alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Presidential Documents

61209 

Federal Register 

Vol. 70, No. 202 

Thursday, October 20, 2005 

Title 3— 

The President 

Notice of October 19, 2005 

Continuation of the National Emergency With Respect to Significant Narcotics Traffickers Centered in Colombia 

On October 21, 1995, by Executive Order 12978, the President declared 

a national emergency pursuant to the International Emergency Economic 

Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701–1706) to deal with the unusual and extraordinary 

threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United 

States constituted by the actions of significant narcotics traffickers centered 

in Colombia, and the extreme level of violence, corruption, and harm such 

actions cause in the United States and abroad. 

The order blocks all property and interests in property of foreign persons 

listed in an annex to the order that are in the United States or within 

the possession or control of U.S. persons, as well as of foreign persons 

determined to play a significant role in international narcotics trafficking 

centered in Colombia. The order similarly blocks all property and interests 

in property of foreign persons determined to materially assist in, or provide 

financial or technological support for or goods or services in support of, 

the narcotics trafficking activities of persons designated in or pursuant to 

the order, or persons determined to be owned or controlled by, or to act 

for or on behalf of, persons designated in or pursuant to the order. The 

order also prohibits any transaction or dealing by United States persons 

or within the United States in such property or interests in property. 

Because the actions of significant narcotics traffickers centered in Colombia 

continue to threaten the national security, foreign policy, and economy 

of the United States and to cause an extreme level of violence, corruption, 

and harm in the United States and abroad, the national emergency declared 

on October 21, 1995, and the measures adopted pursuant thereto to deal 

with that emergency, must continue in effect beyond October 21, 2005. 

Therefore, in accordance with section 202(d) of the National Emergencies 

Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), I am continuing for 1 year the national emergency 

with respect to significant narcotics traffickers centered in Colombia. This 

notice shall be published in the Federal Register and transmitted to the 

Congress. 

W 

THE WHITE HOUSE, 

October 19, 2005. 

[FR Doc. 05–21210 

Filed 10–19–05; 1:08 pm] 

Billing code 3195–01–P
```

[Congressional Bills 111th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 5259 Introduced in House (IH)]

111th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 5259

    To amend title 10, United States Code, to require preseparation 
counseling for members of the reserve components upon their retirement 
                      or separation from service.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                              May 11, 2010

Ms. Pingree of Maine introduced the following bill; which was referred 
                   to the Committee on Armed Services

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
    To amend title 10, United States Code, to require preseparation 
counseling for members of the reserve components upon their retirement 
                      or separation from service.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Equal Access to Preseparation 
Counseling Act''.

SEC. 2. PRESEPARATION COUNSELING FOR MEMBERS OF THE RESERVE COMPONENTS.

    (a) Requirement; Exception.--Subsection (a)(1) of section 1142 of 
title 10, United States Code, is amended--
            (1) in the first sentence--
                    (A) by striking ``Within'' and inserting ``(A) 
                Within''; and
                    (B) by striking ``of each member'' and all that 
                follows through the period at the end of the sentence 
                and inserting the following: ``of--
            ``(i) each member of the armed forces whose discharge or 
        release from active duty is anticipated as of a specific date; 
        and
            ``(ii) each member of a reserve component not covered by 
        clause (i) whose discharge or release from service is 
        anticipated as of a specific date.''; and
            (2) in the second sentence, by striking ``A notation of the 
        provision of such counseling'' and inserting the following:
    ``(B) A notation of the provision of preseparation counseling''.
    (b) Clarification of Covered Matters.--Subsection (b)(7) of such 
section is amended by striking ``from active duty''.
                                 <all>
```
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-6646

ARTHUR COLEMAN, Petitioner - Appellant,

v. E. RICHARD BAZZLE, Warden, Respondent - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Rock Hill. David C. Norton, Chief District Judge. (0:06-cv-03493-DCN)

Submitted: October 15, 2009 Decided: October 19, 2009

Before SHEDD, DUNCAN, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Arthur Coleman, Appellant Pro Se. William Edgar Salter, III, Assistant Attorney General, Donald John Zelenka, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM:

Arthur Coleman seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2006) petition. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2006). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2006). A prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that any assessment of the constitutional claims by the district court is debatable or wrong and that any dispositive procedural ruling by the district

court is likewise debatable. See Miller-El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); Rose v. Lee , 252 F.3d 676, 683-84 (4th Cir. 2001). We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Coleman has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
No. 07-14-00026-CV

In the Interest of S.C., a Child From the 286th District Court

of Hockley County

July 23, 2014

Opinion by Justice Pirtle §

§

§

§

§

§

J U D G M E N T

Pursuant to the opinion of the Court dated July 23, 2014, it is ordered, adjudged

and decreed that the judgment of the trial court be affirmed.

Inasmuch as this is an appeal in forma pauperis, no costs beyond those that

have been paid are adjudged.

It is further ordered that this decision be certified below for observance.

o O o
* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

__________________ No. 95-11014 Conference Calendar

__________________ GEORGE ARCE, Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus MEGAN MITCHELL, Defendant-Appellee.

- - - - - - - - - - Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas USDC No. 3:95-CV-1356-G

- - - - - - - - - - March 1, 1996 Before GARWOOD, JONES, and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * George Arce appeals the dismissal of his civil rights complaint as frivolous. Arce's argument that the dismissal violates his right to due process lacks merit. Arce does not argue that the district court abused its discretion by determining the defendant was not a state actor and dismissing his appeal. Thus, this issue is abandoned on appeal. He was put on notice in the magistrate judge's report that his suit could beNo. 95-11014 -2- dismissed. He filed objections to the report, but did not seek to amend his complaint. His contention that he did not have the opportunity to amend his complaint is frivolous. Arce also argues that he did not receive a copy of an amended report and recommendation by the magistrate judge and, thus, was not allowed the opportunity to file objections to it in violation of his due process rights. The amended findings and recommendation referred to by the district court in its order of dismissal is not part of the record and mention of it was apparently a mistake. Because an amended report and recommendation does not exist, this argument lacks a factual basis.
AFFIRMED.
<PAGE>

                                                                 Exhibit 23

                     CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANTS


The Board of Directors and Shareholders
  of The Advest Group, Inc.:


We consent to the incorporation by reference in the registration statements
of The Advest Group, Inc. and Subsidiaries on Form S-8 (File No. 2-92868)
concerning its 1983 Incentive Stock Option Plan, Form S-8 (File No. 33-17674)
concerning its 1986 Incentive Stock Option Plan, Form S-8 (File No. 33-72042)
concerning its Advest Thrift Plan, Form S-8 (File No. 33-56275) concerning
its 1995 Equity Plan, Form S-8 (File No. 333-00797) concerning its Executive
Officer 1996 Restricted Stock and Stock Option Agreement; Form S-8 (File
No. 33-60425) concerning its 1990, 1991, and 1992 Top Account Executive Stock
Option Plans, its 1993 Stock Option Plan and its 1994 Non-Employee Director
Option Plan; and Form S-8(File No. 333-17711) concerning its Key Professionals
Equity Plan, 1996 Executive Equity Plan, 1997 Executive Equity Plan and 1997
Equity Plan, of our reports dated October 22, 1997, on our audits of the 
consolidated financial statements and financial statement schedules of The
Advest Group, Inc. and Subsidiaries as of September 30, 1997 and 1996 and for
each of the three years in the period ended September 30, 1997, which reports
are incoporated by reference and included, respectively, in this Annual Report
on Form 10-K.


                              /s/ COOPERS & LYBRAND L.L.P.



Hartford, Connecticut
December 11, 1997


                                -103-
United States Department of Labor

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

__________________________________________

J.O., Appellant

and

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, 

Fort Riley, KS, Employer

__________________________________________

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Docket No. 22-0305

Issued: June 14, 2022

Appearances: Case Submitted on the Record

Capp P. Taylor, for the appellant1

Office of Solicitor, for the Director

ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL

Before:

ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Chief Judge

PATRICIA H. FITZGERALD, Deputy Chief Judge

JAMES D. MCGINLEY, Alternate Judge

On November 29, 2021 appellant, through his representative, sought an appeal from a 

purported September 2, 2021 decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs 

(OWCP). The Board assigned Docket No. 22-0305.

The Board, having duly considered the matter, notes that its jurisdiction is limited to the 

review of final adverse OWCP decisions issued under the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act 

(FECA).2 The case record as transmitted to the Board does not contain a final adverse decision of 

OWCP. By letter dated September 2, 2021, OWCP advised appellant that it received his request 

for a hearing before an OWCP hearing representative; however, a final decision had not been 

issued regarding the issue for which a hearing had been requested. Therefore, the case was not in 

1

In all cases in which a representative has been authorized in a matter before the Board, no claim for a fee for legal 

or other service performed on appeal before the Board is valid unless approved by the Board. 20 C.F.R. § 501.9(e). 

No contract for a stipulated fee or on a contingent fee basis will be approved by the Board. Id. An attorney or 

representative’s collection of a fee without the Board’s approval may constitute a misdemeanor, subject to fine or 

imprisonment for up to one year or both. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 292. Demands for payment of fees to a 

representative, prior to approval by the Board, may be reported to appropriate authorities for investigation.

2

5 U.S.C. § 8149; 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3(a).
2

posture for decision. The Board finds that this September 2, 2021 letter was advisory in nature 

and was not a final adverse decision. 

As there is no final adverse decision issued by OWCP over which the Board may properly 

exercise jurisdiction, the Board concludes that the appeal docketed as No. 22 -0305 must be 

dismissed.3 Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the appeal docketed as No. 22-0305 is dismissed.

Issued: June 14, 2022

Washington, DC

Alec J. Koromilas, Chief Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Patricia H. Fitzgerald, Deputy Chief Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

James D. McGinley, Alternate Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

3

Id.
<PAGE>


                                                                   EXHIBIT 4 (d)



                                LIFEPOINT, INC.



                                     WAIVER



                                       BY



                                   HOLDERS OF



                      SERIES C CONVERTIBLE PREFERRED STOCK



     The undersigned, being the holders of all of the issued and outstanding
shares of Series C Convertible Preferred Stock, $.001 par value per share (the
"Series C Preferred Stock"), of LifePoint, Inc., a Delaware corporation (the
"Company"), severally and not jointly, DO HEREBY:



          1. Waive their rights to require the Company to redeem the shares of
     Series C Preferred Stock by reason of the occurrence of an event specified
     in Section VIII, A(iii)(c) of the Certificate of Designation governing the
     Series C Preferred Stock if, but only if, such event arises from a transfer
     of outstanding securities of the Company that have voting power, and not
     through actions taken by the Company or its subsidiaries.



          2. Agree that any transferee of their shares of Series C Preferred
     Stock shall be bound by this waiver, and agree not to transfer their shares
     of Series C Preferred Stock unless the transferee executes and delivers to
     the Company a written instrument agreeing to be bound by the terms of this
     Waiver with respect to the shares of Series C Preferred Stock being
     transferred.



          3. Agree that this Waiver shall be effective as of, and shall relate
     back to, the time each of the undersigned first acquired its shares of
     Series C Preferred Stock.



          4. Understand that this Waiver shall become effective when executed,
     in a single instrument or counterparts, by holders of all of the
     outstanding shares of Series C Preferred Stock.



     IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned have duly executed this Waiver, or have
caused this Waiver to be duly executed by their respective officers or other
representatives thereunto duly authorized, as of the date set forth below.



Dated March 12, 2002



                                              Signatures of Holders of Series C


                                              Convertible Preferred Stock



Accepted and agreed to:



LIFEPOINT, INC.



By:/s/ MICHELE A. CLARK

    ----------------------------------

Michele A. Clark


Controller and


CHIEF ACCOUNTING OFFICER


                                       E-34
### TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-03-00114-CV

Heldy Finch, Appellant

v.

James Arthur Finch, Appellee

FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF WILLIAMSON COUNTY, 395TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

NO. 01-324-F395, HONORABLE MICHAEL JERGINS, JUDGE PRESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

The brief of appellant Heldy Finch was due May 8, 2003. By letter of May 22, 2003,

appellant was notified that her brief was overdue and instructed to tender a brief with the explanation

required by Rule 38 or her appeal would be dismissed for want of prosecution. S ee Tex. R. App. P.

38.8 (a)(1) (if appellant fails timely to file brief, appeal may be dismissed for want of prosecution

unless appellant reasonably explains failure and appellee not significantly injured). To date, we have

received no response. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for want of prosecution. S ee Tex. R. App.

P. 38.8(a)(1); 42.3(b) (dismissal for want of prosecution).

W. Kenneth Law, Chief Justice

Before Chief Justice Law, Justices B. A. Smith and Puryear

Dismissed for Want of Prosecution

Filed: August 14, 20032
#### LEE TIRE & RUBBER CO. OF NEW YORK, Inc., *v.*McCARRAN Et Al.

No. 3125

July 21, 1936.

59 P. (2d) 649.

See, also, 56 Nev. 458, 55 P. (2d) 633.

*J. W. Dignan*and *Gray Mashburn,*for Appellants.

*G. Gunzenclorfer,*for Respondent.

*124OPINION

By the Court,

Coleman, J.:

Upon the reversal of the judgment and order appealed from in this ease, the respective parties filed a cost bill. In due time each filed with the clerk a motion to strike opponent’s cost bill.

The clerk allowed appellants’ costs as stated in their cost bill. From this ruling respondent took an appeal to the justices of the court, as provided in rule 6,.para-graph 3.

We think the ruling of the clerk was correct. Section 8928 N. C. L. provides that where a judgment is modified, or where a new trial is ordered, and no order is made relative to costs, as in this case, the party obtaining any relief shall have his costs. In this case the judgment was not only modified, but entirely reversed and a new trial was ordered; hence the appellant is entitled to his costs. Gerlach Live Stock Co. v. Laxalt, 53 Nev. 259, 266, 298 P. 413, 2 P. (2d) 123.

Respondent contends that it won on the main question involved in the case, and that it was sent back for an accounting, hence there was no such modification or retrial ordered as is necessary to entitle appellants to costs.

We do not agree with this view. But if it be conceded that an accounting merely is now to be taken, there may be a judgment in favor of appellants upon the taking of such accounting. At any rate, there was a substantial judgment rendered upon the former trial which was wiped out in its entirety by the order of reversal. That being true, appellants are entitled to their costs.

The ruling of the clerk appealed from was right, and is affirmed.
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 00-60539

AUSTREBERT ZAVALA-ALVARES, also known as Austreberto Zavala, Petitioner,

versus JOHN ASHCROFT, ATTORNEY GENERAL, Respondent.

-------------------- Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals BIA No. A91-200-775

-------------------- March 7, 2002 Before REAVLEY, WIENER, and PARKER, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Austrebert Zavala-Alvares petitions for review of an orderof the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) holding that ZavalaAlvares’ state conviction for felony driving while intoxicated was an aggravated felony warranting his removal from this country. The respondent and Zavala-Alvares have filed a joint motion to remand the case to the BIA for reconsideration in light of United States v. Chapa-Garza , 243 F.3d 921, 927 (5th Cir.No. 00-60539 -2- 2001). Both parties also move to withdraw the respondent’s motion to dismiss. Zavala-Alvares’ petition for review is GRANTED. The order of the BIA is VACATED, and this case is REMANDED to the BIA for disposition consistent with Chapa-Garza , 243 F.3d at 927. All other outstanding motions are DENIED.
#### State of Connecticut *v.*James Leonard

The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 31 Conn. App. 178 (AC 10653), is granted, limited to the following issue:

> “Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that the trial court’s instruction on reasonable doubt (‘A reasonable doubt is a doubt for which a valid reason can be assigned’) did not dilute the state’s burden of proof or violate the presumption of innocence?”

Berdon, J.,

concurring in part and dissenting in part. I concur that we should review the issue certified. I dissent because I would also certify for review the following issues: (1) Whether the Appellate Court was correct in holding that the trial court properly concluded, from *913the totality of circumstances, that the defendant was not unlawfully seized, and that police officers had a reasonable and articulable suspicion for an investigative detention; and (2) whether the Appellate Court was correct in holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in precluding the defendant from asking the police officer who obtained the information used as the basis for the stop, questions concerning the reliability of the confidential informant and the basis of the informant’s information?

The Supreme Court docket number is SC 14797.

*Susan M. Hankins,*assistant public defender, in support of the petition.

*Mary H. Lesser,*assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.

Decided June 17, 1993
#### STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. FRANK BOYETTE

No. 742SC72

(Filed 1 May 1974)

Appeal by defendant from *Godwin, Judge,*13 August 1973 Session of Superior Court held in Beaufort County. Argued in the Court of Appeals 9 April 1974.

*453Defendant was charged in a warrant (1) with a second offense of driving a motor vehicle upon a public highway while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, and (2) with resisting arrest.

■ Defendant was found guilty of both charges in the District Court. He appealed to Superior Court where he was tried *de novo*upon the warrant. He was found guilty by the jury.

*Attorney General Morgan, by Associate Attorney Wallace, for the State.*

*LeRoy Scott and Franklin B. Johnston for the defendant.*

BROCK, Chief Judge.

We have reviewed defendant’s assignments of error. They present no new or novel question. In our opinion, defendant received a fair trial which was free from prejudicial error.

No error.

Judges Parker and Baley concur.