1

STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA

SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS

In re P.T. and Z.J.

No. 22-0173 (Braxton County 21-JA-35 and 21-JA-36)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Petitioner Mother A.K., by counsel Andrew Chattin, appeals the Circuit Court of Braxton 

County’s February 2, 2022, order terminating her parental rights to P.T. and Z.J.

1 The West 

Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources (“DHHR”), by counsel Patrick Morrisey 

and Lee Niezgoda, filed a response in support of the circuit court’s order. The guardian ad litem, 

Mary Elizabeth Snead, filed a response on behalf of the children in support of the circuit court’s 

order. 

This Court has considered the parties’ briefs and the record on appeal. The facts and legal 

arguments are adequately presented, and the decisional process would not be significantly aided 

by oral argument. Upon consideration of the standard of review, the briefs, and the record 

presented, the Court finds no substantial question of law and no prejudicial error. For these 

reasons, a memorandum decision affirming the circuit court’s order is appropriate under Rule 21 

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

In July of 2021, the DHHR filed a petition alleging that petitioner’s substance abuse 

resulted in her abuse and/or neglect of the children. The petition also noted that this was the 

second abuse and neglect proceeding against petitioner for these exact allegations, although she 

did regain custody of the children at the conclusion of the prior proceeding. The following 

month, petitioner stipulated to driving while intoxicated with Z.J. in the car and that she was in

possession of multiple controlled substances at the time. It was also noted that petitioner had 

been released from jail on the DUI charge, but her bond was revoked when she failed a drug 

screen. 

1

Consistent with our long-standing practice in cases with sensitive facts, we use initials 

where necessary to protect the identities of those involved in this case. See In re K.H., 235 W. 

Va. 254, 773 S.E.2d 20 (2015); Melinda H. v. William R. II, 230 W. Va. 731, 742 S.E.2d 419 

(2013); State v. Brandon B., 218 W. Va. 324, 624 S.E.2d 761 (2005); State v. Edward Charles 

L., 183 W. Va. 641, 398 S.E.2d 123 (1990). 

FILED

September 20, 2022

EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK

SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS

OF WEST VIRGINIA
2

The court held the final dispositional hearing in November of 2021, during which

petitioner requested an improvement period. According to petitioner, she had enrolled in a longterm substance abuse treatment program several weeks prior but left the program after only one 

day. Petitioner asked that she be permitted to enroll in another program during an improvement 

period. However, petitioner was incarcerated at the time of the final hearing and admitted to a 

DHHR employee that she was abusing drugs while in jail. According to the DHHR worker, 

petitioner failed to participate in services during the proceedings and was “in and out of jail.”

The court then found that there was no reasonable likelihood that petitioner could substantially 

correct the conditions of abuse and neglect and that termination of her rights was in the 

children’s best interests. Accordingly, the court terminated petitioner’s parental rights.

2 It is from 

the dispositional order that petitioner appeals.

This Court has previously established the following standard of review:

“Although conclusions of law reached by a circuit court are subject to de 

novo review, when an action, such as an abuse and neglect case, is tried upon the 

facts without a jury, the circuit court shall make a determination based upon the 

evidence and shall make findings of fact and conclusions of law as to whether 

such child is abused or neglected. These findings shall not be set aside by a 

reviewing court unless clearly erroneous. A finding is clearly erroneous when, 

although there is evidence to support the finding, the reviewing court on the entire 

evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 

committed. However, a reviewing court may not overturn a finding simply 

because it would have decided the case differently, and it must affirm a finding if 

the circuit court’s account of the evidence is plausible in light of the record 

viewed in its entirety.” Syl. Pt. 1, In Interest of Tiffany Marie S., 196 W.Va. 223, 

470 S.E.2d 177 (1996). 

Syl. Pt. 1, In re Cecil T., 228 W. Va. 89, 717 S.E.2d 873 (2011). 

On appeal, petitioner argues that the court erred in terminating her parental rights upon 

finding that there was no reasonable likelihood that she could correct the conditions of abuse and 

neglect.

3 We disagree. While it is true that petitioner testified that she sought to enter a second 

2

The father’s rights were also terminated below. The permanency plan for the children is 

adoption in their current placement. 

3

Petitioner also argues that it was error to terminate her rights without granting her an 

improvement period. However, petitioner fails to provide any relevant authority governing the 

granting of improvement periods, in contradiction to Rule 10(c)(7) of the Rules of Appellate 

Procedure, which requires that “[t]he brief must contain an argument exhibiting clearly the points 

of . . . law presented . . . and citing the authorities relied on.” Further, in an Administrative Order 

entered December 10, 2012, Re: Filings That Do Not Comply With the Rules of Appellate 

Procedure, the Court specifically cautioned that “[p]ursuant to Rule 10(j), failure to file a 

compliant brief ‘may result in the Supreme Court refusing to consider the case . . . or imposing 

(continued . . . )
3

treatment program, she ignores the fact that her substance abuse continued across two abuse and 

neglect proceedings and the fact that she voluntarily left her prior treatment program after 

roughly one day. As such, it is clear that the court had ample evidence, including drug screen 

results and petitioner’s own admission to continued substance abuse, upon which to find that 

there was no reasonable likelihood that petitioner could substantially correct the conditions of 

abuse and neglect at issue. See W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(d)(1) (indicating that there is no 

reasonable likelihood conditions can be corrected when the abusing parent has “habitually 

abused or [is] addicted to . . . controlled substances or drugs”).

In short, the court made the findings required by West Virginia Code § 49-4-604(c)(6) to 

terminate parental rights. Further, we have held as follows: 

“Termination of parental rights, the most drastic remedy under the 

statutory provision covering the disposition of neglected children, [West Virginia 

Code § 49-4-604] . . . may be employed without the use of intervening less 

restrictive alternatives when it is found that there is no reasonable likelihood 

under [West Virginia Code § 49-4-604(d)] . . . that conditions of neglect or abuse 

can be substantially corrected.” Syllabus point 2, In re R.J.M., 164 W.Va. 496, 

266 S.E.2d 114 (1980).

Syl. Pt. 5, In re Kristin Y., 227 W. Va. 558, 712 S.E.2d 55 (2011). Accordingly, we find no error 

in the termination of petitioner’s parental rights. 

For the foregoing reasons, we find no error in the decision of the circuit court, and its 

February 2, 2022, order is hereby affirmed.

Affirmed.

ISSUED: September 20, 2022

CONCURRED IN BY:

Chief Justice John A. Hutchison

Justice Elizabeth D. Walker

Justice Tim Armstead

Justice William R. Wooton

Justice C. Haley Bunn

such other sanctions as the Court may deem appropriate.’” As such, we decline to address this 

argument.