2015 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

2-9-2015

Raymond Chestnut v. Warden Lewisburg USP

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"Raymond Chestnut v. Warden Lewisburg USP" (2015). 2015 Decisions. Paper 152.

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NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 14-1285

___________

RAYMOND EDWARD CHESTNUT,

Appellant

v.

WARDEN LEWISBURG USP

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil Action No. 13-cv-01512)

District Judge: Honorable William J. Nealon, Jr.

____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

February 2, 2015

Before: RENDELL, GREENAWAY, JR., and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: February 9, 2015)

___________

OPINION*

___________

PER CURIAM

Appellant Raymond Edward Chestnut, a federal prisoner, appeals an order of the 

 

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.
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District Court dismissing as moot his petition for writ of habeas corpus. For the 

following reasons, we will affirm.

In 2007, while Chestnut was incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institution in 

Williamsburg, South Carolina, he was issued an incident report charging him with assault 

without injury, refusing to obey an order, and insolence toward staff. A Disciplinary 

Hearing Officer (DHO) found Chestnut guilty of each offense and imposed sanctions that 

included the disallowance of 40 days of good conduct time. 

In June 2013, Chestnut filed a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in the United States 

District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania (where he was then incarcerated), 

alleging that his due process rights were violated during the disciplinary proceedings. He 

sought only to have his good conduct time restored. In response, the Government argued 

that the petition should be dismissed as moot because the “DHO reviewed his decision 

and expunged Chestnut’s Incident Report . . . .”1 The District Court agreed, holding that 

“Chestnut’s petition for writ of habeas corpus has been rendered moot by virtue of the 

 

1 As support for this assertion, the Government provided a record of Chestnut’s 

disciplinary history. That record indicates that his good conduct time increased by 40 

days, from 62 (as of August 21, 2013) to 102 (as of August 28, 2013). According to the 

Government, Chestnut’s release date changed by only 35 days based on the formula used 

for calculating good conduct time. See O’Donald v. Johns, 402 F.3d 172, 173 (3d Cir. 

2005) (stating that “BOP utilizes a formula for calculating GCT which takes into account 

the fact that an inmate’s time actually served becomes incrementally shorter each year as 

he is awarded GCT”). 
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expungement of the incident report and the restoration of his good conduct time.” 

Chestnut appealed.

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253. Our review of the 

District Court’s mootness determination is plenary. United States v. Gov’t of V.I., 363 

F.3d 276, 284 (3d Cir. 2004).

The federal courts may adjudicate “only actual, ongoing cases or controversies.” 

Burkey v. Marberry, 556 F.3d 142, 147 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Lewis v. Continental 

Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990)). The “case or controversy requirement subsists 

through all stages of federal judicial proceedings, trial and appellate. . . . The parties 

must continue to have a personal stake in the outcome of the lawsuit.” Lewis, 494 U.S. at 

477-78. “If developments occur during the course of adjudication that eliminate a 

plaintiff’s personal stake in the outcome of a suit or prevent a court from being able to 

grant the requested relief, the case must be dismissed as moot.” Blanciak v. Allegheny 

Ludlum Corp., 77 F.3d 690, 698-99 (3d Cir. 1996).

Chestnut’s personal stake in the outcome disappeared after he filed his § 2241 

petition when the DHO expunged the incident report and restored his good conduct time. 

The District Court was unable to fashion any form of meaningful relief and thus, whether 

or not Chestnut’s due process rights were violated (and we do not suggest that they were), 

the case became moot. See Ehrheart v. Verizon Wireless, 609 F.3d 590, 596 (3d Cir. 

2010).
4

 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court order dismissing 

Chestnut’s case as moot.