doubt." Mitchell v. State, 124 Nev. 807, 816, 192 P.3d 721, 727 (2008) 

(internal quotations omitted). "This court will not disturb a jury verdict 

where there is substantial evidence to support it, and circumstantial 

evidence alone may support a conviction." Hernandez v. State, 118 Nev. 

513, 531, 50 P.3d 1100, 1112 (2002). 

As to the burglary count, Gonzales argues that the State failed 

to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was involved in the break-in, 

because the State's expert "could not testify with one hundred percent 

accuracy that the prints found at the crime scene belonged to [Gonzales]." 

Gonzales cites no authority for his implicit argument that beyond a 

reasonable doubt requires an expert to testify with 100% certainty. See 

Maresca v. State, 103 Nev. 669, 673, 748 P.2d 3, 6 (1987) ("It is appellant's 

responsibility to present relevant authority and cogent argument; issues 

not so presented need not be addressed by this court."). Further, Gonzales 

misstates the expert's testimony. The State's expert acknowledged that 

"[w]e don't testify to a hundred percent," but she testified unequivocally 

that fingerprints recovered from the broken window pane were Gonzales's. 

Accordingly, any rational trier of fact could have found that Gonzales was 

involved with the break-in. 

As to the home invasion count, Gonzales argues that the State 

failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he entered the dwelling. A 

home invasion occurs when a person forcibly enters an inhabited dwelling 

without the permission of the owner. See NRS 175.211; NRS 205.067. A 

defendant has "entered" a building when any part of his person has 

crossed the plane of "an area into which a reasonable person would 

believe that a member of the general public could not pass without 

authorization." Merlino v. State, 131 Nev., Adv. Op. 65, 357 P.3d 379, 385 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

2 

(0) I 947A 413* 
(Nev. Ct. App. 2015) (quoting People v. Valencia, 46 P.3d 920, 926 (Cal. 

2002)). A dual-paned window, that had been intact when the homeowner 

left was found partially broken upon his return. The exterior, but not the 

interior, pane was broken, and Gonzales's fingerprints were found on the 

interior side of the broken exterior pane.' The space between panes of an 

intact dual-paned window is an area to which a reasonable person would 

not believe the general public had access. Thus Gonzales's grasping of the 

interior surface of the external window pane constituted an entry into the 

dwelling, and any rational trier of fact could have found that Gonzales 

entered the dwelling. 

Gonzales next contends that several instances of prosecutorial 

misconduct during closing arguments "tainted the trial." Where an 

appellant preserved a claim at trial, we first consider whether the 

prosecutor's conduct was improper and then determine whether any 

improper conduct warrants reversal. Valdez v. State, 124 Nev. 1172, 1188, 

196 P.3d 465, 476 (2008). Gonzales argues that the State overstated the 

strength of the fingerprint evidence when the prosecutor asked, 

rhetorically, why the fingerprints were certainly Gonzales's and excluded 

everyone else in the world. Gonzales objected below. The State's 

argument was a proper comment on the evidence where the State's expert 

agreed that the fingerprints "only belong to one person and that one 

person would be Yadhir Gonzales." See Miller v. State, 121 Nev. 92, 100, 

110 P.3d 53, 59 (2005). 

'The screen had been removed from the window prior to the pane 

being broken. 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

3 

(0) 1947A .170j. 
Gonzales failed to preserve the remainder of his prosecutorialmisconduct claims. Where the claim of prosecutorial misconduct was not 

•preserved at trial, we review the claim for plain error, that is that the 

error is plain from the record and affected the appellant's substantial 

rights. Valdez, 124 Nev. at 1190, 196 P.3d at 477. Gonzales argues that 

the State vouched for the credibility of its fingerprint expert when the 

prosecutor said (a) such experts are the most independent people in the 

courtroom because they are already back at work comparing prints and (b) 

such experts do not get a pay raise or increase in their profession if they 

are able to match prints. He also argues that the latter comment 

referenced facts not in evidence. Such• statements are not vouching as 

they do not "place[ ] the prestige of the government behind the witness by 

providing personal assurances of [her] veracity." Browning v. State, 120 

Nev. 347, 359, 91 P.3d 39, 48 (2004) (internal quotations omitted). 

Further, the latter comment was a reasonable inference from the expert's 

testimony that she is neither encouraged nor discouraged from identifying 

anyone. 

Gonzales also argues that the State engaged in misconduct 

when it accused the defense of distorting the issues by challenging the 

fingerprint evidence. This was error as the State may not disparage the 

defense. See Truesdell v. State, 129 Nev., Adv. Op. 20, 304 P.3d 396, 402 

(2013). However, Gonzales has not demonstrated that the error affected 

his substantial rights where there was overwhelming evidence that the 

fingerprints were his. 

Gonzales also argues that the State engaged in misconduct 

when the prosecutor stated that he took "offense" to a defense argument 

regarding the scientific validity of fingerprint evidence. This was error as 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

4 

(0) 1947A c(1g;;s4 
a prosecutor may not inject his personal opinions or beliefs into the 

arguments. Aesoph v. State, 102 Nev. 316, 322, 721 P.2d 379, 383 (1986). 

However, Gonzales has not demonstrated that the error affected his 

substantial rights where the comment was fleeting and the prosecutor 

then returned to arguing the evidence. 

Finally, Gonzales contends that the cumulative effect of the 

errors violated his right to a fair trial. Gonzales neither stated the 

cumulative-error test nor applied it and thus failed to provide this court 

with cogent argument in support of his claim. We therefore need not 

consider this claim. See Maresca, 103 Nev. at 673, 748 P.2d at 6. 

For the foregoing reasons, we 

ORDER the judgment of conviction AFFIRMED. 

Gibbons 

J. 

, J. 

Pickering 

cc: Chief Judge, The Eighth Judicial District Court 

Hon. Jack B. Ames, Senior Judge 

Clark County Public Defender 

Attorney General/Carson City 

Clark County District Attorney 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 5 

(0) I947T