SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-5334-16T1

THE BANK OF NEW YORK 

MELLON, f/k/a THE BANK OF 

NEW YORK, AS TRUSTEE 

(CWALT 2006-36T2),

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

MARIANNE CORRADETTI and 

ANTHONY CORRADETTI, h/w, 

Defendants-Respondents, 

and 

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, 

Defendant.

______________________________

Argued October 17, 2018 – Decided

Before Judges Fuentes, Accurso and Vernoia

(Judge Accurso dissenting).

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Cape May County, Docket No. F053052-14.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

January 6, 2020

APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION

February 4, 2021

APPELLATE DIVISION
2

A-5334-16T1

Michael R. O'Donnell argued the cause for appellant 

(Riker Danzig Scherer Hyland & Perretti, LLP, and 

KML Law Group, PC, attorneys; Michael R. 

O'Donnell, of counsel; Ronald Z. Ahrens and Clarissa

Anne Gomez, on the briefs).

Randolph C. Lafferty argued the cause for respondents

(Cooper Levenson PA, attorneys; Randolph C. 

Lafferty, Yolanda N. Melville, and Jennifer Broeck 

Barr, on the brief).

The opinion of the court was delivered by

VERNOIA, J.A.D.

In this mortgage foreclosure action, plaintiff Bank of New York Mellon 

f/k/a The Bank of New York, as Trustee (CWALT 2006-36T2), appeals from 

Chancery Division orders denying its motions for summary judgment and 

reconsideration, and from a July 26, 2017 amended final judgment entered 

after a bench trial in favor of defendants Marianne and Anthony Corradetti 

dismissing the complaint and invalidating and extinguishing plaintiff's 

purported $1,779,000 mortgage on defendants' Ocean City property. We 

affirm in part and remand in part.

I.

In 1992, defendants, who are husband and wife, purchased residential 

property in Ocean City for $525,000. They executed a purchase money 
3

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mortgage in favor of New Jersey National Bank to secure a $400,000 loan. 

The mortgage was canceled on January 25, 1994. 

In 2000, defendants mortgaged the property to Commerce Bank to 

secure a $2,300,000 loan. Three years later, defendants gave mortgages on the 

property to World Savings Bank (WSB) to secure a $500,000 loan and to 

Commerce Bank to secure a $2,300,000 loan. The Commerce Bank mortgage

from 2000 was then canceled. 

The purported transaction at the center of this appeal took place in 

September 2006. A $1,779,000 promissory note in favor of plaintiff's 

predecessor in interest, Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (Countrywide), was 

allegedly signed by defendant Marianne Corradetti on September 25, 2006. A 

mortgage was allegedly signed by defendants that same day in favor of 

Countrywide to secure the putative $1,779,000 loan to Marianne Corradetti.1 

Defendants' purported signatures on the mortgage are notarized by "Robert A. 

Citarelli" on "September 25, 2006."

A HUD-1 Settlement Statement allegedly prepared in connection with 

the transaction reflects a September 25, 2006 settlement date for the closing 

and contains defendants' purported signatures, each of which is followed by a 

1

 The mortgage was recorded with the Cape May County Clerk on October 3, 

2006. 
4

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handwritten date of September 25, 2006. The HUD-1 statement indicates 

defendants were required to pay $8840.26 at the loan closing. The HUD-1 

statement further reflects that proceeds from the loan were remitted by 

Countrywide's settlement agent, Boardwalk Title Agency, Inc., to pay the 

balances due on defendants' 2003 loans from WSB ($407,000) and Commerce 

Bank ($1,352,059.25), as well as local and state taxes. 

Three weeks after the purported mortgage loan transaction, WSB 

acknowledged it received "full payment and satisfaction" of its 2003 mortgage 

on defendants' property and discharged the mortgage. The discharge of WSB's 

mortgage was recorded on October 20, 2006. 

Two weeks later, on November 6, 2006, Commerce Bank filed a 

discharge of its 2003 mortgage on defendants' property. The discharge states 

the 2003 mortgage was "fully paid and satisfied."

Plaintiff filed a foreclosure complaint in 2014 alleging it is the successor 

in interest to Countrywide by assignment.2 The complaint alleged defendant 

2

 The 2006 mortgage was assigned on behalf of Countrywide to the Bank of 

New York Mellon f/k/a The Bank of New York as Trustee for the Benefit of 

the Certificate Holders of the CWALT, Inc., Alternative Loan Trust 2006-

36T2, Mortgage Pass Through Certificates, Series 2006-36T2. The assignment 

of mortgage was recorded on November 17, 2009. The mortgage was then 

assigned to plaintiff by way of an assignment of mortgage recorded on 

February 14, 2014. The assignment of the mortgage to plaintiff occurred prior 

(continued)
5

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Marianne Corradetti received a $1,779,000 loan from Countrywide and 

executed a promissory note in that amount in Countrywide's favor on 

September 25, 2006. The complaint further asserted defendants granted 

Countrywide a mortgage on their Ocean City property to secure payment of the 

note. The complaint averred defendants failed to make an installment payment 

that was due on April 1, 2009, and remained in default thereafter.

Defendants filed a contesting answer which, in pertinent part, denied that 

Marianne Corradetti signed the promissory note and that defendants signed the 

mortgage. Defendants asserted the "signatures on the mortgage and note are 

forgeries and not the signatures of Marianne Corradetti and Anthony 

Corradetti." 

In 2015, plaintiff filed an amended complaint adding claims against 

defendants for equitable subrogation, an equitable lien and unjust enrichment. 

Defendants filed a contesting answer to the amended complaint, again 

asserting the signatures on the note and mortgage were forgeries. Defendants 

(continued)

to the filing of the foreclosure complaint, and plaintiff possessed the 

promissory note when the complaint was filed.
6

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also filed a third-party complaint against Boardwalk Title Agency, Inc. and 

Robert A. Citarelli.3 

Plaintiff subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment. In support 

of the motion, plaintiff presented a statement of material facts asserting 

Marianne Corradetti signed the 2006 promissory note to Countrywide, both 

defendants signed the mortgage, and defendants defaulted on April 1, 2009. 

Plaintiff further asserted the HUD-1 statement showed portions of the loan 

proceeds would be used to pay the 2003 WSB and Commerce Bank loans, and 

the mortgages securing those loans were discharged within six weeks of the 

September 25, 2006 loan transaction. Plaintiff relied on exemplars of 

defendants' purported signatures on various documents, Marianne Corradetti's 

deposition testimony about the signatures, and a report from an expert forensic 

document examiner who opined, within a reasonable degree of scientific 

certainty, that the signatures on the 2006 note and mortgage to Countrywide 

were defendants'.

3

 In August 2015, plaintiff filed a second amended complaint adding 

Boardwalk Title Agency, Inc., and Robert A. Citarelli as defendants and 

asserting separate claims against them. There is no evidence in the record on 

appeal that they were served with defendants' third-party complaint or 

plaintiff's second amended complaint. They did not participate in the 

proceedings before the trial court and have not entered an appearance in this 

appeal.
7

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Defendants submitted opposition to plaintiff's motion and filed a crossmotion for summary judgment, claiming they were entitled to dismissal of the 

foreclosure complaint because the evidence established their signatures on the 

documents were forgeries and the note and mortgage were therefore invalid. 

Defendants produced evidence showing they were on a religious pilgrimage in 

Croatia on September 25, 2006—the date the Countrywide loan and mortgage 

allegedly closed and the HUD-1 was signed—and did not return to the United 

States until September 26, 2006. Marianne Corradetti asserted the signatures 

on the HUD-1 and note, dated September 25, 2006, and on the mortgage, 

which was notarized on September 25, 2006, could not be hers or her 

husband's because they were in Croatia on that date.

Defendants admitted the HUD-1 "reflects" that proceeds from the 

disputed loan were "allegedly used" to pay off the WSB and Commerce Bank 

loans and taxes defendants owed to the Ocean County Tax Collector and the 

New Jersey Division of Taxation, but denied signing the HUD-1. Defendants 

further admitted the WSB mortgage was discharged in October 2006 and the 

Commerce Bank mortgage was discharged in November 2006, but denied they 

were aware "that any payment was made to" either WSB or Commerce Bank 

by Countrywide during 2006.
8

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Defendants also submitted a certification from a physician explaining 

that Anthony Corradetti could not provide any information concerning the 

facts pertinent to the matter because he suffers from Alzheimer's disease. 

After hearing oral argument, the court issued a written opinion 

explaining plaintiff's foreclosure action is based on a mortgage and note that 

were purportedly executed on September 25, 2006, but defendants produced 

evidence showing they could not have executed the documents on that date 

because they were in Croatia. The court rejected plaintiff's reliance on a 

certification from a representative of Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC 

(Bayview), the company plaintiff used to service its mortgage loans. The 

certification incorporated computer records obtained from Countrywide's loan 

servicing provider, Bank of America, that showed thirty payments were made 

on the loan from November 2006 through March 2009. Plaintiff claimed the 

payments confirmed defendants executed the note and mortgage or otherwise 

established defendants ratified the note and mortgage. The court rejected 

plaintiff's reliance on the certification and records, finding neither stated nor 

established defendants made any of the payments.

The court denied plaintiff's motion and defendants' cross-motion for 

summary judgment, finding there was a genuine issue of material fact as to 

whether defendants executed the note and mortgage and, therefore, whether the 
9

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documents were valid. The court denied defendants' summary judgment

motion, finding that when the facts were viewed in the light most favorable to 

plaintiff, there was evidence supporting plaintiff's claim defendants signed the 

documents. The court also found, because there were genuine issues of 

material fact as to whether the purported mortgage was valid and whether the 

purported mortgage proceeds were used to pay off defendants' existing 

mortgages, it could not grant plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on its

mortgage foreclosure, equitable subrogation, equitable lien and unjust 

enrichment claims. The court entered a December 14, 2016 order denying 

plaintiff's summary judgment motion and defendants' cross-motion.

Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing the court erred by 

denying summary judgment on its equitable subrogation claim. Plaintiff 

supplied the court with an unpublished Appellate Division decision that 

plaintiff asserted permitted application of equitable subrogation under the 

circumstances presented here. The court concluded the doctrine of equitable 

subrogation does not convert an invalid mortgage into a valid mortgage, and 

there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the September 25, 

2006 mortgage is valid. The court also reasoned that if plaintiff established

the September 25, 2006 mortgage is valid, application of equitable subrogation 

would be unnecessary because plaintiff would have a first mortgage on 
10 A-5334-16T1

defendants' property and would be able to proceed with the foreclosure. The 

court entered a February 3, 2017 order denying the reconsideration motion.

At the bench trial that followed, plaintiff presented a single witness in 

support of its foreclosure, equitable mortgage, equitable subrogation, and 

unjust enrichment claims. James D'Orlando testified he is a litigation manager 

at Bayview. He explained Bayview's practice of conducting a 132-point data 

check to verify the information contained in the loan and mortgage documents 

supplied by the prior loan service provider before Bayview's assumption of the 

servicing of the loan, and testified this process was followed when Bayview 

took over the servicing of the purported 2006 loan from Bank of America in 

October 2012. However, D'Orlando conceded he had no personal knowledge 

regarding the purported September 25, 2006 mortgage transaction or the data 

check performed on the 2006 loan documents, and was not involved in the 

processing of the loan and mortgage, never spoke to anyone concerning the 

transaction, and had no knowledge of whether defendants actually signed the 

note, mortgage, HUD-1 statement or any other documents related to the 

mortgage loan. His knowledge was limited to his review of Bayview's records 

pertaining to the mortgage and the records Bayview received from Bank of 

America. 
11 A-5334-16T1

D'Orlando's substantive testimony was limited to his identification of 

documents in Bayview's loan serving file: the original September 25, 2006 

Countrywide note, which contains Marianne Corradetti's purported signature; 

the September 25, 2006 mortgage, which lists defendants as the borrowers and 

includes their purported signatures; a September 25, 2006 HUD-1 statement 

which bears defendants' purported signatures; Bank of America's letter to 

Corradetti and enclosed list of thirty payments on the loan from October 2, 

2006, through April 30, 2010, as well as other taxes and fees (the payment 

history); the "BAC Fee Transaction Histories Prior to Bayview"; a list of 201 

transactions from October 20, 2010, through October 2, 2012; a one-page 

untitled document containing fifteen transactions of a similar nature to, but 

different from those in, the "BAC Fee Transaction Histories Prior to Bayview" 

from April 19, 2011, through October 15, 2012; and the "Bayview Customer 

Activity Statement," which lists taxes, fees, and insurance premiums paid on 

defendants' property from October 25, 2012, through May 19, 2017. 

D'Orlando further explained the September 25, 2006 loan closing was for a 

mortgage refinance. 

The court admitted the documents in evidence, as well as others related 

to defendants' 1992 purchase of the Ocean City property, including the 

cancellation of the original purchase money mortgage, the subsequent 2000 
12 A-5334-16T1

mortgage to Commerce Bank and its cancellation in 2003, and the 2003 

mortgages to WSB and Commerce Bank and their cancellations during the sixweek period following the purported September 25, 2006 loan and mortgage 

closing. 

The court also admitted in evidence a November 2, 2009 foreclosure

complaint plaintiff filed against defendants, which was subsequently 

"voluntarily dismissed," plaintiff's motion for entry of a final judgment of 

foreclosure in that matter,

4

and a letter allegedly submitted by defendants in 

response to plaintiff's request for final judgment in that matter. The letter 

stated, "You are hereby notified that I object to the entry of a final judgment in 

the above referenced matter[.] I disagree and dispute the amount that you 

show as amount owed." The letter bears defendants' purported signatures.

Plaintiff rested without calling any other witnesses or presenting any 

other evidence. Although in support of its summary judgment motion plaintiff 

provided an expert report opining that the disputed signatures on the loan and 

mortgage closing documents were defendants', it did not present any expert or 

lay opinion testimony at trial concerning the signatures on any of the

documents admitted in evidence. In addition, although the court noted in its 

4

 The circumstances of that filing and subsequent voluntary dismissal are 

unclear from the record.
13 A-5334-16T1

decision denying summary judgment that there was no evidence establishing 

defendants made any of the purported thirty loan payments from November 

2006 through March 2009 reflected in the payment history, plaintiff failed to 

present any evidence at trial showing defendants made any of the thirty 

payments on the loan or paid the $8840.26 due and owing at the September 25, 

2006 closing as indicated on the HUD-1 statement.5 Nor did plaintiff produce 

records from WSB or Commerce Bank showing the source of the 2006 

payments that satisfied defendants' 2003 mortgages, the amounts of the 

payments that were accepted in satisfaction of those mortgages or that the 

payments were made by Countrywide or its settlement agent, Boardwalk Title 

Agency, Inc.

6

The defense called defendant Marianne Corradetti as its sole witness. 

She testified that she and her husband attended a religious pilgrimage in 

5

 For example, plaintiff did not present bank records from defendants' 

accounts showing they made any of the purported mortgage payments. The 

HUD-1 statement, which the court found was forged, indicated that $8840.26 

was due and owing from defendants at the September 25, 2006 closing, but 

plaintiff did not present any evidence from defendants' bank records showing 

they ever made such a payment. 

6

 Our dissenting colleague correctly points out that the record presented in 

support of plaintiff's summary judgment motion included other putative 

evidence related to the mortgages. See Post at __, __ (slip op. at 1, n.1, and 9, 

n.7). But that evidence was not introduced at trial and cannot be properly 

considered in assessing the validity of the trial court's fact findings. 
14 A-5334-16T1

Croatia from September 18, 2006, through September 26, 2006. She further 

identified her and her husband's passports, which showed they were not in the 

United States on September 25, 2006, when the purported loan and mortgage 

closing took place, and that they did not return until September 26, 2006. A 

copy of defendants' itinerary for the 2006 Croatia trip, their passports and 

photographs of defendants on the trip were admitted in evidence. 

Marianne Corradetti denied the signatures on the loan and mortgage 

documents were hers or her husband's and testified that she never authorized 

anyone to sign them on her behalf.7 She stated she never dealt with 

Countrywide, never granted Countrywide a mortgage on the Ocean City 

property, and "would have never" agreed to place a mortgage on the property 

because it was her "dream house." She further testified that her husband told 

her they were "free and clear" of any mortgage, and she was "unaware that [the 

property] was mortgaged."

Marianne Corradetti testified that her husband handled the family's 

finances and business dealings without her involvement. She denied making 

any of the mortgage payments reflected in the Bank of America payment 

7

 At times, Marianne Corradetti gave conflicting testimony concerning the 

authenticity of her and her husband's purported signatures on various 

documents shown to her.
15 A-5334-16T1

history or otherwise writing checks toward any mortgage payments for the 

property. She was aware of the $2,300,000 mortgage made to Commerce Bank 

in 2000, but had no knowledge as to how it was paid. 

The court subsequently issued a detailed written decision finding 

D'Orlando provided no information "based on his own knowledge with regard 

to the closing" and provided only "the minimum testimony necessary to get the 

records into evidence pursuant to the business records exception" to the 

hearsay rule. See N.J.R.E. 803(c)(6). The court explained D'Orlando's 

testimony was imprecise—at times he testified Bayview did a 130-point data 

check, and at others he referred to it as a 132-point data check—and found 

D'Orlando's testimony beyond "what records are in the Bayview file" was not 

credible because it was not based on his personal knowledge. 8 

Persuaded by the evidence showing defendants did not return to the 

United States until September 26, 2006, the court found credible Marianne 

Corradetti's testimony that she and her husband did not sign the September 25, 

2006 note, mortgage and HUD-1 statement. The court concluded the mortgage 

documents were forgeries and noted plaintiff did not present any credible

8

 For example, D'Orlando testified defendants made the thirty loan payments 

reflected in the Bayview records. That information, however, is not contained 

in the Bank of America records. Those records do not identify the source of 

the payments.
16 A-5334-16T1

evidence establishing that defendants signed the mortgage, note and HUD-1 

"on any day other than September 25, 2006," the notary public was "negligent 

or unscrupulous," or "defendants authorized someone else to sign their names 

for them, to act as their amanuensis." The court also found credible Marianne 

Corradetti's testimony that she believed the property was "free and clear" of 

any mortgage, "she had no knowledge of the subject mortgage . . . never dealt 

with Countrywide, and . . . never was aware of any prior foreclosure."

The court determined "defendants . . . provided clear, satisfactory and 

convincing evidence to overcome any presumption of authenticity offered by 

the notarial seal" in the mortgage documents. The court further found it was 

"enough that defendants show[ed] by clear and convincing evidence that they 

did not sign the documents to be relieved of the obligations of the" mortgage, 

concluded the legal effect of the forgeries invalidated the mortgage, and 

declared the mortgage "void ab initio, canceled, or extinguished." 

The court also concluded plaintiff failed to present any credible evidence 

establishing an agreement between defendants and Countrywide. The court 

rejected plaintiff's argument "that the payment history" for the 2006 loan 

establishes "a ratification of the mortgage" and "an agreement between 

Countrywide and defendants" and found plaintiff failed to produce any 

credible evidence showing defendants actually made the purported payments 
17 A-5334-16T1

reflected in the payment history. The court rejected D'Orlando's testimony 

regarding the payment history as "not convincing, and . . . not credible"

because D'Orlando "never testified how payments were verified, the payment 

dates, the number of payments and amount of payments that were made on"

the mortgage, "could not testify to the information contained in the document,"

and provided conclusory testimony that the information contained in the 

document was true. The court reasoned that whoever forged the mortgage 

documents may have made the payments to cover up the forgeries, and 

plaintiff failed to present any evidence showing defendants actually made any 

payments. The only documents plaintiff presented that the court found reliable 

were those in Bayview's file showing taxes, fees, and insurance premiums paid 

on defendant's property following the purported default. 

Moreover, the court found plaintiff failed to present any evidence the 

September 25, 2006 mortgage loan proceeds were actually "used to satisfy the 

[WSB] and Commerce Bank mortgages." The court found the filed 

satisfactions of the mortgages constituted "evidence that the two mortgages 

were satisfied," but not by whom. The court observed that plaintiff did not 

produce the original WSB mortgage, and the only evidence concerning WSB is 

a recorded satisfaction of the mortgage that does not include any reference to 

Countrywide, Bayview or a payoff amount. Similarly, the court noted the 
18 A-5334-16T1

Commerce Bank satisfaction makes no mention of Countrywide or Boardwalk 

Title Agency, Inc. The court rejected the HUD-1 statement as persuasive 

evidence establishing the loan proceeds were used to pay the WSB and 

Commerce Bank mortgages because "it too contains a forged signature and it 

too is an invalid document." 

The court also rejected plaintiff's reliance on the November 2, 2009 

letter purportedly sent by defendants in response to plaintiff's request for entry 

of a final judgment in the 2009 foreclosure action. Plaintiff argued the letter 

only disputed the amount due claimed by plaintiff in the foreclosure action and 

thus constituted an admission plaintiff had a valid mortgage on the property. 

The court found that the letter, even if written by defendants, disputed not only 

the amount allegedly due but also challenged entry of a final judgment and 

therefore contested plaintiff's right to foreclose.

The court further rejected plaintiff's argument supporting the existence 

of a mortgage under equitable doctrines, finding there was no evidence of 

ratification and that the doctrines of waiver, equitable estoppel, and equitable 

subrogation did not apply. The court found plaintiff erroneously attempted "to 

use equitable subrogation to transform an invalid mortgage into a valid 

mortgage." The court further observed that "no New Jersey case has applied 

equitable subrogation where the adverse party is the fee simple owner of the"
19 A-5334-16T1

property at issue. The court declined to create an equitable mortgage because 

"there is no evidence of an agreement between defendants and Countrywide." 

Last, the court declined to find defendants were unjustly enriched 

because plaintiff did not present "evidence [establishing] that Countrywide 

money was used to satisfy the [Commerce Bank and WSB] mortgages." The 

court held that without credible evidence the proceeds from the purported 

September 25, 2006 transaction were used to satisfy the two mortgages, there 

is no basis to conclude defendants received a benefit from plaintiff or 

plaintiff's predecessor. The court found the HUD-1 signatures were forged,

and, therefore, the HUD-1 statement is invalid and did not establish any 

proceeds were used to satisfy the mortgages. Plaintiff presented no other 

credible evidence the loan proceeds were actually used to satisfy the 

mortgages. 

The court determined "[l]enders have an obligation to do everything 

correctly because their remedy has significant consequences to real people; 

their remedy is ultimately to take someone's home." The court concluded that 

plaintiff "failed to exercise due diligence" and had "bad paper: an invalid 

mortgage, an invalid note, and an invalid HUD-1." 

The court entered a June 30, 2017 order granting judgment in 

defendants' favor and dismissing plaintiff's complaint. The court then filed an 
20 A-5334-16T1

amended order dated July 26, 2017, entering judgment in favor of defendants 

and invalidating the September 2006 Countrywide mortgage and note. This 

appeal followed.

II.

Plaintiff first argues the court erred by denying its motions for summary 

judgment and reconsideration. More specifically, it contends the undisputed 

facts presented in support of its summary judgment motion established it is 

entitled to a lien on defendants' property under the doctrine of equitable 

subrogation because the proceeds from the September 25, 2006 mortgage loan 

transaction were used to pay the balances due under the 2003 WSB and 

Commerce Bank mortgage loans. Plaintiff contends the court erred by finding 

the doctrine is not applicable where loan funds are paid from an allegedly 

invalid mortgage loan and cannot be applied against a fee simple ownership 

interest.

We review a grant or denial of summary judgment de novo and apply the 

same standard as the trial court. See State v. Perini Corp., 221 N.J. 412, 425 

(2015). We "must view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving 

party, which in this case" is defendants. Bauer v. Nesbitt, 198 N.J. 601, 605 

n.1 (2009). The moving party must show there is "no genuine issue as to any 

material fact challenged and that [it] is entitled to a judgment . . . as a matter of 
21 A-5334-16T1

law." Burnett v. Gloucester Cty. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 409 N.J. Super. 

219, 228 (App. Div. 2009) (quoting R. 4:46-2(c)). Measured against these 

well-established principles, we affirm the court's denial of plaintiff's summary 

judgment motion on its equitable subrogation claim.

Under the doctrine of equitable subrogation, "[a] refinancing lender 

whose security turns out to be defective is subrogated by equitable assignment 

'to the position of the lender whose lien is discharged by the proceeds of the 

later loan, there being no prejudice to or justified reliance by a party in adverse 

interest[.]'" Equity Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Chi. Title Ins. Co., 190 N.J. Super. 

340, 342 (App. Div. 1983) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). Thus, to 

succeed under the doctrine of equitable subrogation, the refinancing lender 

must establish that the proceeds of its loan were used to satisfy the lien of the 

prior lienholder. Ibid.

Here, the motion court correctly denied plaintiff's summary judgment 

motion on its equitable subrogation claim because there was a genuine issue of 

material fact as to whether the proceeds from the September 25, 2006 

mortgage loan were used to satisfy the WSB and Commerce Bank mortgage 

loans. Plaintiff did not present any direct evidence showing that funds from

the purported September 25, 2006 transaction were used to satisfy the WSB 

and Commerce Bank mortgage loans. Instead, plaintiff relied on the HUD-1 
22 A-5334-16T1

statement to establish the mortgage loan proceeds were used to satisfy those 

loans. But defendants presented evidence establishing they did not sign the 

HUD-1 statement; they were out of the country and otherwise challenged the 

authenticity of the signatures.9 

Similarly, plaintiff relied on the cancellation of the WSB and Commerce 

Bank mortgages within weeks of the purported September 25, 2006 transaction 

to support its claim it was entitled to summary judgment on its equitable 

subrogation claim. But again defendants denied their participation in the 

transaction, and plaintiff failed to present competent evidence showing that as 

a matter of undisputed fact the proceeds from the transaction were actually 

used to satisfy the WSB and Commerce Bank mortgage loans.

Although plaintiff presented evidence of many circumstances supporting 

its claim the proceeds were used to satisfy the prior mortgage loans, resolution 

of the issue depended upon a weighing of the evidence and a determination of 

the credibility of the parties' respective evidence and testimony. "In reviewing 

whether or not a genuine issue as to any material fact challenged is presented, 

the motion judge cannot weigh the credibility of the evidence." Petersen v. 

9

 Marianne Corradetti testified at her deposition that she did not recall signing 

the HUD-1 statement and did not recognize her husband's signature on the 

statement. She also testified she was "unsure" if she "recognized" her 

purported signature "to be [her] signature." 
23 A-5334-16T1

Twp. of Raritan, 418 N.J. Super. 125, 132 (App. Div. 2011). Thus, the validity 

of the HUD-1 statement and its credibility as an accurate statement of the 

disposition of the mortgage loan proceeds presented fact issues essential to a 

resolution of plaintiff's claimed entitlement to equitable subrogation, and the 

motion court therefore correctly denied plaintiff's motion for summary 

judgment on its equitable subrogation claim,10 as well as its subsequent motion 

for reconsideration.

III.

Plaintiff also challenges the court's orders, entered after the bench trial, 

dismissing its claims and complaint and declaring the purported Countrywide 

note and mortgage void and invalid. Plaintiff contends the court's decision is 

not supported by substantial credible evidence, is contrary to the credible 

evidence presented and results in a manifest injustice. We are not persuaded.

Our review of "the findings and conclusions of a trial court following a 

bench trial are well-established." Allstate Ins. Co. v. Northfield Med. Ctr., 

P.C., 228 N.J. 596, 619 (2017). We do not "engage in an independent 

10

 Because the motion court correctly determined there was a genuine issue of 

material fact as to one of the essential elements of plaintiff's equitable 

subrogation claim—the refinancing lender's payment of an existing lien—it is 

unnecessary to address plaintiff's argument that the court erred by also finding 

the doctrine of equitable subrogation has no application against a fee simple 

owner or where loan funds are secured by an invalid mortgage.
24 A-5334-16T1

assessment of the evidence as if [we] were the court of first instance," State v. 

Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 471 (1999), and will "not weigh the evidence, assess 

the credibility of witnesses, or make conclusions about the evidence,"

Mountain Hill, L.L.C. v. Twp. of Middletown, 399 N.J. Super. 486, 498 (App. 

Div. 2008) (quoting State v. Barone, 147 N.J. 599, 615 (1997)). Instead, 

[w]e give deference to the trial court that heard the 

witnesses, sifted the competing evidence, and made 

reasoned conclusions. Reviewing appellate courts 

should "not disturb the factual findings and legal 

conclusions of the trial judge" unless convinced that 

those findings and conclusions were "so manifestly 

unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, 

relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend 

the interests of justice."

[Allstate Ins. Co., 228 N.J. at 619 (alteration in 

original) (citations omitted) (quoting Griepenburg v. 

Twp. of Ocean, 220 N.J. 239, 254 (2015)).]

"[W]e defer to the trial court's credibility determinations, because it 

'"hears the case, sees and observes the witnesses, and hears them testify,"

affording it "a better perspective than a reviewing court in evaluating the 

veracity of a witness."'" City Council of Orange Twp. v. Edwards, 455 N.J. 

Super. 261, 272 (App. Div. 2018) (quoting Gnall v. Gnall, 222 N.J. 414, 428 

(2015)). We will not disturb a trial court's findings "unless they are so clearly 

insupportable as to result in their denial of justice." Estate of Ostlund v. 

Ostlund, 391 N.J. Super. 390, 400 (App. Div. 2007). An "appellate court 
25 A-5334-16T1

should exercise its original fact finding jurisdiction sparingly and in none but a 

clear case where there is no doubt about the matter." Seidman v. Clifton Sav. 

Bank, 205 N.J. 150, 169 (2011) (quoting Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 412 

(1998)). We review the trial court's interpretation of law de novo. Manalapan 

Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995).

"Reversal is reserved only for those circumstances when we determine 

the factual findings and legal conclusions of the trial judge went 'so wide of 

the mark that a mistake must have been made.'" Llewelyn v. Shewchuk, 440 

N.J. Super. 207, 214 (App. Div. 2015) (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Family 

Servs. v. M.M., 189 N.J. 261, 279 (2007)). Such a mistake "can arise in many 

ways from manifest lack of inherently credible evidence to support significant 

findings, obvious overlooking or underevaluation of crucial evidence, or a 

clearly unjust result." Pioneer Nat'l Title Ins. Co. v. Lucas, 155 N.J. Super. 

332, 338 (App. Div. 1978). However, "[i]f we are satisfied that the trial 

judge's findings and result could reasonably have been reached on sufficient 

credible evidence in the record as a whole, his [or her] determination should 

not be disturbed." Ibid. "Consequently, when a reviewing court concludes

there is satisfactory evidentiary support for the trial court's findings, 'its task is 

complete and it should not disturb the result[.]'" Elrom v. Elrom, 439 N.J. 
26 A-5334-16T1

Super. 424, 433 (App. Div. 2015) (quoting Beck v. Beck, 86 N.J. 480, 496 

(1981)).

Based on our careful review of the evidentiary record, we cannot 

conclude the court's findings of fact are not supported by sufficient evidence it 

deemed credible. The court's determination that Marianne Corradetti's 

signature on the note and defendants' signatures on the mortgage and HUD-1

were forged is unassailable—the evidence presented at trial establishes

defendants were not in the United States on September 25, 2006, when their 

purported signatures were notarized and all of the documents are dated. 

Plaintiff was aware prior to trial that defendants disputed their participation in 

the alleged September 25, 2006 transaction, as well as their signatures on the 

documents, but it opted not to present any evidence to counter the 

uncontroverted evidence that defendants could neither have been present for

the purported transaction nor executed the documents upon which plaintiff's 

foreclosure and other claims were founded. 

The court's well-supported finding that the purported mortgage 

transaction occurred through the forgery of defendants' signatures on the note, 

mortgage and HUD-1 also reasonably provided the lens through which the 

court viewed the other evidence and the lack of evidence. The court rejected 

plaintiff's reliance on the HUD-1 to establish that proceeds from the 
27 A-5334-16T1

transaction were used to satisfy the WSB and Commence Bank mortgage 

loans; it reasoned a forged document could not, and did not, establish one of 

the essential elements of plaintiff's causes of action—that funds purportedly 

obtained from a forged transaction were actually used to pay off those loans. 

The record amply supports the court's finding that plaintiff failed, and 

woefully so, to present any evidence showing the proceeds from the alleged 

September 25, 2006 transaction were used to satisfy the WSB and Commerce 

Bank loans. Confronted with a purported transaction evidenced only by forged 

documents, the court did not find the evidence, which showed only that the

WSB and Commerce Bank mortgage loans were discharged, established that 

funds from the purported transaction were used for the loan payoffs. Indeed, 

and as the court found, plaintiff failed to present any evidence showing the

source of the funds for the loan payoffs, the identity of the payor or that the 

payoff amounts were those listed in the forged HUD-1. 

Plaintiff also reprises a factual argument it made before the trial court. 

It compares defendants' purported signatures on various documents with those 

they allegedly (but could not have) signed on September 25, 2006, and

contends the court should have found they are all the same. To be sure, the 

signatures on the various documents, including those on the September 25, 

2006 purported note, mortgage and HUD-1 look quite similar, and Marianne 
28 A-5334-16T1

Corradetti's testimony about the signatures was at times contradictory. But 

plaintiff ignores the court's factual finding, which is supported by sufficient 

credible evidence and to which we must defer, that the purported September 

25, 2006 signatures, some of which were notarized, are forgeries. That the 

purported September 25, 2006 signatures may look similar to defendants'

genuine signatures on other documents does not require the conclusion that the

September 25, 2006 signatures are also genuine; as noted, the evidence 

otherwise supports the court's determination that the purported September 25, 

2006 signatures could not have been made by defendants because they were 

not in the United States when the purported transaction took place. 

Plaintiff's trial counsel11 placed a substantial and impossible burden on

its solitary witness, D'Orlando, to establish defendants actually participated in

the mortgage transaction, their signatures on the documents were genuine, the 

proceeds were used to satisfy the WSB and Commerce Bank loans and 

defendants actually made thirty mortgage payments to Countrywide's service 

provider. D'Orlando acknowledged he did not possess a scintilla of personal 

knowledge concerning the alleged September 25, 2006 transaction or any of 

the other circumstances purportedly reflected in the documents he presented,

11

 Plaintiff's trial counsel did not participate in the appeal; plaintiff's appellate 

counsel had no involvement in the trial.
29 A-5334-16T1

and the court otherwise found his lack of knowledge and conflicting statements 

rendered his testimony not credible and the Bank of America payment history

unreliable. D'Orlando, through no fault of his own, provided only the 

minimum testimony necessary to allow a series of documents about which he 

had no substantive knowledge to be admitted in evidence. See, e.g., New 

Century Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Oughla, 437 N.J. Super. 299, 326 (App. Div. 2014) 

(noting that a witness providing the foundation for admission of business 

records need not "possess any personal knowledge of the act or event 

recorded"). 

Plaintiff's case required more. Plaintiff knew defendants denied 

participation in the purported September 25, 2006 transaction, disputed the 

validity of the signatures on the closing documents, contested plaintiff's claim 

the transaction proceeds were used to pay off the WSB and Commerce Bank 

loans and rejected plaintiff's assertion they ratified the mortgage. Plaintiff 

rested its proofs at trial on a witness unarmed with the competent and credible 

evidence necessary to prove plaintiff's case in light of defendants' denials and 

the uncontroverted evidence showing the closing documents were forged. The 

court's finding that the proffered evidence was inadequate is supported by the 

record. 
30 A-5334-16T1

Plaintiff's appellate counsel makes an able and exhaustive effort to 

establish that, despite the lack of credible evidence presented at trial, the court 

should have interpreted the evidence differently. Plaintiff's argument that the 

court should have concluded defendants signed the mortgage documents on a 

day other than September 25, 2006, is undermined by the evidence showing 

the signatures were notarized on that date and Marianne Corradetti's testimony, 

which the court found credible, that neither she nor her husband signed the 

documents. Plaintiff's assertion that defendants received the benefit of the 

alleged transaction because the WSB and Commerce Bank mortgages were 

satisfied from the proceeds ignores that the court determined plaintiff failed to 

present any evidence the court found credible showing the proceeds were

actually used to satisfy those loans. Plaintiff's contention that the documents 

showed defendants made thirty mortgage payments following the loan fails to 

account for the absence of any credible evidence showing defendants actually 

made the payments, and the court's finding that D'Orlando's testimony was not 

credible concerning the reliability of the prior mortgage servicer's payment 

history. 

Plaintiff argues again that the November 2, 2009 letter defendants 

allegedly sent in the 2009 mortgage foreclosure proceeding constituted an 

admission to, or ratification of, the mortgage, but the trial court interpreted the 
31 A-5334-16T1

letter differently, finding that, contrary to plaintiff's proffered interpretation, 

the letter disputed plaintiff's entitlement to a judgment of foreclosure. We do 

not substitute our judgment for the trial court's interpretation of the evidence. 

"When more than one reasonable inference can be drawn from the review of"

documentary evidence, "then the one accepted by a trial court cannot be 

unreasonable" and "the mere substitution of an appellate court's judgment for 

that of the trial court's advances no greater good." State v. S.S., 229 N.J. 360, 

380 (2017). We have reviewed the letter and cannot conclude that, given all of 

the circumstances presented and the court's findings of fact that are supported 

by credible evidence, the court's interpretation is "so clearly mistaken—so 

wide of the mark—that the interests of justice demand intervention." Id. at 

381. 

Plaintiff's causes of action are founded on the validity of the note and 

mortgage, defendants' acceptance or ratification of the mortgage loan, or 

evidence establishing defendants received the benefit of the proceeds of the 

purported September 25, 2006 transaction in the form of satisfaction of the 

WSB and Commerce Bank mortgages. See Zaman v. Felton, 219 N.J. 199, 

217-19 (2014) (explaining factors to be considered in establishing an equitable 

mortgage); Reibman v. Myers, 451 N.J. Super. 32, 47-48 (App. Div. 2017) 

(explaining elements of an equitable subrogation claim); VRG Corp. v. GKN 
32 A-5334-16T1

Realty Corp., 135 N.J. 539, 554 (1994) (explaining elements of an unjust 

enrichment cause of action). 

Plaintiff's appellate counsel's efforts to resuscitate plaintiff's claims fail, 

however, because there is sufficient credible evidence supporting the court's 

finding that defendants did not execute the note or mortgage, and the evidence 

the court found credible does not establish the proceeds of the purported 

September 25, 2006 transaction were used to satisfy the WSB and Commerce 

Bank mortgages or that defendants otherwise ratified the purported transaction. 

It is not the role of the trial court or this court to fill in the gaps in a plaintiff's 

proofs or make decisions that are not supported by sufficient credible 

evidence. Where, as here, the trial court's factual findings are supported by 

sufficient credible evidence, we defer to those findings. See Rova Farms 

Resort, Inc. v. Inv'rs Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974). We therefore 

affirm the court's July 26, 2017 amended final judgment, but remand for the 

court to consider and determine an issue that was not addressed in its written 

decision and judgment. 

Although we find no error in the court's findings and conclusions related 

to the purported September 25, 2006 mortgage transaction or the alleged use of 

the proceeds from the alleged transaction on defendants' behalf, we note one 

remaining issue the court did not address. In its finding the Bank of America
33 A-5334-16T1

payment history on the putative mortgage was not sufficiently reliable to 

support a determination that defendants made payments on the mortgage and 

therefore ratified it, the court expressly found reliable the "BAC Fee 

Transaction Histories Prior to Bayview" and the one-page untitled document in 

Bayview's file together listing 216 transactions from October 20, 2010, 

through October 15, 2012, showing plaintiff's payment of taxes, fees, and 

insurance premiums related to defendants' property. The court did not directly

address the reliability or unreliability of the "Bayview Customer Activity 

Statement"—which lists similar transactions for the period of October 25, 

2012, through May 19, 2017—beyond stating that Bayview "began its own . . . 

[s]tatement, presumably after the mortgage was 'boarded.'" However, we note 

that it appears none of the court's stated reasons for finding the Bank of 

America payment history unreliable apply to the "Bayview Customer Activity 

Statement." Together the payments reflected in these documents total a 

substantial amount, with the "Bayview Customer Activity Statement" listing an 

outstanding escrow balance of $148,151.88 as of May 19, 2017.

The trial court overlooked these documents and their implications, and it 

appears plaintiff made the payments to protect its interests in the property 

based on its assertion it was the mortgagee. Plaintiff did not present any 

evidence demonstrating defendants had knowledge of the payments reflected 
34 A-5334-16T1

in these documents—the issue was not addressed by any proofs at trial—and 

thus failed to demonstrate that their payment by plaintiff established 

defendants' acknowledgment or ratification of the alleged mortgage. However, 

the court's finding the documents are reliable supports a claim by plaintiff for 

recovery or reimbursement of the sums paid as reflected in the documents

separate from the alleged September 25, 2006 mortgage or any entitlement to 

an equitable lien based on the alleged disbursement of funds from the putative 

mortgage transaction. 

It is not our intention that this opinion foreclose plaintiff from 

appropriately seeking recovery or reimbursement of sums it has paid that 

might have inured to defendants' benefit based on its erroneous belief it held 

an enforceable mortgage or equitable lien on defendants' property. We 

therefore remand for the parties and the court to address the issue of plaintiff's 

entitlement, if any, to the sums it paid on defendants' behalf and the manner in 

which that issue will be addressed and decided. We offer no opinion on the 

merits of the potential claim, possible defenses or the procedure the parties and 

the court should employ to address the issue. We remand because plaintiff's 

entitlement to recovery or reimbursement of the sums paid that inured to 

defendant's benefit as suggested in the documents the court found reliable, or 

otherwise, should be addressed. 
35 A-5334-16T1

Affirmed and remanded for further proceedings. We do not retain 

jurisdiction. 
____________________________

ACCURSO, J.A.D., dissenting. 

This case turns on our struggle with the standard of review. And, 

essentially, on one finding, that the loan documents the Corradettis purportedly 

signed on September 25, 2006 are forgeries. The majority terms that finding 

"unassailable." Ante at __ (slip op at 26). I think it's unsupported and so 

"inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as 

to offend the interests of justice." Griepenburg v. Twp. of Ocean, 220 N.J. 

239, 254 (2015) (quoting Rova Farms Resort v. Investors Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 

484 (1974)). Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

This case is difficult for the reasons the majority has so capably 

emphasized, the proofs are thin and appellate review of the factual findings of 

the trial court sitting in a non-jury case is so deferential. There is no question 

but that additional proofs would make the case easier to resolve. 1 The issue, 

1

 I am not so convinced as the majority that the fault for that lies exclusively 

with the bank. The summary judgment record reveals several important 

documents produced by the Corradettis in discovery, including a letter from 

Countrywide to Anthony Corradetti dated September 7, 2006, outlining the 

writer's understanding "of the current situation pertaining to your mortgages," 

and identifying the Commerce mortgage as a "[b]lanket mortgage covering 2 

commercial properties, residence in Cinnaminson and 2nd position on Ocean 

City for $1,353,000" having a monthly payment of $21,432 for principal, 

interest, taxes and insurance and a "1st Mortgage on Ocean City for $405,000," 

having a monthly payment of $2705, principal and interest only for total 

(continued)
2

A-5334-16T1

however, is not whether the case could have been better tried. The answer to 

that question is undoubtedly yes.2 The sole question to be resolved is whether, 

based on those few facts in the record, "there is substantial evidence in support 

of the trial judge's findings and conclusions." In re Tr. Created by Agreement 

(continued)

monthly mortgage payments of $24,442. The letter proposed a "[n]ew first 

mortgage on Ocean City property for $1,800,000. This would result in the two 

commercial properties being paid off in full" and a monthly savings of 

$3725.87. The Corradettis also produced a September 29, 2006 letter from 

Boardwalk Title Agency referencing the "Corradetti refinance . . . Closing 

date: September 25, 2006 Disbursement Date: September 29, 2006" enclosing 

a "trust account check in the amount of $1,108.80," "represent[ing] the 

proceeds of your transaction" and a copy of the title agency's check. Mrs. 

Corradetti had no knowledge of the documents. The bank deposed the 

Corradettis' adult daughter, who apparently produced the documents on her 

parents' behalf, who could only say they did not come out of the file drawer in 

the Cinnaminson house where her parents kept their financial records and may 

have come out of one of the file cabinets in Mr. Corradetti's office. 

2

 This is not meant as a criticism of trial counsel. We are aware the title 

agency that closed this loan is no longer in business, and plaintiff could not 

locate the notary who acknowledged the Corradettis' signatures on the loan 

documents. We are also aware that Mr. Corradetti, apparently the only person 

with personal knowledge of the several mortgages on the Ocean City property, 

was unavailable to testify. I surmise the inability of either side to present a 

witness with personal knowledge of this transaction led to the failure to 

introduce at trial what would appear to be relevant documents in the summary 

judgment record, such as the Countrywide letter to Mr. Corradetti of 

September 9, 2006, outlining the proposed loan. Given what we know, I am 

somewhat uncomfortable with the repeated emphasis on the absence of 

documents in the record that could have assisted in resolving this matter. I 

thus have attempted to confine my analysis of the court's findings to the 

evidence in the trial record, not the absence of documents we have no way of 

knowing were available to the parties.
3

A-5334-16T1

Dated Dec. 20, 1961, ex rel. Johnson, 194 N.J. 276, 284 (2008) (quoting Rova 

Farms, 65 N.J. at 484).

The trial court accepted that when the Corradettis left for their religious 

pilgrimage to Croatia in September 2006, there were two mortgages recorded 

against their Ocean City shore house securing loans of $2.8 million. One was 

to World Savings for a $500,000 loan given in 2003 and the other to 

Commerce Bank for a loan, also given in 2003, in the original principal 

amount of $2.3 million. Following the recording of the $1.8 million 

Countrywide mortgage at issue on October 3, 2006, less than ten days after the 

Corradettis returned to New Jersey, both those mortgages were marked 

satisfied and cancelled of record, the World Savings mortgage on October 20 

and the Commerce mortgage on November 6.3

Marianne Corradetti, eighty-five years old at the time of trial, testified 

she knew nothing about any of those loans, and specifically that she would 

never have agreed to allow Countrywide or Bank of New York to place a 

mortgage on the property because it "was [her] dream house." Mrs. Corradetti 

eventually allowed that she knew they had a mortgage on the shore house 

when they purchased it in 1992, but testified her husband Anthony, eighty3 Funds from the Countrywide refinance were also used to satisfy a $2482.38 

State tax lien against the Corradettis' Ocean City property.
4

A-5334-16T1

three at the time of trial and suffering from Alzheimer's, told her "[s]ome time 

ago" that they were "free and clear." Shown the purchase money mortgage on 

cross-examination, Mrs. Corradetti testified she thought the signature on the 

document was hers but said she did not know whether her husband's signature 

was his, testifying "I don't know. I don't think so." 

Mrs. Corradetti also testified her husband handled all of their business 

dealings with banks and insurance companies, and that she "wasn't in on 

anything in [his] business."4 She agreed with the bank's lawyer that if she and 

her husband "were going to get a mortgage loan from Countrywide" that "he 

would be the one to talk to." She also agreed she "would only show up and 

sign something when he told [her] to do that." Shown the September 25 

Countrywide note bearing her signature, Mrs. Corradetti testified 

unequivocally "[t]hat is not my handwriting." 

Mrs. Corradetti also swore unequivocally that it was not her signature on 

the September 25 Countrywide mortgage, although at her deposition she 

testified only that she was "not sure" whether it was her signature. She gave 

the same testimony about the HUD-1 and the other documents for the 

4

 Mrs. Corradetti testified her husband owned his own business, a general 

merchandise wholesaler, which had its ups and downs, but "was sliding" since 

about 2000.
5

A-5334-16T1

September 25 transaction, testifying at her deposition that she was "not sure" 

whether it was her signature on the documents, and at trial that she had "no 

doubt" it was not her signature.

Although initially testifying on cross-examination she "was sure" she did 

not sign the $2.3 million Commerce Bank mortgage given in 2000 and 

cancelled in 2003, Mrs. Corradetti changed her testimony after being 

confronted with her deposition where she had admitted the authenticity of her 

signature on the same document. Asked how that $2.3 million mortgage had 

been satisfied if not replaced with the second $2.3 million Commerce 

mortgage, which was cancelled only weeks after the September 25, 2006 loan 

transaction purportedly took place, Mrs. Corradetti testified she did not know. 

She was also adamant she had never seen the 2010 letter from her and her 

husband to the Office of Foreclosure objecting to the entry of final judgment in 

the prior foreclosure, saying "[t]hose aren't our signatures at all. Never." 

Mrs. Corradetti also testified she did not write the mortgage check for 

$13,126.16 in November 2006 for the shore house mortgage, nor any of the 

other almost thirty checks logged in the bank's payment history, which she 

claimed was not unusual as "[i]t was always done at [Anthony's] office." In 

response to questions by the trial judge, Mrs. Corradetti testified she and her 

husband sold two commercial buildings related to his business in the last ten 
6

A-5334-16T1

years. Observing that documents in evidence "suggest[ed] that maybe there 

were some mortgages taken out on the Ocean City property for some 

significant amount of money," the trial judge asked Mrs. Corradetti if she 

knew whether that money was used for the business or for household bills. 

She responded she did not "know any of that." 

Based on Mrs. Corradetti's testimony, the trial judge found "Mrs. 

Corradetti believes what she says." He also found, however,

that she is not aware of what she signed and what she 

did not sign, and she is not aware of what Mr. 

Corradetti signed and what he did not sign. Her 

memory was lacking as to many documents, and her 

demeanor was such that she seemed unsure and 

hesitant to say whether certain documents were signed 

by her or were not signed by her; she seemed to be 

calculating what answer her attorney was expecting 

more than giving the answer that she remembered.

The court noted the best example of that was Mrs. Corradetti's testimony 

about the first Commerce Bank mortgage for $2.3 million given in 2000, 

where "she simply reversed her testimony." It found Mrs. Corradetti "is 

simply not sure what documents she did sign or did not sign." 5 The court 

found "Mrs. Corradetti's testimony with regard to her not signing the subject 

Note, Mortgage, and HUD-1 Settlement Statement on September 25, 2006 to 

5

 At her deposition, Mrs. Corradetti denied she signed the handwriting 

exemplars produced by her counsel in discovery. 
7

A-5334-16T1

be credible; as to what other documents were signed or not signed by her and 

her husband, the court finds her testimony not credible" (emphasis added).

Thus, I find inexplicable the court's leap from those findings to its 

conclusion that the loan "documents are not authentic," "do not create a valid 

mortgage," and that defendants succeeded on their affirmative defense of 

forgery "by clear and convincing evidence." See Dencer v. Erb, 142 N.J. Eq. 

422, 426 (Ch. Div. 1948) (holding "statements contained in the 

acknowledgment may be shown to be untrue. . . . [b]ut to establish its falsity 

and overcome the strong presumption of its integrity the proof must be clear, 

satisfactory, and convincing") (citations omitted). There is no question but 

that the Corradettis did not sign the loan documents on the day they are dated, 

Monday, September 25, 2006. Their passport stamps established they did not 

return to New Jersey until the following day, September 26. 6 In addition to 

6

 It is unlikely Mrs. Corradetti's own testimony, standing alone, could be 

relied on to establish that fact. I quote her direct examination on that point:

Defendants' Counsel: Now, Mrs. Corradetti, in 2006, 

September 25th of 2006, where 

were you and Mr. Corradetti?

Mrs. Corradetti: Preparing to go away.

Defendants' Counsel: No. September 25th?

(continued)
8

A-5334-16T1

their not returning to New Jersey until Tuesday, September 26, the court noted 

(continued)

Mrs. Corradetti: The 25th.

Defendants' Counsel: You were away from the 18th 

to the 26th.

Mrs. Corradetti: Okay.

Defendants' Counsel: Where were you on September 

25th?

Mrs. Corradetti: In Croatia.

Defendants' Counsel: Were you in Toms River or 

Burlington County, New 

Jersey?

Mrs. Corradetti: I don't remember the two we were in.

Defendants' Counsel: No. No. No. Were you in 

New Jersey, the United States?

Mrs. Corradetti: Yeah.

Defendants' Counsel: On September 25th, 2006, you 

were in Croatia, right?

Mrs. Corradetti: We were in Croatia.

Defendants' Counsel: Were you in Toms River at the 

same time you were —

Mrs. Corradetti: Oh, no. How could I be?

Defendants' Counsel: Okay.

The Court: So Stipulated.
9

A-5334-16T1

the HUD-1 in evidence states it was "Printed on 09/26/2006 at 15:52," the day 

after original signatures were purportedly affixed.7 But a finding that a 

document was not signed on the day it's dated does not ineluctably lead to the 

conclusion the document was forged, and certainly should not here in light of 

the court's critical finding that Mrs. Corradetti could not reliably say what 

documents she and her husband signed or did not sign.8

Instead of focusing on the evidence in the record, the trial judge focused 

on what was not there:

7

 Similarly the closing instructions, which were not admitted in evidence at 

trial but were included in the summary judgment record, reflect they were 

"prepared on 09/25/2006 [at] 16:43:51," that is, near the close of business on 

the day the documents were purportedly signed. 

8

 A far simpler explanation might be provided by the Truth in Lending Act's 

three-day right of rescission in the borrower. See 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a). If the 

loan documents were executed when the Corradettis were back in New Jersey 

on September 26, the day the HUD-1 statement appears to have been printed, 

this loan could not have been funded until Saturday, September 30. As there 

are no Fedwire transactions on the weekend, see

https://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/fedfunds_about.htm, the 

World Savings and Commerce Bank mortgages could not have been paid off 

until after the start of the new month, Monday, October 2, 2006. Although 12 

C.F.R. § 226.23(e) permits a borrower to waive the right to rescind in the 

event of "a bona fide personal financial emergency," backdating occurs, see, 

e.g., In re Shaw, 178 B.R. 380 (D.N.J. 1994), and sometimes only for reasons 

of "ease and economy," see generally, Jeffrey L. Kwall & Stuart Duhl, 

Backdating, 63 Bus. Law. 1153, 1171 (2008). 
10 A-5334-16T1

[T]here is no handwriting expert who testified that the 

signatures are in fact defendants.[9] There is no 

evidence that defendants authorized someone else to 

sign their names for them, to act as their amanuensis. 

See N.J.S.A. 46:14-4.2. There is no evidence that 

defendants authorized or asked someone to 

impersonate them, and that the notary was somehow 

duped. There is no evidence that defendants 

designated an agent to sign on their behalf, or gave a 

power of attorney to someone to sign the documents. 

There is no evidence that defendants had an agreement 

with Countrywide to enter into this mortgage on 

September 25, 2006 or any other day. In the absence 

of such evidence, the only conclusion that can be 

reached is that the signatures are not the defendants' 

signatures, and their signatures were forged on the 

Mortgage, the Note, and the HUD-1 Settlement 

Statement. 

While I agree there is nothing in the record to suggest the Corradettis 

inveigled someone to act as their amanuensis, or any of the other things the 

court imagined, I cannot accept there is "no evidence" in this record "that 

defendants had an agreement with Countrywide to enter into this mortgage on 

September 25, 2006 or any other day." Among the evidence supporting the 

existence of an agreement by Countrywide to lend $1.8 million to the 

Corradettis secured by a first mortgage on their Ocean City shore house is the 

note and mortgage bearing their signatures; the HUD-1 closing statement 

9

 It is unclear why the court held the absence of a handwriting expert against 

the bank when the Corradettis were the party asserting the affirmative defense 

of forgery. 
11 A-5334-16T1

noting the payoff of their existing World Savings and Commerce Bank 

mortgage loans; the discharge of those mortgages shortly after the recording of 

the Countrywide mortgage the week after the Corradettis returned from 

Croatia; the twenty-nine loan payments of more than $13,000 each month from 

November 2006 through March 2009 reflected in the prior servicer's payment 

history; the November 2009 complaint in the prior foreclosure action, alleging 

default as of April 1, 2009, the same date reflected in the prior servicer's 

payment history in the record sent to Mrs. Corradetti during the pendency of 

that action; the motion for final judgment filed in that action in July 2010; the 

letter from the Corradettis to the Foreclosure Unit objecting to the amount 

claimed due; and the Corradettis' failure to pay any real estate taxes or 

insurance on their shore house for over eight years. 

The majority characterizes the finding of forgery as "reasonably 

provid[ing] the lens through which the court viewed" the other evidence in the 

record. I would put it differently. I would conclude the court's finding of 

forgery, for which the only support in the record is that the documents were 

not signed on the day they are dated, infected its other findings. Most 

important, it allowed the court to disregard the HUD-1 statement linking the 

Countrywide loan to the payoff of the Corradettis' existing mortgages to World 

Savings and Commerce Bank. The trial court accepts defendants' mortgages 
12 A-5334-16T1

were paid off, it holds only that "[t]here is nothing in the record of an 

agreement between the defendants and Countrywide that Countrywide money 

was to be used to satisfy the World Savings Bank and Commerce Bank 

mortgages."10 The HUD-1, of course, evidences that agreement. The trial 

court only rejects the HUD-1, as far as I can tell, for its being dated the day 

before the Corradettis returned to New Jersey, notwithstanding the notation on 

the document that it was printed the following day, when the Corradettis were 

back in New Jersey and available to sign it. Critically, the Corradettis offer no 

explanation as to how they paid off the World Savings and Commerce Bank 

mortgages if not with Countrywide's money. 

The trial court's fact finding surrounding the servicer's records of loan 

payments and default is also concerning. The glaring problem with the 

payments is that the bank offered nothing to show they were made by the 

Corradettis. The trial court, however, goes well beyond simply stating the 

obvious. The court found as a fact, apparently simply from a review of the 

documents, that "Bayview never checked and confirmed the information 

contained in the BAC payment history." It also found the testimony offered by 

10

 The judge also found that even if there were proof that Countrywide money 

was used to pay off the World Savings and Commerce Bank mortgages, the 

bank would not be entitled to assert equitable subrogation because defendants 

"never agreed that Countrywide could pay off the two mortgages." 
13 A-5334-16T1

plaintiff's witness "with regard to Exhibit P5," the prior servicer's payment 

history "incredible and not consistent with what the records actually document, 

how the records were assembled or created, and what the process was for 

confirming the information in the records." The court explained it rejected the 

witness's testimony explaining how Bayview, his employer for the last 

fourteen years, "boards" loans it accepts for servicing from another servicer 

because 

[a]t various times, [the witness] testified that 

two employees did a 130 point data check, and at 

other times two employees did a 132 point data check, 

before a mortgage was "boarded" for servicing. He 

did not seem to feel that there was a big difference 

between 130 points and 132 points; however, the court 

finds that it shows a failure to comprehend the 

importance of precision in his testimony. 

A review of the witness's trial testimony confirms the witness and 

lawyers for both sides referred alternately to both a 130- and to a 132- point 

check. But the witness was never asked to clear up the discrepancy, making a 

credibility finding based on that point suspect. The court further criticized the 

witness for failing to "testify that monthly payments were made beginning in 

November 2006 and continued until March 2009, a total of nearly 30 

payments, and that the total payments were over $350,000," positing "[t]hat 

might have been persuasive testimony." But the witness identified the 
14 A-5334-16T1

payment record in evidence, which reflected those twenty-nine payments, each 

over $13,000, and he noted both the date of the mortgage, September 25, 2006, 

and that the loan went into default for non-payment on April 1, 2009, with the 

last payment being made on March 16, 2009. Thus, I cannot understand the 

significance for the trial court of the witness's failure to "testify that monthly 

payments were made beginning in November 2006 and continued until March 

2009, a total of nearly 30 payments, and that the total payments were over 

$350,000."

As already noted, the problem with the payment record is its obvious 

limits; it does not include cancelled checks showing who made the twenty-nine 

payments. Thus, the court's difficulty in interpreting the servicing records, 

which it failed to ask the witness to explain, or its speculations about whether 

there could have been some other servicer before Bank of America, which 

likely could have been answered by the witness had anyone asked, would 

appear beside the point. 

More troubling, the court reaches several conclusions as to the reliability 

of the documents based on purported gaps it perceived in the records, which 

seem both unnecessary and not well-founded. Its speculation that the nearly 

thirty payments logged on this loan might be explained if the same servicer 

who serviced the Countrywide mortgage loan also serviced the prior 
15 A-5334-16T1

Commerce Bank and World Savings mortgage loans is particularly troubling 

given they were all separate loans made by different banks at different times, 

with different loan numbers, terms, payment amounts and due dates. Those 

off-point musings for me, which the judge made a part of his written opinion 

in this matter, only reinforce my view that the factual findings here are 

seriously flawed and should not get our customary unswerving deference. 

The court's conclusions as to the letter purportedly sent by the 

Corradettis to counsel for the bank and the Foreclosure Unit in response to the 

bank's motion for final judgment in the prior foreclosure highlights the flaws 

in the fact finding. The bank's final judgment motion, which was admitted in 

evidence at trial, was served on the Corradettis at their home address in 

Cinnaminson (the same address as on the invoice for the Corradettis' 

pilgrimage admitted in evidence at trial) by certified and regular mail on July 

7, 2010. The notice of motion advised that final judgment would be entered in 

the discretion of the court unless the party served notified the Foreclosure Unit 

and the attorney for the moving party within ten days of service of an objection 

to the entry of the order. The letter, purportedly from the Corradettis and 

bearing both their signatures, is dated July 19, 2010, addressed to both the 

Foreclosure Unit and counsel for the bank and includes a subject line 
16 A-5334-16T1

referencing the motion for final judgment with the docket number of the prior 

foreclosure. It states:

Dear [Counsel]

You are hereby notified that I object to the entry of a 

final judgment in the above reference matter. I 

disagree and dispute the amount that you show as 

amount owed.

The trial court acknowledged the bank's argument that the letter was 

proof of an agreement between Countrywide and defendants because "if there 

was not a valid mortgage, defendants would have written there was no 

agreement and no mortgage." It found, however, that "[w]hile the letter 

purports to be signed by the defendants, Mrs. Corradetti's testimony is that she 

did not sign the letter, and that is not her signature on the letter. There is no

evidence to the contrary." 

The judge also rejected the bank's argument that the Corradettis not only 

failed to repudiate the mortgage "but impliedly admitted their assent to same 

by only contesting the amount due." The judge found:

[p]laintiff misreads the letter. Plaintiff argues 

that there is just one point made in the letter: that 

defendants object to the amount owed. The letter 

clearly states, however, that defendants object to the 

entry of judgment. That statement could not be made 

more clearly. A second objection is to the amount 

due. Even if you read the second sentence as 
17 A-5334-16T1

dependent on the first sentence, defendants are not 

conceding or ratifying the validity of the mortgage.

Further, defendants were pro se defendants. 

Plenty of trained writers and legal advocates might not 

be as clear as plaintiff is demanding defendants should 

have been in their letter objecting to the final 

judgment.

Two points need to be made about the trial court's finding as to this 

letter. First, the trial court's reliance on Mrs. Corradetti's testimony that she 

did not sign the letter is obviously at odds with its conclusion that her 

testimony as to any documents signed by her and her husband beyond "her not 

signing the subject Note, Mortgage, and HUD-1 Settlement Statement on 

September 25, 2006 . . . the court finds . . . not credible." The judge having 

already concluded Mrs. Corradetti was not credible when she testified that 

neither she nor her husband signed this letter, there is actually nothing in the 

record to dispute its authenticity. 

Second, I find it impossible to accept that your typical homeowners 

receiving by certified mail the motion for entry of final judgment of 

foreclosure in evidence, listing the date of the note and mortgage, its 

recording, the address of the property and claiming over $1.8 million due that 

the homeowners do not recognize as a mortgage they gave for a loan of that 

size, write the three-line letter the Corradettis wrote. The trial court appears to 
18 A-5334-16T1

have lost all sight of the import of this letter in the context of this contested 

residential foreclosure proceeding. 

The issue is not whether the Corradettis objected to the entry of final 

judgment or only to the amount due. An objection to the amount due is an 

objection to the entry of final judgment. See Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. 

Garner, 416 N.J. Super. 520, 523-24 (App. Div. 2010). The issue is that the 

Corradettis' defense to this foreclosure is that it is a fraud, that their names 

were forged on the loan documents, that they never borrowed $1.8 million 

from Countrywide and never gave it a mortgage on their Ocean City shore 

house. This letter from the Corradettis obviously does not square with that 

defense, especially considering the Corradettis would have already been 

personally served with the complaint and did not file an answer asserting the 

fraud. Reasoned fact finding requires the trier of fact to weigh conflicting 

evidence, not explain it away by refusing to acknowledge its import for proof 

of a proposition or its defense. See Pioneer Nat'l Title Ins. Co. v. Lucas, 155 

N.J. Super. 332, 339 (App. Div.) (reversing findings in a bench trial based on 

the trial court's failure to "properly evaluate significant evidence," resulting in 

"manifestly erroneous" inferences from the evidence), aff'd, 78 N.J. 320 

(1978).
19 A-5334-16T1

Plaintiff was required to establish by a preponderance of the evidence its 

entitlement to foreclose the recorded mortgage it obviously believed it held on 

the Corradettis' property, reflected in the majority's acknowledgment that the 

bank has been paying the real estate taxes and homeowners' insurance 

premiums on the Corradettis' shore house since assuming the mortgage loan,

see ante at __ (slip op at 33). That means the bank had to prove based on all of 

the evidence in the record, fairly considered, that it was more likely than not 

that the Corradettis replaced the World Savings and Commerce Bank 

mortgages on their shore house totaling $2.3 million with the $1.8 million 

Countrywide mortgage recorded weeks before the cancellation of the World 

Savings and Commerce Bank mortgages were recorded, that they failed to 

make payment as required and that the bank was entitled to foreclose. See

Great Falls Bank v. Pardo, 263 N.J. Super. 388, 394 (Ch. Div. 1993). 

Here, the trial court apparently found it more likely that someone forged 

the Corradettis' signatures on the loan documents, but instead of making away 

with cash, paid $8840.26 on the Corradettis' behalf at closing, arranged for the 

payoff of their prior mortgages totaling $2.3 million, made payments on the 

fraudulent mortgage for the next two-and-a-half years to cover their tracks, and 

when the Corradettis finally discovered the fraud when the bank tried to 

foreclose the bogus mortgage, they wrote the three-line letter to the bank's
20 A-5334-16T1

counsel "object[ing] to the entry of a final judgment" because they 

"disagree[d] and dispute[d] the amount that you show as amount owed." The 

court comes to that extraordinary conclusion based, as far as I can tell, only on 

proof that the documents were not signed on September 25, 2006, the day they 

were dated, and thus, a fortiori, that they "are forged documents, and anyone 

who forges documents might make efforts to cover their forging." I do not 

believe adherence to our standard of review requires me to accept such 

findings, as I view them as "so wide of the mark that a mistake must have been 

made." C.B. Snyder Realty, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 233 N.J. Super. 65, 

69 (App. Div. 1989) (quoting Pioneer, 155 N.J. Super. at 338). 

This case would be decidedly different for me had the trial judge deemed 

Mrs. Corradetti a credible witness regarding the documents she and her 

husband signed instead of one "who is not aware of what she signed and what 

she did not sign." See In re Return of Weapons to J.W.D., 149 N.J. 108, 117 

(1997) (noting "[d]eference to a trial court's fact-findings is especially 

appropriate when the evidence is largely testimonial and involves questions of 

credibility"). Faced with a witness it deemed so unreliable that it rejected as 

not credible everything she said about what documents she signed or didn't 

sign, except as to her not signing the "Note, Mortgage and HUD-1 Settlement 

Statement on September 25, 2006," the trial court, in my view, went wide of 
21 A-5334-16T1

the mark in finding defendants carried their burden to prove their affirmative 

defense of forgery by clear and convincing evidence based on her testimony. 

To me, those findings are fatally inconsistent and not deserving of our 

deference.

Because I do not agree there is "adequate, substantial and credible 

evidence," Rova Farms, 65 N.J. at 484, in this record to support a finding that 

the Corradettis established forgery by clear and convincing evidence, I would 

reverse the trial court's decision invalidating the September 25, 2006 note and 

mortgage and remand for retrial or dismissal without prejudice. 11 Because the 

majority affirms a finding of forgery, which I do not believe is supported by 

substantial evidence in the trial record, I respectfully dissent.

11

 Doing so I believe is what our standard of review requires. See Bank of 

N.Y. v. Raftogianis, 418 N.J. Super. 323, 363 (Ch. Div. 2010) (dismissing the 

bank's foreclosure complaint after trial without prejudice to its right to institute 

a new action when it could prove its right to proceed on the loan documents). 

I can accept one might reasonably conclude plaintiff did not prove its 

entitlement to foreclose the Countrywide mortgage on the evidence adduced at 

trial, even though I "might have reached a different conclusion were [I] the 

trial tribunal." State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 162 (1964). What I cannot 

accept is that defendants proved the loan documents were forgeries by clear 

and convincing evidence, thus invalidating those loan documents.