United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted December 12, 2016*

Decided December 13, 2016

Before

MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge

DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge

No. 16-3237

ELAINE J. LEE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

SCOTT NASATIR, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States

District Court for the Northern District

of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 16 C 7528

Milton I. Shadur,

Judge.

O R D E R

Elaine Lee, a school psychologist, claims in this suit under Title VII of the Civil 

Rights Act of 1964, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2, that because she is African American she is 

given more work than her white peers. (Lee’s pro se complaint identifies as defendants 

four employees of School District 89 in suburban Cook County, Illinois, but under 

Title VII only the school district, not an individual employee, is amenable to suit. 

 

* The defendants were not served with process in the district court and are not 

participating in this appeal. We have unanimously agreed to decide the case without 

oral argument because the issues have been authoritatively decided. FED. R.

APP. P. 34(a)(2)(B).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 16-3237 Page 2

See Passananti v. Cook Cnty., 689 F.3d 655, 677 (7th Cir. 2012); Thanongsinh v. Bd. of Educ., 

462 F.3d 762, 772 n.7 (7th Cir. 2006).) After Lee filed her complaint on July 25, 2016, the 

district court—sua sponte—ordered her to submit a copy of the right-to-sue letter she 

had received from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. When Lee 

complied, the district court—again sua sponte—dismissed the action as untimely. The 

court reasoned that, because the EEOC’s letter is dated March 31, 2016, Lee had missed 

the 90-day deadline for filing suit after receipt of a right-to-sue letter. See 42 U.S.C. 

§ 2000e–5(f)(1) (authorizing aggrieved party to file civil action within 90 days after 

notification that EEOC has dismissed administrative charge of discrimination); DeTata 

v. Rollprint Packaging Prods. Inc., 632 F.3d 962, 967–68 (7th Cir. 2011) (explaining that 

Title VII plaintiff risks dismissal if complaint is not filed within 90 days of receiving 

right-to-sue letter).

Noncompliance with Title VII’s statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, 

not a jurisdictional impediment, DeTata, 632 F.3d at 970; Salas v. Wis. Dep’t of Corr., 

493 F.3d 913, 921 (7th Cir. 2007). A district court can dismiss defective claims 

sua sponte, but ordinarily the judge should give the plaintiff an opportunity to respond

to the perceived defect. See Dawson v. Newman, 419 F.3d 656, 660 (7th Cir. 2005); Stewart 

Title Guar. Co. v. Cadle Co., 74 F.3d 835, 836 (7th Cir. 1996). In her notice of appeal, 

however, Lee has conceded that she missed the deadline, so there is no harm in the 

court’s dismissal. And in her appellate brief Lee does not challenge the district court’s 

conclusion that her lawsuit was untimely. Instead she argues that the EEOC acted 

unlawfully in dismissing her administrative charge of discrimination. Lee’s 

disagreement with the EEOC’s decision is not a valid ground for relief. And because she 

does not contend that the district court misunderstood or misapplied the time limit in 

Title VII, we have no basis to overturn the dismissal of her lawsuit. Accordingly, the 

judgment is

 AFFIRMED.