# FILED

July 9, 1997 Cecil W. Crowson Ap pellate Cou rt Clerk 

## IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE MIDDLE SECTION AT NASHVILLE

SHIRLEY JEAN McCRACKEN ) and ALAN McCRACKEN, ) ) Plaintiff s/Appella nts, )

) Willia

mson C ircuit ) No. 94372 VS. ) ) Appeal N o. ) 01A01-9511- CV-00531 BRENTWOOD UNITED ) METHODIST CHURCH, ) ) Defendant/Appellee. )

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR WILLIAMSON COUNTY

AT FRANKLIN, TENNESSEE THE HONORABLE CORNELIA A. CLARK, JUDGE

For the P laintiffs /Appella nts : For the Defendant/Appellee : Stanley M. Chernau Frank Thomas Linda F. Burnsed Leitner, Warner, Moffitt, Willia ms, Chernau, Chaffin & Burnsed Dooley & Napolitan Nashville, Tennessee Nashville, Tennessee



## AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART;

AND REMANDED

WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., JUDGE-2- 

## O P I N I O N

This appeal involv es a wom an who broke both ankle s in a fall at church

. The woma

n and her husband

filed suit in the Circuit

Court for Willia mson C ounty against the churc h and others . The tr ial court g

ranted the

church’ s motio n for
summar y judgm ent based on the

statute of limit ations and t

he joint enterprise rule. The woma

n and her husband

perfect ed this appe al after obtaining pos t-judgm

ent relief from an inapprop riate int erlocutor y appe al. W e have det ermi ned that the trial court properly granted the post-judgmen t relie f but erred in sum mari ly dismissing the complaint

.

I.
Shirley Jean and Alan McCracken are mem be rs of the Brentwood United Methodist

Church. On June 20, 1993, less than one m onth after joining the church, Ms. McCracken fell as she was entering the ch urch’s new sanc tuary

from
an older port

ion of the building contain ing the chur ch’s cl assroom s. Pers ons entering the sanctuary

at that loc ation had to clim b a flight of

stairs and

then pass through a doorwa y where there

was a 23⁄4 inch change

in the ele vation

of the floor. Ms. McCrac ken stum

bled and fe ll when she

caught one of her shoe s on the threshold, breaking both ankles and injuring her shoulder.

Ms. McCrac ken’s a

nkl e injuries required several surgeries, and she was required to undergo rehabilitati on for nea rly one ye ar before regaining reasona ble mobi lit y. The McCrackens were reluctant to assert a cl a im aga inst the chu

rch; however, the ch urch’s business adm inistrator and senior

pastor assured them that th e church carr ied ade qua te i nsu ran ce fo r in juri es o n ch urc h pr ope rty. Acco rdi ngl y, the McCrackens subm itted a claim to the church’s insurance compa ny and r eceived $ 5,000 to hel

p defray some of their m

edical ex penses.

The McCrac kens retained a law yer w ho continued settlement discussi ons with the church’s ins urance company. When it became evident that a satisfactory settlement

was not forthcoming, the McC ra ckens file d suit on June 1 7, 1994 - three days be fore the statute of limit ation s would have

run on their

claim s. The compl aint named as defendants the Brentwood United Methodist Church1 The McCrackens filed an amended complaint on June 20, 1994, adding an engineering firm as a nother de fendant

.
2 The church i s an uninc orporat ed, not-f or-prof it, religious ass ociat ion; while the foundationis a separate corporation that administers the church’s endowment. The foundation ow ns no pr op er ty. -3- Foundation, Inc. (t

he "foundat

ion") and th e archite ct and con structi on com pany tha t de sig ned and con str uct ed t he s anc tua ry. 1

The church first learned of the McCrackens’ lawsuit on June 20, 1994 when
a Nashville n ewspaper

reporter telephoned

the senior

pastor to ge t a com

ment about th e ca se. The su mmon s an d t he M cCr ack ens ’ or ig in al c omp lai nt were servedon the church’s financial a dminis tr ator on June 28, 1994. The admin istrator

recogniz ed imm

ediatel y t hat the Mc Cracken s had sued the foundation

rather t han the Brentwo odUnited Methodist Church (the “church”). 2 In his June 28, 1994 letter

transm itting the c omplaint and sum mons to the churc h’s insurance compan y, the

administrator stated: “ The plain tiff has s ued the wr

ong entit y. Wou ld thi s pre sent g

round s for

the di smi ssal o f this case ?”

On July 28, 19 94, the foundat ion move d for sum

mary judgm ent on the grounds that it owned no propert y and t hat it wa s not involved with the constructi on of the new

church buil ding. Appr oxima tely t en day s later, the McCrac kens requeste d permissi o n to file a second am

ended com

plaint for the purpose of adding the church as a defendant. The trial court grantedthe m otion, andthe McCrackens filed their second amended com plaint on September 2 2 , 1994. One week

later, the church moved for sum maryjudgment based on the oneyear statute of l imitations i n Tenn. Code An n. § 28-3-1 04(a) (Supp . 1996).

The trial cour

t filed a m

emorandum opinion on Fe bruary 1, 1995, gr

anting the church’ s motio n for

summ ary j udgmen

ton two grounds. First, the trial court determined

that the Mc Crackens could not take advantage of the relation back provisions in Tenn. R. Civ. P. 15.03 and, ther efore, that their

claim s against th e church in th eir sec on d ame nd ed c omp laint we re time-barred. Second, the trial court, rely ing on the j oint enter prise defense, held that t

he McCra ckens could

not sue the church because it was an unincorporated association of which they were3 The Tenness ee Rules o f CivilProcedu re do not a

uthorize “ motions toreconside

r.” We construe this motion to be a motion to alter or amend pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 59.04.

4 The request for an interlocutory appeal was unnecessary because the trial court had designated

its February

13, 1995 order as final in accordance w ith Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54.02. The McCrackens were entitled to an appeal a s of right from this order. -4- mem bers. The Feb ruary

13, 1995 summa

ry judgm ent order stated

specifically that the order constituted a final judgment under Ten n. R . Ci v. P . 54 .02 on all cla ims against t he church.

T he McCr ackens re quested the trial cour

t to “r econsider ” its decis ion to grant the summa

ry judgm ent 3 and, in

the alter native, to grant the m per

missio n to pursue an in terlocutor

y appe al. 4 On Apri l 20, 1995, the trial court deni ed the motion to rec ons ider but granted the McCrackens permission to pursue an interlocutory

appeal. This cour

t denied th e McC rackens’ application for an interlocutory

appeal on M ay 31, 1995, beca use they were entitled to an appealas of right. McCracken v. Bre ntwood United M

ethodist Chu rch, App. No . 01A01- 9505-CV-0 0204 (Tenn . Ct. App. May 31, 199 5).

On June 13, 1995, the McCrackens requested this courtto grant relief fr om their failure to file a ti mely

notice of a

ppeal fro m the trial cour

t’s Apr il 20, 1995 order. O n June 22, 19 95, we denied the m otion but sugge sted that it would be appropria te to seek th is relief fro m the trial court

. McCr ack en v. B rentwood United Metho dist C

hurch, App. No . 01A01-9 505-CV-0 0204 (Tenn . Ct. A pp. June 21, 1995). O n July 7, 1995, the trial cour t vacated and re-entered the

portion of its Ap ril 20, 1995 order denying the McCrackens’ m otion to reconsider. Thereafter, the McCrackens fi led a noti ce of appeal on July 21, 19 95.

II. T ENN . R. C IV . P. 60.02 R ELIE F F ROM J UDGMENT

We turn first to the church’s assertion that the McCrackens are not entitled to Tenn. R . Civ. P . 60.02 relief from their failure to f

ile a notic e of appeal within thirty days f ollowing the

entry of the tr ial court ’s Apr

il 20, 1995 or

der deny ing their motion to reconsi der the sum

mary judgm ent. Th e church a ss erts that the-5-

McCrac kens’ erroneous pursuit of a n i nterlocuto ry app eal is not t he type of mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect that warran ts extraordinary

relief f rom the judgment. W e disagree.

The filing requirements for notices of appeal in civil cases are ma ndatory and jurisdicti onal. Thandiwe v . Traughbe r, 909 S.W .2d 802, 80 4 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994); John Barb, Inc. v. Underwri ters at Lloy ds of London, 653 S.W .2d 422, 42 4 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983). W hile neither th e trial nor

the appell ate court s may

waive
or exp and t he time for filin g a notice o f appeal, First Nat’ l Bank v. Goss, 912 S.W. 2d147, 148 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995), a trial court m ay grant an appellant relief from an untim ely not

ice of app eal in unusua

l or com pelling cir

cumst anc es. See Moody v. Moody, 681 S.W. 2d 545, 546 ( Tenn. 198 4); Jerkins v. McKinney, 533 S.W. 2d 275, 28 0 (Tenn. 1976); Jefferson v. Pneumo Servs . Corp., 699 S.W .2d 181, 184-85 (Te nn . Ct. A pp. 1985). This rel ief gener ally t akes the f

orm of vacating and re-entering the final order.

Parties seeking T enn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 relief m ust substanti ate their re quest by clear and convi ncing evi dence. Davidson v . Davids on, 916 S.W .2d 918, 92 3 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995); Duncan v. Duncan, 789 S.W .2d 557, 56 3 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990). These requests are addressed to the tri al court ’s discr etion, an d thus appellate courts review decisions regarding Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 rel ief using th e abuse of discreti on stand ard. Underwoodv. Zurich Ins . Co., 854 S.W .2d 94, 97 (Tenn. 1993); Banks v. Dement Co nstr. Co., 817 S.W .2d 16, 18 (Tenn. 1991); Day
v. Da y, 931 S.W .2d 936, 93 9 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996); Marr v. Montgomer y Elevator Co., 92 2 S.W .2d 526, 52 8 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995); John Barb, Inc. v. Underwrit

ers at Lloy

ds of London, 653 S.W .2d at 424.

This case presents o ne of the ra re circ umsta

nces war ranting T enn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 rel i e f. The McCrackens’ f ailure to file a timely

notice of appeal following the April 20, 1995 order w as not just a product of their lawyers’ failure to apprecia

te the signi f

icance of t he Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54.02 designation in the5 The McCrackens would not have been entitled to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 re lief had their predicament

been caused by

their lawyer

s’ ignorance or mistaken understanding of the procedural rules. Bivins v. Hospital Corp. of Am., 910 S.W.2d 441, 446 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995); Algee v. State Farm Ins. Co., 890 S.W.2d 44 5, 449 (Te nn. Ct. App . 1994); Kilby v. Sivley, 745 S.W.2d 284, 287 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987).

6 Our Ma y 31, 1995 o rder deny ing the McCrackens’ application for an inter locutory appeal overlook

ed the fa

ct that the

trial cou

rt’s Apr il 20 , 1995 order disposed of the McCrack ens’ motion to reconsider and that the McCrackens had not filed a no tice of appea l. Theseoversig

hts did not affe ct the Mc Cracke

ns’ abilit y to file a time ly

notice of appeal from the April20, 1995 order because our order was not

entered until after the expiration of the time for filing the notice

of appea l. -6- February 13, 1995 ord er. 5 It was also caused by the t rial cour t’s dec ision to grant them an interlocutory

appeal ev en though theFebruar y 13, 1995 order was final. The procedura

l posture of

the appeal would have

been clea

r had t he trial court denied the McCrackens’ applicati on for interlocutory appeal on the ground that they were entitled to appeal as of ri ght. How ever, th e order gr anting the interlocutory

appeal co uld have induced the McCrac kens’ lawyer to conclude that fil ing a no tic e of a ppe al wa s no lon ger nec ess ary. Ac cor din gly, we find t hat the trial court correctly granted the McCrac kens Tenn . R. Civ. P. 60. 02 relief to enable them to file a tim ely notice of appeal from its April 20, 1995 order. 6

III. R ELATION B ACK U NDER T ENN . R. C IV . P. 15.03

The McCrac kens take i ssue with t he trial c ourt’s d ecision tha t they could not take adva ntage of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 15.03 's relat ion back pro vision

because t he church did not have notice of their su it before the statute

of limitations ex

pired. They insist that the churc h receive d time ly notic e of the suit when its senior pastor received a tele phone call from

a newspa

per repor ter reque sting com

ment a bout their suit. While this notice was extremel y infor mal, we find t

hat it sati sfies Tenn. R. Civ. P. 15.03 's requir

emen ts.

Plaintiffs who file their lawsuit at or near the end of t he statute of limit ations period fa ce a diff icult pred icam ent if they

make a mis take rega

rding the
name of th e d efendant. To avoid t he statute of limitations ex

tinguishing the ir claim against misna med defendants , Tenn. R. Civ. P. 15 .03 permits these plaintiffs-7-

to ame nd their co mplaint to corre ct the m isnomer and provi des that the
amen dment

will relate back to the filing of the origin al com plaint under

certain conditions.

At all tim es pertinent to this ca se, Te nn. R. C iv. P. 15 .03 provide d: Whenever

the claim

or defens e asserte d in the ame nde dpleadings a

rose out of

the conduct , transa ction or occurre nce set f

orth or att em

pted to be se t forth in the original pleading, the amendment re lates back to the date of the orig inal plead ing. An ame ndment changing the party against whom a claim is asserted relates back if the foregoing provision is satisfied and if, wit hin the period provided by law fo r comm encing the action against hi m, the party

to be brought

in by a mendm ent (1) has received such notice of the institution of the action that he w ill not

be prejudi ced in maintaining h is d efense on the m erits, a nd (2) knew

or shou ld hav e known that, but f

or a misnomer or other

simil ar m istake concernin g the identity of the proper party, the act io n would have been brought

aga in st hi m. Except a s above specifie d, nothing in this rule sha ll be construed to extend any pe rio d of limit ations gover ning the tim

e in which any

action may be brought. Thu s, the rela

tion back f

eature of Tenn. R . Civ. P . 15.03 w orks only when th e following conditions e xist: (1) t

he claim must a ris e outof the sam

e conduct, transact ion, or oc currenc e involved in the original c omplaint; (2) the party to be brought in by

the am endment must

not be prejudiced in maintaining its defense,
an d(3) the pa

rty to be brought in by am endment either k

new or sho uld

hav e known it would have been sued had it not been for the misnomer or s imilar mistake. Lease v. Tipton, 722 S.W .2d 379, 38 0 (Tenn. 1986); Turner v. Aldor Co. of Nashvi lle, Inc., 827 S.W.2d 318 , 321-22 (Ten n. Ct. App. 199 1).

Tim ely notice is the linch pin of Tenn . R. Civ. P. 15.03. Floyd v. Rentrop, 675 S.W. 2d 165, 168 ( Tenn. 198 4). The cases con struing Tenn. R. C iv. P. 15 .03 have focused on

the conten

t of the notice, t

he tim e within w

hich the noti ce m

ust be receive d, and the persons w ho must receive the notice . Acco rdingly , the cour ts have held that the notice must be notice o f the lawsuit rather than merely notice of the underl ying injury. Smith v. Sou theaster n Propert ies, Ltd., 776 S.W .2d 106,7 Tenn. R. Civ. P. 15.03 was am en de d i n 1 99 5 t o e xt en d t he no ti ce pe ri od to “1 20 da ys

after commencement of the action.” The effe ct of this amendment is the same as the 1991 amendment

to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(3) which was to mitigate the harsh re s ult o f Schiavone v. Fortune, 4 77 U.S. 21, 30, 106 S. Ct. 2379, 2384 (1986). The amendment cannot be applied retroactively

to complaints filed before its July 1, 1995 effec tive date.

8 But see Bell v. P &B Mfg. Corp., 107 F.R.D. 371, 374 (W.D. Tenn. 1985). -8- 109 (Tenn. Ct. App. 19 89). The notic e must also be rece ived before the running of the applic able statu

te of lim itations. 7 Duke v. Replogle En ters., 891 S.W .2d 205, 206-07 (T enn. 1994) ; Allen v. River Edge Motor Lodge, 861 S.W .2d 364, 365 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993). Finally, in addition t o notify ing the defendant, Tenn. R. Civ. P. 15.03 perm

its notify ing the def

endant’ s attorney

but not the emplo yees o f the defe nda nt’s ins ura nce compa ny. Braswell v. Caroth ers, 863 S.W .2d 722, 726 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that n otice to the defendant’s lawyer satisfies Tenn. R. Civ. P. 15.03 ); Smith v. Sou theaster n Propert ies, Ltd., 776 S.W .2d at110 (holdingthat notice to adjustor s empl oyed by the defen dant’s insurance compa ny does not satisfy Tenn. R. Civ. P. 15.03). 8

The courts have n ot definitively decided what type or form of notice satisfies Tenn. R. Civ. P. 15.03's r eq uirements. The rule

requires notice, n ot service. See Montgo mery v. United Sta te Postal Serv., 867 F.2d 900, 903 (5th Cir. 1989). Since Tenn. R. Civ. P. 15.03 m ust be constr

ued liberally to enable cour ts to he a r and decid e cases on t heir merits, Floyd v. Rentrop, 675 S.W .2d at 168; Osborne Enters., Inc. v. City o

f Chatta nooga, 561 S.W .2d 160, 16 3 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1977), the

current prevailing

view is th at the notice re quired by Tenn. R . Civ. P. 15.03 may be either fo rmal or informal. See Korn v. R oyal Caribbean C

ruise Line, Inc., 724 F.2d 1397, 1399 (9th Cir. 1984); Kinally v. Bell of P ennsylvania, 748 F. Supp. 1136, 1141 (E. D. Pa. 1990); 3 James W. Moore, Moore’s F ederal Practice ¶ 15.15[4 ] (2d

ed. 1996); 6A Charl es A. W right, et al., Federal Practice and Proced

ure § 1498, at 1 16 (2d ed. 1 990).

Ten n. R. Civ. P. 15.03 requires more than m ere aw areness t

hat a sui t ha s been filed. See Keller

v. Prince G eorge’s County, 923 F.2d 30, 33-34 (4th Cir. 1991). Unoffic ial, inf

ormal notice tha

t a lawsuit has been f

iled coup led with knowledgeof the facts on which the law s uit is based may suffice as long as th e-9-

rule’s other re quirements are sati sfied. P arties se eking to invoke the relation back provisions of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 15.03 m ust also demonstrate that the party to be addedby amendment will not be prejudiced in maintaining its defense and that the party knew or should hav e known tha t it would have

been sued had it not been for the misnomer or oth er similar mistake.

The church co ncedes tha t the tele phone conver sation bet ween its s enior pastor and the newspaper

reporter occurred

before t he statute of limitations ra

n on the McCrac kens’ c laim. Nonethel ess, it a sserts t hat th e conversa

tion does not qualify a s notice under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 15.03 because t he senior p astor did not have authority

to receive notices of this sort and becaus e the substa

nce of the conversat ion was too vague. Both assertion s are not well taken.

Tenn. R. C iv. P. 15.03 envis ions that the newly added def

endant m ust receive actual not

ice of the lawsuit. Accordingly, an individual de fendant or

the defen dant ’s a tt orn ey mu st receive the notice. When the defendant is an organizat ion, the notice

may be given to a

ny per son within t

he organiz ation with apparent authorit y to receive the n otice. See Garland v. Seaboar d Coastl ine R.R., 658 S.W.2d 528, 530-31 (Tenn. 1983) (holding that service of proces s may be made on a person

so integra

ted in the or

ganization

that he or she will know what to do with the papers). The chur ch’s se nior pastor

plays a signific ant role in the secular and religi ous affair s of the chu rch. A ccordingly , it is re asonable f or us to infer that he is one of the

persons w ithin

the organization who would know what to do with not

ice that a lawsuit ha s been file d against th e church.

Tenn. R. Civ. P. 15.03 does not require the McCrackens to serve the church with process or

to provid the church with a detailed summ ary of the all egations in thei r compl aint. The senior p astor conc eded that h e was aw are th at Ms

. McCracken

had fallen at the chu

rch, and he specif

ically recalle d th a t the newspaper

reporter ask ed questions relating to the newly filed lawsuit. Even thoughthe teleph one call w as not in wr iting, it pr

ovided the senior pastor

with actual notice that the McCrackens had filed a la wsuit against the church se eking damages for the i njuries ste mming from Ms. McCracken’s fall.-10- The evidentia

ry m aterials submit

ted in suppor

t of and in opposition to the
summ ary j udgmen

t moti on contain th e following undisputed f

acts. T he church, through its senio r pastor, receive d actual no tice befo re the sta tute of lim

itations
ran that the McCrackens had filed a lawsuit based on Ms. McC racken’ s fall at t he church. The chur

ch was not

prejudi ced in def

ending a gain st the suit be cause it knew about Ms. M cCracken’s fall as soon as it happen ed. I t also knew that its insurer had been ne gotiating a settlement with the M cCrackens’ law yer f or quite
so me time. Fi nally, the churc h knew tha t the McCr

ackens w ere looking

to the church for dam

ages and , as the business administrator’ s June 28, 19 94
mem orand um underscores, that the McCrackens’ lawyer had mistakenly nam ed the foundation as a defendant rather than the church . These undisputed f

acts establish all the conditions required for the operation of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 15.03's relation b ack provi sion.

IV.

T HE J OINT E NTERPRISE D EFENSE

The McCrackens also take issue with the trial court’s dismissal of their compl aint against the

church on t

he ground tha

t mem bers of an

uni ncorporat e d religious associati on cannot recover from the association for dam ages. The trial court ’s decision

was full y consi stent with

the decisional law as it stood at the time. See Fain v. O’Connel

l, No. 03A01-9403-CV-0 0082, 19 94 WL 577404, at *1-2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 21, 1994 ), rev’d, 909 S.W. 2d 790 (Te nn. 1995); Shropshire

v. Pure Holiness C

hurch of God

, App. No . 03A0 1-91 01-CV -000 22, 19 91 WL 121460, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. A pp. July 10, 1991) (No Tenn. R. App. P. 11 app. filed). However, after th e trial c ourt grant e d th e church’ s summ ary j udgmen

t, the Tennessee Supreme Court announced that the j oint enter

prise def ense was not

a blanket defenseto premise liability suits brought by m embers of unincorporated religious a ssociations

.
While this case was on appe al, the T ennessee Supreme Court reversed the EasternSectio n ’s Fain v. O’Connel l decision. Even though the court noted factual distinctions between the Fain case and the Shropshire

case, i t pointed out t

hat the-11-

defendant in Fain had never

asserted that the plaintiff

“had any re sponsibility

for
or right of contro l ove r the maintenance of the . . . parish facilities.” Fain v. O’Connel l, 909 S.W.2d 790 , 794 (Tenn. 1995). No ting that it did not favor imm un i ty from tort liabi lity, the court u nequivocal ly re

jected any de fense in actions of t his sort “which is based on the legal form of the organization rather than the actual degree o f

fault of the mem

ber.” Fain v. O’Conne ll, 909 S.W.2d at 794-95.

The Te nnessee S uprem e Court’ s Fain decision has prompted the Western Section of this court to reverse at least one o ther sum

mary judgm ent based on

the Shropshire

reasonin g. See Viles v. Kelly, App. No . 02A01-9 508-CV-0 0186, 1996 WL 6051 58, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. A pp. Oct. 23, 1996) (

No Tenn. R. App. P. 11 app. filed). In light of the

absence o f pleading or proof that the Mc Cracken s had any responsibil ity

for or ri ght to control t

he design, construction, or m aintenanc e of the premises of the

Brentwo od United M ethodist Church, the sum

mary judgm ent in this case must meet the same fate.

V.

We affirm

the trial court’ s decision

to grant the

McCrac kens post-judg

ment relief pursuant to Tenn. R . Civ. P . 60 .02 and rever se the sum mary judgm ent dismis sing the McCrackens’ claim s agains t the Brent wood Unite d Methodist Church. We also rem and the case to the trial court for further proceed ing s consistent

with this opinion an d tax the cos ts of this a ppeal to the

Brentwo od United Methodist Church for which execution, if necessary, m ay issue.

_______________

__ ___________ WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., JUDGE CONCUR:

_________________

_______________ SAMUEL L. LEWIS, JUDGE

_________________

_______________-12-

BEN H. CANTRELL, JUDGE