IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-10330

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

MAURICE LAMONT DAVIS; ANDRE LEVON GLOVER, 

 Defendants - Appellants

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 3:15-CR-94-2

USDC No. 3:15-CR-94-1

ON REMAND FROM THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, JONES, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Appellants Andre Levon Glover and Maurice Lamont Davis were 

convicted for a series of robberies committed in June 2014 at Murphy Oil 

locations in the Dallas area. Both Appellants were convicted under the Hobbs 

Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a), for conspiracy to interfere with and aiding and 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

November 12, 2019

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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abetting interference with commerce by robbery.1 They were also convicted on

firearms charges under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).2 Davis alone was convicted for

being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2). In 

their original appeals, we affirmed the district court’s judgment in full. United 

States v. Davis, 677 F. App’x 933, 935–36 (5th Cir. 2017) (per curiam). The 

Appellants petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari. Following its decision 

in Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018), the Court remanded this case to 

our court “for further consideration in light of” Dimaya. Davis v. United States,

138 S. Ct. 1979, 1979–80 (2018) (mem.).

On remand, we affirmed the Appellants’ convictions and sentences on all 

counts save Count Two. United States v. Davis, 903 F.3d 483, 486 (5th Cir. 

2018). Finding the residual clause of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) unconstitutionally

vague in light of Dimaya, we vacated the Appellants’ convictions and sentences

on Count Two and remanded for entry of a revised judgment. Id. While the 

Appellants’ petitions for rehearing were pending, the United States petitioned

for certiorari on the issue of the residual clause in this context, which the 

Supreme Court granted. We stayed proceedings on the petitions for rehearing 

pending the Court’s decision. The Court agreed that § 924(c)’s residual clause 

was unconstitutionally vague, so it affirmed our decision on the Count Two 

convictions. Because we had stayed the petition for rehearing pending the 

Court’s decision, it vacated in part and remanded the case to our court to 

 

1 Glover was convicted under the Hobbs Act on Counts One, Three, Four, Five, and 

Six; Davis was convicted on Counts One, Five, and Six.

2 These were Counts Two and Seven, which charged the Appellants with using, 

carrying, and brandishing firearms during and in relation to, and possessing and brandishing 

firearms in furtherance of, a crime of violence. Glover’s conviction on Count Seven also 

included aiding and abetting the brandishing of firearms. Our original ruling that the 

conviction on Count Seven remains valid following Dimaya because it involved a crime of 

violence under the elements clause which was not altered. See 903 F.3d at 484-85 

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address in the first instance the petition for rehearing which included the issue 

of whether we should order a resentencing. United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 

2319, 2336 (2019).

To summarize, we continue to affirm all convictions save Count Two

which we vacate. We therefore remand for entry of a revised judgment of 

conviction consistent with this opinion. We deny the petition for rehearing as 

to the convictions. Turning to the question of resentencing, we grant the 

petition for rehearing in part and vacate the Appellants’ sentences in full, 

remanding their sentences to the district court for resentencing in full.3 See

Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476, 507 (2011) (“Because a district court’s 

original sentencing intent may be undermined by altering one portion of the 

calculus, an appellate court when reversing one part of a defendant’s sentence 

may vacate the entire sentence . . . .” (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted)). We do not opine on how the district court should resentence the 

Appellants.

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED in part, VACATED in 

part, and REMANDED for entry of a revised judgment and for resentencing.

 

3 While not dispositive, the Government concedes that a full resentencing is 

appropriate here.

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