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*********************************************** 
IN RE MALACHI E.*

(AC 41875)

Lavine, Bright and Moll, Js.

Syllabus

The respondent mother appealed to this court from the judgment of the

trial court terminating her parental rights with respect to her minor

child. She claimed that the trial court erred with respect to the dispositional phase of the proceedings in that it improperly determined that

the termination of her parental rights was in the best interest of the

child. Held:

1. The respondent mother could not prevail on her claim that the trial court

erred when it relied entirely on its adjudicatory determination that she

had failed to achieve sufficient personal rehabilitation in determining

whether the termination of her parental rights was in the best interest

of the child; that court did not rely entirely on its adjudicatory determination in making its dispositional determination, as the court unambiguously made its best interest determination by considering, in addition

to the mother’s failure to rehabilitate, the seven factors prescribed by

statute (§ 17a-112 [k]), including the past effect of the mother’s conduct

on the child, her then present ability to care for the child, the effect of

the mother’s prospective ability to rehabilitate in order to care for the

child, the need for permanency, continuity, and stability in the child’s

life, and the child’s need to end the period of uncertainty, and it expressly

stated that it was making its determination considering multiple other

factors pertaining to the child, and that it had balanced the child’s needs

against the benefits of maintaining a connection with the mother.

2. The trial court’s best interest determination was factually supported and

legally correct, and was not clearly erroneous; there was an abundance

of evidence presented to support that court’s determination that termination of the respondent mother’s parental rights was in the best interest

of the child, including the court’s unchallenged factual findings regarding

the mother’s parental defects, the likelihood that those defects would

continue into the future, and the need for the child to have stability in

his life, and although the mother relied on other findings that were more

favorable to her position, specifically, that the child was being cared

for by the child’s grandmother in the same residence as the mother and

that the mother was making progress in her rehabilitation, those facts

did not provide a basis to reverse the trial court’s determination, as this

court declined to place more emphasis on certain of the trial court’s

findings to reach a conclusion on appeal that differed from that of the

trial court.

Argued January 11—officially released March 6, 2019**

Procedural History

Petition by the Commissioner of Children and Families to terminate the respondents’ parental rights with

respect to their minor child, brought to the Superior

Court in the judicial district of Hartford, Juvenile Matters, where the respondent father was defaulted for

failure to appear; thereafter, the matter was tried to the

court, C. Taylor, J.; judgment terminating the respondents’ parental rights, from which the respondent

mother appealed to this court. Affirmed.

Joshua Michtom, assistant public defender, for the

appellant (respondent mother).

Benjamin A. Abrams, assistant attorney general,

with whom were Benjamin Zivyon, assistant attorney

general, and, on the brief, George Jepsen, attorney gen-
eral, for the appellee (petitioner).
Opinion

BRIGHT, J. The respondent mother appeals from the

judgment of the trial court terminating her parental

rights with respect to her minor child, Malachi E.1 On

appeal, the respondent claims that the court erred in

determining that the termination of her parental rights

was in the best interest of the child because (1) the

court relied entirely on its adjudicatory determination

that the respondent had failed to achieve sufficient personal rehabilitation, and (2) there was no evidence to

support its determination that the termination of her

parental rights was in the best interest of the child.2

We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts, which the court found by clear

and convincing evidence, none of which the respondent

challenges on appeal, and procedural history are relevant to the resolution of this appeal. The child was born

in December, 2015, and is the respondent’s only child.

The child, the respondent, and the child’s maternal

grandmother (grandmother) have lived together in a

two family home owned by the grandmother since the

child’s birth. On May 5, 2016, the grandmother reported

to Monique Frey, a parent educator, who was employed

by the Catholic Charities Nurturing Families Program

and was working with the respondent, that she was

concerned about the safety of the child. In particular,

the grandmother reported that the respondent is an

alcoholic, is aggressive when she is drunk, is depressed

and has bipolar disorder, and that the child had fallen

off of a bed on two occasions. Frey then reported the

grandmother’s concerns to the Department of Children

and Families (department). On that same date, personnel from the department went to the respondent’s residence to discuss the report, but the respondent was

defensive and refused to cooperate.

On May 6, 2016, the grandmother reported to the

department that the respondent began drinking alcohol

after its personnel had departed from the residence.

The grandmother also elaborated on her prior report,

stating that the respondent has a prior history of drinking alcohol and smoking marijuana, that she suffers

from blackouts when she drinks, and that she appropriately cares for the child when she is sober. On that

same date, the department’s personnel returned to the

respondent’s residence. Upon their arrival, the respondent became verbally and physically aggressive, and

expressed a suicidal intent. As a result, she was taken

to Hartford Hospital for a seventy-two hour hold and

a mental health assessment. On May 7, 2016, the respondent was discharged from Hartford Hospital.

On May 9, 2016, personnel from the department met

with the respondent regarding the future supervision

of the child. At the meeting, the respondent admitted

that she had a long history of substance abuse and
mental health issues, that she had been in and out of

treatment for many years, that she had not been taking

her prescribed medications for over a year, and that

the child had fallen off a bed. The respondent agreed

to submit to a substance abuse and mental health

assessment at Wheeler Clinic, and to comply with any

recommendations stemming therefrom. She also agreed

to permit the grandmother to be the primary caretaker

of the child until the respondent had made progress in

her treatment, and that she would have only supervised

contact with the child.

On June 20, 2016, the petitioner, the Commissioner

of Children and Families, filed a neglect petition on

behalf of the child and an addendum in which she

claimed that the child had been denied proper care

and attention as a result of the respondent’s substance

abuse, mental health issues, and the incidents in which

the child had fallen from a bed. On June 21, 2016,

Wheeler Clinic reported that the respondent had

refused to comply with its recommendation that she

participate in individual counseling or trauma-focused

therapy to address her history of abuse and trauma.

The next day, the grandmother reported to the department that the respondent continued to drink alcohol

on the weekends. On August 4, 2016, the respondent,

who was represented by counsel, appeared in court

and denied the allegations of the neglect petition. The

respondent then refused two subsequent recommendations for additional counseling services at Wheeler

Clinic. On September 6, 2016, the grandmother reported

to the department that the respondent had been intoxicated over the weekend and, consequently, the respondent was hospitalized first at Hartford Hospital, and

then at the Institute of Living.

On September 12, 2016, the petitioner filed a motion

for temporary custody of the child that was supported

by an affidavit attested to by a social worker. Therein,

the petitioner alleged, on the basis of the same facts

as the neglect petition, that the child was in physical

danger from his surroundings, that immediate removal

was necessary to ensure his safety, and that reasonable

efforts had been made to eliminate the need to remove

the child. On the same date, the court granted the

motion for temporary custody, pending a hearing that

was scheduled for September 16, 2016, and ordered

specific steps for the respondent’s rehabilitation. On

September 13, 2016, the petitioner filed an amended

neglect petition.

On September 16, 2016, the respondent appeared in

court with counsel, she agreed that the motion for temporary custody could be sustained, and the court issued

specific steps for the respondent’s rehabilitation. On

approximately the same date, the child was removed

from the custody of the respondent and placed in the

care of the grandmother, who lived in the same resi-
dence. Since that time, the grandmother has continued

to care for the child ‘‘full-time,’’ and the respondent has

maintained frequent contact and visits with the child,

which have been supervised by the grandmother.

On November 8, 2016, the respondent entered a plea

of nolo contendre to the neglect petition. On that same

date, the court issued final specific steps for the respondent’s rehabilitation. In accordance with the specific

steps, the respondent was referred to several service

providers, including Radiance Innovative Services, and

engaged in services to address her mental health and

alcohol use. Nevertheless, she achieved limited progress and continued to minimize her issues with alcohol

and her history of trauma.

On May 4, 2017, a meeting was held among the respondent, a clinician from Radiance Innovative Services,

and the department’s personnel. At the meeting, the

clinician reported that the respondent never expressed

any accountability or responsibility for past incidents,

denied being intoxicated and claimed to have had just

one drink when she was out at dinner with a friend,

refused an offer of shelter or sober living housing

because she wanted to retain her freedom, continued

to minimize her issues with her alcohol use, and stated

that alcohol was not an issue for her. On May 18, 2017,

the department referred the respondent to the Therapeutic Family Time Program; however, on June 6, 2017,

it learned that the respondent had been discharged for

her failure to complete the intake process.

On June 13, 2017, the petitioner filed a motion to

review a permanency plan that recommended the termination of the respondent’s parental rights and subsequent adoption of the child. On June 28, 2017, the

department’s personnel conducted a home visit during

which the respondent adamantly refused to participate

in any additional programs, and said that the department could keep the child. During that same visit, the

grandmother confirmed that the petitioner was drinking

alcohol the day prior to the May 4, 2017 meeting.

In August and September, 2017, the department

started facilitating weekly supervised visits at its office.

During that time, the respondent reported to the department that she had been consistently attending therapy,

working on her issues, and was making progress in her

treatment. She expressed an interest in reunification

with the child and recognized that she had made some

mistakes. On September 13, 2017, the clinician reported

that the respondent was more stable and was doing

well and, as a result, the frequency of her sessions was

reduced from weekly to biweekly. On September 20,

2017, Frey reported that their recent sessions had been

‘‘okay’’ compared to prior sessions and that the respondent expressed an interest in ending the process so that

she could parent the child.
On October 15, 2017, the court granted the petitioner’s motion to review and approved the permanency

plan. On October 16, 2017, the petitioner filed a petition

to terminate the respondent’s parental rights with

respect to the child. The petitioner claimed, among

other things, that the child had been found to be

neglected and that the respondent had failed to achieve

the required degree of personal rehabilitation. On

November 16, 2017, the respondent appeared in court

and denied the allegations of the petition.

On June 5, 2018, after a one day trial, the court issued

a memorandum of decision in which it granted the

petition to terminate the respondent’s parental rights.

The court made extensive findings of fact and concluded that the petitioner had met her burden to establish by clear and convincing evidence that statutory

grounds for termination existed and that termination

was in the best interest of the child.

With respect to the statutory grounds for termination,

the court determined that the child previously had been

adjudicated neglected and that the respondent had

failed to achieve a sufficient degree of personal rehabilitation because she failed to comply fully with the specific steps for her rehabilitation that were ordered by

the court on September 12 and 16, and November 8,

2016. In particular, the court determined that the

respondent had not, and would not, overcome her mental health and substance abuse problems within a reasonable time so that she would ‘‘be able to serve as a

safe, responsible, and nurturing parent for [the child]

. . . .’’ The court also determined that termination of

the respondent’s parental rights was in the best interest

of the child because, in light of the importance of longterm stability and the need for expedient custodial

determinations, the respondent had not been, and

would not be able to be, a safe, responsible, and nurturing parent for the child. This appeal followed. Additional

facts will be set forth as necessary.

Before discussing the respondent’s claims, we briefly

set forth the legal principles that govern our review.

‘‘Proceedings to terminate parental rights are governed

by [General Statutes] § 17a-112. . . . Under [that provision], a hearing on a petition to terminate parental rights

consists of two phases: the adjudicatory phase and the

dispositional phase. During the adjudicatory phase, the

trial court must determine whether one or more of the

. . . grounds for termination of parental rights set forth

in § 17a-112 [(j) (3)] exists by clear and convincing

evidence. The commissioner . . . in petitioning to terminate those rights, must allege and prove one or more

of the statutory grounds.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) In re Egypt E., 327 Conn. 506, 526, 175 A.3d

21, cert. denied sub nom. Morsy E. v. Commissioner,

Dept. of Children & Families, U.S. , 139 S. Ct. 88,

202 L. Ed. 2d 27 (2018). ‘‘Also, as part of the adjudicatory
phase, the department is required to prove, by clear

and convincing evidence, that it has made reasonable

efforts . . . to reunify the child with the parent, unless

the court finds . . . that the parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Elijah C., 326 Conn. 480,

500, 165 A.3d 1149 (2017); see General Statutes § 17a112 (j) (1).

‘‘If the trial court determines that a statutory ground

for termination exists, then it proceeds to the dispositional phase.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In

re Elijah C., supra, 326 Conn. 500. ‘‘In the dispositional

phase of a termination of parental rights hearing, the

trial court must determine whether it is established by

clear and convincing evidence that the continuation of

the respondent’s parental rights is not in the best interest of the child. In arriving at this decision, the court

is mandated to consider and make written findings

regarding seven factors delineated in [§ 17a-112 (k)].3

. . . The seven factors serve simply as guidelines for

the court and are not statutory prerequisites that need

to be proven before termination can be ordered. . . .

There is no requirement that each factor be proven

by clear and convincing evidence.’’ (Footnote added;

internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Athena C., 181

Conn. App. 803, 811, 186 A.3d 1198, cert. denied, 329

Conn. 911, 186 A.3d 14 (2018); see In re Nevaeh W., 317

Conn. 723, 740, 120 A.3d 1177 (2015). ‘‘In the dispositional phase . . . the emphasis appropriately shifts

from the conduct of the parent to the best interest of

the child. . . . The best interests of the child include

the child’s interests in sustained growth, development,

well-being, and continuity and stability of [his or her]

environment.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In

re Athena C., supra, 811. ‘‘Because a respondent’s fundamental right to parent his or her child is at stake, [t]he

statutory criteria must be strictly complied with before

termination can be accomplished and adoption proceedings begun.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

In re Elijah C., supra, 326 Conn. 500.

On appeal, the respondent does not contest the

court’s determination with respect to the adjudicatory

phase, namely, that she had failed to achieve rehabilitation, or any of the court’s factual findings. Instead, the

respondent claims that the court erred with respect to

the dispositional phase because it improperly determined that the termination of her parental rights was

in the best interest of the child. We now turn to each

of the respondent’s claims that challenge the court’s

best interest determination.

I

The respondent first claims that the court erred

because it relied entirely on the respondent’s failure

to achieve rehabilitation in determining whether the

termination of her parental rights was in the best inter-
est of the child. In particular, the respondent argues

that the court conflated the adjudicatory phase with

the dispositional phase when it improperly failed to

‘‘perform a separate analysis of [the child’s] best interests,’’ as required by § 17a-112 (j) (2), because the court

‘‘entirely substituted the [respondent’s] failure to rehabilitate as the basis for its best interests determination.’’

We disagree.

We first set forth the applicable standard of review

and specific legal principles that govern our analysis

of this claim. ‘‘The interpretation of a trial court’s judgment presents a question of law over which our review

is plenary. . . . As a general rule, judgments are to be

construed in the same fashion as other written instruments. . . . The determinative factor is the intention

of the court as gathered from all parts of the judgment.

. . . Effect must be given to that which is clearly

implied as well as to that which is expressed. . . . The

judgment should admit of a consistent construction as

a whole.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re

James O., 322 Conn. 636, 649, 142 A.3d 1147 (2016).

Our Supreme Court repeatedly has held that the adjudicatory phase is separate from the dispositional phase.

‘‘It is axiomatic that, once a child has been adjudicated

neglected, the dispositional decision must be based on

the best interest of the child and that the interest of

the child and the parent may diverge.’’ In re Natalie S.,

325 Conn. 833, 847, 160 A.3d 1056 (2017); see In re Baby

Girl B., 224 Conn. 263, 280, 618 A.2d 1 (1992) (‘‘[o]ur

statutes and caselaw make it crystal clear that the determination of the child’s best interests comes into play

only after statutory grounds for termination of parental

rights have been established by clear and convincing

evidence’’ [emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks

omitted]); In re Jessica M., 217 Conn. 459, 466 n.5, 586

A.2d 597 (1991) (statute permitting the termination of

parental rights ‘‘expressly requires the court to find, in

addition to the existence of an enumerated ground for

termination, that such termination is in the best interests of the child’’).

Although the emphasis shifts from the parent to the

child in the dispositional phase; In re Athena C., supra,

181 Conn. App. 811; a trial court is not required to

blind itself to any parental deficiencies that also were

considered during the adjudicatory phase. Our precedents establish that the consideration of the parent’s

circumstances, including the parent’s degree of rehabilitation, is proper during the dispositional phase.4

Indeed,

the respondent explicitly recognizes in her brief on

appeal that the determinations made in the adjudicatory

and dispositional phases ‘‘may often be so intertwined

that the former leads almost inexorably to the latter

. . . .’’ Nevertheless, she argues that the court improperly failed to make the required best interest determination because it relied entirely on her failure to
rehabilitate. We disagree with the respondent’s interpretation of the court’s decision.

The court made the following relevant findings and

determinations with respect to the adjudicatory phase

and the dispositional phase. In reaching its determination that the respondent had failed to achieve a sufficient degree of personal rehabilitation, which is

unchallenged on appeal, the court found that the

respondent had failed to comply fully with nine of the

seventeen specific steps that were ordered by the court

on September 12 and 16, and November 8, 2016.5 The

court found that the respondent had ‘‘been unable to

correct the factors that led to the initial commitment

of her child, insofar as she is concerned. The clear

and convincing evidence reveals that from the date of

commitment through . . . the time of trial, [the respondent] ha[d] not been available to take part in her son’s

life in a safe, nurturing, and positive manner, and, based

on her issues of mental health, substance abuse, parenting deficits, and a failure to complete and benefit from

counseling and services, she will never be consistently

available to [the child].’’

The court further found that, although the respondent

had attended ‘‘various referrals and programs for counseling’’ and that she was making progress in her rehabilitation treatment, she had ‘‘failed to show any consistent

and adequate benefit from these referrals,’’ and she had

‘‘failed to improve her parenting ability to acceptable

standards as far as her child’s safety and emotional

needs are concerned.’’ The court also found that the

petitioner ‘‘ha[d] demonstrated, by clear and convincing

evidence, that [the respondent] cannot exercise the

appropriate judgment necessary to keep [the child] safe

and healthy and to maximize his abilities to achieve,’’

that ‘‘it is patently clear that [the respondent was] not

in a better position to parent her child than she was at

the time of [the child’s] commitment, and still remains

without the qualities necessary to successfully parent

him,’’ and that ‘‘[g]iven th[e] respondent’s history of

mental health and substance abuse issues, it is reasonable to infer that she will remain besieged by these

issues for some extensive time, and that she will not

be physically available to serve as a custodial resource

for [the child] during the time frame for rehabilitation

contemplated in § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) [(ii)].’’

In reaching its determination that the termination of

the respondent’s parental rights was in the best interest

of the child, the court first made the required findings

as to each of the statutory factors provided by § 17a112 (k). In sum, it determined that (1) the petitioner had

made available timely, appropriate, and comprehensive

reunification services to the respondent, (2) the petitioner had made reasonable efforts to reunify the

respondent and the child, (3) the respondent had failed

to comply with nine of the seventeen court ordered
specific steps, (4) the respondent has a strong relationship and bond with the child, (5) the child was twentynine months old, (6) the respondent had been unable

or unwilling to make a realistic and sustained effort to

conform her conduct to acceptable parental standards,

and (7) there was no unreasonable conduct by any

party that prevented the respondent from maintaining

a relationship with the child. In doing so, the court

incorporated, in a summary fashion, the same factual

findings that led to its conclusion in the adjudicatory

phase that the respondent had failed to comply with

the specific steps and that she failed to benefit from

those services. For instance, the court, consistent with

its earlier findings, found that although the respondent

had ‘‘complete[d] some programs . . . these programs

failed to [affect] sufficient change . . . to correct [the

respondent’s] inability to appropriately parent [the

child].’’

The court then outlined that it had ‘‘examined multiple relevant factors, including the child’s interests in

sustained growth, development, well-being, stability,

and continuity of his environment; his length of stay in

foster care; the nature of his relationships with his foster

parent and his biological parents; and the degree of

contact maintained with [the respondent],’’ and that it

had ‘‘balance[d] the child’s intrinsic needs for stability

and permanency against the benefits of maintaining a

connection with [the respondent].’’

The court then found that ‘‘[t]he clear and convincing

evidence shows that [the respondent] ha[d] demonstrated mental health issues, substance abuse issues,

parenting deficits, and a failure to fully benefit from

counseling and services,’’ that she ‘‘was unable to appropriately address these issues by the time of the filing

of the [termination of parental rights] petition,’’ that

‘‘[h]er ability to care for her son remained as poor at

the time of the . . . trial as it was at the inception of

the case,’’ that she ‘‘remained incapable of being a safe,

nurturing, and responsible parent for [the child],’’ that

‘‘despite her referrals and services, [the respondent]

ha[d] failed to rehabilitate herself sufficiently to be a

safe, nurturing, and responsible parent for [the child],’’

and that ‘‘too much time ha[d] already elapsed to justify

giving [the respondent] further time to show her rehabilitation.’’

The court further found that ‘‘the time that the

[respondent] need[s] to attempt to rehabilitate . . . as

[a] safe, nurturing, and responsible [parent], if that were

possible, is time that the child cannot spare,’’ that the

respondent’s parental performance shows that she

‘‘lacks the attributes and characteristics necessary to

fulfill a valid parental role,’’ that the respondent’s failure

to address her issues in a timely manner ‘‘clearly and

convincingly show[s] that it is unlikely that [she] will

ever be able to conform [her] individual behaviors to
appropriate parental standards or be able to serve as a

safe, nurturing, and responsible [parent] for [the child],’’

that given her ‘‘individual behaviors and performances

so far, [the] court [could not] foresee either respondent

parent in this case ever having the ability or the patience

to follow the regimen necessary for their child to maximize his abilities and achievements,’’ that her ‘‘inability

to remain sober and to comply with treatment requirements speaks volumes of her lack of ability to parent

her son and to keep [the child] safe in the long run,’’

and that the child ‘‘can no longer wait for permanency,

continuity, and stability in his life.’’

The court then outlined the principles of long-term

stability and the exigency of termination of parental

rights proceedings and concluded that ‘‘the clear and

convincing evidence in this case establishes that [the

child] is entitled to the benefit of ending, without further

delay, the period of uncertainty he has lived with as to

the unavailability of [the respondent] as [caretaker].

. . . Having balanced [the child’s] individual and intrinsic needs for stability and permanency against the benefits of maintaining a connection with the [respondent],

the clear and convincing evidence in this case establishes that the child’s best interests cannot be served

by continuing to maintain any legal relationship to

the [respondent].’’

The foregoing discussion makes clear that, contrary

to the respondent’s claim, the court did not rely entirely

on its adjudicatory determination in making its dispositional determination. Instead, the court unambiguously

made its best interest determination considering, not

only the respondent’s failure to rehabilitate, but also

the seven statutory factors prescribed by § 17a-112 (k),

the past effect of the respondent’s conduct on the child,

her then present ability to care for the child, the effect

of the respondent’s prospective ability to rehabilitate

in order to care for the child, the need for permanency,

continuity, and stability in the child’s life, and the child’s

need to end the period of uncertainty. Further, the court

expressly stated that it was making its determination

considering multiple other factors pertaining to the

child, and that it had balanced the child’s needs against

the benefits of maintaining a connection with the

respondent. Therefore, we conclude that the court did

not rely solely on the respondent’s past failures to

achieve rehabilitation in determining whether the termination of her parental rights was in the best interest of

the child.

II

The respondent also claims that there was no evidence to support the court’s determination that termination of her parental rights was in the best interest of

the child. The respondent argues that, contrary to the

court’s determination, the evidence presented relating

to her unique circumstances demonstrates that this is
the rare case in which termination was not warranted.

In particular, the respondent argues that termination

was improper because the court found, among other

things, that the child is currently being cared for by

the grandmother in the same residence in which the

respondent resides, and the respondent was making

progress in her rehabilitation treatment. We disagree.

We first set forth the applicable standard of review

that governs our analysis of this claim. ‘‘[A]n appellate

tribunal will not disturb a trial court’s finding that termination of parental rights is in a child’s best interest

unless that finding is clearly erroneous. . . . On

appeal, our function is to determine whether the trial

court’s conclusion was factually supported and legally

correct. . . . In doing so, however, [g]reat weight is

given to the judgment of the trial court because of

[the court’s] opportunity to observe the parties and the

evidence. . . . We do not examine the record to determine whether the trier of fact could have reached a

conclusion other than the one reached. . . . [Rather]

every reasonable presumption is made in favor of the

trial court’s ruling.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Davonta V., 285 Conn. 483,

488, 940 A.2d 733 (2008); see also In re Brayden E.-H.,

309 Conn. 642, 657, 72 A.3d 1083 (2013).6

‘‘[T]he balancing of interests in a case involving termination of parental rights is a delicate task and, when

supporting evidence is not lacking, the trial court’s ultimate determination as to a child’s best interest is entitled to the utmost deference. . . . Although a judge

[charged with determining whether termination of

parental rights is in a child’s best interest] is guided by

legal principles, the ultimate decision [whether termination is justified] is intensely human. It is the judge in

the courtroom who looks the witnesses in the eye, interprets their body language, listens to the inflections in

their voices and otherwise assesses the subtleties that

are not conveyed in the cold transcript.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Nevaeh W., supra, 317

Conn. 740.

In the present case, there was an abundance of evidence presented to support the court’s determination

that termination of the respondent’s parental rights was

in the best interest of the child. On the basis of the

evidence presented, the court found that the following

facts had been proven by clear and convincing evidence.

The respondent had not been, and would not be, a safe,

responsible, and nurturing parent for the child. The

respondent’s mental health issues, substance abuse

issues, parenting deficits, and a failure to fully benefit

from counseling and services are antagonistic to the

best interest of the child. The child required permanency, continuity, and stability in his life, and an end

to the period of uncertainty. The court also made additional findings as to the seven factors mandated under
§ 17a-122 (k), including that the respondent had failed

to comply with a majority of the court ordered specific

steps and that she had been unable or was unwilling

to make a realistic and sustained effort to conform her

conduct to acceptable parental standards. The respondent does not challenge any of the court’s factual findings on appeal.

Affording the utmost deference to the court’s decision, we conclude that the court’s best interest determination was not clearly erroneous. The combination of

the court’s unchallenged factual findings regarding the

respondent’s parental defects, the likelihood that those

defects would continue into the future, and the need

for the child to have stability in his life, support the

court’s determination. Although the respondent directs

our attention to other findings that are more favorable

to her position, specifically, that the child is being cared

for by the grandmother in the same residence as the

respondent and that the respondent was making progress in her rehabilitation, these facts do not provide us

a basis to reverse the court’s determination. We decline

the respondent’s invitation to place more emphasis on

certain of the court’s findings so that we might reach

a conclusion on appeal that differs from that of the

trial court.

Therefore, we conclude that the court’s best interest

determination was factually supported and legally

correct.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

* In accordance with the spirit and intent of General Statutes § 46b-142

(b) and Practice Book § 79a-12, the names of the parties involved in this

appeal are not disclosed. The records and papers of this case shall be open

for inspection only to persons having a proper interest therein and upon

order of the Appellate Court.

** March 6, 2019, the date that this decision was released as a slip opinion,

is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.

1 The court also terminated the parental rights of John Doe, the unknown

father to the child, because he previously had been defaulted for failure to

appear. In light of the fact that John Doe has not appealed from the judgment

of the trial court, we refer in this opinion to the respondent mother as

the respondent.

2 The child’s attorney, pursuant to Practice Book § 67-13, adopted the

respondent’s brief on appeal.

3 General Statutes § 17a-112 (k) provides: ‘‘Except in the case where termination of parental rights is based on consent, in determining whether to

terminate parental rights under this section, the court shall consider and

shall make written findings regarding: (1) The timeliness, nature and extent

of services offered, provided and made available to the parent and the child

by an agency to facilitate the reunion of the child with the parent; (2)

whether the Department of Children and Families has made reasonable

efforts to reunite the family pursuant to the federal Adoption and Safe

Families Act of 1997, as amended from time to time; (3) the terms of any

applicable court order entered into and agreed upon by any individual or

agency and the parent, and the extent to which all parties have fulfilled

their obligations under such order; (4) the feelings and emotional ties of

the child with respect to the child’s parents, any guardian of such child’s

person and any person who has exercised physical care, custody or control

of the child for at least one year and with whom the child has developed

significant emotional ties; (5) the age of the child; (6) the efforts the parent

has made to adjust such parent’s circumstances, conduct, or conditions to
make it in the best interest of the child to return such child home in the

foreseeable future, including, but not limited to, (A) the extent to which

the parent has maintained contact with the child as part of an effort to

reunite the child with the parent, provided the court may give weight to

incidental visitations, communications or contributions, and (B) the maintenance of regular contact or communication with the guardian or other

custodian of the child; and (7) the extent to which a parent has been

prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the child by

the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent of the child, or the

unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic circumstances of

the parent.’’

4 This court consistently has affirmed a trial court’s best interest determination that was based, at least in part, on the court’s previous findings

relating to a parent’s failure to rehabilitate. See, e.g., In re Savannah Y.,

172 Conn. App. 266, 281–82, 158 A.3d 864 (affirming trial court’s best interest

determination that was ‘‘largely based upon the respondent’s chronic mental

health and substance abuse issues’’), cert. denied, 325 Conn. 925, 160 A.3d

1067 (2017); In re Harmony Q., 171 Conn. App. 568, 574–75, 157 A.3d 137

(rejecting claim that trial court erred in making best interest determination

on ground that court improperly determined that respondent failed to rehabilitate), cert. denied, 325 Conn. 915, 159 A.3d 232 (2017); In re Gianni C.,

129 Conn. App. 227, 237–38, 19 A.3d 233 (2011) (affirming trial court’s best

interest determination that was made, in part, on the basis of respondent’s

failure to rehabilitate within reasonable time period); In re Sole S., 119 Conn.

App. 187, 193–94, 986 A.2d 351 (2010) (affirming trial court’s best interest

determination that was made, in part, on the basis of psychologist testimony

that it ‘‘would be in the child’s best interest to give [the respondent] more

time to achieve personal rehabilitation’’); In re Janazia S., 112 Conn. App.

69, 99–100, 961 A.2d 1036 (2009) (affirming trial court’s best interest determination that was made, in part, on the basis of ‘‘abundant evidence of the

respondent parents’ ongoing struggles with criminal behavior and

addiction’’).

5 Specifically, the court found that the respondent had failed to comply

fully with the following nine steps: (1) to keep appointments with the department and to cooperate with home visits by the department and the representative for the child; (2) to take part in parenting and individual counseling;

(3) to submit to substance abuse assessments and to follow the recommendations regarding treatment; (4) to submit to random drug testing; (5) not to

use illegal drugs or abuse alcohol or medicine; (6) to cooperate with service

providers recommended for counseling, services, and substance abuse

assessment or treatment; (7) to sign releases allowing the department to

communicate with her service providers to check attendance, cooperation,

and progress toward identified goals; (8) to secure and maintain adequate

housing and legal income; and (9) to take all psychotropic medication as prescribed.

6 We note that our Supreme Court has clarified that a trial court’s ultimate

conclusion that a ground for termination of parental rights has been proven

presents a question of evidentiary sufficiency. See In re Shane M., 318 Conn.

569, 587–88, 122 A.3d 1247 (2015) (clarifying standard of review); see also In

re Egypt E., supra, 327 Conn. 525–26 (‘‘[a]lthough the trial court’s subordinate

factual findings are reviewable only for clear error, the court’s ultimate

conclusion that a ground for termination of parental rights has been proven

presents a question of evidentiary sufficiency’’ [internal quotation marks

omitted]).

Since In re Shane M., our Supreme Court has not had occasion to apply

the evidentiary sufficiency standard of review to a court’s best interest

determination. As a result, this court has either declined to decide whether

to apply the evidentiary sufficiency standard of review to a best interest

claim; see, e.g., In re Elijah G.-R., 167 Conn. App. 1, 29–30 n.11, 142 A.3d

482 (2016); In re Nioshka A. N., 161 Conn. App. 627, 637 n.9, 128 A.3d 619,

cert. denied, 320 Conn. 912, 128 A.3d 955 (2015); or has continued to apply

the clearly erroneous standard of review. See, e.g., In re Angelina M., 187

Conn. App. 801, 803–804, A.3d (2019) (clearly erroneous); In re Gabriella C.-G., 186 Conn. App. 767, 770, A.3d (2018) (clearly erroneous),

cert. denied, 330 Conn. 969, A.3d (2019); contra In re Athena C., supra,

181 Conn. App. 809, 815–17 (evidentiary sufficiency).

We see no reason why the standard of review applicable to the adjudicatory phase would also not apply to the dispositional phase, particularly in

cases, as in the present case, in which the court’s factual findings are

uncontested; however, we decline to apply the evidentiary sufficiency stan-
dard instead of the clearly erroneous standard of review for the following

reasons. First, we decline to adopt a standard of review for a best interest

determination that our Supreme Court has yet to adopt. Second, both parties

on appeal agree that the clearly erroneous standard of review applies to

the present claim. Third, the evidence in the present case supports the

court’s determination under either standard because, as articulated by this

court in In re Nioshka A. N., ‘‘if the evidence upon which we have relied

in finding that the trial court’s best interest determination was not clearly

erroneous were considered under the evidentiary sufficiency standard, and,

thus, was construed in the light most favorable to upholding the trial court’s

best interest determination . . . that evidence, so construed, would be sufficient to prove by clear and convincing evidence that termination of the

respondent’s parental rights was in the best interest of the child.’’ (Citation

omitted.) In re Nioshka A. N., supra, 161 Conn. App. 637 n.9.