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# United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit

No. 13-3660

G E N E R AL P ARKE R

, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

K E VI N L YO N S

, et al. , Defen dants-Appellees.
Appe al f ro m the Uni ted S tates Distri ct Co urt fo r the

Central Distri ct o f Il l i noi s. No. 11 -1 44 1 — Joe Bil ly McDa de , Judg e.
S UB MI TT E D J UN E 27, 2014

— D E C I D E DJ ULY 7, 2014 *

Before W O OD, Chief Judge, and F L AUM and S YKE S , Circ uit Judges. P E R C URI AM

. An Illi noi s statu t e ba r s persons convic ted of certain cri mes from holdi ng p ublic offi ce. See 10 ILCS § 5/29-15. General P ark er sought to run for a seat on the sch ool

Aft e r exa mini ng the b ri efs and the reco rd, we hav e concl uded tha t or al * argumen t i s unnecessa ry. Thus the appeal i s sub mitted on the b ri efs and the
reco rd. See F ED

. R. A PP

. P. 34 (a)(2 )(C ).2 No. 13-3660
board of Peor i a School Di str ict 150. The state’s atto rney for P e or i a County fi led sui t in stat e court to bar P ark er , who ha d been convic ted of felony theft in the 1980s, from pursuing that
o ff ice

. After a bri ef hear ing held o n shor t notic e, a state cour t
or dered P ark er’s nam e removed from the ballot an d enjo ined hi m from running. P ark er then sued sev eral defendants in federal court, i nclu ding the state’s at t or ney

. He arg ued that they enforced the statute in violati on of due process and equal prot ecti on by denyi ng hi m a chanc e to defend hi mself and tar get i ng hi m based on his race (Afri can Americ an). He also attacke d the consti tutionali ty of the law on i ts face. The di stric t court di smi ssed the sui t as barred by t he Rooker-Feldman doctrine, i mmu ni ty

, and cl a im preclusi on. W e conclu de that i m mu n i ty

, n ot Ro o ke r

- Feldm an, bars the enforcement clai ms and that, ev en i f clai m preclusi on di d not preclude P ark er ’ s faci al attack on the statute, th a t challenge fai ls on the merits. W e there fore affi rm the j udgment. For purposes of thi s appeal, w e t a k e as tr ue the factual allegations in P ark er’s compla int

. S eeking a seat on hi s local sch ool board, i n December 2010 P ark er filed a nominati ng petiti on for t he seat and a statement asserti ng that he w as eli gib le to hold the offi ce. See 105 ILCS §§ 5/9-1, 5/9-10; 10 ILCS § 5/10-5. T

w o months later —about a w eek before the ballots

w ere to be prin ted for t he April 5 electi on—Kev in Ly ons, the st a t e ’s atto rney for Peor i a County , fi led a quo warranto complaint i n Illinoi s ci rcui t c ourtto block P ark er’s candi dacy . The purpose of a quo warranto acti on gene r a l l y “i s to questi on whether a person lawfu lly holds title to offi ce.” McCready v
. Ill. Sec’y of State, 888 N.E.2d 702, 712 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008); 735 ILCS § 5/18-101.No. 13-3660 3
Ly ons asserted i n the complaint that P ark er w as barred by statute from holdi ng the offi ce o f sch ool board member becau se he w as convic ted in the early 1980s of felony theft. The statute in questi on prohibi ts “[a]ny person convic ted of an i nfamous cr ime

... from holdi ng any offi ce o f ho nor , tr ust, o r profit, unles s such person i s again resto red to such rights by the ter ms of a pardon for the offense or other wi se accordi ng to law .” 10 ILCS § 5/29-15. Felony theft i s an “infam o us cri me” under the statute, se e P e ople ex rel. City of Kankakee v
. Morris , 467 N.E.2d 589 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984), and P ark er nev er receiv ed
a pardon for hi s convic tion. (The statute do es not bar per sons convic ted of feloni es from all electi v e offi ce; those who complete their cri minal sentence may run fo r and hold any office cr eated by the Illi noi s Constituti on. See 730 ILCS § 5/5-5-5(b); Buchme ier v
. United States , 581 F

. 3 d 5 6 1 , 564 (7th Ci r
. 2009); People v. Hofer, 843 N.E.2d 460, 464–65 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006).) L y ons requested a declaration that P ark er w as not eli gib le to hold offi ce on the sch ool board and a n inj un cti on barring hi s nam e from appearing on the ballot. On t he fi rst day of the quo warranto proceedings, of whi ch he had less than a day’s notic e, P ark er arg ued that the presi di ng judge, Judge Brandt, w as bi ased and requested 48 hours to fi le a recusal motion. The judge gav e hi m one day

. On the second day

, Judge Brand t gr anted P ark er’s request to sub sti

tute a judge as a matter of right. See 735 ILCS § 5/2-1001(a) (2). Minutes lat er

, the hearin g conti nued befor e a di fferent judge, Judge Shor e. Proceedi ng wi thout couns el and havin g had less than tw o days to research and present hi s case, P ark er mov ed to di smi ss, challen gin g the propr i ety of the sui t. The judge deni ed the motion. P ark er then d e fe nd e d the sui t on three4 No. 13-3660
gr ounds: the statut e barring those convic ted of infamous cri mes fro m holding publi c offi ce do es no t apply to the offi ce of sch ool board member , the state’s att o r ne y w as selecti v ely enforci ng the stat ute, and the rushed heari ngs w ere unjust. At the end o f t he hearin g, the state court rej ected P ark er’s arg uments. Judge Shor e or dered that P ark er w as “barred from holdi ng or running for [t he offi ce of ] sch ool board member ,” enjo i ned hi m from running in the upcoming electi on, and
or d e r ed hi s name removed from the ballot. P ark er appealed, repeat i ng the arg uments he had made in ci rc ui t court and challen gin g for the fi rst tim e the statute’s consti tutionali ty

. The appellate cour t affi rmed the ci rcui t court’s judgment and conclu ded that th e consti tutional arg uments P ark er had not raised i n ci rcui t court w ere forfeited. In the meanti me, the electi on w as held wi thout P ark er’s name on the ballot, a nd another candida t e , Debb i e W olfmey er, who i s whi te, w as elected to the school board. Whi le P ark er’s appeal in stat e court w as pendin g, he fi led thi s sui t in federal c ourt again st Ly ons (wh o, P ark er acknowledges, i s no longer a state’s atto rney), Peor i a County , and other defendants. Through sev eral amendments to hi s complaint, P ark er bri ngs t w o types of clai ms. The fi rst i s a clai m t hat the defendants i mproper ly enforced the statute in the quo warranto proceeding. He a r gues that, in violati on of due process, the defendants “or ches tr ated the quo wa rranto acti on i n a manner whi ch w as desi gned to depriv e [P ark er] of a fai r hearin g” by “arr ang[ing] for the case to be heard b y [ L y ons’s] goo d fri end Judge Brandt” and prov i ding P ark er “wi th wholly inadequate notic e.” P ark er adds that, for sev eral reasons (inclu ding raci al bi as), the enforcement again st hi m violated equal p r o tection.No. 13-3660 5
Hi s second clai m i s a faci a l a ttack. He arg ues that the Illi noi s statute o n its face violates his “i mpli ed right to run for publi c offi ce,” a right that he says i s guaranteed under the Constitution. The dis tr i ct court di smi ssed all cl a ims

. First, o n his clai ms that the defendants i mproper ly enforced the statute, the court ruled that Rooker-Feldma n ba r red the due-process theor y and that the equal-protection theor y fai led on a num b e r of gr oun d s : Ly ons e njoyed pro secu tor i al di screti on and i mmu ni ty; Peor i a County w as not a muni ci pali ty li able for Ly ons’s acti ons becau se state’s a t t o r neys are offi ci als of the state, not the county; and the other defend a nt s w ere ei ther not state actor s or w ere i mmu ne. Second, the court deci ded that clai m preclusi on barred Ly ons’ s faci al consti tutional challen ges to the Illi noi s statute becau se P ark er could have rais ed hi s consti tutional arguments in the quo wa rranto proceedings an d di d not do so. On appeal, P a r ker fi rst challen ges the di stric t court’s applicati on of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. W e conclu de that Rooker-Feldman does not apply here for tw o reasons. First, that doctrine di v ests di stric t courts of j ur isd i cti on only in cases where “the losing party in state court fi led sui t in federal court after the state proceedings ended.” Exxon Mob il Corp. v
. Saudi Basic In d u s
. Corp. , 544 U.S. 280, 291 (2005) (emphas i s added). P ark er sued i n federal cour t wh ile hi s appeal from the state ci rcui t cour t ’ s judgment w as pending in Illi noi s Appellate Court

. Sinc e Saudi Basic Industries , all federal ci rcui ts that hav e addressed the i ssu e hav e conclu ded that Rooker-Feldman does not apply i f, as here, a state-court appeal i s pending when the federal sui t i s fi led. See Nicholson v
. S h af e , 558 F .3d 1266, 12796 No. 13-3660 (11th Ci r
. 2009); Guttman v
. Khalsa , 446 F .3d 1027, 1032 n.2 (10th Ci r
. 2006); Dornheim v
. Sholes , 430 F .3d 919, 923–24 (8th Ci r
. 2005); Mothershed v
. Justices of the Supreme Court, 410 F .3 d 6 0 2, 6 0 4 n.1 (9th Ci r
. 2005); Federación de Maest ros de Puerto Rico v
. Junta de Relaciones del T

raba jo de Puerto Rico , 410 F .3d 17, 25 (1st Ci r
. 2005). As the Ninth Ci rcui t explain ed, Saudi Basic Industries clari fi ed that “[p] ro ceedings end for Rooker-Feldman purposes when t he state courts finally resolve the i ssu e that the federal court plainti ff seeks to re l itigate in a federal forum.” Mothershed, 410 F .3d at 604 n.1 (emphas i s added). It added that i f the state-court appeal i s pe nd ing at the tim e the federal acti on i s fi led, the necess ary final resolution in the state system i s not present. W

e agr ee wi th thi s reasonin g and conclu de that Rooker-Feldman does not bar the clai ms of federa l -c o urt plainti ffs who, li ke P ark er , fi le a federal sui t when a state-court appeal i s pending. In the present case, there i s a secon d r e ason why RookerFeldm an does not apply

. P ark er alleges that Ly ons (the only defendant abo ut wh om P ark er dev elops an arg ument on appeal) viti ated the state-court process by collaborating wi th
a fri endly ju d g e t o r ush the case to a foreo rdain ed judgment. B ecaus e hi s clai ms are premi sed on detailed allegations t ha t the winning party obtained a fav or able ci vil judg me nt by
corr upti ng the st a t e j udi ci al process, Rooker-Feldman does not bar them. See Johnson v
. Pushpin Holdings, LLC, 748 F .3d 769, 773 (7th Ci r
. 2014); Loubser v
. Thacker , 440 F .3d 439, 441–42 (7th Ci r
. 2006); Nesses v
. Shepard, 68 F .3d 1003, 10 0 5 (7th Ci r
. 1995). Though they are not foreclosed by Rooker-Feldman , P ark er’s clai ms that Ly ons i mproper ly enforced the statute nonetheless fail. T o the ext ent that P ark er i s suing Ly ons in hi s offi ci alNo. 13-3660 7
capac i ty as a state offi cer , damages are barred by the Elev enth Amendment. See Nat’l Cas. Co. v
. McFatridge, 604 F .3d 335, 342 (7th Ci r
. 2010) ; Garcia v
. City of Chi

. , 2 4 F

. 3 d 966, 969 (7th Ci r
. 1994). And to the ext ent that he i s suing Ly ons in hi s indi vidu al capaci ty , damages are barred by absolute prosecutor i al i mmu ni ty

. See Fiel ds v
. Wh ar r ie, 672 F .3d 505, 516 (7th Ci r
. 2012); Thomas v
. City of Peoria , 580 F .3d 633, 638–39 (7th Ci r
. 2 0 0 9). Fin ally

, injuncti v e relief again st Ly ons i s unav ai lable

. P ark er cont e nd s that Ly ons mus t be enjo ined from using hi s “raci al bi as” to enforce the statute again st blacks. But Ly ons i s no longer a state’s atto rney , and P ark er alleges no raci ally bi ased enforcement by any one else. Thus he may not obtain an i njuncti on agains t Ly ons. Thi s bri ngs us to P ark er’s arg ument that the Illi noi s statute i s unc onsti tutional on i ts face. He contends that t he d i stric t court err oneo us ly used clai m preclusi on to bar these challenges. The di stric t court w as required to apply Illi noi s’ s law of clai m preclus i on. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738. But as P ark er points out, i n Illi noi s clai m preclusi on “i s an equi table doctrine that i s not appli ed when i t i s ‘fundam entally un fai r to do so.’” In re Dollie's Playhouse, Inc. , 481 F .3d 998, 1001 (7th C ir

. 2007); cf. Federated Dept. Stores, Inc. v
. Moit ie, 452 U.S. 394, 400–01 (1981) (no equi table exception under federal l aw of clai m preclusi on fo r anti tr ust defendants there ). The defendants acknowledge that P ark er had only tw o days to defend hi mself in state court, and P ark er asserts that on such short notic e he could not obtain
couns el or dev elop hi s constit ut i onal clai ms. W e need not d e c i d e wh e the r Il linoi s w ould recog ni ze an equi table excep ti on to clai m preclusi on i n t he se ci rcums tances. Ev en i f i t di d, P ark er’s challenges fai l on the merits.8 No. 13-3660
P a r ker arg ues that future prosecuti ons again st hi m under thi s statute should be enjoi ned under Ex parte Y oung, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). He appe a r s to beli ev e that Y oung allows hi m to proceed again st t he St ate of Illi noi s. But the current state’s atto rney , not t he state i tself, i s the proper defendant under Y oung, whi ch “permi t[s] priv ate ci tizens to sue state officials in their offi ci al capac i ties to require them to comply wi th federal law on an ongoing bas i s.” McDonough Assocs., Inc. v
. Grunl oh , 722 F .3d 1043, 104 9 (7 t h Ci r
. 2013) (emphas i s added). The problem here is t ha t no injuncti on based on Y oung i s po ssi

ble for the si mple reason that P ark er has not stated a clai m that the state statute violates federal l a w
. See V erizon Md., Inc. v
. Pub. Serv . Comm’n of Md. , 535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002). Contr ary to P ark er’s contentions, the statute does not vio l a t e e qual prot ecti on. The right to run for or hold publi c offi ce i s not a fund amental right, Brazil-Br eashears v
. Bilandic, 53 F .3d 789, 792–93 (7th Ci r
. 1995), and felons are not a sus pect clas s, T alley v
. Lane, 13 F .3 d 1 0 3 1 , 1 0 34 (7th Ci r
. 1994); thus, a ban on felons running for elect ive offi ce i s v ali d i f i t i s rat i onally relat ed to a legiti mate state intere st. See Cleme nts v
. Fashi n g, 4 5 7 U.S. 957, 963 (1982). Illinoi s’s stated intere st in barring felons from electi v e offi ce is t o ensure “publi c confi

dence i n the honesty and integr i ty of those serving in state and local offi ces.” People v. Hofer, 843 N.E.2d 460, 464 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006). P ark er does not di spute the legiti macy of thi s inte r e st,
nor has he arg ued that the statute does not rat i onally further i t. Mor eov er

, ev en i f a hi gher lev el of scrutiny ap pli ed to r estric

tions on the right o f ex-felons to hold offi ce, the clai m w ould fai l. The Sup r e me Court has held that states may depriv e convic ted felons of the right to vote—a right that, unli keNo. 13-3660 9
P a r ker ’s i ntere st i n running for offi ce, is fund amental a nd subject to st r ict scrutiny

. Richardson v
. Ramirez , 418 U.S. 24, 56 (1974); see Crawford v
. Mario n Cnty. El e c ti on Bd. , 553 U.S. 181, 210 (2008) (v oting i s a fund amental right). P ark er responds that the statute violates equal prot ecti on becau se i t has a di sparate i mpact on black men. But an asserti on of di sparate raci al i mpact does not state an equal-prot e ct io n clai m. P ark er mus t allege that the legis lature acted wi th a di scri minator y purpose, and he d o e s not do so. See Ashcroft v
. Iqb al , 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009); W

ashington v. Davis , 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976). Li kewi se, P ark er has not persuaded us that the ban violates the First Amend me nt

. T o suc ceed, he mus t demonstrate that the state’s legiti mate intere st in the integr i ty of i ts electi ons does not justif

y i ts ballot restric tion. See Stone v

. Bd. of Election Comm’rs for the City of Chi. , 750 F .3d 678, 681 (7th Ci r
. 2014); B r azil-Breashears , 53 F .3d at 792

. P ark er asserts broadly tha t “speech or expr essi on i s enti tled to consti tutional protection” but that rheto ric does not i denti fy an insu ffi ci ency in the state’s legiti mate i ntere st i n keeping those convic ted of seri ous cri mes off the ballot. Although a ballot di squali fi cati on based on a 30- y ear -old felony convic tion may be harsh, P ark er giv es us no reason to conclu de that the state is no t e nti tled to adopt thi s ru le. Mor eov er

, i f P ark er beli ev es that hi s speci al ci rcums tan c e s
w arr ant i t, he remain s free to seek an executiv e pardon so that he may run for school board. See 10 ILCS § 5/29-15; Delgado v
. Bd. of Election Comm’rs of the City of C h i

. , 865 N.E.2d 183, 185 (Ill. 2007). W e hav e consi dered P a r ker ’s other arg uments and conclud e that t hey lack merit. A F F I R M E D

.