STATE OF LOUISIANA 

COURT OF APPEAL 

FIRST CIRCUIT 

DOCKET NUMBER 

2021CA0561 

SUCCESSION OF LUCILLE WATIS PATIN, 

PAMELA SUE PATIN QUANTZ, CHARLEEN PATIN TAYLOR, 

REBEL KELLEY CAPLINGER, DENIS CURTIN KELLEY, II, 

DORCAS MARIE KELLEY, KERRY WATTS KELLEY, 

AND PATIN-KELLEY, LLC 

VERSUS 

BREAZEALE, SACHSE & WILSON, L.L.P., DAVID M. 

CHARLTON, AND XYZ INSURANCE COMPANY ['XYZ") 

MAY o 9 2022: 

Decision Rendered: ____ _ 

* * * * * 

On Appeal from the 

19th Judicial District Court 

East Baton Rouge Parish, Louisiana 

Trial Court No. 666,011 

The Honorable Timothy E. Kelley, Judge Presiding 

Scott Webre 

Whitney S. Ikerd 

Lafayette, Louisiana 

Victor L. Marcello 

Baton Rouge, Louisiana 

Heather S. Duplantis 

Kevin W. Welsh 

Baton Rouge, Louisiana 

Melissa M. Lessell 

Beverly L. Delaune 

New Orleans, Louisiana 

* * * * * 

Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

Succession of Lucille Watts Patin, 

Pamela Sue Patin Quantz, Charleen 

Patin Taylor, Rebel Kelley Caplinger, 

Denis Curtin Kelley, II, Dorcas Marie 

Kelley, Kerry Watts Kelley, and 

Patin-Kelley, LLC 

Attorneys for Defendants-Appellees, 

Breazeale, Sachse & Wilson, LLP and 

David M. Charlton 

Attorneys for Defendants-Appellees, 

Endurance American Specialty 

Insurance, Scottsdale Insurance 

Company, and Aspen Specialty 

Insurance 

BEFORE: McDONALD, MCCLENDON, 

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McDONALD, J. 

In this legal malpractice action, plaintiffs appeal a judgment granting an exception of 

no cause of action filed by the defendant attorneys and their insurers, dismissing plaintiffs' 

claims with prejudice, and denying plaintiffs' motion for leave to file amended pleadings 

beyond their second supplemental and amended petition for damages. After review, we 

reverse. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

In 1998, Lucille Watts Patin retained attorney David M. Charlton of the law firm, 

Breazeale, Sachse & Wilson, LLP (BSW), to form a limited liability company known as PatinKelley, LLC (PKLLC). Mr. Charlton also handled Ms. Patin's legal matters related to the 

management of her property and the planning of her estate. As part of that work, Mr. 

Charlton drafted documents whereby Ms. Patin sold her 17/181

h ownership interest - both 

surface and mineral rights - in an approximate 382-acre tract of land in Pointe Coupee 

Parish (the property) to PKLLC. In exchange for the property, Ms. Patin received a 97% 

membership interest in PKLLC. 1 The sale between Ms. Patin and PKLLC was recorded in the 

conveyance records on December 28, 1998. 

In 2006, Ms. Patin and PKLLC executed an Act of Correction to the 1998 sale, because 

it was discovered that the 1998 sale did not include a mineral servitude in Ms. Patin's favor, 

even though the parties had intended that Ms. Patin reserve all of the mineral rights when 

she sold the property to PKLLC. 2 Mr. Charlton prepared the Act of Correction to correct the 

error in the 1998 act of sale. The Act of Correction contained language reserving a mineral 

servitude on the property to Ms. Patin and stating that PKLLC disclaimed any and all 

ownership to those mineral rights. Two witnesses signed the Act of Correction, and Ms. Patin 

signed on her own behalf, as well as in her capacity as the PKLLC's managing member. Mr. 

Charlton notarized the Act of Correction, and it was recorded in the conveyance records. 

1 It is undisputed that, at some point, Ms. Patin became the owner of 100% of PKLLC. 

2 In the 2006 Act of Correction, Ms. Patin reserved "all minerals in, on and under, and all mineral rights 

pertaining to" the property sold to PKLLC. As discussed later herein, an owner's sale of land with a reservation 

of mineral rights creates a mineral servitude. See Ohio Oil Co. v. Ferguson, 213 La. 183, 34 So.2d 746, 752 

(1946); Indigo Minerals, LLC v. Pardee Minerals; LLC, 45,160 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/28/10), 37 So.3d 1122, 1128, 

writs denied, 10-1669, 10-1677 (La. 10/8/10), 46 So.3d 1274; SEMO, Inc. v. Bd. Of Com'rs for Atchafalaya 

Basin Levee Dist., 07-2571 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/6/08), 993 So.2d 222, 226. 

2 
Ms. Patin died testate approximately six years later on March 13, 2012, leaving six 

legatees: Pamela Sue Patin Quantz, Charleen Patin Taylor, Rebel Kelley Caplinger, Denis 

Curtin Kelley, II, Dorcas Marie Kelley, and Kerry Watts Kelley (the Patin legatees). In her 

testament, Ms. Patin appointed Ms. Quantz, Ms. Taylor, and Ms. Caplinger as co-executrixes 

of her estate. Later, Ms. Caplinger was appointed as PKLLC's manager. Mr. Charlton was 

retained to serve as legal counsel for Ms. Patin's succession and PKLLC. 

In 2015, the Patin legatees consulted Mr. Charlton regarding a proposed sale of the 

property to Steven W. Kent, II, and Jana Spillman Kent. The Patin legatees communicated 

to Mr. Charlton that they specifically wanted to protect the mineral servitude previously 

reserved by Ms. Patin and to extend it for 10 years. After Mr. Charlton participated in 

drafting and/or reviewing the proposed sale documents, he assured the Patin legatees that 

those documents did retain their mineral servitude for 10 years. Ms. Patin's succession and 

PKLLC sold the property to the Kents on February 11, 2015, and the sale was recorded in 

the conveyance records the next day. 

In late 2017, multiple oil and gas companies approached the Patin legatees with 

interest in leasing the property for exploration; however, after conducting a title search, 

these entities "backed off" and told the Patin legatees that the mineral servitude had not 

been extended for 10 years after the 2015 sale of the property to the Kents and would soon 

prescribe from nonuse. The Patin legatees sought counsel from Mr. Charlton, who confirmed 

that the 2015 sale did not extend the mineral servitude for 10 years and the servitude would 

extinguish in 2019, if not interrupted by proper oil and gas explorations before that time. 3 

According to the Patin legatees, Mr. Charlton did not thereafter respond to them about the 

mineral servitude ownership. 

On February 5, 2018, the Patin legatees and PKLLC (the Patin plaintiffs) filed this 

legal malpractice suit against Mr. Charlton and BSW, alleging that Mr. Charlton had breached 

his obligation to properly handle their legal matters and that BSW was vicariously liable. 

They further alleged that Mr. Charlton had not taken appropriate steps to preserve their 

3 A mineral servitude is extinguished by prescription resulting from 10 years' nonuse. La. R.S. 31:27. 

Prescription of nonuse commences from the date on which the mineral servitude is created but is interrupted 

by good faith operations for the discovery and production of minerals. See La. R.S. 31:28; 31:29; Indigo 

Minerals, LLC, 37 So.3d at 1128. The Patin legatees and PKLLC allege Mr. Charlton said the servitude would 

prescribe in 2019, whereas they allege it actually prescribed in December 2018. 

3 
valuable mineral servitude for a full 10 years after the 2015 sale of the property to the Kents, 

by having PKLLC execute a formal acknowledgement of the succession's servitude prior to 

the 2015 sale. The Patin plaintiffs also alleged that Mr. Charlton's breach of duty caused 

them grave damages, because they would prematurely lose their mineral servitude on the 

property to the Kents. Over a year later, the Patin plaintiffs filed a first supplemental and 

amended petition, adding Scottsdale Insurance Company, Endurance American Specialty 

Insurance Company,4 and Aspen Specialty Insurance Company, BSW's malpractice insurers, 

as additional defendants. 

All defendants answered the suit. Mr. Charlton and BSW then filed an exception of 

no cause of action. Essentially, these defendants maintained that PKLLC is the owner of a 

mineral servitude on the property that, by operation of law, will not expire until 2025 at the 

earliest. Therefore, Mr. Charlton and BSW argued that the Patin plaintiffs failed to plead 

facts sufficient to establish any damages resulting from Mr. Charlton's conduct. The 

malpractice insurers joined in and adopted the exception of no cause of action. 

On December 3, 2019, the Patin plaintiffs filed a second supplemental and amended 

petition and reiterated that the 2006 Act of Correction between Ms. Patin and PKLLC was a 

valid authentic act that correctly reserved a mineral servitude to Ms. Patin, just as the parties 

always intended with the 1998 sale. The 2006 Act of Correction and the 1998 sale were 

both attached to the amended petition. The Patin plaintiffs also alleged that their efforts in 

2018 to commence oil and gas operations on the property were unsuccessful, and the 

mineral servitude prescribed in December of that year, at a time when oil and gas 

exploration companies were "aggressively" leasing properties in the area. 5 

After a hearing, the trial court ruled in favor of the defendants, granting the exception 

of no cause of action, and dismissing the Patin plaintiffs' petition with prejudice. The 

judgment was signed on January 11, 2021. In oral reasons, the trial court found that PKLLC 

owned the mineral servitude at least until 2025 and, thus, there was no damage from Mr. 

Charlton's alleged legal malpractice. The trial court further reasoned that the 2006 Act of 

4 The first supplemental and amended petition erroneously listed this defendant's name as Sompo 

International/Endurance American Specialty Insurance Company. 

5 The Patin plaintiffs also alleged that, in January 2019, the Louisiana Office of Conservation approved the 

creation of a drilling and production unit that included part of the property and, "on information and belief," a 

drilling company would commence operations in latter 2019. 

4 
Correction did not create a mineral servitude in favor of Ms. Patin, because an act of 

correction could not make a substantive change to the 1998 sale of the property. Thus, 

according to the trial court, when PKLLC sold the property to the Kents in 2015, PKLLC still 

owned both the surface and mineral rights and had properly reserved a mineral servitude in 

the sale to the Kents at that time. Additionally, the trial court did not allow the Patin plaintiffs 

to amend their petition again, since they had already tried and failed to state a cause of 

action in prior amendments. 

The Patin plaintiffs appeal from the adverse judgment, claiming the trial court erred: 

(1) in granting the defendants' exception of no cause of action and failing to grant the Patin 

plaintiffs leave to amend their petition, and (2) in finding the 2006 Act of Correction was 

invalid. 

DISCUSSION 

Legal Malpractice Cause of Action 

The peremptory exception of no cause of action questions whether the law affords 

the plaintiff any remedy under the allegations of the petition. The exception is triable solely 

on the face of the petition and any attached written exhibits. La. C.C.P. arts. 853 and 931; 

Agrifund, LLC v. Radar Ridge Planting Co., Inc., 19-1528 (La. 11/25/19), 283 So.3d 492 (per 

curiam); Baca v. Sabine River Authority, 18-1046 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/27 /18), 271 So.3d 223, 

227, writ denied, 19-0149 (La. 3/18/19), 267 So.3d 95. The court must presume all wellpleaded facts are true, must make all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving 

party, and must resolve any doubts in favor of the petition's sufficiency. The exceptor bears 

the burden of showing that the plaintiff has not stated a cause of action. The appellate 

court performs a de novo review of a district court's ruling on an exception of no cause of 

action. Cheniere Constr., Inc. v. State, Dep't of Revenue & Taxation, 19-1471 (La. App. 1 

Cir. 9/18/20), 313 So.3d 992, 994, writ denied, 20-01194 (La. 12/8/20), 306 So.3d 431. 

Generally speaking, Louisiana law recognizes a legal malpractice cause of action in 

favor of a client injured as a result of his attorney's negligent representation. LeBlanc v. 

Alfred, 15-0397 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/17/15), 185 So.3d 768, 774. To establish a legal 

malpractice cause of action, a plaintiff must demonstrate the existence of an attorney-client 

relationship, negligent misrepresentation by the attorney, and loss caused by that 

5 
negligence. Id. The Patin plaintiffs have alleged facts proving an attorney-client relationship 

with Mr. Charlton and have also alleged facts tending to prove his negligent legal 

representation. The issue is whether the Patin plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts to 

establish that Mr. Charlton's legal malpractice caused them loss. 

Whether the Patin plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged facts showing a loss hinges on 

the validity of the 2006 Act of Correction and whether it created a mineral servitude in favor 

of Ms. Patin. If the 2006 Act of Correction was valid, as the Patin plaintiffs claim herein, 

then Ms. Patin's estate owned a mineral servitude on the property at the time of the 2015 

sale to the Kents, but it prescribed from nonuse in 2018, because Mr. Charlton allegedly 

failed to properly preserve it, causing a valuable loss to the Patin plaintiffs. However, if the 

2006 Act of Correction was not valid, as defendants claim herein, then PKLLC owned the 

minerals at the time of the 2015 sale, and its reservation of the mineral servitude for an 

additional 10 years in the 2015 sale document was valid until 2025, and the Patin plaintiffs 

have incurred no loss. 

Reservation of a Mineral Servitude 

The Louisiana Mineral Code, La. R.S. 31:1, et seq., is supplementary to the Louisiana 

Civil Code and is specifically applicable to the subject matter of mineral law. La. R.S. 31:2. 

If the Mineral Code conflicts with the Civil Code or other laws, the Mineral Code shall prevail. 

Id. If the Mineral Code does not expressly or impliedly provide for a particular situation, the 

Civil Code or other applicable laws apply. Id. See American Lung Assn of La., Inc. v. State, 

93-0686 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/10/94), 645 So.2d 1219, 1221-22, writ denied, 95-0078 (La. 

3/10/95), 650 So.2d 1182. 

A landowner may convey, reserve, or lease his right to explore and develop his land 

for production of minerals and to reduce them to possession. La. R.S. 31:15; Frey v. Amoco 

Production Co., 603 So.2d 166, 171 (La. 1992). The basic mineral rights that may be created 

by a landowner are the mineral servitude, the mineral royalty, and the mineral lease. La. 

R.S. 31:16. A mineral servitude is the right of enjoyment of land belonging to another for 

the purpose of exploring for and producing minerals and reducing them to possession and 

ownership. La. R.S. 31:21. An owner's sale of land with a reservation of mineral rights 

creates a mineral servitude. See Ohio Oil Co. v. Ferguson, 213 La. 183, 203, 34 So.2d 746, 

6 
752 (1946); SEMO, Inc. v. Bel. Of Com'rs for Atchafalaya Basin Levee Dist., 07-2571 (La. 

App. 1 Cir. 6/6/08), 993 So.2d 222, 226; Indigo Minerals, LLC v. Pardee Minerals, LLC, 

45,160 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/28/10), 37 So.3d 1122, 1128, writs denied, 10-1669, 10-1677 (La. 

10/8/10), 46 So.3d 1274. Thus, when Ms. Patin sold the property to PKLLC in 1998, she 

desired to reserve a mineral servitude to herself; when the 1998 sale did not do so, the 

parties executed the 2006 Act of Correction to correct that omission. 

The Mineral Code does not dictate the form by which a landowner reserves a mineral 

servitude in an act of sale. But, the Mineral Code does classify a mineral right, including a 

mineral servitude, as an incorporeal immovable. La. R.S. 31:18; Steele v. Denning, 456 

So.2d 992, 998 (La. 1984); Quality Environmental Processes, Inc. v. IP Petroleum Co., Inc., 

16-0230 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/2/17), 219 So.3d 349, 372, writ denied, 17-00915 (La. 10/9/17), 

227 So.3d 833. Under the Civil Code, a transfer of immovable property must be by authentic 

act or by act under private signature. La. C.C. art. 1839; see Peironnet v. Matador Resources 

Co., 12-2292 (La. 6/28/13), 144 So.3d 791, 806-07. An authentic act is defined as a writing 

executed before a notary public or other officer authorized to perform that function, in the 

presence of two witnesses, and signed by each party who executed it, by each witness, and 

by each notary public before whom it was executed. La. C.C. art. 1833. Louisiana 

jurisprudence demonstrates that parties to an instrument transferring immovable property 

may reform that instrument by authentic act to correct substantive errors. See Blevins v. 

Manufacturers Record Pub. Co., 235 La. 708, 105 So.2d 392, 403 (La. 1957) (noting that 

when a deed conveying land contains an erroneous or ambiguous description, the parties 

to the deed are always permitted to reform the deed); Bourgeois v. Landry, 583 So.2d 36, 

40 (La. App. 3 Cir.), writ denied, 587 So.2d 697 (La. 1991) (concluding a correction deed in 

authentic form was a valid act translative of mineral interests). These acts are sometimes 

referenced as "correction deeds." See Blevins, 105 So.2d at 403; Bourgeois, 583 So.2d at 

40. The purpose of a correction deed is to admit mutual error and to change the original 

instrument to conform to the true intent of the parties. Robinette v. Myers, 510 So.2d 1332, 

1334 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1987). The correction deed is clearly valid as between the parties, 

and under certain circumstances where no prejudice occurs, it may be valid as to third 

persons. Id. 

7 
In this case, the 1998 sale failed to reserve a mineral servitude to Ms. Patin. To 

correct this failure, and to accomplish the "transfer of immovable property" that Ms. Patin 

and PKLLC originally intended, Ms. Patin and PKLLC executed the 2006 Act of Correction, 

which was a valid authentic act. Such act fulfilled the requirements of La. C.C. arts. 1833 

and 1839 and was in the nature of a correction deed. Thus, in 2015, Ms. Patin's estate, not 

PKLLC, owned the mineral servitude. So, Mr. Charlton's alleged failure to properly preserve 

the estate's servitude, and his preparation of a sale document that reserved mineral rights 

to PKLLC, when PKLLC did not own the mineral servitude, resulting in the estate's loss of 

the servitude, and current ownership of minerals with the Kents, and not with the Patin 

legatees or PKLLC, supports a legal malpractice cause of action against him, BSW, and their 

insurers. 

In reaching the above conclusion, we expressly reject the defendants' position that 

the only "act of correction" recognized by Louisiana law is the notarial act of correction 

authorized by La. R.S. 35:2.1.6 Although we agree that La. R.S. 35:2.1 expressly limits the 

use of a notarial act of correction to a clerical error, such begs the question of how a 

substantive error in a notarial act is corrected. That is, if the failure to reserve a mineral 

servitude in a sale of immovable property is a "substantive error," and such an error cannot 

be corrected by a notarial act of correction under La. R.S. 35:2.1, then the parties who make 

such an error must have some legal means by which to correct that error. As explained 

above, because the Mineral Code does not dictate that means, we conclude La. C.C. arts. 

1833 and 1839 properly provide such a means herein. Ms. Patin and PKLLC's 2006 Act of 

6 Louisiana Revised Statute 35:2.1 provides: 

A. (1) A clerical error in a notarial act affecting movable or immovable property or any 

other rights, corporeal or incorporeal, may be corrected by an act of correction executed 

by any of the following: 

(a} The person who was the notary or one of the notaries before whom the act was passed. 

(b) The notary who actually prepared the act containing the error. 

* * * * 

(2) The act of correction shall be executed before two witnesses and a notary public. 

B. The act of correction executed in compliance with this Section shall be given retroactive 

effect to the date of recordation of the original act. However, the act of correction shall 

not prejudice the rights acquired by any third person before the act of correction is 

recorded where the third person reasonably relied on the original act. The act of correction 

shall not alter the true agreement and intent of the parties. 

C. A certified copy of the act of correction executed in compliance with this Section shall 

be deemed to be authentic for purposes of executory process. 

D. This Section shall be in addition to other laws governing executory process. 

8 
Correction was an authentic act between the parties, was proper under the Civil Code, and 

validly reserved a mineral servitude to Ms. Patin. Although this authentic act was titled "Act 

of Correction," it was not a notarial act of correction under La. R.S. 35:2.1. 

Accordingly, based on our de novo review, accepting the Patin plaintiffs' well-pied 

allegations and exhibits attached to the petition as true, making reasonable inferences in 

their favor, and resolving all doubts in favor of the petitions' sufficiency, we conclude the 

Patin plaintiffs have stated a cause of action for legal malpractice against the defendants; 

further amendment of the pleadings is unnecessary. see Cheniere Constr, Inc., 313 So.3d 

at 994. The trial court erred in granting the defendants' exception of no cause of action and 

dismissing the petition. 

CONCLUSION 

For the assigned reasons, we reverse the January 11, 2021 judgment, granting the 

exception of no cause of action filed by David M. Charlton, Breazeale, Sachse & Wilson, LLP, 

Scottsdale Insurance Company, Endurance American Specialty Insurance Company, and 

Aspen Specialty Insurance Company, and dismissing the legal malpractice claims asserted 

by the Succession of Lucille Watts Patin, Pamela Sue Patin Quantz, Charleen Patin Taylor, 

Rebel Kelley Caplinger, Denis Curtin Kelley, II, Dorcas Marie Kelley, Kerry Watts Kelley, and 

Patin-Kelley, LLC. We assess costs of this appeal to David M. Charlton, Breazeale, Sachse 

& Wilson, LLP, Scottsdale Insurance Company, Endurance American Specialty Insurance 

Company, and Aspen Specialty Insurance Company. 

REVERSED. 

9 
STATE OF LOUISIANA 

COURT OF APPEAL 

FIRST CIRCUIT 

NO. 2021CA0561 

SUCCESSION OF LUCILLE WATTS PATIN, ET AL. 

VERSUS 

BREAZEALE, SACHSE & WILSON, L.L.P., ET AL. 

~OLFE, J., Dissents and Assigns Reasons. 

I respectfully dissent in this matter and would affirm the district court's 

judgment sustaining the defendants' peremptory exception raising the objection of 

no cause of action and dismissing the legal malpractice claims asserted by the Patin 

plaintiffs. It is my opinion that the 2006 "Act of Correction" purporting to correct a 

"scrivener's error" in the legal description of the property set forth in the 1998 

conveyance is invalid, as the district court properly determined. 

Based upon my de nova review of the petitions and the annexed documents, 

and accepting the alleged facts as true, it is beyond dispute that the Patin plaintiffs 

alleged facts tending to prove the existence of an attorney-client relationship with 

the defendant law firm, BSW, and tending to prove Mr. Charlton's negligence. 

However, for the following reasons I find that the Patin plaintiffs did not allege facts 

necessary to establish causation of damages arising from Mr. Charlton's negligence. 

The pertinent issue surrounding the causation of damages involves an 

examination of the validity of the 2006 Act of Correction and a determination as to 

whether it created a mineral rights servitude in favor of Ms. Patin. In 2006, Ms. 

Patin and the LLC discovered that the 1998 conveyance did not reserve the mineral 

rights in the property to Ms. Patin. When the error was discovered, the parties chose 

to execute the 2006 Act of Correction in an attempt to clarify that Ms. Patin owned 
the mineral rights and the LLC relinquished those rights in the property according 

to their true intent. To make a correction to an authentic act affecting immovable 

property that has been filed in the conveyance records, as was done with the 1998 

conveyance, the legislature allows a filing of an affidavit of correction completed by 

the notary before whom the authentic act was passed. Louisiana Revised Statutes 

35:2.1 currently states, in pertinent part and with emphasis added: 

A. ( 1) A clerical error in a notarial act affecting movable or 

immovable property or any other rights, corporeal or incorporeal, 

may be corrected by an act of correction executed by any of the 

following: 

(a) The person who was the notary or one of the notaries before 

whom the act was passed. 

(b) The notary who actually prepared the act containing the error. 

* * * 

(2) The act of correction shall be executed before two witnesses 

and a notary public. 

B. The act of correction executed in compliance with this Section shall 

be given retroactive effect to the date ofrecordation of the original 

act. However, the act of correction shall not prejudice the rights 

acquired by any third person before the act of correction is recorded 

where the third person reasonably relied on the original act. The 

act of correction shall not alter the true agreement and intent of the 

parties. 

It is clear from the language of the statute that an affidavit of correction may 

correct only a "clerical error," which is an error resulting from a minor mistake or 

inadvertence and not from reasoning or determination. See Black's Law Dictionary 

(11th ed. 2019). A reservation of mineral rights is a substantive change, not a minor 

mistake, clerical error, or a scrivener's error. The addition of a reservation of mineral 

rights changes the effect of the document in regard to the real rights held by the 

parties to the act. Petro-Chem Operating Company, Inc. v. Flat River Farms, 

L.L.C., 51,212 (La. App. 2d Cir. 3/1/17), _ So.3d_, _, 2017 WL 786868 *7, 

writs denied, 2017-0564 and 2017-0562 (La. 6/5/17), 219 So.3d 338, 339. 

Additionally, the reservation of mineral rights in the sale of immovable property is 

2 
a substantive issue that implicates the thought process and intention of the parties to 

the transaction. Thus, an act of correction cannot be used to substantively change or 

correct the omission of a mineral rights reservation. Id. 

The 2006 Act of Correction at issue specifically referenced a "scrivener's 

error" regarding the parties' intent. However, it is improper and invalid to use an 

act of correction for the purpose of changing the reservation of mineral rights, which 

is clearly not a simple scrivener's error. I further note that in 2006, when the Act of 

Correction was executed, La. R.S. 35:2.l(A) required that the act of correction be 

"executed by the notary before two witnesses and another notary public." 

(Emphasis added.) The 2006 Act of Correction did not comply with the 

requirements of the statute at that time, because it was not executed before another 

notary public. Acts of correction executed in improper form have no effect. See 

First Nat. Bank, USA v. DDS Const., LLC, 2011-1418 (La. 1/24/12), 91 So.3d 

944, 955-956. Therefore, I conclude that the district court did not err in determining 

that the 2006 Act of Correction was invalid. 

The LLC owned the mineral and surface rights in the property by virtue of the 

1998 conveyance from Ms. Patin. When the Kents purchased the property from the 

LLC in 2015, the LLC continued to own the mineral rights because the act of sale 

reserved a mineral rights servitude in the LLC's favor. The LLC may still enjoy the 

fruits of the mineral rights on the property until at least 2025, when the use of the 

mineral rights servitude will prescribe if no good faith oil and gas exploration takes 

place on the property before that time. See La. R.S. 31 :27, La. R.S. 31 :28, and La. 

R.S. 31 :29. 1 There is no damage to the Patin plaintiffs by the alleged negligent 

1 Louisiana Revised Statutes 31 :27 provides, in pertinent part: "A mineral servitude is 

extinguished by: (!) prescription resulting from nonuse for ten years;" and Louisiana Revised 

Statutes 31 :28 states, in pertinent part: " Prescription of nonuse of a mineral servitude commences 

from the date on which it is created." Additionally, La. R.S. 31 :29 provides: "The prescription of 

nonuse running against a mineral servitude is interrupted by good faith operations for the discovery 

and production of minerals." 

3 
actions ofBSW and Mr. Charlton, as they have not been forced to prematurely give 

up the mineral rights in the property. Thus, the Patin plaintiffs have not stated a 

viable cause of action for legal malpractice against BS W and Mr. Charlton. 

Pursuant to La. Code Civ. P. art. 934, if a petition fails to state a cognizable 

cause of action and the grounds for the objection can be removed by amendment, 

the plaintiffs should be allowed to amend their demand. LeBlanc v. Alfred, 2015-

0397 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/17/15), 185 So.3d 768, 777. On the other hand, where 

the grounds for the objection cannot be so removed, the district court is not required 

to allow time to amend and the action shall be dismissed. Adams v. OwensCorning Fiberglas Corp., 2004-1296 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/23/05), 921 So.2d 972, 

976, writ denied, 2005-2501 (La. 4/17/06), 926 So.2d 514. The decision to allow 

amendment is within the sound discretion of the district court. LeBlanc, 185 So.3d 

at 777. In this case, the district court allowed two previous amendments to the 

petition, the second time over the objections ofBSW. It is my opinion that allowing 

further amendments by the Patin plaintiffs at this point would merely be an invitation 

to engage in speculative pleading. Thus, I would not disturb the district court's 

sound discretion in refusing a third attempt to amend the petition. See Allstate 

Vehicle and Property Ins. Co. v. Andrus Restoration, LLC, 2019-1279 (La. App. 

1st Cir. 9/21/20), 314 So.3d 51, 56. 

For these reasons, I respectfully dissent and would affirm the district court's 

judgment in its entirety. 

4 
STATE OF LOUISIANA 

COURT OF APPEAL 

FIRST CIRCUIT 

2021CA0561 

SUCCESSION OF LUCILLE WATTS PATIN, 

PAMELA SUE PATIN QUANTZ, CHARLEEN PATIN TAYLOR, 

REBEL KELLEY CAPLINGER, DENIS CURTIN KELLEY, II, 

DORCAS MARIE KELLEY, KERRY WATTS KELLEY, 

AND PATIN-KELLEY, LLC 

~/\, ~ . BREAZEALE, SACHSE & WILSON, L.L.P., DAVID M. l ~1 ij CHARLTON, AND XYZ INSURANCE COMPANY ("XYZ") 

r~· 

VERSUS 

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McClendon, l., concurs in part and dissents in part. 

In deciding an exception of no cause of action, we are guided by the well-settled 

principle that the function of an exception of no cause of action is to test the legal 

sufficiency of the petition by determining whether the law affords a remedy on the facts 

alleged in the pleading. Dodson & Hooks, APLC v. Louisiana Community 

Development Capital Fund, Inc., 2020-01002 (La. 2/17/21), 310 So.3d 553 (per 

curiam). No evidence may be introduced to support or controvert the objection that the 

petition fails to state a cause of action. LSA-C.C.P. art. 931. Therefore, the court 

reviews the petition and accepts well pleaded allegations of fact as true, and the issue 

at the trial of the exception is whether, on the face of the petition, the plaintiff is legally 

entitled to the relief sought. Dodson & Hooks, APLC, 310 So.3d at 553. Furthermore, 

the facts shown in any documents annexed to the petition must also be accepted as 

true. Expert Riser Solutions, LLC v. Techcrane International, LLC, 2018-0612 

(La.App. 1 Cir. 12/28/18), 270 So.3d 655, 663. 

Applying these principles to the petition and attached exhibits, I agree with the 

majority that the Patin plaintiffs have stated a cause of action. Therefore, I concur with 

the result reached. However, I find that the majority errs in addressing the validity of 

the 2006 Act of Correction. Assessing the validity of the 2006 Act of Correction, which 
for purposes of the exception of no cause of action must be accepted as true, was an 

improper and unnecessary step. By taking this additional step, the majority, on an 

exception of no cause of action, decided an issue essential to whether the Patin 

plaintiffs sustained damages.1 Accordingly, I dissent with the portion of the opinion 

addressing the validity of the 2006 Act of Correction. 

1 We note that in Dodson & Hooks, APLC, the Louisiana Supreme Court stated: 

In reaching this conclusion, we emphasize we are not expressing any opinion on the 

merits. Rather, our holding simply stands for the proposition that based on the liberal 

standard for deciding an exception of no cause of action, we find plaintiff has alleged 

sufficient facts to state a cause of action. If Dodson & Hooks believes plaintiff is unable 

to establish these facts, it has other procedural remedies available, such as filing a 

properly-supported motion for summary judgment. 

(Emphasis added); Dodson & Hooks, APLC, 310 So.3d at 553-54.