Filed 7/9/14 In re Joseph M. CA2/1 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS 

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 

DIVISION ONE 

In re JOSEPH M. et al., Persons Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law. 

 B252127 

 (Los Angeles County 

 Super. Ct. No. CK98575) 

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND 

FAMILY SERVICES, 

 Plaintiff and Respondent, 

 v. 

JOSEPH M., SR., 

 Defendant and Appellant. 

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Emma 

Castro, Commissioner. Affirmed. 

 Karen J. Dodd, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and 

Appellant. 

 John F. Krattli, County Counsel, James M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel, and 

Peter Ferrera, Principal Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 

______________________________________ 
2

Minors Joseph (age 6), Andrew (age 5), Madilynn (age 3), and Autumn (age 21 

months) were adjudged dependents of the juvenile court pursuant to Welfare and 

Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b) (failure to protect).1 Joseph M., Sr. 

(Father), appeals from the court’s September 24, 2013 order denying him a contested 

hearing on the issue of visitation. M.M. (Mother) is not a party to this appeal. 

We conclude the juvenile court did not deny Father due process by refusing him a 

contested hearing on the issue of visitation, as he had an adequate procedure available to 

him for protecting his interests, which the court brought to his attention. We affirm. 

BACKGROUND 

 The Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) sought jurisdiction over 

the minors due to reports of domestic violence perpetrated by Father on Mother. At a 

jurisdictional hearing on March 26, 2013, Father submitted a signed waiver of his rights. 

Father pleaded no contest to an amended section 300 petition. After mediation, Father 

and Mother agreed the minors would be placed in the care of Mother, “family 

maintenance services” to be provided to Mother, and “family reunification services” to be 

provided to Father. 

 The juvenile court sustained the amended petition, declared the minors dependents 

of the court, placed the minors in the care of Mother, ordered DCFS to provide “Family 

Maintenance Services” to the “parents,” ordered Father to attend a DCFS-approved 52-

week domestic violence program, plus parenting classes, and ordered Father to have 

monitored visitation. Notwithstanding the plan agreed to by the parties after mediation, 

the court did not order that family reunification services be provided to Father. 

 By June 25, 2013, Father had reported to DCFS that he had almost completed his 

52-week domestic violence program and had provided DCFS with a certificate indicating 

he had completed a parenting class. On that date the juvenile court held a progress 

hearing. It ordered DCFS to meet and confer with Father to work out a visitation 

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code. 
3

schedule. The court ordered DCFS to provide the “parents” with “Family Maintenance 

Services.” It did not order “family reunification” services. 

On September 24, 2013, DCFS reported that the previously assigned caseworker 

had been unable to arrange visits with Father, that a new caseworker recently had been 

assigned, that she had attempted to contact Father without success, and that DCFS had 

not had contact with him since the hearing on June 25, 2013. No visitation schedule had 

been set up for Father and Father had not seen the minors since they were detained. 

DCFS recommended continued supervision. 

On September 24, 2013, the juvenile court held a hearing pursuant to section 364.2 

DCFS informed the court that transportation assistance had not been provided to Father 

because the previous caseworker was out on medical leave and the current caseworker 

just had been assigned on August 28, 2013. The court ordered DCFS to provide the 

transportation assistance that the court had ordered previously. Father stated he was 

concerned about his services, had tried to contact the caseworker several times, and 

wanted to cross-examine the caseworker. He requested a contested hearing on the issue 

of visitation and possibly on DCFS’s failure to provide him with services. He argued that 

he had progressed far enough to receive unmonitored visitation. 

 The juvenile court denied Father’s request for a contested hearing, but suggested 

Father file a section 388 petition.3 The court stated that Father’s section 388 petition 

would be “liberally construed and possibly set for hearing.” 

The juvenile court stated that because the minors had been released to Mother at 

the jurisdictional and dispositional hearing and Father had been offered “enhancement 

services” and not “family reunification services,” he had “no right to contest this 364 

2 A section 364 hearing is a hearing in which the juvenile court determines 

whether continued supervision of the minors is necessary and where the court reviews 

DCFS’s report describing the services offered to the family and the progress made by the 

family in eliminating the conditions or factors requiring court supervision. 

3 A section 388 petition permits the court to modify visitation and other orders on 

proof of change of circumstances, such as completion of court-ordered domestic violence 

and parenting programs. 
4

hearing.” The court observed that Father had not previously been granted a minimum 

number of visits and ordered him to have a minimum of two visits per week for up to two 

hours per visit. The court ordered DCFS to meet and confer with Father to ensure 

compliance with visitation orders and encouraged Father to contact the caseworker to 

work out visitation. The court determined that continued jurisdiction was necessary 

“because conditions continue to exist which justify the Court taking initial jurisdiction 

pursuant to [section] 300.” 

 Father appealed. 

DISCUSSION 

 Father contends he was denied his right to due process when the juvenile court 

denied him a contested hearing, allowing him to present evidence and cross-examine 

witnesses. We disagree. 

 As the United States Supreme Court has recognized, the concept of due process 

cannot be defined with precision. (Lassiter v. Department of Social Services (1981) 452 

U.S. 18, 24 [101 S.Ct. 2153].) It is clear, however, that a parent is entitled to due process 

in dependency proceedings. “‘Since the interest of a parent in the companionship, care, 

custody, and management of his children is a compelling one, ranked among the most 

basic of civil rights [citations], the state, before depriving a parent of this interest, must 

afford him adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard. [Citations.]’” (In re Kelvin 

M. (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 396, 402; In re Jennifer O. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 539, 545.) 

 Statutory procedures that are “carefully calculated to constrain judicial discretion, 

diminish the risk of erroneous findings . . . and otherwise protect the legitimate interests 

of the parents” protect a parent’s due process rights. (Cynthia D. v. Superior Court

(1993) 5 Cal.4th 242, 256.) One of the procedures available in California dependency 

matters that is designed to protect a parent’s due process rights is a petition filed under 

section 388. “A parent’s ability to file a section 388 petition provides an ‘escape 

mechanism’ that lessens the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the parent-child 

relationship in the event of a legitimate change in circumstances. [Citation.]” (In re 

Dakota M. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 224.) 
5

Father was in a position to avail himself of a section 388 petition. The juvenile 

court suggested he file such a petition and stated such a petition would be “liberally 

construed and possibly set for hearing.” Father’s claim that he was deprived of due 

process was, at best, premature, as he was given the opportunity to utilize the juvenile 

court’s “process” by means of a court procedure designed to address just the type of 

change of circumstances that Father had achieved: That is his completion of a parenting 

class and, presumably, completion of a domestic violence program as well. Filing a 

petition under section 388 might well have resulted in unmonitored visitation and 

improvement in services provided to Father, or, at least, the contested hearing Father 

wanted. 

Moreover, in establishing a visitation schedule and ordering DCFS to meet and 

confer with Father to ensure compliance with its visitation orders, and in admonishing 

DCFS to provide Father with the transportation services it had ordered earlier, the 

juvenile court did everything in its power to assist Father short of initiating contempt 

proceedings against DCFS on its own motion. 

Under these circumstances, Father has failed to establish that a section 388 

petition was inadequate to protect his rights or that he was deprived of due process. 

In light of the foregoing, we need not consider the parties’ arguments concerning 

any distinction between a parent’s due process rights when family maintenance or 

enhancement services are ordered, as opposed to family reunification services. 
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DISPOSITION 

The juvenile court’s September 24, 2013 order denying Joseph M., Sr., a contested 

hearing is affirmed. 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED. 

 MILLER, J.*

We concur: 

ROTHSCHILD, Acting P. J. 

CHANEY, J. 

* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant 

to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.