DLD-252 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

____________

No. 18-2036

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ASIA JOHNSON,

 Appellant

v.

JACOB ROTHSCHILD

________________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil No. 2-18-cv-00495)

District Judge: Honorable Arthur J. Schwab

_________________________________________

Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 

or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6

June 28, 2018

Before: JORDAN, SHWARTZ and KRAUSE, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: July 16, 2018)

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OPINION*

___________

PER CURIAM

 * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.
2

Appellant Asia Johnson, proceeding pro se, appeals from the District Court’s 

dismissal of her action as legally frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). For 

the reasons that follow, we will summarily affirm the judgment of the District Court.

Johnson submitted a complaint in the District Court asserting a claim against a 

defendant who apparently resides in the United Kingdom. Johnson’s complaint is far 

from a model of clarity, but appears to complain about “death threats” against her on 

defendant’s family social media sites. See Compl. at ¶ III. She claims to be seeking the 

court’s assistance in “liv[ing] a free peaceful life . . . .” Id. at ¶ IV. Johnson’s complaint 

was accompanied by a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). By order 

entered April 18, 2018, the District Court concluded that Johnson’s claim was frivolous 

within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), and that amendment would be futile. 

Accordingly, it dismissed the action. The District Court further concluded that it could 

not grant Johnson IFP status based upon the statements set forth in her complaint. As 

such, it denied her IFP request as moot. Johnson appeals.

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and exercise plenary review 

over the District Court’s dismissal of Johnson’s complaint as frivolous. See Roman v. 

Jeffes, 904 F.2d 192, 194 (3d Cir. 1990). We construe the complaint liberally, Haines v. 

Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and may summarily affirm the District Court’s order if 

there is no substantial question presented by the appeal. See Third Cir. LAR 27.4 and 

I.O.P. 10.6. We may affirm for any reason supported by the record. See Brightwell v. 

Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 191 (3d Cir. 2011).
3

In this Circuit, leave to proceed IFP generally turns solely on indigence. See

Deutsch v. United States, 67 F.3d 1080, 1085 n.5 (3d Cir. 1995); Roman v. Jeffes, 904 

F.2d 192, 194 n.1 (3d Cir. 1990). If the plaintiff is unable to pay the filing fee, leave to 

proceed IFP generally should be granted. See Deutsch, 67 F.3d at 1085 n.5. If a District 

Court grants IFP status, it may then decide whether to dismiss the complaint under 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). See id. (addressing former § 1915(d)); Roman, 904 F.2d at 194 n.1 

(same). What it generally may not do, however, is deny leave to proceed IFP on the basis 

of non-financial considerations such as the merits of the plaintiff’s complaint. See

Sinwell v. Shapp, 536 F.2d 15, 18-19 (3d Cir. 1976).1 Here, the District Court seems to 

have conflated the IFP and merits analyses, even though, as the District Court itself 

acknowledges at one point, see Mem. Order at 1-2, they should be handled separately.

It is clear from Johnson’s motion submitted to the District Court that she is eligible 

for IFP status based on her economic situation. It is equally clear, however, that the 

District Court correctly determined that Johnson’s complaint is frivolous within the 

meaning of § 1915(e)(2)(B). See Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992); see also

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989) (a complaint is frivolous if it “lacks an 

arguable basis either in law or in fact”). Likewise, the District Court did not abuse its 

discretion in concluding than any amendment would be futile. See Grayson v. Mayview 

State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002).

 1

 We have recognized that denial of leave to proceed IFP for other than financial reasons 

might be warranted under “extreme circumstances,” Deutsch, 67 F.3d at 1084 n.5, but we 

perceive none here.
4

Accordingly, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment but direct 

that it modify its order to grant Johnson’s IFP motion. See 3d Cir. LAR 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.