alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
NOTE: This order is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit

__________________________ 

SHERYL TAYLOR, 

Petitioner, 

v.

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD, 

Respondent.

__________________________ 

2013-3113

__________________________ 

Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection 

Board in No. AT0752120258-I-1. 

__________________________ 

ON MOTION

__________________________ 

O R D E R

Sheryl Taylor moves for the court to “enter an order for 

respondent/the Merit Systems Protection Board . . . to 

appoint or assign counsel.” She moves separately for oral 

argument.

The court generally does not appoint counsel on appeal 

and sees no grounds for doing so here. See Taylor v. Merit 

Sys. Protection Bd., 2013 WL 3613934, at *4 (Fed. Cir. July 

16, 2013) (noting that Taylor had filed “numerous motions” 

seeking appointment of counsel that were denied and that 

Case: 13-3113 Document: 18 Page: 1 Filed: 07/29/2013
SHERYL TAYLOR V. MSPB 2

she had “no constitutional right to counsel for her present 

appeal, and this court has no means by which it could 

appoint counsel to represent her.”).

Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED THAT: 

(1) The motion to appoint counsel is denied.

(2) The motion for oral argument is deferred for 

consideration by the merits panel assigned to hear the 

case.

(3) A copy of the papers relating to the motion for oral 

argument and this order shall be transmitted to the 

merits panel assigned to decide this case. 

 FOR THE COURT

 /s/ Daniel E. O’Toole

 Daniel E. O’Toole

 Clerk

s26 

Case: 13-3113 Document: 18 Page: 2 Filed: 07/29/2013
United States Department of Labor

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

__________________________________________

M.G., Appellant

and

U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, MILL NECK POST 

OFFICE, Mill Neck, NY, Employer

__________________________________________

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Docket No. 22-0575

Issued: March 22, 2022

Appearances: Case Submitted on the Record

Appellant, pro se

Office of Solicitor, for the Director

ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL

Before:

ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Chief Judge

JANICE B. ASKIN, Judge

VALERIE D. EVANS-HARRELL, Alternate Judge

On March 7, 2022 appellant filed an appeal from a January 13, 2021 merit decision of the 

Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). The Clerk of the Appellate Boards

assigned Docket No. 22-0575.

The Board has duly considered the matter and notes that the Board has jurisdiction to 

review final adverse decisions of OWCP issued under the Federal Employees’ Compensation 

Act.1 For final adverse decisions of OWCP issued on or after November 19, 2008, the Board’s 

review authority is limited to appeals which are filed within 180 days from the date of issuance 

of OWCP’s decision.2

The 180th day following the January 13, 2021 decision was July 12, 2021. As appellant 

did not file an appeal with the Board until March 7, 2022, more than 180 days after the

January 13, 2021 OWCP decision, the Board finds that the appeal docketed as No. 22-0575 is 

untimely filed. The Board is without jurisdiction to review the appeal. Appellant has not 

explained her failure to timely file an appeal with supporting documentation sufficient to 

establish compelling circumstances. Because there is no final adverse decision issued by OWCP 

1

5 U.S.C. § 8149; 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3(a) (2009).

2

Id. at § 501.3(e).
2

within 180 days of the filing of the instant appeal, the Board concludes that the appeal docketed 

as No. 22-0575, must be dismissed.3 Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the appeal docketed as No. 22-0575 is dismissed.

Issued: March 22, 2022

Washington, DC

Alec J. Koromilas, Chief Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Janice B. Askin, Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Valerie D. Evans-Harrell, Alternate Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

3 The Board’s decisions and orders are “final upon the expiration of 30 days from the date of their issuance. ” 

20 C.F.R. § 501.6(d).
#### CLARENCE CLARK, Appellant, v. SHERIFF, CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA, Respondent.

No. 10827

June 28, 1978

580 P.2d 472

*Bell, Leavitt & Green,*and *Thomas M. Burns,*for Appellant.

*Robert List,*Attorney General, Carson City; *George E. Holt,*District Attorney, and *Gordon C. Richards,*Deputy District Attorney, Clark County, for Respondent.

OPINION

*Per Curiam:*

On January 31, 1978, the preliminary examination of Clarence Clark was scheduled for May 2, 1978. Clark appeared at the appointed time and the examination commenced. After a short period of time, the magistrate, over Clark’s objection, continued the examination because the prosecuting attorney *365had not arranged to obtain a grant of immunity for the prosecuting witness and was, therefore, not prepared to proceed.

Clark then petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus and has appealed from the order denying the requested relief.

We have previously held that when a prosecuting attorney is not prepared to go forward with a scheduled preliminary examination he may set forth reasons why he may be entitled to a continuance by filing an affidavit pursuant to DCR 21. *See*Hill v. Sheriff, 85 Nev. 234, 452 P.2d 918 (1969). We have also held that, under certain circumstances, the prosecuting attorney may show the reasons that may warrant a continuance by tendering “sworn testimony” in lieu of the written affidavit required by *Hill.*Bustos v. Sheriff, 87 Nev. 622, 491 P.2d 1279 (1971). *See*Reason v. Sheriff, 94 Nev. 300, 579 P.2d 781 (1978).

Here, the prosecuting attorney neither filed an affidavit nor tendered sworn testimony. Rather, he attempts to distinguish *Hill*and *Bustos*arguing that they “are obviously inapplicable” because their requirements “speak only to continuances sought by a party.” The suggested distinction is not persuasive. The prosecuting attorney had more than three (3) months to arrange for a grant of immunity to his witness. He did not do so and he failed to follow the proper procedure in tendering the reason for the omission. Accordingly, we reverse and remand this case to the district court with instructions to grant Clarence Clark’s petition for the writ of habeas corpus. McNair v. Sheriff, 89 Nev. 434, 514 P.2d 1175 (1973).
Court of Appeals

Sixth Appellate District of Texas

J U D G M E N T

In the Interest of D.T., a Child

No. 06-19-00064-CV

Appeal from the 354th District Court of 

Hunt County, Texas (Tr. Ct. No. 85628). 

Opinion delivered by Justice Burgess, Chief 

Justice Morriss and Justice Stevens

participating.

As stated in the Court’s opinion of this date, we find no error in the judgment of the court 

below. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

We note that the appellant has adequately indicated her inability to pay costs of appeal. 

Therefore, we waive payment of costs.

RENDERED DECEMBER 13, 2019

BY ORDER OF THE COURT

JOSH R. MORRISS, III

CHIEF JUSTICE

ATTEST:

Debra K. Autrey, Clerk
#### STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. LYMAN EUGENE GRANT

No. 748SC341

(Filed 1 May 1974)

Criminal Law § 131— new trial for newly discovered evidence — denial proper

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s motion for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence where that evidence consisted of affidavits of a co-defendant and an accessory after the fact which stated that defendant was not involved in the crimes for which he was convicted.

Appeal from order of *James, Judge,*entered at the 26 November 1973 Session of Superior Court held in Greene County.

Defendant appeals from order denying his motion for a new trial on ground of newly discovered evidence. The motion, verified on 16 October 1973, is summarized in pertinent part as follows:

Defendant and Ernie Tomlinson were tried jointly at the 26 June 1972 Session of Superior Court held in Greene County, and convicted of two counts of armed robbery and one count of felonious breaking and entering. Defendant received a 30 years prison sentence and Tomlinson received a 20 years prison sentence. At defendant’s trial, the two alleged victims of the robbery positively stated that defendant was a participant in the crimes. Subsequent to defendant’s trial, Amos Stroud was tried for, and convicted of, being an accessory after the fact of the same robberies and received a prison sentence. Tomlinson and Stroud now say that defendant was not involved in the crimes for which he was convicted; that to have given testimony to that effect at defendant’s trial would have required their taking the witness stand and incriminating themselves. Affidavits of Tomlinson and Stroud are attached to the motion.

Following a hearing on the motion, the trial court entered an order in which it found certain facts, made conclusions of law, and, in its discretion, denied the motion for a new trial.

Defendant appealed.

*Attorney General Robert Morgan, by Deputy Attorney General R. Bruce White, Jr., and Assistant Attorneys General Jones P. Byrd and Alfred N. Salley, for the State.*

*Turner and Harrison, by Fred W. Harrison, for defendant-appellant.*

*432BRITT, Judge.

This case was before this court in July of 1973 when defendant appealed from the judgments imposed at his trial. In an opinion reported in 18 N.C. App. 722, 197 S.E. 2d 898 (1973), this court found no error in the trial. The Supreme Court denied certiorari. 284 N.C. 122, 199 S.E. 2d 661 (1973).

It is well settled in this jurisdiction that a motion for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence is addressed to the discretion of the trial court, and its order denying the motion will not be disturbed unless abuse of discretion appears. 3 Strong, N. C. Index 2d, Criminal Law, § 131, page 53; *State v. Dixon,*259 N.C. 249, 130 S.E. 2d 333 (1963); *State v. Chambers,*14 N.C. App. 249, 188 S.E. 2d 54 (1972). A careful review of the record filed in this appeal, as well as the record filed in the former appeal, impels us to conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s motion for a new trial.

The order appealed from is

Affirmed.

Judges Hedrick and Carson concur.
Dismissed and Memorandum Opinion filed October 18, 2018.

In The 

Fourteenth Court of Appeals 

NO. 14-18-00700-CV

KEVIN VICKERSON, Appellant 

V.

KZARS JEWELRY, Appellee 

On Appeal from the 152nd District Court 

Harris County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. 2017-79966 

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N 

This appeal is from a judgment signed July 9, 2018. No clerk’s record has 

been filed. The clerk responsible for preparing the record in this appeal informed the 

court appellant did not make arrangements to pay for the record. 

On September 19, 2018, notification was transmitted to all parties of the 

court’s intention to dismiss the appeal for want of prosecution unless, within fifteen 
2

days, appellant paid or made arrangements to pay for the record and provided this 

court with proof of payment. See Tex. R. App. P. 37.3(b). 

Appellant has not provided this court with proof of payment for the record. 

Accordingly, the appeal is ordered dismissed. 

PER CURIAM 

Panel consists of Justices Donovan, Jewell, and Wise.
1 Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 98-10486

Summary Calendar

 

MICHAEL JONATHAN CARLSON,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

LESLIE WOODS ET AL.,

Defendants-Appellees.

- - - - - - - - - -

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 7:97-CV-129-AH

- - - - - - - - - -

April 6, 1999

Before DAVIS, DUHÉ, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:1

Michael Carlson, Texas prisoner # 328076, appeals the

magistrate judge’s grant of the defendants’ motion for summary

judgment, dismissing Carlson’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims that he was

denied his right to exercise his religion because he and other

Christian Identity followers were not allowed separate services,

Bible study meetings, and a cassette player for their meetings.

Carlson argues that the magistrate judge erred in granting summary

judgment and that the magistrate judge’s protective order staying
discovery pending a resolution of the defendants’ asserted

qualified immunity defense was an abuse of discretion.

We review a summary judgment de novo and use the same

standards which exist for the district court. Guillory v. Domtar

Industries, Inc., 95 F.3d 1320, 1326 (5th Cir. 1996). Our review

of the record reveals that there were no issues of material fact

that the prison’s policy of not allowing separate services and

Bible study meetings for Christian Identity followers was

rationally related to legitimate penological interests of staffing,

security, available time and space, and the possible ripple effect

of having to afford numerous other religious groups within the

prison separate services and Bible study meetings. Carlson was

afforded the opportunity to attend generic weekly services and to

receive and possess religious materials. Summary judgment was

proper. O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349 (1987)

(quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)); Ganther v.

Ingle, 75 F.3d 207, 211 (5th Cir. 1996).

Carlson consented to the protective order in the district

court, and he has not shown on appeal that the order constituted

plain error. See Robertson v. Plano City of Texas, 70 F.3d 21, 23

(5th Cir. 1995) (rulings not objected to in the district court are

subject to plain error review). 

The magistrate judge’s summary judgment and grant of the

motion for a protective order are AFFIRMED.

Carlson is sufficiently able to present his arguments, and his

motion for the appointment of counsel is DENIED.
EXHIBIT 21.1

The following is a list of all of Pioneer Drilling Companys direct and indirect subsidiaries:



| | 1. | PDC MGMT. CO. (formerly SOTEX Exploration Company), a Texas corporation100% Direct Subsidiary1% general partner of Pioneer Drilling Services, Ltd.
| | -- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | 2. | PDC Investment Corp., A Delaware corporation100% Direct Subsidiary99% limited partner of Pioneer Drilling Services, Ltd.
| | -- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | 3. | Pioneer Drilling Services, Ltd. (formerly Pioneer Drilling Co., Ltd.), a Texas limited Partnership100% Indirect Subsidiaryowned by PDC MGMT. CO. (1%) and PDC
Investment Corp. (99%).
| | -- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | 4. | South Texas Drilling Company, a Texas corporation100% Direct Subsidiary.
| | -- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Merit Systems Protection Board

          - 5 CFR Part 1201 

# AGENCY:

Merit Systems Protection Board. 

# ACTION:

Proposed rule; reopening of the comment period. 

# SUMMARY:

                        The Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB or “the Board”) is reopening the comment period for a proposed rule published in the                         **Federal Register**                         on August 16, 2005 (70 FR 48081). The proposed rule revised 5 CFR 1201.142 and concerned the filing of constructive removal complaints by administrative law judges. The Board is reopening the comment period because of the widespread disruption caused by hurricanes Rita and Katrina.                     

# DATES:

Written comments should be submitted on or before November 25, 2005. 

# ADDRESSES:

                        Send or deliver comments to the Office of Clerk of the Board, U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board, 1615 M Street, NW., Washington, DC 20419; (202) 653-7200; fax: (202) 653-7130; or e-mail:                         *mspb@mspb.gov.*

# FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

                        Bentley Roberts, Clerk of the Board, Merit Systems Protection Board, 1615 M Street, NW., Washington, DC 20419; (202) 653-7200; fax: (202) 653-7130; or e-mail:                         *mspb@mspb.gov.*

# SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

The Board's original notice of the proposed rule (70 FR 48081) contains the relevant supplementary information. 

# List of Subjects in Part 1201 

      - Administrative personnel
      - Actions against administrative law judges
      - Actions filed by administrative law judges

Bentley M. Roberts, 

Clerk of the Board. 

[FR Doc. 05-21389 Filed 10-25-05; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7400-01-P
# C_2007103EN.01000401.xml

| 8.5.2007 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 103/4 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

8.5.2007

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 103/4

---

COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION

COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION

of 19 March 2007

concerning the discharge to be given to the Commission in respect of the implementation of the operations of the European Development Fund (Ninth EDF) for the financial year 2005

(2007/C 103/04)

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community,

Having regard to the ACP-EC Partnership Agreement, signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000 (1) and amended in Luxembourg (Grand Duchy of Luxembourg) on 25 June 2005 (2),

1

2

Having regard to the Internal Agreement on the financing and administration of Community aid under the Financial Protocol to ACP-EC Partnership Agreement (3) setting up, amongst others, the Ninth European Development Fund (Ninth EDF), and in particular Article 32(3) of that Agreement,

3

Having regard to the Financial Regulation of 27 March 2003 applicable to the 9th European Development Fund (4), and in particular Articles 96 to 103 thereof,

4

Having examined the revenue and expenditure account and the balance sheet relating to the operations of the Ninth EDF as at 31 December 2005 and the Court of Auditors' report concerning the financial year 2005 together with the Commission's replies (5),

5

Whereas

| (1) | Pursuant to Article 32(3) of the said Internal Agreement, the discharge for the financial management of the Ninth EDF is to be given to the Commission by the European Parliament on the recommendation of the Council. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

Pursuant to Article 32(3) of the said Internal Agreement, the discharge for the financial management of the Ninth EDF is to be given to the Commission by the European Parliament on the recommendation of the Council.

| (2) | The overall implementation by the Commission of the operations of the Ninth EDF during the financial year 2005 has been satisfactory, |
| --- | --- |

(2)

The overall implementation by the Commission of the operations of the Ninth EDF during the financial year 2005 has been satisfactory,

HEREBY RECOMMENDS that the European Parliament give the Commission a discharge in respect of the implementation of the operations of the Ninth EDF for the financial year 2005.

Done at Brussels, on 19 March 2007.

For the Council

The President

H. SEEHOFER

---

(1)  OJ L 317, 15.12.2000, p. 3.

1

(2)  OJ L 287, 28.10.2005, p. 4.

2

(3)  OJ L 317, 15.12.2000, p. 355.

3

(4)  OJ L 83, 1.4.2003, p. 1.

4

(5)  OJ C 263, 31.10.2006, p. 205.

5

---
FILED 

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 

 July 22, 2005 

 THOMAS K. KAHN 

 CLERK

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 05-11679

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D. C. Docket No. 03-00408-CV-CAR-5

COMPANION PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

ROBERT MATHIS, MARY MATHIS, as Natural Guardians

and Parents of Robert Martin John Mathis,

Defendants-Appellees.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Georgia

_________________________

(July 22, 2005)

Before CARNES, MARCUS and COX, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Companion Property and Casualty Insurance Company (“Companion”) filed

this declaratory judgment action seeking a determination that it had no obligation,
2

under policies issued by it, to defend or indemnify Richard Douglass and Friends of

Douglass Theatre Complex, Inc. on claims asserted against them by Robert Martin

John Mathis and his parents. The district court found that Companion was obligated

to defend and indemnify Friends of the Douglass Theatre Complex, Inc., but was not

obligated to defend or indemnify Richard Douglass individually. Companion

appeals, contending that the district court erred in concluding that it was obligated to

defend and indemnify Friends of the Douglass Theatre Complex, Inc.

Having considered the briefs, and relevant parts of the record, we conclude that

the district court erred in concluding that Companion was obligated to defend and

indemnify Friends of the Douglass Theatre Complex, Inc. For the reasons set forth

in SCI Liquidating Corp. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 181 F.3d 1210, 1213-17 (11th Cir.

1999), we agree with Companion that the intentional conduct alleged in the

underlying action does not fall within the definition of an “occurrence” as defined in

the relevant insurance policies. 

The judgment of the district court declaring that Companion is not obligated

to defend and indemnify Douglass on these claims is affirmed; and, the judgment of

the district court declaring that Companion is obligated to defend and indemnify

Friends of Douglass Theatre Complex, Inc. is reversed.

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART.
#### STATE v. BARNWELL

No. 11 PC.

Case below: 17 N.C. App. 299.

Petition for writ of certiorari to North Carolina Court of Appeals denied 6 March 1973.