Filed 9/16/19 Modified and Certified for Publication 10/11/19 (order attached)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

MARY MORRIS,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

HYUNDAI MOTOR AMERICA,

Defendant and 

Respondent.

 B290693

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. BC612232)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court for the 

County of Los Angeles, Howard L. Halm, Judge. Affirmed.

Rosner, Barry & Babbitt, Hallen D. Rosner and Arlyn L. 

Escalante for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Bowman and Brooke, Brian Takahashi, Jimmy Y. Park and 

Adele V. Karoum; and SJL Law, Julian G. Senior, for Defendant 

and Respondent.

_____________________________________
2

Mary Morris appeals from the trial court’s order awarding

her attorney fees following the settlement of Morris’s action 

against Hyundai Motor America (Hyundai) under the 

Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (the Song-Beverly Act). 

(Civ. Code, § 1790 et seq.) Morris sued Hyundai after she 

purchased a defective used Hyundai vehicle that Hyundai 

refused to repurchase. The parties settled the litigation, with 

Hyundai agreeing to pay Morris $85,000, plus reasonable 

attorney fees and expenses.

After failing to reach agreement with Hyundai on the 

attorney fees amount, Morris moved for a fee award using the 

lodestar method1 that consisted of a $127,792.50 base amount 

with a 1.5 multiplier, for a total of $191,688.75. The trial court 

awarded $73,864 in fees. Morris now contends the court abused 

its discretion in reducing her attorney fee award. We affirm.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

1. Morris’s Complaint

On March 3, 2016, Morris filed a complaint against 

Hyundai asserting causes of action under the Song-Beverly Act 

and the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act stemming from Morris’s 

purchase on June 30, 2014 of a used 2011 Hyundai vehicle for 

 

1 Using the lodestar method to calculate attorney fees, “the 

trial court first determines a touchstone or lodestar figure based 

on a careful compilation of the time spent by, and the reasonable 

hourly compensation for, each attorney, and the resulting dollar 

amount is then adjusted upward or downward by taking various 

relevant factors into account.” (Chavez v. City of Los Angeles

(2010) 47 Cal.4th 970, 985; see Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 

25, 48-49.)
3

which Hyundai issued a warranty. Morris paid $35,183.60 for 

the car, including sales tax, fees, interest and other charges. 

Morris alleged the vehicle’s interior, transmission, engine and 

electrical system had serious defects. She asserted Hyundai 

failed to conform her vehicle to its warranties after a number of 

repair attempts, and Hyundai wrongfully refused to replace her 

car or make restitution as required under the Song-Beverly Act. 

Her complaint sought restitution, an award of actual damages, a 

civil penalty of two times actual damages2 and attorney fees and 

costs.

On April 11, 2017, the date the trial was to commence, the 

parties agreed to settle the matter for the sum of $85,000, which 

consisted of a full statutory “buy-back” of Morris’s car, incidental 

and consequential damages, and a civil penalty. The settlement 

also provided that Morris would receive reasonable attorney fees 

and expenses to be determined by the court in the absence of an 

agreement by the parties.

2. Morris’s Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs

Morris moved for attorney fees and costs pursuant to Civil 

Code section 1794, subdivision (d). Morris argued her counsel 

were able to marshal their expertise and significant experience in 

lemon law cases to litigate Morris’s case efficiently. However, 

Morris contended that Hyundai’s obstreperous and aggressive 

positions in the litigation required extensive efforts by Morris’s 

counsel, the Knight Law Group, including adding the law firm 

 

2 The Song-Beverly Act authorizes a civil penalty of up to two 

times the amount of actual damages if the purchaser establishes 

the manufacturer’s failure to comply with the Act’s provisions 

was willful. (Civ. Code, § 1794, subd. (c).)
4

Altman Law Group as co-counsel in May 2016 to assist in the 

litigation.3

Morris contended Hyundai’s improper objections and 

evasive responses to discovery requests required extensive “meet 

and confer” efforts. Further, Morris’s counsel was required to 

prepare for and defend the depositions of Morris and her expert 

witness, and to prepare for and take the depositions of several 

Hyundai employees and Hyundai’s expert witness. Morris’s 

counsel also attended the inspection of Morris’s vehicle as well as 

an unsuccessful mediation in February 2017.

Morris’s counsel engaged in extensive preparation in 

anticipation of the trial set for April 2017, including: drafting 

11 motions in limine and oppositions to Hyundai’s 12 motions in 

limine; preparing witness and exhibit lists, proposed jury 

instructions, verdict forms, and subpoenas; reviewing deposition 

testimony; drafting an opening statement and outlines for 

witness examinations; and preparing Morris and her expert for 

their trial testimony. On the scheduled trial date, counsel 

appeared and participated in a settlement conference, which was 

successful.

Morris argued that lemon law cases such as hers are 

“rarely simple” and require specialized knowledge of consumer 

protections, the intricacies of automobiles, and manufacturers’ 

and dealers’ policies and protocols for repairs and legal 

compliance. Morris urged the trial court to factor into its 

analysis of the appropriate fee award the skill, knowledge and 

experience that led to an excellent result for Morris, namely a 

 

3 We note, however, that the Altman Law Group is listed as 

co-counsel on the caption of Morris’s original complaint filed in 

February 2016.
5

settlement figure amounting to nearly two and a half times the 

vehicle’s purchase price.

Morris requested lodestar attorney fees of $127,792.50, 

consisting of $50,055 in fees incurred by seven attorneys at the 

Knight Law Group and $77,737.50 in fees incurred by four 

attorneys and one paralegal at the Altman Law Group. Morris 

requested the court apply a 1.5 multiplier to the lodestar figure to 

compensate her attorneys for the fact that the law firms had 

taken the matter on contingency and that payment for their work 

was delayed. She thus sought a total of $191,688.75 in attorney 

fees for 283.3 hours of work.

Morris’s motion was supported by the declarations of the 

lead attorneys from each of the law firms, Steve Mikhov from the 

Knight Law Group and Bryan Altman from the Altman Law 

Group. Mikhov’s declaration cited numerous consumer rights 

cases in which California courts awarded attorney fees for time 

billed by attorneys from Mikhov’s firm and from the Altman Law 

Group, in most cases at similar rates to those the attorneys billed 

in the instant case. Altman’s declaration attached an Attorney 

Fee Survey Report in support of his contention that the hourly 

rates charged by Morris’s attorneys were reasonable and 

commensurate with the rates charged by other attorneys with 

comparable experience in consumer rights law.

3. Hyundai’s Opposition

Hyundai opposed Morris’s attorney fee motion, asserting 

Morris had failed to meet her burden to establish the 

reasonableness of the requested fee award for litigating this “very 

simple case.” Hyundai’s opposition was supported by a 

declaration from its attorney Brian Takahashi, who submitted a 
6

spreadsheet with numerous, specific objections to Morris’s 

attorneys’ billing entries.

Hyundai disputed Morris’s contention that Hyundai 

dragged out the litigation and was overly aggressive, contending 

the parties engaged in standard discovery and there were no 

discovery motions. Hyundai attached examples of discovery 

responses served by Morris’s counsel to demonstrate that they 

were stock objections and responses that were virtually identical 

to those served in all the firms’ other cases. Similarly, Hyundai 

submitted evidence that Morris’s meet and confer letter was the 

same stock letter sent by her counsel in every case they litigated.

Further, Hyundai contended the amount sought in lodestar 

attorney fees was excessive, as much of the billing by Morris’s 

attorneys was “inefficient, unreasonable, duplicative, exaggerated 

and/or not actually incurred.” Hyundai pointed out that 

11 different lawyers at two different firms worked on the case for 

Morris, with very little paralegal time. Hyundai noted the lack of 

any explanation in Morris’s motion papers as to why two firms 

and so many attorneys were necessary to prosecute the case. In 

addition, Hyundai argued the firms had attorneys billing for 

work that paralegals should have done, driving up the cost 

substantially.

Hyundai also asserted that Morris’s counsel appeared to 

have billed for what they believed the “value” of a task should be, 

as opposed to the actual time spent. Hyundai asserted this was 

the case with respect to the drafting of the complaint, discovery 

requests and responses, declarations, deposition notices, and 

other pleadings in the case, which varied from the firms’ 

pleadings in other cases only in their caption, names of the 

plaintiff, and year, model, and identification number of the 
7

vehicle. Hyundai further pointed to examples of duplicative 

billing among attorneys, specific excessive billing entries, billing 

in quarter-hour increments by the Altman Law Group instead of 

one-tenths, and vague billing entries that made it impossible to 

assess the actual value of the work.

Hyundai further contended Morris’s attorneys had charged 

excessive hourly rates, considering the lack of complexity of the 

case. Hyundai noted the lead attorney for Hyundai charged only 

$245 per hour, while Morris’s lead attorney, Altman, billed his 

time at $650 per hour. Further, Hyundai asserted that Mikhov 

unnecessarily billed at his $500 hourly rate to review virtually 

every pleading in the case. Referencing another lemon law case 

brought to trial by Mikhov’s and Altman’s firms, Hyundai noted 

the court limited their billing rates to a range of $175 to $400 per 

hour, and Hyundai argued the same range should apply in 

Morris’s case. Hyundai objected to the admission of the Attorney 

Fee Survey Report attached to Altman’s declaration, alleging it 

lacked foundation and constituted unreliable hearsay. 

4. Morris’s Reply

In her reply, Morris explained that the Altman Law Group 

was associated in because that firm’s attorneys were trial 

specialists, and any resulting duplication of work would have 

been offset by the “gains in trial preparation efficiency.” Morris 

further argued, without any supporting declaration or evidence, 

that the use of 11 attorneys on her case was reasonable and 

efficient because each attorney performed tasks in which he or 

she specialized. According to Morris, “[m]inimal time is spent for 

each attorney to review the file and learn the relevant facts of the 

case, while substantial time is saved from having to switch gears 

to become familiar with procedural rules and specific issues of 
8

each phase of the case.” Morris asserted that even though her 

counsel used “form documents” in the case, work was necessary 

to conform those templates to the actual facts of this case.

5. Tentative Ruling, Hearing, and Final Order on Attorney 

Fees

Before the April 16, 2018 hearing on the motion for 

attorney fees, the trial court issued a tentative ruling.4 The court 

acknowledged it was required to use the lodestar method to 

calculate Morris’s fee award, but it found Morris’s requested fee 

award required reductions. The court found that “[f]or a case 

that did not present particularly complex or unique issues, which 

did not require any discovery motions, and which did not go to 

trial . . . a reasonable number of attorneys is one partner and at 

most two associates/paralegals.” The court thus included in its 

lodestar calculation the fees incurred by Mikhov and only two of 

the seven associates from Knight Law; and of the four lawyers 

from the Altman Group who billed time on the case, the court 

included the fees billed only by Altman and one associate. Out of 

a total of 283.3 hours of billed work, the court did not award any 

fees for 82.5 hours of work billed by six associates.

Further, the court found the stated hourly rates for each of 

the attorneys were not reasonable. It reduced Altman’s rate from 

$650 to $500 per hour, and Mikhov’s rate from $500 to $400 per 

hour. The court fixed each of the associate’s rates at $300 per 

hour, thus reducing one associate’s rate from $350 to $300 per 

hour, the second from $375 to $300 per hour, and the third from 

 

4 In its tentative ruling the court sustained Hyundai’s 

objections to the fee survey attached to Altman’s declaration as 

well as Morris’s objections to select portions of Takahashi’s 

declaration.
9

$450 to $300 per hour. The court granted the full amount of fees 

billed by the paralegal from the Altman Law Group. The result 

was a total lodestar calculation of $73,864, approximately 

42.2 percent less than the requested lodestar award of 

$127,792.50.

The court declined to apply a multiplier, noting it was “not 

convinced . . . that [Hyundai] ‘dragged’ this case out for longer 

than necessary . . . . Further, the Court notes that this case does 

not present particularly complex or unique issues. It is a kind of 

case both [Morris’s] and [Hyundai’s] counsel have tried numerous 

times and involve similar issues, both legally and factually.”

Addressing the court’s tentative ruling during the hearing, 

Morris argued that the court’s disallowance of fees incurred by 

six of the billing attorneys was arbitrary and would “result[] in 

cutting hours that it must be beyond dispute were actually . . . 

and reasonably incurred,” such as the time spent defending 

Morris’s deposition. Morris also argued that Hyundai had not 

shown any reasons that her attorneys’ hourly rates should be 

reduced.

The court noted it was taking a very similar approach to 

that taken in another lemon law attorney fee award case cited in 

Mikhov’s declaration that involved the same law firms on each 

side.5 However, the court suggested Morris’s attorneys were less 

efficient in prosecuting the instant case, which affected the 

court’s determination of the reasonableness of the requested fees. 

The court stated as follows: “[I]n a case like this . . . which is 

similar to almost every other case that you have on your case list, 

 

5 In that case, the same trial judge reduced Altman’s fee 

from $650 to $550 but found Mikhov’s requested $500 hourly rate 

to be reasonable.
10

there’s a certain methodology in prosecuting these cases. There’s 

a template that you would follow. . . . And I understand that it 

can’t be done just by the partner. The partner needs help. And 

as I mentioned, two people, either both could be paralegals, or 

one could be an associate. . . . But I think two people at the very 

most is all that is needed and would make either the prosecution 

or the defense of that litigation efficient and productive. Just 

because attorneys’ fees are provided for under the Song Beverly 

Act doesn’t give any counsel cart[e] blanche to put unlimited 

people on the case doing different things, because every time that 

somebody new to the file picks the file up in order to do whatever 

the task is, there’s a certain amount of built-in startup [time]. 

You have to figure out what’s going on in the case, who’s who, 

where things are located. You have to go through the file a little 

bit. So for every one of those 11 people that worked on the case, 

there was a little bit of that that was involved. . . . And that is 

duplicative. It’s not a very efficient way of doing things.” The 

court stated Morris had not provided a satisfactory explanation 

as to why 11 attorneys were needed to prosecute the case.

The judge further noted his own experience in private 

practice examining 30 to 50 bills a month to determine whether 

charges were reasonable and demonstrated efficiency. The court 

stated, “There has to be some constraint on the billable hours 

that are generated here because the key term under the Song 

Beverly is ‘reasonable,’ . . . . [I]t’s not just actual.”

After additional argument by Morris’s counsel asserting 

that the court should not cut 100 percent of the fees billed by six 

of the associates simply to account for some degree of lost 

efficiency, the court remarked that Morris was requesting a fee 

award of $192,000 for a case that did not go to trial and settled 
11

for $85,000. The court asked Morris’s counsel, “Don’t you think 

that just on its face, that’s a little much?” The court went on to 

state, “[T]his is not Apple versus Samsung case. This is a case 

that you handle on a daily basis. This is the kind of case that 

your firm handles. . . . And I can’t conceive, lodestar or not, that 

you would get up to $192,000 and ask for that in a very serious 

way.” Further, the court reiterated, “[T]here’s got to be a cutoff 

to what reasonableness means. And the way I described it in my 

tentative ruling is what I think is reasonable under the 

circumstance[s].”

The court adopted its tentative ruling as its final decision. 

The court thus awarded Morris attorney fees in the amount of 

$73,864 and costs in the amount of $13,068.96.

DISCUSSION

I. Recovery of Attorney Fees Under the Song-Beverly Act

“A prevailing buyer in an action under the Song-Beverly

Act ‘shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the

judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and

expenses, including attorney’s fees based on actual time

expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably

incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and

prosecution of such action.’ (Civ. Code, § 1794, subd. (d); see

Warren v. Kia Motors America, Inc. (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 24, 35 

[(Warren)] [‘[t]he “plain wording” of section 1794, subdivision (d) 

requires the trial court to “base” the prevailing buyer’s attorney 

fee award “upon actual time expended on the case, as long as 

such fees are reasonably incurred—both from the standpoint of 

time spent and the amount charged’” (italics omitted)].)” 

(Hanna v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 493,
12

506 (Hanna).) “By permitting prevailing buyers to recover their

attorney fees in addition to costs and expenses, our Legislature

has provided injured consumers strong encouragement to seek

legal redress in a situation in which a lawsuit might not

otherwise have been economically feasible.” (Murillo v.

Fleetwood Enterprises, Inc. (1998) 17 Cal.4th 985, 994; accord,

Warren, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th at p. 35.)

Civil Code section 1794 “‘“‘requires the trial court to make

an initial determination of the actual time expended; and then to

ascertain whether under all the circumstances of the case the

amount of actual time expended and the monetary charge being

made for the time expended are reasonable. These circumstances

may include, but are not limited to, factors such as the

complexity of the case and procedural demands, the skill

exhibited and the results achieved. If the time expended or the

monetary charge being made for the time expended are not

reasonable under all the circumstances, then the court must take

this into account and award attorney fees in a lesser amount. A

prevailing buyer has the burden of “showing that the fees

incurred were ‘allowable,’ were ‘reasonably necessary to the

conduct of the litigation,’ and were ‘reasonable in amount.’”’”’” 

(Hanna, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at p. 507; accord, Warren, supra,

30 Cal.App.5th at p. 36; Etcheson v. FCA US LLC (2018)

30 Cal.App.5th 831, 840; Goglin v. BMW of North America, LLC

(2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 462, 470.)

“We review a trial court’s order awarding attorney fees and

costs under the Song-Beverly Act for abuse of discretion.” 

(Hanna, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at p. 507.) “‘“The ‘“experienced

trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services

rendered in his [or her] court, and while his [or her] judgment is
13

of course subject to review, it will not be disturbed unless the

appellate court is convinced that it is clearly wrong.”’”’” 

(Goglin v. BMW of North America, LLC, supra, 4 Cal.App.5th at

pp. 470-471; accord, Warren, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th at p. 36; see

PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1096 [“[t]he

value of legal services performed in a case is a matter in which

the trial court has its own expertise. . . . The trial court may

make its own determination of the value of the services”].) In

particular, “the lodestar method vests the trial court with the

discretion to decide which of the hours expended by the attorneys

were ‘reasonably spent’ on the litigation” (Meister v. Regents of

University of California (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 437, 449), and to

determine the hourly rates that should be used in the lodestar

calculus. (569 East County Boulevard LLC v. Backcountry

Against the Dump, Inc. (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 426, 436-437

(569 East).)

II. The Trial Court Did Not Engage in an Inappropriate

Proportionality Analysis

“While the trial court has broad discretion to increase or 

reduce the proposed lodestar amount based on the various factors 

identified in case law, including the complexity of the case and 

the results achieved, the court’s analysis must begin with the 

‘actual time expended, determined by the court to have been 

reasonably incurred.’ (Civ. Code, § 1794, subd. (d).) ‘[I]t is 

inappropriate and an abuse of a trial court’s discretion to tie an 

attorney fee award to the amount of the prevailing 

buyer/plaintiff’s damages or recovery in a Song-Beverly Act 

action.’” (Hanna, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at p. 510, quoting 

Warren, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th at p. 37.) A “rule of 

proportionality” would make it difficult for individuals with 
14

meritorious consumer rights claims to obtain redress from the 

courts when they cannot expect a large damages award. (See 

Warren, at p. 39.)

Morris contends the trial court engaged in a prohibited 

proportionality analysis in setting the attorney fee award. 

Specifically, she points to the following statement by the court 

during the hearing: “So this is [a request for] $192,000 for a case 

that you settled for $85,000 and didn’t go to trial. Don’t you 

think that just on its face, that’s a little much?” Morris asserts 

the court improperly slashed the requested award by more than 

42 percent, to $73,864, to render the award “more in proportion to 

the $85,000 damages.”

Morris relies on Warren to argue that the court’s remarks 

during the hearing require reversal because they show that the 

court improperly considered the proportion of the fee award to 

the damages award. In Warren, a lawsuit under the 

Song-Beverly Act went to trial, and the jury returned a verdict in 

the plaintiff’s favor and awarded $17,455.57 in damages. 

(Warren, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th at p. 31.) The plaintiff filed a 

motion seeking $351,055.26 in lodestar attorney fees plus a 

multiplier of 1.5. The defendant claimed the number of hours 

and rates billed were excessive due to duplicative, inefficient 

work by three different law firms. (Id. at p. 33.)

At the hearing, “[t]he court noted there was ‘a disconnect’

between the verdict amount of ‘$17,000’ and the over $500,000 in 

requested attorney fees, and said it believed its tentative award 

of $115,848.24 in attorney fees was ‘generous.’” (Warren, supra, 

30 Cal.App.5th at p. 33.) The court then stated, “‘I’m not saying 

that [proportionality is] the basis of my ruling,’” but expressed 

that the disconnect between the verdict and the fee request did 
15

not sit well with the court. (Id. at p. 34.) “In ruling on the 

motion, the court wrote: ‘The three firms billed a total of 

$351,055.26. This is an excessive amount for a non-complex case. 

The court will exercise its discretion and reduce this amount to 

33%, or $115,848.24, of the original requested amount. This 

amount, while still much more than the $17,455.57 award, more 

accurately reflects the reasonable amount of attorneys fees in a 

case which was not particularly complex and which was handled 

by counsel experienced in this area of law. Plaintiff has not 

demonstrated that this many attorneys, at these high rates, were 

necessary or reasonable to justify her requested billed amount. 

Additionally, despite counsel[’]s argument that they carefully 

avoided duplication between the 3 firms, the court is not 

convinced that the repetitiveness of these types of cases would 

necessarily require the amount of time requested.’ (Italics 

added.)” (Ibid.)

On appeal, the court found that, although the trial court 

had expressed some valid reasons justifying a reduction, “the 

trial court’s comments at the hearing and in its written ruling on 

the attorney fee motion indicate that the court applied a 33% 

negative multiplier to Warren’s requested lodestar fees of 

$351,055.26, with at least the partial goal of arriving at an 

attorney fee award that was roughly proportional to or more in 

line with Warren’s modest $17,455.57 damages award.” (Warren, 

supra, 30 Cal.App.5th at p. 39.) The court held, “[W]hen a trial 

court applies a substantial negative multiplier to a presumptively 

accurate lodestar attorney fee amount, the court must clearly 

explain its case-specific reasons for the percentage reduction. 

(Kerkeles [v. City of San Jose (2015)] 243 Cal.App.4th [88,] 102-
16

104 [(Kerkeles)].)[6] If, as occurred here, the reasons for the 

reduction include tying the fee award to some proportion of the 

buyer’s damages recovery, the court abuses its discretion.” (Id. at 

p. 37.)

 

6 In finding the trial court was required to “clearly explain” 

its reasons for the sizeable reduction of the award, the court 

relied on Kerkeles, supra, 243 Cal.App.4th 88. (See Warren, 

supra, 30 Cal.App.5th at p. 37; see also id. at p. 41 [in reliance on 

Kerkeles, finding it appropriate to “effectively appl[y] ‘heightened 

scrutiny’ to the court’s selection of the 33% negative multiplier to 

Warren’s lodestar figure”].) However, Kerkeles concerned an 

award of attorney fees under 42 United States Code section 1988

that is subject to the more stringent federal standard requiring 

district courts to “‘provide a reasonably specific explanation for 

all aspects of a fee determination.’” (Kerkeles, supra, 

243 Cal.App.4th at p. 102; see id. at p. 104 [holding that “the 

reasoning expressed in the court’s order [awarding attorney fees] 

does not meet the federal criterion of a clear and specific 

explanation sufficient for meaningful appellate review” (italics 

added)].) We disagree with the court in Warren that such a 

heightened standard is appropriate for appellate review of fee 

awards under the Song-Beverly Act. Rather, “‘“‘[w]e presume the 

trial court’s attorney fees award is correct, and “[w]hen the trial 

court substantially reduces a fee or cost request, we infer the 

court has determined the request was inflated.”’”’” (Hanna, 

supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at p. 507; accord, Etcheson v. FCA US 

LLC, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th at p. 840; see California Common 

Cause v. Duffy (1987) 200 Cal.App.3d 730, 754-755 [“trial court 

has no sua sponte duty to make specific factual findings 

explaining its calculation of the fee award and the appellate 

courts will infer all findings to support the trial court’s 

determination”].)
17

Unlike the trial court’s written ruling in Warren, which 

suggested the relative proportion of the damages to attorney fees 

was a factor in the court’s calculus, the trial court’s final written 

order in the instant case did not suggest in any respect that the 

court reduced the attorney fee award based on the size of the 

settlement award. Rather, the trial court’s order indicated a fee 

reduction was warranted because it was unreasonable to have so 

many lawyers staffing a case that did not present complex or 

unique issues, did not involve discovery motions, and did not go 

to trial. Further, the court found the attorneys’ hourly rates to be 

unreasonably high.

Morris contends that, as in Warren, the trial court’s 

comments during the hearing – suggesting that the total 

proposed fee was “a little much” considering the case settled for 

$85,000 and did not go to trial – betrayed that at least one of the 

court’s intentions in reducing the fee award was to bring it more 

in line with the settlement amount. Given the court’s clear 

expression in its final order of its reasons for the reductions, we 

will not speculate, based on a stray remark the court made at the 

hearing, that it had other, prohibited reasons that would require 

reversal. (See Key v. Tyler (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 505, 539 

[holding the court’s “oral comments were not final findings and 

cannot impeach the court’s subsequent written ruling”]; 

Jespersen v. Zubiate-Beauchamp (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 624, 633 

fn. 16 [“a judge’s comments in oral argument may never be used 

to impeach the final order, however valuable to illustrate the 

court’s theory they might be under some circumstances”].) Thus, 

we reject Morris’s contention that the trial court applied a 

proportionality analysis in making its attorney fee determination.
18

III. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by 

Cutting Fees Billed by Six of 11 Attorneys

Morris contends the trial court arbitrarily cut 83.5 hours of 

reasonably incurred fees billed by six attorneys who worked on 

the case, citing concerns about inefficiencies and duplication, 

even when Hyundai did not object to these attorneys’ time and 

billing entries in some instances. Morris notes the court did not 

reference any specific examples of inefficiencies or redundancies 

as a result of the number of attorneys staffing the case.

“A trial court may not rubber stamp a request for attorney 

fees, but must determine the number of hours reasonably 

expended.” (Donahue v. Donahue (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 259, 

271.) In evaluating whether the attorney fee request is 

reasonable, the trial court should consider “‘whether the case was 

overstaffed, how much time the attorneys spent on particular 

claims, and whether the hours were reasonably expended.’” 

(Ibid.) “Reasonable compensation does not include compensation 

for ‘“padding” in the form of inefficient or duplicative efforts. . . .’ 

[Citations.] ‘A reduced award might be fully justified by a 

general observation that an attorney overlitigated a case or 

submitted a padded bill or that the opposing party has stated 

valid objections.’” (Ibid.; see Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 

1122, 1132 [“trial courts must carefully review attorney 

documentation of hours expended; ‘padding’ in the form of 

inefficient or duplicative efforts is not subject to compensation”].) 

“‘[J]ust as there can be too many cooks in the kitchen, there can 

be too many lawyers on a case.”’ (Donahue, at p. 272 [finding 

that “simultaneous representation by multiple law firms posed 

substantial risks of task padding, over-conferencing, attorney 
19

stacking (multiple attendance by attorneys at the same court 

functions), and excessive research”].)

In Warren, although the appellate court reversed the trial 

court’s order on attorney fees because the court appeared to have 

slashed the fee award in part to make it more proportional to the 

modest damages award, the appellate court found “the court’s 

other reasons for selecting the negative 33% multiplier were 

appropriate.” (Warren, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th at p. 40.) Those 

reasons included that 16 lawyers at three firms had billed a total 

of $351,055.26, an “‘excessive amount for a non-complex case’” 

that was “‘handled by counsel experienced in this area of law.’” 

(Ibid.) Further, the trial court found the plaintiff “‘has not 

demonstrated that this many attorneys, at these high rates, were 

necessary or reasonable to justify her requested billed amount. 

Additionally, despite counsel[’]s argument that they carefully 

avoided duplication between the 3 firms, the court is not 

convinced that the repetitiveness of these types of cases would 

necessarily require the amount of time requested.’” (Ibid.) The 

appellate court found the trial court was within its discretion to 

reduce the fee award based on “the excessive time spent on the 

‘not so complex case’ by [plaintiff’s] attorneys in the aggregate.” 

(Id. at pp. 40-41.)

Plainly, it is appropriate for a trial court to reduce a fee 

award based on its reasonable determination that a routine, noncomplex case was overstaffed to a degree that significant 

inefficiencies and inflated fees resulted.7 The more unique issue 

 

7 Morris contends that, contrary to the trial court’s findings, 

her attorneys’ “conveyor belt management style,” in which each 

stage of litigation of a lemon law case is handled by a single 

attorney specializing in that stage, resulted in efficient billing. 
20

presented here is whether the trial court’s decision to cut entirely 

the fees for six billing attorneys, resulting in cutting 83.5 of 

283.3 total hours of work – just under 30 percent of the total 

billed hours – was an appropriate way to remedy such 

inefficiencies and make the fee award a reasonable one.

In arguing that the trial court’s methodology was not 

appropriate, Morris relies on Mountjoy v. Bank of America, N.A.

(2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 266 (Mountjoy). In that case, the trial 

court reduced the total hours claimed by the plaintiffs’ attorneys 

by 70 percent largely because the court found that over 

70 percent of the billing entries were flawed, for reasons such as 

excessive time spent on the stated task, duplicative billing, or 

fees for unreasonable tasks. The appellate court found this 

reduction arbitrary because “there appears to be no reasonable 

basis for the conclusion that the total hours included in the 

70 percent-plus time entries that were flawed in one or more 

ways was even reasonably close to 70 percent of the total time 

claimed. For example, it is possible that the hours included in 

the flawed time entries amounted to only 50 percent of total 

hours claimed, in which case the [plaintiffs] would have suffered 

a 20 percent reduction in compensable hours for hours that were 

 

However, Morris failed to present evidence to the trial court of 

such streamlined practices, foreclosing any finding that the trial 

court abused its discretion in finding that Morris’s counsels’ 

practices were inefficient. (See Mountjoy v. Bank of America

(2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 266, 278-279 [where plaintiff offered 

reasons on appeal for double-staffing of certain tasks but failed to 

“point to any evidence in the record in this case that that 

justification applied here. . . . no abuse of discretion has been 

shown in the trial court’s determination that the services of the 

two attorneys were duplicative”].)
21

actually included in time entries that were not flawed.” (Id. at 

pp. 280-281.) “An across-the-board reduction in hours claimed 

based on the percentage of total time entries that were flawed, 

without respect to the number of hours that were actually 

included in the flawed entries, is not a legitimate basis for 

determining a reasonable attorney fee award.” (Id. at p. 282.)

Mountjoy is distinguishable. In that case, the trial court 

identified flaws of some sort in 70 percent of the attorneys’ billing 

entries, but it never purported to assess the reasonable value of 

the attorneys’ services or how many hours should be cut so that 

the fee award would reflect the reasonable services provided. By 

contrast, in the instant case, the trial court determined that 

having too many lawyers work on the case led to inflated bills, 

and its chosen remedy – not awarding fees for some of the 

attorneys – was designed to yield a revised lodestar figure that 

reflected a total amount of fees that were reasonably incurred.

Morris is correct that the trial court’s methodology of 

cutting six attorneys’ hours entirely resulted in cutting nonduplicative billing for some necessary tasks, such as defending 

Morris’s deposition, attending the vehicle inspection, and 

attending a case management conference. However, at the 

hearing, the court made clear that its approach was designed to 

reduce the total award to the reasonable amount that would have 

been billed had there been an appropriate number of attorneys on 

the case. The court could properly have made an across-theboard reduction of 30 percent to accomplish the same purpose. 

(See Warren, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th at p. 41 [“when a 

“‘“voluminous fee application”’” is made . . . the court may . . . 

“‘“make across-the-board percentage cuts either in the number of 

hours claimed or in the final lodestar figure”’”].) The court got to 
22

the same result by cutting particular attorneys’ billings. We are 

satisfied that the trial court did not abuse its broad discretion to 

determine the reasonable value of the professional services 

performed by Morris’s attorneys. (See PLCM Group, Inc. v. 

Drexler, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1096 [“[t]he trial court may make 

its own determination of the value of the services”]; Melnyk v. 

Robledo (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 618, 625 [“the trial court . . . is not 

bound by the itemization claimed in the attorney’s affidavit”].)

IV. Morris Has Shown No Abuse of Discretion in the 

Trial Court’s Reductions of the Attorneys’ Hourly 

Rates

Morris asserts the trial court reduced the hourly rates for 

her attorneys without a reasonable basis for doing so. She 

contends she submitted ample evidence, which Hyundai failed to 

rebut, that her counsel’s rates were reasonable and 

commensurate with other consumer attorneys’ rates.8 (See 

Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 

140, 156 [trial court abused its discretion in reducing counsel’s 

hourly rates where “unrebutted declarations established the 

prevailing rates in the region for attorneys with comparable skills 

and expertise”].)

 

8 Morris complains that the court erred in excluding the 

attorney fee survey attached to Altman’s declaration. However, 

Morris fails to present any argument that the basis for the 

ruling – that the survey was unauthenticated hearsay – was 

incorrect. As such, she has forfeited the argument that the fee 

survey was wrongly excluded. (DP Pham LLC v. Cheadle (2016) 

246 Cal.App.4th 653, 674 [party forfeits argument by failing to 

adequately support it with argument and relevant legal 

authority].)
23

“In making its calculation [of a reasonable hourly rate], the 

court may rely on its own knowledge and familiarity with the 

legal market, as well as the experience, skill, and reputation of 

the attorney requesting fees [citation], the difficulty or complexity 

of the litigation to which that skill was applied [citations], and 

affidavits from other attorneys regarding prevailing fees in the 

community and rate determinations in other cases.” (569 East, 

supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at p. 437; see Mountjoy, supra, 

245 Cal.App.4th at p. 272 [“‘“a reasonable hourly rate is the 

product of a multiplicity of factors . . . . [including] the level of 

skill necessary, time limitations, the amount to be obtained in the 

litigation, the attorney’s reputation, and the undesirability of the 

case”’”].)

In Mountjoy, the plaintiff complained that the trial court 

reduced her counsel’s hourly rate to that of the much less 

experienced defense counsel. The appellate court found that the 

plaintiff had failed to carry her burden to show the court abused 

its discretion in reducing the rate where the court could have 

reasonably determined that a lesser rate was justified due to 

other factors besides experience. (Mountjoy, supra,

245 Cal.App.4th at pp. 272-273.)

Similarly here, even if Morris established that her 

attorneys’ rates were generally commensurate with other 

consumer law attorneys with the same level of experience and 

skill, Morris ignores that there are a number of factors that the 

trial court may have taken into consideration in determining that 

reductions in the attorneys’ hourly rates were warranted. The 

court reasonably could have reduced the rates based on its 

finding that the matter was not complex; that it did not go to 

trial; that the name partners were doing work that could have 
24

been done by lower-billing attorneys; and that all the attorneys 

were doing work that could have been done by paralegals. (See 

569 East, supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at pp. 438-439 [finding billing rate 

reduction of senior attorney was justified where the attorney did 

“the yeoman’s work” that would ordinarily be done by more junior 

associates with low billing rates].) Morris has not carried her 

burden to show an abuse of discretion in the trial court’s 

reduction of the attorneys’ hourly rates.

DISPOSITION

The order awarding fees and costs is affirmed. Hyundai is 

to recover its costs on appeal.

STONE, J.*

We concur:

PERLUSS, P. J.

ZELON, J.

 

* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the 

Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California 

Constitution.
Filed 10/11/19

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

MARY MORRIS,

 Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

HYUNDAI MOTOR AMERICA,

 Defendant and Respondent.

B290693

(Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. BC612232)

ORDER MODIFYING AND

CERTIFYING OPINION FOR

PUBLICATION; NO CHANGE

IN APPELLATE 

JUDGMENT

THE COURT:

The opinion filed on September 16, 2019 and not certified 

for publication, is modified as follows:

On page 8, section 5, first paragraph, last sentence: “82.5” 

should be replaced with “83.5.” The sentence should read as 

follows:

Out of a total of 283.3 hours of billed work, the 

court did not award any fees for 83.5 hours of 

work billed by six associates.

The opinion in this case filed on September 16, 2019 was 

not certified for publication. Because the opinion meets the 
2

standards for publication specified in California Rules of Court, 

rule 8.1105(c), the requests by Defendant and Respondent, as 

well as a non-party, pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 

8.1120(a) for publication are granted.

IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the opinion meets the 

standards for publication specified in California Rules of Court, 

rule 8.1105(c); and

ORDERED that the opinion be published in the Official 

Reports.

This order does not change the appellate judgment.

____________________________________________________________

PERLUSS, P. J., ZELON, J., STONE, J.9

 

9 Judge of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, assigned 

by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the 

California Constitution.