Reversed and Remanded and Majority and Dissenting Opinions filed July 29, 

2021.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-19-00427-CV

HOUSTON PROFESSIONAL FIRE FIGHTERS ASSOCIATION, IAFF 

LOCAL 341; PATRICK “MARTY” LANCTON; GABRIEL ANGEL 

DOMINGUEZ; ROY ANTHONY CORMIER; BRIAN RAY WILCOX; AND 

DELANCE SHAW, Appellants

V.

HOUSTON POLICE OFFICERS’ UNION; CITY OF HOUSTON; MAYOR 

SYLVESTER TURNER; COUNCILMEMBERS AMY PECK, TARSHA 

JACKSON, ABBIE KAMIN, CAROLYN EVANS-SHABAZZ, DAVE 

MARTIN, TIFFANY D. THOMAS, GREG TRAVIS, KARLA CISNEROS, 

ROBERT GALLEGOS, EDWARD POLLARD, MARTHA CASTEXTATUM, MIKE KNOX, DAVID ROBINSON, MICHAEL KUBOSH, 

LETITIA PLUMMER, AND SALLIE ALCORN; CONTROLLER CHRIS 

BROWN; AND FINANCE DEPARTMENT DIRECTOR TANTRI EMO, 

Appellees

On Appeal from the 157th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 2018-85465
2

D I S S E N T I N G O P I N I O N

I agree with the trial court that the Appellees met their summary judgment 

burden to show that the pay-parity amendment is contrary to FPERA, and the Fire 

Fighter Appellants failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact. Thus, I 

respectfully dissent.

* * *

Because FPERA unmistakably preempts contrary local law,1this case 

presents a simple question: Is the the pay-parity amendment’s compensation 

scheme contrary to FPERA?

2

 The answer is “yes.”

FPERA requires the City to provide fire fighters with compensation that is 

“substantially equal to” comparable employment in the private sector and “based 

on prevailing private sector compensation” for other jobs requiring the same or 

similar skills, abilities, and training. See Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code § 174.021. The

pay-parity amendment provides, on the other hand, that the City must compensate 

fire fighters in an amount that is at least equal to compensation provided to the 

City’s police officers.

The majority suggests that the pay-parity amendment merely establishes a 

compensation “floor” for fire fighters. The majority envisions a hypothetical 

world in which fire fighters’ compensation, based on private sector FPERA 

1

See Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code § 174.005 (“This chapter preempts all contrary local 

ordinances, executive orders, legislation, or rules adopted by the state or by a political 

subdivision or agent of the state, including a personnel board, civil service commission, or homerule municipality.”).

2

See City of Laredo v. Laredo Merchants Assoc., 550 S.W.3d 586, 593 (Tex. 2018) (“In 

this case, legislative intent in the Act to preempt local law is clear. The Act states that a local 

government or other political subdivision may not adopt certain ordinances. The issue is 

whether the Ordinance falls within the Act’s ambit.” (quotations and punctuation omitted)).
3

standards, might exceed police officers’ compensation, so “the pay-parity 

amendment does not always foreclose the application of section 174.021’s 

standards.” Maj. Op. at 17. Indeed, the amendment could be consistent with

FPERA if the City’s police officers were paid compensation that is substantially 

equal to comparable employment in the private sector or based on prevailing 

private sector compensation.3 But the only evidence adduced in this case on the

subject matter shows that the City’s police officers are not currently compensated 

in such a way. Former City of Houston Chief of Police Art Acevedo testified that

police officers’ compensation is not based on prevailing private sector 

compensation. The Fire Fighter Appellants concede that, absent the pay-parity 

amendment, the City’s police officers currently are paid substantially more than 

fire fighters.

The majority’s interpretation of FPERA that it does not establish the

exclusive standard for determining fire fighter compensation is not a reasonable

construction that gives effect to both FPERA and the pay-parity amendment. 

FPERA requires one standard: comparable private sector compensation. The payparity amendment requires another standard: police officers’ compensation. The

undisputed evidence shows that these two standards are not currently equivalent: 

police officers’ compensation is not based on private sector compensation, and

their compensation is substantially more than fire fighters’ compensation. Thus, 

there is an “actual conflict” between FPERA and the amendment. Hypothetically,

police officers’ compensation could be based on private sector compensation, thus 

satisfying FPERA, but we cannot rely on the Appellees to alter their method for 

compensating police officers so that fire fighters’ compensation would comply

3 That is, assuming fire fighters and police officers are engaged in comparable 

employment utilizing the same or similar skills, abilities, and training.
4

with FPERA’s private sector requirements. See BCCA Appeal Grp., Inc. v. City of 

Houston, 496 S.W.3d 1, 17 (Tex. 2016) (reasoning that it would not be a 

reasonable construction of the statute and ordinance to rely on the city’s discretion 

in not enforcing its more stringent ordinance).4

* * *

Because the pay-parity amendment ties fire fighters’ compensation to a 

standard that is not based on prevailing private sector compensation, under the 

uncontroverted evidence in this case, the amendment is contrary to FPERA. The 

trial court did not err by granting summary judgment to the Appellees.

/s/ Ken Wise

Justice

Panel consists of Justices Wise, Spain, and Hassan. (Hassan, J., majority).

4 Moreover, the majority cherry-picks the policies underlying FPERA that support the 

majority’s result, ignoring those that do not. See Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code § 174.002(a) (noting the 

policy of this state that fire fighters are provided compensation that is substantially the same as 

compensation prevailing in comparable private sector employment). Our role is not to secondguess the policy choices that inform our statutes or to weigh the effectiveness of their results; 

rather, our task is to interpret statutes to effectuate the Legislature’s intent. See McIntyre v. 

Ramirez, 109 S.W.3d 741, 748 (Tex. 2003).