## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 97-4136

___________ David G. Adams, * * Appellee, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the * District of North Dakota. Kenneth S. Apfel, Commissioner of * Social Security, * * Appellant. *

___________ Submitted: June 11, 1998 Filed: July 15, 1998

___________ Before BEAM, ROSS, and MAGILL, Circuit Judges.

___________ MAGILL, Circuit Judge.

Dr. David Adams filed for disabili ty benefits under Title II and Title XVI of the Social Security Act (the Act), 42U.S.C. §§ 401-433 and 1381-1383d, alleging that he
was dis abled because of his alcoholism. Before Dr. Adams's claim was finall y adjudicated, Congress amended the Act to deny alcoholism-based disability benefits.This case was submitted to a magistrate judge upon cons ent of the parties under 1 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73. -2- The district court held that the amendment did not preclude Dr. Adams from obtaining 1 benefits related to his pre-amendment pending claim, and concluded that Dr. Adam s was entitled to benefits. We disagree and reverse.

I.
Dr. Adams has been an alcoholic since appro ximately 1981, when he was fortyfive years old. In 1994, Dr. Adams applied for Supplemental Security Income benefits based on disability under Title XVI of the Act, and for disability insurance benefit s under Title II of the Act. Dr. Adams alleged that he has been disabled since August 15, 1989, b ecause of his alcoholism and resulting memory loss, panic attacks, an d agoraphobia. In September 1994 the Social Security Administration (SSA) denied Dr. Adams 's claim, concluding that he was not disabled. In 1995, an administrative la w judge (AL J) agreed with the SSA and found that Dr. Adams was not disabled

. Effective M arch 29, 1996, Titles II and XVI of the Act were amended to "eliminat e al coholism

as a basis for obtaining disability insurance and supplemental securit y income benefits." Newton v. Chater , 92 F.3d 688, 695 n.3 (8th Cir. 1996) (interpreting Con tract with America Advancement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-121, § 105, 11 0 Stat. 84 7, 852-55 (1996 Amendment)). On May 7, 1996, the SSA Appeals Counci l declined t o review the ALJ's decision, thus making the ALJ's decision the fina l determination of the SSA.

After t he Appeals Council refused to review the ALJ's decision, Dr. Adam s sought judicial review. The district court found both that Dr. Adams's alcoholis m rendered him disabled under the pre- 1996 Amendment version of the Act, and that the 1996 Amendment did not preclude Dr. Adams from receiving benefits. Th e Commissioner of Social Security (the Commissioner) subsequently filed a motion toThe Commissioner does not challenge the district court's conclusion that Dr

. 2 Adams was "disabled" under the pre-1996 Amendment version of the Act. -3- amend the final order, contending that the 1996 Amendment precluded any award of disability benefits to Dr. Adams based on his alcoholism. The district court disagreed and denied the Commissioner's petition. The Commissioner now appeals.

II.

Th e sole issue we must decide is whether the 1996 Amendment precludes th e award of alcoholism-based benefits to a claimant whose claim for benefits was filed, but was not finally adjudicated, before March 29, 1996--the effective date of th e amendment. The only circuit court to have addressed this issue has held that th e

2 amendment precludes such an award. See Tor res v. Chater , 125 F.3d 166, 169-71 (3d Cir. 1997). We agree, and adopt the reasoning of the Torres court.

Th e plain language of a statute is the starting point in every case involvin g statutory construction. See Berger v. Bishop Inv. Corp. , 695 F.2d 302, 310 (8th Cir. 1982). If the statuteis clear and unambiguous, judicial inquiry is complete. See In re Erickson Pa rtnership , 856 F.2d 1068, 1070 (8th Cir. 1988). A statute is clear an d unambiguo us when "it is not possible to construe it in more than one reasonabl e manner." Breedlove v. Earthgrains Baking Cos. , 140 F.3d 797, 799 (8th Cir. 1998). In addition, we are "reluctan[t] to interpret a statutory provision so as to rende r superfluous other provisions in the same enactment." Freytag v. Commissioner , 501 U.S. 868, 877 (1991) (quotations omitted).

In ame nding the Act to eliminate disability benefits based on alcoholism , Congress explicitly provided that: The amendments . . . shall apply to any individual who applies for, orWe note that, while this case was pendin g on appeal, the district court reversed 3 itself and also agreed with the Torres court's reasoning. Because th e amendment clearly denies alcoholism-based benefits to claimants 4 having claims that were not "finally adjudicated" prior to March 29, 1996, there is not

-4- whose claim is finally adjudicated by the Commissioner of Soc ial Security with r espect to, benefits under . . . the Social Security Act based o n disability on or after the date of the enactment of th is Act, and, in the case of any individual who has applied for, and whose claim has been finally adju dicated by the Commissioner with respect to, such benefits befor e such date of enactment, such amendments shall apply only with respect to such benefits for months beginning on or after January 1, 1997.
1996 Amendment, § 105(a)(5)(A), 110 Stat. at 853 (Title II benefits); see also 199 6 Amendmen t, § 105(b)(5)(A), 110 Stat. at 854 (same language applied to Title XV I benefits). We conclude that the only reasonable interpretation of the amendment's plain langu age is that the amendment applies to preclude an award of alcoholism-base d disability benefits for a claim that was filed, but not yet finally adjudicated, prior t o March 29, 1996.

In th is case, the relevant language is the phrase "on or after the date of th e enactment." Like the Third Circuit, "[w]e are convinced that, grammatically, 'after the date of enactment' modifies the clause, 'whose claim is finally adjudicated by th e Commissioner.'" Torres , 125 F.3d at 170. Strong support for this interpretation "lies 3 in the well-settled tenet o f statutory construction that all provisions of the statute must be con strued together to give each some independent meaning." Id. at 170-71

. Co nstruing the "on or after" clause to modify the word "disabled," as some distric t courts have done, see, e.g., Teitelbaum v. Chater , 949 F. Supp. 1206, 1212-13 (E.D. Pa. 1996), abrogated by Torres , 125 F.3d at 169-71, renders the "final adjudication " language superfluous and leads to incongruous results. See Torres , 125 F.3d at 171. Furthermore, the legislative history firmly supports this interpretation. See id. 4any impermissible retroactive effect. See Landgraf v. USI Film Products , 511 U.S

.

244, 280 (1994) (judici al bar against retroactivity will not arise if Congress expressed clear intent for statute to apply retroactively). Congress recently enacted a clarifyi ng amendment to make its prior intent even 5 clearer. On A ugust 5, 1997, Congress amended the Act to clarify that a claim fo r disability benefits has not been "finally adjudicated" if "(i) there is pending a request for ei ther administrative or judicial review with respect to such claim, or (ii) there i s pending, with respect to such claim, a readjudication by the Commissioner of Socia l Security pursuant to relief

in a class action or implementation by the Commissioner of a court re mand order." Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, § 5525(a)(2), 111 Stat. 624.

-5- Because "[o]ur study of the statute convinces us that it is the date o f adjudication, and not the time when disability exis ts, that triggers the application of the effecti ve date," Torres , 125 F.3d at 171, we must determine whether Dr. Adams' s claim was "finally adjudicated by the Commissioner " before March 29, 1996. We find that it was not. This court recently explained that a claim is "finally adjudicated" when the SSA Appeals Council denies a claimant's request for review of an ALJ's decision. See Newton , 92 F.3d at 695 n.3. In this case, the SSA Appeals Council denied Dr

. Adams 's request for review on May 7, 1996--more than one month after the effective date of the amendment. Accordingly, the 1996 Amendment precludes the award of any alcoholism-based benefits to Dr. Adams. 5

For t he foregoing reasons, we reverse and remand for further proceeding s consistent with this opinion.-6-

A true copy.

Attest:
CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.