J-S63038-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

v.

SHELTON A. THOMAS

 Appellant No. 2445 EDA 2015

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence June 22, 2015

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division

at No(s): CP-51-CR-0002707-2014

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., SHOGAN, J., and FITZGERALD,*J.

MEMORANDUM BY FITZGERALD, J.: FILED DECEMBER 30, 2016

Appellant, Shelton A. Thomas, appeals from the judgment of sentence 

entered in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas.1 Appellant 

challenges the discretionary aspects of his sentence. We affirm.

The trial court summarized the facts of this case as follows:

 

*

Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 On September 9, 2015, this Court issued a rule to show cause as to why 

this appeal should not be quashed as untimely filed based upon the Court of 

Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Docket, which indicated that postsentence motions were untimely filed on July 6, 2015, from the judgment of 

sentence imposed on June 22, 2015. Appellant filed a pro se motion for 

reconsideration of sentence and a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. The 

motion to proceed in forma pauperis was dated June 23, 2015, and attached 

to the motion for reconsideration of sentence, which was undated. Under 

the “prisoner mailbox rule,” a pro se prisoner’s document is deemed filed on

the date he delivers it to prison authorities for mailing. See generally, 

Commonwealth v. Wilson, 911 A.2d 942, 944 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2006). 

Instantly, there is no indication of when Appellant delivered the document to 

the prison authorities. In an abundance of caution, we will not find the 

motion for reconsideration of sentence untimely. See id. 
J-S63038-16

- 2 -

Over a period of several years, beginning June 2011, 

and ending some time in February or March of 2014, 

[Appellant] defrauded the Victim, Raymond Campbell, of 

his life’s savings of at least $95,000. [Appellant] first 

approached the 93 year-old Victim as a stranger with an 

offer to mow the Victim’s lawn. This happened several 

times before one occasion in which [Appellant] insisted on 

disposing of the lawn trimmings in a dumpster across the 

street from the Victim’s home in West Philadelphia, instead 

of allowing the Victim to leave the trimmings on the curb 

on their designated pick-up date. . . .[2] 

[Appellant] also impersonated Seth Williams, the 

Philadelphia District Attorney, over 100 times as a part of 

his scheme to deceive the Victim into paying fabricated 

legal fees stemming from the ostensible dumping. He 

repeatedly called the Victim and identified himself as Mr. 

Williams. At sentencing, Mr. Williams confirmed that he 

had never called the Victim. 

Trial Ct. Op., 9/30/15, at 1-2 (citations to the record omitted). 

On February 12, 2015, Appellant entered a non-negotiated guilty plea 

to criminal trespass,3theft by deception,4theft by extortion,5identity theft,6

 

2 The trial court stated that Appellant “subsequently told the Victim that both 

of them were facing criminal charges for improperly disposing of the 

trimmings.” Trial Ct. Op., 9/30/15, at 1, citing N.T. Sentencing Hr’g, 

6/22/15, at 12-13. A review of the record reveals that Victim testified that 

Appellant was charged “with putting stuff in the dumpster.” Id. at 12.

3 18 Pa.C.S. § 3503(a)(1)(ii). 

4 18 Pa.C.S. § 3922(a)(1). 

5 18 Pa.C.S. § 3923(a)(1).

6 18 Pa.C.S. § 4120(a).
J-S63038-16

- 3 -

and impersonating a public servant.7 Sentencing was deferred for a 

presentence investigation mental health report. See Docket at 7. 

Victim testified at the sentencing hearing:

[The Commonwealth]: And I am going to ask you to tell 

His Honor very briefly the impact that this crime has had 

on you, not just financially, but how it’s affected you in 

every way.

 

 * * *

[Victim]: Well, Your Honor, [Appellant], when he came to 

me and wanted to cut my lawn, that’s how this whole thing 

started. Anyways, he kept coming back to me time and 

time again early, in the morning, saying that he needed 

this money for court fees. It was always at least $600 or 

more. And he always said he had to be in court at an early 

time. So I would have to get up maybe around 5:30 in the 

morning to get in town and get to the ATM and get the 

money.

But before that, I had to go to my portfolio and sell 

shares to obtain this money. And after that was 

exhausted, then I had to go to my credit cards and get 

cash and I exhausted that. So, like I said, this money that 

I had in my portfolio, my intention was to leave that to my 

immediate relatives. So that─that’s all gone, now. And I 

can’t leave them anything. So─

The [c]ourt: How much was the total amount that you 

exhausted?

[Victim]: It was in access [sic] of $95,000.

 * * *

The [c]ourt: So he cut your grass and then he’d say, “I 

need $600 to go to court.”

 

7 18 Pa.C.S. § 4912.
J-S63038-16

- 4 -

[Victim]: No, no.

That’s not how this all started. He─one time he cut the 

grass and I told him, “Leave the bag and I’ll put it at the 

curb on my pickup date.” He said, “No, don’t worry. I’ll 

take care of it.” He takes this bag of leaves and grass and 

goes across the street and puts it in a dumpster and he 

was─so he told me he was caught on camera putting this 

bag in the dumpster and he was picked up and taken to─I 

think the dumpster was from Montgomery County, some 

firm there. And they charged him with putting stuff in the 

dumpster. That’s how this all started.

 * * *

[The Commonwealth]: [T]his occurred over approximately 

how long a period of time?

A: Well, it first started in June of 2011.

Q: And when did it stop?

A: I think it was around maybe February or March of 2014.

N.T. Sentencing Hr’g at 8-9, 11-12, 14. Victim testified that he received 

calls from someone purporting to be District Attorney Seth Williams. Id. at 

16.

The Commonwealth asked Seth Williams to give his “impact in this 

case involving [Appellant] as it relates to you, specifically, the charge of 

impersonating a public servant.” Id. at 19. Mr. Williams testified:

The Witness: Your Honor, I grew up in Cobbs Creek. I 

grew up on Cobbs Creek Parkway just a few blocks down 

from [Victim] and my father worked at the Cobbs Creek 

Recreation Center from 1972 until he retired in 1985. I 

knew [Appellant] almost that entire time. And his 

brother─

The Court: You knew [Appellant]?
J-S63038-16

- 5 -

The Witness: Yes.

[ ]:8 So we used to play ping-pong, basketball. I used to 

see him all of the time. My father showed movies on 

Monday nights. My father was very kind to [Appellant] 

and his brother and his whole family. And so at some 

point I received a telephone call from the Major Crimes 

Unit of the Philly Police Department, Detective Moreno Nix 

and she asked me if I knew [Victim].

The Witness: And I said, no, Your Honor; I did not know 

him. And she let me know that it was a person that I 

knew when I played basketball for the Cobbs Creek 

Commons and where my father ran the Recreation Center, 

had been impersonating me, calling [Victim] over 100 

times claiming to be me, and that as a result of work that 

[Appellant] had done for him, he owed fines. And he kept 

calling him to get money and that [Victim]─and it broke 

my heart because, what, he was a World War II veteran. 

He served in the European Theatre and the South Pacific, 

he was in his 90’s and had given over $95,000 to 

[Appellant].

The Court: He’s a World War II veteran?

The Witness: Yes, sir.

And he worked for the government. He’s not a rich 

man. He just saved his money. . . . I never made a 

telephone call to this gentleman and so [the detective] 

then set up a surveillance and it was during one of those 

that [Appellant] came and they arrested him at the home 

of [Victim].

Id. at 19-21.

The court stated that Appellant “wrecked [Victim’s] life. You know, it’s 

okay if you want to wreck your own life, but don’t go around wrecking the 

 

8 We note that the transcript misidentifies the court as the speaker.
J-S63038-16

- 6 -

lives of other people.” Id. at 40. The court opined: “[i]n the society that we 

have, we must look out for our seniors.” Id. The court noted that this was 

not Appellant’s “first experience with the law. Your background indicates 

that you have had previous experience and run-ins with the law.” Id. at 41. 

The Court explained that it “will be going outside of the guidelines because 

of the crime that was committed, because of the victim of the crime, . . . to 

protect the public, to punish, and to rehabilitate.” Id. at 48. 

Appellant was sentenced to consecutive terms of five to ten years’ 

imprisonment for criminal trespass, three-and-a-half to seven years’ 

imprisonment for theft by deception, three-and-a-half to seven years’ 

imprisonment for theft by extortion, three-and-a-half to seven years’ 

imprisonment for identity theft, and one to two years’ imprisonment for 

impersonating a public servant. Following a hearing, Appellant’s motion for 

reconsideration of sentence was denied. This timely appeal followed. 

Appellant filed a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of errors 

complained of on appeal, and the trial court filed a responsive opinion.

Appellant raises the following issue for our review: “Whether the trial 

court abused its discretion when it sentenced Appellant to an aggregate 

sentence of 161/2 to 33 years[’] incarceration?” 9 Appellant’s Brief at 4. In 

his Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) statement, Appellant claims 

 

9

“Where a defendant pleads guilty without any agreement as to sentence, 

the defendant retains the right to petition this Court for allowance of appeal 
J-S63038-16

- 7 -

1. The trial court abused its discretion when it sentenced 

Appellant to an aggregate sentence of 161/2 to 33 years[’

]

incarceration, which did not follow the dictates of 42 

Pa.C.S. § 9721(b) that requires the court to at least 

consider the particular circumstances of the offense and 

the character of the defendant.

 * * *

In imposing such a harsh sentence, the court based it [sic] 

sentence on the age of the victim, the length of the 

deception, which squarely focuses on the serious nature of 

the crime without taking into account the other section 

9721(b) factors.

 * * * 

[T]his sentencing court failed to take adequate 

consideration of [Appellant’s10] background, non-violent 

nature, remorse, and whether [he11] could be 

rehabilitated. While [Appellant’s] crime cannot be 

trivialized, the sentence imposed in [sic] unreasonable and 

excessively, [sic] and should be vacated.

Id. at 6-7.

This Court has stated,

discretionary aspects of [an appellant’s] sentence [ ] are 

not appealable as of right. Rather, an appellant 

challenging the sentencing court’s discretion must invoke 

this Court’s jurisdiction by satisfying a four-part test. 

We conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) 

whether appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, 

 

with respect to the discretionary aspects of sentencing.” Commonwealth 

v. Brown, 982 A.2d 1017, 1019 (Pa. Super. 2009) (citation omitted).

10 We note that Appellant mistakenly refers to himself as “Mr. Cobb” 

Appellant’s Brief at 6.

11 Again, Appellant refers to himself as “Mr. Cobb.” Id. at 7. 
J-S63038-16

- 8 -

see Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the issue 

was properly preserved at sentencing or in a motion 

to reconsider and modify sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. 

720; (3) whether appellant’s brief has a fatal defect, 

Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a 

substantial question that the sentence appealed from 

is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code, 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).

Commonwealth v. Leatherby, 116 A.3d 73, 83 (Pa. Super. 2015) (some 

citations omitted).

Instantly, Appellant timely filed his appeal, preserved the issue of an 

excessive sentence in his post-sentence motion for reconsideration of 

sentence, and included a statement in his brief that conforms with Pa.R.A.P. 

2119(f). See Appellant’s Brief at 6-7. Accordingly, we ascertain whether 

Appellant has raised a substantial question. See Leatherby, 116 A.3d at 

83.

“We conduct a case-by-case analysis to determine what allegations 

constitute a substantial question.” Commonwealth v. Malovich, 903 A.2d 

1247, 1252 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citation omitted); see also 42 Pa.C.S. § 

9781(b). “[A]n averment that the court sentenced based solely on the 

seriousness of the offense and failed to consider all relevant factors raises a 

substantial question.” Commonwealth v. Bricker, 41 A.3d 872, 875 (Pa. 

Super. 2012) (citation omitted). 

We find that Appellant’s Rule 2119(f) statement presents a substantial 

question. See id. 

Our standard of review is as follows:
J-S63038-16

- 9 -

Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion 

of the sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be 

disturbed on appeal absent a manifest abuse of 

discretion. An abuse of discretion is more than just 

an error in judgment and, on appeal, the trial court 

will not be found to have abused its discretion unless 

the record discloses that the judgment exercised was 

manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, 

prejudice, bias, or ill-will. 

More specifically, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b) offers the 

following guidance to the trial court’s sentencing 

determination:

[T]he sentence imposed should call for confinement 

that is consistent with the protection of the public, 

the gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact 

on the life of the victim and on the community, and 

the rehabilitative needs of the defendant. 

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b).

Furthermore, 

Section 9781(c) specifically defines three instances 

in which the appellate courts should vacate a 

sentence and remand: (1) the sentencing court 

applied the guidelines erroneously; (2) the sentence 

falls within the guidelines, but is “clearly 

unreasonable” based on the circumstances of the 

case; and (3) the sentence falls outside of the 

guidelines and is “unreasonable.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 

9781(c). Under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(d), the appellate 

courts must review the record and consider the 

nature and circumstances of the offense, the 

sentencing court’s observations of the defendant, the 

findings that formed the basis of the sentence, and 

the sentencing guidelines. The weighing of factors 

under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b) is exclusively for the 

sentencing court, and an appellate court could not 

substitute its own weighing of those factors. The 

primary consideration, therefore, is whether the 

court imposed an individualized sentence, and 

whether the sentence was nonetheless unreasonable 
J-S63038-16

- 10 -

for sentences falling outside the guidelines, or clearly 

unreasonable for sentences falling within the 

guidelines, pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(c).

Bricker, 41 A.3d at 875-76 (some citations omitted).

Our Supreme Court has stated:

We emphatically reject, therefore, interpretations of our 

law in this area which call for separate, written opinions 

embodying exegetical thought. Where pre-sentence 

reports exist, we shall continue to presume that the 

sentencing judge was aware of relevant information 

regarding the defendant’s character and weighed those 

considerations along with mitigating statutory factors. A 

pre-sentence report constitutes the record and speaks for 

itself. In order to dispel any lingering doubt as to our 

intention of engaging in an effort of legal purification, we 

state clearly that sentencers are under no compulsion to 

employ checklists or any extended or systematic 

definitions of their punishment procedure. Having been 

fully informed by the pre-sentence report, the 

sentencing court’s discretion should not be 

disturbed. This is particularly true, we repeat, in those 

circumstances where it can be demonstrated that the 

judge had any degree of awareness of the sentencing 

considerations, and there we will presume also that the 

weighing process took place in a meaningful fashion. It 

would be foolish, indeed, to take the position that if a court 

is in possession of the facts, it will fail to apply them to the 

case at hand.

Commonwealth v. Devers, 546 A.2d 12, 18 (Pa. 1988) (emphasis added).

The instant trial court opined:

Criminal Trespass is a felony of the second degree and is 

punishable by up to ten (10) years[’

]

imprisonment. Theft 

by deception is a felony of the third degree and is 

punishable by up to seven (7) years[’

]

imprisonment. 

Theft by Extortion is a felony of the third degree and is 

punishable by up to seven (7) years[’

]

imprisonment. 

Identity theft is a felony of the third degree and is 

punishable by up to seven (7) years[’

]

imprisonment. 
J-S63038-16

- 11 -

Impersonating a Public Servant is misdemeanor of the 

second degree and is punishable by up to two (2) years 

imprisonment. None of the sentences imposed by this 

court exceed the statutory maximum sentences.

 * * *

This [c]ourt did, in fact, consider the guidelines in

sentencing [Appellant], but deviated from them based on 

the “(nature of) the crime committed, because of the 

victim of the crime, to protect the public, and to punish 

and to rehabilitate [Appellant]” N.T. [sentencing Hr’g at] 

48. This [c]ourt specifically stated that “the guidelines are 

not written to cover such incidences as those [in the 

instant case].” Id. at 47-48. 

More specifically, the Standard Sentencing guidelines 

for the relevant section of Criminal Trespass, in light of 

[Appellant’s] Prior Record Score of three (3) and the 

Offense Gravity Score (OGS) of seven (7), call for fifteen 

to twenty-one (15-21) months[’

]

imprisonment. Id. at 26. 

However, this [c]ourt chose to deviate from the guidelines 

and impose a sentence of five to ten (5-10) years on this 

charge because of . . . Victim’s age, as well as the scale 

and prolonged nature of the crime. Id. at 48. The 

charges of theft by Deception and Theft by Extortion both 

carry an OGS of seven (7), which would ordinarily place 

the Sentencing Guidelines between fifteen and twenty-one 

(15-21) months for each offense. This [c]ourt chose to 

deviate from the guidelines and impose a sentence of 

three and a half to seven (3.5-7) years on each charge 

because of the added need to protect senior citizens from 

this type of predation, as well as the scale and prolonged 

nature of the thefts. Id. at 48. Identity Theft under this 

subsection carries an OGS of five (5), resulting in a 

guideline sentence of six to sixteen (6-16) months[’

]

imprisonment. This [c]ourt chose to deviate from the 

guidelines and impose a sentence of three and one half to 

seven (3.5-7) years because the identity stolen belonged 

to the District Attorney of Philadelphia and the guise was 

used over a hundred times to manipulate a lifelong 

government employee and veteran. Id. at 20-21, 48. 

Impersonating a Public Servant carries a OGS of 2, which 

would typically recommend a sentence of probation to nine 
J-S63038-16

- 12 -

(9) months[’

]

imprisonment under the Guidelines. 

However, this [c]ourt chose to deviate from the guidelines 

and impose a sentence of one to two (1-2) years[’

]

imprisonment because of the hundred-plus incidents and 

the elderly victim of the deception. Id. at 20, 48.

Trial Ct. Op. at 4-6 (some citations omitted).

The record belies Appellant’s argument that the trial court focused 

solely on the serious nature of the crime without taking into consideration 

other factors. The court considered the Section 9721(b) factors. See 

Bricker, 41 A.3d at 875-76. Furthermore, the court considered the 

presentence investigation report. See Devers, 546 A.2d at 18. 

Accordingly, after examining the record as a whole, we discern no abuse of 

discretion. See Bricker, 41 A.3d at 875-76. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/30/2016