J-S37013-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

ADRIAN P. CAMPBELL

Appellant No. 878 EDA 2014

Appeal from the PCRA Order February 18, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-45-CR-0001226-2011;

CP-45-CR-0001744-2011

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., SHOGAN, J., and LAZARUS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED JULY 24, 2015

Appellant, Adrian P. Campbell, appeals from the order entered in the 

Monroe County Court of Common Pleas, which denied his petition filed 

pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”).1 We affirm.

The PCRA court set forth the relevant facts and procedural history of 

this case as follows. 

On April 6, 2010, [Appellant] was stopped while traveling 

on State Route 209. A subsequent search of his vehicle 

yielded marijuana and fourteen empty baggies. On April 

8, 2010, a search warrant was executed on [Appellant’s] 

residence, revealing additional marijuana, a scale, and a 

large sum of currency.

As a result of the traffic stop, a Criminal Complaint was 

____________________________________________

1 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. 
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filed against [Appellant] on March 16, 2011, charging 

[Appellant] with Manufacture, Delivery, or Possession with 

Intent to Manufacture or Deliver [(“PWID”)] (35 P.S. § 

780-113(a)(30)); Marijuana—Small Amount Personal Use 

(35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(31)); Use or Possession of Drug 

Paraphernalia (35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(32)); Operating with 

Unsafe Equipment (75 [Pa.C.S.A.] § 4107(b)(2)), and; 

Improper Sun [S]creening (75 [Pa.C.S.A.] § 4524(e)(1)). 

In connection with the search of his residence, a second 

Criminal Complaint was filed against [Appellant] on June 3, 

2011, charging him with [PWID] (35 P.S. § 780-

113(a)(30)), and; Marijuana—Small Amount Personal Use 

(35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(31)).

On June 8, 2011, [Appellant] waived his preliminary 

hearing on the charges stemming from the traffic stop. 

Accordingly, on September 12, 2011, the Commonwealth 

filed a Criminal Information against [Appellant] charging 

him with the same counts listed in the Criminal Complaint. 

This Criminal Information is docketed at number 1226 

Criminal 2011.

On June 29, 2011[, Appellant] waived his preliminary 

hearing on the charges emanating from the search of his 

residence. Accordingly, on October 3, 2011, the 

Commonwealth filed a Criminal Information against 

[Appellant] charging him with the same two counts listed 

in the Criminal Complaint. This Criminal Information is 

docketed at number 1744 Criminal 2011.

* * *

On June 7, 2012, following a trial by jury, [Appellant] was 

found guilty of [PWID, possession of marijuana, possession 

of a small amount of marijuana, and possession of drug 

paraphernalia] docketed at number 1226 Criminal 2011.

On August 21, 2012[, Appellant] entered a plea of guilty to 

Amended Count 1 of the Criminal Information docketed at 

number 1744 Criminal 2011, Marijuana—Small Amount 

Personal Use. This Plea was taken in exchange for the 

Commonwealth’s agreement to [ask the court to enter 

nolle prosequi on] the other charges in that case. This 
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condition was fulfilled. 

On the Motion of [Appellant’s] counsel [(“trial counsel”)],[2]

of the Monroe County Public Defender Office, and by Order 

of this [c]ourt dated August 28, 2012, sentencing on 

[Appellant’s] case docketed at number 1226 Criminal 2011 

was continued and scheduled to be held on the same day 

as sentencing on [Appellant’s] case docketed at number 

1744 Criminal 2011. [Appellant’s] Motion was predicated 

on his medical needs: [Appellant] broke his arm in a 

motorcycle accident and wished to prolong sentencing on 

his case docketed at number 1226 Criminal 2011 so that 

he could attend his doctor’s appointments. 

On September 26, 2012, [Appellant] was sentenced on 

both cases. On [Appellant’s] case docketed at number 

1226 Criminal 2011, [Appellant] was sentenced to [an 

aggregate] period of incarceration not less than 23 months 

and not more than 72 months. On [Appellant’s] case 

docketed at number 1744 Criminal 2011, [Appellant] was 

sentenced to a [consecutive] period of incarceration not 

less than 6 months and not more than 12 months, for a 

total aggregate sentence of not less than 29 months and 

not more than 84 months. All sentences imposed were 

within the statutory guidelines. 

On October 3, 2012[, Appellant]...filed a Motion to 

Reconsider Sentence seeking State Intermediate 

Punishment on both cases. By Order of this [c]ourt dated 

October 9, 2012, said Motion was denied.

On November 14, 2012[, Appellant] filed a pro se Notice of 

Appeal on both cases.[3] 

____________________________________________

2 Trial counsel represented Appellant at his jury trial at number 1226 

Criminal 2011 and during his guilty plea at number 1744 Criminal 2011. 

3 Appellant’s untimely pro se notice of appeal was dated November 9, 2012, 

and entered on the docket on November 14, 2012. Generally, pursuant to 

the prisoner mailbox rule, the date a prisoner hands a pro se filing to prison 

authorities for mailing operates as the effective filing date. See 

Commonwealth v. Chambers, 35 A.3d 34 (Pa.Super. 2011), appeal 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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On December 24, 2012, [trial counsel] filed a Motion for 

Withdrawal of Counsel predicated on his judgment that 

there were no errors that could properly be appealed and 

on information he received that [Appellant] had hired 

[replacement counsel], to represent him in his appeal.[4] 

On January 14, 2013, [Appellant], through [replacement 

counsel], filed his Statement pursuant to Pennsylvania 

Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(b).

On [February 4,] 2013, the Superior Court quashed 

[Appellant’s] appeal as untimely. 

On September 25, 2013, [Appellant], through 

[replacement counsel], filed the present PCRA [petition] 

and a supporting memorandum of law seeking a new trial, 

or in the alternative, a reinstatement of his appellate rights 

based on two ineffective assistance of counsel claims. ... 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

denied, 616 Pa. 625, 46 A.3d 715 (2012) (explaining “prisoner mailbox rule” 

provides that pro se prisoner’s document is deemed filed on date he delivers 

it to prison authorities for mailing). Because Appellant was still represented 

by trial counsel when Appellant filed his untimely pro se notice of appeal, 

however, the court forwarded Appellant’s pro se notice of appeal to trial 

counsel on November 16, 2012. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 576(A)(4) (stating in any 

case in which defendant is represented by attorney, if defendant submits for 

filing written motion, notice, or document that has not been signed by 

defendant’s attorney, clerk of courts shall accept it for filing, time stamp it 

with date of receipt and make docket entry reflecting date of receipt, and 

place document in criminal case file; copy of timestamped document shall be 

forwarded to defendant’s attorney and attorney for Commonwealth within 10 

days of receipt). On December 4, 2012, the court ordered Appellant to file a 

concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(b). 

4 Trial counsel’s motion also asked the court for an extension of time for 

Appellant to file a Rule 1925(b) statement. On December 27, 2012, the 

court denied trial counsel’s motion to withdraw and granted the motion for 

extension. Trial counsel filed another motion to withdraw as counsel on 

January 11, 2013, which the court granted on January 18, 2013, following 

replacement counsel’s entry of appearance on January 4, 2013. 
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(Opinion in Support of Denial of PCRA Relief, filed February 18, 2014, at 1-4; 

R.R. at 19-22) (internal citations omitted). On October 7, 2013, the 

Commonwealth filed a motion for teleconferencing of trial counsel during the 

PCRA hearing, explaining trial counsel had retired and relocated to Florida. 

The court granted the Commonwealth’s motion on October 9, 2013. On 

December 20, 2013, Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration of the order 

granting teleconferencing, claiming it violated Appellant’s rights under the 

Confrontation Clause. The court subsequently denied that motion. 

The court held a PCRA hearing on December 23, 2013. On February 

18, 2014, the court denied PCRA relief. Appellant timely filed a notice of 

appeal on March 17, 2014. On March 24, 2014, the court ordered Appellant 

to file a Rule 1925(b) statement, which Appellant timely filed on April 11, 

2014.

Appellant raises three issues for our review:

WHETHER APPELLANT...IS ENTITLED TO A NEW PCRA 

HEARING OR REINSTATEMENT OF HIS APPELLATE RIGHTS 

WHERE THE HEARING WAS CONDUCTED WITHOUT 

HOLDING A VIDEO CONFERENCE TO OBTAIN TRIAL 

COUNSEL’S TESTIMONY?

WHETHER APPELLANT...IS ENTITLED TO THE 

REINSTATEMENT OF HIS APPELLATE RIGHTS WHERE 

TRIAL COUNSEL FAILED TO FILE A NOTICE OF APPEAL TO 

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA ON HIS 

BEHALF?

WHETHER APPELLANT...IS ENTITLED TO A NEW PCRA 

HEARING OR REINSTATEMENT OF HIS APPELLATE RIGHTS 

WHERE [APPELLANT] WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE 
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ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL WHEN TRIAL COUNSEL DID 

NOT FULLY INFORM AND ADVISE HIM OF THE POTENTIAL 

PENALTIES THE COURT COULD IMPOSE AS A RESULT OF 

HIM CONSOLIDATING HIS CASES FOR SENTENCING?

(Appellant’s Brief at 2). 

Our standard of review of the denial of a PCRA petition is limited to 

examining whether the record evidence supports the court’s determination 

and whether the court’s decision is free of legal error. Commonwealth v. 

Ford, 947 A.2d 1251 (Pa.Super. 2008), appeal denied, 598 Pa. 779, 959 

A.2d 319 (2008). This Court grants great deference to the findings of the 

PCRA court if the record contains any support for those findings. 

Commonwealth v. Boyd, 923 A.2d 513 (Pa.Super. 2007), appeal denied, 

593 Pa. 754, 932 A.2d 74 (2007). If the record supports a post-conviction 

court’s credibility determination, it is binding on the appellate court. 

Commonwealth v. Dennis, 609 Pa. 442, 17 A.3d 297 (2011). 

In his first issue, Appellant explains the PCRA court permitted trial 

counsel to testify at the PCRA hearing via teleconferencing, over Appellant’s 

objection, because trial counsel resided outside of Pennsylvania. Appellant 

claims the Commonwealth arranged for trial counsel to testify via

teleconferencing as opposed to videoconferencing for expediency. Appellant 

argues trial counsel’s testimony by teleconferencing violated Appellant’s 

rights under the Confrontation Clause. Appellant asserts he had a Sixth 

Amendment constitutional right to confront witnesses against him. 

Appellant maintains testimony by teleconferencing deprived Appellant of this 
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right because Appellant, defense counsel, and the court were unable to 

observe trial counsel’s demeanor to assess credibility. Appellant concedes a 

PCRA hearing is not a critical stage in a criminal proceeding, but he suggests 

that when the sole issue is the ineffectiveness of counsel, then the PCRA 

hearing becomes an adversarial proceeding that should entitle Appellant to 

face-to-face confrontation with trial counsel. Appellant concludes the court 

abused its discretion by permitting trial counsel to testify by 

teleconferencing, and this Court should reinstate Appellant’s appellate rights 

nunc pro tunc or afford him a new PCRA hearing with videoconferencing of 

trial counsel’s testimony.5 We disagree. 

Our Supreme Court has discussed an accused’s rights under the 

Confrontation Clause as follows:

The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, made 

applicable to the States via the Fourteenth 

Amendment...provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, 

the accused shall enjoy the right...to be confronted with 

the witnesses against him...” In [Crawford v. 

Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 1364, 158 

____________________________________________

5 Appellant also contends trial counsel’s testimony by teleconferencing 

violated the Rules of Evidence, but Appellant does not specify which rule(s). 

Moreover, Appellant objected at the PCRA hearing to trial counsel’s 

testimony by teleconferencing solely on Confrontation Clause grounds. 

Thus, Appellant waived his complaint based on the rules of evidence. See 

Commonwealth v. McDermitt, 66 A.3d 810 (Pa.Super. 2013) (explaining 

undeveloped claims are waived and unreviewable on appeal); 

Commonwealth v. Lopez, 57 A.3d 74 (Pa.Super. 2012), appeal denied, 

619 Pa. 678, 62 A.3d 379 (2013) (stating if appellant set forth specific 

grounds for objection before trial court, then all other unspecified grounds 

are waived and cannot be raised for first time on appeal). 
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L.Ed.2d 177, ___ (2004)], the Court held that the Sixth 

Amendment guarantees a defendant’s right to confront 

those “who ‘bear testimony’” against him, and defined 

“testimony” as “[a] solemn declaration or affirmation made 

for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact.” The 

Confrontation Clause, the High Court explained, prohibits 

out-of-court testimonial statements by a witness unless 

the witness is unavailable and the defendant had a prior 

opportunity for cross-examination. Id. at 53-56, 124 S.Ct. 

[at] 1354[, 158 L.Ed.2d at ___].

Commonwealth v. Yohe, 621 Pa. 527, 544, 79 A.3d 520, 530-31 (2013), 

cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 134 S.Ct. 2662, 189 L.Ed.2d 209 (2014) 

(internal footnotes omitted). 

Nevertheless:

The focus of claims of violation of this constitutional right 

is on the fairness and reliability of the criminal defendant’s 

trial. [Appellant] has cited to no authority holding that a 

Confrontation Clause challenge may be asserted in nontrial proceedings, including during PCRA evidentiary 

hearings. ... To the contrary, on at least two occasions 

our Supreme Court has held that Confrontation Clause 

issues may not be asserted in collateral proceedings. See

Commonwealth v. Collins, 585 Pa. 45, 65 n.15, 888 

A.2d 564, 576 n.15 (2005) (“Crawford, however, is 

unavailable to claimants on collateral review...”); 

Commonwealth v. Gribble, 580 Pa. 647, 663 n.7, 863 

A.2d 455, 464 n.7 (2004) (“We need not concern 

ourselves with that question, as this is a collateral attack, 

and Crawford does not apply”).

Commonwealth v. Wantz, 84 A.3d 324, 337 (Pa.Super. 2014) (some 

internal citations omitted) (emphasis in original). 

Instantly, the PCRA court addressed Appellant’s first issue on appeal 

as follows:

At the [PCRA] hearing, the Commonwealth called as [its] 
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first witness [Appellant’s] trial attorney...who has since 

retired and now permanently resides in Florida. [Trial 

counsel’s] testimony was taken by telephone. 

[Replacement counsel] objected to the admission of [trial 

counsel’s] testimony on the grounds that his demeanor 

could not be observed, robbing [Appellant] of his right to 

confrontation provided by both the Federal and 

Pennsylvania Constitutions. This [c]ourt noted counsel’s 

objection, admitted the testimony of [trial counsel], and 

provided [replacement counsel] an opportunity to brief the 

issue.

[Appellant’s brief] is devoid of legal authority which would 

support his position that telephone conferencing 

procedures do not comply with the confrontation clauses of 

the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions. 

Similarly, we are unable to locate any authority which 

would either permit or proscribe such testimony at a PCRA 

hearing. We posit that this is because the Confrontation 

Clause does not extend to PCRA hearings. 

A hearing on a PCRA [petition] is not a criminal 

proceeding, but a collateral one which is civil in nature. As 

such, it is not an adversarial proceeding and a critical 

stage in a criminal proceeding as is required to invoke the 

protections of the Confrontation Clause. Even if the 

Confrontation Clause does extend to collateral 

proceedings, the right to a face-to-face confrontation is in 

all cases preferred, not mandated. Accordingly, we 

conclude that the testimony of [trial counsel] was properly 

admitted.... 

(Opinion in Support of Denial of PCRA Relief at 5-6; R.R. at 23-24) (internal 

citations and quotation marks omitted). We accept the court’s reasoning. 

See Ford, supra. At the PCRA hearing, Appellant objected to trial counsel’s 

testimony by teleconferencing solely on Confrontation Clause grounds. 

Because the protections of the Confrontation Clause do not extend to 

collateral proceedings such as a PCRA hearing, Appellant’s first issue on 
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appeal affords no relief. See Wantz, supra. 

In his second issue, Appellant argues trial counsel failed to file a direct 

appeal on Appellant’s behalf despite his requests to do so. Appellant asserts 

trial counsel sent a letter on or about October 16, 2012, informing Appellant 

the court had denied his post-sentence motion and trial counsel would not 

be filing an appeal on Appellant’s behalf because there were no appealable 

issues. Appellant maintains he received trial counsel’s letter roughly one 

week later and understood the letter to mean trial counsel would not file an 

appeal for Appellant. Appellant claims he spoke with a fellow inmate 

regarding the steps to take to request an appeal, so Appellant filed a pro se

notice of appeal dated November 9, 2012, which the court entered on the 

docket on November 14, 2012. Appellant explains the Superior Court 

quashed his appeal as untimely. Appellant highlights his testimony at the 

PCRA hearing concerning a number of issues he wanted to raise on direct 

appeal. Appellant contends trial counsel’s failure to file a requested notice of 

appeal deprived Appellant of the opportunity to pursue appellate issues. 

Appellant concludes trial counsel’s inaction constitutes per se ineffectiveness, 

and this Court must reinstate Appellant’s direct appeal rights nunc pro tunc. 

We disagree.

The law presumes counsel has rendered effective assistance. 

Commonwealth v. Williams, 597 Pa. 109, 950 A.2d 294 (2008). When 

asserting a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the petitioner is 
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required to demonstrate: (1) the underlying claim has arguable merit; (2) 

counsel had no reasonable strategic basis for his action or inaction; and (3) 

but for the errors and omissions of counsel, there is a reasonable probability 

that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different. 

Commonwealth v. Kimball, 555 Pa. 299, 724 A.2d 326 (1999). 

“The threshold inquiry in ineffectiveness claims is whether the 

issue/argument/tactic which counsel has foregone and which forms the basis 

for the assertion of ineffectiveness is of arguable merit....” Commonwealth 

v. Pierce, 537 Pa. 514, 524, 645 A.2d 189, 194 (1994). “Counsel cannot 

be found ineffective for failing to pursue a baseless or meritless claim.” 

Commonwealth v. Poplawski, 852 A.2d 323, 327 (Pa.Super. 2004).

Once this threshold is met we apply the ‘reasonable basis’ 

test to determine whether counsel’s chosen course was 

designed to effectuate his client’s interests. If we conclude 

that the particular course chosen by counsel had some 

reasonable basis, our inquiry ceases and counsel’s 

assistance is deemed effective.

Pierce, supra at 524, 645 A.2d at 194-95 (internal citations omitted).

Prejudice is established when [a defendant] demonstrates

that counsel’s chosen course of action had an adverse

effect on the outcome of the proceedings. The defendant

must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but 

for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 

proceeding would have been different. A reasonable

probability is a probability sufficient to undermine

confidence in the outcome. 

Commonwealth v. Chambers, 570 Pa. 3, 21-22, 807 A.2d 872, 883 

(2002) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The failure to 
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satisfy any prong of the test for ineffectiveness will cause the claim to fail. 

Williams, supra. 

“[T]he PCRA provides the exclusive remedy for post-conviction claims 

seeking restoration of appellate rights due to counsel’s failure to perfect a 

direct appeal....” Commonwealth v. Lantzy, 558 Pa. 214, 223, 736 A.2d 

564, 570 (1999). 

[W]here there is an unjustified failure to file a requested 

direct appeal, the conduct of counsel falls beneath the 

range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal 

cases, denies the accused the assistance of counsel 

guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States

Constitution and Article I, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania 

Constitution, as well as the right to direct appeal under 

Article V, Section 9, and constitutes prejudice for purposes 

of Section 9543(a)(2)(ii). Therefore, in such 

circumstances, and where the remaining requirements of 

the PCRA are satisfied, the petitioner is not required to 

establish his innocence or demonstrate the merits of the 

issue or issues which would have been raised on appeal. 

Id. at 226-27, 736 A.2d at 572 (internal footnote omitted). “While a 

defendant has the ability to relinquish his appellate rights, this can only be 

accomplished through a knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver.” Id. at 

228, 736 A.2d at 572. 

The following principles apply to a claim that counsel was ineffective 

for failing to pursue a direct appeal:

“[B]efore a court will find ineffectiveness of counsel for 

failing to file a direct appeal, the defendant must prove 

that he requested an appeal and that counsel disregarded 

that request.” Commonwealth v. Knighten, 742 A.2d 

679, 682 (Pa.Super. 1999)[, appeal denied, 563 Pa. 659, 

759 A.2d 383 (2000)].
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* * *

The rule set out in Knighten has been modified by more 

recent decisions, particularly Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 

U.S. 470, 120 S.Ct. 1029, 145 L.Ed.2d 985 (2000) and its 

Pennsylvania expression, Commonwealth v. Touw, 781 

A.2d 1250 (Pa.Super. 2001). These cases impose a duty 

on counsel to adequately consult with the defendant as to 

the advantages and disadvantages of an appeal where 

there is reason to think that a defendant would want 

to appeal.

* * *

Pursuant to Roe and Touw, counsel has a 

constitutional duty to consult with a defendant about 

an appeal where counsel has reason to believe either 

“(1) that a rational defendant would want to appeal 

(for example, because there are non-frivolous 

grounds for appeal), or (2) that this particular 

defendant reasonably demonstrated to counsel that 

he was interested in appealing.” Touw[, supra] at 

1254 (quoting Roe[, supra] at 480, 120 S.Ct. [at 1036]).

Commonwealth v. Bath, 907 A.2d 619, 622-23 (Pa.Super. 2006), appeal 

denied, 591 Pa. 695, 918 A.2d 741 (2007) (emphasis added). 

In making this determination, courts must take into 

account all the information counsel knew or should have 

known. Although not determinative, a highly relevant 

factor in this inquiry will be whether the conviction follows 

a trial or a guilty plea, both because a guilty plea reduces 

the scope of potentially appealable issues and because 

such a plea may indicate that the defendant seeks an end 

to judicial proceedings. Even in cases when the defendant 

pleads guilty, the court must consider such factors as 

whether the defendant received the sentence bargained for 

as part of the plea and whether the plea expressly 

reserved or waived some or all appeal rights. Only by 

considering all relevant factors in a given case can a court 

properly determine whether a rational defendant would 

have desired an appeal or that the particular defendant 
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sufficiently demonstrated to counsel an interest in an 

appeal.

Roe, supra at 480, 120 S.Ct. at 1036, 145 L.Ed.2d at ___ (internal citations 

omitted). 

Further, even “[a] deficient failure on the part of counsel to consult 

with the defendant does not automatically entitle the defendant to 

reinstatement of his...appellate rights; the defendant must show prejudice.” 

Touw, supra at 1254. Prejudice in this context means a defendant must 

show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s deficient failure to 

consult, the defendant would have sought additional review. Id. 

Instantly, the PCRA court addressed Appellant’s claim as follows:

At the hearing on [Appellant’s] PCRA [petition], [trial 

counsel] testified that on October 16, 2012, he sent a 

letter to [Appellant] indicating that his Motion to 

Reconsider Sentence was denied and communicating his 

professional judgment that [Appellant’s] cases lacked 

appealable issues. This letter was received by [Appellant] 

approximately one week later. [Trial counsel] further 

testified that he did not remember ever discussing the 

possibility of an appeal with [Appellant]: [Trial counsel] 

neither recalls being contacted by [Appellant], nor do his 

notes reflect any communication from [Appellant] 

regarding his desire to appeal....

Based on the evidence presented at the hearing on 

[Appellant’s] PCRA [petition], we find that [Appellant] 

failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that 

he requested an appeal. Although [Appellant] 

adamantly maintained his desire to pursue a direct 

appeal and even testified vaguely to speaking with 

[trial counsel] about an appeal, we are unsatisfied 

that [Appellant] actually requested [trial counsel] to 

file an appeal. In fact, we were presented with no 

evidence, other than the October 16, 2012 letter, that 
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there was any communication between [Appellant] and 

[trial counsel] during the appeal period, let alone 

communication regarding an appeal. Accordingly, we find 

that [Appellant] did not request an appeal.... 

(Opinion in Support of Denial of PCRA Relief at 8-9; R.R. at 26-27) (internal 

citations omitted) (emphasis added). We accept and are bound by the 

court’s credibility determination, concluding Appellant did not ask trial 

counsel to file an appeal on Appellant’s behalf. See Dennis, supra. See 

also Lantzy, supra; Bath, supra; Knighten, supra.

Turning to whether trial counsel had a duty to consult with Appellant 

about filing an appeal, trial counsel testified at the PCRA hearing, inter alia, 

as follows: (1) trial counsel represented Appellant at his jury trial at number 

1226 Criminal 2011 and at his guilty plea at number 1744 Criminal 2011; 

(2) trial counsel discussed with Appellant the risks of proceeding to trial at 

number 1226 Criminal 2011, including the potential sentences Appellant 

would face if the jury convicted Appellant of all offenses charged, and 

Appellant wanted to go to trial; (3) Appellant decided to enter a guilty plea 

at number 1744 Criminal 2011, and the terms of the plea were set forth in 

the written plea agreement; (4) trial counsel on Appellant’s behalf requested 

consolidation of the cases for sentencing for Appellant’s convenience; (5) 

trial counsel did not promise or inform Appellant that he would receive 

concurrent sentences as a result of consolidating his cases for sentencing; 

(6) trial counsel explained Appellant’s post-sentence rights to Appellant and 

personally observed Appellant sign the explanation of post-sentence rights 
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form (setting forth Appellant’s post-sentence and appellate rights);6(7) trial 

counsel spoke with Appellant on the phone following sentencing on October 

2, 2012, to discuss potentially filing post-sentence motions; (8) the only

issue trial counsel and Appellant discussed during this phone call involved 

asking the court to impose a sentence of state intermediate punishment or 

boot camp; (9) at no time during this call did Appellant say he was unaware 

of the maximum possible sentences involved in his cases; (10) Appellant did 

not ask trial counsel to file a direct appeal on his behalf during this phone 

call or at any time thereafter; (11) based on his phone conversation with 

Appellant, trial counsel filed a post-sentence motion asking the court to 

impose a sentence of state intermediate punishment or boot camp; (12) 

after the court denied Appellant’s post-sentence motion, trial counsel sent 

Appellant a letter dated October 16, 2012, informing Appellant the court had 

denied his post-sentence motion and trial counsel would not be filing an 

appeal on Appellant’s behalf because there were no appealable issues; (13) 

trial counsel’s letter to Appellant confirmed what trial counsel believed had 

been the understanding between Appellant and trial counsel—that there 

were no issues Appellant wanted to pursue other than the request for state 

intermediate punishment or boot camp, which the court had denied; (14) 

____________________________________________

6 Appellant’s signature on this form is somewhat illegible; trial counsel 

explained that Appellant’s signature was scrawled due to his arm injury at 

the time.
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trial counsel knew of no non-frivolous appealable issues; and (15) trial 

counsel ultimately learned Appellant filed a pro se notice of appeal. 

Appellant also testified at the PCRA hearing, inter alia, as follows: (1) 

trial counsel failed to subpoena witnesses Appellant wanted to present at his 

jury trial; (2) trial counsel had minimal communication with Appellant about 

his case at number 1226 Criminal 2011; (3) Appellant complained to trial 

counsel about the prosecutor’s remarks regarding the Commonwealth’s 

expert’s testimony, but trial counsel did not address Appellant’s concerns;7

(4) Appellant also complained to trial counsel about a potential juror who 

allegedly said he would believe a police officer over Appellant, but trial 

counsel did not have that juror stricken; (5) regarding Appellant’s guilty plea 

at number 1744 Criminal 2011, Appellant conceded no one had promised 

him a specific sentence, but he said there was “talk” that Appellant would 

receive a lesser sentence than the one imposed; (6) Appellant denied 

signing the explanation of post-sentence rights form; (7) after sentencing, 

Appellant spoke with trial counsel; trial counsel informed Appellant that he 

would file a post-sentence motion on Appellant’s behalf, but trial counsel felt 

____________________________________________

7 Appellant phrased this complaint as follows: “...I didn’t agree with what the 

DA was saying to the jury. When he had the specialist up here, you know, it 

was basically like the specialist was leading the jury on the topic of the 

marijuana being in a big Ziplock bag.” (N.T. PCRA Hearing, 12/23/13, at 46; 

R.R. at 81). Appellant’s precise claim is not particularly clear. Notably, trial 

counsel objected to the Commonwealth’s expert’s qualifications at trial, but 

the court overruled the objection. 
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there were no appealable issues; (8) following the conversation with trial 

counsel, Appellant believed trial counsel would only be filing a post-sentence 

motion on Appellant’s behalf, but not a notice of appeal; (9) after the court 

denied Appellant’s post-sentence motion, Appellant claims he asked trial 

counsel to file a notice of appeal, but trial counsel insisted there were no 

appealable issues;8and (10) Appellant asked fellow inmates for help in filing 

a pro se notice of appeal.

Here, Appellant’s convictions and sentences arose from a jury trial and 

a guilty plea. Significantly, Appellant alleged no claims of error in his PCRA 

petition or supporting memorandum of law that he wanted to pursue on 

direct appeal relative to his jury trial or his guilty plea. Similarly, Appellant’s 

brief does not specify any issues Appellant wanted to challenge on direct 

appeal in connection with his jury trial or guilty plea. 

At the PCRA hearing, the only issues Appellant discussed relative to his 

jury trial involved trial counsel’s potential ineffectiveness for his alleged 

failure to: (1) subpoena witnesses; (2) communicate with Appellant; (3) 

take action regarding Appellant’s complaints of the prosecutor’s comments 

about the Commonwealth’s expert’s testimony; and (4) remove a 

prospective juror. None of these issues, however, could have been raised on 

____________________________________________

8 Appellant did not provide a timeframe for this alleged discussion. Later in 

the hearing, Appellant admitted he had no communication with trial counsel 

after the court denied his post-sentence motion except for receiving the 

October 16, 2012 letter from trial counsel. 
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direct appeal. See Commonwealth v. Holmes, 621 Pa. 595, 79 A.3d 562 

(2013) (holding, absent certain specified circumstances, claims of ineffective 

assistance of counsel must be deferred until collateral review). See also 

Commonwealth v. Martin, 607 Pa. 165, 5 A.3d 177 (2010) (restating 

general rule that counsel cannot raise his own ineffectiveness). 

Additionally, Appellant advanced no testimony at the PCRA hearing

concerning specific issues he wanted to raise on direct appeal as a result of 

his guilty plea. Appellant’s written plea agreement expressly informed 

Appellant that his appeal rights were limited to challenging the court’s 

jurisdiction, the legality of his sentence, and the validity of his guilty plea. 

Appellant’s guilty plea was open as to sentencing and in exchange for 

Appellant’s guilty plea to possession of marijuana, the Commonwealth 

agreed to ask the court to enter nolle prosequi as to the more serious PWID 

offense at number 1744 Criminal 2011. 

The record also shows that after Appellant filed a pro se notice of 

appeal, Appellant’s subsequent Rule 1925(b) statement raised only one

issue for appellate review: whether the court erred in accepting his guilty 

plea because the plea was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. 

Nevertheless, Appellant failed to challenge the validity of his guilty plea in 

his post-sentence motion. Consequently, had this Court not quashed 

Appellant’s appeal as untimely, his claim would have been waived for failure 

to preserve it. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 720 (governing post-sentence motion 
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procedures); Commonwealth v. D’Collanfield, 805 A.2d 1244 (Pa.Super. 

2002) (holding appellant waived challenge to validity of his guilty plea where 

he failed to initially challenge guilty plea in post-sentence motion). To the 

extent Appellant insists he would have pursued other issues on direct appeal 

but for counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness, those issues would have likewise 

been waived for failure to include them in his Rule 1925(b) statement. See 

Commonwealth v. Castillo, 585 Pa. 395, 888 A.2d 775 (2005) (holding 

any issues not raised in concise statement are waived on appeal). 

Based on these circumstances, trial counsel had no further duty to 

consult with Appellant about filing an appeal because (1) no rational 

defendant in Appellant’s position would have wanted to appeal; and (2) 

Appellant, in particular, failed to demonstrate that he wanted an appeal 

filed. See Roe, supra; Bath, supra; Touw, supra. Thus, as presented, 

Appellant’s claim regarding trial counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness for failing 

to file a direct appeal must fail. 

In his third issue, Appellant argues trial counsel did not fully inform 

and advise Appellant of the potential penalties the court could impose as a 

result of consolidating Appellant’s cases for sentencing. Appellant asserts 

trial counsel admitted at the PCRA hearing he did not expressly discuss with 

Appellant the possibility of Appellant receiving the maximum sentence for his 

guilty plea conviction consecutive to the sentences imposed for his jury trial 

convictions. Appellant claims it was his understanding he would receive less 
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than the maximum sentence if he pled guilty.9 For these reasons, Appellant 

claims his guilty plea was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. Appellant 

concludes trial counsel’s ineffectiveness caused him to render an unknowing 

guilty plea, and this Court should grant Appellant a new trial at number 1744 

Criminal 2011. We disagree.

Initially, we observe:

[G]enerally...issues not raised in a Rule 1925(b) statement 

will be deemed waived for review. An appellant’s concise 

statement must properly specify the error to be addressed 

on appeal. In other words, the Rule 1925(b) statement 

must be “specific enough for the trial court to identify and 

address the issue [an appellant] wishe[s] to raise on 

appeal.” Commonwealth v. Reeves, 907 A.2d 1, 2 

(Pa.Super. 2006), appeal denied, 591 Pa. 712, 919 A.2d 

956 (2007). “[A] [c]oncise [s]tatement which is too vague 

to allow the court to identify the issues raised on appeal is 

the functional equivalent of no [c]oncise [s]tatement at 

all.” Id. The court’s review and legal analysis can be 

fatally impaired when the court has to guess at the issues 

raised. Thus, if a concise statement is too vague, the 

court may find waiver. 

Commonwealth v. Hansley, 24 A.3d 410, 415 (Pa.Super. 2011), appeal 

denied, 613 Pa. 642, 32 A.3d 1275 (2011) (some internal citations omitted). 

Additionally, “[a]llegations of ineffectiveness in connection with the 

entry of a guilty plea will serve as a basis for relief only if the ineffectiveness 

caused the defendant to enter an involuntary or unknowing plea.” 

____________________________________________

9 Based on Appellant’s prior record score of four, Appellant faced a maximum 

sentence of one (1) year of imprisonment. The court sentenced Appellant to 

six (6) to twelve (12) months’ imprisonment for his guilty plea to possession 

of marijuana. 
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Commonwealth v. Moser, 921 A.2d 526, 531 (Pa.Super. 2007) (quoting 

Commonwealth v. Hickman, 799 A.2d 136, 141 (Pa.Super. 2002)). 

“Where the defendant enters his plea on the advice of counsel, the 

voluntariness of the plea depends on whether counsel’s advice was within 

the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.” Moser, 

supra. Pennsylvania law does not require the defendant to “be pleased with 

the outcome of his decision to enter a plea of guilty[; a]ll that is required is 

that [his] decision to plead guilty be knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently 

made.” Id. at 528-29. See also Commonwealth v. Allen, 557 Pa. 135, 

732 A.2d 582 (1999) (explaining court is free to consider totality of 

circumstances surrounding plea to determine defendant’s actual knowledge 

of implications and rights associated with guilty plea; court may consider 

wide array of relevant evidence to assess validity of plea including but not 

limited to transcripts from other proceedings, off-the-record communications 

with counsel, and written plea agreements). 

Instantly, Appellant presented his third issue on appeal in his Rule 

1925(b) statement as follows: “The [c]ourt erred by accepting [Appellant’s] 

plea of guilty because he did not enter his plea, knowingly, intelligently and 

voluntarily.” (Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) Statement, filed April 11, 2014, at 

1). Significantly, Appellant failed to present this issue in the context of trial 

counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness or mention his current claim on appeal that 

he was unaware of the penalties he could face as a result of consolidating his 
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cases for sentencing. See id. Appellant’s vague Rule 1925(b) statement 

compels waiver of his issue on appeal. See Hansley, supra. 

Moreover, in its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the PCRA court explained:

In initial response to [Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement], 

we point out the obvious: a post-conviction court does not 

“accept” guilty pleas. Rather, this [c]ourt denied 

Appellant’s petition for relief based on his allegations of 

ineffectiveness of counsel in connection with the entry of 

Appellant’s guilty plea. What is more is the fact that 

Appellant never explicitly raised the argument that his 

attorney’s ineffectiveness induced an unknowing or 

involuntary plea. This [c]ourt, however, anticipated the 

argument and opined on the matter nevertheless. ...

(Trial Court Opinion, filed April 17, 2014, at 2). In its opinion denying PCRA 

relief, the court reasoned:

At the hearing on [Appellant’s] PCRA [petition], the 

Probation Officer who performed [Appellant’s] presentence investigation testified that, in the Pre-Sentence 

Report, she recommended that the sentencing judge run 

[Appellant’s] sentences consecutively. The Officer testified 

that she would not have changed her recommendation had 

[Appellant’s] two cases been sentenced on two separate 

dates. Further, [Appellant] was colloquied on the 

sentencing judge’s discretion to run multiple sentences 

consecutively when [Appellant] entered his plea of guilty:

THE COURT: ...[I]f in a given case there is more 

than one charge that you’re pleading guilty to; or if 

you are pleading guilty to crimes in more than one 

case, the sentences imposed on each charge could 

be run potentially consecutively, which means one 

after the other.

So for example, if you had 3 months to 12 months 

on one charge, another 3 months to 12 months on 

another charge and then another case where you got 

3 months to 12 months you could potentially face up 

to 9 months to 36 months in jail because of those 
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sentences. And the way—the fancy term is called it 

would be aggregated, or run consecutively, and that 

each of the maximum penalties for each charge in 

each case could be run consecutively. 

[N.T. Guilty Plea Hearing, 8/21/12, at 9-10].[10] 

Accordingly, we find that [Appellant] suffered no prejudice 

and his ineffective assistance of counsel claim predicated 

on [trial counsel’s] failure to advise him of the possible 

penalties resulting from consolidating his cases for 

sentencing is denied.

* * *

Excerpted above, we see that [Appellant] was properly 

advised by the [c]ourt of the possibility of consecutively 

run sentences at the time of the entry of his guilty plea. 

Accordingly, whether [trial counsel] similarly advised 

[Appellant] is inapposite in determining the propriety of his 

plea. 

(Opinion in Support of Denial of PCRA Relief at 14-16; R.R. at 32-34). The 

record supports the court’s analysis. See Ford, supra. 

Additionally, trial counsel testified at the PCRA hearing that he had

informed Appellant the court could impose the maximum sentence for 

Appellant’s guilty plea consecutive to sentences imposed as a result of 

Appellant’s jury trial convictions at number 1226 Criminal 2011. Trial 

counsel denied telling Appellant he would receive concurrent sentences if he 

____________________________________________

10 As well, on June 7, 2012, just prior to commencing Appellant’s jury trial at 

number 1226 Criminal 2011, the court explained to Appellant that if the jury 

were to convict him of the charges in that case, and if Appellant incurred 

convictions in a separate outstanding case, then Appellant could face 

consecutive sentences for his crimes. The court specifically explained to 

Appellant the meaning of “consecutive” sentences. 
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proceeded to a consolidated sentencing hearing. Notably, Appellant

requested consolidation of his cases for sentencing to accommodate medical 

treatment for his physical injuries. Thus, even if properly preserved, 

Appellant’s claim that his plea was unknowing, unintelligent, and involuntary 

would afford him no relief on the ground asserted. See Allen, supra. 

Accordingly, we affirm.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/24/2015