SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY 

 APPELLATE DIVISION 

 DOCKET NO. A-0406-23 

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v.

ASHON Q. MILLER & 

TERRENCE M. MURRAY-LOACH, 

 Defendants-Respondents. 

_______________________________

Submitted January 23, 2024 – Decided January 29, 2024 

Before Judges Haas and Natali. 

On appeal from an interlocutory order of the Superior 

Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Ocean County, 

Indictment Nos. 22-05-0908 and 22-08-1535. 

Bradley D. Billhimer, Ocean County Prosecutor, 

attorney for appellant (Samuel J. Marzarella, Chief

Appellate Attorney, of counsel; William Kyle Meighan, 

Supervising Assistant Prosecutor, on the briefs). 

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for 

respondent Terrence Murray-Loach (Alexander R.

Molloy, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel 

and on the brief). 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE 

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION 

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2 A-0406-23

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for 

respondent Ashon Miller, joins in the brief of 

respondent Terrence Murray-Loach. 

PER CURIAM 

 By leave granted, the State appeals from the Law Division's order granting 

defendants' motion to suppress the evidence a police officer seized during a 

search prompted by the officer detecting the smell of marijuana in the interior 

of their car. Because we conclude that additional factfinding is necessary, we 

reverse and remand. 

I.

 By way of background, the State attempted to justify its search under the 

automobile exception to the general requirement that law enforcement officers 

obtain a warrant before conducting a search of the person or private property of 

an individual. State v. Witt, 223 N.J. 409, 422 (2015). Under the automobile 

exception, a police officer may conduct a warrantless search of a motor vehicle 

during a lawful roadside stop "in situations where: (1) the police have probable 

cause to believe the vehicle contains evidence of a criminal offense; and (2) the 

circumstances giving rise to probable cause are unforeseeable and spontaneous." 

State v. Rodriguez, 459 N.J. Super. 13, 22 (App. Div. 2019) (citing Witt, 223 

N.J. at 447-48). 
3 A-0406-23

At the time of the December 1, 2020 stop and search involved in this case, 

"New Jersey courts . . . recognized that the smell of marijuana itself constitutes 

probable cause that a criminal offense ha[s] been committed and that additional 

contraband might be present." State v. Walker, 213 N.J. 281, 290 (2013) 

(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. 

Nishina, 175 N.J. 502, 515-16 (2003)). Thus, upon detecting the smell of 

marijuana, police were authorized "to conduct a warrantless search of the 

persons in the immediate area from where the smell [had] emanated." Nishina, 

175 N.J. at 516 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Vanderveer, 285 N.J. 

Super. 475, 481 (App. Div. 1995)).1

 Before CREAMMA, the permissible scope of a search was restricted to 

areas "'strictly tied to and justified by' the circumstances which rendered its 

initiation permissible." State v. Patino, 83 N.J. 1, 11 (1980) (quoting Terry v. 

1

 On February 22, 2021, the New Jersey Cannabis Regulatory Enforcement 

Assistance and Marketplace Modernization Act ("CREAMMA") became 

effective. As our Supreme Court recently explained, "CREAMMA . . . added a 

new section in the Criminal Code stating that . . . 'the odor of cannabis or burnt 

cannabis' . . . 'shall [not] constitute reasonable articulable suspicion of a crime' 

except on school property or at a correctional facility. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10c." 

State v. Cohen, 254 N.J. 308, 328 (2023). Thus, the Court confirmed that 

N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10c "has no bearing" on searches that "predated the passage of 

CREAMMA[.]" Ibid. 

 
4 A-0406-23

Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968)). The Supreme Court recently applied this principle 

concerning the proper scope of an automobile search in Cohen. 

In that pre-CREAMMA case, the police stopped the defendant's car for a 

motor vehicle violation. Cohen, 254 N.J. at 314. As they approached the car, 

they detected the "general smell" of then-illegal raw marijuana, although they 

could not pinpoint which area(s) within the car were the source(s) of that odor. 

Id. at 325. The police also observed what appeared to be marijuana in the 

driver's beard. Id. at 314. They searched the car's passenger compartment for 

marijuana, but they found no drugs or contraband there. Id. at 315. At that 

point, the police searched the car's trunk and under the engine hood and 

discovered two guns under the hood. Ibid. The Court invalidated the search 

that went beyond the passenger area of the car because the general smell of 

marijuana was inadequate, in and of itself, to justify a further warrantless 

intrusion outside the interior of the car. Id. at 327. 

 The Court provided guidance for the resolution of other pre-CREAMMA 

cases. As a general rule, the Court held that searches that extend beyond the 

passenger compartment of a car must be justified by "facts indicating something 

more than simply detecting the smell of marijuana from the interior of the car." 
5 A-0406-23

Id. at 324. In other words, the smell of marijuana by itself can only provide 

probable cause for a search of the interior of the car. The Court stated: 

This holding in no way suggests that areas within the 

interior of the car would require separate probable

cause findings in order to conduct a warrantless search. 

We are not dividing up the interior of vehicles such that 

an officer would need to establish different or 

additional probable cause to search the front seat as 

opposed to the back seat, for example. Pursuant to the 

automobile exception, if an officer has probable cause 

to search the interior of the vehicle, that probable cause 

encompasses the entirety of the interior. 

[Id. at 327.] 

 However, if the police wish to extend the search beyond the interior of the 

car, they must be able to point to "unique facts" beyond the mere smell of 

marijuana that establish probable cause to look into other areas of the vehicle. 

Id. at 324. The Court explained: 

We are also not suggesting that the warrantless search 

of a trunk or engine compartment will always require 

separate probable cause findings. Instead, we reiterate 

that a warrantless search of a car "must be reasonable 

in scope" and "strictly tied to and justified by the 

circumstances which rendered its initiation 

permissible." Patino, 83 N.J. at 10-11. However, a 

generalized smell of raw marijuana does not justify a 

search of every compartment of an automobile. 

[Id. at 327-28.] 
6 A-0406-23

II. 

With the governing legal principles in mind, we return to the case at hand.2 

An Ocean County grand jury returned an indictment charging defendants Ashon 

Miller and Terrence Murray-Loach with second-degree unlawful possession of 

a firearm, fourth-degree possession of a large capacity ammunition magazine, 

and fourth-degree unlawful possession of a prohibited weapon. In a fourth 

count, the indictment charged Murray-Loach with second-degree certain person 

not to possess a firearm. The charges were based upon a search of defendants'

car, which resulted in the seizure of a defaced handgun with a seventeen-round 

capacity magazine and twenty cyclobenzaprine hydrochloride pills. Defendants 

filed a motion to suppress the seized items. 

 The trial judge conducted a one-day evidentiary hearing. Officer Austin 

Spagnola was the State's only witness and defendants did not present any 

testimony. Spagnola provided the following account of his search at the hearing. 

 Around 12:30 a.m. on December 1, 2020, Spagnola observed a red Nissan 

sedan with Pennsylvania license plates following a white Ford sedan too closely 

in the left lane. Spagnola began to follow the two cars. As he did, he "detected 

2

 The offenses involved in this case occurred on December 1, 2020. Therefore, 

like Cohen, this matter is a pre-CREAMMA case. 
7 A-0406-23

the odor of burnt marijuana" coming from the cars in front of him.3 Spagnola 

followed the cars for about thirty blocks and then executed a motor vehicle stop 

of the Nissan for the traffic violation of following too closely and because he 

smelled marijuana emanating from it.4

 Spagnola approached the Nissan and saw that the front windows were 

down. He smelled burnt marijuana. Miller was driving the car and MurrayLoach was in the passenger seat. Both men were cooperative. After reviewing 

Miller's driver's license and registration, Spagnola called for a backup unit. It 

arrived a few minutes later. 

 Spagnola then asked defendants to exit the car. They cooperated. 

Spagnola searched the men "for weapons and contraband," but found nothing. 

Spagnola continued to smell marijuana coming from the car. Based upon the 

smell of marijuana, Spagnola began to search the interior of the vehicle. 

 Spagnola started in the front passenger side of the car, including the glove 

compartment. He then proceeded clockwise around the vehicle by moving next 

3

 Spagnola had been "trained in the detection of the odors of [Controlled 

Dangerous Substances], specifically . . . [b]urnt and raw marijuana." 

 

4

 Spagnola radioed another officer to pull over the Ford sedan. The officer 

stopped that car about two blocks further up the road. The officer found 

marijuana in the Ford sedan. 
8 A-0406-23

to the rear passenger side, to the rear driver's side, and then to the front driver's 

side of the car. This search took approximately three minutes. 

Spagnola testified that he found nothing of evidentiary value in the front 

of the car. However, in the back seat he found "two pairs of bolt cutters, a ski 

mask and a pair of gloves, which [Spagnola] believed were commonly 

associated with burglar tools." Spagnola testified he was not aware of any 

reported burglaries in the area that evening. 

 Spagnola could still smell marijuana. Based only on that smell, he 

searched the Nissan's trunk. Because there were a number of different items in 

the trunk, this search took approximately six-and-a-half minutes to complete. 

Spagnola found a prescription pill bottle and some suspected prescription pills 

in the trunk. He did not find any marijuana. 

 However, the marijuana smell persisted. Spagnola testified that because 

he "hadn't found any marijuana yet and [he] could smell the marijuana[,]" he 

returned to the front passenger seat area of the car to perform "another sweep." 

 After he went into the passenger side front door with his flashlight, 

Spagnola said he saw for the first time that the side panel of the center console5

5

 Spagnola described the location of the panel as follows: "I observed on the 

side of the center console on the passenger side, the panel, if you were sitting in 
9 A-0406-23

had "tool marks" on it, which the officer described as "[d]ents and scratches on 

the plastic [panel] itself." Spagnola testified that the panel "wasn't properly put 

back, so there was a gap behind it . . . ." Spagnola testified that he had been 

trained at the police academy to identify hidden compartments, which he called 

"traps," that were used to hide contraband in cars. He could tell that the panel 

had been "manipulated before." Based upon the dents and scratches on the 

panel, the fact that the panel was separated from where it should have been, the 

visible gap behind the panel, and the continued smell of marijuana inside the 

car, Spagnola believed he had located a "trap." 

 Spagnola testified that because of the gap behind the panel, he "just had 

to pull it back a little bit, and [he] could see that there was a firearm behind 

there." Spagnola testified that he put his fingers into the gap behind the panel 

and pulled it back. He did not use any tools to accomplish this. 

After he removed the gun, Spagnola found that it was loaded, had a large 

capacity magazine, and no serial numbers. Spagnola arrested both defendants. 

The entire search of the car from beginning to end had taken 

approximately fifteen minutes. No marijuana was found. 

the passenger side, the panel that would be touching your left leg, it had tool 

marks on it and it wasn't properly put back on to the vehicle." 
10 A-0406-23

Spagnola's written report of the incident did not provide the details of the 

search the officer related in his testimony at the hearing. Instead, the report 

merely stated that "[a] full and complete search of the vehicle was completed." 

There was no mention of the discovery of the panel, the tool marks on it, or the 

gap behind it. Spagnola also did not describe in the report how he accessed the 

handgun behind the panel. Although the report states that photographs of 

defendants' vehicle were taken, the State did not introduce those photographs 

into evidence at the hearing. 

 Spagnola's patrol car was parked behind defendants' vehicle, and the 

search was recorded on the car's dash camera. The State played the Mobile 

Vehicle Recording (MVR) of the search at the hearing. We have reviewed the 

MVR. It shows Spagnola going into defendants' car as he conducted his search, 

opening and searching the trunk, and returning to the front passenger door. The 

MVR does not depict anything that occurred inside the car. 

At some point during the incident, a sergeant arrived at the scene, 

apparently to provide supervision. At approximately the thirty-minute, fiftysecond mark of the MVR, Spagnola tells someone off camera: "There was a 

handgun in this car. It was underneath the plastic panel in the front of the car. 

I popped it open because it was loose and there's a handgun under there." 
11 A-0406-23

Spagnola and the sergeant then walk to the front passenger door of the car, and 

look in. Spagnola tells the sergeant: "All the panels in the car are loose. I 

popped this panel here." 

At the forty-four minute, thirty-nine second mark of the MVR, Spagnola 

and the sergeant return to the front passenger door. Spagnola states: 

I searched the whole car, got into the trunk and seen all 

the stuff and the ski mask in the back seat. You know 

what, let me go pop that plastic off that panel in the 

front because it looked loose. And that's where I found 

it. You see that plastic that's gone here? 

The sergeant replied, "I saw. Is that where it was, right there?" Spagnola told 

the sergeant, "In that little cubby, yeah. And it had everything pushed up against 

it." 

On cross-examination, defendant Miller's attorney played a portion of the 

MVR that depicted Spagnola searching the front passenger side of the car. The 

following colloquy occurred: 

Q: Okay, you said you popped open the panel, 

correct. 

A: Correct. 

Q: What do you mean by that? Is that when you 

pulled it open? 

A: I guess that's the motion I did use, yes. 
12 A-0406-23

Q: Okay. 

A. I pulled it open and I could see the gun there. 

 At the fifty-one minute mark of the MVR, the officers are looking inside 

the front driver's side door. They find wires that Spagnola states appear to have 

been "spliced." The sergeant asks whether the car may have been "hotwired," 

while Spagnola presents a possible explanation that the wires may be associated 

with a "trap." At no point on the MVR does Spagnola state that the panel where 

the gun was found was a "trap." 

 Thus, there are several inconsistencies between the statements Spagnola 

made at the scene on December 1, 2020 and his testimony at the suppression 

hearing. On the one hand, Spagnola stated during the incident that he saw that 

the panel was loose and that he "popped" the plastic off the panel and found the 

gun. At the suppression hearing, however, he stated he noticed tool marks on 

the panel and saw "there was a gap behind it." From his training, he testified he 

believed the panel was a "trap" containing the marijuana that he smelled. 

Spagnola testified he "just had to pull [the panel] back a little bit, and [he] could 

see that there was a firearm behind there." He did not testify that he "popped" 

the panel off or removed it from the car. 
13 A-0406-23

 Unfortunately, the trial judge did not clearly resolve these conflicting 

statements in deciding to grant defendants' suppression motion and she did not 

provide the same level of detail as we have set forth above. The judge began 

her written decision by making very strong credibility findings in Spagnola's 

favor. The judge stated: 

Upon review of the MVR footage and in consideration

of the testimony provided, the court finds Spagnola's 

testimony credible. He maintained direct eye contact 

while being questioned. He was forthright in his 

answers on both direct and cross[-]examination, and he 

was not evasive in his answers. He was able to describe 

the area in which the stop took place, certain 

observations leading up to the stop of the subject 

vehicle, and his narrative was largely corroborated by 

video evidence. 

The trial judge ruled that because Spagnola searched the trunk of the car 

based solely on the smell of marijuana coming from the car, the pills found there 

had to be suppressed under Cohen. The State does not challenge that ruling on 

appeal. 

However, the judge also suppressed the handgun found behind the console 

panel. The judge ruled that Spagnola's 

search of the . . . "side panel" area exceeded the

permissible constitutional scope authorized by the 

automobile exception, particularly in light of Officer 

Spagnola's manipulation of a panel in the vehicle that 

he acknowledges was not designed to be removed. Not 
14 A-0406-23

only did Officer Spagnola interfere with the structure 

of the passenger compartment when he "popped" the 

panel off, the officer's statement on the scene indicates 

that the "loose" appearance of the panel was consistent 

with other panels in the vehicle. Though the officer 

indicated that he observed "tool marks" on the panel, 

nothing in the record suggest to the court that the officer 

was acting on more than a hunch when expanding the 

search based on a generalized odor into closed 

compartments and even the internal structure of the

vehicle. 

The State thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration, which the trial 

judge granted in order "to provide more specific reasoning under the recently 

decided" Cohen case. After revisiting its prior decision, however, the judge 

again suppressed the handgun. The judge stated that she could 

not find under the totality of the circumstances, 

including consideration given to testimony describing 

marks on the panel, that the State established sufficient 

probable cause by a preponderance of the evidence to 

expand the scope of the search by interfering with the 

structure of the passenger compartment in order to gain 

access to the internal structure of the vehicle. Probable 

cause to search the entirety of the interior or passenger 

compartment does not necessarily extend to whichever 

internal zones of the vehicle may be accessed by 

dismantling the vehicle components from therein. 

 We subsequently granted the State's motion for leave to appeal. 
15 A-0406-23

III. 

 On appeal, the State argues that the trial judge "erred in finding the search 

of the panel in the interior of the vehicle concealing a secret compartment to be 

beyond the scope of the automobile exception." However, we are unable to 

address this contention because the trial judge did not adequately resolve the 

factual discrepancies between Spagnola's remarks at the scene and his 

subsequent suppression hearing testimony. 

Our review of a trial court's decision on a motion to suppress is limited. 

State v. Robinson, 200 N.J. 1, 15 (2009). In reviewing a motion to suppress 

evidence, we must uphold the court's factual findings, "so long as those findings 

are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record." State v. Rockford, 

213 N.J. 424, 440 (2013) (quoting Robinson, 200 N.J. at 15). Additionally, we 

defer to findings that are "substantially influenced by [the trial judge's] 

opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and to have the 'feel' of the case, which 

a reviewing court cannot enjoy." Ibid. (alteration in original) (quoting 

Robinson, 200 N.J. at 15). We do not, however, defer to a trial court's legal 

conclusions, which we review de novo. Ibid. 

However, "'where the focus of the dispute is . . . alleged error in the trial 

judge's evaluation of the underlying facts and the implications to be drawn 
16 A-0406-23

therefrom,' the traditional scope of review is expanded." N.J. Div. of Youth & 

Family Servs. v. M.M., 189 N.J. 261, 279 (2007) (quoting In re Guardianship of 

J.T., 269 N.J. Super. 172, 188-89 (App. Div. 1993)). In those circumstances, 

we must reverse a trial judge's determination where his or her findings go "so 

wide of the mark that a mistake must have been made." Ibid. (quoting C.B. 

Snyder Realty, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 233 N.J. Super. 65, 69 (App. Div. 

1989)). 

Applying these standards, we are unable to reconcile the trial judge's 

findings in this matter. As noted above, Spagnola testified that upon entering 

the front passenger side door of the car for a second time, he noticed tool marks 

on the side panel and an open gap behind it. Spagnola testified he believed this 

might have been a "trap" designed to conceal contraband. He did not testify that 

he "popped" the panel off or removed it. Instead, he explained that he pulled 

the panel toward him with his fingers and saw the gun inside. 

Spagnola's statements at the scene did not contain this level of detail. He 

did not mention the tool marks or the suspected "trap" on the passenger side 

panel. He did not state that he pulled the panel toward him and saw the gun 

before he retrieved it from behind the panel. In his comments to the sergeant, 

Spagnola merely stated that all the panels in the car were "loose" and he 
17 A-0406-23

"popped" off the plastic of the panel next to the front passenger seat and found 

the gun. Thus, the narrow actions Spagnola described he took at the scene were 

certainly more intrusive on their face than the more detailed steps Spagnola 

recounted at the suppression hearing. 

To further cloud the issue, the only time that the parties addressed the 

apparent discrepancies with Spagnola at the suppression hearing was during 

cross-examination when defense counsel asked the officer what he meant by 

saying he "popped open the panel." At that point, Spagnola explained that he 

"pulled it open and [he] could see the gun there." 

From the statements made in her written decision, it appears the trial judge 

relied more upon Spagnola's statements at the scene and rejected his explanation 

of his actions at the suppression hearing. However, the judge found all of 

Spagnola's testimony to be credible. If Spagnola's suppression hearing 

testimony was credible, he was concerned about a "trap" that his training taught 

him would be evidenced by the tool marks he stated he saw on the panel and the 

fact that the panel looked like it had previously been manipulated. The gap he 

saw behind the panel allowed him to move the panel toward him with his fingers 

and see the gun. Based on that testimony, if indeed it was credible, Spagnola's 

search may have been permissible under our decision in State v. Nunez, 262 N.J. 
18 A-0406-23

Super. 251 (App. Div. 1993)6 and the Supreme Court's decision in Cohen.7 

Conversely, a different result might be required if the judge specifically found 

that Spagnola's claim that he suspected that the tool marks on, and the gap 

behind the panel indicated it was a "trap" that could contain marijuana was not 

credible, or that Spagnola saw the loose panel, did not peek behind it, and simply 

yanked if off the car hoping to find contraband. 

In short, the trial judge's crediting of the entirety of Spagnola's testimony 

cannot be harmonized with her conclusion that the officer was acting on no more 

than "a hunch" when he either pulled back the panel with his fingers to look 

6

 In Nunez, a trooper conducting a warrantless search pursuant to the automobile 

exception noticed a half-inch gap under the rear window on the passenger side 

of the defendant's car. Id. at 254. The trooper had training and experience that 

had taught him to identify hidden compartments in vehicles, much like Spagnola 

testified to having undergone at the police academy. Ibid. By forcing his fingers 

and arm into the gap, the trooper in Nunez was able to retrieve a plastic shopping 

bag that contained cashier checks totaling $31,000 and cocaine. Ibid. Under 

the totality of these circumstances, we found that "as a result of the officer's 

training and experience, the trooper had reason to believe that the vehicle 

contained secret compartments." Id. at 256. Therefore, the search was justified 

under the automobile exception despite any physical manipulation of the 

structural interior of the car. Ibid. 

7

 Spagnola's discovery of the "trap" might have also given him the extra 

justification Cohen dictates is needed, beyond smelling marijuana, to look 

behind the panel, pull it forward with his fingers, and find and seize the gun 

hidden behind it, if indeed that is how the search actually occurred. Cohen, 254 

N.J. at 324. 
19 A-0406-23

inside, or "popped" it off from the car without already knowing there was a gun 

behind it. The judge did not explain why she seemingly accepted only a portion 

of Spagnola's "credible" testimony and she did not make detailed findings as to 

how Spagnola actually retrieved the gun from behind the panel. 

Accordingly, a remand is required. Because we are concerned that the 

judge would have a commitment to her previous view of the evidence, in fairness 

to her and the parties, we direct that a new suppression hearing occur before a 

different judge. Nothing within this opinion forecasts any views on the merits 

of the State's suppression motion nor on the question of whether defendants may 

be entitled to prevail on the issues once they are fully considered by the trial 

court and adequate findings of fact and conclusions of law are made. 

Reversed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.