Opinion filed June 5, 2014

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals __________

No. 11-13-00372-CV

__________

IN THE INTEREST OF D.E.R., T.M.A., S.N.H., AND T.W.H.,

CHILDREN

On Appeal from the 29th District Court

Palo Pinto County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. C45088

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

This is an appeal from an order of termination involving the parents of 

D.E.R., T.M.A., S.N.H., and T.W.H., the children. The trial court terminated the 

parental rights of the mother as to all four children and the parental rights of the 

fathers of D.E.R., S.N.H., and T.W.H. The mother appeals, as does the father of 

S.N.H. and T.W.H.1 We affirm.

 1

Because the fathers of D.E.R. and T.M.A. have not appealed, we refer to the father of S.N.H. and 

T.W.H. as “the father” in this opinion. We note that the parental rights of T.M.A.’s father were not 

terminated and that he was appointed to be T.M.A.’s managing conservator. 
2

The mother presents two issues on appeal. In those issues, she challenges

the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support termination and the trial 

court’s finding as to best interest. The father presents one issue challenging the 

legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence as to the findings regarding his 

conduct, but the father does not challenge the trial court’s best interest finding. 

The termination of parental rights must be supported by clear and 

convincing evidence. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001 (West 2014). To determine 

if the evidence is legally sufficient in a parental termination case, we review all of 

the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding and determine whether a 

rational trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its finding 

was true. In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005). To determine if the 

evidence is factually sufficient, we give due deference to the finding and determine 

whether, on the entire record, a factfinder could reasonably form a firm belief or

conviction about the truth of the allegations against the parent. In re C.H., 89 

S.W.3d 17, 25–26 (Tex. 2002). To terminate parental rights, it must be shown by 

clear and convincing evidence that the parent has committed one of the acts listed 

in Section 161.001(1)(A)–(T) and that termination is in the best interest of the 

child. FAM. § 161.001. 

With respect to the best interest of a child, no unique set of factors need be 

proved. In re C.J.O., 325 S.W.3d 261, 266 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2010, pet. 

denied). But courts may use the non-exhaustive Holley factors to shape their 

analysis. Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976). These include, 

but are not limited to, (1) the desires of the child, (2) the emotional and physical 

needs of the child now and in the future, (3) the emotional and physical danger to 

the child now and in the future, (4) the parental abilities of the individuals seeking 

custody, (5) the programs available to assist these individuals to promote the best 

interest of the child, (6) the plans for the child by these individuals or by the 
3

agency seeking custody, (7) the stability of the home or proposed placement, 

(8) the acts or omissions of the parent that may indicate that the existing parentchild relationship is not a proper one, and (9) any excuse for the acts or omissions 

of the parent. Id. Additionally, evidence that proves one or more statutory grounds 

for termination may also constitute evidence illustrating that termination is in the 

child’s best interest. C.J.O., 325 S.W.3d at 266. 

In this case, the trial court found that the parents had each committed three

of the acts listed in Section 161.001(1). The trial court found that the mother had 

committed acts found in subsections (D), (E), and (O) and that the father had 

committed acts found in subsections (D), (E), and (P). Specifically, the trial court 

found that both parents had knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the children to 

remain in conditions or surroundings that endangered the children’s physical or 

emotional well-being; that both parents had engaged in conduct or knowingly 

placed the children with persons who engaged in conduct that endangered the

children’s physical or emotional well-being; that the mother had failed to comply 

with the provisions of a court order that specifically established the actions 

necessary for her to obtain the return of the children, who had been in the 

managing conservatorship of the Department of Family and Protective Services for 

not less than nine months as a result of the children’s removal from the parents for 

abuse or neglect; and that the father (a) used a controlled substance in a manner 

that endangered the children and (b) either failed to complete a substance abuse 

treatment program or continued to abuse a controlled substance after completing a 

substance abuse treatment program. The trial court also found, pursuant to Section 

161.001(2), that termination of the mother’s and the father’s parental rights would 

be in the best interest of the children. 

The evidence at the final hearing in November 2013 showed that the 

children—who at the time of the hearing were ages twelve, nine, six, and two—
4

had been removed from the parents on November 28, 2012. When the 

Department’s investigator arrived on that date, police were searching the residence

where the mother and the father lived with all four children. The father was not 

present at the time and refused to come home; the mother was arrested for 

possession of a controlled substance. An investigator for the Department testified 

that, inside the residence, there were “pills” within the children’s reach and that 

“dangerous” construction equipment, including a saw, was found in one child’s 

bedroom. The mother tested positive for methamphetamine on that date. Another 

Department investigator testified that the police had received information 

concerning illegal drug trafficking at the parents’ residence. The mother said she 

was unaware of any drug trafficking but was aware of the presence of the 

hydrocodone pills for which she had no prescription. A tablet that appeared to be a 

drug ledger was also found in the residence; it was in the mother’s handwriting. 

The mother admitted that the handwriting was hers, but she stated that she had 

“written as instructed” by the father.

The Department’s caseworker, Melanie Scott, testified that the mother was 

addicted to drugs and “couldn’t get honest.” The mother continued to test positive 

for drugs after completing a twelve-step program. According to Scott, the mother 

was not very cooperative with the Department but did complete some, but not all, 

of her family service plan. The mother visited the children regularly when she was 

not incarcerated, but little bonding or nurturing occurred during those visits. After 

visitation with the mother, D.E.R. was often angry, upset, and physically sick. 

D.E.R. did not understand why she was in the Department’s care, and she accused 

Scott one time of trying to tear up D.E.R.’s family. The record does not show 

whether D.E.R.’s anxiety eased after the visitations ceased when the mother was 

sent to prison, nor does the record reflect the desires of the children. 
5

At the time of trial, the mother and the father were incarcerated. The mother

was in prison for tampering with a government document; she had been 

incarcerated since July 2013 and expected to be released on September 27, 2014. 

The father had been in prison since March 2013 for violating his parole. Scott 

testified that the parents were unable to maintain appropriate housing for a sixmonth period and that the mother was unable to provide the children with a safe 

environment. The Department attempted a reunification, but the parents were 

unable to reduce the risk to the children. Scott also testified that a home study of 

the children’s maternal grandmother did not go well and showed no stability.

The mother testified that she had completed some of the court-ordered 

services, such as a parenting class, a domestic violence class, a values clarification 

class, a twelve-step program, and some counseling sessions. The mother testified 

that she did not test positive for drugs after May 13, 2013, when she completed her 

twelve-step program. She also testified that she was enrolled in a vocational class 

in prison to become an electrician and a cognitive class to change “criminal mind 

thinking.” The mother admitted making some mistakes but did not want her 

parental rights terminated. She testified that she thought her children would be 

emotionally harmed if her rights were terminated.

Scott testified that termination of the mother’s parental rights would be in 

the children’s best interest. Scott testified that the children need stability; that 

T.M.A.’s father has provided a loving, stable home for her with a good support 

system; that T.M.A. has done very well in her father’s care; and that the father’s 

cousin wants to adopt the other three children. At the time of trial, the Department 

had just completed a home study for an adoptive placement of D.E.R., S.N.H., and 

T.W.H. with the father’s cousin and the cousin’s husband, whom Scott described as 

an older, stable, loving, and nurturing couple.
6

We hold that there was clear and convincing evidence from which the trial 

court could reasonably have formed a firm belief that both parents (1) knowingly 

placed or knowingly allowed the children to remain in conditions or surroundings 

that endangered their physical or emotional well-being or (2) engaged in conduct 

or knowingly placed the children with persons who engaged in conduct that 

endangered the physical or emotional well-being of the children. FAM.

§ 161.001(1)(D), (E).

Under subsection (D), we examine evidence related to the environment of 

the children to determine if the environment was the source of endangerment to the 

children’s physical or emotional well-being. In re D.T., 34 S.W.3d 625, 630 (Tex.

App.—Fort Worth 2000, pet. denied). Under subsection (E), the relevant inquiry is 

whether evidence exists that the endangerment of the children’s well-being was the 

direct result of the parents’ conduct, including acts, omissions, or failures to act. In 

re D.O., 338 S.W.3d 29, 33 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2011, no pet.). Additionally, 

termination under subsection (E) must be based on more than a single act or 

omission; a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct by the parent is 

required. In re D.T., 34 S.W.3d at 634; In re K.M.M., 993 S.W.2d 225, 228 (Tex.

App.—Eastland 1999, no pet.). The offending conduct does not need to be 

directed at the child, nor does the child actually have to suffer an injury. In re 

J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 345 (Tex. 2009). 

In this case, there was evidence that the children were exposed to dangerous 

equipment and drugs inside their home. Thus, a finding under subsection (D) was 

supported because the children’s environment was the source of danger. With 

respect to subsection (E), the evidence showed that the parents used drugs and 

were involved in drug trafficking. Such acts constituted conduct that endangered 

the children. The evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial 

court’s findings as to the mother and the father under Section 161.001(1)(D) and 
7

Section 161.001(1)(E). Because a finding that a parent committed one of the acts 

listed in Section 161.001(1)(A)–(T) is all that is required under that statute, we 

need not address the parents’ remaining arguments regarding the sufficiency of the 

evidence to support the trial court’s other findings under Section 161.001(1). See

TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1. The mother’s first issue and the father’s sole issue are

overruled. 

We also hold that, based on the evidence presented at trial and the Holley

factors, the trial court could reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction 

that termination of the mother’s parental rights would be in the best interest of the 

children. See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72. We cannot hold that the findings as 

to best interest are not supported by clear and convincing evidence. 

Upon considering the record as it relates to the desires of the children; the 

emotional and physical needs of the children now and in the future; the emotional 

and physical danger to the children now and in the future; the parental abilities of

the mother, the father, T.M.A.’s father, and the couple seeking to adopt the other 

three children; the plans for the children by the Department; the instability of the 

parents’ home; the stability of the children’s placement and proposed placement; 

the acts and omissions indicating that the parent-child relationship was not a proper 

one; the dangers associated with the parents’ home; and both parents’ continued 

drug use, we hold that the evidence is sufficient to support the finding that 

termination of the mother’s parental rights is in the best interest of the children. 

See id. The mother’s second issue is overruled.

We affirm the trial court’s order of termination.

June 5, 2014 JIM R. WRIGHT

Panel consists of: Wright, C.J., CHIEF JUSTICE

Willson, J., and Bailey, J.