[Cite as State v. Norris, 2020-Ohio-764.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

SEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

NOBLE COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

IVAN NORRIS, JR., 

Defendant-Appellant.

 

OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY 

Case No. 19 NO 0467 

 

Criminal Appeal from the 

County Court of Noble County, Ohio 

Case No. 18 CR B 194ABCD 

BEFORE: 

David A. D’Apolito, Gene Donofrio, Cheryl L. Waite, Judges. 

JUDGMENT: 

Affirmed. 

Atty. Kelly A. Riddle, Noble County Prosecutor, and Atty. Jamie Riley Pointer, Assistant 

Prosecutor, 150 Courthouse, Caldwell, Ohio 43724, for Plaintiff-Appellee and 

Atty. Scott Essad, 721 Boardman-Poland Road, Suite 201, Youngstown, Ohio 44512, 

for Defendant-Appellant. 

 
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Case No. 19 NO 0467

Dated: February 26, 2020 

 

D’APOLITO, J. 

{¶1} Appellant Ivan Norris appeals the terms of his community control imposed 

by the County Court of Noble County following his jury conviction for three counts of 

animals running at large, in violation of R.C. 951.02, a misdemeanor of the fourth degree; 

as well as his conviction for one count of resisting arrest, in violation of R.C. 2921.33, a 

misdemeanor of the second degree. In his first assignment of error, Appellant argues 

that the trial court did not have the statutory authority to prohibit him from keeping 

livestock on property under his ownership or control as a term of his community control. 

In his second assignment of error, Appellant challenges both the sufficiency and weight 

of the evidence supporting his conviction for resisting arrest. For the following reasons, 

the terms of community control imposed by the trial court and Appellant’s conviction for 

resisting arrest are affirmed. 

FACTS 

{¶2} Appellant was charged with three counts of animals running at large as a 

consequence of events occurring on June 4, October 18, and November 7, 2018. 

Appellant’s elderly and infirm mother, Pearl Norris, resided on the property at issue in this 

appeal (“Norris property”). 

{¶3} On June 4, 2018, Noble County Sheriff’s Deputy Brandon Stokes received 

complaints from two individuals, who resided on neighboring properties, that cattle from 

the Norris property were wandering in the neighborhood. Deputy Stokes contacted 

Appellant regarding the complaints. 

{¶4} On October 18, 2018, Deputy Stokes responded to complaints that the 

cattle were on neighboring properties and had, in the recent past, consumed garden 

vegetables, left holes in the ground, defecated, and caused structural damage to a brick 

bin. One neighbor reported that the path to his basketball court had become impassible. 

Another neighbor, who cared for children in her home, reported that the children were 

reluctant to play in the yard for fear of the cows. 
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Case No. 19 NO 0467

{¶5} On the morning of November 7, 2018, the Noble County Sheriff’s Office 

received complaints that cattle from the Norris property were roaming through the 

neighborhood. At approximately 9:00 a.m., Noble County Sheriff’s Deputy Sergeant 

Robert Pointer arrived at the Norris property, where he discovered that the gate was open, 

five cows were outside of the fenced area, and one was in the roadway. During his 

investigation of the scene, Sergeant Pointer examined a make-shift portion of the fence 

surrounding the Norris property, which was made of pallets. 

{¶6} Tina Tucker, a resident of one of the neighboring properties, approached 

Sergeant Pointer at the foot of the driveway and informed him that that she regularly 

returned cattle to the Norris property by wrangling them with her four-wheeler. She further 

explained that Appellant, who resided in Cleveland, Ohio, visited the property roughly 

every four days. When no one answered the door, Sergeant Pointer learned through 

some investigation that Pearl was no longer residing in the home because she had been 

hospitalized in Cleveland, Ohio. 

{¶7} At approximately 3:00 p.m. that same day, Sergeant Pointer was informed 

that Appellant was present at the Norris property. Sergeant Pointer returned to the 

property to serve three criminal complaints on Appellant for permitting animals to roam at 

large on June 4, October 18, and November 7, 2018. 

{¶8} When he arrived, Sergeant Pointer saw a black sedan in the driveway, and 

Appellant walking the fence line. The gate was closed. Noble County Sheriff’s Deputy 

Jamie Myers arrived at the scene at approximately 4:00 p.m. The two officers called out 

to Appellant as he walked from the fence line to the passenger side of the sedan in the 

driveway. 

{¶9} After the officers entered the gate, Appellant yelled for them to close the 

gate behind them, then turned away in what they perceived to be an effort to avoid 

speaking with them. However, the officers confronted Appellant then asked him to 

accompany them to the cruiser in order to provide him with copies of the criminal 

complaints. Appellant declined. As a consequence, Sergeant Pointer informed Appellant 

that he was under arrest. 

{¶10} Appellant became angry and announced that he “was not * * * going to jail.” 

Appellant was holding several metal clothes hangers that were “kinda flattened out.” 
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Case No. 19 NO 0467

Deputy Myers surmised that Appellant had been using the coat hangers to reinforce the 

fence, however, both deputies recognized that the coat hangers could be used as a 

weapon. (Trial Tr., p. 147-149.) 

{¶11} Sergeant Pointer testified that he drew his taser hoping that the show of 

force would cause Appellant to submit to the arrest. Instead, Appellant ran toward the 

sedan. Pointer yelled “stop,” but Appellant did not comply. As a consequence, Sergeant 

Pointer deployed his taser, which struck Appellant’s jacket but did not incapacitate him. 

{¶12} When Appellant reached the sedan, roughly twenty feet from where his 

confrontation with the officers began, Appellant reached into the window of the driver side 

door. (Id., p. 150.) Fearing that Appellant was reaching for a weapon, the officers took 

Appellant to the ground. While on the ground, Appellant continued to struggle, refusing to 

put his hands behind his back, until the deputies wrestled his hands behind his back and 

handcuffed him. (Id., p. 169.) 

{¶13} Appellant was tried by a jury and convicted of all three counts of animals 

running at large, as well as resisting arrest. The trial court sentenced Appellant to the 

maximum sentence and fine – 30 days and $250.00 – on the first two convictions for 

animals running at large to run consecutively, then suspended the sentences and placed 

Appellant on five years of probation. The terms of Appellant’s probation read, in their 

entirety: 

(1) That the Defendant shall not own, keep, harbor or permit any cattle, or 

any other type of animal(s) that are considered livestock, upon any property 

that the Defendant has any ownership or control over, and that includes the 

property referred to as “The Norris Property” during the trial herein; 

(2) That any livestock currently upon the property referred to as “The Norris 

Property” is to be removed within twenty-one (21) days from today’s date; 

and 

(3) That there are to be no cattle or live stock [sic] running at large that are 

presently occupying “The Norris Property.” 

(2/26/2019 Sent. Entry, p. 2.) 
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Case No. 19 NO 0467

{¶14} Although not germane to this appeal, the trial court imposed no jail term for 

the third conviction for animals running at large, only a fine of $250.00 to run consecutively 

to the convictions for the first two counts. The trial court imposed a sixty-seven day jail 

sentence and a fine of $250.00 for the resisting arrest conviction, but suspended sixty 

days based on the condition that Appellant appear at the Noble County Jail on April 1, 

2019 at 8 a.m. to serve his sentence. Appellant’s sentence was stayed by the trial court 

pending the resolution of this appeal. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1 

TAKING AWAY A PERSON’S LIVESTOCK, OR RIGHT TO OWN 

LIVESTOCK IN THE FUTURE, IS NOT ONE OF THE PUNISHMENTS A 

COURT CAN IMPOSE FOR A VIOLATION OF ORC § 951.02 – WHICH IS 

ONLY A FOURTH DEGREE MISDEMEANOR. 

{¶15} R.C. 951.02, captioned “Animals not to be permitted to run at large,” reads, 

in its entirety: 

No person, who is the owner or keeper of horses, mules, cattle, bison, 

sheep, goats, swine, llamas, alpacas, or poultry, shall permit them to run at 

large in the public road, highway, street, lane, or alley, or upon unenclosed 

land, or cause the animals to be herded, kept, or detained for the purpose 

of grazing on premises other than those owned or lawfully occupied by the 

owner or keeper of the animals. 

{¶16} R.C. 951.99 reads, in its entirety, “Whoever recklessly violates section 

951.02 of the Revised Code is guilty of a misdemeanor of the fourth degree.” The 

maximum jail sentence for a fourth-degree misdemeanor is thirty days and the maximum 

fine is $250.00. See R.C. 2929.24, 2929.28. Unlike Chapter 959 of the Revised Code, 

captioned “Cruelty to Animals,” Chapter 951, captioned “Animals Running at Large; 

Strays,” contains no forfeiture provision. 

{¶17} An appellate court reviews a misdemeanor sentence for abuse of discretion. 

State v. Tribble, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 16 MA 0009, 2017-Ohio-4425, ¶ 24; R.C.
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Case No. 19 NO 0467

2929.22. An abuse of discretion connotes more than an error of law or of judgment; it 

implies that the court’s attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable. State v. 

Adams, 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157, 404 N.E.2d 144 (1980). 

{¶18} In his first assignment of error, Appellant contends that the trial court was 

without authority to confiscate the livestock on the Norris property for the commission of 

a fourth degree felony. He further contends that the forfeiture of the cattle was without 

due process and constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. 

{¶19} R.C. 2929.25, captioned “Misdemeanor community control sanctions,” 

reads, in relevant part: 

The sentencing court shall require as a condition of any community control 

sanction that the offender abide by the law and not leave the state without 

the permission of the court or the offender’s probation officer. In the 

interests of doing justice, rehabilitating the offender, and ensuring the 

offender’s good behavior, the court may impose additional requirements on 

the offender. The offender's compliance with the additional requirements 

also shall be a condition of the community control sanction imposed upon 

the offender. 

R.C. 2929.25(C)(2) (Emphasis added). 

{¶20} R.C. 2929.27, captioned “Nonresidential sanction where jail term not 

mandatory,” reads, in relevant part: 

In addition to the sanctions authorized under division (A) of this section, the 

court imposing a sentence for a misdemeanor, other than a minor

misdemeanor, upon an offender who is not required to serve a mandatory 

jail term may impose any other sanction that is intended to discourage the 

offender or other persons from committing a similar offense if the sanction 

is reasonably related to the overriding purposes and principles of 

misdemeanor sentencing. 

R.C. 2929.27(C) (Emphasis added). 
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Case No. 19 NO 0467

{¶21} In determining whether a condition of probation is related to the interests of 

doing justice, rehabilitating the offender, and insuring his good behavior, courts must 

consider whether the condition: (1) is reasonably related to rehabilitating the offender, (2) 

has some relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, and (3) relates 

to conduct which is criminal or reasonably related to future criminality and serves the 

statutory ends of probation. State v. Jones, 49 Ohio St.3d 51, 53, 550 N.E.2d 469 (1990). 

{¶22} In City of Portsmouth v. Pub. Utilities Commission, 108 Ohio St. 272, 140 

N.E. 604, 606 (1923), the Ohio Supreme Court observed that “[t]he basic meaning of the 

word ‘confiscate,’ as defined by the lexicographers, is property that is seized and 

appropriated by the government to the public use.” Id. at 276. The Court further observed 

that the term “carries with it the idea of forfeiture to the public treasury or appropriation to 

public use.” Id. at 276-77. The terms of Appellant’s community control do not involve an 

appropriation of the cattle to public use. 

{¶23} We have recognized that the criminal forfeiture of property in Ohio is a form 

of punishment and is considered a fine, subject to the excessive fines prohibition in the 

Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article 1, Section 9 of the Ohio 

Constitution. State v. Wolfe, 7th Dist. Belmont No. 97 BA 37, 2000 WL 875338, *1, citing 

State v. Hill, 70 Ohio St.3d 25, 34, 635 N.E.2d 1248 (1994). However, Appellant will not 

lose the value of the livestock as a result of the terms of his community control. He may 

relocate the livestock to property in Noble County that is not under his ownership or 

control, transport the livestock to another county, or sell the livestock, thereby receiving 

equivalent value. Moreover, he may lease the Norris property, or otherwise cede control 

of the property to another party, which would allow the other party to keep livestock on 

the Norris Property. 

{¶24} Appellant cites State v. Walker, 164 Ohio App.3d 114, 2005-Ohio-5592, 841 

N.E.2d 376 (2005)(“Walker 2005”) for the proposition that the Second District reversed a 

trial court decision removing bears from Walker’s property and requiring him to pay for 

their maintenance by the state. However, a review of the two appeals preceding Walker 

2005 actually supports the conclusion that the terms of community control in this case are 

neither contrary to law nor an abuse of discretion. 
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Case No. 19 NO 0467

{¶25} Walker was originally convicted of a fourth-degree misdemeanor based on 

his failure to confine his co-tenant’s dog. The trial court imposed a jail sentence and fine, 

then suspended the sentence on the conditions that the co-tenant’s two dogs be 

surrendered to Animal Control, and that Walker incur no further violations for five years. 

A third condition, that Walker keep no additional animals at his residence, was stayed 

based upon the second condition that he incur no further violations for five years. 

{¶26} In his direct appeal, Walker challenged the third condition, but the Second 

District held that R.C. 2929.51(A)(2) authorized the trial court to suspend Walker’s 

sentence upon any appropriate conditions. The Second District reasoned that 

“[r]estricting Walker to the animals he currently kept on the premises was well within the 

discretion granted by the statute.” State v. Walker, 2nd Dist. Greene No. 2003 CA 93, 

2004-Ohio-7258, ¶ 21. 

{¶27} In Walker’s second appeal, he challenged a post-sentence entry adding a 

fourth condition of his probation, that is, the removal of bears from his property. The 

additional condition was imposed by the trial court after several bears escaped from 

Walker’s property. Walker argued that the new condition was an abuse of discretion. 

{¶28} The Second District applied the Jones test and affirmed the terms of 

probation reasoning: 

Walker has demonstrated difficulty keeping the animals on his property 

restrained. The removal order ought to impress upon him that keeping his 

animals confined is a responsibility he must take seriously. (Prong 1). 

Although the escapees this time are bears and not dogs, the problem is the 

same. Animals that must be confined are getting loose. The removal order 

is certainly related to the failure to confine a dog offense for which Walker 

is on probation. (Prong 2). Finally, future criminality is a genuine possibility, 

if not a probability, should the bears again leave home. The State suggests 

disorderly conduct and failure to report the escape of certain animals as 

possible offenses which the order might prevent. We can imagine disorderly 

conduct as proscribed by R.C. 2917.11(A)(4)(5) and failure to report as 

required by R.C. 2927.21(A) as possibilities should Walker retain the bears. 

(Prong 3). 
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Case No. 19 NO 0467

State v. Walker, 2nd Dist. Greene No. 2004 CA 16, 2004-Ohio-7252, ¶ 23. 

{¶29} Although Walker removed the bears to the property of another individual, 

the bears were ultimately seized by Animal Control after they escaped from confinement 

a second time. Walker 2005 challenged an entry of the trial court providing that the bears

would not be returned to Walker. Appellant reliance on Walker 2005 is misplaced 

because the case stands for the proposition that a trial court has no authority to order 

forfeiture under R.C. 955.99, which governs the keeping of dogs. However, in reaching 

this conclusion, the Second District specifically recognized the distinction between an 

order directing an individual to remove an animal from his property (Walker’s second 

appeal) and an order confiscating an animal (Walker 2005). The Second District wrote: 

Furthermore, even if forfeiture had been ordered as a condition of probation, 

it would not have been appropriate because the penalty statutes for failing 

to confine dogs do not even mention forfeiture as a possibility. Forfeiture, 

therefore, lacks sufficient relationship to the crime for which the defendant 

was convicted. Jones, 49 Ohio St.3d at 53, 550 N.E.2d 469. We are aware 

that we previously upheld an order requiring Walker to remove the bears 

from his property. However, a removal order is quite different from 

confiscating property. In the first situation, an individual retains dominion 

over his property, even though he has to move the property from its current 

location; in the second situation, the individual is stripped completely of 

control. A stronger relationship should be required where the deprivation is 

great. 

Id. at ¶ 79. 

{¶30} Applying the Jones test, we find that Appellant has repeatedly demonstrated 

difficulty restraining the cattle on the Norris property. The removal order is directly related 

to his failure to confine cattle, the offense for which the trial court imposed community 

control. Finally, future criminality is a genuine possibility, if not a probability, based on the 

testimony offered by Appellant’s neighbors at trial. Accordingly, we find that the 

conditions of Appellant’s community control do not constitute a confiscation or forfeiture 
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Case No. 19 NO 0467

of Appellant’s livestock, and, further, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

fashioning the terms of Appellant’s community control. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 2 

THE STATE FAILED TO PROVE THE ELEMENTS OF RESISTING 

ARREST. IVAN NORRIS’S ACTIONS WERE NEITHER RECKLESS NOR 

CAUSED HARM, AND SO THERE WAS NO RESISTING ARREST. THE 

VERDICT WAS BOTH LEGALLY INSUFFICIENT AND AGAINST THE 

MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE. 

{¶31} R.C. 2921.33, captioned “Resisting Arrest,” provides, in pertinent part, “(A) 

No person, recklessly or by force, shall resist or interfere with a lawful arrest of the person 

or another.” R.C. 2921.33(A). A violation of subsection (A) is a misdemeanor of the 

second degree. R.C. 2921.33(D). 

{¶32} Appellant did not move for dismissal of the resisting arrest charge pursuant 

to Crim.R. 29 motion at the conclusion of the state’s case-in-chief. However, a defendant 

is not required to move for acquittal in order to preserve a sufficiency of the evidence 

challenge on appeal. State v. Heckathorn, 7th Dist. Columbiana No. 17 CO 0011, 2019-

Ohio-1086, ¶ 35. 

{¶33} “When a court reviews a record for sufficiency, ‘[t]he relevant inquiry is 

whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any 

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond 

a reasonable doubt.’ ” State v. Maxwell, 139 Ohio St.3d 12, 2014-Ohio-1019, 9 N.E.3d 

930, ¶ 146, quoting State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), paragraph 

two of the syllabus. 

{¶34} In determining whether a criminal conviction is against the manifest weight 

of the evidence, an appellate court must review the entire record, weigh the evidence and 

all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses, and determine whether, 

in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact clearly lost its way and created such 

a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed. State v. 

Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997); State v. Hunter, 131 Ohio 
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Case No. 19 NO 0467

St.3d 67, 2011-Ohio-6524, 960 N.E.2d 955, ¶ 119. “Although a court of appeals may 

determine that a judgment is sustained by sufficient evidence, that court may 

nevertheless conclude that the judgment is against the weight of the evidence.” 

Thompkins at 387, 678 N.E.2d 541. 

{¶35} Appellant succinctly states his argument regarding the resisting arrest 

conviction as follows, “running 20 feet to the passenger-side window of a car (especially 

when no one else is inside the car) is not resisting arrest.” (Appellant’s Br., p. 14.) It is 

important to note that Appellant ran to the driver’s side of the sedan, not the passenger 

side. 

{¶36} We addressed an analogous fact pattern in State v. Faith, 7th Dist. 

Columbiana No. 03 CO 48, 2004-Ohio-3048. In that case, the appellant was involved in 

an altercation with her parents. She drove to the police station to file charged against her 

father, but, in the meantime, her parents called and reported the altercation to the police. 

After taking her statement, and recounting all of the evidence to an assistant prosecutor, 

a police officer informed Faith that she was under arrest. 

{¶37} Faith responded, “[t]his is bull shit,” then turned and walked toward the exit 

door of the police station. The police officer took her by the arm to prevent her from 

leaving, and told her again that she was under arrest. She became argumentative and 

refused to place her hands behind her back. The office had to forcibly restrain her in 

order to place her in handcuffs. 

{¶38} At trial, Faith testified that she was never informed that she was under 

arrest. However, the police officer’s testimony was corroborated at trial by the testimony 

of two dispatchers who witnessed the events leading to Faith’s arrest. On appeal, we 

affirmed Faith’s conviction observing that the trial revolved around two different stories 

about the same event, “either one of which, if believed, would be sufficient evidence to 

prove or disprove the state’s case.” Id. at ¶ 35. 

{¶39} The uncontroverted facts in the above-captioned case establish that 

Appellant was informed the he was under arrest, he refused to submit, he turned and ran 

toward the sedan in the driveway, and he struggled with the officers when they attempted 

to subdue and handcuff him. Because the facts here are more egregious than the facts 
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Case No. 19 NO 0467

in Faith, supra, we find that there was sufficient evidence in the record and the manifest 

weight of the evidence supports Appellant’s conviction for resisting arrest. 

CONCLUSION 

{¶40} In summary, we find that the terms of Appellant’s community control do not 

constitute a confiscation or forfeiture of his livestock. Appellant is free to relocate the 

livestock or sell it for equivalent value. The conditions were reasonably related to 

rehabilitation, had a direct relationship to the animals running at large convictions, and 

were designed to prohibit future criminality and serve the statutory ends of community 

control. Further, while the conditions restrict Appellant’s ability to keep livestock on the 

Norris Property, it does not restrict the use of the property by others. Finally, the 

uncontroverted facts in the record establish the essential elements of resisting arrest. 

Therefore, the terms of community control imposed by the trial court and Appellant’s 

conviction for resisting arrest are affirmed. 

Donofrio, J., concurs. 

Waite, P.J., concurs. 
[Cite as State v. Norris, 2020-Ohio-764.]

 

 

For the reasons stated in the Opinion rendered herein, the assignments of error 

are overruled and it is the final judgment and order of this Court that the judgment of 

the County Court of Noble County, Ohio, is affirmed. Costs to be waived. 

A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate 

in this case pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. It is ordered that 

a certified copy be sent by the clerk to the trial court to carry this judgment into 

execution. 

 

 

NOTICE TO COUNSEL 

This document constitutes a final judgment entry.