UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

LOUIS DEAN COOPER,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

No. 95-2804

SHIRLEY S. CHATER, COMMISSIONER OF

SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of South Carolina, at Greenville.

G. Ross Anderson, Jr., District Judge.

(CA-94-83-6-3AK)

Argued: January 27, 1997

Decided: February 19, 1997

Before RUSSELL and WILKINS, Circuit Judges, and OSTEEN,

United States District Judge for the Middle District of

North Carolina, sitting by designation.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Paul Townsend McChesney, FRALEY, MCCHESNEY

& MCCHESNEY, Spartanburg, South Carolina, for Appellant. Ronald Lamar Paxton, Assistant Regional Counsel, Office of General

Counsel, Region IV, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,

Atlanta, Georgia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Frank W. Hunger, Assistant Attorney General, Margaret B. Seymour, Interim United States
Attorney, Mary Ann Sloan, Acting Chief Counsel, Region IV, Mack

A. Davis, Acting Deputy Chief Counsel, Haila Naomi Kleinman,

Supervisory Assistant Regional Counsel, Office of General Counsel,

Region IV, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, Atlanta,

Georgia, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Louis Dean Cooper filed a claim with the Social Security Administration in March 1990 for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits,1 alleging disability commencing May 1, 1982, as a

result of back pain. After denial of his claim initially and on reconsideration, Cooper requested a hearing before an Administrative Law

Judge ("ALJ"). After considering his claim de novo, the ALJ concluded that Cooper was not entitled to disability insurance benefits

because he could perform his past relevant work, and because he was

not under a disability as defined by the Social Security Act (the "Act")2

at any time through September 30, 1985 -- the date he last qualified

to receive special disability earnings under the Act. The ALJ's findings became the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security

(the "Commissioner") after being approved by the Appeals Council in

December 1993.

Cooper then filed a complaint in the district court challenging the

Commissioner's final decision was unsupported by substantial evidence. The magistrate judge recommended affirming the Commissioner's denial of benefits. After conducting a de novo review of the

record, the district court adopted the magistrate judge's recommendation and affirmed the Commissioner's decision. This appeal followed.

_________________________________________________________________

1 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i)(1), 423.

2 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).

 2
We review the Commissioner's final decision to determine whether

it is supported by substantial evidence and whether the correct law

was applied.3 Section 405(g) precludes our reviewing the evidence de

novo and requires that we uphold the commissioner's finding of no

disability, even if we disagree, as long as it is supported by substantial

evidence.4 The ALJ reviewing the case bears the responsibility of

making findings of fact and resolving evidentiary conflicts.5

Cooper contends that substantial evidence does not support the

ALJ's findings because the ALJ failed to accord proper weight to the

opinion of Cooper's treating physician, who concluded that Cooper

was disabled prior to or on September 30, 1985. Cooper argues that

his treating physician's records, made when he sought treatment combined with his treating physician's retrospective opinion regarding the

extent of his disability during the relevant time period, demonstrates

that Cooper suffered from disabling back pain prior to or on September 30, 1985.

The ALJ must give a treating physician's opinion great weight

unless persuasive contradictory evidence exists. 6 When contradictory

evidence exists, then the ALJ may disregard the opinion. Similarly,

the ALJ may only reject a treating physician's opinion concerning the

extent of past impairment in the presence of persuasive contradictory

evidence.7

After thoroughly evaluating the evidence before him, the ALJ

found the treating physician's contemporaneous records documenting

Cooper's condition at the time of treatment failed to corroborate the

physician's 1993 retrospective opinions that Cooper's debilitating

back pain: (1) began in 1982; (2) caused Cooper to regularly miss

work; and (3) prevented him from engaging in a full eight hour day

prior to September 30, 1985. The treating physician, an internist, indicated that Cooper's disability existed as early as February 1982. Coo-

_________________________________________________________________

3 42 U.S.C.A. § 405(g) (West Supp. 1996).

4 Id; Smith v. Schweiker , 795 F.2d 343, 345 (4th Cir. 1986).

5 Criag v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996).

6 Id.

7 Wilkins v. Secretary, DHHS, 953 F.2d 93, 96 (4th Cir. 1991).

 3
per however, remained at his job until May 1982, which he left

because of being laid-off and not because of his alleged disability. In

February 1982 the physician examined Cooper twice for intermittent

chest pain, which diminished by his third visit in March. Next, in

December 1982, Cooper twice sought treatment for substernal chest

and back pain on his left side. Although, Cooper complained of back

pain during his first visit, when he returned three days later he only

continued to experience chest pain. Other than consulting his doctor

for a dog bite in 1984, Cooper did not seek treatment for severe back

pain until March 1986, after he injured his back attempting to lift a

television set. This onset of back pain occurred three and one half

years after Cooper last sought treatment for chest pains.

Contrary to his treating physician's retrospective opinions regarding Cooper's condition, the physician's active contemporaneous treatment records lack any clinical findings or diagnosis documenting that

Cooper suffered from a disability. Additionally, there is no evidence

that Cooper's physical activity was restricted prior to September 30,

1985. Although Cooper did complain of pain from 1982-85, mild pain

killers alleviated his discomfort. There exist no objective clinical findings that Cooper's subjective complaints of pain prevented him from

performing his past relevant work, which was non-exertional.8

In light of this persuasive contradictory evidence the ALJ properly

discredited the treating physician's opinion pursuant to the requisite

Social Security regulations and case law. We conclude therefore, that

the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence and

was based on the correct legal standards. Accordingly we will not disturb the ALJ's findings.

Having carefully reviewed the record, briefs, and contentions of the

parties at oral argument, we find no error in the district court's order

adopting the magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation. We

therefore affirm the decision of the district court on the opinion of that

court.

AFFIRMED

_________________________________________________________________

8 For fifteen years prior to the expiration of his insured status Cooper

was employed as a shift supervisor and shift superintendent at a corrugated cardboard box manufacturing plant.

 4