United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit 

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No. 22-2957

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United States of America

 Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Devin Delbert Donald Blom

 Defendant - Appellant

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the District of Minnesota

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Submitted: December 15, 2023

Filed: February 14, 2024

[Unpublished]

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Before ERICKSON, MELLOY, and STRAS, Circuit Judges. 

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PER CURIAM.

Defendant Devin Delbert Donald Blom conditionally pleaded guilty to 

conspiring to distribute 500 grams or more of a mixture or substance containing 

methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A), and 846. 

He reserved his right to challenge an initial warrantless search and a later search 

warrant affidavit. Because the initial warrantless search was reasonable in light of 
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his express waiver of rights as a state of Minnesota parolee, and because the later 

warrant affidavit amply demonstrated probable cause, we affirm.

While imprisoned by the State of Minnesota for a drug offense, Mr. Blom 

participated in a voluntary program entitled the “Challenge Incarceration Program.” 

The program has two phases: activities during a period of incarceration followed by 

a parole period of intense supervision. When Minnesota released Mr. Blom from 

incarceration for the supervised parole phase of his program, he signed an 

acknowledgment form detailing his conditions of release and acknowledging his 

consent to “any unannounced visits or searches . . . of the offender’s person, 

residence, possessions, cell phone, vehicle, or premises.” 

During Mr. Blom’s parole, police officers and his probation officer received 

information suggesting he was trafficking methamphetamine. The probation officer 

had personal knowledge as to Mr. Blom’s residence and the vehicles he typically 

used. The officers searched Mr. Blom’s home while Mr. Blom was present. They 

found methamphetamine in a purse and marijuana in a cup. Mr. Blom’s wife, who 

was also on state parole, arrived home during the search and was arrested based on 

what they had found. She was carrying more than $70,000 cash in a purse. Outside 

the residence, a drug dog alerted to a truck that officers knew Mr. Blom used. 

Based on this information, officers decided to seek a warrant before 

continuing their search. In the search warrant affidavit, an officer described the 

above facts but did not provide details as to how much methamphetamine was found 

in the first purse or precisely where in the residence it had been located. A state 

judge issued a warrant. A resulting search of the truck where the dog had alerted 

revealed a scale and approximately eleven pounds of methamphetamine, nine 

pounds of marijuana, and 140 THC vape cartridges.

Mr. Blom moved to suppress all the evidence arguing the initial warrantless 

search was unreasonable and the later-obtained warrant was unsupported by 

probable cause. He also moved for a hearing pursuant to Franks v. Delaware, 438 
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U.S. 154 (1978), arguing the omission of details in the warrant affidavit defeated 

probable cause. The district court1 denied the motions.

We review the district court’s legal conclusions de novo and underlying 

factual determinations for clear error. See United States v. Juneau, 73 F.4th 607, 

614 (8th Cir. 2023). We review the denial of a Franks hearing for abuse of 

discretion. See United States v. Patterson, 68 F.4th 402, 414 (8th Cir. 2023).

A warrantless search within the scope of a known parole condition is generally 

reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. See Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 

852 (2006) (stating that society does not recognize as legitimate an offender’s 

asserted expectation of privacy if it contradicts the plain terms of a parole condition); 

see also United States v. McCoy, 847 F.3d 601, 605 (8th Cir. 2017) (warrantless 

search of a Minnesota parolee’s computer was not unreasonable in light of the 

parolee’s acknowledged search condition). To counter this well-established rule, 

Mr. Blom argues that his signed acknowledgment failed to show he knew of the 

condition because the search condition appeared on the second page whereas his 

signature was on the first page. He also argues that even if he had been aware of the 

search condition on his parole, the initial search in this case exceeded the scope of 

the condition and otherwise fell outside the scope of his retained Fourth Amendment 

expectations of privacy. 

We reject his arguments. The district court did not clearly err in finding Mr. 

Blom’s signed acknowledgment extended to the search condition on his parole. And 

nothing about the present search sets it apart from searches approved in Samson and 

other similar cases. The parole officer was familiar with Mr. Blom’s residence and 

vehicles, and the search did not extend beyond these areas. See, e.g., United States 

v. Thabit, 56 F.4th 1145, 1152 (8th Cir. 2023) (“[T]he waiver signed by parolees 

allowing searches of their residence nullifies any need for law enforcement to 

1

The Honorable Ann D. Montgomery, United States District Judge for the 

District of Minnesota, adopting the Report and Recommendation of the Honorable 

David T. Schultz, United States Magistrate Judge for the District of Minnesota. 
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develop a reason to search. They simply must possess probable cause that the 

parolee actually resides at the search location.”)

Regarding the later search, the affidavit, and the denial of a Franks hearing, 

any omission of information from the affidavit failed to detract from the 

overwhelming evidence and clear existence of probable cause. See United States v. 

Johnson, 75 F.4th 833, 841 (8th Cir. 2023) (intentionally false or omitted 

information must be material to the probable cause determination to merit relief). As

such, denial of the Franks hearing involved no abuse of discretion.2

We affirm the well-reasoned judgment of the district court.

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2

In addressing the issues as framed by Mr. Blom, we make no comment as to

(1) the underlying necessity of the search warrant in this case in light of the parole 

condition, or (2) the sufficiency of an extensive suppression hearing to serve, in 

effect, as a Franks hearing. See, e.g., Johnson, 75 F.4th at 841 n.4.