Filed 7/9/14 In re Joseph M. CA2/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

In re JOSEPH M. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. B252127 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. CK98575)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.
JOSEPH M., SR.,
Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Lo s Angeles County. Emma Castro, Commissioner. Affirmed. Karen J. Dodd, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. John F. Krattli, County Counsel, James M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel, and Peter Ferrera, Principal Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

___________________ ___________________2 Minors Joseph (age 6), Andrew (age 5 ), Madilynn (age 3), and Autumn (age 21 months) were adjudged dependents of the juvenile court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subd ivision (b) (failure to protect). 1 Joseph M., Sr. (Father), appeals from the court’s September 24, 2013 order denying him a contested hearing on the issue of visitation. M.M. (Mother) is not a party to this appeal. We conclude the juvenile court did not deny Father due process by refusing him a contested hearing on the issue of visitation, as he had an adequate procedure available to him for protecting his interests, which the co urt brought to his attention. We affirm.
BACKGROUND The Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) sought jurisdiction over the minors due to reports of domestic violence perpetrated by Father on Mother. At a jurisdictional hearing on March 26, 2013, Fath er submitted a signed waiver of his rights. Father pleaded no contest to an amended section 300 petition. After mediation, Father and Mother agreed the minors would be placed in the care of Mother, “family maintenance services” to be pr ovided to Moth er, and “family reunification services” to be provided to Father. The juvenile court sustained the amende d petition, declared th e minors dependents of the court, placed the minors in the care of Mother, ordered DCFS to provide “Family Maintenance Services” to the “parents,” or dered Father to attend a DCFS-approved 52- week domestic violence program, plus paren ting classes, and orde red Father to have monitored visitation. Notwithstanding the plan agreed to by the par ties after mediation, the court did not order that family reunifi cation services be provided to Father. By June 25, 2013, Father had reported to DCFS that he had almost completed his 52-week domestic violence program and had pr ovided DCFS w ith a certificate indicating he had completed a parenting class. On th at date the juvenile court held a progress hearing. It ordered DCFS to meet and c onfer with Father to work out a visitation

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.3 schedule. The court ordered DCFS to provid e the “parents” with “Family Maintenance
Services.” It did not order “f amily reunification” services. On September 24, 2013, DCFS reported that the previously assigned caseworker had been unable to arrange vi sits with Father, that a new caseworker recently had been assigned, that she had attempted to contact Father without success, and that DCFS had
not had contact with him since the hearing on June 25, 2013 . No visitation schedule had been set up for Father and Fa ther had not seen the minors since they were detained.
DCFS recommended conti nued supervision. On September 24, 2013, the juvenile cour t held a hearing pursuant to section 364. 2 DCFS informed the court that transportation a ssistance had not been provided to Father because the previous caseworker was out on medical leave and the current caseworker just had been assigned on August 28, 2013 . The court ordered DCFS to provide the transportation assistance that the court had or dered previously. Father stated he was concerned about his services, had tried to contact the caseworker several times, and
wanted to cross-examine the caseworker. He requested a contested hearing on the issue of visitation and possibl y on DCFS’s failure to provide him with services. He argued that he had progressed far enough to receive unmonitored visitation. The juvenile court denied Father’s reque st for a contested hearing, but suggested Father file a section 388 petition. 3 The court stated that Father’s section 388 petition would be “liberally construed and possibly set for hearing.” The juvenile court stated that because th e minors had been released to Mother at the jurisdictional and dispositional hearing and Father had been offered “enhancement services” and not “family reunification services ,” he had “no right to contest this 364

2 A section 364 hearing is a hearing in which the juvenile court determines whether continued supervision of the minors is necessary and where the court reviews DCFS’s report describing the services offered to the family and the progress made by the family in eliminating the conditions or factors requiring c ourt supervision.

3 A section 388 petition permits the court to modify vis itation and other orders on proof of change of circumstances, such as completion of court-ordered domestic violence and parenting programs.4 hearing.” The court observed that Father had not previously been granted a minimum
number of visits and ordered hi m to have a minimum of two visits per week for up to two hours per visit. The court ordered DCFS to meet and confer with Father to ensure compliance with visitation orders and encourag ed Father to contac t the caseworker to
work out visitation. The court determined that continued jurisdiction was necessary
“because conditions continue to exist which justify the Court taki ng initial jurisdiction pursuant to [section] 300.” Father appealed.
DISCUSSION
Father contends he was de nied his right to due proce ss when the juvenile court
denied him a contested hear ing, allowing him to presen t evidence and cross-examine witnesses. We disagree. As the United States Supreme Court ha s recognized, the concept of due process cannot be defined with precision. ( Lassiter v. Department of Social Services (1981) 452 U.S. 18, 24 [101 S.Ct. 2153].) It is clear, however, that a pa rent is entitled to due process in dependency proceedings. “‘ Since the interest of a parent in the companionship, care, custody, and management of his children is a compelling one, ranked among the most basic of civil rights [citations], the state, befo re depriving a parent of this interest, must afford him adequate notice and an opport unity to be heard. [Citations.]’” ( In re Kelvin
M. (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 396, 402; In re Jennifer O. (2010) 184 Cal.Ap p.4th 539, 545.) Statutory procedures that are “carefully calculated to constrain judicial discretion, diminish the risk of erroneous findings . . . and otherwise protect the legitimate interests of the parents” protect a parent’s due process rights. ( Cynthia D. v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 242, 256.) One of the pr ocedures available in California dependency matters that is designed to protect a parent ’s due process rights is a petition filed under section 388. “A parent’s ability to file a section 388 petition provides an ‘escape
mechanism’ that lessens the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the parent-child relationship in the event of a legitimate ch ange in circumstances. [Citation.]” ( In re
Dakota M. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 224.)5 Father was in a position to avail himself of a section 388 petition. The juvenile court suggested he file such a petition and stated such a petition would be “liberally construed and possibly set for hearing.” Fath er’s claim that he was deprived of due process was, at best, premature, as he was given the opportunity to utilize the juvenile court’s “process” by means of a court procedur e designed to addre ss just the type of change of circumstances that Father had achie ved: That is his completion of a parenting class and, presumably, completion of a domes tic violence program as well. Filing a petition under section 388 mi ght well have resulted in unmonitored visitation and improvement in services provided to Father, or, at least, the cont ested hearing Father
wanted. Moreover, in establishing a visitation sc hedule and ordering DCFS to meet and confer with Father to ensure compliance w ith its visitation orders, and in admonishing DCFS to provide Father with the transportation services it had ordered earlier, the juvenile court did everything in its power to assist Father short of initiating contempt proceedings against DCFS on its own motion. Under these circumstances, Father has fa iled to establish th at a section 388 petition was inadequate to protect his rights or that he was deprived of due process. In light of the foregoing, we need not co nsider the parties’ arguments concerning any distinction between a parent’s due process rights wh en family maintenance or
enhancement services are or dered, as opposed to family reunification services.6 DISPOSITION The juvenile court’s Septem ber 24, 2013 order denying Jo seph M., Sr., a contested hearing is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

MILLER, J. *
We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, Acting P. J.

CHANEY, J.

* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Cour t assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.