NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

____________ No. 21

- 2009

______ JOHN F. ANDERSON ,

Appellant

v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY

______ ______ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey ( D.C. Civ. No. 2

- 1 8

- c v
- 0 3625 ) Magistrate Judge: Honorable Norah McCann King

______ ______ Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L

. A

. R

. 34.1(a)

May 3 , 202 2

______ ______ Before: GREENAWAY, JR. , PORTER , and PHIPPS , Circuit Judges

.

(Filed : May 24, 2022 )

___________ OPINION *

___________

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full C ourt and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent.2

PHIPPS , Circuit Judge

. John Anderson claims that his obesity together with injuries to his neck, back, knee, and foot from a truck accident, along with his other digestive ailments, prevent s him from working. Based on those conditions, he requested Disability Insurance Benefits from the Social Security Administration , proceeding through each of the four stages of administrative adjud ication, including a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge

. 1 At each stage, SSA denied Anderson’s request, and he sought judicial review of th at determination. The District Court upheld SSA’s den ial of benefits , and for the reasons below, we will a ffirm that judgment.
I
. B ACKGROUND To qualify for Disability Insurance Benefits, a fully

- insured individual must be
disabled. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1), (c)(1), (d) (20 20 )

. As defined by statute, a person is disabled if he or she cannot engage in substa ntial gainful activity due to a physical or mental impairment lasting without interruption for more than twelve months. See i d. § 423(d). Applied to Anderson, who was fully insured until December 31, 2014 , the inquiry becomes whether he was disabled as of that date

. Regulations promulgated by SSA set forth five step s for assessing disability.
Under that process , a person may qualif y as disab led through two partially overlapping paths : by prevailing at S te ps O ne , T wo, and T hree, or alternatively by succe eding at Steps O ne, T wo, F our , and F ive. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4) (2011)

.

1 See generally Smith v. Berryhill , 139 S. Ct. 1765, 1772 (2019) (articulating the four stages of administrative review as an initial eligibility determination, reconsideration, a formal hearing, and review by the Appeals Council). See also 5 U.S.C. § 3105 ( providing for the appointment o f administrative law judges to conduct administrative hearings ) ; Cirko ex rel. Cirko v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. , 948 F.3d 148, 152 (3d Cir. 2020) ( discussing the appointment of SSA administrative law judges )

.3

Here , no one disputes that Anderson succeeds at S teps O ne, T wo, and F our. At
S tep O ne, the ALJ determined that because he was not working, Anderson was not performing substantial gainful activity during the relevant time. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i) ( articulating Step One as an evaluati on of whether the applicant is performing substan tial gainful activity). The ALJ also found in Anderson’s favor at S tep
T wo by concluding that he had several severe medical impairments that significantly
limited his ability to perform basic work activities and were expected to last for more than one yea r
. See id. § § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii) , 404.1509 ( articulating Step Two as a
determin ation of whether the applicant has a “severe medically determinable physical or mental impairment” that is expected to either result in death or “last for a continuous period o f at least 12 months”). And at S tep F our, the ALJ determined that Ande r son could not return to past relevant work as a construction worker and construction supervisor considering his residual functional capacity , which did not allow him to perform medium or heavy work

. See id. § 404.1520(a)(4)( iv) ( articulating Step Four as a
determi nation of whether the applicant can return to past relevant work, considering his residual functional capacity). But the ALJ made findings against Anderson at S teps T hree and F ive

. At S tep
T hree , th e ALJ found that none of Anderson’s impairments, singularly or in combination, met or equaled a listing for a disability. See id. § 404.1520(a)(4)( iii) ( articulating Step
Three as an assessment of whether the applicant has a severe impairment that meets or equals a listed impairment and meets the same duration al requirement as that in Step Two); id. § 404.1520(d) (stating that an applicant who meets the requirements of § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii) will be found “disabled without c onsidering [his] age, education, and work experience”) ; see also id. Part 404, Subpart P, App. 1 (2011) (listing the4

impairments that would render an applicant disabled at Step Three). And a t Step Five,
the ALJ conclud ed that SSA met its burden, which it has for this step, of demonstrat ing
that An d erson could adjust to other work , specifically light work , that exists in significant numbers in the national economy. See id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v) , (g) (articulating Step Five as a determination of whether the applicant can adjust to perform other work) ; id. § 404.1560(c). The ALJ’s Step Three and Five determinations prevented Anderson from qualifying as disabled.
After the ALJ’s adverse ruling and a later denial of Anderson’s request for appellate administrative review, Anderson filed this civil action in District Court. See
42 U.S.C. § 405(g) ( providing for judicial review of “any final decision

. . . made after a hearing” by SSA ); 20 C.F.R. § 404.9 00 (a)(5) (2017) (providing that an SSA decision becomes “final” when the applicant exhausts the four stages of administrative review).
B oth Anderson and SSA consented to a referral to a Magistrate Judge , see 28 U.S.C. § 636(c); Fed. R. Civ. P. 73, and tha t judge affirmed SSA’s denial of b enefits

. Anderson timely appealed that judgment , bringing his suit within the jurisdiction of this Court. See
28 U.S.C. § 1291.
II
. D ISCUSSION A. The Step

- Three C h allenge On appeal, Anderson argues that the ALJ ’s Step

- Three analy sis failed to consider
whether his obesity in combination with his other impairments met a listed disability. A t the administrative level, Anderson did not argue that his impairments met any particular listing. T hat is not fatal to his ab ility to raise such a challenge in federal court . A lthough5

the Supreme Court has described SSA administrative proceedings as “adjudicative,” 2 they are not classically so 3 because they are “non

- adversarial,” 4 and at times “inquisitorial

. ” 5 Even so, AL Js must articulate their factual findings as part of an administrative record so that those findings may be judicially reviewed under the
substantial

- evidence standard. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1383(c)(1)(A), 405(b)(1) (providing that
an administrative decision m ust explain the facts, the administrative determination, and
the reasons upon which that determination is based). 6 De spite the administrative record requirement, the other attributes of SSA administrative proceedings inhibit the application of the otherwise bedrock adjudicative principles of party presentation, waiver, and forfeiture. Accordingly, at the administrative level, an applicant’s failure to identify a specific listing at Step Three does not preclude the applicant from later contending that his or her conditions met such a listing.
But o nce an unsuccessful applicant seeks judicial review of SSA’s administrative decision, principles of party presentation, waiver, and forfeiture do apply

. See Sims v. Apfel , 530 U.S. 103 , 108

– 09 (2000) (recognizing that in the context of SSA appeals “appellate courts will not consider arguments not raised before trial courts”); cf. TD Bank

2 Biestek v. Berryhill , 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1152 (20 19).
3 See Carr v. Saul , 141 S. Ct. 1352, 1363 (2021) (Thomas, J., concurring) (describing SSA proceedings as a “decidedly pro

- claimant, inquisitorial process [that] is quite unlike an adversarial suit in which parties are expected to identify, argue, and preserve all issues”).

4 20 C.F.R. § 404.900(b).
5 Sims v. Apfel , 530 U.S. 103, 111 (2000) (plurality op.).

6 See also Camp v. Pitts , 411 U.S. 138, 141 (1973) (explaining that substantial

- evidence review is appropriate “when reviewing findings made on a hearing record”); Burnett v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin. , 220 F.3d 112, 119

– 20 (3d Cir. 2000) (explaining that substantial evidence review of bare conclusory statements is impossible).6

N.A. v. Hill , 928 F.3d 259, 270 (3d Cir. 2019) ( explaining that appellate courts “may affirm on any basis supported by the record, even if it departs from the District Court’s
rationale ” ) . Thus, to preserve Step Three arguments for this Court ’s review, an applicant who did not succeed at the administrative level must, in district court, identify the
spe cific listings and provide arguments that his or her conditions meet such a listing. In this appeal , Anderson argues that he meets three specific listings and one group of listings due to the cumulative effect of his physical injuries, ailments, and obesity . The individual listings Anderson identifies are Listings 1.02 (describing major dysfunction of a joint) , 1.04 (describing spine disorders) , and 11.14 (describing peripheral neuropathies)

. The group of listings is those contained in Paragraph 5.0 0 (relating to the digestive system)

. B y making those same argu ments in District Court, Anderson preserved them

. But none of those contentions are successful : t he ALJ considered each of the m , and substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclu sion that An derson did not meet any listing

. See Biestek v. Berryhill , 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019) (explaining that the
substantial

- evidence threshold is satisfied if the record contains “ such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion ” (internal citation
and quotation marks omitted)). Listing 1.02 requires an inability to ambulate effectively

. See 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, App. 1 Listing 1.02(A); id. Listing 1.00(B)(2)(b) (1)

– (2) (defining ambulation as “an e xtreme limitation of the ability to walk” such that the individual is unable “to carry out activities of daily living”). But the ALJ determined that Anderson , despite his lower body injuries and obesity, could drive a car, travel on his own and grocery sh op weekly , and the record contains adequate evidence to support that conclusion. See Biestek , 139 S. Ct. at 1154. Even if Anderson’s obesity made walking more difficult ,7

substantial evidence still supported the ALJ’s conclusion, especially here, where
An derson did not allege that his obesity affected his ability to work. Also, the ALJ adopted the conclusions of expert medical consultants who were aware of Anderson’s obesity, so the ALJ’s decision at least “constitutes a satisfactory if indirect considera tion” of Anderson’s obesity. Rutherford v. Barnhart , 399 F.3d 546, 553 (3d Cir. 2005). Listing 1.04 requires nerve root compression, spinal arachnoiditis, or lumbar spinal stenosis that results in an inability to ambulate effectively. See 20 C.F.R. Par t 404, Subpart P, App. 1 Listing 1.04(A)

– (C). But in reviewing Anderson’s medical records,
the ALJ determined that he does not suffer from nerve root compression or spinal
arachnoiditis

. Th ose medical records , reinforced with the ALJ’s other finding that
Anderson could ambulat e effectively despite his injuries and obesity , constitute

s ubstantial evidence that Anderson did not meet or equal Listing 1.04. Listing 11.14 requires significant and persistent disorga nization of motor function in two extremities “in spite of prescribed treatment

. ” See id. Listing 11.14; id. Listing 11.04(B); see also id. Listing 11.00(C) (defining ‘persistent disorganization of motor function’ to require paresis or paralysis, involunt ary movements, and sensory disturbances)

. The ALJ recognized that Anderson once complained of numbness in his right hand but observed that later examination revealed a normal grasp and stable functioning, and relevant evidence in the record supports his o bservation. See Reefer v.
Barnhart , 326 F.3d 376, 379 (3d Cir. 2003) (describing substantial evidence as “sufficient evidence ‘to justify, if the trial were to a jury, a refusal to direct a verdict’” (quoting Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB , 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951)) ) . Although one doctor found sensory loss in Anderson’s foot shortly after he broke it, other medical consultants disagreed with that conclusion. But courts, on substantial

- evidence review,8

“are not permitted to re

- weigh the evidence or impose their own factual determinations,”
so the differing views of the other medical consultants constitute substantial evidence in support of the ALJ’s determination that Anderson failed to meet or equal Listing 11.14. See Chandler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. , 667 F.3d 356, 359 (3d Cir. 2011). Finally, Paragraph 5.00 contains several listings related to various digestive
ailments , 7 and Anderson argues that the ALJ did not consider any of them

. But the
record belies his contention. The ALJ considered Anderson’s treatment for gastritis, gastric ulcers, mild esophagitis, hemorrhoids, and cholecystitis, as well as his gallbladder removal, but deter mined that his digestive impairments did not meet or equal a listed impairment in Paragraph 5.00. As for the listings that could be relevant to Anderson, his doctors found no evidence of gastrointestinal hemorrhaging , see 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Ap p. 1 Listing 5.02 , or inflammatory bowel disease , see id. Listing 5.06

. That record evidence adequately supports the ALJ’s finding that Anderson did not meet or equal a Listing in Paragraph 5.00. See Biestek , 139 S. Ct. at 1154. Therefore, Anderson’s Ste p Three challenge fails.
B. The Step

- Five Challenge At Step Five, the burden shifts to SSA to establish from the administrative record that the applicant can adjust to other work. See Smith v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. , 631 F.3d 632, 634 (3d Cir. 2010). To satisf y that burden , SSA must demonstrate that three
characteristics of the applicant

– education , work experience , and residual functional capacity

– allow him or her to perform jobs that exist in significant number s in the

7 See, e.g. , 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, App. 1 Listing 5.02 (gastrointestinal hemorrhaging requiring a blood transfusion), Listing 5.05 (chronic liver disease), Listing 5.06 (inflammatory bowel disease), Listing 5.0 7 ( short bowel syndrome ) , Listing 5.0 8 ( wei ght loss caused by a digestive disorder ) , and Listing 5.09 ( liver transplantation ).9

national economy

. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1560(c), 404.1569(a); id. Part 404, Subpart P, App. 2. Here, the ALJ determined that Anderson was not disabled under Step Five because
his residual functional capacity allowed him to perform light work

. A nderson argues that substantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s assessment of his residual functional capacity because the ALJ improperly discounted three pieces of evidence: the opinion of his treating podiatrist, his subjective accounts of pain, and the statements of his live

- in companion

. See generally Biestek , 139 S. Ct. at 1154 (explaining that the substantial

evidence standard requires only that the administrative record contain sufficient evidence for a reasonable mind to “accept as adequate to support a conclusion” (internal citation
and quotation marks omitted) ). In reviewing an ALJ’s social security disability determination, a court cannot “re

- weigh the evidence” or “substitute its conclusions for
those of the fact

- finder , ” and each of Anders on’s arguments is premised on those impermissible actions

. Chandler , 667 F.3d at 359; Williams v. Sullivan , 970 F.2d 1178, 1182 (3d Cir. 1992). First, Anderson complains that the ALJ improperly discounted the opinion of his treating podiatrist. According to t h at podiatrist , Anderson’s neuropathy and radiculopathy made it dangerous for him to work as working with those conditions c ould
render him permanently disabled. But an ALJ is “free to accept some medical evidence and reject other evidence” as long as the ALJ “provides an explanation for discrediting the rejected evidence.” Zirnsak v. Colvin , 777 F.3d 607, 614 (3d Cir. 2014); see also
Burnet t v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin. , 220 F.3d 112, 121 (3d Cir. 2000)

. In giving little weight to the podiatrist’s opinion , the ALJ explained that it was vague and failed to identify “any specific work related functional limitations linked to [Anderson’s]10

imp airments.” SSA Office of Disability Adjudication and Review, ALJ Decision at 7 ( July 31, 2017 ) (App. 39). That explanation suffices under the substantial

- evidence
standard

. See Williams , 970 F.2d at 1182 (explaining that federal courts, on substantial

evidence review, may not “weigh the evidence or substitute its conclusions for those of
the fact

- finder”).
Anderson ’s second argument attacks the reduced weight the ALJ afforded to Anderson’s subjective complaints of pain. T he ALJ explained the reason for discount: Anderson’s statements about the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of his symptoms were not entirely credible because they were inconsistent with medical and other evidence. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(2), (3). That exp lanation also suffices
under the substantial

- evidence standard. See Chandler , 667 F.3d at 359; Williams , 970 F.2d at 1182. Finally, Anderson contends that the ALJ improperly discounted a report that Anderson’s live

- in companion submitted to SSA

. Under then

- applicable SSA policy, ALJs could consider “the relationship between the source and the individual” and “whether the opinion is consistent with other evidence,” among other factors. Social Security Ruling, SSR 06

- 03p, 71 Fed. Reg. 45593, 45596 (Aug. 9, 2006), rescinded by
82 Fed. Reg. 15263, 15263 (Mar. 27, 2017) ; see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(f) (requiring the ALJ to “explain the weight given to opinions from [non

- medical] sources or otherwise ensure that [his] discussion of the evidence

. . . allows a claimant or subsequent reviewer to follow the adjudicator’s reasoning”). Consistent with that policy, the ALJ
afforded some weight to that r eport but recognized that it “cannot be considered wholly objective” because it was prepared by “a close friend of the claimant.” SSA Office of Disability Adjudication and Review, ALJ Decision at 8 ( July 31, 2017 ) (App. 40). Thus,11

the ALJ supported his credibility determinat ion with permissible reasons for assigning the statements less weight than other pieces of evidence.
* * * For the foregoing reasons , we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.