REL: 10/31/2014

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SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA

OCTOBER TERM, 2014-2015

____________________

1131282

____________________

Ex parte Stanford Pritchett

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

(In re: Stanford Pritchett

v.

State of Alabama)

(Marengo Circuit Court, CC-7-112;

Court of Criminal Appeals, CR-13-0438)

STUART, Justice.
1131282

WRIT DENIED. NO OPINION.

Bolin, Parker, Shaw, Wise, and Bryan, JJ., concur.

Moore, C.J., dissents.

Main, J., recuses himself.*

*Justice Main was a member of the Court of Criminal

Appeals when that court considered an earlier appeal in this

case.

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MOORE, Chief Justice (dissenting).

The trial court in this case denied Stanford Pritchett's

motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Because, in my view, the

Court of Criminal Appeals' unpublished memorandum affirming

the trial court's judgment, Pritchett v. State (No. CR-13-

0438, June 6, 2014), ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. Crim. App. 2014)

(table), conflicts with the Alabama Rules of Criminal

Procedure and with our precedent on the requirements for a

guilty-plea colloquy, I respectfully dissent from the denial

of Pritchett's petition for a writ of certiorari.

Facts

Pritchett was charged with murder made capital because it

was committed by shooting into a vehicle; he pleaded guilty to

a lesser-included charge of murder and agreed to a negotiated

sentence of 23 years. During his plea hearing the trial judge

did not mention or review the explanation-of-rights form with

Pritchett or ask if he understood the rights he was waiving by

pleading guilty (except for the right to appeal). The trial

judge also did not review with Pritchett the maximum sentence

or minimum sentence for the crime to which he was pleading

guilty. The "Request for Guilty Plea" form Pritchett submitted

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listed the sentencing range for the offense of murder as being

from 10 to 99 years' imprisonment or life imprisonment. In

fact, the range was 20 to 99 years' imprisonment because of an

applicable firearm enhancement. § 13A-5-6(a)(4), Ala. Code

1975.

Acting pro se, Pritchett moved to withdraw his guilty

plea. The trial court denied his motion. The Court of Criminal

Appeals affirmed its denial by an unpublished memorandum.

Pritchett v. State (No. CR-09-1050, Dec. 3, 2010), 92 So. 3d

816 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010) (table). This Court reversed the

Court of Criminal Appeals' judgment on the ground that

Pritchett was not represented by counsel in the proceedings on

his motion for withdrawal of the plea. Ex parte Pritchett, 117

So. 3d 356 (Ala. 2012). On remand, the trial court held a

hearing during which Pritchett's counsel raised the issue of

the court's failure to discuss with Pritchett the

minimum/maximum sentencing range. The trial court again denied

Pritchett's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The Court of

Criminal Appeals again affirmed, by unpublished memorandum,

and Pritchett petitioned this Court for certiorari review. 

Discussion

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Explaining its most recent affirmance of the denial of

Pritchett's motion to withdraw his guilty plea, the Court of

Criminal Appeals stated in its unpublished memorandum:

"Pritchett filed in the circuit court a request to enter a

guilty plea, which he and his attorneys signed, that clearly

states the sentencing range for murder. Further, Pritchett

pleaded guilty pursuant to a negotiated agreement and received

the sentence upon which he agreed." Neither of these reasons

is persuasive. 

"What is at stake for an accused facing death or

imprisonment demands the utmost solicitude of which courts are

capable in canvassing the matter with the accused to make sure

he has a full understanding of what the plea connotes and of

its consequence." Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243-44

(1969). Drawing on Boykin, this Court has held that "a

defendant, prior to pleading guilty, must be advised on the

record of the maximum and minimum potential punishment for his

crime." Carter v. State, 291 Ala. 83, 85, 277 So. 2d 896, 898

(1973) (emphasis added). Although at one time the Court of

Criminal Appeals noted that the submission of "a written

explanation of rights signed by appellant was more than

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adequate to satisfy the requirements of Boykin," Ireland v.

State, 47 Ala. App. 65, 66, 250 So. 2d 602, 603 (Ala. Crim.

App. 1971), "a signed Ireland form is, alone, insufficient to

establish the voluntariness of a plea." Waddle v. State, 784

So. 2d 367, 370 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000). 

Effective January 1, 1991, the Alabama Supreme Court

adopted the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure. Rule 14.4 of

those Rules reads as follows, in pertinent part:

"In all other cases [i.e., cases other than minormisdemeanor cases], except where the defendant is a

corporation or an association, the court shall not

accept a plea of guilty without first addressing the

defendant personally in the presence of counsel in

open court for the purposes of:

"(1) Ascertaining that the defendant has a full

understanding of what a plea of guilty means and its

consequences, by informing the defendant of and

determining that the defendant understands:

"(i) The nature of the charge and the

material elements of the offense to which

the plea is offered;

"(ii) The mandatory minimum penalty,

if any, and the maximum possible penalty

provided by law, including any enhanced

sentencing provisions ...."

Rule 14.4(a), Ala. R. Crim. P. (emphasis added).

"The court may comply with the requirements of Rule

14.4(a) by determining from a personal colloquy with

the defendant that the defendant has read, or has

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had read to the defendant, and understands each item

contained in Form C-44B, CR-51, CR-52, or Form

C-44A, as the case may be."

Rule 14.4(d), Ala. R. Crim. P.

The trial court, though it engaged in a colloquy with

Pritchett, did not discuss with him the maximum and minimum

penalties for the crime of murder, nor did it mention or

discuss the CR-51 (Ireland) form that is used in non-habitualoffender felony cases. The "Request for Guilty Plea" form 1

introduced at the hearing on Pritchett's motion to withdraw

his guilty plea, and cited by the Court of Criminal Appeals,

is not one of the forms identified in Rule 14.4(d), Ala. R.

Crim. P., as acceptable for use in conjunction with a guiltyplea colloquy. In any event, that form contained incorrect

information and thus misinformed Pritchett that he faced a

minimum sentence of 10 years if convicted, rather than a

minimum sentence of 20 years. 

For a defendant's decision to plead guilty to be

intelligent and voluntary, the defendant must know the correct

The CR-51 form introduced into evidence at the hearing

1

on Pritchett's motion to withdraw his guilty plea was a blank

form with no particularized information written on it and no

signatures. According to the Court of Criminal Appeals, the

record of Pritchett's previous appeal contains an Ireland form 

indicating that the minimum sentence for murder is 10 years.

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minimum sentence he or she will face by pleading guilty. "When

an accused who pleads guilty does so on the basis of

misinformation as to the range of punishment the guilty plea

is involuntary." Handley v. State, 686 So. 2d 540, 541 (Ala.

Crim. App. 1996). Furthermore, the trial judge did not

personally address Pritchett regarding either the "Request for

Guilty Plea" form or Form CR-51 as Rule 14.4(d) requires. The

Committee Comments to Rule 14.4 state:

"Section (d) is included to accommodate the

current Alabama practice of informing the defendant

of his rights through a form similar to that

approved in Ireland v. State, 47 Ala. App. 65, 250

So. 2d 602 (1971), and subsequent cases. The rule,

however, specifically retains the requirement that

the trial judge ... specifically question the

defendant concerning the information contained in

each item. Thus, in every case, the record should

affirmatively show a colloquy between the trial

judge and the defendant concerning all such matters.

... This rule requires such a colloquy and requires

that specific inquiry be made with regard to the

rights set out in Rule 14.4(a)(1) and (2)."

(Emphasis added.)

The Court of Criminal Appeals' holding in its unpublished

memorandum in this case that the "Request for Guilty Plea"

form, standing alone, satisfied the requirement that the plea

be voluntary was negated as long ago as 1973 in Carter. Rule

14.4, in effect since 1991, embodies the principle that

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without a colloquy to review a true Ireland form stating all

the rights the defendant is forgoing by pleading guilty, a

guilty plea is not voluntary. Furthermore, the unsupported

statement of the Court of Criminal Appeals that the trial

court did not have to inform Pritchett of the minimum and

maximum sentences because he had agreed to a negotiated plea

finds no recognition in the Alabama Rules of Criminal

Procedure or in prior cases. Surely the information that the

minimum sentence, if the defendant is found guilty, is 20

years, as opposed to 10 years, is necessary for a defendant to

make a knowing and intelligent decision either to plead guilty

or to go to trial.2

Recently the Court of Criminal Appeals recognized this

principle in a case Pritchett cites frequently in his petition

for certiorari review. See Williams v. State, [Ms. CR-13-0436,

May 2, 2014] ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. Crim. App. 2014) (holding

The Court of Criminal Appeals also argued that Pritchett 2

did not object to the trial court's failure to inform him of

the firearm enhancement. This objection, however, is included

in Pritchett's objection to the failure to inform him of the

correct sentencing range. See Anderson v. State, 668 So. 2d

159, 159 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995) (equating a failure to inform

a defendant of a sentencing enhancement with a failure to

inform him of "the correct minimum and maximum possible

sentences he could receive").

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that a guilty plea was involuntary where the defendant was not

informed that a firearm enhancement would increase the minimum

sentence by 10 years). Because informing Pritchett of the

maximum and minimum possible sentences was "an absolute

constitutional prerequisite to acceptance of a guilty plea,"

Carter, 291 Ala. at 85, 277 So. 2d at 897, I believe

Pritchett's petition has merit. "The law in Alabama is clear

that the trial court's failure to correctly advise a defendant

of the minimum and maximum sentences before accepting his

guilty plea renders that guilty plea involuntary." White v.

State, 888 So. 2d 1288, 1290 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004). That the

sentence imposed (23 years) was within the legal range does

not control. "It does not matter that his sentence was legal.

'The accused's right to know the possible sentence he faces is

absolute.'" Bozeman v. State, 686 So. 2d 556, 559 (Ala. Crim.

App. 1996) (quoting Henry v. State, 639 So. 2d 583, 584 (Ala.

Crim. App. 1994)).

Conclusion

I would grant Pritchett's petition for a writ of

certiorari (1) to examine the apparent conflict between the

Court of Criminal Appeals' decision in this case and prior

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decisions and (2) to maintain uniformity in our cases applying

Rule 14.4.

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