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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

April 19, 2018 Session

GILLIS ELLIOTT v. MIKE ROBBINS, ET AL.

Appeal from the Chancery Court for Claiborne County

No. 18340 Elizabeth C. Asbury, Chancellor

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No. E2017-01440-COA-R3-CV

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This appeal arises from an action where the plaintiff sought to reform a deed that did not 

transfer a disputed acre of property to him. The plaintiff alleged that a mutual mistake 

had occurred and that both plaintiff and defendants had intended for the disputed acre to 

be sold. The trial court held that the mutual mistake existed and that the error was clear 

and convincing enough to allow for reformation of the deed. The defendants appeal. We 

affirm the decision of the trial court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court 

Affirmed; Case Remanded

JOHN W. MCCLARTY, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which D. MICHAEL 

SWINEY, C.J., and THOMAS R. FRIERSON, II, J., joined.

Phillip L. Boyd, Rogersville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Mike Robbins.

Treva Robbins, New Tazewell, Tennessee, pro se appellant.

Brennan M. Wingerter, Knoxville, Tennessee, and Lee Dan Stone III, Tazewell, 

Tennessee, for the appellee, Gillis Elliott.

OPINION

I. BACKGROUND

Mike Robbins (“Mr. Robbins”) and Treva Robbins (“Ms. Robbins”) jointly owned 

32.7 acres of real estate at 179 Hatfield Lane in Tazewell, Tennessee (the “Property”) 

from September 18, 1996, to May 23, 2013. Mr. Robbins and Ms. Robbins (collectively 

“Sellers”) purchased the Property from Tilmon and Kathleen D. Hatfield in two separate 

transactions on September 18, 1996. The initial 31.7 acres were purchased for $8,828, 

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and a separate acre was bought for $46,172. Both pieces of land were separately deeded 

to Sellers and originally considered distinct properties by the Claiborne County Assessor 

of Property. The couple built a new residence on the 31.7 acres, while a well and a 

mobile home unsuitable for living remained on the single acre. A Claiborne County tax 

map included both plats of land as a single, combined tract. In a 2007 application to 

reduce their tax burden, Sellers stated their Property as a combined 32.7 acres. After a 

fire destroyed the couple’s new home. Mr. Robbins and Ms. Robbins did not rebuild on 

the Property and later lived elsewhere. Mr. Robbins filed a complaint for divorce against 

Ms. Robbins in November 2012. The divorce complaint stated that they owned “33 

acres” together and did not distinguish the two pieces of land. Ms. Robbins admitted the 

“33 acres” statement was true in her answer to the divorce complaint.

As the divorce proceedings continued, Sellers sought to sell the Property. Their 

son had been jailed on a charge of statutory rape, and the sale of the Property would fund 

his $50,000 bond and pay out additional judgment liens and delinquent taxes. Mr. 

Robbins asked his neighbor Boyd Mason (“Mr. Mason”) about finding someone who 

would buy the Property. Mr. Mason told Mr. Robbins that Gillis Elliott (“Mr. Elliott”) 

once said that he wanted to buy the Property if it ever became available. After Mr. 

Robbins and Mr. Mason went to Mr. Elliott’s home to inform him that the Property was 

available to purchase, the three men then drove to the Property and examined it. Mr. 

Robbins and Mr. Elliott went to the highest point of the Property so Mr. Robbins could 

show Mr. Elliott its boundaries. Mr. Elliott asked where the septic tank and well were 

located, to which Mr. Robbins replied that the septic tank was at the front of the house 

and the well was near the old trailer at the bottom of the hill. As Mr. Robbins described

the Property to Mr. Elliott, it ran from “from the road to the river,” beginning along 

Harbor Road in Claiborne County and widening as it moved north with its wooded border 

along the Powell River. Mr. Elliott learned that a 10-foot right of way existed that 

connected to a neighbor’s property and that the Property line was fenced along the Powell 

River. Mr. Mason testified that he heard Mr. Robbins tell Mr. Elliott that the Property 

ran mostly “from the road to the river.” No mention was made of a separate acre or an 

offset during the conversation between Mr. Robbins and Mr. Elliott, even when they

discussed the well located on the disputed acre. A fence surrounded by overgrown plants 

was in place near the disputed acre, but the fence covered more than the entire acre and 

could not be clearly seen by Mr. Elliott as he examined the Property. Mr. Elliott showed 

interest in buying the Property, which he believed included the 32.7 acres on both plats.

Mr. Robbins testified at trial that he was willing to sell if Mr. Elliott would deed 

him some of the wooded acres in the back of the Property once his son’s legal troubles 

ended in the future. However, Mr. Robbins’ claim was denied by Mr. Elliott, not 

referenced in the trial court’s ruling, and not argued by any party on appeal. No written 

agreement was drafted to memorialize the parties’ discussion, which Mr. Elliott said was 

not unusual for him and the way he had previously purchased real estate. Subsequent to 
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the discussions, Mr. Elliott posted as bond a separate home that he owned in order to gain 

the release of Mr. Robbins’s son from jail. 

Before the sale was closed, Mr. Elliott began work to improve the Property. Mr. 

Elliott hired two of Mr. Robbins’s sons to help him with the improvements, some of 

which occurred on the disputed acre. Mr. Robbins’s sons did not discuss the status of the 

disputed acre with Mr. Elliott at that time. During this period, Mr. Elliott also asked 

James Estep III, the attorney handling the sale, to conduct a title search of the Property.

A title opinion dated May 22, 2013, related that the land consisted of 31.7 acres. The 

Property was not formally surveyed before closing, and Mr. Elliott did not examine prior 

surveys before the sale. On May 23, 2013, Mr. Elliott purchased the Property from 

Sellers for $60,000. The land deeded to Mr. Elliott included the 31.7 acres that Sellers 

received from the Hatfields in September 18, 1996. The deed did not include the 

separate, disputed acre purchased separately by Sellers. Mr. Elliott said that he did not 

know the exact acreage of the Property when he purchased it and did not read the deed 

before or during the closing. When describing the Property, the deed referenced both the 

original deed of 31.7 acres and the tax map that stated the Property was 32.7 acres. Three 

months later, Sellers completed their divorce agreement. The agreement did not 

reference or distribute the disputed acre to either party.

As the new owner, Mr. Elliott continued work on the disputed acre, which 

included building a well house, clearing the land, and graveling the road on the disputed 

acre. Mr. Elliott also built a new residence using the basement of the house that was 

destroyed by the fire. Two of Mr. Robbins’s sons continued to help Mr. Elliott with his 

work. Mr. Elliott believed that the 32.7 acres belonged entirely to him until he learned 

about Mr. Robbins’s claim. Mr. Elliott confirmed through tax records that a second deed 

existed for the disputed acre. Sellers later claimed that they had reserved the disputed 

acre as their son’s inheritance. Sometime after this development, Mr. Robbins, his son, 

and a distant relative returned to the Property and erected a fence around the disputed 

acre using posts and white rope. Mr. Elliott later tore the fence down and continued to 

build on the disputed acre. Upon learning about the second deed, Mr. Elliott went to Ms. 

Robbins’s residence and offered to pay her $2,000 to sign a quitclaim deed and transfer 

her interest in the disputed acre to him. Ms. Robbins refused to sign the deed after 

learning that Mr. Robbins would give her $3,000 not to sign document. After hearing 

this, Mr. Elliott told Ms. Robbins that he would “see [her] in court.”

On September 18, 2014, Mr. Elliott filed a complaint against Sellers to establish 

ownership of the disputed acre. Initially, Mr. Elliott alleged that Sellers misrepresented 

the Property boundaries to him and that Mr. Elliott relied on their misrepresentations to 

purchase the land. As relief, Mr. Elliott requested that the disputed acre be divested from 

Sellers and vested in him through a quitclaim deed. Mr. Elliott moved for a default 

judgment after Sellers failed to provide a timely answer, but Sellers were granted a time 

extension to draft and file a response. In an answer, Mr. Robbins stated that the disputed 
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acre was never intended to be sold with the other parts of the Property. Mr. Robbins 

further stated that any oral agreement to transfer the entire Property was not written down 

and therefore unenforceable through the Statute of Frauds. Mr. Robbins denied any 

representation was made to Mr. Elliott about the boundaries of the disputed acre and 

claimed that a title search could easily determine the existence of the separate deed 

concerning the acre. 

On March 10, 2015, Mr. Elliott filed a motion to amend his complaint to include 

allegations of mutual mistake and fraud concerning the description of the Property by 

Sellers. After the trial court granted the motion, Mr. Robbins filed a motion for summary 

judgment alleging that an oral agreement occurred which was barred by the Statute of 

Frauds. Mr. Elliott subsequently responded, stating that the two pieces of land were 

combined into the single Property by the tax assessor’s office and that the deed was given 

in error through mutual mistake or fraudulent misrepresentations. On November 6, 2015, 

Mr. Robbins filed a counter-complaint that alleged that the oral agreement included a 

transfer of five acres from Mr. Elliott to Mr. Robbins upon the conclusion of the legal 

matters of Mr. Robbins’s son. Mr. Robbins accused Mr. Elliott of abandoning the 

agreement and requested that the five acres be deeded to him as relief. Mr. Elliott denied 

the allegations and moved to dismiss the counter-complaint in a separate answer. Mr. 

Robbins filed an answer to Mr. Elliott’s amended complaint in which he denied intending

to convey the disputed acre until he received the five acres from Mr. Elliott.

The trial was held on May 23, 2017. After Mr. Elliott’s argument, the trial court 

denied Mr. Robbins’ “motion to dismiss,” which both parties later considered as a motion 

for a directed verdict. After all parties’ arguments were made, the court found a mutual 

mistake had occurred and entered a judgment in favor of Mr. Elliott. The trial court 

found through clear and convincing evidence that both parties believed that the Property 

included the 32.7 acres. Once the mistake occurred, the court concluded that Mr. 

Robbins “took advantage of that” to try to get greater value out of the situation. The trial 

court held that the deed transferring the Property from Sellers to Mr. Elliott should be 

reformed to include the disputed acre. A written order was later filed on June 20, 2017. 

This timely appeal followed.

II. ISSUES

We consolidate and restate the issues raised on appeal by defendants as 

follows: 

1. Whether the trial court erred in reforming a deed based on mutual 

mistake or fraud when Sellers sold the Property to Mr. Elliott without 

discussing the disputed land and did not raise the property dispute until 

months after the sale. 
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2. Whether the trial court erred in denying a motion for summary 

judgment and a motion to dismiss when Mr. Elliott argued against both 

motions and the court decided the case on its merits.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

An appellate court shall review findings of fact in civil, non-jury actions on a de 

novo basis. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d). Unless the preponderance of the evidence suggests 

otherwise, a review of the findings of fact shall be accompanied by a presumption of

correctness. Id. Questions of law in civil actions are also reviewed through a de novo 

standard, “according no deference to the conclusions of law made by the lower courts.” 

S. Constructors, Inc. v. Loudon Cty. Bd. of Educ., 58 S.W.3d 706, 710 (Tenn. 2001). A 

trial court’s assessment of the credibility of a witness shall not be re-evaluated unless 

contrary evidence is clear and convincing. Wells v. Tennessee Bd. of Regents, 9 S.W.3d 

779, 783 (Tenn. 1999).

IV. DISCUSSION

Mutual Mistake

Courts must interpret contracts and deeds as written and cannot draft new 

contracts for parties who have already written one. Sikora v. Vanderploeg, 212 S.W.3d 

277, 286 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006). However, a court may reform or correct a mistake in an 

agreement “so that it fully and accurately reflects the agreement of the parties.” Lane v. 

Spriggs, 71 S.W.3d 286, 289 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001); see also Lebo v. Green, 426 S.W.2d 

489, 494 (Tenn. 1968). A chancery court may reform and correct errors in a deed when 

the errors were made by mutual mistake or unilateral fraud. Wallace v. Chase, No. 

W1999-01987-COA-R3-CV, 2001 WL 394872 at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App., Apr. 17, 2001). A 

mistake occurs when an action would not have happened but for “ignorance, 

forgetfulness, advertence, mental incompetence, surprise, misplaced confidence, or 

imposition....” Town of McMinnville v. Rhea, 316 S.W.2d 46, 50 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1958). 

The doctrine of reformation is only appropriate when the intent of both parties is clear 

and the same. Hunt v. Twisdale, No. M2006-01870-COA-R3-CV, 2007 WL 2827051, at 

*8 (Tenn. Ct. App., Sept. 28, 2007). “Because the law strongly favors the validity of 

written instruments, a person seeking to reform a written contract must do more than 

prove a mistake by the preponderance of evidence.... the evidence of mistake must be 

clear and convincing.” Sikora, 212 S.W.3d at 287. A mistake can occur through the 

expression of an agreement, or when one or both parties falsely believe that the signed 

contract reflects a previously-made agreement. Chandler v. Charleston Volunteer Fire 

Dep’t., No. W2011-00322-COA-R3-CV, 2011 WL 4026844 at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App., Sep. 

13, 2011); Sikora, 212 S.W.3d at 287. To reform an agreement because of mistaken 

expression, a party must present clear and convincing evidence that proves:
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(1) the parties reached a prior agreement regarding some aspect of the 

bargain; 

(2) they intended the prior agreement to be included in the written 

contract;

(3) the written contract materially differs from the prior agreement; and

(4) the variation between the prior agreement and the written contract is 

not the result of gross negligence on the part of the party seeking 

reformation.

Sikora, 212 S.W.3d at 287-88. Gross negligence can occur when a party’s mistake 

happens through a failure to act in good faith or without reasonable standards of fair 

dealing. Id., 212 S.W.3d at 290; see also Payne v. First Cmty. Bank (In re Payne), 523 

B.R. 560, 574 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2014) (“[I]nattention alone will not defeat the 

[plaintiff’s] argument.”). A failure to find a drafting error does not prevent reformation. 

Rentenbach Eng’g Co., Constr. Div. v. Gen. Realty Ltd., 707 S.W.2d 524, 527-28 (Tenn. 

Ct. App. 1985). One party’s denial of the existence of an agreement or a mistake does 

not automatically bar the reformation of a contract. Sikora, 212 S.W.3d at 288;

Chandler, 2011 WL 4026844 at *4.

In the present case, the parties’ initial discussions and later actions indicate that an 

agreement existed that differed from the final transaction. According to the trial court’s 

findings, Mr. Robbins generally described the Property to Mr. Elliott and did not mention 

the disputed acre in their conversation. While a fence existed on the Property, it did not 

surround the disputed acre in a way that clearly separated it from the rest of the land. 

Before the Property closed, Mr. Elliott began making improvements on the land, 

including on the disputed acre. Two of Mr. Robbins’s sons also worked for Mr. Elliott 

on the Property and never mentioned the disputed acre directly to Mr. Elliott. Later that 

year, Sellers failed to mention or divest the disputed acre when completing their divorce. 

When Mr. Elliott attempted to give $2,000 to Ms. Robbins to quitclaim her interest in the 

disputed acre, she declined after Mr. Robbins offered to pay her $3,000 not to sign the 

deed. For these reasons, the trial court found not only that both parties had intended to 

sell the disputed acre, but also that Mr. Robbins attempted to take advantage of the 

situation and obtain more money or land to give up the claim for the disputed acre. No 

clear and convincing evidence is present to question the trial court’s assessment of Mr. 

Robbins’s credibility, and this court should consider that assessment when evaluating 

these factors. The lack of specificity in describing the Property and lack of an objection 

to the development of the disputed acre are sufficient to show that an initial agreement 

existed to grant the entire 32.7 acres to Mr. Elliott. 
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The actions following the sale of the Property, including further development of 

the land, Sellers’ failure to address the disputed acre in the divorce, and the effort to 

prevent the land from being quitclaimed, indicate that the parties intended the full 32.7 

acres to be sold as described in the initial agreement. The final agreement as outlined in 

the deed did not transfer the entire Property to Mr. Elliott and is materially different from

the initial agreement. At the time of the sale, the parties appeared to act in good faith 

toward each other and completed the sale with an apparently inadvertent mistake. See 

generally In re Payne, 523 B.R. at 574 (holding that mistakes are not the result of gross 

negligence when “there was no evidence to suggest the errors were anything other than 

inadvertent”); Sikora, 212 S.W.3d at 290. Although the error occurred through the 

understanding of the deed, the failure to find the error does not itself constitute gross 

negligence. Without the presence of gross negligence, the difference between the initial 

agreement and final deed is sufficient to establish a mutual mistake and allow the deed to 

be reformed as ordered by the trial court. Because a mutual mistake exists, this court has 

no need to evaluate Mr. Elliott’s claim of unilateral fraud in the present case.

Sellers argued that Mr. Elliott failed to prove that any mistake in the present case 

was mutual, whether through clear and convincing evidence or otherwise. To prove a 

mutual mistake occurred that allows for reformation, a party must present clear and 

convincing evidence that the mistake occurred. Sikora, 212 S.W.3d at 287. Clear and 

convincing evidence must show that the facts asserted are highly likely to be true and that 

no serious or substantial doubt exists about the validity of the court’s conclusions. Teter 

v. Republic Parking Sys., 181 S.W.3d 330, 341 (Tenn. 2005) (citing Hodges v. S.C. Toof 

& Co., 833 S.W.2d 896, 901 n.3 (Tenn. 1992)). Based on the facts referenced above, the 

trial court did not err in finding clear and convincing evidence of a mutual mistake as 

necessary to alter the deed. By not acknowledging the disputed acre on the Property 

while discussing the sale with Mr. Elliott, Mr. Robbins gave no indication that the 

disputed acre would be held out from the sale. Neither Mr. Robbins nor Ms. Robbins 

claimed the Property when finalizing their divorce or paid taxes on the disputed acre after 

it was sold. The evidence showed that Sellers very likely intended to give the disputed 

acre to Mr. Elliott at the time of the sale. The court’s findings provide no reason to doubt 

whether its conclusions were correct or not. Therefore, the trial court did not err in 

finding clear and convincing evidence of the mutual mistake and allowing the 

reformation to occur.

Alternatively, Sellers challenged the existence of a mutual mistake, arguing that 

the case law relied upon by the trial court only supports reformation when both parties 

acknowledge the mistake. While the parties in Sipes both admitted to mutual mistake, 

this court also described reformation through mutual mistake and fraud as “well settled 

law in this state.” Id., No. W2015-01239-COA-R3-CV, 2017 WL 417222 at *4, (Tenn. 

Ct. App., Jan. 31, 2017) (quoting Bank of Am., Nat’l Ass’n v. Meyer, No. M2014-01123-

COA-R3-CV, 2015 WL 1275394, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App., Mar. 17, 2015)). The law 

described by Sipes and Bank of America cites many of the cases addressed above and
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states that reformation is appropriate when mutual mistake exists and the intent of both 

parties is clear and the same. See Wallace, 2001 WL 394872 at *3; Hunt v. Twisdale, 

2007 WL 2827051, at *8. However, the case law also provides that reformation can 

occur even when one party denies that an agreement existed or that a mistake occurred.

Sikora, 212 S.W.3d at 288. Thus, even though the facts in Sipes differ from the present 

case, the law cited by the court’s opinion does not. The trial court did not err in using the 

case in its reasoning. 

Additionally, Sellers argued that mutual mistake and fraud did not occur because 

Mr. Elliott admitted to not reading the deed before closing the sale of the Property. In 

doing so, Sellers referenced a case recently decided by this court that found no mutual 

mistake when “the signors did not appreciate all the implications of a life estate” inserted 

into a quitclaim deed. Stokely v. Stokely, No. E2017-00433-COA-R3-CV, 2018 WL 

485998 at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App., Jan. 19, 2018). In that case, the appellants sought relief 

after granting a life estate to a relative without fully understanding the effects of the 

grant. Id., 2018 WL 485998 at *2. This court affirmed the ruling of the trial court, which 

held that the deed could not be reformed when the signors were mistaken about the 

implications of creating a life estate. Id., 2018 WL 485998 at *6. In the present case, the 

parties’ signed the agreement with the correct understanding of what it would do, but 

with a mistaken belief of what it would affect. The parties here knew that the deed would 

transfer ownership of the Property, but mistakenly believed that the deed covered 32.7 

acres instead of the 31.7 acres it described. Whether Mr. Elliott read the deed or not, his 

mistake was rooted in his reliance on the land description given to him by Mr. Robbins 

when they first discussed selling the Property. Unlike the facts presented in Stokely, the 

mistake occurred here because of the parties’ understanding of what was part of the 

Property, not what the deed itself would accomplish. Because of this, the mutual mistake 

would still serve as a valid reason to reform the deed, as held by the trial court.

Further, Sellers challenged whether the reformation of the deed is a valid remedy 

for mutual mistake when Mr. Elliott prayed for the trial court to divest Sellers’ interest in 

the disputed acre to him in the original complaint. Sellers argued the trial court 

erroneously applied the remedy when it was not properly pleaded under Rule 8 of the 

Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. See generally Jasper Engine and Transmission 

Exchange v. Mills, 911 S.W.2d 719, 720 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995). In Jasper Engine, a 

petition for a writ of certiorari failed to include sufficient facts to be considered by a 

court, even when “coupled with the conclusory allegation that mutual mistakes have been 

made.” Id. However, a pleading is only required to contain a “short and plain statement 

of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” and a separate “demand for 

judgment for relief the plaintiff seeks.” Tenn. R. Civ. P. 8.01. Further, courts have 

considered reformation to be a valid remedy when judges are seeking to determine the 

ownership of certain real estate. See Kramer v. Coleman, No. 03A01-9601-CH-00033,

1996 WL 283065 at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App., May 30, 1996); see also Continental Land. Co. 

v. Investment Props. Co., No. M1998-00431-COA-R3-CV, 1999 WL 1129025 at *8 
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(Tenn. Ct. App., Dec. 10, 1999). In the present case, Mr. Elliott’s amended complaint 

alleged that mutual mistake occurred based on the facts stated in the original complaint.

Further, Mr. Elliott requested and received approval from the court to alter the complaint 

to include the mutual mistake claim. See Tenn. R. Civ. P. 15.01. While Mr. Elliott 

wanted to establish ownership of the Property through divestment, the court did not err in 

using reformation as the remedy to establish Mr. Elliott’s ownership through mutual 

mistake. Whether as reformation or divestment, the trial court’s order to declare Mr. 

Elliott as the owner of the disputed acre provided sufficient relief as requested in the 

amended complaint. 

Statute of Frauds

Sellers argued that any agreement that would grant Mr. Elliott the disputed acre 

would be invalid through the Statute of Frauds. In Tennessee, an oral contract for the 

sale of land is invalid unless the agreement or promise was later made in writing by the 

parties involved in the sale. Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-2-101(a)(4). The deed that should be 

reformed based on mistake, however, does not disturb the Statute of Frauds. See Lane,

71 S.W.3d at 291; see also First Nat’l Bank v. Ashby, 2 Tenn. App. 666, 669 (Tenn. Ct. 

App. 1925). Parol evidence can be admitted when determining whether a mistake 

occurred in the formation of a contract. Rentenbach Eng’g Co., Constr. Div., 707 S.W.2d 

at 527; see also Textron Fin. Corp. v. Powell, No. M2001-02588-COA-R3-CV, 2002 WL 

31249913 at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App., Oct. 8, 2002) (“When parol evidence is offered not to 

vary or disavow the terms of the contract, but to show an alleged fraud or mistake, this 

Court is hesitant to exclude the evidence.”). In the present case, the presence of a mutual 

mistake would allow the deed to be reformed without invoking the Statute of Frauds. 

Further, the parol evidence would be admitted when evaluating the written deed and the 

potential mistake written in it, not the conversation and oral agreement that Mr. Elliott 

and Mr. Robbins discussed at the Hatfield Lane property. See Rentenbach Eng’g Co., 

Const. Div., 707 S.W.2d at 526-27; City of Lawrenceburg v. Maryland Cas. Co., 64 

S.W.2d 69, 73-74 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1933). The trial court did not err by not imposing the 

Statute of Frauds in the present case.

Pre-trial Motions

Finally, this court must determine whether this trial court was correct in denying 

Mr. Robbins’s two motions before the case was decided on its merits. On their faces, the 

motions separately requested summary judgment and a directed verdict, though the 

directed verdict motion was described as a “motion to dismiss.” An appellate court may 

not revisit a motion for summary judgment when its denial was based on a genuine issue 

of material fact and the case was eventually decided on its merits. Tate v. Monroe Cnty., 

578 S.W.2d 642, 644 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1978). Motions for directed verdicts also face 

limited appellate review after the completion of a trial. Id., see also Mullins v. Precision 

Rubber Prods. Corp., 671 S.W.2d 496, 498 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984). Here, Mr. Elliott 
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sufficiently pleaded allegations of mutual mistake and fraud and presented a sufficient 

issue of material fact that required a trial court to judge the case on its merits. The trial 

court was correct in denying both motions and allowing the case to continue.

V. CONCLUSION

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed, and the case is remanded for further 

proceedings as necessary. Costs of the appeal are taxed to appellants, Mike Robbins and 

Treva Robbins.

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JOHN W. MCCLARTY, JUDGE