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STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA

SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS

David R.,

Petitioner Below, Petitioner

vs.) No. 21-0440 (Wyoming County 19-C-45)

The Honorable Eric Shuck, Judge of the

Thirteenth Family Court Circuit, and

Honey R., 

Respondents Below, Respondents

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Petitioner David R.,1 appeals the Circuit Court of Wyoming County’s May 7, 2021, order 

denying his motion to enforce an earlier granted writ of prohibition. Finding no substantial 

question of law and no prejudicial error, a memorandum decision affirming the order of the circuit 

court is appropriate. See W. Va. R.A.P. 21.

Because the issue before the Court in this matter is an extremely limited legal issue, it is 

unnecessary to set forth a detailed recitation of the facts leading up to petitioner’s challenges to 

personal jurisdiction through a writ of prohibition, and subsequent motion to enforce the writ, in 

the circuit court. It is, instead, sufficient to set forth the following. In 2018, respondent filed an 

action for divorce in the Family Court of Wyoming County. At that time petitioner was, and has 

remained, a resident of Indiana. After limited proceedings in the divorce matter, the family court 

entered an amended temporary order on March 25, 2019, in which it, among other things, ordered 

petitioner to pay temporary spousal support to respondent and awarded respondent real property. 

The order also indicated that it would proceed to a final hearing on the issues of equitable 

distribution, spousal support, attorney’s fees, and custody of the parties’ child. 

On May 24, 2019, petitioner filed a petition for a writ of prohibition in the Circuit Court of 

Wyoming County seeking to prohibit enforcement of the March 25, 2019, order on the grounds 

that the family court lacked personal jurisdiction over him. The circuit court granted the writ, 

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We use initials where necessary to protect the identities of those involved in this case. See 

W. Va. R.A.P. 40(e). Petitioner appears by counsel Timothy A. Bradford. Respondent Honey R. 

appears by counsel Lyne Ranson. 

FILED

October 26, 2022

EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK

SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS

OF WEST VIRGINIA
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finding, in relevant part, that the March 25, 2019, order “fails to make a finding as to service of 

process” and that it failed to find whether constructive service had been achieved. The circuit court 

concluded that the “failure to make a finding as to service of process is contrary to West Virginia 

Code [§] 48-5-103(b)” and that the order was, therefore, “contrary of law, is clear error, and 

exceeds the [f]amily [c]ourt’s legitimate powers.” The circuit court further ordered that respondent 

could be granted a divorce but that the family court was prohibited from considering “spousal 

support, awarding of personal property, awarding of real property, . . . child support, and child 

custody . . . until and when personal jurisdiction has been achieved.”

Following the circuit court’s entry of this order, the family court vacated its temporary 

order that was the subject of the writ of prohibition. After a hearing in July of 2020, the family 

court “proceeded to make findings of fact along with the appropriate legal analysis to determine 

several reasons that personal jurisdiction over the [p]etitioner is proper.” 

In March of 2021, petitioner filed a “Motion to Enforce Writ of Prohibition” in the circuit 

court, arguing that the circuit court’s 2019 order granting him a writ of prohibition “precluded a 

West Virginia court from ever having in personam jurisdiction over him.” The circuit court, 

however, denied the motion, finding that “there is no further Order Granting Writ to enforce,” as 

the family court enforced and followed all directives set forth in the circuit court’s prior order. The 

circuit court went on to explain that petitioner was not actually seeking enforcement of the prior 

order but was, instead, “asking for an entirely separate and new Order Granting Writ of Prohibition 

that finds that the [f]amily [c]ourt’s findings of fact during the July 27, 2020, hearing were wrong 

or misapplied.” The circuit court then concluded that Health Management, Inc. v. Lindell, 207 W. 

Va. 68, 528 S.E.2d 762 (1999), prohibits the issuance of a writ of prohibition based on findings of 

fact related to jurisdictional questions. As such, the circuit court denied petitioner’s motion.

Petitioner now appeals the circuit court’s order denying his motion. 

“Where the issue on an appeal from the circuit court is clearly a question of law or 

involving an interpretation of a statute, we apply a de novo standard of review.” Syl. Pt. 1, Chrystal 

R.M. v. Charlie A.L., 194 W. Va. 138, 459 S.E.2d 415 (1995). 

On appeal, all of petitioner’s arguments concern his belief that “the circuit court erred in 

concluding that the family court . . . has obtained personal jurisdiction over the petitioner.” But 

petitioner fails to recognize that the form of his motion did not require the circuit court to undertake 

a full review of the family court’s determination that personal jurisdiction over petitioner was 

appropriate. Instead, the circuit court simply declined to enforce the prior order granting petitioner 

prohibition relief because, as it correctly concluded, there was nothing left to enforce. In the order 

granting prohibition relief, the circuit court prohibited the family court from proceeding on certain 

matters “until and when personal jurisdiction has been achieved,” and specifically cited the family 

court’s failure to make specific findings regarding service on petitioner as a basis for prohibition 

relief. Given that the family court vacated its prior temporary order and then issued a new order 

making extensive findings as to its basis for personal jurisdiction over petitioner, it appears that 

the family court fully complied with the circuit court’s order granting petitioner prohibition relief. 

As such, the circuit court did not err in denying petitioner’s motion to enforce the writ of 

prohibition.
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Further, petitioner’s challenge to the family court’s specific factual findings underlying its 

determination that it may exercise personal jurisdiction is not a proper basis to seek a new writ of 

prohibition. Petitioner filed a motion with the circuit court, which the circuit court construed as a 

petition for a new writ of prohibition. We agree with the circuit court that petitioner’s challenge to 

the factual findings concerning personal jurisdiction is not appropriate in prohibition. We have 

explained as follows:

As this Court specified in Syllabus point 10 of Jennings v. McDougle, 83 W.Va. 

186, 98 S.E. 162 (1919), “[w]hen a court is attempting to proceed in a cause without 

jurisdiction, prohibition will issue as a matter of right regardless of the existence of 

other remedies.” However, relief in prohibition is inappropriate where jurisdiction 

turns on contested issues of fact. See Health Mgmt., Inc. v. Lindell, 207 W.Va. 68, 

72, 528 S.E.2d 762, 766 (1999); Lewis v. Fisher, 114 W.Va. 151, 154, 171 S.E. 

106, 107 (1933).

State ex rel. Ford Motor Co. v. McGraw, 237 W. Va. 573, 580, 788 S.E.2d 319, 326 (2016). As 

such, petitioner cannot be entitled to relief. 

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

Affirmed.

ISSUED: October 26, 2022

CONCURRED IN BY:

Chief Justice John A. Hutchison

Justice Elizabeth D. Walker

Justice Tim Armstead

Justice William R. Wooton

Justice C. Haley Bunn