NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 v. 

ISAIAH SMALLWOOD JACKSON, 

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 19-50301 

D.C. No. 

3:18-cr-01805-BAS-1 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of California

Cynthia A. Bashant, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted June 8, 2021

Pasadena, California

Before: GRABER, CALLAHAN, and FORREST, Circuit Judges.

At 9:00 p.m. on September 21, 2017, officers knocked on the door to Isaiah 

Smallwood Jackson’s home and when, in response, he stepped out of his home, 

they arrested him. The officers had probable cause to believe that Jackson had 

sexually exploited a minor. Jackson was subsequently convicted of sexual 

exploitation of a minor. On appeal, he argues that his confession and evidence 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

FILED

JUN 22 2021

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
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from his cell phone should have been suppressed and that the government failed to 

prove the interstate commerce element of the charge. We affirm.

“We review de novo the district court’s ruling on a motion to suppress and 

review the underlying factual findings for clear error.” United States v. Evans, 786 

F.3d 779, 784 (9th Cir. 2015). Jackson is correct that, pursuant to United States v. 

Lundin, 817 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2016), the officers were not authorized to knock 

on his door without a warrant with the intent to arrest him. However, the Supreme 

Court has held that “where the police have probable cause to arrest a suspect, the 

exclusionary rule does not bar the [the government’s] use of a statement made by 

the defendant outside of his home, even though the statement is taken after an 

arrest made in the home in violation of [Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 

(1980)].” New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 21 (1990); see also Hudson v. 

Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006) (holding that a violation of the knock-andannounce rule does not necessarily require the suppression of all evidence found in 

the search). On appeal, Jackson does not contest that at the police station he 

waived his Miranda rights and admitted that he met the victim and engaged in a 

sexual act. 

Even where the government has not raised harmlessness we may consider 

whether an error is harmless. United States v. Gonzalez-Flores, 418 F.3d 1093, 

1100-01 (9th Cir. 2005). We held “that sua sponte recognition of an error’s 
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harmlessness is appropriate only where the harmlessness of the error is not 

reasonably debatable.” Id. at 1101.

Here, excluding the evidence from the search of Jackson’s cell phone, there

remained overwhelming evidence of Jackson’s guilt. The jury heard the victim’s 

testimony, evidence from the victim’s cell phone, testimony from the officers 

involved in the case, and Jackson’s confession. The victim testified to the acts for 

which Jackson was convicted, and Jackson admitted those acts. Both the victim 

and Jackson stated that, before the assault, they had communicated only by cell 

phone, using an Internet app. Thus, it is beyond debate that the admission of 

materials from Jackson’s cell phone was harmless error.

Jackson’s challenges to the evidence and jury instructions concerning the 

interstate commerce element of the charges are not persuasive, as we have held 

that the Internet is an instrument of, and intimately related to, interstate commerce. 

United States v. Sutcliffe, 505 F.3d 944, 952–53 (9th Cir. 2007); United States v. 

Costanzo, 956 F.3d 1088, 1092 (9th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 931 (2020).

AFFIRMED.