UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-1131

BRIEANNA KRISTEN GUNSAY; KRISTEN PETIT GUNSAY,

Plaintiffs – Appellants,

v.

B. ROBERT MOZAYENI, M.D.; SGT. TROY PLUMMER, #6137, Individually 

and in his official capacity as a Montgomery County Sheriffs Deputy; LT. GREG 

HENDERSON, Individually and in his official capacity as a Montgomery County 

Sheriff's Deputy; DEPUTY KEVIN STULTZ, #6194, Individually and in his official 

capacity as a Montgomery County Sheriffs Deputy; METIN ATA GUNSAY; 

LINDA LEE MOYER WILLIAMS,

Defendants – Appellees,

and

DEPUTY WADE, Individually and in his official capacity as a Montgomery County 

Sheriffs Deputy; SPECIAL AGENT DAN BALOCKI, Individually and in his 

official capacity as a Special Agent with the State Department's Diplomatic Security 

Service; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; MARSHALL JOHN DOE 1, 

Individually and in his/her official capacity as a United States Marshall; 

MARSHALL JOHN DOE 2, Individually and in his/her official capacity as a United 

States Marshall,

Defendants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore. 

J. Frederick Motz, Senior District Judge. (1:14−cv−01347−JFM)

Argued: May 11, 2017 Decided: June 21, 2017
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Before WILKINSON, KING, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed as modified by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ARGUED: Gregory L. Lattimer, LAW OFFICES OF GREGORY L. LATTIMER, 

Washington, D.C., for Appellants. Jason L. Levine, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY 

GENERAL OF MARYLAND, Annapolis, Maryland; Molissa Heather Farber, OFFICE 

OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland; David Keith Felsen, 

FELSEN & SARGENT, LLC, Rockville, Maryland; Clarence Paul Smith, LAW OFFICE 

OF C. PAUL SMITH, Frederick, Maryland, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Brian E. Frosh, 

Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MARYLAND, 

Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees Greg Henderson and Kevin Stultz. Rod J. Rosenstein, 

United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, Alex S. Gordon, Assistant United States 

Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greenbelt, Maryland, for 

Appellee Troy Plummer.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM: 

Kristen Gunsay, and her daughter Brieanna Gunsay (together, “Plaintiffs”), appeal 

the dismissal of their claims under the Fourth Amendment and Maryland state law relating 

to alleged injuries arising from their encounter with various state and federal law 

enforcement officers. That encounter arose from a long-running dispute between Kristen 

and her ex-husband, Metin Gunsay, to obtain custody of their daughter, Brieanna. Having 

dismissed all of Plaintiffs’ federal claims on qualified immunity grounds, the district court 

declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ pendent state-law claims and 

therefore dismissed those claims with prejudice. After careful review, we conclude that 

the district court did not reversibly err in dismissing Plaintiffs’ claims, with the caveat that 

the district court should have dismissed Plaintiffs’ state-law claims without prejudice. 

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment below but modify the district court’s order to clarify 

that the dismissal of Plaintiffs’ state-law claims is without prejudice.

I.

A.

The present action is the latest in a series of disputes between Kristen and Metin 

stemming from their divorce and custody clashes that have transcended international 

boundaries and drawn on the judicial resources of two countries and at least four state and 

federal jurisdictions. Because a full account of this convoluted history is unnecessary to 

resolve the case at hand, only those facts pertinent to the parties’ present dispute are 

summarized below.
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Kristen and Metin married in July 1988, and Kristen gave birth to Brieanna in June 

1989. According to Kristen, Metin was physically and verbally abusive throughout their 

five-year marriage, which ended in divorce in July 1993. In the resulting divorce decree, 

a Utah court awarded Kristen full custody of Brieanna, with Metin agreeing to certain 

limited visitation rights. In the initial years following the divorce, the parties apparently 

abided by the terms of the Utah court’s judgment without major incident. 

In 1997, however, Kristen moved with Brieanna from Utah to British Columbia, 

Canada. This departure prompted an increasingly bitter custody battle, resulting in 

numerous—and conflicting—orders from Utah and British Columbia courts. By 2000, 

Kristen had obtained orders from the British Columbia courts awarding her permanent 

custody of Brieanna; barring Kristen or Metin from removing Brieanna from the province 

without prior court approval; and restraining Metin and his family from contacting Kristen 

or Brieanna or entering the city in which they lived. Throughout this period, Metin asserted 

that Kristen abducted Brieanna and maintained a public website dedicated to her return to 

Utah. To that end, Metin obtained orders from Utah courts awarding him sole custody of 

Brieanna; repudiating the contrary orders issued by the British Columbia courts; and 

holding Kristen in contempt of court. 

Sometime later, Kristen and Brieanna—now an adult—moved from Canada to 

Maryland, where Brieanna began receiving specialized medical care to treat an unspecified 

“rare illness.” J.A. 17. During the course of this treatment, Plaintiffs allege that Brieanna’s 

treating physician, Dr. Robert Mozayeni, discovered Metin’s website dedicated to 

Brieanna and contacted Metin to alert him to Brieanna’s whereabouts. This 
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communication set in motion the events giving rise to the incident at the heart of this 

appeal.

On April 17, 2011, Metin phoned in a tip to the Montgomery County, Maryland,

Sherriff’s Office that Kristen would be at Mozayeni’s office two days later and was wanted 

by Utah authorities. A review of relevant court records revealed two outstanding warrants 

authorizing Kristen’s arrest—one issued by a Utah state court for felony custodial 

interference and perjury; and a second that appeared to be issued by the U.S. District Court 

for the District of Utah for unlawful flight to avoid prosecution.1

 

When Kristen and Brieanna arrived at Mozayeni’s office on April 19, they were 

approached by as many as nine officers from multiple agencies, including the Montgomery 

County Sheriff’s Office and the U.S. Marshal Service Capital Area Regional Fugitive Task 

Force. According to Plaintiffs, immediately after they parked, the officers approached their 

car with guns drawn, pointed their guns at Kristen’s and Brieanna’s heads, and ordered 

Kristen to exit the vehicle. With Metin and his mother, Linda Williams, looking on from 

a nearby patrol car, the officers then allegedly removed Kristen from the vehicle and forced 

her to the ground in order to place her under arrest. 

After removing Kristen from the vehicle, and with their guns still drawn, the officers

directed Brieanna to exit the vehicle. According to Brieanna, the officers—with weapons 

 1 The latter of these warrants mistakenly indicates that it was issued by the federal 

district court for the “Central District of Utah,” as opposed to the “District of Utah, Central 

Division.” J.A. 508. Although Plaintiffs argued below that this apparent typographical 

error rendered the warrant invalid, they concede on appeal that the warrant was at least 

facially valid at the time of the challenged altercation.
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now holstered—told her not to move while they handcuffed Kristen and removed her from 

the scene. Thereafter, Brieanna claims that the officers repeatedly “moved” her two or 

three inches at a time before encircling her and encouraging her to speak with Metin and 

Williams. J.A. 411. After refusing to speak with Metin, Brieanna briefly, and reluctantly,

spoke with Williams before being released. Brieanna alleges that she remained at the scene 

for approximately an hour after her mother’s arrest. 

B.

After filing a series of lawsuits in Maryland state court, in April 2014, Plaintiffs 

brought this action against Metin, Williams, and Mozayeni (collectively, the “Private 

Defendants”), as well as the Montgomery County Sheriff’s Office and three of its 

employees—Sergeant Troy Plummer (“Sergeant Plummer”), Lieutenant Greg Henderson

(“Lieutenant Henderson”), and Deputy Kevin Stultz (“Deputy Stultz,” and collectively

with the Sheriff’s Office, Sergeant Plummer, and Lieutenant Henderson, the “Public 

Defendants”). 

Against the Public Defendants, Plaintiffs alleged various causes of action, 

including: (1) unlawful seizure, false arrest without probable cause, false imprisonment, 

and excessive force, in violation of their rights under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments 

and the Maryland constitution; (2) conspiracy to violate their civil rights, in violation of 42 

U.S.C. § 1985; (3) false arrest under Maryland law; and (4) intentional infliction of 

emotional distress under Maryland law. Plaintiffs included the Private Defendants in their 

civil conspiracy and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims and further allege 

that Mozayeni violated Brieanna’s right to privacy under Maryland law. 
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On January 13, 2015, the district court dismissed nearly all of Plaintiffs’ claims on 

motions from the various defendants. In particular, the district court concluded that the 

claims against the Private Defendants were barred on res judicata and collateral estoppel 

grounds by the earlier state court proceedings between the parties. Those proceedings, 

which involved substantially similar allegations, ultimately resulted in the dismissal of 

Brieanna’s claims against Metin and Williams, as well as both Plaintiffs’ claims against 

Mozayeni. The state court dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims against Mozayeni without prejudice 

pursuant to a provision of Maryland law requiring medical malpractice claims to be 

submitted to arbitration before being filed in state or federal court. 

As to the claims against the Public Defendants, the district court began its analysis

by explaining that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity in connection with their 

efforts to execute warrants issued for Kristen’s arrest. Offering no further explanation, the 

district court dismissed each of Kristen’s federal claims against the officers. By contrast, 

finding “no justification for [the officers] to point weapons at Brieanna . . . or to detain her 

until she had spoken to” her relatives, the district court allowed Brieanna’s claims to 

proceed. J.A. 349.

Citing various errors in the district court’s analysis, Plaintiffs then moved to amend 

or alter the district court’s judgment dismissing the bulk of their claims. Although the 

district court ultimately denied their motion, the court clarified its earlier holding by noting 

that Kristen’s state-law claims against Metin and Williams were not precluded on res 

judicata grounds. Nevertheless, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction 
8

over those claims because they raised novel issues of Maryland law and implicated the 

state’s unique interest in domestic matters. 

Following discovery on Brieanna’s surviving federal claims, Public Defendants 

moved for summary judgment on grounds of qualified immunity. On January 12, 2016, 

the district court granted the Public Defendants’ motion and dismissed all of Brieanna’s 

remaining claims. This timely appeal followed.

II.

On appeal, Plaintiffs do not contest the dismissal of their federal civil conspiracy 

claims. However, Plaintiffs argue that the district court erred in dismissing their remaining

federal claims against the Public Defendants. Plaintiffs further argue that the district court

abused its discretion in declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over their remaining 

state-law claims. For the reasons that follow, we disagree.

A.

Turning first to Plaintiffs’ federal claims, as this action has progressed, Plaintiffs 

have offered a variety of bases for relief under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments stemming 

from their alleged interaction with the Public Defendants. At this stage, however, Plaintiffs 

proceed primarily on the theory that the Public Defendants used excessive force in arresting 

Kristen and encouraging Brieanna to speak with her estranged relatives.

We apply an objective “reasonableness” standard in reviewing excessive force 

claims under the Fourth Amendment. Anderson v. Russell, 247 F.3d 125, 129 (4th Cir. 

2001) (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395, 397 (1989)). Under this standard, 

“[t]he question is whether a reasonable officer in the same circumstances would have 
9

concluded that a threat existed justifying the particular use of force.” Id. This test “is not 

capable of precise definition or mechanical application” but instead “requires careful 

attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of 

the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the 

officers or others, and whether [the suspect] is actively resisting arrest or attempting to 

evade arrest by flight.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (internal quotation marks omitted); see 

also Pegg v. Herrnberger, 845 F.3d 112, 120 (4th Cir. 2017).

However, even when an officer’s conduct runs afoul of the Fourth Amendment,

“[q]ualified immunity shields government officials from liability for civil damages, 

provided that their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional 

rights within the knowledge of a reasonable person.” Estate of Armstrong ex rel. 

Armstrong v. Vill. of Pinehurst, 810 F.3d 892, 907 (4th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). In determining whether a law enforcement officer is entitled to qualified 

immunity, we engage in a two-pronged inquiry. Tolan v. Cotton, — U.S. —, 134 S. Ct. 

1861, 1865 (2014) (per curiam). The first prong “asks whether the facts, viewed in the 

light most favorable to the plaintiff, show that the officer’s conduct violated a federal 

right.” Smith v. Ray, 781 F.3d 95, 100 (4th Cir. 2015). The second “asks whether the right 

was clearly established” at the time of the alleged violation. Id. This court may analyze 

these two questions in “the order . . . that will best facilitate the fair and efficient disposition 

of each case.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 242 (2009). With these principles in 

mind, we first address Kristen’s excessive force claim and then address Brieanna’s claim.
10

1.

Because the district court dismissed Kristen’s excessive force claim under Rule 

12(b)(6), we review that dismissal de novo, assuming as true all factual allegations set out 

in the Amended Complaint and drawing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiffs’ favor. 

Hamilton v. Pallozzi, 848 F.3d 614, 620 (4th Cir. 2017). For present purposes, we therefore 

assume that the officers at the scene approached Kristen’s car with their guns drawn and 

pointed at Kristen, removed Kristen from the car, forced her to the ground, and arrested 

her pursuant to two outstanding felony warrants, one of which was for evading arrest. 

Regardless of whether the officers’ actions violated Kristen’s rights under the 

Fourth Amendment—a question that we need not, and thus do not, answer—the Public 

Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity because Plaintiffs fail to identify any 

decision, or combination of decisions, by the Supreme Court, this Court, or the highest 

court in Maryland, clearly establishing that, at the time of the incident, the officers’ actions 

violated the Fourth Amendment. See Williams v. Ozmint, 716 F.3d 801, 806 (4th Cir. 2013) 

(affirming award of qualified immunity where plaintiff failed to “cite any case, or 

combination of cases” that clearly established that challenged conduct violated 

Constitution). Accordingly, the district court did not reversibly err in awarding the Public 

Defendants qualified immunity on Kristen’s excessive force claim.

2. 

Turning to Brieanna’s excessive force claim, we also review the decision to grant 

summary judgment to the Public Defendants on that claim de novo, applying the same legal 

standards as the district court. Roland v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 850 F.3d 
11

625, 628 (4th Cir. 2017). “Summary judgment is appropriate only if taking the evidence 

and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 

party, no material facts are disputed and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter 

of law.” Armstrong, 810 F.3d at 895–96 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Based on information obtained during discovery, Plaintiffs concede that the named 

Public Defendants did not point their weapons at Brieanna or order her from the car. 

Appellants’ Br. at 18. Nonetheless, Plaintiffs contend that the named defendants “were at 

the scene” when unnamed officers removed Brieanna from her mother’s car and asked

Brieanna to speak with her grandmother. Id. at 18–19. To that end, Plaintiffs now rely

primarily on a “bystander” theory of liability in advancing Brieanna’s claims against the 

Public Defendants. 

Under the Fourth Amendment, bystander liability is “premised on a law officer’s 

duty to uphold the law and protect the public from illegal acts, regardless of who commits 

them.” Stevenson v. City of Seat Pleasant, 743 F.3d 411, 416–17 (4th Cir. 2014) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). To succeed under a bystander theory of liability, “a plaintiff 

must demonstrate that a law enforcement officer (1) knew that a fellow officer was 

violating an individual’s constitutional rights; (2) had a reasonable opportunity to prevent 

the harm; and (3) chose not to act.” Id. at 417 (alterations and internal quotation marks 

omitted). 

Here, Plaintiffs argue that, “even if [the named Public Defendants] could not be 

identified by Brieanna as taking any specific act of wrongdoing, they could still be held 

liable under the theory of bystander liability.” Appellants’ Br. at 20. Specifically, 
12

Plaintiffs point to language in their Amended Complaint alleging that these defendants 

“deprived and/or allowed plaintiffs to be deprived of” their Fourth Amendment rights. 

Appellants’ Br. at 20 (quoting J.A. 23). The Public Defendants respond that Plaintiffs 

failed to plead any bystander liability claim. However, we have made clear that, at the 

pleading stage, plaintiffs are “not required to use any precise or magical words in their 

pleading” to state a bystander liability claim. Stevenson, 743 F.3d at 418. Under that 

liberal standard, Plaintiffs’ allegation that the Public Defendants “allowed” Brieanna’s 

Fourth Amendment rights to be violated is sufficient to alert the Public Defendants to this 

proposed alternative basis for relief. See id. at 419 (explaining that, based on the 

defendants’ “undisputed presence at the scene of the altercation and the allegation that the 

officers ‘allow[ed] to be committed . . . unreasonable seizure[s],’ it requires no legal 

gymnastics or finagling” to read the plaintiffs’ complaint as alleging a bystander liability 

claim (alterations in original)).

Nonetheless, we conclude that the district court did not err in awarding the Public 

Defendants qualified immunity on Brieanna’s excessive force claim. Regarding Sergeant 

Plummer, in particular, it is undisputed that he was not present at the time the officers 

allegedly pointed their guns at Brieanna and Kristen, and that he left the scene soon after 

the other officers began speaking with Brieanna. Accordingly, Plaintiffs cannot

demonstrate that Sergeant Plummer either knew of the allegedly excessive force used in 

relation to Brieanna or had an opportunity to prevent it, as required to establish a bystander 

liability claim. See Thomas v. Holly, 533 F. App’x 208, 221−24 (4th Cir. 2013) (vacating 

district court’s denial of defendants’ motions for summary judgment asserting qualified 
13

immunity on bystander liability claims where plaintiff presented no evidence to refute 

defendants’ testimony that they did not witness the alleged application of excessive force); 

Smith v. Ray, 409 F. App’x 641, 649 (4th Cir. 2011) (affirming grant of summary judgment 

to defendants on bystander liability claims where defendant officers arrived at the scene 

after the alleged use of excessive force).

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Brieanna, Lieutenant Henderson 

and Deputy Stultz were in the immediate vicinity when the unnamed officers allegedly 

pointed their guns at Brieanna and moved her away from Kristen’s car, and also were 

present during the unnamed officers’ subsequent efforts to encourage Brieanna to speak 

with her relatives. But even assuming the unnamed officers’ conduct violated the Fourth 

Amendment—again, a question that we need not, and thus do not, address—the Public 

Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity because Plaintiffs fail to identify any

decision, or combination of decisions, by the Supreme Court, this Court, or the highest 

court in Maryland, putting Lieutenant Henderson and Deputy Stultz on notice that the 

officers’ actions violated the Fourth Amendment. See Williams, 716 F.3d at 806.2

 

In sum, the undisputed facts establish that Sergeant Plummer is not liable under a 

bystander liability theory because he was not present at the time the officers allegedly 

 2 To the extent that Brieanna’s constitutional claim derives from Plaintiffs’

allegation that she was subjected to false arrest during the alleged encounter, that claim is 

foreclosed under our precedent. Indeed, Plaintiffs point to no evidence that Brieanna’s 

“freedom of action [wa]s curtailed to a degree associated with formal arrest.” United States 

v. Elston, 479 F.3d 314, 319 (4th Cir. 2007). Similarly, even assuming the Public 

Defendants’ efforts to encourage Brieanna to speak with her estranged relatives amounted 

to an unlawful seizure, she fails to provide any authority demonstrating that the officers’ 

conduct violated clearly established law. See Williams, 716 F.3d at 806.
14

pointed their guns at Brieanna and Kristen and that Lieutenant Henderson and Deputy 

Stultz are entitled to qualified immunity. Accordingly, the district court did not reversibly 

err in dismissing Brieanna’s federal claims against the Public Defendants. 

B.

Having concluded that the district court did not err in dismissing Plaintiffs’ 

constitutional claims, we likewise affirm the dismissal of Plaintiffs’ related state-law 

claims. As a general matter, federal district courts have jurisdiction over state-law “claims 

that are so related to claims in [an] action within [their] original jurisdiction that they form 

part of the same case or controversy.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367. 

However, courts may decline to exercise such jurisdiction when: 

(1) the state-law claim raises a novel or complex issue of state law, 

(2) the state-law claim substantially predominates over the claim or 

claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction, 

(3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original 

jurisdiction, or 

(4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for 

declining jurisdiction.

Id. We review a district court’s decision to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction 

for abuse of discretion. Jordahl v. Democratic Party of Va., 122 F.3d 192, 203 (4th Cir.

1997); see also ESAB Grp. v. Zurich Ins., 685 F.3d 376, 393 (4th Cir. 2012).

In this case, the district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over 

Plaintiffs’ state-law claims because, among other reasons, the state-law claims (1) “raise[d]

novel or complex issues of Maryland law” and (2) “ar[o]se from a domestic dispute over 

which federal courts have traditionally declined (when possible) to exercise jurisdiction.” 

J.A. at 364–65. When coupled with the fact that the district court properly dismissed 
15

Plaintiffs’ federal claims that served as the basis of the court’s original jurisdiction, see 

supra Part II.A, these two bases provided an adequate basis for the district court to exercise 

its discretion to decline to retain jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state-law claims, see Farlow 

v. Wachovia Bank of N.C., N.A., 259 F.3d 309, 316–17 (4th Cir. 2001) (discussing district 

court’s discretion to dismiss pendant state-law claims without prejudice after resolving all 

federal claims in defendant’s favor); see also Smith, 409 F. App’x at 651 (finding no abuse 

of discretion in dismissal without prejudice of state tort claims upon dismissal of federal 

claims). However, because the district court declined to wade into the merits of Plaintiffs’ 

state-law claims, dismissal of these claims should have been without prejudice. See 

Farlow, 259 F.3d at 316–17. Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal of Plaintiffs’ state-law 

claims, but modify the district court’s order to clarify that the dismissal is without 

prejudice.

III.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is affirmed as modified 

to reflect that the dismissal of Plaintiffs’ state-law claims is without prejudice.

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED