alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA ex rel. UTILITIES COMMISSION and VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY v. RUFUS L. EDMISTEN, ATTORNEY GENERAL

No. 143

(Filed 31 January 1977)

Appeal by the Attorney General from the judgment of the Court of Appeals, reported in 30 N.C. App. 474, 227 S.E. 2d 602, affirming the order of the North Carolina Utilities Commission, Martin, J., dissenting. Following the enactment of G.S. 62-134 (e) terminating, as of 1 September 1975, all monthly fuel adjustment rate increases based upon the increased cost of fuel, pursuant to a fuel cost adjustment clause previously approved by the Commission, the Commission entered an order permitting Virginia Electric and Power Company to impose a surcharge upon users of its service on and after 1 September 1975. The facts with reference to such surcharge, with minor variations not relevant to the determination of this appeal, are set forth in Case No. 145, *State ex rel. Utilities Commission and Duke Power Co. v. Edmisten, Attorney General,*decided this day.

*Rufus L. Edmisten, Attorney General, by Robert P. Gruber, Special Deputy Attorney General.*

*Edward B. Hipp, Commission Attorney, by Wilson B. Par-tin, Jr., Assistant Commission Attorney, for North Carolina Utilities Commission.*

*Joyner & Howison by Robert C. Howison, Jr., Hunton & Williams by Guy T. Tripp III and Edgar M. Roach, Jr., for Virginia Electric and Power Company.*

*478LAKE, Justice.

For the reasons set forth in *State ex rel. Utilities Commission and Duke Power Co. v. Edmisten, Attorney General, supra,*the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and this matter is remanded to that court with direction that it issue its judgment further remanding the matter to the North Carolina Utilities Commission for the entry by the Commission of an order vacating its order authorizing the said surcharge, and directing Virginia Electric and Power Company to refund to the users of its service the revenues collected by it from them pursuant to such surcharge.

Reversed and remanded.

Justice Copeland

dissenting.

For the reasons set forth in my dissent in *State ex rel. Utilities Commission and Duke Power Co. v. Edmisten, Attorney General,*I respectfully dissent.

Chief Justice Sharp and Justice Moore join in this dissent.
Updated Masking Guidance

This message is intended for all DOL employees and contractors.

We are encouraged to see that more Americans have received the COVID-19 vaccination – science continues to

demonstrate that vaccination can both limit transmission and protect vaccinated people.

In accordance with the CDC’s updated Interim Public Health Recommendations for Fully Vaccinated People and

guidance from OMB, fully vaccinated Federal employees, fully vaccinated onsite contractors, and fully vaccinated visitors

to Federal buildings are no longer required to wear masks.

As a reminder, the other components of the DOL COVID-19 Workplace Safety Plan – including maximum telework and

workplace occupancy limits – remain in place. We will continue to update our Plan based on federal government and

public health guidance.

To clarify what this announcement means for individuals:

If you are fully vaccinated (at least 2 weeks past your final dose), you are no longer required to wear a mask.

If you are not fully vaccinated (at least 2 weeks past your final dose), please continue to wear a mask consistent with

the requirements set forth in DOL’s COVID-19 Workplace Safety Plan.

These changes are consistent with Executive Order 13991 on Protecting the Federal Workforce and Requiring MaskWearing, which charged Federal agencies to “require compliance with CDC guidelines with respect to wearing masks”

and with OMB memorandum M-21-15, which noted in its guidance on face masks that “agencies may provide for

exceptions consistent with CDC guidelines.”

If you are still in need of a COVID-19 Vaccine, search vaccines.gov, text your ZIP code to 438829, or call 1-800-232-

0233 to find locations near you. Additional information on COVID-19 Vaccine Information page can be found on

LaborNet.

The DOL COVID-19 Coordination Team will follow-up with answers to frequently asked questions from DOL agencies

and staff regarding these changes. Please send your questions to 

Thank you for your cooperation.

Rachana Desai Martin (she/her)

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy

Office of the Assistant Secretary for Administration and Management

U.S. Department of Labor

Last updated: May 14, 2021

LABORNET

■

■
United States Department of Labor

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

__________________________________________

S.O., Appellant

and

U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, POST OFFICE,

Greensboro, NC, Employer

__________________________________________

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Docket No. 23-0360

Issued: February 27, 2023

Appearances: Case Submitted on the Record

Appellant, pro se

Office of Solicitor, for the Director

ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL

Before:

JANICE B. ASKIN, Judge

VALERIE D. EVANS-HARRELL, Alternate Judge

JAMES D. McGINLEY, Alternate Judge

On January 5, 2023 appellant filed an appeal from a June 21, 2022 merit decision of the 

Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). The Clerk of the Appellate Boards

assigned Docket No. 23-0360.

The Board has duly considered the matter and notes that the Board has jurisdiction to 

review final adverse decisions of OWCP issued under the Federal Employees’ Compensation 

Act.1 For final adverse decisions of OWCP issued on or after November 19, 2008, the Board’s 

review authority is limited to appeals which are filed within 180 days from the date of issuance 

of OWCP’s decision.2

The 180th day following the June 21, 2022 decision was December 18, 2022. As 

appellant did not file an appeal with the Board until January 5, 2023, more than 180 days after 

the June 21, 2022 OWCP decision, the Board finds that the appeal docketed as No. 23-0360 is 

untimely filed. The Board is without jurisdiction to review the appeal. Appellant has not 

explained his failure to timely file an appeal with supporting documentation sufficient to 

1 5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.; 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3(a).

2 20 C.F.R. § 501.3(e).
2

establish compelling circumstances. Because there is no final adverse decision issued by OWCP 

within 180 days of the filing of the instant appeal, the Board concludes that the appeal docketed 

as No. 23-0360, must be dismissed.3 Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the appeal docketed as No. 23-0360 is dismissed.

Issued: February 27, 2023

Washington, DC

Janice B. Askin, Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Valerie D. Evans-Harrell, Alternate Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

James D. McGinley, Alternate Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

3 The Board’s decisions and orders are “final upon the expiration of 30 days from the date of their issuance.” Id.

at § 501.6(d).
##### 



Agreement Executive Company
 WITNESSETH THAT:
 Merger Republic Merger Agreement
  Effective Date Effective Date Effective Time ab initio
 Employment Period Employment Period Initial Period Second Period provided however
 Position and Duties Initial CEO Board
 Affiliated Entities
 Compensation




---



##### 



Base Salary Annual Base Salary Compensation Committee
 Annual Incentive Payment Incentive Payment Incentive Plan Target Incentive Payment)
 Annual Equity Incentive Awards
 Employee Benefits, Fringe Benefits and Perquisites
 Other Benefits
 Expense Reimbursement
 Indemnification
 Change in Control Agreement Change in Control Agreement provided however




---



##### 



Satisfaction of Obligations under the Prior Agreement th Prior Agreement Payment Code Release
 Termination
of Employment (a) Death or Disability Disability Effective Date provided Disability
 Cause Cause
  nolo contendere




---



##### 



Good Reason Good
Reason
        Notice of Termination Notice of Termination
 Date of Termination Date of Termination
 Obligations
of the Company upon Termination. (a) Good Reason; Other Than for
Cause, Death or Disability




---



##### 



Pro-Rata Bonus Accrued Obligations
 B. Severance Payment
 Equity Benefits
   Other Benefits
 Interest provided however
 Death




---



##### 



Disability provided
 Cause; Other than for Good Reason
 Effect of Termination on Other Positions
 No Mitigation; No Offset
 Certain Additional Payments by the Company Payment Excise Tax
 Accounting Firm




---



##### 



Underpayment
      provided however provided however provided further
  Return of Company Property




---



##### 



Mutual Nondisparagement
 Confidential Information
 Nonsolicitation
 Noncompetition Competition Competing Business
 Equitable Remedies
 Assistance with Claims




---



##### 



Proceeding
 Arbitration
 et seq.
  Successors




---



##### 



Amendment
 Withholding
 Applicable Law
 Severability
 Waiver of Breach
 Notices




---



##### 



provided however
 Survivorship
 Entire Agreement
 Counterparts
 DANA M. CLUCKEYCITIZENS BANKING CORPORATIONBy:Name:Title:
##### 



Exhibit 3.1 (iii)
 AMENDED AND RESTATED
BY-LAWS
OF
PETROLEUM HELICOPTERS, INC.
(as amended through May 1, 2002)
 SECTION 1. OFFICES
 1.1 Principal Office.
 1.2 Additional Offices.
 SECTION 2. SHAREHOLDERS MEETINGS
 2.1 Place of Meetings.
 2.2 Annual Meetings
 2.3 Special Meetings
 2.4 Notice of Meetings




---



##### 



2.5 List of Shareholders
 2.6 Quorum
 2.7 Voting
 2.8 Proxies-General
 2.9 Execution of Proxies
 2.10 Electronically Transmitted Proxies




---



##### 



2.11 Validity of Copies and other Reproductions of Proxies
 2.12 Voting Power Present or Represented
 2.13 Adjournments
 2.14 Withdrawal
 2.15 Lack of Quorum




---



##### 



2.16 Presiding Officer
 2.17 Definitions of Shareholder, Voting Power and Voting Power Present.
 2.18 Notice of Stockholder Business.




---



##### 








---



##### 



SECTION 3. DIRECTORS
 3.1 Powers; Number.
 3.2 Powers.
 3.3 General Election
 3.4 Vacancies




---



##### 



3.5 Filling Vacancies
 3.6 Notice of Shareholder Nominees




---



##### 



3.7 Compensation of Directors
 SECTION 4. MEETINGS OF THE BOARD
 4.1 Place of Meetings.
 4.2 Initial Meetings




---



##### 



4.3 Regular Meetings; Notice
 4.4 Special Meetings; Notice
 4.5 Waiver of Notice
 4.6 Quorum
 4.7 Withdrawal
 4.8 Action by Consent.




---



##### 



4.9 Meetings by Telephone or Similar Communication
 SECTION 5. COMMITTEES OF THE BOARD
 5.1 General.
 5.2 Compensation Committee




---



##### 



5.3 Audit Committee
 5.4 Procedures for Committees.
 SECTION 6. REMOVAL OF BOARD MEMBER
  SECTION 7. NOTICES
 7.1 Form of Delivery.
 7.2 Waiver




---



##### 



SECTION 8. OFFICERS
 8.1 Designations.
 8.2 Appointment of Certain Officers
 8.3 Appointment of Other Officers




---



##### 



8.4 Removal
 8.5 The Chairman of the Board.
 8.6 The Chief Executive Officer.
 8.7 Authority and Duties of Officers
 8.8 The Secretary
 8.9 The President
 8.10 The Chief Financial Officer




---



##### 



8.11 The Treasurer.
 8.12 The Controller
 SECTION 9. STOCK
 9.1 Certificates.
 9.2 Missing Certificates




---



##### 



9.3 Transfers.
 SECTION 10. DETERMINATION OF SHAREHOLDERS
 10.1 Record Date.
 10.2 Registered Shareholders
 SECTION 11. MISCELLANEOUS
 11.1 Dividends
 11.2 Checks




---



##### 



11.3 Fiscal Year
 11.4 Seal.
 11.5 Gender
 11.6 Control Share Acquisitions
 SECTION 12. INDEMNIFICATION




---



##### 



SECTION 13. AMENDMENTS
#### MATTEO BISCOTTO, PLAINTIFF, v. JOHN H. B. DALRYMPLE, TRADING AS RARITAN TRUCKING COMPANY; THE TULLER CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, AND ROSS & TAYLOR, INCORPORATED, DEFENDANTS.

Submitted October 16, 1931

Decided December 15, 1931.

*42Before Justices Campbell, Lloyd and Bodine.

For the plaintiff, *Samuel H. Adler (Herman H. Anclcstein,*of counsel).

For the defendant Boss & Taylor, Incorporated, *Charles StocJcdell Gray.*

Per Curiam.

The plaintiff had judgment for $6,000 in an action tried at the Middlesex Circuit. The defendant seeks to have the verdict set aside on the ground that a nonsuit should have been granted or a verdict directed, on the ground that by the clear weight of evidence there was no proof that the defendant was negligent. It was further argued that by the clear and unequivocal testimony the defendant was proved guilty of contributory negligence.

The plaintiff, a truck farmer, shortly before the accident was driving a Ford over route No. 26 of the New Jersey state highway system near Adams, New Jersey. The defendant was operating, in the vicinity of the paved portion of the roadway, a highway construction crane. Plaintiff testified that as he was passing this machine it suddenly and without warning swung across the road and struck his car causing the injuries of which he complained. The observations which he made before passing indicated to him that he had plenty of room to pass. The machine was not moving,-but when he was so close to it that he could not avoid it, it started to move and struck his car. The flagman, stationed by the contractor to give warning, testified that the plaintiff had passed him and had paid no attention whatever to the red flag which he waved.

The operator of the crane said that the driver of the car had his eyes shut—a circumstance that seems hardly credible. There’was testimony by employes of the defendant, and others, to the effect that the plaintiff’s car was being driven in a careless manner.

*43From our examination of the whole record, we think the conflicting accounts of the occurrence were properly for the jury. We think that plaintiff’s account of the accident was far more likely than that contained in the testimony of the witnesses called for the defense. Numerically the witnesses on behalf of the defendant outweigh the plaintiff, but this circumstance standing alone is not determinative of the weight of the evidence.

The rule will be discharged, with costs.
SUPERSEDED

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SUPERSEDED

- Ch. 2-1000 Eligibility Criteria for Non-Cancerous Conditions
#### Sandra Fay DENTON, Appellant, v. CENTRAL ARKANSAS TRANSIT AUTHORITY, originally sued as Central Arkansas Transit; Mr. Keith Jones; John Davis, Local 704 Union President, Appellees.

No. 04-1982.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: Feb. 16, 2005.

Decided: March 4, 2005.

Sandra Fay Denton, Little Rock, AR, Pro Se.

Carolyn Brack Witherspoon, Mark Thomas McCarty, Cross & Gunter, Little Rock, AR, for Defendants-Appellees.

Before MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, FAGG, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Sandra Denton appeals the district court’s dismissal of her employment-discrimination suit against the Central Arkansas Transit Authority (CATA) and CATA employee Keith Jones.1

Ms. Denton was disciplined and later terminated for sick-leave absences from her job as a bus driver for CATA. CATA agreed to reinstate Ms. Denton if she took and passed a Department of Transportation (DOT) physical. Although she had previously passed a DOT physical, and this had been used as evidence that she was abusing her sick leave, she failed the physical and was not reinstated. She then filed the instant suit asserting that by failing to accommodate her with suitable work, and *97by terminating her employment, defendants violated her rights under Title VI and VII, the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Arkansas Civil Rights Act. The district court dismissed Ms. Denton’s complaint for failure to exhaust DOT administrative remedies, citing *Harris v. P.A.M. Transport, Inc.,*339 F.3d 635 (8th Cir.2003).

In *Harris,*the defendant refused to hire the plaintiff because a DOT physician found him unfit for duty under DOT regulations. The physician’s report conflicted with a prior physician’s report that had reached the opposite conclusion. Because DOT regulations provide appeal procedures where there is disagreement between the driver’s physician and the physician for the motor carrier concerning the driver’s qualifications, we held that the plaintiff first had to exhaust his administrative remedies. *See Harris,*339 F.3d at 638. By contrast, Ms. Denton does not seek to challenge defendants’ refusal to reinstate her based on the findings of the DOT physician; rather she challenges her earlier termination, which was a disciplinary matter, and defendants’ failure to accommodate her. Thus *Harris*is inapposite, and we do *not*believe that Ms. Denton was required to exhaust her administrative remedies with DOT prior to bringing this suit.

We therefore reverse and remand this case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

1

. Ms. Denton also named John Davis, the president of her union local, but he does not appear to have been personally served, and he did not answer the complaint.
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```

[Congressional Bills 111th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 5655 Introduced in House (IH)]

111th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 5655

  To designate the Little River Branch facility of the United States 
Postal Service located at 140 NE 84th Street in Miami, Florida, as the 
                 ``Jesse J. McCrary, Jr. Post Office''.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             June 30, 2010

   Mr. Meek of Florida (for himself, Mr. Boyd, Ms. Corrine Brown of 
Florida, Ms. Ginny Brown-Waite of Florida, Mr. Buchanan, Ms. Castor of 
 Florida, Mr. Crenshaw, Mr. Lincoln Diaz-Balart of Florida, Mr. Mario 
Diaz-Balart of Florida, Mr. Grayson, Mr. Hastings of Florida, Mr. Klein 
of Florida, Ms. Kosmas, Mr. Mack, Mr. Mica, Mr. Miller of Florida, Mr. 
  Posey, Mr. Putnam, Mr. Rooney, Ms. Ros-Lehtinen, and Ms. Wasserman 
   Schultz) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
              Committee on Oversight and Government Reform

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
  To designate the Little River Branch facility of the United States 
Postal Service located at 140 NE 84th Street in Miami, Florida, as the 
                 ``Jesse J. McCrary, Jr. Post Office''.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. JESSE J. MCCRARY, JR. POST OFFICE.

    (a) Designation.--The Little River Branch facility of the United 
States Postal Service located at 140 NE 84th Street in Miami, Florida, 
shall be known and designated as the ``Jesse J. McCrary, Jr. Post 
Office''.
    (b) References.--Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document, 
paper, or other record of the United States to the facility referred to 
in subsection (a) shall be deemed to be a reference to the ``Jesse J. 
McCrary, Jr. Post Office''.
                                 <all>
```
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 95-7780
ISZARD BALLARD, JR., Plaintiff - Appellant, versus PARRIS N. GLENDENING; SAUNDRA E. BANKS; NORMAN N. YANKELLOW; JOSEPH J. CURRAN, Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore. J. Frederick Motz, Chief District Judge. (CA-95-2770-JFM) Submitted: February 7, 1996 Decided: February 26, 1996 Before MURNAGHAN and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and PHILLIPS, Senior Circuit Judge. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Iszard Ballard, Jr., Appellant Pro Se. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: Appellant appeals from the district court's order denying relief on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) complaint. We have reviewed the record and the district court's opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court. Ballard v. Glendening , No. CA-95-2770-JFM (D. Md. Oct. 11, 1995). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
#### STATE v. McFADDEN

No. 134 PC.

Case below: 31 N.C. App. 524.

Petition by defendant for discretionary review under G.S. 7A-31 allowed 31 January 1977. Motion of Attorney Generel to dismiss appeal for lack of substantial constitutional question denied 31 January 1977.