United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted September 20, 2017*

Decided October 5, 2017

Before

MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge

DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge

No. 17‐1968

ARLIN T. CALVIN,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

SUB‐ZERO FREEZER, CO.,

Defendant‐Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Western District of

Wisconsin.

No. 16‐CV‐552

James D. Peterson,

Chief Judge.

O R D E R

Arlin Calvin appeals the entry of summary judgment for his former employer,

Sub‐Zero Freezer Co., in this discrimination suit under the Americans with Disabilities

Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101. The district court concluded that Calvin’s claims were barred by

the statute of limitations because he did not file an administrative charge within 300 days

of his discharge in 2002. We agree and affirm the judgment.

                                                 

* We have agreed to decide this case without oral argument because the briefs and record adequately

present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not significantly aid the court. See Fed.

R. App. P. 34(a)(2)(C).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 17‐1968    Page 2

Calvin, who had worked at Sub‐Zero for nearly a decade, suffered an unspecified

work‐related injury in August 2001 and no longer could perform his job on the

production line. He was assigned a new job that ended in July 2002. Calvin says that at

that time he “was walked out of the back door of Sub‐Zero” and was told by Sub‐Zero’s

Director of Human Resources that his “employment with Sub‐Zero was done.” A year

and a half later, Calvin received a letter from Sub‐Zero. It stated that he had exhausted

his unpaid leave under the collective bargaining agreement and confirmed that his job

had been terminated.   

In 2004 Calvin filed an administrative complaint with the Wisconsin Department

of Workforce Development Equal Rights Division. His case languished for years (the

record contains conflicting accounts of the reasons for the delay), and in 2010 he filed

another administrative complaint. In late 2015 an administrative law judge determined

that there was not probable cause to believe that Sub‐Zero discriminated against him

based on his race, color, or disability.

Calvin then filed this suit under the ADA in 2016. The district judge initially

questioned whether Calvin’s case could be timely, given the dated nature of the events.

But the judge allowed the case to proceed because of uncertain details about the precise

date that Calvin’s job was terminated and whether he had ever received a right‐to‐sue

letter from the Equal Rights Division. The judge eventually entered summary judgment

for Sub‐Zero, concluding that Calvin’s claims were barred by the statute of limitations.

As the judge explained, Calvin knew in July 2002 that his employment was terminated

and yet did not file his administrative complaint until November 2004, long after the

applicable 300‐day limit. See Barrett v. Ill. Dep’t of Corr., 803 F.3d 893, 898 (7th Cir. 2015);

Roney v. Ill. Dep’t of Transp., 474 F.3d 455, 459–60 (7th Cir. 2007). The judge then denied

Calvin’s motion for reconsideration in which he argued—for the first time—that his

discharge did not become official until 2004, when he received the letter from Sub‐Zero

about his terminated job.

Before a plaintiff files a suit for employment discrimination under the ADA, he

must file a timely administrative complaint. See 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (adopting exhaustion

procedures set forth in Title VII for ADA claims); Kersting v. Wal‐Mart Stores, Inc., 250 F.3d

1109, 1118 (7th Cir. 2001); Fairchild v. Forma Scientific, Inc., 147 F.3d 567, 574 (7th Cir. 1998).

In Wisconsin, a plaintiff has 300 days from the alleged discriminatory act to file a

complaint with the EEOC or the state Equal Rights Division. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e‐5(e);

Johnson v. J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc., 280 F.3d 1125, 1128–29 (7th Cir. 2002). A plaintiff’s failure

to file a timely administrative complaint bars his suit. See Salas v. Wis. Dep’t of Corr.,

493 F.3d 913, 921 (7th Cir. 2007) (Title VII).
No. 17‐1968    Page 3

On appeal Calvin asserts that his administrative complaint to the Equal Rights

Division in 2004 was timely. He argues that he filed his administrative complaint within

the 300‐day deadline because his employment was terminated in February 2004, not

July 2002. We disagree. Calvin knew in July 2002 that Sub‐Zero ended his employment

when Sub‐Zero walked him out of the facility, told him that his job was “done,” and

stopped paying him. Those actions, presented to him at that time, were adverse

employment actions that started the limitations period. See dela Rama v. Ill. Dep’t of Human

Servs., 541 F.3d 681, 685–86 (7th Cir. 2008). The February 2004 letter, by contrast, did not

start (or restart) the limitations period. It merely reflected the consequence of Sub‐Zero’s

earlier decision in 2002, of which Calvin was aware in 2002, to end his employment.

See Barrett v. Ill. Dep’t of Corr., 803 F.3d 893, 898 (7th Cir. 2015). Because Calvin knew in

July 2002 that Sub‐Zero had taken these adverse employment actions against him, Calvin

had 300 days from that time to file a timely administrative complaint. See Del. State Coll.

v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 258 (1980); Barrett, 803 F.3d at 898; Cada v. Baxter Healthcare Corp.,

920 F.2d 446, 453 (7th Cir. 1990). His failure, then, to file an administrative complaint until

November 2004, over two years later, dooms his suit.   

AFFIRMED.