IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 16-1183

Filed December 20, 2017

STATE OF IOWA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

LAMONT MONTEE WILLIAMS,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Story County, Paul G. Crawford, 

District Associate Judge.

A defendant appeals convictions for possession of marijuana; failure to affix 

a drug tax stamp; possession of cocaine, third or subsequent offense; and 

possession of hydrocodone, third or subsequent offense. AFFIRMED.

Andrew J. Boettger of Hastings, Gartin & Boettger, L.L.P., Ames, for 

appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Sharon K. Hall, Assistant Attorney 

General, for appellee.

Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Potterfield and McDonald, JJ.
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POTTERFIELD, Judge.

Lamont Montee Williams appeals from his convictions for possession of 

marijuana; failure to affix a drug tax stamp; possession of cocaine; third or 

subsequent offense; and possession of hydrocodone, third or subsequent offense.

Williams maintains the district court should have granted his motion to suppress 

evidence because the search-warrant application did not provide sufficient basis 

to support probable cause and the required nexus between the items sought 

pursuant to the warrant and the people or places searched. 

I. Background Facts and Proceedings. 

On November 9, 2015, Ames Police officers responded to a call from 

Sandra Fairbanks reporting a broken window at her residence. While discussing 

the incident with Fairbanks at the front door to her residence, Officer Vincent Junior 

reported he could smell marijuana and see a hazy smoke inside the residence. 

After entering the residence with Fairbanks’ consent, Officer Junior conducted a 

protective sweep, handcuffed the occupants of the residence—including Williams, 

Fairbanks, and a third adult—and applied for a search warrant. A warrant was 

issued to search the Fairbanks residence and the three individuals, including 

Williams, found there by the officers. In executing the search pursuant to the 

warrant, officers found $1240 in cash and a key to the apartment in Williams’s 

pockets. In a bedroom, officers found marijuana, white powder later identified as 

cocaine, and a prescription bottle with two hydrocodone pills. Mail with Williams’s 

name and male clothing were also found in the bedroom. 

II. Standard of Review.
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Because this case involves the constitutional right to be free from 

unreasonable searches and seizures, our review of the district court’s suppression 

ruling is de novo. See State v. Davis, 679 N.W.2d 651, 656 (Iowa 2004). To 

determine whether probable cause has been established for the issuance of a 

search warrant, we review the totality of the circumstances. Id. We do not make 

an independent determination of probable cause but determine whether the 

issuing judge had a substantial basis for concluding probable cause existed. Id.

We examine only the information actually presented to the court at the time of the 

application for the warrant. Id.

III. Discussion.

a. Probable Cause.

The Iowa Supreme Court has held a trained officer’s detection of a 

sufficiently distinctive odor, by itself or when accompanied by other facts, may 

establish probable cause. State v. Watts, 801 N.W.2d 845, 854 (Iowa 2011). 

Williams argues the warrant application did not demonstrate Officer Junior was 

qualified to recognize the odor of marijuana. Officer Junior’s warrant application 

asserts there were illegal narcotics in the residence because he could “smell the 

odor of raw or burnt marijuana” from outside the residence. Williams claims Officer 

Junior’s inability to differentiate between raw or burnt marijuana casts doubt as to 

his ability to recognize marijuana in any form. 

Officer Junior’s warrant application includes his qualifications in drug 

recognition: he had been a police officer for three years, had been involved with 

illegal drug investigations, attended classes at the Midwest Counter Drug Training 

Center, and had held conversations with cooperative suspects and informants 
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“about illegal drugs, their use, and distribution.” Williams argues the application

did not specifically include training for marijuana recognition or the smell of 

marijuana. Williams compares Officer Junior’s qualifications to the qualifications 

of the officer in Watts, who had been a “Davenport police officer for seven-and-ahalf years, had been involved in the investigation of controlled substance offenses 

for the past two years, and had attended schools pertaining to the investigation of 

controlled substance offenses.” Id. at 855. That officer was found qualified to 

detect the odor of marijuana. Officer Junior, although having less time on the job

than the officer in Watts, has very similar qualifications. All reasonable inferences 

should be drawn in support of finding a probable cause for the search warrant. 

State v. McNeal, 867 N.W.2d 91, 100 (Iowa 2015). Officer Junior’s qualifications

as set forth in the search warrant application are sufficient to establish probable 

cause in his identification of the odors coming from the residence.

b. Nexus.

Williams next argues there is a lack of nexus between several items 

included on the search warrant and the facts contained in the search warrant 

application.

Although a nexus must be established between the items to 

be seized and the place to be searched, direct observation is not 

required. That nexus can be found by considering the type of crime, 

the nature of the items involved, the extent of the defendant’s 

opportunity for concealment, and the normal inferences as to where 

the defendant would be likely to conceal the items.

State v. Groff, 323 N.W.2d 204, 212 (Iowa 1982) (internal citations omitted). 

In determining if evidence seized pursuant to a warrant should be 

suppressed, ‘the affidavit of probable cause is interpreted in a 

common sense, rather than a hypertechnical, manner.’ We draw all 

reasonable inferences to support the judge’s finding of probable 
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cause and give great deference to the judge’s finding. Close cases 

are decided in favor of upholding the validity of the warrant.

McNeal, 867 N.W.2d at 100 (internal citations omitted).

In an action involving a structural challenge to the validity of a warrant, the 

burden of proof rests with the defendant. State v. Fremont, 749 N.W.2d 234, 236 

(Iowa 2008).

Williams argues methamphetamine, cocaine, and opiates and its 

derivatives were included in the warrant as items to be seized without a basis in 

the application to believe they would be located at the residence or on the persons 

named. Officers seized white powder, later identified as cocaine, and a 

prescription bottle with two hydrocodone pills. Even if the search warrant 

application does not draw a nexus to these particular illegal drugs, they would have 

been discovered inevitably during the search for marijuana. Both the hydrocodone 

pills and the cocaine were found in places where marijuana could have been 

hidden. The inevitable-discovery doctrine allows evidence otherwise 

constitutionally excluded to be admitted when the police would have inevitably

discovered the same evidence if acting properly. State v. Tyler, 867 N.W.2d 136, 

171 (Iowa 2015).

Officers found identification and mail addressed to Williams in the bedroom 

where the drugs were found and a key to the apartment in Williams’s pocket. The 

warrant allowed officers to search for: “evidence of occupancy, residency, and or 

ownership of the premises described above, including but not limited to utility and 

telephone bills, sealed envelopes, keys, lease agreements, mortgage records, 

loan documents, passports, photographs, and/or keys relating to safety deposit 
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boxes.” Williams argues there is no credible connection between these items and 

the residence or people named in the application. Williams also argues there is 

no indication as to how items in this category constitute evidence of a crime of any 

type. We agree with the district court that because three people were present at 

the residence it would be important to determine who was in actual or constructive 

possession of the controlled substances that might be and later were found. See 

State v. Maxwell, 743 N.W.2d 185, 193 (Iowa 2008) (noting the State must 

establish the defendant “exercised dominion and control over the contraband, had 

knowledge of the contraband’s presence, and had knowledge the material was a 

narcotic.”). A nexus exists between evidence of residency and the facts contained 

in the search warrant application.

Officers found $1240 in cash in Williams’s pocket. The search warrant 

authorized the seizure of “United States currency, food stamps and/or any other 

means of exchange commonly used in drug transactions.” Williams argues there 

is no nexus between the facts contained on the warrant application, which do not 

indicate a suspicion of drug dealing, and searching for currency. He also argues 

there is no indication as to how items in this category constitute evidence of a crime 

of any type. We do not reach Williams’s arguments regarding whether a nexus 

exists because the currency would have inevitably been discovered in a search 

incident to Williams’s arrest. 

As noted above, the inevitable-discovery doctrine allows evidence gathered 

despite Fourth Amendment violations to be admissible when the police would have 

inevitably discovered the same evidence acting properly. Tyler, 867 N.W.2d at

171. Williams was arrested following the execution of the warrant. A search 
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incident to arrest would have been performed, which would have yielded the 

currency found. A search incident to arrest allows a police officer “to search a 

lawfully arrested individual’s person and the immediately surrounding area without 

a warrant.” State v. Christopher, 757 N.W.2d 247, 249 (Iowa 2008) (citations 

omitted). 

Williams also argues there is no credible connection between the following 

categories of property listed in the search warrant and the residence or people 

named, or any indication as to how items in these categories constitute evidence 

of a crime of any type:

1. Any and all paraphernalia, instrumentalities, substances, 

scales or documents which are evidence of the illicit possession, use,

dealing, or distribution in controlled substances.

2. Addresses and/or telephone books, papers, cell phones, 

electronic records and photographs including names, address, and 

telephone numbers, of potential customers or associates of the 

occupants or residents of the above premises.

3. Books, records (written or electronic), receipts, bank 

statements and records, money drafts, letters of credit, money 

orders, cashier’s checks, passbooks, and bank checks.

No such items were found; none were offered into evidence; there is nothing 

described in those paragraphs to be suppressed. “The appropriate remedy for [a 

Fourth Amendment] violation is suppression of all evidence directly or indirectly 

gathered through the search.” State v. Grant, 614 N.W.2d 848, 855 (Iowa Ct. App. 

2000). Because there was no evidence found, there is no evidence to suppress. 

We do not address the issue of whether there is a nexus between these items 

listed and the warrant application because Williams has no available remedy. 

IV. Conclusion.
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The district court properly denied Williams’s motion to suppress. 

Reasonable inferences could be drawn to conclude Officer Junior was qualified to 

detect the odor or marijuana, supporting a finding of probable cause. The 

hydrocodone pills and cocaine would have inevitably been discovered during the 

search for marijuana, as would the $1240 in a search incident to arrest. A nexus 

exists between documentation of residency and property to be seized. We affirm 

the district court’s denial of Williams’s motion to suppress evidence.

AFFIRMED.