MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as 

precedent or cited before any court except for the 

purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

David W. Stone, IV

Anderson, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Justin F. Roebel

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Idowa Dontray Hood,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

April 18, 2016

Court of Appeals Case No.

48A02-1509-CR-1382

Appeal from the Madison Circuit

Court.

The Honorable David A. Happe, 

Judge.

Cause Nos. 48C04-1306-FC-1236,

48C04-9710-CF-210

Friedlander, Senior Judge

[1] Idowa Dontray Hood appeals from the trial court’s order revoking his 

probation in two cause numbers and imposing his previously suspended 

sentence, contending that there is insufficient evidence to establish that he 

possessed a firearm. We affirm.

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[2] In 1998, Hood pleaded guilty to one count of class B felony burglary for which 

he received an eight-year sentence, with two years suspended to probation 

under cause number 48C04-9710-210. In 2014, Hood pleaded guilty to one 

count of battery resulting in bodily injury and one count of invasion of privacy, 

each Class A misdemeanors, in cause number 48C04-1306-FC-1236. In 1236, 

Hood received consecutive one-year sentences suspended to probation, to be 

served consecutively to his probation in 210.

[3] In July 2015, Hood was serving his probation under 210, but had not yet begun 

to serve his probation in 1236. Execution of Hood’s probation in 210 was 

delayed due to a subsequent conviction for arson, as well as a prior probation 

violation in 210 and the arson case. See Hood v. State, No. 48A02-1309-CR-828 

(Ind. Ct. App. May 28, 2014). 

[4] On July 16, 2015, additional officers were requested to assist in the 

investigation of a white Chevrolet van that had been in involved in a “hit/skip” 

accident. Tr. pp. 8-9. Officer Gabe Bailey responded to the request for 

assistance. When he arrived at the scene, he observed that an officer had the 

driver of the van out of the vehicle. He also observed Hood seated in the front 

passenger seat of the van. Hood had been named as a suspect in the shooting of 

a dog a few days earlier. 

[5] The paper license plate on the van was visibly altered, expired, and was 

registered to a different vehicle, a Buick. During an inventory of the van, 

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officers found a .44 caliber revolver containing one live round and one spent 

casing under the front passenger seat where Hood had been sitting. 

[6] Hood was arrested for possession of the gun. After he was arrested, he asked to 

speak to a detective about the incident involving the recent shooting of a dog. 

He received his Miranda warnings from Detective Norman Rayford, then 

admitted to possessing a handgun during the July 12, 2015 incident involving 

the dog, maintaining that he shot the dog in self-defense. Hood denied that the 

handgun found under the seat of the van was his, though, claiming that he 

came into contact with the gun found under his seat at the time of the traffic 

stop when he reached down to hide a beer from officers. Hood did, however, 

admit that he owned .44 caliber ammunition. 

[7] The Madison County Probation Department filed notices of probation violation 

under both 1236 and 210 on July 24, 2015. The notices alleged that Hood had 

violated the terms of his probation by committing the new criminal offense 

“Unlawful Possession of a Firearm by a Serious Violent Felon[], as filed in 

Madison County Circuit Court, Division IV under cause numbers(s): 48C04-

15007-F4-001102.” Appellant’s App. p. 115. A combined hearing on the 

alleged violations was held on August 17, 2015 at the conclusion of which the 

trial court found that Hood had violated the terms of his probation under both 

causes. When asked by defense counsel if the court was “finding that it 

happened as specifically alleged,” the trial court responded that it was “finding 

the violation as stated.” Tr. p. 23. The trial court revoked Hood’s probation 

and ordered Hood’s aggregate sentence of two years under 1236 be executed in 

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the Department of Correction. The trial court’s order states that on the 

evidence presented the trial court found Hood had “violated the conditions of 

his probation as alleged.” Appellant’s App. p. 16. Hood now appeals. 

[8] A probation revocation hearing is civil in nature, and the alleged violation must 

be proven by the State by a preponderance of the evidence. Mateyko v. State, 

901 N.E.2d 554 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied. When reviewing a claim of 

insufficient evidence to support a trial court’s decision to revoke probation, we 

consider only the evidence most favorable to the judgment, and we neither 

reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses. Id. Revocation is 

appropriate if there is substantial evidence of probative value to support the trial 

court’s conclusion that the probationer has violated the terms of probation. 

Lightcap v. State, 863 N.E.2d 907 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). It is well settled that the 

violation of a single condition of probation is sufficient to support revocation. 

Gosha v. State, 873 N.E.2d 660 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).

[9] Where a defendant is alleged to have violated probation by committing a new 

offense, the State need not show that the defendant was convicted of a crime to 

support the revocation of probation. Lightcap v. State, 863 N.E.2d 907. 

“Although an arrest standing alone does not necessarily support a revocation of 

probation, where there is evidence submitted at the hearing from which the trial 

court could find that an arrest was reasonable and that there is probable cause 

for belief that the defendant violated a criminal law, revocation of probation is 

permitted.” Id. at 911. 

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[10] Possession of a firearm may be actual or constructive. Causey v. State, 808 

N.E.2d 139 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). Here, the issue is whether Hood 

constructively possessed the handgun found under his seat in the van. We will 

find that constructive possession occurs when the person has the intent and 

capability to maintain dominion and control over the firearm. Id. 

[11] With respect to intent to commit this offense, the State is required to 

demonstrate the defendant’s knowledge of the presence of the firearm. Id. 

Testimony at the hearing established that Hood was aware of the presence of 

the firearm. He told Detective Rayford that he came into contact with the gun 

when he reached under the passenger seat of the van to hide a beer from police 

officers during the traffic stop. The evidence is sufficient to establish the 

element of intent.

[12] As for the ability to establish a defendant’s dominion and control over a 

firearm, several types of evidence may be used. Among those types of evidence 

are: (1) incriminating statements by the defendant; (2) attempted flight or 

furtive gestures; (3) proximity of the firearm to the defendant; (4) location of the 

firearm within the defendant’s plain view; and (5) the mingling of a firearm 

with other items owned by the defendant. Id. Additionally, the State must also 

present evidence demonstrating a defendant’s capability to exercise control over 

the firearm, including the ability to reduce the firearm to his or her personal 

possession or to direct its disposition or use. Id. It bears repeating that our 

review of a probation revocation is to ensure that the trial court correctly found 

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that an arrest was reasonable and that there is probable cause for belief that the 

defendant violated a criminal law. Lightcap v. State, 863 N.E.2d 907. 

[13] Although the evidence at the hearing established that Hood did not have 

exclusive dominion and control of the white van in which the firearm was 

found, did not attempt to flee, or like the facts in Causey, make furtive gestures, 

other evidence supports the trial court’s finding. Shortly after his arrest for 

possessing the handgun, Hood asked to speak with a detective, and admitted 

that he had shot at a dog, just four days before. He also admitted that he 

owned .44 caliber ammunition. The firearm, which contained one live shell 

and one spent casing, was located underneath Hood’s seat in the van. 

Additionally, Hood stated that he made contact with the firearm during the 

traffic stop. 

[14] Hood’s explanation that he shot the dog in self-defense and that the firearm 

underneath his seat of the van was not his was before the trial court and 

rejected. We will not reweigh the evidence or reassess the credibility of 

witnesses. Mateyko v. State, 901 N.E.2d 554. There is sufficient evidence to 

establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Hood had committed the 

offense of unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon by 

constructive possession.

[15] Judgment affirmed. 

Bailey, J., and Mathias, J., concur. 

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