Opinion issued August 1, 2023.

In The

Court of Appeals 

For The

First District of Texas 

————————————

NO. 01-22-00267-CR

———————————

DINESHA RENEE JACKSON, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 208th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Case No. 1650785

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Kaila Nelson (“Nelson”) robbed 20-year-old Dequan Anderson (“Anderson”) 

as he left the Dollar General store where he worked. During the course of the 

robbery, Nelson fatally shot Anderson. The State charged Appellant Dinesha Renee 

Jackson with capital murder. During the trial, the State argued Appellant had 
2

conspired with Nelson to commit robbery. The State explained to the jury that it 

convict Appellant of capital murder as a principal or as party to the offense under 

the law of parties.

1

 The jury found Appellant guilty of capital murder and the trial 

court assessed her punishment at confinement for life with no possibility of parole. 

This appeal followed. 

In one issue, Appellant argues there is insufficient evidence to sustain her 

conviction for capital murder because the evidence did not establish she conspired 

to commit robbery or that she could have foreseen capital murder would result from 

carrying out the conspiracy. We affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

Background

On December 17, 2017, Anderson left the Dollar General store where he 

worked to make a “money run” bank deposit of approximately $3,000. As Anderson 

was getting into his car with the deposit bag, Nelson ran up and attempted to take 

the bag from Anderson. Anderson resisted and managed to keep control of the bag. 

As Anderson attempted to reverse out of his parking spot, Nelson fired several gun 

shots in his direction hitting Anderson four times. Anderson’s car came to a stop. 

1

Jackson was charged by indictment with capital murder. The jury charge authorized 

the jury to convict Jackson of capital murder (1) as a principal or (2) as a party to 

the offense under the law of the parties pursuant to Section 7.02(a)(2) or Section 

7.02(b) of the Texas Penal Code. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 7.01, 7.02(a)(2), 7.02(b); 

see also In re State ex rel. Weeks, 391 S.W.3d 117, 124 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) 

(“Regardless of whether it is pled in the charging instrument, liability as a party is 

an available legal theory if it is supported by the evidence.”).
3

Nelson smashed the driver’s window, took the money bag, and ran. Anderson was 

taken by ambulance to the hospital where he later died from the gunshot wounds. 

The State charged Appellant Dinesha Renee Jackson (“Jackson”), an Assistant 

Manager at the Dollar General store where Anderson worked, with capital murder. 

At trial, the State alleged Jackson conspired with Nelson to rob Anderson.

2

Testimony at Trial

A. Deunita Meeks

Deunita Meeks (“Meeks”) testified that in December 2017, she worked as an 

Assistant Manager at the Dollar General store, together with Jackson and Anderson. 

According to Meeks, she, Jackson, and Anderson were all authorized to make bank 

deposits for the store. Meeks explained that during the December holiday season, 

the store makes a midday bank run to deposit money from the morning and the night 

before. Meeks testified that the employee who makes the bank deposit generally 

logs the money out of the safe, counts the money, signs and prepares the bank deposit 

slip, and seals the money in a clear bag. If the night deposit is involved, the 

employee puts the money back in the safe for deposit the next day. Otherwise, the 

employee puts the money bag in another bag and takes it to the bank. Meeks testified 

2 Nelson was convicted of capital murder and the trial court assessed her punishment 

at confinement for life with no possibility of parole. See Nelson v. State, No. 14-

20-00258-CR, 2021 WL 4956990, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 26, 

2021, no pet.). The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed Nelson’s conviction. See 

id. at *5.
4

that Dollar General trains its employees to not resist if someone attempts to rob the 

store. 

Apart from being coworkers, Meeks and Jackson were also friends and they 

lived in the same apartment complex near the Dollar General store. According to 

Meeks, two women had been staying with Jackson at her apartment for about a week 

before the shooting. She identified the two women as Jamesha Robinson 

(“Robinson”) and her girlfriend Nelson. Meeks testified that Robinson is Jackson’s 

friend. Meeks associated with Robinson, but she only met Nelson once. During the 

time Robinson and Nelson stayed at Jackson’s apartment, Jackson borrowed Meeks’

car to take Nelson to look for a job.

Meeks and Jackson were working the morning shift at the Dollar General the 

day of the shooting. Meeks testified that she and Jackson were discussing who 

would make the midday bank deposit. When Meeks offered to go, Jackson told her 

Anderson would go instead because it was his responsibility. Anderson was 

scheduled to arrive for his shift at 1 p.m. Although she knew Anderson would be 

making the midday bank deposit, Jackson prepared the deposit at 12:30 p.m. and she 

signed for it using her own name. 

Jackson was “on her phone” standing near the store’s front window watching 

the parking lot when Anderson arrived and parked his car in front of the store. 

Anderson, who arrived at work at 1:00 p.m., had only been in the store a few minutes 
5

when Jackson instructed him to make the money run to the bank. According to 

Meeks, Anderson was upset because Jackson had already prepared the deposit and 

put her name on it, and he had not had a chance to verify the deposit information. 

Meeks, who was standing next to Jackson, testified she saw Anderson exit the Dollar 

General store with the money bag Jackson prepared. As Anderson was getting into

his car, Meeks testified she saw Nelson run up to Anderson. Nelson tried to grab the 

money bag from Anderson, but Anderson resisted, and a tussle ensued. After 

wrestling the money bag from Nelson, Anderson closed his car door and tried to 

drive away. According to Meeks, Nelson ran away and then returned momentarily 

with a gun in her hand. Nelson shot at Anderson’s car four or five times before 

Anderson crashed the car in the street. After the crash, Nelson ran over to 

Anderson’s car. She broke the driver’s side window, grabbed the deposit bag, and 

ran back to a getaway car. 

Meeks testified that when she saw what happened, she exited the Dollar Store 

and ran over to Anderson’s car to check on him. Meeks and several Dollar General 

customers called 911 to report the shooting. Jackson, who Meeks testified was 

standing next to her when the robbery and shooting occurred and was the Assistant 

Manager on duty, stayed inside the store. She did not check on Anderson or call 

911. 
6

B. Robinson

Robinson was granted immunity by the State. She testified that she and 

Jackson met in in 2007 when they were in the 7th grade and living in Atlanta, 

Georgia. According to Robinson, she and Jackson were close friends and they 

continued to be close even after Jackson moved to Houston, Texas a year or two 

before the shooting.

Robinson met her girlfriend Nelson in high school, but they did not begin to 

date until 2016. By 2017, Robinson and Nelson were both addicted to heroin. 

According to Robinson, Nelson paid for the heroin when she was working, but they 

otherwise had to borrow money from Nelson’s grandmother or friends to support 

their $200 a day heroin addiction. When asked if Nelson had a “hot temper,” 

Robinson testified that Nelson would get irritated and agitated when she was high 

on heroin.

In September 2017, Robinson and Nelson were living with Robinson’s sister

at an apartment complex in Atlanta, Georgia. Robinson testified that one day, after 

she and Nelson argued, Nelson locked herself in the bedroom and threatened to kill 

herself. Robinson, who knew Nelson had a gun, heard gunfire and called the police. 

When Robinson broke into the bedroom, she noticed that Nelson had only fired the 

weapon at the window. Nelson was arrested and the police seized her gun.
7

As a result of the incident, Nelson and Robinson were forced to move out of 

Robinson’s sister’s apartment. Nelson and Robinson, who were both unemployed, 

first stayed with friends or lived out of Robinson’s car. Later, in December 2019, 

Robinson called Jackson to ask for help. Jackson offered to let her stay with her at 

her apartment in Houston. Nelson and Robinson, who arrived in Houston at least a 

week before the shooting, stayed with Jackson at her apartment. Robinson testified 

that she told Jackson about Nelson’s gun incident before she and Nelson came to 

Houston.

After they arrived in Houston, Robinson told Jackson that she and Nelson 

were addicted to drugs. According to Robinson, Nelson purchased heroin when they 

were staying with Jackson and Nelson would smoke the heroin inside Jackson’s 

apartment. Robinson and Nelson looked for work in Houston without success. 

According to Robinson, Nelson’s grandmother sent Nelson money while they were 

in Houston. Nelson used the money to pay for her and Robinson’s $200 per day 

heroin addiction, and Nelson was “desperate to get money” after spending her 

grandmother’s money. 

Robinson testified that she never saw Nelson with a gun when they were in 

Houston. She also testified that Jackson was not a violent person and that she had 

never seen Jackson with a gun. Robinson testified that Nelson did not tell her how 

she was planning to get money to pay for their heroin addiction after they spent 
8

Nelson’s grandmother’s money, and she never heard Jackson and Nelson discuss a 

plan to rob the Dollar General store. 

Robinson testified that Nelson paid Kevin Berry (“Berry”), a private Uber 

driver Nelson met on Craigslist, to drive them around in Houston.3 Nelson called 

Berry the morning of Anderson’s murder and arranged for Berry to drive her and 

Robinson to the Dollar General store. Berry picked up Robinson and Nelson from 

Jackson’s apartment complex and drove them to the Dollar General store. When 

they arrived, Berry parked the car down the street from the store. Nelson got out 

and Berry and Robinson waited for her in the car. After a few minutes, Robinson 

heard gunshots and then Nelson ran up to the car and told Berry, “Drive, drive.” 

According to Robinson, Nelson had a “Dollar General bag” filled with cash when 

she got back in the car. Berry drove the women back to Jackson’s apartment and 

then to the Greyhound bus station where the couple caught a bus back to Georgia. 

They stopped on the way to the bus station, however, for Nelson and Robinson to 

3 Berry, who was also granted immunity by the State, testified that he drove Nelson 

and Robinson to Walmart three days before the shooting to pick up money. The 

next day, Berry drove Nelson and Robinson to buy drugs. According to Berry, they 

did not pay him for that trip. Berry testified that Nelson was wearing a gun both 

days. Nelson contacted Berry and arranged for him to pick her and Robinson up at 

Jackson’s apartment the day of the shooting. Nelson told Berry that she needed to 

be somewhere by 12:30 p.m. According to Berry, Nelson threw $200 in cash at him 

when she got back in the car. Berry testified that he never met Jackson.
9

buy heroin. According to Robinson, Nelson paid for the heroin with the cash she 

had just taken from Anderson.

C. Detective Matthew Brady

Detective Matthew Brady (“Detective Brady”), a homicide detective with the 

Houston Police Department, was assigned to investigate Anderson’s death. He 

testified at trial that Jackson spent several hours after the shooting reviewing 

surveillance videos with police officers at the scene. He testified that Jackson 

directed the officers to customers who had been in the store prior to the shooting as 

possible suspects.

Detective Brady and his partner, Detective Michael Casso (“Detective 

Casso”), interviewed Jackson twice as part of the investigation. 

1. Jackson’s First Interview 

Detective Brady and Detective Casso first interviewed Jackson on January 30, 

2018—about one month after the incident. The video recording of Jackson’s 

interview, marked as State Exhibit 170, was admitted into evidence and played for 

the jury.

Detective Brady testified that Jackson “lied consistently [during the interview] 

until [the detectives] confronted her with some evidence, and then she would adjust 

her statement.” Jackson first told the Detectives she was using her mother’s cell 

phone the day of the shooting because she did not have a phone and that she gave 
10

the police her mother’s phone number when she was questioned by police at the 

scene. She later admitted that she had been using her own cell phone and gave police

the wrong phone number the day of the shooting. Jackson also told the Detectives 

that she threw her cell phone into a lake on the day of the shooting. She stated she 

wanted no one to find her text messages with Nelson and that she bought a new 

phone with a new phone number.

Jackson told the Detectives that no one was staying with her at her apartment 

the day of the shooting. Later, when confronted with pictures of Robinson, she 

admitted Robinson was a friend who stayed with her at her apartment a few days. 

But Jackson claimed that Robinson had returned to Georgia a few days before the 

shooting. At first, Jackson also denied knowing Nelson and acted surprised when 

Detective Brady showed her a photograph of Nelson. Jackson admitted she 

recognized Nelson in the picture, but she claimed that Robinson had traveled from 

Georgia alone and had met Nelson in Houston. Jackson repeatedly denied that 

Nelson had stayed at her apartment. She claimed Nelson never stayed with her and 

only came to Jackson’s apartment while Robinson was there. Jackson eventually 

came clean with the Detectives and admitted that Nelson and Robinson both traveled 

from Georgia together and stayed at her apartment for four days. 

Jackson also denied knowing anything about the robbery. She acted surprised

or feigned ignorance when the Detectives shared some of the facts they discovered
11

during their investigation, including the fact Robinson had been in the getaway car 

with Nelson on the day of the shooting. The Detectives told Jackson they believed 

the robbery was an “inside job” and that she was involved. They explained to 

Jackson that they had been able to trace the robbery back to her based on her 

relationship with Robinson. 

Jackson claimed she knew nothing about Nelson’s plan to rob the Dollar 

General store. She denied “setting up” the robbery or telling Nelson or Robinson 

anything about the money drop. The Detectives asked for the truth, but Jackson 

continued to deny any involvement in the incident. It was not until the Detectives 

confronted her with other facts, including the fact Robinson and Nelson had both 

been picked up from her apartment in the getaway car shortly before the robbery and 

dropped off at her apartment after, that Jackson admitted some knowledge of the 

robbery. 

According to Jackson, the robbery was Nelson’s idea. Even though she 

admitted telling Nelson who would be working the day of the shooting and giving 

Nelson a description of everyone who worked at the Dollar General store, including 

Anderson, Jackson claimed Nelson had figured out the rest on her own. She denied 

alerting Nelson when Anderson left the store or telling Nelson how much money 

Anderson was carrying with him. 
12

When asked how her conversation with Nelson started, Jackson told the 

Detectives that two days before the shooting, Nelson told her she needed money and 

wanted to get a job. Jackson told her manager at the Dollar General store that Nelson 

was looking for a job, but the store was not hiring. According to Jackson, Nelson 

said she “needed to go do something crazy,” which Jackson understood to mean

Nelson was going to “get some money.” According to Jackson, Nelson asked her

about the other employees at the Dollar General store, and she wanted to know “how 

the money worked.” Jackson admitted telling Nelson “everything,” including when 

employees make the store’s bank deposits and that Anderson would be making the 

bank run around 1 p.m. the day of the shooting. She also admitted she gave Nelson 

a physical description of Anderson and texted Nelson as Anderson was leaving the 

store to make the deposit. Jackson also told the Detectives she sent Nelson a picture 

of a different money bag employees at the store had previously deposited. Jackson 

claimed no one ever suggested that Nelson steal the money from Jackson, as opposed 

to another Dollar General employee, when making a money run. 

Although she claimed that Nelson never stated she was planning to rob 

someone, Jackson later admitted she knew Nelson was coming to the Dollar General 

store to get the money. Jackson told the Detectives that Nelson was just supposed 

to take the money from Anderson and run. She claimed Nelson was not supposed 

to pull out a gun and she claimed she did not believe Nelson was the type of person 
13

who would shoot someone. When asked if Anderson was a passive guy, Jackson 

said she did not know. Jackson told the Detectives that the store’s policy is to hand 

over the money in the event of a robbery, but she denied telling Nelson about the 

policy. Jackson at first denied receiving any money from the robbery. She later

admitted that Nelson left $500 for her at her apartment, but she claimed she got rid 

of the “blood money” and never spent it.

Despite repeatedly claiming she had never seen Nelson with a gun, Jackson 

later admitted she knew Nelson had a gun, and that Nelson “always” had the gun 

with her. Jackson admitted she once saw part of the gun when Nelson was wearing 

the gun on her hip, but the gun was mostly covered by Nelson’s shirt. Jackson told 

the Detectives she eventually left the store to go outside after the shooting, and that 

she called her manager to report the incident. 

2. Jackson’s Second Interview 

Detective Brady and Detective Casso interviewed Jackson again on February 

14, 2018. They did so after interviewing Robinson and Nelson, who had been 

arrested in Georgia for Anderson’s murder. A video recording of Jackson’s second 

interview, marked as State Exhibit 171, was admitted into evidence and played for 

the jury. 
14

Jackson, who was arrested at the beginning of the interview, waived her 

Miranda4rights and spoke with the Detectives. Jackson told Detective Brady and 

Detective Casso that Nelson first suggested taking the money from Jackson when 

Jackson was making a bank deposit, but Jackson decided that another store employee

should make the deposit instead because Jackson did not want to “get in trouble” 

with Dollar General. Jackson also claimed she told Nelson that Dollar General

instructs its employees not to resist during a robbery.

Jackson admitted texting Nelson when Anderson arrived at the store and as he 

was leaving the store with the money bag. Jackson admitted that Nelson wore a gun 

on her hip and that she had seen Nelson with the gun before the robbery. Jackson 

told the Detectives that she “didn’t know that [Nelson] was going to bring the gun. . .

I probably would have thought that she would have carried it, but I didn’t think she 

would have brought the gun.” When asked if she assumed Nelson would bring the 

gun with her to the robbery, Jackson stated, “I didn’t know but yeah, it’s like 

common sense like she was probably going to bring it.” Jackson stated that Nelson 

“always” had the gun with her, and she never left it at the apartment because “she 

always had it.” Jackson told the Detectives that her role was to provide Nelson with 

information about the store and the bank run, but the rest was up to Nelson. She 

claimed she did not ask Nelson if she planned to use the gun during the robbery. 

4 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
15

Jackson also admitted she knew Nelson used heroin and crack. While she 

never saw Nelson do drugs, Jackson stated she knew Nelson and Robinson used 

drugs at her apartment because she could smell “a burnt smell” in her restroom. 

Jackson told the Detectives she helped Nelson look for employment in Houston and 

that Nelson “needed money” and was “desperate for crack.”

5

 Jackson also told the 

Detectives she got rid of everything. She threw her cell phone and the money Nelson 

left behind for her in a lake because she was scared and she “didn’t want nobody to 

know.” 

D. The Indictment and Jury Charge

The State charged Jackson with capital murder.6 The jury charge authorized 

the jury to convict Jackson of capital murder (1) as the principal or (2) as a party to 

the offense under the law of parties pursuant to Section 7.02(a)(2) or Section 7.02(b) 

of the Texas Penal Code. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 7.01, 7.02(a)(2), 7.02(b). The 

jury also was authorized to convict Jackson of one of the lesser-included offenses of 

felony murder, aggravated robbery, or robbery under these same theories of criminal 

liability. See id. The jury convicted Jackson of capital murder and the trial court 

5

Jackson also admitted that her boyfriend, who is incarcerated, spoke to Robinson to 

discuss what to do after the robbery. Jackson told the Detectives she gave her 

boyfriend Robinson’s number. 

6 Detective Brady testified that Jackson was initially charged with aggravated 

robbery, but the State later upgraded the charge to capital murder. 
16

assessed her punishment at confinement for life with no possibility of parole. This 

appeal followed.

Sufficiency of the Evidence

In one issue, Jackson argues the evidence is insufficient to support her

conviction for capital murder because there is insufficient evidence (1) she conspired 

with Nelson to commit robbery, or (2) that she should have foreseen capital murder 

would result from carrying out the conspiracy to commit robbery. See TEX. PENAL 

CODE § 7.02(b). According to Jackson, the evidence shows that, at most, she 

conspired with Nelson to commit theft. Jackson further argues there is insufficient 

evidence she should have foreseen capital murder would result from carrying out the 

conspiracy because Jackson is not a violent person, she did not encourage Nelson to 

use violence, she did not know Nelson would use a gun, and she did not expect for 

Anderson to resist Nelson’s efforts to take the money from him because Dollar 

General employees are trained to hand over the money upon demand and to not 

resist. 

The State argues the evidence is sufficient to support Jackson’s conviction for 

capital murder because there is evidence Jackson and Nelson conspired to steal the 

money from Anderson, Jackson knew Nelson “always” carried a gun with her, and 

Jackson admitted it was “common sense” to bring a gun to a robbery.
17

A. Standard of Review

We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence under the standard 

enunciated in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). See Brooks v. State, 323 

S.W.3d 893, 895 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). We examine all evidence in the light most 

favorable to the jury’s verdict to determine whether any “rational trier of fact could 

have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson, 

443 U.S. at 319. “Circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in 

establishing the guilt of an actor” and “the standard of review on appeal is the same 

for both direct and circumstantial evidence cases.” Kuciemba v. State, 310 S.W.3d 

460, 462 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (quoting Guevara v. State, 152 S.W.3d 45, 49 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2004)).

As the trier of fact, the jury is the sole judge of the weight and credibility of 

the evidence. Zuniga v. State, 551 S.W.3d 729, 733 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). As the 

sole judge of credibility, the jury may accept one version of the facts and reject 

another, and it may reject any part of a witness’ testimony. Sharp v. State, 707 

S.W.2d 611, 614 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). We defer to the jury to resolve fairly any 

“conflicts in testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences 

from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2007) (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318–19). A reviewing court, faced with a 

record of historical facts supporting conflicting inferences, must presume the 
18

factfinder resolved any such conflicts in favor of the prosecution, and must defer to 

that resolution. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326. 

B. The Indictment and the Jury Charge 

The State charged Jackson with capital murder. The indictment states:

The duly organized Grand Jury of Harris County, Texas, presents in the 

District Court of Harris County, Texas, that in Harris County, Texas, 

DINESHA RENEE JACKSON, hereafter styled the Defendant, 

heretofore on or about December 17, 2017, did then and there 

unlawfully, while in the course of committing and attempting to 

commit the robbery of Dequan Anderson, intentionally cause the death 

of Dequan Anderson by shooting the Complainant with a Deadly 

Weapon, namely a firearm. 

Although the indictment alleges that Jackson was the principal actor in the capital 

murder, the charge authorized the jury to convict Jackson of capital murder as a

principal actor or as a party to the offense under the law of parties pursuant to Section 

7.02(a)(2) or Section 7.02(b) of the Texas Penal Code. See TEX. PENAL CODE

§ 7.02(a)(2), (b). The charge provides:

Now, if you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt 

that on or about the 17th day of December, 2017, in Harris County, 

Texas, the defendant, Dinesha Renee Jackson, did then and there 

unlawfully, while in the course of committing or attempting to commit 

the robbery of Dequan Anderson, intentionally cause the death of 

Dequan Anderson by shooting Dequan Anderson with a deadly 

weapon, namely a firearm; or 

If you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on 

or about the 17th day of December, 2017, in Harris County, Texas, 

Kayla [sic] Nelson, did then and there unlawfully, while in the course 

of committing or attempting to commit the robbery of Dequan 

Anderson, intentionally cause the death of Dequan Anderson by 
19

shooting Dequan Anderson with a deadly weapon, namely a firearm, 

and that the defendant, Dinesha Renee Jackson, with the intent to 

promote or assist the commission of the offense, if any, solicited, 

encouraged, directed, aided or attempted to aid Kaila Nelson to commit 

the offense, if she did;7 or 

If you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on 

or about the 17th day of December, 2017, in Harris County, Texas, in 

the attempt to carry out a conspiracy to commit the felony of robbery, 

the felony of capital murder is committed by Kayla [sic] Nelson and the 

defendant, Dinesha Renee Jackson, though having no intent to commit 

the offense of capital murder, but in furtherance of the unlawful purpose 

should have anticipated the offense of capital murder would be 

committed as a result of carrying out the conspiracy, then you will find 

the defendant guilty of capital murder, as charged in the indictment.8

C. Applicable Law

A person commits capital murder if she “intentionally or knowingly causes 

the death of an individual” and “intentionally commits the murder in the course of 

committing or attempting to commit kidnapping, burglary, robbery, aggravated

sexual assault, arson, obstruction or retaliation, or terroristic threat.” TEX. PENAL 

CODE §§ 19.02(b)(1), 19.03(a)(2). A person commits robbery “if, in the course of 

7 See TEX. PENAL CODE § 7.02(a)(2) (“A person is criminally responsible for an 

offense committed by the conduct of another if . . . acting with the intent to promote 

or assist the commission of the offense, he solicits, encourages, directs, aids, or 

attempts to aid the other person to commit the offense.”).

8 See TEX. PENAL CODE § 7.02(b) (“If, in the attempt to carry out a conspiracy to 

commit one felony, another felony is committed by one of the conspirators, all 

conspirators are guilty of the felony actually committed, though having no intent to 

commit it, if the offense was committed in furtherance of the unlawful purpose and 

was one that should have been anticipated as a result of the carrying out of the 

conspiracy.”). 
20

committing theft. . . and with intent to obtain or maintain control of the property, 

he: (1) intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to another; or 

(2) intentionally or knowingly threatens or places another in fear of imminent bodily 

injury or death.”9 Id. § 29.02(a). “A person commits criminal conspiracy if, with 

intent that a felony be committed:

(1) he agrees with one or more persons that they or one or more of 

them engage in conduct that would constitute the offense; and

(2) he or one or more of them performs an overt act in pursuance of 

the agreement.

TEX. PENAL CODE § 15.02(a). “An agreement constituting a conspiracy may be 

inferred from acts of the parties.” Id. § 15.02(b); see also Rivas v. State, 473 S.W.3d 

877, 886 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2015, pet. ref’d) (stating “direct evidence of an 

agreement among conspirators is not required and rarely exists”); see also Eggert v.

State, No. 11-05-00227-CR, 2007 WL 1644061, at *1 (Tex. App.—Eastland June 7, 

2007, pet. ref’d) (not designated for publication) (noting that because conspirators’ 

work is clandestine in nature, circumstantial evidence is sufficient to support 

conviction) (citing Butler v. State, 758 S.W.2d 856, 860 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th 

Dist.] 1988, no pet.)).

9 A person commits theft if he unlawfully appropriates property with intent to deprive 

the owner of property. TEX. PENAL CODE § 31.03(a). The offense is a state jail 

felony if “the property is stolen from the person of another.” Id. § 31.03(e)(4)(B). 
21

A person may be convicted as a party to an offense, including capital murder,

“if the offense is committed by his own conduct, by the conduct of another for which 

he is criminally responsible, or by both.” TEX. PENAL CODE § 7.01(a); see Gross v.

State, 380 S.W.3d 181, 186 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). The law of parties, set forth 

under Section 7.02 of the Texas Penal Code, may be applied to a case even though 

no such allegation is contained in the indictment. See In re State ex rel. Weeks, 391 

S.W.3d 117, 124 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (“Regardless of whether it is pled in the 

charging instrument, liability as a party is an available legal theory if it is supported 

by the evidence.”); see also Marable v. State, 85 S.W.3d 287, 287 (Tex. Crim. App.

2002) (“It is well-settled that the law of parties need not be pled in the indictment.”).

Under Section 7.02(a)(2) of the Texas Penal Code, a person is criminally 

responsible for an offense committed by the conduct of another if, acting with intent 

to promote or assist the commission of the offense, he solicits, encourages, directs, 

aids, or attempts to aid the other person to commit the offense. TEX. PENAL CODE

§ 7.02(a)(2). And under Section 7.02(b), a person is criminally responsible for an 

offense committed by another under a theory of conspiracy. That section provides:

If, in the attempt to carry out a conspiracy to commit one felony, 

another felony is committed by one of the conspirators, all conspirators 

are guilty of the felony actually committed, though having no intent to 

commit it, if the offense was committed in furtherance of the unlawful 

purpose and was one that should have been anticipated as a result of the 

carrying out of the conspiracy.

Id. § 7.02(b).
22

When determining whether a person is a party to an offense, courts “may look 

to ‘events before, during, and after the commission of the offense.’” Gross, 380 

S.W.3d at 186 (quoting Wygal v. State, 555 S.W.2d 465, 468–69 (Tex. Crim. App. 

1977)). Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to prove a defendant’s status as a party, 

but “[t]here must be sufficient evidence of an understanding and common design to 

commit the offense.” Id. (citing Guevara v. State, 152 S.W.3d 45, 49 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2004)). “Each fact need not point directly to the guilt of the defendant, as long 

as the cumulative effect of the facts [is] sufficient to support the conviction under 

the law of parties.” Id.

D. Analysis

Jackson argues there is insufficient evidence she conspired with Nelson to 

commit robbery because although she and Nelson agreed that Nelson would steal 

the money bag from Anderson, Jackson and Nelson “never discussed that the theft 

would involve a weapon, and Jackson told the detectives that no one was supposed 

to get hurt.” Jackson further argues that even if she conspired with Nelson to commit 

robbery, there is insufficient evidence she should have foreseen that capital murder 

would result from Nelson carrying out their conspiracy. She argues there is no 

evidence Jackson “encouraged the use of violence” when she and Nelson planned 

the robbery, Jackson has no history of violence, Jackson knew Dollar General 
23

employees are trained not to resist a robber’s demands to hand over money, and 

Jackson did not know Nelson would use a gun during the commission of the robbery.

1. Evidence of Conspiracy to Commit Robbery

The evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, 

establishes that Jackson gave Nelson all the information she needed to carry out the 

robbery, including the time, the place, and the description of the intended victim, 

Anderson. After repeatedly denying that she even knew Nelson, Jackson eventually 

admitted that she had explained to Nelson how Dollar General handles its daily bank 

deposits and that she gave Nelson a description of everyone who worked at the store, 

including Anderson. Jackson, who decided that Anderson would make the midday 

bank run, told Nelson that Anderson was scheduled to arrive at work at 1 p.m., and 

she texted Nelson when Anderson arrived at work and when he left the store to go 

the bank. 

Jackson knew that Nelson was an unemployed heroin addict who needed 

money to pay for her expensive addiction. Jackson admitted that Nelson used drugs 

at her apartment because she could smell “a burnt smell” in her restroom. And as 

she told Detective Brady and Detective Casso, Nelson “needed money” and was 

“desperate for crack.” Jackson also admitted she had seen Nelson with a gun, and 

she knew that Nelson always wore a gun on her hip and never left it behind. Jackson 

also knew Robinson had used the gun before and had been arrested in Georgia for 
24

discharging the gun in Robinson’s sister’s apartment. Robinson testified she told 

Jackson about the gun incident in Georgia, and she also testified that Nelson would 

get agitated when high on drugs. A jury could reasonably infer from this evidence 

that Nelson had a propensity for violence. 

Although she denied knowing that Nelson was planning to bring the gun to 

the robbery, Jackson admitted to Detective Brady and Detective Casso that she 

“probably would have thought that [Nelson] would have carried [the gun].” When 

asked if she had assumed that Nelson was going to bring the gun with her to the 

robbery, Jackson stated, “I didn’t know but yeah, it’s like common sense she was 

probably going to bring it.” Jackson stated that Nelson “always” had the gun with 

her, and she never left it at the apartment because “she always had it.” The jury 

could have reasonably inferred from this evidence that Jackson knew Nelson would 

bring the gun with her to the robbery. See Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13 (stating jury is 

entitled to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts).

After setting the wheels in motion, Jackson stood back and watched from the 

store window as Nelson ran up to Anderson’s car and, after failing to wrestle the 

money away from Anderson, shot at Anderson’s car as he attempted to drive away. 

Jackson, who did nothing to stop Nelson, stayed inside the store after the shooting 

and called the store manager. Unlike Meeks, Jackson never called 911 for help or 

attempted to render aid to Anderson. 
25

Jackson also tried to destroy evidence by throwing her cell phone and the $500 

Nelson left for her at her apartment into a lake later that night. She also misled 

officers at the scene by giving them a fake cell phone number and spending hours 

reviewing surveillance videos with officers at the scene directing them to customers 

who had been in the store prior to the shooting as possible suspects. Jackson was 

also less than forthcoming when she was first interviewed by Detective Brady and 

Detective Casso, repeatedly changing her story when confronted with evidence that 

refuted her claims. And even during her second interview, Jackson was less then 

forthcoming, offering new information or facts only after being pressed for more 

information from Detective Brady and Detective Casso. 

A jury reasonably could conclude from all of this evidence that Jackson 

conspired with Nelson to rob Anderson. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 15.02(b) (“An 

agreement constituting a conspiracy may be inferred from acts of the parties.”); see 

also Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13 (stating jury is entitled to draw reasonable inferences 

from basic facts to ultimate facts). Although Jackson told Detective Brady and 

Detective Casso that the plan was for Nelson to simply grab the money from 

Anderson and run, and that no one was supposed to get hurt, as the sole fact finder, 

it was the jury’s role to assess the weight and credibility of the evidence and resolve 

any conflicts in the evidence and the jury apparently did not find Jackson’s 

statements credible. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326. As the reviewing court, we must 
26

defer to the jury’s resolution of this issue. See id.; see also Ervin v. State, 333 S.W.3d 

187, 201 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. ref’d) (holding evidence 

sufficient to prove defendant conspired to commit robbery because defendant drove 

alleged co-conspirators to carwash, co-conspirators had guns and were wearing 

bandana masks and hoodies, defendant knew co-conspirators were going to rob man

washing his car, and defendant picked up co-conspirators from carwash after 

robbery); Nunez v. State, 215 S.W.3d 537, 541 (Tex. App.—Waco 2007, pet. ref’d) 

(holding evidence sufficient to prove defendant conspired to rob restaurant because 

defendant hid in bushes near restaurant late at night wearing dark clothes and ski 

cap, fled from scene, took same path of escape as alleged co-conspirator, and gun 

and ski cap were found near bushes); Hanson v. State, 55 S.W.3d 681, 690 (Tex. 

App.—Austin 2001, pet. ref’d) (holding evidence sufficient to prove robbery 

conspiracy when defendant knew about plan to rob victim at victim’s home by 

hitting victim over his head, went with alleged co-conspirators to victim’s home, 

carried hammer used in attack in his knapsack, and afterwards retrieved hammer and 

washed knife used by co-conspirators to attack victim); Thompson v. State, 54 

S.W.3d 88, 95 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2001, pet. ref’d) (holding evidence sufficient to 

prove robbery conspiracy because defendant knew of plan to rob two men, defendant 

participated in plan, and noting lack of evidence “that any member of the group did

anything but cooperate with the terms of the plan to commit robbery”).
27

2. Evidence of Murder as a Foreseeable Result

Based on this same evidence, a jury also reasonably could conclude that 

Jackson should have foreseen the possibility of murder occurring during the course 

of the robbery given that Nelson was an unemployed heroin addict with a propensity 

for violence who was desperate for money and always carried a gun with her. See

Love v. State, 199 S.W.3d 447, 453 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. ref’d) 

(“Evidence that a defendant knew his co-conspirators might use guns in the course 

of the robbery can be sufficient to demonstrate that the defendant should have 

anticipated the possibility of murder occurring during the course of the robbery.”); 

see also Ervin, 333 S.W.3d at 201–02 (holding murder was anticipated result when 

defendant participated in robbery conspiracy and knew co-conspirators were armed). 

While Jackson told the Detectives she did not know Nelson was going to bring the 

gun with her to the robbery or think that Nelson would bring it with her, it was the 

jury’s exclusive role to assess the weight and credibility of the evidence and resolve 

any conflicts in the evidence. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326. As the reviewing court, 

we must presume the jury resolved any conflicts in favor of the prosecution and we 

defer to the jury’s resolution. See id. 

Jackson argues this case is distinguishable from our prior opinion in Love v. 

State, 199 S.W.3d 447 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. ref’d). In Love,

the defendant, who worked as a night manager for Whataburger, recognized one of 
28

the men in a car that pulled up to the drive-through window, and he went outside to 

speak to him. Id. at 449. The defendant told that man, his co-conspirator, that he

should return to the restaurant to commit a robbery on a night when the defendant

worked, and they would pretend not to know one another, and the defendant would 

give him the money. Id. The defendant told his co-conspirator that if someone else 

was working that night, he should not believe any employee who told him he did not 

have keys to the restaurant’s safe or know how to open the safe because that 

employee could open the safe. Id. 

When the defendant came back inside the store, he told his co-workers that 

the men he had been talking to outside had guns and were attempting to rob someone 

at the restaurant, but that the defendant knew one of the men and was able to 

convince them not to rob anyone. Id. The defendant told everyone to be careful in 

case the men attempted to rob someone at the restaurant again. Id. at 449–50. The 

defendant, who left work early the night of the robbery, left an intellectually disabled 

co-worker in charge of the restaurant. Id. at 450. The co-worker was shot and killed 

when he refused to provide the keys to the safe to the co-conspirator. Id. at 451.

On appeal, this Court held there was sufficient evidence the defendant should 

have anticipated there was a possibility one of his co-conspirators would commit 

murder during the course of the robbery he helped plan. Id. at 453–54. Jackson 

argues there is insufficient evidence she should have anticipated the possibility
29

Nelson would commit murder during the course of the robbery because unlike the 

defendant in Love, she did nothing to increase the chance of force or violence being 

used in the robbery, and she did not know that Nelson would use a gun during the 

robbery. On the contrary, the jury reasonably could have inferred that Jackson knew 

Nelson would bring the gun with her to the robbery because Jackson knew Nelson 

always carried a gun with her, she “probably would have thought that [Nelson] 

would have carried [the gun]” to the robbery, and she admitted it was “like common 

sense [Nelson] was probably going to bring it” to the robbery. See Hooper, 214 

S.W.3d at 13 (stating jury is entitled to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts 

to ultimate facts). Although Jackson may not have done anything to increase the 

likelihood Nelson would use force or violence to accomplish the robbery, such 

conduct is not required to establish criminal liability under the law of the parties, nor 

is the absence of such evidence dispositive in a sufficiency of evidence inquiry. See

Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319 (stating courts examine all evidence in light most favorable 

to jury’s verdict to determine whether any “rational trier of fact could have found 

the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt”).

We thus hold there is sufficient evidence supporting the jury’s finding that 

Jackson conspired with Nelson to commit robbery, and that Jackson, who knew that 

Nelson always had her gun with her and never left it behind, should have foreseen 
30

the possibility of murder occurring during Nelson’s efforts to carry out their 

conspiracy to rob Anderson. 

We overrule Jackson’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting 

her conviction for capital murder.

Conclusion

We affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

Veronica Rivas-Molloy

Justice 

Panel consists of Justices Goodman, Landau, and Rivas-Molloy.

Do Not Publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).