United States Court of Appeals 

for the Fifth Circuit 

No. 21-20642 

Gerry Monroe, 

Plaintiff—Appellee, 

Versus 

Houston Independent School District, 

Defendant—Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Texas 

USDC No. 4:19-CV-1991 

Before Stewart, Willett, and Oldham, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

In this civil rights suit, the district court rendered a final judgment 

awarding attorney’s fees, court costs, and interest to a plaintiff that obtained 

some, but not all, of the relief he sought against a school district. The school 

* This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5. 

United States Court of Appeals 

Fifth Circuit 

FILED 

February 1, 2023 

Lyle W. Cayce 

Clerk 

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district now appeals arguing that the district court erred in calculating the 

lodestar and abused its discretion when it failed to adjust the lodestar to 

account for the plaintiff’s limited success. Because we hold that the district 

court did not err in calculating the lodestar or abuse its discretion in declining 

to adjust the amount, we AFFIRM. 

I. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Since approximately 2014, Gerry Monroe has served as a selfappointed educational activist and advocate within the Houston Independent 

School District (“HISD”) where he regularly attends monthly board 

meetings. The events that took place during two of the HISD meetings that 

Monroe attended in 2019 became the focus of the underlying proceedings in 

this appeal. First, on April 9, 2019, Monroe attended a reassignment hearing 

for an HISD employee. At that meeting, he shouted expletives, racial 

epithets, pounded on the table, insulted the administrators, and stated that 

he was going to turn the “m*****f***ing school upside down” and “knock 

out three of [HISD’s] principals.” Two days later, on April 11, 2019, Monroe 

attended an HISD board of trustees meeting wearing a grey cap, a bandana 

covering his entire face except his eyes, and a t-shirt that displayed a large 

photo of Fonville Middle School Principal Irma Sandate. The captions on the 

shirt stated that Principal Sandate “must go” because she did not “like black 

people.” When Monroe approached the podium, he spoke loudly and 

angrily, describing an alleged incident where a teacher at Fonville Middle 

School brought a gun to school in her purse. He then began shouting and 

criticizing Principal Sandate for failing to sufficiently address the incident, 

referring to her as an “idiot” and a “tyrant.” Towards the end of his speech, 

Monroe yelled “Do something with that idiot over there. This is the 

mandate: Either you take her out or I’m going to take her out.” He then made 

a gesture with his hand that resembled a pointing gun. HISD peace officers 

addressed Monroe as he was leaving the meeting pursuant to internal policy. 

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 In response to the incident, HISD’s Business Operations Officer 

Eugene Salazar sent a letter to Monroe informing him that he was banned 

from entering all HISD facilities, meetings, and activities and that his entry 

onto HISD property would be considered trespass. The letter provided that 

the ban was a “direct result” of Monroe’s conduct at the April 11 meeting 

and also referenced his disruptive behavior at other HISD meetings. 

 On April 14, 2019, Monroe wrote a letter to HISD appealing the ban 

and alleging that it violated his First Amendment rights. HISD did not 

respond and on June 3, 2019, Monroe filed suit in federal district court 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that HISD had violated his First and 

Fourteenth Amendment rights by imposing the facilities ban against him. A 

week later, Monroe moved for a preliminary injunction seeking to enjoin 

HISD’s enforcement of the ban. 

 On June 12, 2019, HISD sent a second letter to Monroe reaffirming 

the facilities ban previously issued and informing him that he could view the 

HISD meetings online, allow a representative to speak on his behalf, and 

engage with board members off HISD property. On July 10, HISD sent 

Monroe a third letter that modified and reduced the term of the facilities ban. 

The preliminary injunction hearing was then held on July 11 and on July 15, 

HISD sent Monroe a fourth letter, overriding the third letter’s terms, that 

shortened the duration of the original ban from one year or longer to one that 

expired by its own terms on December 31, 2019. The letter further specified 

that during the modified ban’s existence, Monroe would be permitted to 

participate via telephone in any grievance or other administrative 

proceedings in which he was involved and that he could request permission 

to schedule an appointment for an in-person meeting. The letter ended by 

outlining the conduct that HISD considered “inappropriate” for Monroe’s 

future reference. Specifically, the letter provided in pertinent part: 

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With respect to your conduct at any of the above activities 

or at any other meetings or proceedings at HISD facilities or 

campuses, please be advised that HISD considers that the 

following conduct does not meet the standard for 

“appropriate” conduct and also that the following conduct 

disrupts and interferes with proceedings, as set out in 

existing HISD policy, including but not limited to HISD 

Policies BE(LOCAL) and GKA(LEGAL): 

• Use of profanity; 

• Personal verbal attacks on HISD personnel (e.g., 

name-calling); 

• Making of threats (e.g., “take someone out” or 

“knock someone out” or “turn a school upside 

down”); 

• Use of material to cover or obscure any part of your 

face while addressing any HISD Board member or 

employee; 

• Wearing clothing containing offensive or derogatory 

remarks about any HISD Board member or employee; 

• Use of any signs, banners, posters, or similar visual 

aids containing offensive or derogatory remarks about 

any HISD Board member or employee; 

• Use or display of any object that could cause serious 

bodily injury (e.g., a noose); 

• Loud or violent physical gestures such as slamming 

hands on furniture; 

• Threatening physical gestures such as a “finger 

gun”; and 

• Yelling, shouting, or screaming. 

You are further advised that if you engage in conduct listed 

above on HISD property, HISD is fully authorized under 

existing policies, following a warning that is disregarded, to 

have you removed immediately from HISD property 

without further warning or advance notice. You are further 

advised that if you engage in the above conduct on HISD 

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property in the future, HISD may be required to issue 

additional Criminal Trespass Warnings. 

On July 19 the district court issued an order denying the preliminary 

injunction motion on grounds that the July 15 letter containing the modified 

ban struck an “appropriate balance between the right of schools to address 

security concerns and control their premises and [Monroe’s] First 

Amendment rights.” 

After the district court denied Monroe the preliminary injunctive 

relief he sought, he filed an interlocutory appeal with this court. See Monroe 

v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 794 F. App’x 381 (5th Cir. 2019). There, a panel 

of this court noted that the issue before the district court at the time of the 

preliminary injunction hearing was the facilities ban—not HISD’s policy. Id. 

at 384. Consequently, the panel remanded the case for the district court to 

determine in the first instance whether and to what extent Monroe had 

adequately alleged a violation of HISD’s policy, or HISD’s clarification 

thereof in the July 15 letter, and whether a preliminary injunction should 

issue. Id. at 386. 

 After the proceedings were remanded to the district court, Monroe 

filed an amended motion for a preliminary injunction. In his motion, he 

sought to enjoin HISD from enforcing the facilities ban and the speech and 

expression restrictions listed in the July 15 letter. On December 10, 2019, the 

district court held a hearing and the following day, granted in part and denied 

in part the motion. The district court first determined by a preponderance of 

the evidence that Monroe “meant to communicate a serious expression of an 

intent to commit an act of unlawful violence against Principal Irma Sandate” 

during the April 11 HISD board meeting and that the limited facilities ban 

was a reasonable response to Monroe’s threat. 

 The district court next addressed HISD’s speech policies for Monroe 

as outlined in the July 15 letter. It reasoned that the First Amendment’s 

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viewpoint neutrality principle protected Monroe’s right to express negative 

views at the HISD meetings because it was permissible for Monroe or other 

members of the public to express positive views at the meetings. Thus, 

because HISD’s July 15 letter mandated positivity from Monroe, as opposed 

to the negative speech and expression he desired to convey, it violated his 

First Amendment right to free speech. Additionally, because the same 

restrictions were not found in HISD’s policies, the July 15 letter improperly 

established independent restrictions on Monroe’s speech and not the speech 

of others. The district court then preliminarily enjoined HISD from 

punishing Monroe by removing him from HISD facilities or issuing criminal 

trespass warnings on the basis of his engaging in the prohibited speech and 

expression listed in the July 15 letter. 

 On July 26, 2021, the district court held a bench trial on the sole 

remaining issue of whether Monroe was entitled to have the terms of the 

preliminary injunction issued as a permanent injunction. Shortly thereafter 

on August 4, 2021, the district court issued a memorandum decision and 

order vacating the preliminary injunction entered on December 11, 2019 and 

dismissing Monroe’s claims as moot. In doing so, it reasoned that Monroe 

had achieved his objective with HISD’s retraction of the unconstitutional 

restrictions in the July 15 letter, and thus there was no remaining case or 

controversy between the parties. The court then determined that the case 

was moot because it was clear from the testimony of various HISD personnel 

that “the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to 

recur.” The district court then opined that a reasonable attorney’s fee was 

likely available in the case and took the matter under advisement. 

 On November 3, 2021, the district court rendered its order on the 

attorney’s fee issue. It first determined that Monroe was a “prevailing party” 

under 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) because he had met the requirements under 

Dearmore v. City of Garland, 519 F.3d 517, 524 (5th Cir. 2008). The district 

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court then turned to its calculation of the fee award. After an extensive 

analysis of Monroe’s legal team’s itemized billing records using the Johnson1

factors, the district court rendered a total award of $299,200.00, plus court 

costs and interest.2

 The court declined to increase the lodestar amount by 

25% as Monroe’s counsel requested, reasoning that the fee award was 

sufficient as calculated without the enhancement. HISD then appealed the 

district court’s judgment issuing the attorney’s fee award. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“A district court’s award of attorney[’s] fees is reviewed for abuse of 

discretion.” Fessler v. Porcelana Corona De Mexico, S.A. DE C.V., 23 F.4th 

408, 415 (5th Cir. 2022) (citing Torres v. SGE Mgmt., LLC, 945 F.3d 347, 352 

(5th Cir. 2019)). “A district court abuses its discretion if it: (1) relies on 

clearly erroneous factual findings; (2) relies on erroneous conclusions of law; 

or (3) misapplies the law to the facts.” Id. (citing Combs v. City of Huntington, 

829 F.3d 388, 391 (5th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted)).

III. DISCUSSION

On appeal, HISD argues that the district court erred in calculating the 

lodestar because it awarded fees for all the time that Monroe’s attorneys 

spent on the litigation, rather than just the time they spent on pursuing 

successful claims. It also argues that the district court abused its discretion in 

failing to adjust the lodestar to account for Monroe’s limited success since he 

1 Johnson v. Ga. Hwy. Exp., Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-20 (5th Cir. 1974). 

2

 The award included: (1) $262,875.00 for Monroe’s lead counsel at a rate of 

$500/hour for 525.75 hours; (2) $18,600.00 for Monroe’s second counsel at a rate of 

$400/hour for 46.5 hours; and (3) $17,725.00 for Newar’s paralegal at a rate of $100/hour 

for 177.25 hours. 

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did not recover damages or obtain injunctive relief. We address each of these 

arguments below. 

A. Calculation of the Lodestar 

“A prevailing litigant may not ordinarily collect an attorney’s fee from 

the loser absent some statutory exception.” Combs, 829 F.3d at 391 (citation 

omitted). A congressionally-created exception exists, however, in “Title VII 

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which allows a district court to award 

reasonable attorney’s fees to the prevailing party.” Id. (citing 42 

U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k)). Courts apply a two-step method in this circuit for 

determining a reasonable attorney’s fee award. Id. at 391–92 (citing Jimenez 

v. Wood Cnty., 621 F.3d 372, 379 (5th Cir. 2010)). First, the court must 

calculate the lodestar, “which is equal to the number of hours reasonably 

expended multiplied by the prevailing hourly rate in the community for 

similar work.” Id. at 392. In doing so, “[t]he court should exclude all time 

that is excessive, duplicative, or inadequately documented.” Id. Second, 

although the lodestar is presumed reasonable, a court may enhance or 

decrease it based on the twelve Johnson factors.3 Id. “‘[T]he most critical 

factor’ in determining a reasonable fee ‘is the degree of success obtained.’” 

Fessler, 23 F.4th at 415 (citation omitted). “[T]he fee applicant bears the 

burden of establishing entitlement to an award and documenting the 

appropriate hours expended and hourly rates.” Id. at 415–16 (citation 

3 See Cruz v. Maverick Cnty., 957 F.3d 563, 574 n.3 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Johnson, 

488 F.2d at 717–19) (“The Johnson factors are: (1) ‘the time and labor required’; (2) ‘the 

novelty and difficulty of the questions’; (3) ‘the skill requisite to perform the legal service 

properly’; (4) ‘the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of 

the case’; (5) ‘the customary fee’; (6) ‘whether the fee is fixed or contingent’; (7) ‘time 

limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances’; (8) ‘the amount involved and the 

results obtained’; (9) ‘the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys’; (10) ‘the 

undesirability’ of the case’; (11) ‘the nature and length of the professional relationship with 

the client’; and (12) ‘awards in similar cases.’” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 

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omitted). However, once the fee is calculated, “the party seeking 

modification of the lodestar under the Johnson factors bears the burden.” Id. 

at 416 (citation omitted).

This court has held that “[i]t is axiomatic that work on an 

unsuccessful claim cannot be deemed to have been expended in pursuit of the 

ultimate result achieved . . . and therefore no fee may be awarded for services 

on [an] unsuccessful claim.” Fessler, 23 F.4th at 416 (internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted). When unsuccessful claims in the lawsuit are 

unrelated to the successful claims, “the unsuccessful ones must be treated as 

if they had been raised in separate lawsuits and excluded from the fee award.” 

Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). On the other hand, 

“when claims . . . share a common core of facts or related legal theories, a fee 

applicant may claim all hours reasonably necessary to litigate those issues.” 

Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

As the district court acknowledged, the parties’ primary dispute with 

respect to attorney’s fees arose over the application of two specific Johnson

factors: (1) the time and labor required, and (2) the customary fee. See 488 

F.3d at 717–18. The district court stated that, consistent with the guidelines 

set forth in Johnson, id. at 717–19, it had “made a detailed line-by-line review 

of the contemporaneous time records” submitted by Monroe’s attorneys and 

determined that, with their proposed reduction in hours, the attorney time 

and labor spent on the case were reasonable and necessary to remedy HISD’s 

infringement of Monroe’s First Amendment rights. We agree. Although it is 

true that Monroe did not succeed at every turn in the lawsuit, he did 

ultimately prevail on obtaining a preliminary injunction and he was able to 

prove that HISD had violated his constitutional rights when it issued the July 

15 letter attempting to restrict his speech and expression at the HISD 

meetings. As the district court convincingly explained, the claims and steps 

in litigation leading up to Monroe’s ultimate success shared both a “common 

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core of facts” and “related legal” theories. Fessler, 23 F.4th at 416. 

Consequently, the record supports the district court’s conclusion that the 

time and labor Monroe’s attorneys spent on the case was reasonable. See Fox 

v. Vice, 563 U.S. 826, 834 (2011) (“[W]e have made clear that plaintiffs may 

receive fees under § 1988 even if they are not victorious on every claim. A 

civil rights plaintiff who obtains meaningful relief has corrected a violation of 

federal law and, in so doing, has vindicated Congress’s statutory 

purposes.”). 

The district court’s analysis of the Johnson customary fee factor is also 

supported by the record. This court has acknowledged that a district court’s 

selection of “an appropriate hourly rate” should be “based on prevailing 

community standards for attorneys of similar experience in similar cases.” 

Shipes v. Trinity Indus., 987 F.2d 311, 319 (5th Cir. 1993). The district court 

engaged in such an analysis in this case, noting that both of Monroe’s 

attorneys were well-credentialed Houston lawyers with decades of 

experience litigating civil rights cases. The court also took into account other 

Johnson factors that supported Monroe’s counsels’ proposed hourly rates 

such as “the difficulty of litigating constitutional issues that evolved as HISD 

shifted its position, the experience, reputation, and ability of [Monroe’s] 

counsel, and the undesirability of taking on the civil rights case of a 

community activist” like Monroe. This method of calculating the customary 

fee comports with our precedent. As we have explained, “a ‘reasonable’ fee 

is a fee that is sufficient to induce a capable attorney to undertake the 

representation of a meritorious civil rights case” and “the lodestar method 

yields a fee that is presumptively sufficient to achieve this objective.” Combs, 

829 F.3d at 392–93. Moreover, “trial courts need not, and indeed should not, 

become green-eyeshade accountants. The essential goal in shifting fees (to 

either party) is to do rough justice, not to achieve auditing perfection.” Fox,

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563 U.S. at 838. The district court has achieved that goal in this case and thus 

did not err in calculating the lodestar. See Combs, 829 F.3d at 391.

B. Adjustment of Lodestar 

 HISD argued at the district court, and continues to argue on appeal, 

that the district court should have adjusted the lodestar to account for 

Monroe’s limited success. The district court determined, however, that an 

adjustment was unnecessary. We agree. Once the lodestar is calculated, the 

court may “determine whether any other considerations counsel in favor of . 

. . decreasing” it. Combs, 829 F.3d at 394–95. Here, the district court’s indepth analysis of the time records submitted by Monroe’s attorneys in the 

context of the Johnson factors fully supports its lodestar calculation, 

including its decision not to adjust, i.e., decrease, the lodestar. Accordingly, 

we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to 

adjust the lodestar. Fessler, 23 F.4th at 415. 

IV. CONCLUSION

We AFFIRM the district court’s attorney’s fee award in favor of 

Monroe. 

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