alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
I 

111TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 5307 

To amend the Tariff Act of 1930 to include ultralight aircraft under the 

definition of aircraft for purposes of the aviation smuggling provisions 

under that Act. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MAY 13, 2010 

Ms. GIFFORDS (for herself and Mr. HELLER) introduced the following bill; 

which was referred to the Committee on Ways and Means 

A BILL 

To amend the Tariff Act of 1930 to include ultralight aircraft under the definition of aircraft for purposes of 

the aviation smuggling provisions under that Act. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. DEFINITION OF AIRCRAFT UNDER AVIATION 

4 SMUGGLING PROVISIONS OF THE TARIFF 

5 ACT OF 1930. 

6 (a) IN GENERAL.—Section 590 of the Tariff Act of 

7 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1590) is amended— 

8 (1) by redesignating subsection (g) as sub9 section (h); and 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 5307 IH

1 (2) by inserting after subsection (f) the fol2 lowing: 

3 ‘‘(g) DEFINITION OF AIRCRAFT.—As used in this sec4 tion, the term ‘aircraft’ includes ultralight aircraft, as de5 fined by the Secretary of Homeland Security in consulta6 tion with the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Ad7 ministration.’’. 

8 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by 

9 subsection (a) apply with respect to violations of any pro10 vision of section 590 of the Tariff Act of 1930 on or after 

11 the 30th day after the date of the enactment of this Act. 

Æ 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with BILLS
CERTIFICATION



I, John Shaffer, certify that:



1.

I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-QSB of Global-E Investments, Inc.;



2.

Based on my knowledge, this quarterly report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact, or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this quarterly report; and



3.

Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this quarterly report, fairly present in all material respects the financial position, results of operations, and cash flows of the issuer as of, and for, the periods presented in this quarterly report.



4.

The registrant's other certifying officers and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-14 and 15d-14) for the registrant and have:



a)

designed such disclosure controls and procedures to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this quarterly report is being prepared;

b)

evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and procedures as of a date within 90 days prior to the filing date of this quarterly report (the "Evaluation Date"); and

c)

presented in this quarterly report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures based on our evaluation as of the Evaluation Date;



5.

The registrant's other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation, to the registrant's auditors and the audit committee of registrant's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):



a)

all significant deficiencies in the design or operation of internal controls which could adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process, summarize and report financial data and have identified for the registrant's auditors any material weaknesses in internal controls; and

b)

any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal controls; and



6.

The registrant's other certifying officers and I have indicated in this quarterly report whether or not there were significant changes in internal controls or in other factors that could significantly affect internal controls subsequent to the date of our most recent evaluation, including any corrective actions with regard to significant deficiencies and material weaknesses.





Date:  October 21, 2004



/s/ John Shaffer

Secretary

Chief Financial Officer
[Federal Register Volume 70, Number 210 (Tuesday, November 1, 2005)]
[Notices]
[Page 65909]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 05-21646]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

National Institutes of Health


National Cancer Institute; Notice of Closed Meeting

    Pursuant to section 10(d) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, as 
amended (5 U.S.C. Appendix 2), notice is hereby given of the following 
meeting.
    The meeting will be closed to the public in accordance with the 
provisions set forth in sections 552b(c)(4) and 552b(c)(6), Title 5 
U.S.C., as amended. The grant applications and the discussions could 
disclose confidential trade secrets or commercial property such as 
patentable material, and personal information concerning individuals 
associated with the grant applications, the disclosure of which would 
constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.

    Name of Committee: National Cancer Institute Special Emphasis 
Panel. RFA: CA06-502 ``AIDS Malignancy Clinical Trials Consortium.''
    Date: November 30, 2005.
    Time: 8 a.m. to 5 p.m.
    Agenda: To review and evaluate grant applications.
    Place: Ramada Inn Rockville, 1775 Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD 
20852.
    Contact Person: Joyce C. Pegues, PhD., Scientific Review 
Administrator, Special Review and Logistics Branch, Division of 
Extramural Activities, National Cancer Institute, 6116 Executive 
Blvd. 7149, Bethesda, MD 20892. 301/594-1286. <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#ef9f8a889a8a9c85af828e8683c1818687c1888099"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="c5b5a0a2b0a0b6af85a8a4aca9ebabacadeba2aab3">[email protected]</span></a>.

(Catalogue of Federal Domestic Assistance Program Nos. 93.392, 
Cancer Construction; 93.393, Cancer Cause and Prevention Research; 
93.394, Cancer Detection and Diagnosis Research; 93.395, Cancer 
Treatment Research; 93.396, Cancer Biology Research; 93.397, Cancer 
Centers Support; 93.398, Cancer Research Manpower; 93.399, Cancer 
Control, National Institutes of Health, HHS)

    Dated: October 20, 2005.
Anthony M. Coelho, Jr.,
Acting Director, Office of Federal Advisory Committee Policy.
[FR Doc. 05-21646 Filed 10-31-05; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4140-01-M


</pre><script data-cfasync="false" src="/cdn-cgi/scripts/5c5dd728/cloudflare-static/email-decode.min.js"></script></body>
</html>
United States Department of Labor

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

__________________________________________

R.K., Appellant

and

U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, POST OFFICE,

Novato, CA, Employer

__________________________________________

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Docket No. 21-0417

Issued: May 12, 2021

Appearances: Case Submitted on the Record

Appellant, pro se

Office of Solicitor, for the Director

ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL

Before:

ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Chief Judge

JANICE B. ASKIN, Judge

PATRICIA H. FITZGERALD, Alternate Judge

On January 28, 2021 appellant filed a timely appeal from a November 16, 2020 decision

of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). The Clerk of the Appellate Boards

assigned Docket No. 21-0417.

In a letter dated February 24, 2021, and received March 15, 2021, appellant requested that 

the appeal be dismissed.

The Board has duly considered the matter and concludes that appellant’s request for the 

dismissal of the appeal should be granted. Accordingly, 
2

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT appellant’s request for the dismissal of the appeal is 

granted. The appeal docketed as No. 21-0417 is dismissed.

Issued: May 12, 2021

Washington, DC

Alec J. Koromilas, Chief Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Janice B. Askin, Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Patricia H. Fitzgerald, Alternate Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
| | American Bank Note Company
Grafica e Servicos Ltda.
Rua Peter Lund, 146 Sao Cristovao
2930-390 Rio de Janeiro - R J Brasil
| | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

December 12, 2001

Mr. Sidney Levy
Avenida Vieira Souto 620/1020
Rio de Janeiro Brazil

Dear Sidney,

This letter will memorialize our agreement regarding your
continued employment by ABN Brazil.

In consideration of your continued employment and the separate
letter agreement entered into today by and among you, ABN Equities Inc.,
American Banknote Corporation ("ABN"), and American Bank Note Company Grafica e
Servicios Ltda. (the "Company"), we agree as follows:

If, during the time that you remain an employee of the Company,
any shares in the Company are sold by ABN, you will be entitled to receive a
cash bonus equal to 1.2% of the cash consideration received by ABN. In the event
that any such sale includes as a part of the same transaction, a sale of
Transtex SA, the price paid for Transtex shall also be included in the
calculation of this bonus. You shall be entitled to such payment from the
Company only after ABN has actually received its cash consideration. If such a
sale occurs after your employment with the Company terminates for any reason,
this agreement shall be of no effect. Nowithstanding the foregoing, this bonus
shall be paid only if the total cash consideration paid to ABN values the entire
Company at a value equal to or greater than $95,000,000.

If this letter correctly reflects our mutual agreement, please
sign a copy of this letter in the space provided below.

Very truly yours,
AMERICAN BANK NOTE COMPANY GRAFICA E SERVICIOS LTDA.

/s/ Steven G. Singer
By:   Steven G. Singer
AGREED:/s/ Sidney Levy
Sidney Levy
#### ROYAL INSURANCE, a Delaware Corporation, and CARSON READY MIX, INC., a Nevada Corporation, Appellants, v. EAGLE VALLEY CONSTRUCTION, INC., a Nevada Corporation, Respondent.

No. 23322

February 4, 1994

867 P.2d 1146

*Beckley, Singleton, DeLanoy, Jemison & List*and *Stephen S. Kent,*Reno, for Appellants.

*Perry & Spann,*Reno, for Respondent.

*120OPINION

*Per Curiam:*

This is an appeal from an order of the district court dismissing appellants’ complaint for damages sustained in a traffic accident.1 The district court *sua sponte*dismissed appellants’ complaint based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Appellants claimed in their complaint $4,208.74 in damages. At the time appellants filed their action, however, NRS 4.370(l)(b) provided that the district court only had jurisdiction over suits involving more than $5,000 in damages.2

Appellants contend on appeal that attorney’s fees and costs are included in the jurisdictional limit under NRS 4.370. Appellants thus argue that the attorney’s fees and costs incurred in this case raise the amount in controversy above the jurisdictional threshold of the district court. Appellants’ contention is without support. We have previously ruled that “[a] court which is the creation of statute has only the authority given to it by the statute.” McKay v. City of Las Vegas, 106 Nev. 203, 205, 789 P.2d 584, 585 (1990). In this case, the justices’ court has exclusive jurisdiction “if the *damage claimed*does not exceed $5,000.” NRS 4.370(1)(b) (emphasis added). Because appellants only claim $4,208.74 in damages, the district court properly dismissed appellants’ complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the district court.

1

 This appeal was previously dismissed in an unpublished order of this court. On November 18, 1993, the district court requested this court to publish as an opinion our previous unpublished order. Cause appearing, we grant the request. Accordingly, we issue this opinion in place of our order dismissing this appeal filed September 29, 1993.

2

 In 1993, the legislature amended NRS 4.370 and raised the jurisdictional limit of the district court to suits involving more than $7,500.
#### STATE v. McKENZIE

No. 59 PC.

Case below: 30 N.C. App. 64.

30 N.C. App. 258.

Petition by defendants for discretionary review under G.S. 7A-31 denied 4 November 1976.
#### STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JACKIE ELLIOTT

No. 7420SC253

(Filed 15 May 1974)

Burglary and Unlawful Breakings § 6— breaking and entering with intent to commit larceny — failure to define larceny

The trial court in a prosecution for breaking and entering with intent to commit larceny erred in failing to define the crime of larceny in its jury instructions.

Appeal by defendant from *Copeland, Special Judge,*at the 20 August 1973 Criminal Session of UNION Superior Court.

*556Heard in the Court of Appeals 16 April 1974.

The defendant was indicted and convicted of the crime of felonious breaking and entering with the intent to commit larceny. The State’s evidence tended to show that on the night of 1 July 1973, Mr. Fred McCallum, manager of the Monroe Hardware Company in Monroe, North Carolina, locked all the doors and windows and gave no one permission to enter the store after hours. Officer Charles McManus of the Monroe Police Department testified that an alarm system had gone off in police headquarters indicating that someone was on the premises of Monroe Hardware Company and that he and three other officers went to the scene to investigate. The officers found that a window in the rear door had been broken and the door opened. Beside the door, the officers found a pair of shoes and a hat which the defendant later identified as his. Prior to entering the building, the officers observed the defendant walking around inside the building for about five minutes. During the time the officers were watching, the defendant did not attempt to take any merchandise or conceal any on his person. Officer Benton testified that the rear door had a lock which required a special key to unlock it either from the outside or inside. Three witnesses for the defendant testified that on the night in question he was quite drunk. From a verdict of guilty as charged and a judgment imposing a sentence of five to seven years in prison, the defendant appealed.

*Attorney General Robert Morgan by Assistant Attorney General John R. B. Matthis for the State.*

*Charles D. Humphries for defendant appellant.*

CAMPBELL, Judge.

The defendant assigns as error the failure of the trial court to define, in its charge, the crime of larceny. The charge to the jury was in all other respects excellent, and the trial court did give a detailed charge on the issue of intent. However, nowhere did he define the term “larceny” which is a vital element of the crime of breaking and entering with the intent to commit larceny. This was error, and we award a new trial. See *State v. Mundy,*265 N.C. 528, 144 S.E. 2d 572 (1967); *State v. Hickman,*filed in the Court of Appeals on 1 May 1974.

New trial.

Judges Morris and Vaughn concur.
##### 



EXHIBIT 24

CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANTS

We hereby consent to the incorporation by
reference in the Registration Statements on Forms S-8 (File Nos.
33-10631, 33-56772, 33-82560, 333-19265, 333-31391, 333-31393,
333-63304, 333-45348 and 333-65547) and Forms S-3 (File
Nos. 333-27189, 333-37946, 333-86617 and 333-48097) of our
report dated March 16, 2001, relating to International
Remote Imaging Systems, Inc. as of December 31, 2000, and
for each of the two years in the period ended December 31,
2000, which appears in this Form 10-K.



| |                                
| | -------------------------------
| | /s/ PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, LLP

Los Angeles, California

March 27, 2002
<TABLE> <S> <C>

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<PERIOD-TYPE>                                       12-mos
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                                   dec-31-2000
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</TABLE>
# FILED
June 24, 1996 Cecil Crowson, Jr. Appellate C ourt Clerk IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE AT KNOXVILLE

GENE V. AABY, ) FOR PUBLICATION ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Filed: June 24, 1996 ) v. ) KNOX CHANCERY ) JUDY E. AABY STRANGE ) Hon. Frederick D. Mc Donald, ) Chancellor Defendant-Appellant. ) ) ) ) ) No. 03S02-9507-CH-00073



# Order on Petition To Rehear

DROWOTA, J.2 The father, Gene V. Aaby, has filed a petition to rehear in this case, raising several issu es. Of those issues, only the one pertaining to custody merits further comment by this Court.

In the petition to rehear, the father states that this court,in its memorandum opinion filed April 22, 1996, held that custody should not be c hanged to the mother. He requests a rehearing of that determination because, he says , events occurring while the case was pending in this Court warrant a chang e of custody, and a petition to change custody was in fact filed in theKnox County Chancery Court on February 23, 1996.

The father misconstrues the scope of our previous decision. In th e memorandum opinion in this case, we simply concluded that the mother’s desire to
move to Bardstown, Kentucky did not evide nce such poor judgment so as t o warrant
a change of custody. That is the extent of our decision regarding custody; w e did not purport to conclusively d ecide the issue in the opini on, and if the father can show that custody should be changed for r easons o ther than the mother’s desire to move to Bardstown, he may cert ainly do so.

In addition to this clari fication, foot note 3 of the memo randum o pinion i s amended by adding the followi ng sentence. “In that case , the parties shall memoria lize their agreement in an order, which shall be signed and entered by the trial court.”

______________________________________3 Frank F. Drowota, II I Justice Concur: Birch, C.J. Anderson, Reid, and White , JJ.
Motion Granted; Dismissed and Memorandum Opinion filed December 22, 2011.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals 

____________

NO. 14-11-01061-CR

____________

ALVIN DEMOND DERSONE, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 174th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 1317881

MEMORANDUM OPINION

A written request to withdraw the notice of appeal, personally signed by appellant, 

has been filed with this court. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.2. Because this court has not 

delivered an opinion, we grant appellant’s request.

Accordingly, we order the appeal dismissed. We direct the clerk of the court to 

issue the mandate of the court immediately.

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Justices Brown, Boyce, and McCally.

Do Not Publish — Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).
United States Department of Labor

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

__________________________________________

D.P., Appellant

and

U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, CLINTON POST 

OFFICE, Clinton, MD, Employer

__________________________________________

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Docket No. 22-0652

Issued: April 29, 2022

Appearances: Case Submitted on the Record

Appellant, pro se

Office of Solicitor, for the Director

ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL

Before:

PATRICIA H. FITZGERALD, Deputy Chief Judge

JANICE B. ASKIN, Judge

VALERIE D. EVANS-HARRELL, Alternate Judge

On March 23, 2022 appellant filed an appeal from a July 21, 2021 merit decision of the 

Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). The Clerk of the Appellate Boards

assigned Docket No. 22-0652.

The Board has duly considered the matter and notes that the Board has jurisdiction to 

review final adverse decisions of OWCP issued under the Federal Employees’ Compensation 

Act.1 For final adverse decisions of OWCP issued on or after November 19, 2008, the Board’s 

review authority is limited to appeals which are filed within 180 days from the date of issuance 

of OWCP’s decision.2

The 180th day following the July 21, 2021 decision was January 17, 2022. As appellant 

did not file an appeal with the Board until March 23, 2022, more than 180 days after the July 21, 

2021 OWCP decision, the Board finds that the appeal docketed as No. 22-0652 is untimely filed. 

The Board is without jurisdiction to review the appeal. Appellant has not offered a reason to 

explain the failure to timely file an appeal with supporting documentation sufficient to establish 

1

5 U.S.C. § 8149; 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3(a) (2009).

2

Id. at § 501.3(e).
2

compelling circumstances. Because there is no final adverse decision issued by OWCP within 

180 days of the filing of the instant appeal, the Board concludes that the appeal docketed as No. 

22-0652, must be dismissed.3 Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the appeal docketed as No. 22-0652 is dismissed.

Issued: April 29, 2022

Washington, DC

Patricia H. Fitzgerald, Deputy Chief Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Janice B. Askin, Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Valerie D. Evans-Harrell, Alternate Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

3 The Board’s decisions and orders are “final upon the expiration of 30 days from the date of their issuance.” Id.

at § 501.6(d).