IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Robert Duncan, :

Appellant :

:

v. : No. 2230 C.D. 2015

: Submitted: May 20, 2016

City of Philadelphia, Bureau of :

Administrative Adjudication :

BEFORE: HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President Judge

HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

HONORABLE DAN PELLEGRINI, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BY PRESIDENT JUDGE LEAVITT FILED: August 26, 2016

Robert Duncan, representing himself, appeals an order of the Court of 

Common Pleas of Philadelphia County (trial court) affirming, in part, a decision by 

the City’s Bureau of Administrative Adjudication (Bureau) finding Duncan liable 

for two parking tickets. Duncan assigns various errors and raises constitutional 

issues related to the issuance of the tickets and the Bureau’s hearing process. For 

the reasons that follow, we affirm. 

On September 12, 2013, Duncan was issued parking ticket number 

593856107 (Ticket One) for parking at an expired meter on the 500 block of South 

10th Street, Philadelphia. On September 19, 2013, Duncan was issued parking 

ticket number 595150244 (Ticket Two) for making a prohibited stop of his vehicle

at 1401 Arch Street, Philadelphia. Duncan appealed Ticket One and Ticket Two to 

the Bureau. On February 24, 2015, a Bureau hearing examiner conducted a 

hearing and found Duncan liable for both tickets. Duncan appealed to the trial 

court. Following oral argument, the trial court entered an order affirming the 
2

Bureau’s decision as to Ticket One and Ticket Two.

1

 Duncan’s appeal to this 

Court followed.

On appeal,2 Duncan raises several issues, which we consolidate and 

reorder to facilitate our review. First, Duncan argues that the trial court erred in 

finding that the tickets conformed with the requirements in The Traffic Code

(Traffic Code) Section 12-2804(3).3 This Code provision states, in relevant part, 

that

[t]he parking ticket shall also contain other sufficient 

information to identify the vehicle and to inform the person of 

the nature, date, time and location of the violation alleged.

PHILA. CODE §12-2804(3). Duncan argues that the tickets were deficient because 

they did not contain sufficient information to notify him of the actual location of 

the vehicle on a particular block. We disagree.

Ticket One stated that the offense occurred on September 12, 2013, at 

5:22 p.m. on the west side of the 500 block of South 10th Street. The ticket further 

identified the make, color and plate number of the vehicle. The offense was 

identified as a meter violation and included the meter number. Ticket Two stated 

that the offense occurred on September 19, 2013, at 11:29 a.m. at the north side of 

1401 Arch Street. This ticket also identified the make, color and plate number of 

 

1 A third ticket was remanded to the Bureau for a full hearing and is therefore not addressed in 

the instant appeal. 

2 Where the trial court does not take any additional evidence, our scope of review over the 

decision of a local agency is limited to determining whether constitutional rights were violated, 

whether an error of law was committed, whether the procedure before the local agency was 

contrary to statute, and whether necessary findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence. 

Kovler v. Bureau of Administrative Adjudication, 6 A.3d 1060 n.1 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010) (citing 

Section 754 of the Local Agency Law, 2 Pa. C.S. §754).

3

The Traffic Code is set forth at Title 12 of The Philadelphia Code.
3

the vehicle. The offense was identified as a stop violation at the aforementioned 

address. Both tickets satisfied the identification and information requirements set 

forth in Section 12-2804(3) of the Traffic Code. 

In his second issue, Duncan alleges that the trial court erred in finding 

that the tickets conformed to the requirements of Traffic Code Section 12-2804(5), 

which states that

[t]he original parking ticket shall be signed by the issuing 

officer who shall affirm the truth of the facts set forth therein.

PHILA. CODE §12-2804(5). Duncan contends that the issuing officers failed to 

comply with Section 12-2804(5) because they electronically signed the tickets. 

We disagree.

Ticket One was electronically signed by Officer M. Rivera. Bureau 

Hearing, 2/24/2015, Exhibit 1. Ticket Two was electronically signed by Officer K. 

Holtzman. Bureau Hearing, 2/24/2015, Exhibit 2. It has long been held in the 

First Judicial District that electronic signatures satisfy Section 12-2804(5). See, 

e.g., Pavlock v. Bureau of Administrative Adjudication, ex rel. Philadelphia 

Parking Authority (Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, August Term 

2011, No. 01049, filed October 2, 2012). We discern no reason to depart from this 

long-held precedent. Further, Duncan has not explained why an electronic 

signature is less reliable than a signature on a paper ticket. Such is the reality of 

our digital age. We agree with the trial court that both tickets complied with

Section 12-2804(5) of the Philadelphia Code. 

In his third issue, Duncan raises various due process issues. First, he 

argues that the Bureau’s hearing examiner assumed the role of the Philadelphia 

Parking Authority in the hearing, thereby commingling prosecutorial and 
4

adjudicative functions. While Duncan does not develop this argument beyond 

stating it,

4 we presume he takes issue with the hearing examiner’s status as a City 

employee. This Court rejected this identical argument in Kovler v. Bureau of 

Administrative Adjudication, 6 A.3d 1060 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010), where a motorist 

challenged a Bureau hearing examiner’s impartiality because he was a City 

employee. This Court held that “[Bureau of Administrative Adjudication] hearing 

examiners are not constitutionally disqualified from presiding over parking 

violations based solely on their status as employees of the City.” Id. at 1064 n.6. 

Accordingly, we hold that Duncan’s right to due process was not violated by virtue 

of the hearing examiner’s status as a City employee. 

Next, Duncan asserts that the hearing examiner tainted the procedure 

by commenting “well, [this matter is] going to go back, but we will go through 

each ticket.” Bureau Hearing, 2/24/2015, at 3. Duncan provides no explanation 

for how this statement prejudiced his case or demonstrated the hearing examiner’s 

impartiality.

5

 It is well settled that an appellate court will not consider issues that 

are not properly raised and developed in a brief. Boniella, 958 A.2d at 1072 n.8. 

See also Pa. R.A.P. 2119(a) (requiring argument of issues to be “followed by such 

discussion and citation of authorities as are deemed pertinent.”). Duncan has failed 

 

4 As a general rule, “[w]hen issues are not properly raised and developed in briefs, when the 

briefs are wholly inadequate to present specific issues for review, a court will not consider the 

merits thereof.” Boniella v. Commonwealth, 958 A.2d 1069, 1072 n.8 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008)

(quoting Commonwealth v. Feineigle, 690 A.2d 748, 751 n.5 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997)). “Mere issue 

spotting without analysis or legal citation to support an assertion precludes our appellate review 

of [a] matter.” Boniella, 958 A.2d at 1072 n.8 (quoting Commonwealth v. Spontarelli, 791 A.2d 

1254, 1259 n.11 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002)). See also Pa. R.A.P. 2119(a) (requiring argument of issues 

to be “followed by such discussion and citation of authorities as are deemed pertinent.”). 

5

This issue was mentioned preliminarily in Duncan’s argument summary, but is entirely absent 

from the argument section of his brief. 
5

to develop any argument as to how the hearing examiner was biased against him, 

and this Court will not invent one. Moreover, the record reflects that the hearing 

examiner went through each ticket individually to ensure that they complied with 

the Philadelphia Code. We reject this basis for Duncan’s due process claim. 

In his final due process argument, Duncan asserts that the trial court 

erred in ignoring his request to cross-examine the issuing officers of the tickets. 

Specifically, Duncan asserts that “the ticket should be dismissed because of the 

failure of the ticket writer to appear at the hearing, in violation of Pennsylvania 

Administrative Agency Law.” Duncan Brief at 6.6 There are multiple issues with 

this argument; we address them in turn. 

Section 554 of the Local Agency Law provides, in relevant part, that 

“reasonable examination and cross-examination shall be permitted” in a local 

agency proceeding. 2 Pa. C.S. §554. The Bureau has promulgated regulations 

governing the conduct of its hearings. Section 5.02(f) of the Bureau’s regulations 

provides:

The Respondent shall have the right to present witnesses, to 

conduct examinations and to introduce documentary 

evidence....The participation in the hearing of the issuing 

officer shall not be required except as follows:

(i) The Respondent may request examination of 

the issuing officer, provided that the Respondent 

first presents all issues and defenses at the initial 

scheduled hearing. Such request shall set forth all 

of the following:

 

6 Duncan’s brief cites to 2 Pa. C.S. §544, which does not exist. We presume from the context of 

the question presented that Duncan intended to cite to Section 554 of the Local Agency Law, 

dealing with cross-examination under local agency procedure. 
6

(.1) The facts the Respondent expects 

the testimony of the issuing officer 

would provide. 

(.2) The reasons why such facts are 

material to the adjudication of the 

violation charged. 

(.3) The reasons why the most 

reasonable means of establishing such 

facts is through testimony of the 

issuing officer. 

(ii) If the Parking Hearing Examiner finds that the 

most reasonable means of establishing facts 

necessary to adjudication of the violation charged 

is through testimony of the issuing officer, the 

hearing may be continued to a date when the 

issuing officer will be present. 

REGULATIONS OF THE BUREAU OF ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION, §5.02(f). Thus, 

absent a finding that the issuing officer’s presence is the most reasonable means of 

establishing necessary facts, the officer’s presence is not required. 

In Kovler, this Court addressed the argument that due process 

guaranteed the right to cross-examine a ticket-issuing officer and rejected it; we 

concluded that there is no right to confront witnesses in civil cases. Kovler, 6 A.3d 

at 1064. Further, Kovler did not request the officer’s attendance at the hearing and 

did not raise any issue that might require the presence of that officer. Because 

Kovler did not challenge the time, date, location, reason, or any other information 

provided on the ticket, the issuing officer’s presence was unnecessary in order to 

establish the facts necessary for adjudication of the parking ticket. 

In the present case, although Duncan requested to examine the issuing 

officers at the hearing, the hearing examiner concluded that Duncan failed to make 
7

a persuasive case that their presence would be necessary to adjudicate the matter. 

Here, as in Kovler, Duncan does not deny the location of his vehicle at the time the

tickets were issued or contend that the officers lacked valid reasons for issuing the 

tickets. Instead he argues that Ticket One and Ticket Two failed to conform with 

certain technical requirements of the Philadelphia Code, as discussed above. 

Because the issuing officers’ presence was unnecessary to determine whether each

ticket complied with the Philadelphia Code, Duncan’s third due process argument

fails.

In his final argument, Duncan asserts the trial court failed to enforce a 

settlement agreement reached in Pavlock. The City of Philadelphia and the 

Philadelphia Parking Authority appealed the trial court’s order of July 9, 2012, in 

Pavlock to this Court. Pavlock v. Bureau of Administrative Adjudication ex rel. 

Philadelphia Parking Authority (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 1474 C.D. 2012). The appeal to 

this Court was discontinued on June 4, 2013, following a joint motion of the 

parties based on a settlement agreement. Specifically, Duncan contends the

Bureau failed to comply with the settlement terms in paragraphs 2(A), 2(C)(ii), and 

(7). These paragraphs deal with the issuance of proposed regulations, the posting 

of regulations online, and the enforceability of the agreement. Duncan offers no 

evidence or argument as to how the Bureau violated the settlement agreement, or 

how the Bureau’s compliance with the agreement could have possibly affected his 

case. Accordingly, Duncan’s final argument fails.

For all of the reasons discussed above, we affirm the trial court’s 

order.

 _____________________________________

 MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Robert Duncan, :

Appellant :

:

v. : No. 2230 C.D. 2015

:

City of Philadelphia, Bureau of :

Administrative Adjudication :

O R D E R 

AND NOW, this 26th day of August, 2016, the order of the Court of 

Common Pleas of Philadelphia County dated October 8, 2015, in the abovecaptioned matter is AFFIRMED.

 _____________________________________

 MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President Judge