## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 97-2603

___________ United States of America, * * Plaintiff - Appellee, * * v. * * Dennis B. Moore, Sr., * * Defendant - Appellant. *

___________ Appeals from the United States District Court for the No. 97-2605 Western District of Missouri.

___________ United States of America, * * Plaintiff - Appellee, * * v. * * Keven L. Wyrick, * * Defendant - Appellant. *

___________ Submitted: January 14, 1998 Filed: June 26, 1998

___________This opinion i s consistent with the views expressed by Judge Floyd R. Gibson * at the panel’s conference following oral argument. Illness has prevented Judge Gibson from reviewing the opinion, which is being filed to avoid undue delay. The HONORABLE D. BROOK BARTLETT, United States District Judge for 1 the Western District of Missouri. -2- Before LOKEN, FLOYD R. GIBSON, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges. *

___________ LOKEN, Circuit Judge.
Denn is B. Moore appeals his conviction for engaging in a continuing crimina l enterprise (CCE), committing murder to further the CCE, manufacturi ng marijuana, and using a firearm in connection with a drug trafficking offense. Keven Wyrick appeals his conviction for committing murder to further the CCE and conspiring to distribute marijuana. The dist

rict court sentenced both defendants to life in prison. On appeal,

1 they challenge the sufficiency of the evidence and raise various pretrial, evidentiary , and jury instruction issues. We affirm.
I. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Moore and Wyrick argue the evidence was insufficient to convict them of murder in furtherance of a CCE, a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 848(e)(1)(A). Wyrick als o challenges his conspiracy conviction on this ground. We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury verdict and will reverse a conviction f or insufficient evidence onl y if a "reasonable fact-finder must have a reasonable doubt about an essentia l element of the offense." United States v. Spence , 125 F.3d 1192, 1193 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied , 118 S. Ct. 1544 (1998).

The government introduced evidence that Moore began distributing marijuana in the early 1980's, enlisting others to help him, including Orville Childress. Elmont-3-

Kerns and Bill Wayne

Price were two of Moore’s marijuana suppliers. Moore stored marijuana, weapons, and money in local stash houses operated by various people , includi ng Mike Mason, Moore’s brother-in-law. Moore regularly used violence t o collect money and enforce discipline within the organiza tion. Wyrick distributed drugs and perf ormed strong-arm and collection work for Moore. Wyrick’s delivery helper, Steve Lehman, eventually left Wyrick when he threate ned to kill any police officer that tried to stop him.

In the late 1980's, Moore ruined two kilograms of cocaine he had bought from Price on credit for $72,000. Moore obtained $ 70-80,000 of marijuana on consignment fro m Kerns, intending to pay Price with the sale proceeds. When Kerns demande d payment for the marijuana, Moore tried to shift responsibility for the debt to Childress and then decided to kill Kerns. Moore first planned to have Wyric k kill Kerns and then Childre ss kill Wyrick, so the killings would look like a drug deal gone bad, bu t Childress refused to participate. Wyrick agreed to murder Kerns for $10,000, knowing that Moore ’s dispute with Kerns concerned a drug debt related to their marijuan a tra fficking. Moore and Wyrick recruited Terry Wright to help commit the murder

. While Moore planned the murder, Wyrick obtained a pistol. On June 27, 19 89, Wyrick andWright entered Kerns’s house on a pretense. Wyrick fired several times, hitting Kerns. Wyrick and Wright left in Wright’s car, and Wyrick threw pieces of the firearm out the car window. Steve Lehman disposed of their clothing. Wyrick told Lehman he had just murdered Elmont Kerns.

Kern s’s body was discovered with many notebooks showing large marijuan a transactions between Kerns, Moore, and other traffickers. Entries showed Mo ore owed Kerns $404,938 and payments by Moore totaling $247,580. Moore disposed of hi s similar drug records within days of the murder.

Afte r Moore lost Kerns as a supplier, Price was arrested and jailed in April , 1990. When Childress and two other conspirators were subsequently arrested, MooreWy rick argues that the term “continuing criminal enterprise” in 21 U.S.C

. 2 § 848(e)(1)(A) is not defined and is unconstitutionally vague because it has “n o definite, commonly understood meaning,” and that § 8 48(e) is unconstitutionally vague a s applied to him because he did not know the full extent of Moore’s CCE activities. We disagree. We upheld § 8 48(c), which defines “continuing criminal enterprise” for purposes of

§ 848(a), against a constitutional vagueness challenge in United States v. Kirk , 534 F.2d 1262, 1277-78 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied , 433 U.S. 907 (1977)

. Section 848(e) prohibits murder by a person “working in furtherance of a continuing -4- hiredan attorney for the three and approached James Clark to murder the prosecutor and a cooperating w itness, but Clark was arrested on other criminal charges. Despite these blows to his organiz ation, Moore continued to distribute marijuana, enlisting his
son and a former babysitter to help. He arranged numerous armed robberies to fun d
ma rijuana purchases after a police raid in May 1992 left him short of money. Moore
was finally arrested in November 1994. Wyrick continued to buy and sell marijuana until indicted in 1994.

To sustain convictions for murder in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 848(e)(1)(A), an offense forwhich the death penalty is authorized, the government must prove tha t Moore and Wyrick were “engaged in or working in furthera nce of” Moore’s CCE; that Wyrick intentionally killed K erns and Moore procured the killing; and “that there was
a substant ive connection between the killing and the CCE.” To sustain Wyrick’ s conviction for conspiracy to distribute marijuana, the government must demon strate that such a con spiracy existed, and that Wyrick knew of and intentionally joined th e conspiracy. See United States v. Jones , 101 F.3d 1263, 1267 (8th Cir. 1996), cert

. denied , 117 S. Ct. 1566 (1997). As our brief summary of the trial evidence make s clear, the government presented more than sufficient evidence to prove that Moore’s organiza tionwas a CCE as defined in 21 U.S.C. § 848(c), that Moore procured an d Wyri ck committed Kerns’s murder working in furtherance of that CCE, and tha t Wyrick kn owingly participated in the marijuana distribution conspiracy. Thus, th e evidence was sufficient to sustain all the convictions. 2criminal enterprise.” Like the Seventh Circuit, we find nothing unconstitut ionally vague in this language. See United States v. Cooper , 19 F.3d 1154, 1165 (7th Cir. 1994)

. And like the defendant in Cooper , Wyrick was close enough to Moore, the CC E kingpin, to be aware that Moore asked Wyrick to kill Kerns to eliminate a drug debt and thereby further a very substantial and continuing drug trafficking enterprise. Wyrick also argues the district court er red in refusing to give his requested jury 3 instructions regarding multiple conspiracies. I nstead, with Wyrick’s consent, the court gave the following instruction after its marijuana conspiracy instruction:
If you have a reasonable doubt as to whether Keven Wyrick knowingly and intentionally joined in the agreement or understanding referred to in [the conspiracy instruction], then you must find him not guilty of th e offense submitted in [that instruction]. Given the overwhelming evidence of one marijuana conspiracy, and the court’s explicit -5- II. Wyrick’s Motion To Sever
Wyrick argues the district court erred in denying his pretrial motion to sever. He contends the jury could not compartmentalize thevast amounts of evidence against codefendant Moore, there was a severe danger of spillover from this evidence, there were multiple conspiracies including many not involving Wyrick, and there were Bruto n problems related to Moore’s hearsay statements. Although Moore’s conspiracy ha d
ma ny facets, it was still only one conspiracy. The trial involved only two defendants andwas not overly complex. Wyrick’s more limited role in the conspiracy and th e disparity in the evidence against Wyrick and Moore did not warrant severance, and the risk that jurors would be unable to compartmentalize the evidence or that evidenc e agains t Moore would spill over to Wyrick was minimized by the court’s ongoin g limiting instructions. See United States v. Kime , 99 F.3d 870, 880 (8th Cir . 1996), cert. denied , 117 S. Ct. 1015 (1997). Wyrick’s Bruton claim rests on state ments that did not incrim inate him, so the joint trial did not implicate his right to confront and cross

e x amine Moore. In sum, the court’s refusal to sever was not an abuse of discretion. 3instruct ionthat to convict the jury had to find that Wyrick joined the conspiracy a s

defined , there was clearly no plain error in giving this instruction with Wyrick’ s consent. See United States v. Zimmerman , 832 F.2d 454, 457-58 (8th Cir. 1987).
-6- III. Alleged Multiplicity of the Murder Counts

Counts III and IV of the indic tment separately charged Moore and Wyrick with murdering Kerns in furtherance of a CCE and while engaged in a m arijuana distribution conspiracy, two types of murder expressly prohibited by 21 U.S.C. § 848(e)(1)(A). In Rutledge v. United States , 1 16 S. Ct. 1241, 1250 (1996), the Supreme Court held that
adrug conspiracy violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 is a lesser included offense of a CCE violation of 21 U.S.C. § 848. Therefore, Mooreand Wyrick could not be convicted or punished f

or both alleged murders, and Counts III and IV were potentiall y multiplicitous. On appeal, they contend the district court should have dismissed one of the counts for multiplicity or required the government to elect between them.
Responding to this issue, the distr ict court submitted the two counts together on
asingle verdict form and instructed the jurors that if they found a defendant guilty of murderin furtherance of a CCE, they need not consider the charge of murder whil e engaged i n a marijuana distribution conspiracy. This eliminated the risk o f multiplicitous co nvictions or punishment, an appropriate remedy for multiplicity. See United States v. Sue , 586 F.2d 70, 71 (8th Cir. 1978) (per c uriam). Moore and Wyrick argue they were nonetheless prejudiced because the indictment suggested more criminal activity than actually occurred. However, the jury did not see the indictment. Thus, as submitted, the murder charge was no different than if the government had allegedWyrick also argues the court erred by framing the alternative murder charge in 4 two separ ate instructions, instead of in the one instruction Wyrick proposed. Tha t contention is without merit. Moore on the oth er hand argues the district court erred by instructing that the jury “must” find him guilty if they found the necessary facts tru e beyond a reasonable doubt. That contention is foreclosed by our decision in Unite d States v. Kroh , 915 F.2d 326, 335 (8th Cir. 1990) (en banc). We note that Wyrick does not (and cannot) argue that his right to a fair trial was 5 prejud iced, because even if Slyman would have been an impartial juror, he wa s re placed by another, equally impartial juror. However, the government does no t contend that the alleged error is for that reason unreviewable. -7- alternativ e means to commit the offense in a single count, which Fed. R. Crim. P

. 7(c)(1) expressly permits. We co nclude the district court did not abuse its discretion. 4
IV. Jury Selection Issues

Moo re and Wyrick argue the district court erred in sustaining governmen t challenges for cause to venirepersons Martin Slyman, Jerilyn Hatfield, O die Boney, and Charles Marsh. They further challenge the government’s use of peremptory challenges to strike five of the seven remaining African-American venirepersons. See Batson v. Kentucky , 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
A. Venireman Slyman. During vo ir dire, Slyman said he knew Wyrick and that Wyric k’s father, a potential defense witness, used to be his supervisor. Questione d further in chambers , Slyman said he had rooted for Wyrick at boxing matches, and he had “admiration” for Wyrick after reading an article in the K ANSAS C ITY S TARabout Wyrick’s boxing career and efforts “to make changes to turn his life around and that type of thing.” Though Slyman said he could be a fair and impartial juror, the district court granted the government’s motion to strike Slyman for cause, commenti ng this was “[o]ne of the clearest cases I’ve ever seen of partiality.” Wyrick argues the cour t improperly ignored the presumption that prospective jurors are unbiased. 5-8-

When a prospective juror i s challenged for cause, the trial court’s ruling “ought not be set aside by a reviewing court, unless the error is manifest,” that is, unless the for-cause ruling is manifestly wrong on the face of the trial record. Irvin v. Dowd , 366 U.S. 717, 723 (1961) (quotation omitted). Th at was the situation in Irvin , where many of the jurors had admitted during voir dire they beli eved the defendant guilty. Here, on the other hand, the voir dire record reveals a basis for partiality, but Slyman said h e
c o uld be an impartial juror. The district court’s decision to strike him for cause was, in essence, a finding that Slyman’s partiality denial was not credible. Such a finding
cann ot be manifest error; indeed, it is virtually unassailable on appeal. Thus, th e court’s ruling was not reversible error. See United States v. Mills , 987 F.2d 1311 , 1314 (8th Cir.), cert. denied , 510 U.S. 953 (1993).

B. Venire persons Hatfield, Boney, and Marsh. Moore and Wyrick argue th e district court er

red in sustaining the government’s for-cause challenges to three jurors who e xpressed reservations about their ability to apply the death penalty. Th e applicable standard is “whether the juror’s views wou ld prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and hi s oat h.” Wainwright v. Witt , 469 U.S. 412, 424 (1985) (quotation omitted). Thes e venirepersons expressed serious doubt as to their ability to consider imposition of the death penalty. When the prosecutor asked Ms. Hatfield if she could, under an y circumstances, “consider imposing a death sentence on somebody who didn’t pull the trigger,” s he responded, “No, I don’t think so.” When defense counsel pressed th e issue, she replied, “I really don’t think so.” Mr. Boney stated that he would consider the dea th penalty “if a person murdered like maybe 100 or 200 people,” but not fo r “one or two.” Mr. Mar sh said that if he were choosing between life in prison without possibilit y of parole and the death penalty, he would “automatically” opt fo r impri sonment, adding that “it’s wrong to take a life.” Although defendants point t o other testimony sug gesting these venirepersons could follow the rule of law, the court found that each would be unable to do so. The record fairly supports thes e findings and-9-

on this issue, “deference must be paid to the trial judge who sees and hears the juror.” Witt , 469 U.S. at 426. The court did not err in striking these prospective jurors.
C. The Batson challeng e. Moore and Wyrick argue the government struck five of the remaining seven African-American venirepersons for discriminatory reasons

. Although they are white, Moore and Wyrick have standing to raise this issue. Se e Powers v. Ohio , 499 U.S. 400, 416 (1991). The government explained that it struck four of the venireperso ns because of their opposition to the death penalty and the fifth because he could not put aside a bias against police officers. Defendants had th e burden to prove “purposeful discrimination.” The district court found “no reason to beli eve that race played any role” in the government’s decisions to strike. Afte r carefully reviewing the record, we conclude the court did not clearly err in rejectin g defen dants’ Batson challenges. See United States v. Jenkins , 52 F.3d 743, 746 (8t h Cir. 1995) (standard of review).
V. Evidentiary Issues

A. Testimony of Steve Lehman. Government witness Steve Lehman testified that, prior to Wyrick’s involvement with the marijuana conspiracy, Lehm an and Wyrick sold drugs and robbed other drug dealers to supply their own drug habits, and thes e activities brought them to the attention of drug kingpin Moo re. Wyrick objected to this testimony as prej udicial evidence of prior bad acts not relevant to any proper purpose
un der Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). The district court admitted the testimony because it was “intimately related to and involved with the circumstances of the alleged offenses,” and because its probative value outwe ighed the danger of unfair prejudice. Wyrick argues this ruling was reversible error.

Rule 404(b) “permits the introduction of evidence of other criminal activity to complete the story of the crime on trial by proving its immediate context,” Unite d States v. Howard , 504 F.2d 1281, 1284 (8th Cir. 1974), or by explaining theRule 613(b) provides: “E xtrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement by 6 a witness is not admissible unless the witness is afforded an opportunity to explain or deny the same and the opposite party is afforded an opportunity to interrogate th e witness thereon, or the interests of justice otherwise require.” -10- circumstances of the alleged crime or the relationship between alleg ed conspirators, see United States v. McGu ire , 45 F.3d 1177, 1188 (8th Cir.), cert. denied , 515 U.S. 1132 (19 95). After careful review of the testimony in question, we conclude the distric t court did not abuse its discretion in overruling Wyrick’s objections. See generall y United States v. Masters , 622 F.2d 83, 85-88 (4th Cir. 1980).

B. Impeachment of James Clark. Prior to trial, James Clark gave a tape

recorded statement to federal agents in which he said that Moore arranged to hurt people and set up armed robberies, that Wyrick and Childress were the hit men, that Moore admitted plotting Kerns’s murder, that Moore wanted Clark or Childress to kill Mark Williams, and that Moore told Clark to kill a cooperating witness. Called as a trial witness by Moore, Clar k testified that Childress rather than Moore hired Clark to hurt or murder people, including the cooperating witness, and that Childress set up the armed robberies. In other words, Clark’s testimony labeled Childress as leader of the CCE

. Moore and Wyrick then moved to prevent the government from introducin g Clark’s prior statement dur ing its rebuttal case. The district court found the statement admissible to impeach Clark’s trial testimony because “[t]he statement in its entirety is inconsi stent with the story that was told yesterday from the witness stand.” Th e court conc luded that the entire statement must be admitted “to understand an d appreciate [its] inconsistent nature.” Responding to defendants’ contention that Clark
was not give n an opportunity to respond to the prior statement during his tria l testimony, the court noted that the government in cross examinat ion alluded to the prior statement but did not confront Cl ark with each specific portion of the taped statement. The court ruled th at Fed. R. Evid. 613(b) does not require an opportunity to respond 6 before the prior statement is admitted, and that defe ndants would be permitted to recall Clark to respond to the statement after it was admitted into evidence.-11-

On appeal, Moore and Wyrick argue the taped statement should have bee n redacted because only portions were inconsistent. But a prior statement need not be “diametr ically opposite” to be inconsistent, and the trial judge has “considerabl e di scretion” to determine when a statement is inconsistent with the witness’s tria l test imony. See United States v. Rogers , 549 F.2d 490, 496 (8th Cir. 1976), cert

. denied , 431 U.S. 918 (1977). The district court did not abuse its discre tion in admitting the entire statement to convey the true extent of its inconsistency.

Defe ndants further argue that the taped statement was inadmissible becaus e Clark ha d no opportunity to respond to each inconsistency before its admission

. Tradit ionally, courts have insisted that a witness be directed to a prior inconsisten t statement during cross-examination, before the sta tement is admitted. But Rule 613(b) provides that “the witness [have] an opportunity to explain and the opposite party an opportunity to examine on the statement, with no specification of any particular time
or seq uence.” Rule 613 Advisory Committee Note to Subdivision (b); see Unite d State s v. Sutton , 41 F.3d 1257, 1260 (8th Cir. 1994); McCormick on Evidence § 3 7 (4th ed. 1992). One method of providing such an opportunity is to allow recall of the witness after the prior statement is admitted. See United States v. Lynch , 800 F.2 d 765, 770 (8th Cir. 1986).
In this case, although the government d uring cross-examination did not confront Clark with every statement on the tape, he was given a substantial opportunity t o explai n his prior statements before the tape was admitted -- the government aske d whether he remembered makin g a tape-recorded statement to federal agents in the fall of 1992, and whether he remembered telling them that Moore hired Wyrick to hurt people and that Moore told Clark to kill the cooperating witness and wanted Clark to kill Mark Williams. In response, Clark vacillated between denying having made the sta tements and claiming they were inaccurate because he was under the influence o f drugs at the time of the interview. Concluding “it would have been futile for th e government to have gone through any more . . . the pattern was clear,” the court-12-

admitted th e entire statement and allowed defense counsel to recall Clark after th e governm ent’s rebuttal. This ruling was consistent with the plain language of Rul e 613(b) and s ensibly resolved the issue. There was no abuse of the court’s discretion.

C. Admission of Coca

ine Sales Evidence. The superseding indictment alleged
a cons piracy to manufacture and distribute marijuana, but Count One more broadl y accused Moore of a CCE comprised of a series of drug violations “including but not limited to, the of

fenses charged in [the] Superseding Indictment, which violations and others were part of a continuing series of felony violations of Subchapters I and II of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Control Act of 1970.” At trial, Moore and Wyric k objected to the government’s evidence of cocaine distribution, arguing that thi s evidence was not contemplated by the indictment. The court admitted the evidence , concluding that Count One included t he possibility of cocaine distribution, and finding that defendants had sufficient no tice cocaine evidence might be introduced. The court later instructed the jury that cocaine distribution was one possible predicate offense to Moore’s alleged CCE activities. On appeal, Moore and Wyrick argue this amounted to an improper constructive amendment of the indictment.

Th ere is no requirement that the drug offenses predicate to a CCE violation be specifically listed in the indictment, provided the defendant had actual notice of th e charges. See United States v. Johnson , 982 F.2d 1192, 1197 (8th Cir. 1992); Unite d States v. Becton , 751 F.2d 250, 256-57 (8th Cir. 1984); Unite d States v. Simmons , 923 F.2d 934, 952 (2nd Cir.), cert. deni ed , 500 U.S. 919 (1991); United States v. AlvarezMoreno , 874 F.2d 1402, 1408-10 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied , 494 U.S. 1032 (1990). Given the broad language of Count One, it cannot be said that Moore and Wy rick were convicted o f a CCE charge not made in the indictment, the kind of constructiv e amendment th at caused us to reverse in United States v. Yeo , 739 F.2d 385, 387 (8th Cir. 1984). That reduces the issue to one of notice or surprise. See United States v. Wessels , 12 F.3d 746, 750-51 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied , 513 U.S. 831 (1994).-13-

Wyrick a nd Moore had repeated actual notice of the government’s intent t o introduce cocaine distribution evidence -- from t he broad language of Count One, from the government’s pretrial report detailing the conspiracy’s cocaine trafficking, and from the go vernment’s opening statement, which advised that “[t]he evidence in this cas e will show a cocaine distribution sch eme . . . overseen, again, by the Defendant Dennis B. Moore, a scheme in which he used one of his marijuana sources to obtain cocaine which he would then, in turn , distribute locally.” Indeed, in objecting to this evidence at trial, defense counsel admitted awareness “that cocaine might play into the case a little bit.” Thus, the district court did not err in admitting cocaine distribution evidence and permitting its use to establish one of the predicate drug trafficking violation s necessary to prove a CCE.

D. Admi ssion of Firearms. Wyrick and Moore argue that eight firearm s deli veredby conspirators to Michael Mason should not have been admitted at tria l becaus e they were irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial. See Fed. R. Evid. 401, 403

. Given the extensive testimony of gun use and intimidation by members of the dru g traffick ing conspiracy, the firearms were relevant to the government’s case and no t unfairly prejudicial. See Unit ed States v. Dierling , 131 F.3d 722, 732 (8th Cir. 1997).

E. Moo re’s Motion To Suppress. Moore argues the district court erred b y
over ruling his motion to suppress evidence seized during a May 1992 warrant search bec ause there was no probable cause to support issuing the warrant and because th e warrant’s language was so unspecific as to constitute an unconstitutional “general ” warrant. We disagree. The warrant’s supporting affidavit recited that a reliabl e in formant had observed controlled substances, drug paraphernalia, and weapons a t Moore’s residence in April and early May of 1992, and that police had corroborated much of th e informant’s information. This affidavit supplied a sufficient basis for the magist rate to conclude there was a “fair probability” the described items would b e found in Moore’s home on May 12. See Illinois v. Gates , 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). Nor was the warrant’s reference to “drug paraphernalia” impermissib ly broad or vague.-14-

In the co ntext of a search for marijuana, “use of ‘paraphernalia’ was sufficientl y definite to make a violation of Fourth Amendment rights highly unlikely.” Unite d States v. Johnson , 541 F.2d 1311, 1315 (8th Cir. 1976). The warrant in th is case is less broad than the one challenged in Johnson , as it referred to “drug” paraphernalia.

VI. Witness Credibility Instructions
Wyrick an d Moore argue the district court erred by refusing to give thei r request ed cautionary instructions regarding witnesses who testified pursuant to ple a agr eements and witnesses who testified falsely at prior proceedings. Moore als o alleges error in the refusal to give his requested accomplice witness instruction. The court gave instructions, based upon Eighth Circuit Mod el Instruction 4.04, advising the jury to give the testimony

of immunized witnesses such weight as the jurors thought it dese rved, advising the jurors in weighing credibility to “consider . . . whether tha t witness said something different at an earlier time,” and cautioning that the fact tha t trial witness es pleaded guilty to a crime for which Moore and Wyrick were on tria l must not be considered as evidence of their guilt. These instructions fai rly covered “the substance of the requested i nstruction[s].” United States v. Walker , 97 F.3d 253, 255 (8th Cir. 1996). Failure to give an accomplice credibilit y instruction was not reversible error because the testimony w as amply corroborated. See United States v. McGinnis , 783 F.2d 755, 758 (8th Cir. 1986); cf. United States v. Einfeldt , 1 38 F.3d 373, 379 (8th Cir. 1998).
The judgments of the district court are affirmed.
A true copy.

Attest:
CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.