alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEET OF MARCH 31, 1998 AND THE CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF
INCOME FOR THE NINE MONTHS ENDED MARCH 31, 1998, AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS
ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS CONTAINED IN FORM 10-Q
FOR THE PERIOD ENDED MARCH 31, 1998.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUN-30-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JUL-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1998
<CASH>                                           2,753
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   42,745
<ALLOWANCES>                                     2,571
<INVENTORY>                                      2,034
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                48,223
<PP&E>                                          59,184
<DEPRECIATION>                                  28,044
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  92,840
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                0
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                            72
<OTHER-SE>                                      25,456
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    92,840
<SALES>                                        146,385
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               190,540
<CGS>                                          128,352
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  169,568
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                18,908
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                 1,520
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               2,648
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  2,064
<INCOME-TAX>                                       816
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              1,248
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     1,248
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .17<F1>
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .16
<FN>
<F1>For Purposes of This Exhibit, Primary means Basic.
</FN>
        

</TABLE>
# L_2007155EN.01003001.xml

| 15.6.2007 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 155/30 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.6.2007

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 155/30

---

COMMISSION REGULATION (EC) No 661/2007

of 14 June 2007

granting no export refund for butter in the framework of the standing invitation to tender provided for in Regulation (EC) No 581/2004

THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community,

Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 1255/1999 of 17 May 1999 on the common organisation of the market in milk and milk products (1), and in particular the third subparagraph of Article 31(3) thereof,

Whereas:

| (1) | Commission Regulation (EC) No 581/2004 of 26 March 2004 opening a standing invitation to tender for export refunds concerning certain types of butter (2) provides for a permanent tender. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

Commission Regulation (EC) No 581/2004 of 26 March 2004 opening a standing invitation to tender for export refunds concerning certain types of butter (2) provides for a permanent tender.

| (2) | Pursuant to Article 5 of Commission Regulation (EC) No 580/2004 of 26 March 2004 establishing a tender procedure concerning export refunds for certain milk products (3) and following an examination of the tenders submitted in response to the invitation to tender, it is appropriate not to grant any refund for the tendering period ending on 12 June 2007. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

Pursuant to Article 5 of Commission Regulation (EC) No 580/2004 of 26 March 2004 establishing a tender procedure concerning export refunds for certain milk products (3) and following an examination of the tenders submitted in response to the invitation to tender, it is appropriate not to grant any refund for the tendering period ending on 12 June 2007.

| (3) | The Management Committee for Milk and Milk Products has not delivered an opinion within the time limit set by its chairman, |
| --- | --- |

(3)

The Management Committee for Milk and Milk Products has not delivered an opinion within the time limit set by its chairman,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

For the permanent tender opened by Regulation (EC) No 581/2004, for the tendering period ending on 12 June 2007 no export refund shall be granted for the products and destinations referred to in Article 1(1) of that Regulation.

Article 2

This Regulation shall enter into force on 15 June 2007.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 14 June 2007.

For the Commission

Jean-Luc DEMARTY

Director-General for Agriculture and Rural Development

---

(1)  
  OJ L 160, 26.6.1999, p. 48. Regulation as last amended by Commission Regulation (EC) No 1913/2005 (OJ L 307, 25.11.2005, p. 2).

1

(2)  
  OJ L 90, 27.3.2004, p. 64. Regulation as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 276/2007 (OJ L 76, 16.3.2007, p. 16).

2

(3)  
  OJ L 90, 27.3.2004, p. 58. Regulation as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 128/2007 (OJ L 41, 13.2.2007, p. 6).

3

---
#### HODGE v. FIRST ATLANTIC CORP.

No. 85 PC.

Case below: 6 N.C. App. 353.

Petition for writ of *certiorari*to North Carolina Court of Appeals denied 2 December 1969.
NUMBER 13-12-00029-CR

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG

____________________________________________________________

KENNARD SHANTON JOHNSON, Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.

____________________________________________________________

On Appeal from the 377th District Court

of Victoria County, Texas.

____________________________________________________________

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Garza and Vela

Memorandum Opinion Per Curiam

Appellant, Kennard Shanton Johnson, by and through his attorney, has filed a 

motion to dismiss his appeal because he no longer desires to prosecute it. See TEX. R.

APP. P. 42.2(a). Without passing on the merits of the case, we grant the motion to 

dismiss pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.2(a) and dismiss the appeal. 

Having dismissed the appeal at appellant's request, no motion for rehearing will be 
2

entertained, and our mandate will issue forthwith.

PER CURIAM

Do not publish. 

See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b). 

Delivered and filed the

16th day of February, 2012.
#### RICHARD T. SMITH, RESPONDENT, v. EDWARD A. RYAN, APPELLANT.

Submitted October 16, 1931

Decided February 19, 1932.

Before Gummere, Chief Justice, and Justices Parker and Case.

Por the plaintiff-respondent, *Quinn, Parsons & Doremus.*

Por the defendant-appellant, *Autenreith, Gannon & Wortendyke.*

Per Curiam.

Plaintiff sued in a negligence action far alleged damage to his motor boat and personal property thereon resulting from a collision with another motor boat owned and operated by the defendant. The jury awarded a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for $1,200, and from the judgment entered thereon the defendant appeals. The defendant argues two points in his brief, and we assume that such grounds as are not included within the argued points are waived.

None of the grounds included within the argument are stated with such particularity as entitle them, under our cases, to be considered. *State*v. *Blaine,*104 *N. J. L.*325; *297*Hintz*v. *Roberts,*98 *Id.*768. Nevertheless we have considered the points advanced and find no error therein.

The first point is that the trial court committed harmful error in admitting over objection a witness’ estimate of the probable cost of repairing the plaintiff’s boat. The only objection stated at the trial was that the measure of damage was the difference between the value before and after the collision and that an estimate was not evidential thereon. The witness was the proprietor of the Eed Bank Yacht Works and a part of his business was the building and repairing of boats. His testimony disclosed that he had knowledge of the condition of the boat at and prior to the collision. He further testified to the details of the damage, for the repair of which his estimate was made. Undoubtedly the measure of damages was the difference between the value of the boat before and after the injury; but it has been held more than once that the cost of repairs is at least evidential on that point and consequently evidence of cost of repairs is legitimate. *Hintz*v. *Roberts, supra; Maurer*v. *Simon,*4 *N. J. Mis. R.*409; *Judge*v. *Starr,*5 *Id.*283.

The second point is that the trial court committed harmful error in permitting, over objection, plaintiff to read to the jury a list of certain articles of personal property, lost or damaged because of the collision, with the prices that he had paid for each of them. The objection at the trial was to the propounding of the question, and the ground stated was that the price paid for an article was not evidential as to the value of the article at the time of the accident. Witness was asked the further question: “Will you kindly refer to your list again and tell us approximately when you purchased each of those articles and for how long you used each and for what kind of use you employed them from the time of their purchase until the accident?” The witness gave the information thus requested. We consider that the question objected to, fortified by the testimony last recounted, was, as against the objection stated, admissible under the rule stated in *Teets*v. *Hahn,*104 *N. J. L.*357.

Judgment below will be affirmed.
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr., Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Stephen J. Markman

Mary Beth Kelly

Brian K. Zahra

Bridget M. McCormack

David F. Viviano, Justices

I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

 March 28, 2014

h0324

Order 

Clerk

March 28, 2014

148289

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 148289

COA: 310295

Wayne CC: 11-008407-FC

MILTON ELLIOTT LEWIS, III,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________________________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the October 24, 2013 

judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not 

persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MARTIN PEARSON,

Plaintiff

- Appellant,

v. NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE, LLC; et al.,

Defendants

- Appellees. No. 16

- 56837
D.C. No. 5:16

- cv - 01079

- CAS

- AJW

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Christina A. Snyder, District Judge, Presiding Submitted October 23, 2017 **
Before: McKEOWN, WATFORD, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.
Martin Pearson appeals pro se from the district court’s order dismissing his
action alleging federal and state law claims related to the foreclosure of his
property . We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal on the basis of res judicat a
. Manufactured Home Cmtys. Inc. v. City of

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
exc ept as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

NOV 9 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLER K U.S. COURT OF APPEAL S2 16

- 56837

San Jose , 420 F.3d 1022, 1025 (9th Cir. 2005)

. We affirm. The district court properly dismissed P e a r son’ s action as barred by the doctrine of res judicata because his claims were raised, or could have been rais ed,
in a prior state court action that resulted in a final judgment

. See Adam Bros. Farming, Inc. v. County of Santa Barbara , 604 F.3d 1142, 1148

- 49 (9th Cir. 2010) (setting forth elements of res judicata under California law ); see also Brodheim v. Cry , 584 F.3d 1262, 1268 (9th Cir. 2009) (“If two actions involve the same injury to the plaintiff and the same wrong by the defendant, then the same primary right is at stake even if in the second suit the plaintiff pleads different theories of recovery, seeks different forms of relief and/or adds new facts supporting recovery.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)) ; City of Martinez v. Texaco Trading & Transp. Inc. , 353 F.3d 758, 764 (9th Cir. 2003) (privity applies u nder California law “if a party ’ s interests are so similar to another party’ s interests that the latter was the former’ s virtual represen tative in the earlier
action.” (citation and in ternal quotation marks omitted ) )

. The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Pearson’s action
without leave to amend because amendment would have been futile. See Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. , 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth standard of r eview and explaining that a district court can dismiss
without lea ve to amend where amendment would be futile ).3 16

- 56837

The district court did not a buse its discretion in denying Pearson’ s motion for default judgment. See Eitel v. McCool , 782 F.2d 1470, 1471

- 72 (9th Cir. 1986) ( setting forth standard of review and factors for entry of default judgment , and noting the strong policy in favor of deciding cases on their merits); Aldabe v.
Aldabe , 616 F.2d 1089, 1092

- 93 (9th Cir. 1980) (affirming denial of default ju dgment based on “the lack of merit in” plaintiff ’ s underlying claims).
AFFIRMED.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM (IDENTIFY 
SPECIFIC FINANCIAL STATEMENTS) AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO 
SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             APR-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1998
<CASH>                                           1,352
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    2,036
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                      3,148
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                 7,074
<PP&E>                                           2,580
<DEPRECIATION>                                   2,303
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                   7,403
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            1,291
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                         1,928
<OTHER-SE>                                       3,669
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                     7,403
<SALES>                                          2,423
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 2,441
<CGS>                                            1,660
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    1,977
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                  21
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                    464
<INCOME-TAX>                                       173
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                291
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                       291
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .15
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .15
        

</TABLE>
<Page>

             ALLMERICA FINANCIAL LIFE INSURANCE AND ANNUITY COMPANY

                             ENHANCED EARNINGS RIDER

APPLICABILITY: This Rider is made a part of the contract to which it is attached
and is effective on the contract issue date.

Except as otherwise provided under this Rider, prior to the Annuity Date, when a
death benefit(1) is payable, a benefit will be payable under this Rider.

BENEFIT: The Enhanced Earnings Rider ("EER" or "Rider") benefit is equal to the
lesser of:

1.   [80%] of gross payments not previously withdrawn. For purposes of this
     calculation only, except for the Initial Payment, gross payments shall not
     include payments made under the contract during the 12-month period
     immediately prior to the date of death. OR

2.   [40%] of the difference between the Accumulated Value and gross payments
     not previously withdrawn. Accumulated Value is determined on the date on
     which both the death certificate and all necessary claim paperwork have
     been received at the Principal Office.

For purposes of this Rider withdrawals will be considered withdrawn from
earnings first and then withdrawn from gross payments on a last-in, first-out
basis.

PAYMENT OF BENEFIT: The EER benefit will be paid in the same manner and at the
same time that the death benefit (prior to the Annuity Date) is paid under the
contract to which this Rider is attached. If the death benefit (prior to the
Annuity Date) is deferred under provision (a) or (b) of the Payment of the Death
Benefit before the Annuity Date(2) section of the contract, or if the sole
beneficiary continues the contract, the EER benefit will be added to the [Money
Market Sub-Account], and the Rider will terminate (see Termination provision,
below).

CHARGE: [The Company will assess a monthly rider charge which will be deducted
Pro Rata on the last day of each contract month. The monthly rider charge will
be equal to the Accumulated Value on that date multiplied by 1/12th of [.20%].]

TERMINATION:  This Rider will terminate on the earliest of the following:

1.  the Annuity Date;
2.  the date the Company determines a death benefit is payable;
3.  surrender of the contract; or
4.  if the sole beneficiary, who is the deceased Owner's spouse, continues the
    contract.


                    Signed for the Company at Dover, Delaware


           /s/ Mark A. Hug                                /s/ Charles F. Cronin

           President                                      Secretary




----------------------
(1)  For Contract Forms No.: A3025-96 and A3026-96, a benefit will be payable
     under this Rider only when a death benefit is payable due to the death of
     the Annuitant.
(2)  "Payment of Death Benefit before the Annuity Date" as used in this Rider,
     includes "Payment of the Death Benefit" as used in some contracts to which
     the Rider is attached.
Advisory Board on Toxic Substances and Worker Health

July 19, 2017

Mr. R. Alexander Acosta
Secretary of Labor
Department of Labor

200 Constitution Ave.
Washington, DC NW 20210

Honorable Secretary Acosta:

On behalf of the Department of Labor Advisory Board on Toxic Substances and Worker
Health, ] submit the attached recommendations, accompanying rationales, and responses to
questions posed to us by the Department that we adopted at our June 19, 2017 Board meeting.
These recommendations fall within the scope of the chartered mission of the Advisory Board and
represent our ongoing attempts to address multiple aspects of the current Energy Employees
Occupational IlIness Compensation Program.

We are pleased by the support and cooperation of Mr. Steinberg, Ms. Leiton and the rest of
the leadership and staff of the Office of Workers Compensation Program and the Division of
Energy Employees Occupational IlIness Compensation.

We are making excellent progress, I believe, and realize that there is much work still to do
to assist the Department in assessing and, when needed, recommending improvement in this
invaluable program. We hope that our advice is useful and look forward to working with you in
the future.

Sincerely,

ha
Y Steven Markowitz MD, DrPH
Chair
Advisory Board on Toxic Substances
and Worker Health
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit 

## FILED January 9, 2007 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 06-40060 Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus GUADALUPE GUERRA-MESTA, Defendant-Appellant.

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas

(5:04-CR-407-ALL)

-------------------- Before SMITH, WIENER, and OWEN, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Defendant-Appellant Guadalupe Guerra-Mesta appeals his 36- month sentence for knowingly transporting an alien within the United States by means of a motor vehicle, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324. He argues that the district court erred in imposing an enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. for obstruction of justice and in denying him an adjustment pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 for acceptance of responsibility. A district court’s finding that a defendant obstructed justice is reviewed for clear error. United States v. Gonzalez , 436 F.3d2

560, 586 (5th Cir.) , cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2363 (2006). In imposing the enhancement, the district court relied in part on the fact that Guerra-Mesta did not appear at his first sentencing hearing. Guerra-Mesta argues that he did not have notice of the sentencing hearing at which he failed to appear and that his conduct was therefore not willful. Assuming arguendo that this assertion is correct, the district court did not commit clear error in finding that Guerra-Mesta obstructed justice, as he also failed to contact his probation officer for six months, and his probation officer was unable to locate him during that period. See United States v. Infante , 404 F.3d 376, 393-94 (5th Cir. 2005); see also United States v. Phillips , 210 F.3d 345, 348 (5th Cir. 2000) (identifying obstructive conduct as that which creates an inherently high risk that justice will be obstructed and is the result of more than a spur-of-the-moment decision). Guerra-Mesta also argues that the district court erred in denying him a reduction for acceptance of responsibility. A district court’s denial of a reduction for acceptance of responsibility is reviewed under a standard even more deferential than the clearly erroneous standard. United States v. Ragsdale , 426 F.3d 765, 781 (5th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1405 (2006). Only in extraordinary cases do adjustments under both § 3C1.1 and § 3E1.1 apply. § 3E1.1 comment.(n.4). Guerra-Mesta points to no extraordinary circumstances in his case which support his argument that he should have received an acceptance of3

responsibility adjustment despite the imposition of the § 3C1.1 enhancement. As the district court did not err in imposing either enhancement, we do not reach Guerra-Mesta’s argument regarding the district court’s imposition of an alternative non-guideline 36- month sentence. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.