NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

JASMAINE H., Appellant,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, M.S., M.S., M.S., Appellees.

No. 1 CA-JV 21-0101 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. JD36739

The Honorable Michael J. Herrod, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Denise L. Carroll Esq., Scottsdale

By Denise Lynn Carroll

Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Doriane F. Neaverth

Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety

FILED 9-23-2021
JASMAINE H. v. DCS et al.

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Randall M. Howe delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Judge Brian Y. Furuya and Judge Michael J. Brown joined.

H O W E, Judge:

¶1 Jasmaine H. (“Mother”) appeals the juvenile court’s order 

terminating her parental rights to Mk. S. and Ma. S., born in March 2017, 

and Mt. S., born in November 2018. For the following reasons, we affirm.1

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 We view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the 

juvenile court’s order. Demetrius L. v. Joshlynn F., 239 Ariz. 1, 2 ¶ 2 (2016). 

Mother has abused substances since the age of 13 and has used marijuana 

significantly since 18. The Department of Child Safety became involved 

with Mother in 2017 when Mk. S. and Ma. S. were born substance-exposed. 

It offered her substance-abuse treatment, but she failed to engage in the 

service and was closed out unsuccessfully. 

¶3 In April 2018, Father attempted to strangle Mother, who was 

pregnant. Police intervened and charged Father with aggravated assault. 

Three months later and while still pregnant, Mother threatened suicide, and

Father responded by choking her to unconsciousness. Police transported 

her to a psychiatric recovery center where the examining nurse found that 

she had injuries consistent with strangulation. After her stay in the recovery 

center, she reconciled with Father.

¶4 In November 2018, Mt. S. was born substance-exposed. The 

Department implemented a present danger plan that excluded Father from 

the home and identified a responsible adult as the children’s full-time 

caregiver. It then petitioned for an in-home dependency because of 

Mother’s substance abuse, mental-health issues, and domestic violence, and 

the juvenile court adjudicated the children dependent.

1 Mother is also the biological parent of M.R., born in December 2009. 

The juvenile court dismissed the dependency as to her, however, after she 

was returned to her biological father. Additionally, Talib S., the biological 

father (“Father”) to Mk. S., Ma. S., and Mt. S., is not a party to this appeal.
JASMAINE H. v. DCS et al.

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¶5 In January 2019, Mother and Father engaged in another 

physical altercation. The police arrested Father for outstanding warrants 

and Mother obtained an order of protection against him. The Department 

permitted the children to remain in the home so long as Mother did not 

allow Father into the home or have unsupervised visits with the children.

The Department also provided a Family Preservation Team that worked to 

educate Mother about domestic violence. At the completion of the service, 

she continued to minimize Father’s behaviors, and within the month, she 

and Father had again engaged in domestic violence. Consequently, she was

admitted for mental-health observation and the children were placed in the 

care of relatives. The Department took legal custody of the children and 

placed them with a maternal aunt and uncle. It also conducted a Rapid 

Response assessment of the children and found that Mk. S. was autistic and 

nonverbal and that Ma. S. was developmentally delayed.

¶6 The Department required that Mother resolve her substanceabuse, mental-health, and domestic-violence issues and demonstrate that 

she could protect her children from unsafe caregivers before she could 

reunify with her children. To achieve these goals, it provided her urinalysis 

testing, substance-abuse treatment, psychological evaluations after 30 days 

of sobriety, parent-aide services that included a domestic-violence 

component, supervised visitation, and requested that she refer herself for 

domestic-violence counseling. 

¶7 In February 2019, she checked into a five-day inpatient 

substance-abuse-treatment program where she admitted that she used 

marijuana, used cocaine bi-monthly, and “occasionally” used Adderall.

After discharge, she declined to engage in the recommended out-patienttreatment program and consistently tested positive for marijuana, having 

received a medical marijuana card for chronic pain in March 2019.

¶8 In August 2019, Mother submitted to a psychological 

evaluation with Dr. Leslie Montijo-Tai. Dr. Montijo-Tai diagnosed her with 

post-traumatic stress disorder, unspecified personality disorder with 

borderline and narcissistic traits, and cannabis-use disorder. She found that 

Mother still lacked an understanding about the dangers of domestic 

violence and that her untreated mental-health and substance-abuse issues 

impaired her ability to build a healthy emotional connection with the 

children and meet their needs.

¶9 In fall 2019, Mother referred herself to counseling through her 

primary care provider and took an online class about the history of 

addiction to address her substance abuse. In March 2020, she obtained 
JASMAINE H. v. DCS et al.

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another order of protection against Father. The Department commended 

her progress and implemented a reunification plan for her and the children 

in April 2020, including unsupervised visits. After she assured the 

Department and her Family Reunification Team that she had “no 

interactions with Father,” it moved to change the children’s physical 

custody to Mother in June 2020.

¶10 Days later, however, the Department received a “taunting” 

video that showed Father with the children the previous weekend. Mother 

initially denied the event. When showed the video, however, she admitted 

allowing Father into the home because she did not consider him a safety 

threat and he had a right to see his children. The Department therefore 

withdrew its motion to change custody, requested a change in case plan to 

severance and adoption, which the court granted later that month, and 

moved to terminate Mother’s parental rights on the 15 months in out-ofhome placement ground.

¶11 The Department continued to offer Mother urinalysis drug 

testing, supervised visits with the children, and referred her for another 

psychological evaluation with Dr. Stephanie Leonard, to determine 

whether she would benefit from additional reunification services. Dr. 

Leonard found that Mother still presented the same mental-health 

diagnosis from her earlier evaluation. She reported that although Mother 

had completed her services, her emotional issues prevented her from 

applying the skills she had learned, and therefore “impacted her ability to 

[protect the] children.” She opined that Mother had already received

reasonable services to assist her and that any additional time to 

demonstrate the required behavioral changes could “negatively impact the 

children.” Meanwhile, the children thrived in their placement with their 

aunt and uncle, who met all their needs, complied with the safety plan, and 

were willing to adopt all three children.

¶12 The court began a four-day severance trial in January 2021. 

The Department’s case manager testified that while Mother had 

substantially completed services, she had simply “gone through the 

motions” and failed to make the required behavioral changes necessary to 

reunify with her children. He stated that severance would serve the 

children’s best interests because it allowed them to be adopted by their aunt 

and uncle. Furthermore, Drs. Leonard and Montijo-Tai agreed that 

Mother’s lack of insight about her involvement with domestic violence and 

substance abuse would create continued emotional difficulties for her and 

affect her ability to be a safe caretaker for the children.
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¶13 While Mother testified that she was not currently abusing 

marijuana, she admitted that she used marijuana during her current 

pregnancy despite being warned that it presented risks to the unborn child. 

While she testified that she had addressed her domestic violence during her 

services, she admitted that she did not feel threatened by Father and denied 

having been abused by him. Her only concern was that the children would 

mirror some of his behaviors.

¶14 The juvenile court terminated Mother’s parental rights on the 

15 months in out-of-home placement ground. It found that despite diligent 

services provided to Mother, she could not remedy her substance abuse, 

mental health, and domestic-violence issues. It found that she had “gone 

through the motions” of the services, had not changed her behavior, and 

that a substantial likelihood existed that she would not be capable of 

exercising proper and effective parental care and control in the near future.

The court further found that even if she had made improvements, they were 

insufficient and too little, too late. It then found termination in the 

children’s best interests because Mother was unable to handle the special 

needs of her children on a day-to-day basis and because termination would 

allow the aunt and uncle to adopt the children. Mother timely appeals. 

DISCUSSION

¶15 Mother argues that the court erred in terminating her rights 

and finding that termination was in the children’s best interests. A juvenile 

court’s termination determination is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. 

Mary Lou C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 207 Ariz. 43, 47 ¶ 8 (App. 2004). To 

terminate parental rights, the juvenile court must find by clear and 

convincing evidence the existence of at least one statutory ground under 

A.R.S. § 8−533 and by a preponderance of the evidence that termination 

would be in the child’s best interests. A.R.S. § 8–533(B); Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 

66(C); Jennifer S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 240 Ariz. 282, 286 ¶ 15 (App. 2016). 

Because the juvenile court is in the best position to weigh the evidence, 

observe the parties, judge the credibility of witnesses, and resolve disputed 

facts, Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec. v. Oscar O., 209 Ariz. 332, 334 ¶ 4 (App. 2004), 

we will affirm a termination decision unless no reasonable evidence 

supports it, Xavier R. v. Joseph R., 230 Ariz. 96, 100 ¶ 11 (App. 2012). 

¶16 To terminate parental rights for 15 months in an out-of-home 

placement, the juvenile court must find clear and convincing evidence that 

(1) the Department made diligent efforts to provide appropriate 

reunification services; (2) the child has been in an out-of-home placement 

for a cumulative total period of 15 months or longer under court order; (3) 
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the parent has been unable to remedy the circumstances that caused the 

child to be in an out-of-home placement; and (4) a substantial likelihood 

exists that the parent will be incapable of exercising proper and effective 

parental care and control in the near future. A.R.S. § 8–533(B)(8)(c). 

¶17 Reasonable evidence supports the juvenile court’s 

termination of Mother’s parental rights. The children have been in out-ofhome placement for more than 15 months. The Department diligently 

provided Mother with services, including two psychological evaluations, 

outpatient substance abuse treatment, parent-aide services, dialectical 

behavior therapy, supervised and unsupervised visits, and domesticviolence counseling. 

¶18 Mother, though, has been unable to remedy the circumstances 

that caused the out-of-home placement and a substantial likelihood exists 

that she will be incapable of exercising proper and effective parental care in 

the near future. Despite being diagnosed with cannabis-use disorder and 

referred to urinalysis testing and substance-abuse treatment, she refused 

outpatient substance-abuse treatment and continuously tested positive for 

marijuana. Although she took a class on the history of addiction in fall 2019, 

it did not satisfy her substance-abuse treatment referral and did not change 

her behavior. In fact, she continued to use marijuana while pregnant, 

disregarding her doctor’s suggestion not to and warning that it would 

likely have negative health consequences on her unborn child. She also

failed to fully disclose her substance abuse in both of her psychological 

evaluations and continued to self-medicate with marijuana while rejecting 

medication to treat her mental-health issues. 

¶19 And Mother failed to adequately address her engagement in 

domestic violence. On multiple occasions, Father had choked her to the 

point that she lost, or was about to lose, consciousness. At the termination 

hearing, she continued to minimize Father’s actions and maintained that he 

had not physically abused her. Although she participated in domesticviolence classes and therapies, there were numerous reports of police 

involvement related to her and Father’s actions. Mother also disregarded 

the Department’s safety plan and her children’s safety by allowing Father 

into the home. Her reasoning for allowing Father into the home was only 

that he had “a right” to visit his children, thereby placing her and Father’s 

desires over the needs of her children’s. Evidence therefore supports the 

juvenile court’s order terminating Mother’s parental rights to Mk. S., Ma. 

S., and Mt. S.
JASMAINE H. v. DCS et al.

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¶20 Mother nonetheless argues that the Department failed to 

show that it made diligent efforts because it abandoned reunification 

services after it received Father’s taunting video. She claims that the court

abused its discretion in looking at Father’s video and not recognizing the 

work Mother had put in over the case’s duration. Contrary to Mother’s 

position, the video clearly and convincingly evidences that while Mother 

superficially followed the Department’s requirements, she failed to attain 

or regain the necessary skills to properly care for her children. 

¶21 Moreover, the Department is not required to offer every 

conceivable service to a parent. See Christina G. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 

227 Ariz. 231, 235 ¶ 15 (App. 2011). Nor is the Department required to 

undertake rehabilitative measures that are futile or lack a reasonable 

prospect of success. See Mary Ellen C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 193 Ariz. 

185, 192 ¶ 34 (App. 1999). Here, Mother demonstrated marked resistance to 

change, despite her participation in the services provided to her. 

¶22 Even so, the Department continued to provide supervised 

visits after the incident and referred Mother for a psychological evaluation 

with Dr. Leonard to determine what, if any, services would foster 

reunification. Dr. Leonard opined, however, that Mother had already 

received the services that would facilitate reunification and did not advise 

that any additional services were required. The court, therefore, did not err 

when it determined that the Department was not required to provide 

additional services. Mother’s argument that if additional reunification 

services had happened, she would have made the necessary changes is 

speculative and ignores her own failure to follow her treatment plan and to 

make the required changes throughout the dependency. 

¶23 Mother argues next that the trial court erred in finding that 

the Department proved by the preponderance of the evidence that 

termination served the children’s best interests. Termination of parental 

rights is in a child’s best interests if the child will benefit from the 

termination or will be harmed if the relationship continues. Alma S. v. Dep’t 

of Child Safety, 245 Ariz. 146, 150 ¶ 13 (2018). In determining whether the 

child will benefit from termination, relevant factors to consider include 

whether the current placement is meeting the child’s needs, an adoption 

plan is in place, and if the child is adoptable. Demetrius L., 239 Ariz. at 1, 

3–4 ¶ 12. 

¶24 Reasonable evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding 

that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best 

interests. The Department’s case manager testified that the children were in 
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an adoptable placement that were meeting their needs and special needs. 

Both Drs. Leonard and Montijo-Tai testified that because Mother has failed 

to address her substance abuse and lacked insight into her mental-health 

issues, she would be unable to meet the children’s needs and special needs 

if returned to her. The juvenile court, therefore, did not err in terminating 

Mother’s parental rights to Mk. S., Ma. S., and Mt. S. 

CONCLUSION

¶25 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.