alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXHIBIT 32.2





CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Quarterly Report of Timberline Resources Corporation (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the period ended December 31, 2008, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Craig Crowell, Chief Accounting Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



|    |                                                                                                                      
|--- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|(1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



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|--- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|(2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



Date:

May 21

, 2009

By:   /s/ Craig Crowell





_____________________________





Craig Crowell



Chief Accounting Officer



Principal Accounting Officer

| | 
| | 
| | 





The foregoing certification is being furnished solely pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Section 1350 of Chapter 63 of Title 18 of the United States Code) and is not being filed as part of the Report or as a separate disclosure document.







1
Exhibit 32.2

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                                   AS ADDED BY
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

   In connection with the Quarterly Report of OptimumBank Holdings, Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-QSB for the period ended June 30, 2004 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (the "Report"), I, Richard L. Browdy, Chief
Financial Officer (Principal Accounting Officer) of the Company, certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C.ss. 1350, as added by ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, that:

1.       The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
         15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

2.       To my knowledge, the information contained in the Report fairly
         presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results
         of operations of the Company as of and for the period covered by the
         report.

Date:  August 10, 2004          By:  /s/ Richard L. Browdy
                                    ------------------------------------------
                                    Richard L. Browdy, Chief Financial Officer
#### JESSE BOND, Jr., Appellant, v. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent.

No. 8821

April 24, 1978

577 P.2d 412

*219
      *Charles M. Damus,*Las Vegas, for Appellant.

*Robert List,*Attorney General, Carson City; *George E. Holt,*District Attorney, and *H. Leon Simon,*Deputy District Attorney, Clark County, for Respondent.

OPINION

*Per Curiam:*

Jesse Bond, Jr., was convicted, by jury verdict, of (1) forcible rape with substantial bodily harm (NRS 200.366; NRS 193.015); (2) the infamous crime against nature (NRS 201.190); and, (3) battery (NRS 200.481). Bond’s central contention in this appeal is that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for rape with substantial bodily harm. Subordinately, he argues the enhanced penalty statute is inapplicable when, as here, a life sentence has been imposed.

1. We reject Bond’s first contention for the same reason we stated in Hankins v. State, 91 Nev. 477-478, 538 P.2d 167, 168 (1975), where we reiterated the long standing rule that “ ‘[w]here there is substantial evidence to support a verdict in a criminal case, as the record indicates in this case, the reviewing court will not disturb the verdict nor set aside the judgment.’ ”

2. We also reject Bond’s contention that the enhanced penalty statute (NRS 193.165) is inapplicable when a life sentence is imposed. That statute mandates enhancement of any “term *220of imprisonment prescribed by statute.”1
      *Cf.*Woofter v. O’Donnell, 91 Nev. 756, 542 P.2d 1396 (1975).

Affirmed.

NRS 193.165 provides:

> “ 1. Any person who uses a firearm or other deadly weapon in the commission of a crime shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for a term equal to and in addition to the *term of imprisonment prescribed by statute*for such crime. The sentence prescribed by this section shall run consecutively with the sentence prescribed by statute for such crime.

> “2. This section does not create any separate offense but provides an additional penalty for the primary offense, whose imposition is contingent upon the finding of the prescribed fact.

> “3. The provisions of this section do not apply where the use of a firearm or other deadly weapon is a necessary element of such crime.” [Emphasis added.]
**UN PUBLISHED** 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 15**  **- 7687** 

SIMON ALLEN, JR. , Plaintiff

- Appellant ,
v. BRYAN LOUIS , Defendant

– Appellee, and GREENWOOD COUNTY SHERIFFS DEPARTMENT; GREENWOOD SOLICITOR, Office; B. WARE; N. FUTCH; R. COKER; TONY DAVIS; LONNIE SMITH; RONNIE POWELL; C. RAYAN JOHNSON; WALTER RUTLEDGE; BROOKS; WILLIAM KAY; DAVID M. STUMBO, Defendants
.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina , at Anderson
. Rich ard Mark Gergel , District Judge. ( 8:15

- cv - 00363

- RMG )

Submitted : February 25, 2016 Decided: March 1, 2016

Before SHEDD and HARRIS , Circuit Judges , and DAVIS, Senior Circuit Judge
.
Affirmed by un published per curiam opinion
. Simon Allen, Jr., Appellant Pro Se. Carly Marie Harter, Russell W. Harter, Jr., CHAPMAN, HARTER & HARTER, PA, Greenville, South2 Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.3 PER CURIAM: Simon Allen, Jr., appeals the district court’s order accepting the magistrate judge’s recommendation to deny Allen’s motion for a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief and grant Louis summary judgment on Allen’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) claim against L ouis
. * Allen’s failure to challenge on appeal the district court’s dispositive holdings amounts to a waiver of appellate review of those holdings. See 4th Cir. R. 34(b) (“The Court will limit its review to the issues raised in the informal brief.”); Unit ed States v. Al

- Hamdi , 356 F.3d 564, 571 n.8 (4th Cir. 2004) (“It is a well settled rule that contentions not raised in the argument section of the opening brief are abandoned.”). Because we find no reversible error by the district court, we affirm the di strict court’s judgment
. Allen v. Louis , No. 8:15

- cv - 00363

- RMG (D. S.C
. Oct. 16, 2015 ). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decis ional process.

AFFIRMED

* The district court previously dismissed , without prejudice , Allen’s claims against the remaining Defendants. Allen does not challenge th is prior order on appeal.
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 23.4

             [LETTERHEAD OF NETHERLAND, SEWELL & ASSOCIATES, INC.]

               CONSENT OF NETHERLAND, SEWELL & ASSOCIATES, INC.

        We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference in the Annual Report
on Form 10-K of Mission Resources Corporation (the "Company") and to the
references to this firm for the Company's estimated domestic proved reserves
contained on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2001.


                                           NETHERLAND, SEWELL & ASSOCIATES, INC.


                                           By: /s/ Danny D. Simmons
                                              --------------------------
                                              Danny D. Simmons
                                              Executive Vice President


Houston, Texas
March 27, 2002
# In the United States Court of Federal Claims

OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS

No. 21

- 2301 V

UNPUBLISHED

ALYSSA WILFONG

,

Petitioner,

v.

SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES,

Respondent. Chief Special Master Corcoran

Filed: August 16 , 2022

Withdrawal of petition ; Order
concluding proceedings

ORDER CONCLUDING PROCEEDINGS 1

On December 17 , 2021

, Alyssa Wilfong filed a petition for compensation the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 42 U.S.C. § 300aa

— 1 0 through 34

. 2

Petitioner allege d that s he suffered injuries after receiving a human papillomavirus

vaccination on December 19 , 2018

. ECF N o. 1.

Because a decision had not been issued within the time specified in Vaccine Rule 10(b), a notice issued advising that “ that the petitioner may withdraw the petition

under section 300aa

— 21(b) of this title or the petitioner may choose under section

300aa

— 21(b) of this title to have the petition remain before the special master. ” 42 U.S.C. § 300aa

— 12 (g ). O n August 15 , 2022

, Petitioner timely filed a notice to withdraw

the petition pursuant to 42 U

. S

. C

. § 300aa

— 21(b).

In light of Petitioner ’ s election to withdraw the petition pursuant to 42 U

. S

. C

. §

300aa

— 21(b) (promulgated as Vaccine Rule 10(d)), Petitioner ’ s request to withdraw the petition is GRANTED . Accordingly, this Order hereby notifies the Clerk of Court that proceedings “on the merits” of this petition are now concluded, but no judgment “on the merits” should be entered by the Clerk’s Office.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

1 Although I have not formally designated this Order for publication, I am required to post it on the United

States Court of Federal Claims' website because it contains a reasoned explanation for the action in this

case

, in accordance with the E

- Government Act of 2002. 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note (2012) (Federal Management and Promotion of Electronic Government Services). This means the Order will be available to anyone with access to the internet. In accordance with Vaccine R ule 18(b), Petitioner has 14 days to identify and move to redact medical or other information, the disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy. If, upon review, I agree that the identified material fits within this definition,

I will redact such material from public access.

2 National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99

- 660, 100 Stat. 3755.2 s/Brian H. Corcoran

Brian H. Corcoran Chief Special Master
United States Department of Labor

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

__________________________________________

M.F., Appellant

and

U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, POST OFFICE,

Sutter Creek, CA, Employer

_________________________________________

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Docket No. 22-0406

Issued: April 29, 2022

Appearances: Case Submitted on the Record

Alan J. Shapiro, Esq., for the appellant1

Office of Solicitor, for the Director

ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL

Before:

ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Chief Judge

JANICE B. ASKIN, Judge

VALERIE D. EVANS-HARRELL, Alternate Judge

On January 24, 2022 appellant, through counsel, filed a timely appeal from a

November 3, 2021, merit decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). 

The Clerk of the Appellate Boards assigned Docket No. 22-0406.

In a letter dated and received March 25, 2022, counsel requested that the appeal be 

dismissed.

The Board has duly considered the matter and concludes that counsel’s request f or the 

dismissal of the appeal should be granted. Accordingly, 

1

In all cases in which a representative has been authorized in a matter before the Board, no cla im f or a f ee f or 

legal or other service performed on appeal before the Board is valid unless approved by the Board. 

20 C.F.R. § 501.9(e). No contract for a stipulated fee or on a contingent fee basis will be approved by the Board.

Id. An attorney or representative’s collection of a fee without the Board’s approval may constitute a misdemeanor, 

subject to fine or imprisonment for up to one year or both. Id.; see also18 U.S.C. § 292. Demands for payment of

fees to a representative, prior to approval by the Board, may be reported to appropriate authorities for investigation.
2

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT appellant’s request for the dismissal of the appeal 

is granted. The appeal docketed as No. 22-0406 is dismissed.

Issued: April 29, 2022

Washington, DC

Alec J. Koromilas, Chief Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Janice B. Askin, Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Valerie D. Evans-Harrell, Alternate Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
United States Department of Labor

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

__________________________________________

S.T., Appellant

and

DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS,

OLIN E. TEAGUE VETERANS’ MEDICAL 

CENTER, Temple, TX, Employer

__________________________________________

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Docket No. 23-0104

Issued: November 21, 2022

Appearances: Case Submitted on the Record

Appellant, pro se

Office of Solicitor, for the Director

ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL

Before:

ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Chief Judge

VALERIE D. EVANS-HARRELL, Alternate Judge

JAMES D. McGINLEY, Alternate Judge

On October 25, 2022 appellant filed an appeal from a November 24, 2021 nonmerit 

decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). The Clerk of the 

Appellate Boards assigned Docket No. 23-0104.

The Board has duly considered the matter and notes that the Board has jurisdiction to 

review final adverse decisions of OWCP issued under the Federal Employees’ Compensation 

Act.1 For final adverse decisions of OWCP issued on or after November 19, 2008, the Board’s 

review authority is limited to appeals which are filed within 180 days from the date of issuance 

of OWCP’s decision.2

The 180th day following the November 24, 2021 decision was May 23, 2022. As 

appellant did not file an appeal with the Board until October 25, 2022, more than 180 days af ter 

the November 24, 2021 OWCP decision, the Board finds that the appeal docketed as No. 

23-0104 is untimely filed. The Board is without jurisdiction to review the appeal. Appellant has 

not explained her failure to timely file an appeal with supporting documentation sufficient to 

1

5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.; 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3(a).

2

20 C.F.R. § 501.3(e).
2

establish compelling circumstances. Because there is no final adverse decision issued by OWCP 

within 180 days of the filing of the instant appeal, the Board concludes that the appeal docketed 

as No. 23-0104, must be dismissed.3 Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the appeal docketed as No. 23-0104 is dismissed.

Issued: November 21, 2022

Washington, DC

Alec J. Koromilas, Chief Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Valerie D. Evans-Harrell, Alternate Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

James D. McGinley, Alternate Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

3 The Board’s decisions and orders are “final upon the expiration of 30 days from the date of their issuance.” Id.

at § 501.6(d).
#### SHELOMA RICHARDSON, Administratrix of the Estate of CLAYTON C. RICHARDSON, JR. v. GEORGE DEWEY SHERMER

No. 6917SC7

(Filed 5 February 1969)

1. Appeal and Error § 44— failure to file brief

Appellant by failing to file a brief is deemed to have abandoned bis objections and exceptions. Rules of Practice in the Court of Appeals Nos. 28 and 48.

2. Appeal and Error § 36— motion to dismiss appeal — noncompliance with Rules

Appellee’s motion to dismiss the appeal for failure of appellant to serve statement of case on appeal before docketing, and for failure to comply with Rules of Practice Nos. 5, 16, IS, 19 and 28, is allowed where record fails to show compliance with the Rules or waiver of the Rules, and the Court of Appeals has not been requested to allow any amendments.

Appeal by defendant from *Gambill, J.,*9 September 1968 Session of Superior Court of Surry County.

*R. Lewis Alexander and Perry Henson, shown as plaintiff appel-lee’s attorney on the record. (No brief filed.)*

*Franklin Smith, shown as defendant appellant’s attorney on the record. (No brief filed.)*

Mallard, C.J.

What purports to be a record on appeal in this case was filed in the office of the Clerk of the Court of Appeals on 8 November 1968. No other record on appeal has been filed herein.

The record, by what properly should have been an addendum thereto, shows that the statement of the case on appeal had not been served on the appellee when the purported case on appeal was docketed in this Court.

This purported record reveals that the judgment appealed from was entered 12 September 1968, and no extension of time has been granted in which to docket an appeal herein as provided in Rule 5 of the Rules of Practice in the Court of Appeals.

[1] On appeals from the Seventeenth District, when the record on appeal was docketed by 10:00 a.m. on 31 December 1968, appellant’s brief was required to be filed by noon of 7 January 1969. This case was properly on the calendar of this Court for hearing on 28 January 1969. No briefs have been filed. Appellant by failing to file *589a brief is deemed to have abandoned his objections and exceptions. *Bost v. Bank,*1 N.C. App. 470, 162 S.E. 2d 158; Rules of Practice in the Court of Appeals of North Carolina, #28 and #48.

[2] Plaintiff appellee on 13 January 1969 filed a proper motion to dismiss the appeal for failure to comply with Rule 5, Rule 16, Rule 18, Rule 19, and Rule 28 of the Rules of Practice in the Court of Appeals, and for failure to serve statement of case on appeal before docketing. On 22 January 1969 defendant appellant filed an answer to the motion. The motion and the answer thereto have been considered. Compliance with the Rules does not appear in the record, a waiver of the Rules does not appear therein, compliance with the Rules has not been dispensed with by a writing signed by the appellee or her counsel, and this Court has not been requested to and therefore does not allow any amendments. See Rule 16. The motion to dismiss the appeal is allowed.

Appeal Dismissed.

BRitt and Parrer, JJ., concur.
#### In the Matter of the Death of Honorable John A. Sanders

Edgar Eather,

*Chief Justice.*

Milton B. Badt,

*Associate Justice.*

*To the Honorable the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada:*

Your committee appointed to prepare and present resolutions on the life and public service of the late Honorable John Adams Sanders begs leave to submit the following:

Judge J. A. Sanders was born in Virginia on October 16, 1866, and died at Reno, Nevada, on August 14, 1948. He attended the public schools of Virginia, and graduated, at the age of eighteen, from Emory and Henry College, and he then.attended the University of Virginia Law School, in 1889-1890. He was admitted to the Virginia Bar in 1890.

In 1900 he moved to Spokane, Washington, where he practiced until 1904, when he removed to southern *792Nevada. In 1910 he was elected District Attorney of Nye County, and was reelected in 1912 and 1914. In 1916 he was elected an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of Nevada, and reelected in 1922, and again in 1928.

Dated October 7, 1948.

Judge Sanders’ father was a Confederate soldier in the war between the States, serving as a captain in the 45th Virginia Regiment. A lifelong and ardent Democrat, Judge Sanders was, throughout his residence in Nevada, a power in the political activities of the State. An orator of more than average ability, he was, prior to his elevation to the Bench, always in demand in the political campaigns.

He had a personality and mind that fitted him for judicial service. While on the Bench he rendered many opinions that for sound reasoning evidence special ability as well as exhaustive legal research, and stamped him as an able lawyer and judge. The State is indebted to him for his valuable contributions to its legal history.

A daughter, Mrs. Lucile Ahrens, of Detroit, Michigan, survives.

George L. Sanford,

*Chairman*

H. R. Cooke,

Wm. Woodburn,

A. L. Haight,

J. M. McNamara,

L. 0. Hawkins,

C. J. McFadden.

The foregoing resolution was adopted by the Court, and ordered spread upon its minutes and published in the next volume of the Nevada Reports.
#### BILLY RAY JOHNSON, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent.

No. 7427

September 23, 1974

526 P.2d 696

*Larry C. Johns,*of Las Vegas, for Appellant.

*Robert List,*Attorney General, Carson City; *Roy A. Woof-ter,*District Attorney, and *Joel M. Cooper,*Deputy District Attorney, Clark County, for Respondent.

*353OPINION

By the Court,

Zenoff, J.:

At issue on this appeal is the question of whether the denial of the accused’s motion for a continuance of his trial to a later date is sufficient basis to reverse his conviction. Under the circumstances stated we hold that it was not and the verdict will stand.

On January 10, 1973 Billy Ray Johnson, together with Johnny McDonald, Jr., was charged with three counts of robbery. Trial was set for April 9, 1973. While in jail awaiting trial Johnson became engaged in a fight with another inmate resulting in an injury to his hand. The trial date was continued from April 9 to April 16, but one court day before the trial was to begin Johnson moved to change counsel and for a continuance, both of which were denied. At the hearings on the motion Johnson and his counsel testified that they were not in agreement concerning their attitudes towards Johnson’s chances of being acquitted, thus calling for a change of lawyers. As to the injury, the testimony of various witnesses, including the doctor who examined and treated his hand, negated Johnson’s claim that he was physically unable to stand trial while Johnson contended that he was in too much pain to stand trial.

1. The granting of a continuance is within the sound discretion of the court. Morford v. State, 80 Nev. 438, 442, 395 P.2d 861 (1964). Whether the denial of a continuance is arbitrary must be determined from the circumstances present in every case, particularly those presented to the trial judge at the time the request is denied. Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589 (1964). There was in this case no just reason to allow a change of counsel on the eve of trial when it is apparent that the basic reason in doing so was for the purpose of obtaining another delay. What advantage a delay would bring cannot be ascertained, but it is significant that there is no contention that the trial counsel performed in an unsatisfactory *354manner nor that any errors were committed in the conduct of the trial.

2. The appellant’s contention that he was physically unable to participate in the trial or in his defense is equally without merit. The evidence indicates that while Johnson may have suffered some discomfort it was insufficient to impair his ability to cooperate with counsel and participate in the proceedings. Our disinclination to allow last-minute proceedings to delay the commencement of a trial has already been announced. Howard v. Sheriff, 83 Nev. 150, 153, 425 P.2d 596, 598 (1967).

Affirmed.

Thompson, C. J., and Mowbray, Gunderson, and Bat-jer, JJ., concur.
#### UTILITIES COMM. v. UTILITY CO.

No. 52 PC.

Case below: 30 N.C. App. 336.

Petition by plaintiff for discretionary review under G.S. 7A-31 denied 4 November 1976. Motion of defendant to dismiss appeal allowed 4 November 1976.