alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
UN PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 17

- 1133

INNA VLADISLAVOVNA ARGASHOKOVA

,

Petitioner

,

v.

JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General

,

Respondent

.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

.

Submitted : September 12, 2017 Decided: September 22, 2017

Before NIEMEYER, AGEE, and HARRIS , Circuit Judges.

Petition denied in part ; dismissed in part by un published per curiam opinion

.

Tatiana S. Aristova, KHAVINSON & ASSOCIATES, P.C., Plainsboro, New Jersey , for

Petitioner. Chad A. Readler, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Cindy S. Ferrier, Assistant Director, Timothy G. Hayes , Office of Immigration Litigation, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM:

Inna Vladislavovna Argashokova

, a native of the former Soviet Union and a citizen

of Russia

, petition s for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (Board)

denying h er motion to reopen as untimely. We have reviewed the administrative record

and the Board’s order and find no abuse of discretion. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), (c)(2)

(2017). We therefore deny the petition for revie w in part for the reasons stated by the

Board. See In re Argashokova (B.I.A. Jan. 4, 2017).

We lack jurisdiction to review the Board’s refusal to exercise its sua sponte authority

to reopen and therefore dismiss this portion of the petition for review. See Lawrence v.

Lynch, 826 F.3d 198, 20 6

- 07 (4th Cir. 2016) ; Mosere v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 397, 400

- 01

(4th Cir. 2009). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions

are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the

decisional process.

PETITION DENIED IN PART;

DISMISSED IN PART
<PAGE>

                                                                    Exhibit 10.5


                                 BEPARIKO BIOCOM

                     AMENDMENT TO SERIES ONE PROMISSORY NOTE

WHEREAS,

A. Bepariko BioCom, a Nevada corporation (the "Company") has entered into that
certain Promissory Note dated April 20, 2001 (the "Promissory Note") in the
amount of $100,000 payable to ______________________________ (the "Holder"); and

B. The Holder and the Company have agreed to amend the Promissory Note such that
the Due Date be extended all on the terms as set forth in this Amendment
Agreement.

FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the Company and the Holder agree to amend the Promissory
Note, such that the Due Date be deleted in its entirety and replaced with the
following:

"(the "Due Date") which is the earlier of (i) one (1) year from the date of this
Amendment of (2) upon receipt of funds or financings from any source."

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, this Amendment Agreement has been executed and delivered by
the duly authorized representatives of the Company and the Holder.

COMPANY:                                         HOLDER:



BEPARIKO BIOCOM



By:________________________                      By:___________________________
     Stephen P. Harrington                            Name:
     President                                        Title:



Date:_______________________


                                      -30-
#### J. M. BOUNDS, Appellant, v. WARDEN, NEVADA STATE PRISON, Respondent.

No. 8059

July 9, 1975

537 P.2d 475

*429
      *Horace R. Goff,*State Public Defender, and *Michael R. Griffin,*Deputy State Public Defender, Carson City, for Appellant.

*Robert List,*Attorney General, and *Patrick B. Walsh,*Deputy Attorney General, Carson City, for Respondent.

OPINION

*Per Curiam:*

By reason of a guilty plea entered September 16, 1963, appellant stands convicted of murder in the second degree. He is presently incarcerated under a 10-year to life sentence. In August, 1974, he petitioned, unsuccessfully, for post-conviction relief.

In this appeal he argues we should reverse because (1) of events that occurred prior to the time the guilty plea was entered; and, (2) the district court erred when it failed to rule that appellant’s plea of guilty was involuntary.

1. We need not consider the contention regarding events that occurred prior to the guilty plea. See Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973), where the High Court said: “[A] guilty plea represents a break in the chain of events which has preceded it in the criminal process. *When a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open court that he is in fact guilty*of the offense with which he is charged, *he may not thereafter raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the*
      *430
      *guilty plea.”*[Emphasis added.] Cline v. State, 90 Nev. 17, 518 P.2d 159 (1974).

2. In support of the second contention appellant argues he did not fully comprehend the significance of his guilty plea. The district judge rejected the contention and we find no error in that determination.

In this case appellant voluntarily, with the advice of counsel, entered his plea of guilty to the homicide charge.1 The issue of guilt was thereby removed from the case.

“At the time of his arraignment [on September 16, 1963] it was the law of this state that when a guilty plea is not coerced, and the defendant was represented by competent counsel, at the time it was entered, the subsequent conviction is not open to collateral attack and any errors are superseded by the plea of guilty.” Mathis v. Warden, 86 Nev. 439, 441, 471 P.2d 233, 234-235 (1970).

“Here there is no allegation of coercion and counsel is admitted to be competent and well respected. It can be assumed that the appellant was fully advised of the consequences of his plea.” *Mathis, supra.*See also, McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970).

Affirmed.2

Appellant had been charged with “open murder” as a result of the death of his wife. Through plea bargaining by his counsel the charge was reduced to second degree murder.

Mr. Justice Zenoff took no part in the deliberations on this case.
[Federal Register Volume 70, Number 211 (Wednesday, November 2, 2005)]
[Notices]
[Page 66485]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 05-21844]



[[Page 66485]]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

Fiscal Service

[Docket No. BPD-CC-05-]


Change in the Sell Direct Fee Schedule

AGENCY: Bureau of the Public Debt, Fiscal Service, Treasury.

ACTION: Notice.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The Department of the Treasury is announcing the fee schedule 
for Sell Direct. Sell Direct fees are charged to the Legacy Treasury 
Direct and the TreasuryDirect investor for the service of selling 
unmatured securities in the secondary market, pursuant to the 
Regulations Governing Book-Entry Treasury Bonds, Notes and Bills Held 
in Legacy Treasury Direct[reg] and the Regulations Governing Securities 
Held in TreasuryDirect[reg].

DATES: Effective Date: This notice is effective upon publication in the 
Federal Register.

ADDRESSES: You can download this notice at the following Internet 
addresses: http://www.publicdebt.treas.gov or http://www.gpoaccess.gov/ecfr.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Elisha Whipkey, Director, Division of 
Program Administration, Office of Securities Operations, Bureau of the 
Public Debt, at (304) 480-6319 or <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#83e6efeaf0ebe2adf4ebeaf3e8e6fac3e1f3e7adf7f1e6e2f0ade4ecf5"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="ed8881849e858cc39a85849d868894ad8f9d89c3999f888c9ec38a829b">[email protected]</span></a>.
    Susan Klimas, Attorney-Adviser, Edward Gronseth, Deputy Chief 
Counsel, Office of the Chief Counsel, Bureau of the Public Debt, at 
(304) 480-8692 or <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#fb888e889a95d5909792969a88bb998b9fd58f899e9a88d59c948d"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="71020402101f5f1a1d181c1002311301155f05031410025f161e07">[email protected]</span></a>.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: A transaction fee is charged to the investor 
for each security sold in the secondary market using Sell Direct. For 
purposes of computing the transaction fee, a security is considered as 
any amount identified by a separate CUSIP number within a Legacy 
Treasury Direct or TreasuryDirect account. The regulations governing 
Sell Direct are located at 31 CFR 357.22(b) and 31 CFR part 363.209.

Schedule of Fees for the Sale of Securities in the Secondary Market

    The fee schedule for the sale of an unmatured security in the 
secondary market using Sell Direct is as follows: A fee of $45 will be 
charged for each security sold in the secondary market on behalf of the 
investor using Sell Direct.

    Dated: October 26, 2005.
Donald V. Hammond,
Fiscal Assistant Secretary.
[FR Doc. 05-21844 Filed 11-1-05; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4810-39-P


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</html>
#### RONALD RICHARD REED, Appellant, v. STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent.

No. 8048

July 31, 1975

538 P.2d 161

*Horace R. Goff,*State Public Defender, and *Michael R. Griffin,*Deputy State Public Defender, Carson City, for Appellant.

*Robert List,*Attorney General; *Michael E. Fondi,*District Attorney, and *Louis R. Doescher,*Deputy District Attorney, Carson City, for Respondent.

OPINION

*Per Curiam:*

Ronald Richard Reed entered a guilty plea to the crime of forcible rape (NRS 200.363) and was sentenced to a fifteen year term in the Nevada State Prison.

In this appeal the only claim of error is that his guilty plea was not entered voluntarily and with understanding and knowledge of the probable consequences of the plea.

The contention is totally without merit. The trial judge’s *498canvass of Reed, when the guilty plea was accepted, fully comports with the guidelines enunciated in Heffley v. Warden, 89 Nev. 573, 516 P.2d 1403 (1973).

The record reflects Reed was on parole from a burglary conviction at the time charges of forcible rape, infamous crime against nature, burglary and as an habitual criminal were lodged.

Through negotiations by his counsel and the prosecutor it was agreed that in exchange for a guilty plea on the forcible rape charge the other charges would be dismissed. Similar charges in a neighboring county were also dismissed as a result of the bargain.

Applying the rationale enunciated in Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1969), we reach the inescapable conclusion that Reed knowingly entered his guilty plea to the single charge to escape probable conviction and enhancement of punishment under the other charges.

Affirmed.
```

[Congressional Bills 111th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 5287 Introduced in House (IH)]

111th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 5287

To amend the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act to permanently prohibit 
the conduct of offshore drilling on the outer Continental Shelf of the 
                   Atlantic Ocean and Gulf of Mexico.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                              May 12, 2010

 Ms. Corrine Brown of Florida introduced the following bill; which was 
             referred to the Committee on Natural Resources

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To amend the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act to permanently prohibit 
the conduct of offshore drilling on the outer Continental Shelf of the 
                   Atlantic Ocean and Gulf of Mexico.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``East Coast and Gulf Coast Ocean 
Protection Act of 2010''.

SEC. 2. PROHIBITION OF OIL AND GAS LEASING ON ATLANTIC OCEAN AND GULF 
              OF MEXICO OCS.

    Section 8 of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (43 U.S.C. 1337) 
is amended by adding at the end the following:
    ``(q) Prohibition of Oil and Gas Leasing in Certain Areas.--
Notwithstanding any other provision of this section or any other law, 
the Secretary of the Interior shall not issue a lease for the 
exploration, development, or production of oil or natural gas in any 
area on the outer Continental Shelf of the Atlantic Ocean or Gulf of 
Mexico.''.
                                 <all>
```
```

[Congressional Bills 111th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 5545 Introduced in House (IH)]

111th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 5545

To deauthorize a portion of the project for navigation, Potomac River, 
Washington Channel, District of Columbia, under the jurisdiction of the 
                          Corps of Engineers.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             June 16, 2010

  Ms. Norton introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
             Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To deauthorize a portion of the project for navigation, Potomac River, 
Washington Channel, District of Columbia, under the jurisdiction of the 
                          Corps of Engineers.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. PROJECT FOR NAVIGATION, WASHINGTON CHANNEL, DISTRICT OF 
              COLUMBIA.

    Upon the date of enactment of this Act, the following portion of 
the project for navigation, Potomac River, Washington Channel, District 
of Columbia, authorized by the Act of August 30, 1935 (chapter 831; 49 
Stat. 1028) is deauthorized: Beginning at Washington Harbor Channel 
Geometry Centerline of the 400-foot-wide main navigational ship 
channel, Centerline Station No. 103+73.12, coordinates North 441948.20, 
East 1303969.30, as stated and depicted on the Condition Survey 
Anacostia, Virginia, Washington and Magazine Bar Shoal Channels, 
Washington, D.C., Sheet 6 of 6, prepared by the United States Army 
Corps of Engineers, Baltimore district, July 2007; thence departing the 
aforementioned centerline traveling the following courses and 
distances: N. 40 degrees 10 minutes 45 seconds E., 200.00 feet to a 
point, on the outline of said 400-foot-wide channel thence binding on 
said outline the following three courses and distances: S. 49 degrees 
49 minutes 15 seconds E., 1,507.86 feet to a point, thence; S. 29 
degrees 44 minutes 42 seconds E., 2,083.17 feet to a point, thence; S. 
11 degrees 27 minutes 04 seconds E., 363.00 feet to a point, thence; S. 
78 degrees 32 minutes 56 seconds W., 200.00 feet to a point binding on 
the centerline of the 400-foot-wide main navigational channel at 
computed Centerline Station No. 65+54.31, coordinates North 
438923.9874, East 1306159.9738, thence; continuing with the 
aforementioned centerline the following courses and distances: N. 11 
degrees 27 minutes 04 seconds W., 330.80 feet to a point, Centerline 
Station No. 68+85.10, thence; N. 29 degrees 44 minutes 42 seconds W., 
2,015.56 feet to a point, Centerline Station No. 89+00.67, thence; N. 
49 degrees 49 minutes 15 seconds W., 1,472.26 feet to the point of 
beginning, such area in total containing a computed area of 777,284 
square feet or 17.84399 acres of riparian water way.
                                 <all>
```
```

[Federal Register Volume 70, Number 213 (Friday, November 4, 2005)]
[Notices]
[Pages 67210-67211]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 05-22022]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Office of the Secretary

Notice of Applications for Certificates of Public Convenience and 
Necessity And Foreign Air Carrier Permits Filed Under Subpart B 
(formerly Subpart Q) During The Week Ending October 21, 2005

    The following Applications for Certificates of Public Convenience 
and Necessity and Foreign Air Carrier Permits were filed under Subpart 
B (formerly Subpart Q) of the Department of Transportation's Procedural 
Regulations (See 14 CFR 301.201 et. seq.). The due date for Answers, 
Conforming Applications, or Motions to Modify Scope are set forth below 
for each application. Following the Answer period DOT may process the 
application by expedited procedures. Such procedures may consist of the 
adoption of a show-cause order, a tentative order, or in appropriate 
cases a final order without further proceedings.

    Docket Number: OST-2005-22750.
    Date Filed: October 17, 2005.
    Due Date for Answers, Conforming Applications, or Motion to Modify 
Scope: November 7, 2005.
    Description: Application of Capital Cargo International Airlines, 
Inc. requesting a permanent certificate of public convenience and 
necessity to authorize it to engage in foreign scheduled air 
transportation of property and mail between Toledo, OH, on the

[[Page 67211]]

one hand, and Saltillo, Guadalajara, and Monterrey, Mexico, on the 
other.

Renee V. Wright,
Program Manager, Docket Operations, Federal Register Liaison.
[FR Doc. 05-22022 Filed 11-3-05; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-62-P
```
| (1) | The      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of      the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;and |
|-----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| (2) | The      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the      Company. |
|-----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | Signature: | /s/      Ralph P. Scozzafava                         |
|--------|------------|------------------------------------------------------|
|   |       | Ralph      P. ScozzafavaChief      Executive Officer |
|   |       |                                                 |
|   | Date:      | August      11, 2008                                 |
1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

) ROGELIO ACOSTA, ) ) Plaintiff, )

) v. ) Civil Action No. 08-1318 (JR) ) DONALD C. WINTER, ) Secretary of the Navy, ) ) Defendant. ) )

MEMORANDUM OPINION This matter is before the Court on defendant’s motion to dismiss. Plaintiff is a former employee of the United States Navy at Subic Bay, Philippines, whose formal employment discrimination claim was dismissed on the ground that he failed to state a claim of reprisal because he is an alien to whom Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), as amended, does not apply.
See Compl., Attach. (November 5, 2007 Notice of Dismissal, DON 07-61581-02250) at 1-2. He alleges that he is a dual citizen of the Philippines and of the United States because he was born in 1938 in the Philippine Islands when the Philippine Islands were a United States territory. Compl. at 6. In this action, plaintiff asks the Court to “confirm[] [his] having been born a US citizen” such that the United States Navy “allow[s] [him] to have access2

under [Title VII].” Id. at 7.
In Licudine v. Winter , 603 F. Supp. 2d 129 (D.D.C. 2009), this Court held that a person who, like plaintiff, was born in the Philippine Islands when the Philippines was a United States territory is neither a citizen nor a national of United States citizen. Id. at 135-36. Such a person, then, is an alien to whom Title VII does not apply. Id. The Court will grant defendant’s motion to dismiss. An Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

JAMES ROBERTSON United States District Judge
#### FLOYD DONALD SIMPSON, Appellant, v. WARDEN, NEVADA STATE PRISON, Respondent.

No. 8060

August *26, 1975*

539 P.2d 118

*Horace R. Goff,*State Public Defender, and *Michael R. Griffin,*Deputy State Public Defender, Carson City, for Appellant.

*Robert List,*Attorney General, and *Patrick B. Walsh,*Deputy Attorney General, Carson City, for Respondent.

OPINION

*Per Curiam:*

Through this post-conviction habeas proceeding following his plea of guilty to two counts of forgery, the petitioner contends that his retained counsel was incompetent and that the prosecutor failed to keep a plea bargaining agreement. The district court ruled against him and this appeal followed.

The contentions below and here are wholly without merit. The record of the arraignment and of the later hearing on the habeas proceeding reflects competent representation by counsel resulting in the dismissal of several other pending charges against petitioner in return for his plea of guilty to the charges for which he is presently incarcerated and that the negotiated *517plea bargain was fully honored in every respect. Indeed, this appeal admittedly is tendered only to comply with the commands of Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and Sanchez v. State, 85 Nev. 95, 450 P.2d 793 (1969). Our review of the record shows that the appeal is without merit.

Affirmed.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 07-7657

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff – Appellee,

v. DEZMEND RASHAWN DOWEARY, a/k/a Hit, Defendant – Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Raymond A. Jackson, District Judge. (2:04-cr-00016-RAJ-1; 2:07-cv-00280-RAJ)

Submitted: August 27, 2009 Decided: September 4, 2009

Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, WILKINSON, Circuit Judge, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Dezmend Rashawn Doweary, Appellant Pro Se. Darryl James Mitchell, Assistant United States Attorney, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.PER CURIAM: Dezmend Rashawn Doweary appeals the district court’s order dismissing as untimely his motion under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West Supp. 2009). Having previously granted a certificate of appealability, see 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c) (2006), we now conclude that the district court erred in dismissing the motion. The district court entered its judgment of conviction on November 29, 2004, and Doweary timely appealed. We dismissed the appeal on March 30, 2006. Doweary did not petition for a writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court. Thus, his conviction became final ninety days later on June 28, 2006, see Clay v.

United States , 537 U.S. 522, 527 (2003), and he had until June 28, 2007, to file his § 2255 motion. Doweary’s § 2255 motion was dated June 13, 2007, and received by the district court on June 21, 2007. The district court ruled that Doweary’s conviction became final on November 29, 2004, and his § 2255 motion was time-barred. On appeal, Doweary contends the district court erred in ruling his motion was time-barred. In its responsive brief, the Government concedes that Doweary’s § 2255 motion was timely filed, and the district court’s order

should be reversed. Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s order dismissing Doweary’s § 2255 motion as untimely, and we remand the case for reconsideration of the motion. We dispense with

23 oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

VACATED AND REMANDED