United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit 

Chicago, Illinois 60604 

Submitted August 29, 2019*

Decided September 4, 2019 

Before 

DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge 

MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge 

AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge

No. 18-2349 

ANGELA E. BROOKS-NGWENYA, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 

v. 

INDIANAPOLIS PUBLIC SCHOOLS, 

et al., 

 Defendants-Appellees.

 Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Southern District of 

Indiana, Indianapolis Division. 

No. 1:18-cv-00907-WTL-MPB 

William T. Lawrence, 

Judge. 

O R D E R 

This is one of many cases that Angela Brooks-Ngwenya has brought against her 

former employer, Indianapolis Public Schools (“the Schools”). In her prior cases, she 

alleged that the Schools wrongfully fired her and infringed on her copyright of a 

 

*

 We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and 

record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not 

significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C). 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION 

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 
No. 18-2349 Page 2 

curriculum that she developed. In this suit, she raises similar allegations and has added 

two new defendants and state-law claims. The district court dismissed the case at 

screening, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), after offering her both a chance to amend her 

complaint and an opportunity to explain why it should not dismiss for failure to state a 

claim. We affirm the dismissal because earlier judgments preclude Brooks-Ngwenya’s 

federal claims, and her state-law claims rest on factually devoid legal conclusions. 

We take the well-pleaded allegations as true. See Luevano v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 

722 F.3d 1014, 1027 (7th Cir. 2013). While employed as a classroom assistant between 

2001 and 2003, Brooks-Ngwenya piloted a program for students with behavioral issues. 

The program was successful, and the Schools proposed buying it from her and hiring 

her as the program coordinator. The Schools never finalized the agreement, but instead, 

fired Brooks-Ngwenya and implemented a similar program without paying her. The 

two new defendants (the Indianapolis Public Schools Education Foundation and 

Indiana University–Purdue University Indianapolis) promoted that implementation. 

Brooks-Ngwenya has never won any suit against the Schools. Her first suit 

against the Schools and its employees resulted in a settlement agreement in 2005 in 

which she “relinquished all claims of employment discrimination arising under federal 

law in connection with her tenure.” Brooks-Ngwenya v. Indianapolis Pub. Sch., 564 F.3d 

804, 806 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing Brooks-Ngwenya v. Indianapolis Pub. Sch., No. 04-cv-198 

(S.D. Ind. July 6, 2005)). Years later, in another suit, we affirmed summary judgment 

against Brooks-Ngwenya on her relitigated employment claims, citing claim preclusion. 

Brooks-Ngwenya, 564 F.3d at 808–09. We also affirmed summary judgment on her 

copyright claims against the Schools, explaining that although Brooks-Ngwenya’s 

curriculum was similar to the one that the district implemented, no evidence showed 

that the Schools copied “the form of words” of her materials. Id. After 2009, district 

courts have dismissed all of Brooks-Ngwenya’s suits relating to her curriculum. See, e.g., 

Brooks-Ngwenya v. Indianapolis Pub. Sch., No. 11-cv-483 (S.D. Ind. dismissed Sept. 26, 

2012); Brooks-Ngwenya v. Indianapolis Pub. Sch., No. 13-cv-152 (S.D. Ind. dismissed Mar. 

14, 2014); Brooks-Ngwenya v. Nat’l Heritage Acads., No. 16-cv-183 (N.D. Ind. dismissed 

Jan. 6, 2017); Brooks-Ngwenya v. The Mind Trust, No. 16-cv-193 (N.D. Ind. dismissed June 

8, 2017). 

Brooks-Ngwenya is undeterred. She has sued the Schools again for employment 

discrimination and copyright infringement. On the latter claim, she has added the two 

new defendants. She also raised state-law claims for defamation, breach of contract, and 
No. 18-2349 Page 3 

willful infliction of emotional distress against all defendants, but did not point to 

underlying facts to support them. Before the defendants appeared, the district court 

ruled that her earlier litigation precluded the copyright-infringement and employmentdiscrimination claims, and the latter claim was also untimely. Rejecting the state-law 

claims on the merits, the court ruled that Brooks-Ngwenya “failed to identify any 

defamation, any contract, or any willful infliction of emotional distress.” The court 

offered her a chance to explain why it should not dismiss her suit, but she did not 

respond, and the court dismissed her amended complaint for failure to state a claim. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

We review the dismissal de novo, see Luevano, 722 F.3d at 1027, and agree with 

the district court that the claims against the Schools are precluded. A district court may 

invoke claim preclusion sua sponte because “[t]he doctrine ‘is not based solely on the 

defendant's interest in avoiding the burdens of twice defending a suit, but is also based 

on the avoidance of unnecessary judicial waste.’” Muhammad v. Oliver, 547 F.3d 874, 878 

(7th Cir. 2008) (quoting Arizona v. California, 530 U.S. 392, 412 (2000)). In doing so, it may 

rely on judicially noticeable court documents and rulings. See Parungao v. Cmty. Health 

Sys., 858 F.3d 452, 457 (7th Cir. 2017). A comparison of Brooks-Ngwenya’s complaint 

with our opinion in her earlier suit shows that, in both cases, her discrimination claims 

against the Schools arise from her work from 2001 to 2003. She alleges in her complaint 

that in “2003,” an Indiana University–Purdue University Indianapolis employee 

“produced a manual” that included a description of a program-coordinator position, 

and that the Schools “did not hire me in a Coordinator Position.” But we have already 

decided these claims against her, and she has released “all claims of employment 

discrimination” from this period, so Brooks-Ngwenya may not relitigate them. BrooksNgwenya, 564 F.3d at 808–09. Likewise, her copyright-infringement claim is precluded 

because we already decided it between her and the Schools—adversely to her. See Barr 

v. Bd. of Trustees of W. Ill. Univ., 796 F.3d 837, 840 (7th Cir. 2015); Brooks-Ngwenya, 

564 F.3d at 808. 

Brooks-Ngwenya’s response on appeal is unpersuasive. For the first time, she 

asserts that the Schools failed to rehire her in 2017 and 2018. Although we may consider 

on appeal allegations that elaborate on those in the complaint, we need not consider 

new claims, like this one, that she never presented to the district court. See Cty. of 

McHenry v. Ins. Co. of the W., 438 F.3d 813, 819–20 (7th Cir. 2006). 
No. 18-2349 Page 4 

Next, we conclude that Brooks-Ngwenya has failed adequately to plead 

copyright-infringement claims against the two new defendants. Her complaint recites 

threadbare legal conclusions about copyright infringement, but they are insufficient to 

survive dismissal. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–56 (2007). Her only 

factual allegation is that the new defendants helped the Schools implement the very 

program that we have already ruled did not infringe on any copyright belonging to 

Brooks-Ngwenya. Under Indiana preclusion law, which applies here, see 28 U.S.C 

§ 1738, a plaintiff may not relitigate an issue against a new defendant after an earlier 

court has decided that issue against the plaintiff. See White v. Allstate Ins., 605 N.E.2d 

141, 142–44 (Ind. 1992). And after the district court offered Brooks-Ngwenya both an 

opportunity to amend her complaint and to explain why it should not dismiss these 

claims, she furnished no new information. Therefore, the district court properly 

disposed of these claims on the merits. See Luevano, 722 F.3d at 1024–25. 

Finally, we address the supplemental state-law claims, which the district court 

ruled were legally insufficient. After dismissing federal claims before trial, a district 

court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims when it can easily 

decide them. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Sharp Elecs. Corp. v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 578 F.3d 505, 

514–15 (7th Cir. 2009). The district court rightly did so here: Brooks-Ngwenya has not 

specified who or what defamed her, violated a contract, or intentionally inflicted 

emotional distress. 

We conclude by issuing a warning to Brooks-Ngwenya: Further appeals of 

dismissals of claims that she has previously litigated or new litigation on these same 

issues may result in sanctions. Failure to pay them may lead to an order under Support 

Systems International, Inc. v. Mack, 45 F.3d 185, 186 (7th Cir. 1995), forbidding her from 

filing papers in any court within this circuit. 

AFFIRMED