Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2), Attorney General Michael *

B. Mukasey is substituted for former Attorney General Alberto R.

Gonzáles as respondent.

 Of the Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation. **

Not For Publication in West's Federal Reporter

United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit

No. 07-1713

FREDY AUGUSTO ARIAS-VALENCIA,

Petitioner,

v.

MICHAEL B. MUKASEY,*

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,

Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER OF

THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS

Before

Torruella, Lynch, Circuit Judges,

and Tashima, Senior Circuit Judge. **

Martin D. Harris, on brief for petitioner.

Carmel A. Morgan, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration

Litigation, Civil Division, Peter D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney

General, Civil Division, and Barry J. Pettinato, Assistant

Director, on brief for respondent.

April 17, 2008
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Per Curiam. Fredy Augusto Arias-Valencia ("Arias"), a

native of Colombia, arrived in the United States in 1988. After

numerous hearings, missed appearances, and failures to depart the

United States, Arias made a motion to reconsider and remand which

was denied by the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") on April 11,

2007. Arias contends that the Immigration Judge ("IJ") who heard

his case abused his discretion when he denied the motion. After

careful consideration, we deny the petition for review.

I. Background

Arias, a native of Colombia, entered the United States on

October 11, 1988. The following day, the Immigration and

Naturalization Service ("INS") issued an order to show cause

alleging that Arias was subject to deportation for entry without

inspection under the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA")

§ 241(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2). On January 27, 1989, Arias

failed to appear for his hearing, and the IJ ordered him deported

in absentia. On May 26, 1995, Arias filed a motion to reopen his

proceedings. He claimed that he did not receive his hearing notice

in 1989 because it was misaddressed and that he was eligible to

apply for adjustment of status through his mother, then a permanent

resident of the United States. At a hearing on March 26, 1996,

Arias expressed a desire to apply for suspension of deportation.

The IJ granted him until December 2, 1996, to do so; he failed to

file the application. On January 2, 1997, the IJ found that Arias
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had abandoned his opportunity to apply for suspension of

deportation. Furthermore, the IJ found him ineligible to adjust

his status through his mother because her conditional resident

status had been terminated. The IJ determined that Arias was

deportable as charged in the order to show cause. Arias applied

for, but was denied, suspension of deportation and adjustment of

status on January 2, 1997. He was, however, granted voluntary

departure on February 1, 1997.

Arias never departed the United States. On March 12,

1997, he requested that the BIA permit a late-file appeal and allow

him to consolidate his case with his mother's. The BIA denied the

request on August 4, 1997, and determined that Arias's explanation

as to why he continued to miss deadlines did not demonstrate

circumstances that established a proper basis for certification of

an appeal. The BIA rejected the appeal as untimely. On May 18,

1998, Arias filed a motion to reconsider this decision. On

June 28, 2000, the BIA denied the motion as untimely and declined

to exercise its discretion sua sponte to reopen or reconsider the

case.

On September 3, 1999, Arias married Sara Arias, a U.S.

citizen. Together they have two minor children. Melissa Arias was

born in 1999 and she suffers from severe asthma; Ericka Arias was

born in 2000. As a result of the marriage, Arias became the

beneficiary of an approved I-120 application on October 14, 1999.
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Arias was supposed to return to Colombia to adjust his status and

complete processing of his application. When he failed to appear,

his visa petition was denied.

Arias filed another motion to reopen in April 2006. He

alleged that his new family circumstances changed his case. On

June 21, 2006, the IJ, noting Arias's "repeated abuse of the filing

deadlines," denied his motion to reopen as untimely. On July 19,

2006, Arias appealed the IJ's denial of his untimely motion. The

BIA affirmed the IJ's decision and dismissed Arias's appeal. On

January 12, 2007, Arias filed a motion to reconsider requesting

that the BIA remand the case to the IJ to allow him to present a

claim for protection under Article 3 of the Convention Against

Torture ("CAT"). The BIA denied the motion to reconsider on

April 11, 2007, concluding that Arias failed to establish that it

had committed any errors of law or fact in its December 15, 2006

decision. The BIA also determined that Arias's motion was

successive and untimely and that he did not qualify for an

exception to the applicable time or numerical limitations for

filing such a motion; it also determined that a sua sponte

reopening of Arias's case was not warranted. Arias petitioned the

denial of his motion to reconsider.
 A motion to reconsider must set forth either an error of law or 1

an error of fact. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(2). The Government

argues that Arias failed to put forth either and that he merely

argues a change in personal circumstances. We agree. His motion

did not identify any change of law or establish any argument or

aspect of his case that was overlooked. He only argued new facts.

The motion is more correctly defined as a motion to reopen, which

seeks to present new facts that would entitle him to relief from

deportation. Compare 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(2) ("A motion to

reconsider shall state the reasons for the motion by specifying the

errors of fact or law in the Immigration Judge's prior decision and

shall be supported by pertinent authority."), with 8 C.F.R.

§ 1003.23(b)(3) ("A motion to reopen proceedings shall state the

new facts that will be proven at a hearing to be held if the motion

is granted and shall be supported by affidavits or other

evidentiary material."); see also In re Cerna, 20 I. & N. Dec. 399,

400 (BIA 1991). In any event, a motion to reconsider is also

reviewed under the same abuse of discretion standard. See

Onwuameagbu v. Gonzáles, 470 F.3d 405, 407 (1st Cir. 2006).

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II. Discussion

A. Standard of Review

This court ordinarily reviews the BIA's denial of a

motion to reopen under the abuse of discretion standard. Kaweesa 1

v. Gonzáles, 450 F.3d 62, 67 (1st Cir. 2006). "Our review is

highly deferential, focusing on the rationality of the decision to

deny . . . reopening, not on the merits per se, of the underlying

claim." Abdullah v. Gonzáles, 461 F.3d 92, 99 (1st Cir. 2006). We

will uphold the BIA's decision "'unless it is arbitrary,

irrational, or contrary to law.'" Id. (quoting Ahwazi v. INS, 751

F.3d 1120, 1122 (9th Cir. 1985)).

B. Analysis

Arias argues that his case should be re-examined in light

of changed circumstances. See In re Cerna, 20 I. & N. Dec. 399,
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404 (BIA 1991). He submits that the health of his young daughter,

a U.S. citizen, would be put in jeopardy if he returned to

Colombia, and that his marriage to a U.S. citizen and the health of

his daughter were not taken into account by the BIA. Furthermore,

Arias contends that the political situation in Colombia has changed

since 1997 such that if he returns to Colombia with his family, he

and his family will be targeted by the FARC because his family

members are U.S. citizens. While he concedes that his CAT motion

to reopen is untimely, he claims that the change in his own

circumstances and those of his family are compelling reasons that

should be considered by this court. We do not agree.

The BIA properly denied the motion and "provided

'specific, cogent, and supportable explanations'" for its denial.

Chanthou Hem v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 67, 73 (1st Cir. 2008) (quoting

Simo v. Gonzáles, 445 F.3d 7, 11 (1st Cir. 2006)) (alteration

omitted). Arias's motion is also barred because "[a]n alien may

file one motion to reopen proceedings," 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A),

unless an exception applies to the numerical limitation, 8 C.F.R.

§ 1003.2(c)(3). None of the exceptions apply to him, and,

therefore, the BIA did not abuse its discretion. See Chen v.

Gonzáles, 415 F.3d 151, 153 (1st Cir. 2005). Arias has filed

numerous motions to reopen with the BIA; the current one is a nearreproduction of his prior motions.
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The BIA also properly denied Arias's motion as untimely.

His order of deportation is dated January 2, 1997, and he did not

voluntarily depart the United States by February 1, 1997. As his

deportation order became final on March 22, 1999, a motion to

reopen for the purposes of applying for protection under the CAT

was required to be filed by June 21, 1999. See 8 C.F.R.

§ 1003.23(b)(1).

The BIA found that Arias failed to show a material change

in country conditions that would qualify him for an exception to

the time and numerical limitations for motions to reopen. The

documentary evidence Arias submitted with his motion -- newspaper

articles and country reports -- was already in the record. Arias

submitted new evidence that demonstrates civil strife in Colombia

generally, but the evidence does not illustrate any changed

circumstances that are "material so as to warrant reopening."

Mabikas v. INS, 358 F.3d 145, 148 (1st Cir. 2004) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted). Arias has failed to show

that the BIA, in denying the motion, acted in a manner that is

"'arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.'" Abdullah, 461 F.3d

at 99 (quoting Ahwazi, 751 F.2d at 1122).

Arias has avoided immigration officials for nearly twenty

years, and in that time he has made a good life for himself. He is

married to a U.S. citizen, is raising smart, high-achieving

children, and is active at his daughters' school. But 
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it would be ironic, indeed, if petitioner[]

. . . who [has] remained in the United States

illegally following an order of deportation,

[was] permitted to have a second and third

bite at the apple simply because [he] managed

to marry and have children while evading

authorities. This apparent gaming of the

system in an effort to avoid deportation is

not tolerated by the existing regulatory

scheme.

Wang v. BIA, 437 F.3d 270, 274 (2d Cir. 2006). In the past, Arias

has shown nothing but contempt for immigration officials and has

offered feeble excuses for why he did not turn up (or depart) as

instructed. He has been granted voluntary departure twice, but he

chose not to take advantage of those possibilities. Indeed, he has

neglected to take advantage of any of the opportunities that

immigration officials have offered him in the past. "Even

immigration proceedings must at some point come to an end."

Palam-Mazariegos v. Keisler, 504 F.3d 144, 147 (1st Cir. 2007).

The time for these proceedings to come to an end was long ago.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is

denied.

Denied.