J-S34014-17

* Retired Senior Judge specially assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

v.

TAMARRA GEARY

Appellant No. 3128 EDA 2016

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence September 8, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County

Criminal Division at No(s): 

CP-46-CR-0000001-2008

CP-46-CR-0000202-2008

CP-46-CR-0003995-2009

CP-46-CR-0004056-2009

BEFORE: BOWES, SOLANO, AND PLATT,* JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED MAY 23, 2017

Tamarra Geary appeals from the judgment of sentence of twelve to 

twenty-four months incarceration, plus three years probation imposed after 

the court found her in violation of probation. We affirm. 

Appellant was arrested in 2009 and charged with access device fraud, 

forgery, identity theft, tampering with public records, and other related 

offenses, stemming from multiple occasions where she obtained, or 

attempted to obtain, merchandise using false identification and stolen credit 

cards. On March 13, 2013, she entered into an open guilty plea to a single 

count of access device fraud and one count of tampering with public records. 
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The remaining charges were nolle prossed. The court imposed a sentence of 

time served to twenty-three months at each count, to run consecutively, 

followed by three years of probation. Appellant received credit for time 

served and was granted immediate parole. 

While serving her probationary sentence, Appellant allegedly violated a 

Protection From Abuse Order (“PFA”). In order to avoid punishment, 

Appellant fled.1 As a result, she failed to meet her reporting requirements or 

pay her fines and restitution for a period of two years. Appellant waived her 

right to a Gagnon I hearing, and the court held a Gagnon II hearing on 

September 8, 2016. At that hearing, Appellant stipulated to a technical 

violation for failing to report, and thereafter, the court revoked her 

probation. The court then imposed an aggregate sentence of twelve to 

twenty-four months incarceration, plus three years probation. 

Appellant filed a timely petition for reconsideration of sentence on 

September 12, 2016. Before the court responded to Appellant’s petition, 

she filed a timely notice of appeal on September 29, 2016.2 Appellant 

complied with the court’s order to file a Rule 1925(b) concise statement of 

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1 Although a hearing was scheduled on Appellant’s alleged PFA violation, the 

complaining witness did not appear, and the prosecution withdrew the 

charges. 

2 The trial court ultimately filed an order denying Appellant’s petition for 

reconsideration on October 12, 2016. 
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matters complained of on appeal, and the court filed its Rule 1925(a) 

opinion. This matter is now ready for our review. 

Appellant presents one question for our consideration: “[Appellant] 

asserts that the sentences imposed were manifestly harsh and excessive and 

not in conformity with the sentencing code and the holding in the 

Pennsylvania Supreme Court holding (sic) in Comonwealth v. Cottle[, 426 

A.2d 598 (Pa. 1981)].” Appellant’s brief at 7. 

When considering an appeal from a sentence imposed after the court 

has revoked probation, we may review “the validity of the revocation 

proceedings, the legality of sentence imposed following revocation, and any 

challenge to the discretionary aspects of the sentence imposed.” 

Commonwealth v. Wright, 116 A.3d 133, 136 (Pa.Super. 2015). 

Appellant raises a challenge to the discretionary aspects of her 

sentence. When reviewing such a challenge, we are informed by the 

following standard of review: “[s]entencing is a matter vested in the sound 

discretion of the sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on 

appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion.” Commonwealth v. Zirkle, 

107 A.3d 127, 132 (Pa.Super. 2014) (citation omitted). Further, “the right 

to appellate review of the discretionary aspects of a sentence is not 

absolute, and must be considered as a petition for permission to appeal.” In 

order to invoke this Court’s jurisdiction: 
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[W]e conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether 

appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal; (2) whether the 

issues were properly preserved at sentencing or in a motion to 

reconsider and modify sentence; (3) whether appellant’s brief 

has a fatal defect; and (4) whether there is a substantial 

question that the sentence appealled from is not appropriate 

under the Sentencing Code.

Id. 

Instantly, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and a timely petition 

for reconsideration of her sentence. In that petition, she contended her 

sentence was excessive since she is the mother of a seven-year-old 

daughter, she has been gainfully employed, and, other than fleeing, she did 

not otherwise violate her probation. Appellant has also attached a Rule 

2119(f) concise statement of reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal 

generally raising the same claim. Thus, Appellant has preserved her 

challenge and we need only consider whether she has raised a substantial 

question that her sentence was inappropriate under the sentencing code. 

Appellant argues that the court imposed an excessive sentence that 

does not reflect the seriousness of her violation, and that it failed to consider 

circumstances that militated in favor of a lighter sentence. In particular, 

Appellant notes that during her probationary period she worked in home 

healthcare and did not incur any direct probation violations. She 

emphasizes that she is the mother of a young daughter, and that she 

specifically asked the court to consider that relationship in fashioning her 

sentence. Appellant analogizes her case to the Supreme Court’s decision in 
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Cottle, supra, and concludes that, similar to the appellant therein, a 

sentence of confinement was too harsh in light of her marked rehabilitation 

while on probation. 

Before we discuss Cottle, supra, we must first determine whether 

Appellant’s claim presents a substantial question for our review. We 

determine whether an appellant has proposed a substantial question on a 

case-by-case basis. Commonwealth v. Popielarcheck, 151 A.3d 1088, 

1093 (Pa.Super. 2016). In addition, we note that a “substantial question 

exists only when the appellant advances a colorable argument that the 

sentencing judge’s actions were either: (1) inconsistent with a specific 

provision of the Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary to the fundamental norms 

which underlie the sentencing process.” Id. (citation omitted). 

At the outset, we observe that Appellant’s argument, on its face, 

appears to raise a substantial question. For example, she avers that the 

“trial court sentenced [Appellant] to an excessive sentence that failed to 

address an essential component of [her] rehabilitative needs,” and then sets 

forth numerous examples of her circumstances that should have motivated 

the court to impose a lesser sentence. Appellant’s brief at 20-22. We have 

previously held that a substantial question exists where a party combines an 

excessiveness claim “together with [a] claim that the court failed to consider 

[a defendant’s] rehabilitative needs and mitigating factors upon fashioning 

its sentence[.]” Commonwealth v. Swope, 123 A.3d 333, 340 (Pa.Super. 
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2015). However, the mere assertion that the court erred in a certain way is 

not talismanic, and we must consider the substance of Appellant’s argument 

in addition to the statement of her claim when determining whether a 

substantial question was raised. 

Instantly, although Appellant asserts that her sentence is excessive 

because the court failed to consider her rehabilitative needs, the content of 

her argument centers upon the court’s failure to consider her mitigating 

circumstances, i.e., her consistent employment, her lack of other probation 

violations, and her maternal obligations. Appellant’s brief does not set forth 

her rehabilitative needs or how the court failed to address them in imposing 

its sentence. Rather, Appellant focuses on her particular circumstances and 

stresses how those circumstances rendered her sentence excessive. We 

have consistently held that a claim that the court did not give proper 

consideration to mitigating factors does not raise a substantial question.3 

See Commonwealth v. Kane, 10 A.3d 327, 335-336 (Pa.Super. 2010) 

(stating, “[t]hat claim, that the court gave inadequate consideration to 

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3 Additionally, we note that the court premised Appellant’s sentence 

primarily on its judgment that her conduct indicated that she was likely to 

reoffend if not imprisoned, and that the sentence was essential to vindicate 

the authority of the court. Trial Court Opinion, 11/1/16, at 2; N.T. Hearing, 

9/8/16, at 21-22; 42 Pa.C.S. § 9771(c). We find these factors compelling in 

evaluating Appellant’s sentence of incarceration. Thus, even if Appellant had 

raised a substantial question, the reasons underlying the court’s sentence 

are consistent with the protection of the public, and we discern no abuse of 

discretion in that respect. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b). 
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certain mitigating factors, does not raise a substantial question.”). Hence, 

we do not reach the merits of Appellant’s appeal. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/23/2017