J-S41008-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

DENNIS L. CHESTNUT, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellant

v.

DAVID A. GARDNER,

Appellee No. 262 MDA 2017

Appeal from the Order Entered January 26, 2017

in the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County

Civil Division at No.: 15-00569

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., LAZARUS, J., and PLATT, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.: FILED JULY 31, 2017

Appellant, Dennis L. Chestnut, appeals from the trial court’s order 

entering summary judgment in favor of Appellee, David R. Gardner. We 

affirm.

We take the following relevant facts and procedural history from the 

trial court’s January 26, 2017 opinion and our independent review of the 

certified record. Appellant operates C & C Tree Service, a tree removal 

business. He commenced this litigation by filing a writ of summons on 

February 27, 2015. Appellant filed a complaint for negligence on September 

1, 2015, claiming that he obtained liability insurance for his business 

through Appellee, his insurance agent. The policy period ran from August 

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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12, 2012 through August 12, 2013. Appellant averred that the insurance 

was cancelled without notice to him and was no longer in effect as of March 

2013, and that Appellee failed to procure substitute insurance. He sought 

reimbursement for the amount he paid as a result of a loss that occurred on 

August 18, 2013, and for his loss of business while he obtained replacement 

insurance.

The parties conducted discovery, and Appellant was deposed on April 

27, 2016. Appellee filed an answer to the complaint and new matter on 

September 6, 2016. On December 12, 2016, Appellee filed a motion for 

summary judgment and supporting brief, and Appellant filed an answer 

thereto on January 12, 2017. The trial court held argument on the motion 

on January 24, 2017. On January 26, 2017, the trial court entered an 

opinion and order granting the motion for summary judgment.1 This timely 

appeal followed.2

Appellant raises one issue for our review: “Whether the trial court 

committed error by granting summary judgment without considering 

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1

In its opinion, the court erroneously stated that Appellant did not file a 

response to the motion for summary judgment. (See Trial Court Opinion, 

1/26/17, at 2).

2 The trial court did not order Appellant to file a concise statement of errors 

complained of on appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). In its Rule 1925(a) 

opinion, filed on February 9, 2017, it referred this Court to its January 26, 

2017 opinion for the reasons for its decision. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).
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[Appellant’s] response to the motion and deciding causation as a matter of 

law?” (Appellant’s Brief, at 4).

The overarching question of whether summary judgment is 

appropriate is a question of law, and thus our standard of review 

is de novo and the scope of review is plenary. Furthermore:

[i]n reviewing the grant of summary judgment, 

the following principles apply. [S]ummary judgment 

is appropriate only in those cases where the record 

clearly demonstrates that there is no genuine issue 

of material fact and that the moving party is entitled 

to judgment as a matter of law. When considering a 

motion for summary judgment, the trial court must 

take all facts of record and reasonable inferences 

therefrom in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. In so doing, the trial court must 

resolve all doubts as to the existence of a genuine 

issue of material fact against the moving party, and, 

thus, may only grant summary judgment where the 

right to such judgment is clear and free from all 

doubt. On appellate review, then, an appellate court 

may reverse a grant of summary judgment if there 

has been an error of law or an abuse of discretion. 

But the issue as to whether there are no genuine 

issues as to any material fact presents a question of 

law, and therefore, on that question our standard of 

review is de novo. This means we need not defer to 

the determinations made by the lower tribunals. To 

the extent that this Court must resolve a question of 

law, we shall review the grant of summary judgment 

in the context of the entire record.

Feleccia v. Lackawanna Coll., 156 A.3d 1200, 1208–09 (Pa. Super. 2017) 

(citations and quotation marks omitted).

Instantly, Appellant argues that reversal of summary judgment is 

necessary because the trial court failed to consider his January 12, 2017 

response to Appellee’s motion for summary judgment. (See Appellant’s 
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Brief, at 7-8, 10; see also Trial Ct. Op., at 2 (stating that Appellant did not 

file a response to the summary judgment motion)). Consequently, he 

maintains, the court failed to consider the entire record in rendering its 

decision, and to recognize that factual issues for a jury to resolve exist. 

(See Appellant’s Brief, at 7-8, 10). To support his argument, Appellant 

relies on Greely v. W. Penn Power Co., 156 A.3d 276 (Pa. Super. 2017), 

which he claims raises “exactly the situation present in the case at bar 

[where] the trial court did not consider the entire record and did not view 

the evidence in a light most favorable to the non-moving party.” (Id. at 10; 

see id. at 9). We disagree.

In Greely, this Court reversed the trial court’s order granting 

summary judgment in favor of the defendant utility company in a negligence 

action arising from the electrocution death of Greely, a telecommunications 

cable installer. See Greely, supra at 277. In that matter, the record 

reflected that the trial court did not consider the expert report submitted by 

the plaintiff, which opined that the defendant’s negligent actions were the 

proximate cause of Greely’s death. See id. at 282-83. This Court explained 

that, at the summary judgment stage, the trial court must defer to the 

supported conclusions contained in expert reports submitted by the 

nonmoving party. See id. at 283.

In contrast, the instant case does not involve the trial court’s alleged 

disregard of a substantive expert report. Although the court mistakenly 

stated in its opinion that Appellant did not submit a response to the motion 
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for summary judgment, a review of that response reveals that it contained 

nothing substantive. (See Response to Motion for Summary Judgment, 

1/12/17, at unnumbered pages 1-2). Appellant did not raise any evidence 

to counter the legal arguments set forth in the motion, and re-raised the 

same allegations contained in the complaint regarding the failure to notify 

him of the policy cancellation. (See id.). Furthermore, the record reflects 

that, after Appellee filed the motion for summary judgment and Appellant 

filed his response, the trial court held argument on the matter, giving the 

parties the opportunity to develop their claims at that time. (See Trial Ct. 

Op., at 1). Therefore, our holding in Greely in inapposite, and does not 

mandate reversal in this matter. Upon review, we discern no error of law or 

abuse of discretion in the trial court’s grant of summary judgment. See 

Feleccia, supra at 1209.3 Accordingly, Appellant’s sole issue on appeal 

does not merit relief.

Order affirmed.

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3 As noted above, Appellant seeks to recover for a loss that occurred after 

the policy, under its original terms, would have expired. (See supra, at 

*2). Hence, we agree with the trial court’s conclusion that Appellant was 

responsible for knowing the terms of his policy and is barred from recovery. 

(See Trial Ct. Op., at 2).
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/31/2017