UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-4703

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

REGINALD DWAYNE GRANT, a/k/a Dog,

Defendant - Appellant.

No. 15-4706

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

REGINALD DWAYNE GRANT,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Louise W. Flanagan, 

District Judge. (5:14-cr-00296-FL-1; 5:06-cr-00100-FL-1)

Submitted: July 20, 2016 Decided: July 29, 2016

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and WYNN and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Terry F. Rose, Smithfield, North Carolina, for Appellant. John 

Stuart Bruce, Acting United States Attorney, Jennifer P. MayParker, Barbara D. Kocher, Assistant United States Attorneys, 

Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Reginald Dwayne Grant appeals the 46-month sentence he 

received upon pleading guilty to two counts of distributing a 

quantity of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) 

(2012), and the 18-month sentence he received after the district 

court revoked his supervised release. In these appeals, Grant 

contends that the sentences, which the court ordered to run 

consecutively, are substantively unreasonable.* We disagree.

When reviewing the substantive reasonableness of a sentence

imposed upon conviction, we consider “the totality of the 

circumstances” under an abuse of discretion standard. Gall v. 

United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). In evaluating a sentence 

for an abuse of discretion, “we give[] due deference to the 

[d]istrict [c]ourt’s reasoned and reasonable decision that the 

[18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) [(2012)] factors, on the whole, justified 

the sentence.” Id. at 59-60. The sentence must be “sufficient, 

but not greater than necessary,” to satisfy the goals of 

sentencing. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). We presume that a withinGuidelines sentence, as here, is substantively reasonable. 

United States v. Louthian, 756 F.3d 295, 306 (4th Cir.), cert. 

denied, 135 S. Ct. 421 (2014). Grant may rebut that presumption 

 * Grant does not claim that the district court committed any 

procedural error in sentencing him for either the crimes of 

conviction or the revocation of supervised release.
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only “by showing that the sentence is unreasonable when measured 

against the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.” Id.

A revocation sentence is substantively reasonable if the 

district court stated a proper basis for concluding that the 

defendant should receive the sentence imposed. United States v. 

Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 440 (4th Cir. 2006). Although the 

sentence must be “sufficient, but not greater than necessary” to 

satisfy the goals of sentencing, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a), 

3583(e) (2012), “the sentencing court retains broad discretion 

to revoke a defendant’s [supervised release] and impose a term 

of imprisonment up to the statutory maximum,” United States v. 

Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 657 (4th Cir. 2007).

We conclude that Grant fails to rebut the presumption that 

either sentence is substantively reasonable. In fashioning the 

46-month sentence for the crimes of conviction, the district 

court considered Grant’s request for a lesser sentence in light 

of the § 3553(a) factors, such as Grant’s history and 

characteristics, the nature and circumstances of the offense, 

and the need for the sentence imposed. The court also 

adequately explained its reasons in imposing a revocation 

sentence within the statutory maximum.

Additionally, Grant’s argument fails because the revocation 

sentence is separate and distinct from the sentence for the 

crimes of conviction. See Crudup, 461 F.3d at 437-38 (observing 
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that revocation sentence is designed to punish defendant’s 

failure to abide by terms of supervised release). Moreover, the 

argument also runs contrary to U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual

§ 7B1.3(f), p.s. (2015), which provides for imposition of 

consecutive sentences in situations such as Grant’s. Accord

United States v. Johnson, 640 F.3d 195, 208 (6th Cir. 2011) 

(explaining that, although not binding, district court should 

consider § 7B1.3(f), p.s., in determining whether to impose 

consecutive sentences and that such decision is discretionary). 

Accordingly, we conclude that the sentences are 

substantively reasonable, and we affirm the district court’s 

judgments. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before this court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process. 

AFFIRMED