2010 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

5-26-2010

USA v. Robert Rawlins

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Precedential

Docket No. 08-2948

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PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

 

No. 08-2948

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

ROBERT RAWLINS,

Appellant

 

On Appeal from the District Court

of the Virgin Islands

District Court No. 3-04-cr-00154-005

United States District Judge: The Honorable James T. Giles

 

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)

May 3, 2010

Before: SMITH, CHAGARES, and JORDAN, Circuit Judges

(Filed: May 26, 2010)
2

Mark D. Hodge, Esq. 

Hodge & Francois

1340 Taarneberg

St. Thomas, Virgin Islands 00802

Counsel for Appellant

Delia L. Smith, Esq.

Office of United States Attorney

5500 Veterans Drive, Suite 260

St. Thomas, Virgin Islands 00802

Counsel for Appellee

 

OPINION

 

SMITH, Circuit Judge

Robert Rawlins was a baggage handler for Worldwide

Flight Services at Cyril E. King Airport on St. Thomas, United

States Virgin Islands. He was caught using that position to help

smuggle cocaine through the airport, and was eventually

convicted of various drug crimes. Finding no error, we will

affirm. 

I. 

“As required when reviewing convictions, we recite the
3

relevant facts in the light most favorable to the government.”

United States v. Leo, 941 F.2d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 1991).

This appeal arises out of a conspiracy among employees

at Cyril E. King Airport, and others, to smuggle cocaine onto

commercial flights bound for the continental United States. The

conspirators included Alric Thomas, a cocaine supplier; Dion

Brookes, the station manager for a small airline called Air

Sunshine; and airport baggage handlers Rawlins, Bernard

Gabriel, Brent Donovan, Meleek Sylvester, and Mervin Dorival.

This group employed several methods to move cocaine

through the airport. The method the conspirators used most

often was what we will refer to for purposes of this opinion as

“tag switching” or “tag pulling.” The word “tag” refers to the

flight tags that airlines affix to checked luggage. All luggage to

be loaded onto commercial aircraft requires such a tag. The

switching the conspirators engaged in involved stealing flight

tags from legitimately checked bags and affixing those tags to

bags containing cocaine. This method allowed the cocaine to be

smuggled into the cargo holds of U.S.-bound commercial

airplanes. 

The main workspace for the tag-switching operation was

the airport’s baggage room. It was located behind the ticket

counters of several airlines, including Air Sunshine, as well as

the Transportation Security Administration (“TSA”) inspection

area. The room had two baggage belts, both of which held
 These bags were supplied by Thomas and delivered to 1

the airport by an intermediary, such as Sylvester. 

4

checked luggage intended for outgoing flights. A conspiring

baggage handler was able to select a bag that was bound for a

destination where he intended to direct the cocaine. He would

remove the bag’s flight tag, steal any valuables found inside,

then discard the plundered bag. The stolen flight tag would then

be taken to Air Sunshine’s ticket counter or office, where

Brookes was paid to hold unchecked, uninspected, untagged

bags filled with cocaine. The tag would be transferred to one 1

of the drug bags, making it appear that the bag had been checked

and inspected in the ordinary course. A baggage handler would

then transport that bag to the baggage room and place it among

other checked baggage. Finally, the bag containing drugs would

be loaded onto the flight denoted on the flight tag, along with

legitimately checked bags.

The earliest evidence of Rawlins’s involvement in this

operation pertained to the events of September 20, 2003. The

day before, Thomas had given Sylvester three suitcases filled

with cocaine, along with $60,000 in cash. Two bags were to be

loaded onto a flight to Philadelphia; the third was destined for

Newark. As agreed, Sylvester brought the suitcases to the

airport on September 20. Brookes and Dorival took them and

stored them in the Air Sunshine office. Brookes held the three

bags in his office until Rawlins delivered the tags that would

allow the two bags bound for Philadelphia to be loaded onto the
 Donovan testified that he brought the tags to the office 2

that day, but Brookes offered testimony from which the jury

could have concluded that Rawlins did so instead. Taking the

evidence in the light most favorable to the government, as we

must, we credit the testimony implicating Rawlins. 

5

plane. Either Rawlins or Brookes affixed the tags to the bags. 2

Rawlins then carried the two bags to the baggage room. 

Unfortunately for the conspirators, the tag pullers made

a mistake that day. They failed to discard the legitimate

Philadelphia-bound bags from which the two flight tags had

been stolen. A baggage handler who was not involved in the

conspiracy was loading those bags onto the plane when he

noticed that they lacked the necessary flight tags. He and a

colleague alerted TSA, which in turn ordered an X-ray scan of

all luggage intended for the Philadelphia flight. The scan

revealed the two “replacement” bags filled with cocaine. The

third bag that Sylvester had delivered to the Air Sunshine office,

however, remained there undiscovered. Sylvester contacted

Rawlins and told him that the Air Sunshine office held a

suitcase containing ten kilograms of cocaine. Rawlins agreed to

retrieve the suitcase, and returned it to Sylvester around 7:00 or

7:30 that evening. 

Rawlins’s involvement in cocaine smuggling at the

airport continued. On November 8, 2003, he removed a flight

tag from a checked bag in the baggage room, placed it in his
 Rawlins may have similarly aided a drug shipment to 3

Miami on May 1, 2004. Donovan, who by this time was

cooperating with law enforcement, brought a cocaine-filled

suitcase to the airport. He gave it to Brookes, who took it to the

Air Sunshine front desk. Rawlins promised Donovan that he

would obtain tags to place on the luggage, but it is unclear

whether he actually did so.

6

pocket, and took it to Brookes’s office. He returned with a

tagged blue bag, which he placed on the baggage belt. Later

that day, officials in Newark, New Jersey intercepted a cocainefilled bag that had been placed on Continental Flight 1902 from

St. Thomas. Rawlins was also tied to a cocaine-filled suitcase 3

discovered on February 21, 2004. Donovan obtained two tags

and brought them to Brookes. Brookes informed him that he

needed only one tag, so Donovan placed one tag on the drug bag

and restored the other to the luggage from which it had been

taken. Donovan testified that Rawlins was “involved with that

transaction,” and that Rawlins took the tagged drug bag to the

baggage room. This bag, too, was bound for Newark on

Continental Flight 1902, but Customs and Border Protection

(“CBP”) officers discovered and seized it before the flight

departed. 

The next relevant incident occurred on March 10, 2004.

The day before, Sylvester had received two kilograms of cocaine

from Thomas. Thomas instructed him to place the cocaine in a

particular green suitcase that would be checked onto Flight 1902
 On August 13, 2004, Sylvester entered into a 4

cooperation agreement with the government. He set up the

meeting with Thomas and Rawlins pursuant to that agreement.

7

by an unidentified female. Rawlins was slated to help Sylvester,

but backed out at the last minute, leaving Sylvester to pack the

cocaine into a suitcase by himself. Rawlins was present in the

baggage room, however, along with Gabriel, as Sylvester

packed the cocaine. Indeed, Sylvester asked Rawlins if he

would look out for him while he packed the cocaine, and

Rawlins told him to “go ahead.” Sylvester then built a wall of

suitcases to conceal what he was doing from security cameras in

the room. He placed the cocaine in the suitcase, and the suitcase

made it onto the flight. Immigration and Customs Enforcement

(“ICE”) agents had been tipped off about the bag, however, and

the drugs were seized at Newark Airport. After this incident,

Rawlins frequently remarked to Sylvester about how easy it was

to place drugs onto airplanes, and begged to be put in contact

with a supplier he could work with on his own. 

Meanwhile, Sylvester informed Thomas that he no longer

wished to assist with drug smuggling. When Thomas inquired

about possible replacements, Sylvester told Thomas he would

get back to him. On August 30, 2004, Sylvester called Thomas

and told him he had found someone to help him. He called

Rawlins the same day and arranged a meeting between himself,

Rawlins, and Thomas. Before Thomas arrived, Sylvester asked 4

Rawlins if he had “work[ed] anything recently.” Rawlins
8

responded that he had moved drugs through the airport on

Wednesday, August 25, 2004. When Thomas arrived, Sylvester

introduced him to Rawlins and the three men talked about

smuggling drugs through the airport. Rawlins offered to help

Thomas move drugs on American Airlines flights to Miami and

New York, and the two exchanged cell phone numbers before

parting ways. 

There was also evidence corroborating Rawlins’s

involvement in the cocaine smuggling operation that was not

attributed to a specific date. For example, Donovan testified

that baggage handlers often acted as lookouts for each other

while tag-switching occurred in the baggage room, and that

Rawlins had served as a lookout for him in the past. Brookes

identified Rawlins as one of the bag handlers whom Dorival

would send to pick up cocaine-filled bags stored in the Air

Sunshine office, though he did not say when or how often this

occurred. He also testified that Rawlins once paid him $2,000

to hold a bag containing cocaine. 

Rawlins and his cohorts were eventually arrested. A

superseding indictment returned on January 13, 2005 charged

Rawlins, Sylvester, Brookes, Dorival, Gabriel, and others with

various drug crimes. Count One charged Rawlins and eleven

others with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute five or

more kilograms of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846.

Rawlins was also charged in Counts Four, Five, Six, Seven, Ten,

and Eleven with aiding and abetting possession of cocaine with
 On Counts Four and Five, the District Court entered a 5

judgment of acquittal for Rawlins pursuant to Rule 29 of the

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.

 Our jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The 6

District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231 and 48

U.S.C. § 1612(a). 

9

intent to distribute. See 21 U.S.C. § 841. A jury convicted him

on Counts One, Six, Seven, Ten, and Eleven. Count Six related 5

to the drugs seized on September 20, 2003; Count Seven to the

drugs seized on November 8, 2003; Count Ten to the drugs

seized on February 21, 2004; and Count Eleven to the drugs

seized on March 10, 2004. 

Rawlins was sentenced to 162 months in prison. He filed

this timely appeal raising a grab bag of challenges to his

conviction. Rawlins challenges the sufficiency of Count One 6

of the indictment, and the sufficiency of the evidence against

him on several other counts. He also contends that the District

Court abused its discretion by admitting samples of cocaine into

evidence at trial, because the government failed to establish an

adequate chain of custody connecting the cocaine seized by

authorities and the cocaine tested by government chemists. 

II. 

 We begin with Rawlins’s argument that the superseding
10

indictment was invalid because Count One failed to allege a

proper timeframe for the alleged conspiracy. Specifically,

Count One alleged a conspiracy running “from a time unknown

and continuing to September[] 2004, on St. Thomas, in the

District of the Virgin Islands, and elsewhere[.]” Rawlins argues

that the indictment was inadequate because it did not specify

when this alleged conspiracy began. His argument starts with

the non-controversial premise that the essence of conspiracy is

agreement. He contends that every agreement, by definition, is

reached at a discrete point in time, and that this requires that an

indictment setting forth a conspiracy charge must identify the

date the agreement was formed. Because Rawlins did not raise

this claim in the District Court, we review for plain error.

United States v. Fuchs, 467 F.3d 889, 900 (5th Cir. 2006)

(applying plain error review to unpreserved challenge to the

sufficiency of the indictment); United States v. Stein, 233 F.3d

6, 22-23 (1st Cir. 2000) (same). “Plain” error is that which is

“obvious” and affects the defendant’s substantial rights. United

States v. Evans, 155 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir. 1998).

We use a two part test to measure the sufficiency of an

indictment. First, the indictment must “contain[] the elements

of the offense intended to be charged and sufficiently apprise[]

the defendant of what he must be prepared to meet.” United

States v. Hodge, 211 F.3d 74, 76 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Gov’t

of the Virgin Islands v. Moolenaar, 133 F.3d 246, 248 (3d Cir.

1998)). Second, it must “enable[] the defendant to plead an

acquittal or conviction in bar of future prosecutions for the same
 We have previously upheld a conviction based on an 7

indictment charging a conspiracy from a “date unknown [to]

September 8, 1999.” United States v. Givan, 320 F.3d 452, 457

(3d Cir. 2003). We did so, however, without analyzing the

sufficiency of the “date unknown” language. 

11

offense.” Id. Both of those requirements were met here. 

As to the first, we join the Ninth Circuit in holding that

“although an indictment cannot be completely open-ended, an

indictment that specifies an end date is sufficient to apprise

defendants of the charges and enable them to prepare a

defense[.]” United States v. Forrester, 592 F.3d 972, 983 (9th 7

Cir. 2010) (internal citations omitted). See also United States v.

Pease, 240 F.3d 938, 943 (11th Cir. 2001) (upholding

indictment alleging a conspiracy “[f]rom an unknown date

through on or about July 21, 1998”); United States v. Hristov,

466 F.3d 949, 954 (11th Cir. 2006) (recognizing in dicta the

sufficiency of an indictment that charged a conspiracy running

from “an unknown date through September 9, 2003”). Rawlins

mounted a vigorous defense at trial, and he does not explain

how he would have been aided by greater specificity in the

indictment. He invokes United States v. Cecil, 608 F.2d 1294

(9th Cir. 1979). Yet in Cecil, the indictment alleged a drug

conspiracy “beginning on or before July, 1975, and continuing

thereafter until on or after October, 1975[.]” Id. at 1295

(emphasis added). The Ninth Circuit reversed the defendants’

convictions because the indictment failed to allege “sufficient
 “The Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits the government 8

from ‘splitting one conspiracy into several prosecutions.’”

United States v. Rigas, __ F.3d __, No. 08-3218, 2010 WL

1880366(3d Cir. May 12, 2010) (en banc) (quoting United

States v. Becker, 892 F.2d 265, 268 (3d Cir. 1989)). 

12

facts to facilitate the proper preparation of a defense and to

ensure that the defendants were prosecuted on facts presented to

the Grand Jury.” Id. at 1297. It held that the indictment failed

to place the conspiratorial acts within any particular timeframe

because the language describing the dates of the conspiracy was

“open-ended in both directions.” Id. (emphasis added). The

case before us is distinguishable, because the timeframe of the

charged conspiracy was open-ended only as to the beginning

date. Count One explicitly identified September 2004 as the end

of the conspiracy. This was sufficient to inform Rawlins of the

charges he would face at trial, allowing him to adequately

prepare for trial. Forrester, 592 F.3d at 983; Pease, 240 F.3d at

943. 

We further hold that Rawlins’s conviction on Count One

will afford him a basis to invoke double jeopardy in future

proceedings. Hodge, 211 F.3d at 76. While Count One did not 8

provide a starting date for the alleged conspiracy, it did supply

many other details. It identified the statute Rawlins was charged

with violating, ten of his alleged co-conspirators, and the object,

manner, means, location, and end date of the alleged conspiracy.

See Forrester, 592 F.3d at 983. It also detailed at least fifteen
13

overt acts taken in furtherance of that conspiracy, and the

approximate date of each. “Uncertainty regarding a

conspiracy’s beginning and ending dates does not render an

indictment fatally defective so long as overt acts alleged in the

indictment adequately limit the time frame of the conspiracy.”

Id. (citing United States v. Laykin, 886 F.2d 1534, 1542 (9th Cir.

1989)). Here, the indictment alleged that the first overt act

occurred in November of 2002, when Gabriel allegedly

transported a suitcase containing a kilogram of cocaine to New

York, and that the last occurred on August 30, 2004. These

allegations “adequately limit[ed] the time frame of the

conspiracy.” Id. All in all, “the indictment was sufficient to

apprise [Rawlins] of the charges against him, enable him to

prepare a defense, and to avoid double jeopardy on the same

charge.” Id. We find no error, let alone plain error.

We reach our conclusion not only by reference to

precedent, but also taking into account the practical realities of

most criminal enterprises. By definition, conspiracies work in

furtherance of illegal ends. In the usual course, they are

inherently secretive affairs. See, e.g., United States v. Curry,

977 F.2d 1042, 1053 (7th Cir. 1992). They are ordinarily

formed by tacit agreement, United States v. McKee, 506 F.3d

225, 238 (3d Cir. 2007), and are unlikely to “operate with the

paper trail that generally accompanies legitimate business

agreements.” United States v. Price, 13 F.3d 711, 728 (3d Cir.

1994). For these reasons, only the conspirators may know

precisely when their unlawful combination came into being. It
14

is unrealistic to expect that in every case a grand jury will be

able to identify that date, despite an abundance of evidence

before it. Recognizing this practical reality, we decline to

impose such a requirement. 

III. 

Rawlins argues that there is insufficient evidence of mens

rea to sustain his convictions on Counts Six, Ten, and Eleven.

In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we apply a

“particularly deferential” standard which imposes a “very heavy

burden” on the appellant. United States v. Cothran, 286 F.3d

173, 175 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing United States v. Dent, 149 F.3d

180, 187 (3d Cir. 1998)). “We must sustain the verdict if,

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

Government, any rational trier of fact could have found the

essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”

United States v. Introcaso, 506 F.3d 260, 264 n.2 (3d Cir. 2007).

“In making our review we examine the totality of the evidence,

both direct and circumstantial. We must credit all available

inferences in favor of the government.” United States v.

Gambone, 314 F.3d 163, 170 (3d Cir. 2003) (citations omitted).

“[I]n order to convict a defendant of aiding and abetting, the

government must prove that ‘the defendant charged with aiding

and abetting that crime knew of the commission of the

substantive offense and acted with the intent to facilitate it.’”

United States v. Kemp, 500 F.3d 257, 293 (3d Cir. 2007)

(quoting United States v. Dixon, 658 F.2d 181, 189 n.17 (3d Cir.
15

1981)). “[C]ircumstantial evidence can be sufficient to uphold

an aiding and abetting conviction.” United States v. Soto, 539

F.3d 191, 195 (3d Cir. 2008). 

We begin with Count Six. Rawlins claims that there is

no proof that he knew that the luggage he moved from the Air

Sunshine office to the baggage room on September 20, 2003

contained cocaine. According to Rawlins, because his job was

to handle bags, no culpability can attach to the mere act of his

moving luggage from one location to another without direct

evidence that he knew that those bags contained cocaine. We

disagree. As described above, the tag-switchers’ modus

operandi was to (1) store bags containing cocaine with Air

Sunshine; (2) remove flight tags from legitimately checked

luggage; (3) bring those tags from the baggage room to Air

Sunshine; (4) affix the tags to the bags of cocaine; and then (5)

take those bags from the Air Sunshine office to the baggage

room, to be loaded onto the appropriate flight. Brookes

repeatedly identified Rawlins as one of the baggage handlers

whom Mervin Dorival sent to switch tags and move cocainefilled bags from the Air Sunshine office to the bag room. As for

the events of September 20, 2003, Sylvester testified that he

gave Brookes the three cocaine-filled suitcases that Thomas had

given him the previous night. Brookes held those suitcases in

his office until Rawlins delivered the flight tags that would

allow two of them to be placed onboard a flight to Philadelphia.

Either Rawlins or Brookes affixed the stolen tags to the drugladen bags before Rawlins transported those bagsto the baggage
 For example, Rawlins was seen pulling flight tags on 9

November 8, 2003, and he promised Donovan he would do the

same on May 1, 2004.

16

room. The jury could have reasonably inferred that Rawlins’s

participation in the highly irregular (and plainly illegal) act of

tag switching evidenced his knowledge of the cocaine

smuggling occurring through Brookes’s office, and his intent to

facilitate it. 

That conclusion is buttressed by evidence of Rawlins’s

eager participation in cocaine smuggling at the airport on later

occasions, including his actions later on September 20. 9

Sylvester testified that although authorities had seized two of the

suitcases containing cocaine, a third remained in the Air

Sunshine office. He called Rawlins, told him that there was a

suitcase containing ten kilograms of cocaine in Brookes’s office,

and asked him to retrieve it. Rawlins complied. This

demonstrated his willingness to facilitate the drug-running that

was occurring through Brookes’s office by preventing

authorities from discovering the third bag. It is possible, of

course, that the evening of September 20 was the first time that

Rawlins had anything to do with cocaine, and that he knew

nothing of the contents of the suitcases he took to the baggage

room earlier that morning. But a rational jury considering the

totality of the evidence could have reasonably believed

otherwise. See United States v. Iafelice, 978 F.2d 92, 97 n.3 (3d

Cir. 1992) (“There is no requirement . . . that the inference
17

drawn by the jury be the only inference possible or that the

government’s evidence foreclose every possible innocent

explanation.”). We therefore reject Rawlins’s sufficiency of the

evidence challenge to his conviction on Count Six.

Rawlins’s argument concerning Count Ten is similar to

his argument on Count Six. He contends that the trial evidence

proved only that he, a baggage handler, moved bags containing

cocaine on February 21, 2004. According to Rawlins, this was

insufficient evidence from which a rational jury could conclude

that he aided and abetted cocaine possession. Again, we

disagree. Donovan testified that he pulled intact flight tags

from legitimately tagged bags and brought them to Brookes’s

office for placement on bags filled with drugs. He also testified

that Rawlins was “involved with that transaction,” and that

Rawlins carried the bag from the office to the baggage room. In

light of the substantial evidence of Rawlins’s involvement in the

cocaine conspiracy, including its tag-switching activities, the

jury could have reasonably understood this to mean that Rawlins

knowingly carried out a small but crucial role that day by

moving tagged, cocaine-filled suitcases from the Air Sunshine

office to the baggage room. 

Finally, there is sufficient evidence to sustain Rawlins’s

conviction on Count Eleven. Sylvester testified that on March

9, 2004, Thomas paid him $4,000 and gave him two kilograms

of cocaine. Sylvester was to bring the cocaine to the airport the

next day and, with help from Rawlins, place it in a suitcase
 Sylvester’s account was consistent with Donovan’s 10

testimony that Rawlins had acted as a lookout for him, and that

baggage handlers often acted as lookouts for each other in the

baggage room.

 Rawlins’s Statement of Issues suggests a challenge to 11

the sufficiency of the evidence on Count Seven, but Rawlins

waived that issue by failing to develop it in the argument section

of his brief. Mitchell v. Celone, 389 F.3d 86, 92 (3d Cir. 2004).

18

bound for Newark. Rawlins backed out at the last minute,

however, leaving Sylvester to load the cocaine by himself. He

did so in the baggage room, while Gabriel and Rawlins were

present. Sylvester not only told Rawlins what he was doing, but

also asked him to act as a lookout. In response, Rawlins told

him to “go ahead.” The jury could have concluded from this 10

evidence that Rawlins acted as a lookout and thereby aided and

abetted Sylvester’s cocaine possession, as charged in Count

Eleven. See United States v. Barber, 429 F.2d 1394, 1397 n.4

(3d Cir. 1970) (“[T]he fact that an individual has served as a

lookout during the commission of a crime is a clear indication

of participation in the wrongdoing.”).11

IV. 

Rawlins also argues that the District Court erred by

admitting certain packages of cocaine into evidence at trial. He

asserts that the government failed to establish a sufficient chain
19

of custody showing that those cocaine samples were the same

substances seized on the occasions described in the indictment.

Physical evidence must be authenticated before it is

admitted. Authenticity is elemental to relevance, for “evidence

cannot have a tendency to make the existence of a disputed fact

more or less likely if the evidence is not that which its proponent

claims[.]” United States v. Branch, 970 F.2d 1368, 1370 (4th

Cir. 1992). “The requirement of authentication . . . is satisfied

by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in

question is what its proponent claims.” Fed. R. Evid. 901(a).

“Establishing a chain of custody is one form of proof sufficient

to support a finding that the matter in question is what its

proponent claims.” United States v. Mendel, 746 F.2d 155, 166

(2d Cir. 1984). See also United States v. Howard-Arias, 679

F.2d 363, 366 (4th Cir. 1982) (“The chain of custody rule is but

a variation of the principle that real evidence must be

authenticated prior to its admission into evidence.”). 

To establish a chain of custody sufficient to make

evidence admissible, the proponent “need only prove a rational

basis from which to conclude” that the evidence is what the

party claims it to be. Mendel, 746 F.2d at 167. In other words,

in a criminal case, the prosecution must offer sufficient

“evidence from which the trier [of fact] could reasonably believe

that an item still is what the [government] claims it to be.”

United States v. Mejia, 597 F.3d 1329, 1336 (D.C. Cir. 2010)

(quoting 2 Kenneth S. Broun et al., McCormick on Evidence §
20

213 (6th ed. 2009)). This “burden is not a heavy one.” 5

Christopher B. Muller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence

§ 9:1 (3d ed. 2007). 

We have long rejected the proposition that evidence may

only be admitted if a “complete and exclusive” chain of custody

is established. United States v. DeLarosa, 450 F.2d 1057, 1068

(3d Cir. 1971). See also 2 Broun et al., supra, § 213 (explaining

that “a complete chain of custody need not always be proved”);

31 Charles Alan Wright & Victor Gold, Federal Practice and

Procedure § 7106 (1st ed.) (“It is usually unnecessary to

establish a perfect or unbroken chain of custody.”). “[S]erious”

gaps may render a chain of custody so deficient that exclusion

is required, Mejia, 597 F.3d at 1336, but in the ordinary case

gaps in the chain go to the weight of the evidence, not its

admissibility, Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. __,

129 S. Ct. 2527, 2532 n.1 (2009) (quoting United States v. Lott,

854 F.2d 244, 250 (7th Cir. 1988)). See also United States v.

Clark, 425 F.2d 827, 833 (3d Cir. 1970); Mejia, 597 F.3d at

1335; 5 Mueller & Kirkpatrick, supra, § 9:10 (collecting cases).

Furthermore, a trial court’s ruling about the adequacy of a chain

of custody is afforded great deference. It may not be overturned

absent a “clear abuse of discretion.” United States v. Jackson,

649 F.2d 967, 973 (3d Cir. 1981).

Rawlins challenges the adequacy of the chain of custody

for packages of cocaine seized on three occasions: November 8,

2003 (the drug seizure that gave rise to Count Seven), February
21

21, 2004 (Count Ten), and March 10, 2004 (Count Eleven). We

conclude that the District Court’s decision to admit each of these

packages into evidence was not an abuse of discretion. 

Gregory Reardon, a CBP Supervisor stationed in Newark,

New Jersey, testified that he set up and oversaw the November

8, 2003 enforcement operation (Count Seven). An X-ray scan

of all luggage emerging from Continental Flight 1902 revealed

one suitcase containing an anomalous-looking package.

Reardon grabbed that suitcase, and after observing a canine hit

on the bag, opened it. Inside he found a brown taped package

containing a white powdery substance that field-tested positive

for cocaine. He testified that he turned over to “the special

agents in ICE” both the package and the suitcase in which it was

discovered. ICE Special Agent Bradley Benwell testified that

the narcotics seized from Flight 1902 were turned over to him

(though he did not say by whom), and that they were transported

to the “main office” in Newark and placed in the Newark drug

evidence room. He identified Government Exhibit 64 as the

suitcase seized on November 8, but it does not appear that he

was asked to identify the drugs themselves. Later, Maureen

Craig, a DEA chemist stationed in New York City, testified that

she analyzed drugs seized in connection with Flight 1902 on

November 8, 2003. She testified that she “took the evidence out

from the main vault,” performed a series of tests, and

determined that the objects contained approximately four

kilograms of cocaine. She further testified that Government

Exhibits 70 and 71 were the same drug samples she had
22

analyzed. 

Richard Peak, a CBP officer stationed at Cyril E. King

Airport, testified that he was the seized property custodian for

the drugs discovered on February 21, 2004 (Count Ten). He

stated that he took possession of a green suitcase containing

“some bricks of a substance” and placed both the suitcase and

the bricks in the seized property locker at the Federal Building.

He testified that the evidence had been “maintained in our

seized property locker . . . since that time.” Similarly, ICE

Special Agent Louis Penn testified that both the suitcase and the

drugs seized on February 21 were escorted to the seized property

room at the Federal Building. Enrique Pinero, a DEA chemist

stationed in Virginia, was later asked if he had performed tests

on bricks that were “seized from St. Thomas, Virgin Islands on

or about February 21st, 2004.” Pinero answered in the

affirmative. He testified that Government Exhibit 69 was the

“evidence” (i.e., cocaine) that he received at the lab, and that

after he received the samples, he kept them “in a lock up” until

he had a chance to perform his tests. He confirmed that the

bricks he tested contained over two kilograms of cocaine.

As for the drugs seized on March 10, 2004 (Count

Eleven), ICE agent Michael Perreaul testified that he was

present at Newark Airport as officers X-rayed the luggage from

Continental Flight 1902 from St. Thomas. He explained that

while this inspection was in progress, an inspector approached
23

him and handed him a bag containing two brick-shaped objects.

He testified that he removed the bricks, placed them in a bag,

and then signed the bricks over to Agent Benwell. Agent

Benwell confirmed that the drugs were turned over to him

(though again he did not say by whom), and testified that he

placed them in the Newark drug evidence room. Ramona

Montreuil, a DEA chemist stationed in New York City, testified

that she analyzed the evidence seized from Flight 1902 in March

2004. She stated that she “obtained the evidence and opened it,”

and after performing a series of tests, determined that the objects

tested contained just over two kilograms of cocaine. She

testified that Government Exhibits 72 and 73 were the drugs she

tested and the same substances seized in Newark on March 10,

2004. 

Rawlins argues that the chain of custody of the drugs

seized each day was broken because there was no evidence

connecting the drugs that were placed in evidence lockers on

each occasion to the drugs that were received and tested by DEA

chemists. We agree. With respect to the cocaine seized on

November 8, DEA chemist Craig testified that she “took the

evidence out from the main vault,” but Craig was stationed in

New York City while Agent Benwell testified that he placed the

drugs in the Newark evidence room. It was never established

whether Craig retrieved the cocaine herself from Newark, or

whether those drugs were at some point transferred from

Newark to what Craig called the “main vault” in New York
 Furthermore, there is at least the possibility of a gap

12

between Reardon and Benwell. Reardon testified that he turned

the drugs over to unnamed ICE agents, while Benwell, an ICE

agent, testified that the drugs were turned over to him but he did

not say by whom. The exchange may well have been directly

from Reardon to Benwell, but the government hardly nailed this

down. 

24

City. Concerning the cocaine seized on February 21, there was 12

no explanation of how drugs placed in the evidence locker on St.

Thomas ended up in Pinero’s lab in Virginia. Finally, as to the

cocaine seized on March 10, there was only Montreuil’s

testimony that she “obtained” the evidence seized on that date,

“opened it,” and then tested it. Again, there was no explanation

of how a DEA chemist in New York City acquired evidence that

was initially stored in Newark. Montreuil testified that the drugs

she tested were the same drugs seized on March 10, 2004, but

she lacked the personal knowledge necessary to make that

assertion. The most she could say was that she tested a

substance; the substance was cocaine; and the sample introduced

at trial was the same one that she tested. The same is true of

Craig’s testimony that she tested the “samples seized in

connection with [Flight 1902] on or about November 8, 2003,”

and Pinero’s claim that he tested “bricks that were seized from

St. Thomas on or about February 21, 2004.” 

Despite the foregoing gaps in the chain of evidence, we

cannot say that the District Court erred by admitting that
 The adequacy of the chain is assessed in light of the 13

“nature of the article, the circumstances surrounding the

preservation and custody of it, and the likelihood of

intermeddlers tampering with it.” DeLarosa, 450 F.2d at 1068.

Rawlins does not explain how any of these factors weigh against

the District Court’s admissibility ruling.

25

evidence at trial. Our conclusion is driven by two

considerations. The first is the deference we owe the District

Court in resolving disputes of this nature. We cannot overturn

its conclusion as to the sufficiency of the chain of custody

absent a “clear abuse of discretion.” Jackson, 649 F.2d at 973.

Here, none of the chains at issue was so deficient that there was

no “rational basis” for concluding that the evidence was what

the government claimed. Mendel, 746 F.2d at 167. The

testimony of government witnesses created a “reasonable

probability” that the cocaine packages seized on November 8,

February 21, and March 10 were the same materials tested by

DEA chemists and introduced at trial. Mejia, 597 F.3d at 1336.

Each chain could—and should—have been far stronger than it

was. But any weakness goes to the weight of the evidence, not

its admissibility. Clark, 425 F.2d at 833. 

13

The second consideration is the presumption of regularity

in the handling of evidence by law enforcement. “Absent actual

proof of tampering, a trial court may presume regularity in

public officials’ handling of contraband.” Dent, 149 F.3d at 188.

See also United States v. King, 356 F.3d 774, 779 (7th Cir.
 Our reliance on this presumption should not be taken 14

as approval of the prosecutor’s slipshod handling of this issue at

trial. 

26

2004) (applying “presumption of regularity when evidence is

within official custody”); 5 Mueller & Kirkpatrick, supra, § 9:10

(citing cases). We employ the same presumption here. See, e.g.,

Dent, 149 F.3d at 188; Jackson, 649 F.2d at 973-74. No

allegation has been made, nor proof offered, of tampering with

any of the evidence at issue. Therefore, we presume that the

evidence placed in storage was properly transmitted to each of

the chemists who testified. The District Court did not err in 14

admitting it.

V. 

We have considered the remainder of Rawlins’s

arguments and find them to be without merit. For the reasons

stated, the judgment will be affirmed.