COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Baker, Willis and Retired Judge Trabue*

Argued at Norfolk, Virginia 

JOE BOOKER WORRELL, III 

v. Record No. 2569-93-1 MEMORANDUM OPINION**

 BY JUDGE JOSEPH E. BAKER 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA JUNE 6, 1995 

 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF PORTSMOUTH 

Dennis F. McMurran, Judge 

 C. Gerard Thompson (Jackson & Thompson, P.C., 

 on brief), for appellant. 

 Richard B. Smith, Assistant Attorney General 

 (James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General, on brief), 

 for appellee. 

 Joe Booker Worrell, III (appellant) appeals from his bench 

trial conviction by the Circuit Court of the City of Portsmouth 

(trial court) for possession of cocaine with intent to 

distribute. Appellant contends that the trial court erroneously 

denied his motion to suppress evidence of cocaine found by the 

police who stopped an automobile pursuant to information given by 

an informant. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the 

trial court. 

 The record discloses that at about 4:45 p.m. on April 6, 

1992, a "reliable" informant, who had provided information in the 

past leading to arrests, called the Portsmouth Police Department 

 

 *Retired Judge Kenneth E. Trabue took part in the 

consideration of this case by designation pursuant to Code 

§ 17-116.01. 

 **Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010, this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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on an anonymous tip line. The informant gave Sergeant Morrisette 

the following information: a tall black man who worked for the 

city was going to and from a gray Honda, Virginia license 

HQV-704, in the second parking lot on the left entry into the 

London Oaks complex, obtaining crack cocaine. The informant 

stated further that the cocaine was located in a compartment on 

the driver's side door, that the man was with two other black men 

named Tony and David, and that the men would be leaving soon. 

 Morrisette passed this information to Detective Snipes who 

proceeded toward the area described by the informant. Morrisette 

checked the license number and notified Snipes, who was heading 

toward the scene, that the car was registered to a Richard Rogers 

who worked for the city. 

 About fifteen minutes later, following the directions of the 

informant, Snipes found a Honda matching the informant's 

description at the exact place where the informant said it would 

be located. A black male, subsequently identified as appellant, 

was driving the car. Another man, later identified as Anthony 

Williams, had just gotten into the passenger seat. 

 Detective Snipes observed the Honda's back-up lights come on 

and blocked the vehicle with his squad car because it appeared 

that the Honda was starting to leave. Snipes approached 

appellant, who was driving the vehicle, and asked for his license 

and registration. A review of those items revealed that 
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appellant was not the owner of the Honda.1

 Snipes then asked 

appellant to step out of the car. When appellant did so, he 

tried to shut the door quickly, but Snipes "spotted what could 

have been narcotics" inside the door. Snipes then retrieved from 

the door what was later confirmed to be crack cocaine. Appellant 

was placed under arrest and searched. Cash totaling $604 was 

found in appellant's front pants pocket. 

 On appeal, the burden is upon the appellant to show that the 

denial of the motion to suppress constitutes reversible error. 

Fore v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 1007, 1010, 265 S.E.2d 729, 731, 

cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1017 (1980). In reviewing a trial court's 

ruling on a suppression motion, we consider the evidence in the 

light most favorable to the prevailing party below, and the 

decision will not be disturbed unless it is plainly wrong or 

without evidence to support it. Lee v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 

235, 238, 443 S.E.2d 180, 181 (1994); Commonwealth v. Grimstead, 

12 Va. App. 1066, 1067, 407 S.E.2d 47, 48 (1991). Our review of 

the evidence includes the testimony appearing in the record of 

both the suppression hearing and the trial. Greene v. 

Commonwealth, 17 Va. App. 606, 608, 440 S.E.2d 138, 139 (1994). 

 In order for a police officer to lawfully stop the occupants 

of an automobile, the officer must have a reasonable articulable 

suspicion that a crime has been or is about to be committed. 

 

 1A passenger, however, was named Anthony, a name frequently 

shortened to "Tony." 
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Quigley v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 28, 32, 414 S.E.2d 851, 

853-54 (1992). The level of suspicion required to make an 

investigatory stop is less demanding than is required to search 

or to arrest a person. Bulatko v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 135, 

136-37, 428 S.E.2d 306, 307 (1993). When the record discloses 

that information supplied by an informant has been sufficiently 

corroborated, reasonable suspicion may have been shown, and it is 

not necessary that every detail be corroborated. Id., see also 

Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 324 (1990). 

 While a "bright line rule" would be desirable in evaluating 

whether an investigative detention is unreasonable, common sense 

and ordinary human experience must govern over rigid criteria, 

Limonja v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 532, 542, 383 S.E.2d 476, 482 

(1989) (en banc), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 905 (1990), and the 

"totality of the circumstances--the whole picture" must be 

considered. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 8 (1989). 

 When the officers stopped the vehicle in which appellant was 

seated behind the steering wheel, they had corroborated that the 

vehicle was a gray Honda, bearing license plates HQV-704, located 

at the precise place the informant said it would be, owned by a 

city employee, and its occupants were two black men. The 

officers also knew that the informant had in the past proved 

reliable. The information given was that the vehicle would soon 

be leaving. Upon arrival, the police observed that the vehicle's 

back-up lights appeared to indicate that leaving was imminent. 
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We hold that the information received by the police was 

sufficiently corroborated for the police to continue their 

investigation, including the request for the driver to exit the 

vehicle. 

 When appellant opened the driver's side door to exit the 

vehicle, he quickly attempted to close the door where, in a 

compartment described by the informant, the cocaine was found. 

Detective Snipes testified he "spotted" what appeared to be 

cocaine as appellant seemed to be keeping it from his view while 

closing the door. 

 The Fourth Amendment does not forbid all searches and 

seizures, only those that are unreasonable. See Elkins v. United 

States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960); Verez v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 

405, 410, 337 S.E.2d 749, 752 (1985). Thus, the test here is, 

viewing the totality of the circumstances, whether the discovery 

was unreasonably made. The reasonableness of a police officer's 

response to a given situation is a question of fact for the trial 

court and its ruling will not be disturbed on appeal absent clear 

and manifest error. State v. Fisher, 141 Ariz. 227, 238, 686 

P.2d 750, 761 (1984). Here, the discovery was made in plain view 

when appellant exited the vehicle at the place where the 

informant said the cocaine would be found. 

 For the reasons stated, we find that the police had 

reasonable suspicion to believe that criminal activity was or had 

taken place at the point of appellant's arrest, and that it was 
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not constitutionally unreasonable to view the driver's door 

compartment where the cocaine was discovered as appellant was 

leaving the vehicle. According, we cannot say that the trial 

court's evaluation and determination was plainly wrong or without 

evidence to support it, and we affirm its judgment. 

 Affirmed.