alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
[Federal Register Volume 70, Number 217 (Thursday, November 10, 2005)]
[Notices]
[Page 68469]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 05-22483]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

National Institutes of Health


National Institute of Child Health and Human Development; Notice 
of Closed Meeting

    Pursuant to section 10(d) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, as 
amended (5 U.S.C. Appendix 2), notice is hereby given of the following 
meeting.
    The meting will be closed to the public in accordance with the 
provisions set forth in sections 552b(c)(4) and 552b(c)(6), Title 5 
U.S.C., as amended. The grant applications and the discussions could 
disclose confidential trade secrets or commercial property such as 
patentable material, and personal information concerning individuals 
associated with the grant applications, the disclosure of which would 
constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.

    Name of Committee: National Institute of Child Health and Human 
Development Special Emphasis Panel, Social Sciences Population 
Studies.
    Date: November 29, 2005.
    Time: 12:30 p.m. to 2:30 p.m.
    Agenda: To review and evaluate grant applications.
    Place: National Institute of Health, 6100 Executive Boulevard, 
Room 5B01, Rockville, MD 20852 (Telephone Conference Call).
    Contact Person: Michele C. Hindi-Alexander, Division of 
Scientific Review, National Institute for Child Health and 
Development, 1600 Executive Boulevard, R. 5B01, Bethesda, MD 20812-
7510, (301) 435-8382, <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#99f1f0f7fdf0f8f5f4d9f4f8f0f5b7f7f0f1b7fef6ef"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="c9a1a0a7ada0a8a5a489a4a8a0a5e7a7a0a1e7aea6bf">[email protected]</span></a>.

(Catalogue of Federal Domestic Assistance Program Nos. 93.864, 
Population Research; 93.865, Research for Mothers and Children; 
93.929, Center for Medical Rehabilitation Research; 93.209, 
Contraception and Infertility Loan Repayment Program, National 
Institutes of Health, HHS)

    Dated: November 1, 2005.
Anna Snouffer,
Acting Director, Office of Federal Advisory Committee Policy.
[FR Doc. 05-22483 Filed 11-9-05; 8:45am]
BILLING CODE 4140-01-M


</pre><script data-cfasync="false" src="/cdn-cgi/scripts/5c5dd728/cloudflare-static/email-decode.min.js"></script></body>
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Exhibit 10.13

                   INTERNATIONAL THOROUGHBRED BREEDERS, INC.
                        SUITE 1300 1105 N. MARKET STREET
                                   PO BOX 8985
                            WILMINGTON, DE 19899-8985
                       301-426-7599 FAX: 302-302-651-8423




TO:   Frank Leo

FROM: Bill Warner

DATE: Oct. 8, 2004

     This will confirm  that, on December 20, 1996,  International  Thoroughbred
Breeders,  Inc. ("ITB") granted you the option to purchase 200,000 shares of ITB
common stock, par value $2.00 per share, at an exercise price of $4.00 per share
and exercisable 10 years from the date of grant. Such Option vested immediately.
We also confirm that, on January 29, 2002, the option exercise price was reduced
from $4.00 per share to $0.50 per share.  As so modified,  the option remains in
effect on the date hereof.









<PAGE>
Exhibit 10.20
AMENDMENT NO. 1 TO DEFERRED COMPENSATION AGREEMENT
     THIS AMENDMENT NO. 1 TO DEFERRED COMPENSATION AGREEMENT (this “Amendment No. 1”) is enteredinto as of the 7th day of April, 2005 by and among IRWIN HOME EQUITY CORPORATION (the“Corporation”), IRWIN FINANCIAL CORPORATION (“Irwin Financial”) and ELENA DELGADO (“Delgado”) forthe purpose of amending that certain Deferred Compensation Agreement among the parties hereto as ofDecember 22, 2004 (the “Agreement”). Capitalized terms not otherwise defined herein have the samemeanings as specified in the Agreement or that certain Shareholder Agreement among the partiesdated as of October 8, 1996, as amended and restated as of December 22, 2004 (the “ShareholderAgreement”).
     WHEREAS, the parties entered into the Agreement under circumstances and for reasons set forthmore particularly in the Recitals contained in the Agreement, and
     WHEREAS, on March 18, 2005, the Corporation exercised its Call right under the ShareholderAgreement to repurchase the Delgado Shares; and
     WHEREAS, the parties desire to amend the interest calculation provisions contained in Section5 (“Interest”) of the Agreement to better reflect the original intent of the parties.
     NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual promises contained herein and for other good andvaluable consideration, the receipt and adequacy of which are hereby acknowledged, the partieshereto agree as follows:
     1. Amendment to Section 5. Section 5 of the Agreement is, effective as ofMarch 18, 2005, hereby amended as follows:
     “Section 5. Interest. Portions of the Deferred Purchase Price that remain unpaidshall accrue interest from the date of the Call Closing until paid in full, at two percent (2.0%)over the national prime rate as reported in The Wall Street Journal as of the last businessday of each month.”
     2. Effect on Agreement. The Agreement is and shall continue to be in fullforce and effect and is hereby in all respect ratified and confirmed.
     3. Counterparts. This Amendment No. 1 may be executed in counterparts, eachof which shall be deemed an original and all of which, when taken together, shall constitute oneand the same agreement.
     4. Governing Law. This Amendment No. 1 shall be governed by and construed inaccordance with the laws of the State of Indiana.
 

 

     IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have duly executed this Amendment No. 1 as of the datefirst written above.      IRWIN HOME EQUITY CORPORATION:
#### PHILIP FRIEDMAN, PLAINTIFF, v. ABE KAUFMAN, I. LEVINE AND ALEX RUBENSTEIN, DEFENDANTS.

Decided February 16, 1932.

For the plaintiff, *Laurence Semel.*

For the defendants, *Abram I. Buestein.*

Smith, S. C. C.

From my examination of the proof submitted on this motion it is quite apparent that the answer, in so far as it relates to the indebtedness of $1,500 on-the notes, is sham. The endorsement on the check “for balance due on acreage, complying with contract to Ralph A. Norton, Arthur McLean,” is not any acknowledgement that it is in full payment of the purchase price under the contract. It is quite evident that at the time of the endorsement the $1,500' was not due under the contract, and therefore it would not. cover the two notes.

*253The application to strike out the answer as sham will be granted, but the proof is not sufficient to -warrant the entry of judgment for more than the face of the notes and without costs.

There is no proof of the Florida law, and we must therefore construe them under our law, which makes them usurious and bars recovery for more than the face value of the indebtedness and does not permit the recovery of the interest or costs.

If the plaintiff decides to take judgment for this on the order striking out, he may do so; otherwise he may take the order striking out the answer and take an assessment of damages in open court. It will also be necessary for the jury to pass on the question of what is a reasonable counsel fee.
```

[Congressional Bills 111th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 5366 Introduced in House (IH)]

111th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 5366

To require the proposal for debarment from contracting with the Federal 
 Government of persons violating the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 
                                 1977.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                              May 20, 2010

  Mr. Welch introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
              Committee on Oversight and Government Reform

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To require the proposal for debarment from contracting with the Federal 
 Government of persons violating the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 
                                 1977.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Overseas Contractor Reform Act''.

SEC. 2. REQUIREMENT TO PROPOSE FOR DEBARMENT PERSONS VIOLATING THE 
              FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT.

    (a) Requirement To Propose for Debarment.--Unless waived by the 
head of a Federal agency under subsection (b), any person found to be 
in violation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 shall be 
proposed for debarment from any contract or grant awarded by the 
Federal Government within 30 days after a final judgment of such 
violation.
    (b) Waiver.--The head of a Federal agency may waive this section 
for a Federal contract or grant. Any such waiver shall be reported to 
Congress by the head of the agency concerned within 30 days from the 
date of the waiver, along with an accompanying justification.
    (c) Final Judgment.--For purposes of this section, a judgment 
becomes final when all appeals of the judgment have been finally 
determined, or all time for filing such appeals has expired.
    (d) Definitions.--In this section:
            (1) Contract.--The term ``contract'' means a binding 
        agreement entered into by a Federal agency for the purpose of 
        obtaining property or services.
            (2) Person.--The term ``person'' includes--
                    (A) an individual;
                    (B) a partnership; and
                    (C) a corporation.
            (3) Foreign corrupt practices act of 1977.--The term 
        ``Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977'' means--
                    (A) section 30A of the Securities Exchange Act of 
                1934 (15 U.S.C. 78dd-1); and
                    (B) sections 104 and 104A of the Foreign Corrupt 
                Practices Act (15 U.S.C. 78dd-2).

SEC. 3. GOVERNMENTAL POLICY.

    It is the policy of the United States Government that no Government 
contracts or grants should be awarded to individuals or companies who 
violate the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977.
                                 <all>
```
**Exhibit 32.2****CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THESARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**     In connection with the Quarterly Report of The X-Change Corporation on Form 10-QSB for theperiod ending March 31, 2007 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the datehereof (the “Report”), I, Karey Y. Daniels, Chief Financial Officer of the X-Change Corporation(the “Company”), certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 ofthe Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge and belief: (1) The Quarterly Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and  (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all materialrespects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.May 14, 2007/s/ Karey Y. Daniels
#### In re: Wendell Edward BETANCOURT, Petitioner.

No. 04-7935.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted March 25, 2005.

Decided April 12, 2005.

Wendell Edward Betancourt, Petitioner pro se.

Before NIEMEYER, TRAXLER, and KING, Circuit Judges.

Petition denied by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).

PER CURIAM.

Wendell Edward Betancourt petitions for writ of mandamus, alleging the district court has unduly delayed acting on his motion for recusal. He seeks an order from this court directing the district court to act. The district court denied Betancourt’s motion for recusal on December 13, 2004. Accordingly, because the district court has acted on Betancourt’s motion, we deny his mandamus petition as moot. We grant leave to proceed in forma pauperis. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*PETITION DENIED*
#### RONALD C. TILBE, Appellant, v. WARDEN OF THE NEVADA STATE PRISON, Respondent.

No. 12530

December 18, 1980

620 P.2d 860

*Norman Y. Herring,*State Public Defender, and *Thomas J. Ray,*Special Deputy Public Defender, Carson City, for Appellant.

*Richard H. Bryan,*Attorney General, and *Robert C. Manley,*Deputy Attorney General, Carson City, for Respondent.

OPINION

*Per Curiam:*

For the reasons stated in and on the authority of Krewson v. Warden, 96 Nev. 886, 620 P.2d 859 (1980), the order of the district court is reversed and the case is remanded for a determination of whether sufficient grounds exist which excuse appellant’s failure to raise the issues contained in his petition on a direct appeal from his conviction, and if so, for resolution of the merits of the petition.
[Federal Register Volume 70, Number 214 (Monday, November 7, 2005)]
[Notices]
[Page 67527]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 05-22086]


=======================================================================
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SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION


Wisconsin District Advisory Council; Public Meeting

    The U.S. Small Business Administration Wisconsin District Advisory 
Council will be hosting a meeting on Tuesday, November 15, 2005, to 
discuss such matters that may be presented by members, and staff of the 
U.S. Small Business Administration, or others present. The meeting will 
be held at the U.S. Small Business Administration, Wisconsin District--
Milwaukee, 310 West Wisconsin Avenue, Suite 400, Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
    Anyone wishing to attend must contact Cindy Merrigan in writing or 
by fax. Cindy Merrigan, U.S. Small Business Administration, 740 Regent 
Street, Suite 100, Madison, Wisconsin 53715, phone (608) 441-5560, fax 
(202) 481-0815, e-mail: <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#65060c0b011c4b080017170c02040b251607044b020a13"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="36555f58524f185b5344445f5157587645545718515940">[email protected]</span></a>.

Matthew K. Becker,
Committee Management Officer.
[FR Doc. 05-22086 Filed 11-4-05; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8025-01-P


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¿Qué es una adaptación 

razonable?

Es un ajuste o modificación realizada al 

trabajo o lugar de trabajo

o circunstancias de Realizar el mismo, 

permitiendo a un solicitante o empleado con 

una discapacidad aplicar con éxito para un 

trabajo habitual, Realizar los deberes del trabajo, 

o disfrutar de los beneficios y privilegios 

del empleo. La adaptación razonable también 

se aplica al proceso de solicitud.

¿Cómo solicito 

una adaptación 

razonable?

Por lo general, sólo hay que preguntar.

No hay ningún proceso especial para 

solicitar una adaptación, y usted no tiene

que utilizar palabras especiales. Ni 

tampoco tiene que poner su solicitud por 

escrito. Sin embargo, algunos contratistas 

tienen un proceso específico, así que 

pregunte a su empleador.

¿Qué necesito decirle a 

mi empleador?

Simplemente dígale a su empleador que 

usted necesita un ajuste o cambio en el 

trabajo debido a una discapacidad.

Esté preparado para proporcionar a su 

empleador suficiente información para 

demostrar que tiene una discapacidad.

Es importante tener en cuenta que usted no

requiere proporcionar todo su historial médico o de 

salud mental para obtener una adaptación. Usted sólo 

necesita proporcionar información pertinente para solicitar 

una adaptación.

¿Qué sucede a continuación?

Después de que se realice la solicitud, 

el empleador puede pedirle que complete 

ciertos formularios, o seguir otros 

procedimientos. Cualquier 

procedimiento que se le pida que 

siga, no podrá ser utilizado para 

evitar que se proporcione o 

se lleve a cabo la adaptación 

de manera oportuna.
Solicitando una Adaptación

ADAPTACIÓN

Su "adaptación razonable" puede ser diferente 

de las proporcionadas a otros empleados o 

solicitantes de empleo.

Esto se debe a que la adaptación depende de la 

naturaleza de la discapacidad y el tipo de trabajo.

No importa de lo que se trate la adaptación, no puede 

ser excesivamente costosa o perjudicial para su empleador.

Su empleador puede elegir el tipo de adaptación razonable 

que se pondrá a disposición; sin embargo, la adaptación 

debe permitir que un empleado o solicitante con una 

discapacidad tenga éxito.

Los ejemplos incluyen :

• Proporcionar materiales

escritos en formatos

accesibles (letra grande,

Braille, o disco).

• Ajustar o modificar los

horarios de trabajo.

• Proporcionar lectores

o intérpretes de lenguaje

de señas.

• Realizar la contratación,

entrevistas, pruebas, y

otras partes del proceso

de aplicación en lugares

accesibles.

• Realizar las reuniones

de personal en lugares

accesibles.

• Proporcionar o modificar

equipos y dispositivos.

• Ajustar o modificar políticas

y procedimientos.

• Cambiar el entorno de

trabajo de manera que

mejore la accesibilidad.

Si usted cree que ha 

experimentado discriminación 

contactese con la OFCCP:

1-800-397-6251 | TTY 1-877-889-5627 

www.dol.gov/ofccp

Septiembre, 2015
#### TOMLINSON v. BREWER

No. 13 PC.

Case below: 18 N.C. App. 696.

Petition for writ of certiorari to North Carolina Court of Appeals denied 2 October 1973.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. James McFARLAND, Jr, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 04-10786.

Summary Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Decided April 6, 2005.

Nancy E. Larson, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Reed C. O’Conner, Fort Worth, TX, for United States of America.

*574James McFarland, Jr., Beaumont, TX, pro se.

Before DAVIS, SMITH, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

James McFarland, Jr., federal prisoner # 33876-077, was convicted of four counts of robbery in violation of the Hobbs Act and four counts of using and carrying a firearm in relation to those robberies and was sentenced to a total term of 1170 months of imprisonment and five years of supervised release. McFarland sent a letter to the district court in which he stated that his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion, which he placed in the prison mail system, had been lost. His letter questioned how the loss of the motion would affect the limitations period for filing such a motion. The letter was not accompanied by a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 petition on the merits. The district court construed the letter as a motion for extension of time to file a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 petition and denied it. McFarland appealed that decision and now requests the issuance of a Certificate of Appealability (COA). We deny COA as unnecessary and affirm because the district court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the motion.

We agree with the reasoning of *United States v. Leon,*203 F.3d 162 (2d Cir.2000) (per curiam), and conclude “that a federal court lacks jurisdiction to consider the timeliness of a § 2255 petition until a petition is actually filed.” *Id.*at 163. Before the petition itself is actually filed, “there is no ease or controversy to be heard, and any opinion we were to render on the timeliness issue would be merely advisory.” *Id.*

McFarland contends that under *Spotville v. Cain,*149 F.3d 374, 375-76 (5th Cir.1998), his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 petition was “filed” when he placed it in the prison mail system and that the district court had the discretion to allow him to re-mail copies of his timely-filed motion. However, no 28 U.S.C. § 2255 petition has been received by and/or actually filed in the district court. The question when McFarland’s 28 U.S.C. § 2255 petition should be deemed filed cannot be answered until such a motion is actually received and filed in the district court.

Accordingly, the district court’s denial of McFarland’s motion is AFFIRMED.

COA DENIED AS UNNECESSARY; AFFIRMED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
Appel l ant was con v i ct ed o fr obber y i n 19 90, and he appea l ed i t to thi s cour t

. W e di sm i ssed t he 1 conv i ct i on i n Jan uar y of 199 1 an d i ssued m andat e i n M ar ch of 199 1. NO. 07-90 -023 0-CR IN THE CO UR T OF APPEA LS FO R THE S EVEN TH D ISTRI CT O F TEXAS

AT AM AR ILLO PAN EL D APR IL 29 , 200 8

_________

_________

_________

___ TIMO THY

W AY NE C AR TER, JR .,Appel lan t
v. THE S TATE OF TEXAS, Appel lee

_________

_________

_________

______ FRO M T HE 32 0 DIS T RI CT COU RT OF P OT T ER COU NT Y; TH NO. 28, 148 -D; HON. DON EMERSON, PRESIDING

_________

_________

_________

____ Memorandum Opinion

_________

_________

_________

____ Bef ore QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL AND PIRTL E, JJ. Pendi ng before us ar e tw o moti ons filed by appel lan t. The firs t i s e nti tl ed “ Mo ti on for NuncPro Tunc to cor re ct cl er ic al mis tak es of f undamental er ro r. ” The oth er bears t he lab el “M oti on to obta in document s a nd tr ial r ecords in forma pauper is .” For the follo w ing 1
re asons , w e deny

both

.2

Reg ar din g the nunc pro tun c matter , he re q uest s t hat w e di re ct the t ri al cour t and dis tr ic t c ler k t o i ncl ude add it io nal doc uments i n the appel lat e record. These do cument s w er e pur por

tedl y omi tted from thatr ecord. How ev er , w e find the req uestmoot for th e conv ic ti on i nv olv ed arose in 1990. Itw as dis mis sed by this courtin Januar

y of 1991, and
w e i ss ued mandate in Ma rc h of 19 91. The appeal hav ing ended y ears a g o, s uppl ementi ng the a ppel lat e r ecord c oul d notaff ectthe outc ome. Reg ar din g the moti on to obtain his tri al r ecords for free, appel lan t s eeks the re cords to p re p ar e a p eti ti on for habeas r eli ef to the C our t of C ri minal Appea ls

. Atte mpti ng to prosec ute suc h a w ri t ev inc es that he ex haust ed his directappeal s. See Ex pa rte Br own, 662 S.W .2d 3 , 4 (Tex. Cr im. Ap p. 19 83) (statin g tha t one must f irst ex hau st his direct appeal s b efore i nv oki ng ar t. 11.07)

. And s inc e his directappeals hav e been ex haust ed, he i s n ot en ti tl ed to a fre e r ecord. In re McCa rty , N o. 08 -0 5- 0355- CR , 200 5 Tex . Ap p. L E X IS 10197 ( Tex . Ap p.–El Pas o D ecember 8, 2005, or ig . proceed ing ); In r e T re vi no , 79 S.W .3d 7 94, 7 95- 96 ( Tex . Ap p.–C or pus Chr is ti 2002, or ig . proceed ing ). Thus , t he reli ef Car ter ul ti matel y

see ks f ro m the tr ial co urt i s n ot pe rmi tted by l aw , w it hout a s how ing of e xc epti onal ci rc umstan ces , In r e T re vi no, s upr a, an d w e ha v e be en c i te d to no su ch ci rc umstan ces . Acc or din g ly , w e deny

appel lan t’ s moti on for a nunc pro tuncj udg ment and for a free copy of the record.
Br ian Qui nn Chief Justice Do not p ubl is h.