United States Department of Labor

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

__________________________________________

K.M., Appellant

and

U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, PROCESSING & 

DISTRIBUTION CENTER, Oklahoma City, OK, 

Employer

__________________________________________

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Docket No. 22-1000

Issued: November 9, 2022

Appearances: Case Submitted on the Record

Appellant, pro se

Office of Solicitor, for the Director

DECISION AND ORDER

Before:

PATRICIA H. FITZGERALD, Deputy Chief Judge

VALERIE D. EVANS-HARRELL, Alternate Judge

JAMES D. McGINLEY, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION

On June 16, 2022 appellant filed a timely appeal from a June 10, 2022 merit decision of 

the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). Pursuant to the Federal Employees’

Compensation Act1(FECA) and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the Board has jurisdiction to 

consider the merits of this case.

ISSUE

The issue is whether appellant has met her burden of proof to establish an emotional 

condition in the performance of duty.

1

5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.
2

FACTUAL HISTORY

On March 30, 2020 appellant, then a 55-year-old processing distribution clerk, filed an 

occupational disease claim (Form CA-2) alleging that she sustained a stress-related condition 

causally related to factors of her federal employment. She stopped work on February 28, 2020.

In an undated statement received by OWCP on April 13, 2020, appellant related that 

approximately 11:00 p.m. on February 27, 2020 she was sorting letters in her assigned area. R.D. 

frightened her by coming up behind her when she thought she was alone. Appellant advised that 

on May 31, 2019 R.D. had approached her from behind and body slammed her into a letter case. 

She reported the incident to managers G.S. and P.K. and told them that she did not feel safe 

working with R.D. G.S. allowed her to work in another area for a month but then told her to return 

to her usual location. Appellant maintained that on February 27, 2020 she asked R.D. not to come 

up behind her and R.D. began yelling at her. R.D. walked up behind appellant for the second time 

on February 27, 2020, yelled in her face in a threatening manner, and waved her hands in her face. 

Appellant backed away, but R.D. continued to scream at her. Appellant told G.S. about the 

incident and he advised that he had told R.D. to alert him if she walked up behind her in the future. 

G.S. told appellant that if either of them approached him again about these incidents he would take 

corrective action. Appellant responded that R.D. had body slammed her the prior year and 

currently threatened to hurt her and that she felt unsafe at work. She left work and filed a police 

report.

In an undated statement, R.D. advised that on February 27, 2020 she was humming a song 

when appellant told her not to “run up on [her] like that.” She asked appellant why she acted 

scared. G.S. told R.D. that if the two of them did not get along he would fire them both.

In a March 3, 2020 city police incident report form, appellant advised that one year earlier 

a coworker had body slammed her to the floor. On February 27, 2020 the same assailant allegedly

screamed and threatened her and used “wild hand gestures in an intimidating manner.” 

In a development letter dated April 13, 2020, OWCP advised appellant of the type of 

factual and medical evidence necessary to establish her claim and provided a questionnaire for her 

completion. In a separate development letter of even date, it requested that the employing 

establishment provide additional information regarding her alleged injury, including comments 

from a knowledgeable supervisor regarding the accuracy of her allegations and witness statements 

from employees with additional information. OWCP afforded both parties 30 days to submit the 

requested evidence.

On April 16, 2020 P.K. and G.S. indicated that appellant had alleged that on May 31, 2019 

a coworker had bumped into her on purpose and knocked her into the case. The other employee’s 

version of events, however, differed. Appellant worked in another area for a month following the 

incident. On February 27, 2020 she advised that the same employee had scared her and the two 

“ended up in a shouting argument.... The only witness could hear yelling but did not hear what 

was said. Once again the [two] had different stories as to what had happened.” The employees 

were informed of the zero-tolerance policy and appellant became upset.
3

On April 21, 2020 the employing establishment challenged the claim. It asserted that 

appellant had not filed a claim for the May 31, 2019 incident until nearly a year later, and would 

receive discipline if she returned for leaving work without approval.

J.G., a coworker, related in a May 1, 2020 statement that he had twice witnessed R.D. 

scream at other employees. On May 2, 2020 L.M., another coworker, indicated that he had seen 

R.D. have verbal outbursts and use profanity. On May 4, 2020 M.W., a coworker, advised that 

management avoided dealing with R.D. M.W. asserted that appellant was frightened after R.D. 

body slammed her. 

In a statement dated May 12, 2020, appellant reiterated that while casing mail on May 31, 

2019 R.D. had hit her from behind pushing her into the standing case. She advised that the right 

side of her body hurt. Appellant reported the incident to management but there were no cameras 

in the area. She was temporarily relocated for a month but then G.S. told she had to return or lose 

her job. Management informed her the situation had been handled and it was safe for her to return. 

On February 27, 2020 appellant thought she was working alone but R.D. scared her on purpose by 

“entering [her] personal space from behind.” Appellant walked away and R.D. screamed and 

yelled at her. She related that for the second time on February 27, 2020, R.D. walked up behind 

her on her blindside and screamed at her. R.D. also threatened her by stretching out her arms and 

hands like she was choking her while telling her that she wanted to put her hands on her. G.S. 

threatened appellant with corrective action if she reported this again. A mail handler witnessed 

this incident but told her that management had informed him that he was not allowed to comment. 

On September 30, 2020 OWCP prepared a statement of accepted facts (SOAF) and, on 

January 14, 2021, referred appellant to Dr. Louise M. Thurman, a Board-certified psychiatrist, for 

a second opinion examination. 

In a March 29, 2021 report, Dr. Thurman diagnosed post-traumatic stress disorder and 

severe major depression due to assault and harassment at work. She opined that appellant was 

totally disabled from work.

In a development letter addressed to the employing establishment, dated April 16, 2021, 

OWCP requested that a knowledgeable supervisor address the accuracy of appellant’s allegations 

and explain and support with evidence any points of disagreement. It afforded the employing 

establishment 30 days to provide the requested information.

Subsequently, OWCP received an undated statement from G.S. He related that appellant 

and R.D. had “multiple altercations and have been told to not talk to each other and to stay away 

from each other unless it is something that needs to be said about work.” G.S. advised that 

appellant maintained that R.D. had body slammed her, while R.D. indicated that she had bumped 

into appellant “trying to get mail out of the case.” He allowed appellant to case mail in a different 

area because she was scared R.D. had bumped into her on purpose. After appellant returned to the 

regular work location, she told G.S. that R.D. had come up behind her unannounced. G.S. 

indicated that both employees told different stories. He found that both had yelled and cursed at 

each other and told them such behavior would not be tolerated. Appellant became angry and left 

work.
4

In a May 12, 2021 e-mail, S.W., who works for the employing establishment, advised that 

management had investigated two incidents regarding two employees but that the only evidence 

was their statements. A witness heard yelling but not the content of the conversation. Both 

employees were counseled about the zero-tolerance policy. S.W. noted that appellant believed 

that she would receive discipline if she reported a problem but advised that this was untrue. He 

noted that since she had stopped work the area had been reorganized and employees were not 

yelling or openly threatening each other.

By decision dated November 5, 2021, OWCP denied appellant’s emotional condition 

claim. It found that she had not established any compensable factors of employment. 

On March 15, 2022 appellant requested reconsideration. She submitted supporting 

medical evidence.

By decision dated June 10, 2022, OWCP denied modification of its November 5, 2021 

decision. 

LEGAL PRECEDENT

An employee seeking benefits under FECA2 has the burden of proof to establish the 

essential elements of his or her claim,3including that he or she sustained an injury in the 

performance of duty, and that any specific condition or disability for work for which he or she 

claims compensation is causally related to that employment injury.4 These are the essential 

elements of each and every compensation claim regardless of whether the claim is predicated on a 

traumatic injury or an occupational disease.5

To establish an emotional condition in the performance of duty, a claimant must submit: 

(1) factual evidence identifying an employment factor or incident alleged to have caused or 

contributed to his or her claimed emotional condition; (2) medical evidence establishing that he or 

she has a diagnosed emotional or psychiatric disorder; and (3) rationalized medical opinion 

evidence establishing that the accepted compensable employment factors are causally related to 

the diagnosed emotional condition.6

Workers’ compensation law does not apply to each and every injury or illness that is 

somehow related to a claimant’s employment. There are situations where an injury or illness has 

some connection with the employment, but nevertheless does not come within the purview of 

2

Id.

3 M.J., Docket No. 20-0953 (issued December 8, 2021); O.G., Docket No. 18-0359 (issued August 7, 2019); J.P., 

59 ECAB 178 (2007); Joseph M. Whelan, 20 ECAB 55, 58 (1968).

4 M.J., id.; O.G., id.; G.T., 59 ECAB 447 (2008); Elaine Pendleton, 40 ECAB 1143, 1145 (1989).

5

20 C.F.R. § 10.115; R.D.,Docket No. 21-0050 (issued February 25, 2022); Michael E. Smith, 50 ECAB 313 

(1999); Victor J. Woodhams, 41 ECAB 345, 352 (1989); Elaine Pendleton, id.

6

See C.C., Docket No. 21-0283 (issued July 11, 2022); S.K., Docket No. 18-1648 (issued March 14, 2019); Donna 

Faye Cardwell, 41 ECAB 730 (1990).
5

workers’ compensation. When disability results from an emotional reaction to regular or specially 

assigned work duties or a requirement imposed by the employment, the disability is deemed 

compensable.7 However, disability is not compensable when it results from factors such as an 

employee’s fear of a reduction-in-force, or frustration from not being permitted to work in a 

particular environment, or to hold a particular position.8

Administrative and personnel matters, although generally related to the employee’s 

employment, are administrative functions of the employer rather than the regular or specially 

assigned work duties of the employee and are not covered under FECA. 9 Where, however, the 

evidence demonstrates that the employing establishment either erred or acted abusively in 

discharging its administrative or personnel responsibilities, such action will be considered a 

compensable employment factor.10 

Mere perceptions of harassment or discrimination are not compensable under FECA. 11 

Additionally, verbal altercations and difficult relationships with supervisors, when sufficiently 

detailed by the claimant and supported by the record, may constitute factors of employment. This 

does not imply, however, that every statement uttered in the workplace will give rise to coverage 

under FECA.12

In cases involving emotional conditions, the Board has held that, when working conditions 

are alleged as factors in causing a condition or disability, OWCP, as part of its adjudicatory 

function, must make findings of fact regarding which working conditions are deemed compensable 

factors of employment, and are to be considered by a physician when providing an opinion on 

causal relationship, and which working conditions are not deemed factors of employment and may 

not be considered.13 If a claimant does implicate a factor of employment, OWCP should then 

determine whether the evidence of record substantiates that factor. When the matter asserted is a 

compensable factor of employment and the evidence of record establishes the truth of the matter 

asserted, OWCP must base its decision on an analysis of the medical evidence. 14

7 A.C., Docket No. 18-0507 (issued November 26, 2018); Pamela D. Casey, 57 ECAB 260, 263 (2005); Lillian 

Cutler, 28 ECAB 125, 129 (1976).

8 A.E., Docket No. 18-1587 (issued March 13, 2019); GregorioE. Conde, 52 ECAB 410 (2001).

9

See R.M., Docket No. 19-1088 (issued November 17, 2020); Thomas D. McEuen, 41 ECAB 387 (1990); reaff’d 

on recon., 42 ECAB 556 (1991).

10 See C.J., Docket No. 19-1722 (issued February 19, 2021); M.A., Docket No. 19-1017 (issued December 4, 2019).

11 A.E., Docket No. 18-1587 (issued March 13, 2019); M.D., 59 ECAB 211 (2007); RobertG. Burns, 57 ECAB 

657 (2006).

12 R.B., Docket No. 19-1256 (issued July 28, 2020); Y.B.,Docket No. 16-0193 (issued July 23, 2018); Marguerite J. 

Toland, 52 ECAB 294 (2001).

13 R.B., id.; O.G., supra note 5.

14 Id.
6

ANALYSIS

The Board finds that the case is not in posture for decision.

Appellant attributed her emotional condition to altercations with R.D. on May 31, 2019 

and February 27, 2020. She maintained that, on May 31, 2019, R.D. body slammed her from 

behind into a letter case. G.S. indicated that he had investigated the May 31, 2019 incident. He 

noted that R.D. informed him that she had bumped into appellant trying to get mail from a case. 

Physical contact by a coworker or supervisor can give rise to a compensable work factor, if the 

incident is established factually to have occurred as alleged. 15 The evidence, including the 

statement of G.S., supports that physical contact occurred between appellant and R.D. on 

May 31, 2019. In the present case, the work setting brought appellant and R.D. together, and 

created the conditions that resulted in the two incidents on February 27, 2020. The altercations 

occurred while appellant was performing her regular work duties and there is no indication that 

the hostility between her and R.D. resulted from a dispute imported from outside the 

employment.16 Thus, the Board finds that she has established a compensable employment factor

in this regard.

17

 

Regarding the incident of February 27, 2020, appellant alleged that on two occasions R.D. 

walked up behind her to frighten her, yelled at her, threatened her, and waved her hands in her 

face. While the Board has recognized the compensability of physical threats or verbal abuse in 

certain circumstances, this does not imply that every statement uttered in the workplace will give 

rise to coverage under FECA.18 Although the record contains witness statements that R.D. has 

yelled and used profanity directed at co-workers, this evidence does not indicate that the yelling 

or profanity was directed toward appellant. Appellant has not otherwise submitted witness 

statements corroborating her allegations. The Board finds that appellant has not established, with 

corroborating evidence, that she was harassed by R.D. in this regard.19

15 K.W., Docket No. 20-0832 (issued June 21, 2022); J.T., Docket No. 20-0390 (issued April2, 2021); D.B., Docket 

No. 19-1543 (issued March 6, 2020); AltonL. White, 42 ECAB 666 (1991) (physical contact a rising in the course of 

employment, if substantiated by the evidence of record, may constitute a compensable employment factor).

16 Under the friction and strain doctrine, the fact that employees with their individual characteristics (emotions, 

temper, etc.) are brought together in the workplace creates situations leading to conflicts which may result in physical 

or emotional injuries. Because these conflicts have their origin in the employment they arise out of and in the course 

of employment even though they have no relevance to the employee’s tasks. In other words, a conflict between 

employees involving a nonwork topic may be found to have occurred in the performance of duty because the 

employment brought the employees together and created the conditions which resulted in the conflict. However, the 

friction and strain doctrine does not apply to privately motivated quarrels or disputes imported from outside the 

employment. See B.K., Docket No. 16-0698 (issued September 6, 2016); A.B., Docket No. 15-0288 (issued May21, 

2015); F.S., Docket No. 10-1398 (issued May 12, 2011); see also Federal (FECA) Procedure Manual, Part 2 --Claims, 

Performance of Duty, Chapter 2.804.12b (March 1994, January 1997).

17 See P.T., Docket No. 19-1843 (issued April24, 2020); D.B., Docket No. 19-1543 (issued March 6, 2020).

18 R.B., Docket No. 19-1256 (issued July 28, 2020); C.B.,Docket No. 19-1351 (issued March 25, 2020); Charles D. 

Edwards, 55 ECAB 258 (2004).

19 Id.
7

As OWCP found that there were no compensable employment factors, it did not analyze 

or develop the medical evidence. Thus, the Board will set aside OWCP’s decision and remand the 

case for consideration of the medical evidence to determine whether appellant has established an 

emotional condition in the performance of duty causally related to the compensable employment 

factors.20 OWCP should prepare an updated SOAF and request a rationalized opinion from a 

physician in the appropriate field of medicine regarding whether the compensable employment 

factors set forth in the updated SOAF caused or aggravated an emotional condition. After this and 

other such further development as deemed necessary, OWCP shall issue a de novo decision on 

appellant’s emotional condition claim.

CONCLUSION

The Board finds that the case is not in posture for decision.

ORDER

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the June 10, 2022 decision of the Office of Workers’

Compensation Programs is set aside and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent 

with this decision of the Board.

Issued: November 9, 2022

Washington, DC

Patricia H. Fitzgerald, Deputy Chief Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Valerie D. Evans-Harrell, Alternate Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

James D. McGinley, Alternate Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

20 E.A., Docket No. 19-0582 (issued April22, 2021).