alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 98-50440 cons/w

No. 98-50682 Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus ELWOOD CLUCK, also known as Jack Cluck, Defendant-Appellant.

- - - - - - - - - - Appeals from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas USDC No. SA-95-CR-99-1

- - - - - - - - - - July 27, 1999 Before SMITH, BARKSDALE, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: * In case number 98-50440, Elwood Cluck, also known as Jack Cluck, appeals the district court’s orders of denial regarding his motion to rescind judgment, his motion for rehearing of his motion to rescind judgment, and his applications for writs of audita querela and coram nobis. In case number 98-50682, Cluck appeals the district court’s order of denial regarding his subsequent application for writ of coram nobis. We sua sponteNos. 98-50440 c/w 98-50682 -2- consolidate the appeals because they are so closely related. Fed. R. App. P. 3(b)(2). Cluck has filed a motion to expedite appeal and a motion for initial hearing en banc. Because Cluck can neither show good cause to expedite the appeal nor meet the stringent standards for cases warranting en banc consideration, both motions are DENIED. 5th Cir. R. 27.6; Fed. R. App. P. 35(a). Cluck argues that the district court erred by denying all of his motions and applications filed in the district court while the appeal from his judgment of conviction and sentence was pending. As correctly stated by the district court, it had no jurisdiction to consider Cluck’s pleadings. See United States v. Hitchmon , 602 F.2d 689, 692-94 (5th Cir. 1979). Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
T hi s di s pos i t i on i s notappr opr i a t e f orpubl i c a t i on and i s notpr e c e de nt * e xc e pta s pr ovi de d by9th C i r . R . 36- 3.

T he pane l unani m ous l yc onc l ude s thi s c a s e i s s ui t abl e f orde c i s i on ** w ith o u t o r a l ar g u m e n t. See F ed. R . A pp . P . 34 (a )( 2). NOT F OR P UB L I CAT I ON UN I TE D STATE S C OU RT OF APPE ALS FOR T HE NI NTH CI RC UI T B AL WI ND E R S I NG H, P et i t i on er , v. E R I C H . H O L D E R , J r ., A tto rn e yG e n e r a l, R e s p o n d e n t. N o. 09- 71256 A ge nc yN o. A 047- 070- 811 ME MOR AN DU M *

O n P e t i t i on f

orR e vi e w of

an O r de rof

the B o ar do f I m m ig r a tio n A p p e a ls S ubm i tt e d A pr i l 20, 2011 ** B efo re: R Y M E R , T H O M A S , an dP A E Z , C i rcu i tJu d g es. B a l w i nde rS i ngh, ana t i ve and c i t i z e n of I ndi a , pe t i t i ons f

orr e vi e w of

the B oard of Im m i grat i on A pp ea l s’ (“ B IA ”) order s um m ar i l y a ff i rm i ng an i m m i g rat i o n j u d g e’ s (“ IJ”) rem o v al o rd er. O u r j u ri sd i ct i o n i s g o v ern edb y 8 U . S . C . § 1 25 2. W e r evi ew for s ub st ant i alevi dence the IJ ’ s det erm i nat i on thatan 

# FI LED MA Y10 2 011 M OLLY C. DW Y ER, CLERK U . S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS09- 71256 2 a lie n is r e m o v ab le . N

a ka m o to v . A s h c r o

ft , 3 6 3 F .3 d8 7 4 , 8 8 1 ( 9 th C ir . 2 0 0 4 ) . W e d e n yi n p artan dd i s m i s s i n p artth e p e t i t i o n f o rr e v i e w. S ub s tan tia l e v id e n c e s up p o rts th e I J ’s c o n c lu s io n th a t S in g h e n te r e dh is m arriag e f

o r th e p u rp o se o f p ro cu rin g an im m ig ra ti o n b en ef itw h er e S in g h ’s f orm e rU . S . c i t i z e n s pous e t e s t i f i e d tha tthe i rm arr i a ge w a s f r audul e ntand tha ts he m arr ie dS in g h ine x c h an g e f o rr e n u m e r a tio n . See 8 U . S . C . § 1227( a ) ( 1) ( A ) and (G )( i ); 8 U .S .C . § 1 1 8 2 ( a ) ( 6 ) ( C ) ( i) ; s e e a ls o N a ka m o to , 363 F . 3d a t882 ( r e l e vant i nq ui ryfor f

raud det erm i nat i on i s w hether part i es i nt ended atthe t i m e they m arri ed to e s tab lis h alif

e to g e th e r ) . S ub stan ti al ev id en ce also su p p o rts th e a g en cy ’s co n clu sio n th at S in g h ’s c o n d itio n a l s ta tu s w a s te rm in a te d . See 8. U . S . C . § 1227( a ) ( 1) ( D ) ( i ) . B e c aus e he w a s notgr ant e d aw a i ve runde r8 U . S . C . § 1186a ( c ) ( 4) and he di d notappe a l f r om th e C itiz e n s h ip an dI m m ig r a tio n S e rv ic e s ’ d e n ia l o f h is w a iv e r , h is c h a lle n g e to th a t c o n c lu s io n is n o t a v a ilin g . Se e i d. § 1 2 2 7 ( a ) ( 1 ) ( D ) ( ii) . W e la c kju r is d ic tio n o v e rS in g h ’s c o n te n tio n r e g ar d in g th e d e n ia l o f h is m ot i on t o t e rm i na t e be c aus e he di d notr a i s e tha tc ha l l e nge be f or e the B I A , and th e r e f o r e h a s n o t e x h au s te dh is r e m e d ie s . Se e B arr on v . A s h c r o ft , 358 F . 3d 674, 6 7 8 ( 9 th C ir . 2 0 0 4 ) . P E T IT IO N F O R R E V IE W D E N IE D i n p art; D IS M IS S E D i n p art .
#### STATE v. CAVALLARO

No. 165

Case below: 1 N.C. App. 412.

Petition for writ of *certiorari*to North Carolina Court of Appeals denied 23 August 1968.
EXHIBIT 23



CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM



We consent to the incorporation by reference
in the following Registration Statements and related Prospectuses of WMS Industries Inc.:



|(1) | Registration Statement No. 333-57585 on Form S-8 filed June 24, 1998,
|--- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------



|(2) | Registration Statement No. 333-46726 on Form S-8 filed September 27, 2000,
|--- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------



|(3) | Registration Statement No. 333-55574 on Form S-8 filed February 14, 2001,
|--- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------



|(4) | Registration Statement No. 333-101538 on Form S-8 filed November 27, 2002,
|--- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------



|(5) | Registration Statement No. 333-107321 on Form S-3 filed July 25, 2003,
|--- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------



|(6) | Registration Statement No. 333-121199 on Form S-8 filed December 13, 2004,
|--- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------



|(7) | Registration Statement No. 333-121766 on Form S-8 filed December 30, 2004,
|--- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------



|(8) | Registration Statement No. 333-139425 on Form S-8 filed December 15, 2006,
|--- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------



|(9) | Registration Statement No. 333-158919 on Form S-8 filed April 30, 2009, and
|--- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------



|(10) | Registration Statement No. 333-163767 on Form S-8 filed December 16, 2009
|---- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------



of our reports dated August 25, 2010, with respect to
the consolidated financial statements and schedule of WMS Industries Inc. and the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting of WMS Industries Inc., included in this Annual Report (Form 10-K) for the year ended June 30, 2010.



/S/    Ernst & Young LLP



Chicago, Illinois

August 25, 2010
**EXHIBIT 32.2**

Officer’s Certification Pursuant to 

Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 

(18 U.S.C 1350) 

Inconnection with the Annual Report on Form 10-K of Pioneer Drilling Company, a Texas corporation, (the “Company”) for the year ended December 31, 2008 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the“Report”), the undersigned, Lorne E. Phillips, Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer, hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, that, to the best of his knowledge: 

(1)    The Report is in full compliance with the requirements of Section 13(a) and 15(d) of the SecuritiesExchange Act of 1934; and 

(2)    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in allmaterial respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company. 

Dated: February 25, 2009
COURT OF A PPEAL S EI GHTH D I STRI CT OF TEX AS ELPASO, TEXAS

WI L L I E EARLGREER, Appellant,

v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

. § § § § § § No. 08-10-00012- CR

Appea l from Criminal District Court of Jeffer son County , Texas (TC # 08-03862)

MEMORAN DUM OP INION
W i l l i e E arl Greer appea ls his conviction for burg lary of a building. The trial court p l ac ed Ap p el l ant on defe rre d adjudication community supervision for term of five y ear s. The S t at e subsequently filed a motion to revoke alleg ing a violation of the terms and conditions of community supervision. Ba sed on Appellant’s plea of true, the trial court g rante d the State’s motion, adjudicate d Appellant g uilty , and assessed his punishment at confine ment in t h e s t ate jail nine months. We aff irm. Appellant’s court-a

ppointed counsel has filed a brief in which he h as conclude d that the
ap p eal is wholly frivolous and without merit. The brief meets the require ments of A n der s v. Calif ornia, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct

. 1396, 18 L .Ed.2d 493, reh. denied, 388 U.S. 924, 87 S.Ct

. 2094,
18 L .Ed.2d 1377 (1967), by prese nting a profe ssional e valuation of the rec ord demonstrating why , in eff ect, there are no arguable g rounds to be advanc ed. See High v. State, 573 S.W .2d 807 (Tex.Crim.App. 1978); Currie v. Stat e, 516 S

. W .2d 684 (Tex.Crim.App. 1974); Jack son v. Stat e , 485 S.W .2d 553 (Tex.Crim.App. 1972); Gainous v. State, 436 S.W .2d 137 (Tex.Crim.App. 1969).
A copy of counsel’s brief has b ee n delivere d to Appellant, and Appellant has been advised of hisrig ht to ex amine the a ppellate r ecor d and file a pro se brief. N o pro se brief ha s been f iled.
We have car efully revie wed the rec ord and counsel’s brief, and ag ree that the appea l is wholly frivolous and without merit. Fur ther, we find not hing in the rec ord that might arg uably support the appe al. The judg ment is affirme d.

October 13, 2010 ANN CRAWFORD McCL URE, J ustice
Be fore Chew, C.J ., McClure, a nd Rivera, JJ

. (Do Not Publish)
#### STATE v. SPEAR

No. 6

Case below: 1 N.C. App. 255.

Petition for writ of *certiorari*to North Carolina Court of Appeals denied 23 August 1968.
---

Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATIONPursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350As Adopted Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Strategic Internet
  Investments, Incorporated (the "Company") on Form 10-QSB for the period ending
  June 30, 2004 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date
  hereof (the "Report"). I, Ralph Shearing, Chief Executive Officer of the company,
  certify, pursuant to 18 USC Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906
  of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge and belief:

|1. | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and                               
|-- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|  
|2. | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
|  

|Date: |  | August 20, 2004 | /s/ Ralph Shearing           
|----- |  | --------------- | -----------------------------
|      |  |                 | Ralph Shearing, CEO, Director

---
NUMBER 13

- 1 2

- 00 029

- CR



### COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI

- EDINBURG

____________________________________________________________

KENNARD SHANTON JOHNSON

, Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.

____________________________________________________________

On Appeal from the 377 th District Court

of Victoria County, Texas.

____________________________________________________________



### MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Garza and Vela

Memorandum Opinion Per Curiam

Appellant, Kennard Shanton Johnson , by and through his attorney, has filed a

motion to dismiss his appeal because he no longer desires to prosecute it. See T EX

. R.

A PP

. P . 42.2(a). Without passing on the merits of the case, we grant the motion to

dismiss pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.2(a) and dismiss the appeal.

Having dismissed the appeal at appellant's request, no motion for rehearing will be2

enterta ined, and our mandate will issue forthwith.

PER CURIAM

Do not publish.

See T EX

. R. A PP

. P . 47.2(b).

D elivered and filed the

16th day of February, 2012

.
#### CHAMPION INTERNATIONAL CORP., Plaintiff, v. LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant.

No. 87 Civ. 1634 (WCC).

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

Amended Orders Dec. 19, 1988,

and Jan. 30, 1989.

AMENDED ORDER

Dec. 19, 1988

WILLIAM C. CONNER, District Judge:

On November 14, 1988, the Court issued an opinion and order in the above-captioned case. [701 F.Supp. 409]. The opinion is hereby amended *nunc yro tunc*as follows:

1) On the first page of the Court’s opinion and order [page 409], the period of coverage for the Umbrella Excess Liability (UEL) insurance policy shall read “during the period February 1, 1971 to October 31, 1973....”

Page 5, footnote 5 [page 411, footnote 5] shall read, “... the period February 1, 1971 to October 31, 1973.”

2) At page 12, paragraph 3 [page 411, left column, paragraph 2], the third sentence shall read, "Liberty Mutual counters that the ‘occurrence’ was the date the panels were sold or delivered to anyone.”

3) Page 3, footnote 3 [page 410, footnote 3] shall read:

> Liberty Mutual contends that Champion is estopped from asserting in this motion that it is entitled to indemnification under the UEL policy, because, among other reasons, “the complaint omits any reference to the excess policy.” Defendants’ Brief at 3. This proffered ground for estoppel fails because Champion’s amended complaint refers to “policies” which are listed in Exhibit A, and the final policy on the Exhibit A list is the *128UEL policy. Plaintiffs Amended Complaint ¶ 9. The other alleged grounds for estoppel, including acceptance of payments by Champion, raise factual issues to be resolved at trial.

SO ORDERED.

AMENDED ORDER

Jan. 30, 1989

The Opinion and Order dated November 14, 1988 [701 F.Supp. 409] is hereby amended *nunc pro tunc*as follows:

On the Appearance page, 5th line from the bottom [page 409, right column, 14th line from top] should read — Attorneys for Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff—

SO ORDERED.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THE SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE HANOVER
DIRECT, INC. AND SUBSIDIARIES CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEETS AND
STATEMENTS OF INCOME FOR THE TWELVE MONTHS ENDED DECEMBER 30, 1995 AND IS
QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY, EXCEPT FOR GROSS ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE AND THE
ALLOWANCE FOR DOUBTFUL ACCOUNTS, BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-30-1995
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-30-1995
<CASH>                                           2,682
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   32,773
<ALLOWANCES>                                   (2,597)
<INVENTORY>                                     37,118
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               158,727
<PP&E>                                          83,152
<DEPRECIATION>                                (26,090)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 279,009
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          129,953
<BONDS>                                         57,283
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                            6,353
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        62,461
<OTHER-SE>                                      18,396
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   279,009
<SALES>                                        749,767
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               749,767
<CGS>                                          483,493
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  772,386
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               5,050
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (27,150)
<INCOME-TAX>                                     1,003
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (28,153)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                (1,837)
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (29,990)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (0.32)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.32)
        

</TABLE>
#### IMPRESA CONSTRUZIONI GEOM. DOMENICO GARUFI, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 04-5143.

United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.

DECIDED: March 11, 2005.

*ORDER*

Impresa Construzioni Geom. Domenico Garufi moves without opposition to volun*311tarily dismiss its appeal of the judgment of the United States Court of Federal Claims in *Impresa Construzioni v. United States, 61*Fed.Cl. 175 (Fed.Cl.2004).

Upon consideration thereof,

IT IS ORDERED THAT:

(1) The unopposed motion to dismiss is granted.

(2) Each side shall bear its own costs.
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-30169

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

STEVEN DEEM,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Louisiana

USDC No. 5:13-CR-149-1

Before BENAVIDES, SOUTHWICK, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Steven Deem pleaded guilty, pursuant to a written plea agreement, to 

one count of distribution of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 2252A(a)(2). After he stood convicted but before sentencing, Deem, who was 

represented by the Federal Public Defender, moved pro se to withdraw his 

guilty plea and to proceed pro se. Following a hearing, the district court denied 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

October 14, 2014

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 

 Case: 14-30169 Document: 00512802155 Page: 1 Date Filed: 10/14/2014
No. 14-30169

Deem’s motions and sentenced him above the advisory guidelines sentencing 

range to 240 months of imprisonment and a lifetime term of supervised release.

Now, Deem appeals, arguing that the district court erred in denying his 

motion to proceed pro se, an error conceded by the Government. We review 

claims concerning the right of self-representation de novo. United States v. 

Jones, 421 F.3d 359, 363 (5th Cir. 2005). The record reflects that the district 

court denied Deem’s motion because it found that he lacked the skill and 

knowledge to represent himself competently. That a defendant’s decision to 

represent himself may work to his detriment because he lacks the knowledge 

or skills to represent himself competently is irrelevant “to the determination 

whether he is competent to waive his right to counsel.” Godinez v. Moran, 509 

U.S. 389, 400 (1993). The record reflects that Deem knowingly and 

intelligently waived his right to counsel, and he thus should have been allowed 

to exercise his constitutional right of self-representation. See Faretta v. 

California, 422 U.S. 806, 815-21 (1975); United States v. Cano, 519 F.3d 512, 

515-16 (5th Cir. 2008). Because this error requires reversal, see United States 

v. Majors, 328 F.3d 791, 794 (5th Cir. 2003), we do not reach Deem’s challenge 

to the reasonableness of his sentence, see United States v. Akpan, 407 F.3d 360, 

377 n.62 (5th Cir. 2005).

The district court’s denial of Deem’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea 

has not been challenged by Deem on appeal. That issue has thus been waived, 

see United States v. Banks, 624 F.3d 261, 264 (5th Cir. 2010), and Deem’s 

conviction is AFFIRMED. However, the right to self-representation does 

extend to sentencing proceedings. See Cano, 519 F.3d at 515. Accordingly, 

Deem’s sentence is VACATED, and the case is REMANDED to allow Deem a 

chance to represent himself on resentencing.

2

 Case: 14-30169 Document: 00512802155 Page: 2 Date Filed: 10/14/2014
#### ARTHUR T. MOODY v. DENSEL AVERY WIDNER.

(Filed 13 April, 1966.)

Appeal by plaintiff from *Crissman, J.,*November 8, 1965 Civil Session of Davidson.

On the morning of April 18, 1964, the plaintiff procured a room at the Cavalier Motel located on the east side of U. S. Highway 29-70 (1-85) south of Lexington. The plaintiff and a man by the name of Yarborough, whose first name the plaintiff did not recall, and another man whose name he did not know, decided to do some drinking. They spent most of the day drinking white liquor, beer and bourbon. The last of the liquor or bourbon was consumed at the plaintiff’s motel room by the three parties referred to above or by the plaintiff alone about 5:00 P.M. on the day in question.

The plaintiff went to sleep in his motel room about 5:30 or 6:00 o’clock and woke up about 9:30 or 10:00 o’clock, and went to Bill’s Truck Stop located about one-half mile north of the Cavalier Motel, where he purchased a cup of coffee, a coca-cola and a ham*102burger. He remained at the restaurant for about an hour and a half and left there about 11:45 P.M. to return to his room. He had proceeded along the eastern shoulder of the two northbound lanes of the by-pass around Lexington to a point about 100 yards south of the intersection of 29-A and 29-70 (1-85) where the highway going north curves sharply to the left, at which time the plaintiff decided to cross the highway and proceed southward on the western side thereof. Plaintiff testified that he looked to the south, where he could see for a distance of 400 or 500 feet, and saw no car approaching. The northbound lanes were each 12 feet wide. He crossed the first lane and was about midway of the left northern lane when the defendant, who was in the act of passing another car, saw him and tried to turn to the right so as to miss him, but failed. At the time the defendant’s car hit the plaintiff, he was approximately three or four feet from the western edge of the roadway. The plaintiff testified that he never saw the defendant’s car approaching until it was only 75 feet away and he was about the middle of the left lane, in which the defendant was travelling. He further testified he never saw the car travelling in the right northern lane, which the defendant was passing.

At the close of plaintiff’s evidence the defendant moved for judgment as of nonsuit. The motion was denied. The motion was renewed at the close of all the evidence and allowed. Plaintiff appeals, assigning error.

*Phillips, Bower*& *Klass and Walser, Brinkley, Walser & McGirt for plaintiff appellant.*

*Jordan, Wright, Henson & Nichols and William D. Caffrey for defendant appellee.*

Per Curiam.

After a careful review of the evidence adduced in the trial below we are of the opinion that the plaintiff’s evidence is insufficient to establish actionable negligence against the defendant, and we so hold. The judgment as of nonsuit is

Affirmed.

Moore, J., not sitting.
#### LANGDON v. HURDLE

No. 60 PC.

Case below: 17 N.C. App. 530.

Petition for writ of certiorari to North Carolina Court of Appeals denied 1 June 1973.