COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Willis, Bray and Overton 

Argued at Norfolk, Virginia 

JOEL KOSSMAN 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 2409-96-1 JUDGE RICHARD S. BRAY 

 MAY 27, 1997 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, 

 DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES AND 

 MOTOR VEHICLE DEALER BOARD 

 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH 

Robert B. Cromwell, Judge 

 John D. Hooker, Jr. (John D. Hooker, Jr. & 

Associates, on brief), for appellant. 

 Eric K. G. Fiske, Assistant Attorney General 

(James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General, on 

brief), for appellees. 

 Joel Kossman asserted a claim against the Motor Vehicle 

Transaction Recovery Fund (Fund) pursuant to Code § 46.2-1527.3. 

Applying provisions of the statute which pertained when Kossman 

lodged his claim, the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV), acting 

through the Commissioner, and, later, the Motor Vehicle Dealer 

Board (MVDB) determined that Kossman did not qualify for relief. 

 Kossman sought judicial review in accordance with the Virginia 

Administrative Process Act (VAPA), arguing that his claim was 

governed by former Code § 46.2-1523, the statute in effect upon 

the accrual of his cause of action. The trial court, however, 

affirmed the agency decision, and Kossman appeals. Finding no 

error, we affirm the order. 
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I. FACTS

 The substantive facts are uncontroverted. In January 1993, 

Kossman loaned $75,000 to Edward J. Souldourian, a licensed motor 

vehicle salesperson, to finance the purchase of motor vehicles 

for resale. When Souldourian defaulted in the terms of 

repayment, Kossman obtained judgment on October 17, 1994, for 

Souldourian's "fraudulent" conduct. Kossman thereafter pursued 

recovery for his loss from the Motor Vehicle Transaction Recovery 

Fund, Code §§ 46.2-1527.1 to -1527.8, through a letter claim 

dated December 5, 1994. 

 Code §§ 46.2-1522 to -1527 were the predecessor statutes to 

Code §§ 46.2-1527.1 to -1527.8. Former Code § 46.2-1523 

provided, in pertinent part, that: 

 any person . . . awarded a final judgment in 

a court of competent jurisdiction in the 

Commonwealth for any loss or damage by reason 

of any fraud practiced on him or fraudulent 

representation made to him by a licensed or 

registered motor vehicle dealer or one of a 

dealer's salespersons acting for the dealer 

or within the scope of his employment, or for 

any loss or damage by reason of the violation 

by a dealer or salesperson of any of the 

provisions of this chapter in connection with 

the purchase of a motor vehicle on or after 

January 1, 1989, . . . may file a verified 

claim with the Commissioner, requesting 

payment from the Fund of the amount unpaid on 

the judgment. The claim shall be filed with 

the Commissioner no sooner than thirty days 

and no later than twelve months after the 

judgment becomes final. 

(Emphasis added.) The General Assembly repealed Code 

§ 46.2-1523, enacting Code § 46.2-1527.3, see 1994 Va. Acts, ch. 
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478, effective April 8, 1994, which directed that "the 

Commissioner . . . only consider for payment, claims submitted by 

retail purchasers of motor vehicles, and for purchases of motor 

vehicles by licensed or registered motor vehicle dealers who 

contribute to the Fund."1 Id. 

 Acting on Kossman's claim of December 5, 1994, the 

Commissioner applied Code § 46.2-1527.3 and denied Kossman 

relief. In correspondence dated March 14, 1996, Kossman 

requested reconsideration, contending that his claim was 

controlled by the former statute, in effect "at the time the 

fraud was committed," which did not contain the exclusionary 

language of Code § 46.2-1527.3. In response, the MVDB2

 noted the 

distinctions between the current and former statutes and applied 

Code § 46.2-1527.3 to determine that Kossman was not a qualified 

claimant, a decision affirmed by the trial court on Kossman's 

appeal.3 See Code § 9-6.14:17. Kossman again appeals, arguing 

 

 1Kossman concedes that he would not qualify for relief 

pursuant to the amended statute. 

 2Effective January 1, 1996, the legislature vested the MVDB 

with responsibility to administer Code §§ 46.2-1527.1 to -1527.8. 

See 1995 Va. Acts, chs. 767, 816. 

 3Appellees contend that Kossman's failure to properly 

perfect an appeal of the original ruling of the Commissioner in 

accordance with Rule 2A:2 precluded judicial review of the 

administrative decision, notwithstanding his subsequent request 

for reconsideration and the attendant ruling of the MVDB. 

 Rule 2A:2 provides for appeal of the "final order in the 

case decision" to the appropriate circuit court. Code § 9-6.14:4 

defines "case decision" as "any agency proceeding or 

determination that . . . a named party . . . is not . . . in 

compliance with any existing requirement for obtaining . . . [a] 

right or benefit." Under the instant circumstances, the MVDB 
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that his claim is governed by the statute in effect when his 

cause of action against Souldourian first arose, former Code 

§ 46.2-1523, and that application of Code 

§ 46.2-1527.3 deprives him of a "substantive property right" 

without due process. 

II. RECOVERY FROM THE FUND

 On appeal of agency action governed by the VAPA, the 

reviewing court must defer to the agency resolution of factual 

issues, "ascertaining [only] whether there was substantial 

evidence in the . . . record upon which the agency as the trier 

of the facts could reasonably find them to be as it did." Code 

§ 9-6.14:17. "In contrast, judicial review of a 'legal issue' 

requires 'little deference,' unless it . . . 'falls within an 

agency's area of particular expertise.'" Environmental Defense 

Fund, Inc. v. State Water Control Bd., 15 Va. App. 271, 278, 422 

S.E.2d 608, 612 (1992) (quoting Johnston-Willis Ltd. v. Kenley, 

6 Va. App. 231, 243-46, 369 S.E.2d 1, 8 (1988)). This principle 

"recognizes the 'special competence' of the judiciary to decide 

issues of 'common law,' 'constitutional law' or 'statutory 

interpretation,' distinct from 'findings of fact.'" Id. (quoting 

Johnston-Willis, 6 Va. App. at 243-46, 369 S.E.2d at 8). The 

party complaining of agency action must "demonstrate an error of 

law" subject to judicial review. Code § 9-6.14:17. 

 

decision of March 22, 1996, was the "final order in the case 

decision," which Kossman timely appealed to this Court. 
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 "When the wording of a statute is clear and unambiguous, its 

plain meaning is to be accepted without resort to rules of 

interpretation." Commonwealth, Dep't of Mines, Minerals & Energy 

v. May Bros., 11 Va. App. 115, 118, 396 S.E.2d 695, 696 (1990). 

The legislature, in enacting both Code §§ 46.2-1523 and 

46.2-1527.3, established the "Fund," designating it a "special 

fund" "to pay claims" arising from "unpaid judgments, as provided 

for in § 46.2-1527.3 [former 46.2-1523]," and "for no other 

purpose." See Code §§ 46.2-1522, -1527.1. A claim cognizable 

under either statute was predicated upon "a final judgment 

[awarded] in a court of competent jurisdiction," and could not be 

filed "sooner than thirty days . . . after the judgment becomes 

final." Code §§ 46.2-1523, -1527.3. Thus, Kossman's statutory 

claim against the Fund was not extant until judgment against 

Souldourian on October 17, 1994, a time clearly governed by Code 

§ 46.2-1527.3, effective April 8, 1994. 

 Kossman's contention that application of Code § 46.2-1527.3 

to bar his claim deprived him of a "vested right" in violation of 

due process is without merit. "[D]eprivation of a liberty or 

property interest" must be proven to implicate due process. 

Jackson v. W., 14 Va. App. 391, 406, 419 S.E.2d 385, 393 (1992). 

 The repeal of Code § 46.2-1523 did not impair Kossman's cause of 

action against Souldourian for fraud, and the dependent statutory 

claim against the Fund did not arise until after the effective 

date of Code § 46.2-1527.3. Thus, no proprietary interest of 
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Kossman to claim against the Fund was compromised by either the 

legislative or administrative acts in issue. See, e.g., Roller 

v. Basic Constr. Co., 238 Va. 321, 328-30, 384 S.E.2d 323, 326-27 

(1989) (rights of parties not fixed under Workers' Compensation 

Act until occurrence of "injury by accident," and thus prior 

amendment did not affect substantive or vested right). 

 Accordingly, Kossman's claim was properly denied pursuant to 

the provisions of Code § 46.2-1527.3, and we affirm the order of 

the trial court. 

 Affirmed.