FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

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Case No. 5D2023-0748 

LT Case No. 2019-DR-058427

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HAZEM ELSAWAF, 

Appellant,

v.

CATHERINE ELSAWAF, 

Appellee.

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On appeal from the Circuit Court for Brevard County. 

Jigisa Patel-Dookhoo, Judge. 

Nancy A. Hass, of Nancy A. Hass, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for

Appellant.

Lindsey Gardner Shneyder, of Beachfront Family Law, Satellite 

Beach, for Appellee.

May 10, 2024

LAMBERT, J.

Hazem Elsawaf (“Former Husband”) appeals the final 

judgment rendered after trial that dissolved his long-term 

marriage to Catherine Elsawaf (“Former Wife”). Former Husband 

raises two arguments for reversal. First, he contends that the trial 

court erred in granting his counsel’s motion to withdraw from 

representation on the morning of trial that had been filed the 
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previous day and then not granting his pro se request for 

continuance of the trial. Second, Former Husband argues that, for 

various reasons, the trial court reversibly erred when it ordered 

him to pay the sum of $6,332.50 towards Former Wife’s attorney’s 

fees. 

We find it unnecessary to reach the merits of this second issue 

because our resolution of the first issue is dispositive. For the 

following reasons, we reverse the final judgment, other than the 

dissolution of the marriage itself, and remand for a new trial.

I

Trial in this case was set for December 1, 2022, beginning at 

9:00 a.m.1 Leading up to the day of trial, Former Husband had 

been represented by counsel for approximately nine months.2

At 12:44 p.m. on the afternoon before trial, Former Husband’s 

counsel emailed Former Husband and opposing counsel a motion 

to withdraw from representation. The motion alleged that Former 

Husband had not substantially fulfilled his financial obligations to 

counsel and that it would be “unreasonably difficult” for counsel to 

continue with the representation as they now had “irreconcilable 

differences.” 

The motion to withdraw was not noticed for hearing; however, 

it was heard the following morning just before trial commenced. 

Upon the court orally granting the motion to withdraw over 

objection,3 Former Husband, now pro se, requested that the trial 

be continued, arguing that he would be prejudiced if required to 

immediately proceed to trial as he was not prepared to represent 

1 The court also reserved December 12, 2022, as a second day 

for trial, if needed.

2 Former Wife was also represented by counsel, and each 

counsel of record was that party’s second attorney in the case. 

3 The trial court later entered an unelaborated written order 

granting the motion “for good cause.”
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himself. The request was denied, and trial was held that same 

day. 

Following entry of the final judgment, Former Husband

timely moved for rehearing asserting, among other things, that,

under these aforementioned circumstances, his right to due 

process and a fair trial had been violated. The trial court denied 

the motion without a hearing, and this appeal ensued. 

II

Whether a trial court has violated a party’s right to due 

process is reviewed de novo. Garrison v. Williamson, 372 So. 3d 

1275, 1276 (Fla. 5th DCA 2023) (citing Jenkins v. M.F., 280 So. 3d 

507, 510 (Fla. 5th DCA 2019)). On its most basic level, the concept 

of “due process requires both reasonable notice and a meaningful 

opportunity to be heard.” Spencer v. Kelner, 357 So. 3d 166, 168 

(Fla. 4th DCA 2023) (quoting Yue Yan v. Byers, 88 So. 3d 392, 394 

(Fla. 4th DCA 2012)). For the following reasons, we agree with

Former Husband that the trial court, by allowing Former 

Husband’s counsel to withdraw from representation on the 

morning of trial with less than twenty-four hours’ notice, thus 

placing Former Husband in the position of having to represent 

himself at trial without adequate time to prepare, violated his

right to due process. 

III

The process by which an attorney may withdraw from 

representation in an action or proceeding is addressed in Florida 

Rule of General Practice and Judicial Administration 2.505(f)(1).

This rule states that withdrawal from representation is to be by

written order of the court after hearing upon a motion that sets 

forth the reasons for withdrawal and includes the client’s last 

known address, telephone number, and email address. 

Rule 4-1.16 of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar, titled 

Declining or Terminating Representation, sets forth the 

substantive grounds or reasons for an attorney’s withdrawal from 

representation. Subdivision (a) of this rule describes when 

withdrawal is mandatory and provides:
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(a) When Lawyer Must Decline or Terminate

Representation. Except as stated in subdivision (c), a 

lawyer shall not represent a client or, where 

representation has commenced, shall withdraw from the 

representation of a client if:

(1) the representation will result in violation of the Rules 

of Professional Conduct or law;

(2) the lawyer’s physical or mental condition materially 

impairs the lawyer’s ability to represent the client;

(3) the lawyer is discharged;

(4) the client persists in a course of action involving the 

lawyer’s services that the lawyer reasonably believes is 

criminal or fraudulent, unless the client agrees to disclose 

and rectify the crime or fraud; or

(5) the client has used the lawyer’s services to perpetrate 

a crime or fraud, unless the client agrees to disclose and 

rectify the crime or fraud.

Rule 4-1.16(b) then describes when withdrawal from 

representation is optional:

(b) When Withdrawal Is Allowed. Except as stated in 

subdivision (c), a lawyer may withdraw from 

representing a client if:

(1) withdrawal can be accomplished without material 

adverse effect on the interests of the client;

(2) the client insists upon taking action that the lawyer 

considers repugnant, imprudent, or with which the 

lawyer has a fundamental disagreement;

(3) the client fails substantially to fulfill an obligation to 

the lawyer regarding the lawyer’s services and has been 

given reasonable warning that the lawyer will withdraw 

unless the obligation is fulfilled;
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(4) the representation will result in an unreasonable 

financial burden on the lawyer or has been rendered 

unreasonably difficult by the client; or

(5) other good cause for withdrawal exists.

Notably, both 4-1.16(a) and 4-1.16(b) specifically reference the 

exception or limitation in subdivision (c) of this rule to a counsel’s 

ability to withdraw. Rule 4-1.16(c) states:

(c) Compliance With Order of Tribunal. A lawyer 

must comply with applicable law requiring notice or 

permission of a tribunal when terminating a 

representation. When ordered to do so by a tribunal, a 

lawyer shall continue representation notwithstanding 

good cause for terminating the representation.

Accordingly, an attorney seeking to withdraw must provide 

proper or lawful notice of their intent to withdraw; and, secondly, 

even if good cause for withdrawal is shown, the court may require 

that the attorney continue with representation. 

Former Husband’s counsel’s motion to withdraw did not allege 

any of the grounds under rule 4-1.16(a) when withdrawal from 

representation would be mandatory. Thus, turning to rule 4.1-

16(b) when withdrawal from representation is optional, as it was 

here, withdrawal is permissible provided it “can be accomplished 

without material adverse effect on the interests of the client.” In 

the present case, we conclude that the court-allowed withdrawal of 

counsel at the commencement of trial resulted in a material 

adverse effect upon Former Husband. 

The case of Garden v. Garden, 834 So. 2d 190 (Fla. 2d DCA 

2002), is instructive on this issue. Much like what occurred here, 

the husband’s counsel filed a motion to withdraw shortly before the 

start of the dissolution of marriage trial. Id. at 191. The trial court 

granted the motion to withdraw, and the case proceeded to trial. 

Id. at 192. On appeal from the final judgment, the husband argued 

that the trial court erred by permitting his counsel to withdraw 

immediately prior to the trial’s commencement and in denying his 

request for a continuance. Id. at 191.
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The Second District agreed with the husband, concluding that 

the trial court erred in granting the motion to withdraw, id. at 193,

and reversed the final judgment, except as to the granting of the 

dissolution itself. Id. Pertinent here, the court wrote:

When these situations [of a party’s counsel moving to 

withdraw shortly before trial] occur, as they frequently 

do, the trial court is often faced with what it regards as a 

Hobson’s choice. It may permit counsel to withdraw and, 

due to a party’s lack of representation, continue the case. 

This choice detrimentally affects the opposing party, who 

is prepared for trial and has incurred costs and attorney’s 

fees in doing so. The court’s other option is to grant the 

withdrawal motion and to deny the continuance request, 

thereby facing the potential that the ruling may cause the 

moving party to suffer a denial of due process.

There is, we believe, a third choice. Rule 4–1.16(b) of the

Rules Regulating the Florida Bar governs an attorney’s 

ethical termination of representation. In those situations 

where withdrawal is optional, as here, the rule 4–1.16(b) 

provides that withdrawal should be “accomplished 

without material adverse effect on the interest of the 

client.” Withdrawal at the moment a trial is to commence 

can seldom be accomplished without material adverse 

effect on the client. Thus, rule 4–1.16(c) authorizes the 

court to require continued representation of the client by 

counsel, even in those instances where good cause to 

withdraw exists. In those circumstances the court is not 

required to grant a motion to withdraw and may properly 

require a lawyer who has tardily moved to withdraw to 

continue representing the client.

We conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by 

granting the motion to withdraw and failing to require 

counsel to continue representing Mr. Garden. We 

acknowledge that this may be burdensome to the moving 

attorney, but the risk should be borne by counsel who is 

most familiar with the client and events and not by the 

court or by the opposing party . . . .
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Id.

We agree with our sister court. Former Husband, a layman, 

was essentially placed on notice by his counsel’s motion to 

withdraw, filed approximately twenty hours before the start of 

trial, that he faced the possibility of going to trial without the 

attorney who had been representing him over the preceding nine 

months. We have no hesitancy in holding that such circumstances 

violated Former Husband’s right to due process. Garden and rule 

4-1.16(c) make clear that even if good cause exists for withdrawal, 

a trial court may nevertheless require an attorney who has not 

timely moved to withdraw to continue with representation. The 

trial court erred in not doing so here. 

We therefore affirm the final judgment to the extent that it

dissolved the marriage, but otherwise reverse and remand for a 

new trial.4

AFFIRMED, in part; REVERSED, in part, and REMANDED for a 

new trial.

EDWARDS, C.J., and MACIVER, J., concur.

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Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

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4 As previously indicated, we take no position on the merits of 

Former Husband’s second argument regarding the trial court’s 

award of attorney’s fees to Former Wife. Upon remand, we remind 

the trial court that if it does award attorney’s fees to either party, 

it must include in the judgment the requisite findings to support 

such an award, including findings as to the reasonable hourly rate 

and the reasonable number of hours expended. See Fla. Patient’s 

Comp. Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 1985).