United States Department of Labor

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

__________________________________________

L.Y., Appellant

and

DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, 

SALEM VA MEDICAL CENTER, Salem, VA, 

Employer

__________________________________________

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Docket No. 21-0344

Issued: June 15, 2023

Appearances: Case Submitted on the Record

Kelly Craig, Esq., for the appellant1

Office of Solicitor, for the Director

DECISION AND ORDER

Before:

PATRICIA H. FITZGERALD, Deputy Chief Judge

JANICE B. ASKIN, Judge

VALERIE D. EVANS-HARRELL, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION

On January 4, 2021 appellant, through counsel, filed a timely appeal from a July 10, 2020 

merit decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). Pursuant to the 

Federal Employees’ Compensation Act2(FECA) and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the Board 

has jurisdiction over the merits of this case.

1

In all cases in which a representative has been authorized in a matter before the Board, no claim for a fee for legal 

or other service performed on appeal before the Board is valid unless approved by the Board. 20 C.F.R. § 501.9(e). 

No contract for a stipulated fee or on a contingent fee basis will be approved by the Board. Id. An attorney or 

representative’s collection of a fee without the Board’s approval may constitute a misdemeanor, subject to fine or 

imprisonment for up to one year or both. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 292. Demands for payment of fees to a 

representative, prior to approval by the Board, may be reported to appropriate authorities for investigation.

2

5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.
2

ISSUE

The issue is whether appellant has met her burden of proof to establish an emotional 

condition in the performance of duty, as alleged.

FACTUAL HISTORY

On October 31, 2018 appellant, then a 63-year-old advanced medical support assistant, 

filed a traumatic injury claim (Form CA-1) alleging that on July 3, 2018 she experienced a flareup of her post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD)3 when she was verbally attacked and harassed by 

a coworker who was upset about changes to his work schedule and duties, per management’s 

instructions. On the reverse side of the claim form, the employing establishment acknowledged

that appellant was in the performance of duty when the claimed injury occurred; but noted that she 

had previously declined an assignment relocation offer made prior to the date of injury. It further 

controverted the claim, contending that the incident involved a personal emotional reaction to 

administrative activities which was not reported until June 4, 2018, more than 30 days following 

date of injury. Appellant did not stop work.

In a development letter dated November 6, 2018, OWCP informed appellant that she 

submitted no evidence to establish that the claimed July 3, 2018 employment incident occurred, as 

alleged. It advised her of the type of factual and medical evidence necessary to establish her claim 

and attached a questionnaire for her completion. In a separate development letter of even date, 

OWCP requested that the employing establishment provide additional information, including 

comments for a knowledgeable supervisor regarding the accuracy of appellant’s statement. It 

afforded both parties 30 days to submit the necessary evidence.

In a July 11, 2018 e-mail, J.W., appellant’s coworker, reported that he overheard a 

conversation between appellant and S.T., a pulmonary technician, where he was using “very firm 

and a higher than average volume” to instruct her not to schedule him any more patients for the 

month of July. He described his tone as condescending and a form of harassment and bullying in 

the workplace. 

In a July 12, 2018 e-mail, E.H., appellant’s coworker, described a July 10, 2018 incident 

where S.T. was raising his voice and speaking at appellant in a confrontational manner. She 

asserted that appellant was following her supervisor’s instructions for scheduling and that S.T. did 

not like this and believed that she was trying to keep him busy until his vacation. E.H. noted that 

the conversation made her uncomfortable as the tone of his voice was harassing, condescending 

and bullying. The next day, she noted that S.T. walked around the employing establishment with 

a cocky attitude and even told a patient that he “owned this place.”

In a separate e-mail of even date, appellant recounted employment incidents on July 3 

and 10, 2018 in which S.T. yelled at her over issues with pulmonary function test (PFT) 

scheduling. She informed him that she was given instructions to input the scheduling for July and 

3 On December 8, 2016 appellant filed an occupational disease claim (Form CA-2) alleging that she developed 

PTSD due to factors of her federal employment under OWCP File No. xxxxxx726. On June 5, 2017 OWCP accepted 

her claim for chronic PTSD.
3

he responded by telling her to stop scheduling too many people on each day. S.T. slammed his 

schedule down on appellant’s desk and asserted that she should not schedule any more 

appointments for July before he went on vacation. She reported feeling scared and experiencing

shortness of breath with chest pains and shaking before she “blacked out” for an unknown amount 

of time. After the second incident on July 10, 2018 appellant reported the incidents to her 

supervisor.

Appellant submitted a July 12, 2018 witness statement with no signature that indicated that 

she was seen exiting the pulmonary breakroom when S.T., a pulmonary technician, approached 

her in a confrontational manner. S.T. was “all up in [appellant’s] face” and complained about her 

scheduling of veterans for examination. He further instructed that appellant was not to schedule 

any more examinations for the month of July. Appellant had to squat down and squirm to get 

away from him and was observed looking intimated and scared of S.T. S.T. was told that his 

behavior was unacceptable and when someone went to check on appellant, she was reported to 

appear devastated. 

In a July 23, 2018 statement, appellant detailed a July 13, 2018 incident where S.T. peeked 

his head around the corner of her office, said “boo,” and started laughing. She reported that this 

left her feeling helpless, intimidated and afraid. Appellant remained out of work from July 16 

to 20, 2018 and treated with her doctor as a result.

Appellant also submitted e-mails dated June 4 through July 27, 2018 in which management 

observed an issue with scheduling PFTs and advised that patients would need to be contacted in 

order to get them in for appointments sooner. K.V., appellant’s supervisor, offered to move her to 

a new location where she would be assigned new daily assignments, however, appellant declined 

the offer. She requested that she no longer be assigned to work with S.T. because it had caused 

her PTSD to flare up, but K.V. informed her that this would not be possible.

In medical reports dated July 19 and August 31, 2018, appellant informed Dr. Bruce 

Sellars, a licensed clinical psychologist, of two employment incidents on July 3 and 10, 2018 

where she was bullied by a coworker. She asserted that this treatment had caused her PTSD 

symptoms to flare up. Appellant had been out of work since July 13, 2018. In subsequent medical 

reports, she reported that she had since returned to work but still felt haunted by her previous 

confrontations at work.

In a September 7, 2018 report of contact, T.S., an assistant chief supervisor, discussed a 

meeting she had with appellant and her union representative concerning an incident that occurred 

some time ago that caused her to develop PTSD. Appellant claimed that she was feeling unsafe 

in her current work location and with her workload. T.S. reminded her that she had previously 

been offered a change of assignment by her direct supervisor and that she would still be willing to 

relocate her to another location. Appellant expressed concern that this type of move would result 

in her being assigned additional duties above her current ones and requested that she be kept in the 

same location with a lighter workload. T.S. informed her that all medical support assistants were 

assigned the same workload and that if she chose to stay in the same location she would need to 

be able to work at the same level. Appellant subsequently declined the offer to change locations.
4

In a September 10, 2018 letter, Dr. Sellars advised that he had been treating appellant for 

her PTSD since 2014 in relation to a 2012 employment incident. He indicated that, since that time, 

her ability to tolerate stress had been significantly reduced, she was sensitive to environmental 

factors and that she was greatly upset by the potential of conflict in addition to impaired sleep, 

intense anxiety and diminished concentration. Dr. Sellars reviewed appellant’s medical treatment 

and indicated that she was recently overwhelmed at work, causing her to leave due to emotional 

distress. He opined that she was not in any condition to work at the employing establishment 

despite accommodations and the offer of different job assignments, which was a result of her 

original assault from several years ago.

In a September 20, 2018 medical note, Dr. Sellars indicated that appellant was still 

struggling to go to work due to issues with stress management. 

In a September 28, 2018 letter, Dr. Sellars explained that, after two employment incidents 

on July 3 and 10, 2018, appellant reported that she had experienced bullying and taunting from 

one of her coworkers. He observed that she was tearful and that it was evident that she was upset. 

Dr. Sellars noted that since that time appellant had experienced a recurrence of her PTSD 

symptoms and advised thatshe not continue working after July 30, 2018. He opined that her PTSD 

was directly caused by the circumstances of a 2012 employment incident and was recently 

aggravated by the July 3 and 10, 2018 employment incidents.

In a duty status report (Form CA-17) of even date, Dr. Sellars diagnosed PTSD and advised

that appellant was not to resume work.

In medical reports dated from October 1 to 25, 2018, Dr. Sellars reviewed appellant’s 

condition relating to her stress management as she returned to work. He noted that she had been 

off from work and, upon evaluation, advised that she would not be able to return to work during 

the period October 11 to December 14, 2018.

In a November 1, 2018 incident report, T.S. made note of the July 3 and 10, 2018 

employment incidents where appellant claimed she was verbally assaulted by one of her 

coworkers. She observed that appellant was offered a relocation assignment after both instances 

but declined the offers.

In a November 7, 2018 e-mail, K.V. explained that she had two discussions with appellant 

on June 2 and 5, 2018 concerning the PFT schedule. She did not understand why patients were 

waiting 30 days for their preferred schedule date when the clinic had several dates available. 

Appellant explained that S.T. would be upset if she were to fill all the appointment slots for his 

clinic and she did not want to cause any problems with him. K.V. then informed her of the 

importance of the usage of all of the available scheduling for PFTs. On July 10, 2018 appellant 

requested that she come to her office, asserting that S.T. was upset about his scheduling and that 

she felt that her health was in jeopardy. K.V. offered to have her relocated to another duty station 

but appellant declined the offer. Thereafter, appellant sent a July 12, 2018 e-mail where she 

described the incident with S.T. and explained that she would no longer be able to work under the 

stressful conditions. K.V. again offered to move her to a different duty station out of concern for 

her safety and asked her to respond by July 13, 2018 with her decision. Appellant again declined 

the offer to move duty stations and began to use leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act 
5

(FMLA), leaving work early or arriving late. K.V. subsequently learned of an issue with PFT 

scheduling and on July 23, 2018 informed appellant that she could either take a new assignment 

with new duties at a new location or remain at her current duty station where she would have to 

continue to schedule PFT appointments and perform her other duties. Appellant again dec lined, 

explaining that she had no desire to be moved. 

In a November 16, 2018 response to OWCP’s development questionnaire, appellant again 

described the July 3 and 10, 2018 employment incidents in which S.T. came into her office and 

yelled at her while slamming his schedule down on her desk. She claimed that, despite multiple 

people explaining the PFT scheduling changes that were mandated by management, he continued 

to harass her. Appellant reported being “completely frozen,” afraid and short of breath with an 

elevated heartbeat, chest pain, and sweating. After another coworker left the office and left her 

alone with S.T., appellant immediately left work to avoid another conflict with him. She went on 

to describe the history of her PTSD in relation to a 2014 employment incident under OWCP File 

No. xxxxxx726. Appellant explained that it was difficult for her to control her emotions when she 

experienced a flare up of her PTSD symptoms and indicated that the July 3 and 10, 2018 incidents 

with S.T. caused her extreme mental and physical stress that made it impossible for her to continue 

working. She later filed an Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) complaint, which found that 

S.T. had created a hostile and harassing work environment. An EEO supervisor informed her that 

he had been given 30 days off from work and advised that he would be fired if there was another 

incident. Appellant however indicated that she did not complete any documents or forms from the 

EEO concerning these incidents to her knowledge. She further explained the reason she did not 

accept the employing establishment’s earlier offers of a new employment location was because 

she had worked in the location before and that it was a small space filled with a lot of employees. 

Appellant asserted that she had experienced PTSD symptoms while working in the location. She 

also explained that she notified her supervisors within the first 30 days of the incident and that she 

was initially told she would not have to file an additional claim because she had already filed a 

previous one for her condition.

Appellant attached an October 7, 2016 letter from the employing establishment which 

contained a description of her accommodated employment assignment as well as additional 

e-mails dated July 13 to 27, 2018 indicating that she informed her supervisors of the July 3 and 

10, 2018 employment incidents. A.C., appellant’s supervisor, originally advised that she file a 

claim for a recurrence of disability (Form CA-2a) and also discussed employment options that 

would offer new duties or a new employment location.

In a November 26, 2018 letter, Dr. Sellars noted that he had attached copies of his 

September 10 and 28, 2018 letters in order to summarize appellant’s treatment for her PTSDrelated symptoms. He found that, since she had been off of work, many of her symptoms had 

lessened considerably and that her prognosis would improve once she was no longer working for 

the employing establishment.

In response to OWCP’s development questionnaire, K.V. explained in a November 30, 

2018 statement that the employing establishment agreed that the July 3 and 10, 2018 employment 

incidents occurred. She described a June 2, 2018 meeting she had with appellant where she sought 

to have a meeting with her, S.T., and his supervisor, but appellant indicated that it would not be 

necessary. K.V. also noted that appellant was offered an employment assignment in a different 
6

location but that she declined the offer. She discussed scheduling instructions with appellant on 

June 5, 2018, when she then informed her of problems she was having with S.T. getting upset over 

scheduling changes. K.V. again offered her an opportunity to change her employment assignment 

but she again declined the offer. She reported that appellant was informed on June 4, 2018 that 

she would need to schedule PFT appointments per the employing establishment’s directive and 

S.T.’s request. K.V. recognized that this change in scheduling resulted in friction between

appellant and S.T. The employing establishment also attached a position description detailing the 

duties of a medical support assistant.

In a December 3, 2018 medical note, Dr. Sellars advised that appellant was not prepared 

to return to work and requested that her return date be extended to February 15, 2019. He also 

indicated that he discussed the employing establishment’s offer of a modified assignment to the 

consulting team. Appellant advised that she had previously worked in this location in the past and 

it was a stressful work environment that would not be a solution for her. 4

By decision dated December 10, 2018, OWCP denied appellant’s traumatic injury claim, 

finding that the evidence of record was insufficient to establish that a medical condition arose 

during the course of employment and within the scope of compensable work factors as defined by 

FECA. 

OWCP continued to receive evidence. Appellant submitted a December 21, 2018 letter in 

which Dr. Sellars explained that because her PTSD was aggravated by the employment incidents 

she associated her trauma with certain elements of her working at the employing establishment. 

Dr. Sellars opined that, once appellant was no longer working at the employing establishment, her 

prognosis would improve as she would be less likely to experience such situations. He described 

appellant’s history of medical treatment dating back to the September 22, 2014 employment 

incident under OWCP File No. xxxxxx726. Dr. Sellars indicated that, since that time, she had felt 

a heightened sense of anxiety and had been on guard against potential threats. He further detailed 

appellant’s treatment plan and what would be beneficial for her moving forward. 

On January 4, 2019 appellant requested an oral hearing before a representative of OWCP’s 

Branch of Hearings and Review. In an attached statement dated January 3, 2019, she again 

described the July 3, 2018 employment incident in which S.T. approached her in a violent and 

angry manner and yelled at her concerning scheduling issues. Appellant reported feeling scared,

having to cower down in her chair and that if she did not listen to him, she would be harmed 

physically. She disagreed with the employing establishment’s statement that she was offered a 

different assignment, instead asserting that she was not offered a different assignment until 

July 12, 2018. Appellant further explained that she declined to be moved to a different 

employment location because she had been informed that S.T. may be removed from his position 

by the time she returned to work. She also attached copies of e-mails and witness statements dated 

July 11 to 24, 2018 previously considered by OWCP.

By a preliminary decision dated April 2, 2019, an OWCP hearing representative 

determined that appellant’s case was not in posture for a hearing given that OWCP provided no 

4 The employing establishment also attached a December 3, 2018 e-mail in which K.V. indicated that appellant had 

never been assigned to work in that location on the consulting team.
7

explanation in support of its review of the evidence submitted. He advised that, after preparing a 

finding of facts explaining the alleged incidents and performing any other development deemed 

necessary, OWCP should issue a de novo decision regarding her claim. 

By decision dated April 17, 2019, OWCP denied appellant’s claim for an emotional 

condition, finding that the evidence was not sufficient to establish that her medical condition arose 

during the course of employment and within the scope of compensable work factors. 

On April 17, 2020 appellant, through counsel, requested reconsideration of OWCP’s 

April 17, 2019 decision. In an attached memorandum of even date, counsel argued that OWCP 

erred in its April 17, 2019 decision when it found that S.T.’s actions on July 3 and 10, 2018 did 

not rise to the level of verbal abuse that is compensable under FECA. He offered that the witness 

statements and previous Board decisions clearly demonstrated that the incidents in question rose 

to the level of compensability under FECA. 

In medical reports dated February 4 and April 26, 2019, Dr. John Heil, a licensed clinical 

psychologist, opined that, based on a review of appellant’s clinical record, she had been suffering 

from a work-related condition dating back to June 2, 2012. He explained that, although she 

returned to work, she continued to experience problems until she received psychological treatment 

and was diagnosed with PTSD. On evaluation, Dr. Heil explained that the hostile encounters 

appellant experienced on July 3 and 10, 2018 while at work exacerbated her existing symptoms 

and diagnosed PTSD, depression and pain disorder as a result.

By decision dated July 10, 2020, OWCP denied modification of its prior decision.

LEGAL PRECEDENT

An employee seeking benefits under FECA5 has the burden of proof to establish the 

essential elements of his or her claim,6including the fact that the individual is an employee of the 

United States within the meaning of FECA, that the claim was filed within the applicable time 

limitation, that an injury was sustained in the performance of duty, and that any specific condition 

or disability for work for which he or she claims compensation is causally related to that 

employment injury.

7

 These are the essential elements of each and every compensation claim 

regardless of whether the claim is predicated on a traumatic injury or an occupational disease .

8

To establish an emotional condition in the performance of duty, appellant must submit the 

following: (1) factual evidence identifying employment factors or incidents alleged to have caused 

or contributed to the condition; (2) rationalized medical evidence establishing that he or she has 

5

Supra note 2.

6 D.G., Docket No. 22-0654 (issued May 11, 2023); O.G., Docket No. 18-0359 (issued August7, 2019); J.P., 59 

ECAB 178 (2007); Joseph M. Whelan, 20 ECAB 55, 58 (1968).

7 D.G., id.; O.G., id.; M.M., Docket No. 08-1510 (issued November 25, 2010); G.T., 59 ECAB 447 (2008); Elaine 

Pendleton, 40 ECAB 1143, 1145 (1989).

8

20 C.F.R. § 10.115(e); M.K., Docket No. 18-1623 (issued April10, 2019); see T.O., Docket No. 18-1012 (issued 

October 29, 2018); Michael E. Smith, 50 ECAB 313 (1999).
8

an emotional condition or psychiatric disorder; and (3) rationalized medical opinion evidence 

establishing that the emotional condition is causally related to the identified compensable 

employment factors.9

Workers’ compensation law does not apply to each and every injury or illness that is 

somehow related to an employee’s employment. In the case of Lillian Cutler,

10 the Board 

explained that there are distinctions as to the type of employment situations giving rise to a 

compensable emotional condition arising under FECA. There are situations where an injury or 

illness has some connection with the employment, but nevertheless does not come within coverage 

under FECA.11 When disability results from an emotional reaction to regular or specially assigned 

work duties or a requirement imposed by the employing establishment, the disability is deemed 

compensable.12

To the extent that disputes and incidents alleged as constituting harassment by coworkers 

are established as occurring and arising from a claimant’s performance of his or her regular duties, 

these could constitute employment factors.13 However, for harassment to give rise to a 

compensable disability under FECA there must be evidence that harassment did, in fact, occur. 

Mere perceptions of harassment are not compensable under FECA. 14 Additionally, verbal 

altercations and difficult relationships with supervisors, when sufficiently detailed by the claimant 

and supported by the record, may constitute factors of employment. This does not imply, however, 

that every statement uttered in the workplace will give rise to coverage under FECA.15

Perceptions and feelings, alone, are not compensable. To establish entitlement to benefits, 

a claimant must establish a basis in fact for the claim by supporting his or her allegations with 

probative and reliable evidence.16 When the matter asserted is a compensable factor of 

employment and the evidence of record establishes the truth of the matter asserted, OWCP must 

base its decision on an analysis of the medical evidence. 17

9 W.F., Docket No. 18-1526 (issued November 26, 2019); C.M., Docket No. 17-1076 (issued November 14, 2018); 

C.V., Docket No. 18-0580 (issued September 17, 2018); Kathleen D. Walker, 42 ECAB 603 (1991).

10 28 ECAB 125 (1976).

11 G.M., Docket No. 17-1469 (issued April 2, 2018); Robert W. Johns, 51 ECAB 137 (1999).

12 A.C., Docket No. 18-0507 (issued November 26, 2018); Pamela D. Casey, 57 ECAB 260, 263 (2005); Lillian 

Cutler, supra note 10.

13 See B.S., Docket No. 19-0378 (issued July 10, 2019); M.R.,Docket No. 18-0304 (issued November 13, 2018);

David W. Shirey, 42 ECAB 783, 795-96 (1991); Kathleen D. Walker, supra note 9.

14 A.E., Docket No. 18-1587 (issued March 13, 2019); Jack Hopkins, Jr., 42 ECAB 818, 827 (1991).

15 Y.B., Docket No. 16-0193 (issued July 23, 2018); Marguerite J. Toland, 52 ECAB 294 (2001).

16 G.R., Docket No. 18-0893 (issued November 21, 2018); Roger Williams, 52 ECAB 468 (2001).

17 See C.M., supra note 9; Norma L. Blank, 43 ECAB 384, 389-90 (1992). 
9

ANALYSIS

The Board finds that this case is not in posture for decision.

Appellant alleged that she sustained an emotional condition as a result of employment 

factors. OWCP denied her emotional condition claim, finding that she had not established a 

compensable employment factor. The Board must, therefore, initially review whether these 

alleged employment factors are compensable under FECA.18 

The Board notes that appellant’s allegations do not pertain to her regularly or specially 

assigned duties under Cutler. Rather, appellant has alleged a hostile work environment, 

harassment and abuse by her coworker.

Appellant submitted multiple statements detailing her interactions with S.T. on July 3 

and 10, 2018 in which he approached her in an aggressive manner and yelled at her over issues 

concerning the PFT schedule. For harassment or discrimination to give rise to a compensable 

disability under FECA, there must be evidence that harassment or discrimination did in fact 

occur.19 Appellant submitted multiple witness statements dated July 11 and 12, 2018 where her 

coworkers described S.T.’s actions toward her on July 3 and 10, 2018 and opined that he was 

bullying, harassing and condescending towards her. He was reported to have been speaking to her 

in an aggressive manner to the point where appellant appeared devastated and had to “squirm” in 

order to get away from him. Additionally, in K.V.’s November 30, 2018 statement she indicated 

that the employing establishment agreed that the July 3 and 10, 2018 employment incidents 

occurred as appellant described them. Verbal altercations and difficult relationships with 

coworkers, when sufficiently detailed and supported by the record, may constitute compensable 

factors of employment.20 The Board therefore finds that appellant has provided reliable and 

probative evidence regarding S.T. yelling at her and confronting her in an aggressive manner.

Thus, appellant has established a compensable employment factor with respect to the allegations 

of harassment by S.T.21 As the Board finds that appellant has established a compensable 

employment factor with respect to her allegations of harassment, OWCP must base its decision on 

analysis of the medical opinion evidence with regard to causal relationship. 22

Further, OWCP’s procedures provide that cases should be administratively combined when 

correct adjudication of the issues depends on frequent cross-referencing between case files.23 For 

example, if a new injury case is reported for an employee who previously filed an injury claim for 

18 Y.W., Docket No. 19-1877 (issued April 30, 2020); Dennis J. Balogh, 52 ECAB 232 (2001).

19 J.F., 59 ECAB 331 (2008); S.B., Docket No. 18-1113 (issued February 21, 2019); Janet I. Jones, 47 ECAB 345, 

347 (1996); Robert Breeden, 57 ECAB 622 (2006).

20 Supra note 9.

21 Supra note 13; see also J.F., Docket No. 20-1118 (issued September 2, 2022).

22 See J.F., id.; M.D., Docket No. 15-1796 (issued September 7, 2016).

23 Federal (FECA) Procedure Manual, Part 2 -- Claims, File Maintenance and Management, Chapter 2.400.8c 

(February 2000); R.R., Docket No. 19-0368 (issued November 26, 2019).
10

a similar condition or the same part of the body, doubling is required.

24

 Appellant previously filed 

an occupational disease claim on December 8, 2016 for an emotional condition, to which OWCP 

assigned File No. xxxxxx726. On June 5, 2017 OWCP accepted her claim for chronic PTSD. 

However, the medical records of OWCP File No. xxxxxx726 have not been administratively 

combined for cross-referencing as required by OWCP procedures. For a full and fair adjudication, 

the Board finds that this case shall be remanded to OWCP to administratively combine the present 

claim file with OWCP File No. xxxxxx726. Following this and other such further development as 

deemed necessary, OWCP shall issue a de novo decision.

CONCLUSION

The Board finds that this case is not in posture for decision.

ORDER

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the July 10, 2020 decision of the Office of Workers’

Compensation Programs is set aside and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent 

with this decision of the Board.

Issued: June 15, 2023

Washington, DC

Patricia H. Fitzgerald, Deputy Chief Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Janice B. Askin, Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Valerie D. Evans-Harrell, Alternate Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

24 Id.