alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### SOUTHERN ILLINOIS LABORERS DISTRICT COUNCIL OF the LABORS INTERNATIONAL UNION OF NORTH AMERICA, a Labor Organization, and Danny Burnett and Fred Blades, Plaintiffs, v. SPECIAL MINE SERVICES, INC., a Corporation, Defendant.

Civ. No. 90-4181-JLF.

United States District Court, S.D. Illinois.

Dec. 14, 1990.

John P. Womick, Carbondale, Ill., for plaintiffs.

William W. Cody, McMahon, Berger, Hanna, Linihan, Cody & McCarthy, St. Louis, Mo., pro hac vice, Don E. Kramer, Marion, Ill., for defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

FOREMAN, Chief Judge:

Before the Court is Defendant Special Mine Services’ (SMS) Motion to Dismiss. This complaint for injunctive relief was filed by a labor union and two former employees of SMS. The complaint alleges that the two former employees contacted plaintiff labor union with a request that the union represent them and other SMS employees. The complaint alleges that SMS subsequently threatened to discharge the employees, and later did discharge them. The complaint further alleges that the president of SMS slandered the two employees by calling them liars and not trustworthy.

SMS moves to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the claims are preempted by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1989). This Court has recently written that

> *646[t]he courts have long recognized that Congress gave the NLRB [National Labor Relations Board] exclusive jurisdiction over unfair labor practices. Thus, the Supreme Court has stated that the NLRA “preempts state and federal court jurisdiction to remedy conduct that is arguably protected or prohibited by the Act.” *Amalgamated Ass’n of Street, Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees [v. LockridgeJ,*403 U.S. 274, 276 [91 S.Ct. 1909, 1913, 29 L.Ed.2d 473] (1971) (explaining the labor law pre-emption doctrine established in *San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon,*359 U.S. 236 [79 S.Ct. 773, 3 L.Ed.2d 775] (1959)). *See also Veal v. Kerr-McGee Coal Corp.,*682 F.Supp. 957, 959 (S.D.Ill.1988), *affd,*885 F.2d 873 (7th Cir.1989) (“when an activity is either expressly or arguably protected by § 7 or prohibited by § 8 [of the NLRA], a claim arising out of that activity is preempted by the Act.”)

*McDonough v. Gencorp, Inc.,*750 F.Supp. 368, 369-70 (S.D.Ill.1990).

Section 8 of the NLRA proscribes as an unfair labor practice coercion of an employee who is exercising his rights under the NLRA. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1989). Section 8 also prohibits discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment to encourage or discourage membership in a labor organization. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1989). It appears that the actions complained of fall within the proscriptions of the NLRA. They are, therefore, within the exclusive domain of the NLRB, and this Court cannot exercise original jurisdiction over them.

Defendant’s motion is GRANTED, and the complaint is DISMISSED. All other motions are DENIED as MOOT.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

__________________ No. 95-11191 Conference Calendar

__________________ JOSEPH CENTOFANTI, Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus LYLE G. HALLIBURTON, Defendant-Appellee.

- - - - - - - - - - Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 2:95-CV-219

- - - - - - - - - - April 17, 1996 Before DUHÉ, DeMOSS, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Joseph Centofanti appeals the dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d). Centofanti alleges that Lyle Halliburton, a guard in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, violated his constitutional rights because Halliburton would not allow Centofanti to wear a back brace on a bus ride to Galveston Hospital although Centofanti had permission to wear the brace only during work. A complaint filed in forma pauperis (IFP) may be dismissed if the complaint is frivolous. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d); Eason v. Thaler , 14 F.3d 8, 9 (5th Cir. 1994). "An action is frivolous ifNo. 95-11191 -2- it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact." Graves v. Hampton , 1 F.3d 315, 317 (5th Cir. 1993) (quotations omitted). A § 1915(d) dismissal is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Id. "[A] prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment . . . unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference." Farmer v. Brennan , 114 S. Ct. 1970, 1979 (1994). The dismissal of Centofanti's complaint was not an abuse of discretion. Centofanti's appeal is DISMISSED as frivolous. See 5th Cir. R. 42.2. We caution Centofanti that any additional frivolous appeals filed by him will invite the imposition of sanctions. To avoid sanctions, Centofanti is further cautioned to review any pending appeals to ensure that they do not raise arguments that are frivolous because they have been previously decided by this court. APPEAL DISMISSED; SANCTION WARNING ISSUED.
<SEQUENCE>13

                                  EXHIBIT 32.a


                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

                                 18 U.S.C. 1350,

                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In connection with the Quarterly Report of Regent Technologies, Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-KSB for the period ended December 31, 2003, as filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"),
I, David A. Nelson, in my capacity as Chief Executive Officer and Principal
Accounting Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350, as
adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

                  The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section
                  13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

                  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in
                  all material respects, the financial condition and results of
                  operations of the Company.


                                        /S/ DAVID A. NELSON
                                        -------------------
Date: September 12, 2005
                                        David A. Nelson,
                                        Chief Executive Officer and Principal
                                        Accounting Officer
I 

111TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 5510 

To amend the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 to allow 

amounts under the Troubled Assets Relief Program to be used to provide 

legal assistance to homeowners to avoid foreclosure. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JUNE 10, 2010 

Ms. KAPTUR introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on Financial Services 

A BILL 

To amend the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 

2008 to allow amounts under the Troubled Assets Relief 

Program to be used to provide legal assistance to homeowners to avoid foreclosure. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Aiding Those Facing 

5 Foreclosure Act of 2010’’. 


tjames on DSKG8SOYB1PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 5510 IH

1 SEC. 2. FORECLOSURE AVOIDANCE ASSISTANCE. 

2 Section 109 of the Emergency Economic Stabilization 

3 Act of 2008 (12 U.S.C. 5219) is amended by adding at 

4 the end the following new subsection: 

5 ‘‘(d) LEGAL ASSISTANCE.— 

6 ‘‘(1) USE OF FUNDS.—The Secretary may use 

7 any amounts made available under this title that are 

8 not otherwise obligated to provide assistance to non9 profit counseling intermediaries and nonprofit legal 

10 organizations to provide legal assistance to home11 owners of owner-occupied homes consisting of from 

12 one to four dwelling units who have mortgages on 

13 such homes that are in default or delinquency, in 

14 danger of default or delinquency, or subject to or at 

15 risk of foreclosure, to assist such homeowners with 

16 legal issues directly related to such default, delin17 quency, foreclosure, or any deed in lieu of fore18 closure or short sale. 

19 ‘‘(2) PROHIBITION ON LITIGATION.—Paragraph 

20 (1) may not be construed to authorize the use of any 

21 amounts made available under this title to provide, 

22 obtain, or arrange on behalf of a homeowner, legal 

23 representation involving or for the purposes of civil 

24 litigation that is not directly related to any such de25 fault, delinquency, foreclosure, or any deed in lieu of 

26 foreclosure or short sale. 


tjames on DSKG8SOYB1PROD with BILLS
3 

•HR 5510 IH

1 ‘‘(3) AUTHORIZATION.—Amounts used as de2 scribed under paragraph (1) shall be deemed to be 

3 for actions authorized under this title.’’. 

Æ 


tjames on DSKG8SOYB1PROD with BILLS
```

[Congressional Bills 111th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 5030 Introduced in House (IH)]

111th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 5030

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to allow distributions from 
              529 plans for the payment of student loans.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             April 15, 2010

    Ms. Bean (for herself, Mr. Kind, Mrs. Halvorson, Ms. Markey of 
    Colorado, and Mr. Nye) introduced the following bill; which was 
              referred to the Committee on Ways and Means

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to allow distributions from 
              529 plans for the payment of student loans.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``College Savings Flexibility Act of 
2010''.

SEC. 2. 529 PLAN DISTRIBUTION FOR STUDENT LOAN PAYMENTS.

    (a) In General.--Paragraph (3) of section 529(e) of the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by adding at the end the following new 
subparagraph:
                    ``(C) Temporary rule for student loans.--For 
                purposes of this paragraph, any interest or principal 
                paid after December 31, 2009, and before January 1, 
                2015, with respect to a qualified education loan (as 
                defined in section 221) with respect to a designated 
                beneficiary shall be treated as a qualified higher 
                education expense.''.
    (b) Conforming Amendments.--
            (1) Subparagraph (A) of section 72(t)(7) of such Code is 
        amended by inserting ``determined without regard to 
        subparagraph (C) thereof'' after ``section 529(e)(3)''.
            (2) Clause (i) of section 530(b)(2)(A) of such Code is 
        amended by inserting ``determined without regard to 
        subparagraph (C) thereof'' after ``section 529(e)(3)''.
    (c) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section shall 
apply to distributions made after December 31, 2009.
                                 <all>
```
1

Filed 10/14/22 P. v. Vaughn CA3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Sacramento)

----

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

DAVID MATTHEW VAUGHN,

Defendant and Appellant.

C095236

(Super. Ct. No. 21FE004252)

In March 2021, the People charged defendant David Matthew Vaughn with 

manufacturing or transporting an assault weapon (Pen. Code, § 30600, subd. (a)), 

possessing an assault weapon (Pen. Code, § 30605, subd. (a)), and driving while his 

privileges were revoked or suspended (Veh. Code, § 14601.1, subd. (b)(1)). Defendant 

pled no contest to possessing an assault weapon. In exchange for his plea, the People 

agreed to dismiss the remaining charges. 

The court sentenced defendant as follows: “Pursuant to the party’s [sic]

negotiated disposition, it’s the Court’s judgment and sentence that for a felony violation 
2

of Penal Code section 30605(a), that defendant . . . that you are going to be placed . . . on 

formal probation for a period of two years. Imposition of sentence is suspended.

“As a condition of probation, I’m ordering that you serve 60 days in the county 

jail.” 

Contrary to the court’s oral pronouncement of judgment, however, the clerk of the 

court recorded in the minute order that the trial court suspended the execution of 

defendant’s sentence, rather than its imposition. This was error, albeit a clerical one. 

There is, however, a significant difference between suspending execution of judgment 

and suspending its imposition. (See People v. Howard (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1081, 1087-

1088; Pen. Code, § 1203.2, subd. (c).) Thus, on appeal defendant asks this court to 

correct this clerical error; the People concede the issue. 

“Where there is a discrepancy between the oral pronouncement of judgment and 

the minute order or the abstract of judgment, the oral pronouncement controls.” (People 

v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385.) We agree the clerk inaccurately recorded 

the judgment pronounced by the court. We will, therefore, remand the matter and direct 

the trial court to correct its minute order to accurately reflect the oral pronouncement of 

the court. (See People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 186-187 [appellate courts have 

authority to correct clerical errors].) 

DISPOSITION

The judgment in this matter is affirmed. The matter is remanded for the sole 

purpose of allowing the trial court to correct its September 24, 2021 minute order to 
3

accurately reflect its judgment: The court suspended the imposition of defendant’s 

sentence, not its execution. 

/S/

 

RENNER, J.

We concur:

/S/

 

ROBIE, Acting P. J.

/S/

 

EARL, J.
August 29, 2013



### JUDGMENT 

## The Fourteenth Court of Appeals

RICHARD C. FORD , Appellant

NO. 14

- 12

- 00610

- CV V.

PREMIER INSTALLATION & DESIGN GROUP, INC. AND MORRIS E.

SANFORD, III , Appellee s

________________________________ This cause, an appeal from the judgment in favor of appellee s , Premier Installation & Design Group, Inc. and Morris E. Sanford, III, signed, April 2, 2012, was heard on the transc ript of the record. We have inspected the record and find no error in the judgment. We order the judgment of the court below AFFIRMED

. We order appellant, Richard C. Ford, to pay all costs incurred in this appeal. We further order this decision certified b elow for observance.
**Exhibit 32.2**

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO****18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,****AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO****SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

In connection with the Quarterly Report of River Rock Entertainment Authority (the “Authority”) on Form 10-Q for the quarter ending June 30, 2004 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Yuan Fang (Yvonne) Mao, Chief Financial Officer of the Authority, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

|   | (1)          The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or          15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and                                 |
|--------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|   |                                                                                                                                                                        |
|   | (2)          The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material          respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Authority. |

By: /s/ Yuan Fang (Yvonne) Mao   Yuan Fang (Yvonne) MaoChief Financial OfficerAugust 16, 2004

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the River Rock Entertainment Authority and will be retained by the River Rock Entertainment Authority and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

----
Third District Court of Appeal

State of Florida

Opinion filed October 27, 2021.

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________

No. 3D21-1193

Lower Tribunal No. 18-26845

________________

Judy Bell,

Appellant,

vs.

Florida Gaming Casino Inc., etc.,

Appellee.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Michael 

Barket, Judge.

Judy Bell, in proper person.

Mitrani, Rynor, Adamsky & Toland, P.A., and Pamela A. Chamberlin, 

for appellee Florida Gaming Centers, Inc.

Before LOGUE, LINDSEY and LOBREE, JJ. 

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
LOGO

Exhibit 23.1

CONSENT OF CAWLEY, GILLESPIE & ASSOCIATES, INC.

January 28, 2013

Permian Basin Royalty Trust

Bank of America, N.A., Trustee

901 Main Street, 17th Floor

Dallas, Texas 75202-3714

Gentlemen:

Cawley, Gillespie & Associates, Inc., hereby
consents to the use of the oil and gas reserve information in the Permian Basin Royalty Trust Securities and Exchange Commission Form 10-K for the year ending December 31, 2012 and in the Permian Basin Royalty Trust Annual Report for the year ending
December 31, 2012, based on reserve reports dated January 25, 2013, prepared by Cawley, Gillespie & Associates, Inc.

Submitted,

Cawley, Gillespie & Associates, Inc.

Texas Registered Engineering Firm F-693



LOGO

Kenneth J.
Mueller, P. E. 86132

Vice President
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADDED BY

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the filing of the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for
the quarter ended June 30, 2009 (the Report) by OptimumBank Holdings, Inc. (the Company), I, Albert J. Finch, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 1350, as adopted pursuant to
§ 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to my knowledge:



|1. | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
|-- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|2. | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
|-- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|      |  |                   |  |  |  |     |  |                                         
|----- |  | ----------------- |  |  |  | --- |  | ----------------------------------------
|Date: |  | November 23, 2009 |  |  |  | By: |  | /s/ Albert J. Finch                     
|      |  |                   |  |  |  |     |  | Albert J. Finch, Chief Executive Officer
#### Eric BEGIN v. Mary Jane RISBARA, et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Argued Jan. 17, 1991.

Decided April 9, 1991.

*1197Neal L. Weinstein (orally), Old Orchard Beach, for plaintiff.

Lee H. Bals (orally), Friedman & Bab-cock, Portland, for defendant.

Before McKUSICK, C.J., and ROBERTS, GLASSMAN, CLIFFORD, COLLINS and BRODY, JJ.

ROBERTS, Justice.

Eric Begin appeals from a judgment of the Superior Court (York County, *Perkins, J.)*affirming a judgment of the District Court (Biddeford, *MacNichol, J.)*in favor of defendants Mary Jane Risbara and Ris-bara Construction Co. Although we disagree with the District Court’s interpretation of M.R.Civ.P. 26(f)(2), we conclude that the error is harmless because the evidence does not compel a finding in favor of Begin. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.

Disregarding the procedural complexities preceding this appeal, we first address the question whether the District Court erred in its interpretation of M.R.Civ.P. 26(f)(2). At trial in this case, after the defendants had moved for judgment at the conclusion of the plaintiff’s case pursuant to M.R. Civ.P. 50(d), the court permitted the plaintiff to reopen in order to present additional evidence. When the plaintiff learned that defendant Mary Jane Risbara was not present, he offered as evidence her answers to interrogatories. The court found that the plaintiff should have “reasonably anticipated” their use and sustained the defendants’ objection that M.R.Civ.P. 26(f)(2) precluded admission of the interrogatories because they were not filed 7 days prior to trial. We disagree with the court’s application of rule 26(f)(2).

Prior to 1985 discovery materials were filed with the court as they were generated. To relieve the court files of that burden, rule 26(f) was adopted to prevent routine filing with the court. Rule 26(f)(2) provides for filing 7 days prior to any “reasonably anticipated” use of discovery materials. Neither rule 32 (depositions) nor rule 33 (interrogatories) require prior notice of their intended use, and they did not do so prior to 1985. We conclude, therefore, that the 7-day filing requirement of rule 26(f)(2) is for the convenience of the court and is not intended to be a notice provision. In the circumstances of this case, no prejudice from use of the interrogatories was even alleged by the defendants and no inconvenience to the court is apparent.

The error, however, is harmless because our review of the evidence, including the answers to interrogatories, establishes that the court was not compelled to find for the plaintiff. On a motion pursuant to M.R.Civ.P. 50(d) “[t]he court as trier of the facts may then determine them and render judgment against the plaintiff....” In the court’s ruling, it stated that, even with the interrogatories, there was insufficient evidence of negligence on the part of defendant, Mary Jane Risbara.

The entry is:

Judgment affirmed.

All concurring.
# L_2007192EN.01002501.xml

| 24.7.2007 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 192/25 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

24.7.2007

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 192/25

---

COUNCIL DECISION

of 10 July 2007

appointing a Spanish member of the European Economic and Social Committee

(2007/518/EC, Euratom)

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, and in particular Article 259 thereof,

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, and in particular Article 167 thereof,

Having regard to Council Decision 2006/524/EC, Euratom of 11 July 2006 appointing Czech, German, Estonian, Spanish, French, Italian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Luxembourg, Hungarian, Maltese, Austrian, Slovenian and Slovak members of the European Economic and Social Committee (1),

Having regard to the nomination submitted by the Spanish Government,

Having regard to the opinion of the Commission,

Whereas a Spanish member's seat on the European Economic and Social Committee has fallen vacant following the resignation of Mr Pedro BARATO TRIGUERO,

HAS DECIDED AS FOLLOWS:

Article 1

Mr Pedro Raúl NARRO SÁNCHEZ is hereby appointed a member of the European Economic and Social Committee in place of Mr Pedro BARATO TRIGUERO for the remainder of his term of office, which ends on 20 September 2010.

Article 2

This Decision shall take effect on the date of its adoption.

Done at Brussels, 10 July 2007.

For the Council

The President

F. TEIXEIRA DOS SANTOS

---

(1)  
  OJ L 207, 28.7.2006, p. 30.

1

---