United States Department of Labor

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

__________________________________________

V.H., Appellant

and

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, NAVAL 

HOSPITAL, Camp LeJeune, NC, Employer

__________________________________________

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Docket No. 22-0882

Issued: June 9, 2023

Appearances: Case Submitted on the Record

Appellant, pro se

Office of Solicitor, for the Director

DECISION AND ORDER

Before:

JANICE B. ASKIN, Judge

VALERIE D. EVANS-HARRELL, Alternate Judge

JAMES D. McGINLEY, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION

On May 24, 2022 appellant filed a timely appeal from an April 7, 2022 merit decision of 

the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). Pursuant to the Federal Employees’

Compensation Act1(FECA) and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the Board has jurisdiction over 

the merits of this case.

ISSUE

The issue is whether appellant has met her burden of proof to establish an emotional/stressrelated condition in the performance of duty, as alleged.

FACTUAL HISTORY

On October 7, 2016 appellant, then a 60-year-old former medical support assistant, filed 

an occupational disease claim (Form CA-2) alleging that she sustained recurrent severe major 

depressive disorder and generalized anxiety disorder with panic features due to a pattern of 

harassment while in the performance of duty. She noted that she first became aware of her 

1

5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.
2

conditions on July 24, 2011 and first realized its relation to her federal employment on

October 7, 2015. Appellant recounted that prior to her federal employment, she had been treated 

for depression in 2011 after the death of her son. She explained that when the alleged workplace

harassment intensified, she required increased medication for depression and hypertension. On 

the reverse of a separate Form CA-2, J.B., appellant’s former supervisor, noted that appellant 

stopped work on October 21, 2015, and did not return. She was separated from the employing 

establishment on February 16, 2016.

In a supporting statement, appellant attributed the claimed stress-related condition to a 

pattern of harassment by coworker D.L. She explained that she had been hired as a Schedule A 

employee with a disability.2 Appellant alleged that D.L. denied her training and access to computer 

keys, withheld and disrupted her work assignments, spoke to her in a demeaning manner, 

threatened to use his influence to “make things happen” or fire her during her probationary period,

and denied her transfer to another department. She recounted that in September 2015 when she 

called D.L. to advise that she could not report for work due to severe back pain and difficulty 

walking, D.L. directed her to report to the employing establishment to complete her timecard. D.L.

then came to her home “in a government vehicle and took [her] to the office” to complete her 

timecard. In October 2015, a coworker told appellant that D.L. and coworker,J.G., “were laughing 

in open office” about the timecard incident as D.L. or a supervisor could have completed the 

timecard on appellant’s behalf. At a meeting with supervisor J.B. during the first week of 

October 2015, appellant advised J.B. that D.L. had picked her up at her home, laughed about it 

with other employees, and had harassed her for some time. She also expressed concern that J.G.

had shown a new employee their hire package and informed appellant that he knew a lot of 

information about his coworkers. Appellant asserted that the harassment caused uncontrolled 

hypertension and depression and exacerbated irritable bowel syndrome. She requested and was 

granted 12 weeks of Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) leave, commencing September 25, 

2015, due to her health problems.3 However, appellant alleged that J.B. delayed her FMLA 

application and committed errors in its completion.

4

 She also attributed the claimed stress-related

condition to an error in her last date in pay status, as she stopped work in October 2015, but was 

2 On October 13, 2016 OWCP received a June 3, 2013 letter by a state vocational rehabilitation counselor, 

indicating that appellant was “an individual with a documented disability” who could be hired under Schedule A 

Hiring Authority under 5 C.F.R. § 213.3102(u).”

3

In an October 28, 2015 letter, the employing establishment approved appellant’s application for 12 weeks (480 

hours) of FMLA leave commencing September 25, 2015. In a November 18, 2015 letter,it approvedher application 

for 12 weeks of FMLA leave for the period November 6, 2015 through January 4, 2016. Appellant had used 248.75 

hours of the allotted 480 hours and had 231.25 hours remaining. The employing establishment advised her that after 

the entitlement was exhausted, she must return to full-time work or provide acceptable medical certification of her 

inability to work. 

4

In a November 18, 2015 supervisory statement, J.B. provided support for appellant’s federal retirement 

application. He indicated that appellant had been absent from work under her physician’s recommendation for 

continuous FMLA leave from October 2015 through January 4, 2016. J.B. noted that he had supervised appellant for 

three months.
3

paid through December 2015. Appellant also attributed her condition to a November 15, 2015 

letter of reprimand5for not providing a medical excuse within the allotted time. 

In an October 6, 2016 supervisory statement, J.B. noted that appellant had been hired in 

June 2013 as an individual with a documented disability. He confirmed that on September 4, 2015 

D.L. had driven an employing establishment van to pick up appellant from her home and bring her 

to the employing establishment to verify her timecard. J.B. and supervisor L.C. “both agreed that 

an employee should absolutely not come in if sick/using sick leave.” Regarding appellant’s 

allegation that in October 2015 D.L. and J.G. had laughed about D.L. bringing her to the employing

establishment, J.B. acknowledged that he met with D.L. on October 6, 2015, and issued him a 

letter of verbal counseling. He contended that appellant’s health information had not been shared 

with individuals other than himself and L.C. as such information was maintained in a locked

cabinet in a separate building. J.B. also acknowledged that appellant had been “compensated via 

prior pay correction” for an underpayment of salary in December 2015. Regarding appellant’s 

allegation of error in the handling of FMLA leave, he asserted that appellant’s physician had 

recommended intermittent leave, which required her to report anticipated absences within two 

hours of the start of her work shift. J.B. had notified appellant of this requirement in a November 3, 

2015 e-mail.6 Appellant complied until November 9, 2015, when she failed to notify him in a 

timely manner of her absence that day. J.B. therefore issued the November 10, 2015 letter of 

reprimand. 

In an October 6, 2015 letter of counseling, J.B. noted that he had counseled D.L. regarding 

the employing establishment’s “Staff Disruptive Behavior Policy” as it applied to his interactions 

with appellant over a period of several workdays. D.L. acknowledged that when appellant 

requested that she not be included in amobile training unit (MTU) activity, he replied, “What, you 

can’t climb the stairs” in front of other coworkers. He acknowledged “how someone would feel 

that they were being looked down upon or made fun of in front of others,” and that he was not 

allowed to “discipline, belittle, or intimidate others within the work section.”

Appellant submitted a series of e-mails between herself,J.B., L.C., and accounting officer 

B.F., dated from October 13, 2015 through June 24, 2016, regarding appellant’s request that J.B. 

complete a supervisory statement for her retirement application7 and issue a pay correction for 

5 On October 13, 2016 OWCP received a November 10, 2015 letter of reprimand issued by J.B. to appellant for 

failing to notify him on November 9, 2015 that she would not be coming to work within two hours of the beginning 

of her shift.

6 On November 3, 2015 J.B. sent an e-mail advising appellant that as a review of her FMLA documents 

demonstrated that she had been granted intermittent leave, her daily accountability expectations would be revised as 

of November 4, 2015 to require appellant to notify J.B. or a designated supervisor no later than two hours after her 

scheduled start time concerning her leave status. Failure to report to work or notify management of her leave status 

would result in disciplinary action. In a November 10, 2015 e-mail sent at 3:00 p.m., appellant advised J.B. that she 

could not report to work that day and invoked FMLA leave. J.B. responded in a November 10, 2015 e-mail that she 

was assessed absence without leave (AWOL) for November 9 and 10, 2015 from 6:30 a.m. to 1:45 p.m. as she had 

not timely reported her absence.

7 Appellant submitted anApril21, 2016 letter from the Social Security Administration (SSA) listing the amount of 

appellant’s monthly benefit payments, and a June3, 2016 letter from the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) 

noting that appellant had been found disabled from her position as a medical support assistant due to recurrent, severe 

major depressive disorder and generalized anxiety disorder with panic features. 
4

December 24, 2015. In a June 24, 2016 e-mail, B.F. noted that appellant had been erroneously 

charged for five hours of sick leave on December 24, 2015, requiring a prior pay period correction.

In a development letter dated November 29, 2016, OWCP informed appellant of the

deficiencies of her claim. It advised her of the type of factual and medical evidence necessary and 

provided a questionnaire for her completion. In a separate development letter of even date, OWCP 

requested that the employing establishment provide additional information regarding her alleged 

injury, including comments from a knowledgeable supervisor regarding the accuracy of her 

allegations and witness statements from employees with additional information. It afforded both 

parties 30 days to submit the requested evidence.

In response, J.B. provided a December 15, 2016 statement recounting that appellant 

advised him of the alleged harassment in early October 2015. J.B. conducted an investigation and 

“counseled two employees individually who were allegedly harassing” appellant. Both employees 

assured J.B. that “their perceived behavior would stop going forward.” J.B. referred appellant to 

an Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) specialist to process her request for reasonable 

accommodations. However, appellant stopped coming to work on October 21, 2015, before the 

reasonable accommodations process had been completed.

On December 15, 2016 OWCP received J.B.’s October 7, 2015 notes of a counseling 

session with appellant’s coworker, J.G., including review of the employing establishment’s Staff 

Disruptive Behavior Policy. He addressed that J.G.’s interactions with appellant resulted in her 

perception of “being bullied” as she had been informed “he would partake in making fun of her 

medical issues (that he had no solid knowledge of) behind her back.” J.B. discussed “the 

inappropriateness of making fun of others” and iterated that J.G. was not “allowed to discipline, 

belittle, or intimidate others within the work section.” J.G. assured J.B. that “the incident would 

not happen again” and that he would remain professional. 

In a December 24, 2016 statement, appellant attributed her condition to a July 1, 2013 

incident in which a coworker stated that her application had been rejected, a July 3, 2013 staff 

meeting where D.L. stated that appellant was not educated, processing large numbers of service 

members on her own while her coworkers remained at their desks, being denied breaks by D.L.,

D.L. asking coworkers “to take bets” as to whether appellant could complete a task, being ridiculed 

for taking frequent bathroom breaks necessitated by a medical condition, and administrative errors

on her timesheetsin 2014 and December 2015. She also alleged that J.B. did not provide adequate 

feedback regarding her allegations.

Dr. Andrei Androssov, a Board-certified family practitioner, noted in a September 25, 

2015 report that appellant was unable to participate in the MTU due to a medical condition, and 

an October 12, 2015 report by Dr. Androssov recommended immediate treatment for depression 

and chronic pain. OWCP also received a November 3, 2015 report by Dr. Joe Chorley, a licensed 

clinical psychologist, recounting appellant’s allegations of workplace harassment and being 

belittled in front of coworkers. 

By decision dated April 11, 2017, OWCP denied appellant’s claim, finding that she had 

not established a compensable factor of employment. It accepted as factual, but not compensable,

that there were administrative errors on her timesheets in 2014 and December 2015, a denial of 
5

transfer, and a delay in her FMLA application. OWCP found that these were administrative 

matters not considered within the performance of duty and that no error or abuse had been 

demonstrated. It further found that appellant had not established as factual that D.L. had belittled 

her, asked coworkers to take bets, or commented on her bathroom breaks, and that coworkers 

laughed about how she had been made to report to the employing establishment to certify her 

timecard. OWCP concluded that the requirements had, therefore, not been met to establish an 

injury as defined by FECA. 

On April 2, 2018 appellant requested reconsideration. She submitted a series of e-mails 

and a March 27, 2018 summary, as follows: July 11, 12 and 15, 2013 e-mails to and from human 

resources noting appellant’s allegation of an unauthorized disclosure of her Schedule A status; a

November 7 2014 e-mail to supervisor T.M. alleging that on November 6, 2013, D.L. denied her

access to training materials in a shared computer drive; an August 7, 2014 e-mail to supervisor 

T.F. requesting that a monthly staff meeting address unprofessional conduct and alleging that 

coworkers would not share necessary work instructions with her; an October 6, 2014 e-mail to T.F. 

alleging that she had been denied training provided to all other employees on October 2 and 3, 

2014 and instructed only on how to shred documents; a December 9, 2014 e-mail to D.L. 

withdrawing her request to assume a coworker’s payroll duties due to potential stress, the 

coworker’s December 9, 2014 response that appellant should attempt the payroll tasks, and 

appellant’s December 9, 2014 response that she had successfully completed tasks without giving 

up; a November 20, 2015 e-mail to supervisors R.B. and J.B. protesting a November 10, 2015 

letter of reprimand for failing to timely notify her supervisor of an anticipated work absence.

In a December 15, 2015 certification of health care provider for FMLA leave (Form WH380-E), Dr. Ibikunle Ojebuoboh, a Board-certified internist, diagnosed recurrent, severe major 

depressive disorder with crying spells, anxiety, difficulty concentrating, hypersensitivity, 

insomnia, and fatigue.

In a May 2, 2018 statement, J.B. explained that he could not comment on appellant’s 

allegations prior to October 1, 2015 as he had not supervised her before that time.

By decision dated June 28, 2018, OWCP modified the April 11, 2017 decision to find that 

appellant had established a medical diagnosis in connection with her claim, but denied the claim

as she had not established a compensable factor of employment.

On June 20, 2019 appellant requested reconsideration. She submitted a copy of an 

employing establishment anti-harassment policy e-mailed to her division by a supervisor on 

November 5, 2014.

By decision dated September 18, 2019, OWCP denied modification of the June 28, 2018 

decision.

On August 14, 2020, appellant requested reconsideration. She alleged that D.L. humiliated 

her at a July 3, 2013 meeting for not having earned a college degree, and intimidated her by noting 

his high-level position in a fraternal organization and his connections to high-ranking military 

personnel. Appellant submitted an annotated copy of her official position description contending 

that D.L. prevented her from performing essential job functions. 
6

In a statement dated September 28, 2020, appellant alleged that D.L. gave hiring preference 

to a veteran in December 2014 or February 2015 and gave preferential treatment to veterans in the 

work unit.

By decision dated November 10, 2020, OWCP denied modification of the September 18, 

2019 decision. 

On October 12, 2021 appellant requested reconsideration. She explained that there were 

no witness statements until September or October 2015 when the unit suite had been moved. 

Appellant submitted office telephone rosters and a diagram of the suite. She also submitted a 

December 30 2015 report by Erin R. Lesko, a licensed psychological associate (LPA). 

On November 3, 2021 appellant submitted an undated statement regarding her request for 

reconsideration of its November 10, 2020 decision. She newly alleged that in September or 

October 2015, D.L. stated that she should not be afforded reasonable accommodations. 

Additionally, appellant contended that she had been denied access to monthly office-wide training 

from July 1, 2013 through November 2014. She also submitted a social media photograph 

allegedly of D.L. wearing fraternal regalia.

By decision dated November 5, 2021, OWCP denied appellant’s October 12, 2021 request 

for reconsideration of the merits of her claim, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 8128(a). 

By decision dated April 7, 2022, OWCP denied modification of the November 10, 2020 

decision. It found that the evidence received on November 3, 2021 had not established a 

compensable factor of employment.

LEGAL PRECEDENT

An employee seeking benefits under FECA8 has the burden of proof to establish the 

essential elements of his or her claim including the fact that the individual is an employee of the 

United States within the meaning of FECA, that the claim was timely filed, that an injury was 

sustained in the performance of duty, as alleged, and that any disability or medical condition for 

which compensation is claimed is causally related to the employment injury. 9 These are the 

essential elements of every compensation claim regardless of whether the claim is predicated on a 

traumatic injury or an occupational disease.10

To establish an emotional condition in the performance of duty, a claimant must submit: 

(1) factual evidence identifying an employment factor or incident alleged to have caused or 

contributed to his or her claimed emotional condition; (2) medical evidence establishing that he or 

she has a diagnosed emotional or psychiatric disorder; and (3) rationalized medical opinion 

8

Supra note 1.

9

S.B., Docket No. 17-1779 (issued February 7, 2018); J.P., 59 ECAB 178 (2007); Joe D. Cameron, 41 ECAB 

153 (1989).

10 J.M., Docket No. 17-0284 (issued February 7, 2018); R.C., 59 ECAB 427 (2008); James E. Chadden, Sr., 40 

ECAB 312 (1988).
7

evidence establishing that the accepted compensable employment factors are causally related to 

the diagnosed emotional condition.11

Workers’ compensation law does not apply to each and every injury or illness that is 

somehow related to a claimant’s employment. There are situations where an injury or illness has 

some connection with the employment, but nevertheless does not come within the purview of 

workers’ compensation. When disability results from an emotional reaction to regular or specially 

assigned work duties or a requirement imposed by the employment, the disability is deemed 

compensable.12 However, disability is not compensable when it results from factors such as an 

employee’s fear of a reduction-in-force, or frustration from not being permitted to work in a 

particular environment, or to hold a particular position.13

In cases involving emotional conditions, the Board has held that, when working conditions 

are alleged as factors in causing a condition or disability, OWCP, as part of its adjudicatory 

function, must make findings of fact regarding which working conditions are deemed compensable 

factors of employment and are to be considered by a physician when providing an opinion on 

causal relationship, and which working conditions are not deemed factors of employment and may 

not be considered.14 If a claimant does implicate a factor of employment, OWCP should then 

determine whether the evidence of record substantiates that factor.15 

Allegations alone by a claimant are insufficient to establish a factual basis for an emotional 

condition claim.16 Where the claimant alleges compensable factors of employment, he or she must 

substantiate such allegations with probative and reliable evidence.17 Personal perceptions alone 

are insufficient to establish an employment-related emotional condition.18 Administrative and 

personnel matters, although generally related to the employee’s employment, are administrative 

functions of the employer rather than the regular or specially assigned work duties of the employee 

and are not covered under FECA.19 Where the evidence demonstrates that the employing 

11 See A.M., Docket No. 21-0420 (issued August 26, 2021); S.K., Docket No. 18-1648 (issued March 14, 2019); 

Donna Faye Cardwell, 41 ECAB 730 (1990).

12 See A.M., id.; A.C., Docket No. 18-0507 (issued November 26, 2018); PamelaD. Casey, 57 ECAB 260, 263 

(2005); Lillian Cutler, 28 ECAB 125, 129 (1976).

13 Lillian Cutler, id.

14 C.G., Docket No. 20-0058 (issued September 30, 2021); see R.B., Docket No. 19-0434 (issued 

November 22, 2019); O.G., Docket No. 18-0359 (issued August 7, 2019).

15 Id.

16 A.R., Docket No. 18-0930 (issued June5, 2020); L.S., Docket No. 18-1471 (issued February 26, 2020); A.C., 

supra note 12.

17 L.S., id.; G.R., Docket No. 18-0893 (issued November 21, 2018).

18 M.A., Docket No. 19-1017 (issued December 4, 2019); see also A.C., supra note 12.

19 See A.R., supra note 16; D.T., Docket No. 19-1270 (issued February 4, 2020).
8

establishment either erred or acted abusively in discharging its administrative or personnel 

responsibilities, such action will be considered a compensable employment factor. 20

For harassment or discrimination to give rise to a compensable disability, there must be 

evidence, which establishes that the acts alleged or implicated by the employee did, in fact, occur. 21 

Mere perceptions of harassment or discrimination are not compensable under FECA. 22 A claimant

must substantiate allegations of harassment or discrimination with probative and reliable evidence.

Unsubstantiated allegations of harassment or discrimination are not determinative of whether such 

harassment or discrimination occurred.23 Additionally, verbal altercations and difficult 

relationships with supervisors, when sufficiently detailed by the claimant and supported by the 

record, may constitute factors of employment. This does not imply, however, that every statement 

uttered in the workplace will give rise to coverage under FECA.24 The claim must be supported 

by probative evidence.25 If a compensable factor of employment is substantiated, OWCP must 

base its decision on an analysis of the medical evidence, which has been submitted.26

ANALYSIS

The Board finds that this case is not in posture for decision.

Appellant has not attributed her condition to the performance of her regularly or specially 

assigned duties under Cutler.

27

 Instead, she alleged error and abuse in administrative matters and 

harassment by coworkers D.L. and J.G. 

Appellant alleged error and abuse in a series of administrative matters. She attributed her 

stress-related condition, in part, to D.L. bringing her to the employing establishment on 

September 4, 2015 to certify her timecard in person although she had been absent due to illness, 

pay errors in 2014 and December 2015, a November 10, 2015 letter of reprimand, administrative 

errors in her FMLA and retirement applications, being denied breaks, denial or interference with 

her request for a transfer, hiring and selection practices, work assignments including processing 

veterans on her own, denial of training, unauthorized disclosures of confidential information, and 

delay or denial of reasonable accommodations. Supervisor J.B. provided an October 6, 2016 

statement confirming that on September 4, 2015 when appellant had been out sick, D.L. drove to 

her home in an employing establishment van and brought appellantto the employing establishment 

to verify her timecard. He acknowledged that he and supervisor L.C. agreed that an employee 

20 M.A., supra note 18; Robert W. Johns, 51 ECAB 137 (1999).

21 See R.B., Docket No. 19-0343 (issued February 14, 2020).

22 Id.

23 T.Y., Docket No. 19-0654 (issued November 5, 2019); Ronald K. Jablanski, 56 ECAB 616 (2005).

24 W.F., Docket No. 17-0640 (issued December 7, 2018); David Apgar, 57 ECAB 137 (2005).

25 See L.S., supra note 16.

26 Id.

27 Supra note 13.
9

“should absolutely not come in if sick/using sick leave.” Additionally, appellant submitted a 

June 24, 2016 e-mail from B.F. confirming that she had been erroneously charged for five hours 

of sick leave on December 24, 2015 and that a prior pay period correction was required. J.B. 

confirmed that appellant had been “compensated by prior pay correction” for the December 2015 

error. Regarding the letter of reprimand, J.B. contended that appellant was required to notify him 

of FMLA-related absences on a daily basis as she had been approved for intermittent FMLA and 

not continuous FMLA. 

In Thomas D. McEuen,

28 the Board held that an employee’s emotional reaction to 

administrative actions or personnel matters taken by the employing establishment is not covered 

under FECA as such matters pertain to procedures and requirements of the employer and do not 

bear a direct relation to the work required of the employee. The Board has further held that disputes 

regarding payroll matters,29 the handling of leave use and attendance matters,30 issuance of letters 

of reprimand,31 and retirement forms,32 are administrative functions of the employing 

establishment and, absent error or abuse, a claimant’s disagreement or dislike of such a managerial 

action is not compensable.33 In determining whether the employing establishment erred or acted

abusively, the Board has to examine whether the employing establishment acted reasonably.34 JB. 

confirmed that D.L. compelled appellant to appear at the employing establishment on September 4, 

2015 although she “absolutely should not” have come in while on sick leave, and the June 24, 

2016 employing establishment e-mail confirms a December 24, 2015 pay error. The Board 

therefore finds that appellant has established administrative error by the employing establishment 

in compelling her to verify her timecard in person on September 4, 2015 and the error in her pay 

on December 24, 2015. Appellant has thus established compensable factors of employment with 

regard to the administrative incidents.35 

Regarding the November 10, 2015 letter of reprimand, J.B. explained in his October 6, 

2016 statement that appellant was required to report absences within two hours of the start of her 

shift as she had been approved for intermittent FMLA leave rather than a continuous period of 

leave. He advised appellant of this requirement in a November 3, 2015 e-mail. As appellant did 

not notify him in a timely manner of her absence on November 9, 2015, J.B. therefore issued the 

November 10, 2015 letter of reprimand. The Board finds that under the circumstances presented, 

28 Thomas D. McEuen, 41 ECAB 387 (1990), reaff’d on recon., 42 ECAB 556 (1991).

29 G.B., Docket No. 08-1534 (issued December 15, 2008).

30 M.C., Docket No. 20-1051 (issued May 6, 2022); F.W., Docket No. 19-0107 (issued June 10, 2020);R.B., Docket 

No. 19-0343 (issued February 14, 2020); C.T., Docket No. 08-2160 (issued May 7, 2009).

31 M.C., id.; D.W., Docket No. 17-1438 (issued August14, 2018); K.G., Docket No. 10-1426 (issued April13, 

2011); Robert Breeden, 57 ECAB 622 (2006).

32 C.G., Docket No. 14-1141 (issued February 27, 2015).

33 L.S., supra note 16.

34 K.W., Docket No. 20-0832 (issued June 21, 2022); see B.S., Docket No. 19-0378 (issued July 10, 2019); M.R., 

Docket No. 18-0304 (issued November 13, 2018); David W. Shirey, 42 ECAB 783, 795-96 (1991); Kathleen D. 

Walker, 42 ECAB 603, 608 (1991).

35 L.S., supra note 16.
10

that J.B. acted reasonably in issuing the letter of reprimand and that no error or abuse was 

demonstrated.

36

Appellant also attributed her emotional condition to D.L. denying her monthly training 

from July 1, 2013 through October 3, 2014, and denial of specific training on November 6, 2013.

Training is a managerial action, and absent evidence establishing error or abuse, a claimant’s 

disagreement or dislike of such a managerial action is not a compensable factor of employment.37 

Appellant has not submitted factual evidence to substantiate that D.L. denied her training as 

alleged. As such, the Board finds that she has not established a compensable employment factor

with regard to this administrative matter.38

The Board further finds that appellant has not submitted sufficient corroborative evidence 

to establish as factual that the employing establishment erred in calculating her salary in 2014 or

in processing of her FMLA and retirement applications, disclosed her confidential information 

without authorization, or denied requests for reasonable accommodations.

39

 As such, the Board 

finds that she has not established compensable employment factors in this regard.

Appellant also attributed the claimed emotional condition to a pattern of harassment by 

coworkers, specifically by D.L. and J.G. She alleged that D.L. and J.G. laughed openly about D.L. 

bringing her in on September 14, 2015 to sign her timecard, and that D.L. and J.G. ridiculed her 

disability in front of others when she asked not to participate in the MTU. Appellant also alleged 

that D.L. humiliated her at a June 3, 2013 meeting by stating that she did not have a college degree

and that one of herjob applications had been rejected, threatened to fire her during her probationary 

period, and stated that he could “make things happen” due to his personal connections. J.B. issued 

a letter of counseling to J.G. on October 7, 2015, which discussed “the inappropriateness of making 

fun of others” and that J.G. was not to “belittle or intimidate” others. J.G. assured J.B. that the 

incident would not happen again. J.B. also issued D.L. a letter of counseling on October 6, 2015.

D.L. acknowledged that when appellant requested not to be including in the MTU, he replied in 

front of coworkers that appellant could not climb the stairs. As both D.L. and J.G. admitted to J.B. 

that they had openly discussed and ridiculed appellant’s disability, the evidence factually supports 

appellant’s allegations of harassment. The Board therefore finds that appellant has established a 

compensable factor of employment in this regard.

40

 The Board further finds, however, that she 

did not submit sufficient corroborative evidence to establish the remainder of the alleged incidents 

of harassment.41

In denying appellant’s claim, OWCP did not review the medical evidence submitted on the 

issue of causal relationship regarding the accepted compensable factors of administrative error and 

36 K.W., supra note 34.

37 Id., R.B., Docket No. 19-0343 (issued February 14, 2020); Carolyn S. Philpott, 51 ECAB 175 (1999).

38 M.C., supra note 30.

39 Id.

40 C.B., Docket No. 20-1259 (issued July 15, 2022).

41 K.W., supra note 34.
11

harassment. The Board will, therefore, set aside OWCP’s April 7, 2022 decision and remand the 

case for a review of the medical opinion evidence to determine whether she has established that 

her emotional/stress-related condition is causally related to an accepted work factor.

42

 After this 

and other such further development as deemed necessary, OWCP shall issue a de novo decision 

regarding appellant’s emotional/stress-related condition claim.

CONCLUSION

The Board finds that this case is not in posture for decision.

ORDER

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the April 7, 2022 decision of the Office of Workers’

Compensation Programs is set aside and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent 

with this decision of the Board.

Issued: June 9, 2023

Washington, DC

Janice B. Askin, Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Valerie D. Evans-Harrell, Alternate Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

James D. McGinley, Alternate Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

42 Lillian Cutler, supra note 12; see also M.J., Docket No. 20-0953 (issued December 8, 2021); Z.S.Docket No. 

16-1783 (issued August 16, 2018).