* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court

generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order

and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

Filed 8/14/96

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

ANTHONY J. LUCERO,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

JOHN SHANKS, Warden of Central

New Mexico Correctional Facility;

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE

STATE OF NEW MEXICO,

Respondents-Appellees.

No. 95-2220

(D.C. No. CIV 90-981-JC)

(D.N.M.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

Before ANDERSON, LOGAN, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
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this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore

ordered submitted without oral argument.

Appellant Anthony J. Lucero appeals from an order of the district court that

denied his motion to enforce order, for order to show cause and for sanctions, and

found that appellant’s release-from-parole date is October 18, 1996. We have

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2253, and we affirm.

This is a dispute about good time credits arising out of appellant’s petition

for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. On a previous appeal, a panel

of this court remanded for a determination of appellant’s entitlement to credit for

time served, thinking “the State [of New Mexico] surely has access to records

which will easily resolve the matter.” Lucero v. Kerby, 7 F.3d 1520, 1523 (10th

Cir. 1993). Apparently it was not that simple. The Bernalillo County Detention

Center’s records on appellant were missing, R. Doc. 48 aff. 1 at 4-5, and

appellant had been in the custody of the New Mexico Department of Corrections

(DOC) for only forty-three days, see id. aff. 1 at 6. After some more wrangling,

however, the parties stipulated that appellant should be given credit for ninety-six

additional days, plus good time credits against that time. Id. Doc. 40 at 1. Based

on their stipulation, the magistrate judge entered an order which read, in part: 

“[T]he New Mexico Department of Corrections shall recalculate Petitioner

Lucero’s discharge date on [his original sentence] to reflect the additional 96 days
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served, and any credits awarded by the Department on those 96 days.” Id. Doc.

41 at 1. Neither the stipulation, nor the magistrate judge’s order based on it,

specified how much good time credit that would be. The DOC submitted its

recalculation of appellant’s sentence to the court, which accepted it and dismissed

appellant’s habeas petition with prejudice. See id. Doc. 43.

Appellant then filed his motion to enforce order, for order to show cause,

and for sanctions, urging the district court to hold the State in civil contempt for

failing to comply with the stipulation and order with respect to appellant’s good

time credits. The State found while preparing its response to this motion that

although it had determined that appellant was entitled to twenty-seven days’ good

time credit for the forty-three days he had spent in DOC custody, it had 

inadvertently failed to transfer those twenty-seven days from one worksheet to

another, and so had not included them in its calculation of appellant’s

release-from-prison date. Unfortunately, appellant had already been released

from prison by that time, so the State responded to its mistake by changing

appellant’s release-from-parole date from November 16 to October 18, 1996. The

magistrate judge recommended that the motion to enforce order be held moot and

that sanctions be denied because the State’s mistake was bona fide. The district

court adopted that recommendation. 
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On appeal, appellant argues that: (1) the district court abused it discretion

in denying his motion for sanctions, see Reliance Ins. Co. v. Mast Constr. Co., 84

F.3d 372, 375 (10th Cir. 1996)(adjudication of civil contempt reviewed for abuse

of discretion); and, as a result, (2) the magistrate judge erred in finding that his

release-from-parole date is October 18, 1996.

We find no error or abuse of discretion. The purpose of a motion for civil

contempt is to coerce compliance with a court’s order and to compensate the

moving party for losses caused by noncompliance. NLRB v. Monfort, Inc., 29

F.3d 525, 528 (10th Cir. 1994). Under state law, the DOC can award good time

credits only against time spent in DOC custody. State v. Aqui, 721 P.2d 771, 775

(N.M.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 917 (1986). For this reason, appellant’s argument

that the State stipulated that he is entitled to forty-eight days’ good time credit

against forty-three days’ actual custody is unpersuasive. Therefore, once the

State found its twenty-seven day mistake in calculating appellant’s good time

credits and adjusted appellant’s release-from-parole date accordingly, the motion

was mooted. In addition, the record supports the district court’s finding that the

State’s mistake was bona fide. See Robin Woods Inc. v. Woods, 28 F.3d 396, 399

(3d Cir. 1994)(holding inadvertent violation of court order will not support

finding of civil contempt). Appellant did not demonstrate actual damages

warranting compensation from his inadvertently prolonged incarceration. See
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Reliance Ins. Co., 84 F.3d at 377. It follows that the magistrate did not err in

determining that appellant’s release-from-parole date is October 18, 1996.

The judgment of the United States District Court for the District of New

Mexico is AFFIRMED.

Entered for the Court

Stephen H. Anderson

Circuit Judge