UNITED STATES COU RT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ WALID MOAZ, Plaintiff- Appellant,

v. DENVER INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT; DENVER POLICE DEPARTMENT; CITY & COUNTY OF DENVER, Defendant s-Appellees. No. 18-1011 (D.C. No. 1:17- CV-00030-MSKNYW) (D. Colo.)

________________ _________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

________________ _________________ Before BACHARACH , PHILLIPS , and McHUGH , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ This appeal grew ou t of Mr. Walid Moaz’s allegations of discrimination as a limousine dri ver at the Denver Internationa l Airport. Mr. Moaz sued the Denv er International Airp ort, the Denver Poli ce Department, and the City and C ounty of Denver , invoking 42 U.S. C.

* We have determined that oral arg ument would not materially aid our consideration of the a ppeal. Thus, we have decided the appeal b ased on the briefs. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). This order and judgme nt does not constitut e binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and colla teral estoppel. But our order and judg ment may be cited fo r its persuasive valu e under Fed. R. App. P. 32.1(a) and 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A). FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### August 23, 2018
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court2 §§ 1981, 1983, 1985, an d 12203, along with st ate tort law. The federal district court dismissed the amen ded complaint, h olding that

 the court lacked subject-matte r jurisdiction ov er the claims against the police department and

 the other causes of act ion failed to state a claim on which rel ief can be granted. We affirm.
1. Mr. Moaz’s attack on the dis trict judge does not support re versal. Scattered within Mr. Moaz’s open ing brief are various attacks o n the district judge. For example, Mr. Moaz accuses the district judg e of unspecified ethical lapses designed to protect the City and Cou nty of Denver. These accusati ons are apparently ba sed on the rulings t hemselves, but they do not bear a ny evidence of uneth ical conduct. As a re sult, we reject Mr. Moaz’s accusations as a basis for reversal. 2. The district court properly dismissed the claims against th e Denver Police Department. The district court ruled that it lacked subject-matter jurisdi ction over the claims against the Denver Police Department. This ruling wa s based on the allegations in the amended complaint. In considering this r uling, we engage in de novo revie w, crediting the alle gations in the amen ded complaint. See Satterfield v. Malloy , 700 F.3d 1231, 1234 (10th Cir. 2012) (de novo review); Ruiz v. McDonnell , 299 F.3d 1173, 1180 (10th Cir. 2002) (presuming the truth of the allegations in the complaint). Enga ging in3 de novo review, we conclude that the claims against the police department were properly dismissed because the police department is not a separate entity. See Martinez v. Winner , 771 F.2d 424, 444 (10th Cir.) (holding that the Denver Police Department is no t a separate entity that can be sued), modified on other grounds , 778 F.2d 553 (10t h Cir. 1985), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Tyus v. Martinez , 475 U.S. 1138 (1986). 1
3. Mr. Moaz failed to state a v alid claim against the Denver International Airport or the City and County of Denver. The district court also dismisse d the causes of action against the Denver Internati onal Airport and the City and County o f Denver. For these causes of action, the court ruled that the amended complaint fa iled to state a claim on which re lief can be granted. For the dismissal of these causes of action, we engage in de no vo review. Satterfield v. Malloy , 700 F.3d 1231, 1234 ( 10th Cir. 2012). In conducting de novo revi ew, we consider whet her the amended comp laint includes enough factual matter to state a plausible claim for r elief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662 , 678 (2009). We apply this standar d to the causes of action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 1985. 2 For these causes of actio n, Mr. Moaz had to link

1 The district court characteriz ed this pleading defect as juri sdictional, and Mr. Moaz does not challenge t his characterization. Thus, we need not decide whether the pleading defect was jurisdictional. 2 Though an attorney f iled the amended co mplaint, Mr. Moaz subsequently appeared pro se.4 the mistreatment to the en tity’s policy or custom. See Mocek v. City of Albuquerque , 813 F.3d 912, 933 ( 10th Cir. 2015) (42 U.S.C. § 1983); Randle v. City of Aurora , 69 F.3d 441, 446 n.6 (10th Cir. 1995) (42 U.S.C. § 1981); Owens v. Haas , 601 F.2d 1242, 1247 (2d Ci r. 1979) (42 U.S.C. § 1985). In the amended complaint, Mr. Moaz stated in detail how he had been subjected to discrimination. But he did not link the discrimina tion to any policies or customs by the Denver International A irport or the City and County of Denver. Instead, he included only a conclusory allega tion filled with buzz words from t he applicable case la w, stating that the defendants “were acting pursuant to municip al/county custom, policy, decis ion, ordinance, regulation, widespread habit, usage, or practice.” R . at 142, 146. This concluso ry allegation does not withstand dismissal. Mocek v. City of Albuquerque , 813 F.3d 912, 934 ( 10th Cir. 2015). Mr. Moaz has als o invoked 42 U.S.C. § 12203. This section prohi bits retaliation for an allegation o f discrimination under the Ameri cans with Disabilities Act. But Mr. Moaz has not ide ntified any past alle gations of discrimination under the American s with Disabilities Act. Thus, Mr. Moaz has not stated a valid claim under § 12203. Finally, Mr. Moaz alleges that his state tort claims should ha ve been analyzed under the Fed eral Tort Claims Act. But Mr. Moaz forfei ted this allegation by failing to pres ent it in district court. Richison v. Ernest Grp.,5 Inc. , 634 F.3d 1123, 1127–28 (10th Cir. 2011). We could ordinarily consider this allega tion under the plain-er ror standard. But Mr . Moaz has not invoked the plain-error standa rd. As a result, we decline t o consider this allegation. Id. 4. The district court did not err in denying Mr. Moaz’s motion s for appointment of counsel. In district court, Mr. Moaz filed four motions for appointment of counsel; and the district cour t declined to appoint counsel. 3 He challenges these rulings, a nd we conclude that the district court did not err in denying appointment of counsel. In addressing the rulings, we apply the abuse-of-discretion st andard.
Toevs v. Reid , 685 F.3d 903, 916 (10th Cir. 2012 ). We start with the scope of the district court’s author ity: The court cannot appoint cou nsel; instead, the court can only ask an attorney to take the case. Rachel v. Troutt , 820 F.3d 390, 396–97 (10th Cir. 2016). In deci ding whether the district court acted within its discretion, “we consider the merits of t he claims, the nature of the claims, [the claima nt’s] ability to present the c laims, and the complexity of the issues.” Id. at 397. The district court con sidered these factors and declined to req uest legal representation f or Mr. Moaz. This deci sion was reasonable :

3 The district court expressly r uled on the first three motions . For the fourth motion, the court did not expressly rule. As a result, t he fourth motion became moot whe n the district court dismissed the action

.6 Each year, the district court receives hundreds of requests for legal representation a nd only a small number of attorneys are available to accept these request s. Accordingly, the district c ourt must use discretion in deciding w hich cases warrant a request f or counsel. To do otherwise woul d deprive clearly deserving litigants of an opportunity to obta in legal representation. The dilemma is unfortunat e for litigants like [Mr. Moaz]. But the dilemma was not the district cour t’s fault; that dilemma was th e product of the court’s lack of authority to compel legal representation or to reimburse attorneys for their time.
Id. at 397. Accordingly, we conclude t hat the district court did no t abuse its discretion in declining to r equest counsel for Mr. Moaz. 5. We grant leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Every litigant must pa y the filing fee. We ordinarily require p ayment with the initiation of an appeal. 28 U.S.C . § 1915(a)(1). But a n appellant can postpone the paymen t when we grant leav e to proceed in form a pauperis. See id. Mr. Moaz requests this status, and we grant his request becaus e he is indigent and does no t have enough money to pay the filing fee. 6. We deny Mr. Moaz’s motion to appoint counsel for the appeal
. Mr. Moaz has also asked us to a ppoint counsel in the appeal. W e lack authority to appoint counsel; inst ead, we can only request coun sel to represent Mr. Moaz. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). In d eciding whether to request counsel, we must deci de whether the underl ying issues are suffi ciently7 complex to justify asking an attorney to take this appeal. See Rachel v.
Troutt , 820 F.3d 390, 397 (10th Cir. 2016). We don’t be lieve that the y are. Mr. Moaz states that English is his second langu age, but he ha s done a commendable job of ex plaining his allegati ons and arguments. We have little basis to justify an effort to recruit counsel for Mr. Mo az among the hundreds of other app eals prosecuted by pr o se litigants. As a result, we deny Mr. Moaz’s motion for appointment of counsel. 7. We deny Mr. Moaz’s motion fo r leave to file a supplemental brief. Mr. Moaz also moves for leave to file a supplemental brief, addressing matters that took place after his attorney had filed the amended complaint. But even with the suppl emental brief, we could addre ss only the district court’s ruling and that ruling could not have accounte d for matters arising after the filing of the amended complaint. Thus, we den y Mr. Moaz’s motion for leave to file a supplemental brief. Entered for the Court

Robert E. Bacharach Circuit Judge