An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute 

controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance 

with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

NO. COA14-309

NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS

Filed: 7 October 2014

IN THE MATTER OF:

Mecklenburg County

No. 12 JT 32

A.M.B.

Appeal by respondent-mother from order entered 16 December 

2013 by Judge Elizabeth T. Trosch in Mecklenburg County District 

Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 9 September 2014.

Twyla Hollingsworth-Richardson for petitioner-appellee 

Mecklenburg County Department of Social Services.

J. Thomas Diepenbrock for respondent-appellant.

Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, LLP, by Theresa M. Sprain 

and Carolyn C. Pratt, for guardian ad litem.

STEELMAN, Judge.

The trial court’s conclusion that termination of parental 

rights was in the best interests of the juvenile was supported 

by the findings of fact required under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B1110(a).

I. Factual and Procedural History
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On 20 January 2012, the Mecklenburg County Department of 

Social Services, Youth and Family Services (DSS) filed a 

petition alleging that A.B. was a neglected and dependent 

juvenile, based on reports that the child’s mother, J.A.B. 

(mother) had engaged in domestic altercations in A.B.’s 

presence. The petition also alleged that during the previous six 

months mother had lived at five different residences and was

evicted from each due to her behavior. On 20 January 2012 a nonsecure custody order was entered granting DSS custody of A.B. On 

12 April 2012, A.B. was adjudicated neglected based on mother’s 

substance abuse and her “inability to manage her aggression.” 

Following a permanency planning review hearing held on 10 

January 2013, the trial court suspended reunification efforts 

and changed the permanent plan for A.B. to termination of 

parental rights and adoption. 

On 15 March 2013, DSS filed a petition to terminate 

mother’s parental rights, alleging that grounds existed to 

terminate mother’s parental rights pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 

7B-1111(a)(1) (neglect), (2) (failure to make reasonable 

progress), (3) (failure to pay reasonable child support) and (7)

(abandonment). DSS also alleged that grounds existed to 

terminate the parental rights of A.B.’s father, whose identity 

was unknown, pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(5) (2013). 
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On 16 December 2013, the trial court entered an order 

terminating mother’s parental rights pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. 

§ 7B-1111(a)(1), (2) and (3). The unknown father’s parental 

rights were also terminated.

The present appeal is only by mother. 

II. Standard of Review

“The termination of parental rights statutes provide for a 

two-stage termination proceeding: an adjudication stage and a 

disposition stage. In the adjudication stage, the trial court 

must determine whether there exists one or more grounds for 

termination of parental rights under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B1111(a). If the trial court determines that at least one ground 

for termination exists, it then proceeds to the disposition 

stage where it must determine whether terminating the rights of 

the parent is in the best interest of the child, in accordance 

with N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110(a).” In re D.H., __ N.C. App. __, 

__, 753 S.E.2d 732, 734 (2014) (citing In re Montgomery, 311 

N.C. 101, 110, 316 S.E.2d 246, 252 (1984)). 

“We review the trial court’s decision to terminate parental 

rights for abuse of discretion.” In re Anderson, 151 N.C. App. 

94, 98, 564 S.E.2d 599, 602 (2002) (citation omitted). “‘The 

trial court is subject to reversal for abuse of discretion only 

upon a showing . . . that the challenged actions are manifestly 
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unsupported by reason.’” D.H., __ N.C. App. at __, 753 S.E.2d at

734 (quoting In re J.L.H., __ N.C. App. __, __, 741 S.E.2d 333, 

337 (2012) (internal quotation omitted)).

III. Trial Court’s Determination that Termination was in 

the Juvenile’s Best Interests 

Mother does not challenge the evidentiary support for the 

trial court’s findings of fact or its determination that grounds 

existed to support termination of her parental rights, and does 

not argue that the court abused its discretion by concluding

that it was in A.B.’s best interest for mother’s parental rights 

to be terminated. Mother’s sole argument on appeal is that the 

trial court erred in its determination that it was in the best 

interest of A.B. to terminate mother’s parental rights by 

failing to make the findings required by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B1110(a). We disagree.

Once a trial court determines that statutory grounds for 

termination exist, it must “determine whether terminating the 

parent’s rights is in the juvenile’s best interest.” N.C. Gen. 

Stat. § 7B-1110(a). This statute requires that in making its 

determination “the court shall consider the following criteria 

and make written findings regarding the following that are 

relevant”

(1) The age of the juvenile.

(2) The likelihood of adoption of the 

juvenile.
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(3) Whether the termination of parental 

rights will aid in the accomplishment 

of the permanent plan for the juvenile.

(4) The bond between the juvenile and the 

parent.

(5) The quality of the relationship between 

the juvenile and the proposed adoptive 

parent, guardian, custodian, or other 

permanent placement.

(6) Any relevant consideration.

Although N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110(a) requires the trial court 

to consider all six of the enumerated factors, it is required to 

enter written findings of fact “concerning only those factors 

‘that are relevant.’” D.H. at __, 753 S.E.2d at 735 (citations 

omitted). 

Mother argues that the trial court failed to make findings 

of fact on the age of the juvenile, whether termination of 

parental rights would aid in the accomplishment of the permanent 

plan, or concerning the bond between mother and the juvenile, as 

required by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110(a)(1), (3) and (4)

respectively. However, analysis of the trial court’s order 

reveals that the court’s findings sufficiently addressed the 

relevant factors. 

Mother correctly notes that the trial court made no 

findings addressing A.B.’s age. However, mother does not 

identify any evidence that the child’s age was a relevant factor 

in this case, and does not offer any argument as to the 

significance of this omission. We conclude the trial court did 
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not err by failing to make a specific written finding of fact 

concerning A.B.’s age. See D.H. at __, 753 S.E.2d at 735 (“Since 

respondent fails to point to any evidence in the record 

demonstrating that age was placed in issue as a relevant factor, 

such that it had an impact on the trial court’s decision, we do 

not believe that the trial court erred in not making specific 

findings concerning the children’s ages in its order.”).

Mother also argues that the trial court failed to make 

findings pertaining to whether termination of her parental 

rights would aid in the accomplishment of the permanent plan for 

the juvenile. We first note that, since the permanent plan was 

adoption, termination of parental rights is clearly a 

prerequisite to achieving the permanent plan. In addition, N.C. 

Gen. Stat. § 7B-906.1(g) directs a trial court conducting a 

permanency planning hearing to determine “the best plan of care 

to achieve a safe, permanent home for the juvenile within a 

reasonable period of time.” Thus, the trial court’s findings 

regarding the need for “a safe, permanent home . . . within a 

reasonable period of time” are relevant to whether termination 

will achieve the permanent plan. In its order the trial court 

made a variety of findings illustrating the relationship between 

termination of mother’s parental rights and the need to achieve 
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a safe permanent home for A.B. within a reasonable time, 

including the following:

. . . 

3. [A.B.] was adjudicated neglected on 15 

March 2012. . . . 

. . . 

14. [Prior to the adjudication of neglect], 

the mother had at least five different 

addresses[.]. . . All of these residences 

were disrupted due to the mother’s 

behaviors. 

. . . 

20. From October 17, 2001 until . . . 2005, 

[mother] had seven referrals involving her 

children. As a result . . . mother’s 

parental rights to her oldest three children 

were terminated. 

. . . 

22. [DSS] has been involved with the family 

since 2001 for issues related to [mother’s] 

substance abuse, mental health, and history 

of altercations, aggressive behavior, as 

well as the lack of housing stability, . . . 

[and] the injurious environment of the 

juveniles. [Mother] has failed or refused to 

comply with recommended therapy services for 

her and substance abuse treatment since 

[2001.] 

. . . 

25. There is a risk to [A.B.’s] permanence, 

if placed in the home of the mother[,] due 

to the mother’s pattern of coping that she 

displayed prior to custody and ever since; a 

style . . . illustrated by aggression, 

defensiveness and lack of insight. Her 
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pattern has led to conflict and criminal 

arrest. 

34. [Mother] lacks verifiable employment and 

lacks stable housing. . . . 

. . . 

46. The juvenile is bonded to her placement 

provider and is doing extremely well in her 

placement. She functions as a member of the 

family. She is in a potential adoptive 

placement. The likelihood of [A.B.’s] 

adoption is high. 

47. That while [A.B.] . . . knows [that 

mother is] her mother, [mother’s] lack of 

insight into the [effect that] patterns . . 

. symptomatic of [her] mental illness have 

had on her ability to provide [a] safe and 

stable home . . . make termination of 

parental rights in [A.B.’s] best interests. 

Since mother does not challenge these findings of fact, 

they are binding on appeal. Koufman v. Koufman, 330 N.C. 93, 97, 

408 S.E.2d 729, 731 (1991). The court’s findings of fact clearly 

illustrate the unlikelihood of any imminent change in mother’s 

behavior and the resultant need to terminate parental rights in 

order to facilitate A.B.’s adoption. While the trial court did 

not explicitly state that termination of mother’s parental

rights would aid in the accomplishment of the permanent plan for 

the juvenile, it is apparent that the court considered this 

factor.

Mother also contends that the trial court failed to make 

sufficient written findings of fact regarding the bond between 
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mother and the juvenile. Although the court did not use the 

specific word “bond,” it made numerous findings addressing 

mother’s emotional and mental health issues and her lack of 

involvement with A.B., including the following:

. . . 

26. [Mother’s] psychological testing 

illustrated that she is an individual who is 

hostile, impulsive and acts out with minimal 

to no awareness or concern regarding 

consequences of her actions, and tends to 

blame others for altercations and conflicts.

27. [Mother’s] psychological testing 

indicated that she is angry, paranoid and 

distrusting of others. 

28. Dr. Hancock’s evaluation included the 

following diagnoses for [mother]: Bipolar, 

Cannabis Dependence, and Narcissistic 

Personality Disorder with Antisocial Traits. 

. . . 

31. . . . [Mother] is not engaged in any 

known therapy and has not been engaged in 

any consistent therapy or mental health 

program since [A.B.] was placed in [DSS’s] 

custody[.] [Mother] informed Dr. Hancock . . 

. that she does not need therapy. 

32. . . . [Mother] was discharged from [the] 

Salvation Army Women’s Shelter in late 

December 2012 due to “intolerable and 

belligerent behavior towards staff and 

residents.”

33. At the 30 August 2012 hearing, [mother] 

was provided with an opportunity to visit 

[A.B.] at her daycare. [Mother] only visited 

with [A.B.] at her daycare four times 

between August 2012 and [the] 10 January 
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2013 court date despite being provided bus 

passes. [Mother] has not engaged in sharedparenting, although [it is] available. 

[Mother] did not . . . attend [A.B.’s] 

family counseling and community-based 

rehabilitation services . . . [or] the 

Children’s Developmental Services 

appointments as recommended. 

. . . 

36. . . . [Mother] has not provided any 

consistent emotional or other support for 

[A.B.], and has not consistently taken 

advantage of opportunities to further 

develop a relationship with the child. 

. . . 

38. [Mother] is not engaged in any 

therapeutic, psychological or psychiatric 

services. 

. . . 

47. That while [A.B.] . . . knows [that 

mother is] her mother, [mother’s] lack of 

insight into the [effect that] patterns . . 

. symptomatic of [her] mental illness have 

had on her ability to provide [a] safe and 

stable home . . . make termination of 

parental rights in [A.B.’s] best interests.

Mother’s unwillingness to address serious mental health issues 

clearly affects her ability to form an appropriate bond with 

A.B., and her unwillingness to take advantage of the 

opportunities to spend time with A.B. further impacted the 

relationship between mother and child. The trial court’s 

findings make it clear that the court considered the bond 
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between mother and child when determining that termination was 

in A.B.’s best interest. 

The better practice is for a trial court to make findings 

that clearly track the statutory requirements for findings on 

relevant issues. However, although the trial court did not 

employ the specific language of the statute, the court’s order 

adequately addressed how termination will facilitate the 

permanent plan and the bond between mother and child. As this is 

mother’s only challenge to the termination order we conclude 

that the court did not err and that its order should be

AFFIRMED.

Judges CALABRIA and McCULLOUGH concur.

Report per Rule 30(e).