alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXHIBIT 31.2



I, Richard L. Browdy, certify, that:





1.

I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-QSB of OptimumBank Holdings, Inc.;



2.

Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;



3.

Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the small business issuer as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;



4.

The small business issuers other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the small business issuer and have:



(a)

Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the small business issuer, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;



(b)

Evaluated the effectiveness of the small business issuers disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and



(c)

Disclosed in this report any change in the small business issuers internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the small business issuers most recent fiscal quarter (the small business issuers fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the small business issuers internal control over financial reporting.



5.

The small business issuers other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the small business issuers auditors and the audit committee of the small business issuers board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):



(a)

All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the small business issuers ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and



(b)

Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the small business issuers internal control over financial reporting.







|      |              |  |     |                                           
|----- | ------------ |  | --- | ------------------------------------------
|Date: | May 11, 2007 |  | By: | /s/ Richard L. Browdy                     
|      |              |  |     | Richard L. Browdy, Chief Financial Officer
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUN-30-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-2000
<CASH>                                             659
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   36,203
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                     46,911
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                90,327
<PP&E>                                         109,795
<DEPRECIATION>                                  54,680
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 155,192
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           26,290
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
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<COMMON>                                         8,888
<OTHER-SE>                                     115,619
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   155,192
<SALES>                                        160,593
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               160,593
<CGS>                                          119,049
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  119,049
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                   602
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 128
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                    165
<INCOME-TAX>                                        90
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                 75
<DISCONTINUED>                                     325
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                       400
<EPS-BASIC>                                        .09
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</TABLE>
#### DANNY FOSTER, Petitioner, v. EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLARK, DEPARTMENT IX, and THE HONORABLE KEITH C. HAYES, Judge, Respondents.

No. 12299

January 3, 1980

604 P.2d 359

*Skupa and Mainor,*Las Vegas, for Petitioner.

*Robert J. Miller,*District Attorney, Clark County, for Respondents.

OPINION

*Per Curiam:*

Danny Foster has filed an original petition for a writ of prohibition contending that the respondent district court is exceeding its jurisdiction in setting a trial date for him on a charge of illegally discharging a firearm because the crime with which he *5is charged in the information is a misdemeanor1, and only the justice’s court has jurisdiction over misdemeanors.2

Pursuant to NRAP 21(b), this court ordered respondent district court to file an answer against issuance of the writ on or before December 19, 1979. The order was served on the chief judge of the Eighth Judicial District Court and the Clark County District Attorney on December 11, 1979. However, no answer has yet been filed. We therefore elect to treat respondents’ failure to file the answer as a confession of error. *See*Summa Corp. v. Brooks Rent-A-Car, 95 Nev. 779, 602 P.2d 192 (1979); State ex rel. Isbell v. Kelso, 442 S.W.2d 163 (Mo.App. 1969).

Accordingly, a writ of prohibition shall issue requiring respondents to dismiss all charges pending against Foster in the district court in case No. C46635.

1

NRS 202.290 provides:

> “Every person who shall aim any gun, pistol, revolver or other firearm, whether loaded or not, at or toward any human being, or who shall willfully discharge any firearm, air gun or other weapon, or throw any deadly missile in a public place, or in any place where any person might be endangered thereby, although no injury result, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.”

2

NRS 4.370 provides in part:

> “3. Justices’ courts shall have jurisdiction of the following public offenses, committed within the respective counties in which courts are established:

> (c) . . . [A]ll misdemeanors punishable by fine not exceeding $500, or imprisonment not exceeding 6 months, or by both such fine and imprisonment.”
#### MANGUBEN A. PATEL, Appellant, v. ATMARAM K. PATEL, Respondent.

No. 10414

January 14, 1980

604 P.2d 816

*52
      *Fry and Fry,*Reno, for Appellant.

*Joseph J. Kay,*Reno, for Respondent.

OPINION

*Per Curiam:*

The trial court entered judgment dissolving the parties’ marriage and providing for other relief. Appellant Manguben A. Patel has appealed, contending that the district court lacked jurisdiction and made improper rulings regarding child support payments. Appellant further contends that the grounds for divorce were not proved.

Appellant first submits that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to grant the divorce, alleging that respondent failed to satisfy the residency requirement of NRS 125.020.1 The question of plaintiff’s residence in a divorce action is one of fact to be determined by the trial court. Woodruff v. Woodruff, 94 Nev. 1, 573 P.2d 206 (1978). *See*Boisen v. Boisen, 85 Nev. 122, 451 P.2d 363 (1969). Here, there is substantial evidence to support the district court’s finding of respondent’s bona fide residence. *53Woodruff v. Woodruff, *supra;*Boisen v. Boisen, *supra;*Baker v. Baker, 76 Nev. 127, 350 P.2d 140 (1960).

Appellant next contends that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering respondent to pay $75 per child per month for the two children of the marriage. Appellant submits that these support payments are insufficient considering the respondent’s income and the children’s poor health. NRS 125.140 confers broad discretionary powers upon the district court in determining support of minor children in divorce proceedings. The exercise of such discretion by the trial court in awarding support for a minor child will not be disturbed on appeal unless there is a clear case of abuse. Gilbert v. Warren, 95 Nev. 296, 594 P.2d 696; Nichols v. Nichols, 91 Nev. 479, 537 P.2d 1196 (1975); Culbertson v. Culbertson, 91 Nev. 230, 533 P.2d 768 (1975); Buchanan v. Buchanan, 90 Nev. 209, 523 P.2d 1 (1974). A review of the record herein discloses ho such abuse of discretion. Rather, it appears that the trial court reviewed extensive documentation regarding respondent’s financial ability to support the children and carefully considered the fact that the children were covered by respondent’s medical and hospitalization insurance policy.

Finally, appellant contends that incompatibility as the ground for divorce was not proved. This contention is without merit. The record herein is replete with instances evidencing incompatibility.

The judgment of the lower court is affirmed. Respondent’s motion for attorney’s fees and costs is denied.

NRS 125.020(l)(e) provides:

> “Divorce from the bonds of matrimony may be obtained . . . [i]f plaintiff shall have resided 6 weeks in the state before suit be brought.”
Exhibit 32.2  CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. §1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002  In connection with the Quarterly Report of Xtra-Gold Resources Corp. (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the period ended March 31, 2010, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, JAMES WERTH LONGSHORE, Chief Financial Officer of our company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:  (a)the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and  (b)the information contained in this Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.  Date:May 12, 2010/s/James Werth Longshore  By:James Werth Longshore
Principal Financial Officer  A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to and will be retained by our company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
United States Department of Labor

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

__________________________________________

R.N., Appellant

and

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, 

U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, 

Miami, FL, Employer

__________________________________________

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Docket Nos. 23-0015 & 21-0573

Issued: December 27, 2022

Appearances: Case Submitted on the Record

Appellant, pro se

Office of Solicitor, for the Director

ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL IN DOCKET NO. 23-0015 AND 

DISMISSING PETITION FOR RECONSIDERATION

IN DOCKET NO. 21-0573

Before:

PATRICIA H. FITZGERALD, Deputy Chief Judge

JANICE B. ASKIN, Judge

VALERIE D. EVANS-HARRELL, Alternate Judge

On October 6, 2022 appellant sought an appeal from a purported April 14, 2022 decision

of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). The Clerk of the Appellate Boards

assigned Docket No. 23-0015.

The Board has duly considered the matter and notes that its jurisdiction is limited to the 

review of final adverse OWCP decisions issued under the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act 

(FECA).1 This jurisdiction encompasses any final decision issued by OWCP within 180 days of 

the date appellant filed his appeal.2 As of the filing of the current appeal, the most recent OWCP 

decision was dated February 16, 2021. However, by an April 14, 2022 decision in Docket No. 21-

0573, the Board affirmed OWCP’s February 16, 2021 decision.

3

 As there is no final adverse 

1

5 U.S.C. § 8149; 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3(a).

2

20 C.F.R. § 501.3(e) provides in pertinent part: “Any notice of appeal must be filed within 180 days from the 

date of issuance of a decision of the OWCP.”

3 Docket No. 21-0573 (issued April14, 2022).
2

decision issued by OWCP within 180 days of the filing of this appeal,

4 over which the Board may 

properly exercise jurisdiction, the Board concludes that the appeal assigned Docket No. 23-0015 

must be dismissed.

To the extent that this appeal may be construed as a timely petition for reconsideration of 

the Board’s April 14, 2022 decision in Docket No. 21-0573, the Board notes that its decision 

became final upon the expiration of 30 days from the date of issuance. 5 As appellant did not file 

his disagreement with the Board’s April 14, 2022 decision until October 6, 2022, this submission 

may not be deemed as a timely petition for reconsideration as it was filed in excess of 30 days 

from the date of issuance.6 Thus, the petition for reconsideration of the April 14, 2022 Board 

decision in Docket No. 21-0573 must be dismissed as untimely filed. Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the appeal docketed as No. 23-0015 is dismissed.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the petition for reconsideration in Docket No. 21-

0573 is dismissed as untimely filed. 

Issued: December 27, 2022

Washington, DC

Patricia H. Fitzgerald, Deputy Chief Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Janice B. Askin, Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Valerie D. Evans-Harrell, Alternate Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

4

Supra note 2.

5

20 C.F.R. § 501.6(d).

6

See id. at § 501.7(a).
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER

I, William T. Freeman, Chief Executive Officer, in connection with the Report on Form 10-Q of McCormick & Schmicks Seafood Restaurants, Inc. for the quarterly period ended
September 25, 2010 (the Report), hereby certify in accordance with 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

1. The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

2. The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of McCormick & Schmicks Seafood
Restaurants, Inc.



|                       
|-----------------------
|/s/ WILLIAM T. FREEMAN 
|William T. Freeman     
|Chief Executive Officer

Date: November 3, 2010
EXHIBIT 31.2

CERTIFICATIONS

I, Perry J. Grace, certify that:

1.	I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K of ZiLOG, Inc.; 

2.	Based on my knowledge, this annual report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to statea material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading withrespect to the period covered by this annual report; 

3.	Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this annual report,fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented inthis annual report; 

4.	The registrant's other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls andprocedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have: 

(a)	Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to bedesigned under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to usby others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared; 

(b)	Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about theeffectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and 

(c)	Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal control over financial reporting that occurred duringthe registrant's most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant's fourth fiscal quarter in the case of this annual report) that has materially affected, or isreasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant's internal control over financial reporting; and 

5.	The registrant's other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal controlover financial reporting, to the registrant's auditors and the audit committee of the registrant's Board of Directors (or person performing the equivalentfunctions): 

(a)	All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financialreporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect, the registrant's ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and

(b)	Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in theregistrant's internal control over financial reporting. 

  Date: June 22, 2007     By:    /s/ Perry J. Grace           Perry J. Grace *       Chief Financial Officer*
**Exhibit 23.1**

**CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM**

We consent to the incorporationby reference in the Registration Statements on Forms S-8 (File Nos. 333-93423, 333-38078, 333-44794, 333-57486, 333-84904, 333-104108, 333-113651, 333-123323, 333-132478, 333-138898, 333-141287, 333-149622 and 333-157928) pertaining to the 2006Equity Incentive Plan, the 2000 International Stock Option Plan, the 2000 Non-Officer Stock Option Plan, the 1997 Stock Option Plan, the 1999 Employee Stock Purchase Plan and the 1999 Nonemployee Directors Stock Option Plan of Maxygen, Inc. of ourreports dated March 8, 2011, with respect to the consolidated financial statements of Maxygen, Inc., and the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting of Maxygen, Inc., included in this Annual Report (Form 10-K) for the yearended December 31, 2010. 

/s/ Ernst & Young LLP 

Palo Alto, California 

March 8, 2011
NO. 07-05-0204-CR IN THE COUR

T OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVEN TH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

AT AMARILLO PANEL C OCTOBER 26, 2005

______________________________ RONALD THOMAS, APPELLANT

V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, A PPELLEE

_________________________________ FROM THE 64 TH DISTRIC T COURT O F HALE COUN TY; NO. A15178-0310; H ONORABLE ROB ERT W. KINKAID, JR., JUD GE

_______________________________ Before QUINN, C.J., and REAVIS an d HANCOCK, JJ. MEMORANDUM OPIN ION Ronald Thomas brou g ht th is a ppea l fro m his conv ict ion for p osse ssi on of a controlled substance. Bas ed on a finding by the trial court that appell ant no longer wishes to prosecute the appeal, we w ill dismi ss. We previous ly order

ed the appeal abated f or a hearing, in accordance with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedu re 38.8(b), to determine w hether appellant desires to pr osecute the appeal and, if so, whether he i s indigent and entitled to ap pointed counsel. See Thomas v. State, No. 07-05-0204-CR, 2005 Te x.App. LEXIS 7933, (Tex.App.–Am aril lo ,2

no pet.) In conformity

with our September 28, 2005ord er, the t ria l co urt gave not iceof a hearing, which was held on October 12, 2005. Appellant ap peared at the hearin g . The trial cour t found that appellant does not wi sh to proceed w ith this appeal
. In accordance w ith the trial cou rt’s f indi ng an d, with out a ddre ssin g the m erits , we dismiss thi s appeal. T EX . R. A PP . P. 38.8(b)(4) , 43.2(f).
Mackey K. Hancock Justice Do not publish
.
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

JUDGMENT

No. 04-13-00199-CR

Jorge MARTINEZ,

Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas,

Appellee

From the 175th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2013CR1083

Honorable Mary D. Roman, Judge Presiding

BEFORE JUSTICE ANGELINI, JUSTICE MARION, AND JUSTICE BARNARD

In accordance with this court’s memorandum opinion of this date, this appeal is 

DISMISSED. See TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(d).

SIGNED May 22, 2013.

_____________________________

Karen Angelini, Justice
#### STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ROBERT CROSS

No. 7421SC885

(Filed 5 February 1975)

Larceny § 7— larceny of shirts from store — sufficiency of evidence

The State’s evidence was sufficient for the jury in a prosecution for misdemeanor larceny where it tended to show that *employees*of a department store saw defendant leave the store with five shirts without stopping at the cash register to pay for them, an employee followed defendant from the store and asked to see his receipt, defendant began running and dropped the shirts, the shirts were identified as belonging to the store, and after his arrest defendant asked a store employee to let him “pay for this and forget about the whole deal.”

Appeal by defendant from *Armstrong, Judge,*13 May 1974 Criminal Session of Superior Court held in Forsyth County.

Defendant was charged in a warrant with misdemeanor larceny of merchandise from a Sears, Roebuck and Company store. He was convicted in district court and appealed to superior court where he was given a trial *de novo.*He pleaded not guilty, was found guilty, and from judgment imposing prison sentence of not less than 18 nor more than 24 months, he appealed.

*Attorney General Rufus L. Edmisten, by Assistant Attorney General Myron C. Banks, for the State.*

*Ira Julian for defendant appellant.*

BRITT, Judge.

Defendant’s sole assignment of error is that the trial court erred in not granting his motion for nonsuit. The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the State, tended to show:

Around 3:00 p.m. on 10 November 1973, Sears’■ employees observed defendant, acting suspiciously, in the men’s department of the store. Thereafter, they observed defendant leaving the store with five shirts; he did not stop at any cash register to pay for the shirts. A store employee followed defendant out of the store and an employee yelled at defendant “to see. a receipt, please.” Defendant began running and an employee gave chase and got to within a few feet of defendant at which time he dropped the shirts, identified as belonging to the store. Police were alerted, arrested defendant and carried him to the police station where he was identified by-a Sears employee as the man *585who had taken the shirts. Defendant asked the employee to “ [1] et me pay for this and forget about the whole deal.”

We hold that the evidence was sufficient to survive the motion for nonsuit and the assignment of error is overruled.

No error.

Chief Judge Brock and Judge Clark concur.