alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Kenneth S. Apfel has been appointed to serve as Commissioner of Socia l * Security, and is substituted as appellee pursuant to Federal Rule of App ellate Procedure 43(c). United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 97-2128

___________ Douglas D. Dorsey, Jr., * * Appellant, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the * Western District of Arkansas. Kenneth S. Apfel, Commissioner of * Social Security, * [UNPUBLISHED] * * Appellee. *

___________ Submitted: December 30, 1997 Filed: January 8, 1998

___________ Before WOLLMAN, LOKEN, and HANSEN, Circuit Judges.

___________ PER CURIAM.T heHonorable Beverly R. Stites, United States Magistrate Judge for th e 1 WesternDistrict of Arkansas, to whom the case was referred for final disposition by consent of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). -2- Dougl as D. Dorsey, Jr. appeals the district court & s decision affirming th e 1 Commis sioner’s partially unfavorable decision granting only a closed period o f disability insurance benefits from June 10, 1993, through August 8, 1994.
We affirm the Commissione r & s denial of benefits where substantial evidence on the record as a whole supports the decis ion. See Piepgras v. Chater , 76 F.3d 233, 236 (8thCir. 1996). First, we note Dorsey incorrectly argues that the administrative law judge (AL J) was required to assess his disability after August 8, 1994, under th e medical improvements standard; that standard does not apply where, as here, disability, its extent, and its duration are determined in a sin gle decision. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(f); Ness v. Sullivan , 904 F.2d 432, 435 n.4 (8th Cir. 1990); Camp v. Heckler , 780 F.2 d 721, 721-22 (8th Cir. 1986) (per curiam).
We conc lude substantial evidence supports the ALJ & s decision. The AL J properly e valuated Dorsey & s subjective complaints, and his conclusions regarding the extent of Dorsey & s pain are supported by the record, inc luding the opinions of Dorsey & s treating ph ysician. See Polaski v. Heckler , 739 F.2d 1320, 1322 (8th Cir. 1984 ) (factors); J ones v. Callahan , 122 F.3d 1148, 1153 (8th Cir. 1997) (question is no t whet her claimant suffers from pain, but whether claimant is “fully credible when h e claims that his back hurts so much that it prevents him from engaging in gainfu l activity”)

. We find no merit to Dorsey & s arguments that the ALJ failed to conside r Dorse y & s impairments in combination, see Browning v. Sullivan , 958 F.2d 817, 82 1 (8th Cir. 1992), or that the hypothetical posed to the vocational expert (VE) wa s defe ctive. See Roberts v. Heckler , 783 F.2d 110, 112 (8th Cir.1985) (per curiam ) (“hypothetical is sufficient if it sets forth the im pairments which are accepted as true”);-3-

see also Roe v. Chater , 92 F.3d 672, 675 (8th Cir. 1996) (VE testimony based o n proper hypothetical question constitutes substantial evidence). Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court. A true copy.
Attest: CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 18-1723

Filed February 5, 2020

NICOLAS COLE JACOBS,

Applicant-Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF IOWA,

Respondent-Appellee.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Des Moines County, Michael J. 

Schilling, Judge.

An applicant appeals the district court’s denial of his postconviction-relief 

application. AFFIRMED.

Nate Nieman, Rock Island, Illinois, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Israel Kodiaga, Assistant Attorney 

General, for appellee State.

Considered by Bower, C.J., and May and Greer, JJ.
2

MAY, Judge.

When he was sixteen, Nicolas Jacobs told police he had inappropriately 

touched a seven-year-old child. The trial court denied a motion to suppress 

Jacobs’s admission. Jacobs then pled guilty to lascivious acts with a child, a 

forcible felony, and was sentenced accordingly. Later, Jacobs filed this 

postconviction-relief (PCR) action. The PCR court denied relief. This appeal 

followed.

Jacobs contends trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge Iowa 

Code section 232.11 (2015) on equal protection grounds. Section 232.11 provides 

children with a “right to be represented by counsel” that can only be waived under 

limited circumstances. For example, waiver by a child who is sixteen “is valid only 

if a good faith effort has been made to notify the child’s parent, guardian, or 

custodian” of specific information, including their right to “visit and confer with the 

child.” Iowa Code § 232.11(2). But these protections only apply during certain 

“proceedings within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.” Id. § 232.11(1). And 

pursuant to section 232.8(1)(c), violations by children sixteen or older “which 

constitute [] forcible felon[ies] are excluded from the jurisdiction of the juvenile 

court.” So the protections of section 232.11 do not apply to children sixteen or 

older who are suspected of a forcible felony. 

Jacobs claims this is unconstitutional. He claims section 232.11 violates 

equal protection because it treats children differently based on the charges they 

face.

We previously addressed the same issue in State v. Jennings. No. 14-

2098, 2016 WL 3269545, at *6–7 (Iowa Ct. App. June 15, 2016). There, we 
3

rejected an applicant’s claim that “he received ineffective assistance because 

defense counsel did not challenge the exclusion for forcible felonies in the 

application of section 232.11 as a violation of equal protection.” Id. at *6. We see 

no reason to reach a different conclusion here. We affirm the denial of Jacobs’s 

PCR application.

AFFIRMED.
United States Department of Labor

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

__________________________________________

L.H., Appellant

and

U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, POST OFFICE,

San Antonio, TX, Employer 

_________________________________________

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Docket No. 22-0115

Issued: March 22, 2022

Appearances: Case Submitted on the Record

Alan J. Shapiro, Esq., for the appellant1

Office of Solicitor, for the Director

ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL

Before:

ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Chief Judge

PATRICIA H. FITZGERALD, Alternate Judge

VALERIE D. EVANS-HARRELL, Alternate Judge

On November 1, 2021 appellant through counsel, filed a timely appeal from an

October 4, 2021 merit decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). 

The Clerk of the Appellate Boards assigned Docket No. 22-0115.

In a letter dated February 18, 2022, counsel requested that the appeal be dismissed.

The Board has duly considered the matter and concludes that counsel’s request f or the 

dismissal of the appeal should be granted. Accordingly, 

1

In all cases in which a representative has been authorized in a matter before the Board, no cla im f or a f ee f or 

legal or other service performed on appeal before the Board is valid unless approved by the Board. 

20 C.F.R. § 501.9(e). No contract for a stipulated fee or on a contingent fee basis will be approved by the Board.

Id. An attorney or representative’s collection of a fee without the Board’s approval may constitute a misdemeanor, 

subject to fine or imprisonment for up to one year or both. Id.; see also18 U.S.C. § 292. Demands for payment of 

fees to a representative, prior to approval by the Board, may be reported to appropriate authorities for investigation.
2

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the request for the dismissal of the appeal is 

granted. The appeal docketed as No. 22-0115 is dismissed.

Issued: March 22, 2022

Washington, DC

Alec J. Koromilas, Chief Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Patricia H. Fitzgerald, Alternate Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Valerie D. Evans-Harrell, Alternate Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
## In the

Court of Appeals

Second Appellate District of Texas

at Fort Worth

No. 02

- 19

- 00255

- CV

I N THE I NTEREST OF J.P

- L., A C HILD §

§

§

§ On Appeal from the 367th District

Court

of Denton County (18

- 8366

- 367)

December 19, 2019

Opinion by Chief Justice Sudderth

JUDGMENT

This court has considered the record on appeal in this case and holds that there

was no error in the trial court’s judgment. It is ordered that the judgment of the trial

court is affirmed.

SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

By

__ /s/ Bonnie Sudderth

_______________ Chief Justice Bonnie Sudderth
[ARTICLE] 5
<TABLE>
<S>                             <C>
[PERIOD-TYPE]                   12-MOS
[FISCAL-YEAR-END]                          DEC-31-1996
[PERIOD-END]                               DEC-31-1996
[CASH]                                          32,793
[SECURITIES]                                    23,799
[RECEIVABLES]                                    3,485
[ALLOWANCES]                                         0
[INVENTORY]                                          0
[CURRENT-ASSETS]                                56,592
[PP&E]                                       1,244,318
[DEPRECIATION]                                 102,277
[TOTAL-ASSETS]                               1,208,246
[CURRENT-LIABILITIES]                           21,928
[BONDS]                                        360,000
[PREFERRED-MANDATORY]                                0
[PREFERRED]                                    273,965
[COMMON]                                        37,784
[OTHER-SE]                                     487,022
[TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY]                 1,208,246
[SALES]                                        176,988
[TOTAL-REVENUES]                               192,828
[CGS]                                          102,577
[TOTAL-COSTS]                                  128,821
[OTHER-EXPENSES]                                     0
[LOSS-PROVISION]                                     0
[INTEREST-EXPENSE]                              22,527
[INCOME-PRETAX]                                 64,006
[INCOME-TAX]                                         0
[INCOME-CONTINUING]                             64,006
[DISCONTINUED]                                       0
[EXTRAORDINARY]                                      0
[CHANGES]                                            0
[NET-INCOME]                                    64,006
[EPS-PRIMARY]                                     1.23
[EPS-DILUTED]                                     1.23
</TABLE>
## F IRST 

## D ISTRICT 

## C OURT OF 

## A PPEAL 

## S TATE OF 

## F LORIDA

_____________________________
No. 1D 17

- 4938

_____________________________
J OHN G AY , Appellant,

v.

S TATE OF F LORIDA , Appellee.

_____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Escambi a County

. Edward P. Nickinson
, III, Judge

. April 6, 2018

P ER C URIAM

.
A FFIRMED

.
L EWIS , K ELSEY , and W INSOR , JJ., concur

.

_____________________________ Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331

.

_____________________________2 John Gay, pro se
, Appellant

. Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee
, for Appellee.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CHARLES OKONKWO and CECILIA 

OKONKWO, 

Petitioners - Appellants, 

 v. 

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL 

REVENUE, 

Respondent - Appellee.

No. 16-71020

Tax Ct. No. 23496-13 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from a Decision of the 

United States Tax Court

Submitted December 7, 2017**

Pasadena, California

Before: REINHARDT and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges, and BLOCK,

*** District 

Judge.

Appellants Charles Okonkwo and Cecilia Okonkwo seek review of the Tax 

Court’s finding that the Okonkwos were not entitled to certain claimed deductions 

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*** The Honorable Frederic Block, United States Senior District Judge for 

the Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.

FILED

DEC 11 2017

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

on their second house. Reviewing for clear error, see Christensen v. CIR, 786 F.2d 

1382, 1383 (9th Cir. 1986), we affirm.

The Okonkwos’ appeal rests on one contention: that the Tax Court erred in 

finding that their daughter did not pay fair rent while residing in their second 

house. Specifically, the Okonkwos argue that in addition to paying $2,000 per 

month in cash, which is substantially below market value, their daughter also paid 

rent in services. However, the evidence in the record shows that the Okonkwos’ 

daughter provided minimal services, if any, to the Okonkwos during her residence 

in their second house. Because the Tax Court’s finding that the Okonkwos’ 

daughter did not pay fair rent is “plausible in light of the record viewed in its 

entirety,” we must affirm. See Wolf v. CIR, 4 F.3d 709, 712–13 (9th Cir. 1993).

AFFIRMED.
**Exhibit 32.1**

 

**Written Statement of the Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer**

**Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350**

 

Solely for the purposes of complying with 18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, we, the undersigned Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of Alliant Energy Corporation (the “Company”), hereby certify, based on our knowledge, that the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the quarter ended June 30, 2009 (the “Report”) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 

/s/ William D. Harvey

William D. Harvey

Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer

 

/s/ Patricia L. Kampling

Patricia L. Kampling

Vice President-Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer

 

August 6, 2009
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

January 9, 2007

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 06-40060

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

GUADALUPE GUERRA-MESTA,

Defendant-Appellant.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

(5:04-CR-407-ALL)

--------------------

Before SMITH, WIENER, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Defendant-Appellant Guadalupe Guerra-Mesta appeals his 36-

month sentence for knowingly transporting an alien within the

United States by means of a motor vehicle, in violation of 8 U.S.C.

§ 1324. He argues that the district court erred in imposing an

enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. for obstruction of

justice and in denying him an adjustment pursuant to U.S.S.G. §

3E1.1 for acceptance of responsibility. 

A district court’s finding that a defendant obstructed justice

is reviewed for clear error. United States v. Gonzalez, 436 F.3d
2

560, 586 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2363 (2006). In

imposing the enhancement, the district court relied in part on the

fact that Guerra-Mesta did not appear at his first sentencing

hearing. Guerra-Mesta argues that he did not have notice of the

sentencing hearing at which he failed to appear and that his

conduct was therefore not willful. Assuming arguendo that this

assertion is correct, the district court did not commit clear error

in finding that Guerra-Mesta obstructed justice, as he also failed

to contact his probation officer for six months, and his probation

officer was unable to locate him during that period. See United

States v. Infante, 404 F.3d 376, 393-94 (5th Cir. 2005); see also

United States v. Phillips, 210 F.3d 345, 348 (5th Cir. 2000)

(identifying obstructive conduct as that which creates an

inherently high risk that justice will be obstructed and is the

result of more than a spur-of-the-moment decision).

Guerra-Mesta also argues that the district court erred in

denying him a reduction for acceptance of responsibility. A

district court’s denial of a reduction for acceptance of

responsibility is reviewed under a standard even more deferential

than the clearly erroneous standard. United States v. Ragsdale,

426 F.3d 765, 781 (5th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1405

(2006). Only in extraordinary cases do adjustments under both §

3C1.1 and § 3E1.1 apply. § 3E1.1 comment.(n.4). Guerra-Mesta

points to no extraordinary circumstances in his case which support

his argument that he should have received an acceptance of
3

responsibility adjustment despite the imposition of the § 3C1.1

enhancement. As the district court did not err in imposing either

enhancement, we do not reach Guerra-Mesta’s argument regarding the

district court’s imposition of an alternative non-guideline 36-

month sentence. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.
United States Department of Labor

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

__________________________________________

F.L., Appellant

and

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, MARINE 

CORP LOGISTICS MAINTENANCE, 

Barstow, CA, Employer

__________________________________________

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Docket No. 23-0710

Issued: June 2, 2023

Appearances: Case Submitted on the Record

Appellant, pro se

Office of Solicitor, for the Director

ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL

Before:

ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Chief Judge

VALERIE D. EVANS-HARRELL, Alternate Judge

JAMES D. McGINLEY, Alternate Judge

On April 21, 2023 appellant filed an appeal from a January 12, 2022 merit decision of the 

Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). The Clerk of the Appellate Boards

assigned Docket No. 23-0710.

The Board has duly considered the matter and notes that the Board has jurisdiction to 

review final adverse decisions of OWCP issued under the Federal Employees’ Compensation 

Act.1 For final adverse decisions of OWCP issued on or after November 19, 2008, the Board’s 

review authority is limited to appeals which are filed within 180 days from the date of issuance 

of OWCP’s decision.2

The 180th day following the January 12, 2022 decision was July 11, 2022. As appellant 

did not file an appeal with the Board until April 21, 2023, more than 180 days after the

January 12, 2022 OWCP decision, the Board finds that the appeal docketed as No. 23-0710 is 

untimely filed. The Board is without jurisdiction to review the appeal. Appellant has not 

1

5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.; 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3(a).

2

20 C.F.R. § 501.3(e) provides in pertinent part: “Any notice of appeal must be filed within 180 days from the 

date of issuance of a decision of the OWCP.”
2

explained his failure to timely file an appeal with supporting documentation sufficient to 

establish compelling circumstances. Because there is no final adverse decision issued by OWCP 

within 180 days of the filing of the instant appeal, the Board concludes that the appeal docketed 

as No. 23-0710, must be dismissed.3 Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the appeal docketed as No. 23-0710 is dismissed.

Issued: June 2, 2023

Washington, DC

Alec J. Koromilas, Chief Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Valerie D. Evans-Harrell, Alternate Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

James D. McGinley, Alternate Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

3 The Board’s decisions and orders are “final upon the expiration of 30 days from the date of their issuance.” Id.

at § 501.6(d).
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###### Department of the Interior

###### Bureau of Land Management 

          - [WO-310-06-1310-GEOT] 

# AGENCY:

Bureau of Land Management, Interior. 

# ACTION:

Notice of Public Meeting. 

# SUMMARY:

A public meeting is being held by the Bureau of Land Management and the U.S. Forest Service to solicit suggestions from the public and industry on how to best implement the geothermal provisions of the Energy Policy Act of 2005. 

# DATES:

The meeting date is scheduled as follows: November 17, 2005; 1-4 p.m., local time. 

# ADDRESSES:

The meeting will be held at the following location: Reno Hilton Hotel, 2500 East 2nd Street, Reno, Nevada 89595. 

# FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

John Bebout, National Geothermal Program Lead for the BLM at (202) 557-3375 or Bob Fujimoto, Geothermal Lead for the U.S. Forest Service at (503) 808-2430. 

# SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

                    The meeting will begin with an overview of the geothermal provisions of the Energy Policy Act. Participants who request to speak will be given a set amount of time to provide suggestions that address                           ( print page 65934)                        implementation as well as major areas of interest/concern with the geothermal sections of the Act.                 

Dated: October 26, 2005. 

Thomas P. Lonnie, 

Assistant Director, Minerals, Realty and Resource Protection. 

[FR Doc. 05-21676 Filed 10-31-05; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4310-84-P