NO. 4-04-0217 Filed: 2/10/06 

IN THE APPELLATE COURT 

OF ILLINOIS 

FOURTH DISTRICT 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of 

v. ) Champaign County 

CRAIG BARNEY, ) No. 03CF1925 

Defendant-Appellant. ) 

 ) Honorable 

 ) Michael Q. Jones, 

 ) Judge Presiding. _________________________________________________________________

 JUSTICE KNECHT delivered the opinion of the court: 

In January 2004, a jury convicted defendant, Craig 

Barney, of obstructing justice (720 ILCS 5/31-4(a) (West 2002)). 

 In February 2004, the trial court sentenced defendant to a 

three-year prison term. During his trial, defendant was 

restrained by leg irons. Defendant did not object to the 

shackling. Despite his lack of objection, defendant argues on 

appeal his shackling was plain error. We disagree and affirm. 

I. BACKGROUND 

At trial, the State presented the testimony of two 

Urbana police officers, Matthew Quinley and David Smysor. 

Quinley testified he was dispatched to the residence of Charisma 

Johnson to arrest defendant on an outstanding warrant. Smysor 

was similarly dispatched. After they arrived at Johnson's 

residence, Smysor spoke with Johnson while Quinley went upstairs 

to find defendant. Quinley found defendant, who was packing to 

leave, in an upstairs bedroom. 

Quinley informed defendant he was under arrest on the 
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outstanding warrant and took defendant into custody. As part of 

the arrest process, Quinley conducted a routine search. Smysor 

was on defendant's left side, while Quinley was on his right 

side. Quinley searched the right side of defendant. In the 

watch pocket of defendant's pants, Quinley found two small, 

clear, tied plastic bags. Inside each bag was "a white chunky 

substance." Quinley believed the product was crack cocaine 

because it resembled crack cocaine both in substance and in its 

packaging. Quinley laid the plastic bags on the bed, along with 

two sets of keys and two lighters he found on defendant's person. 

Quinley testified Smysor next searched defendant's left 

side. When Smysor completed his search, defendant buckled his 

knees and fell forward onto the top of the bed. Defendant then 

inhaled the two bags. Quinley tried to open his mouth, while 

Smysor "applied a pressure point to him." Quinley and Smysor 

yelled at defendant to spit out the bags. Defendant did not 

comply. When defendant did open his mouth, Quinley found nothing. Defendant said, "It is gone." Defendant later told Quinley 

the substance was soap and his attorney would have the charges 

dropped by the next morning. The officers searched the room and 

did not find the Baggies. 

On cross-examination, Quinley testified he believed 

Johnson was downstairs when the arrest and search occurred. The 

officers did not take defendant to a hospital or make any efforts 

to pump his stomach or vomit. 

Smysor's testimony corroborated Quinley's regarding the 

search and defendant's ingestion of the Baggies. Smysor testified, however, Johnson was in the hallway outside the bedroom 
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door during the arrest. Johnson was not close to defendant or 

the officers. 

At the close of the State's evidence, and after a lunch 

recess, the trial court admonished defendant regarding his right 

to decide whether to testify. Then the following colloquy 

occurred regarding the leg irons: 

"THE COURT: Okay. I think because of 

the unique situation with the leg irons, we 

need to determine whether or not he wishes to 

testify. [Defense counsel], is this a decision that you and your client still aren't in 

a position to make until you evaluate the 

testimony of the other witness, or is it one 

you're in a position to make now? 

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I believe we can make 

it now, if I may have just a moment. Judge, 

we are in a position to decide, and he does 

not intend to testify at this time. 

THE COURT: Okay. That is a decision 

that you have made and it is your choice; is 

that correct, Mr. Barney? 

DEFENDANT: That is correct. 

THE COURT: Very good, sir. Now counsel, 

is there any reason then that we can't go 

ahead right now. It is not visible, is it, 

to the jurors, his leg irons there? 

[PROSECUTOR]: It is visible to me. 

OFFICER: It is tucked in his shoe and 
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his pant leg is over it. 

THE COURT: I'm going to get off the 

bench for a second. [Defense counsel], to 

satisfy yourself, come on over here but I 

can't see it. 

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I suppose I really 

should. Thank you. I really can't see anything obvious. 

THE COURT: Okay. Looks to me then there 

is no prejudice to the defendant if we just 

proceed with the trial at this time. So is 

there anything else either of you wish to 

place on the record? 

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: No." 

Defendant presented the testimony of one witness, 

Charisma Johnson. Johnson testified defendant was her boyfriend 

until the day of his arrest. From the doorway, Johnson observed 

part of the search of defendant. During the search of defendant's left side, one of the officers was attempting to keep her 

out of the room. Johnson could see the bed clearly from where 

she stood. On the bed were some objects, including money, a 

lighter, cigarettes, and candy wrappers, taken from defendant's 

pockets. None of the objects were bags of crack cocaine. 

Johnson did not see defendant fall on the bed. She also did not 

see the officers search the room. 

On cross-examination, Johnson admitted the bedding had 

wrinkles because the bed had not been made. She did not see two 

sets of keys or two lighters on the bed. Johnson testified all 
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she saw the police remove from defendant was money. The officer 

said, "This must be drug money." Johnson responded the money was 

hers. Johnson did not see an officer search defendant's right 

side. 

The jury found defendant guilty of obstructing justice. 

 The trial court later sentenced defendant as stated. 

This appeal followed. 

II. ANALYSIS 

The shackling of defendants during trial should be 

avoided. See People v. Boose, 66 Ill. 2d 261, 362 N.E.2d 303 

(1977). Restraining a defendant by shackling tends to prejudice 

the jury, limits a defendant's ability to aid counsel in his 

defense, and "offends the dignity of the judicial process." 

Boose, 66 Ill. 2d at 265, 362 N.E.2d at 305. 

Though disfavored, shackling is permissible in certain 

circumstances. A court may order a defendant shackled when it 

has reason to believe (1) the defendant may attempt to escape, 

(2) the defendant may pose a danger to individuals in the courtroom, or (3) shackling is necessary to maintain order. Boose, 66 

Ill. 2d at 266, 362 N.E.2d at 305. Before such an order may be 

entered, the court must hold a hearing on this issue outside the 

presence of the jury. During this hearing, the court shall give 

defense counsel the opportunity to argue why defendant should not 

be shackled; and the court shall state, for the record, the 

reasons for the shackling. Boose, 66 Ill. 2d at 266, 362 N.E.2d 

at 305. In this case, no Boose hearing was held and no reasons 

for the shackling were set forth in the record. 

Defendant, however, did not object to the leg shackling 
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at trial or in a posttrial motion. Because he did not object, he 

has forfeited our review of the error. See People v. Beard, 356 

Ill. App. 3d 236, 241, 825 N.E.2d 353, 359 (2005); see also 

People v. Strickland, No. 4-04-0218 (February 10, 2006), ___ Ill. 

App. 3d ___, ___, ___ N.E.2d ___, ___. 

Defendant urges this court to consider his argument 

under the plain-error doctrine. Defendant argues his shackling 

without a Boose hearing constitutes plain error. Defendant 

relies on the Third District decision, People v. Allen, 354 Ill. 

App. 3d 442, 443, 446, 821 N.E.2d 335, 337, 339 (2004), appeal

allowed, 214 Ill. 2d 537, 830 N.E.2d 4 (2005) (No. 99977), which 

held the use of an electronic security belt as a restraining 

device without a Boose hearing was plain error. 

The State disagrees and contends defendant has not 

shown plain error. In support, the State relies on a Fifth 

District decision, People v. Crutchfield, 353 Ill. App. 3d 1014, 

1021-22, 820 N.E.2d 507, 514-15 (2004), in which the court found 

no plain error in the use of a stun belt during trial because the 

defendant could not show he was prejudiced. 

Under the plain-error doctrine, a court of review may 

consider issues that were otherwise forfeited due to the failure 

to object at trial or in a posttrial motion. Before this court 

may invoke the doctrine and find plain error, we must find the 

evidence at trial closely balanced or the error was of such 

magnitude that the defendant was denied a substantial right and a 

fair trial. See People v. Armstrong, 183 Ill. 2d 130, 151, 700 

N.E.2d 960, 969 (1998). 

We have not yet considered the issue of whether shack-
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ling, absent a Boose hearing, constitutes plain error. We have 

considered, in People v. Love, 327 Ill. App. 3d 313, 317-18, 763 

N.E.2d 829, 833 (2002), whether the use of a mask during trial 

amounted to plain error. However, we did not reach the question 

of whether the error was of sufficient magnitude to constitute 

plain error because we found no error in the court's order to 

mask the accused. See Love, 327 Ill. App. 3d at 318-19, 763 

N.E.2d at 833-34. 

The Third and Fifth District Appellate Courts have 

considered the issue and reached opposite conclusions. The Third 

District's finding that shackling absent a Boose hearing always 

equals plain error finds its roots in People v. Doss, 347 Ill. 

App. 3d 418, 807 N.E.2d 697 (2004). In Doss, as here, the 

defendant was required to wear leg shackles during his trial, he 

did not object to such shackling, and the court did not believe 

the jury could see the shackles. See Doss, 347 Ill. App. 3d at 

427-28, 807 N.E.2d at 704-05. In considering the defendant's 

claim, the Doss court emphasized the presumption of innocence, as 

well as the defendant's right to stand trial, absent certain 

circumstances, "with the appearance, dignity[,] and self-respect 

of an innocent and free person." Doss, 347 Ill. App. 3d at 427, 

807 N.E.2d at 704. The court concluded shackling amounted to 

plain error because defendant was deprived of a fair trial. 

Doss, 347 Ill. App. 3d at 428, 807 N.E.2d at 705. Upon reaching 

this conclusion, the Doss court emphasized the right to appear 

innocent and free was particularly significant in its case 

because "the defense theory [was] one of mistaken or inaccurate 

identity." Doss, 347 Ill. App. 3d at 428, 807 N.E.2d at 705. 
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After Doss, the Third District decided Allen, the case 

upon which defendant relies. In Allen, the defendant, during 

trial, wore an electronic security belt as a restraining device 

and did not object to its use. Allen, 354 Ill. App. 3d at 445, 

821 N.E.2d at 38. In spite of the forfeiture of the issue, the 

court found plain error and reversed. Allen, 354 Ill. App. 3d at 

446, 821 N.E.2d at 339. The court reached this conclusion not by 

evaluating the facts of Allen as applied to the plain-error 

doctrine, but by concluding Doss controlled. See Allen, 354 Ill. 

App. 3d at 446, 821 N.E.2d at 339. 

Later, in People v. Brown, 356 Ill. App. 3d 1088, 1090-

91, 828 N.E.2d 351, 354 (2005), the Third District majority again 

addressed the shackling issue and again cited Doss as the basis 

for finding plain error. But Justice Schmidt, who authored the 

Doss opinion (see Doss, 347 Ill. App. 3d at 420, 807 N.E.2d at 

698), criticized the Third District's reliance on Doss. Justice 

Schmidt objected to an automatic finding of plain error and wrote 

the shackling issue in Doss "was reviewed under the plain[-]error 

doctrine because we found the evidence closely balanced." Brown, 

356 Ill. App. 3d at 1091, 828 N.E.2d at 355 (Schmidt, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Schmidt further 

took the blame for the improper reliance on Doss: 

"To the extent that the Doss opinion can be 

read to stand for the proposition that shackling of the ankles without a Boose hearing is 

always reversible error, that can be laid on 

the shoulders of the relatively new and inarticulate appellate judge who authored the 
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opinion." Brown, 356 Ill. App. 3d at 1091, 

828 N.E.2d at 355 (Schmidt, J., dissenting). 

 

Two decisions from the Fifth District, Crutchfield and 

People v. DuPree, 353 Ill. App. 3d 1037, 820 N.E.2d 560 (2004), 

rejected the proposition that shackling absent a Boose hearing is 

always plain error. In Crutchfield, the court agreed that 

requiring a defendant to wear a stun belt absent a Boose hearing 

was a due-process violation but concluded defendant did not 

establish the requirements of the second test under the plainerror doctrine. In other words, the court found defendant did 

not prove the error prejudiced him to the extent that it denied 

him a fair trial. Crutchfield, 353 Ill. App. 3d at 1021-22, 820 

N.E.2d at 514-15. 

In DuPree, the Fifth District employed similar analysis 

to reach the same conclusion. In DuPree, the defendant was 

required to wear a stun belt without a Boose hearing and did not 

object. DuPree, 353 Ill. App. 3d at 1042, 820 N.E.2d at 564-65. 

 Despite his forfeiture of the issue, the defendant urged the 

reviewing court to apply the plain-error doctrine to his case and 

argued "his trial was rendered fundamentally unfair by the fact 

that he was required to wear a stun belt without the court having 

first determined that it was necessary for him to do so." 

DuPree, 353 Ill. App. 3d at 1043, 820 N.E.2d at 565. 

The DuPree court acknowledged the unfairness but 

determined the lack of objection rendered the violation not 

fundamentally unfair. In support, the DuPree court stated its 

conclusion was consistent with that of the United States Supreme 
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Court, which held the following: 

"'[A]lthough the State cannot, consistently with the [f]ourteenth [a]mendment, 

compel an accused to stand trial before a 

jury while dressed in identifiable prison 

clothes, the failure to make an objection to 

the court as to being tried in such clothes, 

for whatever reason, is sufficient to negate 

the presence of compulsion necessary to establish a constitutional violation.'" (Emphasis in original.) DuPree, 353 Ill. App. 

3d at 1044, 820 N.E.2d at 566, quoting 

Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 512-13, 48 

L. Ed. 2d 126, 135, 96 S. Ct. 1691, 1697 

(1976). 

The DuPree court further observed the stun belt did not 

seem to affect the defendant's decision not to testify and no 

evidence suggested the jury was aware of the stun belt. The 

court concluded the failure to hold a Boose hearing did not 

contribute to defendant's conviction and the plain-error doctrine 

did not apply. DuPree, 353 Ill. App. 3d at 1044, 820 N.E.2d at 

566. 

After the Crutchfield and DuPree decisions, the Third 

District acknowledged the two decisions and expressly disagreed 

with their holdings in People v. Buckner, 358 Ill. App. 3d 529, 

532-33, 831 N.E.2d 676, 679 (2005). The Buckner court, considering the claims of a defendant who was restrained by a stun belt 

during trial, held the following: 
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"We do not agree with the analysis of 

the Fifth District on this particular issue. 

 Supreme Court Rule 615 makes it clear that 

plain errors affecting substantial rights may 

be noticed by an appellate court. 134 Ill. 

2d R. 615(a). Moreover, the second prong of 

the plain[-]error doctrine may be invoked in 

circumstances where, despite the absence of 

objection, application of the rule is necessary to preserve the integrity and reputation 

of the judicial process. People v. Herrett, 

137 Ill. 2d 195, 561 N.E.2d 1 (1990)." 

Buckner, 358 Ill. App. 3d at 533, 831 N.E.2d 

at 679. 

The Buckner court further found "the indiscriminate use of a stun 

belt, a device that can deliver an 8-second, 50,000-volt shock 

[citation], offends the dignity of our courts." Buckner, 358 

Ill. App. 3d at 533, 831 N.E.2d at 680. The Buckner court last 

concluded the application of waiver is an administrative limitation and not a jurisdictional constraint, and even if it were, 

"to find this error to be procedurally defaulted, our concern 

over the indiscriminate use of this type of restraint would lead 

us to relax the waiver rule in this case." Buckner, 358 Ill. 

App. 3d at 533, 831 N.E.2d at 680. 

We have considered the decisions of the Third and Fifth 

Districts and conclude plain error does not automatically occur 

when shackles are used without a Boose hearing. We find the 

Third District decisions are unconvincing. Allen and Brown both 
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relied on Doss for their plain-error findings. Such reliance is 

undermined by the author of Doss, who asserts the plain-error 

finding in Doss was based not on the second prong of the plainerror doctrine but because the evidence was closely balanced. 

See Brown, 356 Ill. App. 3d at 1091, 828 N.E.2d at 355 (Schmidt, 

J., dissenting). Although the Doss court did not explicitly 

state the reasons for its plain-error determination, Justice 

Schmidt's assertion in Brown finds support in Doss's rationale 

that the need to protect the Doss defendant's right to appear 

innocent was especially significant given the defense's mistakenidentity theory. See Doss, 347 Ill. App. 3d at 428, 807 N.E.2d 

at 705. 

In addition, the Buckner court did not expressly find 

either prong of the plain-error rule was satisfied. In disagreeing with the Fifth District, the Buckner court simply asserted 

"Supreme Court Rule 615 makes it clear that plain errors affecting substantial rights may be noticed by an appellate court" and 

the second prong of the plain-error rule could be invoked when 

necessary to preserve the integrity and reputation of the judicial process. Buckner, 358 Ill. App. 3d at 533, 831 N.E.2d 680. 

 We believe this is a mischaracterization of the plain-error 

rule. It is well established that to establish the second prong, 

one must show "the error is so fundamental and of such magnitude 

that the accused was denied the right to a fair trial." People 

v. Williams, 193 Ill. 2d 306, 348-49, 739 N.E.2d 455, 477 (2000); 

see also People v. Johnson, 208 Ill. 2d 53, 64, 803 N.E.2d 405, 

411-12 (2003); Armstrong, 183 Ill. 2d at 151, 700 N.E.2d at 969. 

 The necessity to preserve the integrity and reputation of the 
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judicial process is a purpose of the doctrine, not a lone, 

triggering factor for its implementation. See Williams, 193 Ill. 

2d at 348, 739 N.E.2d at 477 (stating a purpose of the plainerror rule is to "preserve the integrity and the reputation of 

the judicial process"). 

Moreover, we need not, as the Buckner court did, 

forgive the procedural defect because of "concern over the 

indiscriminate use of this type of restraint." Buckner, 358 Ill. 

App. 3d 533, 831 N.E.2d at 680. The Buckner decision, as well as 

other decisions of the Third District, was considering the 

standard operating practice of the Will County sheriff to force 

the use of electronic stun belts in court. See, e.g., People v. 

Martinez, 347 Ill. App. 3d 1001, 1003, 808 N.E.2d 1089, 1090 

(2004). We do not condone the use of leg shackles absent the 

requisite findings under Boose. We also note the use of leg 

irons in this case does not rise to the same offensiveness or 

extremity as the indiscriminate use of a stun belt, which, when 

activated, incapacitates the wearer "up to 45 minutes and causes 

immediate and uncontrollable defecation and urination." Martinez, 347 Ill. App. 3d at 1006, 808 N.E.2d at 1093 (McDade, J., 

specially concurring). 

We do not decide whether Buckner, rather than 

Crutchfield or DuPree, reached the correct decision as to the 

stun belt. However, we agree with Crutchfield and DuPree to the 

extent those decisions show the shackling of a defendant without 

a Boose hearing does not automatically amount to plain error. 

Without objecting and preserving the issue for review, the 

defendant must show the evidence was closely balanced or "the 
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error was so serious it affected the fairness of his trial and 

challenged the judicial process's integrity." People v. Thompson, 359 Ill. App. 3d 947, 951, 835 N.E.2d 933, 936 (2005). 

In this case, defendant did not meet his burden. 

Defendant does not argue the evidence is closely balanced. Such 

an argument would fail. The State presented the testimony of two 

police officers, who both testified defendant possessed and then 

ingested two clear bags that contained a white substance. 

Johnson, defendant's ex-girlfriend, disputed testimony that 

defendant fell on the bed. She also testified, however, she was 

not in the bedroom, but in the doorway, the bed was not made, and 

she did not see part of the search. 

Defendant also has not shown prejudice. Although the 

record shows the prosecutor could see the leg irons, the record 

also shows the trial judge stepped from his bench and was satisfied the leg irons were not noticeable by the jury. Defense 

counsel repositioned himself and was similarly satisfied. 

Nothing indicates defendant's decision not to testify was influenced in any way by the leg shackles. Moreover, defendant makes 

no argument that the leg shackles prevented defendant from 

assisting in his defense. 

III. CONCLUSION 

Defendant failed to establish either prong of the 

plain-error doctrine. We find defendant forfeited consideration 

of his argument on appeal and affirm the trial court's judgment. 

Affirmed. 

APPLETON and MYERSCOUGH, JJ., concur.