NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

File Name: 14a0831n.06

No. 14-5079

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

PATRICIA ELLEN BOWEN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,

Defendant-Appellee.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED 

STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 

THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF 

TENNESSEE

BEFORE: SILER, SUTTON, and McKEAGUE, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. Patricia Ellen Bowen appeals the district court’s judgment affirming the 

denial of her application for disability insurance benefits.

In 2009, Bowen filed an application for disability insurance benefits, alleging that she 

became disabled on May 10, 2005. After the Social Security Administration denied the 

application, Bowen requested a hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ). The ALJ 

denied Bowen relief, and the Appeals Council declined to review the case. The district court 

affirmed the denial of Bowen’s application.

On appeal, Bowen raises three arguments: (1) the ALJ erred by discounting the medical 

opinion of her treating physician; (2) the ALJ erred by concluding that her testimony was not 

fully credible; and (3) the ALJ erred by concluding that she retained the residual functional 

capacity (RFC) to perform light work. “Our review of the ALJ’s decision is limited to whether 
No. 14-5079

Bowen v. Soc. Sec. Admin.

- 2 -

the ALJ applied the correct legal standards and whether the findings of the ALJ are supported by 

substantial evidence.” Blakley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399, 405 (6th Cir. 2009). “The 

substantial-evidence standard is met if a reasonable mind might accept the relevant evidence as 

adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. at 406 (internal quotation marks omitted). “We give de 

novo review to the district court’s conclusions on each issue.” Id.

Bowen first argues that the ALJ erred by discounting the medical opinion of her treating 

physician, Dr. Denise Dingle, that Bowen had significant work-related physical impairments. A 

medical opinion from a treating source must be given controlling weight if it is well-supported 

by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and not inconsistent with 

other substantial evidence in the record. Gayheart v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 710 F.3d 365, 376 

(6th Cir. 2013). If not given controlling weight, the ALJ must weigh the treating source’s 

opinion based on the nature of the treatment relationship, the specialization of the medical 

source, and the consistency and supportability of the opinion. Id. 

Substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s decision to discount Dr. Dingle’s medical 

opinion. Dingle made her assessment of Bowen’s physical limitations nearly two years after the 

period relevant to the disability determination, and she failed to specifically identify when the

alleged limitations began and the extent to which the limitations were present during the relevant 

period. In addition, Dingle’s conclusion that Bowen had significant physical limitations 

conflicted with her treatment notes and the other medical evidence in the record, which generally 

demonstrated that Bowen’s physical condition was stable and that she was not suffering from 

debilitating physical impairments.

Bowen next argues that the ALJ erred by concluding that her testimony concerning the 

extent of her impairments was not fully credible. We accord great weight and deference to an 
No. 14-5079

Bowen v. Soc. Sec. Admin.

- 3 -

ALJ’s credibility finding, but such a finding must be supported by substantial evidence. Walters 

v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 531 (6th Cir. 1997). The ALJ could reasonably discount 

Bowen’s testimony that she had severe physical impairments, given the lack of supporting 

medical evidence, the evidence that she engaged in significant activities of daily living, and the 

fact that she refused to comply with the advice of her physician to wear a compression garment

as an important part of her treatment. Thus, the ALJ’s credibility determination was supported 

by substantial evidence.

Finally, Bowen argues that the ALJ erred by concluding that she retained the exertional

capacity to perform light work. Given that Bowen performed light or medium work until the 

alleged onset date of disability and that there is no credible medical evidence or testimony 

showing that she subsequently developed limitations precluding light work, substantial evidence 

supported the ALJ’s RFC determination.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.