alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### CASCADE DRINKING WATERS, INC., a Nevada Corporation, Appellant, v. CENTRAL TELEPHONE COMPANY, a Delaware Corporation, AK’WA PURE CORPORATION, a Nevada Corporation, and GENERAL TELEPHONE DIRECTORY COMPANY, a Delaware Corporation, Respondents.

No. 6910

June 25, 1974

523 P.2d 837

*235
      *Lee and Beasey,*of Las Vegas, for Appellant.

*Rose, Norwood & Edwards, Ltd.,*of Las Vegas, for Respondents.

OPINION

*Per Curiam:*

The first appeal of this case was dismissed without prejudice to the right of appellant to reinstate the appeal after final determination of its complaint. Cascade Drinking Waters v. Central Tel., 88 Nev. 702, 504 P.2d 697 (1972). The validity of the complaint was finally determined and the appeal reinstated. We now must decide the propriety of judgment for the defendants entered for failure of plaintiff to plead or otherwise show a claim for relief.

The plaintiff Cascade Drinking Waters, Inc., alleges that it entered into a written agreement with the defendant Central Telephone Company acting through its agent General Telephone Directory Company to advertise Cascade’s produce, bottled water, in the “Water Companies-Bottled” portion of the classified directory of Central Telephone Company; that the advertisement was placed therein as agreed by the defendants; but that the defendants breached an *implied covenant*of their written agreement by also advertising in the same part of the telephone directory the product of AK’WA Pure Corporation, which sold water purifiers rather than bottled water, all to the *236plaintiff’s damage. Moreover, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants were negligent in advertising the product of AK’WA Pure as it did.

In our view, plaintiff has failed to demonstrate error in the district court’s action, dismissing plaintiff’s said complaint. No substantial, relevant authority has been tendered to establish that a telephone company’s promise to advertise a given business under a certain heading raises such a duty not to advertise other types of business under that heading, as will support an action for alleged loss of business income. We have discovered no such authority.

Affirmed.
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906
OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, Cesar M. Garcia, certify, pursuant to Rule 13a-14(b) and 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that the Annual Report of IRIS International, Inc. on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2007 fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 and that information contained in such Annual Report on Form 10-K fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of IRIS International, Inc.

Dated: March 14, 2008



|                                      |  | 
|------------------------------------- |  | 
|/s/ CÉSAR M. GARCÍA                   |  | 
|César M. García,                      |  | 
|President and Chief Executive Officer |  | 

This certification shall not be deemed filed for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, or the Exchange Act, or otherwise subject to the liability of Section 18 of the Exchange Ace. Such certification shall not be deemed to be incorporated by reference into any filing under the Securities Act of 1933 or the
Exchange Act, except to the extent that the Company specifically incorporates it by reference.
<partyblock><br><br><div align="center"><b><font size="+1">EKO Real Estate Management, Inc., Appellant,<br><br>against<br><br>Patricia Norville, RONALD TAYLOR, and TOMICA DUNCAN, Respondents.</font></b></div><br><br><p>Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Maria Milin, J.), dated September 25, 2014. The order, insofar as appealed from as limited by the brief, granted the branch of a motion by Patricia Norville, Ronald Taylor and Tomica Duncan seeking summary judgment dismissing the petition.</p><p>ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed, without costs, and the branch of the motion by Patricia Norville, Ronald Taylor and Tomica Duncan seeking summary judgment dismissing the petition is denied.</p><p>Landlord commenced this holdover proceeding alleging that it had terminated an oral rental agreement and that, subsequently, Patricia Norville, Ronald Taylor and Tomica Duncan (occupants) continued in possession of the subject apartment without permission. The petition further alleges that the subject apartment, D1, had been rent-stabilized, but had become high-rent decontrolled. It is undisputed that, prior to occupying the subject apartment, occupants had lived in a rent-stabilized apartment, B3, in the same building. Occupants moved, insofar as is relevant to this appeal, for summary judgment dismissing the petition, arguing that, because they had moved into the subject apartment at landlord's request, the lease for the subject apartment retained the same rent-stabilized protections as the lease for their prior apartment. Occupants also argued that, in any event, the subject apartment is, contrary to landlord's allegations, subject to rent stabilization. As limited by its brief, landlord appeals from so much of an order of the Civil Court dated September 25, 2014 as granted that branch of occupants' motion.</p><p>Summary judgment is a drastic remedy and should not be granted when there is any doubt as to the existence of a triable issue of fact (<i>see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp</i>., 68 NY2d 320 [1986]). Here, the record does not establish, as a matter of law, that the rent-stabilized protections for apartment B3 had not been waived, as the parties made contradictory allegations regarding the circumstances surrounding the move to apartment D1. Nor does the record establish, as a matter of law, that apartment D1 itself remains subject to rent stabilization, having not been properly decontrolled (<i>see generally</i> Rent Stabilization Law of 1969 [Administrative Code of City of NY] ยง 26-504.2).</p><p>Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed and the branch of occupants' motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the petition is denied.</p><p>Elliot, J.P., Pesce and Solomon, JJ., concur.</p><br>Decision Date: January 20, 2017<br><br><div align="center"><form method="LINK" action="../../slipidx/at_2_idxtable.shtml"><input type="submit" value="Return to Decision List"></form></div></partyblock>
```

[Congressional Bills 111th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 5278 Introduced in House (IH)]

111th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 5278

 To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located 
at 405 West Second Street in Dixon, Illinois, as the ``President Ronald 
                   W. Reagan Post Office Building''.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                              May 12, 2010

   Mr. Foster (for himself, Mr. Lipinski, Mr. Hare, Mr. Shimkus, Mr. 
     Manzullo, Mr. Quigley, Mr. Schock, Mr. Davis of Illinois, Mr. 
Gutierrez, Mr. Kirk, Mr. Costello, Ms. Bean, Mrs. Biggert, Mr. Jackson 
  of Illinois, Mr. Rush, Mrs. Halvorson, Mr. Johnson of Illinois, Mr. 
Roskam, Ms. Schakowsky, Mr. Rohrabacher, Mr. Garrett of New Jersey, Mr. 
 Ehlers, Mr. Gohmert, Mr. Hensarling, Mrs. Dahlkemper, Mr. Platts, Ms. 
 Kosmas, Mr. Paul, Ms. Markey of Colorado, Mr. Bartlett, Mr. Minnick, 
   Mr. Jordan of Ohio, Mr. Sensenbrenner, Mr. Ryan of Wisconsin, Mr. 
  Costa, Ms. Herseth Sandlin, Mr. Bachus, Mr. Flake, Mr. Cantor, Mr. 
  Moran of Kansas, Mr. LaTourette, and Mrs. Bachmann) introduced the 
 following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Oversight and 
                           Government Reform

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located 
at 405 West Second Street in Dixon, Illinois, as the ``President Ronald 
                   W. Reagan Post Office Building''.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. PRESIDENT RONALD W. REAGAN POST OFFICE BUILDING.

    (a) Designation.--The facility of the United States Postal Service 
located at 405 West Second Street in Dixon, Illinois, shall be known 
and designated as the ``President Ronald W. Reagan Post Office 
Building''.
    (b) References.--Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document, 
paper, or other record of the United States to the facility referred to 
in subsection (a) shall be deemed to be a reference to the ``President 
Ronald W. Reagan Post Office Building''.
                                 <all>
```
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER

I, William T. Freeman, Chief Executive Officer, in connection with the Report on Form 10-Q of McCormick & Schmicks Seafood
Restaurants, Inc. for the quarterly period ended March 27, 2010 (the Report), hereby certify in accordance with 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

1. The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

2. The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of
McCormick & Schmicks Seafood Restaurants, Inc.



|                       
|-----------------------
|/s/ WILLIAM T. FREEMAN 
|William T. Freeman     
|Chief Executive Officer

Dated: May 5, 2010
# C_2007103EN.01000301.xml

| 8.5.2007 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 103/3 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

8.5.2007

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 103/3

---

COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION

COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION

of 19 March 2007

concerning the discharge to be given to the Commission in respect of the implementation of the operations of the European Development Fund (Eighth EDF) for the financial year 2005

(2007/C 103/03)

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community,

Having regard to the Fourth ACP-EC Convention, signed at Lomé on 15 December 1989 (1), as amended by the Agreement signed in Mauritius on 4 November 1995 (2),

1

2

Having regard to the Internal Agreement on the financing and administration of the Community aid under the Second Financial Protocol to the fourth ACP-EC Convention (3) setting up, amongst others, the Eighth European Development Fund (Eighth EDF), and in particular Article 33(3) of that Agreement,

3

Having regard to the Financial Regulation of 16 June 1998 applicable to development finance cooperation under the Fourth ACP-EC Convention (4), and in particular Articles 66 to 74 thereof,

4

Having examined the revenue and expenditure account and the balance sheet relating to the operations of the Eighth EDF as at 31 December 2005, and the Court of Auditors' report concerning the financial year 2005 together with the Commission's replies (5),

5

Whereas

| (1) | Pursuant to Article 33(3) of the said Internal Agreement, the discharge for the financial management of the Eighth EDF is to be given to the Commission by the European Parliament on the recommendation of the Council. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

Pursuant to Article 33(3) of the said Internal Agreement, the discharge for the financial management of the Eighth EDF is to be given to the Commission by the European Parliament on the recommendation of the Council.

| (2) | The overall implementation by the Commission of the operations of the Eighth EDF during the financial year 2005 has been satisfactory, |
| --- | --- |

(2)

The overall implementation by the Commission of the operations of the Eighth EDF during the financial year 2005 has been satisfactory,

HEREBY RECOMMENDS that the European Parliament give the Commission a discharge in respect of the implementation of the operations of the Eighth EDF for the financial year 2005.

Done at Brussels, on 19 March 2007.

For the Council

The President

H. SEEHOFER

---

(1)  OJ L 229, 17.8.1991, p. 3.

1

(2)  OJ L 156, 29.5.1998, p. 3.

2

(3)  OJ L 156, 29.5.1998, p. 108.

3

(4)  OJ L 191, 7.7.1998, p. 53.

4

(5)  OJ C 263, 31.10.2006, p. 205.

5

---
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MARTIN PEARSON, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE, LLC; et al., 

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 16-56837 

D.C. No. 5:16-cv-01079-CAS-AJW 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Christina A. Snyder, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted October 23, 2017**

Before: McKEOWN, WATFORD, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.

Martin Pearson appeals pro se from the district court’s order dismissing his 

action alleging federal and state law claims related to the foreclosure of his 

property. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a 

dismissal on the basis of res judicata. Manufactured Home Cmtys. Inc. v. City of 

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

NOV 9 2017

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 16-56837 

San Jose, 420 F.3d 1022, 1025 (9th Cir. 2005). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Pearson’s action as barred by the 

doctrine of res judicata because his claims were raised, or could have been raised, 

in a prior state court action that resulted in a final judgment. See Adam Bros. 

Farming, Inc. v. County of Santa Barbara, 604 F.3d 1142, 1148-49 (9th Cir. 

2010) (setting forth elements of res judicata under California law); see also 

Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1268 (9th Cir. 2009) (“If two actions involve the 

same injury to the plaintiff and the same wrong by the defendant, then the same 

primary right is at stake even if in the second suit the plaintiff pleads different 

theories of recovery, seeks different forms of relief and/or adds new facts 

supporting recovery.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); City of 

Martinez v. Texaco Trading & Transp. Inc., 353 F.3d 758, 764 (9th Cir. 2003) 

(privity applies under California law “if a party’s interests are so similar to another 

party’s interests that the latter was the former’s virtual representative in the earlier 

action.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Pearson’s action 

without leave to amend because amendment would have been futile. See

Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011)

(setting forth standard of review and explaining that a district court can dismiss 

without leave to amend where amendment would be futile).
3 16-56837 

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Pearson’s motion 

for default judgment. See Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986) 

(setting forth standard of review and factors for entry of default judgment, and 

noting the strong policy in favor of deciding cases on their merits); Aldabe v. 

Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092-93 (9th Cir. 1980) (affirming denial of default 

judgment based on “the lack of merit in” plaintiff’s underlying claims).

AFFIRMED.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5

<S>                                            <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                  3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                                 APR-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                                   JUN-30-1999
<CASH>                                         7,934,471
<SECURITIES>                                   0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  2,004,656
<ALLOWANCES>                                   0
<INVENTORY>                                    0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               14,474,809
<PP&E>                                         68,064,862
<DEPRECIATION>                                 44,239,085
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 46,379,688
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          2,856,830
<BONDS>                                        0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                          0
<PREFERRED>                                    0
<COMMON>                                       0
<OTHER-SE>                                     0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   46,379,688
<SALES>                                        0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               7,957,765
<CGS>                                          0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               4,111,176
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             431,196
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                0
<INCOME-TAX>                                   0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            0
<DISCONTINUED>                                 3,415,393
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                5,621,956
<CHANGES>                                      0
<NET-INCOME>                                   9,037,349
<EPS-BASIC>                                  0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  0



</TABLE>
Opinion issued May 9 , 2013

In The 

## Court of Appeals
For The 

## First District of Texas

NO. 01
- 13
- 00125
- CV

IN THE INTEREST OF D .C., AKA D.R. C. , III , a Child

On Appeal from the 315th District Court

Harris County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 2011
- 04925J

M EMORANDUM OPINION This is an appeal from a judgment signed February 7, 2013

. On April 5,
2013 , the parties filed a joint motion to dismiss the appeal because the trial court
set aside the February 7, 2013 judgment by order signed and entered March 6,
2013

. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 42.1. No opinion has issued. Accordingly, we grant the2

motion and dismiss the appeal. See id. We dismiss all other pending motions as

moot.
PER CURIAM Panel consists of Justices Keyes, Sharp, and Huddle.
United States Department of Labor

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

__________________________________________

C.G., Appellant

and

U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, PROCESSING & 

DISTRIBUTION CENTER, Tampa, FL, 

Employer

__________________________________________

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Docket No. 21-1408

Issued: June 21, 2022

Appearances: Case Submitted on the Record

Appellant, pro se

Office of Solicitor, for the Director

ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL

Before:

PATRICIA H. FITZGERALD, Deputy Chief Judge

JANICE B. ASKIN, Judge

JAMES D. MCGINLEY, Alternate Judge

On September 20, 2021 appellant filed a timely appeal from August 25 and September 8, 

2021 merit decisions of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). The Clerk of 

the Appellate Boards assigned Docket No. 21-1408. 

The Board, having duly considered the matter in Docket No. 21-1408, notes that the Board 

has jurisdiction to review final adverse decisions of OWCP issued under the Federal Employees’

Compensation Act.1 The case record as transmitted to the Board does not contain a final adverse 

decision of OWCP issued within 180 days from the date of docketing of the current appeal. 2 In 

the August 25, 2021 decision, an OWCP hearing representative set aside a February 4, 2021 

preliminary overpayment decision of OWCP and remanded the case for a de novo preliminary 

overpayment decision with regard to the period of April 6, 2017 through April 28, 2018. On 

September 8, 2021 OWCPissued its de novo preliminary overpayment determination. Neither the 

August 25, 2021 decision nor the September 8, 2021 preliminary overpayment determination 

1

5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.; 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3(a).

2

Id. at § 501.3(e) provides in pertinent part: Any notice of appeal must be filed within 180 days from the date of 

issuance of a decision of OWCP. See also supra note 1.
2

constitute a final adverse decision.3 As there is no final adverse decision issued by OWCP over 

which the Board may properly exercise jurisdiction, the Board concludes that the appeal docketed 

as No. 21-1408 must be dismissed. Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the appeal docketed as No. 21-1408 is dismissed.

Issued: June 21, 2022

Washington, DC

Patricia H. Fitzgerald, Deputy Chief Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Janice B. Askin, Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

James D. McGinley, Alternate Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

3

See G.T., Docket No. 21-0199 (issued December 1, 2021).
Exhibit 11


             INTERNATIONAL MULTIFOODS CORPORATION AND SUBSIDIARIES

                Computation of Earnings (Loss) per Common Share
                                   (unaudited)

                    (in thousands, except per share amounts)



<TABLE>
                                      THREE MONTHS ENDED     NINE MONTHS ENDED 
                                     --------------------   --------------------
                                     Nov. 30,    Nov. 30,     Nov. 30,   Nov. 30,
                                        1998        1997         1998       1997
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
<C>                                  <S>         <S>          <S>        <S>
Average shares of 
  common stock outstanding            18,743      18,570       18,758     18,273
Dilutive potential common shares          27         295            -        243
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Average shares outstanding 
  assuming full dilution              18,770      18,865       18,758     18,516
================================================================================
Earnings (loss) from continuing
  operations                         $ 9,815     $13,083    $    (212)   $20,096
Loss from discontinued operations     (7,244)     (3,672)    (136,166)    (4,146)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Net earnings (loss)
  applicable to common stock         $ 2,571     $ 9,411    $(136,378)   $15,950
================================================================================

Basic earnings (loss) per share:
  Continuing operations              $   .52     $   .70    $    (.01)   $  1.10
  Discontinued operations               (.38)       (.19)       (7.26)      (.23)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Total                            $   .14     $   .51    $   (7.27)   $   .87
====================================================================================

Diluted earnings (loss) per share:
  Continuing operations              $   .52     $   .69    $    (.01)   $  1.09
  Discontinued operations               (.38)       (.19)       (7.26)      (.23)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Total                            $   .14     $   .50    $   (7.27)   $   .86
================================================================================


Basic earnings (loss) per share are computed by dividing net earnings (loss) by the 
weighted average number of shares of common stock outstanding during the period.

Diluted earnings per share are computed similar to basic earnings per share except that 
the weighted average shares outstanding are increased to include additional shares from 
the assumed exercise of stock options, if dilutive.  The number of additional shares is 
calculated by assuming that outstanding stock options were exercised and the proceeds 
from such exercises were used to acquire shares of common stock at the average market 
price during the period.



</TABLE>