alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-1649

WILLIAM SCOTT DAVIS, II; BABY J.F.D., c/o William S. 

Davis, II; ESTATE OF WILLIAM SCOTT DAVIS, SR., Deceased,

Plaintiffs - Appellants,

v.

ALBERT J. SINGER; WAKE COUNTY GOVERNMENT; DANIELLE DOYLE; 

SYDNEY J. BATCH; BATCH, POORE & WILLIAMS; MICHELE JAWORSKI 

SUAREZ; MELANIE A. SHEKITA; MICHELLE SAVAGE; ERIC CRAIG 

CHASSE; LISA SELLERS; CHARLOTTE MITCHELL; WENDY KIRWAN; 

SONJI CARLTON; NANCEY BERSON; SUSAN GARVEY, Doctor; ROBERT 

B. RADAR; MARGARET EAGLES; RICHARD CROUTHARMEL,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Newport News. Rebecca Beach Smith,

Chief District Judge. (4:13-cv-00007-RBS-DEM)

Submitted: June 20, 2013 Decided: June 25, 2013

Before GREGORY, DUNCAN, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

William Scott Davis, II, Appellant Pro Se. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

William Scott Davis seeks to appeal the district 

court’s order denying his motion for an order to file exhibits 

under seal, motions to appoint counsel, and motions for a 

preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. This 

court may exercise jurisdiction only over final orders, 28 

U.S.C. § 1291 (2006), and certain interlocutory and collateral 

orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (2006); Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); Cohen v. 

Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545-46 (1949). The 

order Davis seeks to appeal is neither a final order nor an 

appealable interlocutory or collateral order. Accordingly, we 

dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. We deny Davis’ 

motion for the appointment of counsel. We dispense with oral 

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately 

presented in the materials before this court and argument would 

not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
AFFIRM; and Opinion Filed November 30, 2015.

In The

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-15-00089-CR

No. 05-15-00090-CR

DEREK LYNN JEFFERY, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 265th Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause Nos. F14-16488-R, F14-75920-R

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Bridges, Lang-Miers, and Schenck

Opinion by Justice Lang-Miers

Derek Lynn Jeffery waived a jury and pleaded guilty to indecency with a child and 

failure to register as a sex offender. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.11(a)(2) (West 2011); 

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 62.102(a) (West Supp. 2015). The trial court sentenced 

appellant to eight years’ imprisonment on the indecency with a child and two years’ confinement 

in a state jail on the failure to register as a sex offender. On appeal, appellant’s attorney filed a 

brief in which she concludes the appeals are wholly frivolous and without merit. The brief meets 

the requirements of Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). The brief presents a professional 
-2-

evaluation of the record showing why, in effect, there are no arguable grounds to advance. See 

High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 811–12 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978). Counsel delivered a

copy of the brief to appellant. We advised appellant of his right to file a pro se response, but he 

did not file a pro se response. See Kelly v. State, 436 S.W.3d 313, 319–21 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2014) (identifying duties of appellate courts and counsel in Anders cases).

We have reviewed the record and counsel’s brief. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 

826–27 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (explaining appellate court’s duty in Anders cases). We agree 

the appeals are frivolous and without merit. We find nothing in the record that might arguably 

support the appeals.

We affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Do Not Publish

TEX. R. APP. P. 47

150089F.U05

/Elizabeth Lang-Miers/

ELIZABETH LANG-MIERS

JUSTICE
-3-

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

JUDGMENT

DEREK LYNN JEFFERY, Appellant 

No. 05-15-00089-CR V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

Appeal from the 265th Judicial District 

Court of Dallas County, Texas (Tr.Ct.No. 

F14-16488-R).

Opinion delivered by Justice Lang-Miers, 

Justices Bridges and Schenck participating.

Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the trial court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.

Judgment entered November 30, 2015.
-4-

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

JUDGMENT

DEREK LYNN JEFFERY, Appellant 

No. 05-15-00090-CR V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

Appeal from the 265th Judicial District 

Court of Dallas County, Texas (Tr.Ct.No. 

F14-75920-R).

Opinion delivered by Justice Lang-Miers, 

Justices Bridges and Schenck participating.

Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the trial court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.

Judgment entered November 30, 2015.
#### EXCHANGE BANK, a Banking Corporation, Appellant, v. STROUT REALTY, Respondent.

No. 9122

March 2, 1978

575 P.2d 589

*Carl F.*Martillan>, Carson City, for Appellant.

*Crowell, Crowell & Crowell,*Carson City, for Respondent.

OPINION

*Per Curiam:*

This case evolves from a case previously decided by this Court. *See,*Ivanhoe, Inc. v. Strout Realty, 90 Nev. 380, 528 P.2d 700 (1974). Before us then was the issue of a broker’s fee under a “net” real estate listing agreement between those parties.

Although this Court eventually found Ivanhoe not obligated to Strout in any manner, Ivanhoe nevertheless, prior to that litigation and as a condition of sale, had requested the third party purchaser Carrington to make some fee arrangement with Strout. Strout and Carrington had already entered into an *87agreement obligating Carrington to pay a fee of $5,000 should Carrington purchase the Ivanhoe property brought to his attention by Strout.

Carrington tendered a check in that amount which was retained by Strout’s former attorney pending conclusion of the litigation in *Ivanhoe.*At the conclusion of that litigation, Strout deposited the check. In due course, the check was honored by appellant Exchange Bank which had maintained the Carrington account upon which the draft was drawn. That particular account, however, had been closed for several months, and appellant through inadvertence debited another account of Carrington’s. Approximately five months after final payment had been made on the check, appellant made demand upon respondent for the return of the money. Respondent refused and litigation subsequently ensued for alleged unjust enrichment. Both parties moved for summary judgment, and after the district court granted judgment in favor of Strout, Exchange Bank initiated this appeal.

The sole question before us is whether the district court properly entered summary judgment in behalf of respondent.

Here, both parties moved for summary judgment pursuant to NRCP 56 and alleged that there was no genuine issue of fact to be decided. On appeal, appellant alleges that indeed an issue of fact exists relating to the alleged bad faith of respondent. Below, although respondent filed a relevant affidavit in support of its motion, appellant failed to file either affidavits, pleadings, or other papers alleging bad faith on the part of respondent, and there is nothing in the record whatsoever in support of its motion. *See,*NRCP 56(e). It is well settled that on cross motions for summary judgments the trial court may enter judgment on an issue of law alone and that the moving party may not alter its position on appeal. State ex rel. Welfare v. Capital Convalescent, 92 Nev. 147, 547 P.2d 677 (1976); City of Las Vegas v. Cragin Industries, 86 Nev. 933, 478 P.2d 585 (1970); *see also,*Garrett Freightlines, Inc. v. United States, 236 F.Supp. 594 (D.C. Idaho 1964). In the instant case, there was no indication that respondent acted in bad faith or in breach of warranty, and the trial court thus properly entered summary judgment upholding the finality of payment. NRS 104.3418.

The lower court’s order granting summary judgment to respondent is affirmed.
November 10, 2015

JUDGMENT

The Fourteenth Court of Appeals

LAKESHA EMERSON, Appellant

NO. 14-15-00797-CV V.

PARKWAY RANCH LTD, Appellee

________________________________

Today the Court heard its own motion to dismiss the appeal from the 

judgment signed by the court below on September 2, 2015. Having considered the 

motion and found it meritorious, we order the appeal DISMISSED.

We further order that all costs incurred by reason of this appeal be paid by 

appellant, LaKesha Emerson.

We further order this decision certified below for observance.
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Department of Labor

###### Mine Safety and Health Administration 

          - [Docket No. M-2005-071-C] 

The following parties have filed petitions to modify the application of existing safety standards under section 101(c) of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977. 

## 1. Kennecott Energy Company 

Kennecott Energy Company, 748 T-7 Road (82718), P.O. Box 1449, Gillette, Wyoming 82717-1449 has filed a petition to modify the application of 30 CFR 77.803 (Fail safe ground check circuits on high-voltage resistance grounded systems) to its Cordero-Rojo Mine (MSHA I.D. No. 48-00992), Jacobs Ranch Mine (MSHA I.D. No. 48-00997) located in Campbell County, Wyoming; Antelope Mine (MSHA I.D. No. 48-01337) located in Converse County, Wyoming; Spring Creek Mine (I.D. No. 24-01457) located in Bighorn County, Montana; and Colowyo Coal Mine (MSHA I.D. No. 05-02962) located in Moffat County, Colorado. The petitioner requests a modification of the existing standard to permit an alternative method of compliance when the boom/mast is raised or lowered during necessary repairs. The petitioner has listed specific procedures in this petition that will be followed when the alternative method is implemented. The petitioner asserts that the proposed alternative method would provide at least the same measure of protection as the existing standard. 

## Request for Comments 

                    Persons interested in these petitions are encouraged to submit comments via E-mail:                     *zzMSHA-Comments@dol.gov*; Fax: (202) 693-9441; or Regular Mail/Hand Delivery/Courier: Mine Safety and Health Administration, Office of Standards, Regulations, and Variances, 1100 Wilson Boulevard, Room 2350, Arlington, Virginia 22209. All comments must be postmarked or received in that office on or before December 2, 2005. Copies of these petitions are available for inspection at that address.                 

      ( print page 66470)    
Dated at Arlington, Virginia this 27th day of October 2005. 

Rebecca J. Smith, 

Acting Director, Office of Standards, Regulations, and Variances. 

[FR Doc. 05-21847 Filed 11-1-05; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4510-43-P
[Federal Register Volume 70, Number 212 (Thursday, November 3, 2005)]
[Notices]
[Page 66903]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 05-21890]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS


National Research Advisory Council; Cancellation of Meeting

    The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) gives notice under Public 
Law 92-463 (Federal Advisory Committee Act) that the National Research 
Advisory Council meeting scheduled for Tuesday, November 8, 2005, at 
the Hamilton Crowne Plaza Hotel, 14th & K Streets, NW., Washington, DC, 
has been cancelled.
    Any member of the public wishing further information should contact 
Ms. Karen Scott, Designated Federal Officer, at (202) 254-0200, or 
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#94fff5e6f1fabae7f7fbe0e0d4fce5baf9f1f0bae2f5baf3fbe2"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="563d37243338782535392222163e27783b333278203778313920">[email protected]</span></a>. She can also be reached by writing to Ms. 
Scott at Department of Veterans Affairs, Office of Research and 
Development (12C), 810 Vermont Ave, NW., Washington, DC 20420.

    Dated: October 27, 2005.

    By Direction of the Secretary.
E. Philip Riggin,
Committee Management Officer.
[FR Doc. 05-21890 Filed 11-2-05; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8320-01-M


</pre><script data-cfasync="false" src="/cdn-cgi/scripts/5c5dd728/cloudflare-static/email-decode.min.js"></script></body>
</html>
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

FRANCIS G. LANDMESSER,

Petitioner

v.

OFFICE OF LUZERNE COUNTY DISTRICT 

ATTORNEY,

Respondent

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 569 MAL 2019

Petition for Allowance of Appeal 

from the Order of the 

Commonwealth Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 3rd day of March, 2020, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is 

DENIED.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JORGE CUEVAS-MORENO,

 Petitioner,

 v.

ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General,

 Respondent.

No. 10-71374

Agency No. A035-237-425

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Argued and Submitted October 15, 2012. 

 Submission Vacated April 16, 2013. 

Resubmitted for Decision September 4, 2013.

San Francisco, California

Before: HAWKINS, M. SMITH, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.

Jorge Cuevas-Moreno challenges an order of the Board of Immigration

Appeals affirming the Immigration Judge’s determination that he was convicted of

an aggravated felony and is therefore ineligible for cancellation of removal. 

FILED

SEP 11 2013

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

 * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Cuevas-Moreno was convicted of a crime of domestic violence that renders him

removable, but because he was only sentenced to 31 days, that crime is not an

aggravated felony, which would bar his application for cancellation of removal. 

See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) (crime of violence is an aggravated felony only if

the term of imprisonment is at least one year).

In addition the record contains an abstract of judgment indicating that

Cuevas-Moreno was also convicted of violating California Penal Code § 487(a),

which criminalizes the taking of “money, labor, or real or personal property.” That

statute is overbroad, which means that some convictions under the statute are

aggravated felonies, but others are not. Ramirez-Villalpando v. Holder, 645 F.3d

1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2011). The parties dispute whether, under the modified

categorical approach, we may consider the criminal complaint that indicates

Cuevas-Moreno was charged with stealing personal property, conduct that would

constitute an aggravated felony category. See id. at 1039 (stating that § 487(a) is

overbroad because the theft of labor is not an aggravated felony).

We need not resolve this dispute, however, because even without

considering the complaint, “the evidence indicates that one or more of the grounds

for mandatory denial of the application for relief may apply” and therefore, to

obtain cancellation of removal Cuevas-Moreno “[has] the burden of proving by a

-2-
preponderance of the evidence that such grounds do not apply.” 8 C.F.R. §

1240.8(d); Young v. Holder, 697 F.3d 976, 988–990 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc). 

Cuevas-Moreno argues that the record does not “conclusively establish” that he

was convicted of an aggravated felony. Even if that is true, the record is at best

inconclusive and Cuevas-Moreno “cannot carry the burden of demonstrating

eligibility for cancellation of removal by establishing an inconclusive record of

conviction.” Young, 697 F.3d at 990.

PETITION DENIED.

-3-
**Exhibit 10.15**

 

**Independent Auditor’s Report**

 

To the Shareholders and Board of Directors of 

Anthony & Sylvan Pools Corporation and Subsidiaries 

Mayfield Village, Ohio 

 

We haveaudited the consolidated financial statements of Anthony & Sylvan Pools Corporation and Subsidiaries (the “Corporation”) for the year ended December 31, 2000 (prior to reclassification for discontinued operations discussed in Note 3 tothe consolidated financial statements), not presented herein, and have issued our report thereon dated March 28, 2001; such report is included elsewhere in this Form 10-K. Our audit also included the consolidated financial statement schedule ofAnthony & Sylvan Pools Corporation and Subsidiaries, listed in Item 15 (prior to reclassification for discontinued operations discussed in Note 3 to the consolidated financial statements), not presented herein. This consolidated financialstatement schedule is the responsibility of the Corporation’s management. Our responsibility is to express an opinion based on our audit. In our opinion, such consolidated financial statement schedule (prior to reclassification for discontinuedoperations discussed in Note 3 to the consolidated financial statements), when considered in relation to the basic consolidated financial statements taken as a whole, present fairly in all material respects the information set forth therein.

 

 

Deloitte & Touche LLP 

Cleveland, Ohio 

March 28, 2001
```

                                                                    EXHIBIT 32

                          CERTIFICATIONS PURSUANT TO
                        SECTION 1350 OF CHAPTER 63 OF
                      TITLE 18 OF THE UNITED STATES CODE

In connection  with the  Quarterly  Report of Navistar  Financial  Corporation
(the   "Corporation"),   subsidiary   of   International   Truck  and   Engine
Corporation,  on Form 10-Q for the period  ended  April 30, 2004 as filed with
the Securities and Exchange  Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"),  I,
Pamela  Turbeville,  Principal  Executive  Officer and I, Andrew J.  Cederoth,
Principal  Financial  Officer  of the  Corporation,  certify,  pursuant  to 18
U.S.C. § 1350,  as  adopted  pursuant  to § 906 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of
2002, that:

(1)   The Report fully  complies  with the  requirements  of Section  13(a) or
      15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)   The  information  contained  in  the  Report  fairly  presents,  in  all
      material respects,  the  financial  condition  and results of operations
      of the Corporation.

/s/ Pamela Turbeville
    Pamela Turbeville
    Principal Executive Officer
    June 9, 2004

/s/ Andrew J. Cederoth
    Andrew J. Cederoth
    Principal Financial Officer
    June 9, 2004

This   certification   accompanies  the   Report  pursuant  to  § 906 of   the
Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of 2002 and shall not be deemed  filed by the  Company for
purposes of Section 18 of the Securities  Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, or
otherwise subject to the liability of that section.  This certification  shall
also not be deemed to be  incorporated  by reference into any filing under the
Securities Act of 1933, as amended,  or the  Securities  Exchange Act of 1934,
as amended,  except to the extent that the Company  specifically  incorporates
it by reference.
```
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM JOSTENS,
INC. CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AS OF AND FOR THE NINE MONTH
PERIOD ENDED MARCH 31, 1996, AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO
SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<RESTATED>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUN-30-1996
<PERIOD-START>                             JUL-01-1995
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1996
<CASH>                                               0
<SECURITIES>                                     3,569
<RECEIVABLES>                                  141,544
<ALLOWANCES>                                   (9,148)
<INVENTORY>                                    142,236
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               325,215
<PP&E>                                         192,850
<DEPRECIATION>                               (124,461)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 464,943
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          335,334
<BONDS>                                          3,732
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        12,883
<OTHER-SE>                                      96,194
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   464,943
<SALES>                                        405,396
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               405,396
<CGS>                                          180,283
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  180,283
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               184,041
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                 1,715
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               5,040
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 36,032
<INCOME-TAX>                                    14,773
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             21,259
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    21,259
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .53
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .52
        

</TABLE>
**CERTIFICATION      OF PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICER PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350 AS ADOPTED      PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

|   | • | the                Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB/A of the Company for the quarter                ended                June 30, 2005, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission                (the                “Report”), fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)                of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and |
|--------|---------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | • | the                information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material                respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the                Company. |
|--------|---------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

----
STATE v. Angela Marie RANKIN

23A18-1

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

March 5, 2018

Sarah Holladay, Attorney at Law, for Rankin, Angela Marie.

Amy Bircher, Assistant Attorney General, Teresa M. Postell, Assistant Attorney General, J. Douglas Henderson, District Attorney, for State of North Carolina.

The following order has been entered on the Motion for Extension of Time to File Brief filed on the 5th of March 2018 by Plaintiff-Appellant :

"Motion Allowed by order of the Court in conference, this the 5th of March 2018."

*607Plaintiff-Appellant shall have up to and including the 9th day of April 2018 to file and serve his/her brief with this Court.