MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT Reporter	of	Decisions Decision: 20 20 ME 30 Docket: Pen

- 19

- 393 Submitted

On	B riefs : February 2 6 ,	2020 Decided: March	5,	2020

Panel: MEAD, GORMAN,	JABAR
, HUMPHREY ,	HORTON,	and	CONNORS
, JJ.

IN	RE	CHILD	OF	AMBER	D.

PER	CURIAM
[¶1] Amber	D. appeals	 from a	judgment	 of	 the	District	Court	 (Bangor,
Jordan,	J. )	 terminating	 her	 parental	 rights	 to	 her	 child pursuant	 to 22	M.R.S.

§ 4055(1)(B)(2)(a),	(b)( i),	(ii) (2018)

. She	argues	 that	 there	was	insufficient
evidence	 to	 support	 the	 court’s	 finding s of	 at	 least	 one	 ground	 of	 parental
unfitness	and	that	termination	was	in	the	best	interest	of	the	child.		We	disagree
and	affirm	the	judgment.

I.		BACKGROUND
[¶ 2 ] The Department	 of	 Health	 and	 Human	 Services	 initiated	 child
protection	 proceedings	 as	 to	 this	 child	 in	 April	 of	 2018,	 alleging	 that the
mother’s	 rights	 to	 her	 older	 child	 were	 terminated	 in	 2013, the	 mother has
mental	health	issues	and	cognitive	limitations	t hat	prevent	her	from providing
safe	 or	appropriate care for	 the	child,	 the	mother	neglects	 the	child,	and the

mother	does	not recognize	 the	risk	of	sexual	abuse	 to	 the	child	posed	by	 the2
father’s	 diagnosis	 of	 pedophilia. 1 See 22	 M.R.S.	 §	 4032	 (2018)

. The court
( Larson,	J. )	entered	a	preliminary	protection	order	dated	April	20,	2018,	placing

the	child	in the Department ’s custody. See 22	M.R.S.	§	4034	(2018)

. The	mother
waived	her	right	to	a	summary	preliminary	hearing ,	and	she	later	agreed	to	the
entry	of	a	jeopardy	order	based	on	the	same	grounds	set	out	in	the	judgment
terminating	 her	 parental	 rights	 to	 her	 older	 child

— namely,	 that she is
impulsive	and	has	an	explosive	temper,	has	borderline dependent personality

dis order,	 exhibits	 poor	 judgment,	 lacks	 a	 basic	 understanding	 of	 child
development,	and	denies	that	the	father	poses	any	risk	of	sexual	abuse	to	the
child	 despite	 his	 diagnosis	 of	 pedophilia. See 22	 M.R.S.	 §§	 4034(3), 4035
(2018).
[¶ 3 ] On	April	9,	2019,	t he	Department	filed	a	petition	to	terminate	the
mother’s	parental	rights,	alleging	that	the	mother	had	made	little	progress	in

her	 rehabilitation	 and	 reunification	 efforts,	 ha d no	 stable	 place	 to	 live,

continue d to	lack	boundaries	as	to	the	father,	ha d a	l imited	understanding	of

1 The	Department	also	initiated	child	protection	proceedings	as	to	the	father.		The	father	does	not appeal	from	the	termination	of	his	parental	rights,	and	we	therefore	confine	our	discussion	to	those facts	and	procedural	events	that	are	relevant	to	the	mo ther.3
the	sex	offense	risk	posed	to	the	child	by	the	father,	lack ed insight,	and	ha d been
given	a	guarded	prognosis	for	change. 2 See 22	M.R.S.	§	4052	(2018)

. [¶ 4 ] After	a	testimonial	hearing,	by	judgment	dated	August	30,	2019,	the

cou rt ( Jordan,	J. ) made	 the	 following	 findings	of	 fact,	which	are	supported	by
competent	record	evidence. See 22	M.R.S.	§	4054	(2018)

.
The	 Court	 finds	 that [the	 mother] has	 been	 willing	 to	 make	 all efforts	necessary	to address	the	jeopardy	regarding [the child]

. .	.	. [The	mother] has	a	long	history	with [the	father]

. They	continued to	 reside	 together through	 the	 previous	 DHHS	 matter	 and termination	of	their	parental	rights	to [their	older	child] at	the	end of	2013. After	that	proceeding, [the	mother and	father] divorced	in 2016, but	were	living	together	until	very	recently. The	Court	finds that [the	mother’s] recent statements	that	she	believes [the	father] to	be	a	threat	to	the	child's	safety	are	not sincere. She	has	denied	it too	consistently	and for	too	long	a	period	for	the	Court	to	believe she	has	had	a	sudden	change	of	heart. The	Court	acknowledges	that she	 has made	 substantial	 progress	 on	 her	 mental	 health	 issues. However,	 her	 lack	 of	 protective capacity	 continues	 as	 does	 her

co gnit ive	impa i rment	which	makes	her	incapable	of safely	caring for	the	child. Her	lack	of	protective	capacity	does	not	simply	extend to [the	 father] and	 his	 pedophilia,	 but	 to	 exposing	 the	 child	 to unsafe	individuals.

The	 Cou r t	 concludes	 that [the	 mother’s] daily	 ca nnabis	 abuse impairs	her	thinking	and exacerbates	her	significant	mental	health issues. The	Court	finds	that [the	mother] does	not have	the	skills and	intellectual	functioning	to	provide	care	for [the	child] to	a	level that	is not	jeopardous. Her	need	fo r	continuous	prompts	to	be	able

2 The	court	maintained	the	Department’s	custody	of	the	child	in	judicial	review	and	permanency planning	orders	dated	December	14,	2018;	May	6,	2019;	and	October	4,	2019. See 22	M.R.S.	§	4038 (2018)

.4
to	 properly	 care	 for	 this child	 demonstrates	 that	 she	 cannot provide	 safe	care	 on	her	 own. The	child ’ s	 repeated rejections	 of [the	 mother’s] attempts	 at	 affections	 does	 not	 contribute	 to jeopardy,	but	the Court	finds	that	i t	does	fit	into	the	best	interest analysis	if	parental	rights	are terminated

.
The	 Court	 finds that [the	 mother’s	 therapist	 and	 psychological evaluator] were	very	persuasive. The	Court	finds	that [the	mother] has	 plateaued	 in	 her	 therapy

.	 .	 . . (She	 i s	 not	 making	 further progress	at	this	time,	so	there	is	no	way	to	know	where	she	will	go from	 here.) The Court	 also	 finds	 that	 the	 prognosis	 for improvement,	 to	 the	 point	 of	 being	 able	 to	 parent [the	 child] independently,	is guarded. This	combination	of facts	leads	to	the conclusion that	 it	 is	 very	 unlikely	 that	 she	 will	 be	 able	 to	 make enough	 progress	 to	 resolve	 jeopardy in	 a	 time	 reasonably calculated	to	meet [the	child’s] needs.
The	Court	finds	that	too	much	time	has	passed	to	wait	any	longer. Although [the	mother ’ s] housing	situatio n is	expected	to	improve in	 the	 near	 future,	 it	 still	 has	 to	 be	 considered unstable. [The mother] has	 never	 lived	 on	 her	 own	 and	 has	 had	 rec u rring problems	with maintaining	a	reasonably	clean	household	prior	to thi s	date.

.	.	. [The	child] has	been	in	State	custody	 for	 virtually	her	entire	life. The	 Court	 finds	 that	 she has	 a	 very	 good	 relationship	 with	 the foster	parents	and	draws	the	inference	that [the	child] views	them as	 her	 mother	 and	 father. [The	 child] needs	 and deserves	 the assurance	and	stability	of	a	permanent	home

. [¶ 5 ] Based	on	these	findings, the	court	terminated	the	mother’s	parental
rights	to	the	child	on the grounds	that the	mother is	unable	to	protect	the	child
from	 jeopardy	 and	 unable	 to	 take	 responsibility	 for	 the	 child	 and	 these
circumstances	are	unlikely	to	change	in	a	time	reasonably	calculated	to	meet5

the	child’s	needs ,	and	 that	 termination	of	 the	mother’s	rights i s	in	 the child’s

best	interest. See 22	M.R.S.	§	4055(1)(B)(2)(a),	(b)(i),	(ii).		The	mother	appeals.

See 22	M.R.S.	§	4006	(2018 )

.
II.		DISCUSSION
[¶ 6 ] To	terminate	parental	rights	without	the mother’s consent,	the	trial
court	 was	 required	 to	 find,	 by	 clear	 and convincing	 evidence,	 at	 least	 one
ground	of	parental	unfitness	and	that	termination	is	in	the	best	interest	of	the

child. 22 M.R.S.	§	4055(1)(B)(2)	(2018) ; In	re	Child	of	Sherr i Y. ,	2019	ME	162,

¶ 5, 221 A.3d 120 .		The	mother	argues	that because she	“eng aged	in	.	.	.	all	the
required	 services	 for	 reunification,” there	 was	 insufficient	 evidence	 in	 this
matter	to	support	both	the	parental	unfitness	and	best	interest	determinations.

We	 review for	clear	 error the	court’s	 findings	 of	 fact supporting	its	 parental

unfitness	 and	best	interest	determinations, and	we	will	uphold	 those	 facts	if
there	is	any	competent	evidence	in	the	record	to	support	them. In	re	Child	of

Megan	 D. ,	 2019	 ME	 52,	 ¶ ¶ 6

- 8 ,	 206	 A.3d	 899

. We	 review	 for	 an	 abuse	 of

disc retion	the	court’s	ultimate	decision	regarding	the	child’s	best	interest. Id.

¶ 6.
[¶ 7 ] We	conclude	that	there	was	sufficient	record	evidence

— including
the	 testimony	of	 the	mother’s	 therapist,	psychological	evaluator,	Department6
caseworker,	 visit	 supervi sors,	 and	 case	 manager,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 guardian	 ad

litem

— to support	the	court’s	findings	of	parental	unfitness	and	best	interest	by
clear	and	convincing	evidence

. Although	the	court	found	that	the	mother	“has
been	willing	 to	make	 all	efforts	necessary	 to address	 the	jeopardy	 regarding
[ the	child ]
, ”	 the	court	also credited the	 testimony	 of	multiple	witnesses	 that
, notwithstanding	 her	 efforts, the	mother	 remains	 unable	 to	 provide	 safe	 and
proper	care	for	the	child	and	will	be	unable	to	do	so	in	a	time	that	meets	the

child’s	needs. See In	re	Children	of	Tiyonie	R. ,	2019	ME	34,	¶	6,	203	A.3d	824
(“[T]he	 weight	 and	 credibility	 of	 [the]	 evidence	 w as	 for	 the	 trial	 court’s

determination.” ) ; In	 re	 Children	 of	 Anthony	M. ,	 2018	ME	 146,	 ¶	 11,	 195 A.3d

1229 (“Marginal	progress	toward	reunification	and	a	simple	desire	to	remain
parents	is	not	enough	to	ameliorate	jeopardy.”	(alteration	omitted)	(quotation
marks	 omitted))

. W e also discern	 no	 abuse	 of	 discretion	 in	 the	 court’s
determination	 that	 the	 termination	 of	 the	 mother’s	 parental	 rights	 is	 in	 the

child’s	best	interest.
The	entry	is:
Judgment affirmed.7
Joseph	P	Belisle,	Esq.,	Bangor,	for	appellant	mother
Aaron	M.	Frey,	Attorney	General,	and	Meghan	Szylvian,	Asst.	Atty.	Gen.,	Office of	the	Attorney	General,	Augusta,	for	appellee	Department	of	Health	and	Human Services

B ango r District	Cour t	docket	number	PC

- 2018

- 26 F OR C LERK R EFERENCE O NLY