SUMMARY 

July 12, 2018 

2018COA98

No. 17CA1153, People in the Interest of D.C.C. — Juvenile 

Court — Jurisdiction — Dependency and Neglect — Uniform 

Parentage Act 

A division of the Court of Appeals holds that when a court 

declares a child dependent or neglected in a dependency and 

neglect case filed under article 3 of the Children’s Code, a court 

presiding over a separate parentage proceeding under article 4 of 

the Code (The Uniform Parentage Act) loses jurisdiction to 

determine that child’s parentage. In such a situation, all matters 

pertaining to the child’s status must be addressed in the open 

dependency and neglect case. Because the article 4 court in this 

case lacked jurisdiction to determine that the respondent was not 

the child’s father, the article 3 dependency and neglect court erred 

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions 

constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by 

the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be 

cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division. 

Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion 

should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion. 
in relying on the article 4 court’s order so finding in dismissing 

respondent from the dependency and neglect case. 
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2018COA98

Court of Appeals No. 17CA1153 

Weld County District Court No. 16JV505 

Honorable Elizabeth B. Strobel, Judge 

The People of the State of Colorado, 

Petitioner-Appellee, 

In the Interest of D.C.C., D.I.C., and D.R-B., Children, 

and Concerning A.M.G., a/k/a A.M.G-N., 

Respondent-Appellant. 

ORDER REVERSED AND CASE 

REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS 

Division VII 

Opinion by JUDGE J. JONES 

Ashby and Harris, JJ., concur 

Announced July 12, 2018 

No Appearance for Petitioner-Appellee 

Meghan E. Scott, Guardian Ad Litem 

Pamela K. Streng, Georgetown, Colorado, for Respondent-Appellant 
1 

¶ 1 In this dependency and neglect proceeding, A.M.G. (father) 

appeals the order dismissing him from the petition in dependency 

or neglect after a child support court declared he wasn’t the father 

of D.R-B. (child). We conclude that the child support court lacked 

jurisdiction to make paternity findings when there was an ongoing 

dependency and neglect proceeding. So we reverse the order 

dismissing father from the petition. 

I. Background 

¶ 2 In July 2016, the Weld County Department of Human Services 

(Department) filed a petition in dependency or neglect and for a 

determination of paternity. It alleged that J.R-B. (mother) and K.RB. (stepmother) had a history of methamphetamine abuse and 

domestic violence, and had been in and out of jail. 

¶ 3 The petition named A.M.G. as the father of the child, and it 

advised him that paternity of the child might be determined in the 

action pursuant to the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA), sections 19-4-

101 to -130, C.R.S. 2017. No one disputed that A.M.G. was the 

child’s biological father. The court didn’t decide paternity at the 

shelter hearing. 
2 

¶ 4 Before the filing of the dependency and neglect proceeding, 

stepmother had filed a motion for an allocation of parental 

responsibilities over the child in a domestic relations court. The 

court ordered father to complete genetic testing in that case, but 

father didn’t get tested before the Department filed the dependency 

and neglect case. The domestic relations court then certified the 

issues of legal custody and parental rights and responsibilities to 

the dependency and neglect court. See § 19-1-104(4)(a), C.R.S. 

2017. 

¶ 5 Father was served with the petition in dependency or neglect 

on August 1, 2016. After he failed to appear at his adjudicatory 

hearing on August 18, 2016, the district court entered a default 

decree adjudicating the child dependent or neglected. 

¶ 6 Father appeared for the first time at a hearing on February 2, 

2017, and the court appointed counsel. The court also ordered 

father to participate in and cooperate with genetic testing. Mother’s 

attorney indicated to the court that genetic testing had already been 

scheduled for February 15, 2017, and that the child support 

enforcement office had requested the paternity testing. Father 

indicated that he hadn’t been served with an order for genetic 
3 

testing and that he was then hearing about it for the first time. The 

court told father that he would receive an order requiring him to 

show up for the test. The court issued a written order that same 

day. 

¶ 7 A review of the register of actions shows that the Weld County 

Child Support Services Unit filed a petition for support in another 

division of the juvenile court on November 18, 2016, and that father 

was served on November 26, 2016. The register of actions also 

shows that father failed to appear at a hearing in the child support 

case on January 17, 2017, and that on that date the court ordered 

father to appear for genetic testing on February 15, 2017. It 

appears undisputed that father wasn’t ever tested. 

¶ 8 At a review hearing on April 4, 2017, the dependency and 

neglect court informed the parties that, in the child support case, 

the magistrate had entered an order finding that father wasn’t a 

legal parent of the child and “therefore, has no parental rights 

concerning custody and visitation.” The child support court 

declared stepmother to be the child’s legal parent. The dependency 

and neglect court said, “I don’t know that the Magistrate can do 

that with a [dependency and neglect case]. And I think what he was 
4 

trying to do was establish child support. However, nobody appealed 

this.” The dependency and neglect court also said, “[I]’ll leave it to 

you folks and all your great minds to sort this out.” 

¶ 9 The dependency and neglect court provided copies of the order 

from the child support court. That order said, 

[A.M.G.] has been properly served and notified 

of the hearing today. Nevertheless, he failed to 

appear or otherwise respond to this matter. 

[A.M.G.] had an opportunity for genetic testing 

and failed to appear. [Stepmother] wished to 

be declared the legal parent of the child. She 

has legal standing to do so. Based on the 

testimony presented and the provisions of 19-

4-105 the Court finds [stepmother] to be the 

legal parent of the child. She shall be added to 

the birth certificate of the child. 

¶ 10 At a review hearing on June 7, 2017, the dependency and 

neglect court determined that the child support court’s parentage 

order was final because no one had sought review. The dependency 

and neglect court also found that stepmother was the child’s 

parent, and “that being the case, then [A.M.G.] is dismissed from 

this case as the father.” 

¶ 11 Father contends that the dependency and neglect court 

erroneously relied on the order from the child support court finding 

that he wasn’t the child’s legal father. He argues that after the 
5 

dependency and neglect court adjudicated the child, that court 

maintained exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over the child until 

the case was closed or the child reached the age of twenty-one. See 

§ 19-3-205(1), C.R.S. 2017. We agree with father that, under the 

Children’s Code, the dependency and neglect court maintains 

continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over decisions related to the 

status of a child who has been adjudicated dependent or neglected. 

As a result, we conclude that the dependency and neglect court 

erred in dismissing father from the petition based on parentage 

findings made by the child support court.1 

II. Statutory Construction and Standard of Review 

¶ 12 We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. 

People in Interest of C.L.S., 313 P.3d 662, 665-66 (Colo. App. 2011). 

In construing a statute, we strive to give effect to the legislature’s 

intent, and adopt the construction that best carries out the 

 

1 The guardian ad litem argues that father waived any challenge to 

the child support court’s jurisdiction by failing to appeal the 

magistrate’s order in the child support case. But father challenges 

the dependency and neglect court’s order. And, in any event, we’re 

satisfied that the conditions for collaterally attacking the subject 

matter jurisdiction of another court are present in this case. See 

People in Interest of E.E.A. v. J.M., 854 P.2d 1346, 1351 (Colo. App. 

1992). 
6 

statute’s provisions and purposes. We won’t construe it in a 

manner that leads to an absurd or unreasonable result. Huber v. 

Colo. Mining Ass’n, 264 P.3d 884, 889 (Colo. 2011). As well, “[w]e 

construe statutes related to the same subject matter alongside one 

another, with the goal of giving consistent, harmonious, and 

sensible effect to all of their parts.” Kinder Morgan CO2 Co. v. 

Montezuma Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 2017 CO 72, ¶ 24. 

III. The Dependency and Neglect Court Maintains Continuing, 

Exclusive Jurisdiction Over a Child Adjudicated Dependent or 

Neglected 

A. Overview of the Children’s Code 

¶ 13 The General Assembly has declared that the purposes of the 

Children’s Code (Code), in general, include (1) securing for each 

child subject to the Code “such care and guidance, preferably in his 

own home, as will best serve his welfare and the interests of 

society”; (2) preserving and strengthening family ties whenever 

possible, including improving the home environment; (3) removing 

children from the parents’ custody only when their welfare and 

safety or the public’s safety would otherwise be endangered; and (4) 

securing for any child removed from his parents’ custody “the 

necessary care, guidance, and discipline to assist him in becoming 
7 

a responsible and productive member of society.” § 19-1-102(1), 

C.R.S. 2017. 

¶ 14 Within the Code, articles 3 and 4 have different purposes. 

Article 3 addresses dependency and neglect proceedings. See

§§ 19-3-100.5 to -805, C.R.S. 2017. In its legislative declaration, 

article 3 says that “the stability and preservation of the families of 

this state and the safety and protection of children are matters of 

statewide concern.” § 19-3-100.5(1). To that end, the state must 

“make a commitment to make ‘reasonable efforts’ to prevent the 

placement of abused and neglected children out of the home and to 

reunify the family whenever appropriate.” Id. The Code sets forth a 

number of procedures aimed at protecting children from emotional 

and physical harm while seeking to repair and maintain family ties. 

L.L. v. People, 10 P.3d 1271, 1275 (Colo. 2000). 

¶ 15 Article 4 covers parentage proceedings, which are governed by 

Colorado’s version of the UPA. See §§ 19-4-101 to -130. Although 

there’s no legislative declaration included in the article, “[o]ne basic 

purpose of the UPA is the establishment of the parent-child 

relationship, and another is the protection of that relationship.” 

R.McG. v. J.W., 615 P.2d 666, 669 (Colo. 1980) (citations omitted). 
8 

¶ 16 Under the Code, the juvenile court has exclusive, original 

jurisdiction in both dependency and neglect proceedings and 

proceedings to determine parentage. § 19-1-104(1)(b), (f). The 

question before us, however, is whether two juvenile courts can 

simultaneously exercise jurisdiction over a child who’s been 

adjudicated dependent or neglected. For the reasons discussed 

below, we conclude that they can’t, and hold, as has another 

division of this court in a slightly different context, that when a 

child has been adjudicated dependent or neglected, all matters 

related to the child’s status must be addressed in the open 

dependency and neglect case. See People in Interest of E.M., 2016 

COA 38M, ¶ 24, aff’d sub nom. People in Interest of L.M., 2018 CO 

34.2

B. Exclusive, Original Jurisdiction 

¶ 17 We adhere to the well-established rule that where specific and 

general statutes conflict, the specific statute prevails. State, Motor 

 

2 This isn’t to say, however, that the dependency and neglect court 

can’t rely on genetic testing performed in connection with a 

paternity, domestic relations, or other case. It may do so, in its 

discretion, if relevant to matters pending in the dependency and 

neglect case. 
9 

Vehicle Div. v. Dayhoff, 199 Colo. 363, 365, 609 P.2d 119, 121 

(1980). 

¶ 18 Although subsections 19-1-104(1)(b) and (f) give the juvenile 

court exclusive jurisdiction in (1) proceedings over any child who is 

dependent or neglected and (2) proceedings to determine parentage, 

section 19-3-205(1) says that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this 

article, the jurisdiction of the court over any child adjudicated as 

neglected or dependent shall continue until he becomes twenty-one 

years of age unless earlier terminated by court order.” (Emphasis 

added.) There isn’t any provision in article 3 conferring authority to 

another court to hear matters of parentage once a court has 

adjudicated a child dependent or neglected. 

¶ 19 Further, the continuing, exclusive jurisdiction of the 

dependency and neglect court is specifically recognized in the 

jurisdictional statutes of the Code. Section 19-1-104(4)(a) says that 

“[i]f a petition involving the same child is pending in juvenile court 

or if continuing jurisdiction has been previously acquired by the 

juvenile court, the district court shall certify the question of legal 

custody to the juvenile court[.]” Likewise, 
10 

[a]ny party to a dependency or neglect action 

who becomes aware of any other proceeding in 

which the custody of a subject child is at issue 

shall file in such other proceeding a notice that 

an action is pending in juvenile court together 

with a request that such other court certify the 

issue of legal custody to the juvenile court 

pursuant to Section 19-1-104(4) and (5), 

C.R.S. 

C.R.J.P. 4.4(a). As our supreme court recently held, “these statutes 

and rules amply demonstrate the legislature’s preference for 

deciding the fate of parents who are involved in dependency and 

neglect proceedings under Article 3.” L.M., ¶ 38 (when a 

dependency and neglect proceeding is pending, the state can 

terminate parental rights only through the procedures set forth in 

article 3 and not under article 5). 

¶ 20 Reading these statutes together, we conclude that the juvenile 

court presiding over the open dependency or neglect case maintains 

continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over the status of an adjudicated 

child. See E.M., ¶¶ 20, 24. 

C. Due Process 

¶ 21 Parents “have a fundamental liberty interest in the care, 

custody, and control of their children.” In re D.I.S., 249 P.3d 775, 

780 (Colo. 2011); accord Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000). 
11 

When a court decision will effectively eliminate or weaken familial 

bonds by terminating parental rights, or denying custody, parents 

must first receive fundamentally fair procedures. Santosky v. 

Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982); D.I.S., 249 P.3d at 781-82. 

¶ 22 In this case, when the child support court determined that 

A.M.G. wasn’t the child’s father and “therefore has no parental 

rights including custody and visitation,” the court effectively 

terminated his parental rights. The court did so without providing 

him the due process protections that he was being afforded in the 

open dependency and neglect proceeding. 

¶ 23 Parents in dependency and neglect proceedings receive several 

procedural and substantive protections that aren’t available under 

the UPA. In a dependency and neglect proceeding, for example, a 

parent has the statutory right to be represented by counsel at every 

stage of the proceeding and may apply for court-appointed counsel 

if the parent qualifies financially. § 19-3-202(1), C.R.S. 2017. A 

parent in a proceeding under article 4 doesn’t have a statutory right 

to be represented by counsel or to apply for court-appointed 

counsel. 
12 

¶ 24 In addition, in parentage cases, “the goal of the proceeding is 

to determine whether a man is a child’s legal parent.” C.L.S., 313 

P.3d at 670. In dependency and neglect proceedings, by contrast, 

the goal is to stabilize and preserve families and ensure children’s 

safety. See § 19-3-100.5(1). Due process in dependency and 

neglect proceedings dictates that parents named in the petition be 

provided an opportunity to become rehabilitated through 

participation in a treatment plan. See § 19-3-604, C.R.S. 2017; 

A.M. v. A.C., 2013 CO 16, ¶ 29. Thus, after a court adjudicates a 

child dependent or neglected, the court then holds a dispositional 

hearing in which it adopts a treatment plan for the parents if it’s 

possible to do so. § 19-3-507, C.R.S. 2017. The purposes of the 

treatment plan are to provide services to the family, prevent 

unnecessary out-of-home placement of the child, and facilitate 

reunification of the child and family. § 19-3-507(1)(b). 

¶ 25 Such rehabilitative and reunification efforts aren’t available in 

parentage proceedings. In an article 4 proceeding, the only 

protections provided an alleged parent are (1) that each man alleged 

to be the natural father must be made a party to the paternity 

action, or, if not subject to the personal jurisdiction of the court, 
13 

must be given notice of the action and an opportunity to be heard, 

§ 19-4-110, C.R.S. 2017; People in Interest of J.G.C., 2013 COA 171, 

¶ 12; and (2) that genetic testing must be ordered on request, § 19-

4-112, C.R.S. 2017. 

¶ 26 We conclude that there isn’t any substitute in article 4 

proceedings for the protections afforded a parent under article 3.3 A 

parent is thus denied fundamentally fair procedures in actions 

under article 4 when there’s an open dependency and neglect case. 

IV. UPA Compliance 

¶ 27 Father also contends that when a paternity issue arises in a 

non-paternity proceeding, the UPA must be followed or the court 

lacks subject matter jurisdiction. From what we can discern, father 

argues that the juvenile court didn’t properly comply with the UPA. 

Because we hold that the child support court lacked jurisdiction to 

make parentage findings and we remand the case, we needn’t 

address this argument. 

 

3 As discussed in footnote 2 above, however, a dependency and 

neglect court may use genetic testing results obtained in an article 

4 case. 
14 

V. Conclusion 

¶ 28 The order dismissing father from the petition in dependency or 

neglect is reversed. We remand the case to the trial court to make 

findings consistent with this opinion. 

JUDGE ASHBY and JUDGE HARRIS concur.