NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO B.T.

No. 1 CA-JV 24-0028

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. JS19712

The Honorable Christopher Whitten, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

John L. Popilek, P.C., Scottsdale

By John L. Popilek

Counsel for Appellant

Cox Sandoval Law PLLC, Chandler

By Annette Cox Sandoval

Counsel for Appellee Ryan T.

Maricopa County Office of the Legal Advocate, Phoenix

By Amanda L. Adams

Counsel for Appellee B.T.

FILED 07-16-2024
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO B.T.

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Paul J. McMurdie delivered the Court’s decision, in which Presiding 

Judge Jennifer B. Campbell and Judge Kent E. Cattani joined.

M c M U R D I E, Judge:

¶1 Shelby Kohlhofer (“Mother”) appeals from an order 

terminating her parental rights. She argues that the juvenile court could not 

find she abandoned her daughter when the other parent’s interference 

caused her lack of visitation. We find no error and affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Mother and Ryan Tramel (“Father”) are the biological parents

of Brenda,

1 born in August 2011. Mother cared for Brenda during the first 

three and a half years of her life. Mother and Brenda also resided with 

Mother’s parents (“Grandparents”) for some of that time. Although Father 

visited the hospital at Brenda’s birth and provided diapers and formula on 

at least one occasion, he did not otherwise support Brenda. Instead, Father 

and Mother fell out of contact, and Father testified that he “just kind of gave 

up” and “figured it was probably someone else’s child.” 

¶3 In May 2015, the Department of Child Safety (“Department”) 

filed a dependency petition alleging neglect by Mother and Father. The 

Department alleged that Mother had “issues with alcohol” and that family

members reported she drank on a “daily basis,” sometimes before driving. 

The Department alleged that Father had not established paternity nor “had 

any contact with his child since she was two weeks old” and thus had

“abandoned the child.” The Department took temporary custody of Brenda

and placed her with Grandparents.

¶4 Mother failed to appear at the dependency hearing, and the 

court adjudicated Brenda dependent as to her. But Father contested the 

dependency and requested a paternity test, which showed he was the 

father. Father coordinated with the Department and Grandparents to 

become acquainted with Brenda through visits, and the Department 

1 We use a pseudonym to protect the child’s identity.
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO B.T.

Decision of the Court

3

recommended dismissing the dependency because Father had 

“demonstrated that he [could] safely parent his daughter.” In a 2016 

temporary order, the juvenile court awarded Father physical custody and 

legal decision-making authority for Brenda. The court also ordered that 

Mother have visitations supervised by Grandparents and that Father 

inform Mother of “any significant events” related to Brenda. The court

included similar terms in its final judgment in September 2016.

¶5 Mother’s struggles with alcohol continued. Mother was 

convicted of an aggravated DUI offense in November 2016 and again in 

February 2017. She was incarcerated throughout 2017. Shortly after her 

release in 2018, she was incarcerated again for six months for a probation 

violation.

¶6 In August 2018, Father petitioned to terminate Mother’s 

parental rights. It is unclear under what statutory grounds Father based his 

petition. In any event, Father agreed to dismiss the petition after Mother 

and Father attended mediation. The parents then stipulated to a visitation 

schedule. The juvenile court dismissed the termination petition and 

adopted the stipulated schedule.

¶7 The stipulated schedule provided that Grandparents would 

spend at least “4 hours on a Saturday or Sunday” each month with Brenda

and that the parties would “make best efforts” to accommodate visitation 

during holidays. The schedule authorized Mother to visit Brenda during 

Grandparents’ visitation but directed that Father “be provided information 

regarding the details of [visits] with mother.” Finally, the agreement 

provided multiple “conditions,” including that “Mother [had to] abide by 

all conditions of her parole” and that “[i]f Mother fail[ed] to demonstrate 

sobriety her visitations [could] be reduced and/or canceled.”

¶8 In October 2019, Mother was arrested for driving under the 

influence of alcohol while on probation for a previous DUI, with a

15-year-old child in the car. She was convicted of aggravated DUI and 

sentenced to six years in prison. 

¶9 Despite Mother’s incarceration, Grandparents continued to 

allow contact between Mother and Brenda through letters and phone calls. 

But in a 2020 email, Father stated: “[W]e do not want any letters being 

received or sent to or from [Brenda].” Father repeated this position in later

emails over the years and threatened to withhold Grandparents’ visitation

if they allowed Brenda contact with Mother.
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO B.T.

Decision of the Court

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¶10 In July 2023, Father filed a second termination petition against 

Mother alleging abandonment, chronic substance abuse, and felony

length-of-sentence grounds. See A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(1), (3), (4). In February 

2024, the juvenile court held a contested severance hearing.

¶11 At the hearing, Mother testified that she sent four letters to 

Father while in prison “to ask about visitation and grades and school 

pictures.” But Father testified that Mother never asked if she could send 

letters to him, Brenda through him, or Grandparents. He stated he received 

one letter from Mother, delivered through Grandparents, asking Father’s 

consent to allow Brenda to visit her at the prison. The juvenile court found 

that Mother’s testimony about her attempted contact with Father “[was] not 

persuasive.” And Mother admitted she could not call Father because she 

did not have prison approval.

¶12 Mother also testified that she wrote to Brenda “two to three 

times a month” and would send cards and gifts while in prison. Brenda’s 

grandmother testified that Mother wrote letters “on, probably, a monthly 

basis,” but Mother only produced one card and no more than four letters 

per year as evidence. The juvenile court did not resolve the credibility of 

these conflicting statements.

¶13 Father admitted that he “put[] the kibosh on . . . letters and 

contact” between Brenda and Mother by forbidding Grandparents from 

facilitating contact. And he admitted that he was not “open to having 

[Mother] call [Brenda] at [his] house” during her most recent incarceration. 

But he also explained that he would have been “more amenable to phone 

contact” if Mother had “demonstrate[d] sobriety” by providing test results

“and things of that nature.”

¶14 After the hearing, the juvenile court denied termination under 

the substance abuse and length-of-sentence grounds, finding that Father 

did not meet “his burden of proving the elements . . . by clear and 

convincing evidence.” But it granted severance on the abandonment 

ground. The court explained:

There is no evidence that Mother made efforts to have 

visitation with [Brenda] during her various times in 

custody. . . . Mother argues that part of the reason she has not 

spent more time with [Brenda] during the various times she 

has been incarcerated is that Father has interfered with her 

doing so. Indeed, Father has indicated he might not have 

agreed to such contact absent some demonstration of 
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO B.T.

Decision of the Court

5

Mother’s sobriety. But Mother never sought his agreement. If 

she had done so, and Father had unreasonably withheld his 

cooperation, Mother could have asked a Court to order 

requiring the same. She has never done so.

The court then distinguished this case from Calvin B. v. Brittany B., 232 Ariz. 

292 (App. 2013). It concluded that “Father’s actions do not rise to the level 

of interference required to establish a defense to abandonment.” Cf. id. at

297-99, ¶¶ 21-33. Finally, the court found that the termination of Mother’s

parental rights was in Brenda’s best interests.

¶15 Mother appealed. This court has jurisdiction under A.R.S. 

§§ 8-235(A), 12-120.21(A)(1), and 12-2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶16 We will affirm a termination order unless the juvenile court 

abused its discretion or its factual findings were clearly erroneous. See Mary 

Lou C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 207 Ariz. 43, 47, ¶ 8 (App. 2004). “The 

juvenile court, as the trier of fact in a termination proceeding, is in the best 

position to weigh the evidence, observe the parties, [and] judge the 

credibility of witnesses.” Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, 

280, ¶ 4 (App. 2002). We accept the juvenile court’s factual findings unless 

no reasonable evidence supports them. Id. We do not reweigh the evidence. 

Mary Lou C., 207 Ariz. at 47, ¶ 8.

¶17 The juvenile court granted severance on the abandonment 

ground. See A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(1). Under A.R.S. § 8-531(1),

‘Abandonment’ means the failure of a parent to provide 

reasonable support and to maintain regular contact with the 

child, including providing normal supervision. 

Abandonment includes a judicial finding that a parent has 

made only minimal efforts to support and communicate with 

the child. Failure to maintain a normal parental relationship 

with the child without just cause for a period of six months 

constitutes prima facie evidence of abandonment.

¶18 Mother does not challenge the juvenile court’s factual 

findings or its conclusion that severance would be in Brenda’s best interests. 

Instead, she emphasizes that her “‘conduct’ must be evaluated in light of 

‘the [parent]’s ability to perform [her or his] parental obligations.’” See 

Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 246, 249-50, ¶¶ 18, 21-22 (2000).

She argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion by terminating her 
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO B.T.

Decision of the Court

6

rights on the abandonment ground when Father’s interference was to 

blame for Mother’s lack of contact with Brenda. 

¶19 Mother cites Calvin B. in support of her position. See 232 Ariz. 

292. In Calvin B., the mother obtained protective orders against the father,

at least one of which included their son as a protected person. Id. at 294,

¶¶ 3, 7. But the father continued to seek visitation through messages to the

mother’s family and was arrested twice for texting the mother directly to

ask to see their son. Id. at 295, ¶ 8. Before the expiration of the second order

of protection, the mother petitioned to terminate the father’s rights, alleging

abandonment. Id. at ¶ 9. The father responded with a request for temporary

orders seeking parenting time and petitioned to enforce parenting time. Id.

at ¶¶ 9-10. The parties agreed to continue the severance trial to allow the

father supervised visitation, but the court required the indigent father to

pay the visitation costs. Id. at ¶ 12. The father attended some supervised

visits but could not pay for the cost of other opportunities. Id. at ¶ 13.

Meanwhile, the mother prevented the father from speaking to their son

over the phone and canceled two scheduled visits. Id. at 295-96, ¶ 14. The

court ultimately terminated the father’s rights on the abandonment ground.

Id. at 296, ¶ 15.

¶20 This court reversed the termination. Calvin B., 232 Ariz. at 299, 

¶ 33. We reasoned,

[F]or much of the period after the dissolution . . . [mother]

interfered with [father’s] opportunity and ability to develop a

normal parental relationship with their son. A parent may not

restrict the other parent from interacting with their child and

then petition to terminate the latter’s rights for abandonment.

Id. at 297, ¶ 21. We noted that the father “actively sought more involvement 

with their son than [the mother] would allow,” and although “no one 

would suggest [the father] was a salutary parent,” we lauded his efforts in 

successfully “manag[ing] as many as ten visits with his son a year,” 

especially “given the hurdles that [the mother] erected.” Id. at ¶¶ 22, 25.

¶21 Mother argues her case is like Calvin B. because Father’s 

unilateral visitation elimination prevented her from contacting Brenda. She 

concludes that the lack of relationship necessary for an abandonment claim 

stemmed from Father’s conduct, not hers.

¶22 But this case is distinguishable from Calvin B. Here, the 

juvenile court found that Mother had not shown that she “actively sought 

more involvement . . . than [Father] would allow.” See Calvin B., 232 Ariz. 
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO B.T.

Decision of the Court

7

at 297, ¶ 22. Mother had not managed ten visits—or even demonstrated that 

she had sent ten letters—within any of the years of her incarceration. Cf. id. 

at ¶ 25.

¶23 Most importantly, the father in Calvin B. “‘vigorously 

assert[ed] his legal rights’ to see his son” by petitioning the court to enforce 

the standing visitation orders and for modification several times. See Calvin 

B., 232 Ariz. at 294-95, 298, ¶¶ 3, 5, 9, 29 (quoting Michael J., 196 Ariz. at 250, 

¶ 22). By contrast, here, in the years of her incarceration, Mother did not 

once ask the court to enforce visitation under the stipulated orders. See Paul

E. v. Courtney F., 246 Ariz. 388, 395, ¶ 27 (2019) (When the family court has

awarded sole legal decision-making authority to a parent and the other

parent disagrees with the sole legal decision-maker on a major issue, the

court may intervene.). Nor did she petition to modify the stipulated orders,

under which Father held the legal power to suspend visitation. See In re

C.R., 256 Ariz. 170, 174, ¶ 15 (App. 2023) (The court held that Calvin B. only

applies “if the parent wrongfully restricts the other parent’s access to the

child.”).

¶24 Mother wanted to visit Brenda and was hampered by Father’s 

unilateral power to deny contact under the stipulated parenting plan. But 

“abandonment is measured not by a parent’s subjective intent, but by the 

parent’s conduct,” Michael J., 196 Ariz. at 249, ¶ 18. Here, Mother’s conduct 

led to her incarceration, and she took no formal steps to assert her rights 

during the years of her incarceration. The juvenile court did not abuse its 

discretion by finding that Mother abandoned Brenda.

CONCLUSION

¶25 We affirm.