alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Mosazghi SIMON, Petitioner, v. Alberto R. GONZALES, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 04-1655, 04-1784.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted March 18, 2005.

Decided April 7, 2005.

*510David A. Garfield, Law Office of David Garfield, Washington, DC, for Petitioner. Peter D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney General, M. Jocelyn Lopez Wright, Assistant Director, Larry P. Cote, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent.

Before WILKINS, Chief Judge, and LUTTIG and KING, Circuit Judges.

Petitions denied by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).

PER CURIAM.

In these consolidated cases, Mosazghi Simon, a native and citizen of Ethiopia, petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) affirming the immigration judge’s denial of his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture,* and an order denying his motion to reopen the Board’s decision. To obtain reversal of the Board’s determination denying eligibility for asylum relief, an alien “must show that the evidence he presented was so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could fail to find the requisite fear of persecution.” *INS v. Elias-Zacarias,*502 U.S. 478, 483-84, 112 S.Ct. 812, 117 L.Ed.2d 38 (1992). We have reviewed the decision of the Board and the evidence of record and conclude that Simon fails to show the evidence compels a contrary result.

Nor can Simon show he was entitled to withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) (2000). “Because the burden of proof for withholding of removal is higher than for asylum—even though the facts that must be proved are the same—an applicant who is ineligible for asylum is necessarily ineligible for withholding of removal under [8 U.S.C.] § 1231(b)(3).” *Camara v. Ashcroft,*378 F.3d 361, 367 (4th Cir.2004).

Simon also challenges the Board’s denial of his motion to reopen. Our review of the denial of a motion to reopen is extremely deferential, and the decision will not be reversed absent abuse of discretion. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) (2004) (providing grant or denial of motion to reopen is in the discretion of the Board); *Stewart v. INS,*181 F.3d 587, 595 (4th Cir.1999). Such motions are disfavored. *INS v. Doherty,*502 U.S. 314, 323, 112 S.Ct. 719, 116 L.Ed.2d 823 (1992). We have reviewed the administrative record and conclude that the Board did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to reopen.

We deny the petitions for review in these cases. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*PETITIONS DENIED*

*

 Simon raises no claim on appeal regarding the Convention Against Torture. Therefore, he has abandoned this claim. *See United States*v. *Al-Hamdi,*356 F.3d 564, 571 n. 8 (4th Cir.2004); *Edwards v. City of Goldsboro,*178 F.3d 231, 241 n. 6 (4th Cir.1999).
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM JOSTENS,
INC. CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AS OF AND FOR THE THREE MONTH
PERIOD ENDED APRIL 4, 1998, AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO
SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
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<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JAN-02-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-04-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               APR-04-1998
<CASH>                                               0
<SECURITIES>                                     6,884
<RECEIVABLES>                                  137,338
<ALLOWANCES>                                   (7,621)
<INVENTORY>                                    132,563
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               317,566
<PP&E>                                         238,742
<DEPRECIATION>                               (163,232)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 455,788
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          336,716
<BONDS>                                          3,600
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        12,451
<OTHER-SE>                                      88,904
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   455,788
<SALES>                                        168,277
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               168,277
<CGS>                                           68,673
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   68,673
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                80,525
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                   315
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               1,291
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 17,788
<INCOME-TAX>                                     7,292
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             10,496
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
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<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .28
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</TABLE>
IN THE

TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 10-15-00314-CV

IN RE RAMSAY ALLEN RAMSEY

MEMORANDUM OPINION

The petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied, and the motion for emergency 

relief is dismissed as moot.

REX D. DAVIS

Justice

Before Chief Justice Gray,

Justice Davis, and

Justice Scoggins

Petition denied

Opinion delivered and filed September 17, 2015

[OT06]
Exhibit 99.6

 Written Statement of the Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
                   Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350

Solely for the purposes of complying  with 18 U.S.C.  Section  1350, I, the
undersigned Executive Vice President and Chief Financial  Officer of Wisconsin
Power and Light Company (the "Company"),  hereby certify, based on my knowledge,
that the  Quarterly  Report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the quarter ended
March 31, 2003 (the "Report") fully complies with the requirements of Section
13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that information contained in
the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial  condition
and results of operations of the Company.


/s/ Thomas M. Walker
--------------------
Thomas M. Walker
May 15, 2003

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been
provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to
the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
### IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 14

- 30169 Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

- Appellee

v.
STEVEN DEEM , Defendant

- Appellant

Appeal s from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana USDC No. 5:13

- CR

- 149

- 1

Before BENAVIDES, SOUTHWICK, and COSTA, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Steven Deem pleaded guilty, pursuant to a written plea agreement, to one count of distribution of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2). After he stood convicted but before sentencing, Deem, who was represented by the Federal Public De fender , moved pro se to withdraw his guilty plea and to proceed pro se. Following a hearing, the district court denied

* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5 , the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### FILED October 14, 2014

Lyle W. Cayce Clerk Case: 14-30169 Document: 00512802155 Page: 1 Date Filed: 10/14/2014No. 14

- 30169
Deem’s motions and sentenced him above the advisory guidelines sentencing range to 240 months of imprisonment and a lifetime term of sup ervised release. Now, Deem a ppeals, arguing that the district court erred in denying his motion to proceed pro se, an error conceded by the Government. We review claims concerning the right of self

- representation de novo. United States v

. Jones , 421 F.3 d 359, 363 (5th Cir. 2005). The record reflects that the district court denied Deem’s motion because it found that he lacked the skill and knowledge to represent himself competently. T hat a defendant’s decision to represent himself may work to his detrim ent because he lacks the knowledge or skills to represent himself competently is irrelevant “to the determination whether he is competent to waive his right to counsel.” Godinez v. Moran , 509 U.S. 389, 400 (1993). The record reflects that Deem knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel, and he thus should have been allowed to exercise his constitutional right of self

- representation. See Faretta v. California , 422 U.S. 806, 815

- 21 (1975); United States v. Cano , 519 F.3d 512,
515

- 16 (5th Cir. 2008 ). Because this error requires reversal, see United States v. Majors , 328 F.3d 791, 794 (5th Cir. 2003) , we do not reach Deem’s challenge to the reasonableness of his sentence, see United States v. Akpan , 407 F.3d 360, 377 n.62 (5th Cir. 2005). The d istrict court’s denial of Deem’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea has not been challenged by Deem on appeal

. That issue has thus been waived, see U nited States v. Banks , 624 F.3d 261, 264 (5th Cir. 2010) , and Deem’s conviction is AFFIRMED

. However, the right to self

- representation does extend to sentencing proceedings

. See Cano , 519 F.3d at 515 . Accordingly, Deem’s sentence is VACATED, and the case is REMANDED to allow Deem a chance to represent himself on resentencing.

2 Case: 14-30169 Document: 00512802155 Page: 2 Date Filed: 10/14/2014
1 5 1 7 WE S T F R O N T S T R E E T S U I T E 3 5 4 TYL E R , TX 7 5 7 0 2 T E L : 9 0 3 - 5 9 3 - 8 4 7 1 FA X : 9 0 3 - 5 9 3 - 2 1 9 3 Serving Anderson, Angelina, Cherokee, Gregg, Henderson, Houston, Nacogdoches, Rains, Rusk, Sabine, San Augustine, Shelby, Smith , Trinity, Upshur, Van Zandt and Wood Counties www.12thcoa.courts.state.tx.us C HIEF J USTICE J AMES T. W ORTHEN J USTICES B RIAN H OYLE G REG N EELEY 

# T W E L F T H 

# C O U R T O F 

# A P P EA L S C LERK C ATHY S. L USK C HIEF S TAFF A TTORNEY M ARGARET H USSEY 

## March 16, 2015 Ms. Lois Rogers District Clerk, Smith County Courthouse, Suite 204 100 North Broadway Avenue Tyler, TX 75702-7201 * DELIVERED VIA E-MAIL * RE: Case Number: 12-13-00387-CR Trial Court Case Number: 241-1175-13 Style: Wilber Medina v. The State of Texas Pursuant to Rule 18.1 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, enclosed herewith is the Mandate issued in the above cause. When the District or County Clerk has executed the Mandate in accordance with the opinion of this Court, the Clerk is requested to fill in the information below and to return the attached copy to this office. Very truly yours, CATHY S. LUSK, CLERK By:_____________________________ Katrina McClenny, Chief Deputy Clerk C C : Mr. Austin R. Jackson (DELIVERED VIA E-MAIL) Mr. Michael J. West (DELIVERED VIA E-MAIL) Wilber Medina Mandate executed on __ 17th_ day of ___ <MARCH____________, 2015. Brief explanation of action taken: __________ SCANNED ________________________________ LINDA RHYMES erk FILE COPY
# C_2007236EN.01000101.xml

| 9.10.2007 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 236/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

9.10.2007

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 236/1

---

Non-opposition to a notified concentration

(Case COMP/M.4857 — 3i/Accord)

(Text with EEA relevance)

(2007/C 236/01)

On 13 September 2007, the Commission decided not to oppose the above notified concentration and to declare it compatible with the common market. This decision is based on Article 6(1)(b) of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004. The full text of the decision is available only in English and will be made public after it is cleared of any business secrets it may contain. It will be available:

| — | from the Europa competition website (http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes, |
| --- | --- |

—

from the Europa competition website (http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes,

| — | in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website under document number 32007M4857. EUR-Lex is the on-line access to European law (http://eur-lex.europa.eu). |
| --- | --- |

—

in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website under document number 32007M4857. EUR-Lex is the on-line access to European law (http://eur-lex.europa.eu).

---
I 

111TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 5386 

To ban the sale, manufacture, distribution, and use in public facilities of 

drop-side cribs in the United States, and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MAY 25, 2010 

Mr. CROWLEY introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on Energy and Commerce 

A BILL 

To ban the sale, manufacture, distribution, and use in public 

facilities of drop-side cribs in the United States, and 

for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. BAN ON DROP-SIDE CRIBS. 

4 (a) DROP-SIDE CRIB DEFINED.—In this section, the 

5 term ‘‘drop-side crib’’ means any infant crib that has at 

6 least 1 side that moves up and down. Such term does not 

7 include a drop-gate crib or any other crib that has immov8 able sides with a portion of 1 side capable of being folded 

9 down. 


jbell on DSKDVH8Z91PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 5386 IH

1 (b) BAN.—Beginning on the date of the enactment 

2 of this Act, every covered product shall be treated as a 

3 banned hazardous product pursuant to a rule promulgated 

4 under section 8 of the Consumer Product Safety Act (15 

5 U.S.C. 2057). 

6 (c) COVERED PRODUCT.—For purposes of this sec7 tion, a covered product is any drop-side crib that is sold, 

8 offered for sale, manufactured for sale, distributed in com9 merce, used in public facilities such as hotels or day care 

10 centers, or imported into the United States on or after 

11 the date of the enactment of this Act. 

Æ 


jbell on DSKDVH8Z91PROD with BILLS
#### Marshall O. POTTER, Jr., Claimant-Appellant, v. R. James NICHOLSON, Secretary of Veterans Affairs, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 04-7023.

United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.

March 15, 2005.

*ORDER*

MAYER, Circuit Judge.

Marshall 0. Potter, Jr. moves to vacate the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims’ decision in *Potter v. Principi,*00-128(E) (Vet.App. Sep. 2, 2003), and to remand for further proceedings consistent with this court’s decision in *Halpern v. Principi,*384 F.3d 1297 (Fed.Cir.2004). In the alternative, Potter moves to lift the stay and set a briefing schedule in this appeal. The Secretary of Veterans Affairs has not responded.

Upon consideration thereof,

IT IS ORDERED THAT:

(1) The motion to vacate and remand is granted.

(2) The alternative motion to lift the stay is moot.

(3) Each side shall bear its own costs.
#### Sarbjit Singh MEHROK, Petitioner, v. *164Alberto GONZALES,* Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 04-70809.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted March 23, 2005.**

Decided April 4, 2005.

Pardeep Singh Grewal, Oakland, CA, for Petitioner.

Regional Counsel, Western Region Immigration *&*Naturalization Service, Laguna Niguel, CA, Emily A. Radford, Esq., Ari Nazarov, Esq., DOJ-U.S. Department of Justice Civil Div./Offiee of Immigration Lit., Washington, DC, for Respondent.

Before: B. FLETCHER, TROTT, and PAEZ, Circuit Judges.

*

 Alberto Gonzales is substituted for his predecessor, John Ashcroft, as Attorney General of the United States, pursuant to Fed. R.App. P. 43(c)(2).

**

 This panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM ***

Sarbjit Singh Mehrok, a native and citizen of India, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) decision affirming the immigration judge’s (“IJ”) denial of his application for asylum, withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We dismiss in part and grant in part.

Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(3), we dismiss Mehrok’s asylum claim as unreviewable because the IJ determined that the application was untimely. *See Hakeem v. INS,*273 F.3d 812, 815 (9th Cir. 2001).

We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 and review for substantial evidence adverse credibility determinations. *See Bandari v. INS,*227 F.3d 1160, 1165 (9th Cir.2000). Here, the adverse credibility determination is not supported by substantial evidence. *See id.*at 1166.

Accordingly, we remand to the BIA for further proceedings to determine the merits of Mehrok’s withholding of removal and CAT claims. *See INS v. Ventura,*537 U.S. 12, 16-18, 123 S.Ct. 353, 154 L.Ed.2d 272 (2002) (per curiam).

DISMISSED in part; GRANTED in part; REMANDED.

***

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### Gregory A. ROBERTSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent.

No. WD 61644.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District.

July 29, 2003.

Vanessa Caleb, Assistant Appellate Defender, Kansas City, MO, for appellant.

Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Attorney General, Linda Lemke, Assistant Attorney General, Jefferson City, MO, for respondent.

Before: ULRICH, P.J., and HOWARD and NEWTON, JJ.

ORDER

PER CURIAM.

Gregory Robertson (Movant) appeals from the judgment denying his Rule 29.15 motion for post-conviction relief after an evidentiary hearing. In his motion, Mov-ant alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective for accepting his case on the eve of trial and incorrectly advising him that the trial court would grant a continuance to allow counsel time to prepare Movant’s case. After an evidentiary hearing, the motion court found that the inability of counsel to be fully prepared for Movant’s case was not due to ineffective conduct by counsel, but due to the lack of cooperation and the conduct of Movant himself. Thus, Movant, by his conduct, waived the right to claim that his lawyer was unprepared and thus rendered ineffective assistance of counsel.

Affirmed. Rule 84.16(b).
United States Department of Labor

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

__________________________________________

I.B., Appellant

and

DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, 

ORLANDO VA HEALTHCARE SYSTEM, 

Orlando, FL, Employer 

_________________________________________

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Docket No. 21-0705

Issued: October 26, 2021

Appearances: Case Submitted on the Record

Alan J. Shapiro, Esq., for the appellant1

Office of Solicitor, for the Director

ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL

Before:

ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Chief Judge

JANICE B. ASKIN, Judge

VALERIE D. EVANS-HARRELL, Alternate Judge

On April 7, 2021 appellant through counsel, filed a timely appeal from a March 9, 2021

merit decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). The Clerk of the 

Appellate Boards assigned Docket No. 21-0705.

In a letter dated and received August 4, 2021, counsel requested that the appeal be 

dismissed.

The Board has duly considered the matter and concludes that counsel’s request for the 

dismissal of the appeal should be granted. Accordingly, 

1

In all cases in which a representative has been authorized in a matter before the Board, no claim for a fee for legal 

or other service performed on appeal before the Board is valid unless approved by the Board. 20 C.F.R. § 501.9(e). 

No contract for a stipulated fee or on a contingent fee basis will be approved by the Board. Id. An attorney or 

representative’s collection of a fee without the Board’s approval may constitute a misdemeanor, subject to fine or 

imprisonment for up to one year or both. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 292. Demands for payment of fees to a 

representative, prior to approval by the Board, may be reported to a ppropriate authorities for investigation.
2

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT appellant’s request for the dismissal of the appeal is 

granted. The appeal docketed as No. 21-0705 is dismissed.

Issued: October 26, 2021

Washington, DC

Alec J. Koromilas, Chief Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Janice B. Askin, Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Valerie D. Evans-Harrell, Alternate Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
# L_2007090EN.01004701.xml

| 30.3.2007 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 90/47 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.3.2007

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 90/47

---

COMMISSION REGULATION (EC) No 354/2007

of 29 March 2007

amending Regulation (EC) No 195/2007 opening the buying-in of butter in certain Member States for the period 1 March to 31 August 2007

THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community,

Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 1255/1999 of 17 May 1999 on the common organisation of the market in milk and milk products (1),

Having regard to Commission Regulation (EC) No 2771/1999 of 16 December 1999 laying down detailed rules for the application of Council Regulation (EC) No 1255/1999 as regards intervention on the market in butter and cream (2), and in particular Article 2 thereof,

Whereas:

| (1) | Commission Regulation (EC) No 195/2007 (3) establishes the list of Member States in which buying-in for butter is open, as provided for in Article 6(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1255/1999. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

Commission Regulation (EC) No 195/2007 (3) establishes the list of Member States in which buying-in for butter is open, as provided for in Article 6(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1255/1999.

| (2) | On the basis of most recent communications by Spain, the Commission has observed that butter market prices have been equal or superior to 92 % of the intervention price for two consecutive weeks. Intervention buying-in should therefore be suspended in that Member State. Spain should therefore be withdrawn from the list established in Regulation (EC) No 195/2007. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

On the basis of most recent communications by Spain, the Commission has observed that butter market prices have been equal or superior to 92 % of the intervention price for two consecutive weeks. Intervention buying-in should therefore be suspended in that Member State. Spain should therefore be withdrawn from the list established in Regulation (EC) No 195/2007.

| (3) | Regulation (EC) No 195/2007 should therefore be amended accordingly, |
| --- | --- |

(3)

Regulation (EC) No 195/2007 should therefore be amended accordingly,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

Article 1 of Regulation (EC) No 195/2007 is replaced by the following text:

‘Article 1

Buying-in of butter as provided for in Article 6(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1255/1999 is hereby open in the following Member States:

| — | Portugal.’ |
| --- | --- |

—

Portugal.’

Article 2

This Regulation shall enter into force on 30 March 2007.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 29 March 2007.

For the Commission

Jean-Luc DEMARTY

Director-General for Agriculture and Rural Development

---

(1)  
  OJ L 160, 26.6.1999, p. 48. Regulation as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 1913/2005 (OJ L 307, 25.11.2005, p. 2).

1

(2)  
  OJ L 333, 24.12.1999, p. 11. Regulation as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 2107/2005 (OJ L 337, 22.12.2005, p. 20).

2

(3)  
  OJ L 59, 27.2.2007, p. 62.

3

---