Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 33A01-1410-DR-457 |March 31, 2015 Page 1 of 8

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as 

precedent or cited before any court except for the 

purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

APPELLANT PRO SE

John Mark Nipp

New Castle, Indiana

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE

Julia N. Compton

Franklin, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

John Mark Nipp,

Appellant-Petitioner,

v.

Amy Elizabeth Nipp,

Appellee-Respondent,

March 31, 2015

Court of Appeals Case No. 33A01-

1410-DR-457

Appeal from the Henry County 

Circuit Court 

Trial Court Cause No. 33C01-0610-

DR-133

The Honorable Mary G. Willis, 

Judge

Bradford, Judge.

Case Summary

[1] Appellant-Petitioner John Mark Nipp (“Father”) and Appellee-Respondent 

Amy Elizabeth Nipp (“Mother”) were divorced in 2007. Two children, M.N. 

and A.N., were born of the marriage. Mother filed a motion to modify custody 

in 2013. On May 5, 2014, the trial court signed an order granting split custody 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 33A01-1410-DR-457 |March 31, 2015 Page 2 of 8

with Father having primary custody of A.N. and Mother having primary 

custody of M.N. That order also provided that the parties would continue the 

same near-equal parenting time schedule as had been used prior. On August 

22, 2014, Mother filed a motion requesting that the trial court clarify its May 5, 

2014 order. The trial court granted the motion and reduced Father’s parenting 

time with M.N. Father argues that the motion to clarify was essentially a 

motion to correct error that was filed belatedly. We agree and reverse. 

Facts and Procedural History

[2] The parties married in 1996 and had two children together, M.N. and A.N. 

The marriage was dissolved on December 7, 2007. The dissolution order 

provided that the parties would have joint legal custody of the children and that 

Father would be the primary care provider. With regards to parenting time, the 

order provided that 

“each party is receiving almost equal time with the children” and

Mother’s parenting time schedule is extensive and greater than 

contemplated by the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines [(“IPTG”)] 

on what the parties denominate a 2/5 day schedule and Mother was 

allotted 182 overnights on the child support worksheet.

App. 17-18.

[3] On April 16, 2013, Mother filed a motion to modify custody. Hearings on the 

matter were concluded on March 5, 2014. On May 5, 2014, the trial court 

signed an order on custody, support, and parenting time in which it adopted the 

Court Appointed Special Advocate’s recommendation that the parents share 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 33A01-1410-DR-457 |March 31, 2015 Page 3 of 8

joint legal custody. 1 Specifically, the court ordered “that Father shall have 

primary physical custody of [A.N.], and Mother shall have primary physical 

custody of [M.N.].” Appellant’s App. p. 19. Addressing parenting time, “The 

Court ORDERS a deviation from the regular [IPTG] for the reasons set forth 

above and the parties are ordered to continue to exercise extensive parenting 

time with a nearly equal parenting time arrangement.” Appellant’s App. p. 20. 

[4] Following the order, the parties continued to exercise “nearly equal parenting 

time” using the original 2/5 day schedule they had previously used. 

Appellant’s App. p. 20. On August 22, 2014, Mother filed a motion for written 

clarification of the May 5, 2014 order. The motion requested that the trial court 

clarify whether it intended for the parties to continue using the original 

parenting time schedule. After a hearing on the motion, the trial court issued 

an order of clarification, filed September 29, 2014, which allocated to Father 

significantly less parenting time with M.N. Father appeals the trial court’s 

order of clarification. 

Discussion and Decision 

[5] Decisions regarding child support are generally left to the discretion of 

the trial court. Thacker v. Thacker, 710 N.E.2d 942, 944 (Ind. Ct. App. 

1999). Absent an abuse of discretion or a determination that is 

contrary to law, a court on appeal will not disturb a trial court's order 

modifying child support. Id. In reviewing orders modifying child 

support, we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences 

 

1 The order was not issued until June 4, 2014. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 33A01-1410-DR-457 |March 31, 2015 Page 4 of 8

favorable to the judgment. Hamiter v. Torrence, 717 N.E.2d 1249, 1252 

(Ind. Ct. App. 1999). 

Gilbert v. Gilbert, 777 N.E.2d 785, 790 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). 

[6] Indiana Trial Rule 59 provides that a motion to correct error must be filed not 

later than thirty days after entry of final judgment. Father claims that there is 

no basis for a motion to clarify in the Indiana Rules of Trial Procedure and that 

Mother’s motion can only be reasonably characterized as a motion to correct 

error, and therefore, was belatedly filed more than thirty days after final 

judgment. For her part, Mother argues that the motion should be characterized 

as a request for relief from judgment under Trial Rule 60(B)(8), which must be 

filed “within a reasonable time” after a final judgment.2 

[7] Father bases his argument on our recent decision in Hedrick v. Gilbert, 17 N.E.3d 

321 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).

The Indiana Trial Rules do not provide for a “motion for 

clarification.” If we were to treat it as something other than a motion 

to correct error or a motion to reconsider, practitioners would have no 

guidance on what such a motion should be, its timelines, or its possible 

end results. Gilbert argues that she merely asked for certain technical 

clarifications regarding the timeline of payments. While that is true, 

nothing in the rules distinguishes a request for a technical clarification 

from a request for a more substantive change, and nothing in the rules 

 

2 We note that Mother briefly argues, in a footnote, that Father failed to argue to the trial court that 

Mother’s motion to clarify fell within the purview of Trial Rule 59 and that it was untimely, and so waived 

those arguments on appeal. However, we find that Father’s failure to make such arguments below is 

excusable in light of the fact that Mother’s motion was not labeled as a motion to correct error and was 

seemingly crafted to appear not to be a motion to correct error so as to avoid the thirty-day filing 

requirement. “[T]his Court prefers to reach the merits of any issue when at all possible.” Chance v. Chance, 

400 N.E.2d 1207, 1209 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980). 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 33A01-1410-DR-457 |March 31, 2015 Page 5 of 8

provides for a motion to correct a “technical error” as opposed to a 

motion to correct any other error.

* * *

In the end, we find that it would elevate form over substance to treat a 

“motion to clarify” as something other than a motion to correct error. 

Id. at 326. We agree with Father that Hedrick is controlling in the instant 

matter. Nonetheless, we will address Mother’s arguments to the contrary. 

[8] Trial Rule 60(B)(8) provides as follows: “the court may relieve a party or his 

legal representative from a judgment, including a judgment by default, for... (8) 

any reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment, other than those 

reasons set forth in sub-paragraphs (1), (2), (3), and (4).” Mother argues that 

“Trial Rule 60(B) gives a Court broad equitable power to clarify an ambiguous 

court order.” Appellee’s Br. p. 10. However, there is no such language in Rule 

60 providing such broad power to trial courts and Mother provided no case law 

supporting that contention. 

[9] Mother attempts to liken the instant situation with one this court addressed in

Sarna v. Norcen Bank, 530 N.E.2d 113 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988). In Sarna, we upheld 

a trial court’s decision to grant a motion to clarify a judgment rendered 

approximately eighteen months prior. Id. at 115. However, we found that 

Norcen Bank’s motion to clarify was based on Trial Rule 60(A) not 60(B). 

Trial Rule 60(A) allows for the correction of “clerical mistakes.” The clerical 

error in Sarna was due to an improper legal description of land made by the 

recorder’s office which had listed two separate properties of land as having 

overlapping areas. Id. “[W]here the ‘mistake’ is one of substance the finality 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 33A01-1410-DR-457 |March 31, 2015 Page 6 of 8

principle controls. A ‘clerical error’ has been defined as a mistake by a clerk, 

counsel, judge or printer which is not a result of judicial function and cannot 

reasonably be attributed to the exercise of judicial consideration or discretion.” 

Id. at 115 (quotations and citations omitted). 

Trial Rule 60(A) merely provides a remedy to correct by nunc pro tunc

entry clerical errors in judgments, orders, etc., or errors arising from 

oversight or omission. That trial rule, however, does not constitute a 

license to make judicial changes in the actual law or ruling of a case. 

Artusi v. City of Mishawaka, 519 N.E.2d 1246, 1248 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988). 

[10] Mother does not argue that there is any clerical error in the instant case. 

However, she argues that “[a]lthough the particular rule applied in Sarna was 

Trial Rule 60(A), the analysis of the issue in this case nevertheless remains to 

[sic] the same.” Appellee’s Br. p. 13. We do not agree. In its May 5, 2014

ruling, the trial court ordered the parties “to continue to exercise extensive 

parenting time with a nearly equal parenting time arrangement.” Appellant’s 

App. p. 20. This appears to be an unambiguous order for the parties to 

continue the same nearly-equal parenting time schedule as they had been using 

since the original dissolution decree in 2007.

3

 In its subsequent order on 

clarification, the trial court ordered the parties 

2. ...to continue to exercise extensive parenting time with a nearly 

equal parenting time arrangement with [A.N.]. []

 

3 We note that the parties continued using the original parenting time schedule following the May 5, 

2014 order. This implies that there was no confusion with the intent of the order. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 33A01-1410-DR-457 |March 31, 2015 Page 7 of 8

3. Because of the parties inability, refusal and neglect to communicate 

regarding a flexible parenting time [schedule] for [M.N.] to account for 

the change in primary physical custody to Mother, the Court finds that 

Father shall exercise parenting time with [M.N.] no less than the 

provisions of the most recent [IPTG] with Mother to provide 

additional parenting time as [M.N.] requests and the schedule 

allows....

4. All other terms and conditions of the parties Decree, except as 

modified herein, shall remain in full force and effect. 

Appellant’s App. pp. 8-9 (first emphasis in original, second emphasis added). 

[11] We see no evidence of mistake or ambiguity in these orders. The trial court 

used its order on clarification to make a substantive change to its original 

ruling: that is, to continue the near-equal parenting time schedule with regards 

to A.N., but to provide significantly less parenting time to Father with regards 

to M.N. Moreover, in paragraph four of the order on clarification, the trial 

court acknowledged that it was modifying its original order. Such a 

modification would not be precluded had it been made pursuant to a motion to 

correct error or reconsider. However, such motions must be filed within thirty 

days of a final judgment and Mother’s motion for clarification was not filed 

until August 22, 2014, well over thirty days after the order on custody was 

signed and issued; May 5, 2014, and June 4, 2014, respectively. Once the 

period for any such motions and/or appeals has passed, the only proper vehicle 

for seeking a substantive change to a child custody order is a request for 

modification. We therefore reverse the judgment of the trial court with 

instructions that the May 5, 2014 order be enforced as written. 

[12] The judgment of the trial court is reversed. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 33A01-1410-DR-457 |March 31, 2015 Page 8 of 8

[13] Najam, J., and Mathias, J., concur.