United States Department of Labor

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

__________________________________________

M.V., Appellant

and

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, 

INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, 

Santa Clarita, CA, Employer

__________________________________________

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Docket No. 20-0397

Issued: September 8, 2022

Appearances: Case Submitted on the Record

Madison Goodman, Esq., for the appellant1

Office of Solicitor, for the Director

DECISION AND ORDER

Before:

ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Chief Judge

JANICE B. ASKIN, Judge

VALERIE D. EVANS-HARRELL, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION

On December 4, 20192 appellant, through counsel, filed a timely appeal from a June 10, 

2019 merit decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). Pursuant to the 

1

In all cases in which a representative has been authorized in a matter before the Board, no claim for a fee for legal 

or other service performed on appeal before the Board is valid unless approved by the Board. 20 C.F.R. § 501.9(e). 

No contract for a stipulated fee or on a contingent fee basis will be approved by the Board. Id. An attorney or 

representative’s collection of a fee without the Board’s approval may constitute a misdemeanor, subject to fine or 

imprisonment for up to one year or both. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 292. Demands for payment of fees to a 

representative, prior to approval by the Board, may be reported to appropriate authorities for investigation.

2 Under the Board’s Rules of Procedure, an appeal must be filed within 180 daysfrom the date of the last OWCP 

decision. An appeal is considered filed upon receipt by the Clerk of the Appellate Boards. See20 C.F.R. § 501.3(e)(f).

One hundred and eighty days from June 10, 2020, the date of OWCP’s last decision, was December 7, 2020. Since 

using December 10, 2020, the date the appeal was received by the Clerk of the Appellate Boards, would result in the 

loss of appeal rights, the date of the postmark is considered the date of filing. See 20 C.F.R. § 501.3(f)(1). As 

appellant’s appeal request was postmarked December 4, 2021, the appeal is, therefore, timely.
2

Federal Employees’ Compensation Act3(FECA) and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the Board 

has jurisdiction over the merits of this case.

ISSUE

The issue is whether appellant has met her burden of proof to establish that she sustained 

an emotional condition in the performance of duty, as alleged.

FACTUAL HISTORY

On November 1, 2017 appellant, then a 38-year-old internal revenue service agent, filed 

an occupational disease claim (Form CA-2) alleging that she developed an emotional condition 

and related symptoms, including fear, anxiety, insomnia, panic attacks and post-traumatic stress 

disorder (PTSD) due to factors of her federal employment. She explained that she was assaulted

by a taxpayer while in the performance of duty and begin to have flashbacks of the assault, which 

caused her emotional condition and related symptoms. Appellant noted that she first became aware 

of her condition and attributed it to her federal employment on October 10, 2017. She stopped 

work on October 11, 2017.

In a November 7, 2017 development letter, OWCP advised appellant of the deficiencies of 

her claim. It requested additional factual and medical evidence from appellant and provided a 

questionnaire for her completion. OWCP afforded 30 days for a response.

Appellant provided a November 13, 2017 narrative statement and described the events of 

Friday, July 17, 2015. She asserted that a taxpayer requested to speak to her manager, but that he 

was not available. However, appellant was available and he agreed to meet with her at a scheduled 

appointment. When the taxpayer arrived for the appointment, he called her from the employing 

establishment lobby and she went to greet him, when she noticed he was accompanied by a second 

man. After appellant greeted him, he called the other man by initials and instructed him to hand 

her a package. She informed the pair that she was not accepting anything and raised her hand to 

direct attention to the lobby cameras. Simultaneously, the taxpayer directed the other man to throw 

the package at appellant, who was seven months pregnant at the time. She saw the package coming 

at her and only had time to cover her stomach to protect herself before the package struck her arm. 

Appellant then ran into the interview room and the two men ran from the lobby. She informed her 

manager, who picked up the package and reviewed the contents. He informed appellant that the 

taxpayer was suing her. Appellant’s manager then directed her to photocopy the documents 

comprising the package without removing the staples, which took 45 minutes during which time 

she experienced movement in her stomach. A coworker asserted that her manager should have 

completed this task. Appellant concluded that over that weekend, following the incident, she was 

hospitalized due to preterm labor, and was prescribed bedrest, but delivered her infant prematurely.

Appellant also attributed her emotional condition to improper evaluation remarks, 

overriding her proposed adjustments without adequate reasoning, and putting her in unsafe 

situations including conducting a face-to-face meeting with an incarcerated taxpayer at the prison, 

but denying her request for a management escort. She also requested a transfer, which was denied.

3

5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.
3

On October 10, 2017 appellant saw her manager prior to a meeting with a taxpayer’s 

representative. During the meeting,she experienced a flashback to the events of July 17, 2015 and 

alleged that her manager had failed to protect her and to provide her with proper medical attention. 

Appellant asserted that she experienced a panic attack while driving back to the employing 

establishment following the meeting. She sought medical treatment and experienced a panic attack 

at the physician’s office as well as two days later during an interview with her psychiatrist.

Appellant alleged that, prior to the July 17, 2015 meeting, the taxpayer sent letters, which 

established that he was a threat to her and further noted that she was pregnant during this time. 

She asserted that, due to the untimely submission of a document, her donated leave was retracted 

and she was required to return to work.

On October 10, 2017 Dr. Mariam Milad Youssef Assaad, a Board-certified internist,found 

that appellant was temporarily totally disabled due to insomnia, family stress, and a stressful work 

schedule.

In a November 22, 2017 attending physician’s report (Form CA-20), Dr. Ching Lam, 

Board-certified in occupational medicine, diagnosed PTSD and described the July 17, 2015 

employment incident during which a taxpayer physically and emotionally threatened appellant and 

threw a package at her. He answered “Yes” to the question of whether his findings and diagnosis 

was consistent with her history of injury.

In a December 13, 2017 development letter, OWCP requested that the employing 

establishment provide comments from a knowledgeable supervisor on the accuracy of appellant’s 

statements. On January 3, 2018 her supervisor, C.L., was unable to recall that she was required to 

visit a prison for a taxpayer meeting. He acknowledged that appellant’s positions required audits 

or examinations including meetings with taxpayers or their representatives, reviews of documents, 

and determinations of whether the taxpayers paid the appropriate amount of taxes, which could be 

stressful. C.L. was unable to recall a time that she requested accommodation due to stress.

With regard to the July 17, 2015 meeting, C.L. denied that appellant requested his presence 

for the meeting, and asserted that the taxpayer left a package on the floor in the reception area. He 

went with her to pick up the package and she then explained what had taken place. C.L. opened 

the package and found documentation that the taxpayer was suing appellant. He called a Treasury 

Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA) special agent to determine if there were any 

criminal violations by the taxpayer. C.L. did instruct her to make copies of the documents. He 

did not recall that appellant reported that the taxpayer or his companion had thrown the package 

at her. C.L. reported that he was not aware that the package struck her arm. He instead reported 

that to the best of his recollection, based on the records that he reviewed, the taxpayer just dropped 

the package on the floor when appellant refused to accept it. C.L. noted that the special agent 

should have written documentation in the incident report.

By decision dated May 4, 2018, OWCP denied that appellant sustained an emotional 

condition claim in the performance of duty as she had not established that her condition arose 

during the course of employment and within the scope of compensable work factors. It found that 

she had not established error or abuse by the employing establishment in her evaluation or in 

denying her transfer request. OWCP further found that the October 10, 2017 panic attack was 
4

self-generated. It determined that appellant had not substantiated that a taxpayer threw a package 

at her on July 17, 2015.

On March 25, 2019 appellant, through counsel, requested reconsideration of the May 4, 

2018 decision. In support of this request, she provided a February 3, 2019 statement from a 

coworker, K.O., who reported that on July 17, 2015 she witnessed appellant making copies and 

she was shaking and appeared angry. Appellant informed her that she was being sued and that a 

taxpayer had thrown a package at her.

Dr. Elena Konstat, a licensed clinical psychologist, in a report of June 25, 2018, described 

the events of July 17, 2015 as related by appellant. She diagnosed adjustment disorder with mixed 

anxiety and depressed mood. Dr. Konstat opined that appellant’s employment caused and 

contributed to her diagnosed condition.

On April 29, 2019 M.T., appellant’s second-line supervisor, noted that C.L. did not recall 

the events in July 2015 having occurred as appellant described and was unaware that any violent 

activity had occurred. He did recall picking the package up from the floor. M.T reviewed 

appellant’s activity record and found no indication of violent activity. He noted that her activity 

record indicated that she did not accept the package, so the taxpayer told the other person to leave 

it on the floor. According to the activity record, appellant stayed inside the interview room and 

watched the other person leave the package on the floor and then leave the lobby. M.T. reported 

that the lawsuit had been dismissed on July 1, 2015 and the package contained expired documents.

By decision dated June 10, 2019, OWCP denied modification of its prior decision.

LEGAL PRECEDENT

An employee seeking benefits under FECA4 has the burden of proof to establish the 

essential elements of his or her claim, including the fact that the individual is an employee of the 

United States within the meaning of FECA, that the claim was filed within the applicable time 

limitation, that an injury was sustained while in the performance of duty as alleged, and that any 

disability or specific condition for which compensation is claimed is causally related to the 

employment injury.5 These are the essential elements of each and every compensation claim 

regardless of whether the claim is predicated on a traumatic injury or an occupational disease. 6

To establish an emotional condition in the performance of duty, a claimant must submit: 

(1) factual evidence identifying an employment factor or incident alleged to have caused or 

contributed to his or her claimed emotional condition; (2) medical evidence establishing that he or 

she has a diagnosed emotional or psychiatric disorder; and (3) rationalized medical opinion 

4

Supra note 2.

5 A.J., Docket No. 18-1116 (issued January 23, 2019); Gary J. Watling, 52 ECAB 278 (2001).

6

20 C.F.R. § 10.115(e); M.K.,Docket No. 18-1623 (issued April10, 2019); see T.O.,Docket No. 18-1012 (issued 

October 29, 2018); see Michael E. Smith, 50 ECAB 313 (1999).
5

evidence establishing that the accepted compensable employment factors are causally related to 

the diagnosed emotional condition.7

Workers compensation law does not apply to each and every injury or illness that is 

somehow related to an employee’s employment. In the case of Lillian Cutler,

8

the Board explained 

that there are distinctions as to the type of employment situations giving rise to a compensable 

emotional condition arising under FECA.9 There are situations where an injury or illness has some 

connection with the employment, but nevertheless does not come within the concept or coverage 

of workers’ compensation.

10

 When an employee experiences emotional stress in carrying out his 

or her employment duties and the medical evidence establishes that the disability resulted from an 

emotional reaction to such situation, the disability is generally regarded as due to an injury arising 

out of and in the course of employment. This is true when the employee’s disability results from 

his or her emotional reaction to a special assignment or other requirement imposed by the 

employing establishment or by the nature of the work.11 

Allegations alone by a claimant are insufficient to establish a factual basis for an emotional 

condition claim.12 Where the claimant alleges compensable factors of employment, he or she must 

substantiate such allegations with probative and reliable evidence. 13 Personal perceptions alone 

are insufficient to establish an employment-related emotional condition.14 A disabling condition 

resulting from an employee’s feelings of job insecurity per se is not sufficient to constitute a person 

injury sustained in the performance of duty within the meaning of FECA. Thus, disability is not 

covered when it results from an employee’s fear of a reduction-in-force. Nor is disability covered 

when it results from such factors as an employee’s frustration in not being permitted to work in a 

particular environment or to hold a particular position.15 

Administrative and personnel matters, although generally related to the employee’s 

employment, are administrative functions of the employer rather than the regular or specially 

assigned work duties of the employee and are not covered under FECA. 16 Where the evidence 

demonstrates that the employing establishment either erred or acted abusively in discharging its 

administrative or personnel responsibilities, such action will be considered a compensable 

7

S.K., Docket No. 18-1648 (issued March14, 2019); M.C., Docket No. 14-1456 (issued December 24, 2014); 

Debbie J. Hobbs, 43 ECAB 135 (1991); Donna Faye Cardwell, 41 ECAB 730 (1990).

8

28 ECAB 125 (1976).

9

5 U.S.C. §§ 8101-8193.

10 G.R., Docket No. 18-0893 (issued November 21, 2018). Robert W. Johns, 51 ECAB 136 (1999).

11 Supra note 4.

12 B.O., Docket No. 17-1986 (issued January 18, 2019).

13 Id.

14 M.R., Docket No. 18-0305 (issued October 18, 2018).

15 Supra note 10.

16 Charles D. Edwards, 55 ECAB 258 (2004).
6

employment factor.17 A claimant must support his or her allegations with probative and reliable 

evidence. Personal perceptions alone are insufficient to establish an employment-related 

emotional condition.18

ANALYSIS

The Board finds that the case is not in posture for decision. 

Appellant alleged that she sustained an emotional condition as a result of a number of 

employment incidents and conditions, including an alleged July 17, 2015 assault by a taxpayer. 

OWCP denied her emotional condition claim because it found that she had not established that her 

conditions arose during the course of employment and within the scope of compensable work 

factors. The Board must, thus, initially review whether these alleged incidents and conditions of 

employment are covered employment factors under the terms of FECA. 19 

Appellant alleged that on July 17, 2015 she scheduled a meeting with a taxpayer. When 

she went to greet him in the lobby, he was awaiting in the lobby with another man. The taxpayer 

instructed his companion to give a package to appellant. When appellant declined to accept it, he 

directed his companion to throw the package at appellant, who was seven months pregnant at the 

time. She saw the package coming at her and only had time to cover her stomach to protect herself 

before the package struck her arm. Appellant asserted that she informed her supervisor, C.L., of 

the assault. She submitted a witness statement from K.O., who reported that on July 17, 2015 she 

witnessed appellant making copies and that appellant recounted that a taxpayer had thrown a 

package at her. Appellant sought medical treatment after the incident.

In his January 3, 2018 statement, C.L noted that he did not recall that appellant had reported 

that the taxpayer or his companion had thrown the package striking her on July 17, 2015. He 

indicated that he was not aware that the package struck her arm. C.L. instead reported that to the 

best of his recollection and based on the records that he reviewed, the taxpayer just dropped the 

package on the floor when appellant refused to accept it. C.L. noted that the TIGTA special agent 

should have written documentation in the incident report.

M.T. reviewed appellant’s activity record related to the July 17, 2015 employment incident 

and found that it indicated that because she did not accept the package, the taxpayer told the other 

person to leave it on the floor. According to the activity record, appellant stayed inside the 

interview room and watched the other person leave the package on the floor and then leave the 

lobby.

An employee’s statement alleging that an injury occurred at a given time and in a given 

manner is of great probative value and will stand unless refuted by strong and persuasive 

17 Kim Nguyen, 53 ECAB 127 (2001). See Thomas D. McEuen, 41 ECAB 387 (1990), reaff’d on recon., 42 ECAB 

566 (1991). 

18 Roger Williams, 52 ECAB 468(2001).

19 S.F., Docket No. 20-0249 (issued December 31, 2020); O.G.,Docket No. 18-0350 (issued August7, 2019); K.W.,

59 ECAB 271 (2007).
7

evidence.20 CL. did not witness the events, and could not recall appellant’s statements regarding 

the events. Thus, his statement does not directly contradict appellant’s allegation that the 

taxpayer’s companion threw the package in her direction, striking her on the arm.

21

 MT. reviewed 

an activity record, which she asserted contradicts appellant’s statement, but she did not provide 

the contents of this activity record for review by OWCP or the Board.

As noted above, an employee’s emotional reaction to administrative actions or personnel 

matters taken by the employing establishment is not covered under FECA as such matters pertain 

to procedures and requirements of the employer and do not bear a direct relation to the work 

required of an employee unless there is error or abuse on the part of the employing establishment. 22 

In determining whether the employing establishment erred or acted abusively, the Board will 

examine the factual evidence of record.23 

Appellant has alleged events that occurred involving her supervisor including improper 

evaluation remarks, overriding her proposed adjustments without adequate reasoning, and denying

her request for a transfer. She also alleged that her supervisor put her in unsafe situations including 

conducting a face-to-face meeting with an incarcerated taxpayer at the prison, but denying her 

request for a management escort. In determining whether the employing establishment erred or 

acted abusively, the Board has to examine whether the employing establishment acted 

reasonably.24

Although the handling of disciplinary actions and evaluations of work are generally related 

to the employment, the Board has held that they are administrative functions of the employing 

establishment, not duties of the employee, and are not covered under FECA. 25 To the extent that 

supervisors or management properly exercised their supervisory or managerial duties and 

responsibilities, appellant’s emotional reaction thereto is not compensable.26 Mere perceptions of 

error or abuse are not sufficient to establish entitlement to compensation.27 To discharge her 

burden of proof, appellant must first submit any corroborative evidence to establish a factual basis 

for her allegations.28

20 D.B., Docket No. 18-0537 (issued September 12, 2018); Betty J. Smith, 54 ECAB 174 (2002); Allen C. Hundley, 

53 ECAB 551 (2002).

21 D.B., id.

22 See R.D., Docket No. 19-0877 (issued September 8, 2020); AndrewJ. Sheppard, 53 ECAB 170-71 (2001), 52 

ECAB 421 (2001)

23 See B.S., Docket No. 19-0378 (issued July 10, 2019); M.R., Docket No. 18-0304 (issued November 13, 2018);

David W. Shirey, 42 ECAB 783, 795-96 (1991); KathleenD. Walker, 42 ECAB 603, 608(1991).

24 Id.

25 See Janet I. Jones, 47 ECAB 345, 347 (1996); Jimmy Gilbreath, 44 ECAB 555, 558 (1993); Apple Gate, 41 

ECAB 581, 588 (1990).

26 See Janet I. Jones, id.; Isabel Apostol Gonzales, 44 ECAB 901 (1993).

27 D.M., Docket No. 20-0500 (issued July 6, 2021); Ruthie M. Evans, 41 ECAB 416 (1990).

28 E.A., Docket No. 19-0582 (issued April22, 2021); Ruthie M. Evans, id.
8

Based on the evidence of record, the Board finds that appellant has not established, with 

corroborating evidence, that error or abuse was committed by the employing establishment. As 

such, she has not established a compensable factor of employment in this regard. 29

With regard to a denied transfer, the Board has held that denials by an employing 

establishment of a request for a different job, promotion, or transfer are not compensable factors 

of employment under FECA, as they do not involve appellant’s ability to perform her regular or 

specially assigned work duties, but rather constitute appellant’s desire to work in a different 

position or location.

30

With regard to appellant’s allegations that the employing establishment acted unreasonably 

by placing her in unsafe situations, she has not offered corroborative evidence in support of her 

allegations regarding same. She did not submit witness statements or other documentary evidence 

to demonstrate that such events occurred as alleged.31 The Board finds, however, that OWCP 

failed to sufficiently develop the evidence regarding whether she was assaulted at work while in 

the performance of duty on July 17, 2015. OWCP’s procedures provide that, in cases involving 

assault, OWCP should obtain copies of police reports, which may have been made, as well as 

statements from the official superior, the TIGTA special agent who investigated the incident, 

coworkers, the assailant, or other witnesses.32 In this instance, appellant detailed the circumstances 

surrounding the July 17, 2015 incident and reported the taxpayer as the assailant. The record 

reflects that a TIGTA report had been filed. OWCP, however, failed to properly develop the 

evidence by requesting this relevant information from the employing establishment addressing her 

allegations of the assault.33 Further, appellant noted that there may have been video evidence of 

the July 17, 2015 employment incident, as she motioned to cameras in the lobby during her 

interaction with the taxpayer. 

Proceedings under FECA are not adversarial in nature, nor is OWCP a disinterested arbiter. 

While appellant has the burden of proof to establish entitlement to compensation, OWCP shares 

responsibility in the development of the evidence, particularly when such evidence is of the 

character normally obtained from the employing establishment or other governmental source. 34

Accordingly, the Board will remand the case for OWCP to obtain the necessary 

information from the employing establishment regarding the claimed July 17, 2015 employment 

incident. Following such further development as deemed necessary, OWCP shall issue a de novo

decision. 

29 See E.A., id.; R.B., Docket No. 19-0343 (issued February 14, 2020); R.V., Docket No. 18-0268 (issued 

October 17, 2018).

30 Donald W. Bottles, 40 ECAB 349, 353 (1988).

31 See B.S.,supra note 23.

32 5 U.S.C. § 8124(a)(2); 20 C.F.R. § 10.125; L.S., Docket No. 18-1208 (issued April30, 2020); A.M., Docket No. 

18-0630 (issued December 10, 2018.

33 Lillian E. Lesniak, Docket No. 00-1021 (issued February 22, 2001).

34 A.M., supra note 32; L.L.,Docket No. 12-0194 (issued June 5, 2012); N.S., 59 ECAB 422 (2008).
9

CONCLUSION

The Board finds that the case is not in posture for decision.

ORDER

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the June 10, 2019 decision of the Office of Workers’

Compensation Programs is set aside, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent 

with this decision.

Issued: September 8, 2022

Washington, DC

Alec J. Koromilas, Chief Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Janice B. Askin, Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Valerie D. Evans-Harrell, Alternate Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board