alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 31.1

CERTIFICATIONS



I, Albert J. Finch, certify, that:



1.

I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-QSB of OptimumBank Holdings, Inc.;

2.

Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3.

Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the small business issuer as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4.

The small business issuers other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the small business issuer and have:

(a)

Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the small business issuer, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;

(b)

Evaluated the effectiveness of the small business issuers disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

(c)

Disclosed in this report any change in the small business issuers internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the small business issuers most recent fiscal quarter (the small business issuers fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the small business issuers internal control over financial reporting.

5.

The small business issuers other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the small business issuers auditors and the audit committee of the small business issuers board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

(a)

All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the small business issuers ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and

(b)

Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the small business issuers internal control over financial reporting.



|                         |  |     |                                         
|------------------------ |  | --- | ----------------------------------------
|Date:  November 10, 2006 |  | By: | /s/ ALBERTJ. FINCH                      
|                         |  |     | Albert J. Finch, Chief Executive Officer
United States Department of Labor

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

__________________________________________

S.C., Appellant

and

DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS,

DURHAM VA MEDICAL CENTER,

Durham, NC, Employer

__________________________________________

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Docket No. 22-1037

Issued: July 29, 2022

Appearances: Case Submitted on the Record

Appellant, pro se

Office of Solicitor, for the Director

ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL

Before:

ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Chief Judge

JANICE B. ASKIN, Judge

VALERIE D. EVANS-HARRELL, Alternate Judge

On June 27, 2022 appellant filed an appeal from a September 21, 2021 merit decision of 

the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). The Clerk of the Appellate Boards

assigned Docket No. 22-1037.

The Board has duly considered the matter and notes that the Board has jurisdiction to 

review final adverse decisions of OWCP issued under the Federal Employees’ Compensation 

Act.1 For final adverse decisions of OWCP issued on or after November 19, 2008, the Board’s 

review authority is limited to appeals which are filed within 180 days from the date of issuance 

of OWCP’s decision.2

The 180th day following the September 21, 2021 decision was March 20, 2022. As 

appellant did not file an appeal with the Board until June 27, 2022, more than 180 days after the

September 21, 2021 OWCP decision, the Board finds that the appeal docketed as No. 22-1037 is 

untimely filed. The Board is without jurisdiction to review the appeal. Appellant has not offered 

1

5 U.S.C. § 8149; 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3(a) (2009).

2

Id. at § 501.3(e).
2

a reason to explain the failure to timely file an appeal with supporting documentation sufficient 

to establish compelling circumstances. Because there is no final adverse decision issued by 

OWCP within 180 days of the filing of the instant appeal, the Board concludes that the appeal 

docketed as No. 22-1037, must be dismissed.3 Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the appeal docketed as No. 22-1037 is dismissed.

Issued: July 29, 2022

Washington, DC

Alec J. Koromilas, Chief Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Janice B. Askin, Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Valerie D. Evans-Harrell, Alternate Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

3 The Board’s decisions and orders are “final upon the expiration of 30 days from the date of their issuance. ” 

20 C.F.R. § 501.6(d).
Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 211 / Wednesday, November 2, 2005 / Notices 66357 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Office of the Secretary 

[Transmittal No. 06–17] 

36(b)(1) Arms Sales Notification 

AGENCY: Department of Defense, Defense 

Security Cooperation Agency. 

ACTION: Notice. 

SUMMARY: The Department of Defense is 

publishing the unclassified text of a 

section 36(b)(1) arms sales notification. 

This is published to fulfill the 

requirements of section 155 of Public 

Law 104–164 dated 21 July 1996. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ms. 

J. Hurd, DSCA/DBO/ADM, (703) 604–

6575. 

The following is a copy of a letter to 

the Speaker of the House of 

Representatives, Transmittal 06–17 with 

attached transmittal, policy justification, 

Sensitivity of Technology and Section 

620C(d). 

Dated: October 27, 2005. 

L.M. Bynum, 

OSD Federal Register Liaison Officer, 

Department of Defense. 

BILLING CODE 5001–06–M 

66358 Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 211 / Wednesday, November 2, 2005 / Notices 


EN02NO05.047</GPH> 
Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 211 / Wednesday, November 2, 2005 / Notices 66359 


EN02NO05.048</GPH> 
66360 Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 211 / Wednesday, November 2, 2005 / Notices 


EN02NO05.049</GPH> 
Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 211 / Wednesday, November 2, 2005 / Notices 66361 


EN02NO05.050</GPH> 
66362 Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 211 / Wednesday, November 2, 2005 / Notices 


EN02NO05.051</GPH> 
Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 211 / Wednesday, November 2, 2005 / Notices 66363 


EN02NO05.052</GPH> 
66364 Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 211 / Wednesday, November 2, 2005 / Notices 


EN02NO05.053</GPH> 
Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 211 / Wednesday, November 2, 2005 / Notices 66365 


EN02NO05.054</GPH> 
66366 Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 211 / Wednesday, November 2, 2005 / Notices 


EN02NO05.055</GPH> 
Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 211 / Wednesday, November 2, 2005 / Notices 66367 

[FR Doc. 05–21782 Filed 11–1–05; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 5001–06–C 


EN02NO05.056</GPH>
#### STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. WILLIAM LOGAN

No. 7526SC543

(Filed 3 December 1975)

Criminal Law § 87 — redirect examination — evidence unrelated to cross-examination — admissibility

The trial court has discretion to admit evidence on redirect examination unrelated to the witness’s cross-examination which, through oversight, has not been elicited on direct examination.

Appeal by defendant from *Falls, Judge.*Judgment entered 8 April 1975 in Superior Court, Mecklenburg County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 15 October 1975.

Defendant was indicted and tried for distribution of heroin. The State’s evidence tended to show that Larry Reid Snyder, a Charlotte policeman, went to defendant’s home on 11 June 1973 and asked defendant if he “had gotten any of the good junk in that he had told me about several days prior.” Defendant *671“told him that he did not have any new junk in hut that he had some of the old junk in.” Snyder purchased two tinfoil containers from defendant and paid him $24.00.

On cross-examination Snyder testified that he had first talked to defendant on 31 May 1973. On redirect examination Snyder testified that on 6 June 1973 he “purchased two tinfoil containers and one bag of vegetable material” from defendant and that “[a]t this time the defendant told me that this junk was not really that good but that in a couple of days that he would get some more junk that was better. ...”

The State also offered evidence that the two tinfoil containers of “junk” purchased by Snyder from defendant on 11 June were analyzed and found to contain heroin.

. Defendant testified that he had not seen Snyder or sold any heroin to him on 11 June 1973. He denied seeing Officer Snyder on 31 May 1973.

From a verdict of guilty of unlawful distribution of a controlled substance, heroin, and judgment pronounced thereon, defendant appealed.

*Attorney General Edmisten, by Associate Attorney Claudette Hardaway, for the State.*

*Olive, Downer, Williams and Price, by Paul J. Williams, for defendant appellant,*

MARTIN, Judge.

Defendant contends in his first assignment of error that the State should not have been allowed to introduce evidence on redirect examination concerning his sale of illegal drugs to Officer Snyder on 6 June 1973, because this evidence had no relation to anything brought out during his cross-examination of .Officer Snyder.,

The trial court has discretion to admit evidence on redirect examination unrelated to the witness’s cross-examination which, through oversight, he has failed to elicit on direct examination. McCormick on Evidence, 2d ed., § 32; 1 Stansbury, N. C. Evidence, § 36 (Brandis Rev. 1973). The evidence in question was relevant and admissible to show intent, motive, and guilty knowledge. *State v. Logan,*22 N.C. App. 55, 205 S.E. 2d 558 (1974). This assignment of error is overruled.

*672Defendant’s remaining assignment of error is directed to a portion of the court’s charge to the jury. In our opinion the charge considered as a whole was free of prejudicial error.

No error.

Judges Morris and Parker concur.
#### STATE v. GRIER

No. 65 PC.

Case below: 30 N.C. App. 281.

Petition by defendant for writ of certiorari to North Carolina Court of Appeals denied 4 November 1976.
#### TEMISTOKLIS KONSTANTINIDIS, Appellant, v. SHERIFF, CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA, Respondent.

No. 12100

March 13, 1980

607 P.2d 584

*James L. Buchanan, II,*Las Vegas, for Appellant.

*Richard H. Bryan,*Attorney General; *Robert J. Miller,*District Attorney, *Nikolas L. Mastrangelo,*and *Joel M. Cooper,*Deputy District Attorneys, Clark County, for Respondent.

*286OPINION

By the Court,

Thompson, J.:

The respondent has moved to dismiss the appeal of Kon-stantinidis from an order of the district court denying his pretrial petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The ground of the motion to dismiss is that NRS 34.380 as amended by Nev. Stat. ch. 216, § 1 at 312-3 (1979), removed the jurisdiction of this court to entertain the appeal.

The grand jury had charged Konstantinidis with having committed open and gross lewdness, a felony, NRS 201.210, and also second degree kidnapping, NRS 200.310. The indictment for felony gross lewdness was challenged for the reason that it did not allege a prior offense.1 That challenge presented an issue of law as to whether the public offense of felony gross lewdness had properly been charged. The indictment for second degree kidnapping was attacked on the ground that the movement of the victim was incidental to the open and gross lewdness charge and therefore, precluded. Jefferson v. State, 95 Nev. 577, 599 P.2d 1043 (1979). That contention presented an issue of fact which the district court resolved against Kon-stantinidis.

In Gary v. Sheriff, 96 Nev. 78, 605 P.2d 212 (1980), we ruled that the 1979 amendment to NRS 34.380 was constitutional as applied to pretrial writs of habeas corpus to test probable cause. We expressed no opinion as to its validity in other contexts. The *Gary*opinion precludes this appeal with regard to the second degree kidnapping charge since probable cause to hold Konstantinidis for trial was, on a factual basis, resolved in favor of the State, and no appeal is possible. *Gary,*however, *287did not address the constitutionality of the 1979 amendment to NRS 34.380 precluding appellate review of an order denying a pretrial petition for a writ of habeas corpus where the issue is whether the indictment charges a public offense. That question is presented in this case with regard to the indictment of Kon-stantinidis for felony gross lewdness. We now hold that the statutory preclusion of appellate review of an order denying a pretrial petition for a writ of habeas corpus grounded upon the claim that the indictment does not charge a public offense is constitutionally permissible. Prohibition is the appropriate remedy to resolve that issue. Husney v. O’Donnell, 95 Nev. 467, 596 P.2d 230 (1979); Sardis v. District Court, 85 Nev. 585, 460 P.2d 163 (1969); Garnick v. District Court, 81 Nev. 531, 407 P.2d 163 (1965); Houser v. Dist. Ct., 75 Nev. 465, 345 P.2d 766 (1959).

Appeal dismissed.

Mowbray, C. J., and Gunderson, Manoukian, and Bat-jer, JJ., concur.

1

NRS 201.210 provides that open and gross lewdness is a felony only if the accused has committed a prior open and gross lewdness offense. Otherwise, it is a gross misdemeanor.
Opinion issued March 10, 2015

In The

Court of Appeals 

For The 

First District of Texas 

————————————

NO. 01-15-00125-CV

———————————

IN RE MARCELLE GUIMARAES, Relator

Original Proceeding on Petition for Writ of Mandamus

MEMORANDUM OPINION

On February 11, 2015, relator, Marcelle Guimaraes, filed a petition for writ 

of mandamus.1 On February 24, 2015, Guimaraes filed an unopposed “Motion to 

Dismiss her Petition for Writ of Mandamus on Sanctions.” No opinion has issued. 

Accordingly, we grant the motion and dismiss relator’s petition for writ of 

 

1

The underlying case is In the Matter of the Marriage of Marcelle Guimaraes and 

Christopher Scott Brann and In the Interest of [N.S.B.], a Child, cause number 

2012-53837, pending in the 308th District Court of Harris County, Texas, the Hon. 

James Lombardino presiding.
2

mandamus. Cf. TEX. R. APP. P. 42.1(a)(1). We dismiss any other pending motions 

as moot.

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Brown and Lloyd.
**Exhibit 23.1**

**CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTEREDPUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM**

TheBoard of DirectorsCrystal International Travel Group, Inc.

Weconsent to the incorporation by reference in the registration statements on andForm SB-2 (No. 333-136143) of Crystal International TravelGroup, Inc. of our report dated November 10, 2006, with respect to the balancesheets of Crystal International Travel Group, Inc. as of July 31, 2006 and2005, and the related statements of operations, shareholders’ equity andcomprehensive income (loss), and cash flows for the years then ended, whichreport appears in the July 31, 2006, annual report on Form 10-KSB ofCrystal International Travel Group, Inc.

 
|        | /s/ Scharf Pera & Co., PLLC |
|--------|---------------------------------|
|   | Scharf Pera & Co., PLLC     |

 

Charlotte,North Carolina November 14, 2006.

 

----
United States Department of Labor

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

__________________________________________

B.O., Appellant

and

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, NAVAL 

AIR SYSTEMS COMMAND, San Diego, CA

Employer 

_________________________________________

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Docket No. 21-1001

Issued: January 31, 2022

Appearances: Case Submitted on the Record

Jeffery A. Morris, Esq., for the appellant1

Office of Solicitor, for the Director

ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL

Before:

JANICE B. ASKIN, Judge

PATRICIA H. FITZGERALD, Alternate Judge

VALERIE D. EVANS-HARRELL, Alternate Judge

On June 21, 2021 appellant through counsel, filed a timely appeal from a February 16, 

2021, merit decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). The Clerk of 

the Appellate Boards assigned Docket No. 21-1001.

In a letter dated December 21, 2021, counsel requested that the appeal be withdrawn.

The Board has duly considered the matter and concludes that counsel’s request for 

withdrawal of the appeal should be granted. Accordingly, 

1

In all cases in which a representative has been authorized in a matter before the Board, no claim for a fee for legal 

or other service performed on appeal before the Board is valid unless approved by the Board. 20 C.F.R. § 501.9(e). 

No contract for a stipulated fee or on a contingent fee basis will be approved by the Board. Id. An attorney or 

representative’s collection of a fee without the Board’s approval may constitute a misdemeanor, subject to fine or 

imprisonment for up to one year or both. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 292. Demands for payment of fees to a 

representative, prior to approval by the Board, may be reported to appropriate authorities for investigation.
2

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT appellant’s request for the withdrawal of the appeal 

is granted. The appeal docketed as No. 21-1001 is dismissed.

Issued: January 31, 2022

Washington, DC

Janice B. Askin, Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Patricia H. Fitzgerald, Alternate Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Valerie D. Evans-Harrell, Alternate Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
#### Janet HENSHAW; et al., Plaintiffs—Appellees, v. Robert DAUGHERTY; et al., Defendants, and Michael Kramer, Carl McClelland, Defendants—Appellants.

No. 04-15619.

D.C. No. CV-03-00141-HDM/RAM.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted March 23, 2005.*

Decided April 4, 2005.

Elizabeth A. Cannon-Lynch, Sparks, NV, for Plaintiffs-Appellees.

Gregory R. Shannon, Washoe County District Attorney’s Office, Reno, NV, for Defendants-Appellants.

Before B. FLETCHER, TROTT, and PAEZ, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM**

Lieutenant Michael Kramer and Deputy Sheriff Carl McLelland (“the officers”) ap*176peal the district court’s interlocutory order denying their motion to dismiss this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action on qualified immunity grounds. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. *See Mitchell v. Forsyth,*472 U.S. 511, 528, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985). We review de novo, *Grant v. City of Long Beach,*315 F.3d 1081, 1088-89 (9th Cir.2002), and we affirm.

Read in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, the second amended complaint alleges that the officers knowingly relied on false information to manufacture probable cause to arrest a minor for making a threatening telephone call. The district court properly determined that these allegations are sufficient to defeat qualified immunity at this stage of the proceedings. *See Lee v. Gregory,*363 F.3d 931, 934 (9th Cir.2004) (qualified immunity does not protect officers that knowingly violate constitutional rights); *Grant,*315 F.3d at 1088-89 (at the motion to dismiss stage, court must take allegations of complaint as true in determining qualified immunity).

The officers’ contention that the district court should have taken judicial notice of the arrest warrant attached to their original motion to dismiss is unavailing. Plaintiffs allege the officers acted unlawfully in *obtaining*the warrant. Thus, even if the warrant appeared valid on its face, it would not entitle the officers to qualified immunity.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

TROTT, Circuit Judge,

dissenting.

I would reverse and remand to the district court with instructions to grant the officers’ motion to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds.
#### Reverend Richmond EDWARDS in his Capacity as Pastor and President of the Board of Directors of Pilgrim Baptist Church of Kenner and on Behalf of the General Membership of Pilgrim Baptist Church of Kenner v. Richmond EDWARDS, Jr., James Evans, Jr., Issac Netters, and Theodore Dunigan.

No. 2003-CC-1812.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Sept. 5, 2003.

In re Baker, Edward Bro.; Edwards, Richmond Jr.; Baker, Oliver Bro.; Harris, Aaron Bro.; Johnson, James Bro.; McLarin, Willie Bro.; Piper, Roosevelt Jr. Bro; Robichaux, Lawrence Bro.; Seymore, Brace Bro.; Torrence, Charles Bro.; White, Sam Bro; Wilson, Charles Bro; Howard, Alea Sis.; Evans, James Jr.; Netters, Issac; Dunigan, Theodore;—Defendant(s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. E, Nos. 590-084, 590-158; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 03-C-618.

Writ denied. Stay denied.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 7
<LEGEND>
THE SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM FORM 10-Q FOR
THE THREE MONTHS ENDED MARCH 31, 1998 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY
REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1998
<DEBT-HELD-FOR-SALE>                           461,562
<DEBT-CARRYING-VALUE>                            3,332
<DEBT-MARKET-VALUE>                              3,172
<EQUITIES>                                       3,948
<MORTGAGE>                                      10,783
<REAL-ESTATE>                                    1,203
<TOTAL-INVEST>                                 677,384
<CASH>                                           9,614
<RECOVER-REINSURE>                              15,272
<DEFERRED-ACQUISITION>                          29,511
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               1,334,397
<POLICY-LOSSES>                                131,579
<UNEARNED-PREMIUMS>                                918
<POLICY-OTHER>                                 522,211
<POLICY-HOLDER-FUNDS>                            6,640
<NOTES-PAYABLE>                                 10,964
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                         1,179
<OTHER-SE>                                     145,306
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 1,334,397
<PREMIUMS>                                       3,098
<INVESTMENT-INCOME>                             13,955
<INVESTMENT-GAINS>                                   0
<OTHER-INCOME>                                     522
<BENEFITS>                                      10,356
<UNDERWRITING-AMORTIZATION>                        448
<UNDERWRITING-OTHER>                             4,054
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  4,183
<INCOME-TAX>                                     1,464
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              2,719
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     2,719
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.63
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.62
<RESERVE-OPEN>                                       0
<PROVISION-CURRENT>                                  0
<PROVISION-PRIOR>                                    0
<PAYMENTS-CURRENT>                                   0
<PAYMENTS-PRIOR>                                     0
<RESERVE-CLOSE>                                      0
<CUMULATIVE-DEFICIENCY>                              0
        

</TABLE>