### IN THE S UP REME COURT OF TENNESS EE AT NAS HVILLE Fe brua ry 3, 200 5 S es sio n
STATE OF TENNESS EE v . PAUL DENNIS REI D, JR.

Aut om at icApp e al fr omth e Co ur t o f Cr im ina l A ppe als Circuit Court

for Montgom ery C ounty No. 38887 John H. Gasaw ay, III, Jud ge

No. M2001- 02753-SC-DDT-D D - F iled May 24, 2005

The de fendant, Paul Denni s Reid, J r., wa s convicted of two counts of pre meditated first de g ree murder, two c ounts of espec ially ag g ravated kidn ap p ing, and one count of espec ially

ag g ravated robbery . I n imposing a de ath sentenc e for eac h count of fir st deg ree murder, the jury found three ag g ravating c ircumstance s, i.e., that the defe ndant was previously convicted of one or more f elonies wh os e statut ory

e le me nts inv olv e d th e us e of vio le nc e to the pe rs on , th a t th e mur de rs we re e sp e c ia lly heinous, at ro ci ous or cr

uel in that they

involved torture or

serious phy sical abuse bey ond that

n ec es s ar y t o p ro d u ce d ea t h , an d t h att h e m u rd er s we re co m m i t t ed fo r t h e p u r p o s e o f a v o i d i n g, interfe ring with, or preve nting a lawful a rre st or prosec ution of the defe ndant or another, had been proven be y ond a re asonable doubt. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39- 13-204(i)( 2), (5) , (6) ( 2003). I n addition, the ju ry fo u n d that the evidenc e of a g g ravating c ircumstance s outweig hed evide nce of mitigating circ umstances be y ond a re asonable doubt. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204( c) ( 2003). The Court of Criminal Appeals af

firmed the c onvictions and the death sentence s.

After the ca se wa s dockete d in this C ourt, we e ntere d an orde r identifying nume rous i ssues for or al arg ument. We now hold as follows: 1) the trial court did not err in finding that the def endant wa s competent to stand trial; 2) the trial court did not er r in excluding evidenc e during the compete ncy hearing; 3) the trial court did not err in re fusing to hold a new c ompetency hearing on the basis that

a cour t-appointed e x pert wa s biased; 4) the e vidence was s u ff i ci en t to support the defe ndant’s

c on vic tio ns ; 5) the tr ia l c ou rt didno t e rr

in d e nying the de fe nd a nt’ s mo tio n to dis mis s on the ba sis that the a g g ra vatin g c ir c ums ta nc e s we re no t sta te d in the ind ic tme nt; 6) the tr ia l cou rt didno t e rr

in allowing the prosec ution to ame nd the indictment; 7) the trial court did not commit reversible e rror in limi ting e x trinsic evidenc e of inc onsistent statements; 8) the e vidence was suff icient to support the ag g ravating c ircumstance s found by the jury ; 9) the death sentence s were not arbitrary or disproportionate a s imposed in this case ; 10) the evide nce w as suffic ient to support the jury ’s finding that evidenc e of a g g ravating circumstance s outweig hed evide nce of mitigating circ umstances; 11) the ca pital sentencing statutes are not unconstituti onal on the b as i s t h at t hey allow evidenc e to be admitted in violation of due proce ss and conf rontation under the United S tates Constitut ion; 12) the tri al co u rt d i d n o t err i n ad m i t t i n g p h o t o gra p h s o f th e vi ct i m s at t h e cr i m e s ce n e d u ri n g s en t en ci n g;T he o wner of t he st o re t est i f i ed t hat $1
, 5 6 5

. 5 8 had be en st o l en. 1

-2- 13 ) th e tr i a l c o u r td i d n o tc o m m i tr e v e r s i b l e e rr o r i n f a i l i n g t o c h ar g e t h e j u r y

o n t h e “ c a t c h- a ll” statutory provision a s to mitig ating circ umstances; and 14) the trial court did not err in de ny ing a new trial based on prosec utorial misconduct during sentenc ing. We a lso ag ree with the Court of Criminal Appea ls’ conclusions with respe ct to the re maining issues, the rele v ant portions of which a re inc lud e d inthe app e nd ix to this op ini on

. Ac c or din g ly , the Cou rt of Cr imi na l A pp e a ls’ jud g me nt i s aff irmed.

Te nn. C ode Ann . § 39 -1 3- 20 6( a) (1 ); Judg m e nt of t he Co ur t o f Cr im ina l A ppe als Affir m e d

E. R I L EY A NDE R S ON , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which F RAN K F. D R OW OT A , III , C.J ., and J ANI CE M. H OL DER and W I L L I AM M. B ARKE R , J J ., joined. A DOL PH O A. B I RCH , J R ., J ., filed a separ ate c oncurring/dissenting opinion.

Jame s A . Si mmo ns a ndTh oma s F . B loo m, Nashv ille, Te nn e sse e , f or the Ap pe lla nt, Paul D e nn is Reid, J r.
Paul G. Summers, Atto rn ey Ge nera l and Reporter ; Michael E. Moore , Solicitor Genera l; J ennife r L . Smit h, Associate Deputy Attorney Gene ral; J ohn W. Carney , J r., Dist rict Att orney Gene ral; and Arthur F . Bie ber, A ssistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the Appellee , State of Tenne ssee.

OP IN ION

The de fendant, Paul Dennis Reid, Jr., was indicted for two c ounts of preme ditated murder , tw o c ou nts of fe lon y mur de r du ri ng the pe rp e tr a tio n of a ro bb e ry , tw o c ou nts of es peciall y ag g ravated kidnapping , and one c ount of ag g ravated robbery

. The evidenc e prese nted during trial is summariz ed as f

ollows.

G uilt P has e

On t h e n i gh to f A p ri l 2 3 , 1 9 9 7 , An gel a H o l m es , age t we n t y -o n e, an d M i ch el l e M a ce , age six tee n , wer e wor

king at a B askin-Robbins store on Wilm a Rudolph Bouleva rd in Clarksville, Tenne ssee. The store re g ularly closed at 10:00 p.m. At around 10:10 p.m., Cra ig Ma ce a rrived at the store to pick up his sister, Michelle. He noticed that Ang ela Holmes’ car was in the parking lot and that the lig hts inside the store wer e on. He enter ed the store throug h an unlocke d door and f ound no one inside. Mac e ca lled 911.

Offic ers we re dispatc hed to the sce ne and se arc hed the store. They found the cash r eg ister dr a we r e mpty , e xce pt fo r som e c oin s, a nd a sa fe in an of fi c e wi th the top re mov e d. Th e vic tim s’ 1 purses we re f

ound at the store; no money had bee n taken f

rom the purse s. A mop and bucke t were found in the customer

are a, and the fre ezer wa s left open.D e te c tive R o b e rt M ill e r te stif ie d th a t th re e d iff

e re n t r o u te s c o u ld b e tak e n to tra v e l f ro m B a sk in-R o b b ins to 2
D u n b a r C a v e p a rk . T h e d riv ing ti m e fo r th e thr e e ro u te s ra n g e d fro m fo u r to fi v e m inu te s.
-3- On the morning of April 24, 1997, th e b o d ies of Ang ela Holmes and Michelle Mac e we re found at the D unbar Cave State Natural Ar ea in Montg omery County , Tenne ssee, whic h was betwee n 2.1 and 3.6 miles fr o m the B askin-Robbins store. Both victims had suff ere d deep sta

b 2

wo un ds to the ir ne c ks , a s we ll a s sta b wo un ds , c uts , a nd abr a sio ns to oth e r pa rt s o f t hei r bodie s. Both ha d bled to death.

L av an d a Z immerman testified that she ha d visited with the victims at the Baskin-Robbins store fr om 9:20 p.m. until 10:00 p.m. on April 23, 1997. At one point , a man in his late twenties or

early thirties entere d the store a nd became “obnoxious ” an d “v ery loud” about the prices be fore le a vin g

. As Z imm e rm a n le ft the sto re a t 10 :00 p. m., sh e sa w a “ sh iny re d” c ar e nte r the pa

rking lot

. Although she testified that a photogra ph of t he defenda nt’s car – a 1997 re d, four- door F ord Escort – was “ consistent” with the ca r she ha d seen, she conc eded that she told a private inve stigator prior to trial that the car was “dar k reddish or maroon.” She also conc eded that she did not tell officer s about the ca

r whe n she wa s interviewe d in May of 1997.

Geor g e He rtenstein testified that he was driving to work at 9:59 p.m. on April 23, 1997, when he sa w a c ar dr ivi ng slo wl y on Ros sv ie w Roa d ne ar the B a skin- Rob bin s stor e . When He rt e ns te in attempted to pass the car , the ca r abr uptly turned onto Union Ha ll Road, which was one road a fter the e ntr a nc e to the B a skin- Rob bin s st or e . H e rt e ns te in t e sti fi ed tha t th e c ar w a s “ ide nti c a l” to photogr aphs of the de fendant’s car . On cr oss-examination, Hertenstein admitted that he conta cted police in J une of 1997 a fter he saw picture s of the de fendant’s car on the television ne ws . H e a lso acknow ledg ed that he told a private investig ator that the c ar he saw ha d t wo doors, wherea s the de fe nd a nt’ s c ar h a d f

ou r d oo rs

.
J erry Perdue, a friend of Michelle Mac e, testified that he saw a small red car in the B askinRobbins parking lot shortlyafte r 10:00 p.m. on April 23, 1997. He further testified that photog raphs of the de fendant’s car “could very well be” the car he saw in the par king lot. He acknow ledg ed that he tol d law enforce ment office rs t hat t he car he saw was a two-door hatchba ck but that he wa s no longe r sure . He a lso stated that he told office rs that the ca r had bla ck bumper s.

Elfrieda L ane te stified that she was a friend of the def endant a nd that she lived three miles from the B askin-Robbins store in Clarksville, Tennesse e. L ane te stified that the def endant c alled her “ once or

twice” a we ek fr om F ebrua ry to April of 1997 and that they discussed the de fendant’s eff ort to be re -hired at a Shoney ’s restaur ant. L ane te stified that the def endant wa s at her home on or about April 18, 1997, and that he had bee n driving a re d car . Acc ording to L ane, the defe ndant telephoned he r on April 24; he told her that he had pla nned to visit her the previous eve ning but that it had g otten too late.

B us ine ss r e c or ds revea le d th a t th e de fe nd a nt p ur c ha se d g a so lin e a t a Te xac o s ta tio n in Clarksville at 9:45 p.m. on April 23, 1997. The Tex aco station was 0.7 miles from L ane’ s home and-4-

0.9 miles from the B askin-Robbins store. A sign ed credit ca rd re ceipt showe d that the def endant purcha sed $11.95 worth of g asoline. Ha ndwriting experts confirme d that the s ignature on the rece ipt

wa s th e de fe nd a nt’ s. A c op y of the re c e ipt

wa s a lso fo un d inthe de fe nd a nt’ s w a lle t.

J ay Smit h and Shannon Ree ves testified that they saw a car near Dunbar Cave a round 10:30 p. m. o n th e nig ht o f Ap ri l 23 , 19 97

. Th e y we re a t the ho me of Smith’ s g ir lf

ri e nd , H oll y

Sc hmi dt, who lived ac ross the stree t from the Dunba r Cave e ntranc e and pa

rking lot. Smith testified that the

car was a red four- door and that he thoug ht it was “odd” be cause the ca r wa s not in a parking space

. Smit h, a friend of Miche lle Mace , conce ded that he ha d told officer s the ca r looked like seve ral makes of c ars, none of which matched the defe ndant’s ca r. Smith nonetheless testified that the ca r he saw was “consistent” wit h photogr aphs of the defendant’s car. Re eves te stified that he saw a ca r in the D u n b ar Ca v e p ark in g lo t. A lth o u g h h e c o u ld n o t ma k e o u t a n y d e tail s ab o u t the car , he noticed that the c ar’ s headlig hts were on and, at one point, chang ed fr om low to high beam.

Samero Z avar o, a ser ologist and D NA spec ialist with the Tenne ssee B ureau of I nvestig ation, testi fi ed that a D NA sample ta ken fr om blood found on the defe ndant’s lef t tennis shoe was

c on sis te nt w iththe DN A p ro fi le of An g e la Ho lme s. I n a dd iti on , a DN A sa mpl e take n f ro m sm a ll blood stains found on the rig ht tennis shoe was consistent with a mix ture of two or more donors f

rom which neither

Ang ela Holmes nor

Michelle Mac e could b e ex cluded. Z avar o testified that the pr ob abil ity

of se le c tin g a n u nr e la te d in div idu a l th a t w ou ld h a ve the sa me DN A p ro fi le a s th e sa mpl e on the def

endant’ s left shoe was one in 6,800 Caucasian individuals and one in 4,400 AfricanAmeric an individuals.
Meg han C lement, as associate direc tor of for ensic identity testing at L aboratory

Corporation of Am e ri c a (“ L abCo rp ” ), te sti fi e d ab ou t add iti on a l DNA te sti ng

. She te sti fi e d th a t th e DN A s a mpl e fo un d inthe blo odon the de fe nd a nt’ s le ft sh oe wa s c on sis tent

wi th the DN A p ro fi le of An g e la Holmes. The DN A sample found in the blo o d o n t he def endant’ s rig ht shoe did not ex clude the de fe nd a nt, An g e la Ho lme s or Mic he lle Ma c e

. Cle me nt te sti fi e d th a t a c omb ine d s ta tis tic a l a na ly sis

reve aled that the pr obability that the bl o o d fo u n d on the def endant’ s left shoe wa s from a pe rson oth e r tha n An g e la Ho lme s wa s on e in 1 ,8 10 ,0 00 in the Cauc a sian p op ulatio n, on e in 3 ,2 50 ,0 00 in the African- Americ an population, o n ein 4 , 9 5 0 , 0 0 0 in

th eSoutheastern Hispa nic population, and one in 4,520,000 in the Southwestern Hispanic population.

L inda Littlejohn, a fiber c omparison spec ialist with t he Tenne ssee B ureau of I nvestig ation, testified that fiber s found on the victims’ clothing wer e compa red to fibers in the de fendant’s car

. Acc o rd i n g t o L i t t l ej o h n , t h re e f i b er s fo u n d o n An gel a H o l m es ’ c l o t h i n g we re co nsistent with samples ta ke n f r o mt h e d e f

e n d a n t ’ s b a c k s e a ta n d f

l o o r m a t s

. S i m i l ar l y , e i g h tf i b e r s f o u n d o n M i c h e lle Mace ’s clothing and shoes we re consistent with f ibers from the def

endant’ s backse at, ca

rpet, a nd the edg e of the bac kseat. Littlejohn testi fied that it was “ a very rar e ca se that y ou find eleve n fibers that match one sour ce.” Moreove r, t he evidence showed t hat the floor mats found in the defe ndant’s ca r
wer e not standar d for the F ord Escort, but rather, ha d been pur chase d by the def endant at Wal-Mart on Marc h 25, 1997.-5-

L ittlejohn testi fied that she a lso analy zed photogr aphs of footprints found at B askin-Robbins and Dunba

r Cave, as well as nine pairs of shoe s belong ing to the de fendant. L ittlejohn concede d that the shoe prints did not match the de fendant’s shoes.

Two wi t n es s es testified that the de fendant had told them that he could make money by committing robbe ries. Da nny Tac kett testified that he wa s working with the defe ndant at Shoney ’s in J anuary

of 1997 whe n the def

endant sug g ested robbing a “f ast food plac e [in the] middle of the night” beca

use there wer e “no wi t n es s es

. ” Tac kett thought the de fendant was joking . L ikewise, J eff ery Potter testified that in J anuary of 1997, the defendant ex presse d dissatisfaction wit h his job

a n d s u g g e s t e d r o b b e r y a s a w a y t o m ak e m o n e y.

Th e e vid e nc e sh ow e d th a t th e de fe nd a nt w a s u ne mpl oy e d a ndha d v e ry lit tle mon e y

in h is chec king a ccount in the spring of 1997. Howeve r, L inda Patton, a friend of the de fendant, testified that shortly

afte r April 23, 1997, the defendant paid half of her air fare to tra vel to Nashville fr om Texas. Patton further testified that the defe ndant paid cash for her me als, lodg ing, and entertainment in Nashville.

Additional c ircumstantial evidenc e wa s introduced by the prosec ution. L oretto Diorio and her twe lve-y ear -old son, Stephen, testified that they believed the y

saw the de fendant at the Dunbar Cave park on Fe bruary 17, 1997; how ever , they wer e not 100% certain. Ba rbar a Jayroe te stified that sh e sa w the de fe nd a nt at th e Du nb ar C a ve pa rk on Ap ri l 8, 19 97 . Sh e a c kn ow le dg e d th a t sh e tol d the po lic e sh e wa s n ot sur e the de fe nd a nt wa s the sa me ma n s he sa w i n th e pa rk . M itc he ll Ro be rt s testified that the def

endant a sked hi m about getting re- hired at Shoney ’s i n late May or June of 1997. Acc ording to Roberts, the defe ndant was driving a small red ca

r and w as i n possession of a knife with a blade a

bout “eig ht or nine inche s long.”

Dr . Ch arl e s Harl an tes tifie d th a t he pe rf orme d th e auto ps ie s o n th e tw o v ic tim s, An g e la Holmes and Miche lle Mace

. Dr. Harlan testified that Holmes died as a result of a stab wound to her neck that went “a ll the way to her ba ckbone.” The wound, which was consistent with a knife bla de of eig ht or nine inche s, transec ted the ca rotid arte ry and jugula

r vein. Dr. Ha

rlan testified that Mace had suff ere d fourtee n stab wounds, including a fata l sta b wound in he r neck. D r. Ha rlan stated that a compound incision penetr ated Mace’ s backbone , consisted of three chang es i n direc tion, and wa s
c on sis te nt w ith a sa wi ng mot ion

. Ac c or din g to Dr

. Ha rl a n, bo th vic tim s wo uld ha ve take n f ive to fiftee n minutes to bleed to death a nd would have be en consc ious eig hty perc ent of that time.

Seve r a l w it n e s s e s te s ti f

ie d f o r th e d e f e n s e in th e g u il t p h a s e o f th e p r o c e e d in g

. Cath e rine Nay lor testified that she sa w a da rk re d or m aroon car in the parking lot of Baskin-Robbins at 9:48 p.m. on April 23, 199 7

. Ac co rd i n g to Nay lor, the ca r she sa w did not match photog raphs of the de fe nd a nt’ s c ar and wa s n ot a F or d E sc ort. T a mmy

Th omp so n a ndDu sti n K e lle r, stu de nts a t A us tin Peay University , testified that they wer e at B askin-Robbins at 9:50 p.m. on April 23, 1997, and that they wer e driving a 1993 re d Nissan S en t ra

. T h ey saw a man in Ba skin-Robbins with s houlderleng th hair wh o Thompson describe d as “sc rag g ly .” B oth Thompson and Keller testified that de fe nd a nt w a s n ot the ma n th e y sa w i n th e sto re that ni g ht.-6-

B arb ara Mc Willi a ms andMa

rt in McI nty

re , e mpl oy e e s a t Riv e rb e ndMa ximum Se c urity prison in N ashville, testified that they wer e in the parking lot of the Dunbar Cave park betwee n 10:50 and 11:30 p.m. on April 23, 1997. Both McWilliams and McI ntyre te stified that they did not see any other c ars in the pa

rking lot during that time.

Dr. Willi am N. S hields, a professor of biology , testified for the defense as an expert in DNA analy sis a nd zoology and disag ree d with the results of the c ombined statistical analy sis performed by L abCorp. In Shields’ view, the proba bilitythat a per son other than Angel a Ho l m es wa s the

source of the blood on the de fendant’s left shoe wa s betwee n one in 122,000 and one in 12,000,000 in the Cauca sian population. His “best estimate” was one in 1,200,000. Shields also testi fied that there was no rea son for L abCorp to have mix ed the blood st ains found on the de fendant’s rig ht shoe befor e conduc ting its ana ly sis.

After considering the evidenc e, the jury convicted the defe ndant of two c ou n t s of preme ditated first deg reemurder, two c ounts of felony murder, two counts of espe cially ag g ravated kid na pp ing , a nd on e c ou nt of

e sp e c ia lly

a g g ra vate d r ob be ry . T he tr ia l c ou rt me rg e d th e tw o c ou nts of fe lony murder w ith the two counts of pre meditated first de g ree murder. A sentenc ing he aring was the n h e ld f

or the jury to d e te rm ine the pu nis hme nt.

P e nal ty P has e The prose cution introduced te stimonyfrom seve ral of A ng ela Holmes’ family me mb e r s

. H er hu sb a nd , T ob ari s H olm e s, te sti fi e d th a t hi s w if e ’s mur de r “ c ha ng e d e ve ry on e ’s lif e ,” inc lud ing the ir inf a nt d aug hte r w ho “ wo uldne ve r kno w h e r m oth e r. ” He be lie ve d h e sh ou ld h a ve be e n a ble to pr ote c t hi s wi fe. Kim Campb e ll, An g e la ’s mothe r, te sti fi e d th a t sh e ha d a c los e re la tio ns hip wi th her daug hter a nd that she could no long er take family photogr aphs beca use there is a “void.” She further testified that the murde r had “ traumatized” he r y oung est son.

Th e pr os e c uti on a lso int

ro du c e d te sti mon y

fr om s e ve ra l of

Mi c h e l l eM a c e ’ s f

am i l y m e m be rs

. Craig Mace , the victim’s brother, te stified about t he ef fec t of his sister’s murder

on their fa mily . He testified that he had become “ang ry , sad, and fe arf ul,” and that his father wa s “totally destroy ed” by the killing. Connie Bla ck, the victim’s mot her, likew ise testified as to the impac t of the killing on the famil y

a ndits e ff

e c t onthe vic tim ’s old e r s ist e r. She te sti fi e d th a t sh e no lon g e r h a d h e r “ lit tle g irl any more” and that the killing c aused a “void inside her.”

Dr . Ch arl e s H arl a n a g a in d e sc ri be d th e wo un ds su ffered byAn g e la Ho lme s a ndMic he lle Mace . Both victims had massive in ci s i o n s t o their throats, a s well as other cuts, bruises, and abra sions. The wounds to the victi m s ’ t h ro at s h ad cut vital arteries a nd veins. The wounds w ere deep e noug h to also injure t he victim s’ s pines. Dr. Harlan r epeated his g uilt-phase testimony that the victims would have bled to de ath in five to fifte en minutes and that the victims would ha ve bee n conscious an d w o u ld

h a v e f e lt p a inf o r e ig h ty p e r c e n t o f

th a t t im e

. Ph o to g r ap h s d e p ic ti n g the

v i c t i m s ’ i n

j u r i e s w e r e i d e n t i f

i e d b y D r

. H ar l a n a n d s h o w n t o t h e j u r y.T h e d e fen d a n t’s co n v ic tio n s a n d d e a th se n te n c e s fo r th e se o ff e n se s h a v e b e e n a ff

irm e d o n d ire c t ap p e a l. S ta te 3

v. R ei d , 91 S.W

. 3 d 24 7 (T enn. 20 0 2 ).

-7- Finally , the prosec ution introduced evide nce that the defe ndant had two prior convic tions for f i r s td e g r e e m u r d e r a n d a

p r i o r c o n v i c t i o n f

o r e s p e c i a l l y a g g r a v a t e d r o b b e r y i n D a v i d s o n C o u n t y, 3 Tenne ssee. In addition, the defe ndant had one prior convic tion for ag g ravated robbe ry in Texas.

I n mitigation, the defenda nt prese nted ex tensive t estimony from mental he alth and medica l experts. Dr. Xa vier Ama dor, a c linical psy cholog ist, testifi ed t h at the def endant suff

ere d from mul tip le c on dit ion s: ch ro nic sc hizo ph re nia of the pa rano id ty pe , a cog nit ive dis or de r n ot o the rw ise specifie d, documented brain damag e, and mental illness a ssociated with br ai n d y s fu nction. Acc ording to Dr. Amador , the defe ndant also had persona lity chang e of a combined type ca used by head tr auma a nd char acte rized by ag g ressive and impulsi ve beha vior.

Dr. Ama dor desc ribed the de fendant’s famil y h i s t o ry , behavior al problems, and history of mental illness. The defe ndant had a documented history of head trauma, which i n cl u d ed s ev eral he a d in jurie s su ff

e re d inhis c hil dh oo d. Th e de fe nd a nt h a d b e e n d ia g no se d a s h a vin g br a in dy sfunction in 1964 and 1966 and psy chotic disorder s in 1978 and 1984. Dr. Ama dor stated that the defe ndant believe d that he has be en under g overnme nt surveillance since 1978:

There are sever al delusions that are org anized aroun d o n e central de lus ion . H e ha s the lon g -s ta nd ing be lie f that fo r ov e r tw e nty y e ars , h e ’ s b e e n u n d e r

c o n s t a n ts u r v e i l l a n c e b y a s e c r e tg o v e r n m e n ta g e n c y. Th e y vid e ota pe d h im, the y

tape d – a ud iot ape , the y bu g g e d h is c ar, his ho us e . H e ha d b e e n c ho se n fo r thi s su rv e ill a nc e he be lie ve s b e c a us e of so me sp e c ia l qu a lit ie s th a t he po sse sse s. Th e re la tio ns hip Mr . Re id ha s to the g ov e rn me nt ag e nc y that he b e lie ve s is do ing thi s to him is

ve ry mixe d. At

tim e s, he fe e ls t ortured and

. . . pa rano id a bo ut this

a g e nc y . A t othe r t ime[ s] , he talk s a bo ut h is g re a t lo y a lty

to this

a g e nc y

. . . . An d th is i s si mpl y th e cente r o r the c or e of his de lus ion a l be lie fs

.
Dr. Ama dor did not believe the defe ndant was malinge ring ; to the c ontrary , he stated that the defe ndant suffe red f

rom anosog nosia, a sy mptom of psy chosis in w hich a person with a brain injury compulsively

attempts to prove he or

she does not have a m en t al i llness. Although the de fenda nt “wa nts people to believe he is normal,” D r. Amador stated that the de lusions em erge d afte r hours of int e rv ie ws :

He wo u l d m ak e re fe re n ce s t o t h i n gs t h at h e c o u l d n ’t t al k ab o u t , t h i n gs he wa s not at liberty

to say and I had to spend seve ral hours listening to him talk about things that had nothi ng to do with the surveillance

. But e ventually , and this is over the course of the initial twenty hours of interview , I wa s able to docume nt and detail and c orrobor ate . . .-8- what other

people sa id he used to talk a b o u t

. That he w as under g o v e r n m e n ts u r v e i l l a n c e t w e n t y- f o u r h o u r s a d a y.
Patricia Allen, a speec h and lang uag e ther apist at Vande rbilt Medical Center in Nashville, testified that she e valuated the defe ndant for fiftee n hours in 1998. She testified that the def endant

wa s b o rn wi t h a d ef

o rm ed ea r a n d h ea ri n g l o s s

. S h e s t at ed t h at t h e d ef en d an t ’s s p ee ch an d l an gu age skills were consistent with one who has had “sig nificant a cquire d brain injury .” She testified that the def end an t had suff

ere d at least four

documented he ad injuries and that the injuries occur red during important developmenta l pe riods. The de fendant was unable to “problem solve in integ rate d

way s. ” Ac c or din g to All e n, the de fe nd a nt s c or e d “ ve ry po or to b e low a ve ra g e ” on te sts de sig ne d to

measure lang uag e and r easoning skills.

Dr . Pa me la

Au ble , a c lin ic a l ne ur op sy c ho log ist , te sti fi e d th a t sh e int e rv ie we d th e de fe nd a nt, conducte d testing, and revie wed the defe ndant’s medical a nd social histories. She testified that the defe ndant had be en struck in the head by his f ather in 1962 and that the def endant suff

ere d additional head injurie s from ac cidents that occ urre d in 1971, 1972, an d 1990. Dr. Auble testified that the defe ndant’s lef

t temporal lobe, the a

rea of the brain co n t ro l l i n g lang uag e and be havior, wa s “shrunke n and distorted.” A ccor ding to Dr . Auble, the br ain d amage cause d the def endant’ s p s y c h o ti c d is o r d e r

w ith d e lu s io n s a n d r e s u lt e d in imp a irme n ts in th e d e f e n d a n t’ s b e h a v io r

. D r. Auble explained that the def endant ha d di ff

i cult y thinking and that he exhibit ed ag g ression, psy chosis, and delusions. The defe ndant met the criteria for antisocial persona lity disorder, and he believed in a

g overnme nt plot to control and to kill him.

Dr. Auble testified that the defe ndant was not ma linge ring

. She explained that the defe ndant had a f amily history of mental illness and that doc umented evide nce of the def endant’ s delusions had “bee n around f

or a long time.” S h e t es t i fi ed that her te sting mea sured whe ther a person is fa

king emotional or m ental problems and that the m easuring scales were not elevated when applied to the defe ndant.

Dr. Robert Kessler, a

neurolog ist, testified that he examined MRI and PET s ca n s o f the defe ndant’s brain. He desc ribed seve ral a bnormalities in the defendant’s brain, including evidenc e of traumatic injury . Dr. Ke ssler explained that the folds of the lef t temporal lobe we re shr

unken and indicative of de cre ased f

unction. He stated that these kinds of brain lesions cause a condition that mimics schiz ophrenia

and bea r a strong statistical association to psy chotic disorder s.

I n rebuttal, the St ate offer ed the testimonyof Dr. William Bernet, a f orensic psy chiatrist, who testified that he be lieved the de fendant was maling ering . Although the defe ndant had an antisocia l persona lity disorder, Dr. Berne t believed the defe ndant had f abric ated his delusions in the past. He explained:

I

think that [ the def

endant] h as a pattern of maling ering

. . . sy mp to ms

. A n d b y ma li n g e r in g w h a t I me a n is th a t

– h e at times makes thing s up. At times he fabricates sympto m s. Malinge ring-9- g e ne ra lly me a ns tha

t y ou pr e te ndthat y ou ha ve so me thi ng wr on g wi th y ou rs e lf wh e n y ou re a lly

do n’ t.

Dr. B erne t co n ce d ed t hat the def endant ha d evidenc e of br ain damag e and a history of mental problems, including delusions. Dr. B erne t further testified, howeve r, that he “ couldn’t identify any relationship between [the defe ndant’s] brain i njury and the events that led t o his arre st and the killing of these two w omen.”

After deliberating, the jury imposed a death sentenc e for both counts of first degr ee mur der. The jury found that three ag g ravating circ umstances – the defe ndant was pre viouslyconvicted of one or more felonies whose statutory elements invol ved the use of violence to the person, the murder s
we re e sp e c ia lly

he in ou s, atr oci ou s o r c ru e l in that th e y inv olv e d to rtur e or

se ri ou s p hy sic a l a

bu se bey ond that nece ssary

to produce death, an d t h e m u rder s were committed for the pur pose of avoiding , interfe ring with, or preve nting a lawf ul arre st or prosec ution of the defe ndant or a nother – had bee n proven bey ond a rea sonable doubt. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204( i)(2), (5), ( 6) (2003)

. I n addition, the jury

found that the e vidence of ag g ravating circ umstances outweig hed evidenc e of mitigating circ umstances be y ond a re asonable doubt. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39- 13-204(c ) (2003)

.
On app e a l, the Cou rt

of Crimina l A pp e a ls a ff

ir me d th e de fe nd a nt’ s c on vic tio ns a ndde a th

se nte nc e s. Th e de fe nd a nt’ s a pp e a l w a s th e n auto ma tic a lly do c ke te d inthi s Co urt.

AN AL YSI S

Com petency Issues

Th e de fe nd a nt a

rg ue s th a t th e tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d in fi nd ing that he wa s c omp e te nt t o s ta ndtr ia l. I n making this a

rg ument, the defe ndant specific ally contends that the t rial court err ed by placing the burden of proof upon the de fense , by excluding evide nce, and by rely ing upon a

court-a ppointed

e xpe rt . T he State a sse rt s th a t th e tr ia l c ou rt corr e c tly fo un d th a t th e de fe nd a nt w a s c omp e te nt t o stand trial af

ter c onducting a full and f air c ompetency

proce eding

.
I n September of

1999, eig ht day s befor e the trial was to beg in, the defe ndant filed a motion for a determination of his competency . The trial c ourt g rante d the motion and held a competency hearing ove r the c ourse of three day s. W e b egi n our re view of this issue by summarizing the evidenc e in the compe tency hearing.

Dr. Pamela

Auble, a psy cholog ist, testified that she examined the defe ndant on six occa sions beg inning in January

of 1998. As part of her evaluation, Dr. Auble also interviewe d the def endant’ s family members a nd revie wed his m edica l rec ords, educational records, socia l histories, and other information. Acc ording to Dr. Auble, in January of 1999, the de fendant told her that he had bee n under surveillance by the g overnme nt f or over thirteen y ear s. The defe ndant also told Dr. Auble that the g overnme nt had ra diated his body wi t h a m agn etic fie ld, which allowed his a ctions to beD r

. Au bl e t es t i f i ed on be h al f of t h e def en dan t i n t h e pen al t y ph as e of t h e ea r l i er t r i al a s w el l

. Se e Rei d, 91 4
S. W

. 3d a t 268- 69.
-10- monitored on a re mote scre en by the Central Intellige nce A g ency . Acc ording to Dr. Aubl e, the defe ndant believe d that the surveillanc e method had be en deve loped by the Soviet Union.

Dr. Auble testified that conc erns a bout the defe n d an t ’s competency to stand trial emer g ed d u r i n g t h e d e f

e n d a n t ’ s p r i o r

tr i a l f o r t w o f i r s td e g r e e m u r d e r

c h ar g e s i n D a v i d s o n C o u n t y, Te nn e sse e

. Ac c or din g to inf orma tio n Dr . Aub le re c e ive d fr om de fe ns e c ou ns e l, a jury c on su lta nt, 4

a nda de fe ns e inv e sti g a tor , the def e nd a nt s e e me d p ri mari ly

c on c e rn e d w ith his sn a c ks a ndme a ls during the prior tria l, and he did not appea r to r ealize that he mig ht rec eive a death se ntence . The defe ndant believe d that the j udg e, jury , and attorney s wer e play ing roles during t he trial that had bee n scripted. He ref

used to discuss that case with his attorney , and he be lieved jurors ha d been try ing to make comments to him. Acc ording to Dr. Auble, the defe ndant also believe d that fing erprint and blo ode vid e nc e ha d b e e n p la nte d a g a ins t hi m.

As a result of her earlier examination, Dr

. Auble testified that the defe ndant wa s not competent to stand trial. She state d that the def endant be lieved that he was being monitored by the g overnme nt and that his attorney s wer e part of a script to kill him. She stated that the de fendant’s br a in d a ma g e fr om mul tip le inj urie s le ft the de fe nd a nt un able to a ssi st in his ow n de fe ns e be c aus e he c ou ld n ot f

oc us on ke y iss ue s; ind e e d, Dr

. Au ble no te d that the de fe nd a nt w a s p re oc c up ie d w ith ir re le va nt t op ic s a nd

the su bje c ts o f h is d e lus ion s:

He be lie ve s th a t the pe op le in the c ou rt ro om kno w that he ’s inn oc e nt, including the District Attorney and the J udg e and the policemen who interviewe d him, but that nevertheless these c harg es have been se t up. And there ’s a sc ript that people play . That is being ac t ed o u t

. And there fore , . . . [t he def

endant] can n o t appra ise the outcome of the pr oc e e din g s.

. . . Hi s del us ion s als o inte rf e re in his abil ity

to a ssi st in his own defe nse. [The defe ndant’s] reality is distorted. His belief that every thing is pre determined at t his point. That i t doesn’t matter if he he lps his de fe ns e or

no t.

Dr. Auble also observe d that the defe ndant’s strong desire to appea r normal r esulted in his insist ence that mitigating evidenc e not be pr esente d in his own behalf.

On cro ss-examination, Dr. Auble conc eded that the defe ndant had be en diag nosed as malinge ring in ear lier ca ses in Texas and that the def endant e ven admitt ed that he had “fooled the sh ri nk s” in the la te 19 70 s or e arl y 19 80 s. She a lso c on c e de d that the de fe nd a nt ha d dis c us se d a sp e c ts of his prior first de g ree murder trial with attorney s an d t h at h e h ad ult imately ag ree d to present mitigating evidenc e in that ca se.-11-

Dr . X a vie r A ma do r, a

ps y c ho log ist , te sti fi e d th a t he e xami ne d the de fe nd a nt f or ov e r t we nty hours in November

of 1998. Although the defe ndant s uffe red from delusions and anosog nosia, Dr. Amador initially conclude d that the defe ndant was able to a ssist i n his defense and wa s, theref ore, competent f

or his capital murde r t rial held in April of 1999 in Nashville. Howeve r, as the def endant beg an to include his attorne y s in his delusions, Dr. Amad o r later de termined that the de lusions imp a ir e d th e de fe nd a nt’ s a bil ity to d isc los e re le va nt i nf

ormati on and “ thw art [ed ]” h is d e sir e to prese nt evidence in his own behalf. The defe ndant re fer red to one of his attorney s as “Satan,” and he believe d the attorne y s, the prosec utors, and the trial judge wer e being controlled by a surve illance team with “subliminal mag netic tec hnolo gy

. ” Dr . Amador state d that the def endant ha d an

un de rs ta nd ing of

the le g a l pr oc e ss but c ou ld not a pp ly that un de rs ta nd ing to h is o wn pr oc e e din g s. As a re su lt, the de fe nd a nt w a s n ot c omp e te nt t o s ta nd tr ia l.

On cr oss-examination, Dr. Amador a cknowledg ed that the defe ndant admitted he had fa ked delusions in the past and that other me ntal health profe ssionals ha d determined the defe ndant to be malinge ring . Dr. Ama dor also conc eded that the defe ndant ag ree d with defe nse counse l’s pr e se ntatio n o f m iti g a tin g e vid e nc e in the prior c apit a l mur de r t

ri a l. D r. Am a do r n on e the le ss testified that the def

endant’ s I Q was in the “ lo w av er age ” range and that the de fendant was not capa ble of fa king me ntal illness.

Dr. Willi am B ernet , a forensic psy chiatrist at Va nderbilt University , testified that the defe ndant was c ompetent to stand trial. Dr. Be rnet met with the defe ndant three times, including the day befor e the c ompetency

hearing. H e dete rmined that t h e defenda nt suffer ed fr om antisocial persona litydisorder, de lus i o n al p aranoia, and “ a tende ncy to malinge r.” D r. B erne t further determined, howeve r, that the de fendant was able to discuss various aspec ts of his case, inc luding his refusa l to acc ept a plea barg ain bec ause he was innoce nt, the prosec ution’s DNA evide nce, and the use of mitig ating proof suc h as his brain injuries, dy sl ex i a, t ro u b l ed childhood, and low intelligenc e leve l. He explained:

I ta lke d to [the de fe nd a nt] abo ut the dif fe re nt c ha rg e s a ndthe pr oc e ss; for instanc e, we t alked a bout what happe ned in Court, who the d i f f e r e n tp e o p l e ar e i n t h e C o u r t , t h e r o l e s o f t h e D e f e n s e A t t o r n e y, the Pr os e c uti ng At torne y , the wi tne sse s, the Judg e , a ndhe se e me d to hav e a v e ry

g oo d u nd e rs ta nd ing of

ho w C ou rt

wo rk s. He se e ms t o have an understanding of some of the details and not just ki nd of the big pic ture . . . .

Ac c or din g to D r. B e rn e t, t he defend a nt d id n ot w a nt t o p re se nt e vid e nc e of me nta l il lne ss be c aus e he didno t be lie ve he ha d a me nta l dis or de r. Dr

. B e rn e t te sti fi e d th a t th e de fe nd a nt w a s a ble to communicate with his attorney s, that he understood that he may be ac quitted or convicte d, and that h e k n e w t h e p o s s i b l e p u n i s h m e n t s , i n c l u d i n g d e a t h b y l e t h a l i n j e c t i o n , i f h e w e r e f

o u n d g u i l t y

. In sum, Dr. B erne t stated that the def endant wa s competent to stand trial.T h i s Cour t ’ s de ci s i on s i n St at e v

. B l ac k , 815 S. W

. 2d 166 ( T en n

. 1991) , a n d J or dan v

. St at e, 135 S. W

. 327 5 (T enn. 19 1 1 ), did no t s q uarel y ad d res s t he i ss ue. Ins t ead , t he ho l d i ng i n B l ack up hel d t he t ri al co urt ’ s d eci si o n t hat t he d efen d an t wa s co m p eten t , see B l ac k, 8 1 5 S .W .2d at 1 7 3 , a n d t h e ho l d i ng i n J o rd an i nv o l ve d a p l ea o f i nsa nit y as a d e fen se to the c h a rg e d o ff e n se . Jo rd a n , 1 3 5 S .W . at 3 2 9

. -12- Dr. Cy nthia Turner -Gra

ham, a board- certified psy chiatrist who was appointed to serve as an independe nt expert by

the t rial court, testified that the def endant wa s competent to stand trial. She te sti fi e d that the de fe nd a nt un de rs too d the natur e of the c ha rg e s a g a ins t hi m a ndbe lie ve d h e c ou ld pr e se nt a su c c e ssf ul a lib i de fe ns e . T he de fe nd a nt b e lie ve d h e ha d a g oo d wor kin g re la tio ns hip wi th his a tto rn e y s, tho ug h th e y of te n d isa g re e d a

bo ut d e fe ns e str a te g y . A c c or din g to D r. Tu rn e r- Gr aha m, the def endant discusse d t h e i m p o rtanc e of mitig ation evidenc e and unde rstood that he mig ht be sentenc ed to death. The def en d ant denied thinking that he wa s being watche d by the g overnme nt or that hi s trial was being scripted. He said that he “fabric ated stories” to “ac hieve c erta in things at

certain times.” Dr. Turner -Gra ham testified that the defe ndant had an antisocial per sonality disorder but was “c lear ly

competent to stand trial.”
Following the compete ncy hearing, the trial court a ccr edited the testimony of Dr. B erne t and Dr. Turner- Grah am an d ruled that the de fendant was compe tent to stand trial. The trial c ourt emphasized the following : that the defe ndant under stood the nature of the p ro ce ed ings; that the defe ndant under stood the nature of the cha rg es ag ainst him and the p o s s i b le punishment; that the defe ndant w a s ab le to a s s is t in h is d e f e n s e b y s u g g e s ti n g le g a l th e o r ie s a n d s tr a te g y ; a n d th a t the defe ndant was a

ble to communicate w ith his attor n ey s about his trial. Although the defe ndant’s br a in i nju ri e s a ndre la te d c on dit ion s ma de it “ dif fi c ult ” fo r him to c ommun ic a te wi th h is atto rn e y s, the tr ia l c ou rt

fo un d th a t th e se dif

fi c ult ie s d id n ot rend er the de fe nd a nt i nc omp e te nt t o s ta ndtr ia l.
Defendant’ s Competencyand Burden of Proof

The de fendant arg ues that the trial c ourt err ed in finding that he wa s competent to stand trial

a ndin p la c ing the bu rd e n o f p ro of up on him

to e sta bli sh inc omp e te nc y

to st and tr ia l. T he Sta te
re sp on ds that th e tr ia l c ou rt ’s ru lin g s w e re c or re c t.

The F ourtee nth Amendment to the United S tates C onstitut ion and Article I , section 8 of the Tenne ssee Const itution prohibit the t rial of a person who i s mentally incompetent. Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378 (1966); State v. Blackstock, 19 S.W .3d 200, 205 (Tenn. 2000) . To be c ompetent to stand trial, a def

endant in a c riminal case must ha ve “‘the capa city to understand the nature a nd ob je c t of th e p r o c e e d i n g s a g a i n s th i m , t o c o n s u l tw i t h c o u n s e l a n d t o a s s i s ti n p r e p ar i n g h is defe nse.’” State v. Bla ck, 815 S.W.2d 166, 174 (Te nn. 1991) (quoting Macke y v. State, 537 S.W .2d 704, 707 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1975)). The trial court’s findings “are conclusive on appea l unless the evidenc e pre ponderates otherwise .” State v. Oody , 823 S.W .2d 554, 559 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991)

.
As a thre shold issue, we must determine w ho bear s the burde n of proof to establish a d e f e n d a n t’ s c o mp e te n c y

o r in c o mp e te n c y

. A lth o u g h w e h a v e n e v e r a d d r e s s e d th is p r e c is e is s ue, 5 the Court of Criminal Appea ls ha s conclude d that the burden of establishing inc ompetence to standA va rie ty o f ap p ro a c h e s a re tak e n in o the r j u risd ic tio n s. M a n y p la c e the b u rd e n o f p ro o f o n the d e fen d a n t t o 6

e sta b lish h is o r h e r in c o m p e te n c y e ithe r b y sta tute o r ca se la w

. S e e C o lo

. R e v

. S ta t. A n n

. § 1 6 -8 -1 1 1 ; C o n n . G e n . S ta t. Ann

. § 54- 56d; M o. An n

. St at

. § 552. 020; Pa. Cons

. St at

. An n

. t i t

. 50, § 7403; R

. I

. G en

. Law s § 40. 1- 5. 3- 3; U t ah Code Ann

. § 77- 15- 5; V a. Code An n

. § 19. 2- 169. 1; St at e v

. K l ey pas , 40 P. 3d 139 ( K an

. 2001) , ov er r u l ed on ot h er g r ou n ds b y Stat e v. M ars h, 10 2 P

. 3 d 44 5 (K an. 20 0 4 ). O t hers p l ace t he b urden on t he p rosecut i o n. See Il l

. C o m p

. Stat

. A nn.
c h . 7 2 5 § 5 /1 0 4 -1 1 ; S .D . C o d ifi e d L a w s § 2 3 A -1 0 A -6 .1 ; W is. S ta t. A n n . § 9 7 1 .1 4

. -13- trial rests with the def

endant. Oody , 823 S.W .2d at 559. I n Oody , the def endant pr esente d a clinica l 6 psy cholog ist who testified that the defe ndant was border line reta rded, psy chotic, and inc ompetent to be tried. The State, on the other hand, pre sented testimony from two psy cholog ists who stated that the def endant was malinge ring and was competent, as well as the t estimony of officers w ho related the def endant’ s abilityto communicate to them. The Court of C riminal Appea ls placed the burden on the def endant to esta

blish incompetence by a preponderance of the evide nce and upheld the trial court’s f inding that the de fendant was compe t en t t o s tand trial. I d. at 559-60; see also State v. L eming , 3 S.W .3d 7, 14 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998) (applying same standar d).
The Oody

standard is c onsistent w i t h t h e United St ates Supreme Court’s holding that defe ndants may

properly be re quired to establish their inc o m p et en cy by a pre ponderance of

the

e vid e nc e

. Me din a v. Ca lif ornia , 50 5 U. S. 43 7, 44 6 (1 99 2)

. I n Me din a , the Cou rt he ld that a statut e requiring defe ndants to establish their incompetency by a pre ponderance of

the evidenc e did not vio la te du e pr oc e ss. In r e a c hin g that c on c lus ion , th e Cou rt ob se rv e d:

Ba sed on our review of the historical tre atment of the bur den of pr oof in competenc y

proce eding s, the operation of the cha lleng ed rule , and our prece d en t s , we c annot say that the allocation of the burden of pr oo f t o a c ri min a l de fe nd a nt to pr ov e inc omp e te nc e “ of fe nd s so me principle of justice so rooted in the t raditions and consc ience of our people a s to be ranke d as funda mental.”

I d. (quoting Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 202 (1977)). Mor eover , the Court emphasized that “[o] nce a

State provides a defe ndant acc ess to proce dures f or making a compe tency

evaluation,

. . . we perc eive no basis for holding that due proc ess furthe r re quires the State to assume the burden . . . of per suading the trier of fac t that the defe ndant is competent to stand trial.” I d. at 449.

I n contra st, the United States Supreme Court has invalidate d an Ok l ahoma statute that require d de f

e n d a n ts to p r o v e th e ir

in c o mp e te n c y

b y c le ar a n d c o n v in c in g e v id e n c e

. Co o p e r v. Oklaho ma , 5 17 U. S. 3 48 , 3 69 (1 99 6) . In r e a c hin g its ho ldi ng , th e Cou rt ob se rv e d th a t f

orty -s ix states and the f

eder al g overnme nt either re quired the pr osecution to establish a de fenda nt’s competenc y

or re quired de fendants to establish incompetency by a pre ponderance of the evidenc e. I d. a t 36 0- 62

. Th e Cou rt

fu rthe r e mph a size d th a t th e “ c le ar andc on vin c ing e vid e nc e stand arda ff e c ts a clas s of ca ses in which the de fendant has alre ady demonstrated that he is more likely than not incompetent.” I d. at 364.Indeed , we no t e t hat t he t ri al co urt , o ut o f an ab und ance of caut i o n, eval uat ed t he evi d ence and reached t he 7

sa m e c o n c lus io n un d e r tw o se p a ra te sta n d a rd s: p la c ing the b u rd e n o n the d e fen d a n t t o e sta b lish in c o m p e te n c y b y a p repo nd erance o f t he evi d ence and pl aci ng t he b urden on t he Stat e t o est ab l i sh co m p et ency b y a prep o nd erance o f t he evi dence

. -14- We have r eviewe d the appr oache s taken in other jurisdictions, a nd in our view the be tter
r e a s o n e d c h o i c e i s t h e s t a n d ar d t h a tr e q u i r e s d e f e n d a n t s t o e s t ab l i s h t h e i r i n c o m p e t e n c y b y a pr e po nd e ranc e of the e vid e nc e

. Th is sta nd ard wa s ide nti fi e d by the Cou rt of Cr imi na l A pp e a ls i n 1991, and it has bee n applied since that time wit h n o ap p ar en t difficulty or pre judice to either

the defe nse or the prosec ution. Oody , 823 S.W .2d at 559; L eming , 3 S.W .3d at 14. I ndeed, pla cing the pr e po nd e ranc e bu rd e n o n d e fe nd a nts app e ars to s tr ike a n a pp ro pria te ba la nc e in s e ve ra l r e sp e c ts:

After balanc ing the equities . .

. the burde n of proof may constitutionally rest on the defendant.

. . . The main c oncern of the prosec ution . . . is that a defenda nt will feig n incompetenc e in orde r to avoid trial. I f the burde n of proving incompetenc e re sts o n the g o v e r n m e n t , a d e f

e n d a n t w i l l h a v e l e s s i n c e n t i v e t o c o o p e ra te in ps y c hiatr ic inv e sti g a tio ns

. . . . A d e fe nd a nt may also be le ss cooper ative in making available friend s o r famil y who might ha ve information about the defe ndant’s mental state. States may there fore de c ide that a more c omp le te pic tur e of a de fe nd a nt’ s c omp e te nc e wi ll be o b t ained if the defe nse has the inc entive to produc e all the evidenc e in its possession.
Medina, 505 U.S. at 455 (O ’Connor, J., concurring ). F inally , the pre ponderance of the evidenc e standard is c onsistent with due proce ss. I d. at 446.

I n apply ing the se principles to this case , we c onclude that the e vidence in the rec ord does

no t pr e pond e rate a g a ins t th e tr ia l c ou rt ’s fi nd ing that th e de fe nd a nt w a s c omp e te nt t o s ta ndtr ia l. 7 The trial c ourt held an e x haustive evide ntiary hearin g an d co n sidered the expert testimonyof Dr. Auble, Dr . Amador, D r. B erne t, and Dr. Turner- Graham. The tria l c ourt found that the def endant suffe red f rom a brain injury

and had dif

ficulties co m m u n i ca t i n g at times. The trial c ourt furthe r found, howe ver, that the defendant understood the nature of the proc eeding s, understood the c harg es ag ainst him, and communicated w ith his attorney s by sug g esting defe nses. The fac t that not a ll of the def endant’ s defe nse strate g ies or sug g estions were pursued doe s not indicate that he lacked the ability to assist in hi s defe nse. I n s h o rt , t h e trial court hear d the evidenc e and a ccr edited the testimonyof Dr. B erne t and Dr. Turner- Graham. After car efully revie wing the re cord, w e conc lude that the evidenc e does not pre ponderate ag ainst the trial court’s finding that t h e def endant wa s
c omp e te nt t o s ta ndtr ia l.-15- Competenc

y and Ex clusion of Evidence

I n a related issue on competenc y , the def endant a rg ues that the trial c ourt err ed in excluding the testimony

of Rever end Joe I ng le, a minister who ha d visited with the i ncar cer ated de fendant, and the testimony

of Mary Ann He a, a s o ci al worke r for the public def

ender ’s offic e who ha d interviewe d the def

endant se vera l times. The defe ndant maintains that these witnesses would have supported his claim of incompe tency . The State a rg ues that t he trial court did not err in excluding these witnesse s because the de fendant asserte d applicable privileg es that pr evented them from t es t i fy i n g.

T h e r ec o rd s h o ws t h att h e d ef en s e c al l ed R ev er en d I n gl e t o t es t i fy at t h e c o m p et en cyh ea ri n g. Acc ording to defe nse counse l, I ng le would have testified that he met with the de fendant on numerous
occa sions and that the def endant of ten tried to portray

himself as normal. Ing le would have further te sti fi e d th a t th e defe nd ant h a d b izarr e , d e lus ion a l th ou g hts a ndthat th e de fe nd a nt w a s th e mos t mentally ill prisoner he had ever

counsele d. The trial c ourt ref used to allow I ng le to testify , howeve r, beca use the de fendant declined to waive the cler g y -penitent privileg e. See T enn. Code Ann. § 24- 1- 206 (2000).

Simi larly , the re cord shows that the defe nse ca lled Mary Ann Hea d u ri n g the compete ncy he ari ng to te sti fy abo ut he r nu me ro us int e rv ie ws wi th the de fe nd a nt a s a so c ia l w or

ke r f or the pu bli c defe nder. After determining that Hea was part of t he defense team, t he trial court refused to allow her to testify

beca use the de fendant declined to wa ive the appl ic a b le privileg e, i.e., the attorney -client privileg e.

I n our view, the trial court did not er r i n excluding the testimony . First, our c onclusion that a def endant be ars the bur den of e stablishing his or her incompetenc y

nece ssarily

means that he or sh e ha s n ot be e n fou nd to be inc omp e te nt be fo re or du ri ng the c omp e te nc y pr oc e e din g its e lf . A s a result, nothing pr events a defe ndant from invoking an applica bl e p ri v i l ege during a compe tency pro c e e d in g a s a matt e r o f la w

. M o r e o v e r , th e tria l c o u r t is f r e e to r e c o n s id e r th e is sue of the defe ndant’s invocation of privileg es while e vidence of the defe n d ant’s mental status is prese nted during the hea

ring by both the defe nse and pr osecution.
Second, a de fendant’s rig ht to p re s en t evidenc e to meet the bur den of pr oof does not eliminate the trial c ourt’s di scre tion in determining relevanc e and materiality of the e vidence . Her e, the de fe nd a nt p re se nte d e xten siv e e xpe rt te sti mon y to sho w that he wa s not c omp e te nt t o s ta ndtr ia l. The e x pert witnesse s relate d the basis of their opinions, which included ana ly sis of the defe ndant’s family backg round, history

of hea d injuries, and mental illness. Dr. A uble, for instanc e, testified that evidenc e wa s g ather ed not only from the de fendant but also the defe ndant’s attorne y s , jury consultant, and investig ators. Dr . Auble and D r. Amador testified ef

fec tively o n b eh alf of the defe nse; Dr. B erne t and Dr. Turner -Gra ham likewise testified fully and eff ectively on behalf

of the prosec ution. I n sum, the defe ndant’s exerc ise of hi s privileg es di d not preve nt the t rial court from fully considering the material evidenc e and ma king a thoroug h assessment of the rele vant issues-16-

perta ining to the defe ndant’s competency to stand trial. Acc ording ly , we c onclude that the trial court did not err in excluding the testimony of the witnesse s.

Com pe te nc y an d th e Cou rt-

Ap po int e d E x pe rt

The de fendant next arg ues that the trial c ourt err ed in denying his mot i o n fo r a new
c omp e te nc y

pr oc e e din g on the g ro un d tha t the c ou rt -a pp oin te d expe rt , D r. Cy nth ia Tu rn e r- Gr aha m, alleg edly knew one of the victims. The State maintains that there was no evidenc e esta blishing that D r

. T u r n e r

- G r ah a mh a d a c o n f l i c to f i n t e r e s to r

t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n tw a s p r e

j u d i c e d i n a n y w a y. As part of

a motion for a ne w trial, the de fendant introduced the a ffidavit of an Assistant Public Defe nder, G ary

C. Tamkin. The af

fidavit stated that Tamkin and Dr. Turner- Graham wer e friends and that the latter ha d told him “she believed she had met one of the victims

. ” According to T amki n’s af

fidavit, Dr. Turner- Graham said that her son knew one of the victims and that the victim had been to he r house.

I n denying the motion for new tria l, the trial court f ound it “inconce ivable” that an assistant pu bli c de fe nd e r in po sse ssi on of su c h inf orma tio n wo uld wa it un til a ft e r tr ia l to re ve al i t t o his colleag ues. The trial court further noted that the defe nse had prese nted no testimony in support of the issue and ha d failed to e stablish “when, how w ell, or for how long ” Dr . Turner -G raham knew

o n e o f t h e v i ct i m s

. T h e C o u rt o f C ri m i n al Ap p ea l s u p h el d t h e t ri al co u rt ’s ru l i n g.

I n our view, the rec ord supports the trial court’s r uling. The defe ndant fa iled to show that Dr. Turner- Graham had a conf lict of interest or that her testimony was a ffe cted by

alleg edly meeting one of the victims. The defe ndant failed to pr oduce any fac ts w ith reg ard to Dr . Turner -Gra ham’s knowledg e of the victim and failed to e stablish a ny prejudice resulting from Dr . Turner -Gra ham’s testimony . Moreove r, the re cord r evea ls that the trial court c onducted a fu l l and fair compete ncy proce eding and fully

considere d the extensive evidenc e pre sented by both the defe ndant and the prosec ution. W e conc lude that the trial court did not er r in denying the motion for a new trial and

a new competenc y

hearing.

G uilt P has e Iss ue s Sufficiency of Ev idence

The de fendant arg ues that there was insuffic ient evidenc e of premeditation and de liberation to support the first deg ree murder convictions. The State maintains that the e vidence was suff icient to s up po rt

the c on vic tio ns

. When evaluating the suffic iency of the e vidence , we must determine whether “ any rational trier of fac t could have fo u n d the essential e lements of the c rime bey ond a re asonable doubt.” J ackson v. V irg inia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (emphasis in orig inal). W e ar e re quired to af ford the-17-

prosec ution the stronge st leg itimate view of the evidenc e in the record, as well as all rea sonable a nd leg itimate infere nces w hich may b e d ra wn t here from. See State v. B land, 958 S.W.2d 651, 659 (T e n n

. 1 9 9 7 )

. Q u e s ti o n s c o n c e r n in g th e c r e d ib il it y o f th e w it n e s s e s , th e w e ig h t to b e g iv en the

e vid e nc e , a ndfa c tua l is su e s r a ise d by the e vid e nc e are re so lve d by the tr ie r of fa c t. I d. ; se e a lso Sta te v. Cazes, 875 S.W .2d 253, 259 (Tenn. 1994)

. Moreove r, t hese principles of review apply even if a conviction is based upon c ircumstantial evidenc e. State v. Cole, 155 S.W .3d 885, 897 (Tenn. 2005)

.
The off ense of first deg ree murder inc ludes a “ preme ditat ed an d intentional killi ng of another .” Te nn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202( a)( 1) (2003). A premeditated act is “an ac t done af ter the exercise of

ref lection and judg ment” and mea ns that “the intent to kill must have be en formed prior to the act itself.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202(d) (2003) . An intentional act r efe rs to “the nature of the c on du c t or

to a re su lt o f the c on du c t whe n it is [a] per so n’ s con sc iou s obje c tiv e or de sir e to eng ag e in the conduc t or cause the re sult.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39- 11-106(a )(18) (2003).

I n Bla nd, we identifie d and discussed c ircumstance s that, if establi s h ed bythe proof, may
wa rr a nt the tr ie r of fa c t to fi ndor inf e r p re me dit a tio n. Th e c ir c ums ta nc e s in c lud e the us e of a de a dly

wea pon upon an unarmed victim, the particula r cr uelty of a killing , any

threats or decla

rations of intent to kill made by

the def endant, pr oof that the de fendant procure d a we apon, any prepa rations to conce al the crime undertaken befor e the crime is c ommitt ed, and the def endant’ s calm deme anor immediately

afte r a killing . Bla nd, 958 S.W .2d at 660.
We ag ree with the C ourt of C riminal Appea ls’ conclusion that the e vidence was suff icient to support the first deg ree m urder convictions. Ther e wa s ext ensive e vidence connec ting the de fe nd a nt t o th e c ri me s: the de fe nd a nt w a s n e ar the B a skin- Rob bin s sto re a t app ro xima te ly the tim e the two victims had been c losing the store on April 23, 1997; sever al witnesses saw a re d car simil ar to the defe ndant’s car; and credit ca rd re ceipts re veale d that the def endant ha d purcha sed g asoline at a Tex aco station that was mi nutes away from Baskin-Robbins. There was a lso ex tensive evide nce
connec ting the de fendant to the victims: the defendant or his car had been s een at or nea r the Dunba

r Cave a rea in which the victims’ bodies we re f ound; blood found on the defe ndant’s lef t shoe had a DNA pr ofile that wa s consistent with that of Ang ela Holmes; blood f ound on the def

endant’ s rig ht shoe had a

DNA profile that did not exclude the defe ndant or the vic tims; and fibe rs found on the clothing of

Holmes and Miche lle Mace wer e consistent with fiber s fo u n d i n t he def endant’ s car

. Finally , there was e videncethat the def endant ha d acte d with intent and with premeditation: the victims had suffer ed dee p, penetr ating stab wounds to their throats; the st ab wo u n d s had bee n inf lic te d w ithe no ug h f

or c e to p e ne tr a te the vic tim s’ sp ine s; the sta b w ou nd s ha d b e e n in fl ic te d w ith a knife blade se vera l inches long ; an d t h e v i ct i m s bled to death in a se cluded a rea . See State v. Keoug h, 18 S.W .3d 175, 181 (Tenn. 2000) (upholding a finding of pre meditation based on the nature of the killing w here a def endant stabbe d the victim to death with a lar g e knife ).

The de fendant char acte rizes the evidenc e as c ircumstantial and e mphasizes inconsistent

s t at em en ts made by

witnesses, inconsistent descriptions of the defe ndant’s ca r, and othe r alleg ed discrepancies in the e vidence . Howeve r, it is the jury ’s function to weig h the cr edibilityof the-18-

witnesses and to re solve the fa ctual conf licts i n t h e ev i d en ce. Our task is to review the leg al sufficie ncy

of the e vidence under the standards state d above.

Acc ording ly , we c onclude that the e vidence was suff icient to support the two convictions for fi rst deg ree murder. Similarly , we c onclude that the e vidence was suff icient to support the defe ndant’s convictions for especia lly ag g ravated kidnapping , see Te nn. Code Ann. § 39-13- 305(a) (2003), a nd espec ially

ag g ravated robbe ry . See Te nn. Code Ann. § 39-13- 403(a) (2003).

Motion to Dismiss Indictment

Th e de fe nd a nt a sse rt s th a t th e tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d in faili ng to d ism iss the ind ic tme nt b e c aus e t h e i n d i ctment did not char g e the a g g ravating c ircumstance s used to seek the death pe nalty . The defe ndant, citing Appre ndi v. New Jersey , 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), a rg ues that ag g ravating circumstance s must be charg ed in the indictment, submitted to the jury , and esta

blished bey ond a re asonable doubt. The State maintains that Tenne ssee’ s capital sentenc ing sc heme doe s not require ag g ravating c ircumstance s to be cha rg ed in the indictment.

I n Appre ndi, the United States Supreme Court h eld t hat “[o]t her tha n the fa ct of a prior conviction, any

fac t that increa ses the pena lty for a crime be y ond the pre scribed statutory maxi mum must be submitt ed to a jury , and proved bey ond a reasonable doubt.” 530 U.S. at 490. I n Ring, the Supreme Court addre ssed the ca pital sentencing scheme in Arizona, under whic h g uilt or innocence was de termined by

a jury and the pr esenc e of ag g ravating factors require d for the imposition of the death pe nalty

was de termined by

a trial judg e. Rely ing on A pprendi’s holding that the Six th Am e nd me nt re qu ir e d a ju ry determin a tio n o f any fa c ts that w ou ld e xpos e a de fe nd a nt t o a

pe na lty exceeding the maxim um, the Court found Arizona’s sche me u n c o n stitut ional. Ring, 536 U.S. at 609. As in Appre ndi, howeve r, t he Court did not apply the Fi fth Am e nd

me nt rig ht to presentment or g rand jury indictment; inst ead, the Court reiterat ed t hat the F ourtee nth Amendment “ha s not . . . been construed to incl u d e the Fif th Amendment rig ht to ‘prese ntment or indictment of a Gr and Jury .’” Ring, 536 U.S. at 597 n.4 (quoting Appre ndi, 530 U.S. at 477 n.3).
As the parties rec og nize, this Court h a s consistently held that Appre ndi does not aff ect c apital

se nte nc ing in T e nn e sse e a nddo e s n ot r e qu ir e a g g ravatin g c ir c ums ta nc e s to be p le d ina n in dic tme nt. See S ta te v

. L e a c h , 1 4 8 S. W. 3 d 4 2 , 5 9 ( T e n n

. 2 0 0 4 ) ; S tate v

. B e rr y , 1 4 1 S. W. 3 d 5 4 9 , 5 6 2 (Tenn. 2004); State v. Holton, 126 S.W .3d 845, 863 (Tenn. 2004); State v. Delling er, 79 S.W .3d 458, 467 (T e nn . 2 00 2) . In a dd iti on , w e ha ve c lari fi e d tha t Ring , as we ll as the mor e re c e nt d e c isi on in B lake ly v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2 5 3 1 (2004), “ do not chang e our analy sis . . . reg arding whether ag g r a v a ti n g c ir c u ms tan c e s mu s t b e p le d in th e in d ic tm e n t. ” B e rr y , 1 4 1 S. W. 3 d a t 5 6 0 ; St a te v. Da vis , 14 1 S.W. 3d 60 0, 61 6 (T e nn

. 20 04 ). As we e xpla ine d in B e rry , “ [t]he fo c us in App rendi , Rin g , a ndB lake ly

wa s o n th e Sixth A me nd me nt rig ht t o tria l by jury ,” a nd“ the Cou rt

e xpre ssl y declined to impose the F ifth Amendment ri gh t to presentment or g rand jury

indictment upon theFurt herm o re, we no t ed t hat t he m ajo ri t y of st at es have l i kewis e d ecl i ned t o requir e t he i ncl usi o n of aggravat i ng 8

c irc u m sta n c e s in th e ind ic tm e n t. B e rr y, 1 4 1 S .W .3 d a t 5 6 1 n.4

. -19- States.” B erry , 141 S.W .3d at 560. Moreove r, we emphasized that defe nd an t s i n capital c ases 8

rec eive written notice of the St ate’ s intent to seek the death pe nalty prior to trial, as we ll as written notice of the ag g ravating c ircumstance s, under Rule 12.3 of the Tenne ssee Ru l es o f C riminal Procedur e. I d. at 562.

I n short, we ha ve held r e p e ate d ly that Tennesse e’s c apital sentenc ing sc heme doe s not require that ag g ravating c ircumstance s be included in an indi ctment. The defenda nt’s arg uments, theref ore,
are without merit.

Amendm ent of the Indictme nt

The defenda nt also arg ues i n a related indi ctment i ssue t hat t he trial court e rre d in allowing the indictment to be amende d to chang e the pr edicat e felony underlying the two counts of fe lony murder from “espe cially ag g ravated robbery ” to “r obbery .” The State responds that the tria l court did not err be cause the amende d indictment did not include a new or differ ent cha

rg e.

We co nc lud e t h att h e tr i a l c o u r td i d n o te rr i n a l l o w i n g t h e S t a t e t o a m e n d t h e i n d i c t m e nt. First, an indictment may

be ame nded without the def endant’ s consent bef

ore jeopar dy

attache s if “no additional or diffe rent o ff en s e i s thereby

char g ed and no substantial rights of the defe ndant ar e there by prejudice d.” Te nn. R. Crim. P . 7(b). Sec ond, the indictment initiallych arg ed that two counts of felony murder occur red in the c ourse of

“espe cially

ag g ravated robbe ry ”; the ame ndment state d th a t th e tw o c ou nts of fe lon y mur de r o c c ur

re d d uring the c ou rs e of “ ro bb e ry ,” wh ic h is simply a lesser included off

ense of “espe cially

ag g ravated robbe ry .” Te nn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-401; -403 (2003). As a re s u l t , n o new or differ ent offe nses wer e alleg ed; to the contra ry , the amende d indictment, like the orig inal indictment, char g ed two counts of felony murder pursuant to Tennesse e Code Annotated se ction 39-13-202( a)( 2).

The de fendant also arg ues that he w as pre judiced bec ause the amende d indictment no longe r
re qu ir e d th e State to p ro ve the e le me nts of e sp e c ia lly

a g g ra vate d r ob be ry . We dis a g re e . T he State
was re quired by

the amende d indictment to pr ove the r equire d elements of the char g ed off enses, i.e., felony murder. B eca

use the amende d indictment did not charg e new or diffe rent off enses, se e Te nn. R. Crim. P . 7(b), the de fendant had notice of the cha rg es and their r equire d elements. State v. Hammonds, 30 S.W .3d 294, 300 (Tenn. 2000) (stating that notice is the purpose of an indictment). F ina lly , th e de fe nd a nt’ s c on vic tio ns fo r t wo c ou nts of fe lon y mur de r w e re me rg e d w ithhis convictions for two c ounts of preme ditated first deg ree murder. I n sum, the t rial court did not err, and the de fendant is entitl ed to no re lief on this gr ound.An addi t i onal l i mi t at i on, howev er , i s t hat ext r i ns i c evi dence m ay not b e us ed whe r e t he t r i al cour t det er mi nes 9

t h at t h e ex t r i n s i c ev i den ce c on ce r n s a col l at er al mat t er

. N ei l Cohe n et al

. , T en n es s ee La w of Evi den ce , § 613. 5 ( 4t h e d. 2 0 0 3 ).
-20-

Ex tri ns ic Ev ide nc e of P rio r I nc on sis te nt S tat e me nts

The de fendant contends t hat the trial c ourt err ed in excluding e x trinsic evidenc e of inconsistent statements offe red dur i ng the testimony of Sg t. R. W . Knig ht to impeach two of the State ’s wi tne sse s. Se e Te nn

. R. Ev id. 61 3( b)

. Th e Sta te re sp on ds that the tr ia l c ou rt didno t a bu se its dis c re tio n a ndthat a ny e rr or wa s h arm le ss. We beg in our revie w of this issue by summarizing the re levant portions of the transcript. The d e f e n s e q u e s t i o n e d t h e S t a t e ’ s w i t n e s s , S g t

. R

. W

. K n i g h t , ab o u ts t a t e m e n t s m a d e t o h i mb y a witness for the pr osecution, Jay Smit h. Although Smith had testi fied that he saw a car sim ilar to the defe ndant’s at Dunba

r Cave on the ni g ht of April 23, 1997, and said that he did not rec all contac ting the police, Sg t. Knight testified that Smi th had ca lled the police on Ma y 1, 1997, to provide the lic e ns e nu mbe r o f a

c ar h e ha d s e e n at Dun bar Ca ve . Sg t. Knig ht f urthe r t e sti fi e d th a t th e lic e ns e number provide d by

Smit h did not belong to the de fendant.

Simi larl y , th e de fe ns e qu e sti o n e d S g t

. Kn i g h t

a b o u t prior state me nts ma de by

a no the r w itn e ss fo r thepr os e c uti on , L a va nd a Z imm e rm a n. Z imm e rm a n h a d te sti fi e d th a t sh e sa w a car sim ila

r t o the def endant’ s in the Ba skin-Robbins parking lot on the night of A pril 23, 1997, but said that police office rs did not ask her whether she had seen any car s at t hat t ime. Sgt. Knight testified, howe ver, that th e po lic e a sk e d Z imm e rm a n w he the r any c ars ha d b e e n inthe pa

rking lot

.
The trial c ourt denied the defe ndant’s reque st to introduce Sg t. Knight’ s written summaries of the intervie ws with Smi th and Z immerman, eve n though the defe ndant h ad asked Sgt. Knig ht

abo ut the wi tne sse s’ state me nts a ndha d p ro pe rl y mo ved th at the su mma ri e s b e a dmi tte d in to evidenc e during Sgt. Knig ht’s testimony . The trial c ourt conc luded that evidence of a prior inconsistent statement may be introduce d only by either (1) using a sec ond witness to relate the prior inconsistent statements or (2) using ex trinsic evidenc e of the prior statement during the examination of the wi tne ss w ho is be ing imp e a c he d. Th e Cou rt of Cr imi na l App e a ls he ld that the tr ia l c ou rt did not abuse it s discretion because Sgt. Knight’s written summaries were c umulative to his testim ony in c ou rt

.
Ex trinsic evidenc e of a witness’s prior inconsistent statement “is not admis sible unless and

un til the wi tne ss i s a ff

or de d a n o pp ortun ity

to e xpla in o r d e ny

the sa me and th e op po sit e pa rt y is

a ff or de d a n o pp ortun ity

to i nte rr og a te the wi tness th ereo n, or the int e re sts of

jus tic e oth e rw ise require .” Te nn. R. Evid. 613(b). The A dvisory Commi ssion Comments to Rule 613(b) cla rify that the “on ly r e q u ir e me n t” f

o r th e u s e o f e xtrin s ic e v id e n c e is th a t th e w it n e s s mu s t b e “ a f f orded a n opportunity

to ex p l ai n or deny .” The e x trinsic evidenc e may be “the written or r ecor ded conte nt 9 of the prior

statement itself or the testimony of anothe r witness as to the c ontent of the prior written

or ora l statement.” Ne il Cohen et al., Tenne ssee L aw of Evidence , § 613.4 (4th ed. 2003).-21-

I n our view, the trial co urt err ed in conc luding that the de fendant could not introduce the written summaries of the statements made by Smit h and Z immerman to Sgt. Knig ht. Rule 613(b)

re qu ir e s o nly

that th e wi tne sse s b e g ive n a n o pp ortun ity to exp lai n or de ny

the ir prior state me nt. This require ment was met during the defe nse’s cross-e x amination of Smith and Zimmerman during the Sta te ’s pr oo f r e g ard ing the ir prior state me nts . M or e ov e r, Rul e 61 3( b) do e s n ot e xpre ssl y lim it the imp e a c hin g pa

rty to one fo rm of e xtri ns ic e vid e nc e , nor do e s it re qu ir e a n impe a c hin g pa rt y to choose be tween two a vailable f orms of extrinsic evidence

. I n short, the trial court’s ruling , which lim ite d th e de fe ns e to the us e of the te sti mon y

of Sg t. Kn ig ht an d pre c lud e d the us e of the wi tne sse s’ statements, was e rrone ous under Rule 613(b)

.
We also conc l u d e, h o we v er, that the trial court’ s err or did not aff ect the r esult of the proce eding . The de fendant attempted to elicit inconsistencies be tween Smith and Z immerman’s incourt testimony

and their prior statements. The defenda nt asked both Smith and Zimmerman about the ir prio r stat e me nts on c ro ss- e xami natio n; thu s, bo th w itn e sse s w e re g ive n a n o pp ortun ity to
e xpla in o r d e ny

the ir state me nts . T he de fe ns e the n u se d Sg t. Knig ht’ s te sti mon y a s e xtri ns ic evidenc e of the prior inconsist ent s tatements m ade by Smit h and Zimmerman. Although the re w ere written summaries of

the witnesses’ prior stateme nts, the defe nse did not establish that the written summaries would have been mor e ef fec tive than Sgt. Knight’s testim ony or otherw ise critica l to the de fe ns e

. I n su m, the tr ia l c ou rt ’s e rr or wa s h arm le ss, a ndthe de fe nd a nt, the re fo re , is no t e nti tle d to relief on this iss ue.

P enalty P hase Issues

Sufficiency of Aggrav ating Ci rcumstance s

The de fendant contends that the e vidence was insuffic ient to support the jury ’s application of the “ heinous, atroc ious, or crue l” ag g ravating c ircumstance s e t f o r th in T e n n e s see Code A nnotated section 39-13-204( i)(5) (2003). The State maintains that the evidenc e was suff icient to support the jury ’s application of this agg ravating c ircumstance

.
Ou r ana ly sis re qu ir e s th a t w e de te rm ine wh e the r, a ft e r vie wi ng the e vid e nc e in a lig ht m os t favor able to the State, a

rational trier

of fa ct could h av e fo u n d the exist ence of the a g g ravating circ umstance be y ond a re asonable doubt. Terry v. State, 46 S.W .3d 147, 160-61 (Te nn. 2001). Although the defe ndant has c halleng ed only one of the three ag g ravating c ircumstance s in this case, we will addr ess ea ch in turn. See Te nn. Code Ann. § 39-13-206( c)( 1)(B ) (2003) (re quiring revie w of ag g ravating c ircumstance s found by the jury ).

1. Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 39-13-204(i)( 2)

The a g g ravating c ircumstance found in Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 39-13-204(i)( 2) (2 0 0 3 ) i s as follows: “The defe ndant was pr eviously convicted of

one (1) or more f

elonies, other than the pre sent char g e, whose statutory elements involve the use of violence to the person[.]” The plain statutory

language require s the prosec ution to prove that the def endant ha d (1) a

prior-22-

conviction, (2) f

or a f elony offe nse, (3) whose statutory elements involved the use of vi olence to a person. Da vis 141 S.W .3d at 618.

I n this case, the pr osecution established this agg ravating c ircumstance by relying on the defe ndant’s prior convictions in Tenne ssee for t wo counts of first deg ree murder and one count of espec ially ag g ravated robbe ry . These thr ee c onvictions were clea rly felony offe nses whose statutory elements involved the use of violence to the person. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39- 13-202(a ); -403. The prose cution also relied o n t h e d ef en dant’s prior c onviction in Tex as for the offe nse of ag g ravated robbe ry , which the pa rties stipulated was a

violent felony

.
Acc ording ly , the evidenc e was sufficie nt to support the jury ’s application of this agg ravating

c ir c ums ta nc e be y on d a

re a so na bledo ub t.

2. Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 39-13-204(i)( 5)
The ag g ravating circumstance in Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 39-13-204(i)( 5) applies wher e the “ murder was especially heinous, atroc ious, or crue l in that it i nvolved torture or serious phy sical abuse bey ond that nece ssary to produce death.” The de fendant a rg ues that this ag g ravating circ umstance should not have been a pplied beca

use the fa cts of this case wer e not as seve re or ag g ravated as other

case s in which this ag g ravating c ircumstance has bee n applied.

“To r tu r e ” h a s b e e n d e f

in e d a s “ th e in f

li c ti o n o f s e v e r e me n ta l o r p h y s ic a l p ain upon the victim while he or she r emains alive and conscious.” State v. Williams, 690 S .W.2d 517, 529 (Te nn. 19 85 ). “ Se ri ou s phy sic a l a bu se be y on d th a t ne c e ssa

ry to p ro du c e de a th” ha s b e e n d e fi ne d a s f oll ow s:

The word “serious” alludes t o a matter of deg ree . The a buse must be phy sical, as oppose d to mental, and it must be “bey ond that” or more than what is “ne cessa

ry to pr oduce death.” “Abuse ” is de fined as an act that is “excessive” or which makes “imprope r use of a thing ,” or which uses a

thing “ in a manner contrary to the natural or l eg al rules for its use.”

State v. Odom, 928 S.W .2d 18, 26 (Tenn. 1996) (quoting Bla ck’s L aw Dic tionary 11 (6th ed.1990)) ;
see a lso St ate v. Morris, 24 S.W .3d 788, 797 (Tenn. 2000)

.
I n thi s c a s e , th e e v id e n c e s u p p o r ts a f in d in g o f to r tu r e a n d s e r io u s p h y s ic a l i n ju r y b e y ond that nece ssary

to produce death. B oth victims were stabbe d multipl e times. Both victims were stabbed in the throat or nec k with such sever e for ce that the m urder wea pon penetr ated bone ; indeed, the wounds inflicted on Miche lle Mace included five cuts t o her ve rtebra l column as a re sult of a

“ sa wi ng ” mot ion . B othvic tim s w e re a liv e a ndc on sc iou s f or fi ve to fi ft e e n minu te s as the y ble d to de a th i n g re a t pain. I n s um, the e vid e nc e wa s su ff ic ie nt t o s up po rt

the jury ’s app lic a tio n o f this ag g ravating c ircumstance bey ond a reas o n able doubt. See State v. Mann, 959 S.W .2d 503, 511 (Tenn. 1997) (victim beate n, strang led, and stabbe d eleve n times).-23- 3. Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 39-13-204(i)( 6)

The ag g ravating circ umstance in T ennesse e Code Annotated se ction 39-13-204( i)(6) a pplies wher e a “ murder w as committed for the purpose of avoiding , interfe ring with, or preve nting a lawful

arr est or prose cution of the de fendant or another .” Secti o n 2 0 4 (i )(6) focuse s on a def endant’ s mot ives in co mmi tti ng a mur de r, a ndit i s n ot l imi te d to the kil lin g s o f e y e wi tne sse s o r tho se witnesses who know or

can iden t ify

the def endant. See Terry , 46 S.W .3d at 162. Moreove r, the de fe nd a nt’ s d e sir e to a vo id a rr e st o r p ro se c uti on ne e d n ot be the so le mot ive fo r kill ing the vic tim and instead may

be just one of the pur

poses motivating the de fendant to kill. I d.; see a lso Davis, 141 S.W .3d at 618-19.

Her e, the victims wer e robbe d, kidnapped, taken to a remote are a, stabbed, a nd abandone d. The e vidence supported a finding that one of the def endant’ s purposes in committing the murde rs was to avoid a

rre st or prosec ution for t h e robbery and kidnapping offe nses. Acc ording ly , the evidenc e wa s sufficient to support the jury ’s application of this a g g ravating circ umstance be y ond a

rea sonable doubt.

Pr op or tio na lit

y

Whe re a de fe nd a nt ha s be e n se nte nc e d to de a th, we mus t app ly a c omp arativ e pr op ortio na lit y
a na ly sis pu rs ua nt t o T e nn e sse e Cod e An no ta te d s e c tio n 3 9- 13 -2 06 (c )( 1) (D ) ( 20 03 ). Th e an a ly sis ide nti fi e s a

be rr a nt, arb itr ary , o r c apric iou s se nte nc ing by de te rm ini ng wh e the r the de a th se nte nc e is “‘disproportionate t o the puni shment imposed on others convicted of the s ame crime.’” Bla nd, 958 S.W .2d at 662 (quoting Pulley v. Har ris, 465 U.S. 37, 42-43 (1984))

.
I n conducting this analy sis, this Court employ s the prec ede n t- s e e king method of compa rative pr op ortio na lit y

re vie w, in w hic h w e c omp are a c a se wi th o the r c a se s in vo lvi ng sim ila r d e fe nd a nts and similar crimes. See B land, 958 S.W.2d at 665-67. Whil e no defe ndants or crimes are alike, a de a th s e nte nc e is d isp ro po rt ion a te if a c a se is “ plainl y la c kin g in c ir c ums ta nc e s c on sis te nt w iththo se in case s where the death penalty has bee n imposed.” I d. at 668.

We h a ve re pe a te dly he ld that the po ol of c a se s c on sid e re d by thi s Cou rt in i ts p ro po rt ion a lit y revie w includes those f

irst deg ree murder c ases in which the State seeks the death penalty , a ca pital sentenc ing hearing is held, and the s entenc ing jury determines whether the sentenc e should be life i m p r i s o n m e n t , l i f

e i m p r i s o n m e n t w i t h o u t t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f p ar o l e , o r d e a t h

. S e e S t a t e v

. G o d s e y, 60 S.W .3d 7 5 9 , 7 8 3 (T en n . 2001). We have explained that the pool does not include first deg ree
mur de r c a se s in wh ic h a

ple a ba rg a in i s r e a c he d w ith re sp e c t to the pu nis hme nt o r i n w hic h th e Sta te d o e s n o ts e e k

t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y:
[C]ons ide ratio n of ca se s in whic h the State , f or wh a te ve r r e a so ns , d id

n o t s e e k th e d e a thp e n a lty w o u ld n e c e s s ar il y r e q u ir e u s to s c ru ti n iz e
w h a t i s u lt im a te ly

a d is c r e ti o n ar y

p r o s e c u to r ia l d e c is io n

. We previouslyhave de clined to re view the e x erc ise of prose cutorial-24- dis c re tio n, a ndit w ou ld b e pa rt ic ula rl y ina pp rop ri a te to d o s o in conducting compar ative proportionalityrevie w, wher e our f unction is limited to ide ntify ing aber rant death sentenc es, no t i dentify ing potentialc apit a l c a se s.

I d. at 784 (c itations omi tted) (e mphasis added)

.
Acc ording ly , our compa

rative pro p o rt i o n al i t y

re v i ew o f t h e a p p l i ca b l e p o o l of ca ses consider s
numerous fa ct o rs re garding the of fense : (1) the means of death; (2) the manne r of de ath; (3) the motivation for the killing; (4 ) the place of death; (5) the victim’s ag e, phy sical condition, and psy cholog ical condition; (6) the a bsence or prese nce of pre meditation; (7) the abse nce or prese nce of provoc ation; (8) the a

bsence or pre sence of j ustification; and (9) the injury to and ef fec t upon nondece dent victims. Bland, 958 S.W.2d at 6 6 7 . We also consider nume rous fa ctors about the defe ndant: (1) prior criminal rec ord, if any ; (2) ag e, ra ce, and g ender ; (3) mental, e motional, and phy sical condition; (4) role in the m urder ; (5) coope ration with authorities; (6) le vel of re morse; (7) knowledg e of the victim’s helplessn es s ; and (8) potential for r ehabilitation. I d.; see a lso St ate v. Bane, 57 S.W.3d 411, 428-29 (Tenn. 2001).

I n this case, we beg in by

revie wing t h e n at u re o f the off enses. Thedefe ndant robbe d and kid na pp e d th e vic tim s in Cla

rk sv ill e , Te nn e sse e , on April 23, 19 97

. Th e de fe nd a nt dro ve the vic tim s to a sec luded ar ea and s tabbed them to death. The victims suffe red de ep, pene trating stab wounds to the ir thr oats. Th e sta

b w ou nd s h a d b e e n in fl ic te d w ith a kn if e bla de se ve ra l in c he s lo ng wi th enoug h forc e to pene trate the i r s pines. The victims wer e alive f ive to fiftee n minutes after being stabbed a nd wer e consc ious for eig hty perc ent of that time a s they bled to death. The defe ndant’s conduct wa s intentional and preme ditated. He acted alone i n these off enses, without any

evidenc e of provoc ation or justification.

We next consider evidence reg arding the defendant and his backg round. The de fendant was unemploy ed at the time of these off enses , an d he had prior convictions for f irst deg ree murder,

es p ec i al l y aggr av at ed ro b b er y , an d ro b b er y

. He al s o h ad a h i s t o ry o f m en t al i l l n es s an d b ra i n d am age stemming from a number of hea d injuries. Dr. Xa vier Ama dor testified that the de fendant suffer ed from chr onic schizophrenia of the par anoid type, a cog nitive disorder, doc umented bra in damag e, and mental illness c hara cterized by ag g ressive and impulsi ve behavior . Dr. Pamela Auble testified that the def

endant’ s brain dama g e cause d the defe ndant’s signific ant mental disorder s and re sulted i n p er v as i v e i m p ai rm en t s i n t h e d ef en d an t ’s b eh av i o r, t h at t h e d ef en d a n t h ad d i ff

i cu l t y t h i n k i n g, exhibi te d a g g r e s s io n , p s y c h o s is , a n d d e lu s io n s , a n d th a t h e b e li e v e d h e w a s u n d e r g o v e r n ment
su rv e ill a nc e a ndc on tr ol

. Dr. Robe rt Ke ssl e r t e sti fi e d th a t th e de fe nd a nt h a d s e ve ra l br a in

a bn or ma l i t i e s , i n c l u d i n g tr au m a t i c b r a i n i n j u r i e s , t h a t b o r e a s tr o n g s t a t i s t i c a l a s s o c i a t i o n to psy chotic disorder s. Although me ntal health pr o fe s sionals testified that the def endant wa s schizophrenic and de lusional, there wa s also evi d en ce re g arding the def endant’ s history

of malinge ring . Finally , no evidence wa s prese nted to show that the def endant c ooperated with the authorities, exhibit ed re morse for the killings, or wa s amena ble to reha

bilitation.-25-

For the following rea sons, we conc lude that t he death sentence as applied to the de fendant in this case wa s not excessive or disproportionate w hen compa red to de fendants in other case s. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39- 13-206(c )(1) (A), ( C), (D) ( 2003).
First, this Court has upheld death sentence s in numerous similar case s where the def endant stabbed a victim or victims. See L eac h, 148 S.W .3d at 42; Keoug h, 18 S.W .3d at 183; State v. Bush, 942 S.W .2d 489 (Tenn. 1997); State v. Hines, 919 S.W .2d 573 (Tenn. 1995); State v. Thompson, 76 8 S. W.2 d 2 39 (T e nn . 1 98 9) ; State v. Wes t, 7 67 S.W. 2d38 7 ( Te nn . 1 98 9) . I n se ve ra l of the se
c a s e s , l i k e t h e p r e s e n tc a s e , a v i c t i mw a s s t ab b e d t o d e a t h i n t h e c o u r s e o f a r o b b e r y o r o t h e r

f e l o n y. L eac h, 148 S.W .3d at 60; Bush, 942 S.W.2d at 507; Hines, 919 S.W.2d at 584; W est, 767 S.W .2d at 397.

Se c on d, thi s Co urt has up he ld num e ro us de a th s e nte nc e s in c a se s in vo lvi ng a de fe nd a nt w ith prior convictions for felonies whose statutory elements involved the use of violence to the pe rson, i.e., one of

the ag g ravating c ircumstance s applied by the jury in this case. S ee, e .g ., L eac h, 148 S.W. 3da t 60 . A s th is C ou rt of te n h a s said, thi s a g g ra vati ng circ ums ta nc e is “ mor e qu a lit a tiv e ly persua sive and objec tively reliable than ot her[]” ag g ravating c ircumstance s. State v. Howell, 868 S.W .2d 238, 261 (Tenn. 1993)

.
L ikewise, we have uphe ld the death pe nalty in simi l ar ca s es i nvolving the othe r two ag g ravating c ircumstance s applied in this case , i.e., t he murder was heinous, atrocious or c ruel in that it involved torture or seriou s injury bey ond that nece ssary

to produce death, a nd the murder was committed to avoid or preve nt the defe ndant’s ar rest or pr osecution. L eac h, 1 4 8 S

. W

. 3 d at 59 (ag g ravating c ircumstance (i)(5) ); Bush, 942 S.W.2 d at 5 0 4

- 0 5 ( a g g r a v ating c ircumstance s (i)(5) and (6)) ; Hines, 919 S.W .2d at 584 (a g gra v ating circ umstance ( i)(5)) ; Thompson, 768 S.W .2d at 252 (ag g ravating c ircumstance s (i)(5) and (i)( 6)).
Finally , we ha ve upheld se ntence s in numerous ca ses involving de fendants who prese nted sim ila r e vid e nc e of mit ig a tin g c ir c ums ta nc e s. F or e xamp le , se ve ra l c a se s h a ve inv olv e d d e fe nd a nts who pre sented e vidence of their f amily backg rounds or poor childhood environments. Da vis, 141 S.W .3d at 621; State v. Middlebrooks, 995 S.W .2d 55 0 , 552 (Tenn. 1999) ; Hines, 919 S.W .2d at 57 3. Simi larl y , s e ve ra l si mil ar c a se s h a ve inv olv e d d e fe nd a nts wi th m e nta l il lne ss. Mid dle br oo ks , 99 5 S. W.2 d at 55 2 ( de fe nd a nt w ithborderlin e pe rs on a lit y dis or de r andbr a in i mpair me nt) ; H ine s, 91 9 S. W.2 d at 57 3 ( de fe nd a nt w ithpa rano id p e rs on a lit y

di so rder , d y sth y mia , a ndc hr on ic depre ssion); Cazes, 875 S .W.2d at 259 (defe ndant with possible neurolog ical dama g e); Smith, 868 S.W .2d at 561 (de fendant with chronic de pression, par anoid per sonality disorder , c h r onic depr essive

ne ur os is, a ndpa

rano id del usion a l di so rd e r) ; H ow e ll, 86 8 S. W.2 d at 26 2 ( de fe nd a nt w ith br a in damag e).

We need not find that this case is ex actly like a prior c ase in e very respe ct, nor must we de te rm ine that t his c a se is “ mor e or le ss” lik e oth e r s imi lar d e a th p e na lty c a se s. I ns te a d, we mus t identify aber rant de ath sentenc es by

analy zing whethe r a c apital ca se plainly lacks c ircumstance s
s i m i l ar t o t h o s e c a s e s i n t h e p o o l o f c a s e s i n w h i c h a d e a t h s e n t e n c e h a s b e e n u p h e l d

. A c c o r d i n g l y,-26-

for the f oreg oing r easons, the death sentenc es imposed on the defe ndant for the first deg ree murder offe nses in this case a

re not disproportionate

.
W eighing of Aggravating and Mitigati ng Circumstances
As explained abo v e , th ee v id e n c eo v e rw h e lmin g ly s u p p o r te d thr e ea g g r a v ating circ umstances
app lie d b y

the jury : th a t th e de fe nd a nt h a d p re viou s con vi cti on s f or fe lon ie s w ho se e le me nts involved violence to the person; that the murders we re e specia lly heinous, atroc ious or crue l in that they involved torture or

phy sical abuse bey ond that nec es s ar yto produce death; and the murders

wer e committed by

the def endant to avoid a

rre st or prosec ution. The mitigating circ umstances inc lud e d te sti mon y

abo ut the de fe nd a nt’ s b a c kg ro un d, he a d in jurie s, br a in da ma g e , men ta l il lne ss, and belief that he wa s under g overnme nt surveillance

.
Af te r r e vie wi ng the re c or d a ndc on sid e ri ng the e vid e nc e dis c us se d a bo ve wi th regardto proportionality , we c onclude that the e vidence supported the jury ’s fi n d ing that the ag g ravating circ umstances outwe ighe d mitigating circ umstances be y ond a reasonable doubt. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-206( c)( 1)(C) ( 2003).

Capital Sentenc ing – Rights to Due Process and Confrontation

The de fendant arg ues that Tenne ssee’ s capital sente ncing scheme violates his rig hts to due proce ss and conf

rontation under the United S tates Constitut ion because the rule s of evidenc e do not apply and the jury is pe rmitted to he ar evidenc e that is not reliable and trustworthy . See Te nn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204( c) ( rules of evidenc e not a pplicable during penalty phase)

. The State responds that the de fe nd a nt’ s a

rg ume nt i s w ith ou t me ri t.

We have rec ently reje cted the arg ument raised by the defendant. I n Be rry , we obse rved that under Te nnessee Code Annotated se ction 39-13-204( c), e vidence that is releva nt to the circ umstances of

the murder , the ag g ravating c ircumst ance s relied upon by the State, or the mitigating circ umstances is admiss ible if such evidence has probative value i n the determination of punishment. Ber

ry , 141 S.W .3d at 563-64. Although the statute g ives wider disc retion to the trial

c ou rt than n orma lly

pe rm itt e d u nd e r the Te nn e sse e Rul e s o f E vid e nc e , w e e xpla ine d:
[T]he dis c re tio n a llo we d ju dg e s a nda tto rney s d uring se nte nc ing in first deg ree murder cases is not unfettere d. Our c onstitut ional standards r equire inqu i ryinto the reliability , rele vance , value, a nd prejudicia l effe ct of sente ncing ev i dence to preserve funda mental fairne ss and protec t the rig hts of both the defe ndant and the vic tim’s family . The rule s of evidenc e can in some instances be helpful g uides in rea ching these de terminations of ad m i ssibili ty . Trial judg es ar e not, however , require d to adher e strictly to the ru les of evide nce. T h ese r ules are too restrictive and unwieldy in the are na of c apital

s en t en ci n g.-27-

I d. (quoting State v. Sims , 45 S.W .3d 1, 14 (Tenn. 2001) ).

Acc ording ly , the standards set fo rt h i n T en n es s ee C o d e A n n o t at ed s ec t i o n 3 9-13-204( c) allow t ri al co u rt s to ex clude e vidence that may violate the constitutional g uarantees of due proce ss or
c on fr on ta tio n. Th e de fe nd a nt’ s a rg ume nt, the re fo re , is wi tho ut m e ri t.

Admissibili ty of Photographs

The de fendant arg ues that the trial c ourt err ed in admitting photog raphs of the victims during the pena lty

phase of the trial. The defenda nt contends that the photogra phs of the victims taken at the crime scene wer e g ruesome and intended to inflame the passions of the jury . The State maintains that the trial court properly admitted the photog raphs in support of an ag g ravating c ircumstance

.
A trial court is afforde d broad discr etion in determining whether to admit photogra

phs of the decea sed in a murde r prose cution. State v. Odom, 137 S.W .3d 572, 588 (Tenn. 2004) ; State v. Morris, 24 S.W .3d 788, 810-11 (Te nn. 2000). The de cision to admit photogra phs will be reve rsed only if the trial court has abused its discre tion. Odom, 137 S.W .3d at 588.

Th e re c or d s ho ws that th e tr ia l c ou rt adm it ted o ne ph oto g ra ph of e a c h v ic tim

a t th e c ri me
scene . The c olor phot o gra p h s showed the de ep stab wounds inflicte d on the victims’ necks. The trial court c oncluded that the photog raphs we re probative in establishing an ag g ravating circ umstance, i.e ., the murder s were heinous, atroc ious or crue l in that they involved t o rt ure or phy sical abuse bey ond t h at nece ssary to produce death, a nd that the probative value of the photogr aphs outweig hed the risk of unfair pr ejudice.

I n o ur vie w, th e tr ial c ou rt

didno t a bu se its dis c re tio n. Th e ph oto g ra ph s w e re re le va nt t o
e s t ab l i s h a n a g g r a v a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e a n d w e r e n o t i n tr o d u c e d f o r t h e p u rp o s e o f

i n f l a m i n g t h e j u r y. Thoug h g raphic , the photogr aphs wer e not unduly g ruesome or unfa irly prejudicia l. Morever , the tria l c o u r t a ll o w e d th e a d mi s s io n o f o n ly o n e p h o to g r ap h o f e a c h v ic ti m to d e p ic t th e nature and

e xten t of the inju ri e s in fl ic te d b y the de fe nd a nt. Ac c or din g ly , th e tr ia l c ou rt didno t a

bu se its dis c re tio n ina dmi tti ng the c ri me sc e ne ph oto g ra ph s o f the vic tim s. Failure to Instruct Jury on “Catch-all” Mitigat ing Provision

Th e de fe nd a nt a

rg ue s th a t th e tr ia l c ou rt

e rr e d in faili ng to ins truc t the jury on the “ c a tc h- a ll” mit ig a tin g c ir c ums ta nc e se t ou t in Te nn e sse e Cod e An no ta te d se c tio n 3 9- 13 -2 04 (j )( 9) . T his statut e allows the jury to consider “[a]ny other mi tigating f actor which is raise d by

the evidenc e produc ed by either the prosec ution or defe nse at e ither the g uilt or sentencing hearing.” I d. The State re sponds that the trial court and the Court of Criminal Appeals properly held that the issue wa s waived beca use the de fendant did not object or include the issue in the motion for ne w trial.

The re cord shows that the trial court instructe d the jury on n u m er o u s s t atut ory

and nonstatutory mitigating circ umstances. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204( j). The non-statutory

mitigating-28-

c ir c ums ta nc e s c ha

rg e d to the jury

inc lud e d th e de fe nd a nt’ s “ his tory of c hil dh oo d, ” “ me nta l il lne ss
or e mot ion a l di stu rb a nc e ,” a nd“ br a in i nju ry or dama g e .” Al tho ug h th e de fe nd a nt c or re c tly a sse rt s that the t rial court failed to instruct the j ury on the “c atch- all” provision noted above , the transc ript shows that the trial court ga ve the f ollowing instruction:

Tenne ssee l aw p rovi des that in arriving at the punishment, the jury shall consider a s previously indicated, any mitigating circ umstances raised by the evidenc e in the g uilt-finding pha se, the se n t en cing phase, or both, which s h al l i nclude, but ar e not limited to, the followi n g: [ s p ecific statutory and non-statutory

mitigating circ umstances]. No distinction shall be ma de betwee n the mitigating circ umstances listed and those othe rwise r aised by the evidenc e.

Th e de fe nd a nt d id no t obje c t to the ins truc tio ns , n or didthe de fe nd a nt i nc lud e thi s is su e in h is mot ionfo r a

ne w t ri a l.
Although a

trial court must instruct the j ury on the s tatutory mitigating “catch-a ll” provision, the omission in t his case was not plain err or. The trial court inst ructe d the jury on statutory

and nonstatutory mitigating circ umstances that could be considere d. The trial court also instructed the jury that mi tig a tin g c ir c ums ta nc e s w e re “ no t li mit e d to” the sp e c if ic statut ory

a ndno n- statut ory

fa c tor s. I n sum, the trial court’s instructions as a whole e ncompassed the statutory “catch-a ll” provision and informed the jury

that it could consider any mitigating circ umstances r aised by the evidenc e in the g uilt and penalty

phases of the trial. Ac cording ly , the trial court’s failure to instruct on the statutory mitigating “catch-a ll” provision did not affec t t h e s ubstantial rig hts of the def endant a nd was not plain err or. Tenn. R. Crim. P. 52(b).

Pr os e c uto ria l Misc on du c t in Pe na lty Ph as e

The de fendant next contends that the tria l court e rr ed in failing to gr ant a ne w sentenc ing hearing due to prosecutorial misconduct during closing arg ument

. T he def endant a rg ues that the prosec utor’s misconduct included r efe rring to a victim ’s t houg hts, appea ling to the jury ’s passion, usi n g crime- scene photos of the victims on a projec tor, and telling the jury that the def

endant ha d

mu r d e r e d f

o u r p e o p le in“ c o ldb lo o d

. ” T h e St a te r e s p o n d s th a t th e r e w a s n o p r o s e c u to r ial misconduct and that the de fendant failed to objec t to many of the prose cutor’s state ments.

This Court has often observed that “c losing arg ument is a valuable privilege that should not be unduly restric ted.” B ane, 57 S.W.3d at 425. We have likewise rec ogn i z ed t hat the prose cutor may not eng ag e in der og atory

rema rks, appe al to the prejudice of the j ury , misstate the evidenc e, or make a rg uments not r easona

bly based on the evidenc e. State v. Bates, 804 S.W .2d 868, 881 (Tenn. 1991) (r efe rring to defe ndant as a “ra bid dog” ). The tri al co urt has discre tion in controlling the

course of ar g uments and will not be reve rsed a bsent an a buse of that discr etion. Ba ne, 57 S.W.3d at 424.-29-

Moreove r, prose cutorial misconduct doe s not amount to rever sible err or abse nt a showing that it ha s a ff e c te d th e ou tc ome of the c a se to thepr e jud ic e of the de fe nd a nt. Se e Sta te v. Cha lme rs , 28 S.W .3d 913, 917 (Tenn. 2000). I n making this determination, we must consider : (1) the c onduct complained of viewed in lig ht of the fa cts and c ircumstance s of the ca se; (2) the curative measure s undertaken by

the court and the prose cution; ( 3) the intent of the prosec utor in making the improper arg uments; (4) the cumulative eff ect of the i mproper conduct and any other errors in the r ecor d; and (5) the r elative stre ng th and wea kness of the case

. I d. at 917; State v. Buc k, 670 S.W .2d 600, 609 (Tenn. 1984) . We will review e ach of the def endant’ s arg uments with these standar ds in mind.

The defenda nt asserts that the prosec utor improperly ref err ed to the thoug hts Ang ela Holmes may h av e h ad b efor e she die d. The re cord shows that the prosec utor arg ued that the victim may have been thinki ng about her family or her wedding , which had ta ken plac e at Dunba

r Cave, and that

“ we c a n o nly

sp e c ulate a s to wh a t sh e wa s thi nking .” Al tho ug h c ou ns e l are re qu ir e d to c on fi ne the ir arg uments to those supported by the evidenc e or infe renc es dra wn from the e vidence , the def endant did not object to the prosec utor’s re marks at tr i al

. Thus, we c annot conc lude either that the trial court a bused its discretion in allowing the arg ument or that the prosec utor’s ar g ument aff ecte d the

ou tc ome of

the tr ia l.

Th e de fe nd a nt n e xt ar g ue s th a t th e pros e c uto r e ng a g e d in mis c on du c t by us ing do lla

r b ill s to de monstrate the defe ndant’s g ree d. I n denying the motion for new tria l, the trial court obse rved that the prosec utor had asked, “why did this man do this,” and had then place d money on a proje ctor wh ile statin g , “ that’ s wh y .” Th e tr ia l c ou rt fo un d that the arg ume nt ha d be e n ma de in r e sp on se to the ar g ument that the def

endant should not be sente nced to de ath bec ause of his mental illness. The

re c or d sh ow s that the de fe ns e did no t ob je c t to the arg ume nt or the pr os e c uto r’ s c on du c t at t ri al. After revie wing the trial cour

t’s finding s and the re cord, w e cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discre tion or that the prosec utor’s ar g ument aff ecte d the re sult of the trial.

The de fendant arg ues that the prose cutor e ng ag ed in misconduct by placing the crime scene photogr aphs of the vic tims on a projector. The rec ord shows that the prose cutor stated:

This is not som e cr azy

offe nse. This is standard g ree d. He’ d rathe r kill and rob [than] work. And that’s what he did; h e k i lled and

ro bb e d, a ndturne d tw o b e a uti fu l li ttl e c hil dr e n in to this . A ndit wasn’t be cause of his mental illness or his mother or his fathe r. B e c au s e h e w a n t e d m o n e y.

Th e re c or d doe s not, ho we ve r, re ve a l th e pr os e c uto r’ s p re c ise a c tio ns wh ile makin g the se arg ume nts

. Mo re ov e r, the de fe nd a nt d id n ot o bje c t to the pr os e c uto r’s con du ct or make a n o ff e r o f p ro of

to prese rve the rec ord for

appellate revie w. As a r esult, we c annot conc lude that the trial court a bused its dis c re tio n ina llo wi ng the arg ume nt o r that a ny mis c on du c t a ff

e c te d th e ou tc ome of

the tr ia l.
Finally , the def

endant a rg ues that the prose cutor e ng ag ed in m is c o n d u c t b y ma kin g r e f e r e n ces to the underlying f

acts of the defe ndant’s prior f irst deg ree murder c onvictions. The re cord showsIn 1 9 9 8 , t h e leg islatu re a m e n d e d s ta tuto ry p ro v isio n s to a llo w the p ro se c u tio n to intro d u c e the fac ts 10
und erl y i ng a pri o r vi o l ent f el o ny be i ng us ed t o s eek t he d eat h pe nal t y

. T enn. C o d e A nn. § 3 9

- 1 3

- 2 0 4 (c). T he

ame n dmen t i s n ot a ppl i ca bl e i n t h i s c as e. Se e O dom, 137 S. W

. 3d a t 585.
-30- that the p r o s e c u to r s tate d th a t th e tw o v ic ti ms in th is c a s e w e r e “ th e th ir d a n d f o u r th p e r s o n s” the defe ndant had killed, that the de fendant had now killed “f o u r” p eo p le, and that the de fendant had kil le d f ou r p e op le “ in c old blo od .” Th e de fe nd a nt did no t ob je c t to the arg ume nts , h ow e ve r, un til the prosec utor stated: “I submit to y ou the fact that this is the t hird and fourth person he’ s murdere d, t h at ’s p o we rful enoug h to blow away any mitigating evidenc e.” A t that point, the trial court sustained the def

endant’ s objection and instructe d the j ury to disreg ard the arg ument. The trial c ourt la te r i ns truc te d th e jury

a s f oll ow s:

I n its closing ar g ument, the S tate may have implied that the jury should impose death bec ause the defe ndant has be en convic ted of killing four pe ople. The de fendant has bee n tried, convic ted and

se nte nc e d f

or his prior

c on vic tio ns . Y ou are to c on sid e r tho se convictions only

for the pur

pose of de termining whether the State has proven be y ond a re asonable doubt the ex i s t ence of a n ag g ravating circ umstance, and for no other purpose.

At the time of the offe nses in this ca se, this Court had consistently held that it was improper for the prosec ution to introduce evidenc e or make arg uments based on the f acts unde rly ing a

prior violent felony

conviction being used to establish the agg ravating circumstance in Tennesse e Code Annotated se ction 39-13-204( i)(2) w here the pr i o r co nviction on its face involved violenc e to the person. See State v. Big bee, 885 S.W.2d 797, 812 (Tenn. 1994) ; see al s o Odom, 137 S.W .3d at 585. 10

I n Big bee, the prosec ution introduced the fac ts underly ing the defe ndant’s prior c onviction fo r f ir st degree mur de r i n w hic h th e vic tim ha d b e e n s ho t th re e tim e s, arg ue d th a t th e jury sh ou ld consider that the defe ndant had c ommitt ed two killings, a nd sug g ested that the de ath pena lty was appropriate bec ause the defe ndant alre ady had re ceive d a life sentence for the prior murde r. B igbe e, 885 S.W .2d at 810. This Court remande d for a new se ntencing hea ri n g after conc luding that the inadmissible evidence an d the prosec utorial arg ument improperly enhanc ed the a g g ravating circ umstance and aff

ecte d the jury ’s determination to the prejudice of the def endant. I d. at 812.

Simi larly , in Odom, the prosec ution introduced deta ils of a prior f irst deg ree murder committed by

the def endant in support of the ag g ravating c ircumstance in Tennesse e Code Annotated se ction 39-13-204( i)(2). Odom, 137 S.W .3d at 585. The details included testimony from the investig ating office r of the prior c rime, as we ll as photogr aphs of the vic tim of the prior off ense. After noting that the pr osecution re lied heavily on the fa cts underlying the defe ndant’s prior f elony convictions to enhanc e the e ffe ct of this a g g ravating circ umstance during its c losing a rg ument, we
rema nded for

a new sentenc ing pr ocee ding.-31-

We conclude that the prosec utor’s ar g uments in the prese nt case , althoug h err or, do not

war rant a new se ntencing proce eding

. Unlike Bigbe e and Odom, the prosecutor di d not introduce evidenc e of the fac ts underly ing the defe ndant’s prior first deg ree murder convictions. Althoug h the prosec utor repe atedly

mentioned that the def

endant ha d now killed four pe ople, the jury was a war e of the de fendant’s pri o r co n v i ct ions for two counts of f irst deg ree murder and was a war e that the pr os e c uti on wa s r e ly ing on the se prior c on vic tio ns to es ta bli sh a n ag g ra vatin g c ir c ums ta nc e . While the re fer ence to the defe ndant’s killing four people in “ cold blood” could be interpre ted to mean that the prior first deg ree murder offense s were simil ar to the pr esent off enses, that r efe renc e alone does not amount to mis conduct of the deg ree and seve rity

described in Big bee and Odom. I n addition, the trial court properly

g ave two c urative instruc tions to t he jury , which we m ust presume we re fo llo we d b y

the jury

. Se e State v. Sha w, 37 S.W. 3d 90 0, 90 4 (T e nn . 2 00 1) (the jury is p re su me d to follow curative inst

r u c ti o n s )

. A lt

h o u g hthe prosec utor’s ar g ument was prose cutorial misconduct a nd

err or, the de fendant objected, a nd the trial court sust ained the obje ction and g ave c urative instructions. Accor dingly , we c onclude that the trial court did not abuse its di scre tion and that the prosec utorial misconduct did not affe ct the outcome of the trial.

CO NC LU SION

Af te r r e vie wi ng the re c or d a ndapp lic able a uth ority , w e ho ld as fo llo ws : 1) the tr ia l c ou rt did not err in fi nd in g that th e de fe nd a nt w a s c omp e te nt t o s ta ndtr ia l; 2 ) the tr ia l c ou rt didno t e rr

in

e xclu din g e vid e nc e du ri ng the c omp e te nc y he ari ng ; 3) the tr ia l c ou rt didno t e rr

in r e fu sin g to h old

a new competenc y

hearing on the basis that a court-appointed ex pert was biased; 4) the e vidence was sufficie nt to support the defe ndant’s convic tions; 5 ) t h e t ri al court did not err in deny ing the defe ndant’s motion to dism iss on the basis that the ag g ravating circ umstances wer e not stated in the indictment; 6) the trial court did not err in allowing the prosecution to amend the indictment; 7) the trial court did not co m m it rever sible err or in limit ing e x trinsic evidenc e of prior inconsistent statements; 8) the e vidence was suff icient t o s u p p o rt the ag g ravating c ircumstance s found by the jury ; 9) t he death sentenc es were not arbitra ry or di sproportionate as imposed in this case; 10) the evidenc e wa s sufficient to support the jury ’s finding that evidenc e of a g g ravating c ircu m s tance s outweig hed evide nce of

mi t i gating circ umstances; 11) the capital se ntencing statutes are not unconstitutional on the ba sis that they allow evidenc e to be admitted in violation of due proce ss and

c on fr on ta tio n u nd e r the Un ite d State s Con sti tut ion ; 12 ) the tr ia l c ou rt did no t e rr in a dmi tti ng c ri me
sc e ne ph oto g ra

ph s o f the vict ims du ri ng se nte nc ing ; 13 ) the tr ia l c ou rt didno t c omm it r e ve rs ibl e
err or in failing to char g e the jury on the “c atch- all” statutory provision as to miti g ating circ umstances; and 14) the trial c ourt did not err in de ny ing a new tria l based on a lleg ed prose cutorial misconduct during sentenc ing.
The Court of Criminal Appea ls’ judgme nt is aff irmed. The sentenc e of de ath shall be c arried out on the 5th day

of Oc tober, 2005, unless oth er wi s e o rdered by this Court or other proper authority .. I t appea

ring that the def

endant is indig ent, costs of the a ppeal a re ta x ed to the State.

___________________________________ E. RILEY AN DE RSO N, JUSTI CE