## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 97-3021

___________ United States of America, * * Plaintiff - Appellee, * * v. * * Scott E. Hildebrand, * * Defendant - Appellant. *

___________ Appeals from the United States District Court for the No. 97-3023 Northern District of Iowa. No. 97-3278

___________ United States of America, * * Plaintiff - Appellee/Cross- * Appellant, * * v. * * Joan M. Webb, * * Defendant - Appellant/Cross- * Appellee. *-2- ___________ No. 97-3024 No. 97-3277

___________ United States of America, * * Plaintiff - Appellee/Cross- * Appellant, * * v. * * Larry A. Webb, * * Defendant - Appellant/Cross- * Appellee. *

___________ No. 97-3026 No. 97-3280

___________ United States of America, * * Plaintiff - Appellee/Cross- * Appellant, * * v. * * David I. Gardemann, * * Defendant - Appellant, Cross- * Appellee. *-3- ___________ No. 97-3031 No. 97-3279

___________ United States of America, * * Plaintiff - Appellee/Cross- * Appellant, * * v. * * Joseph A. Mentlick, Jr., * * Defendant - Appellant/Cross- * Appellee. *

___________ No. 97-3033 No. 97-3281

___________ United States of America, * * Plaintiff - Appellee/Cross- * Appellant, * * v. * * Kenneth Lee Kraklio, * * Defendant - Appellant/Cross- * Appellee. *The HONORABLE ANDREW W. BOGUE, United States District Judge for * the District of South Dakota, sitting by designation. -4- ___________ No. 97-3276

___________ United States of America, * * Plaintiff - Appellant, * * v. * * Allen K. Zurcher, * * Defendant - Appellee. *

___________ Submitted: February 12, 1998 Filed: July 28, 1998

___________ Before McMILLIAN and LOKEN, Circuit Judges, and BOGUE, District Judge. *

___________ LOKEN, Circuit Judge. Scott Hildebrand, Joan Webb, Larry Webb, David Gardemann, Joseph Mentlick, Kenn eth Kraklio, and Allen Zurcher were convicted of mail fraud, conspiracy t o commit mail fraud , and conspiracy to launder money for their roles in an organization kn own as “We The People” that offered to file claims in a purported federal clas s action lawsu it for a fee of $300. Gardemann, Kraklio, and the Webbs appeal thei r convictions; Mentlick appeals his conviction and sentence; and Hildebrand appeals his-5-

sentence. The government appeals t he sentences imposed on the Webbs, Gardemann, Mentlick, Kraklio, and Zurcher. We affirm.

I. Background and Sufficiency of the Evidence Issues.
Defendant s’ scheme grew out of a lawsuit filed in the United States Distric t Court for the District of Colorado in which two families filed a pro se class actio n complaint alleging unlawful foreclosure of their farms in state court. We will refer to this lawsuit as the Baskerville case. Plaintiffs moved for appointment of Hildebran d
as re ceiver for various Farm Credit Services affiliates, the Farmers Hom e Administration, and the National Banking Association. In early June 1993, Hildebrand filed a document declaring hi mself receiver and videotaped himself on the steps of the federal courthouse reading a pre ss release announcing that the Federal Land Bank and its affiliates, the Farmers Home Administration, the National Banking Association, and the City of Fort Collins and County of Larimer, Colorado, had been placed i n receivership by the Baskerville court. Hildebrand then organized “We The People.” Through printed literature, videotaped presentations, and public meetings held in a t leas t forty States, We The People represented that anyone who had ever borrowe d money from a Federal Reserve Bank System entity, paid taxes or attorney’s fees, been divorced, or had a death in the family was entitled to a substantial damage award in the Baskerville

case. The catch was that

claimants needed to pay We The People $300 to
cover the administrative costs of filing claims. The group permitted impoverishe d claimants to file without paying the $300 fee on the condition that it receive twenty percent of any d amage recovery. These were called “80/20” claims. We The People warned that claims would be paid on a first- come, first-serve basis; that no new claims could be filed once pay-outs began; and that citizens who did not file a claim woul d face criminal prosecution. Defendants had varying roles in We The People. Hil debrand was the leader and promoter. His home in Greene, Iowa was the organization’s headquarters. Mentlick-6-

was Hildebrand’s right-hand man who proclaimed himself a receiver and appeare d regular lywith Hildebrand on promotional videos and at promotional meetings

. Gardeman n

entered claims information into computers, was actively involved i n promotio nal meetings, and had signature authority on three bank accounts used t o deposit claims money. Kraklio and the Webbs were claims writers who solicited claims and coll ected administrative fees. Kraklio submitted at least six hundred claims t o Hil debrand. The Webbs supervised forty claims writers operating in seven States

. Clai ms writers were generally paid $50 per paid claim. Zurcher was the group’ s bookkeeper, a job he described as “overseeing the claims administration activity.” The government identified 6,832 claims filed with We The People claims writers betwee n Spring 1993 and October 1994. About two-thirds were fully paid claims , evidence that the group collected at least $1.3 mil lion in administrative fees. No claims were submitted to the Baskerville court, which denied class certification and the motion to appoint receivers in June 1993 and dismissed the case with prejudice in November 1993. See Baskerville v. Federal Land Bank , 25 F.3d 1055 (10th Cir. 1994).
Defendants were indicted in September 1995. At trial, the central issue wa s whether eac h defendant participated in the scheme with intent to defraud. Withou t disputing their roles in the scheme, defendants argued they did not know the truth about the Baskerv illecase, did not profit from their activities, and participated because o f strongly held political views. They emphasized the 80/20 claims, the organization’ s meticulous records, and the steps taken to ens ure that claims forms were properly filled out. Two defendants were acquitted at the close of the government’s case. A mistrial
was d eclared as to Scott Hildebrand when his attorney became ill; he was trie d separately and found guilty of all charges in June 1997. The remaining defendants were found guilty of all charges at the end of the first trial in December 1996. On appeal, Mentlick, Kraklio, and the Webbs argue the eviden ce was insufficient to support their convictions. We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the-7-

verdict, giving the government the benefit of all reasonable inferences and reversin g onl yif no reasonable jury could have found every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States v. Berndt , 86 F.3d 803, 809 (8th Cir. 1996).
A. Mail Fraud. These defendants argue the evidence does not support a n in ference of criminal intent to commit, or to conspire to commit mail fraud. W e disagree. To sustain

a conviction for mail fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1341, the evidence must establish that a defendant knowingly participated in a plan or scheme to defraud in which it was reasonably foreseeable the mails would be used. To prove a conspiracy to co mmit mail fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 371, the evidence must establish that a defendant intentionally joined a conspiracy to commit mail fraud, knowing the purpose of the conspiracy. See United States v. Earles , 955 F.2d 1175, 117 7-78 (8th Cir. 1992). The vic tims paid $300 to an organization that had no intent to file claims on thei r be half. Thus, overall the scheme was manifestly fraudulent. As to these defendants , there was substantial evidence that they had access to newspaper articles, Baskerville court documents, a state court injunction, and explicit warnings from state authorities which alerted them, or sho uld have alerted them, to the essentially fraudulent nature of the scheme. Accordingly, a jury could reasonably infer that Mentlick, Kraklio, Joa n Webb, and Larry Webb carried out promotional activities, claims filing, and th e collectio n

of $300 fees after acquiring the requisite criminal intent. “One wh o kno wingly participates in an ongoing mail fraud devised by another is guilty of mai l fraud.” Earles , 955 F.2d at 1177. The Webbs and Kraklio complain that they directly participated in only a few of the forty-one substantive mail fraud counts. But each particip ant in a scheme to defraud is r esponsible for his partners’ use of the mails in furtherance of that scheme. Se e Pinkerton v. United States , 328 U.S. 640, 647 (1946); United S tates v. Nance , 502 F.2d 615, 619 (8 th Cir. 1974), cert. denied , 420 U.S. 926 (1975). These defendants als o a rgue that many of the substantive counts involved innocent transactions, and that the counts based upon 80/20 claims involved mailings that did not defraud anyone.-8-

However, there was evidence that a number of the 80/20 claims were later converted to paid claims, and

further evidence that the 80/20 claims procedure was necessary to the
s c heme because We The People warned that anyone who did not file a claim could be prosec uted. Facially innocent mailings intended to further a scheme to defraud violate § 1341. See Schmuck v. United States , 489 U.S. 705, 715 (1989); United States v

. Pemberton , 121 F.3d 1157, 1170-71 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied , 118 S. Ct. 104 6 (1998). B. Money Laundering. Mentlick, Kra klio, and the Webbs argue the government failed to prove they conspired to launder money in vio lation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h). To prove a conspiracy to launder money, the government must establish that a defendan t knowingly joined a conspiracy to launder money and an overt act in furtherance of that conspiracy. See United States v. Conley , 37 F.3d 970, 9 76-77 (3d Cir. 1994). In Count 43, t he government charged a conspiracy to violate two distinct money launderin g statutes, 1 8 U.S.C. §§ 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) and 1956(a)(1)(B)(i). Each requires proof that def endants engaged in financial transactions with the knowing use of the proceeds o f illegal activities such as mail fraud. The final element of subsection (a)(1)(A)(i) requires proof of “intent to promote the carrying on” of unl awful activity such as mail fraud. We will refer to this as “reinvestment” money laundering. Subsection (a)(1)(B)(i) requires pro of of intent “to conceal or disguise” the illegal proceeds, which we will refer to a s “concealment” money laundering. See United States v. Nattier , 127 F.3d 655, 658-59 (8thCir. 1997), cert. denied , 118 S. Ct. 1398 (1998). Here, the district court charged that the jury must find a conspiracy to commit both types of money laundering, and the jury did s o. But the statute requires the government to prove reinvestment mone y laund ering or

concealment money laundering. In these circumstances, we need onl y examine whether the evidence was sufficient to convict of one type or the other. Se e United State s v. Jackson , 935 F.2d 832, 842 (7th Cir. 1991). Because reinvestmen t money la undering carries a higher base offense level for sentencing purposes, se e U.S.S.G

. § 2S1.1(a), and because that was the base offense level used in sentencin g these defendants, we must examine whether theThe fo rfeiture verdicts against these defendants ranged from $45,000 for Joan 1 Webb to $500,000 for Allen Zurcher. -9- evidenc e was sufficient to convict them of conspiring to commit reinvestment mone y laundering. The government located seven bank ac counts operated by We The People. Over $ 1 ,100,000 was deposited into these accounts and almost $500,000 was withdrawn in cash. The deposits were primarily money orders in amounts around $300, and a number
came from claimants processed by Kraklio and the Webbs. Although the government could not track the

cash withdrawals, it introduced checks written on these accounts to pay for office supplies, secretarial services, and office staff wages. Checks written to Larry and Joan Webb, Kraklio, and Mentlick reimbursed claims writers for promotional expenses an d paid claims writer commissions on fees collected from the fraud victims. Fro m this evidence, the jury could reasonably find that these defendants knowingl y pa rticipatedin a conspiracy to deposit fraud proceeds into bank accounts and then t o expend those proceeds to promote the on-goi ng scheme to defraud. That is sufficient to convict th em of conspiracy to commit reinvestment money laundering. See Unite d States v. Cruz , 993 F.2d 164, 167 (8th Cir. 1993).

II. Value of Funds Laundered for Sentencing Purposes.
Whe n conspirators are convicted of fraud that includes money laundering, th e Guidel ine provision imposing the more severe money laundering penalties, U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1, mustbe applied at sentencing. See United States v. Morris , 18 F.3d 562, 56 9 (8th Cir. 1994). That Guideline increase s the base offense level depending on the value of the ille gal proceeds that were laundered. See § 2S1.1(b)(2). Here, the probatio n officer recommended, and the district court agreed, that the value determinations should be based upon the jury’s money laundering forfeiture verdicts against each defendant. 1 The government appeals these determinations, arguing that they significantlyOf

cou rse, if a sentencing court finds that all fraud proceeds were laundered , 2 thenthe amount of fraud loss and the value of money laundered will be the same fo r sentencing purposes. That was the situation in United States v . Mullens , 65 F.3d 1560, 1564-65 (1 1th Cir. 1995), cert. denied , 517 U.S. 1112 (1996), and United States v

. -10- understated the value of money laundered by all defendants except Hildebrand. This is a complex and difficult sentencing issue. The government proposes a relatively simple answer -- (1) fix the amount of the loss for fraud sentencing purposes, see U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1(b)(1), as the full $300 fe e collectedfrom each victim because the conspirators never intended to file claims; (2 ) group the fraud and money laundering counts under U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(d); (3) with the offenses grouped, determine the value of money laundered f or purposes of § 2S1.1(b)(2) as equal to the amount of the fraud loss; (4) conclude t hat all claim fees collected by We The P eople were reasonably foreseeable relevant conduct for each defendant, se e U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3; and therefore (5) base each defendant’s money laundering sentence
on the to tal amount of claim fees the government proved the conspiracy collected , namely, $1, 352,736. We reject this contention because points (3) and (4) are unsound as a matter of law.
Fraudsentences are based on the amount of loss to victims. Money laundering sentences are based on the value of the money la undered. While both measures address the relative scope of the illegal activity, they do not measure the same types of harm

. And because the base offense levels for money laundering are much higher than the base offense level for fra

ud, compare § 2S1.1(a), with§ 2F1.1(a), it is wrong to assume that the Sente ncing Commission intended to equate the amount of fraud loss with the value of money laundered for every fraudulent scheme that includes some form of mone y laundering (as most every fraud scheme does). Therefore, we agree with decision s h o lding that fraud and money laundering counts are not so closely related as to permit loss and value grouping under § 3D 1.2(d). See United States v. Taylor , 984 F.2d 298, 303 (9th Cir. 1993); U nited States v. Johnson , 971 F.2d 562, 575-76 (10th Cir. 1992). 2Rose , 20 F.3d 367, 372 (9th Cir. 1994), cases on which the government relies. -11- Rather than simply equating fraud loss with value of money laundered, as th e government urges, a s entencing court must separately determine the value of laundered pro ceeds attributable to each conspirator. There are two factors that complicate thi s tas k. First is the need to distinguish between different types of money laundering

. Reinvest ment

money laundering offenses punish the plowing back of illegal proceed s into the unlawful scheme. Concealment money laundering offenses punish measure s used to keep illegal proceeds from being detected. The former are punished mor e seve rely with an initial base offense level of 23, rather than 20, because reinveste d proceeds generate further criminal activity. SeeU.S.S.G. § 2S1.1, comment. (backg’d). Just as t he two offenses punish different types of conduct, the value of the mone y laundered must be measured differ ently. For example, when an elaborate fraud scheme includes a money laundering concealment devi ce, it is likely that all proceeds have been
concea ledand will therefore count in the § 2S1.1(b)(2) value determination. But it i s less likely that all

illegal proceeds have been reinvested in an illegal enterprise because
some ma y have been withdrawn, for example, for the conspirators’ personal livin g exp enses. Thus, when the government starts with the higher base offense level fo r reinvestment money laundering , it may encounter greater problems in proving the value of the illegal proceeds that were laundered. The second complicating factor is to determine what was reasonably foreseeable relev ant conduct for each money laundering conspirator. A relatively periphera l conspirator may know more about the fraud scheme than he or she knows about th e reinvestment money l aundering offense. Because fraud and money laundering may not be grouped for purposes of § 2S1.1(b)(2), the government must prove reasonabl e for eseeability specifically as to the money laundering. This can raise intriguin g questions; for example, when Hildebrand paid Larry Webb his claim writer’s-12-

commissions, wer

e those payments a reinvestment of illegal proceeds as to Hildebrand but a personal withdrawal as to Webb?

In th is case, the government came to sentencing with a global approach to thi s issue that we reject. Not surprisingly, therefore, the government did not place in th e sentencing reco rd the kind of detailed evidence on the value-of-money-laundered issue that would support its contention that each def endant should be assessed the value of all fraud procee ds under § 2S1.1(b)(2). The district court recognized it was not bound by the jury’s c riminal forfeiture verdicts and concluded they were a reasonable estimation of th e value of money laundered attributable to each conspirator. The government has failed to persuade us that the resulting findings were clearly erroneous. III. Jury Instruction Issues

. A. Del iberate Ignorance Instruction. Mentlick, Gardemann, Kraklio, and th e Webbs argue the district court erred in givin g a deliberate ignorance or willful blindness instruction consistent with Eighth Circuit Model Criminal Jury Instruction 7.04:

You may find that a defendant acted knowingly if you find beyond a reason able doubt that the defendant was aware of a high probability tha t materially false representations were being made about the Bask erville case or the claims process, but deliberately avoided learning the truth. Th e element of knowledge may be inferred if a defendant deliberately closed his or her eyes to what would otherwise have been obvious to him or her.

A deli berate ignorance instruction is appropriate when the defendant asserts a lack o f guilty knowledge, but the evidence supports an inference of deliberate ignor ance. United States v. Gruenberg , 989 F.2d 971, 974 (8th Cir.), cert. denied , 510 U.S. 873 (1993). In deciding whether this instruction was warranted, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and reverse if the district court abused “its-13-

wide di scretion to formulate jury instructions.” United States v. Cunningham , 83 F.3d 218, 221 (8th Cir. 1996). Iowa Assistant Attorney General Steven Reno testified that in September 1993 his offi ce obtained an order from the Wayne County District Court enjoining collection of the $300 c laim fees. Hildebrand, Zurcher, Kraklio, and the Webbs were personall y servedwith copies of that order. In December 1993, Reno attended a promotiona l meeting a nd told Kraklio and the Webbs they were misrepresenting the status of th e Ba skerville case and defrauding claimants. In January 1994, Reno attended anothe r promotiona lmeeting and told Gardemann and others the claims process was a scam

. Gardem annbragged at a videotaped claims meeting in 1994 that “I’ve been called a scam artist in pretty nearly every state I’ve been in.” An October 1994 search o f Gardemann’s storage unit revealed a notice from the Colorado Attorney General ’s Office disclosing the history of the Baskerville case and a copy of the Tenth Circuit’s decision aff irming its dismissal. A search of the Webbs’ residence revealed a June 199 3 Bas kerville transcript confirming the case had been dismissed, documents from th e procee dings in Wayne County, and newspaper clippings, including one titled “Judg e Halts Alleged Farm Scam.” Kraklio had documents from the Baskerville case an d
news paper clippings, including one entitled “Attorney General Warns Fairfielders Not to Fall for Scam.” Searches of Mentlick’s home and office uncovered copies of th e Baskerville

docket sheets stating the case had been dismissed; newspap er clippings with headlines such as “Organization’s Claims Hogwash,” “I’ve Got This Bridge to S ell,” and “Class Action Really a Scam, State Says”; and a notice from the Wisconsin Department of Justice stating, “There is absolutely no basis to these claims. They are outrageou s misrepresentations being made to take money from unsuspecting citizens.” To be gu ilty of deliberate ignorance, “the defendant must have been presente d with facts that put him on notice that criminal activity is probably afoot, and then th e defendant must have failed to investigate those facts, thereby deliberately declining to verify or discover the criminal activity.” United States v. Barnhart , 979 F.2d 647, 652-14-

(8th Cir. 1992). Newspaper articles and contacts from state investigators alleging fraud
are cla ssic warning signs. See United States v. Camuti , 78 F.3d 738, 744 (1st Cir

. 1996). Ignoring a state court restra ining order and repeated accusations of fraud are far stronger evidence of deliberate ignorance or actual intent to defraud. Here, a reasonable jury could infer defendants knew they were engaged in fraud activities that wer e probably criminal and deliberately fail ed to investigate. The district court did not abuse its discretion in giving the deliberate ignorance instruction. B. Freedom of Speech Instruction. Ment lick, Gardemann, and Kraklio argue the district court erred in refusing their proposed instructio n that advised the jury of the First Amendment freedom of expressio n and instructed that, if the jurors found “the intent of
adefendant or the tendency of his or her words was not to produce a lawless act, one likely to occur, you must find the defendant not guilty.” These defendants argue tha t refusing this instruction denied them the defense that their actions were motivated by a polit ical objective, namely, to overhaul the monetary system. However, they wer e charged w ith mail fraud and money laundering, not anti-government speech. Thei r spee chwas challenged only to the extent that they fraudulently solicited claims

. “[W]here speech becomes an integral part of the crime, a First Amendment defense is foreclosed even if the prosecution rests on words alone.” United States v. Freeman , 761 F.2d 549, 552 (9th Cir. 1985 ), cert. denied , 476 U.S. 1120 (1986); see United States v. Holecek , 739 F.2d 331, 335 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied , 469 U.S. 1218 (1985).

IV. Alleged Prosecutorial Misconduct

. At trial, the government called Geraldine S andein, who had performed secretarial work for defendants Gardemann and Zurcher. The following exchange took plac e during her direct examination:-15-

Q: Did you bill Mr. Zurcher for the wo rk that was done in connection with these items? A: Yes. Q: Do you still have those bills? A: No, I do not. Q: Where are they? A: I don’t know the answer to that. My office has been bro ken into several times, and those are no longer in my office.
Defendants objected and moved for a mistrial because the jury might infer they ha d committed

the burglary to conceal their crimes. After speaking to counsel and th e wi tness outside the presence of the jury, the court denied the motion but cautioned the jury, “There is not

a shred of evidence that any of these Defendants had anything to do with any break-ins, and you cannot infer that.” The court subsequently denied post

verdict motions for judgments of acquittal or a new trial on this ground. Defendant s again raise the issue on appeal. To warrant reversal, “the prosecutor’s rem arks or conduct must in fact have been imprope r, and (2) such remarks or conduct must have prejudicially affected th e defe ndant’s substantial rights so as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial.” Unite d States v. Guerra , 113 F.3d 809, 815 (8th Cir. 1997), quoting United States v. Stands , 105 F. 3d 1565, 1577 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied , 118 S. Ct. 120 (1997). The district court ruled that the prosecutor’s co nduct was improper because he intentionally elicited Ms. Sandein’s testimony, he knew the jury might draw the prejudicial inference, h e failed to seek the

court’s permission in advance, and therefore he “acted in bad faith in eliciting thi s testimony.” We disagree. The prosecutor violated no order in limine i n eliciting this testimony. It was relevant to explain why the invoices in question wereDefendants also argue they are entitled to a new trial because the prosecuto r 3 was overly solicitous and flirtatious with the jury, coached witnesses, intentionall y attempted to introduce exhibits wi thout proper foundation, and made improper closing and rebuttal arguments. After careful review of t he record for plain error, we conclude these post-verdict contentions are without merit. -16- not offered as trial exhibits. Even if the prosecutor believed the court might exclude this testimony as unduly prejudicial, it was not improper to ask the question duri ng the course of the trial, when its relevancy and any offsetting prejudice could best be weighed, rather than to ask the court’s permission in advance (though this tactic may of course risk a mistrial, depending upon the severity of the possible prejudice).

In a ddition to concluding that the prosecutor was not guilty of imprope r ques tioning, we agree with the district court that denial of a mistrial over this brie f episode, accompanied as it was by a cautionary instruction that if anything was overly critical of the prosecution, did not deprive defendants of a fair trial. 3

V. Other Issues Raised by Defendants.
A. Ac ceptance of Responsibility. Mentlick argues the district court erred i n denying his request for a two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility. Thi s adjustment “is not intended to apply to a defendant who puts the government to it s burden of proof at trial by denying the essential factual elements of guilt, is convicted, and only then admits guilt and expresses remo rse,” except in rare circumstances such as “where a defendant goes to trial to assert and preserve issues that do not relate to factual guilt.” U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, comment. (n.2). Mentlick contends that his ass ertion of a First Amendment defense is such a rare circumstance. We disagree. His defense was that he lacked the requisite criminal i ntent, a denial of factual guilt. Moreover, the record does not reflect that Mentlick has ever accepted responsibility for his offenses.-17-

B. Upward Departure. Prior to sentencing, the government requested an upward departure based on Hildebrand’s violation of a state court injunction and hi s misrepresentation that he was appointed a federal co urt receiver. See U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1, comment. (n.1). At the close of the sentencing hearing, the district court imposed a twolevel upward departure for those reasons, and it sentenced Hildebrand at the top of his adjusted sentencing range of 151 to 188 months, explaining:

I actually was not going to do an upward departure until I heard you r allocution, and if you had come into this court wi th some kernel of remorse for having ruined p eople’s lives, I wouldn’t have departed upward, but all I heard is the same nonsense that I heard on the videotapes, a nd you bought yourself with your allocution an upward depar ture and you bought yourself a sentence at the high end of the Guideline range. Hildebrand argues the district court interfered with his right to allocution by considering it in departing upward and in sentencing him at the top of the guideline range. In selecting a point within the appropriate guideline range, or in deciding whether a departure is warranted, the sentencing court is entitled to “consider, without limitation, any info rmation concerning the background, character and conduct of the defendant , unless oth erwise prohibited by law.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.4. The purpose of the right t o allocutio n

is to give the defendant “the opportunity to present to the court his plea i n mitigation.” See Green v. Un ited States , 365 U.S. 301, 304 (1961). It does not violate thi s right if the district court considers defendant’s attitude, demeanor, and outrageous protestation s of innocence in exercising its sentencing discretion. See United States v. Li , 115 F.3d 125, 134-35 (2nd Cir. 1997); United States v. Clemmons , 48 F.3d 1020, 1025 -26 (7th Cir. 1995), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Allender , 6 2 F.3d 909 (7th Cir. 1995).-18-

Hildebran d further argues he was not given advance notice that his allocutio n might serve as a basis for an upward departure, as Burns v. United States , 501 U.S. 129, 135 (1991), requires. At the start of the sentencing hearing, the di strict court gave notice it would con sider an upward departure on the grounds urged by the government, and it expressly imposed the departure for those reas ons. We do not read Burns as precluding the court from taking into account what was said at the sentencing hearing in making its final decision whether to depart.
C. Miscellaneous Issues. Mentlick contends the Northern District of Iowa juryselection plan violated his constitutional right to a fair trial because his jury pool wa s selected f rom voter registration lists. This contention is foreclosed by cases such a s United Stat es v. Einfeldt , 138 F.3d 373, 379 (8th Cir.), petition for cert. filed , No

. 97-9435 (June 8, 1998). Defendants’ remaining a

rguments were briefed pursuant to Anders v. California , 38 6 U.S. 738 (1967). Mentlick argues (1) United States courts have no jurisdictio n becau se they are illegally sitting in admiralty; (2) the government failed to turn ove r evidence seized in violation of a Colorado court order; and (3) the district court and the jury v iolated their oaths to support the Constitution. Gardemann argues the claim s process was not fraudu lent as a matter of law. Larry and Joan Webb argue (1) the trial court lacked jurisdiction; (2) the government withheld evidence; (3) governmen t witnesses committed perjury; and (4) defendants’ conduct was not criminal because they
were duty-bound to disclose government fraud. We have considered these arguments and conclude they are without merit.

VI. The Government’s Other Sentencing Issues.
A. Minor Part

icipant Role Reduction. The government argues the district court erred in granting two-level reductions to Joan Webb, Larry Webb, and Zurcher for their minor roles in the criminal offense. See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b). “The propriety of a-19-

downward adjustment is determined by comparing the acts of each pa rticipant in relation to the relevant conduct for which the participant is held accountable and by measuring each parti cipant’s individual acts and relative culpability against the elements of th e offense.” United States v. Belitz , 1998 WL 145916 *3 (8th Cir. 1998). The Webb s were not d irectly involved with the conspiracy’s banking operations, and their claim s writing a ctivities were significantly less extensive than the other prosecuted claim s writer, Kraklio. Zurcher was extensively involved in th e group’s banking affairs, but his efforts were largely ministerial, and he received very little compensation for his work. We conclu de the district court’s minor participant findings were not clearly erroneous. See United States v. Tran , 122 F.3d 670, 674 (8th Cir. 1997) (standard of review).
C. Do wnward Departure under U.S.S.G. § 5H1.1. Zurcher’s guideline s sentencin g range was fifty-one to sixty-three months. The district court departe d downward and imposed a sentence of five years probation, with six months served in a community correctional facility followed by eighteen months of home confinement. The court invoked U.S.S.G . § 5H1.1, which provides that age, while not ordinarily relevant in det ermining whether to depart, “may be a reason to impose a sentence below th e applicable guideline range when the defendant is elderly and infirm and where a form of punishment such as home confinement might be equally efficient as and less costly than incarceration.” The government argues the district court abused its discretion because itonly made conclusory findings that Zurcher’s age and infirmity were present to a n exceptional degree, and that home confinement would be equally efficient and less costly than incarceration.

Because age is a discouraged factor, departure is permissible “only if the factor is present to a

n exceptional degree or in some other way makes the case different from the ordinary case where the factor is present.” Koon v. United States , 116 S. Ct. 2035, 2045 (1996). The district court specificall y found that the seventy-year-old Zurcher has life-threatening health conditions. Although the government argues none of these-20-

conditions show infirmity to an exceptional degree, “[d]istrict courts have an institutional advantage over appellate courts in making these sorts of determinations, especially a s they see so many more Guidelines cases than appellate courts do.” Koon , 116 S. Ct. at 2047. The go vernment introduced no evidence showing that home confinement would not cost less than incarc eration, and its expert testified that the Bureau of Prisons could manage Zurcher’s conditions but admitted this would only be possible at certain facilities andwould entail accommodations. Although this issue is close because we doubtless would have granted no downward departure or a far less generous departure, w e conclude the district court did not abuse its departure discretion under Koon

. The judgments of the district court are affirmed. A true copy.
Attest:
CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.