UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

---------------------------------------------------------------x

DR. JUDY WOOD on behalf of the MEMORANDUM DECISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, AND ORDER

07 CV 3314 (GBD)

Plaintiff/Relator,

 

-against- 

 

APPLIED RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, INC.;

SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL

CORP.; BOEING; NuSTATS; COMPUTER 

AIDED ENGINEERING ASSOCIATES, INC.;

DATASOURCE, INC.; GEOSTAATS, INC.;

GILSANZ MURRAY STEFICEK LLP;

HUGHES ASSOCIATES, INC.; AJMAL

ABBASI; EDUARDO KAUSEL;

DAVID PARKS; DAVID SHARP; DANIELE

VENEZANO; JOSEF VAN DYCK; KASPAR

WILLIAM; ROLF JENSEN & ASSOCIATES,

INC.; ROSENWASSER/GROSSMAN CONSULTING 

ENGINEERS, P.C.; SIMPSON GUMPERTZ &

HEGER, INC.; S.K. GHOSH ASSOCIATES,

INC.; SKIDMORE, OWING & MERRILL,

LLP; TENG & ASSOCIATES, INC.;

UNDERWRITERS LABORATORIES, INC.;

WISS, JANNEY, ELSTNER ASSOCIATES, 

INC.; AMERICAN AIRLINES; SILVERSTEIN

PROPERTIES; and UNITED AIRLINES,

Defendants.

---------------------------------------------------------------x

GEORGE B. DANIELS, District Judge: 

Case 1:07-cv-03314-GBD Document 100 Filed 06/26/2008 Page 1 of 16
 The three related cases that are pending before this Court are: Wood v. Applied 1

Research Associates, Inc., et al., 07 CV 3314 (GBD); Reynolds v. Science Applications Int’l, et

al., 07 CV 4612 (GBD) and Haas v. Gutierrez, et al., 07 CV 2623 (GBD).

 Plaintiffs also claim that there is significant evidence that the cause of the destruction of 2

World Trade Center building number 7 was a controlled demolition. 

 Reynolds argues that “[t]his case involves the fraud perpetrated by the jetliner crash 3

hoax.” (Reynolds Opp’n Mem. at 6). Wood refers to “... the expressed myth of 9/11 that 19

Arabs did it with box cutters.” (Wood Opp’n Mem. at 13). Haas contends that “World Trade

Center building number 7 (WTC7) ... was not damaged in any way by any jetliner impact ...”

“There is evidence of a controlled demolition ... that NIST is overtly seeking to squelch ...” 

(Haas Opp’n Mem. at 14). 

2

In separate actions, three different plaintiffs, who are all represented by the same 1

attorney, commenced individual lawsuits attempting to challenge the investigative findings, of

the National Institute of Standards and Technology (“NIST”), as to how and why the World

Trade Center buildings collapsed on 9/11. The focus of the NIST investigation was on the

sequence of events “from the instance of aircraft impact to the initiation of collapse for each

tower.” Plaintiffs claim that a terrorist attack was not responsible for the destruction of the

World Trade Center complex (“WTC”). According to plaintiffs, the evidence demonstrates that

the destruction of the World Trade Center Towers was caused by a United States secret military

“directed energy weapon.” Plaintiffs’ attorney argues that “the defendants knowingly 2

participated in the fraud of furthering the false claim that two wide-body jetliners hit the World

Trade Center on 9/11/01.” (Reynolds Opp’n Mem. at 1). 3

 Congress authorized NIST, a non-regulatory agency within the United States 

Department of Commerce, to conduct the technical investigation into the structural failings

leading to the collapse of the Twin Towers and the building located at 7 World Trade Center

Case 1:07-cv-03314-GBD Document 100 Filed 06/26/2008 Page 2 of 16
 As a result of the collapse of the WTC, the National Construction Safety Team Act (the 4

“Act”), 15 U.S.C. § 1703 et seq., was enacted. The purpose of the Act “is to improve the

structural integrity of buildings and evacuation and emergency response procedures by

investigating building failures and recommending specific improvements to building standards,

codes, and practices, as well as to evacuation and emergency response procedures.” H.R. Rep.

No. 107-530, at 5 (2002) reprinted in 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. 941, 941. Although the primary focus

of the Act is on future building collapses, it nevertheless “gives NIST comprehensive authority to

complete the investigation of the WTC disaster.” Id. at 14, 950; see also, 15 U.S.C. § 7311

(“The authorities and restrictions applicable under this chapter ... shall apply to the activities of

the National Institute of Standards and Technology in response to the attacks of September 11,

2001.”).

 Plaintiffs Wood and Reynolds sued the following twenty-seven defendants: Science 5

Applications International Corp.; Applied Research Associates, Inc.; Boeing; NuStats; Computer

Aided Engineering Associates, Inc.; DataSource, Inc.; GEOSTAATS, Inc.; Gilsanz Murray

Steficek LLP; Hughes Associates, Inc.; Ajmal Abbasi; Eduardo Kausel; David Parks; David

Sharp; Daniele Venezano; Josef Van Dyck; Kaspar William; Rolf Jensen & Associates, Inc.;

Rosenwasser/Grossman Consulting Engineers, P.C.; Simpson Gumpertz & Heger, Inc.; S.K.

Ghosh Associates, Inc.; Skidmore, Owings & Merrill, LLP; Teng & Associates, Inc.;

Underwriters Laboratories, Inc.; Wiss, Janney, Elstner Associates, Inc.; Silverstein Properties;

American Airlines and United Airlines.

Plaintiff Reynolds subsequently dismissed his action against Silverstein Properties,

American Airlines and United Airlines. 

 Plaintiff Haas sued the following defendants in both their individual and official

6

capacities: Carlos M. Gutierrez, Secretary, United States Department of Commerce; NIST’s

Acting Director James Turner (pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 25(d), Acting Director Turner is

3

(“WTC7”). On October 16, 2005, NIST issued its “Final Report on the Collapses of the Twin 4

Towers of the World Trade Center;” which report is referred to as “NCSTAR 1.” NIST’s

investigation into the collapse of WTC7 is still proceeding. 

 Plaintiffs Judy Wood and Morgan Reynolds each independently sued the same nongovernmental defendants who allegedly provided consulting and other services to NIST in

connection with the NCSTAR 1 report. Plaintiff Edward Haas sued both governmental and 5

non-governmental actors who are allegedly responsible for conducting the investigation itself, or

have provided services as part of that investigation. All defendants, in each of the three actions,

6

Case 1:07-cv-03314-GBD Document 100 Filed 06/26/2008 Page 3 of 16
automatically substituted for his predecessor, William A. Jeffrey); Dr. Shyam Sunder, NIST’s

Lead Investigator; Dr. Theresa McAllister, NIST’s Research Structural Engineer; and Catherine

Fletcher, Chief of NIST’s Management and Organization Division. Haas also named as

defendants “John Doe I-V, Contractors Employed by NIST,” as well as three defendants, who

were also sued by plaintiffs Wood and Reynolds, to wit, Silverstein Properties, Applied Research

Associates, Inc., and Science Applications International Corp.. In plaintiff Haas’ proposed

second amended complaint, he only names the Secretary of Commerce and NIST officials as

defendants. 

 Plaintiffs’ lawsuits make no allegation with regard to the hijacking of United Airlines 7

Flight 93, which crashed in a field just outside Shanksville, Pennsylvania, or the hijacking of 

American Airlines Flight 77, which was crashed into the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia. 

4

moved to dismiss the lawsuits as being frivolous, and for lack of federal subject matter

jurisdiction and failure to state a claim, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) and (6), respectively. 

The motions to dismiss are granted and all three complaints are dismissed with prejudice.

Plaintiffs assert that NIST’s investigation is tainted by fraud and other serious

misconduct. They contend that the NCSTAR 1 report constitutes a “fraudulent document,” in

that it conceals the true cause for the collapse of the Twin Towers. Plaintiffs maintain that the

alleged fraudulent nature of the investigation has furthered the deception, perpetrated upon the

masses, that the WTC was demolished as a result of terrorists plowing two commercial airplanes,

filled with thousand of gallons of jet fuel, directly into the Twin Towers at a high rate of speed.7

They claim that, through the employment of psychological operations, millions were deceived

into believing that the destruction was caused by a terrorist hijacking that murdered thousands of

innocent people inside. Plaintiffs theorize that what actually occurred was that the Twin Towers

disintegrated after being struck by the United States military’s secret laser-like weaponry. All

three plaintiffs explain that these “directed energy weapons” “are operational in Earth[’s] orbit, at

high altitude, low altitude, at sea and on land, ranging in lethality from the capacity to do great

Case 1:07-cv-03314-GBD Document 100 Filed 06/26/2008 Page 4 of 16
 Both plaintiffs Wood and Reynolds have asserted the same causes of action for 8

violations of three provisions of § 3729(a) which imposes liability upon:

 “Any person who - -

(1) knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, to an officer or

employee of the United States Government ... a false or fraudulent

claim for payment or approval;

(2) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false

record or statement to get a false or fraudulent claim paid or

approved by the Government; [or]

...

(7) knowingly makes, uses or causes to be made or used, a false

record or statement to conceal, avoid, or decrease an obligation to

pay or transmit money or property to the Government[.]

 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1-2), (7). 

 The Information Quality Act directs “the Office of Management and Budget [“OMB”]

9

... [to] issue guidelines ... that provide policy and procedural guidance to Federal agencies for

ensuring and maximizing the quality, objectivity, utility, and integrity of information ...

disseminated by Federal agencies ...” Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 1(a)(3) [Title V, § 515], Dec. 21,

5

damage such as that of destroying the World Trade Center Twin Towers in less than 10 seconds

each, as occurred on 9/11/01, down to and including imposition of a disabling stun on human

beings for crowd control and/or other psy ops [psychological operations] purposes.” (Wood Am.

Compl. ¶ 23; Reynolds Compl. ¶ 22; Haas Am. Compl. ¶ 25). 

Plaintiffs Wood and Reynolds commenced their respective individual actions on behalf 

of the United States Government for violations of the False Claims Act (“FCA”), 31 U.S.C. §

3729 et seq., claiming that the defendants hired by the Government were not entitled to payment

for the allegedly fraudulent services they provided to NIST. The False Claims Act prohibits a 8

person from attempting to get a fraudulent claim for payment approved by the Government, or

using false records to reduce the amount one owes to the Government. In plaintiff Haas’ 

separate individual lawsuit, he seeks to enjoin NIST from continuing its investigation into the

collapse of WTC7 on the grounds that NIST has violated the Information Quality Act by 9

Case 1:07-cv-03314-GBD Document 100 Filed 06/26/2008 Page 5 of 16
2000, 114 Stat. 2763, 2763A-153, published at 44 U.S.C. § 3516, note. It further requires that

each federal agency “establish administrative mechanisms allowing affected persons to seek and

obtain correction of information maintained and disseminated by the agency that does not comply

with the guidelines issued” by the OMB. Id. 

 Plaintiff Haas submitted a “Request for Correction” to NIST claiming that a statement 10

appearing in a December 12, 2006 NIST document was contrary to a statement in the NCSTAR 1

report. Although both documents indicate that there was no “evidence” of a controlled

demolition event, the NCSTAR 1 report further refers to the lack of “corroborating” evidence

that the towers were brought down by controlled demolition. Haas argued to NIST that the

phrase “‘corroborating evidence,’ by definition, indicates that there was some evidence of

controlled demolition ...” (Haas Am. Compl. Ex. A, at 26). Unable to secure a forbearance

agreement from NIST, Haas commenced the instant action seeking a preliminary and permanent

injunction enjoining NIST from continuing its investigation until the outcome of his request for

correction was known. NIST has since denied his application, and Haas now seeks leave to file

a second amended complaint claiming NIST should be enjoined from continuing its technical

investigation until: (1) valid information is dissemination to the public; and (2) a criminal

investigation into the controlled demolition of WTC7 is initiated and the outcome thereto is

known. (Haas Opp’n Mem. at 18; Haas Aff’d ¶¶ 18-19). 

6

intentionally disseminating contradictory information to the public and concealing the existence

of a controlled demolition event at WTC7. The aim of the Information Quality Act is to assure 10

that the information publicly released by a federal agency is of the highest quality. It requires 

the dissemination of true and accurate information, and a mechanism for individuals, affected by

that information, to seek and obtain a correction of false or inaccurate information. None of

plaintiffs’ asserted legal claims can withstand defendants’ motions to dismiss.

NO COURT HAS SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OVER PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIMS

The False Claims Act affords a private individual the right to sue in federal court, on

behalf of the Government, any person who knowingly presents or makes a false or fraudulent

claim for payment. See, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(4)(A), (B). An individual is, however, 

jurisdictionally barred from bringing a FCA action that is based upon publicly disclosed

Case 1:07-cv-03314-GBD Document 100 Filed 06/26/2008 Page 6 of 16
 Section 3730(e)(4)(A) provides: 11

No court shall have jurisdiction over an action under this section based upon the

public disclosure of allegations or transactions in a criminal, civil, or

administrative hearing, in a congressional, administration or Government

Accounting Office report, hearing, audit, or investigation, or from the news

media, unless the action is brought by the Attorney General or the person bringing

the action is an original source of the information. 

31 U.S.C. § 3730 (e)(4)(A) (footnote omitted). 

 In their respective complaints, plaintiffs allege that defendant Underwriters

12

Laboratories, Inc. (“UL”) “overtly suppressed [ ] information [from NIST] by terminating the

7

information, unless the individual bringing the action is an “original source” of the information.11

To be an “original source” of publicly disclosed information, a plaintiff must have direct and

independent knowledge of information on which the lawsuit’s allegations are based, and have

voluntarily provided such information to the Government prior to filing the action. See, §

3730(e)(4)(B); Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. United States, - - U.S. - -, 127 S.Ct. 1397, 1407 (March

27, 2007). To even attempt to assert this type of lawsuit, plaintiff must possess and be an

original source of at least the substantive information publicly disclosed about the particular

fraud. See, United States ex rel. Smith v. Yale Univ., 415 F.Supp.2d 58, 72 (D.Conn. 2006)

(quoting United States ex rel. Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante, P.A. v. Prudential Ins. Co.,

944 F.2d 1149, 1160 (3d Cir. 1991)). A party lacks direct and independent knowledge “if a third

party is ‘the source of the core information’ upon which the ... complaint is based.” United

States v. New York Med. Coll., 252 F.3d 118, 121(2d Cir. 2001) (quoting United States ex rel.

Kreindler & Kreindler v. United Techs. Corp., 985 F.2d 1148, 1159 (2d Cir. 1990)). 

The allegations in plaintiffs’ complaints are based entirely on information made publicly

available through NIST’s administrative investigation, the administrative report resulting

therefrom (i.e, NCSTAR 1), a prior civil action and various media accounts. Their lawsuits

12

Case 1:07-cv-03314-GBD Document 100 Filed 06/26/2008 Page 7 of 16
services of one of its employees, Kevin Ryan, who called attention to [the] incongruity of causal

explanation.” (Wood Am. Compl. ¶ 39; Reynolds Compl. ¶ 37). Prior to the commencement of

the cases at bar, Kevin Ryan filed suit against UL claiming he was wrongfully discharged

because he had sent an e-mail to NIST indicating that: UL had conducted WTC-related

metallurgical testing; the official explanation for the destruction of the WTC was not supported

by a scientific analysis of the evidence; and there was substantial evidence that all three buildings

collapsed from explosive devices. (Ryan v. Underwriters Labs., Inc., No. 06-1770 (S.D.Ind. filed

Nov. 16, 2006). Thus, the information at the heart of the Wood and Reynolds litigation “was

publicly disclosed because it was available to anyone who wished to consult the [Ryan] court

file.” Kreindler, 985 F.2d at 1158. 

8

simply rely upon their own theoretical examination of information already within the public

domain. Plaintiffs’ attempted analysis of that information constitutes pure speculation that the

NIST participants were involved in a cover-up to conceal the true cause for the towers’ collapse. 

They merely disagree with NIST’s investigative findings, and specifically wish to reject the 

basic factual premise that terrorist destroyed the Twin Towers using passenger-filled airplanes as

missile-like weapons. Plaintiffs, understandably, offer nothing more than conjecture and

supposition to support their claim that the towers were struck by high powered energy beams. 

Their personal hypothesis about what should be concluded from publicly disclosed information

does not qualify either of them as an original source of information in order to sustain an

individual FCA claim on behalf of the Government. See, Kreindler, 985 F.2d at 1159; see also,

New York Med. Coll., 252 F.3d at 121-22. Federal jurisdiction over a private FCA action is not

created simply by arguing that the review of publicly disclosed information spurs plaintiffs to

advance a different theory. Such an argument, based solely on publicly available information,

could no more support a federal lawsuit to advance an alternative theory regarding the

assassination of President Kennedy, or whether men ever actually landed on the moon. 

In addition to the FCA claims, plaintiff Reynolds also asserts State common law causes 

Case 1:07-cv-03314-GBD Document 100 Filed 06/26/2008 Page 8 of 16
 Plaintiff Wood asserted these common law causes of action in her original complaint. 13

In her amended complaint, she indicates that her action is being brought “under the common law

or equitable theories of unjust enrichment, payment under mistake of fact, recoupment of

overpayments and common law fraud.” (Wood Am. Compl. ¶ 1). Nevertheless, no basis for any

common law claims are specifically pled in her amended complaint. 

 The implausabily of plaintiffs’ theories warrants no further consideration by this Court 14

beyond the insufficiency of the legal claims upon which plaintiffs attempt to advance those

theories in their lawsuits. 

9

of action for unjust enrichment, payment by mistake, recoupment of overpayment, and fraud.13

However, as plaintiffs’ attorney acknowledges, the Congressional grant of private standing to sue

in FCA cases does not extend to common law causes of action. See, United States ex rel. 

Phipps v. Comprehensive Cmty. Dev. Corp., 152 F.Supp.2d 443, 451-52 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); see

also United States ex rel. Rockefeller v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 274 F.Supp.2d 10, 14 (D.D.C.

2003), aff’d sub nom. Rockefeller ex rel. United States v. Washington TRU Solutions, LCC,

2004 WL 180264 (D.C.Cir. Jan. 21, 2004). Plaintiffs asserted these common law claims in a

representative capacity on behalf of the United States Government. Neither plaintiffs claim to be

personally aggrieved or damaged as a result of the defendants’ alleged wrongdoing. All 

common law claims are, therefore, dismissed for lack of standing. Accordingly, plaintiffs Wood

and Reynolds’ actions are barred for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

PLAINTIFFS’ PLEADINGS ARE WHOLLY INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A LAWSUIT 

Even if the requisite jurisdiction had existed, dismissal of plaintiffs’ complaints is

independently warranted, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), for failure to state a claim and for

failure to plead fraud with the requisite particularity mandated by Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b).14

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the factual allegations in the complaint

Case 1:07-cv-03314-GBD Document 100 Filed 06/26/2008 Page 9 of 16
 The sufficiency of the pleadings is determined by examination of the complaint, the 15

exhibits attached thereto, and matters incorporated by reference therein. Other independent

submissions made by the defendants, with regard to the jurisdictional challenge, were not

considered in assessing the legal adequacy of the complaints. 

10

“must create the possibility for a right to relief that is more than speculative.” Spool v. World

15

Child Int’l Adoption Agency, 520 F.3d 178, 183 (2d Cir. 2008). Although complaints generally 

“do[ ] not need detailed factual allegations, [ ] plaintiff[s’] obligation to provide the grounds of

[their] entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation

of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. - -, 127

S.Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (May 21, 2007) (internal citations, quotation marks and original brackets

omitted). Plaintiffs’ theories about the cause of the 9/11 disaster completely fail to state a

cognizable claim for relief. 

To state a FCA claim, plaintiffs must sufficiently allege that defendants knowingly

presented a false or fraudulent claim; knowingly made or used a false record or statement to get a

fraudulent claim paid; or knowingly made or used a false record or statement to decrease their

obligation to pay the Government. The theory of plaintiffs’ lawsuit is that the defendants

violated the FCA because they were not entitled to any remuneration for the services they

rendered to NIST since NIST ultimately failed to conclude, consistent with plaintiffs’ 

hypothesis, that the Twin Towers was destroyed by the military’s directed energy weapons. The

results of defendants’ evaluations are incompatible with plaintiffs’ own interpretations. This

does not, however, give rise to a reasonable inference that defendants are not entitled to any

compensation from the Government for the services they provided. See, Wang v. FMC Corp.,

975 F.2d 1412, 1421 (9 Cir. 1992); United States ex rel. Swafford v. Borgess Med. Ctr., 98 th

Case 1:07-cv-03314-GBD Document 100 Filed 06/26/2008 Page 10 of 16
11

F.Supp.2d 822, 833 (W.D.Mich. 2000), aff’d 24 Fed.Appx. 491 (6 Cir. 2001). th

Plaintiffs have pled no factual allegations to support a reasonable inference that

defendants knowingly sought payment from the government to which they were not entitled. 

Plaintiffs wish to reach the conclusion that no compensation was owing to defendants by relying

on the other self-serving conclusion that the services they rendered were worthless. In plaintiffs’

view, defendants would only be entitled to compensation if NIST had acknowledged plaintiffs’

theory that directed energy weapons, and not a terrorist attack, was responsible for the

destruction of the WTC. Seeking payment for services rendered to NIST is not unlawful simply

because the plaintiffs themselves disagree with NIST’s investigative findings. See generally,

Mikes v. Straus, 274 F.3d 687, 703 (2d Cir. 2001) (“In a worthless services claim, the

performance of the service is so deficient that for all practical purposes it is the equivalent of no

performance at all.”). Even purported errors based on flawed reasoning, mathematic

calculations, or scientific judgments are not false for purposes of the FCA. See, Pfingston v.

Ronan Eng’g Co., 284 F.3d 999, 1003 (9 Cir. 2002); Wang, 975 F.2d at 1421; United States ex th

rel. Taylor v. Gabelli, 345 F.Supp.2d 313, 329 & n.87 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 

Furthermore, plaintiffs have failed to plead any factual allegations to support their FCA

claims asserted under “the ‘reverse false claims’ provision, § 3729(a)(7), which creates FCA

liability for false statements designed to conceal, reduce, or avoid an obligation to pay money or

property to the Government.” United States ex rel. Lissack v. Sakura Global Capital Mkts., Inc.,

377 F.3d 145, 152 (2d Cir. 2004). “This section was added ‘to provide that an individual who

makes a material misrepresentation to avoid paying money owed the Government would be

equally liable under the Act as if he had submitted a false claim to receive money.” United

Case 1:07-cv-03314-GBD Document 100 Filed 06/26/2008 Page 11 of 16
12

States ex rel. Bahrani v. Conagra, Inc., 465 F.3d 1189, 1194-95 (10 Cir. 2006) (quoting S.Rep. th

No. 99-345, at 18, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5283 (1986)). Plaintiffs cannot 

identify any existing financial obligation any of the defendants owed to the Government, nor can

they identify any specific false record or statement that a defendant made to avoid such a

purported obligation. The pleadings are therefore also insufficient to state a reverse false claims

cause of action.

Plaintiffs have not only failed to comply with the liberal pleading standards applicable to

a consideration of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), they have also failed to

meet the stricter pleading standard under Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b). Claims asserted under the FCA, an

anti-fraud statute, are also subject to Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleadings standard, requiring

averments of fraud to be pled with particularity. Gold v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 68 F.3d 1475,

1476-77 (2d Cir. 1995); see also, Eisenstein v. Whitman, 4 Fed.Appx. 24, 26 (2d Cir. 2001). 

Plaintiffs’ counsel acknowledges that to satisfy Rule 9(b) “the Second Circuit has said that the

complaint must: (1) specify the statements that the plaintiff contends were fraudulent, (2)

identify the speaker, (3) state where and when the statement were made, and (4) explain why the

statements were fraudulent.” (Reynolds Opp’n Mem. at 35 (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted)). Plaintiffs argue that their pleadings comply with the Second Circuit criteria

because they (1) identify the subject statements as being “each and every time during a two plusyear period that defendants made false claims for payments based on fraudulently performed

work”; (2) “adequately alleges the ‘identity of the speaker’ as being these defendants”; (3)

“adequately pleads ‘where and when the statements were made.’ They were made in NCSTAR

1”; and (4) explains the statements were fraudulent because they concealed the true cause for the

Case 1:07-cv-03314-GBD Document 100 Filed 06/26/2008 Page 12 of 16
 Both the Wood and Reynolds complaints allege, in pertinent part:

16

The various cost reports, requisitions, billing statements and/or requests for

reimbursements submitted by the defendant NIST participants ... all contain false

claims for reimbursement and made false statements ... because the true nature

and intent was to mislead NIST and to cause a false causal statement concerning

what caused the destruction for the WTC complex to occur. *** All such

submitted cost reports, invoices, reimbursement claims and the like constitute

false claims under the False Claims Act because the defendants knew ... that the

actual cause of the destruction of the WTC complex was the result of the use of

directed energy weapons.

(Wood Am. Compl. ¶¶ 56, 59-60; Reynolds Compl. ¶¶ 54, 57-58). 

13

Twin Towers’ collapse. (Id. at 36). Such general and conclusory pleadings fall far short of Rule

9(b)’s pleading standard.

Plaintiffs vaguely allege that, for a number of years, all defendants wrongfully sought

payment for services performed in bad faith. They do not cite to a single identifiable record or 16

billing submission that they claim to be false, or give a single example of when a purportedly

false claim was presented for payment by a particular defendant at a specific time. Additionally,

plaintiffs’ general attribution, to the defendants, of the purported false statements published in

the NCSTAR 1 report is untenable to support a particularized pleading of fraud. Defendants are

not the authors of the report, and plaintiffs point to no specific factual assertion relied upon in the

report that was allegedly falsely provided by defendants to NIST. 

Plaintiffs merely allege the existence of a nefarious conspiracy of epic proportion. They

name all defendants as coconspirators. They therefore conclude that all defendants’ work 

records and the services they performed are fraudulent because they are tainted by the illegal

conspiracy in which they participated. Such generalized attempts at fraud pleading fail to meet

the requirements of Rule 9(b). See, United States ex rel. Joshi v. St. Luke’s Hosp., Inc., 441 

F.3d 552, 556-57 (8 Cir. 2006) (Alleging all work performed by defendants was illegal and th

Case 1:07-cv-03314-GBD Document 100 Filed 06/26/2008 Page 13 of 16
 The complaints also state that Haas is suing, under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named 17

Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), for violations of his Fifth Amendment Due Process rights. The

complaints, however, fail to contain any factual allegations to support such a claim, and no

constitutional cause of action is specifically pled. 

 Haas further “claims [ ] that there is evidence that warrants a parallel criminal 18

investigation into whether or not there was a motive and opportunity for those that might have

had prior knowledge of the September 11, 2001 attacks, to take advantage of the event and

destroy WTC7 for yet to be fully understood purposes.” (Haas Aff’d ¶ 10). Plaintiff contends

that “[s]uch a criminal investigation could reveal that the direction NIST is heading with its

technical investigation into the WTC7 failure is completely without merit.” (Id.). He therefore

14

every invoice fraudulent because of an underlying conspiracy to submit fraudulent claims fails to

satisfy Rule 9(b)); United States ex rel. Aflatooni v. Kitsap Physicians Serv., 314 F.3d 995, 1002

(9 Cir. 2002) (“The False Claims Act [ ] focuses on the submission of a claim, and does not th

concern itself with whether or to what extent there exists a menacing underlying scheme.”). 

Plaintiff Haas’ complaint, for violations of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §

551 et seq, is also insufficiently pled. His claim is premised on NIST’s failure to suspend its 17

investigation while his request, seeking a change of information, was under consideration. 

Because that request has since been denied by NIST, his causes of action, relating to the

existence of a pending request, no longer even presents a live controversy for which relief would

be available, and is therefore moot. See, White River Amusement Pub, Inc. v. Town of Hartford,

481 F.3d 163, 167-68 (2d Cir. 2007). 

Plaintiff Haas, however, argues that his claim now, as alleged in his proposed amended

complaint, is actually premised on the alleged intentional dissemination of contradictory

information by NIST, in violation of the Information Quality Act. He seeks an order of

forbearance requiring NIST to cease its investigation “until valid (i.e. quality) information has

been disseminated in place of the currently contradictory information available to the public.”18

Case 1:07-cv-03314-GBD Document 100 Filed 06/26/2008 Page 14 of 16
argues that NIST’s “technical investigation [should be] halted until the outcome of the criminal

investigation is determined.” (Id. ¶ 18). 

 The non-governmental defendants’ motions for sanctions, pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 19

3730(d)(4) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 11, are denied. A belief, no matter how incredible, that the WTC

was destroyed using secret exotic weaponry, does not give rise to even a colorable claim for

relief. All plaintiffs, as well as the attorney for the plaintiffs here, are hereby warned that filing

further successive untenable actions may result in the imposition of monetary or other serious

sanctions. See, Catanzano v. Wallenstein, 142 Fed.Appx. 540 (2d Cir. 2005); Iwachiw v. New

York City Bd. of Elections, 126 Fed.Appx. 27, 29-30 (2d Cir. 2005); Pentagen Techs. Int’l Ltd.

v. United States, 172 F.Supp.2d 464 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d 63 Fed.Appx. 548 (2d Cir. 2003). 

15

(Haas Opp’n Mem. at 18). Plaintiff’s proposed alternative legal theory is unavailing. The

Information Quality Act does not create any legal rights, enforceable by unrelated third parties, to

information or its correctness. See, Salt Inst. v. Leavitt, 440 F.3d 156, 159 (4 Cir. 2006); Ams. th

for Safe Access v. United States Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 2007 WL 2141289, at *4

(N.D.Cal. July 24, 2007); In re Operation of the Missouri River Sys. Litig., 363 F.Supp.2d 1145,

1174 (D.Minn. 2004), aff’d in part and vacated in part on other grounds 421 F.3d 618 (8 

th

Cir. 2005). Neither the Information Quality Act, nor the Administrative Procedure Act, create a

private right of action upon which plaintiff may independently pursue this litigation. 

Regardless of how plaintiff Haas attempts to characterize his “forbearance” claims,

dismissal is warranted, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), for failure to state a claim. NIST is

not legally required to cease its congressionally mandated investigation every time an interloper

questions the accuracy of one of its statements. Such a forbearance policy would indefinitely

delay significant investigations. An influx of illegitimate requests that information be changed

would effectively cripple the process. Hence, defendants’ motion to dismiss Haas’ first amended

complaint is granted. Plaintiff Haas’ motion to file a second amended complaint is denied on the

grounds of futility.19

Case 1:07-cv-03314-GBD Document 100 Filed 06/26/2008 Page 15 of 16