DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

July Term 2014

A.H., a Child,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

No. 4D13-637

[November 5, 2014]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, 

Broward County; Michael Orlando, Judge; L.T. Case No. 12006278DL00B.

Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Ellen Griffin, Assistant Public 

Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Melanie Dale 

Surber, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

DAMOORGIAN, C.J.

A.H., a minor, appeals a juvenile disposition order adjudicating him 

delinquent for trespass of a conveyance and sentencing him to community 

service. A.H. argues that the trial court erroneously denied his motion for 

judgment of dismissal because the state failed to introduce sufficient 

evidence establishing a prima facie case of trespass of a conveyance. We 

agree and reverse.

By way of background, A.H. was charged with grand theft auto and 

resisting arrest without violence after A.H., who was riding as a passenger 

in a stolen vehicle, allegedly fled when police pulled over the vehicle. The 

matter proceeded to a bench trial where the state announced that it would 

proceed on the lesser included count of trespass of a conveyance rather 

than grand theft. The state presented the following evidence at trial.

A.H.’s co-defendant, also a passenger in the vehicle, testified that the 

driver of the vehicle told him that the vehicle was a rental. He also testified 

that he did not notice any signs of theft-type damage to the vehicle (e.g.,
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damage to the vehicle’s ignition column or locks/windows), which was 

corroborated by photos of the vehicle at the time it was recovered.

The officer who arrested A.H.’s co-defendant testified that on the date 

of the incident, he encountered the vehicle, ran its tag, and confirmed that 

it was reported stolen. As he and his partner approached the vehicle, its 

occupants jumped out and began to run. He observed A.H. fleeing after 

his partner commanded A.H. to stop.

After the state rested, A.H. moved for a judgment of dismissal, arguing 

that the state failed to submit any evidence that A.H. knew or should have 

known the vehicle was stolen. The court denied A.H.’s motion. 

A.H. testified in his own defense. He maintained that he did not flee

and complied with the officer’s commands. A.H. also maintained that he 

did not know the car was stolen as the driver told him it was his girlfriend’s 

car. 

Following his testimony, A.H. renewed his motion for judgment of 

dismissal, which the trial court again denied. A.H. was adjudicated 

delinquent on the trespass of a conveyance charge, but acquitted of the 

resisting charge. In rendering its decision, the trial court reasoned that 

“the facts of the case were as such that . . . he should have known the car 

was stolen.” This appeal now follows.

“Our review of the trial court’s denial of the motion for judgment of 

dismissal is de novo.” E.A.B. v. State, 851 So. 2d 308, 310 (Fla. 2d DCA 

2003). “The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the 

State, and if a rational trier of fact could find that the elements of the crime 

have been established beyond a reasonable doubt, sufficient evidence 

exists to sustain the conviction.” Id. “If the State did not present sufficient 

evidence to establish a prima facie case of the crime charged, then a 

judgment of dismissal is proper.” Id.

To support A.H.’s conviction for trespass of a conveyance, the state had 

to prove that A.H. “willfully entered or remained in a conveyance without 

being authorized, licensed or invited by the owner or a person authorized 

to give permission.” R.M. v. State, 763 So. 2d 1060, 1061 (Fla. 4th DCA 

1999); see also § 810.08, Fla. Stat. (2012). In the context of an alleged 

trespasser riding as a passenger in a stolen vehicle, the “willful” element 

requires the state to establish that the passenger knew or should have 

known that the vehicle was stolen. R.M., 763 So. 2d at 1062; E.A.B., 851 

So. 2d at 310. Evidence that a passenger in a stolen vehicle fled upon 
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interaction with law enforcement, standing alone, is not enough to meet 

this burden. R.M., 763 So. 2d at 1062; E.A.B., 851 So. 2d at 310.

The Second District’s decision in E.A.B. is instructive. There, the court

reversed a minor’s adjudication for trespass of a conveyance for riding as 

a passenger in a stolen vehicle. 851 So. 2d at 310. Although the minor 

fled from law enforcement when it attempted to stop the vehicle, the minor 

testified that he did not know the vehicle was stolen as the person driving 

the car told the minor it was his car. Id. Absent any other evidence 

regarding the minor’s knowledge that the vehicle was stolen, the court 

reversed. Id.

Here, there simply was no evidence tending to establish that A.H. knew 

or should have known the subject vehicle was stolen other than the fact 

that he fled when approached by law enforcement. There was no physical 

damage to the car indicating that it was stolen. See P.W. v. State, 730 So. 

2d 422, 423 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999) (evidence not sufficient to establish minor 

who was passenger in stolen car had knowledge car was stolen where 

minor claimed he did not know and there was no damage to the car’s 

ignition, stereo, or windows). Additionally, A.H. testified that he did not 

know the car was stolen, and so did his co-defendant. In sum, the only 

evidence tending to establish that A.H. knew the car was stolen was the

officer’s testimony that A.H. fled after being commanded to stop. While 

evidence of A.H.’s flight was admissible and relevant to establish guilt, this 

evidence alone was insufficient to establish the required element of the 

charge – that A.H. knew the vehicle was stolen. E.A.B., 851 So. 2d at 310.

Reversed.

CIKLIN and FORST, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.