alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 32





CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Ameriprise Certificate Company (the “Company”) for the quarterly period ended March 31, 2023, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), Abu M. Arif, as Chief Executive Officer of the Company, and James R. Hill, as Chief Financial Officer of the Company, each hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:


(1)    The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and


(2)    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.











Date:May 2, 2023By:/s/ Abu M. ArifAbu M. ArifChief Executive Officer


Date:May 2, 2023By:/s/ James R. HillJames R. HillChief Financial Officer
#### JAMES SPENCER, JR., Appellant, v. NEVADA STATE WELFARE DIVISION, Respondent.

No. 9794

September 28, 1978

584 P.2d 669

*Wiener, Goldwater & Waldman, Ltd.,*Las Vegas, for Appellant.

*Robert List,*Attorney General, Carson City, and *James G. Armstrong,*Deputy Attorney General, Las Vegas, for Respondent.

OPINION

*Per Curiam:*

The natural father of five minor children born out of wedlock appeals an order terminating his parental rights. He here contends the district court erred in finding him an unfit parent, *628and in finding he had made only “token efforts” to avoid being declared unfit.1

In our view, the record supports the judgment. There is ample evidence of an unstable and chaotic homelife, ultimately resulting in the children being taken into State Welfare custody for neglect and abandonment; of failure to make support payments as ordered; of failure to provide for medical needs, despite repeated notification by telephone and mail; and of erratic attendance of court-ordered counseling sessions to improve appellant’s domestic situation. It appears that appellant has, in fact, never provided the children with an adequate homelife for any substantial period of time, and, in determining appropriatate action for their best interest, the district court judge noted all five were still under the age of eight.

We are unable to say that the lower court erred.

1

NRS 128.105 provides:

> “Grounds for termination of parental rights.

> 1. A finding by the court of *any one*of the following:

> (a) Abandonment of a child;

> (b) Neglect of a child; or

> (c) Unfitness of a parent,

is sufficient ground for termination of parental rights.

2. Upon a finding by the court that a parent or parents have made only *token efforts:*

> (a) To support or communicate with the child;

> (b) To prevent neglect of the child; or

> (c) To avoid being an unfit parent,

the court may declare the child abandoned or neglected or the parent unfit.” (Emphasis added.)

NRS 128.018 defines “unfit parent” as:

> “. . . any parent of a child who, by reason of his fault or habit or conduct toward the child or other persons, fails to provide such child with *proper care,*guidance and *support,*or who knowingly permits such child to associate with vagrants, vicious or immoral persons, or to live in a disreputable place.” (Emphasis added.)
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA No. DA 22
- 0 574 STATE OF MONTANA,

Plaintiff and Appellee, v. CHARLOTTE ANN WOLFCHILD,

Defendant and Appellant.

**ORDER** Upon consideration of Appellant’s motion for extension of time, and good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellant is granted an extension of time to and including September 22 , 2023 , within which to prepare, file, and serve Appellant’s opening brief on appeal.

Electronically signed by: Mike McGrath Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

August 16 2023

08/16/2023

Case Number: DA 22-0574
Exhibit 10.44


 


PROMISSORY NOTE


 


 


 


	Amount: $820,000	 March 2, 2022


 


FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned,


 


Farvision Education Group inc. (“company”) promises to pay
to


 


Ms. Fan Zhou to its order, the principal sum of eight hundred
twenty thousand dollars ($820,000.00) in lawful money of Canada without interest with one year term starting date on February 28,
2022, and the company has an option on the renewal term.


 


This promissory note and the rights.
obligations and relations of the undersigned and the holder hereto shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the
Province of Ontario (but without giving effect to the conflict of law rules thereof). The undersigned and the holder hereto agree that
the Courts of Ontario shall have jurisdiction to entertain any action or other legal proceedings based on any provisions of this promissory
note.


 


The undersigned and the holder hereto
do hereby attorn to the jurisdiction of the Courts of the Province of Ontario.


 


 





	 	Farvision Education Group Inc.
	 	 
	 	Per: /s/ Yiu Bun Chan
	 	        Name: Yiu Bun Chan
	 	        Title: Authorized Signing Officer
	 	 

       
I have the authority to bind the Corporation
	 	 
	 	Per: /s/ Fan Zhou
	 	        Name: Ms. Fan Zhou
	 	        Title: Authorized Signing Officer
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 05-2247

CYNTHIA P. HUMPHRIES, M.D.,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

ANTHONY J. PRINCIPI, SECRETARY OF VETERANS

AFFAIRS,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Terrence W. Boyle,

District Judge. (CA-03-426)

Submitted: March 23, 2006 Decided: March 27, 2006

Before WILKINSON, LUTTIG, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Cynthia P. Humphries, Appellant Pro Se. Frank DeArmon Whitney,

United States Attorney, Sharon Coull Wilson, OFFICE OF THE UNITED

STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
- 2 -

PER CURIAM:

Cynthia P. Humphries, appeals the district court’s order

granting summary judgment to Defendant and denying relief on her

civil action alleging claims of employment discrimination under

Title VII. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible

error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the

district court. See Humphries v. Principi, No. CA-03-426 (E.D.N.C.

Aug. 23, 2005). We dispense with oral argument because the facts

and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
### M A N D A T E

TO THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO 3 of NUECES COUNTY, GREETINGS:

Before our Court of Appeals for the Thirteenth District of Texas, on the 29th day of

January, 2015, the cause upon appeal to revise or reverse your judgment between

TEXAS REAL ESTATE

COMMISSION, Appellant,

v.

CHARLOTTE A. HANSEN AND

JAMES LARRY HANSEN, Appellees.

CAUSE NO. 13-12-00757-CV (Tr.Ct.No. 04-60394-3)

was determined; and therein our said Court made its order in these words:

THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS, having considered this cause on

appeal, concludes the appeal should be DISMISSED

. The Court orders the appeal

DISMISSED in accordance with its opinion. Costs of the appeal are adjudged against

appellant.

We further order this decision certified below for observance.

      

WHEREFORE, WE COMMAND YOU to observe the order of our said Court of Appeals

for the Thirteenth District of Texas, in this behalf, and in all things have it duly

recognized, obeyed and executed.

WITNESS, the Hon. Rogelio Valdez, Chief Justice of our Court of Appeals, with the seal

thereof affixed, at the City of Edinburg, Texas this 16th day of April, 2015.

Dorian E. Ramirez, CLERK
# L_2007098EN.01002201.xml

| 13.4.2007 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 98/22 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

13.4.2007

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 98/22

---

COMMISSION REGULATION (EC) No 401/2007

of 12 April 2007

on the issue of import licences for high-quality fresh, chilled or frozen beef and veal

THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community,

Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 1254/1999 of 17 May 1999 on the common organisation of the market in beef and veal (1),

Having regard to Commission Regulation (EC) No 936/97 of 27 May 1997 opening and providing for the administration of tariff quotas for high-quality fresh, chilled and frozen beef and for frozen buffalo meat (2),

Whereas:

| (1) | Regulation (EC) No 936/97 provides in Articles 4 and 5 the conditions for applications and for the issue of import licences for meat referred to in Article 2(f). |
| --- | --- |

(1)

Regulation (EC) No 936/97 provides in Articles 4 and 5 the conditions for applications and for the issue of import licences for meat referred to in Article 2(f).

| (2) | Article 2(f) of Regulation (EC) No 936/97 fixes the amount of high-quality fresh, chilled or frozen beef and veal meeting the definition laid down therein which may be imported on special terms for the period 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007 at 11 500 t. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

Article 2(f) of Regulation (EC) No 936/97 fixes the amount of high-quality fresh, chilled or frozen beef and veal meeting the definition laid down therein which may be imported on special terms for the period 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007 at 11 500 t.

| (3) | It should be recalled that licences issued pursuant to this Regulation will, throughout the period of validity, be open for use only in so far as provisions on health protection in force permit, |
| --- | --- |

(3)

It should be recalled that licences issued pursuant to this Regulation will, throughout the period of validity, be open for use only in so far as provisions on health protection in force permit,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

1.   All applications for import licences from 1 to 5 April 2007 for high-quality fresh, chilled or frozen beef and veal as referred to in Article 2(f) of Regulation (EC) No 936/97 shall be granted in full.

2.   Applications for licences may be submitted, in accordance with Article 5 of Regulation (EC) No 936/97, during the first five days of May 2007 for 8 939,341 t.

Article 2

This Regulation shall enter into force on 13 April 2007.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 12 April 2007.

For the Commission

Jean-Luc DEMARTY

Director-General for Agriculture and Rural Development

---

(1)  
  OJ L 160, 26.6.1999, p. 21. Regulation as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 1913/2005 (OJ L 307, 25.11.2005, p. 2).

1

(2)  
  OJ L 137, 28.5.1997, p. 10. Regulation as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 317/2007 (OJ L 84, 24.3.2007, p. 4).

2

---
Exhibit 23.1














CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM











The Board of Directors and Stockholders






BSD Medical Corporation




We consent to the incorporation by reference in Registration Statement No. 333-162080 on Form S-3 and Registration Statement No. 333-157025, No. 333-142973, No. 333-50588, and No. 333-165885 on Form S-8 of BSD Medical Corporation of our reports dated November 14, 2011 with respect to the financial statements and internal control over financial reporting of BSD Medical Corporation contained in BSD Medical Corporation’s Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended August 31, 2011.




/s/ Tanner LLC




Salt Lake City, Utah


November 14, 2011




---
I 

111TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 5585 

To provide a statutory waiver of compliance with the Jones Act to foreignflagged vessels assisting in responding to the Deepwater Horizon oil 

spill, and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JUNE 23, 2010 

Mr. CARTER (for himself, Mr. CULBERSON, Mr. OLSON, Mr. DJOU, Mr. 

MCCAUL, Mr. SMITH of Texas, Mr. PUTNAM, Mr. SENSENBRENNER, Mr. 

ROONEY, Mr. FLEMING, Mr. BOYD, Mr. STEARNS, Mr. GOHMERT, and 

Mr. HARPER) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 

A BILL 

To provide a statutory waiver of compliance with the Jones 

Act to foreign-flagged vessels assisting in responding to 

the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Water Assistance from 

5 International Vessels for Emergency Response Act’’ or the 

6 ‘‘WAIVER Act’’. 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 5585 IH

1 SEC. 2. WAIVERS. 

2 Notwithstanding any other provision of law, section 

3 12112 and chapter 551 of title 46, United States Code, 

4 shall not apply to any vessel documented under the laws 

5 of a foreign country while that vessel is engaged in con6 tainment, remediation, or associated activities in the Gulf 

7 of Mexico in connection with the mobile offshore drilling 

8 unit Deepwater Horizon oil spill. 

Æ 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with BILLS
#### KATHARINE THOMAS, Appellant, v. RIVERSIDE RESORT AND CASINO, Respondent.

No. 25018

November 30, 1994

885 P.2d 575

*Murphy & Munhall,*Las Vegas, for Appellant.

*Bell & Young,*Las Vegas, for Respondent.

OPINION

*Per Curiam:*

Appellant Katharine Thomas sued the Riverside Resort and Casino because of injuries she sustained when a bellman ran over her with a baggage cart. Riverside contends that it is not liable for the bellman’s allegedly negligent conduct because the bellman was in the employ of an independent contractor.

*1284Riverside contracted with Valet American, Inc., the bellman’s employer, to provide bell and porter services to the hotel. Citing *Wells, Inc.*v. *Shoemake,*Riverside contends that because it had retained the services of Valet American, an independent contractor, it is not liable for the negligence of Valet American’s employee. 64 Nev. 57, 177 P.2d 451 (1947). The trial court accepted Riverside’s argument and granted summary judgment to Riverside on the ground that Riverside was insulated from liability because of Valet American’s status as an independent contractor.

Summary judgment is only appropriate when, after review of the record in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, there remain no genuine issues of material fact. Butler v. Bogdanovich, 101 Nev. 449, 451, 705 P.2d 662, 663 (1985).

In this case, we hold that the district court erred when it granted summary judgment because the contract between Riverside and Valet American contains language whereby Riverside appears to have expressly assumed liability for the negligence of Valet American’s employee at the hotel. Specifically, Paragraph 4 of the Concession Agreement presents an issue of material fact:

> Hotel shall be responsible for all public liability, bodily injury, property damage, and medical expenses applicable to the total operations and functions of Hotel including the activities of Concessionaire [Valet American] hereunder, and may insure against all liability therefor .... Concessionaire shall be responsible for and shall hold Hotel free and harmless from all such liability arising from operations and functions of Concessionaire hereunder, to the extent of the deductible portion of Hotel’s insurance coverage not to exceed one thousand dollars.

If, as the contract says, the Hotel agreed to “be responsible for all public liability . . . applicable to hotel operations and functions of the hotel, including the activities of Concessionaire” and if, as appears to be the case, Riverside has agreed to be liable for the activities of the Concessionaire, Riverside certainly is not entitled to summary judgment in its favor.

We reverse the district court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of Riverside and remand the matter to the district court.
United States Department of Labor

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

__________________________________________

M.A., Appellant

and

U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, DETROIT 

PROCESSING & DISTRIBUTION CENTER,

Detroit, MI, Employer

__________________________________________

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Docket No. 23-0072

Issued: November 21, 2022

Appearances: Case Submitted on the Record

Appellant, pro se

Office of Solicitor, for the Director

ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL

Before:

ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Chief Judge

VALERIE D. EVANS-HARRELL, Alternate Judge

JAMES D. McGINLEY, Alternate Judge

On October 18, 2022 appellant filed an appeal from an April 18, 2022 merit decision of the 

Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). The Clerk of the Appellate Boards

assigned Docket No. 23-0072.

The Board has duly considered the matter and notes that the Board has jurisdiction to 

review final adverse decisions of OWCP issued under the Federal Employees’Compensation Act.

1

 

For final adverse decisions of OWCP issued on or after November 19, 2008, the Board’s review 

authority is limited to appeals which are filed within 180 days from the date of issuance of OWCP’s 

decision.2

The 180th day following the April 18, 2022 decision was October 15, 2022. As appellant 

did not file an appealwith the Board until October 18, 2022,more than 180 days after the April 18, 

2022 OWCP decision, the Board finds that the appeal docketed as No. 23-0072 is untimely filed. 

The Board is without jurisdiction to review the appeal. Appellant has not explained her failure to 

timely file an appeal with supporting documentation sufficient to establish compelling 

1

5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.; 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3(a).

2

20 C.F.R. § 501.3(e).
2

circumstances. Because there is no final adverse decision issued by OWCP within 180 days of the 

filing of the instant appeal, the Board concludes that the appeal docketed as No. 23-0072, must be 

dismissed.3 Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the appeal docketed as No. 23-0072 is dismissed.

Issued: November 21, 2022

Washington, DC

Alec J. Koromilas, Chief Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Valerie D. Evans-Harrell, Alternate Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

James D. McGinley, Alternate Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

3 The Board’s decisions and orders are “final upon the expiration of 30 days from the date of their issuance.” Id. at 

§ 501.6(d).
#### STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA ex rel. UTILITIES COMMISSION and CAROLINA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY v. RUFUS L. EDMISTEN, Attorney General

No. 144

(Filed 31 January 1977)

Appeal by the Attorney General from the judgment of the Court of Appeals, reported in 30 N.C. App. 475, 227 S.E. 2d 602, affirming the order of the North Carolina Utilities Commission, Martin, J., dissenting. Following the enactment of G.S. 62-134 (e) terminating, as of 1 September 1975, all monthly fuel adjustment rate increases based upon the increased cost of fuel, pursuant to a fuel cost adjustment clause previously approved by the Commission, the Commission entered an order permitting Carolina Power & Light Company to impose a surcharge upon users of its service on and after September 1, 1975. The facts with reference to such surcharge, with minor variations not relevant to the determination of this appeal, are set *479forth in Case No. 145, *State ex rel. Utilities Commission and Duke Power Co. v. Edmisten, Attorney General,*decided this day.

*Rufus L. Edmisten, Attorney General, by Robert P. Gruber, Special Deputy Attorney General.*

*Edward B. Hipp, Commission Attorney, by Wilson B. Par-tin, Jr., Assistant Commission Attorney, for North Carolina Utilities Commission.*

*Joyner & Howison by Robert C. Howison, Jr., and William E. Graham, Jr., for Carolina Power & Light Company.*

LAKE, Justice.

For the reasons set forth in *State ex rel. Utilities Commission and Duke Power Co. v. Edmisten, Attorney General, supra,*the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and this matter is remanded to that court with direction that it issue its judgment further remanding the matter to the North Carolina Utilities Commissions for the entry by the Commission of an order vacating its order authorizing the said surcharge, and directing Carolina Power & Light Company to refund to the users of its service the revenues collected by it from them pursuant to such surcharge.

Reversed and remanded.

Justice Copeland

dissenting.

For the reasons set forth in my dissent in *State ex rel. Utilities Commission and Duke Power Co. v. Edmisten, Attorney General,*I respectfully dissent.

Chief Justice Sharp and Justice Moore join in this dissent.
**Exhibit11**

 

 

INTERNATIONALMULTIFOODS CORPORATION AND SUBSIDIARIES

 

Computationof Earnings (loss) per Common Share

(unaudited)

 

(inthousands, except per share amounts)

 

 
|                                               |   | **THREE MONTHS ENDED** |       |
|----------------------------------------------------|--------|------------------------|------------|
|                                               |   | **May 31,  2003**      |       | **June 1,  2002** | ** ** |
|                                               |   |                   | ** ** |   | ** ** |
| Average shares of common stock outstanding         |   | 19,193                 |       | 19,028 |   |
| Dilutive potential common shares                   |   | —                 |       | 428 |   |
| **Total adjusted average shares**                  |   | **19,193**             | ** ** | **19,456** | ** ** |
|                                               |   |                   |       |   |   |
| Earnings (loss) from continuing operations         |   | $                      | (303       | ) | $ | 3,306 |   |
| Loss from discontinued operations                  |   | —                 |       | (39,744 | ) |
| **Loss applicable to common stock**                |   | **$**                  | **(303**   | **)** | **$** | **(36,438** | **)** |
|                                               |   |                   |       |   |   |
| Basic earnings (loss) per share of common stock:   |   |                   |       |   |   |
| Continuing operations                              |   | $                      | (0.02      | ) | $ | 0.17 |   |
| **Discontinued operations**                        |   | **—**             | ** ** | **(2.08** | **)** |
| Total                                              |   | $                      | (0.02      | ) | $ | (1.91 | ) |
|                                               |   |                   |       |   |   |
| Diluted earnings (loss) per share of common stock: |   |                   |       |   |   |
| Continuing operations                              |   | $                      | (0.02      | ) | $ | 0.17 |   |
| **Discontinued operations**                        |   | **—**             | ** ** | **(2.04** | **)** |
| Total                                              |   | $                      | (0.02      | ) | $ | (1.87 | ) |

 

Basic earnings(loss) per share are computed by dividing net earnings (loss) by the weightedaverage number of shares of common stock outstanding during the period.

 

Diluted earningsper share are computed similar to basic earnings per share except that theweighted average shares outstanding are increased to include additional sharesfrom the assumed exercise of stock options, if dilutive.  The number of additional shares iscalculated by assuming that outstanding stock options were exercised and thatthe proceeds from such exercises were used to acquire shares of common stock atthe average market price during the period.

 

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