COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-13-00519-CR

RALPH WOODWARD APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE

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FROM THE 396TH DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY

TRIAL COURT NO. 1218737D

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MEMORANDUM OPINION1

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Appellant Ralph Woodward appeals the revocation of his deferred 

adjudication community supervision for burglary of a habitation, his conviction,

and his twenty-five-year sentence as a habitual offender.

2

 Appellant concedes 

 1

See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.

2

See Tex Penal Code Ann. § 12.42(d) (West Supp. 2014), § 30.02(a)(1), 

(3), (c)(2) (West 2011).
2

that he violated a condition of community supervision but argues that, although a 

trial court may grant a petition to adjudicate, adjudicate guilt, revoke community 

supervision, and sentence a person to confinement, the trial court should not 

have done so in this case because options were available that better fit the 

preferred goal of a continuum of sanctions. We affirm.

We review an order revoking deferred adjudication community supervision 

and adjudicating guilt under an abuse of discretion standard.3

 In a revocation 

proceeding, the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the 

defendant violated the terms and conditions of community supervision.4

 Proof by 

a preponderance of the evidence of any one of the alleged violations of the 

conditions of community supervision is sufficient to support a revocation order.5

Based on the record before us, we cannot say that the trial court abused 

its discretion by revoking Appellant’s community supervision and adjudicating his 

guilt. Appellant initially entered a plea of true to the allegation that he violated the 

terms and conditions of community supervision by failing to complete the 

Substance Abuse Felony Punishment (SAFP) program but then withdrew the 

 3

Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.12, § 5(b) (West Supp. 2014); Rickels 

v. State, 202 S.W.3d 759, 763 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Cardona v. State, 665 

S.W.2d 492, 493 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984); Cantu v. State, 339 S.W.3d 688, 691 

(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2011, no pet.).

4

Cobb v. State, 851 S.W.2d 871, 873 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).

5

Moore v. State, 605 S.W.2d 924, 926 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980); 

Sanchez v. State, 603 S.W.2d 869, 871 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980).
3

plea and entered a plea of not true. Appellant took the stand, however, and 

admitted to the violation alleged. His testimony, along with the testimony of the 

State’s witness, provided proof by a preponderance of the evidence of the 

violation.6

 We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking 

Appellant’s community supervision and proceeding to adjudication of guilt.

Appellant forfeited his sentencing complaint by not raising it on allocution

or in his motion for new trial.

7

 But as the State points out, the sentence that the 

trial court imposed—twenty-five years’ confinement—is the minimum sentence 

permitted by law for burglary of a habitation with two prior sequential felony 

convictions.8

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

 6

Moore, 605 S.W.2d at 926; Sanchez, 603 S.W.2d at 871.

7

See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.07 (West 2006); Hicks v. State, 

415 S.W.3d 587, 588 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth, no pet.).

8

See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 12.42(d), 30.02(a)(1), (3), (c)(2).
4

/s/ Lee Ann Dauphinot

LEE ANN DAUPHINOT

JUSTICE

PANEL: DAUPHINOT, MCCOY, and MEIER, JJ.

DO NOT PUBLISH

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

DELIVERED: November 20, 2014