T.C. Memo. 1997-428

UNITED STATES TAX COURT

JENNIFER A. LESTRANGE, Petitioner v.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent

Docket No. 19567-95. Filed September 22, 1997.

Gerald A. Holmes, for petitioner.

Bryan E. Sladek, for respondent.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

PAJAK, Special Trial Judge: This case was heard pursuant to

section 7443A(b)(3) of the Code, and Rules 180, 181, and 182. 

All section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect

for the taxable year in issue. All Rule references are to the

Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.

Respondent determined a deficiency in petitioner's 1994
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Federal income tax in the amount of $1,479. The Court must

decide whether petitioner is entitled to an earned income credit

in the amount of $1,479 for the taxable year in issue.

This case was submitted fully stipulated pursuant to Rule

122. The stipulated facts are so found. Petitioner resided in

Santa Rosa, California, when her petition was filed.

Petitioner has a son, Treymaine D. Wilkins (Treymaine). 

Treymaine was approximately 21⁄2 years old at the end of 1994. 

With the exception of September 1994, from March 1, 1994, through

December 31, 1994, petitioner and Treymaine resided with Charlene

Groom, petitioner's mother and Treymaine's grandmother

(grandmother) at 3 different residences in California. The

grandmother rented the 3 residences. Petitioner paid one-half of

the rent and utilities for the exclusive use of a bedroom and

shared use of the common areas. Petitioner paid for food for

Treymaine and herself. Apparently, Heather Lestrange (Heather),

the grandmother's other daughter and petitioner's sister, also

lived in the residences.

Petitioner was employed by the Target Division of Dayton

Hudson Corporation. She earned $5,626.40 and reported a roundedoff amount of $5,626 on her 1994 return. The grandmother's

adjusted gross income was greater than petitioner's adjusted

gross income in 1994.

On her 1994 Federal income tax return, petitioner claimed an

earned income credit. She identified Treymaine as her
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"qualifying child" within the meaning of section 32(c)(3).

On her 1994 Federal income tax return, the grandmother

claimed an earned income credit. The grandmother identified her

daughter Heather as her qualifying child on her 1994 return.

Respondent determined that petitioner was not entitled to an

earned income credit for 1994. Petitioner bears the burden to

prove that respondent's determination is incorrect. Rule 142(a);

Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933).

Section 32(a) provides for an earned income credit in the

case of an "eligible individual". Section 32(c)(1)(A) provides

that an "eligible individual" means any individual who has a

"qualifying child" for the taxable year. Section 32(c)(3)

defines qualifying child in pertinent part as follows:

(3) QUALIFYING CHILD.--

(A) IN GENERAL.--The term "qualifying child" means, 

with respect to any taxpayer for any taxable year, an 

individual--

(i) who bears a relationship to the taxpayer 

described in subparagraph (B),

(ii) * * * who has the same principal place of 

abode as the taxpayer for more than one-half of such 

taxable year,

(iii) who meets the age requirements of

subparagraph (C), and

(iv) with respect to whom the taxpayer meets the 

identification requirements of subparagraph (D).

Respondent on brief admits that section 32 consists of four

elements. The parties agree that Treymaine has satisfied these
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four elements of section 32(c)(3)(A) with respect to petitioner. 

However, respondent contends that section 32(c)(1)(C) precludes

petitioner from being an eligible individual with respect to

Treymaine for the year in issue.

Section 32(c)(1)(C) provides:

If 2 or more individuals would (but for this

subparagraph and after application of subparagraph (B))

be treated as eligible individuals with respect to the

same qualifying child for taxable years beginning in

the same calendar year, only the individual with the

highest adjusted gross income for such taxable years

shall be treated as an eligible individual with respect

to such qualifying child. 

Respondent argues that Treymaine was a qualifying child with

respect to both petitioner and the grandmother for 1994.

Therefore, respondent contends that because the grandmother had

the higher adjusted gross income in 1994, section 32(c)(1)(C)

precludes petitioner from being an eligible individual with

respect to Treymaine for that year.

Petitioner observes that because the grandmother did not

identify Treymaine on her 1994 Federal income tax return as her

qualifying child, all four of the requirements of section

32(c)(3)(A) were not met by the grandmother. Consequently,

Treymaine is not a qualifying child with respect to the

grandmother. Thus, section 32(c)(1)(C) does not apply because

petitioner and the grandmother are not eligible individuals with

respect to the same qualifying child. 

Respondent refers to the legislative history of the Omnibus
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Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-508, sec.

11111(a), 104 Stat. 1388, 1388-408 (the act that enacted the

"qualifying child" test). Respondent then contends that if a

child satisfies the relationship, abode, and age requirements

found in section 32(c)(3)(A)(i), (ii), and (iii), the child is a

qualifying child. Respondent claims the identification

requirement found in section 32(c)(3)(A)(iv) is merely a

requirement to report the name, age, and Taxpayer Identification

Number of an individual who is otherwise a qualifying child. On

brief, respondent argues that Congress imposed the identification

requirement simply to ease administration of the law and reduce

respondent's administrative burden. See H. Conf. Rept. 101-964,

at 1037 (1990), 1991-2 C.B. 560, 564. Yet, the legislative

history cited above shows that there are four requirements to

meet the definition of a qualifying child. In fact, respondent

so admits on brief.

The starting point for interpreting a statute is the

language of the statute itself. Consumer Product Safety Comm'n

v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980). If the language

of the statute is plain, clear, and unambiguous, "'the sole

function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms.'" 

United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241

(1989) (quoting Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485

(1917)). Thus, as long as the statutory language is clear and

unambiguous, there generally is no need for courts to inquire
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beyond the plain language of the statute. Absent absurd,

unreasonable, or futile results, there is "no more persuasive

evidence of the purpose of a statute than the words by which the

legislature undertook to give expression to its wishes." United

States v. American Trucking Associations, 310 U.S. 534, 543

(1940).

Section 32(c)(1)(A) defines an eligible individual as an

individual who has a qualifying child for the taxable year. A

qualifying child is an individual who satisfies a relationship

test, an abode test, an age test, and for whom the taxpayer

satisfies an identification requirement. Sec. 32(c)(3)(A)(i)-

(iv). These requirements are conjunctive.

For the year in issue, Treymaine met the requirements of

section 32(c)(3)(A)(i), (ii), (iii), and (iv) with respect to

petitioner. With respect to his grandmother, Treymaine only met

the requirements of section 32(c)(3)(A)(i), (ii), and (iii). 

What is significant here is that the grandmother did not identify

Treymaine as her qualifying child on her 1994 Federal income tax

return and thus failed to satisfy the requirement of section

32(c)(3)(A)(iv). Accordingly, Treymaine is not a qualifying

child with respect to his grandmother.

Because petitioner and the grandmother are not eligible

individuals with respect to the same qualifying child, section

32(c)(1)(C) does not preclude petitioner from entitlement to an

earned income credit for 1994. We cannot say that this
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conclusion is "so bizarre that Congress could not have intended

it." Demarest v. Manspeaker, 498 U.S. 184, 191 (1991). The

language of section 32(c)(3)(A) is sufficiently clear to be

dispositive of the issue at hand. "[W]hen a statute speaks with

clarity to an issue judicial inquiry into the statute's meaning,

in all but the most extraordinary circumstance, is finished." 

Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 475

(1992).

 The parties agreed that petitioner would be entitled to a

refund of $1,499 if decision were entered in her favor in this

case.

Decision will be entered

for petitioner.