In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 17‐1848

NELSON D. EDWARDS, et al.,

Plaintiffs‐Appellants,

v.

MICHAEL JOLLIFF‐BLAKE, et al.,

Defendants‐Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 1:13‐cv‐4558 — Jorge L. Alonso, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED SEPTEMBER 5, 2018 — DECIDED NOVEMBER 1, 2018

____________________

Before EASTERBROOK, HAMILTON, and SCUDDER, Circuit

Judges.

SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. Chicago police officers obtained a

warrant and searched the home of Nelson Edwards for drugs

and a suspected drug dealer. After the search turned up

neither, Edwards and his family brought suit under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 against the City of Chicago and the police officers who

applied for and executed the search warrant. They alleged

their constitutional rights were violated when the officers
2 No. 17‐1848

obtained a warrant unsupported by probable cause,

performed an unreasonable search of their home, and used

excessive force during the search. The district court saw the

material undisputed facts the other way and granted the

defendants’ motion for summary judgment. We affirm,

concluding that probable cause supported the search warrant

and, regardless, the officers are entitled to qualified

immunity.

I

Nelson Edwards owns a home on South Keeler Avenue in

Chicago, where he lives with his daughters, Sherri and

Shawna Edwards, and his granddaughter, Shawna Walker. In

2012, Chicago police officers searched the Edwardses’ home

after receiving a warrant authorizing them to look for heroin

and an alleged drug dealer named Freddy Sutton. Michael

Jolliff‐Blake was the Chicago police officer who obtained the

warrant, and he did so on the basis of information provided

by a confidential informant, “J. Doe.”

Four days before the search, Doe reported buying heroin

in the house from a man he knew as “Fred.” Jolliff‐Blake pre‐

pared a warrant affidavit based on Doe’s account: it stated

that Doe had bought heroin from Fred for the past couple of

months; Fred sold heroin out of the basement of the home on

South Keeler; and Doe had bought and used heroin from Fred

earlier that day and, while doing so, saw Fred carrying a plas‐

tic bag containing over 100 baggies of heroin. The affidavit

also explained that Jolliff‐Blake showed Doe a photo of the

home on South Keeler, which Doe confirmed was the location

in which he bought heroin. Jolliff‐Blake then drove Doe to the

location, where Doe again confirmed his identification of the
No. 17‐1848 3

home. Jolliff‐Blake also used a Chicago Police Department da‐

tabase to obtain a photograph of a man named Freddy Sutton,

who Doe identified as the “Fred” who sold him heroin. Jolliff‐

Blake’s supervisor and an assistant state’s attorney reviewed

and approved the warrant application.

The next day—one day after receiving the information

from Doe—Officer Jolliff‐Blake presented the application to a

Cook County Circuit Court judge. Jolliff‐Blake also brought

Doe with him, made Doe available for questioning, and pro‐

vided the judge with Doe’s criminal history. The judge then

questioned Doe under oath, though there is no transcript of

the proceeding. The judge found that probable cause existed

and issued the warrant.  

The officers conducted the search four days later. Nelson

and Sherri Edwards were outside and prevented from

entering the home and disrupting the search, which took

about two hours. At some point, Nelson Edwards tried to

enter but was pushed by an officer and prevented from doing

so. At another point, Nelson Edwards told the police that the

home contained registered guns, which the police, in turn,

located. During the search, a police dog alerted to the

presence of drugs in the home, likely due to prescription

narcotics found by the officers.  

Ultimately, the search uncovered no heroin or other illegal

drugs. Nor did the police find Freddy Sutton. After the police

left, the Edwardses noticed some limited property damage,

including a loose door frame, a mark on a door, and a cut

chain on the outdoor fence.  

In 2013, the Edwards family filed suit under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 against Officer Jolliff‐Blake, other Chicago police
4 No. 17‐1848

officers, and the City of Chicago, alleging violations of their

civil rights through the defendants’ procurement and

execution of a search warrant without probable cause,

including an excessive force claim for the use of force against

Nelson Edwards. The Edwardses also brought a Monell claim

against the City, alleging the existence of an unconstitutional

policy allowing police officers to apply for search warrants

based on information provided by anonymous John Doe

informants.

The district court dismissed the Monell claim because the

Edwardses did not plausibly allege the existence of any policy

or practice permitting searches without probable cause. As to

the claims against the individual officers, the district court

granted their motion for summary judgment, concluding

based upon its own review that the search warrant was

supported by probable cause. It emphasized that Doe had

acquired the information based on firsthand observations,

provided a detailed description of his recent heroin purchase

from Fred at a confirmed location on South Keeler, and

personally appeared before the Cook County judge and

answered her questions. The district court held in the

alternative that the officers were entitled to qualified

immunity based on their reasonable reliance on the warrant.

The district court further concluded that the officers

conducted the search in a reasonable manner and used no

excessive force against Nelson Edwards.  

II

A

In determining the sufficiency of a warrant affidavit, we

focus on the totality of the information presented to the Cook
No. 17‐1848 5

County judge. See United States v. Peck, 317 F.3d 754, 756 (7th

Cir. 2003). Where, as here, the affidavit supporting a search

warrant relies on information supplied by an informant, the

analysis examines five primary factors, none of which is

determinative by itself: “the level of detail, the extent of

firsthand observation, the degree of corroboration, the time

between the events reported and the warrant application, and

whether the informant appeared or testified before the

magistrate.” United States v. Glover, 755 F.3d 811, 816 (7th Cir.

2014). In determining whether probable cause existed, “we

look only at what the officer knew at the time he sought the

warrant, not at how things turned out in hindsight.”

Beauchamp v. City of Noblesville, Ind., 320 F.3d 733, 743 (7th Cir.

2003). The law affords “great deference” to the probable cause

finding made by the judge who evaluated the warrant

application in the first instance, and we will uphold that

determination so long as there is a “substantial basis” for

concluding “that a search would uncover evidence of

wrongdoing.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983).

These factors support the Cook County judge’s finding of

probable cause. The information that Doe provided the police

was based on his detailed, firsthand observations as a long‐

time customer of a heroin dealer he knew as Fred. Doe pro‐

vided specific information regarding his recent heroin pur‐

chase from Fred, including the quantity that he had pur‐

chased (3 baggies for $30), the quantity that Doe observed that

Fred possessed (over 100 baggies), and a statement Fred made

offering to sell Doe more heroin whenever he needed it. The

police then corroborated Doe’s account by having Doe iden‐

tify a picture of the house, confirm that identification a second

time by driving Doe to the location, and identify a picture of
6 No. 17‐1848

Fred. The affidavit also established that Doe knew the sub‐

stance to be heroin because he injected it shortly after the pur‐

chase and found it similar to the heroin he had purchased

from Fred on other occasions. That Doe provided the police

all of this information against his own penal interest rein‐

forced his credibility. See United States v. Jones, 208 F.3d 603,

606, 609 (7th Cir. 2000) (explaining that an informant’s relia‐

bility was bolstered because she admitted to purchasing ap‐

proximately twelve pounds of marijuana from the suspect on

at least three previous occasions).  

Additionally, only one day had passed between Doe’s

purchase of the heroin and Officer Jolliff‐Blake’s application

for the warrant. Finally, Doe personally appeared before the

Cook County judge, giving the judge an opportunity to ask

questions and thereby “evaluate the informant’s knowledge,

demeanor, and sincerity.” United States v. Robinson, 724 F.3d

878, 884 (7th Cir. 2013). These facts and circumstances

combined to demonstrate a substantial likelihood that the

search would uncover evidence of a crime, and “the Fourth

Amendment requires no more.” Gates, 462 U.S. at 236.

The Edwardses beg to differ, emphasizing that the warrant

application said not a word about Doe’s reliability. They also

contend that the police did next to nothing to corroborate

Doe’s account of drug dealing occurring at their home and

provided no explanation in the warrant application of how

the police determined that “Fred” was Freddy Sutton or how

the drug house that Doe described was determined to be the

home on South Keeler.  

That Doe lacked a track record of serving as a reliable po‐

lice informant is far from disqualifying. Indeed, as we have

emphasized before, “[a]t the beginning of his work with the
No. 17‐1848 7

police, every informant necessarily provides information for

the first time.” Guzman v. City of Chicago, 565 F.3d 393, 396 (7th

Cir. 2009). In the absence of information on Doe’s history of

reliability, the law required the Cook County judge to assume

that Doe had no record of past reliability. See United States v.

Koerth, 312 F.3d 862, 867 (7th Cir. 2002). Statements from an

informant of unknown reliability may serve to establish prob‐

able cause “if, under the totality of the circumstances, a rea‐

sonable person might consider that the statements are worthy

of credence.” Id. at 868. That is the case here.

To be sure, the Edwardses are right to observe that the of‐

ficers largely took Doe at his word without independently

corroborating much of his account. While the officers took

steps to have Doe confirm the identity of the house and Fred,

they did not seek corroboration outside of Doe himself. For

example, the officers did not ask Doe to wear a wire when

buying additional heroin from Fred or introduce another in‐

formant to Fred to do so. Put differently, the steps the police

took gave them some additional information, but did not “di‐

rectly bolster” Doe’s account that Fred was dealing heroin at

the home on South Keeler. United States v. Dismuke, 593 F.3d

582, 588 (7th Cir. 2010), abrogated on other grounds, as recog‐

nized in United States v. Miller, 721 F.3d 435, 438–39 (7th Cir.

2013).

These observations only go so far, though. We must view

the corroborative efforts the police took against the multiple

other factors strongly supporting a finding of probable cause.

And here those facts added up to probable cause: Doe’s de‐

tailed tip was based on firsthand and recent observations; he

confirmed the identity of the location and person from whom

he bought the heroin; and then he appeared before the Cook
8 No. 17‐1848

County judge and submitted to questioning. The district court

reached this exact conclusion after conducting a careful and

detailed review of the record, and we see no basis to disagree.

For their part, the Edwardses see disputed factual issues

at every turn and argue the district court should have sent the

case to trial. We disagree. The only facts “relevant to

determining whether probable cause existed are those known

to the police when they apply for a warrant.”

Beauchamp, 320 F.3d at 745. And, while the Edwardses are able

to point to certain facts that remain disputed, we do not see

those facts as both genuine and material to the probable cause

question. Carroll v. Lynch, 698 F.3d 561, 564 (7th Cir. 2012).

Consider a few examples. Take the Edwardses’ contention

that the dispute over whether Doe had a prior relationship

with the police precludes summary judgment. Viewing the

facts in the light most favorable to the Edwardses shows that

Doe first met the officers only shortly before he gave the tip

and, more specifically, just after he came into police custody

while high on heroin, craving more heroin, and in a state of

mind where he was willing to do about anything to get that

heroin, including serve as a police informant.  

Even if all true, we fail to see how this materially alters the

probable cause analysis. The warrant affidavit made no rep‐

resentations that Doe had a prior relationship with the police

or a track record of providing reliable information. Further,

the affidavit made clear that Doe was a heroin user, and the

Cook County judge was provided with Doe’s criminal his‐

tory. And the police certainly are not playing in foul territory

by choosing to talk to heroin users about where and from

whom they buy heroin.  
No. 17‐1848 9

Take another example. The Edwardses emphasize that

Doe was unable to identify the address and location of the

drug house at his depositions. Doe’s inability to recall the ad‐

dress of the house during his depositions in 2015, however,

does not create a genuine dispute of fact as to whether Doe

identified the home on South Keeler as the drug house in

2012. Doe never wavered in his assertion that he had pur‐

chased heroin from the house he had identified for the offic‐

ers, even if three years later he provided confused testimony

regarding the exact location of the house.  

Finally, the Edwardses point out that during the course of

the litigation, Officer Jolliff‐Blake originally provided incor‐

rect information regarding Doe’s identity in his discovery re‐

sponses. Jolliff‐Blake amended his discovery responses, ex‐

plaining that his error was the product of having 8–10 inform‐

ants at any given time and apparently not keeping organized

or detailed logs about each of the informants. What is clear,

however, is that the Edwardses had a full and fair opportunity

to depose J. Doe after Jolliff‐Blake made the correction. At

summary judgment, the Edwardses pointed to no evidence

indicating that the person who provided the tip was not the

same person who appeared before the Cook County judge

and who they later deposed.

While our dissenting colleague is correct to observe that

the district court originally noted that Officer Jolliff‐Blake’s

changed discovery responses raised credibility issues, the dis‐

trict court ultimately concluded that no factual dispute pre‐

cluded a determination that probable cause existed. State‐

ments made in the course of ruling on a discovery dispute do

not change this determination, which was based on the

court’s careful review of the record. And on this record, the
10 No. 17‐1848

officer’s confusion and poor recordkeeping do not negate the

Cook County judge’s finding of probable cause based on an

informant that personally appeared before her.

The Edwardses have not identified a genuine dispute as to

any fact that is material to our probable cause inquiry.

B

We also see no constitutional infirmity in the officers’

execution of the search. They had a warrant to search a single‐

family home for illegal drugs and that is what they did. They

were not required to call off the search because the home did

not fit the stereotype of a stash house. Rather, our caselaw

requiring officers to abandon a search addresses scenarios in

which the warrant plainly did not describe the location to be

searched, such as where, for example, the warrant described

a single‐family home and the officers arrived to find a multi‐

unit building. See Guzman, 565 F.3d at 397–98; Jacobs v. City of

Chicago, 215 F.3d 758, 771 (7th Cir. 2000) (same). The

Edwardses attempt to shoehorn the facts at hand into this

body of caselaw, noting minor inconsistencies between how

the home at South Keeler was described in the warrant and

how the officers encountered it. For instance, the Edwardses

point out that their basement was a small, cluttered area,

which is inconsistent with it being a site to run a heroin

operation. But these small inconsistencies, pointed out with

the benefit of hindsight, would not have given the officers

good reason to believe they were searching the wrong home.

Nor are we aware of any rule requiring officers executing

a valid warrant to abandon the search if drugs are not imme‐

diately seen or found. Here, the police dog alerted for the

presence of narcotics in the home and Nelson Edwards told
No. 17‐1848 11

the officers that there were guns in the home, which the offic‐

ers then had to locate. Faced with these circumstances, the

Fourth Amendment did not require the officers to call off the

search. We cannot say that the officers’ taking two hours to

search an entire home exceeded the bounds of reasonable‐

ness. See United States v. Jennings, 544 F.3d 815, 818 (7th Cir.

2008).  

The police were also on solid legal ground in detaining the

Edwardses during the search, as a warrant founded on

probable cause carries with it the “categorical authority to

detain any occupant of the subject premises during the

search.” Id. Furthermore, the district court properly rejected

Nelson Edwards’ excessive force claim. A push by an officer

to stop Nelson Edwards from running into a house that was

subject to an ongoing search was objectively reasonable under

the circumstances. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397

(1989).

III

So, too, do we agree with the district court’s conclusion

that, even assuming the search warrant was not supported by

probable cause, the officers are entitled to qualified immunity

for their conduct in procuring and executing the warrant. In

assessing qualified immunity, we ask two questions:

“(1) whether the facts, taken in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff, show that the defendants violated a constitutional

right; and (2) whether that constitutional right was clearly

established at the time of the alleged violation.” Betker v.

Gomez, 692 F.3d 854, 860 (7th Cir. 2012). We conduct this

inquiry against the backdrop of the Supreme Court’s repeated

(and recent) reminders “not to define clearly established law

at a high level of generality” and with the understanding that
12 No. 17‐1848

qualified immunity “protects all but the plainly incompetent

or those who knowingly violate the law.” Kisela v. Hughes, 138

S. Ct. 1148, 1152 (2018); see also White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548,

551–52 (2017).

An “officer who relies on a subsequently invalidated war‐

rant may be liable for § 1983 damages only if the warrant ap‐

plication was ‘so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to ren‐

der official belief in its existence unreasonable.’” Junkert v.

Massey, 610 F.3d 364, 369 (7th Cir. 2010) (quoting Malley v.

Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 345 (1986)). This standard derives from,

and is applied much like, the standard for the good‐faith ex‐

ception to the exclusionary rule. Id. An officer faces personal

liability only if “courts have clearly held that a materially sim‐

ilar affidavit previously failed to establish probable cause un‐

der facts that were indistinguishable from those presented in

the case at hand” or if “the affidavit is so plainly deficient that

any reasonably well‐trained officer would have known that

his affidavit failed to establish probable cause and that he

should not have applied for the warrant.” Id. (quoting Koerth,

312 F.3d at 870).

Time and again we have upheld warrants based on an

informant’s recent and firsthand account of criminal activity.

See, e.g., Dismuke, 593 F.3d at 588 (upholding warrant based

on informant’s tip that he had personally observed the

suspect with guns in his home within the last week); United

States v. Sims, 551 F.3d 640, 644 (7th Cir. 2008) (concluding that

an affidavit based on informant’s tip that he had seen drugs

on the suspect and in the suspect’s residence within the past

72 hours “clearly supported a determination of probable

cause”). Here, the affidavit contained detailed information

about Doe’s recent purchase of heroin, explaining where Doe
No. 17‐1848 13

bought the drugs, who he bought them from, and the steps

the police took to confirm Doe’s identification of the location

and Fred as the seller. Officer Jolliff‐Blake presented Doe to

the Cook County judge, who then proceeded to question Doe.

There was no reason the officers should have doubted the

sufficiency of these actions once the Cook County judge—

relying upon the totality of this information—approved the

application and issued the warrant. The district court reached

the same conclusion: that probable cause existed to support

the warrant. While not dispositive, agreement by neutral fact‐

finders that probable cause existed “certainly is further

evidence that [the officers’] reliance on the affidavit was

reasonable.” United States v. Harju, 466 F.3d 602, 611 n.5 (7th

Cir. 2006).

The Edwardses posit that the police procured the warrant

with a reckless disregard for the truth. It is “clearly estab‐

lished ‘that a warrant request violates the Fourth Amendment

if the requesting officer knowingly, intentionally, or with

reckless disregard for the truth, makes false statements in re‐

questing the warrant and the false statements were necessary

to the determination that a warrant should issue.’” Lawson v.

Veruchi, 637 F.3d 699, 705 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting Knox v.

Smith, 342 F.3d 651, 658 (7th Cir. 2003)). The standard requires

a showing that the Edwardses cannot make: that “the officers

entertained serious doubts as to the truth of their statements,

had obvious reasons to doubt the accuracy of the information

reported, or failed to inform the judicial officer of facts they

knew would negate probable cause.” Beauchamp, 320 F.3d at

743.
14 No. 17‐1848

As the Edwardses see it, multiple omissions on the offic‐

ers’ part evince their reckless disregard for the truth. They as‐

sert that the officers failed to disclose Doe’s severe heroin ad‐

diction, the coercive (heroin‐craving) circumstances under

which he provided the tip, and his failure to adequately iden‐

tify his supplier and the house where he claimed to have pur‐

chased drugs. The Edwardses also argue that the officers un‐

reasonably relied upon “an obviously impaired witness” who

gave them inconsistent information, and then recklessly failed

to corroborate this information.  

These omissions were either presented to the Cook

County judge or irrelevant to the probable cause

determination. Foremost, the Edwardses too discount, if not

entirely overlook, that Doe appeared before the Cook County

judge. They also ignore that the officers provided the judge

with Doe’s criminal history and the affidavit contained much

of the purportedly omitted information, including Doe’s use

of heroin. More to the point, the affidavit stated that Doe had

been using heroin for over two years, had used heroin the day

before, and had bought heroin from Fred “numerous times”

in the past two months. It was no secret to anyone that Doe

was a heroin addict. And it could not have possibly been news

to the Cook County judge that Doe, as an addict, may have

been impaired, suffering from withdrawal, and had an

incentive to cooperate with the police. Judges, too, live in the

real world and “are aware that informants are frequently

facing charges and hoping for deals.” Molina ex rel. Molina v.

Cooper, 325 F.3d 963, 970 (7th Cir. 2003). Given Doe’s

appearance and the officers’ disclosures, this is a far cry from

a situation involving the “wholesale omission of damaging

credibility information.” Glover, 755 F.3d at 818.  
No. 17‐1848 15

The Edwardses further argue that the officers failed to

disclose Doe’s confusion as to the location of the drug house.

The Edwardses point to nothing in the record, however,

indicating the officers had reason to doubt Doe’s

identification of the drug house at the time they applied for

the warrant. They instead rely on Doe’s inability to recall the

address of the drug house at his depositions years later. It is

unclear how the officers could have disclosed something to

the Cook County judge that they did not know at the time.

The Edwardses cannot manufacture a factual dispute with

after‐the‐fact confusion.

Nor does the officers’ minimal corroboration show a reck‐

less disregard for the truth sufficient to overcome qualified

immunity, especially in light of the other factors indicating

the reliability of Doe’s information. At the time they applied

for the warrant, Doe had identified the residence on South

Keeler as the drug house, from a picture and in person. The

officers had no reason to doubt the accuracy of this infor‐

mation and instead, may have reasonably assumed that some‐

one with a drug habit would be able to identify the house

where he had recently purchased drugs. The affidavit out‐

lined the steps that Jolliff‐Blake took to corroborate Doe’s ac‐

count. Armed with this information, “[t]he state judge could

have told the police that they needed to do more investiga‐

tion; by issuing the warrant instead, the judge entitled the po‐

lice to search without the risk of personal liability.” Walker v.

Weatherspoon, 900 F.3d 354, 358 (7th Cir. 2018).

The record does not support the conclusion that the offic‐

ers recklessly attempted to mislead the Cook County judge,

and the officers are entitled to qualified immunity. See e.g.,
16 No. 17‐1848

Archer v. Chisholm, 870 F.3d 603, 615–16 (7th Cir. 2017) (reject‐

ing the argument that defendants recklessly provided mis‐

leading statements in the warrant application and concluding

defendants were entitled to qualified immunity); Junkert,

610 F.3d at 370 (concluding officers were entitled to qualified

immunity based on their reasonable belief that the affidavit

established probable cause even though it left “much to be de‐

sired”).  

IV

The district court properly entered judgment for the City

of Chicago on the Monell claim. The Monell claim arises out of

the Chicago Police Department’s policy and practice of using

John Doe informants and, most importantly, is premised on

the same conduct upon which the Edwardses base their

claims against the individual officers. Because the Edwardses

cannot make out a constitutional violation in their claim

against the individual officers, there can be no viable Monell

claim based on the same allegations. City of Los Angeles v.

Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986); see also White v. City of Chicago,

829 F.3d 837, 844 (7th Cir. 2016) (“Probable cause also

establishes that White did not suffer a constitutional injury,

which is a necessary element of a Monell claim.”).

Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in

denying the Edwardses’ motion to compel Doe’s Registered

Cooperating Individual file. We will reverse a district court’s

denial of a motion to compel only upon a “clear showing that

the denial of discovery resulted in actual and substantial prej‐

udice.” Gonzalez v. City of Milwaukee, 791 F.3d 709, 713 (7th Cir.

2015). The district court determined that the file was not rele‐

vant because itrelated only to Doe’s track record as an inform‐
No. 17‐1848 17

ant after he provided the tip in question. We agree, and con‐

clude that the Edwardses have not made out the requisite

showing of prejudice.  

For these reasons, the district court correctly concluded

the search warrant was supported by probable cause and the

officers’ conduct in executing the warrant was reasonable. We

AFFIRM.  
18 No. 17‐1848

HAMILTON, Circuit Judge, dissenting in part. Plaintiffs’

claims against defendant Jolliff‐Blake should be remanded for

trial. As recognized by Judge Chang, the first district judge to

handle this case, both Officer Jolliff‐Blake and the “John Doe”

informant who testified have significant credibility problems.

Those credibility problems call into question the foundation

for the search warrant. A jury should decide the claims

against Jolliff‐Blake.

Eleven police officers arrived at plaintiffs’ home with a

warrant to search the house for drugs. It was not a promising

site for finding a round‐the‐clock drug operation. Nelson Ed‐

wards had owned the home for 41 years. In 2012, he was 72

years old and had retired after working for 31 years for the

University of Illinois at Chicago. He lived at the house with

his two daughters and his twelve‐year‐old granddaughter.

Police officers found no drugs beyond prescription medica‐

tion. In fact, upon entry, it was clear enough to the officers that

they likely had the wrong house that the supervising sergeant

ordered the “white glove” treatment. A short while into the

search, Mr. Edwards’ daughter overheard one officer say,

“We’ve been bamboozled again.”  

The central claim in this lawsuit is that Officer Jolliff‐Blake

made false statements, either knowingly or recklessly, to the

judge who issued the search warrant. See, e.g., Molina ex rel.

Molina v. Cooper, 325 F.3d 963, 968 (7th Cir. 2003). The plain‐

tiffs contend that Officer Jolliff‐Blake was at least reckless in

obtaining a search warrant for their home based on what he

was supposedly told by an unreliable heroin addict, one who

was desperately “dope‐sick” and desperate to tell the police

something—or anything. It’s not surprising that heroin ad‐

dicts are sources of information about where to buy heroin.
No. 17‐1848 19

But the key questions are what Officer Jolliff‐Blake knew

when he sought the warrant, and whether he had obvious rea‐

sons to doubt the information he reported to the judge. E.g.,

Beauchamp v. City of Noblesville, 320 F.3d 733, 742–43 (7th Cir.

2003), citing Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 345, 341 (1986)

(qualified immunity protects “all but the plainly incompetent

or those who knowingly violate the law”).

To be clear, if we accept the defendants’ final version of the

facts here, then all defendants were entitled to summary judg‐

ment. The majority’s account of the law applicable to the de‐

fense’s final version of the facts is correct. The search of the

plaintiffs’ home was a fruitless fiasco, but it did not violate the

Fourth Amendment if it was based on a mistaken but honest

judgment to trust what the informant told the police.

But I disagree with my colleagues because two genuine is‐

sues of material fact are at the heart of plaintiffs’ claims

against OfficerJolliff‐Blake. Conflicting testimony from Jolliff‐

Blake and “Doe” means that neither’s testimony can or should

be accepted for purposes of summary judgment. The first is‐

sue is the sheer identity of the “John Doe” informant upon

whom the search warrant application was based. The second

is which house “John Doe” supposedly told Jolliff‐Blake was

where he had bought heroin.  

The majority accepts as undisputed the final answers pro‐

vided in discovery by Jolliff‐Blake and then by Doe. As ex‐

plained below, however, those final answers conflicted with

repeated, sworn testimony from both Jolliff‐Blake and John

Doe on the same subjects.

The defense attributes the changing answers under oath to

confusion and the fallibility of memory. Fair enough, but this
20 No. 17‐1848

is summary judgment. Plaintiffs are entitled to the benefit of

any admissible evidence favoring their claims and conflicts in

the evidence, as well as reasonable inferences favorable to

their claims. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530

U.S. 133, 150 (2000); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477

U.S. 242, 249 (1986) (a “judge’s function” on summary judg‐

ment is not “to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of

the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue

for trial”); Muhammad v. Pearson, 900 F.3d 898, 902 (7th Cir.

2018), citing Zimmerman v. Doran, 807 F.3d 178, 182 (7th Cir.

2015). A jury hearing both Jolliff‐Blake’s and John Doe’s con‐

flicting answers on critical facts could reasonably conclude

that neither should be believed about any important fact. See

Reeves, 530 U.S. at 147 (relying on “general principle of evi‐

dence law that the factfinder is entitled to consider a party’s

dishonesty about a material fact as ‘affirmative evidence of

guilt’”), quoting Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 296 (1992).1

Officer Jolliff‐Blake’s Original Version: From the beginning,

plaintiffs sought the identity of the “John Doe” who suppos‐

edly claimed he had bought heroin at plaintiffs’ home in June

2012. The defense refused, asserting that the information

should be kept confidential. Plaintiffs then served requests for

admissions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 36. Jolliff‐

Blake answered the requests for admission twice, on Decem‐

ber 2, 2013, and again on January 29, 2014, with amendments

not relevant here.  

                                                 

1 I agree with my colleagues’ decisions about claims against all other

defendants. If Jolliff‐Blake was dishonest or reckless in obtaining the

search warrant, plaintiffs could hold him accountable for the restraints on

their liberty and the use of force against Mr. Edwards during an unconsti‐

tutional search.
No. 17‐1848 21

In those twice‐sworn answers, Jolliff‐Blake claimed that:

(1) he knew the identity of John Doe at the time of the search

but no longer knew it; (2) he had kept no written notes or rec‐

ords of Doe’s real name, address, or telephone number; (3) he

had never registered Doe as an informant under Chicago po‐

lice policies; and (4) he had not used Doe as an informant

since the debacle at the Edwards’ home.  

After responding to the requests for admissions, Jolliff‐

Blake also answered plaintiffs’ interrogatories, first on March

5, 2014 and again on August 20, 2014. Those sworn answers

repeated that, after the search of the plaintiffs’ home in June

2012, Jolliff‐Blake had not used Doe again to obtain search or

arrest warrants and that Doe had not been registered as an

informant.

Plaintiffs then moved to compel defendants to identify

“Doe.” Judge Chang held a hearing on August 5, 2014. He

pointed out that the search had failed to uncover the alleged

drug‐dealer, any drugs, or any drug paraphernalia, rendering

the representation “that there was a drug operation operating

supposedly night and day in that basement” a “falsity.” In

terms of whether Officer Jolliff‐Blake knowingly or recklessly

disregarded the truth, the judge observed that “right now you

have, as far as the records show, officers who took the word

of someone who had just supposedly gotten high and bought

drugs at this location and they didn’t ask him why he is coop‐

erating.” At that hearing, however, Judge Chang postponed

ruling on the motion to compel until after Officer Jolliff‐

Blake’s deposition.

Officer Jolliff‐Blake’s New Story: Faced with a likely order to

disclose Doe’s identity, Jolliff‐Blake changed his story a few

days before his deposition. He filed a motion under Rule 36(b)
22 No. 17‐1848

for leave to change his answers to four requests to admit. In

the new answers, Jolliff‐Blake claimed that all of his testimony

up to that point had been about the wrong “John Doe.” Jolliff‐

Blake now claimed that: (1) he actually did know Doe’s true

name; (2) he did keep records of Doe’s identity; (3) Doe in fact

had been registered as an informant; and (4) he had actually

used Doe as an informant again after the search of the plain‐

tiffs’ home.  

This is how Jolliff‐Blake himself amended his answers:  

Request No. 25. The defendant responding to this Re‐

quest to Admit knows the true name of the “John Doe”

informant who gave information leading to the issu‐

ance of Search Warrant #12 SW 6213.

Withdrawn Answer: Denied

Amended Answer: Admit

Request No. 31. The defendant responding to this Re‐

quest to Admit kept no written notes or records of the

name, address, or telephone number of the “John Doe”

informant who gave information leading to the issu‐

ance of Search Warrant #12 SW 6213.

Withdrawn Answer: Admit

Amended Answer: Admit defendant kept no written

notes or records of the address or telephone number of

the “John Doe” informant. Deny defendant kept no

written notes or records of the name of the John Doe

informant.

Request No. 32. The defendant responding to this Re‐

quest to Admit has never registered the “John Doe” in‐

formant who gave information leading to the issuance
No. 17‐1848 23

of Search Warrant # 12 SW 6213 5 as a Registered Co‐

operating Individual as defined in the Chicago Police

Department policies and procedures.

Withdrawn Answer: Admit

Amended Answer: Deny

Request No. 34. The defendant responding to this Re‐

quest to Admit has not used the “John Doe” informant

who gave information leading to the issuance of Search

Warrant #12 SW:6213 as an informant since using him

to obtain Search Warrant #12 SW 6213.

Withdrawn Answer: Admit

Amended Answer: Deny

Officer Jolliff‐Blake attributed this dramatic change in his

repeated, sworn testimony to an epiphany he supposedly ex‐

perienced when he read his partner’s deposition testimony

describing the “John Doe” for this search warrant. Jolliff‐

Blake claimed he realized then that when he had answered

the requests to admit, he “mistakenly confused the [relevant]

informant with two other informants that he was also using

about the same time in the 11th District who were physically

similar in color, size and stature to the [relevant] Informant.”

Plaintiffs did not buy this explanation. In opposing Jolliff‐

Blake’s motion to withdraw his admissions, they pointed out

how many times he had repeated the original version under

oath and how much work their attorneys had done based on

the original version. They also argued that his new answers
24 No. 17‐1848

were just false. They questioned whether there had actually

been a real John Doe for this search warrant.2

Judge Chang’s oral decision on the motion to withdraw

admissions was sensible. He allowed Officer Jolliff‐Blake to

withdraw his admissions, but he explained that the changing

answers presented credibility issues for a jury:

At this point it is better to allow the plaintiff to cross‐

examine on the changes rather than to lock in the de‐

fendant on a version of events that, at least according

to the defendant, [is] not accurate anymore.

This goes right to the heart of the merits of the case.

And there was some time passage, obviously, between

the underlying events in this case and the answers to

the request to admit. He has worked on, you know,

many, many investigations since then. And so I will al‐

low this amendment so that we have the fact finder,

you know, the jury, actually decide on the back and

forth of testimony as opposed to on really a discovery

issue.

This does not meant that he should not have been bet‐

ter prepared to answer the requests to admit. This was

obviously a crucial issue, and it really should have

                                                  2 Confidential police records submitted in camera show that months

after the fruitless search of plaintiffs’ home (and after time for an internal

investigation), Officer Jolliff‐Blake recorded using the same “John Doe” as

making three controlled drug buys within one week. The records indicate

that Doe received no money and produced not even one arrest. These sup‐

posed buys were apparently the minimum needed to “register” Doe as a

“registered cooperating individual,” which could strengthen a claim in

court that his identity should be kept confidential.
No. 17‐1848 25

been the focus of a searching inquiry of his own

memory, but it is going to be up to the fact finder to

decide as opposed to leaving it to the request to admit.

Nov. 21, 2014 Tr. 18. Judge Chang also required the defense

to pay some costs of follow‐up discovery required by the

changes in Jolliff‐Blake’s testimony.

The judge’s approach had a sound legal basis. When a

party obtains relief from an admission under Rule 36(b), both

answers are admissible as an opposing party’s admission and

can be used to impeach the witness. 8B Wright & Miller, Fed‐

eral Practice & Procedure § 2264 (3d ed.). That is essentially the

same result as when a deposition witness changes an answer

under Rule 30(e). Thorn v. Sundstrand Aerospace Corp., 207 F.3d

383, 389 (7th Cir. 2000) (amending deposition answer does

“not remove the issue from the jury” because “fortunately the

rule requires that the original transcript be retained . . . so that

the trier of fact can evaluate the honesty of the alteration”); 8A

Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2118 (3d ed.)

(“the preferable rule seems to be that the original answers

must of course remain in the record” and can be used for im‐

peachment purposes at trial).  

“John Doe’s” Testimony: In the wake of Jolliff‐Blake’s new

story, Judge Chang also ordered disclosure of John Doe’s

identity. Defendants identified the person who they claimed

had provided the basis for this search warrant, and plaintiffs

took his deposition. To call him a difficult witness is an un‐

derstatement. His deposition was conducted in three sessions.
26 No. 17‐1848

The first two ended when he just walked out. To call his testi‐

mony confused is even more of an understatement.3  

Doe’s account of where he had supposedly bought heroin

was a moving target. During his first session, he testified—

repeatedly—the he had bought the drugs from a house on

Flournoy Street, not from the plaintiffs’ home on Keeler Ave‐

nue. Doe referred to Flournoy Street a dozen times. He em‐

phasized that, although “I don’t know addresses,” “If you

needed dope, everybody would just say go down—go down

to Flournoy.”4 Plaintiff’s attorney was the first to mention “the

800 block of South Keeler,” where plaintiffs lived, but Doe

stuck to his Flournoy answers until right before the abrupt

end of the deposition when he stumbled onto “Arthington.”

Doe’s later two sessions hewed more closely to the defend‐

ants’ preferred version, that he bought heroin from the plain‐

tiffs’ house at the corner of South Keeler and Arthington.

These conflicts in a witness’s testimony on a critical issue

present genuine issues of fact. Parties moving for summary

judgment are not entitled to “cherry‐pick” only the evidence

                                                  3 In addition to oscillating between incoherent combativeness and ap‐

pearing to drift off to sleep, the witness peppered his testimony with easily

disprovable and pointless lies. For example, he said his parents died in

Hurricane Katrina. In reality, he had recently been convicted of defraud‐

ing his mother, who lived in Illinois. He said he attended a high school in

New Orleans that does not exist. He actually attended high school in Illi‐

nois.

4 Early in the deposition, the witness hesitated and said: “Pretty sure

that’s the street name. Or Lexing – no. Wait – Lexington. Flournoy.

Flournoy.” The target of the drug search was ostensibly one Freddie Sut‐

ton, who had a long list of drug‐related arrests and whose long‐time resi‐

dence was several blocks away on Lexington, near Flournoy.
No. 17‐1848 27

most favorable to them. E.g., Malin v. Hospira, Inc., 762 F.3d

552, 564 (7th Cir. 2014). When moving parties make that mis‐

take, it’s the court’s job to correct the mistake, not to repeat it.

Id.

The Majority’s Excuses for the Defense: The majority

acknowledges Doe’s “confused” testimony and Jolliff‐Blake’s

“confusion and poor recordkeeping.” Ante at 9–10. Yet the

majority finds no reason to doubt the (final) versions of their

testimony supporting the search warrant. Respectfully, as

Judge Chang recognized in the district court, it is not the task

of a district court or this court to sort out such factual disputes

on summary judgment.

Confusion, poor recordkeeping, and the effects of time on

memory may be reasonable explanations for the conflicts, but

they are not the only ones. A reasonable jury could also con‐

clude that if Officer Jolliff‐Blake was willing to testify—re‐

peatedly—to his original version, then he simply is not a reli‐

able witness. Maybe his memory was faulty. Maybe he was

not being honest. Either way, he impeached his own testi‐

mony on critical facts. He showed that his testimony is not

reliable. At the very least, that’s what a reasonable jury could

find.

Standard jury instructions teach jurors that in deciding

what weight to give a witness’s testimony, they may consider

impeachment by his own prior statements and conflicting tes‐

timony from others. The instructions also teach that in weigh‐

ing the effect of an inconsistent statement, jurors should “con‐

sider whether it was simply an innocent error or an inten‐

tional falsehood and whether it concerns an important fact or

an unimportant detail.” Seventh Circuit Pattern Civil Jury In‐

struction 1.14.  
28 No. 17‐1848

I do not contend that trivial variations in a witness’s testi‐

mony always require denial of a summary judgment motion

based on his testimony. The contradictions here, however, go

to the heart of the case: who was “John Doe,” where did he

say he bought the heroin, and did the police have any busi‐

ness trusting him? If Jolliff‐Blake cannot keep his sworn testi‐

mony straight on these matters, it is a mistake to say the courts

must accept the final, defense‐friendly version of his testi‐

mony. Consistent with our pattern instructions, this case pre‐

sents issues for trial, not summary judgment.

The majority’s decision to accept Jolliff‐Blake’s explana‐

tions for his conflicting testimony and impeachment takes this

court well outside the proper role for summary judgment.

Maybe this fiasco of a search was the result of an honest but

too‐credulous officer’s mistake in crediting “Doe.” That’s

what my colleagues believe. But that’s not our decision to

make. Maybe we are just seeing a cover‐up for the fiasco. The

evidence also permits a reasonable inference that Jolliff‐

Blake’s and Doe’s defense‐friendly account of any facts

simply does not deserve to be believed. Plaintiffs’ claims

against Jolliff‐Blake should be tried. To that extent, I respect‐

fully dissent.