F OR P UBLICATION



### UNIT E D ST AT E S CO URT O F APPE AL S FO R T H E NINT H CIRCUIT

J O S E P H B A

U M A N N , individually , and on behalf of other members of the
g eneral public similarly

situated, Plaintiff-Appellant
,

v

.

C H A S E I N V E S T M E N T S E R V I C E S C O R P ., a Delaware corporation; J PM O R G A N C H A S E B A

N K NA; J PM O R G A N C H A S E & C O ., a Delaware corporation,

Defendants-Appellees

. N o. 12-55644

D.C. No. 2:11-cv-06667- GHK-F MO

OPI NI ON

A ppeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Georg e H. King , Chief District J u d g e, Presiding

Arg ued and Submitted March 5, 2013 Submission Vacated Aug ust 13, 2013 Resubmitted March 6, 2014

Pasadena, California

F iled March 13, 2014

B efore: Michael Daly

Hawkins, Sidney R. Thomas, and Andrew D. Hurwitz
, Circuit J udg es.B A U M A N N V

. C H A S E I

N V E S T M E N T S E R V I C E S 2

Opinion by J udg e Hurwitz ; Concurrence by

J u dg e Thomas

SUMMARY *

C lass Action F airness Act

The panel reversed the district court’s o rder deny ing plaintiff’s motion to remand an a ction, broug ht in state court under the California L a

bor Code Private Attorney s General Act of 2004, and then r e moved by defendants on the basis o f diversity jurisdiction and pursuant to the Class Action F airness Act of 2005.

Plaintiff sued h is e mploy er, Chase I nvestment Se rvices Corporation, under the Private Attorney General Act in Ca l i f ornia superior court, alleg ing that Chase had failed to pay h im and oth e r “ ag g r ieved parties” (Chase financial advisors) for overtime, p rovide for meal breaks, allow r e st periods, and timely reimburse ex p enses. The complaint
soug h t statutory civil penalties for each a lleg ed violation, a nd asserted that plaintiff’’s p otential share o f a ny penalties recovered and attorney

s’ fees would be less than $75,000.

The p a n e l held that the district c ourt could not ex ercise jurisdiction over this removed California Pri v a t e Attorney General action under the Cla s s A ction F airness Act. The panel conclude that California Private Attorney General Act actions are n ot sufficiently similar to Rule 23 class a ctions to

* T h is su m m ary co n stitu

tes n o part o f th e o p in io n o f th e co u rt. It h as b een p rep ared b y

co u rt staf

f f o r th e co n v en i en ce o f

th e read er.B A U M A N N V

. C H A S E I

N V E S T M E N T S E R V I C E S 3

establish the o rig inal jurisdiction of a f ederal court under the Class Action F airness Act. The panel also noted that because plaintiff’s portion of the recovery would be less than $75,000, there was also n o d iversity jurisdiction under 28 U .S.C. § 1332(a), and therefore plaintiff’s motion to remand should have been g ranted. T he panel reversed with instructions to g rant that motion.

J udg e Thomas concurred in the majority opinion

. He wrote sepa r at ely only to note his prior disag reement on the
qu es t i on of whether c laims u n der the L abor Code Private Attorney General A ct of 2004 can be ag g reg ated in determining whether diversity jurisdiction ex ists. Urbino v

. Orkin Services of California, I nc. , 726 F .3d 1118, 1123 (9th Cir. 2013) (Thomas, J ., dissenting ).

COUNSEL

Glenn A. Danas (arg

ued), Marc P r i m o , and Ry an H. W u, I nitiative L eg al Group A PC, L os Ang eles, California, f o r Plaintiff-Appellant.

Carrie A. Gonell (arg

ued) a nd J ohn A

. H ay ashi, Morg an, L ewis & B ockius L L P, I rvine, Calif o r n ia; Samuel S. Shaulson, N ew York, New York; a nd Alison B

. W illard, San F rancisco, California, for Defendants-Appellees.

Allen Graves (arg

ued ) a n d Eliz abeth Sullivan, The Graves F irm, Pasadena, Cali f

o r n ia, f or Amicus Curiae Stacy Thompson.

Georg e W

. Abele a n d M e linda A. G ordon, Paul Hasting s L L P, L o s Ang eles, Cal i f ornia; Robin S. Conrad, KateB A U M A N N V

. C H A S E I

N V E S T M E N T S E R V I C E S 4

Comerford T odd, and S h a n e B

. Kawka, National Chamber L itig ation Center, W ashing ton, D.C., for Amicus Curiae California Employ

ment L aw Council and Chamber o f Commerce of the United States of America.

OP INION

HURW I TZ , Circuit J udg e:

This is a civil action filed in California state court under the California L abor Code Private Attorney s General A ct o f 2004 (“PAGA” )
, C a l. L a b. Code §§ 2698–2699.5, and then

remov ed to the United States District Court for the Central District of California. PAGA auth o r iz es ag g rieved employ e es, acting as private attorney s g eneral, t o r e cover civil p enalties from their e mploy ers for violati o ns of the L abor Code. See Arias v

. Super. Ct.
, 209 P.3d 9 2 3
, 9 2 9 –30 ( C a l. 2009). The sole q uestion presented on appeal is whether the d istrict court had subject matter jurisdiction over this removed action.

I n Urbino v

. O r k i n Services
, 726 F .3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2013), we held that p o t e n tial PAGA p enalties ag ainst an employ e r may not be ag g reg ated to meet the minimum
amount in controversy requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 133 2 (a). The remaining

issue in this appeal is whether a district court may instead e x ercise orig inal jurisdiction over a PAGA acti o n under the Class Action F airness A ct o f 2005 ( “ C A FA ”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1 453, 1711–15. W e hold that CAF A provides no basis for federal jurisdiction.B A U M A N N V

. C H A S E I

N V E S T M E N T S E R V I C E S 5

I.

F actual and P rocedural Background

J oseph B aumann sued his employ er, Chase I n vestment Services Corporation (“Chase”), under PAGA in California superior court, alleg ing that Chase had f ailed to pay him a

nd other “Ag g rieved Parties” (Chase financial advisors) for overtime, provide for meal breaks, allow r est per i o d s, a nd timely r eimburse e x penses. The complaint soug ht PAGA statutory civil penalties for e a c h alleg ed v iolation, a nd asserted that B aumann’s potential share of any penalties recovered and attorney

s’ fees would be less than $75,000.

Chase filed a notice o f r e m oval, invoking diversity jurisdiction under § 1 332(a) and alleg ing that the amount in controversy ex ceeded $75,000 if a ll potential statutory penalties and attorney s fee awards were ag g reg ated. The notice of removal also invoked CAF A jurisdictio n u n d er § 1332(d)(2), alleg ing minimal diversity
, a class of more than 100 members, and an amount in controversy ex ceeding $5,000,000. The district court denied B aumann’s motion to remand, ag g r eg ating the potential c l a ims ag ainst Chase a nd finding subject matter jurisdiction u nder § 1332(a). The court according ly

declined to address CAF A jurisdiction.

The district court certified its order deny ing B aumann’s motion to r e m a n d
, and we permitted an appeal to be taken from that or d e r

. S

e e 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). Section 1292(b) authoriz es appeals from orders, not questions, so “our r eview of the p resent controversy is not automatically limited solely to the q uestion deemed c ontrolling by the district court.” I n

re Cinematronics, Inc.
, 9 1 6 F .2d 1444, 1449 (9th Cir. 1990). And, because the sole questi o n r e m aining in this appeal—B A U M A N N V

. C H A S E I

N V E S T M E N T S E R V I C E S 6

whether a PAGA suit is a “class action” as defined in CAF A
, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(1)(B )—is a purely leg al issue, which we review de novo, W

as h ington v. Chimei Innolux Corp.
, 659 F .3d 842, 846–47 (9th Cir. 2011), we choose as a matter of judicial economy

to address it in the first instance. 1

II.

CAF A Jurisdiction

CAF A confers orig inal jurisdiction to the district courts “of any ci v i l action in which the matter in controversy

ex c e eds the sum or value of $5,000,000, ex clusive o f interest and costs, and is a class action in which – any member of the class of p laintiffs is a citiz en of a S t ate different f r om any defendant.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)–(A). The claims o f class members m a y be ag g r eg ated to d etermine whether the
amount in c ontroversy requirement has be e n s atisfied. Id. § 1332(d)(6). The class also must have at least 100 members. Id. § 1332(d)(5)(B ). There is no quest i o n t h a t this PAGA action involves statutory violations a lleg edly suffered b y

more than 100 Chase employ ees, that t h e citiz enship of o ne of those employ ees is different than Chase ’ s , o r that the
ag g r eg ated statutory penalties soug ht ex c eed $5,000,00 0. Therefore, the only issu e for decision is whether this is a “class action.”

A “class action” is d efined by CAF A as “any civil action filed under rule 23 o f the F e deral Rules of Civil Procedure o r

1 B ecau se it is u n disp u t ed th at B au m an n ’ s p o rtio n o f an y reco v ery (in clu d in g f

ees) w o u ld b e less th an $ 7 5,0 0 0
, w e h o ld f o r th e rea so n s

ex p lain ed i n Urb i n o th at th e d istrict co u rt erred in f

in d i n g th e am ou n t in

co n tro v ersy

req u irem en t in

§ 1 3 32 (a) satisf

ied

.B A U M A N N V

. C H A S E I

N V E S T M E N T S E R V I C E S 7

similar State statute or rule of judicial procedure authoriz ing

an action to be broug ht by 1 or mo re r epresentative persons

as a class action.” I

d. § 1 332(d)(1)(B ). B ecause this action

was commenced in California s t a t e c ourt, it c learly was not filed p ursuant to F ederal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. The question before us thu s b o i l s down to “whether the suit was ‘filed under’ a sta t e statute or rule of judicial procedure ‘similar’ t o Rule 23 that authoriz e s a c lass action.” P u rdue Pharma L.P. v. Kentucky , 704 F .3d 208, 214 (2d Cir. 2013). W e therefore beg in with a n overview of PAGA, the state statute under which this suit was filed.

1. P A G A

The California leg islature e nacted PAGA b ecause o f inadequate financing and staffing to enforce state labor laws. 2003 Ca l

. Stat. Ch. 906, §§ 1–2. The leg islature d e clared it “in the public interest to allow ag g rieved employ ees , a c ting

as private a ttorney s g eneral, to recover civil p e n a l t ies for L abor Code violations, with the understanding that labor law enforcement ag encies were to r etain primacy o v e r private enforcement efforts.” Arias
, 209 P.3d at 9 2 9

– 3 0. I f the California L abor and W o r k f orce D evelopment Ag ency (“L W DA”) declines to investig ate an alleg ed la b o r law

v iolation o r issue a citation, an ag g rieved employ ee may

commence a PAGA action ag ainst a n employ er “ p e rsonally and on behalf of other current or former e mploy ees to r ecover civil penalties for L abor Code v iolations.” Id. at 930. “[ T] he civil penalty is one hundred dollars ($100) for each ag g rieved employ e e per pay period for the initial violation and two hundred dollars ($200) for each ag g r ieved employ ee per pay period for each subsequent vio lation.” Cal. L a b. Code § 2 6 9 9 ( f )(2). An ag g r ieved employ e e is “any person w ho

was employ e d by the alleg ed violator and ag ainst whom o neB A U M A N N V

. C H A S E I

N V E S T M E N T S E R V I C E S 8

or more of the alleg ed violat i o n s was c ommitted.” Id. § 2699(c). T he L W DA receives seventy -five percent of the penalties collect e d i n a PAGA a ction, and the ag g rieved employ e es the remaining twenty -five percent. Id. § 2699(i).

2. P AG A and Class Actions

Section 3 8 2 of the California Code of Civil Procedure authoriz es a class action if “the question is one of a common

o r g eneral interest, of many persons, or when the partie s a r e numerous, and it is impracticable to b ring them all b efore the court.” I n addition, before a class may be certified

a party must establish the ex istence of both an ascertainab l e class and a well-defined community of interest am o ng the c lass

m e mbers. The community of inter e s t

r e q u i r e m e n t i n v o l v e s t h r e e f a c t o r s : (1) predominant common questions of law o r fact; (2) class repres entatives with claims o r defenses ty

pical of the class; an d ( 3 ) c lass representatives who can adequately represent the class.

Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co. , 2 P.3d 27, 31 (Cal. 2000) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

The c ompla i n t in this c ase did not invoke the California class action s t a t ute. The state L abor Code is silent as to whether a PAGA action is a “class action,” but the California Supreme Court has a

uthoritatively addressed that issue, hol d ing that PAGA actions are not class actions under state law. Arias
, 2 09 P.3d at 926. The court found PAGA actions fundamentally different f rom class actions, chiefly becauseB A U M A N N V

. C H A S E I

N V E S T M E N T S E R V I C E S 9

the statutory suits are essentially law enforcement actions. Id. at 933–34.

The state hig h court’s decision, however, does not end our i n q u iry

. CAF A does not r e q uire that a suit be filed unde r a state class action statute o r r ule, b ut only that the a ction be broug ht under a “similar State statute or rule of j udicial procedure authoriz ing an a ction to b e broug ht by 1 or more representative pe r s o ns as a c lass action.” 28 U .S.C. § 1332(d)(1)(B ). “A state statute or rule is ‘s i m i lar’ to F ederal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 if it closel y r e sembles Rule 23 or is like Rule 23 in substance or in e ssentials.” W e st Virginia e x rel. McGraw v

. CVS Pharmacy, Inc.
, 646 F .3d 169, 174 (4th Cir. 2011).

The substance and essential s of Rule 23 are familiar. Rule 23 allows for class actions “only if”:

(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable;

(2) there a re q uestions of law or fact common to the class;

(3) the claims or d e fenses of the representative parties a

re ty pical of the claims or defenses of the class; and

(4) the representativ e parties will fairly a nd adequately

protect the interests of the class.

F ed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). I n addition, a class action cannot be maintained unless one of the three requirements of Rule 23(b) i s also met. A class certification order is subject to t h eB A U M A N N V

. C H A S E I

N V E S T M E N T S E R V I C E S 10

detaile d r e q u i rements of Rule 23(c) both as to form a nd notice. 2

2 (1 ) Certifica tio n Ord

er

. (A ) Time to Issu e

. A t an early p racticab le tim e a ft e r a p erso n su es o r i s su ed as a class rep r e s e nt ativ e, th e

co u rt m u st d eterm in e b y o rd er w h eth er to certif

y th e actio n as a class actio n

. (B ) Defin in g th e Cla s s ; Ap p o i n tin g C

la ss Co u n s el

. A n

o rd er th at certif

ies a class actio n m

u st d ef in e th e c l ass

an d th e class claim s, issu es, o r d ef e ns e s , an d m

u st ap po in t class co u n sel u n der Ru le 2 3 (g ).

(C) Alterin g o r Amen d in g th e Ord er

. A n o rd e r th at g ran t s o r d en ies class certifi c a t i o n m ay b e altered or

am en d ed b ef

o re f in al j u d g m en t

. (2 ) No tice

. (A ) Fo r ( b ) ( 1 ) o r ( b) ( 2 ) Cla s ses

. Fo r an y class certif ied

u n d er Ru le 23 (b )(1 ) o r ( b ) ( 2 ), th e co u rt m ay d i rect ap pro p riate n o tice to th e class.

(B ) Fo r ( b ) ( 3 ) C l a s ses

. Fo r an y class certif ied u n der Ru le 2 3(b )(3 ), th e co u rt m u st d irect to class m em

b ers th e best n o tice th a t is p racticab le u n der th e circu m s tan ces, i n clu d in g in d iv id u al n o tice to all

m em b ers w h o c a n be id en tif

ied th ro u g h reaso n ab le ef f o rt. T h e n o ti c e m

ust clearly an d co n cisely state in
p lain , easily

u n d ersto o d lan g u ag e:
(i) th e n atu re o f

th e actio n ;
(ii) th e d ef

in i tio n o f th e class certif

ied ;
(iii) th e class claim s, issu es, o r d ef en ses;B A U M A N N V

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N V E S T M E N T S E R V I C E S 11

I n determining w hether PAGA is sufficiently “similar” to Rule 23 to qualify u nder CAF A as a statute “authoriz ing a[ ] [ class] action,” we d o not write on a b lank analy tical slate. I n Chimei
, we held that “

parens patriae suits filed by state Attorney s General may not be remov e d to federal court because the suits are not ‘class actions’ within the p l ain meaning of CAF A.” 659 F .3d at 8 47; cf. Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Cor p

. , 1 3 4 S. Ct. 736, 739 (2014) (holding that a parens patriae suit is a lso not a CAF A “mass

a c tion”). W e noted that parens patriae suits “lack stat u t o r y requirements fo r numerosity
, commonality
, ty p icality
, o r adequacy of r epresentation that would make them sufficiently ‘similar’ to a cti ons broug ht under Rule 23, and

. . . d o not contain cert i f

ication procedures.” Chimei
, 659 F .3d at 850. According ly
, we concluded that p arens patriae suits “lack the defining attributes of true c l a ss actions. As such, they only ‘resemble’ class actions in the sense that they a re representative suits.” Id. ; accord Purdue Pharma
, 704 F .3d at 216–17.

Apply ing the Chimei rubric, we conclud e that PAGA actions are also not sufficiently si m ilar to Rule 23 class

( i v ) th at a class m em

b er m ay en t er an ap p earan ce th ro u g h an atto rn ey

if th e m em b er so d esires;

(v ) th at t h e co u rt w ill e x c l ud e f

ro m th e class an y

m em b er w h o req u ests ex clu sio n ;
(v i) th e tim e an d m an n er f o r req u estin g ex clu sio n ;

an d

(v i i ) t he b in d in g ef

f ect of a class j u d g m en t on

m em b ers u n d er Ru le 2 3 (c)(3 ).

Fed . R. Civ . P . 2 3 (c).B A U M A N N V

. C H A S E I

N V E S T M E N T S E R V I C E S 12

actions to trig g er CAF A jurisdiction. Unlike Rule 23(c)(2), PAGA ha s n o notice requirements for unnamed ag g rieved employ e es, nor may such employ ees opt out of a PAGA action. I n a PAGA action, the court does not inquire i n to the named p laintiff’s and c l a s s counsel’s a bility to fairly and a de q u ately represent unnamed employ ees—critical requirements in federal class actions under Rules 2 3(a)(4) and (g ). See, e.g. , P hillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts
, 472 U.S. 797, 8 1 2 ( 1 985) (“[ T ] he Due Process Clause of course requires that the named plain tiff at all times adequately

re p r esent the interests of the absent class members.”); Radcliffe v. Experian Info. Solutions Inc.
, 71 5 F .3d 1157, 1165–69 ( 9th C i r

. 2013) (noting the importance o f class counsel’s ability to adequately represent the class a nd absent class members). Moreover, u n l i k e Rule 23(a), PAGA contains no requirements of numerosity
, commonality
, o r ty picality

. Cf. Purdue Pharma
, 704 F .3d at 216–17 (noting that p arens patriae suits contain none of the “ hallmarks o f Rule 2 3 class actions; namely
, adequacy o f r e presentation, numerosity
, commonality
, ty picality
, o r the requirement o f class certification” and thus “lack the equivalency to Rule 23 that CAF A demands”); CVS Pha rmacy , 646 F .3d at 175–76 (noting that the W est Virg inia law a t issue does not “contain[ ] any numerosity
, c ommonality
, or ty picality requirements, all of which are essential to a class action.”).

I n addition, the f

inality o f P A GA judg ments differs di stinctly f

rom that of class action judg ments. The F ederal Rules ensure t h a t members of the class r eceiving notice a nd declining to opt out are bound by a judg ment. F ed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(3). Class a ction judg ments are also preclusive as to all claims the class could h ave broug ht. Cooper v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond , 467 U.S. 867, 874 (1984).B A U M A N N V

. C H A S E I

N V E S T M E N T S E R V I C E S 13

I n contrast, PAGA ex pressly provides that em p l o y ees retain all rig hts “to pursue o r recover other remedies available under state or federal law, either separatel y or concurrently

w i t h an a ction taken under this part.” Cal. L ab. C o d e § 2699(g )(1). “[ I ] if the employ er d efeats a PAGA claim, the nonparty employ ees, becau s e t h e y were not g iven notice o f
t h e action or afforded a

n opportunity to be heard, a r e n o t bound by the judg ment as to remedies other than civil penalties.” O choa-Hernandez v. Cjaders Foods, Inc

. , No. C 08-2073 MHP, 2010 W L 1340777, at *4 (N

. D

. C a l

. Apr. 2, 2010); see Arias , 209 P.3d at 934.

I n short, “a PAGA sui t i s f undamentally different than a class a ction.” McKenzie v. Fed. Express Corp.
, 765 F

. Supp. 2d 1222, 1233 (C.D. Cal. 2011). These differences stem from the central nature of PAGA. P A G A plaintiffs are private attorney s g eneral who, stepping into the shoes of the L W DA, bring claims on b ehalf of the state a ge n c y

. See Arias
, 209 P.3d a t 929–30. B ecause an identical suit broug ht by the
state ag e ncy itself would plainly not qualify as a CAF A class action, n o different r esult should obtain whe n a private attorney g eneral is the nominal plaintiff.

The nature of PAGA penalties is also markedly different than damag es soug h t in Rule 23 class actions. I n class actions, d amag es are ty

pically restitution for wrong s done to class members. B ut PAGA actions instead p rimarily seek to vi ndicate the public interest in e nforcement of California’s labor law. S

ee Sample v

. Big L o t

s S tores, Inc.
, No. C 10- 0 3276 SB A, 2010 W L 4939992, at *3 (N.D. Cal. N o v

. 3 0
, 2010); Franco v. Athens Disposal Co.
, 90 Cal. Rptr. 3d 539, 556 (Ct. App. 2009). T h e b u l k o f a ny recovery g oes to the L D W A
, n o t to ag g rieved e mploy ees. And, the twenty -five percent portion of the penalty awarded to the ag g rievedB A U M A N N V

. C H A S E I

N V E S T M E N T S E R V I C E S 14

employ e e does not reduce any other claim that the employ ee may have ag a inst the employ er—in this case, for e x ample, for withheld overtime pay

. See Caliber Bodywor k s , I n c. v

. Super. Ct.
, 36 Cal. Rpt r. 3 d 3 1
, 40 (Ct. App. 2005). The employ e e’s recovery is thus an incentive to perform a service
to the state, not restitution for wrong s done to members o f the class.

I n the end, Rule 23 and PAGA are more d issimilar than alike. A PAGA action is at h ear t a c ivil enforcement action filed on behalf of and for the benefit of the state, not a claim for class relief.

Despite these fundamental differences, Chase arg ues that PAGA actions are “ clas s actions” under CAF A because PAGA is a state procedural law that w o u l d be displaced b y Rule 2 3 in f

ederal c ourt u nder the rationale of S h a d y G rove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Insurance Co.
, 559 U.S. 393 (2010). B ut Shady Grove is of n o h elp to Chase. I n Shady G rove , the Supreme Court considered whether a New York l a w , which p recluded suits seeking

re c o v ery of penalties from proceeding as class a ctions, deprived a federal district court of jurisdiction over a diversity suit proposed as a Rule 23 class action. I d

. at 397. The issues were w h ether Rule 23 conflicted with the New York law, and if so, whether the Rule ex ce e d e d the authoriz ation of the R ules E n abling Act or Cong ress’s rulemaking power. Id. at 398. The Supreme Court h e ld that the New York law conflicted with Rule 23, and after a pply ing the analy sis man d a ted by Hanna v. Plumer
, 380 U.S. 460 (1965), concluded that the F e d eral Rule was not u ltra v ires. Shady Grove
, 559 U.S. at 398–410; id. at 429–36 (Stevens, J
., concurring ).B A U M A N N V

. C H A S E I

N V E S T M E N T S E R V I C E S 15

I n contrast, the issue before us is simply one of statutory construction—whether the action soug ht to be removed was

“ filed under ” a state statute “ similar” to Rule 23. W e do not today decide whether a fe d er a l court may allow a PAGA

a c t ion otherwise within its orig inal jurisdiction to proc e e d under Rule 23 as a class action. W e hold only that PAGA is
not sufficiently similar to Rule 23 to establish the orig inal jurisdiction of a federal court under CAF A.

III.

Conclusion

F or the reas ons above, we hold that the district court could not e x ercise j urisdiction over this removed PAGA action u n der CAF A. And because, in lig ht o f U r b i n o , there

was also n o federal subject matter j u r i sdiction under § 1 332(a), see supra n.1, B a umann’s motion to remand should h ave b een g ranted. We reverse w i t h i nstructions to g rant that motion.

R E V E R S E D A N D R E M A N D E D W I T H INSTRUCTIONS

.

THOMAS, Circuit J udg e , concurring :

I concur in the majority opinion. I write s ep a r a t el y only
to note my prior disag reement o n the q uestion of whether claims under the L abor Code Private Attorney General Act o f 2004, Cal. L a b

. C o d e § 2698 et seq, can be ag g reg ated in determining whether diversity jurisdiction ex ists. U r bino v

. Orkin Services of California, Inc.
, 726 F .3d 1118, 1123 (9thB A U M A N N V

. C H A S E I

N V E S T M E N T S E R V I C E S 16

C i r

. 2 0 13) (Thomas, J
., dissenting )

. Urbino is law of th e circuit, of course, and binds this p anel. However, if I were writing o n a clean slate, I w ould hold otherwise as to t he question of ag g reg ation.