IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-40897

Summary Calendar

In the Matter of: LEO ROGERS DUGAS; VALERIE DARLENE DUGAS,

Debtors

LEO ROGERS DUGAS; VALERIE DARLENE DUGAS,

Appellants

v.

CLARON CORPORATION,

Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Texas

USDC No. 1:09-CV-990

Before JOLLY, GARZA, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

*

Debtors, Leo Roger Dugas and Valerie Darlene Dugas (collectively the

Dugases), appeal from the judgment of the district court, affirming the

bankruptcy court’s decision that the Claron Corporation (Claron) willfully

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

June 15, 2011

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not *

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

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violated the Bankruptcy Code’s automatic stay provision, 11 U.S.C. § 362, and

awarding the Dugases actual damages. The Dugases appealed. We DISMISS.

I.

In 1994, the Dugases filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy action in the

Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Texas. In their bankruptcy

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schedules, the Dugases claimed an interest in certain funds that were the

subject of a separate interpleader action, Howell Crude Oil Co. v. JSB Petroleum

Inc., No. 611, 156 (Co. Ct. at Law No. 1, Harris County, Tex. Dec. 3, 1992)

(hereinafter the Howell Action). Claron, also a party to the Howell Action, filed

a notice of appearance in the Dugases’ Chapter 13 case.

At or about the same time, Claron learned that certain funds related to the

Howell Action (hereinafter the funds) were deposited in the registry of the

County Civil Court at Law No. 1 of Harris County, Texas (hereinafter the state

court). Claron filed a motion for release of the funds, which the state court

granted. The Dugases learned of the transfer and filed a motion to disgorge,

seeking an order from the bankruptcy court directing Claron to return the funds

to the state court registry. Following a hearing, the bankruptcy court denied the

motion, finding that the Dugases “totally failed to produce any evidence” that

they were entitled to relief. The district court affirmed. Thereafter, the Dugases

appealed the district court’s judgment.

On appeal, this court reversed the bankruptcy and district courts’

judgments and remanded the case for reconsideration of the motion. See In re

Dugas, No. 98-40079, 1999 WL 152967, at *5 (5th Cir. Mar. 3, 1999). We

construed the Dugases’ disgorgement motion as an action to enforce the

 This case has a long and complicated history that we do not discuss here. The facts

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are described in more detail in the bankruptcy court’s memorandum of decision. See In re

Dugas, No. 94-10027, 2009 WL 3297958 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. Oct. 13, 2009 ). 

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automatic stay provisions of § 362. Id. at *4. We explained that “the issue was

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whether the stay was violated when the Harris County court . . . released funds

to Claron.” Id. at *5. We held that, although the Dugases may not have

presented sufficient evidence to prevail in their action, it was error for the

bankruptcy court to summarily conclude that they failed to produce any

evidence. Id. at *4.

On remand, the bankruptcy court reset the motion for a hearing, but

Claron failed to appear. Subsequently, in light of the uncontested evidence

presented by the Dugases, the bankruptcy court found that Claron violated the

automatic stay. Claron was also ordered to pay $1,020 in actual damages and

$30,000 in punitive damages and to return the funds to the state court registry.

After learning of the decision, Claron filed a notice of appeal with the district

court, followed by a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of

Bankruptcy Procedure 9024. While Claron’s appeal was pending, the

bankruptcy court conducted a hearing on the Rule 9024 motion. During the

hearing, Mr. Dugas admitted under examination that neither he nor Mrs. Dugas

had any legitimate claim of ownership in the funds. On October 24, 2001,

pursuant to the procedure described in Winchester v. United States Attorney, 68

 Section 362 explains in relevant part:

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(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition

filed under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title, or an application

filed under section 5(a)(3) of the Securities Investor Protection

Act of 1970, operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, of--

. . .

(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the

estate or of property from the estate or to exercise

control over property of the estate; 

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F.3d 947, 949 (5th Cir. 1995), the bankruptcy judge issued a notice of intent to

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grant Claron’s Rule 9024 motion upon remand or other disposition by the district

court. Claron then filed a motion to remand the appeal, which the district court

granted, treating the remand motion as a voluntary dismissal. As the dismissal

returned jurisdiction over the case back to the bankruptcy court, it entered an

order granting Claron’s Rule 9024 motion and vacating its previous order.

The bankruptcy court reset the Dugases’ disgorgement motion for another

hearing. Subsequently, it held that, although the Dugases failed to prove that

they had a right to the funds, Claron’s unilateral acts to remove the funds

violated the automatic stay. The judge awarded the Dugases $1,020 in actual

damages, as well as post-judgment interest. The district court affirmed. The

Dugases appealed. On appeal, the Dugases present their arguments pro se.

Claron has not filed a response to their appeal.

II.

“[A] party who is not aggrieved by a judgment of the district court has no

standing to appeal it.” Ward v. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 F.3d 599, 603

(5th Cir. 2004). Therefore, as a general rule, a prevailing party may not appeal

a judgment in its favor. Id. “Rather, a prevailing party has standing to appeal

only if it can demonstrate an adverse effect resulting from the judgment in its

favor.” Id. Because the district court found in the Dugases’ favor, they must

establish that the district court’s judgment had an adverse effect on them. They

have not made this showing.

In Winchester, we addressed how to treat a Rule 60(b) motion for relief from a

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judgment filed while that judgment is on appeal. 68 F.3d at 949. In the bankruptcy context,

a notice of appeal divests the bankruptcy court of jurisdiction except to take action in aid of

the appeal to the district court until the case is remanded by the district court or to correct

clerical errors under a Rule 9024 motion for relief from judgment. See id. The bankruptcy

court still has the authority to consider and deny the Rule 9024 motion filed after a notice of

appeal, because the denial of the Rule 9024 motion is in furtherance of the appeal. However,

a bankruptcy court may not grant a Rule 9024 motion filed after a notice of appeal without

leave from the district court. Id. 

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The closest the Dugases come to challenging the district court’s judgment

is their argument that the district court erred in letting Claron keep the funds

because they have an interest in the funds. However, this argument does not

meet Rule 28’s requirements and does not explain why they have been aggrieved

by the district court’s judgment. Specifically, we directed that the district court,

on remand, reach the merits of the Dugases’ disgorgement motion, which we

construed as an action to enforce the automatic stay provisions of § 362. Dugas,

1999 WL 152967, at *5. On remand, the Dugases requested actual and punitive

damages and asked the court to return the funds to the state court registry,

because they claimed that they were entitled to the funds.

Accordingly, the district court first held that Claron willfully violated the

stay because: “Claron could have obtained relief from the automatic stay but

chose instead to circumvent the court and unilaterally seek release of the funds.”

Next, the district court examined whether the Dugases were entitled to actual

and punitive damages. The district court held that the Dugases provided

evidence that they were entitled to actual damages reflecting the cost of

prosecuting the motion. However, the district court explained, the Dugases were

not entitled to punitive damages and the funds would not be returned to the

registry because the Dugases did not prove that they were entitled to the funds.

The district court noted that the only evidence the Dugases presented showing

that they had any interest in the funds was: (1) their bankruptcy schedules,

which reference the funds as an “account receivable,” and (2) Mr. Dugas’s

testimony that Jeff Buescher, president of JSB, verbally assigned him an

interest in the funds. On appeal, the Dugases fail to adequately challenge the

district court’s factual determination. They merely state that they are entitled

to the funds because the funds are listed in their bankruptcy schedules. Other

than this conclusory statement, they do not point to any relevant case law or

make any other arguments to support their contention.

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In sum, the Dugases have not established that they have standing to

appeal, as they have not shown that they were aggrieved by the district court’s

judgment in their favor.

III.

Accordingly, we DISMISS this appeal for lack of jurisdiction, as the

Dugases do not have standing.

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