alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

June 6, 2007

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 06-51021

Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

FERNANDO GUTIERREZ-MUNOZ,

Defendant-Appellant.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas 

USDC No. 2:06-CR-170-ALL

--------------------

Before SMITH, BENAVIDES, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM:*

Appealing the Judgment in a Criminal Case, Fernando

Gutierrez-Munoz raises arguments that are foreclosed by

Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 235 (1998),

which held that 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2) is a penalty provision and

not a separate criminal offense. The Government’s motion for

summary affirmance is GRANTED, and the judgment of the district

court is AFFIRMED.
#### ROBERT LaVERNE LEWIS, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent.

No. 7600

December 23, 1974

529 P.2d 796

*437
      *Horace R. Goff,*State Public Defender, and *Gary A. Sheerin,*Deputy State Public Defender, of Carson City, for Appellant.

*Robert List,*Attorney General; *Roy A. Woof ter,*District Attorney, and *Dan M. Seaton,*Deputy District Attorney, Clark County, for Respondent.

OPINION

By the Court,

Zenoff, J.:

Robert LaVerne Lewis pleaded guilty to a charge of attempted forgery under NRS 205.090 and was sentenced to a term of five years in the Nevada State Penitentiary. The sentence was suspended and he was placed on probation for a period of two years. During Lewis’s probation period the State of Nevada moved to revoke his probation because of purported violations of his probation agreement. The Eighth *438Judicial District Court revoked the probation and imposed the original sentence.

The issue raised on appeal is whether the district court abused its discretionary power in revoking probation. Lewis claims that the State is required to establish violations of the probation agreement by a preponderance of evidence.

In considering the standard to be applied in revoking probation the law is well-established that revocation of probation is within the exercise of the trial court’s broad discretionary power and such an action will not be disturbed in the absence of a clear showing of abuse of that discretion. Pickens v. State of Texas, 497 F.2d 981, 982 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Lara, 472 F.2d 128, 129 (9th Cir. 1972); 18 U.S.C.A. 3651 (the equivalent federal statute to NRS 176.215).1

Evidence beyond a reasonable doubt is not required to support a court’s discretionary order revoking probation. The evidence and facts must reasonably satisfy the judge that the conduct of the probationer has not been as good as required by the conditions of probation. Pickens v. State of Texas, supra; Bernal-Zazueta v. United States, 225 F.2d 64, 68 (9th Cir. 1955).

The appellant’s record reflects that sufficient evidence was present to justify revocation. Lewis left the state without permission of his probation officer, he changed his residence without permission, failed to report to his probation officer for several months and it was established at the revocation hearing that he occupied more than one motel room under an alias and in each instance left without paying for the accommodations. Also, he performed some automotive repair service while in the employ of another person, received payments therefor which he did not turn over or report to the employer. *439All the foregoing constituted violations of his probation agreement. There was no abuse of discretion by the district court.

Affirmed.

Thompson, C. J., and Mowbray, Gunderson, and Bat-jer, JJ., concur.

NRS 176.215

1. The period of probation or suspension of sentence may be indeterminate or may be fixed by the court and may at any time be extended or terminated by the court.

18 U.S.C.A. 3651

The court may revoke or modify any condition of probation, or may change the period of probation.
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#### ROBERT FRANKLIN JACKSON, Appellant, v. STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent.

No. 7124

July 8, 1974

523 P.2d 850

*Morgan D. Harris,*Public Defender, and *Robert L. Stott,*Deputy Public Defender, Clark County, for Appellant.

*Robert List,*Attorney General, Carson City; *Roy A. Woof-ter,*District Attorney, and *Charles L. Garner,*Deputy District Attorney, Clark County, for Respondent.

OPINION

*Per Curiam:*

While on a routine patrol at approximately 1:30 a.m. on the morning of August 7, 1970, in the vicinity of Jackson and H Streets in Las Vegas, Nevada, two police officers observed the appellant leaving an apartment complex. There were no other persons in the vicinity. As he walked along the sidewalk on H Street the officers observed a plastic baggie in his hand. Appellant looked in the direction of the police officers, dropped the baggie and proceeded along the sidewalk to a car parked at the curbside.

*267Keeping appellant under constant visual surveillance, the officers turned their patrol car around and pulled in behind the parked vehicle, commanded him to step away from the vehicle, and requested his identification. One of the officers immediately retrieved the discarded plastic baggie, opened it and found several toy balloons containing capsules which appeared to be heroin. Appellant was advised that he was under arrest for possession of narcotics.

In this appeal Jackson urges that his identification by the officers stemmed from an illegal stop and detention. This contention is without merit.

NRS 171.123(1) allows a police officer to “detain any person whom such officer encounters under circumstances which reasonably indicate that such person has committed, is committing or is about to commit a crime.” Here the conduct of the appellant was sufficient to lead the officers “reasonably to conclude in light of his [their] experience that criminal activity may [might] be afoot. . . .” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1967). See also Wright v. State, 88 Nev. 460, 499 P.2d 1216 (1972).

The record contains substantial evidence to support the finding of probable cause to stop and detain. Terry v. Ohio, supra, Wright v. State, supra.

NRS 171.123(1) requires only a reasonable indication of criminal activity to justify a stop and detention. Here the officers, with some training in the detection of narcotics violations, were reasonably prompted to stop and detain appellant upon viewing his act of dropping the plastic baggie when he became aware of their presence.

The judgment and conviction is affirmed.
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 1350, CHAPTER 63 OF TITLE 18, UNITED STATES CODE,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

Pursuant to Section 1350, Chapter 63 of Title 18, United States Code, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, the undersigned, as Chief Executive Officer of Norcraft Holdings, L.P. and Norcraft Companies, L.P. (together, the Company), does hereby certify that to the undersigneds knowledge:

1) the Companys Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the period ending March 31, 2010 fully complies with the requirements of
Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

2) the information contained in the Companys
Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the period ending March 31, 2010 fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



|                   |  |                                      
|------------------ |  | -------------------------------------
|Date: May 17, 2010 |  | /s/ Mark Buller                      
|                   |  | Mark Buller  Chief Executive Officer

A signed
original of this written statement, required by Section 906, has been provided to Norcraft Holdings, L.P. and Norcraft Companies, L.P. and will be retained by Norcraft Holdings, L.P. and Norcraft Companies, L.P. and furnished to the Securities
and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
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</TABLE>
United States Department of Labor

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

__________________________________________

P.S., Appellant

and

U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, POST OFFICE, 

Bedford Park, IL, Employer

__________________________________________

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Docket No. 23-0805

Issued: December 18, 2023

Appearances: Case Submitted on the Record

Alan J. Shapiro, Esq., for the appellant1

Office of Solicitor, for the Director

ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL

Before:

ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Chief Judge

JANICE B. ASKIN, Judge

JAMES D. McGINLEY, Alternate Judge

On May 17, 2023 appellant filed an appeal from an April 26, 2023 decision of the Office 

of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). The Clerk of the Appellate Boards assigned 

Docket No. 23-0805.

In a letter dated and received August 31, 2023, appellant, through counsel, requested that 

the appeal be withdrawn.

The Board has duly considered the matter and concludes that appellant’s request for the 

withdrawal of the appeal should be granted. Accordingly,

1

In all cases in which a representative has been authorized in a matter before the Board, no claim for a fee for legal 

or other service performed on appeal before the Board is valid unless approved by the Board. 20 C.F.R. § 501.9(e). 

No contract for a stipulated fee or on a contingent fee basis will be approved by the Board. Id. An attorney or 

representative’s collection of a fee without the Board’s approval may constitute a misdemeanor, subject to fine or 

imprisonment for up to one year or both. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 292. Demands for payment of fees to a 

representative, prior to approval by the Board, may be reported to appropriate authorities for investigation.
2

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT appellant’s request for the withdrawal of the appeal 

is granted. The appeal docketed as Docket No. 23-0805 is dismissed.

Issued: December 18, 2023

Washington, DC

Alec J. Koromilas, Chief Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Janice B. Askin, Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

James D. McGinley, Alternate Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
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<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from financial
statements for the three month period ended March 31, 1997 and is qualified in
its entirety by reference to such financial statements.
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</TABLE>
United States Department of Labor

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

__________________________________________

M.T., Appellant

and

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, MILITARY 

SEALIFT COMMAND, Norfolk, VA,

Employer

__________________________________________

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Docket No. 24-0035

Issued: January 25, 2024

Appearances: Case Submitted on the Record

Alan J. Shapiro, Esq., for the appellant1

Office of Solicitor, for the Director

ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL

Before:

ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Chief Judge

PATRICIA H. FITZGERALD, Deputy Chief Judge

VALERIE D. EVANS-HARRELL, Alternate Judge

On October 19, 2023 appellant, through counsel, filed a timely appeal from an October 4, 

2023 merit decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). The Clerk of 

the Appellate Boards assigned the appeal Docket No. 24-0035.

In a letter dated and received January 8, 2024, appellant, through counsel, requested that 

the appeal be dismissed.

1

In all cases in which a representative has been authorized in a matter before the Board, no claim for a fee for legal 

or other service performed on appeal before the Board is valid unless approved by the Board. 20 C.F.R. § 501.9(e). 

No contract for a stipulated fee or on a contingent fee basis will be approved by the Board. Id. An attorney or 

representative’s collection of a fee without the Board’s approval may constitute a misdemeanor, subject to fine or 

imprisonment for up to one year or both. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 292. Demands for payment of fees to a 

representative, prior to approval by the Board, may be reported to appropriate authorities for investigation.
2

The Board has duly considered the matter and concludes that appellant’s request for the 

dismissal of the appeal should be granted.2 Accordingly, 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT appellant’s request for the dismissal of the appeal is 

granted. The appeal docketed as No. 24-0035 is dismissed.

Issued: January 25, 2024

Washington, DC

Alec J. Koromilas, Chief Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Patricia H. Fitzgerald, Deputy Chief Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Valerie D. Evans-Harrell, Alternate Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

2 The Board’s decisions and orders are final upon the expiration of 30 days from the date of their issuance. 20 C.F.R. 

§ 501.6(d).
United States Department of Labor

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

__________________________________________

S.U., Appellant

and

DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, 

PALO ALTO VA MEDICAL CENTER, 

Palo Alto, CA, Employer

__________________________________________

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Docket No. 23-0294

Issued: June 9, 2023

Appearances: Case Submitted on the Record

Appellant, pro se

Office of Solicitor, for the Director

ORDER GRANTING REMANDING 

Before:

PATRICIA H. FITZGERALD, Deputy Chief Judge

VALERIE D. EVANS-HARRELL, Alternate Judge

JAMES D. McGINLEY, Alternate Judge

On December 26, 2022 appellant filed a timely appeal from a November 28, 2022 merit 

decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). The Clerk of the Appellate 

Boards assigned Docket No. 23-0294. 

The Director of OWCP filed a motion on January 9, 2023, requesting that the Board set 

aside OWCP’s November 28, 2022 decision and remand the case for further specified 

development. The Director noted that although appellant’s November 22, 2022 traumatic injury 

claim (Form CA-1) for having contracted COVID-19 while in the performance of duty included a 

date of injury of October 16, 2022, the record reveals that he was not tested until October 24, 2022. 

The Director further noted that the record is unclear as to “when exactly appellant stopped 

working” and, on appeal, appellant contends that his date of injury was October 25, 2022. The 

Director acknowledged “that there is no indication” regardingwhy OWCP listed October 16, 2022 

as the date of injury as the evidence of record did not support that this was the date of actual 

exposure because appellant was exposed to an ill coworker on that date. The Director conc luded 

that under the facts and circumstances of this case, the date of injury is unclear “and, therefore, 

appellant’s entitlement to COP is uncertain.” On remand, the Director indicated that OWCP will 

further develop the record to determine the date of injury, to be followed by a de novo decision on 

appellant’s entitlement to COP for exposure to COVID-19 while in the performance of duty. 
2

The Clerk of the Appellate Boards served appellant with a copy of the Director’s motion 

to remand on January 19, 2023. No response was received.

The Board, having duly considered the matter, concludes that, for all of the reasons 

espoused by the Director in his motion to remand, this motion shall be granted. Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the motion to remand filed by the Director of the 

Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs is granted. The November 28, 2022 decision of 

OWCP is set aside and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this order of 

the Board.

Issued: June 9, 2023

Washington, DC

Patricia H. Fitzgerald, Deputy Chief Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Valerie D. Evans-Harrell, Alternate Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

James D. McGinley, Alternate Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board