United States Department of Labor

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

__________________________________________

S.D., Appellant

and

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, OFFICE OF 

WORKERS’ COMPENSATION PROGRAMS, 

Jacksonville, FL, Employer

__________________________________________

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Docket No. 23-0898

Issued: July 13, 2023

Appearances: Case Submitted on the Record

Appellant, pro se

Office of Solicitor, for the Director

DECISION AND ORDER

Before:

ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Chief Judge

PATRICIA H. FITZGERALD, Deputy Chief Judge

JAMES D. McGINLEY, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION

On June 25, 2018 appellant filed a timely appeal from a February 14, 2018 merit decision 

and a June 1, 2018 nonmerit decision of the Office of Workers’Compensation Programs (OWCP). 

Pursuant to the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act1(FECA) and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 

501.3, the Board has jurisdiction over the merits of this case. 2

ISSUES

The issues are: (1) whether appellant has met her burden of proof to establish an emotional 

condition in the performance of duty, as alleged; and (2) whether OWCP properly denied 

appellant’s request for reconsideration of the merits of her claim pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 8128(a).

1

5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.

2 The Board notes that following the June 1, 2018 decision, OWCP received additional evidence. However, the 

Board’s Rules of Procedure provides: “The Board’s review of a case is limited to the evidence in the case record that 

was before OWCP at the time of its final decision. Evidence not before OWCP will not be considered by the Board 

for the first time on appeal.” 20 C.F.R. § 501.2(c)(1). Thus, the Board is precluded from reviewing this additional 

evidence for the first time on appeal. Id.
2

FACTUAL HISTORY

On August 17, 2017 appellant, then a 50-year-old claims examiner, filed an occupational 

disease claim (Form CA-2) alleging that she developed aggravation of diagnosed conditions of 

anxiety, chronic post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), adjustment disorder with mixed anxiety 

and depressed mood, amnesia, confusion, panic disorder and agoraphobia, and major depressive 

disorder due to factors of her federal employment. She explained that she was overworked. 

Appellant noted that she first became aware of her condition on May 1, 2015 and realized its 

relation to her federal employment on June 12, 2017. She did not stop work.

In a September 13, 2017 development letter, OWCP informed appellant of the deficiencies 

of her claim. It requested that she submit additional factual and medical evidence and provided a 

factual questionnaire for her completion. OWCP afforded appellant 30 days to submit the 

necessary evidence. 

OWCP thereafter received medical evidence. 

In response to OWCP’s development questionnaire, appellant submitted a November 11, 

2017 statement in which she recounted a series of incidents which she believed contributed to her 

emotional condition. She noted personal stressors, including medical problems, injuries, and 

deaths of family members and friends. Appellant further outlined various employment-related 

issues, including a transfer from a different department to a department within the employing 

establishment; an increase in her workload in April 2016 due to a “switch of 14 digits”;

discrimination and an equal employment opportunity (EEO) claim; receipt of unfavorable 

memoranda on May 16 and 23, 2017; meetings with a supervisor on May 30, 2017; procedures for

deleting documents from case files between February 2016 and August 2017; and schedule 

conflicts in September 2017 following a local hurricane. She also related that in May 2017 she 

became overwhelmed with covering the phone bank as a customer service representative while 

also managing her own workload amidst a staffing shortage. As of June 29, 2017, appellant was 

limited to working four hours to per day and had difficulty completing her claims examiner duties 

and covering the phone bank. She attached copies of e-mails with employing establishment 

supervisors from February 2016 through October 30, 2017, which reflected dates that she was 

assigned to cover the phone bank from either 8:45 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. or from 12:45 p.m. to 4:00 

p.m. and logs of Form CA-110 notice of telephone call callbacks for the time periods August 16 

through 24, 2017 (34 total), July 13 and 14, 2017 (13 total), and July 26 through 28, 2017 (14 

total).

In an undated statement, appellant outlined various e-mail exchanges with her supervisor 

on October 30, 2017 regarding the schedule for the phone bank, a meeting regarding her 

accommodations request, and her personal issues with scheduling a contractor to complete a roof 

repair on her home following a hurricane.

In a December 14, 2017 letter, the employing establishment controverted appellant’s 

occupational disease claim based upon a lack of medical evidence.

In a separate letter of even date, R.F., appellant’s supervisor, reviewed appellant’s 

statements and supporting documentation. He indicated that the reassignment of work that 

occurred in April 2016 was administrative in nature and denied any discrimination or inappropriate 

incidents. R.F. noted that he routinely assisted appellant to prioritize and complete her work 
3

assignments and provided her with assistance from other supervisors. He explained that he 

counseled her to complete callbacks during business hours and to properly delete documents from 

the system in order to avoid mailing out incorrect letters. R.F. indicated that he provided appellant 

with an accommodation of waiver of core hours as of June 5, 2015 and, in 2017, had meetings

with her as part of a performance improvement plan (PIP). He further noted that the phone bank 

was a regularly assigned duty of a claim’s examiner.

In a witness statement dated January 16, 2018, K.H., appellant’s former coworker, noted 

that she worked with appellant for the employing establishment from 2013 to 2017 in District 6. 

She noted that claims examiners were assigned 6,000 cases each, andDistrict 6 was the first district 

where claims examiners handled all events through a claim from inception to closure. K.H. noted 

that she observed appellant’s condition “drastically decline” over the time that she worked with 

her, and that she appeared to be “drowning in tasks that were overdue and needed to be completed.” 

She indicated that she personally became overwhelmed with the workload after a “major shakeup 

of the digits/cases assigned to us,” and that she eventually left her position with the employing 

establishment due to the “outrageous demands” and “insane amounts of work required at District 

6.” K.H. indicated that she observed instances where R.F. wrote appellant e-mails within minutes 

of assigning her tasks to ask what she was working on. She further related that after appellant 

reduced her work hours due to ongoing health issues, R.F. assigned appellant to the phone bank

for four hours of her workday and also expected her to complete her case management tasks.

By decision dated February 14, 2018, OWCP denied appellant’s claim for an employmentrelated emotional condition, finding that the evidence of record was insufficient to establish the 

factual component of fact of injury. It noted that the evidence submitted failed to establish the 

alleged incidents. OWCP concluded, therefore, that the requirements had not been met to establish 

an injury as defined by FECA.

On May 11, 2018 appellant requested reconsideration of the February 14, 2018 decision. 

No additional evidence was received.

By decision dated June 1, 2018, OWCP denied appellant’s request for reconsideration of 

the merits of her claim pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 8128(a).

LEGAL PRECEDENT

An employee seeking benefits under FECA3 has the burden of proof to establish the 

essential elements of his or her claim, including the fact that the individual is an employee of the 

United States within the meaning of FECA, that the claim was timely filed within the applicable 

time limitation of FECA,4that an injury was sustained in the performance of duty as alleged, and 

that any disability or medical condition for which compensation is claimed is causally related to 

3

Id.

4

S.B., Docket No. 17-1779 (issued February 7, 2018); J.P., 59 ECAB 178 (2007); Joe D. Cameron, 41 ECAB 

153 (1989).
4

the employment injury.

5

 These are the essential elements of each and every compensation claim, 

regardless of whether the claim is predicated upon a traumatic injury or an occupational disease.6

To establish an emotional condition in the performance of duty, appellant must submit the 

following: (1) factual evidence identifying employment factors or incidents alleged to have caused 

or contributed to the condition; (2) medical evidence establishing that he or she has an emotional 

or psychiatric disorder; and (3) rationalized medical opinion evidence establishing that the 

emotional condition is causally related to the identified compensable employment factors. 7

Workers’ compensation law does not apply to each and every injury or illness that is 

somehow related to an employee’s employment.8 There are situations where an injury or illness 

has some connection with the employment, but nevertheless does not come within the concept or 

coverage under FECA.9 When disability results from an emotional reaction to regular or specially 

assigned work duties or a requirement imposed by the employment, the disability is deemed 

compensable.10 However, disability is not compensable when it results from factors such as an 

employee’s fear of reduction-in-force, or frustration from not being permitted to work in a 

particular environment or to hold a particular position.11

Administrative and personnel matters, although generally related to the employee’s 

employment, are administrative functions of the employer rather than the regular or specially 

assigned work duties of the employee and are not covered under FECA. 12 Where the evidence 

demonstrates that the employing establishment either erred, or acted abusively in discharging its 

administrative or personnel responsibilities, such action will be considered a compensable 

employment factor.13

ANALYSIS -- ISSUE 1

The Board finds that the case is not in posture for decision.

5

J.M., Docket No. 17-0284 (issued February 7, 2018); R.C., 59 ECAB 427 (2008); James E. Chadden, Sr., 40 

ECAB 312 (1988).

6 K.M., Docket No. 15-1660 (issued September 16, 2016); L.M., Docket No. 13-1402 (issued February 7, 2014);

Delores C. Ellyett, 41 ECAB 992 (1990).

7 W.F., Docket No. 18-1526 (issued November 26, 2019); C.V., Docket No. 18-0580 (issued September 17, 2018); 

George H. Clark, 56 ECAB 162 (2004); Kathleen D. Walker, 42 ECAB 603 (1991).

8 L.Y., Docket No. 18-1619 (issued April 12, 2019); L.D., 58 ECAB 344 (2007).

9 W.F., Docket No. 17-0640 (issued December 7, 2018); David Apgar, 57 ECAB 137 (2005).

10 Pamela D. Casey, 57 ECAB 260, 263 (2005); Lillian Cutler, 28 ECAB 125, 129 (1976).

11 Lillian Cutler, id.

12 C.V., Docket No. 18-0580 (issued September 17, 2018).

13 Id.
5

Appellant attributed her emotional condition in part to Cutler14 factors. She alleged that 

she felt overwhelmed by her work duties when she was limited to working four hours per day. 

Appellant indicated that there was an increase in her workload in April 2016 due to a “switch of 

14 digits,” and that she was assigned additional duties to cover the phone bank for four hours per 

day on various occasions from July 21, 2016 through August 29, 2017, which made it very difficult 

to also complete claims examiner’s tasks within her assigned case files. She asserted that her 

workload was overwhelming, and resultedin an exacerbation of her depression, anxiety, and panic 

symptoms.

The Board finds that, as to appellant’s allegation that she sustained an emotional condition 

due to overwork based upon her regular and specially assigned job duties, appellant has established 

a compensable work factor under Cutler.

15

 The case record contains evidence, particularly the 

statements of appellant’s former co-worker, K.H., who confirmed that after appellant was limited 

to working four hours per day, she was assigned to cover the phone bank for nearly her entire shift 

on various occasions while also expected to complete her other assigned duties. The case record 

contained numerous e-mails which detailed the dates that she was assigned to the phone bank, and 

also the number of callbacks she was assigned. K.H. also noted that she observed appellant’s 

condition deteriorate due to the increased workload and agreed that there was an overwhelming 

amount of work and stress involved in the position, especially following the change of digits/cases 

assigned to claims examiners. The Board has held that conditions related to stress from situations 

in which an employee is trying to meet his or her position requirements are compensable. 16 

Further, the Board has held that overwork is a compensable factor of employment if appellant 

submits sufficient evidence to substantiate this allegation.17 As appellant attributed her emotional 

condition, in part, to the stress of trying to meet the duties of her position, including covering the 

phone bank while also completing her regularly assigned tasks in a high volume case load, the 

Board, thus, finds that appellant has established a compensable employment factor of overwork. 

On remand, OWCP shall consider the medical evidence with regard to whether she has established 

a diagnosed emotional condition casually related to this accepted employment factor of overwork.

Appellant has also alleged stress and anxiety due to actions by her supervisors,

discrimination, and an EEO claim. Mere disagreement or dislike of actions taken by a supervisor 

are not compensable absent evidence establishing error or abuse.

18

 Further, an employee’s reaction 

to an administrative or personnel matter is not covered by FECA, unless there is evidence that the 

employing establishment acted unreasonably.19 The case record contains e-mails between 

appellant and her supervisors which establish that she received assistance for issues with deleting 

documents from case files, and that her scheduling needs were accommodated at the time of the 

14 Lillian Cutler, supra note 12.

15 Id. 

16 S.S., Docket No. 21-0184 (issued July 14, 2021); E.A., Docket No. 19-0582 (issued April22, 2021); K.J., Docket 

No. 17-1851 (issued September 25, 2019); P.W., Docket No. 08-0315 (issued August22, 2008); Jeral R. Gray, 57 

ECAB 611 (2006).

17 W.F., Docket No. 18-1526 (issued November 26, 2019).

18 R.B., Docket No. 19-1256 (issued July 28, 2020); D.J., Docket No. 16-1540 (issued August 21, 2018); Linda 

Edwards-Delgado, 55 ECAB 401 (2004).

19 Id.; see also Alfred Arts, 45 ECAB 530 (1994).
6

damage to her roof. The case record does not contain any documentation regarding an EEO claim

or discrimination claim. Because appellant has not presented sufficient evidence to establish that 

her supervisor acted unreasonably, or that the employing establishment engaged in error or abuse 

in these personnel matters, she has failed to identify a compensable work factor relating to this 

allegation.20

As noted above, the Board finds that appellant has established a compensable employment 

factor under Cutler with regard to her claim of overwork based upon her regular and specially 

assigned job duties. Accordingly, OWCP must analyze the medical evidence to determine whether 

she sustained an emotional condition as a result of this compensable employment factor. The case 

will, therefore, be remanded to OWCP. After this and other such further development as deemed 

necessary, OWCP shall issue a de novo decision.21

CONCLUSION

The Board finds that this case is not in posture for decision.

ORDER

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the February 14 and June 1, 2018 decisions of the 

Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs are set aside, and the case is remanded for further 

proceedings consistent with this decision of the Board.

Issued: July 13, 2023

Washington, DC

Alec J. Koromilas, Chief Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Patricia H. Fitzgerald, Deputy Chief Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

James D. McGinley, Alternate Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

20 Id. See also B.G., Docket No. 18-0491 (issued March 25, 2020).

21 In light of the Board’s disposition of Issue 1, Issue 2 is rendered moot.