Opinion filed April 24, 2014

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals __________

No. 11-13-00335-CV

__________

IN THE INTEREST OF H.E.M.T. AND E.A.T., CHILDREN

On Appeal from the 29th District Court

Palo Pinto County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. C44989

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

This is an appeal from an order terminating the parental rights of the mother

and father of H.E.M.T. and E.A.T. (the children).1 The mother voluntarily 

relinquished her parental rights and did not file an appeal. The father timely filed 

an appeal. In a single issue on appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the 

evidence to support termination. We affirm.

Termination Standard and Findings

The termination of parental rights must be supported by clear and 

convincing evidence. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001 (West 2014). To determine 

if the evidence is legally sufficient in a parental termination case, we review all of 

 1

We note that the trial court also terminated parental rights with respect to a third child, M.R.T., who has 

the same mother but a different father. Neither of M.R.T.’s parents has filed an appeal. 
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the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding and determine whether a 

rational trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its finding 

was true. In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005). To determine if the 

evidence is factually sufficient, we give due deference to the finding and determine 

whether, on the entire record, a factfinder could reasonably form a firm belief or 

conviction about the truth of the allegations against the parent. In re C.H., 89 

S.W.3d 17, 25–26 (Tex. 2002). To terminate parental rights, it must be shown by 

clear and convincing evidence that the parent has committed one of the acts listed 

in Section 161.001(1)(A)–(T) and that termination is in the best interest of the 

child. FAM. § 161.001. 

In this case, the trial court found that Appellant had committed three of the 

acts listed in Section 161.001(1)—those found in subsections (D), (N), and (O).

Specifically, the trial court found that Appellant had placed or allowed the children 

to remain in conditions or surroundings that endangered their physical or emotional 

well-being, that he had constructively abandoned the children, and that he had 

failed to comply with the provisions of a court order as necessary for him to obtain 

the return of the children. The trial court also found, pursuant to 

Section 161.001(2), that termination of Appellant’s parental rights would be in the 

best interest of the children. In his brief, Appellant does not challenge the 

sufficiency of the evidence to support the best interest finding.

Evidence at Trial

The Department of Family and Protective Services removed the children

from their parents in June 2012 after M.R.T., the children’s half-sister who was less 

than eight months old, was seriously injured while in the care of the mother and 

M.R.T.’s father. The Department was appointed as the children’s managing 

conservator at that time. The final hearing on termination occurred in October 

2013.
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The evidence shows that, prior to the incident involving M.R.T. and her 

father, the children had been exposed to domestic violence involving Appellant. 

When Appellant lived with the mother and the children, Appellant injured the 

mother and committed “ongoing domestic violence” against her in the presence of 

the children. Appellant was arrested for “beating [the mother] up.” At the time of 

trial, Appellant was in a Florida prison. He had been convicted of assault and of 

trafficking in stolen property.

Donna Massey, the Department’s conservatorship worker, testified that the 

Department had put a plan in place so that Appellant could be reunited with his 

children but that, to her knowledge, Appellant had not fulfilled any portion of his 

plan. Massey contacted Appellant in prison and requested that he fill out a child 

resource form. She informed Appellant that, if he would send her information 

about relatives that would be a suitable placement for the children, the Department 

would place them with those relatives. Appellant subsequently expressed a desire 

that his parental rights not be terminated and that the children remain in foster care 

until his release from prison. According to Massey, Appellant had no contact 

whatsoever with the children during the time that the children were in the care of 

the Department. Appellant did not visit the children, nor did he send any cards, 

letters, or gifts to them. Massey testified that Appellant cannot support his 

children. Additional evidence relating to the best interest of the children was also 

presented at trial but need not be detailed here because Appellant does not 

challenge the best interest finding.

Analysis

The Department produced clear and convincing evidence from which the 

trial court could reasonably have formed a firm belief that Appellant had 

constructively abandoned the children. To support a finding of constructive 

abandonment, the Department must have shown that the children had been in the 
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managing conservatorship of the Department for at least six months, that the 

Department had made reasonable efforts to return the children, that Appellant had

not regularly visited or maintained significant contact with the children, and that 

Appellant had demonstrated an inability to provide the children with a safe 

environment. See FAM. § 161.001(1)(N). The undisputed evidence shows that the 

Department had been the children’s managing conservator for over a year. The 

record also shows that the Department had made reasonable efforts to return the 

children to Appellant or to his family, that Appellant had not regularly visited or 

maintained significant contact with the children, and that Appellant had 

demonstrated an inability to provide the children with a safe environment. 

Therefore, we hold that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support 

the trial court’s finding under Section 161.001(1)(N). See In re J.A.L., No. 11-13-

00191-CV, 2013 WL 7083191 (Tex. App.—Eastland Dec. 19, 2013, no pet.) (mem. 

op.); In re N.R.T., 338 S.W.3d 667, 673–75 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2011, no pet.). 

Because a finding that a parent committed one of the acts listed in 

Section 161.001(1)(A)–(T) is all that is required under that statute, we need not 

address Appellant’s contentions that the evidence is insufficient to support the trial 

court’s findings under subsections (D) and (O). See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1. 

Appellant’s sole issue on appeal is overruled. 

This Court’s Ruling

We affirm the trial court’s order of termination.

April 24, 2014 MIKE WILLSON

Panel consists of: Wright, C.J., JUSTICE

Willson, J., and Bailey, J.