Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed December 3 , 2019.

In The 

## Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14

- 18

- 00673

- CR

KEDRICK NELMS , Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS , Appellee

On Appeal from the 427th District Court

Travis County, Texas Trial Court Caus e N o. D

- 1

- DC

- 18

- 904003

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N
A jury found Appellant Kedrick Nelms guilty of trafficking of a person younger than 18 years and compelling prostitution. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 20A.02(a), 43.05 (Vernon Su pp . 2019) . The trial court sentenced Appellant to
40 y e a rs’ confinement

. Challenging the trial court’s judgment, Appellant asserts two issues addressing the trial court’s admission of certain testimony and the2

State’s plea bargain offer. For the reasons below, we affirm. 1

B ACKGROUND Comp lainant was 14 ye ar s old when she met Appellant through a mobile dating site in 2016

. Appellant introduced Complainant to a woman named Kirsten, who talked to Complainant about posting her pictures online to solicit prostitution.
Shortly thereafter , Com

plainant travele d t o Austin and San Antonio with
Kirsten and another woman named Bria. On both trips Complainant and the other two women engaged in prostitution with men they met through online
advertisements . Complainant was arrested in San Antonio afte r she was appreh en d e d by police officers while smoking marijuana. Complainant was transported to a juvenile detention facility where she was interviewed by senior juvenile probation officer Eliseo Mata. Complainant initially was not cooperative
with Offi cer Mata but, af te r Officer Mata showed Complainant the prostitution
advertisement s he found online, Complainant became more cooperative and provided details regarding her involvement with Appellant, Kirsten, and Bria.
Complainant, Bria, and Officer Mata testified at Ap pe l l ant’s trial. After the parties rested , the jury found Appellant guilty of trafficking of a person younger than 18 years and compelling prostitution. Appellant timely appealed.

A NALYSIS Appellant asserts (1) the trial court abused it s discretion by perm it t i ng inadmissible hearsay testimony into evidence, and (2) he was denied due process by the State’s failure to communicate a plea bargain offer of eight years ’

1 This case was transferred to this court f ro m the Third Court of Appeals by Texas Supreme Court Transfer Order Misc. Docket No. 18

- 9083 , issued June 19, 2018 . Because of the transfer , we must decide the case in accorda n ce with the precedent of the Third Cour t of A ppeals if our decision otherwise would have been inconsistent wi th that court ’ s pre c edent. See Tex. R. App. P. 41.3.3

confinement

. I. Any Error in the Admission of the Challenged Testimony Wa s Harmless. Ap p e llant asserts the trial court abused its discretion by permitting Officer Mata to testify regarding hearsay statements Complainant made during her interview at the detention facility. Specifically, Appellant challenges Officer
Mata’s test imony about t he f ollowing topics: (1) Complainant’s description of Appellant , where they met , and that she wanted to be in a relationship with him ; (2) Complainant’s descriptions of Kirsten and Bria and their involvement in the relevant events; and (3) Com plainant’s st at e m ents regarding the purpose of the trips to Austin and San Antonio. Presuming it was error to admit this testimony and that Appellant properly preserved this error for appellate review, we conclude any error was harmless.
Hearsay is def

ined as a sta te m e nt, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the current trial or hearing, that is offered into evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Tex. R. Evid. 801(d). Errors in the admission of hearsay evidence general ly are non

- co ns t i tutional in nature; therefore, even when
such error is established, it will be disregarded unless it affected a defendant’s substantial rights. See Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(b); Sandoval v. State , 409 S.W.3d 259, 287 (Tex. App.

—

Austin 2013, no pet.)

. An e rr o r affects a defendant’s substantial rights when the error “had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” King v. State , 953 S.W.2d 266, 271 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). The erroneous admission of evide nce will not wa r r ant reversal if the
same or similar evidence was admitted without objection at another point in the
trial. Estrada v. State , 313 S.W.3d 274, 302 n.29 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).
Here, the evidence imparted in Officer Mata’s challenged state ments was4

adm it t e d without objection during other witnesses’ testimony. Complainant identified Appellant in court as the man she met through a dating application and said he connected her to Kirsten and Bria, asked her to “make money,” and “pretended to b e [her] boyfr ie n d .” Complainant also testified regarding how she met Kirsten and Bria and their involvement in the posting of the online prostitution advertisements. Complainant also described the women’s trips to Austin and San Antonio and the prostitut ion they enga ge d in.
Bria testified that Appellant and Kirsten “intended to engage in prostitution or pimping together.” Bria discussed meeting Complainant, taking elicit photographs with Complainant, and posting the pictures on prostitute websites.
Br ia also descr ib e d the Austin and San Antonio trips with Kirsten and Complainant and said the purpose of the trips was to prostitute and make money. Bria said Complainant agreed to the trips because she thought Appellant “was going to be her boyfriend.”

As this recit at i o n shows, the testimony Appellant challenges also was admitted via other witnesses , namely, Complainant and Bria. Therefore, any error in the admission of the challenged testimony did not affect Appellant’s substantial rights and did not h ave a substan ti a l and injurious effect on the jury’s verdict. See King , 953 S.W.2d at 271; Sando val , 409 S.W.3d at 287

. We overrule Appellant’s first issue.

II. The Record Does Not Contain Any Evidence to Support Appellant’s Claim the State Intended to Offe r an Eight

- Ye ar P lea Bargain. In his second issue, Appellant focuses on the parties’ pre trial discussion s regarding plea bargain offers. At Appellant’s November 17, 2017 arraignment, the
State offered to recommend a sentence of 15 years’ confinement in e xc hange for a

“ guilty ” plea. Appellant declined the State’s offer.5

At a pretrial hearing held on June 14, 2018, the parties again discussed a possible plea bargain and Appellant counter

- offered with six years’ confinement
for a “ guilty ” plea. The St a te rejected Ap p ellant’s counteroffer. When the trial

court inquired about the State’s previous offer , a prosecutor stated: “[t]he State had offered eight [years] and the offer had expired and there was no counter in the intervening nine months, ten month s

. ” A second p r osecutor told the trial court , “when we announced ready for trial and everything, the offer that we put on the record, I believe, was eight years’ TDC.”
Appellant’s trial counsel and the trial court stated they did not have any
recollecti o n of the State ’ s prior offer. Pressing this point further , Appellant’s trial
counsel stated:
[I]f the State is averring that there was an offer for eight [years], then I think, as an officer of the court, if the defendant wanted to take that, I don’t thi n k he ever turn e d that down on the record. And so therefore, there might be an error in him not having been able to address the offer at some time in the past. That’s my only concern. Because I don’t remember the offer being eight [years]

. Asserting t h is exchange sh o ws the State intended to offer an eight

- year plea bargain, Appellant conte nds the State’s failure to communicate this offer to his trial
counsel violate d his due process rights.

A defendant in Texas has neither a constitutiona l nor statut ory rig h t to plea bargain for a particular punishment or a reduced charge. Perkins v. Court of Appeals for Third Supreme Judicial Dist. of Tex

. , at Austin , 738 S.W.2d 276, 283 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) ; Morano v. State , 572 S.W.2d 550, 551 (Tex. Cr im. App. [ Panel O p .] 1978) . But when a plea bargain is expressly approved by the trial court in open court, the plea bargain becomes a binding contractual arrangement
between the State and the defendant. See Perkins , 738 S.W.2d at 283 ; see also6

Blanco v . State , 18 S.W.3d 218, 220 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (“It also is well

settled that a defendant is entitled to insist on the benefit of his bargain.”)

. After a plea agreement is approved by the trial court, t he defendant may seek specific
enforcement of t he agreement if the S tate fail s to keep its end of the bargain

. See
Ex p arte Rogers , 629 S.W.2d 741, 742 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (orig. proceeding).
But here, the record does not show Appellant and the State agreed to an eight

- year plea bargain. T he record also does not sh o w that this alleged bargain was expressly approved by the trial court in open court. At most, the record suggests the State’s prosecutors were mistaken about the term of confinement
included with the previous offer ( which wa s made seven months ear lier)

— b ut this suggestion alone does not entitle Appellant to seek specific enforcement of the alleged offer. See Perkins , 738 S.W.2d at 283; Ex parte Rogers , 629 S.W.2d at
742. Without any evidence in the record to support App el lant’s contention, we

o verrule h is second issue.

C ONCLUSION We overrule Appellant’s issues on appeal and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

/s/ Meagan Hassan Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Frost and Ju stices Wise and Hassan

. Do Not P ublish

— Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).