[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 13-12687

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D.C. Docket No. 1:11-cr-00441-TWT-LTW-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

CALVIN JOHNSON, 

 Defendant - Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

________________________

(September 16, 2014)

Before JORDAN and BENAVIDES,* Circuit Judges, and RYSKAMP,** District 

Judge.

PER CURIAM: 

 * Honorable Fortunato P. Benavides, Senior United States Circuit Judge for the U.S. Court of 

Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, sitting by designation.

** Honorable Kenneth L. Ryskamp, United States District Judge for the Southern District of 

Florida, sitting by designation.

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After a jury trial, Calvin Johnson appeals his conviction and sentence for 

possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). 

Johnson raises five issues on appeal. First, Johnson argues that the district court 

erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence found during a parole search, in 

violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. Second, Johnson argues that the court 

erred in permitting testimony about statements he made. Third, Johnson argues 

that the court erred in allowing evidence that he was on parole. Fourth, Johnson 

argues that the court improperly admitted expert witness testimony. Finally, 

Johnson argues that the court imposed a procedurally and substantively 

unreasonable sentence. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

I.

This case involves a warrantless search of a parolee’s residence and 

property. The search was triggered when Johnson violated the conditions of his 

parole several times, including an arrest for reckless driving and possession of 

marijuana. Thereafter, Georgia state parole officers attempted to serve a parole 

arrest warrant on Johnson at his residence. Eventually, Johnson’s residence and 

property were searched, and Johnson was subsequently arrested. 

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The facts surrounding Johnson’s parole conditions, search, and arrest are set 

forth as follows.

1

 

A. The Terms and Conditions of Johnson’s Parole

Following Johnson’s release from prison on parole, he met with a parole 

officer for an initial intake interview. During the meeting, the officer and Johnson 

reviewed Johnson’s Parole Certificate. A condition of the Parole Certificate, 

entitled, “Law/Immediate Notification of Searches,” permitted parole officers to 

conduct warrantless searches of Johnson’s residence and property at any time. The 

officer explained that condition by stating that, anytime the parolee comes into 

contact with the police, the parolee and his residence can be searched. Further, the 

officer gave instances in which officers could search a parolee, such as if the 

parolee is stopped or questioned, or when an officer has reasonable suspicion. 

Finally, the officer explained that parolees have no Fourth Amendment rights 

while on parole. 

B. The Search of Johnson’s Residence

While on parole, Johnson committed several parole violations. Due to such 

violations, parole officers attempted to execute an arrest warrant on Johnson at his 

 1 Such facts are taken from the district court’s denial of the motion to suppress evidence 

following the suppression hearing. 

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residence.2 Johnson’s sister, mother, and grandmother were at the residence. 

Johnson’s sister informed the officers that Johnson was not home. With 

permission, the officers cleared the residence to ensure Johnson was not present. 

The officers did not locate Johnson. 

Having cleared the residence, the officers searched Johnson’s bedroom and 

the garage. The officers recovered an assault rifle and a magazine loaded with 

ammunition in Johnson’s bedroom and drug paraphernalia in the garage.3

 

Johnson’s sister, mother, and grandmother informed the officers that the weapon 

did not belong to any of them. Thereafter, Johnson’s sister contacted Johnson, and 

the officers instructed Johnson to report to the parole office. 

C. The Arrest and Interview of Johnson 

Johnson reported to the parole office as instructed, where he was taken into 

custody. While in custody, the chief parole officer searched Johnson and 

recovered two cellular telephones. Subsequently, an agent from the Bureau of 

Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (“ATF”) interviewed Johnson. The agent 

identified himself to Johnson as a federal agent with ATF, explained to Johnson 

that he was not required to answer any questions, and read Johnson his Miranda4

 2 Johnson’s parole violations included failure to obtain employment or provide proof of his 

enrollment in school, electronic-monitoring/curfew violations, and an arrest for reckless driving 

and possession of marijuana.

3 During the suppression hearing, the parole officer could not recall specifically where each item 

was recovered. 

4 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 

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warnings. When the agent inquired whether Johnson understood his rights and was 

willing to waive such rights, Johnson responded affirmatively to both questions.

Thereafter, Johnson answered questions regarding the origins of the assault rifle. 

Johnson initially denied possession of the assault rifle. However, after the agent 

asked who else lived in the house, Johnson replied that he would take the charge. 

D. The Search of Johnson’s Cellular Telephone

After the agent questioned Johnson, the chief parole officer searched one of 

Johnson’s cellular telephones. In doing so, the officer found several photographs 

of Johnson holding an assault rifle that appeared to be the same weapon the 

officers had recovered from Johnson’s residence. Therefore, a federal search 

warrant was obtained to search Johnson’s cellular telephones.

E. Trial Testimony

During trial, the government called the parole officers and ATF agent. The 

officers testified about Johnson’s release from parole, including his conditions and 

supervision, and the search of Johnson’s residence and cellular telephone. The 

ATF agent testified about his interview with Johnson. 

Moreover, the government called expert witnesses. The witnesses described 

the discovery of encrypted jail calls between Johnson and his sister and determined 

that Johnson had told his sister what to say at trial, including that he had not been 

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home during the relevant time period and that she was unable to identify who was 

in the photograph found on the cellular telephone.

Defense counsel called Johnson’s sister. His sister testified consistent with 

Johnson’s instructions. However, Johnson’s sister did not testify as to whom was 

depicted in the photographs because she was not asked that question. 

Following the testimony and closing arguments, the jury returned a guilty 

verdict on the sole count of felon in possession of a firearm. 

F. Sentencing

At sentencing, the district court calculated the guidelines range to be 110-

137 months. Over Johnson’s objection, the court applied a base offense level of 26 

under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(1). The court applied the level of 26 by finding that 

Johnson had committed the instant offense after sustaining two convictions of a 

crime of violence or a controlled substance offense, namely obstruction of a police 

officer and possession with intent to distribute marijuana. Additionally, the court 

added a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice under U.S.S.G § 3C1.1.

Further, the court heard arguments concerning the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) 

sentencing factors. Johnson requested that the court impose a sentence below his 

guideline range due to his personal history and circumstances. The government 

responded that a lenient sentence was inappropriate in light of the nature of 

Johnson’s offense and his criminal history. 

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After hearing the parties’ arguments, the court sentenced Johnson to the 

statutory maximum of 120 months’ imprisonment, followed by three years of 

supervised release, and a $100 special assessment. The court explained that it had 

considered the § 3553(a) factors, but the factors weighed in favor of a sentence 

within the guidelines range and the maximum sentence under the statute. The 

court further explained that, if any procedural error occurred, the sentence imposed 

would have been the same because the sentence is fair and reasonable. 

This appeal follows. 

II.

We review the district courts’ findings of fact on a motion to suppress 

evidence for clear error and questions of law de novo. United States v. White, 593 

F.3d 1199, 1202 (11th Cir. 2010). The district court’s ruling on the admission of 

evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion. United States v. Gibson, 708 F.3d 

1256, 1275 (11th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). 

We review the district court’s legal conclusions regarding the sentencing 

guidelines de novo and its factual findings for clear error. United States v. DiazCalderone, 716 F.3d 1345, 1348 (11th Cir. 2013). An improper calculation of the 

guidelines range constitutes a procedural error. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 

51 (2007). If no significant procedural error occurred, “[w]e review the 

reasonableness of a defendant’s sentence under a deferential abuse of discretion 

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standard. United States v. King, 751 F.3d 1268, 1281 (11th Cir. 2014) (citation 

omitted). “In evaluating the reasonableness of a sentence, we measure the 

sentence against the factors outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” Id. (citation and 

footnote omitted). The weight accorded any specific § 3553(a) factor is committed 

to the sound discretion of the district court. United States v. Clay, 483 F.3d 739, 

743 (11th Cir. 2007). 

III.

Johnson first argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to 

suppress evidence from the search of his residence and cellular telephone because 

the parole officers lacked reasonable suspicion. Specifically, he claims that 

reasonable suspicion was required based on a statement made to him during his 

intake interview by a parole officer.5

 We disagree. 

The United States Supreme Court determines whether a search is reasonable 

within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment by examining the totality of the 

circumstances. Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 848 (2006) (citation omitted). 

The reasonableness of a search “is determined by assessing, on the one hand, the 

degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the 

degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental 

interests.” Id. (quotation omitted). 

 5 Johnson further argues the officers did not have authority to search his residence because it was 

outside the scope of the arrest warrant. We do not need to address this argument, as the 

government does not argue that the arrest warrant provided justification to search the residence. 

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In Samson, the Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment does not 

prohibit a police officer from conducting a suspicionless search of a parolee when 

the parolee agrees to be subjected to search at any time as a condition of parole. 

Id. at 857. There, an officer searched the petitioner based solely on his status as a 

parolee. Id. at 846-47. As a condition of the petitioner’s release, he had agreed to 

be subject to searches at any time. Id. at 851. The Court examined the petitioner’s 

privacy interests and explained that “parolees have fewer expectations of privacy 

than probationers, because parole is more akin to imprisonment . . . . Id. at 850. 

“The essence of parole is release from prison, before the completion of sentence, 

on the condition that the prisoner abide by certain rules during the balance of the 

sentence.” Id. (quotation omitted). The Court further explained that the 

petitioner’s search condition required the petitioner to submit to suspicionless 

searches by a parole officer or other peace officer at any time. Id. at 852. 

Accordingly, the Court found that the petitioner did not have a reasonable 

expectation of privacy, given the petitioner’s status as a parolee and his acceptance 

of the parole condition. Id. at 852. 

Thereafter, the Court found that the state’s interests were substantial. Id. at 

853. Combating recidivism and promoting reintegration into society warrant 

privacy intrusions. Id. Thus, the Court held that “the Fourth Amendment does not 

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prohibit a police officer from conducting a suspicionless search of a parolee.” Id.

at 857. 

This court has applied the Samson analysis to a Georgia parolee and upheld 

a suspicionless search of a parolee. See United States v. Stewart, 213 F. App’x 898 

(11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam). In Stewart, the defendant argued that the Fourth 

Amendment requires an officer to have reasonable suspicion to search a parolee. 

Id. at 899. This court held that, because the defendant’s “parole certificate 

required him to submit to a search ‘at any time’ without a warrant, the search was 

authorized by the terms of [the defendant’s] parole conditions.” Id. at 899. 

Here, the district court properly denied Johnson’s motion to suppress 

evidence from the warrantless searches of his residence and cellular telephone

because the parole officers were operating under a Fourth Amendment waiver. 

Johnson agreed in writing that parole officers may, at any time, conduct

warrantless searches of his residence and property as a condition of parole. 

Johnson elected to complete his sentence out of prison by being subject to the 

condition. The condition was clearly expressed to Johnson, and he submitted to 

the condition by signing the Parole Certificate. Given Johnson’s status as a parolee 

and his acceptance of the parole condition, he did not have a reasonable 

expectation of privacy. Samson, 547 U.S. at 852. Furthermore, the State of 

Georgia has an overwhelming interest in supervising parolees to reduce recidivism 

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and promote reintegration into society. Id. at 853. Accordingly, the district court 

properly denied Johnson’s motion to suppress evidence.

6

 Id. at 857; Stewart, 213 

F. App’x at 899. 

Although Johnson argues that his intake officer explained to him that an 

officer could only conduct a search if he had reasonable suspicion, the intake 

officer testified that she read the Parole Certificate to Johnson, which included that 

a parole officer may, at any time, conduct a warrantless search. The intake officer 

never testified that searches require reasonable suspicion. Rather, the officer 

described to Johnson a few examples where officers could search Johnson’s 

residence, which could include, among others, an instance of reasonable suspicion. 

Most importantly, the officer explained to Johnson that he had no Fourth 

Amendment rights while on parole. Thus, the parole officers were not required to 

have reasonable suspicion for the search of Johnson’s residence and cellular 

telephone.7

 

IV.

 6 The recent Supreme Court case, Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014), has no application 

to the instant case because here Johnson waived his Fourth Amendment rights as a condition of 

parole. 

7 We note that the Magistrate Judge found reasonable suspicion based on Johnson’s multiple 

parole violations, including the failure to obtain employment, overnight electronic-monitoring 

violations, and his recent arrest for reckless driving and possession of marijuana. Although we 

find that reasonable suspicion was not required, nothing herein should be construed as supporting 

or denying reasonable suspicion. 

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Johnson’s next argument—that the district court erred in permitting 

testimony about statements made by Johnson—is also without merit. Specifically, 

Johnson argues that he involuntarily waived his Miranda rights because he

believed he was being interviewed for electronic-monitoring violations and the 

ATF agent implicitly threatened that his family would be prosecuted.

In this case, the district court properly admitted Johnson’s statements made 

to the ATF agent. Johnson voluntarily and knowingly waived his Miranda rights. 

The ATF agent explained that he was an ATF agent and that the conditions of 

Johnson’s parole did not require him to answer any questions. The agent read 

Johnson his Miranda rights, and inquired whether Johnson understood and was 

willing to waive his rights. Johnson responded affirmatively to both questions. 

Furthermore, the agent did not threaten Johnson, nor did he promise Johnson 

anything in return for speaking to him. When the agent inquired about the assault 

rifle, Johnson answered that it was not his. The agent then asked who else lived in 

the house, and Johnson replied that his sister and mother lived there. After the 

agent asked if the gun belonged to either of them, Johnson replied that he would 

take the charge. This exchange of questioning does not constitute a threat. Thus, 

the district court properly admitted testimony about statements made by Johnson 

during the interview. 

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Although Johnson contends that he waived his rights based on his belief that 

the ATF agent would inquire about the electronic-monitoring violations, the 

Supreme Court has “never read the Constitution to require that the police supply a 

suspect with a flow of information to help him calibrate his self-interest in deciding 

whether to speak or stand by his rights.” United States v. Barner, 572 F.3d 1239, 

1244 (11th Cir. 2009) (holding it was not required that defendant be advised that 

his interrogator was actually conducting a drug investigation rather than a home 

invasion investigation) (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 422 (1986)). 

V.

Similarly, Johnson’s next argument—that the district court erred in allowing 

evidence that he was on parole—is without merit. Specifically, Johnson contends

that the jury was not required to know that he was on parole because he stipulated 

that he was a convicted felon. 

Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence that 

Johnson was on parole because the information was required to explain why the 

parole officers searched Johnson’s residence and cellular telephone, and the events 

of Johnson’s arrest and interview. Without such explanation, the jury would have 

been left to speculate as to why the officers searched Johnson’s home. Thus, the 

district court properly admitted such evidence because it pertained to the chain of 

events explaining the context of the crime charged. See United States v. McLean, 

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138 F.3d 1398, 1403 (11th Cir. 1998) (“Evidence, not part of the crime charged but 

pertaining to the chain of events explaining the context . . . is properly admitted if 

linked in time and circumstances with the charged crime, or forms an integral and 

natural part of an account of the crime . . . .”) (quotation omitted); United States v. 

Herre, 930 F.2d 836, 837-38 (11th Cir. 1991) (finding evidence of defendant’s 

previous arrest was inextricably intertwined with evidence of the charged offense

and was part of “the chain of events explaining context, motive, and set-up . . . to 

complete the story of the crime for the jury.”) (quotation omitted). 

VI. 

Johnson next argues that the district court erred in permitting the ATF agent 

to testify as an expert witness in regard to the contents of the cellular telephone

because he had not received the requisite notice and lacked the opportunity to 

prepare a defense. Particularly, Johnson claims that he objected to the agent being 

called based on his expertise with forensic computer analysis, but the district court 

took testimony on the issue. Johnson’s argument is misplaced. 

Contrary to Johnson’s argument, the district court sustained Johnson’s 

objection at trial. The court stated that it would not allow expert testimony about 

computer forensics and directed the government to only question the agent as to his 

personal knowledge based on handling the device used to extract digital content 

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from Johnson’s cellular telephone. Thus, the court did not abuse its discretion in 

admitting testimony regarding the contents of Johnson’s cellular telephone. 

VII. 

Finally, Johnson argues that the district court’s sentence is procedurally and 

substantively unreasonable. Johnson argues that his sentence is procedurally 

unreasonable because his prior conviction for obstruction of a law enforcement 

officer was not a “crime of violence,” and thus was improperly used to apply the 

base offense level of 26 in U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a). Johnson further argues that his 

sentence is procedurally unreasonable because the district court erred in applying 

the obstruction of justice enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. Lastly, Johnson 

argues that his 120-month sentence is substantively unreasonable because the court 

imposed a sentence “greater than necessary” to achieve the purposes of 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(a). We disagree. 

A. Procedural Reasonableness

1. “Crime of Violence” U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(1)

Johnson argues that his prior conviction for obstruction of a law enforcement 

officer was not a “crime of violence” because a defendant can violate the felony 

part of the statute by nonviolent means.

U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a) provides that a defendant will receive a base offense 

level of 26 if: (A) the offense involved a [] semi-automatic firearm that is capable 

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of accepting a large capacity magazine . . .; and (B) the defendant committed any 

part of the instant offense subsequent to sustaining at least two felony convictions 

of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense.” U.S.S.G. § 

2K2.1(a)(1). Section 4B1.2(a) defines “crime of violence” as “any offense under 

federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, 

that (1) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical 

force against the person of another, or (2) is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or 

extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a 

serious potential risk of physical injury to another. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a). 

In assessing crimes of violence under the Sentencing Guidelines, courts use 

the same framework to analyze violent felonies under the Armed Career Criminal 

Act (“ACCA”). United States v. Harris, 586 F.3d 1283, 1285 (11th Cir. 2009). 

Under the ACCA, courts use a “categorical approach,” in which courts look only to 

the fact of conviction and the statutory definition of the prior offense, not the 

particular facts underlying the conviction. United States v. Alexander, 609 F.3d 

1250, 1253-54 (11th Cir. 2010). However, when statutory phrases cover several 

crimes, some requiring violent force and some which do not, courts may use the 

“modified categorical approach,” thereby relying on the charging document, plea 

agreement, transcript of the plea colloquy, and findings and conclusions from a 

bench trial. Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 144 (2010). 

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The Georgia state statute under which Johnson was convicted for obstruction 

of a police officer provides: “Whoever knowingly and willfully resists, obstructs, 

or opposes any law enforcement officer . . . by offering or doing violence to the 

person of such officer . . . is guilty of a felony . . . . O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24(b). 

Here, the district court did not err in finding that Johnson’s conviction for 

obstruction of a police officer qualified as a “crime of violence.” Johnson’s 

specific offense for obstruction of a police officer was categorized as a felony 

obstruction, not a misdemeanor obstruction. Additionally, under the “categorical 

approach,” Johnson’s prior conviction for obstruction of justice is a “crime of 

violence.” The Georgia statutory language of the felony provision includes as an 

element of the offense the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force 

against the person of another. See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a); O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24(b); 

Fairwell v. State, 717 S.E.2d 332, 338-39 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011) (stating that 

“restricts, obstructs, or opposes” implies forcible resistance). Finally, under the 

“modified categorical approach,” the charging documents and guilty plea from the 

prior conviction show that Johnson’s prior offense involved actual force in the 

form of battery by punching a police officer in the face. Therefore, the district 

court properly applied the base offense level of 26 under § 2K2.1(a)(1) because the 

prior conviction was properly categorized as a “crime of violence.” 

2. Obstruction of Justice Enhancement 

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Johnson next argues that the district court erred in applying a two-level 

increase for obstruction of justice in the total offense level under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 

because conversations with his sister constituted truthful trial preparation. 

The Guidelines provide for a two-level increase in the total offense level if: 

(1) the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to 

obstruct or impede, the administration of justice with respect to the 

investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense of 

conviction, and (2) the obstructive conduct related to (A) the 

defendant's offense of conviction and any relevant conduct; or (B) a 

closely related offense . . . .

Obstructive conduct includes, among other things, suborning perjury or unlawfully 

influencing a witness. Id., comment. n.4(A)-(B). 

Here, the district court did not clearly err in applying the two-level 

enhancement for obstruction of justice. The court explained that it was clear from 

the coded message from Johnson to his sister that it was intended to persuade her 

to testify to things that were not true. For example, Johnson attempted to have his 

sister testify that he had not been in the house when the incriminating photos were 

taken. However, the court found that the photographs and date stamps 

conclusively showed that Johnson was at the house. Thus, the obstruction of 

justice enhancement was not clearly erroneous. See, e.g., United States v. 

Izquierdo, 448 F.3d 1269, 1278 (11th Cir. 2006) (“Where there are two permissible 

views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly 

erroneous.”) (citation omitted). 

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B. Substantive Reasonableness 

Lastly, Johnson contends that his sentence was “greater than necessary” to 

achieve the purposes under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 

The district court must impose a sentence “sufficient, but not greater than 

necessary to comply with the purposes” listed in § 3553(a)(2), including the need

for the sentence imposed “to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote 

respect for the law, to provide just punishment for the offense,” deter criminal 

conduct, and protect the public from the defendant’s future criminal conduct. See 

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). The court must also consider such factors as “the nature 

and circumstances of the offense and the history and circumstances of the 

defendant.” See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). 

Johnson’s 120-month sentence was substantively reasonable. The sentence 

fell within the applicable 110-to-137 month guidelines range. See United States v. 

Hunt, 526 F.3d 739, 746 (11th Cir. 2008) (stating that a sentence within the 

guidelines range is ordinarily expected to be reasonable). Additionally, the court 

acted within its discretion when applying the § 3553(a) factors. Although Johnson 

argues that the court gave too little weight to his positive personal history, the 

record reveals the serious nature of the instant offense and Johnson’s significant 

criminal history. For example, the court found that the firearm at issue was loaded 

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related convictions, and Johnson had committed one crime of violence against a 

law enforcement officer. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Accordingly, the 120-month 

sentence was reasonable and supported by the § 3553(a) factors.8

 

VIII.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Johnson’s conviction and sentence. 

 8 Because we find that Johnson’s sentence was substantively reasonable, we need not address 

Johnson’s argument that the court erred in determining his base offense level under § 

2K2.1(a)(1) by using a prior conviction for possession with intent to distribute a small amount of 

marijuana. Johnson fails to argue that the district court committed clear error in applying the 

relevant guidelines provisions and definitions to the facts of his case. Rather, Johnson argues 

that, because the conviction only involved a small amount of marijuana, the court should have 

considered a two-level downward variance. Such an argument relates to whether a sentence is 

substantively reasonable. 

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