FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

GREG LANDERS, individually and on

behalf of others similarly situated,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

QUALITY COMMUNICATIONS, INC.;

BRADY E. WELLS; ROBERT J.

HUBER,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 12-15890

D.C. No.

2:11-cv-01928-

JCM-RJJ

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Nevada

James C. Mahan, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

November 8, 2013—San Francisco, California

Filed November 12, 2014

Before: Andrew J. Kleinfeld, Johnnie B. Rawlinson,

and Ronald Lee Gilman*, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Rawlinson

* The Honorable Ronald Lee Gilman, Senior Circuit Judge for the

United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by

designation.
2 LANDERS V. QUALITY COMMUNICATIONS

SUMMARY**

Labor Law

The panel affirmed the dismissal, pursuant to Rule 8 of

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, of an action under the

Fair Labor Standards Act, alleging failure to pay minimum

wages and overtime wages.

The panel held that under Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662

(2009), it is not enough for a complaint under the FLSA

merely to allege that the employer failed to pay the employee

minimum wages or overtime wages. Rather, the allegations

in the complaint must plausibly state a claim that the

employer failed to pay minimum wages or overtime wages. 

Agreeing with the First, Second, and Third Circuits, the panel

held that detailed factual allegations regarding the number of

overtime hours worked are not required, but conclusory

allegations that merely recite the statutory language are not

adequate. A plaintiff asserting a claim to overtime payments

must allege that she worked more than forty hours in a given

workweek without being compensated for the hours worked

in excess of forty during that week.

The panel held that the complaint in this case did not state

a plausible claim because it did not allege facts showing that

there was a specific week in which the plaintiff was entitled

to but denied minimum wages or overtime wages.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
LANDERS V. QUALITY COMMUNICATIONS 3

COUNSEL

Christian James Gabroy, Gabroy Law Offices, Henderson,

Nevada; Leon Greenberg and Dana Sniegocki (argued), Leon

Greenberg Professional Corporation, Las Vegas, Nevada, for

Plaintiff-Appellant.

Malani L. Kotchka (argued) and Steven C. Anderson, Lionel,

Sawyer, & Collins, Las Vegas, Nevada, for DefendantsAppellees.

OPINION

RAWLINSON, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiff-Appellant Greg Landers (Landers) appeals from

an order dismissing his complaint against DefendantsAppellees Quality Communications, Inc. (Quality), Brady E.

Wells, and Robert J. Huber. Landers’ complaint alleged

violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). 

Specifically, Landers alleged that Quality failed to pay

Landers and other similarly situated employees minimum

wages and overtime wages. The district court dismissed

Landers’s complaint pursuant to Rule 8 of the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure, and Landers filed a timely appeal. We

have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we

affirm. 

I. BACKGROUND

Landers was employed by Quality as a cable services

installer. He brought suit, individually and on behalf of other

similarly situated persons, alleging that Quality failed to pay
4 LANDERS V. QUALITY COMMUNICATIONS

him, and other similarlysituated individuals, minimum wages

and overtime wages in violation of the FLSA.

In the complaint, Landers alleged that: (1) he was

employed by Quality in its cable television, phone, and

internet service installation business; (2) his employment was

subject to the FLSA’s minimum wage and overtime pay

requirements; (3) he was not paid at the minimum wage; and

(4) he was subjected to a “piecework no overtime” wage

system, whereby he worked in excess of forty hours per week

without being compensated for his overtime.

In the alternative, Landers alleged that even if he were

paid some measure of overtime, the overtime payment was

less than that required by the FLSA. According to Landers,

Quality failed to compensate him for all of the overtime hours

he worked and/or the overtime rate at which he was paid was

calculated using an incorrect rate, resulting in an overtime

payment that was less than that required by the FLSA.

Quality moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rules

8(a)(2) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

The district court granted the motion, concluding that Landers

failed to state a plausible claim for unpaid minimum wages

and overtime wages. The district court determined that the

complaint did “not make any factual allegations providing an

approximation of the overtime hours worked, plaintiff’s

hourly wage, or the amount of unpaid overtime wages. . . .”

Given these deficiencies, the district court concluded that the

allegations asserted in the complaint were “merely

consistent” with Quality’s liability, but fell “short of the line

between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief,”

under Rule 8, as construed in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662
LANDERS V. QUALITY COMMUNICATIONS 5

(2009). Landers filed a timely appeal challenging the

dismissal.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“We review de novo the district court’s decision to grant

Defendants’ motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) . . . We

accept as true all well pleaded facts in the complaint and

construe them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving

party.” Zadrozny v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 720 F.3d 1163, 1167

(9th Cir. 2013) (citations and internal quotation marks

omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

This case presents an issue of first impression in this

circuit. Post-Twombly and Iqbal, this court has not addressed

the degree of specificity required to state a claim for failure

to pay minimum wages or overtime wages under the FLSA.

A. Rule 8 Pleading under Twombly and Iqbal

“The FLSA sets a national minimum wage[] . . . and

requires overtime pay of one and a half times an employee’s

hourly wage for every hour worked over 40 hours in a

week. . . .” Probert v. Family Centered Servs. of Alaska, Inc.,

651 F.3d 1007, 1009–10 (9th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted); 

see also 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1) (minimum wage); 29 U.S.C.

§ 207(a)(1) (overtime). In determining whether a plaintiff

has stated a plausible claim under the FLSA, we look to Rule

8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See, e.g., Eclectic

Props. E., LLC v. Marcus & Millichap Co., 751 F.3d 990,

995–97 (9th Cir. 2014).
6 LANDERS V. QUALITY COMMUNICATIONS

Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

requires that each claim in a pleading be supported by “a

short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). PreTwombly and Iqbal, the pleading requirement could be met by

a statement merely setting forth the elements of the claim. 

See, e.g., AlliedSignal, Inc. v. City of Phoenix, 182 F.3d 692,

696 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that dismissal under Rule 8 was

not warranted even though the plaintiff “failed to plead

specific facts in its complaint concerning the nature of the

City’s alleged negligence”). However, that state of affairs

changed when the Supreme Court clarified in Twombly that

to satisfy Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint must contain sufficient

factual content “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on

its face. . . .” 550 U.S. at 570. Under Twombly, a complaint

that offers “labels and conclusions, . . . a formulaic recitation

of the elements of a cause of action[,]” or “naked

assertion[s]” devoid of “further factual enhancement” will not

suffice. Id. at 555, 557.

This requirement of plausibility was reinforced in Iqbal. 

See 556 U.S. at 678 (explaining that to satisfy Rule 8(a)(2),

“a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted

as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face”)

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). A claim for

relief is plausible on its face “when the plaintiff pleads factual

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference

that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. . . .”

Id. (citation omitted). This standard does not rise to the level

of a probability requirement, but it demands “more than a

sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. . . .”

Id. (citation omitted). In keeping with Twombly, the Supreme

Court held in Iqbal that “[w]here a complaint pleads facts that

are merely consistent with a defendant’s liability, it stops
LANDERS V. QUALITY COMMUNICATIONS 7

short of the line between possibility and plausibility of

entitlement to relief.” Id. (citation and internal quotation

marks omitted).

In evaluating whether a complaint states a plausible claim

for relief, we rely on “judicial experience and common sense”

to determine whether the factual allegations, which are

assumed to be true, “plausibly give rise to an entitlement to

relief.” Id. at 679.

B. Application of Twombly and Iqbal to Claims Brought

Under the FLSA

Pre-Twombly and Iqbal, a complaint under the FLSA for

minimum wages or overtime wages merely had to allege that

the employer failed to pay the employee minimum wages or

overtime wages. Takacs v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc.,

444 F. Supp. 2d 1100, 1107 (S.D. Cal. 2006) (holding that a

complaint citing to the statute was adequate to plead a claim

under the FLSA). However, post-Twombly and Iqbal, we

review Landers’s complaint to determine whether the

allegations plausibly state a claim that Quality failed to pay

minimum wages and overtime wages, keeping in mind that

detailed facts are not required. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at

555.

The district courts that have considered this question are

split: some district courts, including the district court in this

case, have required plaintiffs to approximate the overtime

hours worked or the amount of overtime wages owed,
8 LANDERS V. QUALITY COMMUNICATIONS

whereas other courts have forgone such a requirement.1 No

circuit court has interpreted Rule 8 as requiring FLSA

plaintiffs to plead in detail the number of hours worked, their

wages, or the amount of overtime owed to state a claim for

unpaid minimum wages or overtime wages. Although the

circuit courts are in harmony on what is not required by

Twombly and Iqbal, there is no consensus on what facts must

be affirmatively pled to state a viable FLSA claim

post-Twombly and Iqbal.

In Pruell v. Caritas Christi, 678 F.3d 10, 13 (1st Cir.

2012), plaintiffs alleged that they had “regularly worked

hours over forty in a week and were not compensated for

such time . . .” The First Circuit described this allegation as

“one of those borderline phrases” that, “while not stating

ultimate legal conclusions, are nevertheless so threadbare or

speculative that they fail to cross the line between the

conclusory and the factual.” Id. (citation and internal

1 Compare Lagos v. Monster Painting, Inc., No. 2:11-CV-00331, 2011

WL 6887116, at *2 (D. Nev. Dec. 29, 2011) (relied on by the district

court); De Silva v. North Shore-Long Is. Jewish Health Sys. Inc., 770 F.

Supp. 2d 497, 509-510 (E.D.N.Y. 2011); Zhong v. August August Corp.,

498 F. Supp. 2d 625, 628 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (requiring the plaintiffto allege

the approximate number of hours worked and overtime wages to survive

a motion to dismiss), with Goodman v. Port Auth. of New York and New

Jersey, 850 F. Supp. 2d 363, 379–81 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); Williams v. Skyline

Auto. Inc., No. 11 Civ. 4123, 2011 WL 5529820, at *2 (S.D. N.Y. Nov.

14, 2011); Allen v. City of Chicago, No. 10 C 3183, 2011 WL 941383, at

*6 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 15, 2011); Carter v. Jackson-Madison Cnty. Hosp.

Dist., No. 1:10-cv-01155, 2011 WL 1256625, at *4–6 (W.D. Tenn. Mar.

31, 2011); Noble v. Serco, Inc., No. 3:08-76, 2009 WL 1811550, at *2–3

(E.D. Ky. June 25, 2009); and Monroe v. FTS USA, LLC, No. 2:08-CV02100, 2008 WL 2694894, at *3 (W.D. Tenn. July 9, 2008) (rejecting the

argument that approximation of overtime hours must be included in the

complaint).
LANDERS V. QUALITY COMMUNICATIONS 9

quotation marks omitted). The court observed that this

allegation was “little more than a paraphrase of the statute[]”

and thus “too meager, vague, or conclusory to . . .” nudge

plaintiffs’ claim “from the realm of mere conjecture. . . .” to

the realm of plausibility, as required by Twombly and Iqbal. 

Id. (citation omitted). The First Circuit noted that the

amended complaint lacked examples of unpaid time, a

description of work performed during overtime periods, or

estimates of the overtime amounts owed. See id. at 14. The

court concluded that the allegations were “deficient[,]

although not by a large margin.” Id.

In a trilogy of cases, the Second Circuit also grappled

with the level of specificity required to state a claim for

overtime pay under the FLSA. The first case in this trilogy

is Lundy v. Catholic Health System of Long Island Inc.,

711 F.3d 106 (2d Cir. 2013). In Lundy, the Second Circuit

noted that some courts within that circuit had required that a

complaint seeking overtime wages under the FLSA contain

“an approximation of the total uncompensated hours worked

during a given workweek in excess of 40 hours.” Id. at 114

(citation omitted). In contrast, courts outside the Second

Circuit had “done without an estimate of overtime, and

deemed sufficient an allegation that plaintiff worked some

amount in excess of 40 hours without compensation.” Id.

(citation omitted).

After commenting that the determination of plausibility

of a claim is “context-specific . . . ” and “requires the

reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and

common sense,” the court concluded that no plausible FLSA

claim was pled. Id. (citation and footnote reference omitted). 

Critically, Plaintiffs had failed to allege “a single workweek
10 LANDERS V. QUALITY COMMUNICATIONS

in which they worked at least 40 hours and also worked

uncompensated time in excess of 40 hours.” Id.

Plaintiff No. 1 alleged a typical schedule of three shifts

per week that totaled 37.5 hours. On occasion, she worked an

additional shift of 12.5 hours or a slightly longer shift. 

Plaintiff’s failure to detail “how occasionally” or “how long”

she worked in excess of her regular shift, or that she was

denied overtime pay in any of those weeks when she worked

in excess of her regular shift doomed her claim. Id. at

114–15.

Plaintiff No. 2 alleged that her “typical[]” workweek

consisted of “four shifts per week, totaling 30 hours.” Id. at

115. “[A]pproximately twice a month, she worked five to six

shifts instead of four shifts, totaling between 37.5 and 45

hours.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

However, like Plaintiff No. 1, she failed to allege denial of

overtime pay in any of the weeks when she worked additional

shifts. See id.

Plaintiff No. 3 (Lundy) “worked between 22.5 and 30

hours per week[.]” Id. (citation omitted). Because his hours

worked never exceeded forty in any given week, he was

unable to state a valid claim. See id. Because no plaintiff

alleged both a single workweek composed of at least forty

hours and uncompensated time in excess of forty hours in that

same workweek, the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of

Plaintiffs’ overtime claims. See id.

In Nakahata v. New York-Presbyterian Healthcare

System, Inc., 723 F.3d 192 (2d Cir. 2013), the Second Circuit

once again resolved a case involving plaintiffs alleging that

“they were not paid for overtime hours worked.” 723 F.3d at
LANDERS V. QUALITY COMMUNICATIONS 11

201. The Second Circuit concluded that Plaintiffs’

allegations that they “were not compensated for work

performed during meal breaks, before and after shifts, or

during required trainings . . .” failed to state a plausible claim

that they were denied overtime, because the Plaintiffs failed

to allege that they “were scheduled to work forty hours in a

given week. . . . ” Id. The court explained that Lundy’s

requirement that plaintiffs plead with specifity a workweek in

which they were entitled to but denied overtime, was

designed to ensure that plaintiffs provide “sufficient detail

about the length and frequency of their unpaid work to

support a reasonable inference that they worked more than

forty hours in a given week.” Id. The Second Circuit

declined to adopt a requirement that Plaintiffs approximate

the number of overtime hours worked. See id. n.10.

In the final case of the trilogy, Dejesus v. HF

Management Services, LLC, 726 F. 3d 85, 89 (2d Cir. 2013),

the plaintiff avoided the error of her predecessor plaintiffs. 

She alleged that in “some or all weeks she worked more than

forty hours a week without being paid 1.5 times her rate of

compensation.” (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted). The Second Circuit nevertheless concluded that the

plaintiff failed to state a plausible claim for relief because she

did not “allege overtime without compensation in a given

workweek,” as required by Lundy. Id. at 90 (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). The

court explained that Lundy’s requirement that plaintiffs allege

with specificity a workweek in which they were entitled to

but denied overtime payment, “was designed to require

plaintiffs to provide some factual context that will nudge their

claim from conceivable to plausible. . . .” Id. (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted). Although the Lundy

standard did not require “plaintiffs to keep careful records
12 LANDERS V. QUALITY COMMUNICATIONS

and plead their hours with mathematical precision,” the

standard could not be satisfied by allegations that do little

more than parrot the statutory language of the FLSA. Id. 

Instead, Lundy required plaintiffs to draw on their memory

and personal experience to develop factual allegations with

sufficient specificity that they plausibly suggest that

defendant failed to comply with its statutory obligations

under the FLSA. See id. Notably, as in Lundy and Nakahata,

theSecond Circuit again declined to require an approximation

of the number of overtime hours worked.

In an unpublished decision, the Eleventh Circuit

analogized Plaintiff’s allegations in an FLSA case to the

allegations of an antitrust violation at issue in Twombly. See

Sec’y of Labor v. Labbe, 319 F. App’x 761, 763 (11th Cir.

2008) (per curiam). The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that a

claim for unpaid minimum wages and/or overtime wages

under the FLSA was straightforward and did not involve the

same level of complexity as the antitrust claims at issue in

Twombly. Given this dissonance in complexity, the court

reasoned that the quantum and specificity of facts necessary

to allege a plausible FLSA claim was much lower than that

necessary to allege the antitrust claim at issue in Twombly. 

See id. The Eleventh Circuit thus concluded that the

Secretary’s allegations that “Labbe repeatedly violated stated

provisions of the FLSA by failing to pay covered employees

minimum hourly wages and to compensate employees who

worked in excess of forty hours a week at the appropriate

rates[]” stated plausible claims for relief. Id.

Most recently, the Third Circuit applied the standards of

Twombly and Iqbal to a claim for unpaid overtime wages in

Davis v. Abington Memorial Hospital, 765 F.3d 236 (3d Cir.

2014). In Davis, each of the plaintiffs alleged that “he or she
LANDERS V. QUALITY COMMUNICATIONS 13

typically worked shifts totaling between thirty-two and forty

hours per week and further allege[d] that he or she frequently

worked extra time. . . .” Id. at 242 (internal quotation marks

omitted). Plaintiffs contended that “[b]ecause they typically

worked full time, or very close to it and also worked several

hours of unpaid work each week, . . . it is certainly plausible

that at least some of the uncompensated work was performed

during weeks when the plaintiffs’ total work time was more

than forty hours. . . .” Id. (citations, alterations, and internal

quotation marks omitted). The Third Circuit disagreed. 

Consistent with Lundy, the court concluded that the

allegations were insufficient to state a plausible claim under

the FLSA. Although several of the plaintiffs alleged that

their typical workweek was at least forty hours “in addition

to extra hours frequently worked during meal breaks or

outside of their scheduled shifts[,]” none of the plaintiffs

alleged that the extra hours were in fact worked during a

typical forty-hour workweek. Id. at 243 (internal quotation

marks omitted). Absent that crucial allegation, no plausible

claim for overtime wages was stated. See id. The Third

Circuit explained that a plaintiff need not identify precisely

the dates and times she worked overtime. An allegation that

a plaintiff typically worked a forty-hour workweek, and

worked uncompensated extra hours during a particular fortyhour workweek would state a plausible claim for relief. 

However, because no such allegation was made by any of the

plaintiffs, the Third Circuit affirmed dismissal ofthe overtime

claims. See id.

We are persuaded by the rationale espoused in the First,

Second and Third Circuit cases. Although we agree with the

Eleventh Circuit that detailed factual allegationsregarding the

number of overtime hours worked are not required to state a

plausible claim, we do not agree that conclusory allegations
14 LANDERS V. QUALITY COMMUNICATIONS

that merely recite the statutory language are adequate. But

see Labbe, 319 F. App’x at 763. Indeed, such an approach

runs afoul of the Supreme Court’s pronouncements in Iqbal

that a Plaintiff’s pleading burden cannot be discharged by

“[a] pleading that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action . . .” Iqbal,

556 U.S. at 678 (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted).

We agree with our sister circuits that in order to survive

a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff asserting a claim to overtime

payments must allege that she worked more than forty hours

in a given workweek without being compensated for the

overtime hours worked during that workweek. See Pruell,

678 F.3d at 13; see also Lundy, 711 F.3d at 114; Davis,

765 F.3d at 242–43. We are mindful of the Supreme Court’s

admonition that the pleading of detailed facts is not required

under Rule 8, and that pleadings are to be evaluated in the

light of judicial experience. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555;

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. We also agree that the plausibility of

a claim is “context-specific.” Lundy, 711 F.3d at 114. A

plaintiff may establish a plausible claim by estimating the

length of her average workweek during the applicable period

and the average rate at which she was paid, the amount of

overtime wages she believes she is owed, or any other facts

that will permit the court to find plausibility. See Pruell,

678 F.3d at 14. Obviously, with the pleading of more specific

facts, the closer the complaint moves toward plausibility. 

However, like the other circuit courts that have ruled before

us, we decline to make the approximation of overtime hours

the sine qua non of plausibility for claims brought under the

FLSA. After all, most (if not all) of the detailed information

concerning a plaintiff-employee’s compensation and schedule

is in the control of the defendants. See Pruell, 678 F.3d at 15;
LANDERS V. QUALITY COMMUNICATIONS 15

see also 29 U.S.C. § 211(c) (FLSA provision requiring

employers subject to the FLSA to keep records concerning

their employees’ work schedules and compensation).2

We further agree with our sister circuits that, at a

minimum, a plaintiff asserting a violation of the FLSA

overtime provisions must allege that she worked more than

forty hours in a given workweek without being compensated

for the hours worked in excess of forty during that week. See

Pruell, 678 F.3d at 13; see also Lundy, 711 F.3d at 114;

Davis, 765 F.3d at 242–43. Applying that standard to the

pleadings in this case, Landers failed to state a claim for

unpaid minimum wages and overtime wages. The complaint

did not allege facts showing that there was a specific week in

which he was entitled to but denied minimum wages or

overtime wages.

In his complaint, Landers alleged the following:

• The compensation system used by the defendants for

the plaintiff . . . was a de facto “piecework no

overtime” system, meaning such employees were

being paid a certain amount for each “piece” of work

they performed pursuant to a schedule, the plaintiffs

not being paid time and one-half their “regular hourly

rate” for work in excess of 40 hours a week . . .

• [A]lternatively, defendants utilized a compensation

system that did pay some measure of overtime wages

upon a designated hourly rate but failed to pay any

overtime wages on the additional and substantial

2 This reasoning applies with equal force to Landers’s minimum wage

claims.
16 LANDERS V. QUALITY COMMUNICATIONS

portion of the earnings of the plaintiff and those

similarly situated that were paid by the defendants

solely on a piece rate basis.

• Alternatively, if defendants did not engage in a

“piecework no overtime” pay scheme, and paid the

plaintiff . . . a facially proper overtime wage

demonstrated on their payroll records as time and

one-half their regular hourly rate including all

piecework earnings, the defendants failed to pay such

persons for all overtime hours that they worked . . .

• Defendants, in furtherance of their scheme to deny the

plaintiff . . . proper overtime pay as required by the

FLSA would falsely list certain “overtime hours” and

“regular hours” and “overtime compensation” on the

plaintiff’s . . . pay stubs, such listings being inaccurate

in terms of hours actually worked and not reflecting

any attempt to pay time and one-half the employees’

true “regular rate” as required by the FLSA . . . 

• [T]he named plaintiff . . . [was] entitled to a minimum

wage and an overtime hourly wage of time and onehalf [his] regular hourly wage for all hours worked in

excess of forty hours per week, the named plaintiff

. . . worked more than 40 hours per week for the

defendants, and the defendants willfully failed to

make said overtime and/or minimum wage payments.

Much like the plaintiffs in Lundy, Landers presented

generalized allegations asserting violations of the minimum

wage and overtime provisions of the FLSA by the defendants. 

Landers alleged that the defendants implemented a “de facto

piecework no overtime” system and/or failed to payminimum
LANDERS V. QUALITY COMMUNICATIONS 17

wages and/or overtime wages for the hours worked by

Landers. Landers also asserted that the defendants falsified

payroll records to conceal their failure to pay required wages. 

Notably absent from the allegations in Landers’s complaint,

however, was any detail regarding a specific workweek when

Landers worked in excess of forty hours and was not paid

overtime for that specific workweek and/or was not paid

minimum wages. Although plaintiffs in these types of cases

cannot be expected to allege “with mathematical precision,”

the amount of overtime compensation owed by the employer,

they should be able to specify at least one workweek in which

they worked in excess of forty hours and were not paid

overtime wages. Dejesus, 726 F.3d at 90. Landers’s

allegations failed to provide “sufficient detail about the length

and frequency of [his] unpaid work to support a reasonable

inference that [he] worked more than forty hours in a given

week.” Nakahata, 723 F.3d at 201. Instead, as in Nakahata,

Landers “merely alleged that [he was] not paid for overtime

hours worked. . . .” Id. Although these allegations “raise the

possibility” of undercompensation in violation of the FLSA,

a possibility is not the same as plausibility. Id. Landers’s

comparable allegations fail to state a plausible claim under

Rule 8. See id.

IV. CONCLUSION

Under the post-Twombly and Iqbal standard, Landers

failed to state a plausible claim for relief under the FLSA. 

Landers expressly declined to amend his complaint, electing

to stand on his claims as alleged. Therefore, we do not

remand to the district court for amendment of the complaint. 

See Alaska v. United States, 201 F.3d 1154, 1163–64 (9th Cir.

2000) (“[W]here a party did not seek leave to amend a

pleading in the lower court, we would not remand with
18 LANDERS V. QUALITY COMMUNICATIONS

instructions to grant leave to amend.”) (footnote reference

omitted). We decline to impose a requirement that a plaintiff

alleging failure to pay minimum wages or overtime wages

must approximate the number of hours worked without

compensation. However, at a minimum the plaintiff must

allege at least one workweek when he worked in excess of

forty hours and was not paid for the excess hours in that

workweek, or was not paid minimum wages. Landers’s

allegations fell short of this standard, and the district court

properly dismissed his complaint for failure to state a

plausible claim.

AFFIRMED.