UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

JOSEPH H. ZERNIK, ) 

) 

Plaintiff, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ) 

et al., ) 

) 

Defendants. ) 

Civil Action No. 09-805 (RJL) 

MEMORAND~NION (June 1L, 2009) 

This matter is before the Court on pro se plaintiff Joseph Zemik's petition for a 

writ of mandamus and plaintiffs motion to disqualify this Court [Dkt. #3]. For the 

following reasons, the Court will deny the motion to disqualify and dismiss the petition 

sua sponte for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 

12(b)(6); Baker v. Dir., us. Parole Comm 'n, 916 F.2d 725, 727 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (district 

court may dismiss complaint sua sponte if it is patently obvious that plaintiff cannot 

prevail on the facts as alleged). 

Plaintiffs petition centers primarily on events related to the compelled sale of his 

house, as ordered by the Los Angeles Superior Court in August 2007 following 

contentious litigation over a purchase and sale agreement. (See Pet. at 3-38.) Plaintiff 

alleges that his civil rights were abused in that proceeding, and he now seeks a writ of 

mandamus ordering the U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and 

Securities and Exchange Commission to investigate alleged frauds committed by Bank of 

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America Corporation (as successor to Countrywide Financial Corporation), alleged 

harassment by the law firm Bryan Cave LLP, and alleged corruption and fraud in the 

California state and federal courts.) (See generally Pet. at 99-110.) Plaintiff also seeks a 

writ of mandamus ordering investigations into the alleged abuse of Richard Fine, an 

attorney imprisoned in Los Angeles County, and into the alleged wrongful imprisonment 

of 10,000 individuals in the late 1990s in connection with the Rampart Scandal. (Pet. at 

96-98.) Finally, plaintiff also asserts a civil RICO claim pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) 

and False Claims Act claim pursuant to 31 U.S.c. § 3729 against Bank of America for 

alleged conduct related to plaintiff s loss of his house and for alleged conduct related to 

the nation's subprime mortgage crisis. 

At the outset, the Court addresses plaintiffs motion to disqualifY. A judge shall 

disqualifY himself "in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be 

questioned," 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), or in which the judge has "personal knowledge of 

disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding," id. § 455(b)(l), among other 

circumstances. Plaintiff contends that this Court's service as Deputy Chief Minority 

Counsel for the u.S. House Select "Iran-Contra" Committee warrants recusal here, based 

on plaintiffs allegation that the Iran-Contra affair was "a key event in the abuse of [Los 

Angeles] County residents," (Mot. at 1), which plaintiff briefly identifies in his petition as 

In connection with plaintiffs allegations regarding the California state courts, plaintiff 

also seeks an writ of mandamus (l) ordering certain Los Angeles Superior Court actions be 

deemed void and/or vacated, (Pet. at 99-102), (2) ordering that the Grant Deed filed with the Los 

Angeles County Registrar in connection with plaintiff s former property be deemed void, (Pet. at 

108), and (3) ordering Bryan Cave LLP to provide him with information concerning its 

representation of Countrywide in the litigation involving plaintiff s house, (Pet. at 110-112). 

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evidence of widespread abuse of Los Angeles residents' civil rights. Because this 

Court's prior service does not call into doubt the Court's impartiality due to the wholly 

unrelated nature ofIran-Contra's alleged connection to this case, and because this Court 

does not have personal knowledge of any facts relevant to plaintiffs petition, plaintiffs 

motion to disqualify will be DENIED. See s.E.C v. Loving Spirit Found. Inc., 392 F.3d 

486,493 (D.C. Cir. 2004) ("Recusal is required when a reasonable and informed observer 

would question the judge's impartiality."). 

A writ of mandamus is "a drastic and extraordinary remedy reserved for really 

extraordinary causes." Cheney v. u.s. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367,380 (2004) (internal 

quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 473 F.3d 

345, 353 (D.C. Cir. 2007). The Court's mandamus authority derives from 28 U.S.C. § 

1361, and it extends only to "officer[s] or employee[s] of the United States or any agency 

thereof[.]" Further, a writ of mandamus is available only if"(1) the plaintiff has a clear 

right to relief; (2) the defendant has a clear duty to act; and (3) there is no other adequate 

remedy available to the plaintiff." In re Medicare Reimbursement Litig., 414 F.3d 7, 10 

(D.C. Cir. 2005) (internal citation omitted). A court may issue a writ of mandamus only 

if "the duty to be performed is ministerial and the obligation to act peremptory and 

clearly defined. The law must not only authorize the demanded action, but require it; the 

duty must be clear and undisputable." Shoshone Bannock Tribes v. Reno, 56 F.3d 1476, 

1480 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (internal citation omitted). 

Plaintiff s petition fails to seek any writs of mandamus this Court could 

permissibly issue. First, this Court cannot review the decisions of state courts or direct 

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state court judicial offers in the performance of their duties. See In re Taylor, No. 04-

7070,2004 WL 2009373, at * 1 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 9,2004) (per curiam) (denying petition 

for writ of mandamus "because this court has no authority over the Superior Court of the 

District of Columbia"); In re Carter, No. 92-8033,1992 WL 381041, at *1 (D.C. Cir. 

Dec. 2,1992) (per curiam) (citing Van Sickle v. Holloway, 791 F.2d 1431, 1436 n.5 (lOth 

Cir. 1986) (federal appellate courts lack authority to "direct state courts or their judicial 

officers in the performance of their duties")). Similarly, 28 U.S.C. § 1361, by its plain 

language, does not permit this Court to compel action by state officials or private entities. 

And finally, it is well established that this Court cannot order the Executive Branch to 

exercise its prosecutorial discretion to perform an investigation. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 

U.S. 821, 831 (l985); Gray v. Bell, 712 F.2d 490,513 (D.C. Cir. 1983). Accordingly, 

plaintiff's petition for a writ of mandamus must be dismissed in all respects for failure to 

state a claim. 

Plaintiff's civil RICO and False Claims Act claims must also be dismissed. To 

state a civil RICO claim, a plaintiff must allege four elements: "( 1) conduct (2) of an 

enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity." Pyramid Securities Ltd. v. 

IB Resolution, Inc., 924 F.2d 1114, 1117 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (internal citation omitted). The 

term "pattern of racketeering activity" is defined as requiring the commission of at least 

two predicate racketeering offenses over a ten year period. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5). 

Plaintiff alleges seven predicate racketeering offenses to support his claim, including 

collusion in robbery, mail fraud, and wire fraud. (Pet. at 93.) Each and every of 

plaintiff's alleged predicate racketeering offenses, however, relates solely to the 

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compelled sale of plaintiff's house in 2007. (See id.) As such, plaintiff fails, at a 

minimum, to allege a pattern of racketeering activity, as his claims relate to a single 

alleged scheme, for which he was the sole injured party. See W Assocs. Ltd. ex reI. Ave. 

Assocs. Ltd. v. Mkt. Square Assocs., 235 F.3d 629,634 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (plaintiff failed 

to allege a "pattern of racketeering activity" where plaintiff only alleges "a single 

scheme, a single injury, and a single victim"). And finally, as to plaintiff's False Claims 

Act claim, while "private persons acting on behalf of the government may sue those who 

defraud the government and may share in any proceeds ultimately recovered," United 

States ex reI. J Cooper & Assoc., Inc. v. Bernard Hodes Group, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 2d 

225, 233 (D.D.C. 2006) (internal citation omitted); 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b), pro se plaintiffs 

are not qualified to represent the interests of the United States in such an action, United 

States ex reI. Rockefeller v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 274 F. Supp. 2d 10, 16 (D.D.C. 

2003), aff'd, No. 03-7120, 2004 WL 180264 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 21, 2004), cert. denied, 543 

U.S. 820 (2004). Accordingly, plaintiff's civil RICO and False Claims Act claims must 

also be dismissed for failure to state a claim. 

Thus, for all of the above reasons, the Court will DENY plaintiffs' motion to 

disqualify and will DISMISS plaintiff's petition for a writ of mandamus. An appropriate 

Order will issue with this Memorandum Opinion. 

~ON United States District Judge 

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