we find substantial evidence supports the denial of Medicare benefits. *See*42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (standard of review); 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff(b)(l) (incorporating § 405(g)).

Accordingly, we affirm.

2

. The Honorable John R. Tunheim, United States District Judge for the District of Minnesota, adopting the report and recommendations of the Honorable Janie S. Mayeron, United States Magistrate Judge for the District of Minnesota.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 98-6847

JOHN PATRICK MCSHEFFREY,

Petitioner - Appellant,

versus

MARK A. HENRY, Warden,

Respondent - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

Maryland, at Baltimore. Andre M. Davis, District Judge. (CA-98-

1543-AMD)

Submitted: September 10, 1998 Decided: September 24, 1998

Before MURNAGHAN, MICHAEL, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

John Patrick McSheffrey, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Appellant appeals the district court’s orders denying relief

on his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1994) petition and denying his motion for

reconsideration. We have reviewed the record and the district

court’s opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we

affirm on the reasoning of the district court. McSheffrey v. Henry,

No. CA-98-1543-AMD (D. Md. May 22 & June 2, 1998). We dispense with

oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would

not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
Exhibit 32

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of
Telos Corporation (the Company) on Form 10-K for the year ending December 31, 2009 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), we, John B. Wood and Michele Nakazawa, certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to our knowledge:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of
the Company.



Date: March 31, 2010/s/ John B. WoodJohn B. WoodChief Executive OfficerDate: March 31, 2010/s/ Michele NakazawaMichele NakazawaChief Financial Officer




85
UNITED STATES NAVY–MARINE CORPS

COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

_________________________

No. 201700126

_________________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Appellee

v.

JOSEPH A. KERBEIN

Quartermaster First Class (E-6), U.S. Navy

Appellant

_________________________

Appeal from the United States Navy-Marine Corps Trial Judiciary

Military Judge: Commander Arthur L. Gaston III, JAGC, USN.

Convening Authority: Commanding Officer, Afloat Training Group 

MIDPAC, Pearl Harbor, HI.

Staff Judge Advocate’s Recommendation: Lieutenant Junior Grade

Jared M. Janes, JAGC, USN.

For Appellant: Major Jason L. Morris, USMCR.

For Appellee: Brian K. Keller, Esq.

_________________________

Decided 29 June 2017

_________________________

Before MARKS, RUGH, and JONES, Appellate Military Judges

_________________________

After careful consideration of the record, submitted without assignment of 

error, we affirm the findings and sentence as approved by the convening 

authority. Art. 66(c), Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 866(c). 

For the Court

R.H. TROIDL

Clerk of Court
[Federal Register Volume 70, Number 216 (Wednesday, November 9, 2005)]
[Notices]
[Page 68129]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 05-22339]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY


Submission for OMB Review; Comment Request

November 2, 2005.
    The Department of the Treasury has submitted the following public 
information collection requirement(s) to OMB for review and clearance 
under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, Public Law 104-13. Copies of 
the submission(s) may be obtained by calling the Treasury Bureau 
Clearance Officer listed. Comments regarding this information 
collection should be addressed to the OMB reviewer listed and to the 
Treasury Department Clearance Officer, Department of the Treasury, Room 
11000, 1750 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW., Washington, DC 20220.
    Dates: Written comments should be received on or before December 9, 
2005 to be assured of consideration.

Internal Revenue Service (IRS)

    OMB Number: 1545-1788.
    Type of Review: Extension.
    Title: Taxpayer Advocacy Panel (TAP) Membership Application.
    Form: IRS form 13013C.
    Description: An application to volunteer to serve on the Taxpayer 
Advocacy Panel, an advisory panel to the IRS.
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Revenue Service, Room 6516, 1111 Constitution Avenue, NW., Washington, 
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Management and Budget, Room 10235, New Executive Office Building, 
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Michael A. Robinson,
Treasury PRA Clearance Officer.
[FR Doc. 05-22339 Filed 11-8-05; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4830-01-P
WARNING: THE EDGAR SYSTEM ENCOUNTERED ERROR(S) WHILE PROCESSING THIS SCHEDULE.

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Intro

Youth with Disabilities Entering the Workplace 

through Apprenticeship

U.S. Department of Labor presents:

About this Tool Kit: 

This tool kit was developed under contract with the U.S. Department of Labor’s Office of 

Disability Employment Policy. A companion research paper was also prepared that examined 

issues surrounding apprenticeship and people with disabilities. A number of experts in the 

apprenticeship, disability and youth development fields were consulted in the preparation of 

both of these documents. Their assistance is greatly appreciated. 

The purpose of the tool kit is to provide information on a series of topical areas around 

registered apprenticeship and how it can be used to provide employment opportunities for 

people with disabilities. The intended audiences for this tool kit are service providers, both 

public and private, that work with young people, including young people with disabilities. 

As such, a variety of service providers should find this useful, including youth workforce 

development professionals, vocational rehabilitation service providers, other disability service 

providers, including community rehabilitation providers, One-Stop Career Center personnel, and 

high school personnel that work with youth on post-secondary transition planning. Although 

the emphasis is on young people with disabilities, much of the information is applicable to all 

youth and young adults.
Office of Disability 

Employment Policy

U.S. Department of Labor

200 Constitution Ave., NW

Washington, DC 20210

Voice 

1-866-ODEP-DOL (633-7365) 

TTY 

1-877-889-5627

www.dol.gov/odep

Youth with Disabilities Entering the Workplace through Apprenticeship - Tool Kit Introduction

The tool kit is organized by the 

following six topical areas:

1. Understanding Apprenticeship Basics

2. Preparing Youth and Young Adults for 

Apprenticeship Programs

3. Increasing Participation of Young Adults with 

Disabilities In Apprenticeship Programs

4. Establishing New Apprenticeship Programs

5. What Apprenticeship Employers Need to 

Know About Working with Young Adults with 

Disabilities

6. Looking to Future Opportunities in 

Apprenticeship

Each of the guide sheets in this tool kit has three sections: 1) An Overview, which introduces 

the topic; 2) What You Need to Know, which provides content information on the topic; and 3) 

Where to Go for More Information, which provides additional web-based resources. The guide 

sheets, which collectively provide a comprehensive resource on registered apprenticeship, can 

also be used individually. Some information is repeated to facilitate individual use. Users of 

this guide should feel free to distribute it in its entirety or in parts. For example, the guide 

sheet “What Apprenticeship Employers Need to Know about Working with Young Adults with 

Disabilities” may serve as a suitable stand-alone handout for employers. 

Tool kit prepared by: Irene Lynn, Institute for Educational Leadership - Dominique Mack, HeiTech Services
#### James MCALPHIN, Appellant, v. Jan ALEXANDER, Nurse, Varner Super Max, ADC, originally sued as “Alexander”; Rebecca Johnston, Nurse, Maximum Security Unit, ADC, originally sued as “Johnston”, Appellees.

No. 04-1878.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted Dec. 23, 2005.

Decided Feb. 7, 2005.

*86James McAlphin, Grady, AR, pro se.

James Michael Lewis, Humphries Law Firm, Pine Bluff, AR, for Defendants-Appellees.

Before RILEY, MCMILLIAN, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Arkansas inmate James McAlphin appeals from the final judgment entered in the District Court1 for the Eastern District of Arkansas dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action after an evidentiary hearing. McAlphin claimed that defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

After careful review of the record, we agree with the district court that McAlphin failed to show defendants disregarded his serious medical needs. *See Jolly v. Knudsen,*205 F.3d 1094, 1096 (8th Cir.2000) (Eighth Amendment standard). Instead, the medical records show that, although McAlphin tested positive for tuberculosis in 1995, he received drug therapy treatment for it, he was evaluated annually, and his 2002 and 2003 x-rays and sputum tests showed that the disease was not active. Moreover, although he also tested positive for both e-coli and H. pylori, one defendant testified that McAlphin experienced no harm from the e-coli and that she afforded him standard and successful treatment for H. pylori. *See Logan v. Clarke,*119 F.3d 647, 649-50 (8th Cir.1997) (prison doctors were not deliberately indifferent because they treated prisoner on numerous occasions and offered sensible medication and treatment).

Accordingly, we affirm. *See*8th Cir. R. 47A(a).

1

. The Honorable William R. Wilson, Jr., United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Arkansas, adopting the report and recommendations of the Honorable Jerry W. Cavaneau, United States Magistrate Judge for the Eastern District of Arkansas.
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<PAGE>

                                                                     EXHIBIT 12


                               POWER OF ATTORNEY

     KNOW ALL PERSONS BY THESE PRESENTS, that each person whose signature
appears below constitutes and appoints SHARON NITKA as his true and lawful
attorney-in-fact and agent, with full power of substitution and
resubstitution, for him and in his name, place and stead, in any and all
capacities, to sign NURESCELL INC.'S Form 10-KSB report for the year ended
March 31, 2000 and any and all amendments thereto, and to file the same, with
all exhibits thereto, and other documents in connection therewith, with the
Securities and Exchange Commission, granting unto said attorney-in-fact and
agent full power and authority to do and perform each and every act and thing
requisite and necessary to be done in connection therewith, as fully to all
intents and purposes as he might or could do in person and hereby ratifying
and confirming all that said attorney-in-fact and agent, or her substitute or
substitutes, may lawfully do or cause to be done by virtue hereof.

<TABLE>
<CAPTION>

SIGNATURE                      TITLE                                               DATE

<S>                            <C>                                                 <C>
/s/ WILLIAM A. WILSON          President and Chairman of the Board                 July 5, 2000
---------------------
William A. Wilson

/s/ SHELBY T. BREWER           Director                                            July 5, 2000
--------------------
Shelby T. Brewer

/s/ JOHN R. LONGENECKER        Director and Vice President - Operations            July 5, 2000
-----------------------
John R. Longenecker

/s/ ADRIAN A. JOSEPH           Chief Executive Officer                             July 5, 2000
--------------------
Adrian A. Joseph

/s/ ROBERT MERRIMAN            Director                                            July 5, 2000
-------------------
Robert Merriman

</TABLE>
#### J. W. McCLELLAN v. JACK BYRON COX.

(Filed 7 November 1962.)

Appeal by defendant from *Gambill, J.,*February Mixed Term 1962 Of UNION.

This is a civil action that arose out of property damage sustained by the plaintiff in an automobile accident that occurred about 11:50 *98a.m. on 23 September 1960 on U. S. Highway No. 29 in Davidson County, about three miles south of Lexington, near Yarborough’s Restaurant.

U. S. Highway No. 29 is a four-lane highway and runs generally in a northerly-southerly direction. The northbound lanes and the southbound lanes are separated by a grassed median. The collision occurred while both ears were being operated in a northerly direction. The highway was dry and was slightly downhill at that point; the speed limit was 60 miles per hour.

The plaintiff was the owner and operator of a 1955 Plymouth automobile and the defendant was the owner and operator of a 1957 Plymouth automobile. Defendant Cox was in front in the right-hand lane, traveling about 45 miles per hour. Plaintiff was in the left-hand or passing lane and had just passed a large truck, which truck was in the right-hand lane and behind defendant’s automobile. When the plaintiff was approximately 80 or 90 feet of a cross-over between the north and southbound lanes, and defendant’s automobile was about 40 feet in front of him, the defendant without giving any signal began slowing down and cut across to his left lane directly in front of plaintiff’s car, apparently with the intention of going into the cross-over. Plaintiff immediately applied his brakes but could not stop before he ran into the rear of defendant’s automobile.

The case was submitted to the jury on plaintiff’s alleged cause of action for damages to his car and on the cross-action by defendant for personal injuries and damages to his car.

The jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff and judgment was accordingly entered.

The defendant appeals, assigning error.

*Coble Funderburk for 'plaintiff appellee.*

*Smith & Griffin for defendant appellant.*

Per Curiam.

We have carefully examined the defendant’s assignments of error and in our opinion they present no prejudicial error that would justify granting a new trial.

On the evidence presented, the case of *Simmons v. Rogers,*247 N.C. 340, 100 S.E. 2d 849, supports the result reached in the trial below.

No error.