United States Department of Labor

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

__________________________________________

R.D., Appellant

and

U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, CHARLOTTE 

MOTOR VEHICLE SERVICE FACILITY, 

Charlotte, NC, Employer

__________________________________________

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Docket No. 19-0877

Issued: September 8, 2020

Appearances: Case Submitted on the Record

Appellant, pro se

Office of Solicitor, for the Director

DECISION AND ORDER

Before:

CHRISTOPHER J. GODFREY, Deputy Chief Judge

JANICE B. ASKIN, Judge

VALERIE D. EVANS-HARRELL, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION

On March 18, 2019 appellant filed a timely appeal from a March 5, 2019 merit decision of 

the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP).1 Pursuant to the Federal Employees’

Compensation Act2(FECA) and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the Board has jurisdiction over 

the merits of this case. 

ISSUE

The issue is whether appellant has met his burden of proof to establish an emotional 

condition in the performance of duty, as alleged.

 

1 Appellant timely requested oral argument pursuant to section 501.5(b) of the Board’s Rules of Procedure. 

20 C.F.R. § 501.5(b). By order dated December 6, 2019, the Board exercised its discretion and denied the request, 

finding that the arguments on appeal could adequately be addressed in a decision based on the case record. Order 

Denying Request for Oral Argument, Docket No. 19-0877 (issued December 6, 2019).

2 5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.
2

FACTUAL HISTORY

On June 13, 2018 appellant, then a 47-year-old motor vehicle service tractor trailer 

operator, filed an occupational disease claim (Form CA-2) alleging that he experienced stress and 

depression due to factors of his federal employment including numerous actions by management. 

He noted that he first became aware of his condition and its relation to his federal employment on 

June 1, 2018. Appellant further alleged that these actions aggravated his preexisting post-traumatic 

stress disorder (PTSD). He did not stop work. 

In support of his claim, appellant submitted a September 2, 2016 memorandum from 

appellant to D.J., T.W, J.S., and C.B., employing establishment managers, which requested that 

“under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973” any communications from Supervisor D.J. be in writing. 

He noted that this included work requests, directives, and instructions. In support of his request, 

appellant noted that he was a disabled veteran and his disabilities must be accommodated. 

Appellant also submitted a June 12, 2018 National Labor Relations Board charge filed

against the employing establishment alleging acts of retaliation.

In a July 9, 2018 development letter, OWCP informed appellant that the evidence of record 

was insufficient to establish his claim. It advised him of the type of factual and medical evidence 

required and provided a questionnaire for his completion. OWCP afforded appellant 30 days to 

provide the necessary evidence. In a separate development letter of even date, it requested factual

information from the employing establishment regarding his allegations. 

OWCP subsequently received additional evidence. In an August 19, 2016 e-mail, appellant 

informed management that D.J. was “getting out of hand” which was aggravating his PTSD and 

causing him stress. He alleged that manager J.S. was lying for D.J. Appellant denied cursing or 

being aggressive towards D.J. as had been alleged. He asserted that he was subjected to retaliation 

as a union official and that he was a disabled veteran who was being mistreated and discriminated 

against. 

In November 29 and December 19, 2016 reports, Dr. John Wheeler, a clinical psychologist, 

diagnosed PTSD and noted that appellant reported increased work stress. 

In an August 25, 2017 report, Dr. Keith Logan, a Board-certified psychiatrist and 

neurologist, noted that he had treated appellant for a mood disorder and PTSD since May 2017. 

Appellant, in February 7, 2018 e-mail, notified the employing establishment management

that there were “very serious issues” with D.J. and immediate supervisors within his chain of 

command. He asserted that D.J. had lied about employees and engaged in harassment. Appellant 

claimed management had failed to act on complaints about D.J. even when there had been physical 

altercations caused by D.J.’s behavior. He asserted that D.J. made false statements and filed a 

police report as retaliation for his filing of an equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint. 
3

In an April 1, 2018 statement, appellant noted that on March 30, 2018 he was told that D.J. 

wanted to conduct an investigative interview with him.

3

 He indicated that D.J. yelled at him. 

Appellant told D.J. that another supervisor could conduct the interview or he would respond to 

written questions, but D.J. continued the interview. He requested his time card to clock out and 

leave, but he could not as D.J. held his time card, which appellant asserted was attempting to hold 

him “hostage”. Appellant acknowledged that when D.J. was near him, he commented “I see why 

your son acts like a woman, if I had a Dad like you I would be a MITCH too.” Following this 

comment, D.J. informed appellant that he was on emergency placement and asked for appellant’s

badge, which appellant dropped at D.J.’s feet. Appellant was then placed in off-duty status with 

pay, effective March 29, 2018, as the result of an investigation into behavior deemed him injurious 

to himself or others. 

OWCP thereafter received a number of witness statements relative to the alleged March 29, 

2018 incident. The record contains an unsigned statement dated March 29, 2018 from T.F. to 

W.C.; an unsigned and undated note from E.I.; March 30, 2018 statements from T.K. and W.C.; 

and an undated statement from A.B. These witness statements generally note that there was an 

interaction between D.J. and appellant of March 29, 2018 in which D.J. was acting in a harassing 

manner and resulted in appellant’s placement on emergency leave status. W.C. confirmed in his 

statement that appellant had stated something inappropriate to D.J. about a family member. T.F. 

noted that appellant informed D.J. of an agreement that he could not talk to appellant. T.K. noted 

that D.J.’s harassment had been ongoing. W.C. stated that D.J. made the only threating statement.

4

 

In an April 10, 2018 note, Karen Clanton, a licensed professional counselor, reported that 

appellant was seen on December 20, 2017 due to stress and frustration with a coworker. 

In a report dated April 16, 2018, Dr. Wheeler opined that appellant was disabled from work

for an extended period due to PTSD and workplace stress. 

On May 7, 2018 appellant was issued a notice of a 14-day suspension due to improper 

conduct. The suspension notice indicated that on March 29, 2018 he refused to meet with D.J. for 

an investigative interview, was abusive and very loud in front of coworkers, and verbally attacked 

D.J. in a very personal manner. 

In May 10, 2018 e-mail correspondence to S.W., appellant discussed his 14-day suspension

and contended that it was improper. 

An undated statement from the appellant’s union regarding the investigative interview

noted he had not used the word “faggot” toward D.J.’s son during the investigative interview. The 

union alleged that in order to justify placing him on emergency placement that management made 

up this lie. It asserted that the issuance of a 14-day suspension was improper as it failed to follow

progressive discipline and was issued without just cause, which violated management rules.

 

3 While appellant indicated that the incident occurred on March 30, 2018, other evidence of record indicates a 

March 29, 2018 date. 

4 The record contains identical statements dated April 4, 2018 from various individuals concerning management’s 

disparity in its issuance of discipline. The signatures are illegible. 
4

Lastly, the union alleged that D.J.’s actions were intended to provoke appellant and there was a 

failure by management to honor appellant’s reasonable accommodation request that any 

interaction with D.J. be in writing. 

The record contains the first page of a July 9, 2018 report from Dr. Kamala L. Uzzell, a 

licensed counselor, noting appellant felt depressed, sad, and disengaged from his family due to 

mistreatment by managers at work. 

By decision dated August 9, 2018, OWCP denied appellant’s claim, finding that the 

evidence submitted was insufficient to establish that the employment events occurred as alleged. 

In March 29, 2018 e-mail correspondence from D.J. to S.H., he asserted that on that 

morning he had requested interviews with appellant and W.C. regarding a March 23, 2018 incident 

involving L.B. Appellant allegedly refused to enter D.J.’s office, became loud, and used profanity 

in front of employees. D.J. alleged that appellant used a homophobic slur against him and his son, 

stating “you are a forgot [sic], no wonder your son is a forgot [sic] too, you are full of [s***].” At 

that point, he placed appellant on emergency leave and asked for his badge. Appellant then threw 

his badge on the floor and D.J. asked appellant to leave the premises. He replied by yelling “I am 

a disabled vet, you can do nothing to me, you watch, I will be back in 15 days.” 

OWCP received June 1, 2018 chronology of events from appellant in which he noted that 

in September 2016 he received 7- and 14-day suspensions. Appellant asserted that the seven-day

suspension was based on a lie fabricated by D.J. who claimed that he saw appellant sleeping. He

claimed the 14-day suspension was also based on another lie made by D.J., but management failed 

to act upon his reports of harassment. As a result of these actions, appellant requested a reasonable 

accommodation that any communication from D.J. be in writing. He also claimed that, in 

November 2016, an employee had left a racial slur on the office door and management failed to 

properly investigate or issue discipline due to perpetrators close relationship with management. 

Appellant asserted that his PTSD and depression were aggravated by being forced to work in close 

quarters with this employee, who he alleged was given preferential treatment. He alleged that D.J. 

harassed him and then lied when filing a police report in December 2017 asserting that appellant 

made threats and had a long history of violence with the employing establishment. In June 2018,

appellant was interviewed by the postal investigation service regarding the December 2017 police 

report incident. During the interview he was advised that management had alleged that he 

physically assaulted D.J., which he asserted was an attempt to frame him for more serious charges. 

In a June 17, 2018 statement, V.S. advised that she was present as appellant’s union 

representative during an investigative interview on June 15, 2018 during which he was asked 

whether he had grabbed D.J. and thrown him to the ground. The investigator claimed that this was 

an accusation made by higher-level employing establishment management. Appellant denied 

making any threat or having physical contact with D.J. He informed the investigator that there 

was “courthouse video” and witnesses supportive of his account. Moreover, appellant stated that 

he was off-duty at the time of the incident and he played an audio of D.J. threatening to call 911. 

In a statement dated July 16, 2018, W.C. indicated that he had represented appellant over 

the past few years and generally alleged that he had personally witnessed D.J. and C.B. lie on 

official documentation to discipline appellant and willfully make false statements regarding 
5

appellant. He noted that management refused to do anything about appellant’s complaints against 

management. 

On August 21, 2018 appellant requested reconsideration. 

In e-mail correspondence dated August 30, 2016, D.J. forwarded e-mails between C.B. and 

J.S dated August 15 and 30, 2016 regarding appellant’s conduct.

5

 

The employing establishment provided statements dated March 30, 2018 from M.M. and 

D.M. which both noted that the prior day D.J. had requested appellant to come into his office for 

an investigative interview. Both noted that thereafter appellant began to yell and act aggressively. 

In a September 17, 2018 e-mail, D.J. responded to appellant’s allegations of harassment 

and stress and commented upon appellant’s job performance and interactions. He attached 

documentation for incidents occurring on March 23 and 29, 2018 in which he considered 

appellant’s behavior to be disruptive. D.J. alleged that appellant created obstacles for the

supervisor by threatening civil court, EEO complaints, and labor charges and demanding union 

time for both himself and his group and that appellant was unhappy that all the charges he 

previously filed against D.J. were dismissed due to lack of supporting evidence. 

By decision dated November 8, 2018, OWCP denied modification finding that appellant 

had not established the factual portion of his claim. 

On December 18, 2018 appellant requested reconsideration. 

In a November 29, 2018 report, Dr. Milagros Valentin, a Board-certified psychiatrist and 

neurologist, requested that appellant be excused from work for the period November 30 to 

December 14, 2018 due to excessive work stress and medication changes to stabilize his 

psychiatric issues.

A copy of a December 7, 2018 grievance appeal settlement was submitted in which

appellant’s emergency placement on leave from March 28 to April 3, 2018 was to be expunged 

from his personnel record.6

By decision dated March 5, 2019, OWCP found that appellant had not established a 

compensable factor of employment.

 

5

J.S. noted that on August 15, 2016 he witnessed appellant place his finger in D.J.’s face, swear, tell D.J. that he 

could not beat him or win anything against him, and tell D.J. that he would be removed from the Transportation 

Department just like R.G. J.S. noted that on August 30, 2016 D.J. was attempting to conduct an investigative interview 

with appellant, a union representative, and him. Appellant walked out of the meeting after informing both J.S. and 

D.J. that the meeting was over and that he was going to record them. 

6

It also noted that he was incorrectly charged 32 hours of FMLA leave when he had requested to remain in leave 

without pay/nonpay status until his return to duty on April 17, 2018. 
6

LEGAL PRECEDENT

An employee seeking benefits under FECA7 has the burden of proof to establish the 

essential elements of his or her claim, including the fact that the individual is an employee of the 

United States within the meaning of FECA, that the claim was filed within the applicable time 

limitation, that an injury was sustained while in the performance of duty as alleged, and that any 

disability or specific condition for which compensation is claimed is causally related to the 

employment injury.8 These are the essential elements of each and every compensation claim 

regardless of whether the claim is predicated on a traumatic injury or an occupational disease.9

To establish an emotional condition in the performance of duty, a claimant must submit: 

(1) factual evidence identifying an employment factor or incident alleged to have caused or 

contributed to his or her claimed emotional condition; (2) medical evidence establishing that he or 

she has a diagnosed emotional or psychiatric disorder; and (3) rationalized medical opinion 

evidence establishing that the accepted compensable employment factors are causally related to 

the diagnosed emotional condition.

10

Workers’ compensation law does not apply to each and every injury or illness that is 

somehow related to an employee’s employment.11 There are situations where an injury or an 

illness has some connection with the employment, but nevertheless does not come within the 

concept or coverage of workers’ compensation. Where the disability results from an employee’s 

emotional reaction to his or her regular or specially assigned duties or to a requirement imposed 

by the employment, the disability comes within the coverage of FECA.12 On the other hand, the 

disability is not covered when it results from such factors as an employee’s fear of a reduction-inforce or his or her frustration from not being permitted to work in a particular environment or to 

hold a particular position.13

Administrative and personnel matters, although generally related to the employee’s 

employment, are administrative functions of the employing establishment rather than the regular 

 

7

Id.

8 A.J., Docket No. 18-1116 (issued January 23, 2019); Gary J. Watling, 52 ECAB 278 (2001).

9 20 C.F.R. § 10.115(e); M.K., Docket No. 18-1623 (issued April 10, 2019); see T.O., Docket No. 18-1012 (issued 

October 29, 2018); see Michael E. Smith, 50 ECAB 313 (1999).

10 See S.K., Docket No. 18-1648 (issued March 14, 2019); M.C., Docket No. 14-1456 (issued December 24, 2014);

Debbie J. Hobbs, 43 ECAB 135 (1991); Donna Faye Cardwell, 41 ECAB 730 (1990).

11 T.G., Docket No. 19-0071 (issued May 28, 2019); L.D., 58 ECAB 344 (2007); Robert Breeden, 57 ECAB 

622 (2006).

12 L.H., Docket No. 18-1217 (issued May 3, 2019); Trudy A. Scott, 52 ECAB 309 (2001); Lillian Cutler, 28 ECAB 

125 (1976).

13 A.E., Docket No. 18-1587 (issued March 13, 2019); Gregorio E. Conde, 52 ECAB 410 (2001).
7

or specially assigned work duties of the employee and are not covered under FECA.14 However, 

the Board has held that where the evidence establishes error or abuse on the part of the employing 

establishment in what would otherwise be an administrative matter, coverage will be afforded.15 

In determining whether the employing establishment has erred or acted abusively, the Board will 

examine the factual evidence of record to determine whether the employing establishment acted 

reasonably.16 

For harassment or discrimination to give rise to a compensable disability under FECA, 

there must be probative and reliable evidence that harassment or discrimination did in fact occur.17 

Mere perceptions of harassment, retaliation, or discrimination are not compensable under FECA.18

In cases involving emotional conditions, the Board has held that, when working conditions 

are alleged as factors in causing a condition or disability, OWCP, as part of its adjudicatory 

function, must make findings of fact regarding which working conditions are deemed compensable 

factors of employment and are to be considered by a physician when providing an opinion on 

causal relationship and which working conditions are not deemed compensable factors of 

employment and may not be considered.19 If an employee does implicate a factor of employment, 

OWCP should then determine whether the evidence of record substantiates that factor. As a rule, 

allegations alone by a claimant are insufficient to establish a factual basis for an emotional 

condition claim. The claim must be supported by probative evidence.20 If a compensable factor 

of employment is substantiated, OWCP must base its decision on an analysis of the medical 

evidence which has been submitted.

21

OWCP’s procedures provide: 

“An employee who claims to have had an emotional reaction to conditions of 

employment must identify those conditions. The CE [claims examiner] must 

carefully develop and analyze the identified employment incidents to determine 

whether or not they in fact occurred and if they occurred whether they constitute 

factors of the employment. When an incident or incidents are the alleged cause of 

 

14 See G.R., Docket No. 18-0893 (issued November 21, 2018); Andrew J. Sheppard, 53 ECAB 170-71 (2001), 

52 ECAB 421 (2001); Thomas D. McEuen, 41 ECAB 387 (1990), reaff’d on recon., 42 ECAB 556 (1991).

15 See O.G., Docket No. 18-0359 (issued August 7, 2019); D.R., Docket No. 16-0605 (issued October 17, 2016); 

William H. Fortner, 49 ECAB 324 (1998).

16 B.S., Docket No. 19-0378 (issued July 10, 2019); Ruth S. Johnson, 46 ECAB 237 (1994).

17 T.G., Docket No. 19-0071 (issued May 28, 2019); Marlon Vera, 54 ECAB 834 (2003).

18 Id.; see also Kim Nguyen, 53 ECAB 127 (2001).

19 S.K., Docket No. 18-1648 (issued March 14, 2019); Dennis J. Balogh, 52 ECAB 232 (2001).

20 L.S., Docket No. 18-1471 (issued February 26, 2020); Charles E. McAndrews, 55 ECAB 711 (2004).

21 M.A., Docket No. 19-1017 (issued December 4, 2019); Norma E. McAndrews, 55 ECAB 711 (2004).

21 M.A., id.; Norma L. Blank, 43 ECAB 384, 389-90 (1992).
8

disability, the [claims examiner] must obtain from the claimant, agency personnel 

and others, such as witnesses to the incident, a statement relating in detail exactly 

what was [stated] and done. If any of the statements are vague or lacking detail, 

the responsible person should be requested to submit a supplemental statement 

clarifying the meaning or correcting the omission.”

22

OWCP’s regulations provide that an employer who has reason to disagree with an aspect 

of the claimant’s allegation should submit a statement that specifically describes the factual 

argument with which it disagrees and provide evidence or argument to support that position.23

ANALYSIS

The Board finds that appellant has not met his burden of proof to establish an emotional 

condition in the performance of duty, as alleged.

The Board initially notes that appellant’s allegations do not pertain to his regularly or 

specially assigned duties under Cutler.

24

 Rather, appellant has alleged error and abuse by his 

supervisors in administrative and personnel actions, harassment, and a hostile work environment.

Appellant made several allegations regarding administrative and personnel actions. As 

noted above, an employee’s emotional reaction to administrative actions or personnel matters 

taken by the employing establishment is not covered under FECA as such matters pertain to 

procedures and requirements of the employer and do not bear a direct relation to the work required 

of an employee unless there is error or abuse on the part of the employing establishment.

25

 In 

determining whether the employing establishment erred or acted abusively, the Board will examine 

the factual evidence of record.26

Appellant alleged that management wrongfully issued a 7-day suspension on September 2, 

2016, a 14-day suspension on September 19, 2016, and a 14-day suspension on May 7, 2018. 

Although the handling of disciplinary actions and evaluations are generally related to the 

employment, the Board has held that they are administrative functions of the employing 

establishment, not duties of the employee, and are not covered under FECA.

27

 An administrative 

or personnel matter will be considered to be an employment factor where the evidence discloses 

error or abuse on the part of the employing establishment. In determining whether the employing 

 

22 Federal (FECA) Procedure Manual, Part 2 -- Claims, Performance of Duty, Chapter 2.804.17(j) (July 1997); see 

also D.B., Docket No. 18-0537 (issued September 12, 2018).

23 20 C.F.R. § 10.117(a); see id. at Chapter 2.800.7(a)(2) (June 2011) 

24 Supra note 12.

25 Supra note 14. 

26 B.S., Docket No. 19-0378 (issued July 10, 2019); Ruth S. Johnson, 46 ECAB 237 (1994).

27 F.W., Docket No. 19-0107 (issued June 10, 2020); see Janet I. Jones, 47 ECAB 345, 347 (1996); Jimmy 

Gilbreath, 44 ECAB 555, 558 (1993); Apple Gate, 41 ECAB 581, 588 (1990); Joseph C. DeDonato, 39 ECAB 

1260 (1988).
9

establishment erred or acted abusively, the Board has to examine whether the employing 

establishment acted reasonably. Appellant submitted a grievance settlement form dated 

December 7, 2018 indicating that his suspension from March 28 to April 3, 2018 was to be 

expunged. He also alleged that he had filed a NLRA charge alleging that these actions were taken 

as retaliation. Appellant also submitted a March 28, 2017 prearbitration settlement removing the 

7- and 14-day suspensions without prejudice, related to prior matters in 2016. These submissions, 

however, do not establish error or abuse on behalf of the employing establishment. Rather, they 

are merely settlement documentation without an admission of wrongdoing on the part of 

management. The Board finds that there is no evidence of record to establish that appellant was 

improperly disciplined as it related to the suspensions from work. Appellant has not offered 

evidence to establish error or abuse or that the employing establishment acted unreasonably in 

these matters and therefore he has not established a compensable employment factor relating to 

his disciplinary suspensions.

28

Appellant has also asserted that on March 29, 2018 D.J. failed to honor his reasonable 

accommodation request by communicating verbally with him instead in writing. The Board has 

held that management’s handling of reasonable accommodations are administrative functions of 

the employing establishment, and not duties of the employee.29 While appellant submitted a copy 

of his September 2, 2016 request that communication by D.J., his supervisor, be in writing, the 

record does not contain evidence that this request for an accommodation had been approved and 

was binding upon D.J on March 29, 2018. Regarding investigative interviews, the Board has long 

held that such interviews can only be considered compensable factors of employment if there is 

probative evidence establishing error or abuse.30 The evidence of record only establishes that 

appellant did not want to interact orally with D.J. The evidence of record also establishes, 

however, that appellant was not asked to leave the premises until after he made ad hominem,

homophobic comments against D.J. and his son. As such, the Board finds that the evidence of 

record does not establish error or abuse by D.J. during the March 29, 2018 interview.31 As 

appellant has not submitted corroborating evidence of error or abuse in this administrative matter, 

he has not established this matter as a compensable employment factor.32

Appellant asserted that he was subjected to mistreatment and harassment by management, 

specifically D.J. and C.B. While he submitted signed statements from his coworkers attesting to

general mistreatment by management, these generalized and overly-road statements are

insufficient to establish that he was subjected to mistreatment or harassing behavior by 

management, at any specific time. Mere perceptions of harassment or discrimination are not 

compensable under FECA.33 Unsubstantiated allegations of harassment or discrimination are not 

 

28 Supra note 22.

29 See S.B., Docket No. 18-1113 (issued February 21, 2019); Janet I. Jones, supra note 27.

30 F.M., Docket No. 16-1504 (issued June 26, 2017); G.S., Docket No. 09-0764 (issued December 18, 2009).

31 Id.

32 Id.

33 T.G., Docket No. 19-0071 (issued May 28, 2019); Marlon Vera, 54 ECAB 834 (2003). 
10

determinative of whether such harassment or discrimination occurred. As appellant has not 

established specific dates or times in which he was subjected to a specific action or event, he has 

not established a compensable employment factor relating to alleged mistreatment and 

harassment.

34

 

Appellant has also asserted that a racial slur was placed on the office door which 

management refused to investigate, that manager engaged in a pattern of disparate discipline, that 

D.J. made retaliatory and false allegations including defamatory and false statements regarding his 

work record and character, and that a police report was filed in retaliation for his filing an EEO

complaint against D.J. The Board finds, however, that appellant has not provided corroborating 

or supporting evidence to support any of these allegations. When a claimant alleges compensable 

factors of employment, he or she must substantiate such allegations with probative and reliable 

evidence.35 As appellant has not provided evidence in support of his assertions he has, thus, not 

established a compensable employment factor as to any of these additional assertions.

As appellant has not submitted sufficient factual evidence to establish a compensable factor 

of employment, the Board finds that he has not met his burden of proof to establish his claim.36 

Appellant may submit new evidence or argument with a written request for reconsideration 

to OWCP within one year of this merit decision, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 8128(a) and 20 C.F.R. 

§§ 10.605 through 10.607.

CONCLUSION

The Board finds that appellant has not met his burden of proof to establish an emotional 

condition in the performance of duty, as alleged.

 

34 A.L., Docket No. 17-0368 (issued June 20, 2018).

35 C.R., Docket No. 19-1721 (issued June 17, 2020); M.D., 59 ECAB 211 (2007).

36 Upon return of the case record OWCP should consider administratively combining the present claim with 

appellant’s claim in OWCP File No. xxxxxx595.
11

ORDER

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the March 5, 2019 decision of the Office of Workers’

Compensation Programs is affirmed.

Issued: September 8, 2020

Washington, DC

Christopher J. Godfrey, Deputy Chief Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Janice B. Askin, Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Valerie D. Evans-Harrell, Alternate Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board