* This order is not binding precedent, except underthe doctrines of law of

the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. T he court generally disfavors the citation of orders; nevertheless, an order may be c ited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.

** After examining the briefs and the appellate reco rd, this three-judge panel has determined unanimously that oral argumentwould not be of material assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The cause is therefore ordered su bmitted without oral argument. 

## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### MAY 3 2005 

### PATRICK FISHER Clerk UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

ANDREW JOHN YELLOWBEAR, JR., Petitioner-Appellant, No. 04-8120

v. (D. of Wyo.) WYOMING ATTORNEY GENERAL; SKIP HORNECKER, in his official capacity as Supervisor, Fremont County Detention Center,

Respondents-Appellees. (D.C. No. 04-CV-243-B)

ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY *

Before KELLY , O’BRIEN , and TYMKOVICH , Circuit Judges. **
Petitioner-Appellant Andrew John Yellowbear, a stat e prisoner appearing pro se, presents three claims in his appeal from th e District of Wyoming. He is currently awaiting trial in the Ninth Judicial District of Wyoming for the murder-2-

of his minor daughter. He argues that the State of Wyoming does not have jurisdiction over him; that tribal courts violated his due process rights; and that the state improperly denied him discovery. The dis trict court did not act on the issue of certificate of appealability (“COA”). Pur suant to the General Order of October 1, 1996, under these circumstances COA is d eemed denied. The parties are familiar with the facts, and we nee d not restate them here. After our review of the materials submitted by Mr. Yellowbear against the backdrop of his state court record, it is apparent the conclusions of the district court are simply not debatable. As the district co urt explained, Mr. Yellowbear is a prisoner in pre-conviction custody and is therefo re unable to rely upon 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which is a vehicle intended only forstate court prisoners who have already been convicted to contest the legality of t heir convictions. He has also failed to meet the exhaustion requirements of § 225 4 because he has failed to first bring his claims to state authorities. Mr. Yellowbear is likewise ineligible for habeas co rpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Although § 2241 is generally available to prisoners who have not yet been tried, Mr. Yellowbear has not exhausted hi s remedies at the state court level. We recognize § 2241 does not contain an exp licit exhaustion requirement as § 2254 does. However, because Mr. Yellowbear ra ises no credible federal constitutional claim, it is not inconsistent with § 2241 or our habeas corpus-3-

precedent to follow the exhaustion policy of § 2254 in this case. See Montez v. McKinna , 208 F.3d 862, 866 (10th Cir. 2000) (requiring exh austion for § 2241 habeas claims). On appeal, Mr. Yellowbear has also filed a “motion for a restraining order” and a “motion for sanctions.” These issues were no t presented at the district court, and we need not address them here. See King v. United States , 301 F.3d 1270, 1274 (10th Cir. 2002) (as a general rule, “th is court will not consider an issue on appeal that was not raised below.”) Furth ermore, like his other arguments, Mr. Yellowbear’s new motions present no recognizable habeas corpus claim and have not been fully exhausted at the stat e court level. Accordingly, we agree with the district court that Mr. Yellowbear has failed to state a recognizable habeas corpus claim, and we DENY COA and DISMISS the case. We also DENY Mr. Yellowbear’s “motion fo r a restraining order” and his “motion for sanctions.” Entered for the Court Timothy M. Tymkovich Circuit Judge