Opinion filed April 24, 201 4



### In The 

# Eleventh Court of Appeals

__________ No. 11

- 1 3

- 00 335

- C V

__________ IN THE INTEREST OF H.E.M.T

. AND E.A.T

. , CHILD REN

On Appeal from the 29 th District Court Palo Pinto County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. C44989

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N This is an appe al from an order terminat ing the parental rights of the mother
and father of H.E.M.T. and E.A.T. (the children). 1 The mother voluntarily relinquished her parental rights and did not file an appeal

. The fat he r timely filed an appeal. In a single issue on appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support termination. We affirm

. Termination Standard and Findings
The termination of parental rights must be supported by clear and convincing evidence. T EX

. F AM

. C ODE A NN

. § 161.001 ( West 201 4 ). To determine if the evidence is legally sufficient in a parental termination case, we review all of

1 We note that the trial court also terminated parental rights with respect to a third child, M.R.T., who has the same mother but a different father. N either of M.R.T.’s parents has filed an appeal.2 the evidence in the light m ost favorable to the finding and determine whether a rational trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its finding

was true. In re J.P.B. , 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005). To determine if the evidence is factually sufficient, we g ive due deference to the finding and determine whether, on the entire record, a factfinder could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the allegations against the parent. In re C.H. , 89 S.W.3d 17, 25

– 26 (Tex. 2002). To terminate parental rights, it must be shown by clear and convincing evidence that the parent has committed one of the acts listed in Section 161.001(1)(A )

– ( T) and that termination is in the best interest of the
child. F AM

. § 161.001. In this case, the trial court found that Appellant had committed t hree of the acts listed in Section 161.001(1)

— those found in subsections (D)
, ( N ) , and (O)

. Specifically, the trial court found that Appellant had placed or allowed the children
to remain i n conditions or surroundings that endangered their physical or emotional
well

- being
, that he had constructively abandoned the children , and that he had failed to comply with the provisions of a court order as necessary for him to obtain
the return of the c hildren

. The trial court also found, pursuant to
Section 161.001(2), that termination of Appellant ’s parental rights would be in the
best interest of the children. In his brief, Appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the b est interest finding.
Evidence at Trial
T he Department of Family and Protective Services removed the children from their parents in June 2012 after M.R.T., the children’s half

- sister who was less than eight months old, was seriously injured while in the care of the mother and
M.R.T.’s father. T he Department was appointed as the children’s managing
conservator at that time

. The final hearing o n termination occurred in October
2013.3 The evidence shows that , prior to the incident involving M.R.T. and her father, the children had been exposed to domestic violence involving Appellant

. When Appellant lived with the mother and the children, Appellan t injured the mother and committed “ongoing domestic violence” against her in the presence of
the children

. Appellant was arrested for “beating [the mother] up.” At the time of trial, Appellant was in a Florida prison. He had been convicted of assault a nd of trafficking in stolen property. Donna Massey, the Department’s conservatorship worker, testified that the Department had put a plan in place so that Appellant could be reunited with his children but that, to her knowledge, Appellant had not fulfilled any portion of his plan. Massey contacted Appellant in prison and requested that he fill out a child
resource form. She informed Appellant that, if he would send her information about relatives that would be a suitable placement for the children, the De partment would place them with those relatives. Appellant subsequently express ed a desire that his parental rights not be terminated and that the children remain in foster care until his release from prison. According to Massey, Appellant had no contact whatsoever with the children during the time that the children were in the care of the Department. Appellant did not visit the children, nor di d he sen d any cards, letters, or gifts to them. Massey testified that Appellant cannot support his
children

. Additional evidence relating to the best interest of the children was also presented at trial but need not be detailed here because Appellant does not
chall enge the best interest finding. Analysis
T he Departmen t produced clear and convincing evidence from which the trial court could reasonably have formed a firm belief that Appellant had constructively abandoned the child ren

. To support a finding of constructive
abandonment
, the Department must have shown that the child ren ha d been in the4 managing conservatorship of the Department for at least six months , that the Department had made reasonable efforts to return the child ren, that Appellant had not regularly visit ed or maintain ed significant contact with the child ren, and that Appellant ha d demonstrated an inability to provide the child ren with a safe
environment. See F AM

. § 161.001(1)(N). The undisputed evidence show s that the Department had been the children’s managing conserv ator f or over a year . The
record also shows tha t the Department had made reason able efforts to return the children to Appellant or to his family , that Appellant had not regularly visited or maintained significant contact with the children , and that Appell ant had demonstrated an inability to provide the children with a safe environment.
Therefore , we hold that t he evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s finding under Section 161.001(1)( N )

. See In re J.A.L. , No. 11

- 13

- 00191

- CV, 2013 WL 7083191 (Tex. App.

— Eastland Dec. 19, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.); In re N.R.T. , 338 S.W.3d 667, 673

– 75 (Tex. App.

— Amarillo 2011, no pet.). Because a finding that a parent committed one of the acts listed in
Section 161.001(1)(A)

– (T) is all that is required under that statute, we need not
address Appellant ’s contentions that the evidence is insufficient to support the trial
court’s finding s under subsec tion s ( D ) and ( O )

. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 47.1. Appellant ’s sole issue on appeal is overruled. This Court’s Ruling
We affirm t he tria l court’s order of termination.

April 24, 2014 MIKE WILLSON
Panel consists of: Wright, C.J., JUSTICE Willson , J., and Bailey , J.