FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

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No. 1D17-4240

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BETTY CAITLIN NICOLE SMITH,

Appellant,

v.

ZACHARY TAYLOR DANIEL,

Appellee.

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On appeal from the Circuit Court for Madison County.

E. Bailey Browning, III, Judge.

June 4, 2018

PER CURIAM.

Appellant, the mother, appeals that portion of the “Final 

Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage with Dependent or Minor 

Child” ordering shared parental responsibility and granting

supervised parenting time between the parties’ minor child and 

Appellee, the father. Because those provisions of the final 

judgment ignore an unexpired Kentucky Domestic Violence Order 

of Protection entered against the father, and for additional reasons 

discussed below, we reverse.

A trial court has “broad discretion” in determining timesharing matters and parenting plans, and its decision will not be 

disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. J.N.S. v. 

A.M.A., 194 So. 3d 559, 560 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016); Miller v. Miller, 
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842 So. 2d 168, 169 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003). In the present case, 

however, we hold the trial court did abuse its discretion by failing 

to accord full faith and credit due the Kentucky Domestic Violence 

Order of Protection under 18 U.S.C. § 2265(a)1 and section 

741.315(2), Florida Statutes (2016).2 See also § 61.526(1), Fla. Stat.

(2016).3 Significantly, the Order of Protection prohibits the father 

from coming within 500 feet of the minor child. By granting the 

father “parenting time,” even though supervised, the final order 

directly contravenes the explicit terms of the Order of Protection. 

Furthermore, the Order of Protection was direct and 

unrefuted evidence of domestic violence against the mother and 

the minor child by the father. Although the trial court did find that 

domestic violence occurred during the marriage because the father 

 1 18 U.S.C. § 2265(a) states in pertinent part: “Any protection 

order that is consistent with subsection (b) of this section by the 

court of one State . . . shall be accorded full faith and credit by the 

court of another State . . . and enforced by the court . . . of the other 

State . . . .” Subsection (b) requires that the issuing state shall have 

had jurisdiction over the parties and given reasonable notice and 

an opportunity to be heard to the party against whom the order is 

sought. Here, the Order of Protection recites that the court had 

jurisdiction and Appellee (“Respondent” per the order) “was 

provided with reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard.” 

Appellee has not challenged the order in any way.

2 Section 741.315(2), Fla. Stat., states: 

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. s. 2265, an injunction for 

protection against domestic violence issued by a court of 

a foreign state must be accorded full faith and credit by 

the courts of this state and enforced by a law enforcement 

agency as if it were the order of a Florida court . . . .

3 Section 61.526(1), Fla. Stat.—appearing in Florida’s 

Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act—

requires a Florida court to “recognize and enforce a child custody 

determination of a court of another state . . . .” The Kentucky

Domestic Violence Order of Protection grants temporary custody 

of the minor child to Appellant.
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did not refute the mother’s allegations of the violence, there is 

nothing in the final order suggesting that the trial court seriously 

considered this finding in carrying out its duty to determine the 

best interests of the child according to the provisions of sections 

61.13(2)(c)2.4 and 61.13(3)(m),5 Florida Statutes (2016). Nor can 

the court’s pronouncement that the father should enjoy shared 

parental responsibility and visitation with the minor child be 

reconciled to its crediting of the mother’s testimony that the 

domestic violence “did substantial emotional damage to the Child” 

and “that the Child’s conditions and [medical] status require 

special consideration and attention by the Court.” 

In addition, apart from giving a passing mention to domestic 

violence, which, as previously noted, is a factor to be considered 

under section 61.13(3)(m), the final order is otherwise devoid of 

any suggestion that the trial court considered the remaining

factors in section 61.13(3)(a)-(t), Florida Statutes (2016), in order 

to determine the best interests of the child. See Bainbridge v. Pratt, 

68 So. 3d 310, 313 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (concluding that while 

“there is no statutory requirement that a trial court engage in a 

discussion as to each of the factors [in section 61.13(3)], a 

discussion of the relevant factors can be helpful in determining 

whether the trial court’s judgment is supported by competent, 

substantial evidence”). For this reason, we conclude that the trial 

court’s award of shared parental responsibility and parenting time 

is not based on competent, substantial evidence.

Thus, we reverse that portion of the “Final Judgment of 

Dissolution of Marriage with Dependent or Minor Child” relating 

to shared parental responsibility and parenting time. We remand 

the case to the trial court with instructions for it to reconsider, and 

if necessary, to take additional evidence on and make findings 

 4 Section 61.13(2)(c)2., Florida Statutes, provides that when 

considering whether to order shared parental responsibility and 

time-sharing, “the court shall consider evidence of domestic 

violence . . . as evidence of detriment to the child.”

5 Section 61.13(3)(m), Florida Statutes, states that one of the 

factors to be evaluated in determining the best interests of the 

child is “[e]vidence of domestic violence . . . .”
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concerning, the Kentucky Domestic Violence Protection Order and 

the best interests of the child, as those factors directly affect the 

issues of shared parental responsibility and parenting time.

AFFIRMED, in part, REVERSED, in part, and REMANDED for 

further proceedings.

LEWIS, ROBERTS, and JAY, JJ., concur.

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Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

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Betty Smith, pro se, Appellant.

Zachary Daniel, pro se, Appellee.