### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT KNOXVI LLE A ugus t 12 , 200 4 S es sio n SU SA N L OUIS E MO OR WEISSF ELD v. S TEV EN CU RTIS WEISSF ELD

Appeal f romthe Circ uit Court for Knox County No. 80536 Bill S wan n, Jud ge F iled Septem ber 16, 2004

No. E2004-00134-COA- R3-CV

Th is a pp e a l ari se s f

ro m a po st- div or c e c a se in wh ic h th e tria l c ou rt fo un d th e Ap pe llant t o b e in b oth criminal and c ivil contempt for her failure to comply

with the court’s order r espec ting c o-par enting time and division of property . The Appe llant contends that the trial c ourt err ed i n i t s fi n ding of criminal conte mpt because she was not provided a dequate notice under Tenn. R. Crim. P. 42(b). The Ap pe lla nt a lso c on te nd s th a t th e tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d in i ts a wa rdof a tto rn e y ’s fe e s to op po sin g c ou ns e l. We reve rse the trial court’s or der to the e x tent that it decre es t h e Ap p ellant to be in criminal c on te mpt a ndwe mod if

y the tr ia l c ou rt ’s or de r w hic h a wa rd s atto rn e y ’s fe e s to op po sin g c ou ns e l.
Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt of t he Ci r c uit

Co ur t R e ve r se d in P ar t a nd Judgme nt Modif

ied; Cause Rem anded S HAR ON G. LEE , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which H ER SCH EL P. F RAN KS , P.J . and D. M I CH A EL S WI NEY , J ., joined.
Ke vinW. Sh e ph e rd , M aryvil le , T e nn e sse e , f or the Ap pe llant, Sus a n L ou ise Mo or Wei ssf e ld
Gr e g ory H. Ha rriso n, Kn oxvil le , T e nn e sse e , f or the Ap pe lle e , St e ve n Cu rt is We iss fe ld OP IN ION
I. The Appellant, Susan L ouise Moor Weissfeld, and the Appellee , Steven Curtis W eissfeld, wer e divorced by order of t he Knox County Circuit Court enter ed De cembe r 13, 1999, nunc pro tunc t o No v em b er 19, 1999. After the ir divorce , disputes arose be tween the parties r eg arding various matters such a s the payment of child support, the pay ment of marital de bt and rig hts of visitation. On September

13, 2002, the parties announce d in open court that they had re ache d an ag ree ment as-2-

to all controverted issues and a n ag ree d order setting f orth the terms of the ir ag ree ment was e ntere d on J anuary

3, 2003, nunc pro tunc t o S e p t e m b e r 1 3 , 2 0 0 2

. T h e a g r e e d o r d e r i n c orpo ra te s a pe rm a ne nt p are nti ng plan w hic h s ta te s, in p e rt ine nt p art , a s f oll ow s: I.

. R E S ID E N T IA L S H A R IN G S C H E D U LE
A

. D A Y T O D A Y S C H E D U LE The pa rties shall share joint custody of the minor child, [E.L .W.] , (DOB 02/16/87), with the Mother having primary residential c ustody during the school y ear ..., and the F ather shall have primary residential c ustody

during the summer

... . F. TRANSPORTATI ON ARRANGEMEN TS The F ather

shall provide tra ns portation for a ll of his co-par enting time with the child, except that the Mother shall provide transportation of the child at either the beg inning or

the end of

the Father’s summer

co-pa renting time. Whe ne ve r t

rans po rt a tio n f

or the c hil d is pro vid e d b y

a ir lin e , th e c hil d w ill fl y

to or fr om S t. L ou is, Mis so uri.
G. OTHER I n no event shall either party withhold the child from the other pa re n t fo r any visitation enumerated he rein. Furthermore , the co- pare nting time desig nated here in to the non- cu s t o d i al pare nt, shall not be at the discre tion of the custodial pare nt. Furthermore , the co-pa renting time shall not be at the child’s discr etion, except that for a ny

o f the ten w eeke nd or extended we ekend c o-par enting times [previouslyenumer ated] that the Father intends to exercise out of state, the Father and child shall discuss which we ekend is be st considering the child’s ac tiviti es at the time.
The a g ree d order

further provides that “within ten (10) day s of this a g ree ment, the Mother [shall] g ive to the Father, one half of a ll family photogr aphs and vide otapes.”
At or ar ound the same time the pa rties enter ed into the above ag ree ment, Mr. Weissfeld relocated to Rolla, Missouri to obtain new employ ment. On July 22 , 200 3, Mr . Weis sf e ld fi le d a pe tit ionfo r c on te mpt

a ndfo r m od if

ic a tio n a g a ins t Ms. Weissfeld which ref

ere nces the ag ree d order

and parenting plan cited above and alleg es, inter ali a , t h e f o l l o wi n g: 4. T h e F a t h e r arr a n g e d f

o r t h e c h i l d t o b e e n r o l l e d i n s u m m e r s c ho ol i n Mis so uri du e to h e r p oo r g ra de s th e prior se me ste r, ha d a

rr a ng e d a nd pa id i n advanc e for

airline tra ns p o rt at i o n and shuttle for the minor child. When the Father a rrived at the airport in St. L ouis, Missour i at t he appointed time on or-3-

about the 1 day

of June, 2003, the ch i ld was not on the flig ht. The F ather st sear ched f rantica lly for the child at the St. L ouis airport only to learn later a fter a telephone c onversation with the Mother and the child, that the child had dec ided not to come to Missouri.
5. I n direc t defianc e of the Sept em b er 1 3 , 2003, order , the Mother un ilaterallyde c ide d th a t th e min or c hil d w ou ld n ot b e re qu ir e d to tr a ve l to Missou ri fo r t h e sum mer with her Father. The Mother’s a ctions constitute a blatant violation of sections I (A) and I (F ), of the Permanent Pare nting Plan, and c os t the F a the r no t on ly the su mme r wi th the daug hte r, but al so consid e ra ble fi na nc ia l lo ss. 6. Furthermore , para g raph 5 of the Agre ed Order of September 13, 2003, require d the Mother to g ive the Father one half of all familyphotogr aphs and videotapes w ithin Ten (10) day s of the a gre em en t. The Mother ha s failed and re fu se d to g ive the F a the r s a id f a mil y ph oto g ra ph s a ndvid e ota

pe s, a ndto this date persisted in her failure and re fusal, constituting w illful contempt of the Orde r fo the Cou rt

. The pe tition requests that, upon hearing, the court find Ms. W eissfeld in conte mpt “and that sh e be pu nis he d a s th e c ou rt de e ms a pp ro pria te , in c lud ing bu t no t li mit e d to inc arc e ratio n, a ndfu ll restitution.” The petiti on further reque sts that Mr. Weissfeld “be a war ded his rea sonable attorney fee s incurre d in bring ing this cause.” A hea ring on the contempt petition was c onducted on November 21, 2003. The trial c ourt fo un d M s. Wei ssf

e ld t o be in c ivi l c on te mpt fo r h e r f a ilu reto turn o ve r o ne -h a lf of the famil y photogr aphs and videotapes and in criminal contempt for denying Mr . Weissfeld co-pa renting time. Th e tr ia l c ou rt ord ered th a t Ms . We iss fe ld b e imm e dia te ly inc arc e rate d f

or te n d a y s u po n th e se fi nd ing s. Th e tr ia l c ou rt

ind ic a te d th at Ms . We iss fe ld’ s in c arc e ratio n u po n th e fi nd ing of c ivi l contempt would end onc e she c omplied wi t h t h e court’s order requiring that she provide Mr

. Weissfeld with the photogr aphs and vide otapes, but that there was nothing she could do as to the ten day sentenc e im posed for criminal contempt “except serve the time for having willfullydisobey ed the court orders.” The trial court ref used to se t a

bond on the criminal contempt matter, indicating that t h e post ing of

a bond in that matter w as moot until t he civil contempt wa s cure d. An orde r setting f orth the court’s ruling s and incorpor ating its m emorandum opinion was entere d on Dec ember

2, 2003. The orde r also dec ree d that Ms. Weissfe ld w ould be responsible for attorney ’s fee s incurre d by Mr. Weissfeld in the prosec ution of the case . By subsequent orde r of De cembe r 17, 2003, attorney ’s fe es we re a war ded to Mr. Weissfeld’s attorney in the amount of $5,250.00. There afte r, Ms. Wei s s fe l d appea led the trial c ourt’s orde r finding her in c ontempt and its order a sse ssi ng a tto rn e y ’s fe e s.-4- II.
We a dd re ss the fo llo wi ng tw o is su e s in thi s a pp e a l:
1. Was Ms. Weissfeld acc orded adequate notice under Tenn. R. Crim. P. 42(b) with reg ards to the c ha rg e s o f c ri min a l c on te mpt ? 2. Should the trial court’s orde r aw arding Mr. Weissfeld attorney ’s fe es for prosec ution of the contempt ac tion be modified?
III . Th is i s a no n-

jury c a se a nd , a c c or din g ly , ou r r e vie w i s de novo upon the re cord of the trial court without any

presumption of cor

rec tness attaching to the trial court’s co n cl u sions of law. Campbell v. Florida Steel Corp., 9 1 9 S. W. 2 d 2 6 , 3 5 ( T e n n . 1 9 9 6 ) a n d T e n n . R. A p p . P. 1 3 ( d )

. We must, however, pr esum e the trial court’s fa ctual finding s to be corr ect a bsent evidenc e preponde rating to the contra ry . Union Carbide Corp. v. H u d d leston , 854 S.W .2d 87, 91 (Tenn. 1993). IV.
Th e tr ia l c ou rt

de te rm ine d th a t Ms . We iss fe ld w a s g uil ty of c ivi l c on te mpt

fo r r e fu sin g to deliver f amily photogr aphs and vide otapes a nd of criminal contempt for denying Mr . Weissfeld copare nting time. For denial of co-par enting time, Ms. W eissfeld wa s order ed to be inca rce rate d for ten day s. This c onstitut ed criminal contempt since punishment was for a finite period without the possibili ty

of re lease upon compliance with the order

. The c riminal contempt alleg ed in this case is an indirec t criminal contempt under Tenne ssee law in that it i s d es cr i b ed as having been c ommitt ed outside of the c ourt’s pre sence . State v. Maddux , 571 S.W .2d 819, 821 (Tenn. 1978). This Court has previously held that “tria l courts may imp os e pu nis hme nt fo r ind ir e c t c ri min a l c on te mpt only af ter providing notice pursuant to Tenn. R

. C r i m. P

. 4 2 (b)” , ci t i n g Jones v . Jones , 01A01-9607-CV- 00346, 1997 Tenn. App. LEXI S 132, at *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. F ebrua

ry 26, 1997), no appl. perm. app.( emphasis adde d ).
Tenn

. R. Crim

. P. 4 2 ( b ) p r o v id e s inp e r ti n e n t p ar t a s f o ll o w s w ith r e s p e c t t o th e n o tice re qu ir e d f or pr os e c uti on of

ind ir e c t c ri min a l c on te mpt : The notice shall state the time and plac e of hearing, allowing a re asonable time for the pre paration of the defe nse, and shall state the essential f acts c onstitut ing the criminal conte mpt charg ed and describe it as such

. The n o t i ce s h a ll be given or all y by the jud

ge in op e n c ou rt in the pre se nc e of t he def e nd an t or, on application of the district attorney g ener al or of an attorney

appointed by

the court for that purpose, by an order to show cause or an order of ar rest. The de

fe nd an t is entitled to admission to bai l as provided in these rules. ( Emphasis added)-5-

Ms. Weissfeld contends on appe al that notice pur suant to Tenn. R. Cri m . P

. 42(b) wa s inadequate. We a g ree that notice was inadequate and the conviction of Ms. Weissfeld for criminal contempt must be reve rsed f or this rea son. I n Ah e rn v . A he rn , 15 S.W .3d 73 at 78,79 (Te nn. 2000) the Supreme Court of this state noted the dis tin c tio n b e tw e e n c ivi l a ndc ri min a l a s f oll ow s: Traditionally , contempt has be en cla ssified as civil or c riminal dependi n g upon the a c tio n ta

ke n b y the c ou rt to a dd re ss the c on te mpt

.

... A f te r a f in d in g o f c o n te mp t a c o u r t c a n imp r is o n a n in d iv id u a l to c ompel perf ormanc e of a

court orde r. This is typically ref err ed to as “ civil cont em p t .” Th is r e me dy

is a va ila ble on ly wh e n th e ind ivi du a l ha s th e abil ity to c omp ly

wi th the orde r at the time of the contempt hea ring . Thus, with civil contempt, the one in contempt has the “ key s to the jail” and can purg e the c ontempt by comply ing with the court’s order

. I n civil contempt, the imprisonment is meted out for the be ne fi t of a pa rty lit ig a nt. A court can also imprison and/or fine an individual sim ply as punishment for the c ontempt. This remedy is c ommonly ref

err ed to as “ criminal conte mpt.” Unless otherw ise provided, the circ uit, chance ry , and appe llant courts ar e limited to imposi ng a fine of $50.00 and to imprisoning an individual f or not more than ten d ay s . A p arty

who is in criminal contempt ca nnot be fre ed by eventua l compliance . (Citations omi tted.) Significantly , an individual char g ed with criminal contempt is en t itled to many of the c on sti tut ion a l pr ote c tio ns a ff or de d a ny oth e r c ri min a l de fe nd a nt, as we rece ntl y a c kn ow le dg e d in Moody v . Hutchison , No. E2003-01325- COA-R3-CV, 2004 Tenn. A p p . L E XI S 331, (Tenn. Ct. App. May 25, 2004), appl. perm appeal filed Aug. 13, 2004 , at *11. As we further specifie d in Storey v

. Storey , 835 S.W . 2d 593, 599 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992), i n cluded among the se protec tions are the presumption of innoce nce, the rig ht to require that g uilt be proven be y ond a re asonable doubt, the rig ht not to incriminate one’s self and the right to notice.
Te nn . Crim P. 42 (b ) i nc lud e s th e re qu ir e me nt that th e no tic e “ state the e sse nti a l f a c ts constituting the c riminal contempt cha rg ed and des cribe it as such.” ( Emphasis added.) See also, Storey v . Storey , 835 S.W .2d 593, 600 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992).
I n Jones v . Jones , at ** 8, 9 w e no te d a s f oll ow s: Th e Te nn . R. Cr im. P. 4 2( b) no tic e mus t sp e c ifi c all y char g e a pa

rty with criminal contempt and must succinc tly state t he facts giving rise t o the cha rg e. B eca use the same conduct can constitute both c ivil and criminal contempt, the ( Te nn . R . Cr im

.-6-

P . 42(b) notice eli minates any possible confusion conc erning the nature of the proce eding ). (Empha sis added). We find nothing in the re cord which shows that Ms. Weissfeld was spec ifically notified that the c ha rg e s a g a ins t he r w e rec ha rg e s o f c ri min a l c on te mpt . T he pe tit iondoes no t provid e thi s inf orma tio n, no r d id the tr ia l c ou rt a dv ise he r that sh e wa s be ing tr ie d f or c ri min a l c on te mpt . It is true that the petition f

or contempt reque sted incar cer ation and the trial court did wa rn the pa rties that there would be inca

rce ration upon proof

of conte mpt. However , this does not cure the lack of notice to Ms. Weissfeld, since as noted bythe Court in Ahern, above, and, as is appar ent from the se ntence s imp os e d by

the Cou rt in this c a se , in c arc e ratio n is c omp a tib le wi th b othc ivi l a ndc ri min a l c on te mpt

. Acc ording ly , mere k n o wl ed ge that inca rce ration is a potential conse quence upon a finding of contempt will not suffice to e liminate ambiguity as to the nature of the char g e. The notice def iciency in this case could ha ve bee n eliminated had the petition f or contempt specific ally stated that it was a p e t i t i o n f

o r c r i m i n a l c o n t e m p ta n d c o n t a i n e d a d e t a i l e d d e s c r i p t i o n o f

t h e o f f e n s e c h ar g e d

. In addition, the trial court should have advised the de fendant at the outset of the hearing that she wa s be ing tr ie d f

or c ri min a l c on te mpt

. I n addition to the i nadequa cy of the notice provided in this case , it is our determination that the trial court err ed in try ing the civil and criminal contempt tog ether . I n Coo ne r v . Co on e r, 01-A-01

- 9701-CV-00021, 1997 Tenn. App. LEXI S 690 (Tenn. Ct. App. Octobe r 10, 1997), no appl. perm. app., a t *1 6 w e no te d th a t, “ [c]iv il a ndc ri min a l pr oc e e din g s sh ou ld no t be trie d s imu ltane ou sly be c aus e of

the sig nif

ic a nt d if fe re nc e s inthe re sp e c tiv e bu rd e ns of pro of a ndpr oc e du ra l r ig hts acc orded to the pe rson ac cused of contempt.” Trial court proc edure is “fundame ntally flawe d” whe n the notice r equire ments of Rule 42(b) ha ve not bee n m et and whe n civil and criminal contempt actions ar e tried simultaneously

. Cooner, at pag e *7. We further

ob s er v e t h at t h e trial c ourt dec lined to set bail for Ms. Weissfeld upon her conviction in this case. At the c onclusion of the hea ring on No v em b er 21, 2003, the following e xch a ng e too k p la c e be tw e e n c ou ns e l f or Ms. Wei ssf

e ld andthe tria l c ou rt : MR. SHEP HERD: Your Honor , may I ask for the court to post a n appea l bond for Ms. Weissfeld?
THE COURT: No.
MR. SHE PHE RD : T he c ou rt is n ot p os tin g a

bo ndon a

c ri min a l c on te mpt ? THE COURT: We have t wo k i n ds of incar cer ation here . We have c ivil and criminal. You’r e ahe ad of y ourself, sir. A ny thing f urther?

... MR. SHE PHE RD : Y ou r h on or , a s o n the c on te mpt iss ue , d oe s th e c ou rt

no t po st a bo ndon a

c ri min a l c on te mpt ?
TH E CO UR T: We’ ll d e a l w iththat so me other time, no t no w. I n o the r w or ds , wh e n y ou ha ve - - it’ s mo ot u nti l y ou ’v e c ur e d y ou r c ivi l c on te mpt

.-7-

MR. SHEP HERD: I

believe w e’r e still entitled by law to have a conte mpt bond. THE COURT: We can de al with that when i t , i n fac t, would be oper ative and helpful for

y ou. Tenn. R. Crim. P. 42(b) provides that the defendant in a criminal contempt case is “entitled to admission to bail as provided by these rule s.” Tenn. R. Crim P.32(d) further provides that “[t]he se tti ng of ba il or re le a se up on re c og nizanc e is a matter of right for one convicted of

a misdemea nor, pending the exhaustion of all dir ect proce dure in the case .” (Emphasis added.) As noted by the Court in Ah e rn a nda s p ro vid e d in Ten n. Cod e An n. § 2 9- 9- 10 3, thepu nis hme nt f or c ri min a l c on te mpt

is limit ed to the imposition of a fine of $50.00 and impri s o n m en t fo r not more than te n day s and, there fore , a criminal contempt conforms to the def inition of mi sdemea nor under Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-11 0 wh ich provides that a misdemeanor is a

violation of the law “ punishable by fine or confine ment for less than one ( 1) y ear , or both... .” Al tho ug h we area wa rethat Ms . We iss fe ld d id no t r a ise the tr ia l c ou rt ’s failu re to se t ba il a s a n is su e in this app e a l, w e arec omp e lle d to raise thi s issue in our discre tion under authority of Tenn. R. App. P. 13(b)

. I t is our determination that the cited rules mandate that there be a timely setting of bail upon a criminal contempt conviction and the trial court’ s failure to do so in thi s case constituted further proce dural e rror . V.
B e c aus e a

po rt ionof

the a tto rn e y ’s fees whi ch Ms . We iss fe ld w a s o rd e re d to pay in this matter de rive fr om the prosec ution of the criminal conte mpt ac t i on and the Court’s f inding of criminal conte mpt is reverse d, we f ind it appropriat e to i nstitut e an a djustment of such fee s. As previously

noted, attorne y ’s fe es attributed to the pr osecution of the contempt action and a ssessed a g a ins t Ms . We iss fe ld amou nte d to a tota l of $5, 25 0. 00 . M r. Wei ssf e ld’ s atto rn e y

fi le d a n a ff

ida vit of a tto rn e y ’s fe e s w hic h p re se nts a br e akd ow n o f tim e a nd c os t inc ur re d in the pr os e c uti on of

thi s action. Our revie w of the rec ord, particula rly the transcript of the hea ring on November

21, 2003, compels us to conclude that a substantial ma jority of the time e x pended by Mr. Weissfeld’s attorne y wa s sp e nt o n th a t po rt ionof th e act io n whic h th e tria l c ou rt de te rm ine d to be c ri min a l c on te mpt , rathe r than on that portion of the action which r esulted in a finding of civil contempt. In light of our reve rsal of the trial court’s finding of criminal contempt, the Court’s awa rd of attorney ’s fe es to Mr. Weissfeld’s attorney

in this case is reduc ed fr om $5,250.00 to $1,000.00.
For the fore g oing r easons the judgme nt of the trial court of Dec ember 2, 2003, is rever sed in part and the trial court’ s order of De cembe r 17, 2003, is modified. The cause is rema nded for collection of c osts below. Costs on appeal ar e asse ssed to Steven Cu rt i s W eissfeld, for which e x e c u t i o n m a y i s s u e , i f

n e c e s s ar y.

_________________________________________

S HA RO N G. L EE , J UDGE