alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### ALICIA A. MURPHY, Appellant, v. CHARLES F. MURPHY, Respondent.

No. 17631

March 31, 1987

734 P.2d 738

*Stanley W. Pierce,*Las Vegas, for Appellant.

*Marilyn V Romanelli,*Las Vegas, for Respondent.

OPINION

*Per Curiam:*

Charles Murphy was granted a divorce in mid-1985. He was awarded the entirety of the parties’ community property, except a twelve-year-old automobile. Nearly a year later, Alicia Murphy moved to set aside the property distribution. She alleged that *186Charles had threatened to kill her if she sought any further property, so that she was afraid to litigate the issue. She also claimed that she was not represented by counsel at the time, and that her motion was made after her first subsequent contact with counsel. A domestic relations referee heard the matter and concluded that the court lacked jurisdiction because more than six months had elapsed since entry of the decree. The trial court, adopting that conclusion, dismissed the motion. We reverse.

The six-month limitation on allegations of fraud is inapplicable to fraud upon the court. Savage v. Salzmann, 88 Nev. 193, 195, 495 P.2d 367, 368 (1972). Jurisdiction to remedy fraud upon the court is inherent. Further, the court can proceed even in the absence of further action by a party, Kupferman v. Consolidated Research & Mfg. Corp., 459 F.2d 1072, 1074 n. 1 (2d Cir. 1972). Alicia styled her allegations as exposing a fraud upon the court, and her motion is cognizable on that basis. Fraud upon the court consists of, *inter alia,*“such conduct as prevents a real trial upon the issues involved,” *Savage, supra,*88 Nev. at 195, 495 P.2d at 368. In certain older decisions holding that threats of this nature were not a proper basis for relief, we relied heavily on the fact that the aggrieved party was represented by counsel. Mazour v. Mazour, 64 Nev. 245, 180 P.2d 103 (1947); Calvert v. Calvert, 61 Nev. 168, 122 P.2d 426 (1942). Thus, those cases are distinguishable and Alicia has stated a proper claim.

The language of NRCP 60(b), however, is ambiguous as to whether Alicia may proceed by motion or must bring an independent action to set aside the property division. We conclude that the better reading allows motion practice, for two reasons. First, a contrary reading renders unnecessary the provision dealing with fraud upon the court; NRCP 60(b) already allows an independent action to set a decree aside on any cognizable basis. Second, if a court can proceed *sua sponte,*we perceive no reason to limit the avenues by which the court’s attention may be directed to the fraud. Therefore, we hold that appellant’s choice to proceed by motion was not inappropriate. *Accord*Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. H. K. Porter Co., 521 F.2d 699 (6th Cir. 1975); *Kupferman, supra;*Taft v. Donellan Jerome, Inc., 407 F.2d 807 (7th Cir. 1969). It follows that the order of dismissal must be reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings.
#### GREGORY MAINES, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent.

No. 7345

June 25, 1974

523 P.2d 420

*Rodlin Goff,*State Public Defender, Carson City, for Appellant.

*Robert List,*Attorney General, Carson City; *Roy A. Woof-ter,*District Attorney, and *Charles L. Garner,*Deputy District Attorney, Clark County, for Respondent.

*237OPINION

*Per Curiam:*

This appeal is from an order denying a petition for habeas relief, presented under the provisions of Nevada’s post-conviction procedure statutes. NRS 177.315 to NRS 177.385.

NRS 177.375(1) provides: “If the petitioner’s conviction was upon a plea of guilty, all claims for post-conviction relief are waived except the claim that the plea was involuntarily entered.” In our view, when the district court accepted appellant’s plea of guilty to Counts I and II of the information against him, the court adequately canvassed him to assure that the plea was made voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the charge and consequences of the plea. NRS 174.035(1); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969); Heffley v. Warden, 89 Nev. 645, 516 P.2d 1403 (1973).

Moreover, appellant’s further contention, that he possessed a legal defense to Count II of the information, because it had once been dismissed pursuant to bargained plea of guilty to Count I of the information, is not well taken. Where, as occurred in this case, the count is dismissed as part of a bargained plea which is later repudiated by a defendant, the charge may be reinstated against him. See: People v. Kirkpatrick, 498 P.2d 992 (Cal. 1972); In Re Sutherland, 493 P.2d 857 (Cal. 1972).

Affirmed.
[Federal Register Volume 70, Number 199 (Monday, October 17, 2005)]
[Notices]
[Page 60381]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 05-20643]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION

[Disaster Declaration <greek-i> 10180 and <greek-i> 10181]


Alabama Disaster Number AL-00003

AGENCY: Small Business Administration.

ACTION: Amendment 2.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: This is an amendment of the Presidential declaration of a 
major disaster for the State of Alabama (FEMA-1605-DR), dated August 
29, 2005.
    Incident: Hurricane Katrina.
    Incident Period: August 29, 2005 and continuing through September 
26, 2005.
    Effective Date: September 26, 2005.
    Physical Loan Application Deadline Date: October 28, 2005.
    EIDL Loan Application Deadline Date: May 29, 2006.

ADDRESSES: Submit completed loan applications to: Small Business 
Administration, Processing and Disbursement Center, 14925 Kingsport 
Road, Fort Worth, TX 76155.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: A. Escobar, Office of Disaster 
Assistance, Small Business Administration, 409 3rd Street, Suite 6050, 
Washington, DC 20416.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The notice of the President's major disaster 
declaration for the State of Alabama, dated August 29, 2005, is hereby 
amended to establish the incident period for this disaster as beginning 
August 29, 2005 and continuing through September 26, 2005.
    All other information in the original declaration remains 
unchanged.

(Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance Numbers 59002 and 59008)
Herbert L. Mitchell,
Associate Administrator for Disaster Assistance.
[FR Doc. 05-20643 Filed 10-14-05; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8025-01-P
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.

, Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Stephen J. Markman

Mary Beth Kelly

Brian K. Zahra

Bridget M. McCormack

David F. Viviano

, Justices

I, Larry S. Royster , Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

September 30, 2013

d0923 

# Order

Clerk September 30, 2013

147257

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff

- Appellee,

v SC: 147257

COA: 315828

Kent CC: 13

- 000387

- FH

JOSEPH MARTIN MORALES,

Defendant

- Appellant.

_________________________________________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the May 14, 2013 order

of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded

that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted
from the financial statements contained in the body of the
accompanying Form 10-Q and is qualified in its entirety by
reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-END>                                   JUN-30-1998
<CASH>                                                6,980 
<SECURITIES>                                              0 
<RECEIVABLES>                                        58,894 
<ALLOWANCES>                                            947 
<INVENTORY>                                          47,526 
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                    138,407 
<PP&E>                                              370,862 
<DEPRECIATION>                                      121,377 
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                      493,771 
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                90,070 
<BONDS>                                             295,229 
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                     0 
<PREFERRED>                                               0 
<COMMON>                                                224 
<OTHER-SE>                                           41,034 
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                        493,771 
<SALES>                                             164,006 
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                    164,006 
<CGS>                                               121,310 
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                       159,747 
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                       (200)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                          0 
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   17,550 
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                     (13,091)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         (4,134)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  (9,627)
<DISCONTINUED>                                            0 
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                           0 
<CHANGES>                                                 0 
<NET-INCOME>                                         (9,627)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                          (.45)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                          (.45)
                                               


</TABLE>
EXHIBIT 32.2



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADDED BY

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In connection with the Quarterly Report of OptimumBank Holdings, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-QSB for the period ended March 31, 2007 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the Report), I, Richard L. Browdy, Chief Financial Officer (Principal Accounting Officer) of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 1350, as added by § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



1.

The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



2.

To my knowledge, the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company as of and for the period covered by the report.







|      |              |  |     |                                           
|----- | ------------ |  | --- | ------------------------------------------
|Date: | May 11, 2007 |  | By: | /s/ Richard L. Browdy                     
|      |              |  |     | Richard L. Browdy, Chief Financial Officer
#### SALLY H. MYERS, Appellant, v. RICHARD W. MYERS, Respondent.

No. 7888

July 23, 1975

537 P.2d 1194

*Jack Lehman,*of Las Vegas, for Appellant.

*Beckley, Singleton, DeLanoy & Jemison, Chartered,*and *Harry M. Reid,*of Las Vegas, for Respondent.

OPINION

*Per Curiam:*

This appeal is from an order reducing a divorced father’s decreed obligation to pay child support from $220 per month per child to $170 per month per child for the period commencing June 15, 1975, to June 15, 1981. The appellant mother asserts that the record does not show a change of circumstances warranting reduction. Our review of .the record, however, does not reveal an abuse of judicial discretion as that phrase is defined in Goodman v. Goodman, 68 Nev. 484, 236 P.2d 305 (1951)

Affirmed.
V 

111TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 492 

For the relief of Esther Karinge. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JANUARY 13, 2009 

Mr. MARKEY of Massachusetts introduced the following bill; which was 

referred to the Committee on the Judiciary 

A BILL 

For the relief of Esther Karinge. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. PERMANENT RESIDENT STATUS FOR ESTHER 

4 KARINGE. 

5 (a) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding subsections (a) 

6 and (b) of section 201 of the Immigration and Nationality 

7 Act, Esther Karinge shall be eligible for issuance of an 

8 immigrant visa or for adjustment of status to that of an 

9 alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence upon fil10 ing an application for issuance of an immigrant visa under 

11 section 204 of such Act or for adjustment of status to 

12 lawful permanent resident. 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with BILLS
2 

•HR 492 IH

1 (b) ADJUSTMENT OF STATUS.—If Esther Karinge 

2 enters the United States before the filing deadline speci3 fied in subsection (c), she shall be considered to have en4 tered and remained lawfully and shall, if otherwise eligible, 

5 be eligible for adjustment of status under section 245 of 

6 the Immigration and Nationality Act as of the date of the 

7 enactment of this Act. 

8 (c) DEADLINE FOR APPLICATION AND PAYMENT OF

9 FEES.—Subsections (a) and (b) shall apply only if the ap10 plication for issuance of an immigrant visa or the applica11 tion for adjustment of status is filed with appropriate fees 

12 within 2 years after the date of the enactment of this Act. 

13 (d) REDUCTION OF IMMIGRANT VISA NUMBER.— 

14 Upon the granting of an immigrant visa or permanent res15 idence to Esther Karinge, the Secretary of State shall in16 struct the proper officer to reduce by 1, during the current 

17 or next following fiscal year, the total number of immi18 grant visas that are made available to natives of the coun19 try of the alien’s birth under section 203(a) of the Immi20 gration and Nationality Act or, if applicable, the total 

21 number of immigrant visas that are made available to na22 tives of the country of the alien’s birth under section 

23 202(e) of such Act. 

24 (e) DENIAL OF PREFERENTIAL IMMIGRATION

25 TREATMENT FOR CERTAIN RELATIVES.—The natural 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with BILLS
3 

•HR 492 IH

1 parents, brothers, and sisters of Esther Karinge shall not, 

2 by virtue of such relationship, be accorded any right, privi3 lege, or status under the Immigration and Nationality Act. 

Æ 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with BILLS
Exhibit 32.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 1350, CHAPTER 63 OF TITLE 18, UNITED STATES CODE,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

Pursuant to Section 1350, Chapter 63 of Title 18, United States Code, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, the undersigned, as Chief Financial Officer of Norcraft Holdings, L.P. and Norcraft Companies, L.P. (together, the Company), does hereby certify that to the undersigneds knowledge:

1) the Companys Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the period ending September 30, 2010 fully complies with the requirements of
Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

2) the information contained in the Companys
Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the period ending September 30, 2010 fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



|                        |  |                                                                  
|----------------------- |  | -----------------------------------------------------------------
|Date: November 15, 2010 |  | /s/ Leigh Ginter                                                 
|                        |  | Leigh Ginter  Chief Financial Officer (Chief Accounting Officer)

A signed original of this written statement,
required by Section 906, has been provided to Norcraft Holdings, L.P. and Norcraft Companies, L.P. and will be retained by Norcraft Holdings, L.P. and Norcraft Companies, L.P. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff
upon request.



30
#### RODERICK LEMORE HYMON, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent.

No. 22839

March 25, 1993

849 P.2d 356

*Schieck & Derke,*Las Vegas, for Appellant.

*Frankie Sue Del Papa,*Attorney General, Carson City; *Rex A. Bell,*District Attorney, *James Tufteland,*Deputy District Attorney, and *Ulrich W. Smith,*Deputy District Attorney, Clark County, for Respondent.

OPINION

*Per Curiam:*

Appellant Roderick Hymon (“Hymon”) was convicted by a *356jury of attempted robbery with use of a deadly weapon and battery with use of a deadly weapon. For the reason set forth below, we reverse the judgment and remand for a new trial.

The battery and attempted robbery occurred on April 14, 1991. Two days later, the police arrested Hymon on an unrelated charge and photographed him pursuant to booking procedures. At the commencement of trial, Hymon moved to introduce the booking photo into evidence. Hymon argued that this booking photo was exculpatory in that it portrayed him differently from the description the victim in the instant case gave of her assailant. Hymon’s counsel refused to introduce the booking photo because it would open the door for the State to inquire into Hymon’s subsequent arrest. Hymon’s counsel believed that the harm from such an inquiry would outweigh the benefit derived from the admission of the photo. The trial court agreed with Hymon’s counsel and denied Hymon’s motion.

Later in the trial, after Hymon’s alibi witness testified, the State moved the court for permission to use evidence of Hymon’s other bad acts on rebuttal, in order to show identity and absence of mistake. The trial court granted the State’s motion. Hymon then renewed his request to introduce the booking photo into evidence. The trial court again denied the request. This was prejudicial error. In denying Hymon’s initial request to admit the photo, the trial court properly deferred to the tactical concerns of Hymon’s counsel. However, after the trial court granted the State’s motion to use evidence of Hymon’s other bad acts, the justification for denying Hymon the right to use the booking photo was moot.

NRS 47.040 states:

> (1) . . . error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected, and . . . (b) in case the ruling is one excluding evidence, the substance of the evidence was made known to the judge by offer ....

We hold that a substantial right of Hymon was affected. Hymon wanted to introduce the booking photo into evidence because he felt that it was exculpatory. Because the excluded evidence related to a material point in issue, the identity of the perpetrator, Hymon was unduly prejudiced. Hymon gave a timely offer of proof as required by NRS 47.040. The erroneous exclusion of evidence by the trial court, affecting a substantial right of Hymon, requires this court to reverse Hymon’s convictions and remand this matter for a new trial.
#### MANDY CAMPO, Appellant, v. CARNIVAL LEISURE INDUSTRIES, LTD., a Bahamian Corporation, Respondent.

No. 22950

August 10, 1994

879 P.2d 745

*Michael H. Singer,*Las Vegas, for Appellant.

*Deaner, Deaner & Scann*and *John A. Curtas,*Las Vegas, for Respondent.

OPINION

*Per Curiam:*

This is an appeal from a judgment of the district court in favor of respondent Carnival Leisure Industries, Ltd., a Bahamian Corporation. Respondent filed a complaint against appellant Mandy Campo, a Nevada resident, to recover a $25,000 debt which Campo incurred on September 15, 1984, at respondent’s hotel-casino in Nassau. A bench trial was held at which the parties stipulated that Nevada law would govern this dispute. On *1009November 13, 1991, the district court entered judgment in favor of respondent for $25,000 plus interest, plus $5,000 in attorney’s fees and $118.75 in costs. This appeal followed.

Appellant’s sole contention on appeal is that the district court erred in concluding that a debt incurred by a Nevadan while gambling at a Bahamian hotel-casino is enforceable in Nevada. We disagree.

Appellant does not challenge the district court’s conclusion that the credit documents were valid and enforceable as negotiable instruments under Nevada law. *See*NRS 104.3104 (amended, 1993 Nev. Stat., ch. 402, § 18 at 1257-59). Furthermore, the district court did not err in concluding that enforcement of the Bahamian gaming licensee’s credit instruments does not violate Nevada’s gaming laws. As a matter of public policy, and consistent with the general purpose of Nevada’s statutory scheme, *see*NRS 463.0129 (amended, 1991 Nev. Stat., ch. 371, § 2 at 968-69; ch. 645, § 1 at 2144-45), Nevadans who incur gaming debts at validly licensed operations in other jurisdictions should not be exempt from enforcement of those debts in Nevada. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.1

1

 The Honorable Robert E. Rose, Chief Justice, did not participate in the decision of this appeal.
**UN PUBLISHED** 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 11**  **- 6106** 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

- Appellee ,
v. KINGDAWUD MUJAHID BURGESS, a/k/a David Clifton Burgess , Defendant

- Appellant
.

Appeal from the United St ates District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia , at Alexandria
. Gerald Bruce Lee , District Judge. ( 1:06

- cr - 00429

- GBL

- 1 )

Submitted : May 19, 2011 Decided: May 24, 2011

Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, and AGEE and KEENAN , Circuit Judges.

Aff irmed by un published per curiam opinion
. Kingdawud Mujahid Burgess, Appellant Pro Se. Dennis Michael Fitzpatrick, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit
.2 PER CURIAM: Kingdawud Mujahid Burgess appeals the district court ’ s order denying his motion for reduction of sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) (2006). We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the

rea sons stated by the district court. United States v. Burgess , No. 1:06

- cr - 00429

- GBL

- 1 (E.D. Va. Dec. 2 2 , 2010) . We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED