No. 2-- 06--0897 Fil ed: 5-16-07

______________________________________________________________________________ IN THE APP ELL ATE C OURT

OF IL LINO IS SECOND DI STRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ In re MARR IAGE OF ) Ap peal f rom th e Ci rcui t Court MARY BETH SING EL, ) o f La ke Co un t y. ) Petitioner-A

ppelle e, ) ) and ) No. 03-- D--1130 ) THOM AS J . SINGEL

II, ) Ho no r ab le ) Diane E. W

i nter, Re sp on den

t-A pp el l an t. ) Judge, Presi din g.

______________________________________________________________________________ JU STI CECA

LL UM de l i v ered th e op i n i on of th e c our t: Re sp on den

t, T ho mas J. Sin ge l II , ap pe als fr o m an o r de rde nying his mo t io n fo rad dit io na l t ime in which t o file a p os t

judg ment motion un

der section 2--1203(a) of the Code of Ci vi l Procedure (735 ILCS 5/ 2- -1 20 3( a) (West 20 04 )) a gai n st a j udgm en t diss ol v i n g h i s m ar riag e to peti

tion er, Ma ry Beth Sin ge l. We ag r ee wit h p et it io ne rt ha t we lac k ju r isd ict io n, an d w e d ismis s t he ap pe al. On April 3, 2006, the trial

court entered a

judgm ent disso lving the par t ies' marr iage a nd re so lving all of the is sues rai sed by

petitioner' s di ssolution petition. Thi rty days later, o n May

2, 2006, res pon dent f i l ed a " Moti on f or Ex ten si on of Ti me f or F i l i ng of Motion to Reco nsi

derJud gment of Apri l 3, 2006." The m

ot ion a ll eged that, o n May

1, 2006, respondent retained n ew counsel

and th at, because

counsel had not yet recei

ved the cas e fi

le from the previous att orney or revi ewed t he trial trans cri pts, he coul

d not f i l e a postju

dgm en t motion wi

thi n the 30-d ay l i m i t of se cti on 2--1 203(a

). Citing Supreme Court Rule 183 (134 Ill. 2d R. 183), the motion requested an ex t en sio n o f t ime inNo. 2-- 06--0897

1 The tria l court's order al so gran ted peti tion er' s postdi

ssol uti on petiti

on f or a ru l e to sh

ow cause agai

nst respondent and a

ll owed her t o file a pe t it io n fo rt he at t o rne y fee s t ha t she inc ur r ed in br in ging t he

pe ti ti on. Th e ord

er s tate d that there

wa s n o j us t rea son

to de l ay the en f orce men t or appe al of the pa rt of the orde r de ny i ng res pon dent' s m oti on f ormore tim

e i n wh ic h to file a moti on to recons i der the di ssol

uti on j udgm

en t. See 21 0 Il

l . 2d R. 3 04(a). -2- whi ch t o file a mo t ion t o r ec o nsid er th e j udgm

en t. Res pon den t di d n ot actual l y f i l e a moti on to recon sider the j udgm

en t, ei ther wi thi n 30 day s or at an y tim e the reaf ter. On June 8, 2006, pet itio ner re spo nded t o t he mot ion. Sh e c o nt en de d fir st t ha t Ru le 1 83 did not app ly to t he t ime li

mit set by sect ion 2
-- 120 3( a) and t hu s c o uld no t en ab le r es po nd en t t o o bt ain an ex tens i on. Pe t it ioner obs er ved t hat , u nder sec t ion 2
-- 120 3( a) , a po st judg ment mo t ion must be f i l ed "wi thi n 3 0 da y s af ter th e entr y of t he jud gme nt o rwit hin

an y f urth er ti me the c ourt m

ay al l ow wit hin the 30 day s or any

extensi ons thereof." 735 ILCS 5/2--1203(a) (West 2004). She contended th at, beca use re spo ndent ha d n eit he rfiled a p o st jud gme nt mo t io n no ro bt ain ed an ex t en sio n w it hin 30 day s af ter the e ntry o f t he disso lut ion jud gment , t he t rial co ur t lacke d jur isdict ion t o g ra nt t he ext ens io n o r a ny o t her re lief. On August 15, 2006, t he t rial co ur t "de nied" r esp ond ent 's mot ion. The court hel d that it had lostjur isd ict io n o ve rt he ca se be ca us e n o pr o pe rpo st jud gme nt mo t io n ha d b ee n file d w it hin 30 da ys of th e j udgm

en t. 1 On Se pt emb er 12 , 20 06 , r es po nd en t filed a n o t ice o f ap pe al. We m ust dismi ss t his ap pe al a s u nt imel y. A not ice o f app eal fro m a final j udg ment mu st be fi le d wit hin 30 d ays aft er t he ent ry o f the j udgm en t or, if a timely m

ot ion d irect ed a gainst t he judg ment is fil

ed, wit hin 30 d ays aft er t he ent ry o f the or der dispo sing o f the last pend in g m oti on directed agai nst the j udgme

nt. 210 Ill . 2d R. 303(a)(1). Here, respondent fi le d hi s notice of

appealNo. 2-- 06--0897

-3-

on Septem ber 12, 20 06, more than 30 da ys a ft er t he en t ry o f t he dis so lut io n ju dg men t . T hu s, his appeal is u nt imely u nle ss t he r e w as a t imely p o st jud gme nt mo t io n t ha t ex t en de d t he t ime i n wh i ch to app eal. The re was no s uch mo t ion. Apr oper postj udgm

en t motion un

der s ection 2--1 203(a

) m ust req ues t a reheari

ng, r etrial , m odif i ca ti on or vaca t ur of t he judg ment, or simi lar t ype o f relief aga inst t he ju dgm en t. Cou nty of Cook v. Il l i noi s Frate rnal Ord er of Pol i ceLa bor Co un cil , 358 Ill . App. 3d 66 7, 6 72 (2 00 5) . A s i

ts ti t le in dic ates, respondent's "Motion f or Extension of

Tim e for Fi li ng of M ot ion to Rec onsi de r Judgmen t" did no t r eq ue st r elie f ag ain st t he jud gme n t, b ut me rely permission to fi

le a m ot ion that would do so. Therefore, be ca us e r es po nd en t did not file a proper po stjudgm

ent motion, h

is notice of appeal was unti me ly . Beca use a tim ely not ice o f app eal is jurisd ictio nal, his ap pea l must be dis mi ssed. See Lo we nt ha l v. Mc Do na ld , 367 Il l . Ap p. 3d 91 9, 925 ( 2006) . Contra ry to what res

ponde nt con tend s, i t does n ot matter th at he fi

le d hi s m ot ion f or an ex ten si on o f t ime w it hin

30 day s af

ter t he en try of the j udgme

nt. Under section 2--1203(a), an i ni tial ex ten si on bey ond the 30-day l

im it m ust be granted

wi thi n that 30-da

y peri od. Lowenthal , 367 Il

l . App. 3d at 921-22. Fi nal ly , respondent's rel

ia nce on Rul

e 183 is in vai n. Even i f , arguendo , the rule authorized t he trial court to grant an ex

tension past the deadli

ne set by section 2--1203(a), the fact remai ns that t he tri al cou rt did n ot do so wi

thi n the 30 d

ays req ui red b y section 2--120 3(a). In

an y ev en t, however, we agree wi

th petitioner that Rule 183 does not apply here. The rul e allowsthe tri al court to extend the ti

me for fi li ng a "pl eadi ng" or for "the do i n g of

an y ac t w hich is req uire d by t he [ su pr eme cour t] r ules." 134 Ill . 2d R. 1 83. By it s p lainter

m s, th e r ul e a pp l i es onl y to th e ti me l i m i ts f orpl eadi n gsan d to ti me l i m i ts that ha ve be en set by the s uprem e court rul

es. Rob i ns on v . Joh

ns on ,No. 2-- 06--0897

-4-

346 Il l . Ap p. 3d 89 5, 905 ( 2003) . The ref ore, the tri

al courtcould n

ot have used Rul

e 183 t o g ra nt resp onde nt m ore ti me to fi l e a postju

dgm en t motion un

der s ection 2--1 203(a

). The appeal

from the judgm

ent of the ci

rcuit court o f L ake County is di sm is sed. Appeal dis mi ssed. BYRNE, J. , concur s. JUSTICE O'MA

LLEY, specially

concurrin

g: While I concur in

the j ud gme nt o f t he co ur t , I wr ite s epa ra t ely to explo re t he t rial co ur t 's con cl us i on tha t i t l ost j urisd

i cti on over the matter after

30 day s had el

apsed and b efore i

t had entered a judg ment on r

es pon dent' s m oti on f or an ex ten si on of tim e to fil e a m ot ion to reconsi der. The trial courtheld t hat it lo st jurisd ictio n ove r t he ca se be ca us e n o prop er p ostj udg

men t moti on had b een f

il ed wit hin 30 d ay s of t he final or der . I n Bell

evill e Toyot a, Inc. v. T oyot a Mot or S ales, U.S.A., Inc. , 199 I ll. 2d 325 (2002), o ur supreme c ourt consi der ed t he nat ur e o f subject matt er jurisd ictio n and t he legislat ur e's abi

li ty to li mi t subj ect matter jurisdi ction by statut e. The court held that " 's ubj ect ma tt er jurisd ictio n' re fers t o t he po wer of a co ur t t o he ar and d et er mine cases of t he general cl ass to whic

h t he pro ceeding i

n question bel

ongs." Be l l ev

i l l e T oy ota , 19 9 I ll. 2 d a t 33 4. Ou rsu pr eme co ur t he ld th at, o t he rt ha n a dmin ist r at ive r ev iew , "a cir cu it court 's sub je ct mat t er jur isd ict io n is c o nfe rr ed en t ire ly by o ur st at e c o nst it ut io n, " a nd it s s ub jec t mat t er jur isd ict io n " ex t en ds t o all 'ju st ic iab le ma t t er s.' " Be lleville Toy

ota , 199 Ill . 2d at 334 . Our supr eme court d efi ned "j usticiable m

att er" as "a contr oversy

appropri ate f or revi ew b y the c ourt , in

that i t i s def i n i te a n d c on crete , a s op

pos ed to hy pot hetic al or moot , to uchi

ng upon the l

egal relations of parties

hav in g adv erse l egal i ntere sts." Be l l ev i l l e T oy ota , 199 Ill . 2d at 335.No. 2-- 06--0897

-5-

Thus , the q

ues tion ari ses as to the ef f ect of section 2--120 3 of

the C ode of

Ci vi l Procedu re (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2--1203 (West 2004) ) on t he trial court's juris diction over the cause aft er t he ex pi rati on of the 3 0-day

tim e peri od. Is i t in the n atureof a lim

itat ions p er iod ? Or is it so mething els e e nt ir ely? On e re as ona bl e p osi ti on i s th at i t i s a ti me l i m i t, wh i ch may be the su bj ec t of an obj ec ti on if it is no t o bse rve d, bu t do es no t by it se lf div es t t he cir cu it co ur t o f jur is dic t ion. See DHR I nt er na t io na l, Inc. v. Wi

nston & Strawn , 347 Ill . App. 3d 64 2, 64 9 ( 20 04 ) ( wh ile Un i f orm A rb i trati on Act (710 ILCS 5/1 et seq. (Wes t 200 4) ) c re at ed ne w just iciable matt er , a failure t o c omp ly with a jurisdi ctional

li mi t in the Un

if orm Arb itration A

ct may be t he su bject of a n objec t ion bu t do es no t by it se lf div es t t he t r ial c o ur t o f su bje ct mat t er jur isd ict io n) . I n o t he rwo r ds , if t he t r ial co ur t r ule d ( er r o ne o us ly) on th

e m oti on aft er t he 30-day ti

me li mi t o f s ection 2--1203 of the Code had e la psed, t he ord er wou l d b e v oi da b l e, n ot v oi d. Th e c i

rc ui t c ourt would ha

ve j urisdi ction over the m

atter be yo nd t he 30
- da y limitof se ct ion 2
-- 120 3 o f the Co de, but it w ou ld be er ro r, pur sua nt to se cti on 2--1203 of the Code, to enter an order. The si tuation is muddi ed, because the e

xpi ration of the 30- day peri od ha s i m mem oria l l y be en term ed " j uri sdi cti onal," ev

en af ter Be l l ev i l l e T oy ota . On t he ot her han

d, the trial court 's stateme

nt that it lost jurisdi ction i s al so reasonabl e. Once the fi nal order was entered, ar gua bly ther e wa s no long er "a c ont ro ver sy app ro pr iate for re view by t he [ tria l ] court, *** touch

i ng u pon the legal

relati ons of

parties h avi ng a dve rse l egal i ntere sts." Be lleville Toy

ota , 199 Il

l . 2 d at 335 . T hat had a ll been res olved by the final o rd er . U nder suc h a
v ie w, the 3 0-day

l i m i t of se cti on 2--1 203 of

the C ode i s i

n f act j uri sdi cti onal, be caus e af

ter it s expir at ion, t he t rial co ur t canno t affect its jud gment and losesal l contact wi

th the matter be f

ore it . In ot her wo rd s, t he mat t er is no longe r a justiciabl

e m atter overwhich the trial court would ot herwiseNo. 2-- 06--0897

-6-

have j urisd

i cti on. Th us , wi th th e p as si ng of the 30-day period, t he trial court's juris diction al so lapses. Of course, if a l osin g party were to forgo fil

in g a m ot ion to reconsi der and i

nstead simp ly fi le a new ac ti on rais in g exactl y the sam e i ssues, we would not say that the trial courtlac ke d ju r isd ict io n t o rule that t he m

att er was re s j udi ca

ta . I write separat ely

because there appear t o be two reasonable way s of looking at the issue . If we we r e t o ad o pt t he firs t vie w, t he n t he t r ial c o ur t did not lose i ts subj ect ma

tt er jurisdi ction over t he cause, but i

t would have been

error under section 2--1203 of the Code t o g ra nt re spo ndent 's m oti on for an extension. Under t he se co nd view, t he t rial co ur t did in fact lose jurisd ictio n. T he dif feren ce in the two posi

tions i s si gni f i can t. In the fi rst vie w, the iss ue i s wai vab le and an erroneous order en tered b y the tri al court i s void

ab l e. In the second vi

ew, the is sue cann

ot be wai ved an d an order entered by

the trial court on the motion woul d be v oid an d subj ect to attack at any

tim e, even years henc e. W

hether the tri al

court l ost sub

j ect m atter j uri sdi

cti on or not, its decision wa s i n accord wi th the Code. H ence, I c oncu

r.