Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 215 / Tuesday, November 8, 2005 / Notices 67757 

changes to Technical Specifications 

Table 5.5.9–2, ‘‘Steam Generator Tube 

Inspection,’’ and Table 5.5.9–3, ‘‘Steam 

Generator Repaired Tube Inspection,’’

were also submitted in the licensee’s 

application dated September 17, 2004 

(ULNRC–05056), for the replacement 

steam generator project and were 

approved in Amendment No. 168, 

which was issued in the NRC letter 

dated September 29, 2005. 

Date of issuance: October 25, 2005. 

Effective date: October 25, 2005, and 

shall be implemented within 90 days of 

the date of issuance. 

Amendment No.: 169. 

Facility Operating License No. NPF–

30: The amendment revised the 

Technical Specifications. 

Date of initial notice in Federal 

Register: December 7, 2004 (69 FR 

70723). The June 17, 2005, 

supplemental letter provided additional 

information that clarified the 

application, did not expand the scope of 

the application as originally noticed, 

and did not change the staff’s original 

no significant hazards consideration 

determination. The Commission’s 

related evaluation of the amendment is 

contained in a Safety Evaluation dated 

October 25, 2005. 

No significant hazards consideration 

comments received: No. 

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 31st day 

of October, 2005. 

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

Ledyard B. Marsh, 

Director, Division of Licensing Project 

Management, Office of Nuclear Reactor 

Regulation. 

[FR Doc. 05–22002 Filed 11–7–05; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY 

COMMISSION 

Notice of Availability of Interim Staff 

Guidance Documents for Fuel Cycle 

Facilities 

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission. 

ACTION: Notice of availability. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

James Smith, Project manager, 

Technical Support Group, Division of 

Fuel Cycle Safety and Safeguards, Office 

of Nuclear Material Safety and 

Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission, Washington, DC 20005–

0001. Telephone: (301) 415–6459; fax 

number: (301) 415–5370; e-mail: 

jas4@nrc.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

I. Introduction 

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

(NRC) continues to prepare and issue 

Interim Staff Guidance (ISG) documents 

for fuel cycle facilities. These ISG 

documents provide clarifying guidance 

to the NRC staff when reviewing 

licensee integrated safety analysis, 

license applications or amendment 

requests or other related licensing 

activities for fuel cycle facilities under 

subpart H of 10 CFR part 70. FCSS–ISG–

08 has been issued and is provided for 

information. 

II. Summary 

The purpose of this notice is to 

provide notice to the public of the 

issuance of FCSS–ISG–08, Revision 0, 

which provides guidance to NRC staff to 

address accident sequences that may 

result from natural phenomena hazards 

relative to license application or 

amendment request under 10 CFR Part 

70, Subpart H. FCSS–ISG–08, Revision 

0, has been approved and issued after a 

general revision based on NRC staff and 

public comments on the initial draft. 

III. Further Information 

The document related to this action is 

available electronically at the NRC’s 

Electronic Reading Room at http:// 

www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. 

From this site, you can access the NRC’s 

Agencywide Documents Access and 

Management System (ADAMS), which 

provides text and image files of NRC’s 

public documents. The ADAMS 

ascension number for the document 

related to this notice is provided in the 

following table. If you do not have 

access to ADAMS or if there are 

problems in accessing the document 

located in ADAMS, contact the NRC 

Public Document Room (PDR) Reference 

staff at 1–800–397–4209, 301–415–4737, 

or by e-mail to pdr@nrc.gov. 

Interim staff guidance ADAMS 

Accession No. 

FCSS Interim Staff Guidance-08, Revision 0.ML052650305 

This document may also be viewed 

electronically on the public computers 

located at the NRC’s PDR, O 1 F21, One 

White Flint North, 11555 Rockville 

Pike, Rockville, MD 20852. The PDR 

reproduction contractor will copy 

documents for a fee. Comments on these 

documents may be forwarded to James 

Smith, Project Manager, Technical 

Support Group, Division of Fuel Cycle 

Safety and Safeguards, Office of Nuclear 

Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 

Washington, DC 20005–0001. 

Comments can also be submitted by 

telephone, fax, or e-mail which are as 

follows: Telephone: (301) 415–6459; fax 

number: (301) 415–5370; e-mail: 

jas4@nrc.gov. 

Dated at Rockville, Maryland this 27th day 

of October 2005. 

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

Melanie A. Galloway, 

Chief, Technical Support Group, Division of 

Fuel Cycle Safety and Safeguards, Office of 

Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards. 

Attachment—FCSS Interim Staff 

Guidance-08, Revision 0, Natural 

Phenomena Hazards 

Prepared by Division of Fuel Cycle 

Safety and Safeguards, Office of 

Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards 

Issue 

Additional guidance is required to 

address accident sequences that may 

result from natural phenomena hazards 

in the context of a license application or 

an amendment request under Title 10 

Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 

part 70, subpart H. 

Introduction 

This Interim Staff Guidance (ISG) 

provides additional guidance for 

reviewing the applicant’s (or licensee’s) 

evaluation of natural phenomena 

hazards up to and including ‘‘highly 

unlikely’’ events for both new and 

existing facilities. 

Discussion 

The performance requirements of 10 

CFR 70.61 for facilities processing 

special nuclear materials require that 

individual accident sequences resulting 

in high consequences to workers and 

the public be ‘‘highly unlikely’’ and that 

sequences resulting in intermediate 

consequences to these receptors be 

‘‘unlikely.’’ Although the threshold 

levels that differentiate high 

consequence events from intermediate 

consequence events are established in 

the regulations, the definitions of 

‘‘highly unlikely’’ and ‘‘unlikely’’ are 

not. Definitions of these terms must be 

described in the integrated safety 

analysis (ISA) summary submitted by 

applicants and licensees according to 10 

CFR 70.65(b)(9) and subjected to staff 

approval. Further description of the 

acceptance criteria for the definitions of 

these terms can be found in Chapter 3 

of NUREG–1520, ‘‘Standard Review 

Plan for the Review of a License 

Application for a Fuel Cycle Facility.’’

The implementation of these 

requirements may vary somewhat due to 

different definitions of likelihood 

proposed by different applicants (or 

67758 Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 215 / Tuesday, November 8, 2005 / Notices 

1For natural phenomena, deterministically 

defined events such as the probable maximum flood 

(PMF) or safe shutdown earthquake (SSE) which are 

used as reactor design bases can also be applied to 

10 CFR Part 70 facilities as ‘‘highly unlikely’’

events. The actual probability (or likelihood) of 

such events may be difficult to define quantitatively 

and varies from site to site. 

licensees).1 The consequence thresholds 

of the performance requirements (except 

for chemical releases) are specified 

quantitatively in the regulation. The 

regulation and its performance 

requirements pertain to existing 

facilities as well as proposed facilities 

and apply to man-made external 

hazards and natural phenomena hazards 

as well as process hazards. However, 

new facilities and new processes at 

existing facilities must also address 10 

CFR 70.64 requirements which includes 

the baseline design criterion for natural 

phenomena hazards (10 CFR 

70.64(a)(2)). This baseline design 

criterion requires that ‘‘the design must 

provide for adequate protection against 

natural phenomena with consideration 

of the most severe documented 

historical events for the site.’’ The 

Statement of Considerations (Reference 

2) describes the application of the 

baseline design criteria as consistent 

with good engineering practice, which 

dictates that certain minimum 

requirements should be applied to 

design and safety considerations. The 

baseline design criteria must be applied 

to the design of new facilities and new 

processes at existing facilities, but does 

not require retrofits to existing facilities 

or existing processes (e.g., those housing 

or adjacent to the new processes). Also 

included in 10 CFR 70.64(b) is a 

requirement for incorporation of 

defense-in-depth in design and a 

requirement to prefer engineered 

controls over administrative controls. 

New structures associated with 

facilities being reviewed, such as the gas 

centrifuge facilities and the Mixed 

Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility (MOX), 

will be designed and constructed to 

meet the seismic regulatory 

requirements. Hence, these facilities and 

additional new facilities to be licensed 

under 10 CFR part 70 are not expected 

to present designs with seismic 

deficiencies. New facilities can also be 

expected to be above a ‘‘highly 

unlikely’’ flood such as the PMF and 

can be expected to withstand tornado 

winds and missiles, if necessary. 

Most structures at existing nuclear 

fuel cycle facilities are built to a model 

building code which includes meeting a 

design basis earthquake having an 

exceedance probability of 2 × 10¥3 per 

year to less than 10¥3 per year 

(Department of Energy (DOE) Standard1020–2002, Appendix C). Existing 

facilities are generally sited above the 

100-year floodplain and are designed for 

wind as well as snow and ice loading as 

specified in applicable building codes. 

Extreme natural events such as ‘‘highly 

unlikely’’ floods and/or earthquakes 

have not been calculated for many 

existing sites, and it would be expensive 

and time consuming to do so. 

The staff believes that many existing 

facilities can be shown to be in 

compliance with, or, at least, near 

compliance with, the performance 

requirements of the regulation by 

accounting for conservatisms in the 

seismic, flooding, and wind design of 

the facility. In addition, relatively minor 

engineered improvements and 

administrative measures may further 

enhance safety, at least with respect to 

the public and other off-site receptors. 

Seismic Hazards 

Potential damage to and/or failure of 

items relied on for safety (IROFS) due to 

ground movement and/or the seismic 

response of adjacent or interior IROFS 

must be considered in the ISA/ISA 

Summary accident sequence 

evaluations. Damage or failures that also 

should be considered include: 

1. Seismic-induced failure of a facility 

component which is not an IROFS but 

which can fall and damage an IROFS, 

for example, a heavy load drop from a 

crane on a container. 

2. Displacement of adjacent IROFS 

during a seismic event, causing them to 

pound together. 

3. Displacement of adjacent 

components resulting in failure of 

connecting pipes or cables resulting in 

flooding, fires, and/or releases of 

radiological or chemical materials. 

Seismic event evaluations must also 

consider potential multiple failure of 

IROFS. For example, multiple failures of 

tanks. 

DOE has also recognized the 

difference between earthquake design 

probability and the probability that a 

safety component cannot perform its 

function. To quantify this difference, 

DOE has developed a risk reduction 

factor, R, as the ratio between the 

seismic hazard exceedance probability 

and the performance goal probability. 

Conservatism in nuclear facility design 

arising from factors such as use of 

prescribed analysis methods, 

specification of material strengths, and 

limits on inelastic behavior explains at 

least part of this apparent reduction in 

actual risk. This risk reduction factor is 

discussed in Appendix C of DOE–STD–

1020–2002 (Reference 3). 

For a consequence to occur to the 

public or external site workers, licensed 

material or hazardous chemicals that 

could affect the safety of licensed 

material must be released through at 

least one, and often two, confinement 

barriers, for example: 

1. Storage containers, gloveboxes, 

tanks, or handling devices, 

2. Ventilation system dynamic 

confinement and filtration, and/or 

3. Building structural shell. 

Criticalities, on the other hand, may 

result from the introduction of a 

moderator or loss of safe geometric 

control of confined materials. 

By using risk reduction factors 

calculated for a facility and its specific 

components and/or making estimates of 

the degree of failure by comparison with 

the observed behavior of similarly 

constructed buildings during severe 

earthquakes, reasonable scenarios can 

be postulated. These scenarios may not 

release all the material at risk or present 

an unimpeded leak path to receptors. 

For example, some facilities might be 

able to show that even with an 

earthquake that is ‘‘highly unlikely’’

only certain types of containers or 

confinement systems are likely to be 

breached. If the amount of material 

contained in such containers is variable, 

then that probabilistic component may 

be factored into the overall likelihood of 

the accident sequence. If employing 

some of these mitigating considerations 

to the analysis requires reliance on 

special containers or procedures, then 

additional IROFS may also be needed. 

Another factor to be considered is the 

likely rate of release based on the 

damage sustained. For example, some 

facilities may lose dynamic confinement 

but maintain building integrity. In some 

processes, radiological and/or 

chemically hazardous material is held 

inside its primary containment at 

subatmospheric pressure. In these cases, 

even though the primary containments 

are inside a structure designed to 

withstand less than a ‘‘highly unlikely’’

earthquake, the subatmospheric 

conditions may be sufficient to limit 

both facility worker and off-site doses in 

the event of a greater earthquake. For 

example, an earthquake that results in 

limited subatmospheric containment 

losses may allow adequately trained 

workers to evacuate and/or take 

mitigative actions. The buildings 

containing cylinders of liquid UF6 at gas 

centrifuge facilities are designed for a 

‘‘highly unlikely’’ earthquake. In 

addition, some buildings at one of the 

proposed facilities are equipped with a 

seismically-activated interlock (an 

IROFS) that will shut off the buildings’

heating, ventilation, and air 

conditioning system during an event, 

Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 215 / Tuesday, November 8, 2005 / Notices 67759 

2Even if the licensee defines unlikely as less than 

10¥3 per year for the process sequences in the ISA 

Summary, the conservative assumptions inherent in 

most flood plain hydrologic studies such as those 

performed for Federal Emergency Management 

Agency flood insurance rate maps should justify the 

consideration of flooding above the 500-year 

floodplain as an unlikely event. 

thus limiting any leakage of UF6 to the 

outside. 

Flooding Hazards 

Most fuel cycle licensees do not 

require large quantities of cooling water 

and, therefore, do not need to be located 

near large bodies of water. A site 

licensed under 10 CFR Part 70 does not 

need to meet prescriptive flood 

protection requirements but does have 

to meet the performance requirements 

for all credible events including 

flooding. A site meeting the flood 

protection requirements of a commercial 

reactor should be considered as being 

designed or located adequately to 

withstand a ‘‘highly unlikely’’ flooding 

event. NUREG–1407, ‘‘Procedural and 

Submittal Guidance for the Individual 

Plant Examination of External Events for 

Severe Accident Vulnerability,’’ Section 

2.4, states that the design basis flood 

(which for river sites is the probable 

maximum flood) as described in 

Regulatory Guide 1.59, ‘‘Design Basis 

Flooding for Nuclear Power Plants,’’ is 

estimated to have an exceedance 

frequency of less than 10¥5 per year. 

Sites that do not meet this level of 

protection can still meet the 10 CFR 

70.61 performance requirements but 

have to be considered on an individual 

basis. 

In evaluating the effects of flooding on 

existing facilities, the following floodrelated hazards should be considered: 

River Flooding 

• Inundation and hydrostatic loading 

• Dynamic forces 

• Wave action 

• Sedimentation and erosion 

• Ice loading 

Upstream Dam Failures 

• Inundation and hydrostatic loading 

• Dynamic forces 

• Erosion and sedimentation 

Precipitation/Local Storm Runoff 

• Inundation (local ponding) and 

hydrostatic loading 

• Dynamic loads (flash flooding) 

Tsunami, Seiche, Hurricane Storm 

Surge 

• Inundation and hydrostatic loading 

• Dynamic forces 

• Wave action 

Methods for determining these 

flooding and water-related effects for 

reactor sites are described in American 

National Standards Institute/American 

Nuclear Society 2.8, ‘‘Determining 

Design Basis Flooding at Power Reactor 

Sites.’’ These methods can be applied to 

10 CFR 70.61 analyses with less 

conservatism in some of these 

parameters. 

A standard siting requirement for 

residential and commercial 

developments is to be above the 100- 

year floodplain. For large river basins, 

warning time and time to secure 

materials and evacuate personnel will 

probably be available. For small streams 

there may be relatively little warning in 

regard to thunderstorms and localized 

rainfall. In such cases, rapid actions 

may be the only administrative 

protection available. In evaluating the 

effectiveness of proposed protection, the 

effects of inundation, hydrostatic 

loading, erosion, and sedimentation will 

need to be evaluated. At a minimum, 

this would require that criticality events 

be prevented and materials remain 

confined within site structures. 

At some sites, a delineation of the 

500-year floodplain may also be 

available. If the site is above the 500- 

year floodplain, flooding may be 

considered an unlikely event 2

depending on the quality of the 

estimate. In this category, criticality 

events should still be prevented, but the 

breaching of a limited number of 

material containers may be allowable 

under the performance requirements (up 

to 25 rem for the public, up to 100 rem 

for workers, and a specified release 

limit) for events, that in terms of 

likelihood, are between ‘‘unlikely’’ and 

‘‘highly unlikely.’’

In addition to the facility’s location 

relative to the 100-year or 500-year 

floodplains, the effects of local intense 

precipitation and snow load should be 

considered. Local intense precipitation 

especially with snow can result in roof 

collapse and localized site flooding. 

Normally, protection from local 

precipitation and snow is relatively easy 

to achieve in roof design and local site 

drainage design. 

Wind and Tornado Loading 

Wind design for an existing facility if 

prescribed by an applicable building 

code would have an annual exceedance 

probability of greater than or equal to 2 

¥ 10¥2. At such relatively high 

probabilities, tornado design criteria are 

not specified. However, depending on 

the geographical location of the facility, 

the effects of a tornado with an annual 

exceedance probability of 10¥5 or 

greater may need to be considered. 

Wind forces on walls of structures 

should be determined using appropriate 

pressure coefficients, gust factors, and 

other site-specific adjustments. If the 

wind is likely to blow inside the 

structure, either through design or 

wind-driven missile vulnerability, the 

effects of wind on internal IROFS 

requires consideration. If the winds are 

from a tornado, the effects of the 

atmospheric pressure change (APC) 

associated with the tornado must be 

considered. Normally, ventilation 

systems are most vulnerable to APC but 

windows, buried tanks, and sand filters 

can also be affected. 

For straight winds, hurricanes, and 

weak tornadoes, missile criteria as 

specified in Table 3–3 of DOE–STD–

1020–2002 (Reference 3) may be 

considered. The missile specified is a 15 

pound, 2 inches by 4 inches plank at a 

specified elevation and impact velocity. 

For facilities which may be subjected to 

more severe tornado missiles, the 

guidance in Tables 3–4 and/or 3–5 of 

DOE–STD–1020 may be followed. For 

the tornado, a 3,000 pound automobile 

rolling and tumbling on the ground 

should also be considered. For such 

evaluations, the probability of the entire 

sequence should be considered, and 

missile criteria from either Tables 3–4 or 

3–5 of DOE–STD–1020 may be used as 

appropriate. 

Considerations for Existing Processes at 

Existing Facilities 

Existing processes at existing facilities 

are not required to address 10 CFR 70.64 

baseline design criteria. They must still 

meet the performance requirements of 

10 CFR 70.61 including accidents 

caused by natural phenomena, for 

which the staff may require additional 

IROFS to meet the performance 

requirements. For existing facilities, 

additional administrative controls/ 

IROFS can be used to meet the 

performance requirements without the 

need for design features normally 

required by accepted engineering 

practice. For plants where near 

compliance can be obtained and 

complete compliance will be relatively 

costly, an exemption to the regulation 

may be requested. 

As discussed earlier, many existing 10 

CFR Part 70 facilities are not designed 

for an earthquake beyond that specified 

in applicable building codes. Although 

this design may provide fairly good 

seismic protection to the structure, it 

may not protect internal equipment. 

Also, an existing facility may not be 

designed to any specific seismic criteria 

in which case its ability to withstand 

earthquakes can only be estimated based 

on comparison with similar structures 

or through complex structural analysis. 

In such cases, licensees may add 

67760 Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 215 / Tuesday, November 8, 2005 / Notices 

additional IROFS to meet the 

performance requirements. An example 

where such IROFS (procedures and 

upgrades) may be effectively 

implemented could be a facility where 

the consequences of a release of 

licensed material to the public in a 

seismic event would be from fires and/ 

or explosions. In this case, fixes such as 

seismically qualified flammable gas 

shutoff valves or electrical shutoffs 

might provide a large decrease in 

potential seismic consequences. 

In regard to flooding, flood elevations 

beyond that of the 100-year flood may 

not have been determined for the site. 

For sites in close proximity to a river, 

these determinations could be 

expensive and time consuming. For 

these cases, flood warning time may 

allow measures such as moving material 

at risk and/or blocking doors and 

openings in the facility structure. 

Improving a facility’s ability to 

withstand high winds, rain and snow 

loads, and exterior fires can likewise be 

improved with a combination of 

administrative procedures and 

engineered improvements. Removing 

material at risk from under walls or 

roofs that are not seismically designed 

can reduce potential releases in case of 

collapse from winds or roof loads. 

Exemptions to the regulation may still 

be required for existing facilities even 

with administrative and engineered 

improvements. In regard to 

consequences to the public, complete 

compliance with 10 CFR 70.61 using 

realistic assumptions should be the goal 

if obtainable. Compliance with 10 CFR 

70.61 regarding consequences to facility 

workers may require a request for an 

exemption once personnel protective 

equipment, emergency procedures, and 

worker training is accounted for. In 

evaluating a request for an exemption to 

the regulation, the expected operational 

life of the facility should also be 

factored into the determination of risk. 

Considerations for New Processes at 

Existing Facilities 

The design of new processes at 

existing facilities must address natural 

phenomena hazards in accordance with 

10 CFR 70.64 (a)(2) as well as the 

performance requirements of 10 CFR 

70.61. Nevertheless, new processes at 

existing facilities may have the same 

problems in demonstrating compliance 

with 10 CFR 70.61 in regard to accident 

sequences initiated by natural 

phenomena as existing facilities based 

on the design and/or siting of the 

original structures. In the case of new 

processes, the Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission staff should expect 

compliance with the performance 

requirements of 10 CFR 70.61 to the 

extent possible given the existing 

facility design and location. New 

processes at existing facilities also must 

meet the requirements of 10 CFR 

70.64(b) which requires defense-indepth and a preference for engineered 

controls over administrative controls. 

However, structural improvements, 

permanent flood barriers, and other 

engineered improvements which could 

be considered retrofits cannot be 

required by the staff for application to 

existing structures. New structural 

features within existing structures to 

prevent breaches in containment in the 

event of natural phenomena hazards 

may be considered, however. An 

example might be a seismicallydesigned vault to hold radioactive 

materials associated with a new process. 

In regard to new processes, engineered 

controls, where feasible, are preferred 

over administrative procedures that 

might otherwise be proposed for an 

existing process with a limited 

operational lifetime. Such engineered 

improvements may not be required for 

licensing but could be scheduled to 

replace administrative procedures or 

other long-term compensatory measures 

on a timely basis after the start of 

operations. The object is to encourage 

engineered safety in new processes 

compared to equivalent existing process 

while recognizing the restraints of the 

existing structures and location. 

Although primarily aimed at reducing 

risk to the public, the emphasis on 

engineered safety may also be applied to 

worker consequences in a way 

consistent with what has been accepted 

at other facilities. 

Regulatory Basis 

10 CFR 70.61 specifies performance 

requirements associated with risks 

identified by an ISA. 

10 CFR 70.64 specifies requirements 

for new facilities or new processes at 

existing facilities including baseline 

design criteria (a)(2), ‘‘Natural 

Phenomena Hazards.’’

Technical Review Guidance 

In reviewing the applicant’s 

evaluation of the effects of natural 

phenomena on its facility, it should be 

recognized that estimates of ‘‘unlikely’’

and ‘‘highly unlikely’’ natural 

phenomena such as the PMF or SSE 

may not exist for the particular site. 

Hence, extrapolation and/or 

transposition of extreme event estimates 

made for other relatively nearby 

facilities (such as power reactor sites) 

should be allowed where feasible and 

technically justifiable. In addition, 

sophisticated probabilistic tools such as 

Bayesian analysis or Monte Carlo 

sampling methods need not be 

employed to improve the estimate of 

likelihoods of natural phenomena event 

sequences unless desired by the 

applicant (or licensee). For the purpose 

of determining appropriate values of 

extreme events, deterministic events 

such as the probable maximum flood or 

safe shutdown earthquake can be used 

in place of purely probabilistically 

determined ‘‘highly unlikely’’ events 

and may be preferable, depending on 

the quality of historical data. Where 

extreme events need to be coupled with 

other probability-driven mechanisms 

such as the release fraction or transport 

pathway, already low likelihood 

combinations do not have to be made 

even less likely with the use of 

conservative parameters. 

For existing facilities, due credit 

should be given to analysis assumptions 

and administrative controls, emergency 

procedures, and active engineered 

controls that do not change the design 

bases of the facility structures to natural 

phenomena. If the ISA/ISA Summary 

demonstrates that the existing facility is 

near compliance (within an order of 

magnitude of a likelihood threshold or 

within 50 percent of meeting a 

consequence threshold, but not both), 

an exemption to the regulation may be 

considered. 

An example evaluation for an 

amendment request is provided in the 

appendix to this ISG. 

Recommendation 

This guidance should be used to 

supplement NUREG–1520, Chapter 3, 

Integrated Safety Analysis. 

References 

U.S. Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10, 

Energy, Part 70, ‘‘Domestic Licensing of 

Special Nuclear Material.’’

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (U.S.) 

(NRC). NUREG–1520, ‘‘Standard Review Plan 

for the Review of a License Application for 

a Fuel Cycle Facility.’’ NRC: Washington, 

D.C. March 2002. 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (U.S.), 

Washington, D.C. ‘‘Domestic Licensing of 

Special Nuclear Material; Possession of a 

Critical Mass of Special Nuclear Material.’’

Federal Register: Vol. 65, No. 181, pp. 56211–

562331. September 18, 2000. 

NUREG–1407, ‘‘Procedural and Submittal 

Guidance for the Individual Plant 

Examination of External Events (IPEEE) for 

Severe Accident Vulnerabilities.’’ NRC: 

Washington, D.C. June 1991. 

Regulatory Guide 1.59, Revision2, ‘‘Design 

Basis Flooding for Nuclear Power Plants.’’

NRC: Washington, D.C. August 1977. 

U.S. Department of Energy (U.S.) (DOE). 

DOE-Standard-1020–2002, ‘‘Natural 

Phenomena Hazards Design and Evaluation 

Criteria for Department of Energy Facilities.’’

DOE: Washington, D.C. 2002. 

Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 215 / Tuesday, November 8, 2005 / Notices 67761 

American National Standards Institute/ 

American Nuclear Society (ANSI/ANS). 

ANS–2.8, ‘‘Determining Design Basis 

Flooding at Power Reactor Sites.’’ ANSI/ 

ANS: July 1992. 

Dated: October 28, 2005. 

Robert C. Pierson, 

Director, Division of Fuel Cycle Safety and 

Safeguards, NMSS. 

APPENDIX—Example Natural 

Phenomena Hazard Review for 

Compliance with 10 CFR 70.61 

This example review is for an amendment 

to authorize operations in a blended lowenriched uranium oxide conversion building 

(OCB). The site is located near a river and is 

just above the 100-year flood plain of a 

nearby creek. The Effluent Process Building 

(EPB) was also part of the amendment but 

was not evaluated because the quantities of 

radioactive material or hazardous chemicals 

(that come under NRC regulation) contained 

in the EPB are not considered sufficient to 

exceed the 10 CFR 70.61 consequence 

threshold for ‘‘unlikely’’ events. 

Seismic Evaluation 

The OCB is of reinforced concrete 

construction and is constructed to seismic 

criteria contained in the Standard Building 

Code (SBC–1999) which is equivalent to 

being designed for an earthquake having a 

probability of exceedance of approximately 4 

X 10¥4 per year. Using Appendix C of DOE–

STD–1020–2002, a risk reduction factor of 4 

was determined by U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (NRC) staff, giving the structure 

a likelihood of significant damage from an 

earthquake of 10¥4 per year or less. Hence, 

the collapse or loss of building integrity from 

an earthquake may be considered to be 

‘‘highly unlikely’’ as the probabilistic value 

of ‘‘highly unlikely’’ indicated by the 

applicant was a probability of exceedance of 

10¥4 to 10¥5 per year. Within the building, 

the material at risk consists of low enriched 

uranyl nitrate liquid, ammonium diuranate 

slurry, and uranium dioxide powder. All of 

these materials are expected to be within 

containers and spillage during a seismic 

event is expected to be minimal. Since the 

building is expected to retain its integrity, the 

leak path factor will be relatively low even 

without dynamic confinement from the 

ventilation system. Facility workers are 

expected to take actions to limit personal 

intake of radionuclides. The staff concludes 

that the OCB complies with the performance 

requirements of 10 CFR 70.61 with regard to 

seismic events. 

High Winds Evaluation 

The OCB structure is also designed for 

wind loads in accordance with the SBC–

1999, and the probability of a tornado 

impacting the facility is less than 10¥5 per 

year. Therefore, the facility needs only to be 

evaluated in regard to the effects of wind 

loads and missiles, but not for tornadoes. The 

reinforced concrete exterior walls of the OCB 

are considered by NRC staff to be adequate 

to withstand high wind velocities as well as 

missiles (from DOE–STD–1020–2002) that 

should be assumed for such events. A 

collapse of building walls due to wind forces 

such that radioactive material would escape 

is considered to be ‘‘highly unlikely’’ by NRC 

staff. In addition, the meteorological 

conditions likely to result in severe winds 

may be forecast in advance, and protective 

measures taken. The staff concludes that the 

OCB complies with the performance 

requirements of 10 CFR 70.61 with regard to 

wind events. 

Flooding Evaluation 

The lowest floor in the OCB is 15 feet 

above the 100-year flood plain from an 

adjacent creek. From a review of the 

topography of the site area, it appears that 

flooding of the site could occur, most likely, 

from flooding on the nearby river with 

coincident flooding on the adjacent creek 

which could back up through the railroad 

culvert. This event is expected to have 

warning time and may overtop the railroad 

embankment to the north of the facility and 

flood parts of the town nearby. However, the 

facility is sufficiently removed from the main 

channel of the river such that flood-induced 

scouring and erosion would not be expected. 

In addition, the hydrostatic loading from the 

flood on the exterior walls of the OCB would 

not be expected to cause collapse. The 

primary concern is inundation which could 

float unsecured containers within the OCB 

but not remove them from the facility. A 

criticality event can not be excluded, but 

could occur only in the flooded and, 

therefore, evacuated section of the plant and 

would not affect facility workers. In addition, 

the warning time would allow the movement 

of material to reduce the likelihood of a 

flood-induced criticality. The staff concludes 

that the OCB complies with the performance 

requirements of 10 CFR 70.61 with regard to 

flooding. 

[FR Doc. 05–22199 Filed 11–7–05; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P 

OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND 

BUDGET 

Executive Office of the President; 

Acquisition Advisory Panel; 

Notification of Upcoming Meetings of 

the Acquisition Advisory Panel 

AGENCY: Office of Management and 

Budget, Executive Office of the 

President. 

ACTION: Notice of Federal Advisory 

Committee meetings. 

SUMMARY: The Office of Management 

and Budget announces four meetings of 

the Acquisition Advisory Panel (AAP or 

‘‘Panel’’) established in accordance with 

the Services Acquisition Reform Act of 

2003. 

DATES: There are four meetings 

announced in this Federal Register 

Notice. Public meetings of the Panel 

will be held on November 29th and 

December 16th, 2005 and January 5th 

and January 19th, 2006. All meetings 

will begin at 9 a.m. eastern standard 

time and end no later than 5 p.m. 

ADDRESSES: The November 29, 2005 

meeting will be held at the General 

Services Administration (GSA) 

Auditorium at 1800 F Street, NW., 

Washington, DC 20405. The location for 

the December 16, 2005, January 5, 2006, 

and January 19, 2006 meetings will be 

the Federal Deposit Insurance 

Corporation (FDIC) basement 

auditorium, 801 17th Street, NW., 

Washington DC 20434. The public is 

asked to pre-register one week in 

advance for all meetings due to security 

and/or seating limitations (see below for 

information on pre-registration). 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION: Members of 

the public wishing further information 

concerning these meetings or the Panel 

itself, or to pre-register for the meetings, 

should contact Ms. Laura Auletta, 

Designated Federal Officer (DFO), at: 

laura.auletta@gsa.gov, phone/voice mail 

(202) 208–7279, or mail at: General 

Services Administration, 1800 F Street, 

NW., Room 4006, Washington, DC 

20405. Members of the public wishing 

to reserve speaking time must contact 

Ms. Anne Terry, AAP Staff Analyst, in 

writing at: anne.terry@gsa.gov, by fax at 

(202) 501–3341, or mail at the address 

given above for the DFO, no later than 

one week prior to the meeting at which 

they wish to speak. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

(a) Background: The purpose of the 

Panel is to provide independent advice 

and recommendations to the Office of 

Federal Procurement Policy and 

Congress pursuant to section 1423 of the 

Services Acquisition Reform Act of 

2003. The Panel’s statutory charter is to 

review Federal contracting laws, 

regulations, and governmentwide 

policies, including the use of 

commercial practices, performancebased contracting, performance of 

acquisition functions across agency 

lines of responsibility, and 

governmentwide contracts. Interested 

parties are invited to attend the 

meetings. Opportunity for public 

comments will be provided at all 

meetings. At this time, the Panel does 

not expect to hold public meetings 

beyond the January 19, 2006 date. Any 

change will be announced in the 

Federal Register. 

All Meetings—Selected working 

groups, established at the February 28, 

2005 and May 17, 2005 public meetings 

of the AAP (see http://www.acqnet.gov/ 

aap for a list of working groups), will 

report their draft findings and 

recommendations during these 

meetings. While the Panel may hear 

from some additional invited speakers,