In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 15-2352

KATHY ANN STARK,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN,

Acting Commissioner of 

Social Security Administration,

Defendant-Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Indiana, Fort Wayne Division.

No. 14-cv-00108 — Joseph S. Van Bokkelen, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED DECEMBER 16, 2015 — DECIDED FEBRUARY 22, 2016

____________________

Before MANION, KANNE, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

MANION, Circuit Judge. Kathy Stark, aged 60, applied for 

disability insurance benefits, primarily asserting that she is 

disabled by degenerative disc disease that causes severe 

back, neck, and hip pain. The ALJ denied her application 

largely on the basis that she did not testify credibly about the 

severity of her pain. We agree with Stark that the credibility 
2 No. 15-2352

analysis was flawed and remand the case to the agency for 

further proceedings.

I. BACKGROUND

Before her back pain forced her to stop working in 2009, 

Stark had worked for over ten years as a yard driver, moving pick-up trucks at a General Motors plant from the assembly line to a storage area. She earned about $38,000 per 

year, presumably with benefits.

Her back pain started in 2000, when she underwent her 

first of three surgeries. Her orthopedic surgeon diagnosed 

her with degenerative disc disease and performed a lumbar 

fusion and procedures to widen her nerve pathways. Stark 

experienced persistent and continuous pain in her left leg, 

and three months later, she was diagnosed with nerve root 

irritation and moderate-to-severe spinal stenosis. Stark underwent a second surgery to reduce nerve compression in 

her spinal canal; the procedure showed an irritable nerve 

root. Her pain did not abate. An electrodiagnostic study 

showed results consistent with radiculopathy. So Stark underwent a third surgery, another lumbar fusion. She also 

was prescribed daily narcotic pain relievers. 

At follow-up appointments, her orthopedic surgeon

found that Stark’s fusion had healed well, but he opined that 

she had a neuropathic root and predicted that “she will still 

always have a component of the neuropathic leg pain.” In 

November 2002, the surgeon believed that any improvements in her leg pain would likely level off within a year. By 

late 2004, he did not believe that any other surgical options 

would alleviate her pain. 
No. 15-2352 3

Over the next few years Stark underwent numerous nonsurgical treatments to alleviate the pain radiating from her 

nerve damage. For example, she received a series of epidural 

spinal injections and underwent a nerve root block. Meanwhile, she continued on a regimen of Neurontin, Darvocet, 

Celebrex, and physical exercises. In late 2007 she began a 

physical therapy program to treat her lumbar pain. But she 

still experienced lower back pain on lumbar-flexion exercises 

after eight sessions of therapy and another epidural injection, so her physical therapist recommended follow-up with 

a physician. Her family physician prescribed three injections 

of local anesthetics in her spine in 2008, which Stark said offered short-term pain relief in her mid-upper back. The physician added Oxycodone and Avinza to her medication regiment, but Stark’s pain control was “fair-to-poor.” The family physician opined that her chronic low-back pain could be 

due to lumbar disc disruption, a diseased nerve root, irritation of the lumbar spine, or sacroiliac joint dysfunction. 

In connection with her application for benefits, Stark was 

examined in 2009 by a state-agency doctor. He opined that 

she was capable of engaging in sedentary-to-light physical 

demand work, based on his physical exam of her and review 

of her medical history. Stark reported very severe pain in her 

back that radiated down her left leg and prevented her from 

sitting for more than two hours. Despite Stark’s description 

of pain, the state doctor assessed that Stark could do light 

physical demand activities based on her full range of motion 

and ability to squat, kneel, and walk. A state-agency medical 

consultant also reviewed Stark’s file, and estimated that 

Stark occasionally could lift or carry 20 pounds and sit for a

total of about 6 hours in an 8-hour day. 
4 No. 15-2352

At a hearing before an ALJ in late 2012, Stark testified to 

the severity of her pain. She reported a “tremendous amount 

of pain every day,” which had worsened steadily over the 

past three years, and she stopped working because of it. It is 

important to note here that for many years she continued to 

work at General Motors in spite of the increasing pain and 

many medical and physical treatments. At the hearing, she 

rated her upper and lower back pain at a 7 out of 10. When 

she tried to hold her 7-pound grandson for more than a few 

minutes, she said that her back erupted in pain and she 

could not move the next day. She rated her right hip pain at 

a 6 or 7 out of 10. She felt like a “volt of electricity” goes 

through her leg, making her toes throb. Most of her days

were spent easing her pain with ice packs or heat therapy, 

and alternating lying prone on the couch with performing 

small tasks like doing laundry. Dinner preparation extended

for hours because she could not stand for more than 20 

minutes. She continued to take Neurontin and Aleve, which 

she said helped ease her pain. She could no longer take narcotic pain relievers because of a hepatitis C diagnosis that 

arose out of a tainted blood transfusion.

A vocational expert testified that Stark could perform her 

past work as a driver if limited to the extent described by the 

ALJ: able to lift 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently; able to sit, stand, or walk for 6 hours each in an 8-

hour workday; occasionally able to climb, balance, stoop, 

kneel, crouch, crawl; and no limits on pulling or pushing. In 

contrast to Stark’s testimony about her present need for frequent breaks, the expert testified that an employer would 

tolerate two 15-minute breaks daily and fewer than 2 to 3 

absences per month. 
No. 15-2352 5

The ALJ denied benefits using the 5-step framework. 

See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). The ALJ found that Stark had 

not engaged in substantial gainful activity since her alleged 

onset in October 2009 (Step 1); she suffered “back pain status 

post remote fusion” and hepatitis C, both severe (Step 2); 

and her impairments, individually or in combination, did 

not satisfy a listing for presumptive disability because her 

back impairments had not resulted in nerve root involvement, sensory or reflex loss, spinal arachnoiditis, or an abnormal gait (Step 3). At Step 4 the ALJ rejected Stark’s account of disabling limitations. Despite noting that she had 

been treated with medication, physical therapy, joint injections, chiropractic therapy, and lumbar fusions, the ALJ concluded that “the objective evidence does not substantiate the 

extreme symptoms and limitations to which she testified.”1

The ALJ acknowledged that she experiences “some symptoms,” but her testimony regarding daily activities “demonstrates a level of daily function not inconsistent with light 

work activity.” Finally at Step 5 the ALJ agreed with the vocational expert that she could perform her past work as a 

driver. 

II. ANALYSIS

Stark mounts a three-pronged challenge to the ALJ’s adverse credibility finding. She first argues that at Step 4 the 

ALJ misconstrued her testimony about the intensity of her 

 1 The ALJ did not mention Stark’s inability to ingest narcotic pain relievers because of the hepatitis C. However, both attorneys brought it up 

at oral argument, and at this juncture she apparently is unable to use 

certain pain relief medicines.
6 No. 15-2352

pain, the extent of her daily activities, and her need for frequent periods of rest. 

We agree with Stark that the ALJ’s finding that Stark’s 

own testimony supports the residual-functional-capacity assessment is patently wrong. The ALJ inexplicably failed to 

consider objective evidence that buttressed Stark’s testimony 

of disabling pain. This evidence included the nature of 

Stark’s diagnoses of radiculopathy and degenerative disc 

disease, evidence of prescriptions for strong pain medications, epidural injections, multiple surgeries, and physical 

therapy. The ALJ cursorily mentioned Stark’s treatments, 

but she did not consider how the treatments relieved Stark’s 

pain. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(v), (vi) (factors relevant to 

severity of pain include treatment for pain relief and other 

measures to relieve pain, like lying flat on the back). Nor did 

the ALJ consider the conclusion of Stark’s treating physician

that she always will have neuropathic leg pain, which could 

account for her complaints of pain, or her degenerative disc 

disease, which could account for her pain progressively

worsening. Even if the ALJ thought that the objective evidence was insufficient, pain alone can be disabling, Carradine 

v. Barnhart, 360 F.3d 751, 753 (7th Cir. 2004), and Stark testified that she is limited by her pain. Testimony of severe pain 

cannot be disregarded simply because it is not supported by 

objective medical evidence. See Hall v. Colvin, 778 F.3d 688, 

691 (7th Cir. 2015); Pierce v. Colvin, 739 F.3d 1046, 1049–50 

(7th Cir. 2014) (“Pain can be severe to the point of being disabling even though no physical cause can be identified ...”). 

Stark’s persistence in struggling through household 

chores despite her pain does not mean, as the ALJ extrapolated, that she can manage the requirements of the work-
No. 15-2352 7

place. See Spiva v. Astrue, 628 F.3d 346, 352 (7th Cir. 2010); 

see also Engstrand v. Colvin, 788 F.3d 655, 661 (7th Cir. 2015). 

We have repeatedly rejected that reasoning as “naïve,” 

see Hughes v. Astrue, 705 F.3d 276, 278 (7th Cir. 2013), because 

a person performing chores has flexibility in scheduling, can 

receive help, and is not held to a minimum standard of performance, unlike an employee. See Bjornson v. Astrue, 

671 F.3d 640, 647 (7th Cir. 2012). 

And Stark’s need for frequent breaks is not consistent 

with light work activity, also contrary to the ALJ’s finding. 

See, e.g., Roddy v. Astrue, 705 F.3d 631, 639 (7th Cir. 2013) 

(criticizing ALJ’s reliance on claimant’s ability to perform 

household tasks because inability to get through the day 

without lying down every hour does not indicate ability to 

work even sedentary job). Stark testified that she presently 

requires long breaks between tasks, uses extra time to complete short tasks, and experiences immobilizing pain for a 

full day after holding her 7-pound grandson. But the ALJ 

arrived at an RFC that presumes that Stark could take only 

two fifteen-minute breaks daily, perform tasks 85% of the 

time, and frequently lift 10 pounds. Thus Stark’s testimony 

reflects that she cannot do her past job. 

Stark’s second challenge to the adverse credibility finding rests on the ALJ’s use of language that this court routinely has condemned as “meaningless boilerplate” and “backwards” analysis. See Bjornson, 671 F.3d at 645; Martinez v. 

Astrue, 630 F.3d 693, 696 (7th Cir. 2011); Parker v. Astrue, 

597 F.3d 920, 921–22 (7th Cir. 2010). The ALJ used boilerplate 

language to find that Stark’s “medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged 

symptoms,” but her “statements concerning the intensity, 
8 No. 15-2352

persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not 

entirely credible.” Use of boilerplate is not automatically 

ground for remand, see Murphy v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 811, 816 

(7th Cir. 2014), but it captures a deeper problem in the ALJ’s 

analysis: the ALJ based her credibility finding on her finding

about Stark’s ability to work, but a proper assessment requires the reverse. A finding about Stark’s ability to work 

depends on the credibility of her statements about severe 

pain. See Bjornson, 671 F.3d at 645. The ALJ first assessed 

Stark’s residual functional capacity with postural, carry and 

lift, and stand and walk restrictions that the ALJ opined 

would accommodate Stark’s chronic back pain. And only 

then did the ALJ assess and discredit Stark’s testimony about 

her extreme back pain and inability to sit for extensive periods.

Stark’s third challenge to the credibility finding rests on 

the ALJ’s disregard for her work history. Stark points out 

that she had a long, steady work history, and that she earned 

a much greater monthly income (and presumably other benefits like health insurance) while working than the payment 

benefits she would receive under disability. This work history, says Stark, shows that she is not a malingerer; she suffered through pain and operations to continue working and 

earning a good income. Although not mentioned, we could 

probably assume that she also received the benefits of good 

medical benefits at GM.

An ALJ is not statutorily required to consider a claimant’s work history, but “a ‘claimant with a good work record 

is entitled to substantial credibility when claiming an inability to work because of a disability.’” Hill v. Colvin, 807 F.3d 

862, 868 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting Rivera v. Schweiker, 717 F.2d 
No. 15-2352 9

719, 725 (2d Cir. 1983)). In assessing Stark’s credibility about 

the disabling effects of her pain, the ALJ should have 

acknowledged Stark’s efforts to continue work while experiencing significant pain and undergoing numerous surgeries 

and other treatments to relieve it. See Pierce, 739 F.3d at 1051 

(criticizing ALJ for failing to consider claimant’s “dogged 

efforts” to work in deciding claimant’s credibility); Flores v. 

Massanari, 19 F. App’x 393, 404 (7th Cir. 2001) (criticizing 

ALJ for failing to acknowledge claimant’s solid work history 

of 13 years).

III. CONCLUSION

We REVERSE the district court’s judgment and 

REMAND this case to the Commissioner for further proceedings.