NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE. 

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

In re the Matter of: 

ROBYN MARIE SESSIONS, Petitioner/Appellee,

v.

VITALE NICOLO SESSIONS, Respondent/Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CV 15-0589 FC

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. FC2002-011187

The Honorable Joseph P. Mikitish, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Raymond S. Dietrich PLC, Phoenix

By Raymond S. Dietrich

Counsel for Petitioner/Appellee

Law Office of Alan K. Wittig PC, Queen Creek

By Alan K. Wittig

Counsel for Respondent/Appellant
SESSIONS v. SESSIONS

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Patricia A. Orozco delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Andrew W. Gould and Judge Margaret H. Downie

joined.

OROZCO, Judge:

¶1 Vitale Nicolo Sessions (Husband) appeals from the superior 

court’s order enforcing a domestic relations order (DRO) and directing use 

of the formula set forth therein to calculate his former wife’s share of 

pension benefits. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Husband and Robyn Marie Sessions (Wife) married on April 

30, 1988. Husband, then a police detective with the City of Mesa, began

participating in the Public Safety Personnel Retirement System (PSPRS) on 

October 17, 1993. Wife served Husband with a petition for dissolution on 

November 1, 2002. The parties agreed to divide Husband’s PSPRS 

pension benefits pursuant to a DRO, and the superior court dissolved the 

marriage effective February 1, 2005. 

¶3 In December 2005, the superior court entered a stipulated

DRO, which provided that if Husband did not commence his pension 

benefits upon completion of twenty years of service, Husband must pay 

Wife directly “monthly payments based upon the benefits available at 

completion of 20 years’ service,” pursuant to a formula. Both parties 

approved the DRO as to form and content and signed the DRO. 

¶4 The formula set forth in the DRO specified that Wife’s 

fractional interest in Husband’s pension benefits would be calculated as 

follows:

A. The amount of the payment payable to [Husband] 

based upon 20 years’ total service will be multiplied 

by a fraction, the numerator of which is the number of 

months the parties were married to each other while 

[Husband] was participating in the [PSPRS]

November 1, 2002, (as shall be determined by the 

[PSPRS]from the dates contained in this Order and 
SESSIONS v. SESSIONS

Decision of the Court

3

the Records of the [PSPRS]and/or the records 

available to the [PSPRS]from participating employers) 

and the denominator of which shall be the total 

months of service upon [Husband’s] completion of 20 

years’ service, times fifty percent (50%).

B. From the amount determined in 2(A) above, the 

[PSPRS]shall subtract $219.14, and the resulting dollar 

amount shall be paid to [Wife]. 

¶5 In 2013, several months before Husband was to reach his 

twenty-year service mark, pension counsel calculated the amount

Husband should pay Wife directly as $606.76 per month effective 

November 1, 2013. 

¶6 In performing the calculation, pension counsel ran a benefit 

estimate using the PSPRS benefit estimator of the actual benefit that 

would be payable to Husband based on twenty years of service, which 

estimated Husband’s monthly benefit to be $3,654.43. Pension counsel 

then noted that:

The formula contained in the [DRO] directs that the benefit 

is to be multiplied by one-half and by a fraction, whose 

numerator is the number of months of benefit accrual during 

the marriage through November 1, 2002, and the 

denominator would be 20 years. My notes indicate that your 

date of marriage was April 30, 1988, and [Husband’s] PSPRS 

start date was October 17, 1993. Therefore, the numerator 

should reflect 108.5 months (from October 17, 1993, through 

November 1, 2002, is 9 years and one-half month, or 108.5 

months), and the denominator is 240 months. Therefore, 

one-half of the community property interest in the PSPRS 

benefit is 22.6%. (108.5/240 x .5 = 22.6%)[.]

The direct payment is calculated by multiplying $3,654.43 by 

22.6% (or $822.90). Then the . . . offset amount of $219.14 is 

subtracted, leaving a direct payment amount to [Wife] of 

$606.76.

¶7 Husband objected to the calculation and instead offered to 

pay Wife $275 per month. Wife rejected Husband’s offer and petitioned to 

enforce judgment. The superior court granted Wife’s petition and ordered 

the parties to use the formula set forth in the DRO. 
SESSIONS v. SESSIONS

Decision of the Court

4

¶8 We have jurisdiction over Husband’s timely appeal 

pursuant to Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution, and Arizona 

Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) sections 12-120.21.A.1 and -2101.A.2 (West 

2016).1

DISCUSSION

¶9 We review the superior court’s order granting a post-decree 

petition for abuse of discretion. See City of Phx. v. Geyler, 144 Ariz. 323, 328

(1985). “An abuse of discretion may occur when a trial court commits an 

error of law in the process of exercising its discretion.” Kohler v. Kohler, 

211 Ariz. 106, 107, ¶ 2 (App. 2005). 

¶10 Husband argues that because the formula set forth in the 

DRO requires use of Husband’s three highest years of income before the 

filing of the petition of dissolution, pension counsel incorrectly calculated 

the retirement benefit by using the Husband’s benefit amount payable at

his twenty-year service date. Contrary to Husband’s argument, however, 

the plain language of the DRO requires use of the “amount payable to 

[Husband] based upon 20 years’ total service.” In accordance with the 

DRO, pension counsel used an estimate of the actual benefit that would be 

payable to Husband based on twenty years of service. 

¶11 Husband next argues that at the time he agreed to the DRO, 

he understood that the calculation would be based on the “past [highest] 3 

years [of] income as of November 1, 2002.” Husband signed the DRO and 

agreed to its form and content. A competent person is presumed “to 

know the contents of an agreement he signs.” In re Estate of Henry, 6 Ariz. 

App. 183, 186 (1967). Moreover, a person who signs a written agreement 

“is bound to know and assent to its provisions in the absence of fraud, 

misrepresentation, or other wrongful acts by the other party.” Teran v. 

Citicorp Person-to-Person Fin. Ctr., 146 Ariz. 370, 372 (App. 1985). If 

Husband misunderstood the terms of the DRO, that was a unilateral 

mistake on his part. Hartford v. Indus. Comm’n of Ariz., 178 Ariz. 106, 111 

(App. 1994) (noting that a unilateral mistake is one where only one party 

to an agreement is mistaken as to the subject matter or the agreement’s 

expression). 

 

1 We cite the current version of applicable statutes when no revisions 

material to this decision have since occurred. 
SESSIONS v. SESSIONS

Decision of the Court

5

¶12 Finally, Husband argues that the DRO violates A.R.S. § 25-

318 and Koelsch v. Koelsch, 148 Ariz. 176 (1986), because it awards some of 

Husband’s post-dissolution income to Wife. Section 25-318.A provides for 

the equitable division of community property at dissolution. In re 

Marriage of Flower, 223 Ariz. 531, 535-36, ¶ 16 (App. 2010) (finding 

property characterized as community property subject to “equitable 

division”). Pension plans are a deferred form of compensation, and “any 

portion of the plan earned during marriage is community property subject 

to equitable division at dissolution.” Koelsch, 148 Ariz. at 181. In Koelsch, 

our supreme court addressed a formula used by the superior court—in the 

absence of a DRO—to divide the community interest of a pension plan for

an employee eligible to retire under PSPRS who chose to continue 

working past normal retirement age, thus delaying receipt of retirement 

benefits. Id. at 179. In so doing, Koelsch observed that “earnings after 

dissolution are separate property.” Id. at 181. Relying on that language, 

Husband argues that calculating Wife’s share of pension benefits using 

Husband’s benefit amount payable at his twenty-year service mark 

violates A.R.S. § 25-318 and Koelsch. 

¶13 In contrast to Koelsch, however, the dispute here involves the 

enforcement of the DRO, which is governed by the law of judgments.

Once the superior court approved and entered the DRO, it became a final 

appealable order. A.R.S. § 12-2101.A.2; Boncoskey v. Bonkoskey, 216 Ariz. 

448, 451, ¶ 12 (App. 2007) (recognizing the right to appeal from a qualified 

DRO as a special order after final judgment). A final judgment “exists as 

an independent resolution by the court of the issues before it and 

rightfully is regarded in that context and not according to the negotiated 

intent of the parties.” In re Marriage of Zale, 193 Ariz. 246, 249, ¶ 11 (1999). 

Husband did not appeal the 2005 entry of the DRO and is thus bound by 

its terms. Therefore, we find no abuse of discretion by the superior court 

in enforcing the DRO and requiring the parties to use the formula set forth 

therein.
SESSIONS v. SESSIONS

Decision of the Court

6

CONCLUSION

¶14 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm. Both Husband and 

Wife request attorney fees and costs on appeal, but neither provide a basis 

for their fee request. In our discretion, we do not award either party

attorney fees. However, as the prevailing party, Wife is entitled to costs 

upon compliance with ARCAP 21.