## United States Court of Appeals **For the Eighth Circuit**

___________________________
No. 22

- 2957

___________________________
United States of America

Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Devin Delbert Donald Blom

Defendant - Appellant

____________ Appeal from United States District Court for the District of Minnesota

____________
Submitted: December 15, 2023 Filed: February 14, 2024 [Unpublished]

____________ Before ERICKSON, MELLOY, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.

____________

PER CURIAM.

Defendant Devin Delbert Donald Blom conditionally pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute 50 0 grams or more of a mixture or substance containing methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841 (b)(1)(A)

, and 846.
He reserv ed his right to challenge an initial warrantless search and a later search
warrant affidavit

. Because the initial warrantless search was reasonable in light of- 2

- his express waiver of rights as a state of Minnesota parolee, and because the later
warrant affidavit a mply demonstrated probable cause

, we affirm.

While imprisoned by the State of Minnesota for a drug offense, Mr. Blom participated in a voluntary program entitled the “Challenge Incarceration Program

. ” The program has two phases: activities during a period of incarceration followed by a parole period of intense supervision. When Minnesota released Mr. Blom from incarceration for the supervised parole phase of his program, he signed an acknowledgment form detailing his conditions of release and acknowledging his

consent to “any unannounced visits or searches . . . of the offender’s person, residence, possessions, cell phone, vehicle, or premises.”

During Mr. Blom ’s parole

, police officers and his probation officer received information suggesting he was trafficking methamphetamine. The probation officer had personal knowledge as to Mr. Blom’s residence and the vehicles he typically
used. The o fficers searched Mr. Blom’s home while Mr. Blom was present. They
found methamphetamine in a purse and marijuana in a cup . Mr. Blom’s wife , who was also on state parole, arrived home during the search and was arrested based on what they had found. She was ca rrying more than $70,000 cash in a purse

. Outside the residence, a drug dog alerted to a truck that officers knew Mr. Blom used

.

Based on this information, officers decided to seek a warrant before continuing their search. In the search warrant affidavit, an office r described the above facts but did not provide details as to how much methamphetamine was found in the first purse or precisely where in the residence it had been located. A state judge issued a warrant. A resulting search of the truck where the dog had alerted
revealed a scale and approximately eleven pounds of methamphetamine, nine pounds of marijuana, and 140 THC vap e cartridges.

Mr. Blom moved to suppress all the evidence arguing the initial warrantless
search was unreasonable and the later

- obtained warrant was unsupported by probable cause. He also moved for a hearing pursuant to Franks v. Delaware , 438- 3

- U.S. 154 (1978), arguing the omission of details in the warrant affidavit defeated probable cause. The district court 1 denied the motions.

We review the district court’s legal conclusions de novo and underlying
factual determinations for clear error. See United States v . Juneau , 73 F.4th 607,
61 4 (8th Cir. 2023). We review the denial of a Franks hearing for abuse of
discretion. See United States v. Patterson
, 68 F.4th 402, 414 (8 th Cir. 2023).

A warrantless search within the scope of a known parole condition is generally
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. See Samson v. California , 547 U.S. 8 43

, 8 52 (2006) (stating that society does not recognize as legitimate an offender ’ s asserted expectation of privacy if it contradicts the plain terms o f a parole condition ) ; see also United States v. McCoy

, 847 F.3d 601, 605 (8th Cir. 2017) (warrantless search of a Minnesota parolee’s computer was not unreasonable in light of the parolee’s acknowledged search condition). To counter this well

- established rule, Mr. Blom argues that his signed acknowledgment failed to show h e knew of the
condition because the search condit ion appeared on the second page whereas his signature was on the first page. He also argues that even if he had been aware of the search condition on his parole, the initial search in this case exceeded the scope of
the condition and otherwise fell outside the scope of his retained Fourth Amendment expectations of privacy

.

We reject his arguments. The district court did not clearly err in finding Mr. Blom’s signed acknowledgment extended to the search condition on his parole. And nothing about the present search sets it apart from searches approved in Samson and
other similar cases. The parole officer was familiar with Mr. Blom’s residence and
vehicles

, and the search did not extend beyond these areas. See, e.g.
, United States

v. Thabit

, 56 F.4 th 1145, 1 152 (8 th Cir. 20 23 ) (“[T]he waiver signed by parolees allowing searches of their residence nullifies any need for law enforcement to

1 The Honorable Ann D. Montgomery, United States District Judge for the District of Minnesota, adopting the Report and Recommendation of the Honorable David T. Schultz, United States Magistrate Judge for the District of Minnesota.- 4

- develop a reason to search. They simply must possess probable cause that the parolee actually resides at the search location. ”)

Regarding the later search, the affidavit, and the denial of a Franks hearing, any omission of information from the affidavit failed to detract from the overwhelming evidence and clear existence of probable cause. See United States v.
Johnson , 75 F.4th 833, 841 (8th Cir. 2023) ( intentionally false or omitted
information must be material to the probable cause determination to merit relief ). As such, denial of the Franks hearing involved no abuse of discretion. 2

We affirm the well

- reasoned judgment of the district court.

______________________________

2 In addressing the issues as framed by Mr. Blom, we make no comment as to (1) the underlying necessity of the search warrant in this case in light of the parole condition , or (2) the sufficiency of an extensive suppression hearing to serve, in effect, as a Franks hearing. See, e.g.
, Johnson , 75 F.4th at 841 n.4.