### IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 16

- 10330

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff

- Appellee

v. MAURICE LAMONT DAVIS; ANDRE LEVON GLOVER,

Defendants

- Appellants

Appeal s from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas U S D C No. 3:15

- CR

- 94

- 2 USDC No. 3:15

- CR

- 94

- 1

ON REMAND FROM THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT Before HIGGINBOTHAM, JONES, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges

. PER CURIAM: * Appellants Andre Levon Glover and Maurice Lamont Davis were convicted for a series of robberies committed in June 2014 at Murphy Oil
locations in the Dallas area. Both Appellants were convicted under the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a), for conspiracy to interfere with and aiding and

* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### FILED November 12, 2019 Lyle W. Cayce Clerk Case: 16-10330 Document: 00515195346 Page: 1 Date Filed: 11/12/2019No. 16

- 10330

2 abetting interference with commerce by robbery. 1 They were also convicted on firearms ch arges under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). 2 Davis alone was convicted for being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2)

. In their original appeal s , we affirmed the district court’s judgment in full

. United States v. Davis , 677 F. App’ x 93 3, 935

– 36 (5th Cir. 2017) (per curiam). The Appellants petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari. Following its decision
in Sessions v. Dimaya , 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018), the Court remanded this case to our court “for further consideration in light o f ” Dimaya

. Davis v. United States , 138 S. Ct. 1979, 1979

– 80 (2018) ( m em.)

. On remand, we affirmed the Appellants’ conviction s and sentences on all counts save Count Two. United States v. Davis , 903 F.3d 483, 486 (5th Cir. 2018). Finding the residual clause of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) unconstitutional ly vague in light of Dimaya , we vacated the Appellants’ conviction s and sentences

on Count Two and remanded for entry of a revised judgment. Id. While the Appellants’ petitions for reheari ng were pending , the United States petitioned for certiorari on the issue of the residual clause in this context , which the Supreme Court granted

. We stayed proceedings on the petitions for rehearing pending the Court’s decision. T he C ourt agreed that § 924(c)’s residual clause was unconstitutionally vague , so it affirmed our decision on the Count Two
convictions . B ecause we had stayed the petition for rehearing pending the Court’s decision, it vacated in part and remanded th e case to our court to

1 Glover was convicted under the Hobbs Act on Counts One, Three, Four, Five, and Six; Davis was convicted on Counts One, Five, and Six.

2 These were Counts Two and Seven, which charged the Appellants with using, carrying, and brandishing firearm s during and in relation to, and possessing and brandishing firearm s in furtherance of, a crime of violence. Glover’s conviction on Count Seven also included aiding and abetting the brandishing of firearm s

. Our original ruling that the conviction on Count Seven remains valid following Dimaya because it involved a crime of violence under the element s clause which was not altered. See 903 F.3d at 484

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3 addres s in the first instance the petition for rehearing which included the issue of whether we should order a resentencing

. United States v. Davis , 139 S. Ct. 2319, 2336 (2019). To summarize, we continue to affirm all convictions save Count Two
which we vacate

. We therefore remand for entry of a revised judgment of
conviction consistent with this opinion. We deny the petition for rehearing as
to the convictions. Turning to the q uestion of resentencing, we grant the petition for rehearing in part and vacate the Appellants’ sentences in full, remanding the ir sentences to the district court for resentencing in full. 3 See Pepper v. United States , 562 U.S. 476, 507 (2011) (“Because a district court’s original sentencing intent may be undermined by altering one portion of the calculus, an appellate court when reversing one part of a defendant’s sentence may vacate the entire sentence

. . . . ” ( citation and internal quotation marks
omit ted )). We do not opine on how the district court should resentence the Appellants

. T he judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED in part, VACATED in part, and REMANDED for entry of a revised judgment and for resentencing.

3 While not dispositive, the Government concedes that a full resentencing is appropriate here. Case: 16-10330 Document: 00515195346 Page: 3 Date Filed: 11/12/2019