This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A14-0848

Douglas Neil Raasch, petitioner,

Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,

Respondent.

Filed March 2, 2015

Affirmed

Hooten, Judge

Isanti County District Court

File No. 30-CR-10-132

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Kathryn J. Lockwood, Assistant 

Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Jeffrey R. Edblad, Isanti County Attorney, Deanna N. Natoli, Assistant County Attorney, 

Cambridge, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Smith, Presiding Judge; Schellhas, Judge; and Hooten, 

Judge. 

U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

HOOTEN, Judge

Appellant pleaded guilty to second-degree criminal sexual conduct and was 

sentenced. Two years later, appellant filed a petition for postconviction relief, seeking to 
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withdraw his guilty plea and arguing that his plea was constitutionally invalid because he 

entered into it involuntarily due to improper pressure from his attorneys. On appeal from 

the district court’s order denying the postconviction petition, we affirm.

FACTS

In 2010, appellant Douglas Neil Raasch was charged with second-degree criminal 

sexual conduct. Raasch was represented by two public defenders. In 2011, Raasch 

requested that his public defenders be discharged so he could retain private counsel. The 

district court denied this request, advising Raasch that until a private attorney filed a 

certificate of representation or appeared on his behalf, he would be represented by the 

public defender.

In 2012, Raasch entered an Alford plea1to second-degree criminal sexual conduct 

under a plea agreement with respondent State of Minnesota. At the plea hearing, he was 

represented by one of his public defenders who, along with the district court judge, 

examined Raasch regarding his waiver of rights and his proffered Alford plea.

During the plea colloquy, Raasch acknowledged that he had “had enough time to 

talk” with his attorneys about pleading guilty. His public defender showed him the rule 

15 plea petition, and Raasch acknowledged that he had reviewed the plea petition and 

signed it. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 15. Paragraph five of the plea petition states, “I feel that 

 

1 A defendant who pleads guilty via an Alford plea maintains his innocence, but concedes 

that there is sufficient evidence to support a verdict of guilty. See North Carolina v. 

Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S. Ct. 160 (1970). This procedure was adopted by the Minnesota 

Supreme Court in State v. Goulette, 258 N.W.2d 758 (Minn. 1977).
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I have had sufficient time to discuss my case with my attorney. . . . I am satisfied that my 

attorney has represented my interest and has fully advised me.”

The district court asked Raasch if he had “had enough time to discuss this matter 

with [his] attorneys,” and Raasch indicated that he had. The district court asked him

whether “anybody made any threats or promises to [him] or anybody [he] know[s] in 

order to get [him] to plead guilty,” and Raasch replied, “No.” The district court asked 

him if his attorneys “advised [him] to [his] satisfaction regarding [his] rights [and] the 

possible defenses,” and Raasch responded, “Yes.” Raasch confirmed that he had 

received discovery and discussed it with his attorneys. The district court told Raasch 

that, if he proceeded to trial, he would “be given an opportunity to present any evidence 

that [he] thought was favorable,” and he “could compel the attendance of witnesses if [his 

attorneys] thought that would be helpful to [his] case.” Raasch stated that he understood 

these rights and that he was giving them up. The district court accepted the plea, and 

Raasch was sentenced the next day.

In 2014, Raasch submitted a petition for postconviction relief, contending that his 

guilty plea was based on improper pressure from his attorneys and was therefore invalid. 

Raasch filed an affidavit in which he alleged that his other public defender, who did not 

appear at the plea hearing, had “pushed” him to plead guilty and did not want to take his 

case to trial because he was about to start a new job in Anoka County. Raasch also 

alleged that his public defenders refused to show him discovery and told him that they 

would not call his witnesses if he proceeded to trial. Finally, Raasch suggested that the 

district court wrongly denied his request to discharge his public defenders.
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The district court denied Raasch’s postconviction petition. It found that Raasch’s 

allegation that his plea was induced by improper pressure from his attorneys was 

contradicted by the evidence in the record. The district court also found that Raasch

did not produce any corroborating or additional information 

or evidence with his motion besides his own affidavit to show 

that his attorneys acted in a manner to push him into a plea 

situation that he is now claiming he did not want. [Raasch] 

did not raise . . . the issue of being pressured into [a] plea at 

the time of the hearing, [and] in fact the transcript shows that 

he was asked twice if he had been forced into the [plea

agreement] and both times he indicated that he had not.

The district court concluded that the guilty plea was valid and that “the petition and files 

and records of the proceeding conclusively show that [Raasch] is entitled to no relief.” 

This appeal followed.

D E C I S I O N

Raasch argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his 

postconviction petition to withdraw his guilty plea because the plea was involuntary.

“Generally, a person convicted of a crime who claims the conviction violates his rights 

under the constitution or laws of the United States or Minnesota may file a petition for 

postconviction relief.” Riley v. State, 819 N.W.2d 162, 167 (Minn. 2012); see also Minn. 

Stat. § 590.01, subd. 1 (2014). “The petitioner bears the burden of establishing facts 

alleged in the petition by a fair preponderance of the evidence.” Black v. State, 725 

N.W.2d 772, 775 (Minn. App. 2007). “To meet this burden, the petitioner must support 

his allegations with more than mere argumentative assertions that lack factual support.” 

Id. (quotation omitted).
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We review a denial of a petition for postconviction 

relief . . . for an abuse of discretion. A postconviction court 

abuses its discretion when its decision is based on an 

erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in 

the record. We review a postconviction court’s factual 

determinations under a clearly erroneous standard, and do not 

reverse those determinations unless they are not factually 

supported by the record. But we review the court’s legal 

conclusions de novo.

Riley, 819 N.W.2d at 167 (quotation and citations omitted).

A defendant may withdraw a guilty plea at any time if “withdrawal is necessary to 

correct a manifest injustice.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1. “A manifest injustice 

exists if a guilty plea is not valid.” State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 94 (Minn. 2010). 

“To be constitutionally valid, a guilty plea must be accurate, voluntary, and intelligent.” 

Id. “A defendant bears the burden of showing his plea was invalid.” Id. The validity of 

a plea is a question of law that we review de novo. Id. Whether a plea is voluntary 

depends on “what the parties reasonably understood to be the terms of the plea 

agreement.” Id. at 96. The voluntariness requirement ensures “that the defendant is not 

pleading guilty because of improper pressures.” State v. Trott, 338 N.W.2d 248, 251 

(Minn. 1983).

The district court concluded that Raasch did not prove by a preponderance of the 

evidence the facts he alleged in the petition. See Black, 725 N.W.2d at 775. We 

conclude that the district court’s findings of fact are not clearly erroneous. The record 

clearly indicates that, during the plea hearing, Raasch acknowledged that he received 

discovery in this case, was apprised of what evidence could be offered against him, and 

understood that he would be able to call the witnesses he wanted to call. Further, Raasch 
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stated that he had had enough time to talk to his attorneys and that his attorneys had 

satisfactorily advised him about his rights and possible defenses. He acknowledged in 

the plea petition that he was satisfied with his attorneys’ representation. While the 

district court did not discharge Raasch’s public defenders, it was for a good reason: the 

district court did not want to leave him without representation. Finally, Raasch’s 

assertion that one of his public defenders pressured him into pleading guilty is undercut 

by the fact that, at the plea hearing, his other public defender appeared on Raasch’s 

behalf, not the one whom he claimed pressured him into pleading guilty. Ultimately, the 

only support for Raasch’s contention that he pleaded guilty due to improper pressure 

from his attorneys is his own self-serving statements in his affidavit, but these 

“argumentative assertions” do not entitle him to the relief he seeks. See id.

The district court correctly concluded that the record contains no support for 

Raasch’s claim that his guilty plea was involuntary. The district court did not abuse its 

discretion by denying Raasch’s petition for postconviction relief.

Affirmed.