[Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Wallace, 138 Ohio St.3d 350, 2014-Ohio-1128.] 

DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. WALLACE. 

[Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Wallace, 138 Ohio St.3d 350, 

2014-Ohio-1128.] 

Attorneys—Misconduct—Client trust account improprieties—Engaging in 

conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation—Twoyear suspension, 12 months stayed on conditions.

(No. 2013-0573—Submitted September 10, 2013—Decided March 26, 2014.) 

ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 

Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 12-062. 

____________________ 

Per Curiam. 

{¶ 1} Respondent, Paul Lawrence Wallace of Columbus, Ohio, Attorney 

Registration No. 0010369, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1980. 

We suspended him from the practice of law for six months in May 2000, based on 

his deliberate attempts to mislead his client into believing that the client’s civil 

case was pending for more than a year after the United States District Court for 

the Northern District of Ohio had dismissed it. Disciplinary Counsel v. Wallace, 

89 Ohio St.3d 113, 729 N.E.2d 343 (2000) (“Wallace I”). We denied his 

application for reinstatement in February 2001 because there were additional 

disciplinary proceedings pending against him and because it appeared that he had 

failed to comply with the requirements of Gov.Bar R. X(3)(G) (requiring a 

suspended attorney to complete one credit hour of continuing legal education for 

each month of the attorney’s suspension and one hour of instruction related to 

professional conduct for each six months of the suspension). Disciplinary 

Counsel v. Wallace, 91 Ohio St.3d 1434, 741 N.E.2d 896 (2001). 
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{¶ 2} We dismissed the second disciplinary action against Wallace in 

March 2002, finding that his resubmission of a former client’s backgroundinvestigation documents to the Ohio Attorney General’s Office during his 

suspension was a ministerial act that did not constitute the practice of law. 

Disciplinary Counsel v. Wallace, 94 Ohio St.3d 414, 763 N.E.2d 1154 (2002) 

(“Wallace II”). We reinstated his license to practice law on March 6, 2002. 

Disciplinary Counsel v. Wallace, 94 Ohio St.3d 1249, 764 N.E.2d 438 (2002). 

{¶ 3} On August 16, 2012, a probable-cause panel of the Board of 

Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline certified a two-count complaint 

filed by relator, disciplinary counsel, to the board. Having considered the parties’ 

stipulated facts, evidence, and misconduct, Wallace’s hearing testimony, and 

three letters from character witnesses, a panel of the board found that Wallace had 

engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation that 

adversely reflected on his fitness to practice law by (1) failing to hold a client’s 

insurance settlement and a separate cash payment in a separate client trust 

account, (2) failing to maintain a record of the funds he held on behalf of the 

affected client, and (3) misappropriating the client’s funds. The panel 

recommended that Wallace be suspended from the practice of law for two years, 

with six months stayed on conditions, and that he be required to serve one year of 

monitored probation. 

{¶ 4} The board adopted the panel’s findings of fact and misconduct and 

agreed with the panel’s recommendation that Wallace be suspended for two years 

and serve one year of monitored probation on reinstatement, but it recommended 

that the stayed portion of that suspension be increased to one year. Wallace 

objects to the board’s recommendation that he serve an actual suspension from the 

practice of law, arguing that a fully stayed suspension with monitored probation 

will adequately protect the public from future harm. We overrule his objection 
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and adopt the board’s findings of fact and misconduct and its recommended 

sanction. 

Misconduct 

Count One 

{¶ 5} In December 2008, Wallace represented Nigel Jackson in multiple 

legal and business matters, including (1) an insurance claim for the theft of 

Jackson’s BMW, (2) the incorporation of his business, Who Done It Productions, 

L.L.C., (3) his efforts to publish a book he authored, (4) some real-estate matters 

involving Jackson and his cousin, (5) an unsuccessful claim for reimbursement of 

funeral expenses incurred by Jackson on behalf of Glen Jones, (6) a civil 

judgment against Jackson and his girlfriend, Aisha Towles, and (7) an insurance 

claim for the theft of property from Towles’s vehicle. 

{¶ 6} Jackson paid Wallace a $300 retainer, but it is not clear whether they 

reached an agreement regarding the fee for his services. Wallace claims that he 

agreed to handle the insurance claim for the stolen BMW for $200 per hour, but 

Jackson maintained that they never reached an agreement, and Wallace never 

submitted an invoice for his time. 

{¶ 7} Jackson was arrested and charged with drug trafficking in March 

2009. Although Wallace did not represent him in his criminal case, he visited 

Jackson in the Delaware County Jail on at least two occasions to discuss his other 

legal matters. During one of those visits, Jackson executed a limited power of 

attorney to permit Wallace to transfer the title for his BMW to his insurer, Liberty 

Mutual. The power of attorney erroneously appointed Jackson as his own 

attorney-in-fact, but Wallace testified that he successfully transferred the BMW 

title to the insurer. 

{¶ 8} In late July 2009, Liberty Mutual issued a $32,132.80 check to 

Jackson and Towles and, pursuant to Jackson’s instructions, mailed it to 

Wallace’s office. Wallace informed Jackson that he would deposit the check into 
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his client trust account. Before depositing the check, he endorsed Jackson’s and 

Towles’s names without obtaining their express permission to do so. 

{¶ 9} From August through October 2009, Wallace misappropriated 

Jackson’s entire $32,132.80 insurance settlement, paying $21,000 to himself and 

using the remainder for other client obligations. In September 2009, Wallace 

spoke with Jackson and informed him that he would “net $24,000.” Believing 

that the check was for $24,000, Jackson authorized Wallace to disburse that 

amount to others on his behalf, but Wallace did not have sufficient funds in his 

client trust account to do so. He deposited $2,500 that he had received from 

Towles into his client trust account and made a $1,000 distribution authorized by 

Jackson. Although Wallace did not maintain any records to substantiate the 

distributions he made on Jackson’s behalf or his fee, his bank records show that 

he distributed $20,995 from his operating account to third parties on Jackson’s 

behalf and retained $8,637.80 as his fee. 

{¶ 10} In November 2009, Towles called Liberty Mutual and learned that 

the check for the stolen BMW was $32,132.80 rather than the $24,000 that 

Wallace had divulged to Jackson. When she confronted Wallace several days 

later, he told her that the difference between the two amounts represented his legal 

fees. 

{¶ 11} On these facts, and in accordance with the parties’ stipulations, the 

board found that Wallace violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.15(a) (requiring a lawyer to 

hold the property of clients in an interest-bearing client trust account, separate 

from the lawyer’s own property), 1.15(a)(2) (requiring a lawyer to maintain a 

record for each client on whose behalf funds are held), 8.4(c) (prohibiting a 

lawyer from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 

misrepresentation), and 8.4(h) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct 

that adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice law). The board also 
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found that there was insufficient evidence to establish an alleged violation of 

Prof.Cond.R. 1.15(d) and therefore dismissed it. 

Count Two 

{¶ 12} During Jackson’s incarceration, he instructed Towles to deliver a 

bag containing an undisclosed amount of cash to Wallace to be held for future 

expenses associated with the publication of Jackson’s book. Towles delivered the 

bag to Wallace at his office. Wallace did not retain any records to document the 

receipt of this cash, but he maintains that the bag contained $7,500. He deposited 

$2,500 of those funds into his client trust account on October 14, 2009, distributed 

$1,000 from the account to Jackson’s company, and misappropriated the 

remaining $1,500 of that deposit by issuing a check for $500 to Owen Loan 

Servicing, L.L.C., and a check for $1,000 to himself. On November 24, 2009, he 

deposited the remaining $5,000 into his operating account, which also contained 

funds belonging to him, and issued a $10,000 check to Jackson’s company from 

the account, representing the remainder of the $7,500 cash payment he had 

received from Towles and a final disbursement of the Liberty Mutual settlement 

proceeds. 

{¶ 13} The parties stipulated and the board found that this conduct 

resulted in additional violations of Prof.Cond.R. 1.15(a), 1.15(a)(2), 8.4(c), and 

8.4(h). 

Sanction 

{¶ 14} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider 

relevant factors, including the ethical duties that the lawyer violated and the 

sanctions imposed in similar cases. Stark Cty. Bar Assn. v. Buttacavoli, 96 Ohio 

St.3d 424, 2002-Ohio-4743, 775 N.E.2d 818, ¶ 16. In making a final 

determination, we also weigh evidence of the aggravating and mitigating factors 

listed in BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B). 
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{¶ 15} The panel and board adopted the parties’ stipulated aggravating 

factors, agreeing that Wallace has a prior disciplinary record, acted with a selfish 

motive, and engaged in multiple offenses. See BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(a), (b), 

and (d). With regard to mitigation, they adopted the parties’ stipulation that 

Wallace made a full and free disclosure during the disciplinary process, that he 

has a positive reputation in the legal community, and that the client was paid in 

full and suffered no financial harm as a result of Wallace’s misconduct. See

BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(d) and (e). They also accorded some mitigating effect 

to the fact that the six-month suspension we imposed in Wallace I resulted in an 

actual suspension of over 20 months because we had denied his application for 

reinstatement during the pendency of Wallace II, which was ultimately dismissed. 

{¶ 16} Relator argued that the appropriate sanction for Wallace’s 

misconduct is a two-year suspension with one year of monitored probation on his 

reinstatement to the practice of law. Wallace argued that a fully stayed 

suspension with monitored probation would adequately protect the public from 

future harm. 

{¶ 17} The panel acknowledged our precedent, which identifies 

disbarment as the presumptive sanction for misappropriation of client funds but 

permits the imposition of lesser sanctions in the presence of significant mitigating 

factors. See, e.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. Burchinal, 133 Ohio St.3d 38, 2012-

Ohio-3882, 975 N.E.2d 960, ¶ 17 (stating that the presumptive sanction for 

misappropriation of client funds is disbarment, but imposing a two-year 

suspension with 18 months stayed, in recognition of significant mitigating factors, 

including the absence of a disciplinary record, full cooperation with the 

disciplinary process, letters attesting to the attorney’s diligence and good 

character, and a documented mental impairment that was being treated with good 

prognosis). 
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{¶ 18} But in recommending that we suspend Wallace for two years with 

six months stayed and require him to serve one year of monitored probation upon 

reinstatement, the panel considered five cases cited by relator in which we 

imposed sanctions ranging from an indefinite suspension to a six-month 

suspension. 

{¶ 19} In Columbus Bar Assn. v. Peden, 134 Ohio St.3d 579, 2012-Ohio5766, 984 N.E.2d 1, we indefinitely suspended an attorney, who had a prior 

disciplinary record, because he had neglected several client matters, commingled 

personal and client funds, failed to maintain adequate records of the client funds 

in his possession, failed to return unearned funds, and failed to cooperate in the 

disciplinary investigation. Id. at ¶ 16, 22, 27, 33, 38, 43, 54. 

{¶ 20} We imposed a two-year suspension, followed by one year of 

monitored probation, and continuing-legal-education requirements on an attorney 

who had misappropriated client funds to pay personal and business expenses, 

failed to promptly deliver funds that clients were entitled to receive, and 

fabricated a fee dispute in an effort to defend his actions. Columbus Bar Assn v. 

King, 132 Ohio St.3d 501, 2012-Ohio-873, 974 N.E.2d 1180, ¶ 6, 16. Unlike 

Wallace, King did not have a prior disciplinary record in his more than 30 years 

of practice. Id. at ¶ 13. 

{¶ 21} In Disciplinary Counsel v. Simon-Seymour, 131 Ohio St.3d 161, 

2012-Ohio-114, 962 N.E.2d 309, ¶ 3-6, 12, we suspended an attorney for two 

years with six months stayed on conditions after she had misappropriated money 

from a decedent’s estate, overdrew her client trust account, falsely represented to 

the probate court that she had satisfied certain estate obligations that she had not 

paid, and failed to reasonably communicate with her clients. Mitigating factors 

included that Simon-Seymour had no prior discipline, made complete restitution 

to the affected client, and cooperated in the disciplinary process, while the only 
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aggravating factor was that she had engaged in a pattern of misconduct by 

mishandling client funds over a period of several years. Id. at ¶ 9. 

{¶ 22} Likewise, in Disciplinary Counsel v. Gildee, 134 Ohio St.3d 374, 

2012-Ohio-5641, 982 N.E.2d 704, ¶ 5-14, 18, we suspended an attorney for two 

years, with the second year stayed on the conditions that she commit no further 

misconduct and make full restitution to the affected client after she had 

misappropriated more than $8,000 in client funds and made false statements to the 

relator during the course of the disciplinary investigation. Mitigating factors in 

that case, including the absence of a prior disciplinary record, full and free 

disclosure to the board during the disciplinary process, positive character 

evidence, and Gildee’s genuine expression of remorse at the disciplinary hearing, 

were balanced against aggravating factors, including a dishonest and selfish 

motive, multiple offenses, resulting harm to the victim, and Gildee’s failure to 

make restitution. Id. at ¶ 16-17. 

{¶ 23} At the opposite end of the spectrum, we imposed a six-month 

suspension to be served consecutively to an attorney’s ongoing suspension for 

previous misconduct, after finding that he engaged in fraud and dishonesty, failed 

to deposit and maintain client funds in a separate client trust account, failed to 

maintain complete records of client funds in his possession, and used funds 

belonging to a client to pay personal and business expenses. Disciplinary 

Counsel v. Manning, 119 Ohio St.3d 52, 2008-Ohio-3319, 891 N.E.2d 743. 

{¶ 24} Based on these cases, the panel’s recommended sanction of a twoyear suspension with six months stayed, plus one year of monitored probation, 

falls within the range of sanctions we have imposed for comparable misconduct. 

The board, however, modified the panel’s recommendation to stay the entire 

second year of the suspension. 

{¶ 25} Wallace objects to the board’s recommendation and argues that any 

suspension we impose should be stayed in its entirety because he has put systems 
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in place to prevent future misconduct and he has already served an additional 14 

months of actual suspension beyond the six-month suspension imposed in 

Wallace I, despite our dismissal of the alleged misconduct in Wallace II. But the 

only case that Wallace cites in which we imposed a fully stayed suspension for 

comparable conduct is Disciplinary Counsel v. Edwards, 134 Ohio St.3d 271, 

2012-Ohio-5643, 981 N.E.2d 857. And Edwards involved significant mitigating 

factors that are not present in this case—the attorney had practiced more than 30 

years with no prior discipline and his diagnosed mental disability was found to 

have contributed to the charged misconduct. Id. at ¶ 10, 15. 

{¶ 26} Although the misconduct, aggravating factors, and mitigating 

factors in the cases cited by the panel and board are not identical to the 

circumstances presented here, they are more analogous to the present case than 

are the factors in Edwards. We universally impose a period of actual suspension 

for attorney misconduct involving dishonesty and the misappropriation of client 

funds. See Disciplinary Counsel v. Fowerbaugh, 74 Ohio St.3d 187, 190, 658 

N.E.2d 237 (1995) (holding that misconduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, 

or misrepresentation warrants an actual suspension from the practice of law). 

{¶ 27} Despite Wallace’s protests to the contrary, the recommended 

sanction already takes into account the mitigating factors that he urges us to 

consider. Indeed, in its report, the panel stated that its recommendation that the 

final six months of the suspension be stayed is based solely on the fact that he had 

served an additional 14 months in excess of the six-month suspension we imposed 

in Wallace I. The board recommended extending the stay to the entire second 

year of the two-year suspension. Based on the foregoing, we overrule Wallace’s 

objections, adopt the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the board, and find 

that a two-year suspension, with the second year stayed, plus a one-year period of 

monitored probation upon Wallace’s reinstatement to the practice of law is the 

appropriate sanction in this case. 
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{¶ 28} Accordingly, Paul Lawrence Wallace is suspended from the 

practice of law in Ohio for two years, with the second year stayed on the 

condition that he commit no further misconduct. On reinstatement to the practice 

of law, he will serve a one-year period of monitored probation in accordance with 

Gov.Bar R. V(9). Costs are taxed to Wallace. 

Judgment accordingly. 

PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, KENNEDY, and FRENCH, JJ., concur. 

O’CONNOR, C.J., and LANZINGER and O’NEILL, JJ., dissent and would 

decline to stay any portion of the two-year suspension. 

____________________ 

Scott Drexel, Disciplinary Counsel, and Joseph M. Caligiuri, Senior 

Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, for relator. 

Paul Lawrence Wallace, pro se. 

_________________________