UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

VOTE FORWARD; AMY BOLAN; AARON 

CARREL; DANTE FLORES-DEMARCHI; 

PAUL HUNTER; SEBASTIAN IMMONEN; 

KATHRYN MONTGOMERY; SEAN 

MORRISON; INDERBIR SINGH DATTA; 

MARTHA THOMPSON; LINDA 

ROBERSON; GARY YOUNG; VOCES 

UNIDAS DE LAS MONTAÑAS; 

COLORADO ORGANIZATION FOR 

LATINA OPPORTUNITY AND 

REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS; PADRES & 

JÓVENES UNIDOS; 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

LOUIS DEJOY, in his official 

capacity as the Postmaster 

General; and the UNITED STATES 

POSTAL SERVICE, 

Defendants. 

Civ. Action No. 20-2405 (EGS) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

 Plaintiffs—eleven voter-eligible individuals and four 

organizations dedicated to seeking greater civic engagement in 

the November 2020 election—bring this lawsuit against Defendants 

Louis DeJoy (“Mr. DeJoy”), in his official capacity as 

Postmaster General of the United States, and the United States 

Postal Service (“USPS), alleging that a new USPS policy 

implemented in July 2020 violates Plaintiffs’ constitutional 

right to vote and constitutes ultra vires agency action. See
2 

Pls.’ Am. Compl., ECF No. 15.1 Plaintiffs seek a preliminary 

injunction with regard to their constitutional claim. 

 Upon consideration of the Plaintiffs’ motion, the response, 

the reply thereto, the applicable law, and the entire record, 

the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ motion. 

I. Background 

A. Factual Background 

1. The COVID-19 Pandemic 

 Plaintiffs assert that the COVID-19 pandemic has increased 

reliance on mail delivered by the USPS. Pls.’ Mem. Law Supp. 

Mot. Prelim. Inj. (“Pls.’ Mot.”), ECF No. 16-1 at 7. According 

to Plaintiffs, several states have adjusted their election 

procedures to allow for all eligible voters to vote by mail-in 

ballot in the November 2020 election: 43 states and the 

District of Columbia will permit all eligible voters to vote by 

mail, and 28 states will require that the ballots be received, 

rather than postmarked, by Election Day. Id. at 7-8 (citing news 

reports). In total, the adjustments made by many states in 

response to the COVID-19 pandemic will result in approximately 

83% of all eligible voters having the opportunity to vote in 

this method. Id. (citing news reports). It is anticipated that 

1 When citing electronic filings throughout this Opinion, the 

Court cites to the ECF page number, not the page number of the 

filed document. 
3 

at least 80 million mail-in ballots will be submitted for the 

November election. See Hersh Decl., ECF No. 16-15 ¶ 14. 

2. USPS Policy Changes 

 On July 10, 2020, USPS announced an “operational pivot” to 

make “immediate, lasting, and impactful changes in our 

operations and culture.” Ex. 4 to Pls.’ Mot., ECF No. 16-6 at 2. 

As most relevant here, the document stated that (1) “[a]ll trips 

will depart on time (Network, Plant and Delivery); late trips 

are no longer authorized or accepted”; (2) “[e]xtra trips are no 

longer authorized or accepted”; (3) “[c]arriers must begin on 

time, leave for the street on time, and return on time”; and (4) 

“no additional transportation will be authorized to dispatch 

mail to the Plant after the intended dispatch” (collectively, 

the “Late/Extra Trips Policy”). Id. The USPS knew that 

prohibiting these trips would result in delayed mail delivery: 

“One aspect of these changes that may be difficult for employees 

is that—temporarily—we may see mail left behind or mail in the 

workroom floor or docks . . . , which is not typical.” Id.

However, the document noted expectations that “operations will 

begin to run more efficiently and that delayed mail volumes will 

soon shrink significantly.” Id. at 3. These changes were also 

confirmed in a USPS PowerPoint presentation, which explained 

that if “the [USPS processing] plants run late they will keep 

the mail for the next day. If [delivery units] get mail late and 
4 

your carriers are gone and you cannot get the mail out without 

[overtime] it will remain for the next day.” Ex. 5, ECF No. 16-7 

at 5-6. Since the USPS policy took effect, USPS has eliminated 

an average of 32,900 extra or late trips per week, Grimmer 

Decl., ECF No. 16-11 ¶¶ 10-11, or a 75% drop in the number of 

both types of trips, Pls.’ Reply, ECF No. 24 at 11. 

 Due to the policy changes expressly prohibiting late trips 

and extra trips, the ability to deliver mail in an efficient 

manner can be inhibited at three different points in the 

delivery chain. First, mail handlers deliver mail from the local 

post office to a USPS processing plant; if the mail arrives at 

the post office after the handler has already left for the 

processing plant, the mail may wait at the post office until the 

next day. Pls.’ Mot., ECF No. 16-1 at 12-13. Second, once the 

mail arrives at the processing plant, if it is not processed 

prior to the mail handler’s scheduled departure time from the 

plant to the relevant delivery unit, it again may remain at the 

plant until the next day. Id. at 13. Third, once the letter has 

made it to the delivery unit, it still must arrive prior to the 

mail carrier’s trip to the final intended destination; if it 

arrives after the mail carrier has left for her delivery route, 

the letter may be delayed one day. Id. at 13. Thus, the USPS 

policy changes may potentially delay certain mail items for up 

to three days more than typical prior to the policy changes. 
5 

 The USPS policy changes stand in contrast with prior 

practices that allowed postal workers to conduct late trips or 

extra trips “to delay or supplement their scheduled deliveries 

to ensure that they have collected and transported all 

outstanding mail at any given facility.” Pls.’ Mot., ECF No. 16-

1 at 10 (citing Ex. 3 to Pls.’ Mot., ECF No. 16-5). 

Defendants have clarified that late or extra trips are not 

“banned”; however, they acknowledge that they continue “at a 

reduced level.” Suppl. Cintron Decl., ECF No. 21-3 ¶ 4. On 

September 21, 2020, USPS also issued “Operational Instructions” 

providing that “transportation, in the form of late or extra 

trips that are reasonably necessary to complete timely mail 

delivery, is not to be unreasonably restricted or prohibited. 

Managers are authorized to use their best business judgment to 

meet our service commitments.” See Ex. 1 to Notice Suppl. 

Material, ECF No. 30-1 at 4. 

3. USPS Postal Policy Changes Have Led To Nationwide 

Delays And Continue To Have A Nationwide Impact 

USPS records indicate that nationally, on-time delivery of 

First-Class Mail began to decline following implementation of 

the USPS policy changes. On-time services scores are the 

“measure of the frequency with which USPS is able to deliver 

mail in the timeframe defined by its service standards.” Pls.’ 

Reply, ECF No. 24 at 11; see also Suppl. Grimmer Decl., ECF No. 
6 

24-2 ¶¶ 5, 7. During the pre-policy period, from January 4, 2020 

to July 4, 2020, the average USPS service score was 91.6% 

nationally; however, the August 29, 2020 service score was 3.56 

percentage points lower than the pre-policy average. Suppl. 

Grimmer Decl., ECF No. 24-2 ¶ 5; see also id. (noting that the 

August 29 service score was 2.96 percentage points lower than 

the three-week period prior to the USPS policy implementation). 

The overall decline in service scores is consistent across all 

but one region in the United States, though the service scores 

vary. For example, while the USPS “Capital Metro” area has a 

service score that has declined 6.3 percentage points since 

implementation of the USPS policy, the service score in the 

“Southern” area has declined by only approximately two 

percentage points. See id. ¶ 7. Moreover, services scores in 91% 

of USPS districts around the United States are lower as compared 

to the pre-policy average from January 4, 2020 to July 4, 2020. 

Id. ¶¶ 8-9. 

 Defendant Mr. DeJoy has recognized that USPS made only “one 

change” in early July 2020, and that change regarded his request 

that “the team . . . run the transportation on time and mitigate 

extra trips.” Ex. 6 to Pls.’ Mot., ECF No. 16-8 at 4. In the 

August 13, 2020 letter to all USPS employees, Mr. DeJoy also 

acknowledged delivery delays were “unintended consequences” of 

the USPS policy changes. See Pls.’ Mot., ECF No. 16-1 at 16 
7 

(citing USPS, Path Forward: PMG Addresses Restructuring (Aug. 

13, 2020), https://rb.gy/y6tbre). Furthermore, in testimony 

before the House Committee on Oversight and Reform on August 24, 

2020, Mr. DeJoy again recognized that the USPS policy changes 

were causing delivery delays and that it “expose[d] a need to 

realign some of [USPS’s] processing and scheduling that caused 

mail to miss the scheduled transportation.” See Ex. 8 to Pls.’ 

Mot., ECF No. 16-10 at 10. Mr. DeJoy stated that because 

“production schedules within the plants were not aligned with 

the transportation schedules going out,” “about 10% of the mail 

was not aligned.” See Ex. 6 to Pls.’ Mot., ECF No. 16-8 at 7. 

B. Procedural History 

Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit on August 28, 2020. See 

Compl., ECF No. 1. On September 8, 2020, Plaintiffs filed an 

amended complaint against Defendants, see Am. Compl., ECF No. 

15, and subsequently filed a motion for preliminary injunction 

requesting that the Court enjoin Defendants and their agents 

from implementing the USPS policy changes, see Pls.’ Mot. 

Prelim. Inj., ECF No. 16. Defendants filed their opposition on 

September 15, 2020. See Defs.’ Resp. Pls.’ Mot. Prelim. Inj. 

(“Defs.’ Opp’n”), ECF No. 21. Plaintiffs filed their reply brief 

on September 20, 2020. See Pls.’ Reply Supp. Mot. Prelim. Inj. 

(“Pls.’ Reply”), ECF No. 24. The motion is ripe for the Court’s 

consideration. 
8 

II. Legal Standard 

“A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must 

establish [1] that he is likely to succeed on the merits, [2] 

that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of 

preliminary relief, [3] that the balance of equities tips in his 

favor, and [4] that an injunction is in the public interest.’” 

Aamer v. Obama, 742 F.3d 1023, 1038 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (alteration 

in original) (quoting Sherley v. Sebelius, 644 F.3d 388, 392 

(D.C. Cir. 2011)). Where the federal government is the opposing 

party, the balance of equities and public interest factors 

merge. See Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009). A 

preliminary injunction is an “extraordinary remedy that may only 

be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled 

to such relief.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 

U.S. 7, 22 (2008) (citation omitted). “The purpose of a 

preliminary injunction is merely to preserve the relative 

positions of the parties until a trial on the merits can be 

held.” Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981). In 

this Circuit, the four factors have typically been evaluated on 

a “sliding scale,” such that if “the movant makes an unusually 

strong showing on one of the factors, then it does not 

necessarily have to make as strong a showing on another factor.” 

Davis v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 571 F.3d 1288, 1291–92 

(D.C. Cir. 2009). 
9 

In the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in Winter v. 

Natural Resources Defense Council, 555 U.S. 7 (2008), “the D.C. 

Circuit has suggested that a positive showing on all four 

preliminary injunction factors may be required.” Holmes v. FEC, 

71 F. Supp. 3d 178, 183 n.4 (D.D.C. 2014); see also Sherley, 644 

F.3d at 393 (“[W]e read Winter at least to suggest if not to 

hold that a likelihood of success is an independent, freestanding requirement for a preliminary injunction.” (citation 

and quotation marks omitted)). Nonetheless, “the Circuit has had 

no occasion to decide this question because it has not yet 

encountered a post-Winter case where a preliminary injunction 

motion survived the less rigorous sliding-scale analysis.” 

ConverDyn v. Moniz, 68 F. Supp. 3d 34, 46 n.2 (D.D.C. 2014). 

III. Analysis 

A. Plaintiffs Are Likely To Succeed On The Merits Of 

Their Constitutional Claim 

1. Plaintiffs Likely Have Standing To Bring This 

Challenge 

As a threshold matter, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs 

cannot establish that they are likely to succeed on the merits 

because Plaintiffs lack standing in this case. Defs.’ Mot., ECF 

No. 21 at 31. 

To establish standing, “a plaintiff must show (1) an 

‘injury in fact,’ (2) a sufficient ‘causal connection between 

the injury and the conduct complained of,’ and (3) a 
10 

‘likel[ihood]’ that the injury ‘will be redressed by a favorable 

decision.’” Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 

2341 (2014) (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 

560-61 (1992)). “These requirements apply whether an 

organization asserts standing to sue, either on its own behalf, 

or on behalf of its members.” Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. 

United States, 101 F.3d 1423, 1427 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (citing 

Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 378 (1982)). 

“Standing to seek . . . forward-looking injunctive relief 

requires [Plaintiff] to show that it is suffering an ongoing 

injury or faces an immediate threat of injury. For a future 

injury, that means submitting evidence showing that there is a 

substantial risk that the harm will recur.” Narragansett Indian 

Tribal Historic Pres. Office v. FERC, 949 F.3d 8, 13 (D.C. Cir. 

2020) (internal quotation marks, citations, and alterations in 

original omitted). However, only one plaintiff needs standing in 

order for a claim to go forward. See Carpenters Indus. Council 

v. Zinke, 854 F.3d 1, 9 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (citing Mountain States 

Legal Found. v. Glickman, 92 F.3d 1228, 1232 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). 

Defendants argue that neither the “Organization 

Plaintiffs”—Vote Forward, Voces Unidas de las Montañas, COLOR, 

and Padres & Jóvenes Unidos—nor the individual Plaintiffs can 

establish that they have suffered an injury-in-fact. Defs.’ 

Mot., ECF No. 21 at 31. Defendants do not allege that Plaintiffs 
11 

have not established causation or redressability for the 

purposes of standing. 

First, regarding organizational standing, the D.C. Circuit 

recently articulated the test for determining whether an 

organization satisfies the “irreparable harm” prong: 

An organization is harmed if the “actions 

taken by [the defendant] have ‘perceptibly 

impaired’ the [organization’s] programs.” 

Fair Emp’t Council of Greater Wash., Inc. v. 

BMC Mktg. Corp., 28 F.3d 1268, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 

1994) (quoting Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 

455 U.S. 363, 379, 102 S. Ct. 1114, 71 L.Ed.2d 

214 (1982)); see also Nat’l Treasury Emps. 

Union v. United States, 101 F.3d 1423, 1430 

(D.C. Cir. 1996) (explaining that the initial 

question is whether “a defendant’s conduct has 

made the organization’s activities more 

difficult”). If so, the organization must then 

also show that the defendant’s actions 

“directly conflict with the organization’s 

mission.” Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 101 F.3d 

at 1430. The second step is required to ensure 

that organizations cannot engage in activities 

simply to create an injury. Id. 

League of Women Voters v. Newby, 838 F.3d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 

Citing Plaintiff Vote Forward as an example, Plaintiffs 

argue that Defendants’ policy changes have impaired Vote 

Forward’s programs by causing it to “redirect [its] limited 

resources, which includes both [its] labor and [its] funds, to 

address challenges caused by Defendants’ Policy that were 

unforeseen.” Pls.’ Mot., ECF No. 16-1 at 41. According to 

Plaintiffs, as part of Vote Forward’s mission to “empower 

grassroots volunteers to help register voters from traditionally 
12 

underrepresented communities and encourage them to vote,” see 

Forman Decl., ECF No. 16-24 ¶ 2, Vote Forward “has built an 

online platform through which volunteers throughout the country 

are connected with and encouraged to mail hand-written letters 

to fellow citizens imploring them to vote,” Pls.’ Reply, ECF No. 

24 at 26 (citing Forman Decl., ECF No. 16-24 ¶¶ 4-5). While Vote 

Forward had previously planned to mail the get-out-the-vote 

letters on October 27, in line with its “data” suggesting that 

letters mailed closer to Election Day are more successful, Vote 

Forward has had to move up its mailing date as a direct result 

of the USPS policy changes, threatening to “diminish the success 

of the campaign.” Pls.’ Reply, ECF No. 24 at 26 (citing Forman 

Decl., ECF No. 16-24 ¶¶ 6, 8). As a result, Plaintiffs allege 

that Vote Forward has had to divert resources “to respond to an 

influx of inquiries [from] volunteers regarding USPS’s mailing 

delays and to assess whether sending out [get-out-the-vote] 

letters earlier than planned would negatively impact the 

effectiveness of Vote Forward’s letter-writing campaign.” Pls.’ 

Mot., ECF No. 16-1 at 42. In addition, Vote Forward has had to 

“expend[] multiple weeks of effort” to launch two new programs 

as a result of the USPS policy changes: one that “aims to 

quantify the mailing delays associated with Defendant’s 

policies,” and another that “seeks to ascertain the differential 

impact on voter turnout if [get-out-the-vote] letters are sent 
13 

one week versus three weeks prior to an election,” “at a total 

cost of approximately $50,000.” Id.; Forman Decl., ECF No. 16-24 

¶¶ 9-11. Thus, Defendants’ actions have “made the organization’s 

activities more difficult,” Newby, 838 F.3d at 8 (quoting Nat’l 

Treasury Emps. Union, 101 F.3d at 1430), as a result of the 

“direct conflict between the defendant’s conduct and the 

organization’s mission,” Abigail All. v. Eschenbach, 469 F.3d 

129, 133 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). 

Contrary to Defendants’ assertion, Plaintiffs’ decision to 

“use[] its resources to counteract” such injury is not selfinflicted solely because it is voluntary. Food & Water Watch, 

Inc. v. Vilsack, 808 F.3d 905, 919 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting 

PETA v. USDA, 797 F.3d 1087, 1093 (D.C. Cir. 2015)); see also 

Equal Rights Ctr. v. Post Props., 633 F.3d 1136, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 

2011) (explaining that an injury is not a “self-inflicted . . . 

budgetary choice[]” merely by having been made willfully or 

voluntarily (quoting Fair Emp’t Council of Greater Wash., Inc., 

28 F.3d at 1276). Rather, as long as the organization expends 

resources “to counteract the effects of the defendant[’s]” 

challenged conduct, that diversion can suffice for Article III 

purposes. Id. at 1140. As stated above, Plaintiff Vote Forward 

has demonstrated that its expenditures—“such as the time and 

monetary expenses associated with Vote Forward’s new programs to 

test the time it will take to deliver letters and to gauge the 
14 

effectiveness of a get-out-the-vote campaign weeks, rather than 

mere days, before Election Day”—were undertaken to directly 

counteract the harms caused by Defendants’ actions. Pls.’ Reply, 

ECF No. 24 at 28. In addition, although Defendants argue that 

Plaintiffs such as Vote Forward could not suffer an injury 

because they “educate and assist potential voters as part of 

their standard activities,” Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 21 at 32, the 

fact that Defendants’ actions undermined Vote Forward’s ability 

to conduct its usual activities is sufficient to constitute a 

“drain on the organization’s resources,” not “simply a setback 

to the organization’s abstract social interests.” Nat’l Ass’n of 

Home Builders v. EPA, 667 F.3d 6, 11 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting 

Nat’l Taxpayers Union, Inc. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1428, 1433 

(D.C. Cir. 1995)); see also Havens, 455 U.S. at 379 (finding 

sufficient for organizational standing purposes that plaintiff 

alleged it had “been frustrated by defendants’ racial steering 

practices in its efforts to assist equal access to housing 

through counseling and other referral services” and “had to 

devote significant resources to identify and counteract the 

defendant’s [sic] racially discriminatory steering practices” 

(alteration in original)). 

The Court also concludes that Plaintiffs have shown 

traceability and redressability. Regarding traceability, 

Plaintiffs have demonstrated that the implementation of the USPS 
15 

policy changes in July coincided with a significant decline in 

USPS on-time service scores, and Defendants have acknowledged 

that the only change USPS made in early July was in regard to 

the policy regarding transportation and extra trips. Pls.’ 

Reply, ECF No. 24 at 12 (citing Ex. 6, ECF No. 16-8). 

Defendants, however, argue that Plaintiffs cannot establish that 

their injuries are solely the result of the USPS policy changes 

because of the “simultaneous impact” of the COVID-19 pandemic. 

Defs.’ Mot., ECF No. 21 at 43-44. Defendants suggest instead 

that staffing shortages due to the pandemic caused the decline 

in USPS on-time service scores. Id. The Court is not persuaded. 

As Plaintiffs point out, USPS data “show no relationship between 

declines in on-time service scores and the time periods in which 

USPS allegedly experienced staffing shortages.” Pls.’ Reply, ECF 

No. 24 at 13. In fact, in comparison with prior months, the 

average service scores actually increased in March at the moment 

when Defendants allege staffing shortages were worsening. Id. 

(citing Grimmer Decl., ECF No. 24-2 ¶ 13; Prokity Decl., ECF No. 

21-2 ¶ 5). Furthermore, “declines in service scores continued 

after the claimed staffing problems had abated.” Id. (citing 

Prokity Decl., ECF No. 21-2 ¶ 10). Based on the data figures, 

the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ claimed injuries are likely the 

result of the USPS policy changes and may be remedied by 

declaratory or injunctive relief.
16 

Accordingly, Plaintiff Vote Forward has established a 

substantial likelihood of standing. Because the Court is 

satisfied that Vote Forward has standing, the Court need not 

address whether the other Plaintiffs also have standing in order 

to proceed. 

2. The Applicable Legal Standard 

 Prior to considering the merits, the parties disagree as to 

which legal standard should govern Plaintiffs’ claim that the 

USPS policy changes impose an unconstitutional burden on the 

right to vote under the First and Fifth Amendments. Plaintiffs 

argue that the Court should apply the Anderson-Burdick

framework, derived from Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 

(1983) and Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992), in this 

matter. Pls.’ Mot., ECF No. 16-1 at 26. Under Anderson, Burdick, 

and their progeny, the United States Supreme Court has 

recognized that “‘[e]lection laws will invariably impose some 

burden upon individual voters,’ and that not all laws burdening 

the right to vote are subject to strict scrutiny.” Libertarian 

Party v. D.C. Bd. of Elections & Ethics, 682 F.3d 72, 73-74 

(D.C. Cir. 2012) (alteration in original) (quoting Burdick, 504 

U.S. at 433-34). Instead, courts “must first consider the 

character and magnitude of the asserted injury” to the 

plaintiffs’ right to vote against “the precise interests put 

forward by the [government] as justifications for the burden 
17 

imposed[,]” including “the legitimacy and strength of each of 

those interests” and “the extent to which those interests make 

it necessary to burden the plaintiff’s rights.” Anderson, 460 

U.S. at 789. The level of scrutiny a court should apply depends 

on the burden. When a voter’s rights are “subjected to severe 

restrictions, the regulation must be narrowly drawn to advance a 

state interest of compelling importance.” Burdick, 504 U.S. at 

434 (internal quotation marks omitted). But when a voter’s 

rights are subjected only to “reasonable, nondiscriminatory 

restrictions,” “the State’s important regulatory interests are 

generally sufficient to justify the restrictions.” Id. (internal 

quotation marks omitted). If the restriction falls somewhere 

between those two poles, then the court uses a flexible 

analysis, “where the more severe the burden, the more compelling 

the [government’s] interest must be.” Soltysik v. Padilla, 910 

F.3d 438, 444 (9th Cir. 2018). 

 Defendants, for their part, argue that the Anderson-Burdick

framework does not apply here because that standard only 

concerns the constitutionality of state election laws—not “a 

non-election law that may have an attenuated, indirect effect on 

the electoral process” or the “everyday actions” of federal 

agencies. Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 21 at 36-37. In Defendants’ 

view, “[a]pplying the Anderson-Burdick balancing test to any 

policy that has some impact on the electoral process would 
18 

produce odd results,” including “that any deficiency in USPS 

service could give rise to a constitutional voting rights 

claim.” Id. at 37. Defendants argue that because the AndersonBurdick framework does not apply, Plaintiffs’ claim must fail 

because Plaintiffs have not alleged stand-alone claims under 

either the First or Fifth Amendments, which encompass distinct 

requirements as compared to a claim alleged under AndersonBurdick. Id. at 38. 

 Defendants further argue that even if the Court considers 

the USPS policy to constitute an “election law,” the AndersonBurdick framework still would not apply. Id. Rather, the Court 

would apply the rational basis test under McDonald v. Board of 

Election Commissioners of Chicago, 394 U.S. 802 (1969). In 

McDonald, the Supreme Court held that an Illinois statute that 

denied certain inmates mail-in ballots did not impose an 

unconstitutional burden on their right to vote. Id. at 807. 

Rather, the statute only restricted their asserted right to 

receive an absentee ballot, and they were therefore not 

“absolutely prohibited from voting by the State.” Id. at 808 & 

n.7. The Supreme Court noted that “the record is barren of any 

indication that the State might not, for instance, possibly 

furnish the jails with special polling booths . . . or provide 

guarded transportation to the polls.” Id. at 808 n.6. The Court 

further noted that a more rigid standard is proper only when the 
19 

policy or practice at issue categorically “den[ies] [plaintiffs] 

the exercise of the franchise . . . preclud[ing] [them] from 

voting.” Id. at 807-08. Accordingly, the Supreme Court upheld 

the statute under rational basis review. Id. at 811. Defendants 

argue that McDonald is controlling because “Plaintiffs are 

claiming that USPS policies may deprive them of the ability to 

cast votes through mail-in ballots” and Plaintiffs’ “position is 

not materially different from the county jail inmates . . . who 

were physically restricted from the polls.” Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF 

No. 21 at 39. 

 The Court finds that McDonald is inapposite. First, 

Defendants mischaracterize Plaintiffs’ claim in this case. 

Plaintiffs do not broadly challenge the USPS policy changes as 

denying them the right to receive mail-in ballots, as was at 

issue in McDonald. Rather, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants’ 

policy changes undermine the integrity of the November 2020 

election by causing delays in the delivery of mail-in ballots, 

resulting in the risk that hundreds of thousands of voters will 

be disenfranchised. Second, “[t]he Supreme Court has expressly 

restricted [McDonald’s] applicability to cases in which there is 

no evidence showing that the challenged restriction will 

prohibit the plaintiff from voting.” Jones v. U.S. Postal Serv., 

No. 20-cv-6516 (VM), 2020 WL 5627002, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 

2020). For example, in Hill v. Stone, the Supreme Court 
20 

explained that, in McDonald, “there was nothing in the record to 

indicate that the challenged Illinois statute had any impact” on 

the right to vote, but that the case had acknowledged that 

“[a]ny classification actually restraining the fundamental right 

to vote . . . would be subject to close scrutiny.” Hill v. 

Stone, 421 U.S. 289, 300 n.9 (1974) (citing McDonald, 394 U.S. 

at 807-09). In other words, “[e]ssentially the Court’s 

disposition of the claims in McDonald rested on failure of 

proof.” O’Brien v. Skinner, 414 U.S. 524, 529 (1974). Because 

Plaintiffs have provided evidence that the USPS policy will 

inhibit many voters’ ballots from being counted in the November 

2020 election, McDonald’s rational basis test is inappropriate.

 Whether the Court should consider Plaintiffs’ claim under 

the Anderson-Burdick framework is not so straightforwardly 

dismissed, however. The Court first notes that Defendants’ claim 

that the policy changes implemented by USPS only inadvertently 

or indirectly affect voting rights is unpersuasive, particularly 

in a year in which the global COVID-19 pandemic has forced many 

individuals to decide either to vote by mail-in-ballot or to not 

vote at all. See Jones, 2020 WL 5627002, at *14 (“The Court . . 

. disagrees with the Government that this case does not 

implicate ‘the counting of votes.’ To hold otherwise would be to 

ignore the facts at hand: a large number of voters will be 

exercising their right to vote in the November 2020 election by 
21 

placing their ballots in the mail. There is simply no reason for 

the Court to ignore the severe reality that the country is in 

the middle of a deadly pandemic . . . .”). For the November 2020 

election, 43 states and the District of Columbia will permit all 

eligible voters to vote by mail-in ballot, and 28 of those 

states will require that the ballots be received by Election 

Day. Pls.’ Mot., ECF No. 16-1 at 7-8 (citing news reports). 

Furthermore, a “conservative” estimate predicts that 80 million 

ballots will be submitted by mail. See Hersh Decl., ECF No. 16-

15 ¶ 14. In other words, for tens of millions of voters this 

year, the postal service “is literally the method by which the 

election is conducted.” Pls.’ Reply, ECF No. 24 at 16. The USPS 

policy thus directly impacts and controls the ability of 

millions of citizens to have their vote counted. Defendants 

themselves do not dispute their unique role within the electoral 

process and their “longstanding commitment to the timely 

delivery of Election Mail.” Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 21 at 13. Even 

beyond delivering mail-in ballots, USPS conducts “extensive 

outreach to state and local election officials to support 

effective use of postal services to facilitate the distribution 

and return of ballots”; gives an “Election Mail Kit” to 

“approximately 11,500 state and local election officials”; and 

has established a separate “bipartisan Election Mail Committee 

to actively oversee USPS’s support of Election Mail for the 
22 

Election.” Id. at 12-13. This relationship between the USPS and 

the electoral process suggests a strong connection with the 

protection of voters’ rights. 

And although the Court acknowledges that the majority of 

cases apply the Anderson-Burdick test within the confines of a 

state election law, this aligns with the fact that “our country 

has a highly decentralized system of election administration, in 

which states and localities are primarily responsible for 

regulating and managing elections.” Jones, 2020 WL 5627002, at 

*14 (citations omitted). Defendants correctly note, for example, 

that both Anderson and Burdick themselves concerned the 

constitutionality of state-level election laws and indicated 

that the balancing test applies when a court is considering a 

challenge to such laws. However, the Court is not persuaded that 

either case, or the cases that have followed, have so restricted 

application of the balancing framework to only that specific 

context. For example, courts within this Circuit have relied 

upon the Anderson-Burdick framework in analyzing “state” 

practices that allegedly burden parties’ ability to cast their 

votes effectively under both the Fifth Amendment and the 

Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Libertarian Party, 682 F.3d at 

74 (analyzing under Burdick plaintiffs’ First and Fifth 

Amendment claims that the District “consistent with its 

regulations, never reported which individuals were penciled in 
23 

by voters choosing the write-in option or how many votes any 

such individual accrued”); Turner v. D.C. Bd. of Elections & 

Ethics, 77 F. Supp. 2d 25, 30, 33 (D.D.C. 1999) (RWR) (analyzing 

the constitutionality of Congress’s 1998 District of Columbia 

Appropriations Act under Burdick, among other standards, where 

the Act barred the D.C. Board of Elections and Ethics from 

counting, releasing, and certifying the results of a 

referendum). But see LaRouche v. Fowler, 152 F.3d 974, 994 (D.C. 

Cir. 1998) (finding that the Burdick test was inappropriate in a 

challenge against the Democratic National Committee’s internal 

rules because the test “was not designed for a case in which the 

First Amendment weighs on both sides of the balance”). Courts 

have also applied the Anderson-Burdick balancing test in the 

context of non-election laws. For example, in Monserrate v. New 

York State Senate, 599 F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 2010), the United 

States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit addressed a First 

Amendment challenge to the New York Senate’s decision to expel a 

senator who had been accused of domestic violence. Id. at 152-

53. The Second Circuit found that the Anderson-Burdick line of 

cases was not limited to the pre-vote election law context, 

stating that the Supreme Court had “minimized the extent to 

which voting rights are distinguishable from ballot access 

cases” because “the rights of voters and the rights of 

candidates do not lend themselves to neat separation.” Id. at 
24 

155 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 

Accordingly, the Second Circuit applied the Anderson-Burdick

test in analyzing whether the senator’s expulsion burdened 

constitutional rights related to voting and political 

association. Id.; see also Peeper v. Callaway Cnty. Ambulance 

Dist., 122 F.3d 619, 622-23 (8th Cir. 1997) (analyzing a board 

resolution prohibiting a newly elected ambulance board member 

from voting on certain matters because her husband worked for 

the ambulance district under the Anderson-Burdick framework); 

Hussey v. City of Portland, 64 F.3d 1260, 1262, 1264 (9th Cir. 

1995) (applying the Anderson-Burdick framework in evaluating the 

constitutionality of an “ordinance requiring non-residents to 

consent to annexation as a condition of receiving a subsidy, or 

reduction in hook-up costs, for mandated sewer connections,” 

finding that consents were the “constitutional equivalent” of 

voting). 

Here, regardless of the intent behind the changes, the USPS 

policy “will invariably impose some burden upon individual 

voters” and their constitutional rights in an election year. 

Libertarian Party, 682 F.3d at 73-74. The USPS directly affects 

how Election Mail is handled and the speed with which Election 

Mail arrives at its intended destination. While the USPS serves 

many other functions, its role in handling ballots compels the 

conclusion that USPS plays an active role in ensuring that 
25 

elections are conducted in a “fair and honest” manner, “rather 

than chaos.” Burdick, 504 U.S. at 433 (citation omitted). 

Furthermore, the Court is not convinced that the AndersonBurdick framework is limited to only state government and not 

federal government actions. To so find would effectively 

exclude, for example, any federal legislation impacting 

elections in the District of Columbia pursuant to Congress’s 

plenary power over the District. See U.S. Const. art. I § 8; 

Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 397 (1973). In addition, 

this case does not present the same concerns as the D.C. Circuit 

noted in LaRouche v. Fowler, 152 F.3d 974 (D.C. Cir. 1998), 

where the court noted that applying Anderson-Burdick to the 

rules of a non-state political party was inappropriate because 

“the presence of First Amendment interests on both sides of the 

equation makes inapplicable the test applied to electoral 

restrictions where the First Amendment weighs on only one side.” 

Id. at 995. 

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have 

established that the Anderson-Burdick framework likely applies 

to Plaintiffs’ claim. 

3. Plaintiffs Have Shown That They Are Likely To 

Succeed On The Merits Of Their Constitutional 

Claim 

 Plaintiffs argue that the USPS policy changes “impose[] 

undue burdens on Plaintiffs’ and other voters’ rights to vote in 
26 

violation of the First and Fifth Amendments.” Pls.’ Mot., ECF 

No. 16-1 at 10. The Court agrees that, under the AndersonBurdick framework, Plaintiffs have shown that they are likely to 

succeed on the merits of their claim. 

As explained above, under the Anderson-Burdick framework, 

the Court must determine whether “the character and magnitude of 

the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and 

[Fifth] Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate” 

outweighs “the precise interests put forward by the State as 

justifications for the burden imposed by its rule,” taking into 

account “the extent to which those interests make it necessary 

to burden the plaintiff’s rights.” Burdick, 504 U.S. at 433–34. 

Next, the court evaluates how much deference to afford to the 

government’s interests. If voting rights are “subjected to 

severe restrictions, the regulation must be narrowly drawn to 

advance a state interest of compelling importance.” Burdick, 504 

U.S. at 434 (internal quotation marks omitted). But when a 

voter’s rights are subjected only to “reasonable, 

nondiscriminatory restrictions,” then courts apply a rational 

basis review. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 

“It is beyond cavil that ‘voting is of the most fundamental 

significance under our constitutional structure.’” Burdick, 504 

U.S. at 433 (quoting Ill. Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers 

Party, 440 U.S. 173, 184 (1979)). “Obviously included within the 
27 

right to choose, secured by the Constitution, is the right of 

qualified voters within a state to cast their ballots and have 

them counted . . . .” United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 

315 (1941) (emphasis added). Thus, where a policy creates a 

situation where “[a] large number of ballots will be 

invalidated, and consequently, not counted based on 

circumstances entirely out of the voters’ control,” the “burden 

[on the right to vote] is exceptionally severe.” Gallagher v. 

N.Y. State Bd. of Elections, No. 20-cv-5504, 2020 WL 4496849, at 

*16 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 2020); see also Doe v. Walker, 746 F. 

Supp. 2d 667, 679-80 (D. Md. 2010) (“By imposing a deadline 

which does not allow sufficient time for absent uniformed 

services and overseas voters to receive, fill out, and return 

their absentee ballots, the state imposes a severe burden on 

absent uniformed services and overseas voters’ fundamental right 

to vote.”). 

Here, the Court finds that the “character and magnitude” of 

Plaintiffs’ asserted injury to the right to vote is significant. 

Plaintiffs have provided sufficient evidence suggesting that 

Defendants’ policy has caused and will continue to cause 

inconsistency and delays in the delivery of mail across the 

United States, placing at particular risk voters residing in one 

of the 28 states that require mail ballots to be received, not 

just post-marked, by Election Day. For example, Plaintiffs 
28 

explain that if a voter residing in one of those 28 states mails 

in her ballot on the Saturday before Election Day, a one-day 

delay “significant[ly] increases the risk of the ballot being 

rejected as untimely,” and a two-day delay “would make 

disenfranchisement a certainty.” Pls.’ Mot., ECF No. 16-1 at 30. 

Furthermore, Plaintiffs simply cannot predict when their ballots 

will arrive at their intended destination. When they will 

arrive, and whether they will arrive in time to be counted, 

instead depends upon “arbitrary factors, such as the particular 

USPS branch that handles their ballots.” Jones, 2020 WL 5627002, 

at *16; see also Supp. Grimmer Decl., ECF No 24-2 ¶¶ 5, 7 

(listing “on-time” service scores varying across USPS areas in 

the United States). Indeed, USPS itself has acknowledged the 

threat of voter disenfranchisement that may result from delivery 

delays caused by Defendants’ policy, warning in a July 29, 2020 

letter to 46 states and the District of Columbia that USPS 

“cannot guarantee all ballots cast by mail for the November 

election will arrive in time to be counted.” See Pls.’ Mot., ECF 

No. 16-1 at 15. Thus, in a year in which it is estimated that 80 

million citizens are anticipated to submit their votes via USPS, 

and between 3.7% and 9.3% of those are estimated to mail ballots 

on the Saturday before Election Day, the potential for voter 

disenfranchisement is immense. See Hersh Decl., ECF No. 16-15 ¶¶ 

14, 21-23; see also Pls.’ Mot., ECF No. 16-1 at 7 (citing 
29 

Juliette Love, Matt Stevens, & Lazaro Gamio, Where Americans Can 

Vote by Mail in the 2020 Election, N.Y. Times (last updated Aug. 

14, 2020), https://rb.gy/fwss8l)). 

Furthermore, while content neutral, Defendants’ policy 

changes place an especially severe burden on those who have no 

other reasonable choice than to vote by mail, such as those who 

may be at a high risk of developing a severe case of COVID-19 

should they become exposed to the virus at the polling place, 

and those who are not physically able to travel to the polls due 

to disability. See Pls.’ Mot., ECF No. 16-1 at 31. For these 

individuals, mail-in voting is either the only choice or the 

only safe choice they have. Defendants, however, suggest that 

these individuals and others can avoid such injuries if they 

only choose to vote earlier. Defendants argue that there is no 

severe burden on Plaintiffs because any disenfranchisement would 

be due to “‘their own failure to take [the] timely steps’ 

necessary.” Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 21 at 40 (alteration in 

original) (quoting Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 758 

(1973)). In Defendants’ view, USPS “cannot be required by the 

Constitution to ensure that a voter’s ballot arrive in the 

timeframe set by her state if that voter mails the ballot the 

day before the state’s deadline.” Id. This argument fails. In 

suggesting that voters should cast their ballots earlier than 

required, Defendants ignore Plaintiffs’ “essential” interest in 
30 

making “informed choices among candidates for office.” McIntyre 

v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 346-47 (1995). As the 

Supreme Court has recognized, “[i]n election campaigns, 

particularly those which are national in scope, the candidates 

and the issues simply do not remain static over time.” Anderson, 

460 U.S. at 790. Many individuals, including Plaintiffs in this 

case, rely on the efficient delivery of their mail-in ballots so 

that they make take the time available to consider the issues 

and candidates in an election. See, e.g., Datta Decl., ECF No. 

16-23 ¶¶ 3-5. Accordingly, any argument that Plaintiffs inflict 

injury on themselves by not voting earlier does not 

significantly lessen their harms in this situation. In any 

event, Plaintiffs’ arguments are in regard to voters who decide 

to send in their ballots three days in advance of Election Day, 

not one day. 

 Defendants also argue that the Plaintiffs’ claim must fail 

because there is no constitutional right to vote by mail and 

states are not required to offer mail-in voting. Defs.’ Opp’n, 

ECF No. 21 at 35. Defendants contend that “[i]f a State can 

prohibit mail-in voting . . . then USPS policies which may 

indirectly limit when a ballot must be mailed cannot be 

constitutionally suspect.” Id. However, Defendants miss the 

point. Plaintiffs here are not alleging that Defendants are 

denying them a right to vote by mail. Rather, Plaintiffs are 
31 

alleging that the Defendants’ policy changes undermine the 

integrity of the November 2020 election by causing delays in the 

delivery of mail-in ballots, resulting in thousands of votes not 

being counted. As the Supreme Court has explained, “[h]aving 

once granted the right to vote on equal terms, the State may 

not, by later arbitrary and disparate treatment, value one 

person’s vote over that of another.” Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 

104-05 (2000) (quoting Harper, 383 U.S. at 665). And that is 

precisely the issue. For example, if one of the individual 

Plaintiffs submits her ballot, but it does not make it to her 

local election office in time because of delays caused by the 

USPS policy, “her ‘right to full and effective participation in 

the political processes of h[er] [Nation]’s legislative bodies’ 

is impaired relative to that of both in-state and out-of-state 

voters with access to USPS branches functioning effectively.” 

Jones, 2020 WL 5627002, at *21 (alteration in original) (quoting 

Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 506, 565 (1964)). 

 Defendants contend that the USPS policy changes do not 

impose a “severe” burden on voters because “USPS has not 

instituted a ban on late trips or extra trips,” only a call for 

a “renewed focus on schedules.” Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 21 at 40. 

Defendants argue that there is “little indication” that policy 

changes will cause delays in view of the “resources USPS is 

committing to Election Mail, and USPS’s assurance that it has 
32 

the capacity to process the expected volume of Election Mail.” 

Id. However, even if Defendants did not institute a full “ban” 

on late or extra trips, Defendants have not rebutted the 

statistics that Plaintiffs have put forward indicating that the 

nearly 75% drop in the number of late and extra trips has 

resulted in “a material cut in USPS’s capacity to timely deliver 

mail.” See Cintron Decl., ECF No. 21-1 ¶¶ 23-25; Pls.’ Reply, 

ECF No. 24 at 11; see also Grimmer Decl., ECF No. 16-11 ¶ 9 

(stating that USPS cuts amounted to an average of 32,900 fewer 

trips per week). Although Defendants suggest that the drop in 

USPS’s “on-time” deliveries were partly caused by staffing 

shortages from COVID-19, the Court is persuaded by Plaintiffs’ 

analysis of USPS data showing “no relationship between declines 

in on-time service scores and the time periods in which USPS 

allegedly experienced staffing shortages.” Pls.’ Reply, ECF No. 

24 at 13. Furthermore, as USPS has “itself forecast[ed] the 

injuries” previously, it is “disingenuous” for USPS to claim 

that there is “little indication” of delays in delivery of mailin ballots. See Jones, 2020 WL 5627002, at *12 (citation 

omitted). The Court finds that such burdens on voters’ right to 

have their ballots counted suggests that a high level of 

scrutiny is required. 

Against such injuries, Defendants assert that the policy 

changes are “intended to increase efficiency” and “minimize 
33 

unnecessary costs.” Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 21 at 41. Defendants 

contend that these “general regulatory interests” survive the 

Anderson-Burdick inquiry under a rational basis review. Id.

(quoting Libertarian Party, 682 F.3d at 77). In Defendant’s 

view, the fact that the USPS policy changes were actually 

inefficient in the short term or that cost savings may be 

minimal does not mean that they were any less legitimate. Id. 

Defendants argue that “the proffered justifications for the USPS 

policy at issue are sufficient to justify the indirect, minimal 

burden it may impose on voters.” Id. Plaintiffs dispute that 

Defendants’ justifications are sufficient to justify the burden 

imposed on voters. Plaintiffs argue that the USPS policy changes 

were in fact inefficient and that the mail delivery slow-downs 

were expected because the policy’s purpose was to “undermine the 

ability of the Postal Service to fulfill its statutory duty to 

provide ‘prompt, reliable, and efficient services to patrons in 

all areas.’” Pls.’ Mot., ECF No. 16-1 at 32-33 (quoting 39 

U.S.C. § 101(a)). Plaintiffs also contend that Defendants’ cost 

savings rationale is insufficient because (1) case precedent 

establishes that the government may not burden fundamental 

rights in its quest to save costs; (2) the cost savings are 

minimal over the period leading up to Election Day; and (3) 

Defendant Mr. DeJoy has confirmed that the USPS’s financial 

position is sound. Id. at 33-35. 
34 

 Defendants are correct that the government generally need 

not justify itself with “elaborate, empirical verification” of 

its interests in a rational basis review. Timmons v. Twin Cities 

Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 364 (1997). However, the Court 

finds that the bar is higher here. Given the severity of 

Plaintiffs’ harms, the Court must instead determine whether 

Plaintiffs’ injuries are outweighed by Defendants’ 

justifications under at least an intermediate level of scrutiny, 

if not strict scrutiny. The Court finds that Defendants do not 

meet either. 

 The Court respects that the federal government, and USPS 

in particular, have legitimate interests in maintaining 

efficient programs and in saving money; however, these interests 

do not justify the resulting harms Plaintiffs face. As stated 

above, the burden the USPS policy changes place on Plaintiffs’ 

constitutional right to vote and have their vote counted is 

significant. At risk is disenfranchisement in the November 

election of potentially hundreds of thousands of individuals. 

These harms justify a high level of scrutiny, yet Defendants 

only generally assert that “compliance with pre-set schedules is 

intended to increase efficiency” and minimize “administrative 

costs.” Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 21 at 41 (quoting Libertarian 

Party, 682 F.3d at 77). Defendants’ reasons for administrative 

cost savings are insufficient: as the Supreme Court has 
35 

explained, the “vindication of conceded constitutional rights 

cannot be made dependent upon any theory that it is less 

expensive to deny than to afford them.” Watson v. City of 

Memphis, 373 U.S. 526, 537 (1963). Furthermore, Defendants have 

failed to provide any reasons regarding why implementation of 

the USPS policy changes were necessary during a nationwide 

election season in the middle of a pandemic, particularly in 

view of Defendants’ express acknowledgement that they 

anticipated “mail left behind or mail on the workroom floor or 

docks.” Ex. 4, ECF No. 16-6 at 2. And despite Defendants’ 

assertions to the contrary, as of the end of August, USPS 

service scores remain lower that the pre-policy average. See 

Suppl. Grimmer Decl., ECF No. 24-3 ¶ 5. 

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs are likely to 

succeed on their constitutional claim. 

B. Plaintiffs Face Irreparable Harm 

“The failure to demonstrate irreparable harm is ‘grounds 

for refusing to issue a preliminary injunction, even if the 

other three factors . . . merit such relief.’” Nat’l Mining 

Ass’n v. Jackson, 768 F. Supp. 2d 34, 50 (D.D.C. 2011) (RBW) 

(quoting Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches v. England, 454 F.3d 

290, 297 (D.C. Cir. 2006)). “In this Circuit, a litigant seeking 

a preliminary injunction must satisfy ‘a high standard’ for 

irreparable injury.” ConverDyn, 68 F. Supp. 3d at 46 (quoting 
36 

Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches, 454 F.3d at 297). The movant 

must demonstrate that it faces an injury that is “both certain 

and great; it must be actual and not theoretical,” and of a 

nature “of such imminence that there is a clear and present need 

for equitable relief to prevent irreparable harm.” Wis. Gas Co. 

v. FERC, 758 F.2d 669, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (quotation marks and 

emphasis omitted). Furthermore, similar to the test for 

organizational standing, an organization faced irreparable harm 

where (1) the “actions taken by [the defendant] have 

‘perceptibly impaired’ the [organization’s] programs,” League of 

Women Voters, 838 F.3d at 8 (alteration in original) (quoting 

Fair Emp’t Council of Greater Wash., 28 F.3d at 1276), and (2) 

“the defendant’s actions ‘directly conflict with the 

organization’s mission,” id. (quoting Nat’l Treasury Emps. 

Union, 101 F.3d at 1430). 

 The Court finds that both the individual Plaintiffs and the 

Organization Plaintiffs face irreparable harm absent a 

preliminary injunction. 

 1. The Individual Plaintiffs Face Irreparable Harm 

 The individual Plaintiffs argue that the USPS policies puts 

their vote at risk of not being counted if they choose to send 

in their ballot on a day that is close to Election Day. Prior to 

the implementation of the USPS policy, the individual Plaintiffs 

would have been able to reasonably expect that a ballot placed 
37 

in the mail on October 31, the Saturday prior to Election Day, 

would have arrived at its intended destination by November 3, 

based on the 1 to 3 day First Class Mail delivery standard. 

Pls.’ Mot., ECF No. 16-1 at 37. Now, however, even with just a 

one-day delivery delay caused by the USPS policy changes, there 

is a significant risk that a voter’s ballot will not be counted. 

Id.

In response, Defendants argue that the individual 

Plaintiffs’ preference to wait to send in their ballots until 

closer to Election Day because they want to avoid regretting 

their decision or because they want to “wait until they have all 

the information they need” is insufficient and too speculative 

to establish an irreparable harm. Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 21 at 42 

(alterations omitted). In other words, “‘if their plight can be 

characterized as disenfranchisement at all, it was not caused 

by’ USPS but rather ‘their own failure to take [the] timely 

steps’ necessary.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 

Rosario, 410 U.S. at 758). Furthermore, Defendants assert that 

“in light of service improvements and ongoing efforts to timely 

delivery [sic] Election Mail,” Plaintiffs cannot show that their 

ballots would not be received in time. Id. at 42-43. 

The Court finds that the individual Plaintiffs have 

sufficiently shown they will likely suffer irreparable harm 

absent a preliminary injunction. As described above, Plaintiffs 
38 

have provided ample evidence showing that, due to delays in the 

delivery of mail, there is a substantial risk that Plaintiffs 

will suffer an undue burden on their constitutional right to 

vote. See Obama for Am. v. Husted, 697 F.3d 423, 436 (6th Cir. 

2012) (“A restriction on the fundamental right to vote . . . 

constitutes irreparable injury.”); Cardona v. Oakland Unified 

Sch. Dist., Cal., 785 F. Supp. 837, 840 (N.D. Cal. 1992) 

(explaining abridgement “or dilution of a right so fundamental 

as the right to vote constitutes irreparable injury”). There is 

“no do-over and no redress” once the election has passed. League 

of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224, 247 

(4th Cir. 2014). Defendants’ suggestion that Plaintiffs need 

only vote earlier than planned also does not remedy the harms 

Plaintiffs would face in being forced to make a decision on how 

to vote before they have all of the information they require. 

Cf. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 346–47 (“In a republic where the 

people are sovereign, the ability of the citizenry to make 

informed choices among candidates for office is essential, for 

the identities of those who are elected will inevitably shape 

the course that we follow as a nation.”). Finally, regarding 

Defendants’ assertion that Plaintiffs have failed to show the 

likelihood of delivery delays, as Plaintiffs have pointed out, 

Defendants’ own data suggests that USPS’s service scores have 

not bounced back since the implementation of the policy changes, 
39 

and Defendants have provided no other information suggesting 

that that will change prior to Election Day. See Pls.’ Reply, 

ECF No. 24 at 10-13; see also Grimmer Decl., ECF No. 16-11; 

Suppl. Grimmer Decl., ECF No. 24-2. 

The individual Plaintiffs have thus asserted irreparable 

harm. 

2. The Organization Plaintiffs Face Irreparable Harm 

The Organization Plaintiffs argue that they have also 

demonstrated that irreparable harm is clear and immediate 

because the USPS policy has “caused Plaintiffs to redirect their 

limited resources, which includes both their labor and their 

funds, to address challenges caused by Defendants’ Policy that 

were unforeseen.” Pls.’ Mot., ECF No. 16-1 at 41. In response, 

Defendants argue that any claimed injury to the Organization 

Plaintiffs’ resources are insufficient because they have not 

established that mail delays were solely a result of the USPS 

policy as opposed to COVID-19. Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 21 at 43. 

Defendants assert that COVID-19 caused significant staffing 

shortages beginning in March 2020, and, although the shortages 

began to recover in June, “the availability for July again began 

to decrease, with availability falling to its lowest levels in 

the week of July 11, 2020.” Id. (citing Prokity Decl., ECF No. 

21-2 ¶¶ 4-5). Thus, given these “simultaneous” impacts, 

Plaintiffs cannot claim that the USPS policy was the sole cause 
40 

of their injury. Id. at 43-44. Defendants also contend that any 

future harms are not “certain and great.” Id. at 44 (quoting 

Whitman-Walker Clinic, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human 

Servs., No. 20-cv-1630 (JEB), 2020 WL 5232076, at *38 (D.D.C. 

Sept. 2, 2020)). 

Here, the Organization Plaintiffs have shown a likelihood 

of suffering irreparable harm. “As the D.C. Circuit has 

confirmed, ‘[o]bstacles’ that ‘unquestionably make it more 

difficult for [an organization] to accomplish [its] primary 

mission . . . provide injury for purposes both of standing and 

irreparable harm.’” Whitman-Walker Clinic, Inc., 2020 WL 

5232076, at *38 (alterations in original) (quoting League of 

Women Voters, 838 F.3d at 9). As described, the USPS policy 

changes have likely impaired and will likely continue to impair 

Plaintiff Vote Forward’s ability to provide its services, 

undermining its mission. Plaintiff Voces Unidas has asserted 

similar harms to its programs: to counteract the harms caused by 

the USPS policy changes, Voces Unidas—an organization “dedicated 

to increasing civic engagement of the Latino population in three 

rural Colorado counties” through get-out-the-vote campaigns—

estimates it will need to spend between $50,000 to $80,000 

beyond its original budget through hiring “additional canvassers 

to intensify the campaign earlier than previously anticipated 

and to pay for additional advertising and dissemination of 
41 

information to the communities it serves.” Pls.’ Mot., ECF No. 

16-1 at 42-43 (citing Voces Unidas Decl, ECF No. 16-25); cf. 

Food & Water Watch, Inc., 808 F.3d at 920 (explaining that an 

organization suffers an injury where it “expend[s] resources to 

educate its members and others” and those “operational costs 

[go] beyond those normally expended”). Furthermore, the Court 

has already determined that Plaintiffs’ harms were the result of 

the implementation of the USPS policy changes, not staffing 

shortages, and, as stated above, “that harm is irreparable” 

because after the November election passes, “there can be no do 

over and no redress.” League of Women Voters, 838 F.3d at 9 

(quoting League of Women Voters of N.C., 769 F.3d at 247). 

C. The Balance of Equities and Public Interest Favor an 

Injunction 

The balance-of-equities factor directs the Court to “balance 

the competing claims of injury and . . . consider the effect on 

each party of the granting or withholding of the requested relief.” 

ConverDyn, 68 F. Supp. 3d at 52 (quoting Winter, 555 U.S. at 24). 

“When the issuance of a preliminary injunction, while preventing 

harm to one party, causes injury to the other, this factor does not 

weigh in favor of granting preliminary injunctive relief.” Id.; see 

also Serono Labs., Inc. v. Shalala, 158 F.3d 1313, 1326 (D.C. Cir. 

1998). By contrast, the balance of equities may favor a preliminary 

injunction that serves only “to preserve the relative positions of 

the parties until a trial on the merits can be held.” Rufer v. FEC, 
42 

64 F. Supp. 3d 195, 206 (D.D.C. 2014) (CRC) (quoting Camenisch, 451 

U.S. at 395). “The purpose of . . . interim relief is not to 

conclusively determine the rights of the parties, Univ. of Tex. v. 

Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981), but to balance the equities as 

the litigation moves forward. In awarding a preliminary injunction 

a court must also ‘conside[r] . . . the overall public interest,’ 

Winter, [555 U.S.] at 26.” Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance 

Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2087 (2017) (second alteration in 

original).

Plaintiffs contend that the balance of the equities and the 

public interest favor a preliminary injunction because it is in 

the public interest to prevent constitutional violations and to 

allow eligible citizens to vote. Pls.’ Mot., ECF No. 16-1 at 43-

44. Defendants do not contest the equities in Plaintiffs’ favor. 

Rather, Defendants argue that the public interest and the 

balance of the equities disfavor granting relief because (1) 

“USPS is currently undertaking extensive efforts to facilitate 

the timely delivery of Election Mail”; (2) “the Individual 

Plaintiffs have an opportunity to avoid any harm by mailing in 

their ballots without delay”; (3) the July 10 “Stand-Up Talk” 

“does not represent official USPS policy”; and (4) granting 

relief “could require the Court to act as an overseer of the 

agency’s day-to-day activities. Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 21 at 44-

45. 
43 

Here, the balance of the equities and the public interest 

favor an injunction. “By definition, ‘[t]he public interest . . 

. favors permitting as many qualified voters to vote as 

possible.” League of Women Voters of N.C., 769 F.3d at 247-48 

(quoting Husted, 697 F.3d at 437). It is also clearly in the 

public interest to require that USPS implement policies that do 

not infringe upon constitutional rights. League of Women Voters, 

838 F.3d at 12 (“There is generally no public interest in the 

perpetuation of unlawful agency action.”). Nor does the proposed 

injunction contemplate that the Court would become involved in 

overseeing the day-to-day operations of the USPS. And while it 

may be true that the “Stand-Up Talk” itself may not be an 

official policy, Defendants do not contest that they have 

implemented changes regarding transportation and extra trips, 

and the Court has the authority to adjust the requested relief 

as appropriate. See Richmond Tenants Org. v. Kemp, 956 F.2d 

1300, 1308 (4th Cir. 1992) (“It is well established . . . that a 

federal district court has wide discretion to fashion 

appropriate injunctive relief . . . .”). 

IV. Conclusion 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS the Plaintiffs’ 

motion for a preliminary injunction. Any request to stay this 

decision pending appeal will be denied for substantially the 
44 

same reasons as those articulated in this Opinion. An 

appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion. 

SO ORDERED. 

Signed: Emmet G. Sullivan 

 United States District Judge 

 September 28, 2020