alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
[Cite as State v. Michels, 2023-Ohio-1461.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO

HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

STATE OF OHIO,

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

 vs.

CHRISTOPHER MICHELS,

 Defendant-Appellant.

:

:

:

:

:

APPEAL NO. C-220518

 TRIAL NO. B-2200672

O P I N I O N.

Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas

 

Judgment Appealed From Is: Reversed and Cause Remanded

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: May 3, 2023

Melissa A. Powers, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Sean M. Donovan, 

Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee,

Thomas W. Kidd, for Defendant-Appellant.
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

2

ZAYAS, Judge.

{¶1} Christopher Michels appeals the three-year driver’s-license suspension 

imposed after a guilty plea to two counts of child endangerment. For the following 

reason, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand the cause for resentencing 

consistent with this opinion. 

{¶2} Michels pled guilty to violating R.C. 2919.22(C)(1), which prohibits 

operating a vehicle in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A) while children under 18 are present 

in the car. R.C. 4511.19(A) prohibits operating a vehicle while under the influence of 

drugs or alcohol.

{¶3} For a violation of R.C. 2919.22(C)(1), the trial court may impose “a class 

seven suspension of the offender’s driver’s or commercial driver’s license or permit or 

nonresident operating privilege from the range specified in division (A)(7) of section 

4510.02 of the Revised Code.” R.C. 4510.02(A)(7) specifies a suspension for “a definite 

period not to exceed one year.”

{¶4} Here, the trial court imposed a three-year suspension which exceeds the 

range specified in R.C. 4510.02(A)(7). The state concedes the error.

{¶5} Accordingly, we sustain the assignment of error, reverse the imposition 

of the three-year driver’s-license suspension, and remand the cause to the trial court 

for resentencing with respect to the imposition of the license suspension. The trial 

court’s judgment is affirmed in all other respects.

Judgment reversed and cause remanded.

CROUSE, P.J., and KINSLEY, J., concur.

Please note:

The court has recorded its own entry this date.
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Court of Appeals

Sixth Appellate District of Texas

J U D G M E N T

Charles Randall Kay, Appellant

No. 06-15-00169-CR v.

The State of Texas, Appellee

Appeal from the 62nd District Court of 

Franklin County, Texas (Tr. Ct. No. F8162). 

Memorandum Opinion delivered by Justice 

Moseley, Chief Justice Morriss and Justice 

Burgess participating.

As stated in the Court’s opinion of this date, we find that the appeal should be dismissed 

for want of jurisdiction. Therefore, we dismiss the appeal.

We note that the appellant, Charles Randall Kay, has adequately indicated his inability to 

pay costs of appeal. Therefore, we waive payment of costs.

RENDERED DECEMBER 9, 2015

BY ORDER OF THE COURT

JOSH R. MORRISS, III

CHIEF JUSTICE

ATTEST:

Debra K. Autrey, Clerk
#### JOAN RAISHBROOK, Appellant, v. THE ESTATE OF JUDITH F. BAYLEY, Deceased, Respondent.

No. 7471

December 11, 1974

528 P.2d 1331

*Wiener, Goldwater, Galatz & Waldman, Ltd.,*of Las Vegas, for Appellant.

*Foley Brothers*and *Lionel Sawyer Collins & Wartman,*of Las Vegas, for Respondent.

OPINION

*Per Curiam:*

Because the record on appeal contains neither a transcript nor any statement of the evidence adduced in the court below, *416which we deem essential to determination of contentions presented to us, the order appealed from is affirmed. When evidence on which a district court’s judgment rests is not properly included in the record on appeal, it is assumed that the record supports the lower court’s findings. NRAP 10; City of Las Vegas v. Bolden, 89 Nev. 526, 516 P.2d 110 (1973); Meakin v. Meakin, 88 Nev. 25, 492 P.2d 1304 (1972); Leeming v. Leeming, 87 Nev. 530, 490 P.2d 342 (1971); Pfister v. Shelton, 69 Nev. 309, 250 P.2d 239 (1952).1

1

Appellant’s present counsel were substituted for prior counsel, to argue this appeal, after the time for docketing the record had passed.
N OTE : This order is nonprecedential. 

# United States Court of Appeals **for the Federal Circuit**

__________________________ SHERYL TAYLOR , Petitioner
,

v. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTEC TION BOARD , Respondent.

__________________________
2013

- 31 13

__________________________ Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection Board in No. AT0752120258 -I-1.

__________________________ ON MOTION

__________________________ O R D E R Sheryl Taylor moves for the court to “enter an order for respondent/the Merit Systems Protection Board . . . to appoint or assign counsel .” She moves separately for oral argument.
T he court generally do es not appoint counsel on appeal and see s no grounds for doing so here

. See Taylor v. M erit Sys. Protection B d. , 2013 WL 3613934 , at *4 (Fed. Cir. July 16, 2013) (noting that Taylor had filed “ numerous motions ” seeking appointment of counsel that were denied and that Case: 13-3113 Document: 18 Page: 1 Filed: 07/29/2013SHERYL TAYLOR V

. MSPB 2

she had “no constitutional right to counsel for her present appeal, and this court has no means by which it c ould appoint counsel to represent her .”). Accordingly
, I T I S O RDERED T HAT : (1) The motion to appoint counsel is denied. (2) The motion for oral argument is deferred for consideration by the merits panel assigned to hear the

case. (3) A copy of the papers relating to the motion for oral argument and this order shall be transmitted to the merits panel assigned to decide this case

. F OR T HE C OURT

/s/ Daniel E. O’Toole Daniel E. O’Toole Clerk

s26 Case: 13-3113 Document: 18 Page: 2 Filed: 07/29/2013
# C_2007099EN.01000201.xml

| 3.5.2007 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 99/2 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

3.5.2007

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 99/2

---

Non-opposition to a notified concentration

(Case COMP/M.4580 — OEP/Dailycer)

(Text with EEA relevance)

(2007/C 99/03)

On 26 March 2007, the Commission decided not to oppose the above notified concentration and to declare it compatible with the common market. This decision is based on Article 6(1)(b) of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004. The full text of the decision is available only in English and will be made public after it is cleared of any business secrets it may contain. It will be available:

| — | from the Europa competition website (http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes, |
| --- | --- |

—

from the Europa competition website (http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes,

| — | in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website under document number 32007M4580. EUR-Lex is the on-line access to European law. (http://eur-lex.europa.eu) |
| --- | --- |

—

in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website under document number 32007M4580. EUR-Lex is the on-line access to European law. (http://eur-lex.europa.eu)

---
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#### SNARR ADVERTISING, INC., Appellant, v. RAYMOND L. STURGEON, dba STURGEON’S LOG CABIN AND CAFE, Respondent.

No. 7541

January 16, 1975

530 P.2d 762

*12
      *Hále and Belford,*and *Steve Lane*and *Stephen V. Novacek,*of Reno, for Appellant.

*Belanger and Wagner,*of Lovelock, for Respondent.

OPINION

*Per Curiam:*

We affirm the order of the district court granting a Rule 41 (b) dismissal since the appellant has not docketed with this court a transcript of the trial, nor a substitute therefor, and, we must, therefore, assume that the evidence supported the trial court’s implicit determinations. City of Las Vegas v. Bolden, 89 Nev. 526, 516 P.2d 110 (1973); Meakin v. Meakin, 88 Nev. 25, 492 P.2d 1304 (1972).
#### UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Marion T. FRAMPTON, Defendant-Appellant-Cross-Appellant, *377Latique Johnson, a/k/a “John,” Defendant-Appellee.

Nos. 02-1512, 02-1656, 02-1678.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

April 18, 2005.

Andrew D. Greene, Lake Success, NY, for Defendant-Appellee-Cross-Appellant.

Craig P. Schlanger, Syracuse, NY, for Defendant-Appellee.

David M. Grable, Assistant United States Attorney for the Northern District of New York (William C. Pericak, Assistant United States Attorney, Glenn T. Suddaby, United States Attorney, on the brief), Albany, NY, for Appellant-CrossAppellee, of counsel.

PRESENT: WINTER, STRAUB, and LAY,1 Circuit Judges.

1

. The Hon. Donald P. Lay, Judge, Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting by designation.

*SUMMARY ORDER*

In light of the Supreme Court’s decision in *United States v. Booker,*— U.S.-, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), and this Court’s decision in *United States v. Crosby,*397 F.3d 103 (2d Cir.2005), we issued an inquiry to defendants to ascertain whether they each sought remand of their cases to the District Court for further proceedings in conformity with *Crosby.*Frampton, through counsel, has notified us that he seeks such a remand. That request is granted.2

The opinion previously issued in connection with this appeal and reported at *United States v. Frampton,*382 F.3d 213 (2d Cir.2004), is hereby made part of this order and is fully effective, except to the extent that it is inconsistent with the present remand. Any appeal taken from the District Court following this remand and resentencing, to the extent it occurs, can be initiated only by filing a new notice of appeal. *See*Fed. RApp. P. 3, 4(b). A party will not waive or forfeit any appropriate argument on remand or on any appeal post-remand by not filing a petition for rehearing of this remand order. The mandate shall issue forthwith.

For the foregoing reasons, Frampton’s case is hereby REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this order and *Crosby.*

2

. To date, Johnson has not notified us that he seeks remand. This summary order neither effects a remand of *his*case nor prejudices any timely request for remand under *Crosby*that he might make.
United States Department of Labor

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

__________________________________________

B.G., Appellant

and

U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, WINTERWOOD 

POST OFFICE, Las Vegas, NV, Employer

__________________________________________

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Docket No. 23-0402

Issued: February 27, 2023

Appearances: Case Submitted on the Record

Appellant, pro se

Office of Solicitor, for the Director

ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL

Before:

JANICE B. ASKIN, Judge

VALERIE D. EVANS-HARRELL, Alternate Judge

JAMES D. McGINLEY, Alternate Judge

On January 17, 2023 appellant filed an appeal from an April 27, 2022 merit decision of 

the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). The Clerk of the Appellate Boards

assigned Docket No. 23-0402.

The Board has duly considered the matter and notes that the Board has jurisdiction to 

review final adverse decisions of OWCP issued under the Federal Employees’ Compensation 

Act.1 For final adverse decisions of OWCP issued on or after November 19, 2008, the Board’s 

review authority is limited to appeals which are filed within 180 days from the date of issuance 

of OWCP’s decision.2

The 180th day following the April 27, 2022 decision was October 24, 2022. As appellant 

did not file an appeal with the Board until January 17, 2023, more than 180 days after the

April 27, 2022 OWCP decision, the Board finds that the appeal docketed as No. 23-0402 is 

untimely filed. The Board is without jurisdiction to review the appeal. Appellant has not 

explained her failure to timely file an appeal with supporting documentation sufficient to 

1 5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.; 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3(a).

2 20 C.F.R. § 501.3(e).
2

establish compelling circumstances. Because there is no final adverse decision issued by OWCP 

within 180 days of the filing of the instant appeal, the Board concludes that the appeal docketed 

as No. 23-0402, must be dismissed.3 Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the appeal docketed as No. 23-0402 is dismissed.

Issued: February 27, 2023

Washington, DC

Janice B. Askin, Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Valerie D. Evans-Harrell, Alternate Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

James D. McGinley, Alternate Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

3 The Board’s decisions and orders are “final upon the expiration of 30 days from the date of their issuance.” Id.

at § 501.6(d).
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 95-7333

BRUCE CALDWELL,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

THOMAS C. RUFFINO, Director of West Tennessee

Detention Facility; FRANKLIN FREEMAN, Secretary of North Carolina Department of Correction; MICHAEL EASLEY, Attorney General of

North Carolina; JAMES HUNT, Governor of North

Carolina,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. W. Earl Britt, District

Judge. (CA-95-431-5-BR)

Submitted: January 18, 1996 Decided: February 1, 1996

Before HAMILTON and LUTTIG, Circuit Judges, and CHAPMAN, Senior

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Bruce Caldwell, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Appellant appeals from the district court's order denying

relief on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) complaint. We have reviewed

the record and the district court's opinion and find no reversible

error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district

court. Caldwell v. Ruffino, No. CA-95-431-5-BR (E.D.N.C. Aug. 9,

1995).

Because Appellant has failed to demonstrate the requisite

extraordinary circumstances, we also deny his motion for appointment of counsel. See Whisenant v. Yuam, 739 F.2d 160, 163 (4th Cir.

1984). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
<PAGE>
                                                                   EXHIBIT 10.18

                 AMENDMENT TO 401(K) PLAN DATED DECEMBER 3, 2001



RESOLVED, that the Company's 401(k) Plan be modified so that effective January
1, 2002 the:

     (a)  Fidelity Freedom Fund 2040 be made available as an investment vehicle
          for participants;

     (b)  Plan address be changed to 4600 North Beach Street, Haltom City, Texas
          76137;

     (c)  enrollment period be the first of any calendar month following the 90
          day introductory period (subject to current plan limitations);

     (d)  contribution by an employee of up to 100% of a bonus award be
          permitted (subject to Plan limitations), and

     (e)  matching contribution by the Company be made to a participant only if
          1000 hours of service has been worked during the year to which the
          match applies.



/s/ JOE HALLIGAN                                 /s/ DAVID A. LATTANZIO
------------------------                         -------------------------
Joseph Halligan                                  David A. Lattanzio
Chief Executive Officer                          Chief Financial Officer




/S/ TOM CALDERON
------------------------
Tom Calderon
Controller
# C_2007232EN.01000101.xml

| 4.10.2007 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 232/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

4.10.2007

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 232/1

---

Non-opposition to a notified concentration

(Case COMP/M.4723 — ENI/EXXON MOBIL (Hungary, Czech Republic and Slovakia))

(Text with EEA relevance)

(2007/C 232/01)

On 24 July 2007, the Commission decided not to oppose the above notified concentration and to declare it compatible with the common market. This decision is based on Article 6(1)(b) of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004. The full text of the decision is available only in English and will be made public after it is cleared of any business secrets it may contain. It will be available:

| — | from the Europa competition website (http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes, |
| --- | --- |

—

from the Europa competition website (http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes,

| — | in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website under document number 32007M4723. EUR-Lex is the on-line access to European law. (http://eur-lex.europa.eu) |
| --- | --- |

—

in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website under document number 32007M4723. EUR-Lex is the on-line access to European law. (http://eur-lex.europa.eu)

---