United States Department of Labor

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

__________________________________________

L.E., Appellant

and

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, 

TRANSPORTATION SECURITY 

ADMINISTRATION, Billings, MT, Employer

__________________________________________

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Docket No. 22-1302

Issued: December 26, 2023

Appearances: Case Submitted on the Record

Appellant, pro se

Office of Solicitor, for the Director

DECISION AND ORDER

Before:

PATRICIA H. FITZGERALD, Deputy Chief Judge

JANICE B. ASKIN, Judge

JAMES D. McGINLEY, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION

On September 7, 2022 appellant filed a timely appeal from a May 26, 2022 merit decision 

of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). Pursuant to the Federal Employees’

Compensation Act1(FECA) and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the Board has jurisdiction over 

the merits of this case.

ISSUE

The issue is whether appellant has met her burden of proof to establish a stress-related

condition in the performance of duty. 

FACTUAL HISTORY

On November 12, 2018 appellant, then a 58-year-old program analyst, filed an 

occupational disease claim (Form CA-2) alleging that she experienced a stroke due to hypertension 

1

5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.
2

which was caused by having to work in a hostile work environment. She noted that she first 

became aware of her condition and realized its relation to her federal employment on 

July 18, 2017. Appellant stopped work on August 15, 2018. 

In an accompanying narrative statement, appellant alleged that H, the Assistant Federal 

Security Director, whom she noted was not her supervisor, created a hostile work environment 

through aggressive behavior, intimidation, and retaliation in 2017 and 2018, after she and three 

other coworkers filed a formal complaint. Appellant alleged that in April, May, and June 2017, 

several coworkers were told and/or made to sign confidentiality forms to not discuss any 

workplace topics or issues concerning H with her. She alleged that H revoked her “HR” access to 

a timekeeping system, and that her supervisor received an e-mail stating that any payroll 

information she needed could be obtained through the coordination center. Appellant indicated 

that her supervisor reinstated her privileges and protected her access. She filed a formal complaint 

on July 26, 2018 regarding H’s retaliation and reprisal to D.F., the Federal Security Director , but

her complaint was ignored and never forwarded to the anti-harassment department. In 

August 2017, she alleged public humiliation as she heard H yelling about an e-mail she had sent 

to H regarding a drug test of an employee. Appellant indicated that she then suffered a stroke on

July 18, 2017, after which she kept her office door closed and turned coworkers away when they 

came to her to seek advice about their own mistreatment by “H.” In June 2018, appellant alleged 

that H accused her of timecard fraud. She indicated that she filed an Equal Employment 

Opportunity (EEO) complaint, and the investigation report was with the Professional 

Responsibility office. Appellant alleged that on July 11, 2018 H was overheard using profanity 

about her two-day-a-week telework schedule as she was the only employee with such a telework 

schedule. She detailed her medical history and stated that, following her stroke, she started taking 

Family and Medical Leave Act leave in August 2017 due to continued hostility in the workplace. 

In a November 8, 2018 report, Dr. Lisa A. Melody, a Board-certified internist, opined that 

appellant’s elevated blood pressure and acute neurologic symptoms developed in association with 

increased workplace stress, which appellant indicated was due to difficulties with a supervisor.

In a development letter dated December 11, 2018, OWCP informed appellant of the 

deficiencies of her claim. It advised her of the type of additional factual and medical evidence 

needed and provided a questionnaire for her completion. OWCP afforded appellant 30 days to 

submit the necessary evidence.

OWCP subsequently received appellant’s completed development questionnaire; narrative 

statements dated July 26, 2017 and November 1, 2018; a copy of appellant’s position description; 

a copy of the April 5, 2017 complaint against H for harassing behavior bearing several signatures; 

a May 12, 2017 e-mail regarding appellant’s request for access to HR computer programs and/or 

sites; an April 17, 2018 e-mail regarding the employing establishment’s EEO policy; and 

appellant’s July 13, 2018 e-mail to H noting her concerns regarding the H’s use of obscene 

language on multiple occasions. 

OWCP also received additional evidence regarding appellant’s medical treatment from 

2014 through 2018. 
3

In a development letter dated February 20, 2019, OWCP requested that the employing 

establishment respond to appellant’s allegations and provide additional information, including 

comments from a knowledgeable supervisor. It afforded the employing establishment 30 daysto 

respond. 

On March 27, 2019 OWCP again requested that appellant provide additional evidence. 

Appellant subsequently submitted statements from coworkers, L.B. dated July 31 and 

December 17, 2018;

2 statements from C.F. dated July 31 and December 12, 2018;3 statements 

from R.S. dated August 2, 2018;

4 a statement from K.H. dated December 11, 2018;5 and a 

statement from D.F. dated January 30, 2019.

6

Appellant also submitted a witness statement from her supervisor, K.C., dated 

December 14, 2018. He acknowledged that a coworker was terrified of being caught by H in 

appellant’s office. K.C. acknowledged that appellant had e-mailed him that H yelled about her, 

that he reported the incident, and a management inquiry was conducted, but he did not know the 

results. He also related the actions he took after appellant e-mailed him in May 2017 that H 

revoked her access to HR computer programs. K.C. indicated that the revocation of the access to 

HR computer programs occurred because of a glitch in the system and that H did not revoke 

appellant’s access. K.C. also explained that appellant’s whereabouts and time and attendance was 

questioned by H as no one could locate appellant’s whereabouts when an issue arose. He advised 

that the matter was closed when it was learned that appellant was teleworking. K.C. also indicated 

that he forwarded appellant’s accusations regarding H for a management inquiry, but he did not 

know the results. 

By decision dated May 29, 2019, OWCP denied appellant’s claim, finding that the 

evidence of record was insufficient to establish an emotional condition in the performance of duty. 

It noted the incidents alleged which could not be accepted as factual and found that the established 

events were not compensable factors of employment as they were administrative or operational 

2 L.B. attested to hearingH loudly complain to “J” andthat she heard the comment “f***ing schedule.” She also 

reported hearing H say, “F*** you” while exiting a workspace and say,” This s*** isn’t going to fly,” but L.B. 

indicated that she did not know who the comment was directed towards or what it referred to. L.B. noted that in 

May 2017H had her sign a nondisclosure agreement regarding her discussions with appellant about H, but provided 

no reason. She also verified that H told her that appellant could not be her advocate and that she was not allowed to 

speak to appellant in appellant’s office. 

3 C.F. reported his interactions with H. He indicated that she told him that he needed to be loyal to her and to not 

talk to appellant about anything other than work items. C.F. indicated that he was once told to report to her office 

after she observed him coming out of appellant’s office andH thenquestioned why he was speaking to appellant. He 

indicated that he was also instructed to sign a non-disclosure form. 

4 R.S. described several instances involving H either yelling at him or calling him names. 

5 K.H. verified that on July 11, 2018 she witnessed H state to her first line supervisor, M.J., “He needs to set a 

f***ing schedule” regarding K.C. permitting appellant to telework a second day a week. 

6 D.F. noted the actions he took regardingappellant’s complaint against H. He also noted that while the Office of 

Professional Responsibility had not issued a decision, the ROI substantiated some of the claims that H was 

unprofessional. 
4

decisions made by her supervisor, some of which did not directly concern her or did not appear to 

be related to any function of her job.

On July 1, 2020 appellant requested reconsideration and submitted additional evidence.

In a May 6, 2020 statement, appellant reiterated her description of incidents regarding H.

She alleged that H took nearly a month to submit documentation regarding the accusation that 

appellant had committed timecard fraud, and that the delay was unfounded and stressful. 

Appellant alleged that she was in the office on July 11, 2018 when H made the comment “she 

needs to set a f***ing schedule.” She indicated that this was witnessed by L.B. and that D.V. 

confirmed that the comment was made about her. Appellant alleged that as the result of her final

complaint on July 13, 2018, management finally took action regarding her complaints pertaining 

to “H,” approximately one year and four months from her original April 5, 2017 complaint. By 

that time, appellant’s stress was extreme, and she was unable to perform at her previous level. 

Shortly thereafter, she took a leave of absence due to stress and difficulty managing her blood 

pressure. Appellant indicated that her EEOC complaints were still being adjudicated.

In support of her allegations, appellant submitted copies of TSA Management Directives 

effective September 3, 2015; a July 23, 2018 WebTA employee summary; her November 21, 2018 

EEO complaint with exhibits; and a copy her June 22, 2018 e-mail with 14 pages additional e-mails

pertaining to the payroll issue. 

In her November 21, 2018 EEO complaint, appellant alleged additional allegations against

“H.” During her April 21, 2017 mid-year review with C, she indicated that the majority of the 

three-hour meeting was spent discussing her interactions with H. Appellant related that she felt 

threatened and felt that C was warning her that the results of continuing to complain would be 

detrimental. She also felt intimated when she was asked for the notes regarding the meeting. 

Appellant alleged that on September 5, 2017 C told her that management was deciding who her 

back-up would be. C indicated that she should be under H and asked whether she liked her. 

Appellant replied that it was not about liking her, it was about being treated with respect. 

OWCP also received a December 19, 2018 witness statement from J.J;

7 a copy of the TSA 

MD 110.73-3 Handbook: Anti-Harassment Program, revised August 26, 2017; an August 23, 

2017 e-mail from F to H; a copy of TSA MD No. 1100.73-5: Employee Responsibilities and Code 

of conduct; July 23, 2018 a timekeeping system analysis affirmed by appellant; and numerous 

e-mails from appellant dated July 10, 2018 through February 26, 2019. 

By decision dated July 20, 2020, OWCP denied appellant’s request for reconsideration, 

finding that it was untimely filed and failed to demonstrate clear evidence of error. 

7

J.J. indicated that she did not take action regarding appellant’s complaint as she was only copied as a recipient. 

She also indicated that H was a J-band employee and that complaint investigations must be handed by the Office of 

Professional Responsibility.
5

On October 7, 2020 appellant, through counsel, requested reconsideration arguing that 

appellant’s request for reconsideration was timely received by OWCP. Evidence regarding 

appellant’s mail delivery service was provided. 

By decision dated January 4, 2021, OWCP denied modification of its May 29, 2019 

decision. It also found that the additional events appellant alleged were not compensable 

employment factors. 

Appellant requested reconsideration on December 20, 2021. She indicated that F admitted 

that H was reprimanded due to a July 2018 incident; and that F admitted that management’s 

inaction of previous complaints allowed continued harassment. In support, appellant submitted a 

December 15, 2021 statement from M.O.;8 a December 16, 2021 statement from C.F.;9 a 

December 18, 2021 statement from K.H.;

10 and a December 16, 2021 statement from D.F. 

In his December 16, 2021 statement, D.F. acknowledged that the investigator concluded 

that H used profane, demeaning, and abusive language in the workplace pertaining to the July 13, 

2018 complaint and that was not a one-time incident in July 2018. He indicated that in 2019 H 

was reprimanded by the Office of Professional Responsibility for policy violations pertaining to 

the July 2018 investigation and conduct towards appellant. D.F. also stated that he was subjected 

on numerous occasions to H’s outbursts and abusive behavior which he reported without resolve. 

He acknowledged that appellant submitted complaints pertaining to H’s alleged harassment and 

misconduct on April 5 and July 26, 2017 and July 13, 2018, but he did not report or complete an 

incident report pertaining to the alleged harassment in those complaints, in accordance with the 

employing establishment’s Anti-Harassment Policy Management Directives. D.F. noted that 

appellant was provided a “notice to affected person” per policy pertaining to her July 13, 2018 

complaint letter. He admitted that he had violated the employing establishment’s Anti-Harassment 

Policy Management Directives and that no management inquiry was conducted with regard to 

appellant’s complaints about H yelling on April 15, 2017, and appellant’s June 22, 2018 timecard 

fraud accusations against H. D.F. noted that H’s behavior and treatment of appellant took place 

over a span of 14 months and that her work performance and demeanor declined. He provided his 

opinions regarding management’s handling of appellant’s 2017 complaints and his belief that the 

revocation of appellant’s access to HR computer programs was a form of retaliation. D.F. also 

acknowledged that shortly after the April 5, 2017 complaint C.F. and L.B. were made to sign 

confidentiality agreements, which was not required by management.

8 M.O. reiterated appellant’s conversations concerning H and described appellant’s reactions. She denied knowing 

the results of any complaints submitted. 

9 C.F. stated that H displayed demeaning and/or hostile behavior towards him and that he had signed the April 5, 

2017 complaint letter against H. He agreed with appellant that H’s behavior worsened and was in retaliation and 

intimidation after the complaint was filed. C.F. opined that H had it out for appellant, noting that she tried to limit her 

access to certain programs and had fabricated timecard fraud. He also stated that he saw appellant emotional at work. 

10 K.H. indicated that H displayed inappropriate, harassing behavior towards her and other employees both publicly 

and privately. She also stated that she had witnessed that H mistreated appellant, but provided only general examples

without specifics.
6

By decision dated March 1, 2022, OWCP denied modification of its prior decision. It 

found that the statements from coworkers were hearsay opinions regarding H. OWCP further 

noted that while the statement from F indicated that not all of appellant’s complaints were 

submitted and that H was reprimanded in 2019, there was no evidence or decision in the record to 

substantiate error or abuse by management in the handling of the complaints against H.

Appellant requested reconsideration on May 4, 2022. 

In an October 7, 2019 response to a grievance letter, M.S., indicated that H had a May 8, 

2019 Letter of Reprimand issued for failing to comply with a management directive for using 

condescending language to employees, using profanity and derogatory language in the workplace

on several occasions. She outlined the process regarding the grievance as well as H’s statements 

made during their September 6, 2019 discussion, including that she had admitted to using profanity 

in the workplace when speaking with her peers in confidence. It was determined that a Letter of 

Counseling was the appropriate penalty. The decision was noted to be final and concluded the 

grievance process. H signed and acknowledged receipt on October 7, 2019. 

By decision dated May 26, 2022, OWCP denied modification of its prior decision.

LEGAL PRECEDENT

An employee seeking benefits under FECA11 has the burden of proof to establish the 

essential elements of his or her claim,12 including that he or she sustained an injury in the 

performance of duty, and that any specific condition or disability for work for which he or she 

claims compensation is causally related to that employment injury. 13 These are the essential 

elements of each and every compensation claim regardless of whether the claim is predicated on a 

traumatic injury or an occupational disease.14

To establish an emotional condition in the performance of duty, a claimant must submit:

(1) factual evidence identifying an employment factor or incident alleged to have caused or 

contributed to his or her claimed emotional condition; (2) medical evidence establishing that he or 

she has a diagnosed emotional or psychiatric disorder; and (3) rationalized medical opinion 

evidence establishing that the accepted compensable employment factors are causally related to 

the diagnosed emotional condition.15

11 Supra note 1.

12 M.J., Docket No. 20-0953 (issued December 8, 2021); O.G.,Docket No. 18-0359 (issued August 7, 2019); J.P.,

59 ECAB 178 (2007); Joseph M. Whelan, 20 ECAB 55, 58 (1968).

13 M.J., id.; O.G., id.; G.T., 59 ECAB 447 (2008); Elaine Pendleton, 40 ECAB 1143, 1145 (1989).

14 20 C.F.R. § 10.115; R.D., Docket No. 21-0050 (issued February 25, 2022); Michael E. Smith, 50 ECAB 313 

(1999); Victor J. Woodhams, 41 ECAB 345, 352 (1989); Elaine Pendleton, id.

15 See C.C., Docket No. 21-0283 (issued July 11, 2022); S.K.,Docket No. 18-1648 (issued March 14, 2019); Donna 

Faye Cardwell, 41 ECAB 730 (1990).
7

Workers’ compensation law does not apply to each and every injury or illness that is 

somehow related to a claimant’s employment. There are situations where an injury or illness has 

some connection with the employment, but nevertheless does not come within the purview of 

workers’ compensation. When disability results from an emotional reaction to regular or specially 

assigned work duties or a requirement imposed by the employment, the disability is deemed 

compensable.16 However, disability is not compensable when it results from factors such as an 

employee’s fear of a reduction-in-force, or frustration from not being permitted to work in a 

particular environment, or to hold a particular position.17

Administrative and personnel matters, although generally related to the employee’s 

employment, are administrative functions of the employer rather than the regular or specially 

assigned work duties of the employee and are not covered under FECA. 18 Where, however, the 

evidence demonstrates that the employing establishment either erred or acted abusively in 

discharging its administrative or personnel responsibilities, such action will be considered a 

compensable employment factor.19

Mere perceptions of harassment or discrimination are not compensable under FECA. 20 A 

claimant must substantiate allegations of harassment or discrimination with probative and reliable 

evidence.21 Unsubstantiated allegations of harassment or discrimination are not determinative of 

whether such harassment or discrimination occurred.22

Additionally, verbal altercations and difficult relationships with supervisors, when 

sufficiently detailed by the claimant and supported by the record, may constitute compensable 

factors of employment. This does not imply, however, that every statement uttered in the 

workplace will give rise to coverage under FECA.23

16 A.C., Docket No. 18-0507 (issued November 26, 2018); Pamela D. Casey, 57 ECAB 260, 263 (2005); Lillian 

Cutler, 28 ECAB 125, 129 (1976).

17 A.E., Docket No. 18-1587 (issued March 13, 2019); Gregorio E. Conde, 52 ECAB 410 (2001).

18 See R.M.,Docket No. 19-1088 (issued November 17, 2020); Thomas D. McEuen, 41 ECAB 387 (1990); reaff’d 

on recon., 42 ECAB 556 (1991).

19 See C.J.,Docket No. 19-1722 (issued February 19, 2021); M.A.,Docket No. 19-1017 (issued December 4, 2019).

20 A.E., Docket No. 18-1587 (issued March 13, 2019); M.D., 59 ECAB 211 (2007); RobertG. Burns, 57 ECAB 

657 (2006).

21 R.D., Docket No. 21-0050 (issued February 5, 2021); J.F., 59 ECAB 331 (2008); Robert Breeden, 57 ECAB 

622 (2006).

22 T.Y., Docket No. 19-0654 (issued November 5, 2019); G.S., Docket No. 09-0764 (issued December 18, 2009);

Ronald K. Jablanski, 56 ECAB 616 (2005); Penelope C. Owens, 54 ECAB 684 (2003).

23 R.B.,Docket No. 19-1256 (issued July 28, 2020); Y.B.,Docket No. 16-0193 (issued July 23, 2018); Marguerite J. 

Toland, 52 ECAB 294 (2001).
8

ANALYSIS

The Board finds that appellant has not met her burden of proof to establish a stress-related

condition in the performance of duty. 

The Board initially notes that appellant did not attribute her stress to the performance of 

her regular employment duties under Cutler.

24

 

Appellant attributed her emotional condition to administrative and personnel actions on the 

part of management. The Board has previously found that absent evidence establishing error or 

abuse, a claimant’s disagreement or dislike of a managerial action is not a compensable factor of 

employment.25

Appellant submitted statements from several coworkers, which indicated that they were 

only allowed to talk to her about work topics, not discuss matters pertaining to issues concerning 

H with her, and that she could not be an advocate for her coworkers. The coworkers also had to 

sign nondisclosure agreements/confidentiality forms, not a common practice at the employing 

establishment. The Board notes, however, thatH was not appellant’s supervisor and the statements 

from the coworkers, which were general in nature, failed to fully explain why they were only 

allowed to discuss work topics with appellant. The record also indicates that when the employing 

establishment learned of these allegations C informed H that she could not place such restrictions 

on employees. Appellant has not submitted the necessary corroborating evidence to establish error 

or abuse by management in these administrative and personnel matters. 26

Appellant also alleged thatH revoked her necessary computer access in an act of retaliation

which interfered with her operational duties. While H appeared to have some authority over the 

access to HR computer programs, C indicated that H told him the removal of appellant’s access 

was a glitch and it was soon restored. C further indicated that appellant’s access to HR computer 

programs was never revoked. There is no evidence of record to support that the removal of

appellant’s access was done purposefully, or that it was abusive. Although appellant expressed 

dissatisfaction with the actions of H regarding this matter, the Board has held that mere dislike or 

disagreement with certain supervisory actions will not be compensable absent error or abuse on 

the part of the supervisor.27

Appellant alleged that she was “in essence” being accused of timecard fraud when H 

questioned her whereabouts and time and attendance entries. The evidence reflects that appellant 

was teleworking when H questioned appellant’s whereabouts. Furthermore, C indicated that he 

requested, and appellant made corrections to her timekeeping system entries. There is no evidence 

24 Lillian Cutler, supra note 16. 

25 Id.

26 R.V., Docket No. 18-0268 (issued October 17, 2018).

27 T.C., Docket No. 16-0755 (issued December 13, 2016).
9

of record to support any error or abuse regarding the monitoring of appellant’s whereabout or her 

time and attendance entries.28

Appellant also described her feelings during her April 21, 2017 mid-year review with C,

noting that she felt as if C was warning her that continued complaints would be detrimental and 

that she felt intimidated when C asked for a copy of the meeting notes. Appellant also indicated 

that C approached her on September 5, 2017 about a decision to make H her back-up, and asked 

whether appellant liked H, appellant indicated it was about being treated with respect. Appellant 

alleged that she felt intimidated by these events. However, personal perceptions alone are 

insufficient to establish an employment-related emotional condition.

29

 

Appellant alleged error by management in failing to follow its procedures after she filed 

her April 5 and July 26, 2017 complaints, noting that its failure to timely follow through on the 

complaint. However, appellant’s allegation in this regard was general in nature, and did not 

factually substantiate error or abuse by the employing establishment. Appellant has not submitted 

evidence to factually corroborate these allegations.30

The Response to Grievance Memo acknowledges that H used profanity in the workplace

and OWCP accepted that H used profanity when discussing appellant’s schedule. However, there 

is no showing that any of the profanity used when discussing appellant’s schedule was directed at 

appellant.31 The record also establishes that the initial reprimand issued to H in this regard was 

reduced to a letter of counseling, based on H’s explanation that the inappropriate remarks were

made in a confidential setting. 

Appellant also attributed her emotional condition to harassment by H after she filed the 

initial April 5, 2017 complaint. The Board has held that the filing of such complaints or 

grievances, by themselves, does not establish that workplace harassment or unfair treatment 

occurred.32 Although appellant did provide statements from coworkers, these statements did not 

establish that the incidents complained of constituted harassment.

33

 Appellant has not established 

a compensable work factor with respect to the claimed harassment.

As the Board finds that appellant has not established a compensable employment factor, it 

is not necessary to consider the medical evidence of record. 34

28 See R.L., Docket No. 17-0883 (issued May 21, 2018); L.R., Docket No. 14-1990 (issued January 27, 2015).

29 A.S., Docket No. 23-007 (issued August 16, 2023). 

30 See L.S., Docket No. 18-1471 (issued February 26, 2020). 

31 R.B.,Docket No. 19-1256 (issued July 28, 2020); C.B.,Docket No. 19-1351 (issued March 25, 2020); Charles D. 

Edwards, 55 ECAB 258 (2004).

32 B.O., Docket No. 17-1986 (issued January 18, 2019); James E. Norris, 52 ECAB 93 (2000).

33 See WilliamP. George, 43 ECAB 1159, 1167 (1992) (claimed employment incidents not established where 

appellant did not submit evidence substantiating that such incidents actually occurred).

34 See B.O., supra note 32; see also Margaret S. Krzycki, 43 ECAB 496, 502-03 (1992)
10

Appellant may submit new evidence or argument with a written request for reconsideration 

to OWCP within one year of this merit decision, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 8128(a) and 20 C.F.R. 

§§ 10.605 through 10.607.

CONCLUSION

The Board finds that appellant has not met her burden of proof to establish a stress-related

condition in the performance of duty. 

ORDER

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the May 26, 2022 decision of the Office of Workers’

Compensation Programs is affirmed.

Issued: December 26, 2023

Washington, DC

Patricia H. Fitzgerald, Deputy Chief Judge

Employees' Compensation Appeals Board

Janice B. Askin, Judge

Employees' Compensation Appeals Board

James D. McGinley, Alternate Judge

Employees' Compensation Appeals Board