UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

WALID MOAZ, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

DENVER INTERNATIONAL 

AIRPORT; DENVER POLICE 

DEPARTMENT; CITY & COUNTY 

OF DENVER, 

 Defendants-Appellees. 

No. 18-1011 

(D.C. No. 1:17-CV-00030-MSKNYW) 

(D. Colo.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

_________________________________ 

Before BACHARACH, PHILLIPS, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

 This appeal grew out of Mr. Walid Moaz’s allegations of 

discrimination as a limousine driver at the Denver International Airport. 

Mr. Moaz sued the Denver International Airport, the Denver Police 

Department, and the City and County of Denver, invoking 42 U.S.C. 

 

* We have determined that oral argument would not materially aid our 

consideration of the appeal. Thus, we have decided the appeal based on the 

briefs. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). 

 This order and judgment does not constitute binding precedent except 

under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. 

But our order and judgment may be cited for its persuasive value under 

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1(a) and 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A).

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

August 23, 2018

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court
2 

§§ 1981, 1983, 1985, and 12203, along with state tort law. The federal 

district court dismissed the amended complaint, holding that 

 the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the claims 

against the police department and 

 the other causes of action failed to state a claim on which relief 

can be granted. 

We affirm. 

1. Mr. Moaz’s attack on the district judge does not support reversal. 

Scattered within Mr. Moaz’s opening brief are various attacks on the 

district judge. For example, Mr. Moaz accuses the district judge of 

unspecified ethical lapses designed to protect the City and County of 

Denver. These accusations are apparently based on the rulings themselves, 

but they do not bear any evidence of unethical conduct. As a result, we 

reject Mr. Moaz’s accusations as a basis for reversal. 

2. The district court properly dismissed the claims against the 

Denver Police Department. 

 The district court ruled that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over 

the claims against the Denver Police Department. This ruling was based on 

the allegations in the amended complaint. In considering this ruling, we 

engage in de novo review, crediting the allegations in the amended 

complaint. See Satterfield v. Malloy, 700 F.3d 1231, 1234 (10th Cir. 2012) 

(de novo review); Ruiz v. McDonnell, 299 F.3d 1173, 1180 (10th Cir. 2002) 

(presuming the truth of the allegations in the complaint). Engaging in 
3 

de novo review, we conclude that the claims against the police department 

were properly dismissed because the police department is not a separate 

entity. See Martinez v. Winner, 771 F.2d 424, 444 (10th Cir.) (holding that 

the Denver Police Department is not a separate entity that can be sued), 

modified on other grounds, 778 F.2d 553 (10th Cir. 1985), vacated on 

other grounds sub nom. Tyus v. Martinez, 475 U.S. 1138 (1986).1

3. Mr. Moaz failed to state a valid claim against the Denver 

International Airport or the City and County of Denver. 

 The district court also dismissed the causes of action against the 

Denver International Airport and the City and County of Denver. For these 

causes of action, the court ruled that the amended complaint failed to state 

a claim on which relief can be granted. 

For the dismissal of these causes of action, we engage in de novo 

review. Satterfield v. Malloy, 700 F.3d 1231, 1234 (10th Cir. 2012). In 

conducting de novo review, we consider whether the amended complaint 

includes enough factual matter to state a plausible claim for relief. 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 

 We apply this standard to the causes of action under 42 U.S.C.

§§ 1981, 1983, and 1985.2

 For these causes of action, Mr. Moaz had to link 

 

1

 The district court characterized this pleading defect as jurisdictional, 

and Mr. Moaz does not challenge this characterization. Thus, we need not 

decide whether the pleading defect was jurisdictional. 

2

 Though an attorney filed the amended complaint, Mr. Moaz 

subsequently appeared pro se. 
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the mistreatment to the entity’s policy or custom. See Mocek v. City of 

Albuquerque, 813 F.3d 912, 933 (10th Cir. 2015) (42 U.S.C. § 1983); 

Randle v. City of Aurora, 69 F.3d 441, 446 n.6 (10th Cir. 1995) (42 U.S.C. 

§ 1981); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1247 (2d Cir. 1979) (42 U.S.C. 

§ 1985). 

 In the amended complaint, Mr. Moaz stated in detail how he had been 

subjected to discrimination. But he did not link the discrimination to any 

policies or customs by the Denver International Airport or the City and 

County of Denver. Instead, he included only a conclusory allegation filled 

with buzz words from the applicable case law, stating that the defendants 

“were acting pursuant to municipal/county custom, policy, decision, 

ordinance, regulation, widespread habit, usage, or practice.” R. at 142, 

146. This conclusory allegation does not withstand dismissal. Mocek v. 

City of Albuquerque, 813 F.3d 912, 934 (10th Cir. 2015). 

Mr. Moaz has also invoked 42 U.S.C. § 12203. This section prohibits 

retaliation for an allegation of discrimination under the Americans with 

Disabilities Act. But Mr. Moaz has not identified any past allegations of 

discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act. Thus, Mr. Moaz 

has not stated a valid claim under § 12203. 

 Finally, Mr. Moaz alleges that his state tort claims should have been 

analyzed under the Federal Tort Claims Act. But Mr. Moaz forfeited this 

allegation by failing to present it in district court. Richison v. Ernest Grp., 
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Inc., 634 F.3d 1123, 1127–28 (10th Cir. 2011). We could ordinarily 

consider this allegation under the plain-error standard. But Mr. Moaz has 

not invoked the plain-error standard. As a result, we decline to consider 

this allegation. Id.

4. The district court did not err in denying Mr. Moaz’s motions for 

appointment of counsel. 

 In district court, Mr. Moaz filed four motions for appointment of 

counsel; and the district court declined to appoint counsel.3

 He challenges 

these rulings, and we conclude that the district court did not err in denying 

appointment of counsel. 

 In addressing the rulings, we apply the abuse-of-discretion standard. 

Toevs v. Reid, 685 F.3d 903, 916 (10th Cir. 2012). We start with the scope 

of the district court’s authority: The court cannot appoint counsel; instead, 

the court can only ask an attorney to take the case. Rachel v. Troutt, 

820 F.3d 390, 396–97 (10th Cir. 2016). In deciding whether the district 

court acted within its discretion, “we consider the merits of the claims, the 

nature of the claims, [the claimant’s] ability to present the claims, and the 

complexity of the issues.” Id. at 397. 

The district court considered these factors and declined to request 

legal representation for Mr. Moaz. This decision was reasonable: 

 

3

 The district court expressly ruled on the first three motions. For the 

fourth motion, the court did not expressly rule. As a result, the fourth 

motion became moot when the district court dismissed the action. 
6 

Each year, the district court receives hundreds of requests for

legal representation and only a small number of attorneys are 

available to accept these requests. Accordingly, the district court 

must use discretion in deciding which cases warrant a request for 

counsel. To do otherwise would deprive clearly deserving 

litigants of an opportunity to obtain legal representation. The

dilemma is unfortunate for litigants like [Mr. Moaz]. But the 

dilemma was not the district court’s fault; that dilemma was the 

product of the court’s lack of authority to compel legal 

representation or to reimburse attorneys for their time. 

Id. at 397. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not abuse 

its discretion in declining to request counsel for Mr. Moaz. 

5. We grant leave to proceed in forma pauperis. 

Every litigant must pay the filing fee. We ordinarily require payment 

with the initiation of an appeal. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). But an appellant 

can postpone the payment when we grant leave to proceed in forma 

pauperis. See id. 

 Mr. Moaz requests this status, and we grant his request because he is 

indigent and does not have enough money to pay the filing fee.

6. We deny Mr. Moaz’s motion to appoint counsel for the appeal. 

 Mr. Moaz has also asked us to appoint counsel in the appeal. We lack 

authority to appoint counsel; instead, we can only request counsel to 

represent Mr. Moaz. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). In deciding whether to request 

counsel, we must decide whether the underlying issues are sufficiently 
7 

complex to justify asking an attorney to take this appeal. See Rachel v. 

Troutt, 820 F.3d 390, 397 (10th Cir. 2016). We don’t believe that they are. 

 Mr. Moaz states that English is his second language, but he has done 

a commendable job of explaining his allegations and arguments. We have 

little basis to justify an effort to recruit counsel for Mr. Moaz among the 

hundreds of other appeals prosecuted by pro se litigants. As a result, we 

deny Mr. Moaz’s motion for appointment of counsel. 

7. We deny Mr. Moaz’s motion for leave to file a supplemental brief. 

Mr. Moaz also moves for leave to file a supplemental brief, 

addressing matters that took place after his attorney had filed the amended 

complaint. But even with the supplemental brief, we could address only the 

district court’s ruling and that ruling could not have accounted for matters 

arising after the filing of the amended complaint. Thus, we deny 

Mr. Moaz’s motion for leave to file a supplemental brief. 

Entered for the Court 

Robert E. Bacharach 

Circuit Judge