F OR P UBLICATION



### UNIT E D ST AT E S CO URT O F APPE AL S FO R T H E NINT H CIRCUIT

G R E G L A N D E R S , individually

and on behalf of others similarly situated,

Plaintiff-Appellant
,

v

. Q U A L I T Y C O M

M U N I C A T I O N S , I

N C .; B R A D Y E. W E L L S ; R O B E R T J

. H U B E R , Defendants-Appellees

. N o. 12-15890

D.C. No. 2:11-cv-01928- J CM-RJ J

OPI NI ON

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Nevada J ames C. Mahan, District J udg e, Presiding

Arg ued and Submitted November 8, 2013—San F rancisco, California

F iled November 12, 2014

B efore: Andrew J . Kleinfeld, J ohnnie B . Rawlinson, and Ronald L ee Gilman * , Circuit J udg es.
Opinion by

J udg e Rawlinson

* T h e H o n o rab le Ro n ald L ee G ilm an , S en i o r Circu it J u d g e f o r th e Un i ted States Co urt o f A p p eals f o r th e Six th Circu it, s itti n g b y d esig n atio n

.L A N D E R S V

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SUMMARY * *

Labor Law

The panel affirmed the dismissal, pursu a nt to Rule 8 o f t h e F ederal Rules of Civil Procedure, of an action und e r t h e F air L abor Standards Act, alleg ing f a ilure to pay minimum wag es and overtime wag es.

The panel h eld that u nder Bell A tlantic Corp. v. Twombly
, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and A s h c roft v. I qbal
, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), it is not e n o u g h f or a complaint under the F L SA merely to alleg e that the employ er failed to pay the employ ee minimum wag es or overtime wag e s. Rather, the alleg ations in the complaint must plausibly s t a t e a claim that the employ e r failed to pay minimum wag e s or o v e r t ime wag es. Ag reeing with the F irst, Second, and Third Circuits, the panel held that detailed factual alleg ations reg arding the number o f overtim e h o urs worked are not required, but conclusory alleg ations that merely recite the statutory la n gu a ge are not adequate. A p laintiff asserting a claim to overtime pay ments must alleg e that she w orked more than f orty hours in a g iven workweek without being

compensated for the hours worked in ex cess of forty

during that week.

The panel h eld that the complaint in this case did not state

a plausible claim because it did not alleg e facts showing that there was a specific week in which the plaintiff w as entitled to but denied minimum wag es or overtime wag es.

** T h is su m m ary co n stitu

t es n o p ar t o f t h e o p in io n o f th e co urt. It h as b eenp rep ared b y

co urt staf

f f o r th e co n v en i en ce o f

th e read er.L A N D E R S V

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COUNSEL

Christian J ames Gabroy
, Gabroy L aw Offices, H en derson, Nevada; L eon Greenberg and Dana Snieg ocki ( argued), L e on Greenberg Professional Corporation, L as Veg as, Nevada, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Malani L

. Kotchka (arg

ued) and Steven C. Anderson, L ionel, Sawy er, & Collins
, L as V eg as, Nevada, for DefendantsAppellees.

OP INION

RAW L I NSON, Circuit J udg e:
Plaintiff-Appellant Greg L anders ( L anders) appeals from

a n order dismissing his complaint ag ainst Defendants

Appellees Quality Communications, I nc. (Quality ), B rady E. W e lls, a nd Robert J

. Huber. L anders’ complaint alleg e d violations of the F air L abor Standards Act (F L SA). S p ecifically
, L anders alleg ed that Quality failed to pa y L anders and other similarly s ituated employ ees minimum wag es a nd overtime w ag es. The distr i c t court dismissed L anders’s complaint pursuant to Rule 8 of the F ederal Rules of Civil Procedure, a

nd L a nders filed a timely appeal. W e ha v e j u risdiction pursuant to 28 U .S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

I. BACK G ROUND

L anders was employ ed by Q uality as a c able services installer. He b roug ht suit, individually and on behalf o f other similarly situated persons, alleg ing that Quality f ailed to payL A N D E R S V

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him, and other si m i l a

r l y situated individuals, minimum wag e s and overtime wag es in violation of the F L SA.

I n the complaint, L anders alleg e d t h at: (1) he was employ e d b y Quality in its c a b l e television, phone, a nd internet service installation business; ( 2) his employ ment was subject to the F L SA’ s m inimum wag e and overtime pay requirements; (3) he w as not paid at the minimum wag e; a nd (4) he w as subjected to a “piecework no overtime” w ag e sy stem, w hereby he worked in ex cess of f orty hours per week without being compensated for his overtime.

I n the alternative, L a n ders a lleg ed that even if he were paid some measure o f overtime, the overtime pay ment was l e s s than that required by the F L SA. A ccording to L an d er s , Quality failed to compensate him f or all of the o vertime hours he worked and/or the overtime rate at w hich he was paid was calculated using an incorrect r ate, resulting in an o vertime p a y m ent that was less than that required by the F L SA. Quality moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rules 8(a)(2) and 12(b)(6) o f the F ederal Rules of Civil Procedure. The d istrict court g ranted the motion, concluding that L anders failed to state a plausible claim fo r u n p aid minimum wag e s and overtime w ag es. The di s t r i ct court determined that the complaint did “not make any factual alleg ations providing an approx imation of the o v e r time hours worked, plaintiff’s hourly wag e, or th e a mount of unpaid overtime wag e s.

. . . ” Given these deficiencies, the district court concluded that the alleg ations asserted in the complaint were “merely consistent” with Quality ’s liability
, b ut fell “ short of the line between possibility

and plausibility

of entitlement to relief,” under Rule 8
, as construed in Bell A tlantic Corp. v. Twombly
, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and A s h c roft v. I qbal
, 556 U.S. 662L A N D E R S V

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(2009). L anders filed a timely appeal c halleng ing the dismissal.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“W e review de novo the district court’s decision to g rant D efendants’ motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)

. . . W e accept as true all well p leaded facts in the compl ai n t a nd construe them in the lig ht most favorable to the nonmoving party .” Zadrozny v. Bank of N.Y

. Mellon
, 720 F

. 3d 1163, 1167 (9 t h Cir. 2013) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

This case presents an issue of first im p r es sion in this circuit. Post- Twombly and Iqbal
, this court has not addressed the deg ree o f specific i t y required to state a claim for failure to pay minimum wag es or overtime wag es under the F L SA.

A. Rule 8 P leading under T wom bly and Iqbal

“ Th e F L SA sets a national minimum wag e [ ]

. . . a n d requires overtime pay of one a nd a half times an employ ee’s hourly wag e for every hou r w o r k e d o ver 40 hours in a week.

. . . ” Probert v. Family Centered Servs. of Alaska, Inc.
, 651 F .3d 1007, 100 9–10 (9th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted); see also 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1) (minimum wag e); 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) (o v e r time). I n determining whether a p laintiff has stated a plausible claim under the F L SA, we look to Rule 8 of the F e deral Rules o f Civil Procedure. See, e.g. , Eclectic P r o p s. E., LLC v. Marcus & Millichap Co.
, 751 F

. 3d 9 9 0
, 995–97 (9th Cir. 2014).L A N D E R S V

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Rule 8(a)(2) of the Fe d e r a l Rules of Civil Procedure requires that each cl ai m i n a pleading be supported b y “a short and plain s t a t ement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . .” F ed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). PreTwombly and Iqbal
, the pleading requirement could b e met b y
a statement merely set t i n g f o rth the elements o f the c laim. See, e.g. , AlliedSignal, Inc. v. City of P hoenix
, 182 F

. 3d 692, 696 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that dismissal under Rule 8 was not warranted even thoug h the plaintiff “failed to plead specific facts in its c omplaint c o n c erning the nature of the City ’ s alleg ed neg lig ence”)

. Ho w ever, that state of affairs chang ed when the S u p r e me Court clarified in Twombly that to satisfy Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint must contain sufficient factual c ontent “to stat e a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.

. . .” 550 U.S. at 570. Under Twombly
, a complaint that offers “labels and conclusions,

. . . a formulaic recitation of the e l e m e nts of a c a use of a c tion[ ,] ” or “naked assertion[s ]” d e void o f “further factual enhancement” will not suffice. Id. at 555, 557.

This requirement of plausibility was reinforced in Iqbal

. See 556 U.S. at 678 ( ex plaining t hat to satisfy Rule 8(a)(2), “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted

as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). A claim for relief is plausible on its face “when the plaintiff pleads f actual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the m i s c o n d u ct alleg e d.

. . . ” Id

. (citation omitted). This standard does not rise to the level of a probability requirement, but it demands “mor e than a sheer possibility that a defendant has a c ted unlawfully

. . . . ” Id

. (citation omitted). I n keeping with Twombly
, the Supreme Court h eld in I

qbal that “[ w] here a complaint pleads facts that

are merely consistent w ith a def e n d ant’s liability
, it stopsL A N D E R S V

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short of the line be t w e e n possibility and p lausibility o f entitlement to relief.” Id. (citation and internal q u o tation marks omitted).

I n evaluating whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief, we r ely on “

judicial ex perience and common sense” to determine whether the f actual alle gations, w hich a re assumed t o be true, “ plausibly g ive rise to an entitlement to relief.” I d. at 679.

B. Application of Twom bly and Iqbal to Claim s Brought Under the F LSA

Pre- Twombly and Iqbal
, a complaint under the F L SA for minimum wag es or overtime wag es merely had to alleg e that the employ er failed to pay the employ ee minimum wag es o r overtime w ag es. Takacs v. A.G. Edwa r ds & Sons, Inc.
, 444 F . Supp. 2d 1100, 1107 (S.D. Cal. 2006) (holding that a complaint citing to the statute was adequate to plead a claim under the FL SA). However, post- Twombly and Iqbal
, we
r e view L a

nders’s c omplaint to determine whether t h e alleg ations plausibly state a claim that Quality failed to pay minimum w ag es and ove rtime wag es, keeping in mind that detailed facts are not required. See Twombly
, 550 U.S. at 555.

The district courts that have considered this question a re split: some district courts, inc l u ding the district court in this
case, have required plaintiff s to approx imate the overtime ho u r s w o rked or the amount of overtime wag es owed,L A N D E R S V

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whereas other courts have forg one such a r equirement. 1 No circuit court h as interpreted Rule 8 a s r equiring F L SA plaintiffs to plead in detail the number of hours worked, their

w a g es, o r the amount o f overtime owed to state a claim f o r unpaid minimum wag es o r o vertime wag es. Althoug h the

c ircuit courts are in harmony on w hat is n ot required by Twombly and Iqbal
, there is no consensus on what facts must be affirmatively pled t o state a viable F L SA claim post- Twombly and Iqbal

.

I n P r u e l l v

. Caritas Christi
, 678 F .3d 10, 13 (1st Cir. 2012), plaintiffs alleg ed that t h ey had “reg ularly worked hours over f

o r t y in a w eek and were not compensated for

suc h t ime

. . . ” The F irst Circuit described this alleg ation a s “one o f those borderline phrases” that, “wh i le not stating ultimate leg al conclusions, are nevertheless so threadbare or speculative that they fail to cro s s the line b etween the conclusory and the factual.” Id. ( citation and internal

1 C o mp a re La g o s v. Mo n ster Pa i n t in g , In c. , No

. 2 :1 1

- CV- 0 0 3 3 1
, 2 0 1 1 W L 6 8 8 7 1 16
, at * 2 (D. Nev

. Dec. 2 9
, 2 0 1 1 ) (rel i e d o n b y th e d istrict

co urt); De S ilva v. No r th S ho re-Lo n g Is. Jewish Hea l th S ys. In c. , 7 70 F. Su p p

. 2 d 4 9 7
, 5 0 9

- 5 1 0 (E.D.N.Y. 2 0 1 1 ); Zh o n g v. Au g u st Au g u st Co rp

. , 4 9 8 F

. Su p p

. 2 d 6 25
, 6 2 8 (S.D.N.Y. 2 0 0 7 ) (req u irin g th e plain tif f to alleg e th e ap p ro x im ate n

u m b er o f h ours w o rk ed an d o v ertim e w ag es to surv iv e
a m o tio n to d i sm iss), with Go o d

ma n v. Po r t Au th

. o

f New Yo rk a n d

New Jersey
, 8 5 0 F. Su

p p

. 2 d 3 6 3
, 3 7 9

– 8 1 (S.D.N.Y. 2 01 2 ); W illia ms v. S

kylin e Au to . In c. , No

. 1 1 Civ

. 4 1 2 3
, 2 0 1 1 WL 5 5 29 82 0
, at * 2 (S.D. N.Y. No v

. 1 4
, 2 0 1 1 ); Allen v. City o

f Ch ica g o , No

. 10 C 3 1 8 3
, 2 0 1 1 W L 9 4 1 3 8 3
, at

* 6 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 1 5
, 2 0 1 1 ); Ca rter v. Ja ckso n -Ma d iso n Cn t y. Ho sp

. Dist.
, No

. 1 :1 0- cv

- 0 1 1 5 5, 2 0 1 1 W L 1 2 56 6 2 5
, at * 4

– 6 (W .D. T en n

. Mar. 3 1
, 2 0 1 1 ); No b le v. Serco

, In c. , No

. 3 :0 8

- 7 6
, 2 0 0 9 W L 1 8 1 1 5 5 0
, at * 2

– 3 (E.D. Ky . J un e 2 5 , 2 0 09 ); an d Mo n ro e v. FTS US A, LLC
, No

. 2 :0 8

- CV0 2 1 0 0
, 2 0 0 8 W L 2 6 9 4 8 9 4
, at * 3 (W .D. T en n

. J u ly 9
, 2 0 0 8 ) (rej ectin g th e arg u m en t th at ap p ro x i m a tio n o f o v ertim e h o urs m u st b e in clu d ed in th e
co m plain t).L A N D E R S V

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quotati o n m a r ks o mitted). T he court observed that this alleg ation w as “little more than a paraphrase of the statute[ ] ” and thus “ too meag er, vag ue, or c o n c l u sory to

. . .” nudg e plaintiffs’ c laim “from the realm of mere conjecture. . . .” to the realm o f plausibility
, as required by Twombly and Iqb a l

. Id. (citation omitted). T h e Fi rst Circuit noted that the amended complaint la cked ex amples of unpaid time, a description of work perform e d d u ring overtime periods, o r estimates of the overtime amounts owed. See id. at 14. The court concluded that the alleg ations were “deficient[
, ] althoug h not by

a larg e marg in.” Id

.

I n a trilog y o f c as es, the Second Circuit also g rappled

w i t h the level of specificity r equired to state a c laim f o r overtim e p a y under the F L SA. The first case in this trilog y is Lundy v

. Catholic Health S y stem of Long Island Inc.
, 711 F .3d 106 (2d Cir. 2013). I n Lundy
, t h e S e c o n d Circuit noted that some courts within that circuit had required that a complaint seeking overtime wag es under the FL S A c ontain “an approx imation of the total u ncompensated hours worked during a g iven workweek in ex cess of 4 0 h o u rs .” Id

. at 114 (citation omitted). I n contrast, c o urts outside the Second Circuit had “ done without an estimate o f overtime, a nd deemed sufficient an alleg ation th a t p l a intiff worked some amount in ex c ess o f 4 0 hours without compensation.” Id

. (citation omitted).

After commenting that the determ i n ation of p lausibility of a claim is “contex t-specific

. . . ” and “requ ires the reviewing c ourt to draw on its judicial e x perience a nd

common sense,” the court concluded that no plausible F L SA claim was pled. I

d

. (citation and footnote reference omitted). Critically
, Plaintiffs h ad failed to a lleg e “a sing le workweekL A N D E R S V

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in which they worked at least 4 0 h o u r s and also worked uncompensated time in ex cess of 40 hours.” Id

.

P l a intiff No. 1 alleg ed a ty pical schedule of three sh i f t s per week that totaled 37.5 hours. On occasion, she w orked an additional shift of 1 2.5 hours or a slig htly long er s hift. Plaintiff’s failure to detail “how o ccasionally” or “how long ” she w orked in ex cess of h er r eg ular shift, or that s h e w a s denied overtime pay in any of those weeks when she worked in ex cess of h e r r e gu lar shift doomed her claim. Id

. at 114–15.

P l a i n tiff No. 2 alleg ed that her “ty pical[ ] ” workweek consisted of “four shifts per week, totaling 30 hours.” Id

. at 115. “[ A ] pprox imately twice a month, she worked f ive to six shifts instead of four shifts, totaling between 37. 5 and 45 hours.” Id

. (citation and internal q uotation marks omitte d ). H o w e v e r, like Plaintiff No. 1, she failed to alleg e denial of overtime p ay in any of the weeks when she worked additional shifts. S ee id

.
Plaintiff No

. 3 (L

undy ) “worked between 22.5 and 30 hours per week[ .] ” Id

. (citation omitted). B ecause his hours worked never ex ceeded forty in any g iven week, h e w a s unable to st at e a valid claim. See id

. B ecause no p laintiff alleg ed b oth a sing le workweek c omposed of at l ea s t forty hours and uncompensated time in e x cess of forty h ours in that

same w orkweek, the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal o f Plaintiffs’ overtime claims. See id

.

I n Nakahata v

. New Y ork-Presbyterian Healthcare System, Inc.
, 723 F .3d 192 (2d Cir. 2013), the Second Circuit

once a g ain resolv e d a c ase involving plaintiffs alleg ing that “they were not paid for overtime hours worked.” 7 23 F

. 3 d atL A N D E R S V

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201. The Second Circuit concluded that Plai n t i f f s’ alleg ations that they “ were n o t compensated for work performed during meal b r e aks, b efore and after shifts, o r during required training s

. . .” failed to state a plausible claim that they were denied o vertime
, because the Plaintiffs failed to alleg e that they “were scheduled to work forty ho u r s in a g iven week.

. . . ” I

d. T h e court ex p lained that Lundy ’s requirement that plaintiffs p lead with specifity a workweek in which t h e y were entitled to but denied o vertime, was desig ned to ensure that plaintiffs provide “ sufficient d e t a il about the leng th and frequency of their unpai d w o r k to support a reasonable inference that they worked more than forty hours in a g iven week.” I d

. The Second Circuit declined to adopt a requirement that Plaintiffs approx ima t e the number of overtime hours worked. See id . n.10.

I n t h e f inal case of the trilog y , Dejesus v. HF Management Services, LLC
, 726 F

. 3 d 85, 89 (2d Cir. 2013), t h e plaintiff avoided the error of h er predecessor plaintiffs. She alleg ed that in “ some o r all weeks she worked more than forty hours a week without being pai d 1.5 times her rate o f compensation.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The Second Circuit nevertheless concluded that the plaintiff failed to state a plausible claim f or relief because she d i d n ot “alleg e overtime without compensation in a given workweek,” as required by Lundy. Id. at 90 ( citation a nd internal quotation marks o m i tted) (emphasis added). The court ex plained that Lundy ’ s r equireme nt that plaintiffs a lleg e with specificity a workweek in which they were entitled to but denied overtime p ay ment, “ was desig ned to r equire plaintiffs to provide some factual contex t that will nudg e their claim from conceivable to plausible.

. . .” Id. (citation a nd internal quotation marks omitted). A l t houg h the Lundy standard d id not require “plaint i f f s to keep careful recordsL A N D E R S V

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and p le a d t h e ir hours with mathematical precision,” the standard c ould not be satisfied b y alleg ations that d o l i ttle

more than parrot the s t a t u t o r y lang uag e of the F L SA. Id

. I nstead, Lundy required plaintiffs to draw on their memory and personal ex perience t o develop factual alleg ations with sufficient specificity that they p l a u sibly sug g est that defendant f

ailed to comply wi t h its statutory o blig ations under the F L SA. See id. Notably
, as in Lundy and Nakahata
, th e S e c ond Circuit a g ain d eclined to require an approx imation of the number of overtime hours worked.

I n an unpublished decision, the El e v e n th Circuit analog iz e d Plaintiff’s alleg atio n s i n an F L SA c ase to the alleg ations of an antitrust violation at issue in Twombly

. See Sec’y of Labor v. Labbe
, 319 F

. Ap p ’ x 761, 763 (11th Cir. 2008) ( per curiam). The Eleventh C i rcuit reasoned that a claim f o r unpaid minimum wag es and/or overtime wag e s under the F L SA was straig h tforward a nd did not involve the

same level of complex ity a s the a ntitrust claim s a t issue in Twombly. Given this dissonance in complex i t y , t h e court reasoned that the quantum and specifi c i t y o f facts necessary to alleg e a plausible F L SA c laim w as much lower than that necessary to alleg e the ant i t ru s t claim at issue in Twombly. See id

. The Eleventh Circuit thus concluded that the Secretary ’ s alleg ations that “L abbe repeatedly violated stated provisions of the F L SA by failing to pay covered employ ees minimum h o urly wag es and to compensate employ ee s w h o worked in ex cess of f

orty hours a week at the a p p r opriate rates[ ]” stated plausible claims for relief. Id.

Most recently , the Third Circuit applied the standards of Twombly and Iqbal to a claim for unpaid overtime wag es in Davis v. Abington Memorial Hospital
, 765 F .3d 2 36 (3d Cir. 2014). I n Davis
, each o f the plaintiffs alleg ed that “he or sheL A N D E R S V

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ty pically worked shifts totaling between thirty -two a nd forty hours per week and further alleg e[ d ] that he or she f requently worked ex tra time.

. . .” Id

. a t 242 (internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiffs contended that “[ b ] ecause they ty pically worked full time, or very close to it and also worked several hours of unpaid work each week,

. . . it is certainly plausible that a t least some of the uncompensated work was performed during weeks when the plaintiffs’ total work time w a s more than forty hours.

. . .” I

d

. ( c itations, alterations, and internal quotation marks omitted). The Third Circuit disag re ed

. Consistent with Lundy
, t he court concluded that the alleg ations were insufficient to state a p lausible claim under the F L SA. Althoug h several of the plaintiffs a l l e g ed that their ty pica l w o r k w eek w as at least forty hours “in addition to ex tra hours frequ e n t ly worked during meal breaks o r
ou t s i de of their scheduled shifts[ ,] ” none of the plaintiffs alleg ed that the ex tra h ours were in f a c t worked during a ty pical f orty

- h our w orkweek. Id

. at 243 (internal q u o t a t ion marks o mitted). Absent that crucial alleg ation, no pl ausible claim for o vertime w ag es was stated. See i d

. T h e Third Circuit ex plained that a plaintiff need not i d e n tify precisely the dates and times she worked o vertime. An alleg ation that

a plain t i f f ty pically worked a forty -hour workweek, a nd worked u ncompensated ex tra hours during a particular forty

hour workweek wou l d s t ate a plausible claim for relief. However, because no such alleg ation w as made by any of the plaintiffs, the Third Circuit affirmed d ismissa l o f the overtime claims. See id

.

W e are persuaded b y the rationale espoused in the F irst, Second and T hird Circuit cases. Althoug h we ag ree w ith the Eleventh Circuit that d etailed factual alleg at i o n s r e g a rding the number of overtime hours worked are not required to state a plausible claim, we do not ag ree that conclusory alleg ationsL A N D E R S V

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that merely r ecit e the statutory lang uag e are adequate. But

see Labbe
, 319 F

. App ’ x a t 7 6 3

. I ndeed, such an approach

runs afoul of the Supr e m e C o urt’s pronouncements in Iqbal that a Plaintiff’s pleading burden cannot be discharg e d b y “[ a] pleading that offers labels a nd conclusions or a formulaic recitation o f the eleme nts of a cause of action

. . .” Iqbal
, 556 U.S. at 678 ( c i t a t ion and internal quotation marks omitted).

W e ag ree w ith our sister circuits that in order to survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff asserting a claim to overtime pay ments must alleg e that she w orked more than forty hours i n a g iven workweek without being c ompensated for the overtime hours worked du r i n g that workweek. S ee Pruell
, 678 F .3d a t 13; see al

so Lundy
, 711 F .3d at 114; Davis
, 765 F .3d at 242–43. W e are mindful of the Supreme Court’s admonition that the pleading of detailed facts is not r equired under Rule 8, and that pleading s are to be ev al u a t ed in the lig ht of judicial ex perience. See Twombly
, 550 U

. S

. a t 555; Iqbal
, 556 U.S. at 6 79. W e a lso ag ree that the plausibility o f

a claim is “contex t-specific.” Lundy
, 7 1 1 F .3d at 114. A plaintiff may establish a plausib le claim by estimating the leng th of her averag e workweek during the applicable period and the averag e rate at which she was paid, t h e a m o unt o f overtime wag es she belie v e s s h e is owed, or any o ther facts that w ill permit the court to f ind plausibility

. See Pruell
, 678 F

. 3d a t 14. Obviously
, with the pleading of more specific facts, the closer the complaint moves toward plausibility

. However, like the other c ircuit c ourts that h a v e ruled before us, we decline to make the approx imation of overtime hours the sine qua non of plausibility for claims broug ht under the F L SA. After all, most (if not a ll) of the detailed information

c o n c e r n i n g a p l a i n t i f

f -employ ee’s compensation and schedule is in the control of the defendants. See Pruell
, 678 F .3d a t 15;L A N D E R S V

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see also 29 U.S.C. § 2 11(c) (F L SA provision requiring employ e rs subject to the F L SA to keep record s co ncerning their employ ees’ work schedules and compensation). 2

W e further agr ee w ith our sister circuits that, at a minimum, a plaintiff asserting a violation of the F L SA overtime provisions must a l l e ge that she worked more than forty hours in a g iven workweek without being compensated for the hours worked in ex c ess of forty during that week. See Pruell
, 678 F. 3 d at 13; see also Lundy
, 711 F .3d at 114; Davis
, 765 F .3d at 242–43. Ap p l y ing that standard to the pleading s in this c ase, L anders failed to state a claim for unpaid minimum wag es and overtime wag es. The complaint did not alleg e facts showing that there was a specific week in which he was entitled to but denied minimum wag es o r overtime wag e s.

I n his complaint, L anders alleg ed the following :

• The compensation sy stem used by the d efendants for the plaintiff

. . . was a d e f a c t o “piecework no overtime” sy stem, m e aning such employ ees were being paid a certain amount for each “ piece” of work they performed pursuant to a s c hedule, the plaintiffs not b eing paid time and one-half their “reg ular hourly rate” for work in ex cess of 40 hours a week . . .

• [ A] lt e r natively
, d efendants u tiliz ed a compensation sy stem that did pay some measure of overtime wag e s upon a d esig nated hourly rate but failed to pay any overtime wag es on the a d d itional and substantial

2 T h is reaso n i n g a p p lies w ith eq u al f o rce to L an d ers’ s m in im

u m w ag e claim s.L A N D E R S V

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portion of the ea rn ing s of the plaintiff and those

s i m ilarly situated that were paid by the defendants solely on a piece rate basis.

• Alternativ ely
, if defendants did not eng a g e in a “piecework no overtime” pay scheme, and paid the p laintiff

. . . a facially p roper overtime wa ge demonstrated on their pay roll records as time a

nd one-half their regular hourly rate including all piecework earning s, the d efendants failed to pay such persons for all overtime hours that they worked . . .

• Defendants, in furtherance of their scheme to deny the plaintiff

. . . p roper overtime pay as req u i red by the F L SA would falsely list certain “overtime hours” a nd “reg u lar hours” a

nd “overtime compensation” on the plaintiff’s

. . . pay stubs, such listing s being inaccurate in terms of hours actually w orked and no t r e f lecting any attempt to p ay time and one-half the e mploy ees’ true “reg ular rate” as required by

the F L SA . . .

• [ T] he named plaintiff

. . . [ w as] entitled to a minimum wag e and an o vertime hourly w a ge o f time and onehalf [ his] regular hourly wag e for all hours worked in

ex c ess of forty hours p er week, the named pl a i n t i f f

. . . worked more than 4 0 hours per week for the defenda n t s , and the defendants willfully failed to make said overtime and/or minimum w ag e pay ments.

Much like the plaintiffs in Lundy
, L and ers presented g enera l i z ed a lleg ations asserting violations of the minimum wag e and overtime p rovisions of the F L SA by the d e fendants. L anders alleg ed that the defendants implemented a “ de facto piecework no o vertime” sy stem and/or failed to pay minimumL A N D E R S V

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wag es and/or overtime wag es for the hours wo r k e d b y L anders. L anders also asserted that the defendants falsified pay roll records to conceal their failure to pay required wag es. Notably a bsent from the alle gations in L anders’s complaint, however, was any d etail reg arding a specific workweek when L an d e r s worked in ex cess of forty hours and was not paid

ove r time f

or that specific workweek and/or was not p aid minimum w ag es. Althoug h plaintiffs in these ty pes of cases cannot be ex pected to alleg e “with mathematical precision,” the amount of overtime compensation owed by the employ er, they should be able to specify at least one workweek in which they worked in ex cess of forty hours and were n ot p aid overtime wag es. Dejesus
, 726 F .3d at 90. L a nders’s alleg ations f

ailed to provide “ sufficient detail about the leng th and frequency of [his] unpaid work to suppo rt a r easonable inference that [ he] worked more than forty hours in a g i v en week.” Nakahata
, 723 F

. 3d at 201. I nstead, as in Nakahata
, L anders “ merely alleg e d that [ he w as] not pai d f or overtime hours w orked.

. . .” Id

. Althoug h these alleg ations “raise the possibility ” of undercompensation in violation of the F L SA,

a possibility is not the same as plausibility

. Id

. L a nders’s comparable alleg ations f

ail to s t a t e a plausible claim under Rule 8. S ee id

.

IV. CONCLUSION

Under t h e p ost- Twombly and Iqbal standard, L anders fa i l ed to state a plausible claim for relief under the F L SA. L anders ex pressly declined to amend h is complaint, electing to stand on his c l aims as alleg ed. Therefore, we d o not remand to the district court for amendment of the complaint. See Alaska v. United States
, 201 F .3d 1154, 1163–64 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[ W ] here a par t y d i d n ot seek leave to amend a pleading in the lower court, w e w o u ld not remand withL A N D E R S V

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instructions to g rant leave to amend. ”) (footnote r e ference omitted). W e decline to impose a r equirement that a p laintiff alleg ing failure t o p ay minimum wag es or overtime wag e s must approx imate the number of h o u r s worked without compensation. However, at a m i nimum the plaintiff must

a l l e ge at least one workweek when he worked in ex cess of forty hours and was not pa i d f o r t h e ex cess hours in that workweek, or was not p aid minimum wag es. L a nders’s

a l leg a tions fell short of this standard, and the d istrict co u r t properly dismissed his complaint for failure to state a plausible claim.

AF F IRMED.