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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 41952

MICHAEL T. HAYES,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

STATE OF IDAHO,

Respondent.

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2015 Unpublished Opinion No. 634

Filed: September 16, 2015

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED

OPINION AND SHALL NOT

BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada

County. Hon. Deborah A. Bail, District Judge. 

Order denying petition for post-conviction relief, affirmed.

Michael T. Hayes, Boise, pro se appellant. 

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Jessica M. Lorello, Deputy 

Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. 

________________________________________________

GRATTON, Judge

Michael T. Hayes appeals from the district court’s order denying his petition for postconviction relief. We affirm.

I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In 2003, Hayes pled guilty to a misdemeanor driving under the influence (DUI) offense, 

Idaho Code § 18-8004(1)(a), which the State charged as a “first offense DUI.” In 2004, Hayes 

pled guilty to another misdemeanor DUI offense, I.C. § 18-8004(1)(a), which the State again 

charged as a “first offense DUI.” With both the 2003 and 2004 convictions, Hayes received

notification forms notifying him that, pursuant to I.C. § 18-8005, the State would charge a third 

DUI offense within five years as a felony. In 2006, the Idaho legislature amended I.C. § 18-8005 

to make a third DUI conviction within ten years a felony. In 2011, the State charged Hayes with 

yet another DUI offense under I.C. § 18-8004(1)(a). Because Hayes’ two earlier DUI
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convictions occurred within ten years of his 2011 DUI, the State charged his 2011 DUI as a 

felony under the amended version of I.C. § 18-8005.

Before pleading guilty, Hayes discussed with counsel possible legal arguments that might

get his 2011 DUI charge dismissed. Counsel told Hayes he did not believe those arguments 

would result in a dismissal and suggested that Hayes take the State’s plea bargain. Hayes was 

faced with two possibilities: He could plead guilty to the felony DUI charge and receive a 

maximum ten-year sentence; or he could proceed to trial where the prosecutor would pursue the

felony DUI charge with a persistent violator enhancement, which carries a possible lifetime 

sentence. Hayes pled guilty and stated to the court his guilty plea was freely and voluntarily 

given.

Hayes petitioned for post-conviction relief alleging his counsel was ineffective in various 

ways. After an evidentiary hearing, the court denied Hayes’ petition. Hayes timely appeals.

II.

ANALYSIS

Hayes asserts the district court erred in denying his petition for post-conviction relief.

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petition for post-conviction relief initiates a civil, rather than criminal, proceeding, governed by 

the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. I.C. § 19-4907; State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437, 443, 

180 P.3d 476, 482 (2008). See also Pizzuto v. State, 146 Idaho 720, 724, 202 P.3d 642, 646 

(2008). In order to prevail in a post-conviction proceeding, the petitioner must prove the 

allegations by a preponderance of the evidence. I.C. § 19-4907; Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 865, 

869, 801 P.2d 1216, 1220 (1990); Baxter v. State, 149 Idaho 859, 861, 243 P.3d 675, 677 (Ct. 

App. 2010). When reviewing a decision denying post-conviction relief after an evidentiary 

hearing, an appellate court will not disturb the lower court’s factual findings unless they are 

clearly erroneous. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a); Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 56, 106 

P.3d 376, 382 (2004); Russell v. State, 118 Idaho 65, 67, 794 P.2d 654, 656 (Ct. App. 1990). 

The credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given to their testimony, and the inferences to 

be drawn from the evidence are all matters solely within the province of the district court. 

Dunlap, 141 Idaho at 56, 106 P.3d at 382; Larkin v. State, 115 Idaho 72, 73, 764 P.2d 439, 

 

1 Hayes also asserts: (1) the State violated his equal protection and due process rights;

(2) his counsel failed to file a Rule 35 motion; and (3) prosecutorial misconduct. These claims 

either were not raised below or do not have any legal or factual support and will not be addressed 

on appeal.
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440 (Ct. App. 1988). We exercise free review of the district court’s application of the relevant 

law to the facts. Baxter, 149 Idaho at 862, 243 P.3d at 678.

Hayes asserts his counsel in the underlying case was ineffective in various ways. A claim 

of ineffective assistance of counsel may properly be brought under the Uniform Post-Conviction 

Procedure Act. Barcella v. State, 148 Idaho 469, 477, 224 P.3d 536, 544 (Ct. App. 2009). To 

prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the petitioner must show that the attorney’s 

performance was deficient and that the petitioner was prejudiced by the deficiency. Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); Self v. State, 145 Idaho 578, 580, 181 P.3d 504, 506 

(Ct. App. 2007). To establish a deficiency, the petitioner has the burden of showing that the 

attorney’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Aragon v. State, 

114 Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988); Knutsen v. State, 144 Idaho 433, 442, 163 P.3d 

222, 231 (Ct. App. 2007). Where, as here, the petitioner was convicted upon a guilty plea, to 

satisfy the prejudice element, the petitioner must show that there is a reasonable probability that, 

but for counsel’s errors, he or she would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going 

to trial. Plant v. State, 143 Idaho 758, 762, 152 P.3d 629, 633 (Ct. App. 2006). This Court has 

long adhered to the proposition that tactical or strategic decisions of trial counsel will not be 

second-guessed on appeal unless those decisions are based on inadequate preparation, ignorance 

of relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation. Gonzales v. State, 151 

Idaho 168, 172, 254 P.3d 69, 73 (Ct. App. 2011).

Hayes first argues that his counsel coerced his guilty plea, making it involuntary. At his 

plea hearing, Hayes stated that his guilty plea was freely and voluntarily given. However, Hayes 

asserts his counsel coerced his plea by dismissing arguments he wished to assert at trial and 

telling him he could get a persistent violator enhancement and life sentence if he did not take the 

State’s plea bargain. The district court found:

There is no persuasive evidence that the petitioner’s plea was in any way 

coerced. While he was unhappy that he faced the potential longer sentence 

resulting from the possibility of a persistent violator enhancement, his 

unhappiness does not amount to coercion. . . . His attorney gave him correct legal 

advice when he told the petitioner that he did not have a legal defense to the DUI. 

The petitioner testified that he did not have a factual defense to the DUI. The 

petitioner failed to prove that his plea was in any fashion coerced or that he 

received anything other than correct legal advice.
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We agree. As explained below, Hayes’ arguments would have failed in the district court. 

His counsel correctly advised him of this fact. Further, the United States Supreme Court has 

long held a plea is not coerced because it is motivated by the defendant’s desire to accept the 

certainty of a “lesser penalty rather than face a wider range of possibilities extending from 

acquittal to conviction and a higher penalty authorized by law for the crime charged.” Brady v. 

United States, 397 U.S. 742, 751 (1970). Thus, the district court correctly held that Hayes’ plea 

was voluntary.

Hayes next argues his counsel failed to move to dismiss his felony DUI. In a postconviction proceeding challenging an attorney’s failure to pursue a motion in the underlying 

criminal action, the district court may consider the probability of success of the motion in 

question in determining whether the attorney’s inactivity constituted ineffective assistance. Lint 

v. State, 145 Idaho 472, 477, 180 P.3d 511, 516 (Ct. App. 2008). Where the alleged deficiency is 

counsel’s failure to file a motion, a conclusion that the motion, if pursued, would not have been 

granted by the trial court, is generally determinative of both prongs of the Strickland test. Id.

at 477-78, 180 P.3d at 516-17. 

Hayes advances two theories his counsel could have used to support a motion to dismiss 

his felony DUI. His first theory is that the State entered a binding contract with him by charging

his 2003 and 2004 DUIs as “first offense DUIs.” He asserts the State breached this contract 

when it charged his 2011 DUI as a felony. Because the State never charged him with a “second 

offense DUI,” he asserts the State could not charge his third DUI as a felony under I.C. § 18-

8005. This argument fails under the plain language of I.C. § 18-8005. Subsection six states:

[A]ny person who pleads guilty to or is found guilty of a violation of the 

provisions of section 18-8004(1)(a), (b) or (c), Idaho Code, who previously has 

been found guilty of or has pled guilty to two (2) or more violations of the 

provisions of section 18-8004(1)(a), (b), or (c), Idaho Code . . . within ten (10)

years, notwithstanding the form of the judgment(s) or withheld judgment(s), shall 

be guilty of a felony . . . .

I.C. § 18-8005(6). 

Both of Hayes’ 2003 and 2004 convictions were for violations of I.C. § 18-8004(1)(a),

regardless of whether the State charged them as “first offense DUIs.” These convictions were 

within ten years of his 2011 charge for violating I.C. § 18-8004(1)(a). Hayes never disputed that 

he violated I.C. § 18-8004(1)(a) for any of his charges. Thus, the plain language of I.C. § 18-

8005(6) authorized the State to charge Hayes’ 2011 DUI as a felony. Further, this Court and the 
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Idaho Supreme Court have held that if a defendant is found guilty of three or more DUI offenses 

within the requisite time period under I.C. § 18-8005(6), the defendant has committed a felony.

State v. Craig, 117 Idaho 983, 985, 793 P.2d 215, 217 (1990); State v. Locke, 149 Idaho 641, 

643, 239 P.3d 34, 36 (Ct. App. 2010). This is true regardless of how the State characterizes prior 

DUI charges. Thus, a motion by Hayes’ counsel asserting Hayes’ first theory would have failed.

Hayes’ second theory is that the notification forms he received with his 2003 and 2004 

convictions formed a binding contract, which the State breached when it charged his 2011 DUI 

as a felony under I.C. § 18-8005. These forms notified Hayes that the State would charge a third 

DUI conviction in five years as a felony under I.C. § 18-8005. However, in 2006 the Idaho 

legislature amended I.C. § 18-8005 to make a third DUI conviction in ten years a felony. Hayes 

asserts the forms bound the State and the amendment did not apply to him. Thus, according to 

Hayes, the State could not charge his 2011 DUI as a felony because he received his 2011 DUI 

more than five years after his 2003 and 2004 convictions.

Hayes second theory is also without merit. This Court addressed a similar argument in 

State v. Lamb, 147 Idaho 133, 206 P.3d 497 (Ct. App. 2009). With his prior DUI convictions, 

the defendant in Lamb received notices that the State would charge a third DUI conviction in five 

years as a felony. Id. at 136, 206 P.3d at 500. The defendant argued those notices were part of 

his plea agreements, which the State breached by charging his third DUI as a felony under the 

amended version of I.C. § 18-8005(6) more than five years after his first DUI. Id. This Court 

rejected that argument, stating:

The 2006 amendment to I.C. § 18-8005[(6)] placed [the defendant] on 

notice that the DUI enhancement law was no longer as had been described to him 

upon his earlier convictions. The notion that the trial courts’ warnings given in 

his prior DUI cases somehow became part of [the defendant’s] plea agreements is 

frivolous. A trial court’s advisement of the risk of future penalties under a 

recidivist statute is a warning designed to deter the defendant from committing 

future offenses, not a promise that puts restraints on future prosecutions. It 

certainly does not constitute a promise that the law will, with respect to the 

defendant, never change.

Lamb, 147 Idaho at 137, 206 P.3d at 501 (internal citations omitted).

The same reasoning applies to Hayes’ second theory. The notification forms he received 

with his prior DUI convictions were not binding contracts, part of his plea agreements, or 

promises that the law, with respect to him, would not change. Rather, the forms were warnings

meant to deter Hayes from reoffending. The 2006 amendment to I.C. § 18-8005(6) put Hayes on 
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notice that the law had changed. Thus, Hayes’ theory that the notification forms were binding 

upon the State is frivolous, and a motion by Hayes’ counsel asserting that theory would have 

failed.

Because the district court would not have granted a motion under either of Hayes’ 

theories, Hayes’ claim that counsel should have moved for dismissal of his felony DUI fails both 

prongs of the Strickland test.

Finally, Hayes argues his counsel failed to move to dismiss his prior DUI convictions. 

Hayes’ asserts the forms he received with his 2003 and 2004 DUI convictions were promises that 

induced his prior guilty pleas. According to Hayes, the State failed to honor those promises 

when it charged his third DUI as a felony.

As discussed above, the forms were not promises, contracts, or part of Hayes’ plea 

agreements. Thus, the forms did not create any basis for Hayes to rely on in making his prior 

guilty pleas. Further, regardless of whether the forms were promises, the Idaho Supreme Court 

held in State v. Weber, 140 Idaho 89, 92, 90 P.3d 314, 317 (2004) that a defendant has no right to 

collaterally attack the validity of prior DUI convictions used to support a charge of felony DUI,

unless the prior convictions were obtained in violation of the defendant’s right to counsel. 

Because Hayes’ prior DUI convictions were not obtained in violation of his right to counsel, he 

cannot collaterally attack their validity in this proceeding. Thus, the district court would not 

have granted a motion collaterally attacking the validity of Hayes’ prior DUI convictions, and his

claim that counsel should have moved for dismissal of his prior DUI convictions fails both 

prongs of the Strickland test.

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III.

CONCLUSION

Hayes’ plea was not coerced and his counsel was not ineffective for failing to seek 

dismissal of his felony DUI charge and prior DUI convictions. The district court’s order denying 

post-conviction relief is affirmed. No costs or attorney fees are awarded on appeal.

Judge GUTIERREZ and Judge HUSKEY CONCUR.

 

2 Hayes requests $3,500 in attorney fees for paralegal services on appeal. Because Hayes 

is not the prevailing party, we decline to award costs or attorney fees. See I.C. § 12-121; Idaho 

Appellate Rule 41; Rendon v. Paskett, 126 Idaho 944, 945, 894 P.2d 775, 776 (Ct. App. 1995).