MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT Reporter	of	Decisions

Decision: 2022 ME	45

Docket: Ken-21-370

Submitted

On	Briefs: June	22,	2022

Decided: August	11,	2022

Panel: MEAD,	JABAR,	HORTON,	and	LAWRENCE,	JJ.

JULIE	BEEDLE

v.

DUANE	BEEDLE

LAWRENCE,	J.

[¶1]	 Duane	 Beedle	 appeals	 from	 a	 judgment	 of	 the	 District	 Court	

(Waterville,	 Gilbert,	 J.)	 granting	 Julie	 Beedle’s	 motion to	 amend	 a	

2019 stipulated	 order	 by	 inserting	 a	 vehicle	 or	 serial	 identification	 number	

next	 to	 each alleged	 corresponding	 item	 of	 personal	 property	 listed	 in	 that	

stipulated	order.		Duane	argues	that	Julie’s	motion	is	untimely.		We	agree	and	

therefore	vacate	the	order	and	remand	for	dismissal	of	the	motion.

I.		BACKGROUND

[¶2]		The	following	facts	are	taken from	the	procedural	record.		See, e.g.,	

Philbrook	 v.	 Theriault,	 2008	 ME	 152,	 ¶	 2,	 957	 A.2d	 74.	 	 The	 parties	 were	

divorced	 by	 judgment	 entered	 by	 the	 court	 (Stanfill,	 J.)	 in	 January	 2013.		

Between	 2014	 and	 2018,	 they	 filed various	 post-judgment	 motions.	 	 On	
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January 3,	2019, having	reached	an	agreement	the	preceding	day,	the	parties	

presented	 their	 stipulations	 to	 the	 court. Without	 a	 hearing	 on	 the	

post-judgment	 motions	 pending	 at	 that	 time, the	 court	 (Montgomery,	 J.)	

executed a	stipulated	order	on	that	same	day.		The	stipulated	order	required

that	Duane	pay	$50,000	to	Julie	over	a	period	of	two	years.		Specifically,	$25,000	

was	to	be	paid	to	Julie	immediately,	with	the	remaining	$25,000	to	be	paid	to	

Julie	in	two	later installments.		To	secure	payment	of	the	remaining	$25,000,	

the	 stipulated	 order	 further	 required	 that	 Duane	 grant	 to	 Julie	 a	 security	

interest	in	certain	items	of	personal	property,	which	were	listed	by	name	or	

description	 but	 were	 not accompanied	 by	 an identifying	 number,	 such	 as	 a	

vehicle or	serial identification	number.1

[¶3]		After	Julie	filed	motions	for	contempt,	to	enforce,	and	for	a	turnover	

order,	 14	 M.R.S.	 §	 3131	 (2022),	 the	 court	 entered	 an	 order	 for	 a	 writ	 of	

possession,	 dated	 August	 27,	 2020,	 commanding	 the	 sheriff	 to	 provide	 Julie	

with	 possession	 of	 the	 personal	 property	listed	 as	 security	 for	 the	 debt	 still	

owed	by	Duane	pursuant	to	the	stipulated	order.		When	execution	of	the	writ	of	

possession	was	unsuccessful,	Julie	 filed	another	motion	 for	contempt against	

1		The	items	of	personal	property	in	which	Duane	was	required	to	grant	Julie	a	security	interest	

were	listed	in	the	stipulated	order	as	follows:	“Lund	Fishing	Boat	and	Trailer;	1977	Corvette	Stingray;	

Large	covered	trailer;	Harley	Davidson	Electra	Glide;	Honda	ATV;	Snowmobiles;	and	Snap-on	Tools.”
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Duane. The	court	(Rushlau,	J.)	entered	an	order,	dated	July	16,	2021,	dismissing

Julie’s	 motion	 for	 contempt	 without	 prejudice	 because	 she	 failed	 to	 provide	

proper	notice	to	Duane.		In	the	July	16 order, the	court	observed that	the	list	of	

personal	property	items	in	the	2019 stipulated	order	lacked	unique	identifying	

numbers,	 and	 it	 noted	 that	 Julie	 had	 never	 moved	 to	 amend	 that	 order	 to	

include	such unique	identifying	information.

2		

[¶4]		On	September	20,	2021,	Julie,	through	her	counsel, filed	a	motion	to	

amend	the	2019	stipulated	order.		She	cited no	rule	of	court	or	other	authority	

for	 her	 request,	 but	 nonetheless asked the	 court	 to	 add	 vehicle or	 serial	

identification	numbers	next	to	the	corresponding	names	or	descriptions	of	the	

personal	property	items	in	which	she	was	to	be	granted	a	security	interest.3 In	

support	of	her	motion,	Julie	attached	what	appears	to	be	a	security	agreement,	

signed	by	Duane	and	dated	January	2,	2019,	granting	Julie	a	security	interest	in	

the	 personal	 property	 specified	in	 the	January	 3,	 2019, stipulated	 order	and	

listing	the	items’	corresponding	serial	or	vehicle	identification	numbers.		Julie	

also	attached	what	appears	 to	 be	a	UCC	 financing	 statement	 on	 file	with	 the	

2		Because	the	order	on	Julie’s	contempt	motion	is	not	before	us	and	the	court	did	not	reach	the	

merits	ofthat	motion,	we	express	no	view	on	whether	the	stipulated	order	would	need	to	be	amended	

for	Julie	to	pursue	a	contempt	motion.	

3		Julie’s	motion	to	amend	did	not,	however,	seek	the	addition	of	identification	numbers	for	the	

Snowmobiles	or	Snap-on	Tools.		
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Secretary	of	State,	which	provides	for	Julie’s	security	interest	in	the	items	listed	

in	the	stipulated	order	and, like	the	security	agreement, lists	the	corresponding	

unique	identification	number	for	each	item.		

[¶5]		Duane	filed	an	objection,	dated	October	4,	2021,	to	Julie’s	motion	to	

amend in	which	he	represented	that	he	received	Julie’s	motion	via	regular	mail	

on	the	same	day	that	it	had	been	filed	with	the	court. In	his	objection,	Duane	

argued	 only	 that	 the	 motion	 was	 untimely,	 contending	 that	 it	 was	 untimely	

regardless	 of	 whether	 it	 was	 treated	 as	 a	 motion	 to	 alter	 or	 amend	 the	

judgment,	see M.R.	Civ.	P.	59(e),	or	as	a	motion	for	relief	from	judgment	based	

on	 mistake,	 inadvertence,	 excusable	 neglect,	 newly	 discovered	 evidence,	 or	

fraud,	see M.R.	Civ.	P.	60(b).		

[¶6]		Construing Julie’s	motion	as	“a	motion	to	correct	an	ambiguity	or	

clerical	error”	in	the	stipulated	order,	see M.R.	Civ.	P.	60(a), the	court	(Gilbert, J.)	

granted	 Julie’s	 motion	 without	 holding	 a	 hearing. By	 judgment dated	

October 22,	 2021,	 the	 court	 sought	 to	 “clarify”	 an	 “ambiguity”	 in	 the	 2019	

stipulated	order	and	directed that	the	list	of	personal	property	in	that order	be	

corrected to	 include	 the	 corresponding	 vehicle	 or	 other	 serial	 identification	

numbers.		Duane	timely	appealed	the	judgment.		See M.R.	App.	P.	2B(c)(1).		
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II.		DISCUSSION

[¶7]	 	 Duane	 argues	 that	 the	 court	 erred	 in	 granting	 Julie’s	 motion	

pursuant	 to	 Rule	 60(a)	 because	 amending	 the	 stipulated	 order	 to	 include	

identifying	 numbers	 associated	 with	 the	 items	 of	 personal	 property	 was	 a	

substantive	change	rather	than	the	mere	correction	of	a	clerical	error.

4 He also	

contends that	Julie’s	post-judgment	motion	was	untimely filed pursuant	to	M.R.	

Civ.	P. 52(b),	59(e),	and	60(b).

[¶8]	 	 “We	 review	 an	 order	 on	 a	 post-divorce	 motion	 for	 abuse	 of	

discretion	 or	 error	 of	 law,	 but	 review	 the	 interpretation	 of	 Rules	 of	 Civil	

Procedure	 de	 novo.”5	 	 Bridges	 v.	 Caouette,	 2020	 ME	 50,	 ¶	 10,	 230 A.3d 1

(quotation	marks and	citation omitted).		Maine	Rule	of	Civil	Procedure	60(a)	

provides, “Clerical	mistakes	in	judgments,	orders	or	other	parts	of	the	record	

and	errors	therein	arising	from	oversight	or	omission	may	be	corrected	by	the	

4		We	address	this	argument	despite	Duane’s	failure	to	raise	it	in	his	objection	to	Julie’s	motion	to	

amend	because Duane	could	not	have	known	that	the	court	would	construe	Julie’s	motion to	amend

as	a	motion	to	correct	a	clerical	mistake.		We	do	not,	however,	address Duane’s	argument	that	he	was	

never	formally	served	with	Julie’s	motion	pursuant	to	M.R.	Civ.	P.	103,	which	also	was	not raised in	

Duane’s objection	to	Julie’s	motion and	is	therefore	waived.		See	Moores	v.	Doyle,	2003	ME	105,	¶	7,	

829	A.2d	260 (“Unless	the	defense	of	insufficient	service	of	process	is	raised	in	a	responsive	pleading	

or	 by	 motion,	 it	 is	 not	 preserved	 for	 appellate	 review.”);	 M.R.	 Civ.	 P.	 106(b).	 	 In	 fact,	 Duane	

acknowledged	receipt	of	Julie’s	motion	in	his	objection.		

5		Neither	party	asserts,	nor	do	we	discern,	that	the	court	“utilized	its	inherent	authority	to	clarify	

an	ambiguous	provision”	in	the	stipulated	order.		Thompson	v.	Rothman,	2002	ME	39,	¶	1,	791	A.2d	

921.
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court	at	any	 time	of	its	own	initiative	or	on	 the	motion	of	any	party.”		Relief	

under	Rule 60(a)	is	limited	to	clerical	mistakes	and	is	not	available	to	correct	

substantive	errors.		Bean	v.	Cummings,	2008	ME	18,	¶	18,	939	A.2d	676;	Bridges,	

2020	ME	50,	¶	12,	230	A.3d	1. We	have	interpreted	that limitation	to	mean	that	

“Rule 60(a)	may	be	invoked	only	when	 the clerical	error	is	obvious	 from	 the	

face	of	the	judgment.”		Bridges,	2020	ME	50,	¶¶ 12-13,	230	A.3d	1 (holding	that	

the	 court	 could	 not,	 pursuant	 to	 Rule	 60(a),	 correct	 a	 “patent	 ambiguity”	

resulting	from	two	conflicting	terms	in	a	divorce	judgment	when	the	error	was	

not	“obvious	 from	 the	 four	corners	of	 the	document”);	see Waning	v.	Dep’t	of	

Transp.,	2008	ME	95,	¶¶	3,	5,	11,	953	A.2d	365 (explaining that,	when	an	order	

improperly	identified	property	as	being	located	in	Gray,	the	amendment	of	that	

order,	 correcting the	 description	 of	 the	 property	 to	 its	 actual	 location	 in	

New Gloucester, was	a	substantive	change).

[¶9]		Here,	the	absence	of	vehicle	or	other	serial	identification	numbers	

from	 the	 stipulated	 order	 does	 not	 appear from	 the	 four	 corners	 of	 that	

stipulated	order	to	be	an	obvious	clerical	error.

6		It	is	telling	that	the	identifying	

6		Because the correction	of	a	clerical	error	under	Rule	60(a)	requires	that	the	error	be	discernible	

from	the	four	corners	of	the	judgment	that	a	party	seeks	to	amend,	the	court’s	comment	in	its	July	16,	

2021,	order—observing	in	passing	that	the	stipulated	order	lacked identifying	numbers—does	not	

somehow	transmute the	absence	of	such	numbers	into	a	clerical	mistake in	the inarguably	separate	

and	distinct	stipulated	order issued over	two	and	one-half years before the	comment.
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numbers	had	to	be	provided to	the	court	in	the	form	of	the	exhibits	attached	to	

Julie’s	motion	in	order	for	it	to	correct	the	alleged	clerical	error.		The	fact	that	

such extrinsic	evidence	was	necessary	for	the	court’s	Rule	60(a)	determination	

underscores	that	the	attempt	 to “correct”	the	stipulated	order	 to	include	 the	

identifying	 numbers	 constituted	 a	 substantive	 change	 rather	 than	 the	

correction	of	a	clerical	omission.		Moreover,	the	absence	of	a	hearing	left	the	

trial	court,	and	now us,	without	the	capacity	to	review	the	admissibility	of	those

exhibits.

7 See Town	 of	 Gorham	 v.	 Duchaine,	 2020	 ME	 7,	 ¶ 11,	 224	 A.3d	 241

(“[S]imply	attaching	documents	to	a	motion	is	not	the	equivalent	of	properly	

introducing	or	admitting	them	as	evidence.		Documents	attached	to	motions	are	

not part	 of	 the	 record	 and	 therefore	 cannot	 be	 considered	 evidence	 in	 the	

record	on	appeal.”);	Deutsche	Bank	Nat’l	Tr. Co.	v.	Wilk,	2013	ME	79,	¶	14,	76	

A.3d	363 (“[A]	 fact-finder	may	not	consider	 facts	not	properly	in	evidence	or	

made	 part	 of	 the	 record.”).	 	 To	 the	 extent	 that	 there	 was	 an	 oversight	 or	

7 Similarly,	the	absence	of	a	hearing	on	January	3,	2019,	when	the	stipulated	order	was	executed,	

makes	it	unclear	whether	the	identifying	numbers	were	even	provided	to	the	court.		If	neither	party

proffered this	information,	 the	lack	of	identifying	numbers	in	 the	stipulated	order	could	not	have	

been	the	result	of	the	court’s	oversight	or	omission.
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omission	of	the	type	contemplated	by	Rule 60(a),	there	must	be	evidence	in	the	

record	to	show	that inadvertent	error	by	the	court.

[¶10]	 	 Because	 amending	 the	 stipulated	 order	 to	 include	 vehicle and	

serial identification	numbers	constituted	a	substantive	change,	Julie’s	motion	

to	amend	the	2019	stipulated	order	should	have	been	considered	pursuant	to	

Rule	59(e)	as	a motion	to	alter	or	amend	the judgment and	then	dismissed	as	

untimely.		See M.R.	Civ.	P.	59(e) (requiring	that	motions	to	alter	or	amend	the	

judgment	be	filed	not	later	than	14	days	after	entry	of	the	judgment).8

The	entry	is:

Judgment	vacated	and	remanded	for	dismissal.

Stephen	C.	Smith,	Esq.,	Steve	Smith	Trial	Lawyers,	Augusta,	for	appellant	Duane	

Beedle

Brenden	Smith,	Esq.,	Law	Office	of	Brenden	Smith,	Bowdoinham,	for	appellee	

Julie	Beedle

Waterville	District	Court	docket	number	FM-2010-415

FOR	CLERK	REFERENCE	ONLY

8 Julie	filed	her	motion	to	amend	the	stipulated	order	977 days	after	the	January	17,	2019, filing	

deadline established pursuant	to	Rule	59(e)	(i.e.,	fourteen	days	after	the	entry	of	the	stipulated	order

by	the	court	on	January	3,	2019).