NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential. 

United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 

2008-3070 

JOEL THOMAS STEINMETZ, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, 

 Respondent. 

Joel T. Steinmetz, of Bozeman, Montana, pro se. 

Richard P. Schroeder, Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil 

Division, United States Department of Justice, of Washington, DC, for respondent. With 

him on the brief were Jeffrey S. Bucholtz, Acting Assistant Attorney General; Jeanne E. 

Davidson, Director; and Brian M. Simkin, Assistant Director. 

Appealed from: Merit Systems Protection Board 
NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential. 

United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 

2008-3070 

JOEL THOMAS STEINMETZ, 

 Petitioner, 

v. 

UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, 

 Respondent. 

Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection Board in DE0353050429-I-1. 

__________________________ 

DECIDED: July 10, 2008 

 __________________________ 

PER CURIAM. 

Mr. Joel Thomas Steinmetz petitions this court for review of a decision of the 

Merit Systems Protection Board (“Board”) dismissing his appeal on the merits and 

finding that the Postal Service did not violate his restoration rights. Steinmetz v. U.S

Postal Serv., 106 M.S.P.R. 277 (July 20, 2007). We affirm. 

BACKGROUND 

Mr. Steinmetz is a former Parcel Post Distribution Clerk who sustained an on-thejob injury and began receiving Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (“OWCP”) 

benefits effective August 24, 1998. On May 18, 1999, the Postal Service offered him an 

OWCP-approved rehabilitation position, which he accepted on July 22, 1999. Effective 

July 24, 1999, prior to reporting to his new position, the agency placed him on 
administrative leave. His OWCP benefits were suspended for approximately one month 

while he was on administrative leave. On August 25, 1999, the agency withdrew the 

OWCP-approved rehabilitation position offer. The agency resumed paying OWCP 

benefits to Steinmetz after his administrative leave ended on August 27, 1999. 

On July 11, 2005, OWCP terminated his benefits upon finding that he was fully 

recovered from his injury and able to perform the duties of his former position or an 

equivalent position. Thereafter, the agency offered him restoration under 5 C.F.R. 

§ 353.301(b) as an employee who had fully recovered more than one year from the date 

his OWCP benefits eligibility began. He did not, however, accept this offer before it 

expired. Instead, he maintained that he was entitled to restoration under 5 C.F.R. 

§ 353.301(a) as an employee who fully recovered within one year from the date his 

OWCP benefits eligibility began. 

Mr. Steinmetz filed an appeal claiming that he was entitled to restoration under 5 

C.F.R. § 353.301(a). After holding a hearing, the administrative judge dismissed Mr. 

Steinmetz’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Thereafter, the full Board reopened the case 

on its own motion under 5 C.F.R. § 1201.118, reversed the jurisdictional dismissal, and 

dismissed the appeal on the merits. This petition for review followed. 

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9). 

DISCUSSION 

We must affirm the Board’s decision unless we find it to be: “(1) arbitrary, 

capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (2) obtained 

without procedures required by law, rule, or regulation having been followed; or (3) 

unsupported by substantial evidence.” 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c); Walls v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 

2008-3070 2
29 F.3d 1578, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1994). “Under this standard, we will reverse the MSPB’s 

decision if it is not supported by ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might 

accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Haebe v. Dep’t of Justice, 288 F.3d 

1288, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). 

On appeal, it appears that Mr. Steinmetz’s principle argument is that the 

administrative judge and/or the Board already determined that he fully recovered in 

1999 within the one year period required for restoration under 5 C.F.R. § 353.301(a). 

Based on the record, this assertion is incorrect. In fact, both the administrative judge 

and the full Board concluded that he did not show that he fully recovered within one 

year. 

To the extent that Mr. Steinmetz is challenging whether substantial evidence 

supported that conclusion, he appears to argue that the rehabilitation position offer and 

the one month suspension of his OWCP benefits while he was on administrative leave 

show that he fully recovered within one year. The Board considered and rejected this 

argument, noting that OWCP restarted his wage-loss compensation payments after his 

administrative leave ended. The Board also noted that the administrative judge credited 

the testimony of a witness who stated that rehabilitation positions are not offered to fully 

recovered employees, that it is common for benefits to be temporarily suspended for 

employees in temporary pay status, and that employees are not considered fully 

recovered until a notice is issued indicating that compensation will cease based on full 

recovery. The Board further noted that the administrative judge found that Mr. 

Steinmetz failed to present any documentation showing that the temporary suspension 

of his benefits was based on his alleged full recovery. 

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2008-3070 4

Moreover, the Board considered letters written within the relevant timeframe 

indicating that Mr. Steinmetz was not fully recovered within a year. It considered a May 

24, 1999 letter from OWCP, which indicated that OWCP did not consider Mr. Steinmetz 

to be fully recovered at that time and quoted 5 U.S.C. § 8106(c)(2) governing partial 

disability. Additionally, the Board considered a June 21, 1999 letter written by a 

psychologist and forwarded to the OWCP stating that Mr. Steinmetz presented “a high 

potential for violent acting-out” and that he should not return to work for the agency. 

Steinmetz, 106 M.S.P.R. at 281. Further, it considered a June 22, 1999 letter from Mr. 

Steinmetz informing the agency that he agreed with the psychologist that he should not 

return to work for the agency. In light of the foregoing, we conclude that substantial 

evidence supports the Board’s determination that Mr. Steinmetz failed to show that he 

fully recovered within a year. 

Finally, Mr. Steinmetz cites several cases and statutory and regulatory provisions 

that he claims favor his position on appeal. We have considered the cited cases and 

provisions, however, and we conclude that they do not support his claim that the Board 

applied the wrong law in determining that the agency did not violate his restoration 

rights. 

For the aforementioned reasons, we affirm the decision of the Board. 

COSTS 

Each party shall bear its own costs.