UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

____________________________________ ) MS. Q., et al. , ) ) Plaintiffs, ) )

v. ) Civil Action. No. 18

- 2409 (PLF) ) U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ) ENFORCEMENT, et al ., ) ) Defendants. ) ____________________________________)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on defendants’ motion to dismiss

. See Dkt. No.

41. Plaintiffs, Ms. Q. and her minor son J., have opposed the motion to dismiss, see Dkt. No. 4 2 ;

defendants have not filed a reply in support of their motion. Nor have they addressed plaintiffs’
request that the Court stay these proceedings pending the outcome of plaintiffs’ asylu m proceedings. See Response to Show Cause Order, Dkt. No. 44, at 5

- 6. Accordingly , and for the

reasons described below , the Court will stay these proceedings.
Ms. Q. and her minor son J. traveled to the United States in March 2018 to seek
asylum from gang violence in El Salvador. Immigration authorities apprehended Ms. Q. and J.
shortly after they entered the United States between legal points of entry. Suspecting that Ms. Q.

herself wa s affiliated with a gang, authorities separated her from her son and took J. to a shelter
for unaccompanied minors operated by the Office of Refugee Resettlement (“ORR”)

. In October
2018, plaintiffs filed a complaint seeking declaratory relief and an inju nction that would prevent
defendants from separating Ms. Q. and J. during the pendency of their asylum petitions. S ee2 Dkt. No. 1 . The next day, plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction seeking

immediate reunification

. S ee Dkt. No. 7. Follo wing oral argument on November 27, 2018 , the
Court granted the motion for preliminary injunction, and ordered defendants to reunite Ms. Q.

and J. See Dkt. No. 26. Defendants complied with the Court’s Order to reunite Ms. Q. and J. on
November 30, 201 8 , a fter eight months of confining Ms. Q and her three

- year

- old child in
separate detention facilities

. See Supplemental Status Report, Dkt. No. 29, at 1. Plaintiffs have
now been released from defendants’ custody under an alternative to detention program while
they pursue their asylum claims

. Response at 11.
Defendants argue th at because plaintiffs ’ claims for relief are premised on their
separation , th e claims are now moot. This Court has granted motions to dismiss under related

circumstances. See , e.g. , Mejia

- Mejia v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf ’ t , 2019 WL 4707150,
at *2 (D.D.C. Sept. 26, 2019) . P laintiffs in this matter, however, have provided s pecific
information in support of their claim that a live controversy persists between plaintiffs and

defendants. First, although plaintiffs have been reunited and released, the government e xplicitly

reserved both (1) “all rights to seek review of the [Pr eliminary Injunction] Order on appeal or

otherwise , ” and (2) “the ability to take action pursuant to any request for provisional arrest or
extradition . . . without notice to this Court.” Supplemental Status Report, Dkt. No. 29, at 1.
Second, the initial separation occurred under color of criminal allegations that apparently

continue to exist : Ms. Q. and J. did not enter at a legal port of entry, and t he government has

never retracted its claim that Ms. Q.’s alleged gang affiliation

– though premised on a largely
discredited group warrant

– offers a basis to detain Ms. Q. and to separate her from her son.
Finally, frequent contact between the parties is likely to persist so long as plaintiffs seek asylum

– the very time frame identified as the focus of their request for injunctive relief

. That is3 because, u nder the terms of plaintiffs’ discretionary release , Ms. Q. must report to an office of
the Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) every three months.

But t he Court need not determine at this time whether these facts constitute a live
controversy that could be affected by relief from this Court, or whether, if not, plaintiffs’ claims

nevertheless may proceed under the “ capable of repetition yet evading review ” exception to the

mootness doctrine. See Response at 42 ; Planned Parenthood of Wisconsin, Inc. v. Azar , 2019

WL 6121445 at *3 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 19, 2019) (“That exception to mootness applies when (1) the
challenged action is in its duration too short to be fully litigated p rior to its cessation or
expiration, and (2) there is a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party will be
subjected to the same action again.”). 1 The mootness questions need not be resolved because

“ [t] he Court has the inherent power to manage its docket and stay proceedings .” Juniper
Networks, Inc. v. Bahattab , 2011 WL 13262818, at *1 (D.D.C. Mar. 31, 2011) (citing Landis v.

North America Co. , 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936). In particular, “a trial court has broad discretion to
stay all proce edings in an action pending the resolution of independent proceedings elsewhere. ”
Juniper Networks, Inc., v. Bahattab , 2011 WL 13262818 at 1. The Court finds it appropriate to
do so here. In the instant case, the outcome s of plaintiffs ’ asylum petitions , which are currently
pending before the Board of Immigration Appeals , are likely either to facilitate resolution of this
case or to alter the mootness analysis. Granting a stay in this matter would simply maintain the
status quo created by the prelimina ry injunction, and would not prejudice any party. Indeed,

1 It is clear, however, that another exception to the mootness doctrine

– the voluntary cessation exception

– is facially inapplicable to this case. Because the government reunited Ms. Q. and J. only upon the explicit order of this Court

– and then, only a t the last minute, while maintaining their objections

– the cessation was definitionally in voluntary. Cf

. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. , 528 U.S. 167, 190 (2000) (“[A] defendant claiming that its voluntary compliance moots a case bears the formidable burden of showing that the wrongful behavior will not reoccur.”).4 defendants have not interposed an objection to plaintiffs’ suggestion that the case be stayed.
Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED that this matter is STAYED until further order of this Court; it is
FURTHER ORDERED that defendants’ motion to dismiss [Dkt. No. 4 1 ] is
HELD IN ABEYANCE until further order of this Court; it is

FURTHER ORDERED that the parties shall submit a joint status report on or

before January 21 , 20 20 , informing the court of the status of this litigation and the progress of
the plaintiffs’ asylum proceedings; and it is

FURTHER ORDERED that the parties shall submit a joint status report within

seven days of any material change in either plaintiff’s asylum or custodi al status.

SO ORDERED.

___________________________ PAUL L. FRIEDMAN United States District Judge

DATE: November 21, 2019