### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-03-00752- CV

Ra m e sh G udur , A ppe lla nt

v. Texas Depart m ent of Health, App ellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 126TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. GN001593 , HO NORAB LE JOH N K. DIETZ, JUDGE PRESI DING

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N
This case arises from a sum mary judgme nt ag ainst Ramesh Gudar in a suit he broug ht under the Texas Whi stleblower Ac t ag ainst the Texas Depa rtment of He alth (the De partment). See Tex. Gov’ t Code Ann. § 554.001-.010 (West 2004)
. We w ill af firm the judgme nt of t h e d i s t rict
c ourt
. BACK GR OUND

G u d u r w o r k e d f o r t h e D e p art m e n t f

o r o v e r s i xt e e n y e ar s , b o t h i n A u s t i n an d in Houston. Acc ording to Gu d ur’s plea dings, dur ing the course of his employ ment with the De pa rtme nt, he “ wa s su

bje c te d to re ta liatio n in t erm s o f r e pe a te d n on -p ro mot ion to h ig he r j ob s, ho sti le and

un sa fe wo rk ingc on dit ion s, pr e te xtua l di sc ipl ini ng , d ow n g ra din g of pr of e ssi on a l st a tus ,He thought this trip wa s suspicious because the airpor t in Harling en is close to South Padre 1 I sland. 2 be ing giv e n c le ri c a l a ssi g nme nts tho ug h a pr of e ssi on a l e mpl oy e e , n e g a tiv e re fe re nc e s, los t opportunities a

nd finally termination.” I n particula r, he a lleg ed that, in August 1998, he expressed his conce rn to Depa

rtment manag ers that his super visor, S h ery l Guilbeaux, and Pegg y Gulledg e, another Depa rtment supervisor, w ere trave ling at gove rnment expense for persona l ple asure . As an
e xamp le , h e ha d me nti on e d a n u pc omi ngtr ip to Ha

rl ing e n th a t th e tw o s up e rv iso rs ha d a lle g e dly schedule d. This scheduled trip wa s canc elled after Gudur questioned i ts leg itimacy
. At that time,

1 he be lie ve d th a t G uil be a

ux thr e a te ne d to “ g e t r id o f h im i f h e purs ue d th is m a tte r. ” He a sse rt e d th a t, in retaliation, Guilbea

ux “tr ied to make [Gudur] look bad to the highe r mana g er” and that she
canc elled a pr esentation he org anized and had pr eviously rec eived pe rmission to give. Gudur stated f

urther that Guilbeaux voted ag ainst him whe n serving as a member of
com mi tt e e s c o n s id e r in g h is a p p li c a ti o n s f

o r h ig h e r p o s it io n s w it

h th e d e p artm e n t an d

that she advo c a te d to o th e r me mb e r s o f th e c o mm itte e s a g a in s t h is a p p li c a ti o n s . Sh e a ls o “ ma de up or distorted events” conce rning him. Although he re ce i v ed a posi tive revie w from a new pr og ram direc tor, J udy

Morris, he be lieved that Morris beg an eng ag ing in similar beha vior toward him af

ter he complaine d to her a

bout Guilbeaux’s a ctions. He a lleg ed that she a lso refuse d to give him major assig nments and “ma

rg inalized his work and ef forts to take on ma

jor responsibilities.” L ater , Gudur applied for

a position a s Oper ations Manag er; acc ording to Gudur’s plea dings, G uilbeaux helped in the eventua l hiring of

Ray mond Turner , a fr iend of he rs, for the p o s i t i o n . Gu dur asse rted that Turner then joined with Guilbeaux and Morris in “ hara ssing” him, “ raising trivial o b jectionsOn Fe b ru ary 2 5 , t h e D ep ar t m en tam en d edi t s n o t i ce o f i n t en tt o d i s m i s s , ad d i n g t h e c h ar ge 2 that G ud ur us e d w or k c omp ute rs to do wnl oad se xua lly e xplic it m a te ri a l f

ro m th e int e rn e t. I

n h is response to the Depa

rt m en t’s no-evide nce motion for summar y judgme nt, Gudur attac hed, as evidenc e of ina

ppropriate usag e of the intern et b y o t h er employ ees w ho wer e not disciplined, an email from a Depa

rtment employ ee conce rning the availability of t ickets to a theater pe rfor mance in Austin that another De partment e mploy ee w ould not be using a nd was off

eringfor sa le. 3 re g ard ingpa

pe rw or k an d ‘ c re a tin g ’ i nc ide nts to d isc ipl ine and re pr ima nd ” him . H e a lso a sse rt s th a t, afte r he informed the Depa rtment that he ha d filed a c omplaint with the feder al Equal Employ ment Oppo rtunity

Commi ssion, some Depar tment manag ers a

nd employ ees attempted to “entra p and frame” him in order

to develop re asons to support his termination. On J anuar

y 24, 2000, Gudur filed a letter with the investigations sect i o n o f t he Depa rtment’s “O ffice of Ge nera l Counsel,” alleging various ac ts of “potential fr aud/abuse eng ag ed in” by Guilbeaux, Gulledg e, and other employ ees. In particula r, he note d a trip to L are do taken by Gu ilb e a ux and Gu lle dg e in Jul y

19 98 , th e c anc e lle d tr ip to Ha rl ing e n in Au g us t 19 98 , va ri ou s d e ta ils about alleg ed re taliatory

actions take n ag ainst him, and questions concerningwhether proper leave forms we re submitted by Guilbeaux, Gulledg e, and other employ ees dur ing pe riods he desc ribed a s
un e xpla ine d a

bs e nc e s. On

F e br ua ry 2, the De pa

rtme nt n oti fi e d G ud

ur of its int e nt to d ism iss him fr om e mploy

men t be c a

us e of fa ilure “ to m a int a in e ff

e c tiv e wo rk ingre latio ns hip s” and fa ilure “ to communicate w ith respec t.” I n particula r, the De partment noted be havior towa rd other e mploy ees and super visors, scre aming , loud disag ree ments, accu s at i o n s of lying a nd use of pr ofanity
. On 2 F e b r u ar y 2 4 , C h ar l e s P an k e y, t h e D e p art m e n t ’ s d i r e c t o r o f i t s O f f i c e o f E qu a l O p p o rtu n i t y, responde d by letter to Gudur’s c omplaints that the Depar tment would be investig ating his claims and
encour ag ed him to also seek assistance from the Equa l Employ ment Opportunity

Commi ssion and4

the Texas Commi ssion o n Human Rig hts. The Depa rtment terminated him fr om his posit ion on Marc h 3, 2000.

Ap p ea ri n g pr o s e , Gudur filed this suit on J une 1, 2000. The Department filed a noevidenc e motion for summary judgme nt, assertingonly that Gudur could produce no evidenc e that he re ported a

ny violati o n of the lawor that he r eporte d a violation to “an a ppropriate law enfor ceme nt authority .” See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 554.002(b); Te x . R. Civ. P . 166a(i). Gudur filed a r esponse, in which he argued that the court could not g rant no-e vidence summary judgme nt beca use t here had not bee n an ade quate oppor tunity for discove ry . See Te x. R. C iv. P. 1 66 a (i ); see als o Dickson Constr. v. Fidelity &Deposit Co. , 5 S.W .3d 353, 356-57 (Te x . App.—Texarkana 1999, pet. denied) . He att ac h ed p age s of alleg ed evide nce in support of his claim but without any
a uth e nti c a tio n. I n a dd iti on , h e fi le d a mot ion to c omp e l dis c ov e ry , c la imi ngtha t th e De pa rtme nt d id
n o tp r o v i d e an s w e r s o r

d o c u m e n t s i nr e s p o n s e t o h i s d i s c o v e r y. The district cour

t denied Gudur ’s motion to compel dis cover y , g rante d the Depa rtment’s no-evide nce motion for summary judgme nt, and taxed all court costs ag ainst Gudur. This appea l followed.
DI SCU SSIO N

Gudur bring s three issues on a ppeal, c laiming that the district c ourt err ed in denying his mot ion

to c omp e l di sc ov e ry , in

g ra nti ng the no -e vid e nc e mot ion fo r s umm ary jud g me nt b e c a

us e the r e h a d n o t b e e n a d e qu a t e t i m e f o r d i s c o v e r

y , an d i n t a xi n g c o s t s a g a i n s t h i m . W e w i ll a dd re ss
eac h in turn.Gudur c omplains of the di strict court’s ruling concer ning thirty reque sts for produc tion and 3 te n in te rr og a tor ie s. 5 Discover y issues

I n h is f ir st i ssu e , G ud

ur argue s th a t th e tr ia l c ourt

a bu se d it s d isc re tio n in

de nyinghis motion to compel discovery beca use t he De partment’s r esponses to his reque st for produc tion and interrog atories we re “ inadequate, eva sive, intended to mislead and wer e an abuse of the discover y proce ss.” 3 Th e sc op e of dis c ov e ry re sts wi thi n the dis c re tio n o f t he tr ia l c ourt
. Gi ns be rg v . F ift h Cou rt o f A pp e als , 686 S.W .2d 105, 108 (Tex. 1985). An abuse of discre tion occurs whe n the trial court’s a ction is arbitrar

y , unrea sonable, or ba sed upon a g ross and pre judicial err or of law , Johnson

v . F ou rth Cou rt o

f A pp e als , 700 S.W .2d 916, 918 (Tex. 1985), or is without refe renc e to any g uiding rules and pr inciples. Downer v. Aquam arine Operators, Inc

. , 701 S.W .2d 238, 241-42 (Te x . 1985). Wit h respe ct to the re solution of factua l issues or m atters c ommitt ed to the trial c ourt’s discre tion, we may not substitut e our judgme nt for that of t he trial court unless Gudur establishes that the trial court could reasona

bly have r eac hed only

one dec ision and that the trial cour t’s decision is arbitra

ry and unre asonable
. W

alker v . Pack

er , 8 27 S.W. 2d 83 3, 83 9- 40 (T e x. 19 92 ) (o ri g . p ro c e e din g ). Th is burden is a he avy

one. Can ad

ian He lic op te rs, Ltd

. v . W itt ig , 8 7 6 S
. W
. 2 d

3 0 4 , 3 0 5 (T ex . 1 9 9 4 ) ( o ri g. proce eding ). Our r eview is much le ss defe rential with respe ct to a trial court’s deter mination of

the leg al principles contr olling its ruling be cause a trial c ourt has no discre tion in determining w hat the law is or i n applying the law to the fa cts. W alker , 827 S.W .2d at 840. Thus, a c lear failure by

the trial cour t t o an al y z e o r apply the law c orre ctly

will constitut e an a

buse of discr etion. Id . ByI n its brief, the De partment states that the documents amounted to ove r 1000 pag es. Gudur 4 has not made those doc uments part of the appellate rec ord. 6 attackingthe trial cour

t’s order on the abuse -of- discretion g round, Gudur ha s assumed the he avy burd e n of e sta

bli sh ing that the tr ia l c ourt la c ke d the dis c re tio n to make the de c isi on e nte re d b e c a

us e the fa cts and law re q u i re d a diffe rent de cision. See J ohnson , 7 00 S.W. 2d

a t 91 7- 18 ; Midkiff v. Shaver , 788 S.W .2d 399, 402 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1990, no writ).

I n th is c a se , th e De pa

rtme nt p ro du c e d a list of

do c ume nts it w a s ma

kin g a va ila

ble to Gu dur i n r e sp on se to h is r e qu e sts fo r p ro du c tio n. I t ans we re d some int e rr og a tor ie s and ob je c te d to 4 others on the ba ses that they wer e over ly

broad, not r easona

bly calc ulated to lead to the discove ry of admissible evidenc e, and not r elated to Gudur’s cause of a ction. The district cour t denied Gudur ’s motion to compel r eg arding eac h reque st f or production. I t also found some of the inter rog atories had bee n answe red a

nd sustained the De partment’s obje ctions on others. On appea l, Gudur ar g ues that the district court abused i ts discretion because the Department’s objections were g ener al and not specific and that his reque sts and interrog atories we re not ove rbroa d and wer e rea sonably calc ulated to lead to the discove ry

of admissible evidenc e. See Tex. R. C i v . P. 193.2(a). He also complains that the dist ri ct court ha d no leg al basis on which to deny his moti on on thirty

of his reque sts for production. Gudur’s request for production contained 58 reque sts conce rning the Depa rtment’s p ra cti ces, r ecor ds conce rning his activities while employ ed by the Depa

rtment, and re cords
conce rning the ac tiviti es of other employ ees f

rom 1996 until 20 0 3
. For example, he re quested witness statements from Morr is and Guilbeaux conce rning all co m m u n i cations re g ardingany7

employ ment ref ere nces r equeste d about hi m, computer use history of thirty -four

employ ees ove r the
course of almost eig ht y ear s, rec ords conc erningnon-work r elated f axes sent by

any employ ee dur ing the same e ight- y ear period, a ll documents conce rning Gudur’s a pplications for promotions during
a fo ur -ye ar p e ri od , p e rs on ne l f ile s o f a ny oth e r e mpl oy e e wh o h a d f ile d a wh ist le blo we r s uit

a g a ins t the Department during a nine-y ear period, personnel documents of other e mploy ees w ho rec eived jobs for which Gudur applied, whistleblower complaints filed by other employ ees during atwelvey e ar p e ri od , a

nd oth e r s imi lar do c ume nts
. Th e re c or d a lso c on ta ins the De pa rtme nt’ s r e sp on se , in which it lists documents it made a vailable to Gudur

in res ponse to the re quests for pr oduction, documents not made pa

rt of re cord. G udur’s fi rst set of interr og atories c ontained twenty -five questions, asking for similar information.

We have r eviewe d the re cord c are fu l l y an d are unable to c onclude that the district court a bused its discretion in denying Gudur’s motion to compel. We over rule Gudur ’s first issue.
No -e vid e nc e m ot ion for sum m ar y j udgm e nt

I n his second issue, Gudur asser ts that the district court er red in g ran t i ng the Depa rtment’s no-e vidence motion for summary judgme nt. I n particula

r, he a rgues that he pr esente d evidenc e ra ising a

fac t issue conce rning damag es, that he w as pre vented from providing evidenc e
on other elements beca

use he did not have adequate time for discove ry , that the burde n of proof had shifted to the Depa

rtment, see T e x. G o v ’ t C o d e A n n . § 5 5 4
. 0 0 4 ( We s t 2 0 0 4 ) , an d th a t h e raised g enuine issues of material fa ct conc erningthe re ason for his termination. A no-e vidence summary

judgme nt is essentially

a pretrial direc ted ver dict; thus, we apply the same le g al suffic iency standard in r eviewin g the no-e vidence summary judgme nt as we8

apply in review ing a

direc ted ver dict. Jack

son v. F i es t a Ma r t

, Inc. , 9 7 9 S. W. 2 d

6 8 , 7 0 ( T e x. App.—Aust i n 1 998, no pet.). A no- evidenc e summary judgme nt is im proper ly g rante d if the non-movant pre sents more than a scintilla of probative e vidence to raise a g enuine issue of materia l fac t. See F

ort W orth Osteopathic Hosp. v. Re ese, I nc. , 148 S.W
. 3 d 9 4 , 9 9 (T ex . 2004); Cantu v. Texas W orkforce Comm ’n , 145 S.W .3d 236, 239 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, no pet.). A no- evidenc e point will be sustained when (a) there is a complete a bsence of evide nce of

a vital fa ct, (b) the court is barre d by

rules of la

w or of e vidence from giving weig ht to the only evidenc e off

ere d to prove a vital f ac t , (c ) t he evide nce of

fer ed to prove a vital fa ct is no more than a mere scintilla, or (d) the evidenc e conc lusively

establishes t h e o p posite of the vital fa ct. Merre ll Dow Pharms. v. Havne r , 953 S.W .2d 706, 711 (Tex. 1997). More tha n a scintilla of evide nce e x ist s if it would allow
rea sonable a

nd fair- minde d p eo p l e to di ffe r in their conc lusions. Forbes, Inc . v. Granada Bioscience

s, Inc. , 124 S.W .3d 167, 172 (Tex. 2003). We note at the outset that the De partment’s no- evidenc e mot ion for summary judgme nt attacke d only two elements of Gudur’s claim—that he reported a violation of the lawor that he repor

ted a violation to an appr opriate la w enf orce ment ag ency . See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 554.002. The issue of da mag es wa s not within t he scope of the motion. There fore , we will not
co n s i d er damag es whe n revie wing the district court’s judg ment. S e e Ci n c in n a ti Li

fe I n s . Co. v

. Cates , 927 S.W .2d 623, 625 (Tex. 1996).

We now consider Gudur’s a rg ument that he wa s preve nted from pr oviding e vidence beca use he did not have adequate time f or discovery
. When a party contends that it has not had a n ad eq u at e opportunit y

for discove ry

befor e a summar

y -judg ment hear ing, it must file either anThe re cord c ontains a letter r equesting a continuanc e, but it was not verifie d and is attac hed 5 to Gudur’s re sponse to the motio n for summary judgme nt. The re cord a lso contains an unsig ned, unnotarized “a ffidavit” attached to Gudur ’s motion to compel discovery . I n this document, Gudur a sse rt s th a t a

se pa rate , s ig ne d d oc ume nt w a s “ faxed se pa ra te ly sin c e it c ou ld n ot be fax e d v ia c omp ute r. ” We h a ve e xami ne d th e re c or d b ut h a ve no t f ound the re fe re nc e d a ff

ida vit
. I n any

e ve nt, the “a ffidavit” in the r ecor d does not explain the n ee d fo r fu rther disc overy . See Tenne co Inc . v. Enterprise Prods. Co. , 925 S.W .2d 640, 647 (Tex. 1996); TemPay, I nc. v. TNT Concrete &Constr., Inc. , 37 S.W .3d 517, 521 (Tex. App.—Austin 2001, pet. denied). Pro se repr esentat i o n d o es not excuse an a

ppellant from c omplying w ith applicable r ules of proc edure : “Neither is [ t he rig ht of self-r epre sentation] a license not to comply with the rele vant rules of proce dural and s u b stantive law.” Fa re tta v . Ca lif

or nia , 422 U.S. 806, 834 n.46 (1975). “ L itigants who r epre sent themselves m u s tco mp l y

wi t h t h e ap p l i cab l e p ro ce d u ra l ru l es , o r e l s e t h ey

wo u l d b e gi v en an u n fa i r a dv an t age over lit iga nts repr esente d by

counsel.” Mansfield State Bank v . Cohn , 5 7 3 S. W. 2 d 1 8 1 , 1 8 4

- 8 5 ( T e x. 19 78 ); see also Laubach v. Chunn , 2003 Tex. App. L EXI S 5319, at *2 n.2 (Tex. App.—Austin J une 26, 2003, no pet.). 9 aff idavit expl aining the nee d for f urther disc overy

or a ve rified motion for c ontinuance. Tenneco I nc. v. Enterprise Prods. Co. , 925 S.W .2d 640, 647 (Tex. 1996); Te m P a y , I n c . v . TN T Concre te & Constr., Inc. , 3 7 S. W.3 d 5 17 , 5 21 (T e x. Ap p. —Aus tin 20 01 , p e t. d e nie d) . T he re c or d in thi s c a se indicates that Gudur d i d n ot seek e ither for m of relief

. There fore , his contention conce rning 5 adequate time for discove ry is waived. We next turn to Gudur’s a ssertion that the burde n o f p ro o f on summary judgme nt rested on the Depa

rtment bec ause he was terminated within 90 day s of making a repor t of a violation of the law
. See Te x. Go v’ t Cod e Ann. § 55 4. 00 4. Th e e sse nti a l e le me nts of a wh ist le blo we r c la im
are : (1) a p u b l i c em ploy ee a cting in good f aith makes a

repor t; (2) the re port involves conduct violating a

law by the ag ency

or a public e mploy ee; ( 3) the re port is made to an a ppropriate law enfor ceme nt authority ; and (4) the public employ ee suf fer s retaliation for

making t h e re p ort. Id
. § 554.002; Du v all v . Tex as De p’ t of Hu ma n S e rv s. , 82 S.W .3d 474, 478 (Tex. A pp.—Austin 2002,
no pet.)
. I nit s n o - e v id e n c e mo ti o nf o r s u mm ar y ju d g me n t, th e D e p artm e n t a s s e rte d th a t Gu d urWe will construe this challeng e to be na rrowly focuse d on th e p o i n t s raised in the 6 Depa rtment’s motion. 10 lacke d evidenc e that he ha d repor ted a violation of the law a nd that he lac ked evide nce that he had repor ted such a violation to an appropr iate law-e nforc ement author ity . Both c laims conce rn Gudur’ s burd e n to pr ov e e le me nts un de r s e c tio n 5 54 .0 02 ; the burd e n wou ld not sh if t to the De pa

rtme nt u nti l Gudur satisfied this ini tial burden. Se e id
. § 554.004(a)
. I n other wor ds, a plaintiff’s showingthat he re ported a

violation of the law to a

n appropr iate law-e nforc ement authority is the means by

which a plaintiff e stablishes the rig ht to the statutory presumption that the re taliation occur red “ beca use the employ ee made the repor

t” i f t erminate d within 90 day s of m aking the re port. Se e id
. We thus reject Gudu r’s arg ument that the burde n had shifted to the De partment for purposes of this summary jud g me nt. Finally , Gudur a rg ues that he submitt ed sufficie nt evidence to raise a g enuine issue of material fac t whether

the Depa

rtment “re taliated ag ainst the Plaintiff when it dismissed and terminated him fr om his job after his whistle blowing .” I n response , the Depart m en t s tates that 6 Gudur fa iled to properly

authentica

te th e e v id ence attache d to his response to the no-e vidence motion for summary judgme nt. Thus, it a sserts that Gudur prese nted no evidenc e in r esponse to the motion.

“De fec ts in the form of af fidavits or attac hments will not be gr ounds for rev er sal
un le ss s pe c if

ic a lly po int e d o ut b y ob

jec tio n b y

an o pp os ingpa

rt y wi th o pp or

tun ity , b ut r e fu sa l, t o
ame n d
. ” T e x. R. Ci v . P. 1 6 6 a ( f )
. O n th e o th e r h an d , a d e f e c t in s u b s ta n c e c an n o t b e w a iv ed by failing to object or obtain a written orde r. Ba ue r v . J

as so , 946 S.W .2d 552, 557 (Tex. App.—Corpus Chr ist i 19 97 , n o w ri t) ; Pee renboom v . HSP Foods, Inc

. , 910 S.W .2d 156, 160 (Tex. App.—Waco11

19 95 , n o w ri t) ; Kot

zu r v . Ke lly , 791 S.W .2d 254, 256 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1990, no writ); Trimble v. Gulf Paint & Battery, Inc

. , 728 S.W .2d 887, 889 (Tex. App.—Houston [1s t Dist.] 1987, no writ). Una

uthenticated or

unsworn docume nts, or documents not supported by any aff idavit, are not entitled to consideration as summar y -judg ment evidenc e. Llopa, Inc. v. Nagel , 956 S.W .2d 82, 8 7 (T ex . Ap p . — S anAn t o n i o 1 9 9 7 , p et
. d en i ed ) ( ci t i n g St. Paul Cos. v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc

. , 798 S.W .2d 4, 5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, writ dism’d by ag r.)) . A complete a

bsence of authentication is a d efect of substanc e that is not waived by a par ty failing to object and may be
ur g e d for the fi rs t ti me on a pp e a l. Blanche v . First Nat ionwide Mortg. Corp. , 74 S.W .3d 444, 451 (T e x. Ap p. —D a lla s 2 00 2, no pe t.) ; Me dfo rd v . M e dfo rd , 68 S.W .3d 242, 246 (Tex. App.—For t Worth 2002, no pet.).

To preva il on his whist le b lo wer claim, Gudur must show that he is a public e mploy ee, he ac ted in g ood faith i n m ak i n g a re port, the re port involved a violation of law by his employ ing g overnme ntal entity or a public employ ee, the repor t was made to an appr opriate la w enf orce ment authority , and he suf

fer ed re taliation for makingthe re port. See Tex. Gov’ t Code Ann. § 554.002(a ); Du v all , 8 2 S. W. 3 d

a t 4 7 8
. T h e “ g o o d

f a it h ” c o mp o n e n t i ns e c ti o n s 5 5 4
. 0 0 2 ( a ) ( g o o d f a it h r e p o rt of leg al violation) and (b) (g ood faith belief that repor

t is made to a

n appropr iate law e nforc ement authority ) has subjec tive and objec tive prong s. Texas De p’t of Transp. v. Needham , 82 S.W .3d 314, 320-21 (Te x . 2002).

I n response to the Depa

rtment’s no-evide nce motion for summary judgme nt, Gudur submitt ed a le tter he submitted to the Dep ar t m en t ’s “Of fice of Ge nera l Counsel,” in which he
a ss e rt e d t h a t a m o n g “ s o m e u n l aw f u l a c t s an d a c t s o f p o t e n t i a l f r a u d / a b u s e ” w e r e t h e L a re do tr ipThe a ddress for the Off ice of Criminal I nvestig ations is the same one to whic h Gudur 7 addre ssed his letter to the “O ffice of Ge nera l Counsel.” Gu dur a tte mpt e d to c ur e thi s d e fe c t by a tta c hin g to hi s motio n f or ne w t ri a l an a ff ida vit 8 stating that “my

attachme nts to my

response to Defen d an t ’s motion for no-evide nce summar y jud g me nt a

re wi thi n my pe rs on a l know le dg e and tr ue and c or re c t.” On a pp e a l, h e argue s th a t th is attempt rende red the district c ourt’s judgme nt in err or. As a g ener al rule, the trial court c onsiders the r ecord only

as it proper ly

appea rs when the motion for summary judgme nt is heard. Marek v. Tomoco Equipment Co. , 738 S.W .2d 710, 713 (Tex. A pp.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 1987 , n o writ). Howeve r, it is within the trial court’s discretion whether to c onsider pleading s and aff idavits filed afte r the motion for summary judgme nt is hear d but be fore the summary judgme nt is entered. Id .; se e als o B os ton Se a P ar ty of H ou sto n, In c . v . A rgov itz , 583 S.W .2d 465 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston [1st Di st. ] 197 9, no wr it) ; Aztec Pipe & Supply Co., Inc. v . Sundance O il Co. , 568 S.W .2d 401, 403 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston [ 1st Dist.] 1978, writ ref ’d n.r.e.). S ummary

judgme nt evidence may

be filed late, but only

with leave of

court. Benc hmark Bank

v. Crowder , 919 S. W. 2 d 6 5 7 , 6 6 3 ( T e x. 1996). A party must obtain an order from the court g ranting leave to f ile, or the evidenc e will not be conside red a s part of the rec ord. Id .; see also O’C on no r’s Tex a s Ru l e s : Ci vi l T ri als , ch . 7 -B, § 10.9.5 (2003). Assuming that Gudur’s aff idavit r epre sents an attempt to e nter competent e vidence i n t o t h e r e c o r d , t h e c o u rtd i d n o te n t e r an y o r d e r g r an t i n g G u d

u r l e a v e t o f

i l e s u c h e v i d e n c e . In addition, he attempted to ente r the evidence afte r t he dis trict court entered judgment, not just after 12 taken by Guilbeaux and Gulledg e in J uly 1998 and unre ported lea ve t i m e t ak en by

Gulledg e and “fr iends” of Gulledg e and Guilbeaux. He also repor ted what he believed to be reta liatory measure s take n a g a ins t hi m by

Gu ilb e a ux. In th a t le tte r, he a sse rt e d th a t he dr a ft e d th e let ter in r e sp on se to
a conve rsation he ha d with an investig ator, L onzo Kerr. In addition, Gudu r s u b mi tt ed docume ntation from the Depa

rtment’s Off

ice of Criminal I nvestig ation that it has responsibility for investig ating 7 alleg ed De partment “ employ ee misconduc t which may be violations of [Depa

rtment] poli cies a

nd pr oc e dures or

vio latio ns of

law” and

fr a ud or “ oth e r u nla wf ul c on du c t in vo lvi ng[De pa rtme nt]
resour ces, f

unds, proper

ty o r p r o gr a ms . ” H e a ls o s u

b mi tte d emails, employ ee c alenda rs, Guilbeaux’s notes conc erninghis work per formanc e, his termination letters a nd response s, employ

ment evaluations, a

nd a complaint form he c laims he submitted to the EEOC. These doc uments were not authenticated in any

way and thus do not constitute competent summary -judg ment evidenc e. 8the he ari ng . We the re fo re sti ll m ay no t c on sid e r t

hat e vid e nc e on

a pp e a l. 13 Finally , Gudur’s r esp o n s e i ncludes a document purpor

ted to be a c opy

of the De pa rtmen t’ s inte rr og a tor

y re sp on se s b ut w ithGu dur’ s ty pe wr itt e n c omm e nts . T his do c ume nt i s not signe d by an attorney or an employ ee of the Department. As a result, we are una ble to consider the su bs tanc e of

the sta te me nts wi thi n th a t do c ume nt a s w e ll. As a re s ult, Gudur failed to submit any competent e vidence in response to the De pa rtme nt’ s mo tio n f

or no -e vid e nc e summa

ry ju dgme nt. We h a ve re je c te d a ll h is a

rgume nts
conce rning the g rant of summar y judgme nt in favor of

the Depa rtment, and we ove rrule his sec ond issue.
Costs of court I n his third issue, Gudur argues t hat the district cour t erre d in gr anting costs to the Depa rtment. I n particula

r, he argues t hat he is not able to pay costs beca use he has bee n unemploy ed for over three y ear s and that he should not be taxed costs beca use the district cour

t erre d in denying h i s m o t i o nt o c o mp e l d i s c o v e r y. “The succe ssful party

to a sui t shall rec over of his adver sary all costs incurre d there in, except wher e other

wise provided.” Tex. R. C iv. P. 131. “The cour t may , fo r go o d ca u s e, to be state d o n th e re c or d, a dju dg e the c os ts oth e rw ise tha n a s p ro vid e d b y

law o r t he se ru le s. ” Te x. R. Civ. P . 141. Rule 141 has t wo requirements—that t here be good cause and that it be st ated on the
rec ord. Ty

pically , “g ood cause ” has me ant that the pre vailing pa rty unnece ssarily

prolong ed the proce eding s, unrea sonably incre ased c osts, or otherwise did something that should be pena liz ed.14

Furr’s Supermk

ts. v. Bethune , 53 S.W .3d 375, 376-77 (Tex. 2001)
. A par ty ’s inability

to pay court costs is not “g ood cause ” as a matter of la

w. Id . at 378. I n its final order gra

nting summ ary

judgme nt in favor of

the Depa rtment, the district
c ourt ta xed c os ts o f c ourt

a g a ins t G ud

ur . N oth ingin t

he re c or d s up po rt s a

fi nd ingof

g oo d c a us e to deviate f rom the re quirements of Rule 131. We over rule Gudur ’s third issue.
CO NC LU SION We have ove rruled Gudur’s iss ues on appea l. We aff irm the district court’s g rant of
summa ry jud g me nt i n f

a vo r o f t he De pa rtme nt.

Bob Pembe rton, J ustice Be fore Chief J ustice L aw, Justi ces B . A. Smith and Pemberton Affir med Filed: Oc tober 21, 2005