NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

DREW MICHAEL WITZIG, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 17-0006

Appeal from the Superior Court in Mohave County

No. S8015CR201600090

The Honorable Billy K. Sipe, Jr., Judge Pro Tempore

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Jason Lewis

Counsel for Appellee

Legal Advocate Attorney’s Office, Kingman

By Jill L. Evans

Counsel for Appellant

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Maria Elena Cruz delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop and Judge Diane M. Johnsen joined.

FILED 12-5-2017
STATE v. WITZIG

Decision of the Court

2

C R U Z, Judge:

¶1 Following a jury trial, defendant Drew Michael Witzig was 

convicted of one count of possession of dangerous drugs for sale and one 

count of possession of drug paraphernalia. Witzig appeals the superior 

court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained at a traffic stop.

For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 On the night of January 17, 2016, Officer Holstrom was

parked parallel to a two-lane road in her marked patrol vehicle. The area 

was dark, and, as Officer Holstrom was observing traffic, she saw a taxi 

drive by within the 25 mile-per-hour speed limit. When the taxi was 

“approximately 10 feet or less” past her position, Officer Holstrom could 

not see its license plate because it did not appear to be lit. She then initiated 

a traffic stop due to the unilluminated license plate. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. 

(“A.R.S.”) § 28-925(C).

¶3 Prior to making the stop, Officer Holstrom had information 

that a person with a felony warrant named “Drew” was “possibly in a 

taxicab in the area,” but she testified she was not specifically looking for 

taxis and did not intend to stop all taxis that passed her. When she 

approached the vehicle, Officer Holstrom contacted the driver and noticed 

a passenger was in the right-rear seat. She recognized the passenger as 

Witzig. Her attention was drawn to Witzig because “[h]e was fidgeting his 

feet” and “holding his right pocket of his pants.” Based on Witzig’s

conduct, Officer Holstrom searched the taxi and discovered drugs and drug 

paraphernalia belonging to Witzig.

1

¶4 As a result of evidence seized from the stop, Witzig was 

indicted on felony drug-related charges. Officer Holstrom did not inspect 

the taxi’s license plate light or issue the driver a citation. The taxi driver 

testified she did not check the license plate light after the stop to see if it 

was operational.

¶5 Witzig filed a motion to suppress the seized evidence on the 

basis that the automobile stop was unlawful and in violation of his Fourth 

Amendment rights. Witzig argued Officer Holstrom’s knowledge of 

 

1 In his motion to suppress, Witzig challenged only the stop, not the 

accompanying search.
STATE v. WITZIG

Decision of the Court

3

someone with a warrant traveling in a taxi, along with her failure to inspect 

the taxi or issue the driver a citation, demonstrated that she had stopped 

the taxi on a pretext. The superior court denied the motion, finding Officer 

Holstrom acted in a reasonable manner when she made the traffic stop after 

she was not able to view the taxi’s license plate, pursuant to A.R.S. § 28-

925(C).

¶6 A jury convicted Witzig as noted above. The superior court 

sentenced him to presumptive, concurrent prison terms as a repetitive 

offender. Witzig timely appealed his convictions and sentences. We have 

jurisdiction pursuant to Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution, 

and A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, and 13-4033(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶7 Witzig challenges the superior court’s denial of his motion to 

suppress, arguing Officer Holstrom lacked objectively reasonable suspicion 

of a violation to perform the traffic stop. “We review the facts in the light 

most favorable to sustaining the ruling on a motion to suppress[,]” and 

confine our review to only those facts presented at the suppression hearing.

State v. Starr, 222 Ariz. 65, 68, ¶ 4 (App. 2009). We defer to the superior 

court’s factual findings, “including findings on credibility and the 

reasonableness of the inferences drawn by the officer[,]” but review its 

conclusions of law de novo. State v. Moran, 232 Ariz. 528, 531, ¶ 5 (App. 

2013).

¶8 An officer needs only reasonable suspicion of a traffic 

violation to justify a traffic stop under the Fourth Amendment. Heien v. 

North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 536 (2014); see also State v. Salcido, 238 Ariz. 

461, 464, ¶ 7 (App. 2015) (holding a stop must be based on an officer’s 

“articulable, reasonable suspicion that the person has committed a traffic 

violation.”). Reasonable suspicion exists when the totality of the 

circumstances provides a “particularized and objective basis” for 

suspecting a person has violated the law. State v. Gonzalez-Gutierrez, 187 

Ariz. 116, 118 (1996) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 

(1981)). An officer is not required to determine that an actual violation has 

occurred before stopping a vehicle for investigation. State v. Nevarez, 235 

Ariz. 129, 133, ¶ 7 (App. 2014).

¶9 As relevant here, A.R.S. § 28-925(C) requires that a lamp “be 

constructed and placed in a manner that illuminates with a white light the 

rear license plate and renders it clearly legible from a distance of fifty feet 

to the rear.” Further, under A.R.S. § 28-1594, police may stop and detain a 
STATE v. WITZIG

Decision of the Court

4

person when reasonably necessary to investigate an actual or suspected

traffic violation.

¶10 The facts presented at the suppression hearing support the 

conclusion that Officer Holstrom had at least reasonable suspicion 

sufficient to initiate a traffic stop. Officer Holstrom testified she stopped 

the taxi that night because, since the plate was not illuminated, she could 

not read its license plate from approximately ten feet away and this

constituted a traffic offense. See A.R.S. § 28-925(C). The superior court 

found the officer had reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation to justify the 

stop. The court did not abuse its discretion in finding Officer Holstrom’s 

testimony credible and denying Witzig’s motion to suppress evidence 

obtained as a result of the traffic stop.

¶11 Witzig also argues that because Officer Holstrom received 

information that a person named “Drew,” who had a felony warrant, would 

be a passenger in a taxi in the area, her stated reason for the stop was 

pretextual. Even if this was Officer Holstrom’s subjective reason for the 

stop, her subjective intent does not invalidate the otherwise lawful traffic

stop. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (holding the 

reasonableness of traffic stops does not depend on the actual motivations 

of the officers involved); see also Jones v. Sterling, 210 Ariz. 308, 311, ¶ 11 

(2005) (“[E]vidence seized as a result of a traffic stop meeting ‘normal’ 

Fourth Amendment standards is not rendered inadmissible because of the 

subjective motivations of the police who made the stop.”).

¶12 Lastly, Witzig argues the superior court “improperly based its 

decision in part on its own experience” with traffic stops.

2 We disagree. 

 

2 After finding Officer Holstrom credible and the stop lawful, the 

court stated:

. . . 

It doesn’t matter to the Court that [Officer Holstrom] 

didn’t issue an equipment repair order, a citation, or 

contacted the cab owner. I’ve been stopped many times for 

having supposedly license plates out and -- and taillights out 

and headlights out, and I never had a written equipment 

warning issued to me. Typically[,] it’s a traffic stop where the 

officer simply taps me on the shoulder and says, [b]y the way, 
STATE v. WITZIG

Decision of the Court

5

The court properly found the stop lawful, as discussed supra ¶ 10, by 

considering the circumstances that led Officer Holstrom to initiate the stop. 

See Gonzalez-Gutierrez, 187 Ariz. at 118. The court’s comments recognizing

that an officer has discretion to issue a citation after executing a stop are

irrelevant to determining whether the stop was lawful. See, e.g., United 

States v. Willis, 431 F.3d 709, 716-17 (9th Cir. 2005) (upholding a stop when

the officer issued no traffic citations but “could have relied on the traffic 

violation as a justification” for the stop).

CONCLUSION

¶13 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Witzig’s convictions and 

sentences.

 

your right rear license -- your right rear taillight is out, get it 

fixed.

So[,] I never received any sort of paperwork, so I don’t 

think that’s probably a real common thing, if, again, an officer 

is simply making a stop for an equipment violation.