alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Damon Richard NELSON, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 04-1306.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

April 8, 2005.

Elizabeth A. Stafford, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Detroit, MI, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

John R. Minock, Cramer, Minock *&*Gallagher, Ann Arbor, MI, for Defendants Appellant.

Before MARTIN, COOK, and LAY,* Circuit Judges.

*

 The Honorable Donald P. Lay, Circuit Judge for the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation.

PER CURIAM.

Damon Nelson appeals his sentence for being a felon in possession of a firearm and possessing with intent to distribute crack, arguing that the district court erred in sentencing him under “mandatory” Guidelines, in light of *United States v. Booker,*— U.S.-, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 *703L.Ed.2d 621 (2005). We agree that the district court erred, and presume this prejudiced Nelson. *See United States v. Barnett,*398 F.3d 516, 525-30 (6th Cir.2005). Because nothing in the record rebuts this presumption, we vacate Nelson’s sentence and remand for resentencing in *Booker.*light of
EXHIBIT 23



CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM



We consent to the incorporation by reference in the following Registration Statements and in the related Prospectuses of WMS Industries Inc.



|(1) | Registration Statement No. 333-57585 on Form S-8 filed June 24, 1998,
|--- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------



|(2) | Registration Statement No. 333-46726 on Form S-8 filed September 27, 2000,
|--- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------



|(3) | Registration Statement No. 333-55574 on Form S-8 filed February 14, 2001,
|--- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------



|(4) | Registration Statement No. 333-101538 on Form S-8 filed November 27, 2002,
|--- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------



|(5) | Registration Statement No. 333-107321 on Form S-3 filed July 25, 2003,
|--- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------



|(6) | Registration Statement No. 333-121199 on Form S-8 filed December 13, 2004,
|--- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------



|(7) | Registration Statement No. 333-121766 on Form S-8 filed December 30, 2004, and
|--- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|(8) | Registration Statement No. 333-139425 on Form S-8 filed December 15, 2006
|--- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------



of our reports dated August 28, 2007, with respect to the consolidated financial statements and schedule of WMS
Industries Inc and the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting of WMS Industries Inc., included in this Annual Report (Form 10-K) for the year ended June 30, 2007.



/s/    Ernst & Young



Chicago, Illinois

August 28, 2007
```

[Congressional Bills 111th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 5643 Introduced in House (IH)]

111th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 5643

    To amend the Toxic Substances Control Act to prohibit the use, 
  production, sale, importation, or exportation of the poison sodium 
 fluoroacetate (known as ``Compound 1080'') and to prohibit the use of 
                  sodium cyanide for predator control.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             June 30, 2010

     Mr. DeFazio (for himself, Mr. Campbell, Mr. George Miller of 
   California, Mr. Grijalva, Mr. Hinchey, Mr. Moran of Virginia, Mr. 
    McGovern, Mrs. Maloney, Ms. McCollum, Mr. Tierney, Mr. Smith of 
Washington, and Mr. Kucinich) introduced the following bill; which was 
 referred to the Committee on Energy and Commerce, and in addition to 
    the Committee on the Judiciary, for a period to be subsequently 
   determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such 
 provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
    To amend the Toxic Substances Control Act to prohibit the use, 
  production, sale, importation, or exportation of the poison sodium 
 fluoroacetate (known as ``Compound 1080'') and to prohibit the use of 
                  sodium cyanide for predator control.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Compound 1080 and Sodium Cyanide 
Elimination Act''.

SEC. 2. PROHIBITION ON USE, PRODUCTION, SALE, IMPORTATION, OR 
              EXPORTATION OF COMPOUND 1080.

    Section 6 of the Toxic Substances Control Act (15 U.S.C. 2605) is 
amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:
    ``(g) Compound 1080.--The use, production, sale, importation, or 
exportation of sodium fluoroacetate (known as `Compound 1080') is 
prohibited. Any person who violates this subsection shall be fined 
under title 18, United States Code, or imprisoned not more than 2 
years, or both.''.

SEC. 3. PROHIBITION ON USE OF SODIUM CYANIDE FOR PREDATOR CONTROL.

    (a) Prohibited Act.--Sodium cyanide may not be used in a predator 
control device.
    (b) Penalty.--Whoever uses sodium cyanide in a predator control 
device shall be fined under title 18, United States Code, or imprisoned 
not more than 2 years, or both.
    (c) Predator Control Device.--In this section, the term ``predator 
control device'' means--
            (1) a dispenser designed to propel sodium cyanide when 
        activated by an animal; and
            (2) any other means of dispensing sodium cyanide, including 
        in the form of sodium cyanide capsules, for wildlife management 
        or other animal control purposes.
                                 <all>
```
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 97-11330 Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus JUAN RODRIQUEZ, a/k/a Juan Rodriguez Defendant-Appellant.

- - - - - - - - - - Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 94-CR-24-1

- - - - - - - - - - October 22, 1998 Before POLITZ, Chief Judge, and WIENER and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * Juan Rodriquez, Texas prisoner # 687029, appeals the district court’s denial of his motion for his “Federal Sentence to Run Concurrent with Remainder of State Sentence.” Rodriquez contends that his federal sentence should have commenced when he was remanded to the custody of the United States Marshal after sentencing. Rodriquez was “loaned” to federal authorities pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendumto answer the federal charges pending against him. He was thereafter returned to TexasNo. 97-11330 -2-

authorities. See Causey v. Civiletti , 621 F.2d 691, 693 (5th Cir. 1980)(if a defendant in state custody is turned over to federal officials for federal prosecution, the state government’s loss of jurisdiction is only temporary and the prisoner will be returned to state custody at the completion of the federal proceedings). “A sentence to a term of imprisonment commences on the date the defendant is received in custody awaiting transportation to . . . the official detention facility at which the sentence is to be served.” 18 U.S.C. § 3585. Rodriquez could not be received by the federal authorities for service of his federal sentence until he was released by Texas authorities. See Blackshear v. United States , 434 F.2d 58, 59 (5th Cir. 1970). The district court’s denial of Rodriquez’s motion is
AFFIRMED.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 07-7657

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff – Appellee, 

 v. 

DEZMEND RASHAWN DOWEARY, a/k/a Hit, 

 Defendant – Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Raymond A. Jackson, District 

Judge. (2:04-cr-00016-RAJ-1; 2:07-cv-00280-RAJ) 

Submitted: August 27, 2009 Decided: September 4, 2009 

Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, WILKINSON, Circuit Judge, and 

HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge. 

Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

Dezmend Rashawn Doweary, Appellant Pro Se. Darryl James 

Mitchell, Assistant United States Attorney, Norfolk, Virginia, 

for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
PER CURIAM: 

Dezmend Rashawn Doweary appeals the district court’s 

order dismissing as untimely his motion under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 

(West Supp. 2009). Having previously granted a certificate of 

appealability, see 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c) (2006), we now conclude 

that the district court erred in dismissing the motion. 

The district court entered its judgment of conviction 

on November 29, 2004, and Doweary timely appealed. We dismissed 

the appeal on March 30, 2006. Doweary did not petition for a 

writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court. Thus, his conviction 

became final ninety days later on June 28, 2006, see Clay v. 

United States, 537 U.S. 522, 527 (2003), and he had until June 

28, 2007, to file his § 2255 motion. Doweary’s § 2255 motion 

was dated June 13, 2007, and received by the district court on 

June 21, 2007. The district court ruled that Doweary’s 

conviction became final on November 29, 2004, and his § 2255 

motion was time-barred. On appeal, Doweary contends the 

district court erred in ruling his motion was time-barred. In 

its responsive brief, the Government concedes that Doweary’s 

§ 2255 motion was timely filed, and the district court’s order 

should be reversed. 

Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s order 

dismissing Doweary’s § 2255 motion as untimely, and we remand 

the case for reconsideration of the motion. We dispense with 

2 
3 

oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 

adequately presented in the materials before the court and 

argument would not aid the decisional process. 

VACATED AND REMANDED
Exhibit 32.1



CERTIFICATION  PURSUANT TO THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906

OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





I, John Swallow, CEO, and Chairman of the Board of Directors of Timberline Resources Corporation (the Company), do hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to my knowledge:



1.  This Quarterly Report on 10QSB of the Company for the period ended December 31, 2005 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the report), fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



2.  The information contained in the report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



Date: May 31, 2006.



/s/ John Swallow



_______________________

John Swallow

(CEO and Chairman of the Board of Directors)





























---
Written Statement of the Chief Financial Officer

     Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss.1350, I, the undersigned Executive Vice President
and Chief Financial Officer of Journal Communications, Inc. (the "Company"),
hereby certify, based on my knowledge, that the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of
the Company for the quarter ended June 16, 2002 (the "Report") fully complies
with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
and that information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.


/s/ Paul M. Bonaiuto
------------------------------------------
Paul M. Bonaiuto
July 30, 2002
I 

111TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 5067 

To prohibit any use of eminent domain authority by the United States 

to expand the Pinon Canyon Maneuver Site in southeastern Colorado. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

APRIL 20, 2010 

Mr. COFFMAN of Colorado introduced the following bill; which was referred 

to the Committee on Armed Services 

A BILL 

To prohibit any use of eminent domain authority by the 

United States to expand the Pinon Canyon Maneuver 

Site in southeastern Colorado. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. PROHIBITION ON USE OF EMINENT DOMAIN 

4 AUTHORITY TO EXPAND PINON CANYON MA5 NEUVER SITE, COLORADO. 

6 The Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the 

7 Army may not use eminent domain authority to expand 

8 the Pinon Canyon Maneuver Site in southeastern Colo9 rado. 

Æ 


tjames on DSK5CLS3C1PROD with BILLS
# L_2007155EN.01003401.xml

| 15.6.2007 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 155/34 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.6.2007

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 155/34

---

COMMISSION REGULATION (EC) No 664/2007

of 14 June 2007

fixing the maximum export refund for white sugar in the framework of the standing invitation to tender provided for in Regulation (EC) No 38/2007

THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community,

Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 318/2006 of 20 February 2006 on the common organisation of the markets in the sugar sector (1), and in particular the second subparagraph and point (b) of the third subparagraph of Article 33(2) thereof,

Whereas:

| (1) | Commission Regulation (EC) No 38/2007 of 17 January 2007 opening a standing invitation to tender for the resale for export of sugar held by the intervention agencies of Belgium, the Czech Republic, Spain, Ireland, Italy, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Sweden (2) requires the issuing of partial invitations to tender. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

Commission Regulation (EC) No 38/2007 of 17 January 2007 opening a standing invitation to tender for the resale for export of sugar held by the intervention agencies of Belgium, the Czech Republic, Spain, Ireland, Italy, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Sweden (2) requires the issuing of partial invitations to tender.

| (2) | Pursuant to Article 4(1) of Regulation (EC) No 38/2007 and following an examination of the tenders submitted in response to the partial invitation to tender ending on 13 June 2007, it is appropriate to fix a maximum export refund for that partial invitation to tender. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

Pursuant to Article 4(1) of Regulation (EC) No 38/2007 and following an examination of the tenders submitted in response to the partial invitation to tender ending on 13 June 2007, it is appropriate to fix a maximum export refund for that partial invitation to tender.

| (3) | The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Management Committee for Sugar, |
| --- | --- |

(3)

The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Management Committee for Sugar,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

For the partial invitation to tender ending on 13 June 2007, the maximum export refund for the product referred to in Article 1(1) of Regulation (EC) No 38/2007 shall be 435,00 EUR/tonne.

Article 2

This Regulation shall enter into force on 15 June 2007.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 14 June 2007.

For the Commission

Jean-Luc DEMARTY

Director-General for Agriculture and Rural Development

---

(1)  
  OJ L 58, 28.2.2006, p. 1. Regulation as last amended by Commission Regulation (EC) No 247/2007 (OJ L 69, 9.3.2007, p. 3).

1

(2)  
  OJ L 11, 18.1.2007, p. 4. Regulation as amended by Regulation (EC) No 203/2007 (OJ L 61, 28.2.2006, p. 3).

2

---
#### EQUITY ASSOCIATES v. SOCIETY FOR SAVINGS

No. 118 PC.

Case below: 81 N.C. App. 182.

Petition by defendant for discretionary review under G.S. 7A-31 denied 31 January 1977.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

FERMIN GONZALEZ VASQUEZ, 

Petitioner, 

 v. 

MATTHEW G. WHITAKER, Acting 

Attorney General, 

Respondent.

No. 17-72804 

Agency No. A070-669-661 

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted January 15, 2019**

Before: TROTT, TALLMAN, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.

Fermin Gonzalez Vasquez, a native and citizen of Guatemala, petitions for 

review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal 

from an immigration judge’s order denying his motion to reopen deportation 

proceedings conducted in absentia. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. 

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

JAN 18 2019

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 17-72804 

We review for abuse of discretion the denial of a motion to reopen, and we review 

de novo constitutional claims. Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 791-92 (9th 

Cir. 2005). We deny the petition for review.

The agency did not abuse its discretion or violate due process in denying 

Gonzalez Vasquez’s motion to reopen as untimely, where he filed it 21 years after 

his final order of deportation, and he failed to show diligence for equitable tolling 

of the filing deadline. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(4)(iii)(A)(1); Avagyan v. Holder, 

646 F.3d 672, 679 (9th Cir. 2011) (equitable tolling is available to an alien who is 

prevented from timely filing a motion to reopen due to deception, fraud, or error, 

as long as the alien exercises due diligence in discovering such circumstances); 

Lata v. INS, 204 F.3d 1241, 1246 (9th Cir. 2000) (requiring error and substantial 

prejudice to prevail on a due process challenge). 

Because the timeliness determination is dispositive, we do not reach

Gonzalez Vasquez’s contentions regarding exceptional circumstances. See 

Simeonov v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 532, 538 (9th Cir. 2004) (courts and agencies are 

not required to reach non-dispositive issues). 

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
#### STATE v. MOTSINGER

No. 18 PC.

Case below: 31 N.C. App. 594.

Petition by defendant for discretionary review under G.S. 7A-31 denied 14 January 1977.
#### Billy MCNEELY, Plaintiff—Appellant, v. Jo Anne B. BARNHART, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, Defendant—Appellee.

No. 04-55381.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted March 23, 2005.*

Decided April 4, 2005.

Lawrence D. Rohlfing, Esq., Rohlfing Law Firm, Santa Fe Springs, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

James R. Sullivan, Esq., USLA—Office of the U.S. Attorney, Civil & Tax Divisions, Los Angeles, CA, Michael A. Cabotaje, Social Security Administration, San Francisco, CA, for Defendant-Appellee.

Before: B. FLETCHER, TROTT, and PAEZ, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Billy McNeely appeals the district court’s dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction his action challenging the denial by the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration of his application for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) pursuant to Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1381 et seq. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, *Subia v. Commissioner of Social Security,*264 F.3d 899, 901 (9th Cir.2001), and we affirm.

On May 23, 2002, an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) denied McNeely’s request for SSI benefits, and McNeely was advised of his right to file an appeal with the Appeals Council within 60 days of the date of the ALJ’s decision. McNeely did not file an appeal until nearly four months later. The Appeals Council dismissed McNeely’s appeal because McNeely failed to show good cause for its tardiness. The dismissal order was not a final reviewable order, and the district court properly concluded that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. *See Matlock v. Sullivan,*908 F.2d 492, 493 (9th Cir.1990).

*168Contrary to McNeely’s contention, there is no evidence that the Appeals Council’s letter of April 24, 2003 invited a briefing on the merits, or that the Appeals Council indicated an intent to waive the timeliness issue.

McNeely’s remaining contentions lack merit.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
##### 



Exhibit 31.2 CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER PURSUANT TO
SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 I, Bonnie L. Herron, the Chief Financial Officer of Intelligent Systems Corporation, certify that:  1.
    I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-KSB of Intelligent Systems Corporation;2.
    Based on my knowledge, this annual report does not contain any untrue statement of a material
fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period
covered by this annual report;3.
    Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in
this annual report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results
of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this
annual report;4.
    The registrants other certifying officers and I are responsible for establishing and
maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and
15d-15(e) for the registrant and we have:  a)
    designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure
controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material
information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made
known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this
annual report is being prepared; andb)
    evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure controls and procedures
and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure
controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such
evaluation; andc)
    disclosed in this report any change in the registrants internal control over
financial reporting that occurred during the registrants most recent fiscal quarter (the
registrants fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially
affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrants internal control
over financial reporting.  5.
    The registrants other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based on our most recent
evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrants auditors and the
audit committee of registrants board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent
functions):  a)
    all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of
internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect
the registrants ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information;
andb)
    any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who
have a significant role in the registrants internal control over financial reporting. Date: March 30, 2005 /s/ Bonnie L. HerronBonnie L. HerronChief Financial Officer Intelligent Systems Corporation