The pa pers submitted in connec tion with these motions i nclude: the plaintiff’ s 1 complaint (“Compl.”); de fenda nts’ motion to di smiss or, in the alternative, f or summary judgme nt (“De fs.’ Mot.”) ; plaintiff’s opposition to t he def endants’ motion (“ Pl.’s Opp.”); Pl.’s Opp., Ex. 3 (Declar ation of Michae l Fenw ick) (“ Fe nwick De cl.”) ; plaintiff’s motion to st rike UN I TE D ST AT ES D I STR I CT C OU RT F O R T H E D IS T R IC T O F C O LU M B IA

__________________________________________ ) MI CHAEL

FEN WI CK, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Ci vi l A cti on No. 07 -23 30 (P L F) ) UNI TED STATES OF AMERI CA, e t al

. ) ) De fe nd ants . ) __________________________________________)
OPI NI ON Pla int if f M ic ha e l F e nw ic k c la ims that in div idu a l de fe nd ants An dr e w Pu dim ott , Jer e my F isc he r, and

JohnMic kle — a ll D e puty Un ite d St a te s Ma

rs ha ls — vio late d h is F ourt

h Amendment rig hts and committed the common law torts of f alse imprisonment, assault, and batte ry a g a ins t hi m. H e se e ks dama g e s f ro m th e ind ivi du a l de fe nd ants un de r B ive ns v. Six Unknown Ag ents of F ed. B urea u of Na rcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) , and fr om the United States pursuant to the F eder al Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). Curre ntly pendingbefor e the Court are (1) de fenda

nts’ motion to di smiss pl aintiff’s c omplaint ag ainst the individual defe ndants for insuff

icient servic e of pr ocess a nd failure to state a c laim, (2) def endants’ motion for summary

judgme nt, and (3) the plaintiff’s objec tion and motion to s trike all juvenile c ourt
rec ords submitted by

the def endants in support of their motions t o dismiss and for summary judgme nt (“motion to strike”). 1(“Pl.’s Mot.”); plaintiff’ s memorandum in support of his motion to st rike (“ Pl.’s Mem.”);

de fe nd ants ’ r e sp on se to p la int if f’ s mo tio n to str ike and

re ply to p la int if

f’ s o pp os iti on

to defe ndants’ motion (“De fs.’ Resp.” ); and plaintiff’ s reply to defe ndants’ opposition to plainti ff’ s motion to s trike (“ Pl.’s Reply ”). In support of their memor anda of law, both the plaintiff a

nd the defe ndants have submitt ed ce rtain exhibit s under se al, at Doc ket No. 32 (“ Def s.’ Sealed Ex hibits”) and Doc ket No. 31 (“ Pl.’s Sealed Exhi bits”). 2 After considera

tion of the parties’ arguments and the a pplicable law , the Court will gr ant def

endants’ motion to dismiss in part, deny the re mainder of

that motion without prejudice , deny

plaintiff’s motion to strike, and def er a ny ruling on defe ndants’ motion for summary judgme nt until t he par

ties have submitted additional brief s and docume nts as instructed in this Opini on and the a ccompa nying O rder
. I . BA CKGROUND On J anuar

y 3, 2007, Michae l Fenw ick drove a g ree n L incoln into the parkinglot of an a partment c omplex in Washington, D.C., parke d, and g ot out of the ca r. Pl.’s Opp. at 3-4. He wa lked to the door of his g irlfriend’ s apar tment and then, findingthat she wa s not at home, returne d to the car . I d. at 4. In the meantime, de fenda nts Pudi mott, Fischer, a

nd Mickle (“ the deputies”) wer e standingnear by in the parkinglot, waiting to enf orce an evic tion order issued f or one of the units in t he complex. I d. at 4.

The pa rties’ a ccounts of what happe ned next diverg e widely . Acc ordingto the defe ndants, based on Mr . Fe nwick’s a ppear ance and beha

vior and the a

ppear ance of his car , the deputies deve loped a r easona ble suspicion that Mr. Fe nwick wa s driving a stolen automobile. De fs .’ Mo t. at 4. As Mr . F e nw ic k w a s st and ingbe sid e the L inc oln a ft e r r e tur

nin g fr om h is g irlfriend’ s apar

tment, they

asked him to stop and speak with them. I d. Although Mr . Fe nwick hear d their re quest, he did not stop, but inst ead g ot into the car a nd put it in reverse . I d. He then3

drove the car

forwa rd towar d “one or

more [of the] deputies,” plac ing the ir lives in dang er. I d. at 25. Responding to the “ appar ent threat to the safety of themselves, f

ellow offic ers, a

nd/or possibly other by standers,” Deputies Pudimott and Fischer fired se vera l shots at Mr. Fenw ick, id. at 26, bef ore he drove of

f, leaving the parkinglot. Com pl. ¶ 38. Mr. Fe nwick, in contra st, claims that he did not hear the deputies’ r equests that he stop and talk to them. Pl.’s Opp. at 5. Not understandingthat they wished him to stay

in the parkinglot, he climbed into his car a nd beg an to bac k out of his parkingspace . I d. at 6. Afte r the c ar h a d p ull e d o ut o f t he sp a c e , it

sto pp e d w hil e Mr . F e nw ic k c ha ng e d g e ars . F e nw ic k D e c l. at 3. At that point Deputy Pudimot t beg an shooting at Mr. F enwick. D eputy Fische r also “f

ired befor e [Mr. Fe nwick] heard a ny order s to stop,” and “while the car was stopped.” Pl.’s Opp. at 12. Once Mr. Fe nwick beg an to drive f orwa rd in the ca

r, De puty Fische r fire d “at lea st” one other shot at him “as [Mr. Fe nwick] was drivingawa y .” I d. at 12. At no time did the deputies “fe ar[] for their lives.” I d. at 12.

Un lik e the sh oo tin g its e lf , th e e ve nts that f

oll ow e d a re , f or the mos t pa

rt , n ot i n dispute. Although he had bee n struck duringthe shooting, Mr . Fe nwick mana g ed to drive out of the par king lot. F enwick D ecl. at 3. Soon afterwa rd, he c hecke d into a hospital for trea tment of his injuries and was a

pprehe nded by

police while ther e. I d. In Fe bruar

y 2007, Mr. Fe nwick, who wa s six teen year s old at the time, was char g ed as a

juvenile with, amongother thing s, ag g ravated assault on a police office r and r ece ipt
an d co n v er s i o no f s t o l en p ro p erty . De fs
. ’ S ea l edE x . 7 at2 -3
. Hi s ca s e w as tri edb ef o re a j u d ge in t he F amil y Di vis ion of the Sup e ri or

Court of the Di str ic t of

Col umb ia . I d. Duri ngthe tr ia l, Mr . F e nw ic k’ s c ouns e l mo ve d f or the e xclu sio n o f t ang ibl e e vid e nc e , in c lud ingthe a lle g e dly4

stolen car driven by

Mr. Fe nwick and a ll phy sical evide nce c ollected f rom Mr. F enwick at the hospital, on the g round that the e vidence had bee n rec overe d as a dire ct re sult of the illega l seizure of Mr. F enwick in violation of the F ourth Amendment. De fs.’ Sea led Ex. 3 at 6. That seizure, ac cordingto counsel, occ urre d when “ the deputies ra n over to [the car

Mr. Fe nwick wa s driving ] wit h g uns drawn a nd then shot the driver .” I d. at 5. The c ourt reje cted Mr. F enwick’ s motion t o suppress, stating , “I don’t see or

find
any thi ngina pp ro pr iate in [the de putie s’ ] ac tio ns a t a ll. ” Pl. ’s Se a le d E x. 14 a t 5. In a se pa rate ruling , the cour

t found Mr. F enwick “ g uilty /involved” as to one c ount eac h of assa ult on a police office r with a da

ng erous we apon, re ceipt of stolen pr operty , and unauthor ized use of a ve hicle. Pl. ’s Se a le d E x. 16 at 2- 3; D e fs .’ Se a le d E x. 6 at 5. An a pp e a l f ro m th a t de c isi on

is p e nd ingin the District of Columbia Court of Appea ls. See Def s.’ Sealed E x . 6. O nD e c e mb e r

2 8 , 2 0 0 7 , th i s a c t i o nw a s f i l e d b y M r . F e n w i c k ’ s m o th e r , C h e r yl Fe nwick, who se rved a s the primary plaintiff in this case until Mr. Fe nwick re ache d the ag e of majority . The c omplaint alleg es that De puties Fische r, Mickle, a nd Pudimot t violated Mr. F e nw ic k’ s r ig hts un de r t

he F ourt h A me ndme nt t o th e Con sti tut ion , a nd that th e Un ite d St a te s is lia ble to M r. F e nw ic k und e r t he F e de ra l T or

t Cla ims Ac t f

or a c ts o f a ssa

ult , b a tte ry , a

nd fa lse imprisonment committ ed by the deputies in the c ourse of their employ

ment. Mr. Fe nwick see ks $1 0 mi lli on

in c omp e ns ator

y dama g e s a

nd $1 00 mil lio n in

punit ive dama g e s.5 I I . DI SCUS SI ON A. De fe nd an ts’ Mo tio n to Di

sm iss Th e de fe nd ants have su

bmi tte d a sin g le mot ion

e nti tle d “ Mo tio n to Di smi ss o r, in the Alternative, for Summary J udg ment.” F or cla

rity , the Court will treat that filing as two separ ate motions, one to dismiss and one for summary judgme nt. The def

endants a ssert four g rounds for dismissal of some or a ll of the plaintiff’s c laims: (1) Deputies Purdimott, Fischer , and Mickle ha

ve neve r bee n proper ly

serve d with proce ss, and so claims ag ainst them should be dismiss ed pursua

nt to Rul e 12(b) (5) of

the Fe dera l Rules of Civil Procedur e, De fs.’ Opp. at 10; (2) Mr. F enwick c annot ra ise any common law tort cla ims ag ainst the deputies in their individual
c a pa c iti e s b e c a

us e tho se c la ims are ba

rr e d b y the F TCA , id . at 33 ; ( 3) the pla int if f’ s c la ims ag ainst Deputy

Mickle ar e so vague and insubstantial that they must be dismis sed; and (4 ) “ [p]la int if

f h a s f a ile d to state a

c la im f or re lie f” be c a

us e “ [t]he de fe nd ants are , at a min imum, entitled to qualified immunity .” I d. at 19-20.

Withre g ard

to t he fo ur th c on te nti on , th e Court

no te s th a t a lth ou g h th e de fe nd ants ’ phrasingsug g ests that they are seekinga dismissal of plaintiff’s cla ims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the F eder al Rules of Civil P roce dure, which provides f or the dismissal of a c omplaint in the
e ve nt t hat it “ fa il[s] t o s tate a

c la im u po n w hic h r e lie f c an b e g ra nte d, ” the de fe nd ants ’ a

rgume nts reg ardingqualified immunity cannot be resolved on a

motion to di smiss. The defe ndants rely on materia ls outside the pleading s in making the ir qualified immunity arguments, see, e .g ., Def s.’ Mot. at 29-30, and so those a rguments must be addre ssed as pa rt of a motion for summar y judgme nt. See F ED . R. C IV . P. 12(d). Similarly , the def endants’ a

rguments conce rningthe
su ff ic ie nc y of the pla int if

f’ s c la ims a g a ins t D e puty Mic kle re fe r t o mate ri a l outsi de the ple a din g s,The plaintiff ma intains that service was made under Rule 4( i)(3) of the Fe dera l 2 Rules of Civil P roce dure. See Pl.’s Opp. at 17. That Rule, howeve r, simply require s that the United States also be se rved wheneve r one of its employ ees is “sue d in an individual capa city for an ac t or omission occurringin connec tion with duti es per formed on the United States’ beha lf.” F ED . R. C IV . P. 4(i)(3). It does not alter or control the manne r in which individuals must be serve d under Rule 4( e). See id. (requir ing a party to serve the United States and “ also serve the office r or e mploy ee unde r Rule 4(e ), (f ), or ( g )”)
. 6 see D efs.’ Reply

at 20, and ther efor e will also be tre ated a s part of the summary judgme nt motion. The Court’s discussion of the defe ndants’ motion to dism iss thus encompasses only two issues: insufficiency

of ser vice of proce ss and the propr iety of cla ims ag ainst the deputies under the FT CA.
1. Ins uf fi c ie nc y of Se rv ic e of

Pr oc e ss Service of proc ess upon individuals within a judicial district of the United States is gove rned by

Rule 4(e) of the F eder al Rules of Civil P roce dure. Rule 4( e)( 2) states that ser vice upon an individual may

be ef fec ted by (A ) d e liv e ri nga

c op y of the summo ns an d o f th e c o mp l a i n tt o th e i n d i v i d u a l p e r s o n a l l y; (B ) leaving a

copy of ea ch at the individual’s dwelling or usual plac e of a bode with someone of

suitable ag e and discretion who r esides ther e; or

(C) deliver ing a

copy of ea ch to an a g ent authorized by appointment or by

law to re ceive service of proc ess. F ED . R. C IV . P. 4(e) (2). I f a pla intiff fails to make pr oper se rvice upon a def endant “ within 120 2 da y s a ft e r t he c omp la int

is f ile d, the c ourt

. . . mu st d ism iss the a c tio n w ith out pr e jud ic e a g a ins t that defe ndant or orde r that ser vice be made within a spe cified time. B ut if the plaintiff shows g ood cause for the f

ailure, the court must extend the time for servic e for an appr opriate pe riod.”7

F ED . R. C IV . P. 4(m). “T he law is c lear that the par

ty on whose be half ser

vice is made has the burden of establishing its validity

when c halleng ed.” Che n v. District of Columbia, 256 F.R.D. 263, 266 (D.D.C. 2009) ( citation and interna l quotation marks omitted).

The de fenda

nts argue that Mr. F enwick ha s failed to make proper service upon Deputies Pudimott, Mi ckle, a nd Fische r bec ause the plaintiff’s proc ess serve r neve r met any of the re quirements of Rule 4( e)( 2) of the F eder al Rules. Def s.’ Mot. at 11-12. As Mr. F enwick
c on c e de s, the pr oc e ss s e rv e r d id n ot p e rs on a lly de liv e r c op ie s o f t

he summo ns and

c omp la int

to the deputies or le ave c opies at their “ dwelling or plac e of a bode.” See Pl.’s Opp. at 17. Instead,
acc ordingto his affidavits, he lef t the appropr iate docume nts with Edward B ordley , an employ ee of the Of fi c e of the Ge ne ra l Co un se l of

the Un ite d St a te s Ma

rs ha ls Se rv ic e wh o a lle g e dly claimed to be a

n ag ent authorized to ac cept se rvice on behalf of the de puties. See Aff

idavit of Service , Docke t No. 3, ¶¶ 2- 3. The individual defe ndants, howeve r, cla im that Mr. Bordle y was
never authorized to acc ept servic e on their be half a nd have pr oduced a

decla ration in which Mr. B or dle y say s th at he tol d th e pla int if f’ s p ro c e ss s e rv e r t

hat he wa s not

authorized to acc ept
se rv ic e fo r t

he de putie s. De fs .’ Mo t., Ex. 2 , ¶ ¶ 3 -4 . Sp e c if

ic a lly , M r. B or dle y

state s: On Ap ri l 23 , 2 00 8, Ire c e ive d a te le ph on e c a ll f

ro m a proce ss server

stating that he wished to ser ve a Summons and Complaint for [t his case]. Iinformed him that I would acc ept se rv ic e on

be ha lf of the U. S. M ars ha ls Se rv ic e , b ut i f t he c a se involved an ac tion ag ainst USMS personnel in their individual capa cities, then the individuals should be serve d pursuant to Rule 4 of the F eder al Rules of Civil P roce dure. . . . . L ater

in the day

on April 23, 2008, Imet with the pr oc e ss s e rv e r i n th e lob by of USM S he a dq

ua rt e rs . . . I a g a in inf or me d h im that I

wa s n ot a

uth or ize d to a c c e pt s e rv ic e on be ha lf of USM S pe rs onne l su e d in the ir ind ivi du a l c a

pa c iti e s. I d.8 “[C] laims by

an ag ent of having a

uthority to rec eive pr ocess or

the fa ct that an ag ent ac tually

acc epts proce ss is not enough” to satisfy the servic e re quirements of Rule 4( e)( 2); “ther e must be evide nce that the defe ndant[s] intended to conf er that authority

upon the ag ent.” 4A C H A RLES A. W R I GH T & A RT H U R R. M I L L ER , F ED ER A L P R AC TI C E AND P ROCE DURE § 1097 (3d ed. 2002); see also Schwarz v. Thomas, 222 F.2d 305, 308 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (statements of alleg ed ag ent ar e not suffic ient evidenc e of a uthority to acc ept proc ess). Eve n if Mr. B ordley did, as the proc ess serve r alleg es, cla im to be authorized to rece ive proc ess for the individual defe ndants, Mr. F enwick ha s produce d no evidenc e demonstrating a ny intent on the part of the deputies to authorize Mr. B ordley to rec eive se rvice on their beha lf. As a r esult, the Court conclude s that Mr. Fe nwick has f ailed to make pr oper se rvice upon defe ndants Fische r, Mickle, and Pudimott. A plaintiff who, like Mr. F enwick, ha s failed to mee t the require ments of Rule 4 may never theless avoid dismissal of his complaint if he ca n show “g ood cause ” for

his failure. F ED . R. C IV . P. 4(m). Even if the pla intiff lacks g ood cause , the Court may , in its di scre tion, aff ord the plaintiff a dditional tim e in which to ef fec t service proper ly . I d. Her e, the Court has de te rm ine d th at e ve n if

Mr . F e nw ic k la c ks g oo d c a us e fo r h is f

a ilure to c omp ly

wi th R ule 4 u p to this point , he should be pe rmitted additional time in which to serve the individual defenda nts. See id. advisory

committee’s note ( 1993 amendments) ( court is authorized to “re lieve a pla intiff of the c onsequenc es” of

Rule 4(m) “e ven if ther e is no g ood cause shown”). The de fenda

nts filed their motion to dism iss, outli ning the defe cts in Mr. Fe nwick’s attempted service of the de puties, on May 22, 2009. That motion was fully briefe d by August 20, 2009. The statute of limitations on Mr. Fenw ick’s B ivens claims expired on J anuar y9

3, 2010, three y ear s after

the date of

his confrontation with the deputies. See L eder man v. United States, 131 F. Supp. 2d 46, 61 (D.D.C. 2001) ( statute of limitations for Bivens c laims is three y e ars ). I f M r. F e nw ic k’ s c la ims a g a ins t th e ind ivi du a l de fe nd ants ha d b e e n d ism iss e d p ur su ant t o Rule 4(m) soon af

ter the de fenda

nts’ motion became r ipe, that dismissal would have bee n wi tho ut p re

jud ic e , s e e Che n v . D istri c t of Col umb ia , 2 56 F .R. D. a t 26 7, and Mr . F e nw ic k c ou ld have re fi le d h is c la ims a g a ins t th e de putie s b e fo re Janu ary 3, 20 10 . I f t

he Court we re to d ism iss Mr. Fe nwick’s c laims without prejudice now, howe ver, those c laims would be barr ed by the statute of limitations, and the Court’s dismis sal there fore would eff ectively insulate the individual defenda

nts from potential liability . See F ED . R. C IV . P. 4(m) advisory committee’s note (1993 amendments) (r elief f rom dismissal “may

be justified . . . if the a

pplicable statute of limit ations would bar the r efiled a ction”). The Court will not i mpose such an outc ome on Mr. F e nw ic k s imp ly

be c a us e its de c isi on

c ome s n owra

the r t ha n b e fo re Janu ary

3, 20 10 . Ins te a d, it will require Mr . Fe nwick to ef fec t proper se rvice upon the def endant de puties by

April 15, 2010. I f h e fa ils to c omp ly

wi th R ule 4 b y that date , th e de fe nd ants may re ne w the ir

mot ion to d ism iss
. 2. Cla ims Ag a ins t Ind ivi du a l D e fe nd ants Un de r t he F TCA As the def

endants note, “ [i ]t is unclear whether Plaintiff is seeking to rec over ag ainst the individual defenda nts . . . under the F eder al Tort Claims Act.” De fs.’ Mot. at 33. Mr. Fe nwick’s c omplaint claims that “the United States is liable” unde r the F TCA “for the . . . actions of the individual De fenda nt office rs.” Compl. ¶ 42. In the next parag raph of the complaint, howeve r, the plaintiff r equests “judg ment ag ainst Defe ndant offic ers, jointly and
sever ally , in the sum of $10,000,000” under the FT CA. I d. at 5. Mr. F enwick’ s response to the10

defe ndants’ motion to dism iss fails to clarify his intentions, s tating that “[p] laintiff’s common law cla ims ag ainst Defe ndants Pudimot t, Fische r, and Mickle are adequately stated, eve n if they must be broug ht ag ainst the United States under the Fe dera l Tort Claims Act.” Pl.’s Opp. at 44. Mr. Fe nwick thus appe ars to ac knowledg e that only the United States, and not the individual defe ndants in this matter, may be held liable unde r the F TCA even a s he insists that he has

“ c omm on law [to rt ] cl a ims a g a ins t” the de fe nd ant d e putie s. To be c lear , while Mr. F enwick ma y have c onstitut ional claims ag ainst the deputies under

Bive ns, he has no va lid common law tort claims ag ainst them; such claims may be
asser ted only ag ainst the United States. As the Supreme Court has explained: The F eder al Employ ees L iability Reform a nd Tort Compensation Act of 1988, c ommonly

known as the Westfa ll Act, acc ords fe dera l e mpl oye e s a

bs olute immun ity

fr om c omm on -l aw t or

t c la ims arisingout of ac ts they

undertake in the cour se of their officia l dutie s. Osborn v. Ha ley , 549 U.S. 225, 229 (2007) (c iting 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1) ). Mr. F enwick him se lf de c lare s th at th e de fe nd ant d e putie s “ we re a c tin g a s la w e nf or c e me nt o ff

ic ia ls a nd wi thi n the scope of their e mploy ment at the time of the inc ident” that g ave r ise to this action. Compl
. ¶ 42. The A ttorney

Gene ral ha s rea ched the same c onclusion, cer tifying that the deputies “w ere actingwithin the scope of the ir employ ment as employ ees of

the United States at the time of the
a lle g e d in c ide nt. ” De fs .’ Mo t., Ex. A . A s a re su lt, any

tor t c la ims Mr . F e nw ic k mi g ht o the rw ise be a ble to a sse rt

a g a ins t th e de putie s are fo re c los e d b y the Wes tf

a ll A c t, a nd Mr . F e nw ic k mu st ins te a d p re ss t

ho se c la ims a g a ins t th e Un ite d St a te s a lon e . Se e 28 U. S.C. § 2 67 9( d) (4 ); 28 U.S.C. 2679(b)(1). Thus, to the e x tent that Mr. Fe nwick attempts to state common law tor t claims ag ainst the individual defenda nts, those claims must be dismi ssed.11 B. Plaintiff ’s Motion to Strike As part of their motion for summary judgme nt, the defe ndants argue that Mr. Fe nwick’s c laims ag ainst them are prec luded by the outcome of

the proc eeding s ag ainst Mr. Fe nwick in the F amily

Division of the Superior Court of the D istrict of Columbia. Defs.’ Mot. at 14. Specifica lly , they

contend that the Super ior Court considere d some of the issues unde rlying Mr. Fe nwick’s c urre nt claims and re solved them in a manne r unfavorable to him, meaning that Mr. Fe nwick is barr ed by the doctrine s of re s judicata a nd/or collater al estoppel fr om relitigating tho se iss ue s h e re . I d. at 14 -1 6. Th e y a lso argue that if

Mr . F e nw ic k w e re to s uc c e e d o n h is claims befor e this Court, he would undermine the ruling of the Superior Court that he was

“ inv olv e d” in t

he c ri me of

a ssa ult on a po lic e of fi c e r. I d. Suc h a

n o utc ome , th e y

ins ist , is imp e rm iss ibl e un de r H e c k v . H ump hr e y , 5 12 U. S. 4 77 (1 99 4) . I d. In s up po rt of tho se arguments, the defe ndants have filed as e x hibits under seal tra nscripts of sele cted por

tions of the Superior Court proc eeding s, as well as c erta in motions and other documents re lated to Mr. F e nw ic k’ s tr ia l a s a

juv e nil e be fo re the F amil y Di vis ion of that c ourt . In response , Mr. Fe nwick has move d “to strike all exhibits , rec ords and r efe renc es to the rec ord of the [Superior Court] procee dings of fer ed by Def endants in support of Def endants’ motion to dismiss and/or for summary judgme nt,” and a lso “reque sts an order pr oh ibi tin g De fe nd ants fr om” re fe rr ingto o r q uo tin g fr om “ that r e c or d. ” Pl. ’s Mo t. at 3. I t is dif fi c ult to d isc e rn

up on wh at ba sis Mr . F e nw ic k b e lie ve s th e re c or ds sh ou ld b e str uc k. Hi s pr ima ry argume nt a

pp e ars to b e that “ M. F .’ s Juve nil e Court re c or ds c ann ot b e us e d to e sta bli sh12

fac ts in thi s civil rights c ase.” Pl.’s Mot. ¶ 20. That statement, howeve r, misconstrues the nature of the de fenda

nts’ arguments conce rningthe Superior Court proc eeding s and the purpose for which the de fenda

nts have submitted selec ted Superior Court tra nscripts. The de fenda

nts do not sug g est that the Court should adjudicate the fac ts underlying the plaintiff’s cla ims in t his matter by re lyingon

the tr ans c ri pts . Rathe r, the y argue that th e re le va

nt f a c tua l de te rm inatio ns have already be en made— by the Superior Court — and that revisions of those dete rminations are barr ed by the doctrine s of re s judicata or c ollatera l estoppel. See De fs.’ Mot. at 17-19. Rec ords of prior judicia l proce eding s are routinely and, indee d, nece ssarily

admitted for the pur

pose of establishing the applicability of re s judicata or c ollatera l estoppel. See, e .g ., Roge rs v. J ohnsonNorman, 466 F . Supp. 2d 162, 165 n.3 (D.D.C. 2006); Alexander v. Washing ton Gas L ight Co., 481 F. Supp. 2d 16, 24 (D.D .C. 2006).

To the extent that Mr. Fe nwick asse rts that rec ords of his trial in Superior Court
mu s tb e s tru ckb ec au s e t h o s e d o cu m en t s ar e c o n fi d en t i al , h i s ar gu m en ti s fo re cl o s ed
. Al th o u gh
re c or ds of

juv e nil e de lin qu e nc y

pr oc e e din g s a

re ty pic a lly “ ke pt c on fi de nti a l and

no t op e n to ins pe c tio n, ” D. C. C ODE § 1 6- 23 31 (b ), the Sup e ri or Court a lr e a dy ha s r ule d th a t th e de fe nd ants
may fi le in t his Court “ c op ie s o f d oc ume nts , tr ans c ri pts and fi nd ing s b y

the [Sup e ri or ] Court ” related to Mr. Fe nwick’s juvenile pr ocee dings “ for use in the civil action broug ht on behalf of [Mr. Fenwic k].” I n re M.F ., Case No. 2008 F SP 000300, Order, at 2 ( D.C. Super. Ct. Oct. 22, 2008). Since the Super ior Court has found that District of Columbia law imposes no ba r on the use of those r ecor ds in these proc eeding s, this C ourt will not revisit the issue.

Mr. Fe nwick’s r emainingarguments relate not to the admissibil ity or consideration of the Superior Court re cords, but rather to the mer its of the defe ndants’ ar g ument13

that the Superior Court proc eeding s prec lude Mr. F enwick f rom asser ting his constitutional and FTCA c laims. See, e.g ., Pl.’s Mem. at 1-24 (a rguing that Heck v. H umphrey , 512 U.S. 477 (1994), is not applica

ble to this case) ; id. at 29-34 (conte nding that rulings f rom Mr. F enwick’ s tr ia l in the Sup e ri or

Court sh ou ld n ot s e rv e a s th e ba sis fo r t he inv oc a tio n o f c oll a te ra l e sto pp e l in this action). Those a

rguments are proper ly

asser ted in an opposition to the defenda nts’ motion for summary

judgme nt, not in a motion t o strike; Mr. Fe nwick’s disagree ment with the merits of the de fe nd ants ’ l e g a l argume nts do e s n ot r e nd e r t he re c or ds up on

wh ic h th e de fe nd ants re ly inadmissible. Consequently , the Court will deny Mr. Fe nwick’s objec tion and motion to s trike. C. Defendants’ Motion for Summary J udgment A sig nificant portion of the defe ndants’ motion for summary judgme nt is devoted to t he ir argume nt t

hat Mr . F e nw ic k is ba

rr e d f ro m li tig a tin g his c on sti tut ion a l and F TCAc la ims beca use the issues under lying the m were alre ady resolved a g ainst him in t he Superior Court. See De fs .’ Mo t. at 14 -1 9. Th e re late d d oc tr ine s o f c la im p re c lus ion and iss ue pr e c lus ion

— a lso known, re spectively , as re s judicata a nd collater al estoppel — “ preve nt[ ] repetitious li tigation in vo lv in g the s ame caus es o f act io n o r t he s ame is su es. ” McG ee v. Di st ri ct o f C ol um bi a, 6 46 F. Supp. 2d 115, 122 (D.D.C. 2009) (quotingI .A.M. Nat’l Pension F und v. Indus. Gea r Mfg . Co., 723 F.2d 944, 946 ( D.C. Cir. 1983)) (inter nal quotation marks omitted). Those doc trines ar e
me ant t o “ c on se rv e jud ic ia l r e so ur c e s, avo id i nc on sis te nt r e su lts , e ng e nd e r r e sp e c t f or jud g me nts of pre dictable a

nd cer tain eff ect, a nd . . . preve nt serial for

um-shopping a

nd piece meal litigation.” I d. at 123 (c itation and internal quotation marks omitted). The doctrines a re so integral to the14

a dmi n is tr a ti o no f

th e c o urts th at “ a

c o urt m ay

inv o k e [th e m] su a s

po nte .” I d. (citingStanton v. District of Columbia Court of Appea ls, 127 F.3d 72, 77 (D.C. Cir. 1997))
.

In arguing that Mr. Fe nwick’s c laims are pr eclude d, the def endants have re lied principally

on Hec k v. Humphrey , 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1993), in whic h the Supreme Court held that “to re cover

damag es for

. . . harm c aused by

actions whose unla

wfulness would re nder a conviction or sente nce inva lid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the c onviction or sentenc e has been r ever sed on direc t appea l” or other wise over turned by a judicial or e x ecutive a ct. The Court
e xpre sse s n o o pin ion

at th is t ime on

the a pp lic a bil ity of He c k to the ins tant a c tio n, be c a us e it finds that the question of pre clusion must be more thoroug hly briefe d befor e the Court will be able to re nder a

decision on the de fenda

nts’ motion for summary

judgme nt. I n particula

r, the Court re qu ir e s th e pa

rt ie s to ans we r t

he fo llo wi ngqu e sti on s: 1. Are the principles a

nnounced in Allen v. Mc Curry , 449 U.S. 90 (1980), and
re late d c a se s a

pp lic a ble in t his a c tio n, and

if so , w hat is the ir

imp a c t on

Mr . F e nw ic k’ s c la ims ? 2. In ruling on Mr. Fe nwick’s motion to suppress tang ible evidenc e (D efs.’ Sealed Ex. 3) duringhis delinquency trial, did the Superior Court consider and re ject his claim of excessive forc e? I f so, how does that ruling a ffe ct this case?

Th e Court

e mph a size s th a t it

ha s n ot r e a c he d a

ny c on c lus ion s r e g ard ingthe se questions itself, but cannot deve lop a clea r idea of the implications of the Superior Court pr oc e e din g s f

or thi s c a se un til the y

are ans we re d. In a dd iti on , th e Court wo uld be a ide d in resolvingthe pre clusion issue by revie wing the followingadditional rec ords from the Super ior Court pr oc e e din g s:15 1. A transc ript of the ora l arguments prese nted to the Superior Court by counsel fo r M r. F e nw ic k a

nd the Di str ic t of

Col umb ia

re g ard ingthe mot ion

to s up pr e ss t ang ibl e evidenc e; and 2. Th e Di str ic t of Col umb ia ’s br ie f i n o pp os iti on to M r. F e nw ic k’ s mo tio n to
su pp re ss t ang ibl e e vid e nc e in t he Sup e ri or

Court . Be cause consideration of the prec lusion iss ue must be dela y ed until the parties have ans we re d th e qu e sti on s and su pp lie d th e do c ume nts sp e c if ie d a bo ve , th e Court

wi ll d e fe r i ts decision on the de fenda

nts’ motion for summary

judgme nt until a later date
. I I I . CONCL USI ON For the fore g oing r easons, the de fenda nts’ motion to di smiss i s GRANTED in par t
and DENI ED in p art , a

nd the pla int if

f’ s mo tio n to str ike is D EN I ED . T he pa rt ie s sh a ll s ub mit supplemental brief

s and additional docume ntary evidenc e as dire cted in Part I I .C. of this Opinion
an d th e a c c o mp an yi n g O r d e r . A nO r d e r c o n s i s t e n tw i thth i s O p i n i o ns h a l l i s s u e th i s s am e d ay. SO ORDERED. /s/_______________________________ PAULL . FRI EDMAN Un i t edS t at es Di s tri ctJ u d ge DATE: Mar ch 8, 2010