Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed December 3, 2019.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-18-00673-CR

KEDRICK NELMS, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 427th District Court

Travis County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. D-1-DC-18-904003

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

A jury found Appellant Kedrick Nelms guilty of trafficking of a person 

younger than 18 years and compelling prostitution. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. 

§§ 20A.02(a), 43.05 (Vernon Supp. 2019). The trial court sentenced Appellant to 

40 years’ confinement. Challenging the trial court’s judgment, Appellant asserts 

two issues addressing the trial court’s admission of certain testimony and the 
2

State’s plea bargain offer. For the reasons below, we affirm.1 

BACKGROUND

Complainant was 14 years old when she met Appellant through a mobile 

dating site in 2016. Appellant introduced Complainant to a woman named Kirsten, 

who talked to Complainant about posting her pictures online to solicit prostitution. 

Shortly thereafter, Complainant traveled to Austin and San Antonio with 

Kirsten and another woman named Bria. On both trips Complainant and the other 

two women engaged in prostitution with men they met through online 

advertisements. Complainant was arrested in San Antonio after she was 

apprehended by police officers while smoking marijuana. Complainant was 

transported to a juvenile detention facility where she was interviewed by senior 

juvenile probation officer Eliseo Mata. Complainant initially was not cooperative 

with Officer Mata but, after Officer Mata showed Complainant the prostitution 

advertisements he found online, Complainant became more cooperative and 

provided details regarding her involvement with Appellant, Kirsten, and Bria. 

Complainant, Bria, and Officer Mata testified at Appellant’s trial. After the 

parties rested, the jury found Appellant guilty of trafficking of a person younger 

than 18 years and compelling prostitution. Appellant timely appealed. 

ANALYSIS

Appellant asserts (1) the trial court abused its discretion by permitting 

inadmissible hearsay testimony into evidence, and (2) he was denied due process 

by the State’s failure to communicate a plea bargain offer of eight years’

1 This case was transferred to this court from the Third Court of Appeals by Texas 

Supreme Court Transfer Order Misc. Docket No. 18-9083, issued June 19, 2018. Because of the 

transfer, we must decide the case in accordance with the precedent of the Third Court of Appeals 

if our decision otherwise would have been inconsistent with that court’s precedent. See Tex. R. 

App. P. 41.3. 
3

confinement. 

I. Any Error in the Admission of the Challenged Testimony Was 

Harmless. 

Appellant asserts the trial court abused its discretion by permitting Officer 

Mata to testify regarding hearsay statements Complainant made during her 

interview at the detention facility. Specifically, Appellant challenges Officer 

Mata’s testimony about the following topics: (1) Complainant’s description of 

Appellant, where they met, and that she wanted to be in a relationship with him; 

(2) Complainant’s descriptions of Kirsten and Bria and their involvement in the 

relevant events; and (3) Complainant’s statements regarding the purpose of the

trips to Austin and San Antonio. Presuming it was error to admit this testimony 

and that Appellant properly preserved this error for appellate review, we conclude 

any error was harmless. 

Hearsay is defined as a statement, other than one made by the declarant 

while testifying at the current trial or hearing, that is offered into evidence to prove 

the truth of the matter asserted. Tex. R. Evid. 801(d). Errors in the admission of 

hearsay evidence generally are non-constitutional in nature; therefore, even when 

such error is established, it will be disregarded unless it affected a defendant’s 

substantial rights. See Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(b); Sandoval v. State, 409 S.W.3d 259, 

287 (Tex. App.—Austin 2013, no pet.). An error affects a defendant’s substantial 

rights when the error “had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in 

determining the jury’s verdict.” King v. State, 953 S.W.2d 266, 271 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 1997). The erroneous admission of evidence will not warrant reversal if the 

same or similar evidence was admitted without objection at another point in the 

trial. Estrada v. State, 313 S.W.3d 274, 302 n.29 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). 

Here, the evidence imparted in Officer Mata’s challenged statements was 
4

admitted without objection during other witnesses’ testimony. Complainant 

identified Appellant in court as the man she met through a dating application and 

said he connected her to Kirsten and Bria, asked her to “make money,” and 

“pretended to be [her] boyfriend.” Complainant also testified regarding how she 

met Kirsten and Bria and their involvement in the posting of the online prostitution 

advertisements. Complainant also described the women’s trips to Austin and San 

Antonio and the prostitution they engaged in. 

Bria testified that Appellant and Kirsten “intended to engage in prostitution 

or pimping together.” Bria discussed meeting Complainant, taking elicit 

photographs with Complainant, and posting the pictures on prostitute websites. 

Bria also described the Austin and San Antonio trips with Kirsten and Complainant 

and said the purpose of the trips was to prostitute and make money. Bria said 

Complainant agreed to the trips because she thought Appellant “was going to be 

her boyfriend.” 

As this recitation shows, the testimony Appellant challenges also was 

admitted via other witnesses, namely, Complainant and Bria. Therefore, any error 

in the admission of the challenged testimony did not affect Appellant’s substantial 

rights and did not have a substantial and injurious effect on the jury’s verdict. See 

King, 953 S.W.2d at 271; Sandoval, 409 S.W.3d at 287.

We overrule Appellant’s first issue. 

II. The Record Does Not Contain Any Evidence to Support Appellant’s 

Claim the State Intended to Offer an Eight-Year Plea Bargain. 

In his second issue, Appellant focuses on the parties’ pretrial discussions

regarding plea bargain offers. At Appellant’s November 17, 2017 arraignment, the 

State offered to recommend a sentence of 15 years’ confinement in exchange for a 

“guilty” plea. Appellant declined the State’s offer. 
5

At a pretrial hearing held on June 14, 2018, the parties again discussed a 

possible plea bargain and Appellant counter-offered with six years’ confinement

for a “guilty” plea. The State rejected Appellant’s counteroffer. When the trial 

court inquired about the State’s previous offer, a prosecutor stated: “[t]he State had 

offered eight [years] and the offer had expired and there was no counter in the 

intervening nine months, ten months.” A second prosecutor told the trial court,

“when we announced ready for trial and everything, the offer that we put on the 

record, I believe, was eight years’ TDC.” 

Appellant’s trial counsel and the trial court stated they did not have any 

recollection of the State’s prior offer. Pressing this point further, Appellant’s trial 

counsel stated:

[I]f the State is averring that there was an offer for eight [years], then I 

think, as an officer of the court, if the defendant wanted to take that, I 

don’t think he ever turned that down on the record. And so therefore, 

there might be an error in him not having been able to address the 

offer at some time in the past. That’s my only concern. Because I 

don’t remember the offer being eight [years]. 

Asserting this exchange shows the State intended to offer an eight-year plea 

bargain, Appellant contends the State’s failure to communicate this offer to his trial 

counsel violated his due process rights. 

A defendant in Texas has neither a constitutional nor statutory right to plea 

bargain for a particular punishment or a reduced charge. Perkins v. Court of 

Appeals for Third Supreme Judicial Dist. of Tex., at Austin, 738 S.W.2d 276, 283 

(Tex. Crim. App. 1987); Morano v. State, 572 S.W.2d 550, 551 (Tex. Crim. App. 

[Panel Op.] 1978). But when a plea bargain is expressly approved by the trial 

court in open court, the plea bargain becomes a binding contractual arrangement 

between the State and the defendant. See Perkins, 738 S.W.2d at 283; see also 
6

Blanco v. State, 18 S.W.3d 218, 220 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (“It also is wellsettled that a defendant is entitled to insist on the benefit of his bargain.”). After a 

plea agreement is approved by the trial court, the defendant may seek specific 

enforcement of the agreement if the State fails to keep its end of the bargain. See 

Ex parte Rogers, 629 S.W.2d 741, 742 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (orig. proceeding). 

But here, the record does not show Appellant and the State agreed to an 

eight-year plea bargain. The record also does not show that this alleged bargain 

was expressly approved by the trial court in open court. At most, the record 

suggests the State’s prosecutors were mistaken about the term of confinement

included with the previous offer (which was made seven months earlier) — but this 

suggestion alone does not entitle Appellant to seek specific enforcement of the 

alleged offer. See Perkins, 738 S.W.2d at 283; Ex parte Rogers, 629 S.W.2d at 

742. Without any evidence in the record to support Appellant’s contention, we 

overrule his second issue. 

CONCLUSION

We overrule Appellant’s issues on appeal and affirm the trial court’s 

judgment. 

/s/ Meagan Hassan

Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Frost and Justices Wise and Hassan.

Do Not Publish — Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).