alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# C_2007110EN.01000301.xml

| 16.5.2007 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 110/3 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

16.5.2007

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 110/3

---

Non-opposition to a notified concentration

(Case COMP/M.4620 — Swisscom/Fastweb)

(Text with EEA relevance)

(2007/C 110/04)

On 10 May 2007, the Commission decided not to oppose the above notified concentration and to declare it compatible with the common market. This decision is based on Article 6(1)(b) of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004. The full text of the decision is available only in English and will be made public after it is cleared of any business secrets it may contain. It will be available:

| — | from the Europa competition website (http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes, |
| --- | --- |

—

from the Europa competition website (http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes,

| — | in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website under document number 32007M4620. EUR-Lex is the on-line access to European law. (http://eur-lex.europa.eu) |
| --- | --- |

—

in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website under document number 32007M4620. EUR-Lex is the on-line access to European law. (http://eur-lex.europa.eu)

---
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<SECURITIES>                                     4,753
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</TABLE>
United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 23-3220

___________________________

Michael McKinney

lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant

v.

Martin O’Malley,1 Commissioner of the Social Security Administration

lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellee

 ____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the District of Minnesota

 ____________

Submitted: March 20, 2024 

Filed: March 28, 2024

[Unpublished] 

____________

Before SHEPHERD, KELLY, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.

____________

PER CURIAM.

1Martin O’Malley has been appointed to serve as Commissioner of Social

Security, and is substituted as appellee pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate

Procedure 43(c).
Michael McKinney appeals the district court’s2

 order affirming the denial of

supplemental security income. We agree with the court that substantial evidence in

the record as a whole supports the adverse decision. See Kraus v. Saul, 988 F.3d

1019, 1023-24 (8th Cir. 2021) (standard of review). The administrative law judge

(ALJ) was not required to adopt the exact limitations set forth in the opinions she

found partially persuasive, and her residual functional capacity (RFC) determination

regarding McKinney’s abilities to interact with others was supported. See Webster

v. Kijakazi, 19 F.4th 715, 719 (5th Cir. 2021) (while ALJ did not adopt verbatim

opinion which limited claimant to minimal interaction with others, ALJ incorporated

limitation by limiting claimant to occasional public contact, and RFC assessment was

supported by substantial evidence); Page v. Astrue, 484 F.3d 1040, 1043 (8th Cir.

2007) (RFC determination was supported by substantial evidence, including medical

evidence, state agency consultants’ opinions, and claimant’s subjective statements). 

As the ALJ did not err in formulating the RFC assessment, she also did not err in

relying on the vocational expert’s (VE’s) testimony based on that assessment. See

Lacroix v. Barnhart, 465 F.3d 881, 889 (8th Cir. 2006) (ALJ’s hypothetical question

to VE need only include limitations that ALJ finds are substantially supported by

record as whole).

The judgment is affirmed.

______________________________

2The Honorable Paul A. Magnuson, United States District Judge for the District

of Minnesota.

-2-
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 22-6812

DONTE CAUDLE,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

NASH COUNTY JAIL,

Defendant - Appellee.

No. 22-6813

DONTE CAUDLE,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

KEISHA LONG, Nurse,

Defendant – Appellee,

and

DR. A. ANDERSON; SHERIFF WEST TRIPP,

Defendants.

USCA4 Appeal: 22-6814 Doc: 13 Filed: 12/20/2022 Pg: 1 of 4
2

No. 22-6814

DONTE CAUDLE,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

SHERIFF WEST TRIPP,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at 

Raleigh. James C. Dever III, District Judge; Louise W. Flanagan, District Judge. (5:20-

ct-03003-D; 5:17-ct-03280-FL; 5:18-ct-03030-FL)

Submitted: December 15, 2022 Decided: December 20, 2022

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and WILKINSON and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Donte Caudle, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

USCA4 Appeal: 22-6814 Doc: 13 Filed: 12/20/2022 Pg: 2 of 4
3

PER CURIAM:

Donte Caudle filed a single notice of appeal, listing three different district court

proceedings in which he wishes to appeal. Caudle’s notice of appeal does not identify any 

specific district court orders from which he intends to appeal. However, in each of the 

three district court proceedings, the most recent order or judgment was entered on the 

district court docket no later than June 2020. Accordingly, we dismiss all three appeals for 

lack of jurisdiction because the notice of appeal was not timely filed.

In civil cases, parties have 30 days after the entry of the district court’s final 

judgment or order to note an appeal, Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A), unless the district court 

extends the appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5) or reopens the appeal period under 

Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6). “[T]he timely filing of a notice of appeal in a civil case is a 

jurisdictional requirement.” Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 214 (2007).

The most recent orders in these district court proceedings were entered no later than 

June 2020. Caudle filed the notice of appeal on June 22, 2022.*

 Because Caudle failed to 

file a timely notice of appeal or to obtain an extension or reopening of the appeal period, 

we dismiss the consolidated appeals.

* For the purpose of this appeal, we assume that the postmark date appearing on the 

envelope containing the notice of appeal is the earliest date Caudle could have delivered 

the notice to prison officials for mailing to the court. Fed. R. App. P. 4(c)(1); Houston v. 

Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988).

USCA4 Appeal: 22-6814 Doc: 13 Filed: 12/20/2022 Pg: 3 of 4
4

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 

adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process.

DISMISSED

USCA4 Appeal: 22-6814 Doc: 13 Filed: 12/20/2022 Pg: 4 of 4
#### IN RE: BOBBY LEE JONES (Minor)

No. 7119DC277

(Filed 26 May 1971)

1. Constitutional Law § 30; Infants § 10; Courts § 15— juvenile proceedings— constitutional safeguards — notice of charges

Although juvenile proceedings in this State are not criminal prosecutions, a juvenile cited under a petition to appear for an inquiry into his alleged delinquency is entitled to the constitutional safeguards of due process and fairness; these safeguards include notice of the charge or charges upon which the petition is based.

2. Infants § 10— juvenile proceedings — amendment of petition — .due process

Juvenile’s constitutional rights were not violated when the court, on the day of the juvenile’s hearing, allowed the petition to be amended in order to identify more specifically the owner of the property allegedly stolen by the juvenile.

Appeal by respondent from *Warren, District Judge,*19 February 1971 Session of District Court held in Cabarrus County.

Respondent, a juvenile, was adjudged to be a delinquent child by order entered 19 February 1971. The adjudication followed a hearing held pursuant to G.S. 7A-285, and was based *438upon a finding by the court that on 29 January 1971 respondent committed larceny by taking a set of blue lights from a parked vehicle, the same being the property of the City of Concord. Respondent was ordered committed to the North Carolina Board of Juvenile Corrections, to be confined for an indefinite period of time not to exceed his eighteenth birthday. This appeal followed.

*Attorney General Morgan by Assistant Attorney General Banks and Staff Attorney Price for the State.*

*Thomas K. Spence for juvenile appellant.*

GRAHAM, Judge.

Appellant contends the court committed error in refusing motion made on his behalf to quash the petition upon which the hearing was conducted and in allowing the petition to be amended. The amendment was made on the day of the hearing but before the hearing commenced.

[1] Juvenile proceedings in this State are not criminal prosecutions and a finding of delinquency in a juvenile proceeding is not synonymous with the conviction of a crime. Nevertheless, a juvenile cited under a petition to appear for an inquiry into his alleged delinquency is entitled to the constitutional safeguards of due process and fairness. *In re Burrus,*275 N.C. 517, 169 S.E. 2d 879; *In re Alexander,*8 N.C. App. 517, 174 S.E. 2d 664. These safeguards include notice of the charge or charges upon which the petition is based. *In re Gault,*387 U.S. 1, 18 L. Ed. 2d 527, 87 S.Ct. 1428.

[2] Here the petition sufficiently alleged the offense of larceny. The amendment in no way changed the nature of the offense but simply identified more specifically the owner of the property allegedly stolen. Allowing the amendment under these circumstances was within the sound discretion of the court.

The record fails to show that appellant was denied any constitutional safeguards at any stage of the proceedings.

No error.

Judges Campbell and Britt concur.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff - Appellee,

 v.

SUNDEEP DHARNI,

 Defendant - Appellant.

No. 11-16438

D.C. Nos. 2:10-cv-02934-EJG

2:05-cr-00306-EJG

Eastern District of California, 

Sacramento

ORDER

Before: WALLACE, FISHER, and BERZON, Circuit Judges.

(1) The Joint Motion to Dismiss and Remand to District Court and Joint

Status Report are construed as a joint motion for summary reversal of the district

court’s denial of relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. 

(2) The joint motion for summary reversal, so construed, is granted in the

interests of justice. See Baca v. Adams, 777 F.3d 1034 (9th Cir. 2015). The

district court shall enter judgment vacating Dharni’s convictions. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2255. We express no view as to the alleged constitutional infirmity of Dharni’s

conviction. Cf. United States v. Hock, 172 F.3d 676, 680-81 (9th Cir. 1999)

(holding that the district court properly construed the parties’ stipulation that the

FILED

OCT 06 2015

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
defendant’s conviction was defective as a § 2255 motion and properly granted the

motion).

(3) This matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this

disposition. If the parties reach a new plea agreement under Fed. R. Crim. P.

11(c)(1)(C), the district court should either accept the parties’ new plea agreement

and sentence Dharni in accordance therewith or reject that plea agreement and

proceed accordingly.

SO ORDERED. THE MANDATE SHALL ISSUE FORTHWITH.
USA v DHARNI 11-16438 

WALLACE, J., dissenting

I dissent from this Order for the same reasons I dissented from the majority’s

order requiring to the parties to show cause. As I explained there, we should now

reinstate our prior opinion, United States v. Dharni, 738 F.3d 1186, reh’g granted

and opinion vacated, 757 F.3d 1002 (9th Cir. 2014), because Dharni has stipulated

that he cannot establish that the facts assumed in our original opinion were wrong.

That stipulation forecloses him from carrying his burden of establishing a Sixth

Amendment violation. Because he has failed to carry his burden, the district court

did not err in denying his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion.

I disagree with the majority that we have power to reconstrue the parties’

filings as a joint motion for summary reversal. While the majority believes that the

“interests of justice” support doing so, that belief cannot overcome the fact that the

parties never actually filed any such motion. Moreover, the government has

expressly disclaimed any confession of error. Accordingly, I see no basis for

ordering the district court to vacate Dharni’s convictions. I respectfully dissent.

FILED

OCT 06 2015

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
#### JAMES RUDY STEWART, Jr., Appellant, v. WARDEN, NEVADA STATE PRISON, Respondent.

No. 10141

August 9, 1978

579 P.2d 1244

*517
      *Horace R. Goff,*State Public Defender, *J. Thomas Susich,*Chief Deputy Public Defender, and *J. Gregory Damm,*Deputy Public Defender, Carson City, for Appellant.

*Robert List,*Attorney General, Carson City; *Larry R. Hicks,*District Attorney, and *John L. Conner,*Deputy District Attorney, Washoe County, for Respondent.

OPINION

*Per Curiam:*

James Rudy Stewart, Jr., was convicted, by jury verdict, of first degree murder and the judgment and sentence were affirmed by this court in Stewart v. State, 92 Nev. 168, 547 P.2d 320 (1976). Thereafter, Stewart filed a petition for post-conviction relief which was summarily dismissed. On appeal that order was vacated and the case was remanded to permit the district court to hear and resolve the contentions raised in the post-conviction petition. Stewart v. Warden, 92 Nev. 588, 555 P.2d 218 (1976).

The instant proceeding is Stewart’s appeal from the order which the district court entered after it had considered and resolved those allegations contained in. the petition for post-conviction relief.

The only assigned errors complain of two (2) jury instructions. At trial there was no objection to either instruction; therefore, the alleged errors would not have been considered in Stewart’s direct appeal. *See*Cutler v. State, 93 Nev. 329, 566 P.2d 809 (1977), where we noted that a failure to tender an objection during trial precludes appellate consideration of the claimed error. *Cf.*Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U.S. 233 (1977). Since the alleged errors were not cognizable on the direct appeal, *a fortiori,*they are not cognizable in a subsequent post-conviction proceeding.

Affirmed.
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 98-1293

MANUEL SAMPEDRO, Petitioner, versus U.S. IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERVICE, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals. (A30-723-748) Submitted: June 16, 1998 Decided: August 28, 1998 Before MURNAGHAN, NIEMEYER, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Manuel Sampedro, Petitioner Pro Se. David Michael McConnell, Philemina McNeill Jones, Papu Sandhu, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).* Initially styled as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2241 (West 1998), the district court correctly construed the petition as a challenge to Sampedro’s deportation ordered in 1994 and properly transferred the matter to this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 1631 (West 1998). 2 PER CURIAM: Manuel Sampedro petitions for review of an Immigration Judge’s(IJ) June 1994 order directing Sampedro’s deportation for reentering the United States after his initial deportation in July 1993. * Because Sampedro never appealed the IJ’s order to the Board of Immigration Appeals, we find that we are without jurisdiction to consider his challenge to the order of deportation. See 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(1) (1994); Farrokhi v. INS , 900 F.2d 697, 700-01 (4th Cir.1990). We therefore grant the Immigration and Naturalization Service’s motion to dismiss the petition for review. We dispense withoral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
Court of Appeals

of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA,____________________

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order:

A20A0489. IBEKWE v. THE STATE.

This case was docketed by this court on September 27, 2019, and appellant’s

brief and enumerations of error were due October 17, 2019. As of the date of this

order, appellant has not filed a brief and enumeration of errors and has not requested

an extension of time in which to do so. Accordingly, this appeal is hereby

DISMISSED as abandoned pursuant to Court of Appeals Rules 13 and 23.

Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

Clerk’s Office, Atlanta,____________________

I certify that the above is a true extract from

the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of said court

hereto affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk.

October 22, 2019

10/22/2019
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

JUDGMENT

No. 04-15-00371-CV

Joseph HARRIS and All Other Occupants of 

3527 Cameron Springs, San Antonio, Texas 78244,

Appellants

v.

BANK OF AMERICA, N.A.,

Appellee

From the County Court at Law No. 5, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2014CV03915

Honorable David J. Rodriguez, Judge Presiding

BEFORE CHIEF JUSTICE MARION, JUSTICE BARNARD, AND JUSTICE ALVAREZ

In accordance with this court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is 

AFFIRMED. It is ORDERED that appellee, Bank of America, N.A., recover its costs of this 

appeal from appellants, Joseph Harris and All Other Occupants of 3527 Cameron Springs, San 

Antonio, Texas 78244.

SIGNED November 10, 2015.

_____________________________

Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice
EXHIBIT 32.2

                  CERTIFICATION OF PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL OFFICER
                       PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

         Solely for the purposes of complying with 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as
adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, I, the
undersigned Chief Financial Officer of Flexible Solutions International, Inc.
(the "Company"), hereby certify that, to the best of my knowledge, the Annual
Report on Form 10-KSB/A (Amendment No. 1) of the Company for the year ended
December 31, 2004 (the "Report") fully complies with the requirements of Section
13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that the information
contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial
condition and results of operations of the Company.

Date:  December 5, 2005                         /s/ DANIEL B. O'BRIEN
                                                ---------------------
                                                Daniel B. O'Brien
                                                Chief Financial Officer
United States Department of Labor

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

__________________________________________

K.M., Appellant

and

U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, GOVERNMENT 

MAILS ANNEX POST OFFICE, 

Washington, DC, Employer

__________________________________________

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Docket No. 22-0414

Issued: June 29, 2022

Appearances: Case Submitted on the Record

Appellant, pro se

Office of Solicitor, for the Director

ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL

Before:

PATRICIA H. FITZGERALD, Deputy Chief Judge

JANICE B. ASKIN, Judge

VALERIE D. EVANS-HARRELL, Alternate Judge

On November 17, 2021 appellant filed a timely appeal from a November 16, 2021 merit 

decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). The Clerk of the 

Appellate Boards assigned Docket No. 22-0414.

In a letter dated June 10, 2022 and received June 15, 2022, appellant requested that the 

appeal be withdrawn.

The Board has duly considered the matter and concludes that appellant’s request for the 

withdrawal of the appeal should be granted. Accordingly,
2

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT appellant’s request for the withdrawal of the appeal 

is granted. The appeal docketed as No. 22-0414 is dismissed.

Issued: June 29, 2022

Washington, DC

Patricia H. Fitzgerald, Deputy Chief Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Janice B. Askin, Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Valerie D. Evans-Harrell, Alternate Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board