PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-4096

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

OKECHUKWO EBO OTUYA, a/k/a Oke, a/k/a Waffi,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

Maryland, at Greenbelt. Deborah K. Chasanow, Chief District 

Judge. (8:10-cr-00596-DKC-3)

Argued: May 16, 2013 Decided: June 19, 2013

Before WILKINSON and AGEE, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Wilkinson wrote the 

opinion, in which Judge Agee and Senior Judge Hamilton joined.

ARGUED: Marta K. Kahn, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant. 

Robert K. Hur, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greenbelt, 

Maryland, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Rod J. Rosenstein, United 

States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland; Jonathan Lenzner, 

Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES 

ATTORNEY, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee.
2

WILKINSON, Circuit Judge:

Okechukwo Ebo Otuya was convicted of one count of 

conspiracy to commit bank fraud, two counts of substantive bank 

fraud, and one count of aggravated identity theft for his role 

in a scheme that defrauded Bank of America of hundreds of 

thousands of dollars. He appeals his convictions and resulting 

96-month prison sentence on a variety of grounds. Finding his 

contentions to be without merit, we affirm.

I.

A.

In late 2007, Otuya and several coconspirators began 

operating an elaborate scheme to defraud Bank of America through 

the use of stolen checks. The scheme involved three basic 

steps. First, Otuya and his confederates would drive around 

affluent Maryland residential neighborhoods, stealing mail out 

of roadside mailboxes and placing it in large trash bags. The 

conspirators would then comb through the purloined mail in 

search of credit card convenience checks, which are instruments 

that are processed as charges to an account holder’s credit card 

account (as opposed to a checking account). 

The second part of the scheme involved paying local college 

students in exchange for access to their bank account and ATM 

cards, which the conspirators would then use to process the 
3

stolen checks. For example, one college student named Brandon 

Simmons sold his ATM card, PIN number, social security number, 

and a signed check to the conspirators in early 2008 for $400. 

Third, Otuya and his confederates would deposit the stolen 

convenience checks into the purchased student accounts and 

withdraw the corresponding funds before Bank of America could 

determine that the checks were not authorized. Many of these 

deposits and withdrawals were made by “runners,” or middle men 

(usually other college students) whom the conspirators paid to 

actually deposit and withdraw the checks at various Bank of 

America branch locations, thereby lessening the conspirators’ 

own exposure. But on at least two occasions Otuya personally 

deposited stolen checks into the student accounts. In 

particular, Otuya used Simmons’s bank account information to 

deposit two checks worth $9,400 and $6,200 in October 2008.

The government indicted Otuya and four co-defendants for 

the foregoing activity in September 2010. Three of Otuya’s codefendants pleaded guilty and the fourth was convicted in a 

separate jury trial. The indictment contained four counts with 

respect to Otuya: one count of conspiracy to commit bank fraud, 

in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349; two counts of bank fraud, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344; and one count of aggravated 

identity theft, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A. The 

conspiracy count was based on Otuya’s participation in the 
4

overarching scheme to steal and process unauthorized credit card 

convenience checks in the student accounts. The substantive 

bank fraud and aggravated identity theft counts were based on 

Otuya’s individual conduct in depositing stolen checks into the 

Bank of America account belonging to Simmons.

B.

At trial, the government began its case by presenting 

testimony from three “runners” who deposited and withdrew stolen 

checks for Otuya -- Rebecca Elias, Makeda Tefera, and Tezeta 

Tesfaye. Elias explained, for example, how Otuya and other 

conspirators would drop her off at different Bank of America 

branch locations and pay her to either deposit a fraudulent 

check into one of the student accounts or withdraw funds from 

such an account. Elias testified further that Otuya personally 

handed her fraudulent checks for deposit on several occasions 

and that after making withdrawals, she would sometimes hand the

funds directly to Otuya upon returning to the car. The three 

runners also visually identified Otuya in Bank of America video 

footage introduced by the government as the person who deposited 

a forged check into the account belonging to Brandon Simmons. 

Testimony was also adduced regarding Otuya’s spending 

habits. Elias explained, for instance, how Otuya would buy 

bottles of liquor in the VIP areas of clubs. Tefera observed 

that Otuya drove an Audi -- even though, as Elias pointed out, 
5

Otuya was not known to have a full-time job. In addition, a 

Maryland realtor testified that Otuya and his roommate paid 

$14,000 up front to rent a house for six months. 

On May 16, 2011, the jury returned a verdict convicting 

Otuya on all four counts. During sentencing, the district court 

began its guidelines range calculation by noting that Otuya’s 

base offense level was seven. It then considered three 

enhancements relevant to this appeal. First, the court applied 

a twelve-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(G) 

because it found that the intended amount of loss from the fraud 

scheme attributable to Otuya exceeded $200,000. Second, the 

court applied a four-level enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. 

§ 2B1.1(b)(2)(B) because the offense involved fifty or more 

victims. Finally, the court applied a three-level enhancement 

under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b) on the ground that Otuya was a manager 

or supervisor in an offense involving five or more participants. 

In view of these enhancements, the court calculated Otuya’s 

total offense level as 26, which, when cross-referenced against 

Otuya’s criminal history category, produced a guidelines range 

of 63 to 78 months for the bank fraud conspiracy and substantive 

bank fraud counts. After evaluating the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) 

sentencing factors, the court selected a within-guidelines range 

of 72 months for these counts, to run concurrently. The court 

also imposed a consecutive sentence of 24 months for the 
6

aggravated identity theft count, yielding a total sentence of 

96-months. 

This appeal ensued. 

II.

A.

Prior to trial, the government moved to admit evidence that 

was discovered in a search of a backpack belonging to Otuya upon 

his arrest. The government filed its motion pursuant to Federal 

Rule of Evidence 404(b)(2), which requires pretrial notice of a 

prosecutor’s intent to introduce evidence of other bad acts. 

Specifically, the government sought to introduce evidence 

from the backpack that included: a printout of a Bank of America 

account profile belonging to a man named Frank Hawkins; a debit 

card and Tennessee identification card belonging to another Bank 

of America customer; a laptop computer with images of checks and 

credit reports belonging to other individuals; and four cell 

phones that contained the names of coconspirators in their 

contact lists and text messages with bank account information. 

The government contended that although this evidence related to 

a modified version of the fraud (which involved buying account 

information from a Bank of America insider rather than using 

stolen checks), the evidence was admissible because it was 

intrinsic to the charged activity. In the alternative, the 
7

government argued that the evidence was admissible to prove noncharacter purposes such as modus operandi and knowledge. 

Over Otuya’s opposition, the district court decided at a 

pretrial hearing that it would admit the evidence. In doing so, 

the court explained its initial view that the evidence arose out 

of the “same series of transactions as the charged offenses” and 

related to an ongoing conspiracy with the “same general core of 

coconspirators,” such that it was intrinsic to the charged 

crimes. The court left open the possibility of revisiting the 

issue at trial, however, stating that “if at any time I conclude 

I’m hearing things differently . . . I’ll let everyone know, and 

we’ll have [further] discussion at that point.”

Later, when the government sought to introduce the evidence 

at trial, Otuya renewed his objection. The court stood by its 

earlier decision and admitted the evidence on the grounds that 

it was intrinsic to the charged acts and, alternatively, that it 

was permissible under Rule 404(b) because the evidence helped 

establish a common scheme, absence of mistake, and Otuya’s 

identity in the Bank of America video footage. 

The government then offered witnesses to provide context 

for the backpack evidence. Most notably, a former Bank of 

America teller named Malia Forrester testified that she provided 

customers’ account information to the conspirators in exchange 

for payment in 2010. One of the account profiles that she sold 
8

belonged to Frank Hawkins -- the same customer whose information 

was found inside Otuya’s backpack. And Frank Hawkins’s son, 

James Hawkins, testified that fraudulent checks were indeed 

drawn on his father’s account in July 2010.

B.

Otuya argues at the outset that his conviction should be 

reversed because the district court improperly admitted evidence 

found in his backpack under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). 

That rule excludes “[e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or other act” 

if it is offered to “prove a person’s character in order to show 

that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance 

with the character.” However, evidence of another bad act may 

be admissible in two situations relevant here. First, the 

evidence may be introduced if it concerns acts “intrinsic to the 

alleged crime” because evidence of such acts “do[es] not fall 

under Rule 404(b)’s limitations” to begin with. United States 

v. Chin, 83 F.3d 83, 87-88 (4th Cir. 1996). Second, even if the 

evidence involves extrinsic acts, it may be admitted for a noncharacter purpose such as to prove identity. See Fed. R. Evid. 

404(b)(2). For the reasons below, we conclude that the district 

court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence 

from Otuya’s backpack under both of these grounds. See United 

States v. Weaver, 282 F.3d 302, 313 (4th Cir. 2002) (reviewing 

evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion).
9

1.

First, the district court reasonably concluded that the 

backpack evidence was intrinsic to the charged offenses. Our 

cases have held that evidence of other bad acts is intrinsic if, 

among other things, it involves the same “series of transactions 

as the charged offense,” United States v. Kennedy, 32 F.3d 876, 

885 (4th Cir. 1994), which is to say that “both acts are part of 

a single criminal episode,” Chin, 83 F.3d at 88 (internal 

quotation marks omitted). 

Here, the trial court was confronted with abundant evidence 

showing that the 2008-2009 and the 2010 fraudulent activity were 

really components of the same ongoing criminal episode. Both 

sets of acts involved the same victim (Bank of America), 

defrauded under the same basic scheme (depositing unauthorized 

checks into student checking accounts using the students’ ATM 

cards), by the same conspirators. Indeed, one of the cell 

phones found in Otuya’s backpack in 2010 contained 27 text 

messages from an individual named “Tai,” who was implicated as a 

runner in the 2009 activity. Several of these messages were 

suggestive of the same ongoing fraud: one message contained a 

bank account number, PIN, and social security number; two other 

messages stated “Who has the plastic?” and “Collect the card 

from him tonite.” 
10

In light of these facts, the court’s determination that the 

evidence in Otuya’s backpack arose out of the same series of 

transactions and involved the same criminal episode as the 

charged fraud was hardly an abuse of discretion.

2.

Even if the backpack evidence was somehow found to concern 

acts extrinsic to the charged crimes, the district court did not 

err in admitting it under its alternative rationale: that the 

evidence was permissible to prove a matter other than Otuya’s 

character. 

To begin with, the court did not abuse its discretion in 

finding that the backpack evidence was relevant to issues other 

than Otuya’s character. For example, in order to convict on the 

bank fraud charges, the government had to prove that Otuya 

knowingly executed a scheme to defraud Bank of America. See

United States v. Mancuso, 42 F.3d 836, 844 (4th Cir. 1994). The 

fact that Otuya possessed Bank of America account information, a 

debit card, and a Tennessee identification card all belonging to 

individuals other than himself was thus relevant both to 

demonstrate his knowing participation in the scheme and to 

corroborate the eye-witness identifications of Elias and other 

witnesses against Otuya. 

The district court also acted within its discretion when it 

found that the backpack evidence was relevant to establishing 
11

Otuya’s common scheme or modus operandi of obtaining Bank of 

America account information, paying college students for the use 

of their debit cards and accounts, and having runners deposit 

forged instruments into those accounts. See United States v. 

Siegel, 536 F.3d 306, 318 (4th Cir. 2008) (other crime evidence 

relevant for modus operandi where defendant’s “typical pattern 

was to obtain the personal information of another person, use 

that information to obtain credit in that person’s name, and 

take whatever steps were necessary to prevent that person from 

learning about the new accounts until it was too late”). We 

therefore conclude that the district court did not err in 

admitting the evidence.*

III.

Otuya next challenges his conviction for aggravated 

identity theft. The statute imposes a mandatory consecutive two 

year prison sentence against one who, “during and in relation to 

any felony violation enumerated in subsection (c) [including 

bank fraud], knowingly . . . uses, without lawful authority, a 

means of identification of another person.” 18 U.S.C. 

 * Because the other direct and circumstantial evidence of 

Otuya’s guilt was so overwhelming, we also find that any error 

in admitting the backpack evidence would have been harmless in 

any event. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a) (“Any error . . . that 

does not affect substantial rights must be disregarded.”).
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§ 1028A(a)(1). Otuya asserts that § 1028A’s use of the phrase 

“without lawful authority” means that in order to violate the 

statute, a defendant must use another individual’s 

identification for a particular purpose without the individual’s 

consent. And because Otuya had such consent here -- that is, 

because his coconspirator, Brandon Simmons, agreed to Otuya’s 

nefarious use of his identification -- Otuya contends that his 

aggravated identity theft conviction must be reversed.

We reject this argument for a straightforward reason: no 

amount of consent from a coconspirator can constitute “lawful 

authority” to engage in the kind of deplorable conduct that 

Otuya engaged in here. Simply put, one does not have “lawful 

authority” to consent to the commission of an unlawful act. Nor 

does a “means of identification” have to be illicitly procured 

for it to be used “without lawful authority.” To excuse Otuya’s 

act of using another person’s identification to defraud Bank of 

America of thousands of dollars simply because a coconspirator 

agreed to let him do so would produce an untenable construction 

of the statute and an unacceptable result. 

Moreover, as we explained in United States v. Abdelshafi, 

the phrase “without lawful authority” means that § 1028A 

prohibits the use of another person’s identifying information 

“without a form of authorization recognized by law.” 592 F.3d 

602, 609 (4th Cir. 2010). Although Abdelshafi involved a 
13

situation where the defendant used the identifying information 

of others for an illegal purpose without obtaining their 

permission to do so, that distinction makes no difference. For 

it is obvious that, with or without permission from its rightful 

owner, a defendant who uses the means of identification of 

another “during and in relation to any felony violation 

enumerated” in the statute necessarily lacks a form of 

authorization recognized by law. Our holding as much places us 

in accord with every circuit to have addressed the question. 

See United States v. Lumbard, 706 F.3d 716, 722-25 (6th Cir. 

2013); United States v. Ozuna-Cabrera, 663 F.3d 496, 499 (1st 

Cir. 2011); United States v. Hines, 472 F.3d 1038, 1040 (8th 

Cir. 2007).

Otuya raises several arguments in response, but none are 

persuasive. He first argues that our decision in United States 

v. Woods, 710 F.3d 195 (4th Cir. 2013), commands a different 

result. In Woods, we upheld a jury instruction that defined the 

phrase “act without lawful authority” to mean the use of a 

“means of identification of another person without the person’s 

consent or knowledge.” Id. at 208. While that definition is 

consistent with the one that Otuya presses in this appeal, it 

does not foreclose the interpretation that we adopt here. That 

is to say, a defendant acts without lawful authority not only

when he uses a means of identification without the consent or 
14

knowledge of its owner (as in Woods) but also when he uses the 

identification in order to commit a crime even with consent (as 

is true here). In other words, the jury instruction rightly 

upheld in Woods was not incorrect; it was just under-inclusive. 

This makes sense in light of the facts in Woods, where the 

defendant apparently did not argue that he had actual consent to 

use the means of identification at issue. The defendant in that 

case instead pressed an argument regarding his mens rea, 

claiming that “he did not know that he was acting without lawful 

authority.” Id. (emphasis added). Otuya, by contrast, does not 

raise any contentions about his mental state in this appeal. 

Otuya next makes a number of arguments concerning statutory 

purpose, legislative history, and the provision’s title. With 

respect to purpose, Otuya contends that the aggravated identity 

theft statute is designed to protect victims from the 

consequences of having their identifications misappropriated. 

He relies in particular on a statement in Flores-Figueroa v. 

United States, where the Supreme Court accepted the government’s 

description of § 1028A’s purpose as “provid[ing] enhanced 

protection for individuals whose identifying information is used 

to facilitate . . . crimes.” 556 U.S. 646, 654 (2009). Otuya 

suggests that in light of this purpose, he falls outside of the 

statute’s reach insofar as there was no identity theft victim in 

need of protection in his case. Otuya also points to stray 
15

remarks in the legislative history where individual lawmakers 

discussed the victim-protection aim of the law. And he relies 

lastly on the statute’s title –- “aggravated identity theft” --

as an indication that the law was designed to protect against 

the actual theft of an identity, which did not occur here.

Despite Otuya’s pleas, all of these arguments must be 

rejected under an elementary rationale: arguments about purpose, 

history, and statutory titles cannot contradict a law’s plain 

text. See Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Dimension 

Fin. Corp., 474 U.S. 361, 374 (1986) (rejecting the “invocation 

of the ‘plain purpose’ of legislation at the expense of the 

terms of the statute itself”); W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. 

Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 98-99 (1991) (“Where [a statute] contains a 

phrase that is unambiguous . . . we do not permit it to be 

expanded or contracted” based on legislative history); Pa. Dep’t 

of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 212 (1998) (“The title of a 

statute cannot limit the plain meaning of the text.” (internal 

quotation marks and alterations omitted)). As we have 

explained, the plain meaning of § 1028A(a)(1) is unambiguous: 

one who uses a means of identification to commit an enumerated 

felony does not act with “lawful authority.” We thus affirm 

Otuya’s conviction for aggravated identity theft.
16

IV.

With his challenges to his convictions unavailing, Otuya 

attempts next to contest the district court’s application of the 

sentencing guidelines. Otuya claims that the district court 

erred in three respects, but his arguments are unpersuasive.

A.

Otuya’s first claim is that the trial court erroneously 

imposed a twelve-level enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. 

§ 2B1.1(b)(1)(G) on the ground that Otuya’s offense involved an 

intended loss amount in excess of $200,000. We review the 

court’s calculation of loss amount for clear error. United 

States v. Allen, 491 F.3d 178, 193 (4th Cir. 2007).

In calculating the amount of loss for the purpose of the 

§ 2B1.1(b)(1) enhancement, a district court may consider the 

“greater of actual loss or intended loss” and must only make a 

“reasonable estimate” of that amount based on available 

information. U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(A), (C). In a case like 

this one involving jointly undertaken criminal activity, a 

particular loss may be attributed to a defendant if it results 

from the conduct of others so long as the conduct was “in 

furtherance of, and reasonably foreseeable in connection with” 

the criminal activity. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B) & cmt. n.2. 

In this case, the district court made a reasonable estimate 

that the intended loss reasonably foreseeable to Otuya was in 
17

excess of $200,000. In reaching that determination, the court 

referenced a detailed spreadsheet that the government 

constructed describing 78 specific losses that were intended in 

the course of the fraud scheme. The court then selected the 33 

particular losses that it found to be in furtherance of the 

conspiracy and reasonably foreseeable to Otuya, either because 

he personally perpetrated the underlying fraudulent transactions 

or because he had a close working connection with the 

conspirators who did. There is no dispute that the total of the 

intended losses from those transactions exceeded $200,000, and 

in fact approached $400,000. In view of this strong evidence, 

the court did not clearly err in its loss calculation or the 

resulting imposition of a twelve-level enhancement.

B.

Otuya’s second challenge to his sentence concerns the 

court’s application of a four-level enhancement for a crime 

having fifty or more victims under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(2)(B). 

That guideline provision defines the term “victim” to include, 

inter alia, “any person who sustained any part of the actual 

loss.” U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.1. “Actual loss” is defined to 

mean “pecuniary harm,” which in turn encompasses “harm that is 

monetary or that otherwise is readily measurable in money” and 

does not include “non-economic harm.” U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 cmt. 

n.3(A)(i), (iii). We review the court’s ruling on this 
18

enhancement for clear error with respect to factual findings and 

de novo as to legal conclusions. See United States v. Blake, 81 

F.3d 498, 503 (4th Cir. 1996). 

The thrust of Otuya’s argument is that the district court 

took an erroneous view of this enhancement when it counted as 

victims a number of individual account holders whose losses were 

reimbursed by Bank of America. In Otuya’s view, because such

reimbursed persons did not suffer any monetary or pecuniary 

harm, they did not “sustain[] any part of the actual loss” as 

would be required to meet the definition of a “victim.” 

U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.1. 

In rejecting this contention, the district court noted a 

divide in authority among our sister circuits. For example, in 

United States v. Yagar, the Sixth Circuit held that bank account 

holders do not count as “‘victims’ under the Guidelines [where] 

they [a]re fully reimbursed for their temporary financial 

losses.” 404 F.3d 967, 971 (6th Cir. 2005); see also, e.g., 

United States v. Kennedy, 554 F.3d 415, 419 (3d. Cir. 2009). By 

contrast, the First Circuit has “reject[ed]” the position taken 

in Yagar and in other circuits, that “account holders d[o] not 

suffer actual pecuniary harm, ‘readily measurable in money,’ 

[if] their losses were reimbursed.” United States v. Stepanian, 

570 F.3d 51, 56 (1st Cir. 2009). The First Circuit instead 

takes the view that the definition of “victim” in U.S.S.G. 
19

§ 2B1.1 cmt. n.1 “does not have a temporal limit or otherwise 

indicate that losses must be permanent.” Id. at 55.

While our circuit has yet to squarely address this issue, 

we need not do so here because there is an alternative basis in 

the record that indisputably warrants the application of the 

number-of-victims enhancement. See United States v. Jinwright, 

683 F.3d 471, 488 (4th Cir. 2012) (“We may affirm the district 

court on the basis of any conduct in the record that 

independently and properly should result in an increase in the 

offense level by virtue of the enhancement.” (internal quotation 

marks and alterations omitted)). Specifically, U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 

cmt. n.4(C) provides an additional definition of “victim” that 

is obviously pertinent based on Otuya’s conduct: “in a case in 

which undelivered United States mail was taken . . . ‘victim’ 

means . . . any person who was the intended recipient, or 

addressee, of the undelivered United States mail.” 

The government presented ample evidence at trial that at 

least fifty persons had their mail taken by Otuya and his 

confederates. Rebecca Elias and Makeda Tefera testified that 

they went on multiple trips -- referred to by the conspirators 

as “missions” -- during which Otuya and others would drive 

through residential neighborhoods and steal mail out of 

mailboxes. Elias explained that she personally went on two or 

three missions with members of the conspiracy, and that on one 
20

of these missions she witnessed Otuya take mail out of a number 

of roadside boxes and stuff it inside a “large trash bag in the 

passenger side seat,” to the point where the bag was “pretty 

full.” Tefera testified that she, too, saw Otuya fill up a 

plastic bag with stolen mail, so much so that it was 

“overflowing.” Thus, although neither witness offered a precise 

number for how many persons had their mail stolen on any given 

mission, or how many missions the conspirators took in total, 

the testimony was surely sufficient to support a finding of at 

least fifty victims. On that basis, we affirm the district 

court’s application of the number-of-victims enhancement.

C.

Finally, Otuya challenges the trial court’s imposition of a 

three-level enhancement for his aggravated role as a manager or 

supervisor in the offense under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b). The 

guidelines list the following factors as among those relevant to 

a determination of aggravated role: “the exercise of decision 

making authority . . . the recruitment of accomplices . . . 

[and] the degree of participation in planning or organizing the 

offense.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 cmt. n.4. Given the facts adduced 

at trial, the court did not err in concluding in light of these 

factors that Otuya was a manager or supervisor in the scheme.

For starters, the trial court correctly observed that Otuya 

was intimately involved in planning and organizing the offense 
21

and making key decisions. Otuya frequently obtained convenience 

checks and supplied both the checks and student account 

information to runners, instructing them on what to do upon 

entering a bank. To that end, Elias, Tesfaye, and Tefera each 

testified that the defendant supervised their actions on 

multiple occasions. Moreover, Otuya also regularly decided 

where, when, and in what amounts the various transactions would 

be performed. And as a government inspector testified during 

Otuya’s sentencing hearing, Otuya recruited others to join in 

the scheme and taught them the basics of how it operated. We 

therefore affirm the application of the three-level aggravated 

role enhancement to Otuya.

V.

For the reasons given, the judgment of the district court 

is hereby affirmed.

AFFIRMED