* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_____________________

No. 95-40848

Summary Calendar

_____________________

MORRIS DALE GEORGE,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

JAMES A. LYNAUGH, Director; JAMES E. RILEY, Executive Director of

TDCJ; JAMES A. Collins, Director; ROBERT OWENS, Director of Pardons

and Paroles Division of TDCJ; MELINDA BOZARTH, Director of Pardons

and Paroles Division of TDCJ; WILLIAM H. BROOKS, Director of Parole

Selection, TDCJ Pardon and Parole Division; JIM BOWLES, Dallas

County Sheriff; ISRAEL ALVAREZ, Administrative Assistant to the

State Classification Committee; CAY CANNON, TDCJ Bureau of

Classification; NATHANIEL QUARTERMAN, Warden, Coffield Unit; HARRY

KINKER, Warden, Coffield Unit; HILTON C. BRYANT, Chief of Unit

Classification, Coffield Unit; UNIDENTIFIED ROGER, Unidentified

Agent of Dallas Sheriff's Office; Records Division, 

Defendants - Appellees.

________________________________________________

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Texas

(6:95-CV-335)

________________________________________________

March 20, 1996

Before DAVIS, BARKSDALE, and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Morris Dale George, pro se and in forma pauperis, appeals the

dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. We AFFIRM.
- 2 -

I.

George's action concerned the deprivation of jail time credit

for 138 days that George spent in custody on a parole prerevocation

warrant. George was confined to the Dallas County jail and

Concept, Inc. I.S.F. from March 1992 until July 1992, when the

warrant was withdrawn and his parole continued. He was later

arrested on a second prerevocation warrant; his parole was revoked;

and he was returned to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice

(TDCJ). George realized, after his arrival at the Coffield Unit,

that he had not been credited for the 138 days that he was confined

pursuant to the first warrant. George alleged that he notified

various officials, but to no avail. George ultimately sought and

received state habeas relief, but, by that time, he had been

released on mandatory supervision. George contends that the

failure to credit his time caused him to remain in prison four and

one half extra months.

George consented to trial by a magistrate judge. He contended

that his right to due process was violated by the many defendants,

which the magistrate judge described as forming two groups: the

first was state officials, employed by the prison system, who

failed to correct the problem once George was returned to the TDCJ;

and the second was members of the Dallas County Sheriff's

Department (the sheriff and one unnamed defendant) who failed to

provide the TDCJ with documentation showing the 138 days George

spent in custody.
- 3 -

The magistrate judge transferred the claims against the

sheriff and unnamed defendant to the Northern District of Texas,

where she determined venue was proper, but retained the claims

against the state officials. Regarding those claims, the

magistrate judge held they had no basis in law and dismissed them.

II.

At issue are whether the magistrate judge abused her

discretion by dismissing the claims against the state officials as

frivolous, by denying George's motion to amend his complaint, and

by refusing to appoint counsel to represent him; and whether the

magistrate judge erred in transferring the claims against the

Dallas County defendants.

A.

George claimed that the state officials denied his right to

due process. An in forma pauperis complaint may be dismissed as

frivolous, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d), if it lacks an arguable

basis in fact and law, and we review such a dismissal for abuse of

discretion. E.g., Ancar v. Sara Plasma, 964 F.2d 465, 468 (5th

Cir. 1992). Because George received an adequate post deprivation

remedy, in the form of state habeas relief, and because George did

not allege any facts to demonstrate that the conduct of any of

these defendants rose above mere negligence, the magistrate judge

correctly concluded that George's claim of constitutional harm

lacked any basis in law. There was no abuse of discretion.
- 4 -

B.

Denial of leave to amend a complaint is reviewed only for

abuse of discretion. E.g., Ashe v. Corley, 992 F.2d 540, 542 (5th

Cir. 1993). George failed to file a proper amended complaint with

his motion. Rather, the complaint incorporated and made reference

to the original complaint. Denial of leave to amend was within the

magistrate judge's discretion.

C.

We review the denial of a motion to appoint counsel for abuse

of discretion. E.g., Ulmer v. Chancellor, 691 F.2d 209, 212 (5th

Cir. 1982). A trial court is not required to appoint counsel for an

indigent plaintiff in a § 1983 action unless exceptional

circumstances exist. Ulmer, 691 at 212. Because this case does

not involve particularly complex facts or require skill in the

presentation of evidence or cross examination, and because George

has demonstrated his ability to present the issues, the magistrate

judge acted within her discretion.

D.

Because an order transferring venue is an interlocutory order

and is not appealable, we lack jurisdiction on this appeal to

review the transfer of the claims against the county defendants.

See Enplanar, Inc. v. Marsh, 11 F.3d 1284, 1298 (5th Cir.), cert.

denied, __ U.S. __, 115 S. Ct. 312 (1994).

III.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment is 

AFFIRMED.