### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT NAS HVILLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs N ove mb er 29, 200 7

ESTA TE OF HEN RY AT LAS QU ALL S A M OS E. QU A LL S v. H. J. Q. KL U TT S, EX EC U TR IX
Appeal from t he Probate C ourt forPer ry County No. PB-325 Timothy L. Easter, Judge

No. M2006- 02776-COA-R 3-CV - Filed Janu ary 9, 2008

This is the second appe al by the appe llant who again ha s asked this court to re view the Probate Court of Perry County’s denial of his petition. I n that petition, the appellant conte sted the manne r in which the Ex e c utrix o f h is la te fathe r’ s e state a dmi nis te re d th e e state . W e ha ve de te rm ine d th e iss ue is res judicata a ndthe re by a ff

ir m th e tr ia l c ou rt . W e ha ve a lso de te rm ine d th e app e a l is de vo id o f m e ri t and, ther efor e, the Exe cutrix is entitled to rec over he r re asonable expense s incurre d on appea l.
Tenn. R. App . P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Pr obate Court A ffirm ed

F R ANK G. C LE MENT , J R ., J., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which P AT R I C I A J. C OTTRE LL , P.J., M.S., and A NDY D. B ENNETT , J., joined.
Amos E. Qualls, Fayetteville, Tenne ssee, Pro Se.
Kimberly M. Hinson, Linden, Te nness ee , and La rry Joe Hinson, Hohenwa ld, Tennesse e, for the appellee , H. J. Q. Klutts, Executrix.

OP IN ION
This is the second appe al by Amos E. Qualls fr om an adve rse r uli n g b y the probate court
conce rning the administration of his late father’s e state. The petition in the Probate Court of Per ry Cou nty fi le d b y M r. Qu a lls (“ the pe tit ion e r” ) c on te ste d th e ma nn e r i n w hic h h is sist e r, the Ex e c utrix of his late father’s e state, administere d the estate . The pet i t i o n er ch allenged his sister’ s ad mi n is tr a ti o n o f th e e s tate a n d s o u g h t to r e c o v e r p r o p e r ty h e c o n te n d e d th e E x ecutr ix was unlawfully withholding.
The probate court denied the petition and approved the Exec utrix’s final ac counting, which decisions the petitioner a

ppeale d to this court. We affirmed t he decision of the probate court in 2005 and rema nded the matter . Being dissatisfied with the decision of this court, the pe titioner filed an Application for Permission to Appea l to the Supre me Court of Tenne ssee, whic h was c onsidered and denied by the Court on De cembe r 27, 2005. Being dissatisfied with that result, the petitioner the n filed a “ Motion to R econside r” w hich was de nied on J an u ar y 26, 2006. There afte r he f iled an-2-

“Applic at i on for Permission t o Appea l,” which wa s denied by the Supre me Court on January 30, 20 06 . T he pe tit ion e r f

ile d y e t a no the r “Pe tit ion to Re c on sid e r, ” wh ic h w a s d e nie d b y th e Sup re me Court on Ma rc h 2 9 , 2006. Following t he Supreme Court’s fourth denia l of the petitioner’ s applications for

relief , the ca se wa s remande d to the Probate Court of Per ry County. On rema nd, the pe tit ion e r fi le d a “ Mo tio n fo r Im me diate Be nc h Tria l” se e kin g to re -t ry the iss ues prev iou sly de te rm ine d b y th e pr ob a te c ou rt a nd thi s cou rt

. Th a t motio n wa s den ie d by the pr ob a te c ou rt . T his appea l followed.
In this appea l the petitioner ra ises the issue of whe t h er t he trial c ourt err ed in denying the petitioner’s Motion for I mmediate Bench Trial. The answe r to the question pre sented is “no,” the trial court did not er

r i n denying t he mot ion beca use t he is sues t he petitioner sought to litigate wer e
re s ju dic ata

.
A N A L Y SIS

In the fir st appea l b y the petitioner, he filed with this court a Statement of the Evidence pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 24(c ) in lieu of a ve rbatim transcri p t o f t h e testi mony. After the Appellee , the Exe cu t ri x , objected to the pe titioner’s Statement of the Evide nce, the probate court ruled that the pe titi o n er ’s s tatement of the evidenc e wa s inacc urate and incomplete. W e subsequently determined that without a sufficie nt rec ord, we could not adequat ely re view the decision of the probate court t o dismiss the petit ion, and, for that rea son, we a ffirme d the dec ision of the probate court.

Ou r d e c isi on wa s a

pp e a le d to the Sup re me Cou rt of Te nn e sse e

. Th a t c ou rt de nie d th e app e a l, there by aff

irming our decision, wherein we had af firmed the de cision of the Probate Court of Perry Cou nty . T hu s, the ma tte r w a s re ma nd e d to the pr ob a te c ou rt fo r fu rthe r pr oc e e din gs c on sis te nt w ith

our opinion. Unfortunately, the petitioner has misconstrue d our dec ision and the significanc e of the d e c i s i o n o f t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t i n t h i s m a t t e r

. F o r a b e t t e r u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e ma tte r, we wi ll conduct a summary re view of w hat has pre viously occurr ed in this matter.
The pe titioner’s fathe r, He n ry At l as Qua lls (“Dec edent” ) died a resident of

Perry County, Te nn e sse e , o n M a y 18, 20 00

. Th e De c e de nt wa s pre de c e a se d by his wif e a nd wa s su rv ive d b y th e ir three children: He nrietta Qua lls Klutt s (“Exe cutrix”) , Jerry Franklin Qualls, and Amos Eugene Qualls (“the petitioner”) . The Dec edent exec uted his La st W ill and T estament on August 5, 1998, wh e re in h e app oin te d h is d aug hte r a s th e Ex e c utrix o f h is e state . Si gn if icant ly , th e wi ll a lso contained an in terrorem c laus e , w hic h s ta te s: Every he ir, legate e, devise e, or be nefic iary unde r t his Will who s hall contest in any

c ou rt a ny pr ov isi on of thi s instru me nt sha ll not be e nti tle d to a ny de vis e s, le ga c ie s, or bene fits under this Will or any codicil her eto or a ny trust cre ated he reby, and any and all devise s, legac ies, and porti o n s o f t he income or corpus of

my estate, ot h er wi se provided to be paid to such per son, shall lapse and sha ll be paid, distributed and passed a s though such person ha d died prior to my death lea ving no liv ing la wf

ul d e sc e nd a nts . M y E xe c utrix h e re in n a me d a re sp e c if ic a lly a uth oriz e d toO n M ar ch 18, 2000, t he D ec ede nt exe cut ed a qui t cl ai m dee d conve yi ng hi s r ea l pr oper t y t o Ex ecu t ri x a nd 1

r es er vi ng i n hi m s el f

a l i f e e s t at e.
-3- de fe nda t th e e xp e ns e of

my e state a ny c on se nt or

a tta c k o f any natur e up on thi s W ill or any c odicil here to, or upon any pa ragr aph or pr ovision hereto.

The will of the De cede nt also provided that his r eal pr operty would go to the Exe cutrix, and 1 any mo n e y o r s e c u r it ie s h e ld b y th e D e c e d e n t w o u ld b e d iv id e d in e q u a l s h ar e s a mong his three

c hil dr e n. As fo r h is p e rs on a l pr op e rty, the De c e de nt’ s w ill dir e c te d a s f oll ow s:

I h e re by dir e c t th a t a ll m y p e rs on a l pr op e rt y s ha ll b e dis po se d o f a s f oll ow s:
(A ) I fi rs t dir e c t th a t so muc h o f m y p e rs on a l pr op e rt y th a t c on sis ts o f I nd ia n r e lic s,
carvings, and art wor

ks that I have cre ated shall be divi ded in the foll owing manner :

Eac h of my children sha ll, in turn, (starting first with Amos Eugene Qu a lls , th e n s e c on d w ith Je rry Fr a nk lin Qualls , a ndthi rdwi th Henrietta Joy Klutts) pick an it em, and c ontinue in turns picking one item at a time until each of them shall have c hosen as many items a s the y d e sir e : pr ov ide d h ow e ve r th at if the re are a ny ite ms i n th is cate gory re maining after

eac h shall have ha d as many opportunities

a s p os sib le , o r the y de sir e , th e n th e de vis e of su c h r e ma ini ng ite ms sh a l l l ap s e a n d b e c o m e a p ar to f t h e r e s i d u e o f

m y e s t a t e

. ( I ti s my wish, although not an absolute direc tion, that the Indian relics, so far as possible be kept together as a whole c ollection and not sold at any

auc ti on or

sa le that my [s ic ] b e pa rt of the a dmi nis tr a tio n o f m y estate.)
(B) I dire ct sec ondly, that so much of m y persona l property that consists of items that
wer e given to myself a nd m y l ate wife as gifts fr om my children, Amos Eugene Qua ll s , J e rr y Fr a n k li n Q u a ll s , a n d H e n r ie tt a J o y K lu tt s , s h a ll b e d is trib u te d to the child which gave such item as a gif t in the first instance.
(C) Thirdly I dire ct that such items of pe rsona l t y as re main afte r the de vise and d i s t ri b ution shall become pa rt of the r esidue of my e state and disposed of as here inafter

described.

Se c tio n X II of

thewi ll, tit le d Re sid ua

ry Es ta te , d ir e c te d th a t “ a ll ite ms of pe rs on a l pr op e rt y which shall bec ome a pa

rt of re siduary estate shall be sol d at auc tion and the net proc eeds of such sale shall be give n, in equal shares, to my children, A mos Eugene Qua lls and Jerry Fra nklin Qualls,” and that the r emainder

of the re siduary estate “sh al l be distributed in equal sha res to my childre n, Amos Eugene Q ualls, Jerry Franklin Qualls, and Henrietta Joy Klutts.”-4-

Th e Ex e c utrix t ime ly f

ile d a pe tit ionin the Pr ob a te Cou rt of Pe rry Co un ty s e e kin g to a dmi t the will to probate. The petition was grante d and the Exe cutrix proc eede d to administer the estate

. The Dece dent’s children appar ently participated i n the s elec tion of personal property in acc ordanc e with the will. Therea fter, in August of 2002, the Exec utrix conducte d a public sale auctioning the

rema ining personal prope rty. The sa le produc ed $3,912.41 for the estate

. Subsequently, the Exec utrix filed a pr oposed final a ccounting, which w as met by the petitioner’s motion to rejec t the Exec utrix’s final ac counting. The pe titioner the n s ubmitted a

su pp le me nta l f

ili ng to the c ha nc e ry c ou rt se tti ng fo rth a his tory of a nim os ity wi th the Ex e c utrix, his sister, and a ccusations that the Executrix ha d failed to prope rly distribute the persona l property.

After conducting a he aring on the pe tit i o n , the Chance llor dismis sed the pe tition by order enter ed May 12, 2003, and approve d the final acc ounting that had been submitt ed by the Exec utrix. On Ju ne 11 , 20 03 , the pe tit ion e r fi le d a pe tit ionfo r r e c on sid e ratio n, wh ic h th e Chanc e llo r s umm ari ly de nie d. Th e re a ft e r, the pe tit ion e r f ile d th e first of hi s appea ls t o th is c ou rt , a sk ing thi s c ou rt to revie w the Chanc ellor’s May 12, 2003 or der.

The fir st appea l filed by the petit ioner set forth in exc ess of thirty issues. As this court noted in our first opinion,
Mr. Qualls conce des t he futil ity of this approa ch by making the f ollowing statement in his brief:
As a pra ctical matter, the court is not expec ted to take the ne cessa ry tim e to r ule on a ll tho se iss ues li ste d h e re on a n in div idu a l ba sis

. [Appe llant] would be ha

ppy to recei v e the re medies re quested-and prays that the c ourt rule in his favor

. Maybe some of t he issues can be

c omb ine d a ndde a lt w ithin a mor e ge ne ra l ma nn e r, rathe r tha n w ith specific ity as set forth her e, or maybe the court could choose which issues are most signi fica nt to rule on.
Qu all s v . Kl utt

s , No. M2003-01850-COA- R3-CV, 2005 WL 1887121, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 9, 2005).

Af te r r e vie wi ng the ple tho ra of iss ue s ra ise d, the c ou rt de te rm ine d “ the sin gle iss ue fo r this Court’s resolution ca n b e stated a s follows: whether the trial court e rre d in dismi ssing the Appellant's petitio n co n t esting the Appellee ’s final a ccounting and ma nner of administering the estate. For the following rea sons, we must aff irm the trial court’s decision.” Id. a t *4 . I n o ur a na lys is set forth in the opinion following the first appe al we note d:

After evaluating the Appellant’s statement of the evidenc e, the trial court e ntere d an order noting that, while i t did contain som e of the evidenc e produc ed at the he aring, it also included the Appel l an t’s unsworn comments a nd persona l observations and omitted the testimony of the Appellee of fer ed under

direc t ex am i nation. The trial court noted in its order

of Februa

ry 24, 2004, that the Appellee testified that some of-5-

the items of personal property reque sted by the Appellant we re e ither stolen or ha d been give n to her by the D ece dent or her m other prior to their deaths. Otherwise, she denied withholding the other items re quested by the A ppellant. The tria l court found the Ap pe lle e ’s te sti mon y to be truth fu l, an d w e fi ndno thi ng in the lim ite d r e c or d to subvert this finding. Se e We ll s v. T e nn . B d. of R e ge nts , 9 S.W.3d 779, 783 (Tenn. 19 99 ) ( “ [A ]p pe llate c ou rt s w ill no t r e -e va luate a tr ia l ju dg e ’s a sse ssm e nt o f w itn e ss
cre dibilit y absent c lear

and convinc ing evidence to the contra ry.”)

. Qu all s , 2005 WL 1887121, at *4

. In the a nalysis the court we nt on to note:
The Appel l ant ut ilizes a significa nt portion of his brief to ar gue that the tria l court erred in applying the in terrorem clause in the Dec edent’ s will to hi s petition. Our Sup re me Cou rt

ha s p re vio us ly r

ule d a s f oll ow s:

This Court has rec ognized that a forf eiture provision in a will is not void as aga inst publi c policy. Tate v. Camp , 147 Tenn. 137, 149, 245 S.W . 8 39 , 8 42 (1 92 2) ; Thompson v. Gaut , 82 Tenn. 310, 314 (1884)

. H o w e v e r , it h a s b e e n th e ru le since T a t e v. Camp , that a for feiture provi sion will not be enf orce d wher e a c ontest is pursued “in good faith and upon pr obable c ause.” After considerin g decisions from other jurisdi ctions, the C ourt in Tate v. Camp approve d the following fr om South Norw alk Trust Co. v. St. John, 92 Conn. 168, 101 A. 961, 963 (1917), “ ‘Whe re the contest has not been made in good f aith, and upon probable cause and re asonable justification, the forf ei ture should be given full operative eff ect. Wher e the contra

ry appe ars, the legatee ought not to forf

eit his legacy.’ ” Tate v. Camp , 147 Tenn. at 155-56, 245 S.W. at 844.
Winningham v. Winningham , 966 S.W.2d 48, 51 (Tenn. 1998). We cannot de termine if the Ap pe lla nt’ s pe tit ion wa s fi le d in go od faith a ndup on pr ob able c a us e be c a us e our ability to revie w the fa cts nec essary to making such determination is hampered by an incomplete and inacc urate statemen t o f t h e evide nce. L ikewise, e ven if we
wer e inclined to addr ess ea ch and e very issue prese nted by t he Appe llant in his brief, the state of

the re c or d p re ve nts a n a de qu a te re vie w o f tho se iss ue s a s w e ll.
Qu all s , 2005 WL 1887121 at *5. From there, the court conclude d that “without a stateme nt of the evidenc e which acc urate ly ref lects the e vidence prese nted to the trial court, we must presume that the re c or d, ha d it

be e n a c c ur a te ly p re se nte d to thi s Co urt, w ou ld c on ta in s uff ic ie nt e vid e nc e to support the trial court’s decision.” Id. For the fo re go ing re a so ns , th e cou rt , in the fi rs t app e a l, aff irmed the probate court’s decision to dismiss t he petition, and re manded with costs of the appea l taxed to the pe titioner. Id.
In this, the second a

ppeal of the same a ction, the petitioner raises the issue of “ whether the tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d inde ny ing [the pe tit ion e r’ s] ‘M oti on fo r Im me diate Be nc h Tr ia l.’ ” Th e a ns we r t o the question prese nted is “no,” the trial court did not er r in denying the motion.T he pet i t i on er r ai s ed t w o add i t i on al i s s ues on app eal

. T here i s , ho w ever , no f act ual bas i s t o s up po r t t he i s s ues 2
raised

. T h u s, w e d ec l i n e to co n d u ct an an aly si s o f t h e w h o l l y u n su p p o rted i ssu es.
-6- The single issue in the first a ppeal wa s whether

the trial cour t err ed in dismissi ng the petitioner’s pe tition contesting t he Exe cutrix’s fin al ac counti ng and manne r of a dminist ering the estate. I n that appea l, this court affirmed the probat e court’s decision to deny the pe titioner’s original petition. By m ak i n g t he motion following remand of the ca se to the probate court, the petitioner wa s seeking a trial on the m erits of the unde rlying petition as though it had not yet been de c ide d. It , h ow e ve r, ha d b e e n d e c ide d b y th e pr ob a te c ou rt , w hic h d e c isi on wa s a ff ir me d b y th is court. More over, w hen the petitioner sought further revie w by t he Te nnessee Supreme Court, that court de clined the pe tition. As a consequenc e, the original decision of the pr obate c ourt was
a ff ir me d ina ll r e sp e c ts andthe iss ue wa s n o lo ng e r su bje c t to tr ia l on the me ri ts. For the se re a so ns , we a gain af

firm the probate court; this time affirming its decision to deny the pe titioner’s motion for another bench trial of the issue that is, and ha s been, re s ju dic ata

.
Ha vin g a dd re sse d th e dis po sit ive iss ue onapp e a l, we no w c on sid e r wh e the r this app e a l is 2 frivolous, as the Exe cutrix conte nds. A frivolous appe al is one that has n o rea sonable c hance of

succe ss. Lovelace v. Owen s -Illinois, Inc. , 632 S.W.2d 553, 555 (Tenn. 1982) . A frivolous appe al is one that is “devoid of merit,” or one in which there is “littl e prospe ct that the appe al ca n ever
succe ed.” Morton v. Morton , 182 S.W.3d 821, 838 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (c iting Industrial Dev. Bd. of the City of T

ullahoma v. Hancoc k , 901 S.W.2d 382, 385 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995))

.
Ou r S up re me Cou rt

ha s st a te d tha t suc c e ssf

ul l iti ga nts sh ou ld n ot h a ve to b e ar the e xp e ns e of groundless a

ppeals. Davis v. G ulf Ins. Group , 546 S.W.2d 583, 586 (Tenn. 1977) . The Te nnessee Gene ral Asse mbly has also taken a stand on the issue by proc laiming:
When it appe ars to any r eviewing c ourt that the appea l f rom any court of rec ord wa s frivolous or taken solely for delay, the court may . . . awa rd just damages a gainst the appellant, whic h may include, but nee d no t b e li mited to, costs . . . and expense s inc ur re d b y th e app e lle e a s a

re su lt o f the app e a l.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 27- 1-122.

A frivo lou s app e a l is on e that is de vo id o f m e ri t, andwe ha ve de te rm ine d th a t th is a pp e a l is

certainl y d ev o i d o f merit. Ther efor e, the Exe cutrix is entitled to rec over he r re asonable expense s incurre d on appea l.

I N C ONCL US I ON

Th e jud gme nt o f the pr ob a te c ou rt is af fi rm e d in all re sp e c ts, a ndthi s c a us e is r e ma nd e d to the trial court for a determination a s to the damage s due pursua nt to the provisions of Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-1-122. Costs of this appeal a re ta xed to the petitioner, A mos Eugene Qua lls, for which

exec ution may issue if nece ssary.-7- ___________________________________ FRANK G. CLEMENT, JR., JUDGE