Filed 12/26/14 In re J.C. CA2/8 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b) . This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

In re J.C. , A Perso n Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law

. B 255676

LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

M.C. , Defendant and Appellant. (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. CK60359 )

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Carlos E. Vasquez , Judge

. Affirmed

.
Roni Keller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Richard D. Weiss, Acting County Counsel, Dawyn R. Harrison, Assistant County Counsel, and Tyson B. Nelson, Deputy County Counsel , for Plaintiff and Respondent

.

__________________________2

Father M.C. appeals from the juvenile court orders taking jurisdiction of his son
J.C. and placing him in foster care. We affirm because the court assumed jurisdiction in part b ased on misconduct by the mother and because substantial evidence supports the jurisdictional and dispositional findings.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 1
On March 12, 2014, mother C.M. pled no contest to a petition filed by the Los Angeles County Departme nt of Children and Family Services (DCFS) that asked the juvenile court to assume jurisdiction o ver three

- month

- old J.C. because the child was born with methamphetamine in his system and mother had a long history of drug abuse. (Welf & Inst. Code, § 300, subd. (b).) Father submitted on the petition based on the various DCFS reports and other documentary evidence admitted in evidence. The trial

court ass umed jurisdiction of J.C. based on J.C.’s positive test, mother ’s drug abuse, and
on father’s failure t o protect J.C. from mother’s drug abuse. At an April 7, 2014 dispositional hearing
, the trial court denied reunification services for mother, placed the child in foster care, and ordered reunification services for father. The trial court declined to place the child with either father or paternal grandparents based on father ’s and mother’s previous history with the DCFS, which
included incidents of domestic violence and drug use and questions about father’s mental
health

. Father contends the trial court er red because: (1) there was insufficient evidence that he knew or could have done anything to stop mother’s drug use during her pregnancy; and (2) there was no evidence he posed a risk of harm to J.C.

1 As with most dependency cases the background facts are somewhat lengthy. We have tailored them to fit the issues raised on appeal.3 DISCUSSION

1. Because Jurisdiction Was Proper Based o n Mother’s Conduct
, We Need Not Consider Whether It Was Also Proper Based o n Father’s Conduct
Because the juvenile court assumes jurisdiction of the child, not the parents, jurisdiction may exist based on the conduct of one parent only. In those situatio ns an appellate court need not consider jurisdictional findings based on the other parent’s conduct. ( In re I.A. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1484, 1491.) Nevertheless , we may exercise our discretion to reach the merits of the other parent’s jurisdictional cha llenge in three situations: (1) the jurisdictional finding serves as the basis for dispositional orders that are also challenged on appeal; (2) the findings could be prejudicial to the appellant or could impact the current or any future dependency proce edings; and (3) the finding could have consequences for the appellant beyond jurisdiction. ( In re Drake M. (2012)
211 Cal.App.4th 754, 762

- 763.) Father does not claim any error based on the juvenile court’s assumption of jurisdiction based on mother’s c onduct. Accordingly, DCFS contends that the general rule applies and that we should therefore affirm based on the uncontested jurisdictional findings made against mother. Although f ather contends that the Drake M. exceptions apply here, he does not expla in why, meaning he has not suggested any legal or practical consequences that might flow from this finding either within or outside the dependency proceedings. ( In re Drake M., supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 763.) We therefore deem the issue waived. (

Alli ance for Children’s Rights v. Los Angeles County Dept. of Children and Family Services (2002) 95 Cal.App.4 th 1129, 1139, fn. 4 .) We alternatively conclude on the merits that the three Drake M. exceptions are not applicable here. Even if the current juris dictional finding were erased, father is still left with an established history with DCFS based on incidents involving previous children from his relationship with mother , children over whom DCFS earlier assumed custody

. These include sustained allegation s of domestic violence, drug abuse, father’s mental health issues, and general neglect. The dispositional order in this case was based in large4

part on father’s past history and his failure to adequately address his mental health issues. Therefore the ju risdictional findings in this case did not affect the dispositional order
, and we do not see how the current findings might further prejudice father in the future. Next, we alternatively hold that the jurisdictional findings were supported by
substantial evidence.

2. Substantial Evidence Supports t he Jurisdictional Finding
Jurisdiction was sustained as to father because he failed to protect J.C. from mother’s drug abuse during her pregnancy. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300, subd. (b).)
Father contends there w as insufficient evidence to support this finding because he and mother had separated, leading him to doubt whether the child was his 2 and mother was in a drug rehab program during her pregnancy and told him she was no longer taking drugs

. B ased on this he told DC F S, “how am I supposed to protect the child when it was in the
mother’s womb and we were n’t even together at th e time. I was under the impression that she was not using anymore because that’s what she was telling me. . . . I didn’t hear about any drug use until the [social worker] called my dad and informed him that the baby was born.” We review the dependency court’s findings under the substantial evidence standard. We must affirm the court’s findings unless, after reviewing the entire record

a nd resolving all conflicts and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the order, we determine there is no substantial evidence to support them. Substantial evidence is evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value. ( In re Christopher C

. (2010)
182 Cal.App.4th 73, 84.) Father and mother began using drugs together when they were bo th around 15 years old. Although not married, they had stayed together as a couple for approximately 10 years and had two children before J.C. wa s born in Jan uary 2014. Father claimed he was unsure whether J.C. was his child because he and mother had separated, but
, before

2 Parentage was confirmed by DNA testing.5

paternity was confirmed
, believed t he child was likely his. Thus, even though the parents were no longer living together at the time of co nception, it is clear they were still romantically involved with each other. Father also told DCFS that the “[l]ast I knew she was using was the last time I used; August 2013. I though t she was doing well.” DCFS contends, and we agree, that this stateme nt gives rise to an inference that father was still doing drugs with mother when she was more than five months pregnant with J.C. , a child
h e believed was likely his own. That gives rise to another inference

– that instead of taking steps to stop mother’s drug use during the first five months of her pregnancy
, father instead abetted and encouraged it. Father challenges these inferences, claiming they are undercut by the following statements in the record: (1) his February 2014 interview where he said th at except for a one week relapse he had been s ober for a year; (2) his statement that he separated from
mother because he wanted to become sober but she w as still using drugs; (3) his statement that he asked for a paternity test because he and mother had separated and were not living together when J.C. was conceived or during the pregnancy; and (4) mother was in a substance abuse program during the pregnancy. These factual assertions are, at best, overstatements that are either unsupported by the record or overcome by the inferences discussed above that are favorable to the trial court’s jurisdictional order. We
take each in turn. (1) Father’s February 2014 statement that he had been continuously sober for six
months confirms his statement that he did drugs with mother in August 2013. His statement that he had been “working toward sobriety for 12 months” with a one

- week relapse is ambiguous at best. Given that the child was conceived in April 2013, it is reasonable to infer that mother was using drug s at that time and thereafter
, and that father
knew about it. (2) & (3) F ather’s separation from mother, presumably sometime before J.C. was conceived in April 2013, does not necessarily preclude father’s inferential knowledge of mother’s drug use during pregnancy.6

(4) F ather cites to a letter show ing that mother enrolled in a residential drug treatment program on November 18, 2013
, and mov ed out one month later. Nothing in this evidence precludes a finding that mother was using drugs before that time and that
father knew about it. Because there was sufficient evidence that father knew mother was taking drugs while she was pregnant and did nothing to protect his unborn child from her conduct, we affirm the juvenile court’s jurisdictional order.

3. Substa ntial Evidence Supports t he Dispositional Order
In order to remove a dependent child from the parents’ home there must be clear and convincing evidence of a substantial danger to the child’s health, safety, and
emotional well

- being that cannot be elimina ted by reasonable means. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 361, subd. (c)(1).) We review the juvenile court’s findings under the substantial evidence standard. ( Sheila S. v. Superior Court (2000) 84 Cal.App.4 th 872, 880

- 881.) Father planned to live with his paren ts. He contends the juvenile court should have placed the minor with him because he would have help from his parents or, alternatively, placed the minor with father’s parents and allow ed him to live in their
home. Father contends the trial court erred by removing J.C. because he had been drug

free for seven months, successfully participat ed in an outpatient treatment program, completed a parenting program, and was observed to be comfortable holding the minor and tending to his needs, including feeding and changing his diapers. A March 31, 2014, letter from father’s drug treatment program reported that even though he had good attendance and was still testing clean, his participation was “sluggish.” Father was also a “no

- show” for two tests. Given his yea rs

- long struggles with drug abuse, his seven months of sobriety did not mean that he was no longer at risk of relapsing. This is highlighted by the fact that his two older children had been removed from the home because of mother’s and father’s drug use, after which he entered a drug treatment program, suggesting that he was prone to relapses. The parents also had a history of domestic violence as recently as 2012, and father had never received a mental7

health evaluation. Based on this, we hold there was substantial evidence that J.C. would
be at risk if he were returned to father. 3

DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s jurisdictional and dispositional orders concerning appellant
C.M. are affirmed.

RUBIN, J. WE CONCUR:

BIGELOW, P. J .

FL IER, J.

3 Father asks us to take judicial notice of recent juvenile court o rders placing the minor in his care. We deny that request because the issue presented to us is whether the juvenile court’s jurisdictional and dispositional orders were correct when made. Although father may have subsequently convinced the juvenile court that custody with father was no longer detrimental to J.C., that circumstance does not change our task here.