If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

-1-

S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

MARILYN WILLIAMS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

and

MERCYLAND HEALTH SERVICES and 

GREATER LAKES AMBULATORY SURGERY 

CENTER,

Intervening Plaintiffs,

FOR PUBLICATION

January 28, 2021

9:25 a.m.

v No. 349903

Wayne Circuit Court

FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE 

COMPANY OF MICHIGAN,

LC No. 17-015281-NF

Defendant-Appellee.

Before: GLEICHER, P.J., AND K. F. KELLY AND SHAPIRO, JJ.

SHAPIRO, J.

Plaintiff Marilyn Williams appeals the trial court’s order granting summary disposition in 

favor of defendant Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company of Michigan under MCR 

2.116(C)(10), on the basis that plaintiff made a false or fraudulent statement related to her claim 

for no-fault benefits in violation of an antifraud provision in its policy. In light of the Supreme 

Court’s recent decision in Meemic Ins Co v Fortson, ___ Mich ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2020) (Docket 

No. 158302), we reverse. 

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was injured in an automobile collision on September 1, 2016. She filed a claim 

for personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits with defendant, her no-fault insurer. Defendant 

denied the claim and plaintiff filed suit on October 20, 2017. 

Defendant moved for summary disposition on the ground that plaintiff’s policy, including 

her PIP coverage, was void because she had violated an antifraud provision in the policy by making 
2

false statements to defendant after her auto accident regarding her employment, the extent of her 

injuries and her need for assistance. Because the issue presented is purely legal, we need not 

recapitulate the details of the alleged fraud. The provision relied on by defendant provided that 

the policy would be void if a claimant made a material misrepresentation either in procuring the 

policy or in the course of postprocurement claims. The relevant provision in the policy reads: 

The entire policy will be void if whether before or after a loss, you, any 

family member, or any insured under this policy has:

1. Intentionally concealed or misrepresented any material fact or 

circumstances;

2. engaged in fraudulent conduct; or

3. made false statements;

relating to this insurance or to a loss to which this insurance applies.

Significantly, defendant does not claim that plaintiff committed fraud in the inducement, 

i.e., plaintiff did not make any material misrepresentations when applying for and purchasing 

defendant’s no-fault policy. Nor does defendant claim in its motion that the evidence concerning 

the accident, injury and treatment, seen in the light most favorable to plaintiff, would be 

insufficient to qualify for PIP benefits. Defendant sought dismissal solely on the allegations of 

postprocurement fraud. The trial court granted the motion and this appeal followed.

II. ANALYSIS

A. 

In Meemic, ___ Mich ___, the Michigan Supreme Court considered whether a no-fault 

insurer may rely on a contractual antifraud provision to deny a claim or void or rescind a policy

when the benefits in question are those mandated by statute, such as PIP benefits, as opposed to 

optional coverages such as uninsured motorist coverage. The Court concluded that as to benefits 

mandated by the no-fault act, MCL 500.3101 et seq., a no-fault policy may not provide for defenses 

to coverage other than those in the no-fault act or that existed in common law and were not 

abrogated by the act. The Court unambiguously concluded that antifraud provisions are invalid to 

the degree they purport to apply to misrepresentations or fraud that occur after the policy has been 

issued (postprocurement fraud) but upheld such provisions as long as they are limited to fraud in 

the inducement (preprocurement fraud). In the opinion’s concise opening paragraph, the Court 

explained the legal problem and resolved it:

Meemic Insurance Company seeks to void its policy with defendants Louise and 

Richard Fortson and stop paying no-fault benefits to their son. Although the 

benefits are mandated by statute, Meemic seeks to avoid its statutory obligations 

by enforcing the antifraud provision in the policy. The issue before the Court is the 

extent to which a contractual defense like the one here is valid and enforceable 

when applied to coverage mandated by the no-fault act, MCL 500.3101 et seq. We 

hold that such contractual provisions are valid when based on a defense to 

mandatory coverage provided in the no-fault act itself or on a common-law defense 
3

that has not been abrogated by the act. Because Meemic’s fraud defense is 

grounded on neither the no-fault act nor the common law, it is invalid and 

unenforceable. [Id. at ___; slip op at 1-2 (emphasis added).]

In determining that the antifraud provision did not have a basis in the common law, the 

Court distinguished postprocurement fraud from fraud in the inducement:

[T]he fraudulent activity at issue here did not relate to the inception of the contract.

The fraudulent attendant-care bills . . . neither induced Meemic to enter into the 

policy nor deceived Meemic as to the contents of the policy. Meemic could not 

possibly have relied on any fraudulent misrepresentations when it agreed to insure 

the Fortsons in 2009 because, at the time, they had not yet made any of the alleged 

misrepresentations. . . . In short, Meemic’s contract-based fraud defense fails 

because it is not the type of common-law fraud that would allow for rescission. [Id. 

at ___; slip op at 17-18 (emphasis added).]

The Court forcefully reiterated its view that a no-fault policy may provide for nonstatutory

policy-based exclusions and defenses only as to optional coverages, not mandatory ones such as 

PIP benefits: “[O]ne thing that is not open to debate is that the [no-fault] act governs the coverages 

it mandates, and the insurance policy controls coverages that are optional (i.e., not required by the 

act)[.]” Id. at ___; slip op at 6. The Legislature did not include postprocurement 

misrepresentations among the grounds in MCL 500.3113 on which a court may conclude that the 

claimant is not entitled to PIP benefits, though it could readily have been included.1

It is clear that the text of the no-fault act does not authorize insurers to void or rescind a

no-fault policy on the basis of fraud or misrepresentation. Because fraud is not a statutory defense, 

the sole remaining question is whether that defense existed at common law and survived the 

adoption of a no-fault system. Meemic concluded that under common law, fraud constituted 

grounds to void a contract only as to preprocurement fraud:

[W]e must consider whether Meemic’s fraud defense is available at common law. 

As we explained in [Titan Ins Co v Hyten, 491 Mich 547, 555; 817 NW2d 562 

(2012)], “Michigan’s contract law recognizes several interrelated but distinct 

common-law doctrines—loosely aggregated under the rubric of ‘fraud’—that may 

entitle a party to a legal or equitable remedy if a contract is obtained as a result of 

 

1 The grounds set forth in MCL 500.3113 are the knowing use of an unlawfully taken vehicle, 

MCL 500.3113(a), a failure to carry the security required by MCL 500.3101 or 500.3103 on the 

vehicle involved in the accident, MCL 500.3113(b), or when a claimant is an out-of-state occupant 

of a vehicle not registered in Michigan that was not insured by an insurer that has filed a 

certification in compliance with MCL 500.3163, see MCL 500.3113(c). And notably, in MCL 

500.3173a(4) the Legislature has demonstrated that it knows how to adopt legislation making 

postprocurement fraud grounds for denial of a claim. That statute provides that, as to claims filed 

with the Michigan automobile insurance placement facility, provision of material false information 

renders the claimant ineligible for benefits and classifies such an act as a fraudulent insurance act 

under MCL 500.4503.
4

fraud or misrepresentation.” The key phrase is “if a contract is obtained as a result 

of fraud or misrepresentation.” Id. [Id. at ___; slip op at 13.]

The Court continued, “At common law, the defrauded party could only seek rescission, or 

avoidance of the transaction, if the fraud related to the inducement to or inception of the contract.” 

Id. at ___; slip op at 13-14 (emphasis in original). Thus, where the fraud alleged was not in “the 

inducement to or inception of the contract,” there is no common-law basis to rescind or avoid 

performance.

Meemic also explained that applying such antifraud provisions to mandatory coverage 

undermines the entire no-fault system. It stated that “[t]o allow such provisions would reduce the 

scope of the mandatory coverage required by the no-fault act, as supplemented by the common 

law. It would in short, vitiate the act.” Id. at ___; slip op at 10 (emphasis added). And were there

any doubt as to the import of its decision, the Court recapped its holding at the end of the opinion:

“[W]e hold that [the] contractual antifraud provision is invalid and unenforceable because it is 

not based on a statutory or unabrogated common-law defense.” Id. at ___; slip op at 24 (emphasis 

added). 

In the instant case, the allegedly fraudulent statements were made postprocurement and did 

not influence or induce the policy’s procurement. The rule of law clearly set forth in Meemic

requires that we reverse the trial court.

B. 

Whether postprocurement fraud could void a PIP policy has only became significant since 

this Court’s decision in Bahri v IDS Prop Cas Ins Co, 308 Mich App 420, 424-425; 864 NW2d 

609 (2014), which applied an antifraud provision to postprocurement fraud in a PIP case. Prior to 

Bahri, no case of record had ever held that false statements by a Michigan no-fault insured—other 

than those relevant to fraud in the inducement—were grounds to void or rescind a policy. Since 

Bahri, claims of fraud asserted by no-fault insurers against their insureds have become 

commonplace. 

Bahri did not provide extensive analysis in support of its holding. Rather, it relied 

exclusively on Mina v Gen Star Indemnity Co, 218 Mich App 678, 686; 555 NW2d 1 (1996) rev’d 

in part on other grounds 455 Mich 866; 568 NW2d 80 (1997), a fire insurance case governed by a 

wholly different statute, MCL 500.2833. That statute not only permits insurers to incorporate

antifraud provisions in their policies, its plain text requires fire insurance policies to include a 

provision “[t]hat the policy may be void on the basis of misrepresentation, fraud, or concealment.” 

MCL 500.2833(1)(c). Such a clause in a fire insurance policy is entirely consistent with the 

controlling statute. However, Mina provides no support for the notion that such a clause is 

consistent with the no-fault act, which does not contain such language. And Bahri neglected to 

examine or explain why no-fault insurance policies should be governed by a fire insurance statute

containing critical language missing from the no-fault act. Indeed, the inclusion of a fraud remedy 

in MCL 500.2833 reflects the Legislature’s awareness that such provisions are warranted in certain 

circumstances, and strongly suggests that the Legislature deliberately adopted a different approach
5

when it enacted the no-fault act.

2

 In sum, by concluding that a single misrepresentation in the 

course of a PIP claim was ground to deny all benefits and void the contract on summary 

disposition, Bahri announced a rule of law unrooted in precedent or statutory authority.

Further, Bahri never considered whether the antifraud provision it upheld was consistent 

with the no-fault act insofar as it was applied to fraud other than fraud in the inducement—it merely 

assumed that to be the case despite the absence of supporting caselaw. And the no-fault act does

provide other grounds for denial of benefits. For example, Meemic points out that “MCL 500.3113 

lists several of . . . these circumstances, including, for example, when a person willingly operates 

an unlawfully taken vehicle or operates a vehicle as to which he or she was an excluded operator. 

The no-fault act, however, does not provide a fraud defense to PIP coverage.”3 Id. at ___; slip op 

at 12 (emphasis added). 

Contrary to defendant’s suggestion, limiting no-fault antifraud provisions to fraud in the 

inducement—as required by Meemic—will not leave no-fault insurers without recourse in the 

event of a fraudulent claim. An insurer maintains the power to deny claims or parts of claims it 

believes fraudulent. The plaintiff then bears the burden of filing suit and ultimately proving that 

she was injured in an auto accident and that the injury resulted in reasonable and necessary medical 

care and other covered expenses. 

Furthermore, the Legislature provided a specific remedy for postprocurement fraud in the 

no-fault act itself. MCL 500.3148(2) permits an insurer to recoup attorney fees “in defending 

against a claim that was in some respect fraudulent or so excessive as to have no reasonable 

foundation.” The fact that the no-fault act provides a specific mechanism for relief in the context 

of a fraudulent claim further supports that materially different remedies created by the insurance 

policy are not valid. “It is a general rule of law in Michigan that when a statute creates a new right 

or imposes a new duty having no counterpart in the common law the remedies provided in the 

statute for violation are exclusive and not cumulative.” Ohlsen v DST Indus, Inc, 111 Mich App 

580, 583; 314 NW2d 699 (1981), citing Pompey v General Motors Corp, 385 Mich 537; 189 

NW2d 243 (1971).

C.

Meemic did not consider the legal underpinnings of Bahri or the many cases that have 

followed it. The Supreme Court mentioned Bahri only in a footnote and declined to determine 

 

2 The only other case cited in Bahri was TBCI PC v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 289 Mich App 

39; 795 NW2d 229 (2010). But that case did not address whether or not antifraud provisions were 

permissible in no-fault policies. The question in TCBI was whether a prior jury’s finding of fraud 

by the claimant constituted res judicata as to the claimant’s medical provider when it filed their 

own suit for reimbursement. Id. at 40-44. The jury’s finding in the prior case that the claimant 

had committed fraud and so was not entitled to coverage was not appealed, and so the validity of 

the antifraud provision was never considered by this Court. 

3 As noted in fn 1, this does not apply if the claim is made to the Michigan automobile insurance 

placement facility. MCL 500.3173a(2).
6

whether and to what extent that case survived its holding. The footnote does contain a suggestion 

that the Court might view Bahri’s reach differently when the claimant is the named insured: 

The Court of Appeals has upheld a fraud-exclusion provision when the fraud related 

to proof of loss on a claim rather than fraud in the procurement or execution of the 

policy. See Bahri v IDS Prop Cas Ins Co, 308 Mich App 420, 425; 864 NW2d 609 

(2014); but see Shelton [v Auto-Owners Ins Co], 318 Mich App 648, 652-655; 899 

NW2d 744 (2017) (limiting Bahri to when the claimant is an insured under the 

defendant's policy). A leading treatise has explained that “to avoid a policy on the 

ground of fraud or false swearing in the proof of loss, the statement in question 

must be material.” 13A Couch, Insurance, 3d (2019 rev ed), § 197:18, pp 48-49.

In this case, however, because there is no allegation of fraud in relation to Justin’s 

claim for benefits, the Court need not address the issue of whether and to what 

extent fraud related to proof of loss can justify voiding the policy. Moreover, 

because this case involves fraud by someone other than the claim beneficiary, the 

Court need not address whether a clause voiding a policy for postprocurement fraud 

would be valid as applied to fraud by an individual who is both a policyholder and 

the claim beneficiary. [Meemic, ___ Mich at ___; slip op at 16 n 15.]

Despite this hint that Bahri might survive in some form if the claimant was also the policy holder,

the Court resoundingly rejected such an approach later in the opinion by explaining that the 

claimant’s relation to the policy did not alter its conclusion that the antifraud provision was 

inconsistent with the no-fault act:

[T]he correct framework for deciding this case has nothing to do with the nowabrogated innocent third-party doctrine. . . . The dispositive question in this case 

turns upon the nature of the common-law fraud defense—specifically, that it must 

relate to the contract’s inception—which is irrelevant to [the claimant’s] status as a 

third party. [Id. at ___; slip op at 18 n 17.]

Thus, Meemic did not turn on the fact that the claimant was not a party to the contract, but on the 

holding that antifraud provisions may not be applied to PIP claims, other than fraud in the 

inducement. 

By addressing Bahri only tangentially and declining to adopt its holding, the Meemic Court 

left it to our Court to sort out what now remains of Bahri.

4 We conclude that Bahri remains good 

 

4 Our dissenting colleague concludes that Meemic “expressly exempted this scenario from its 

holding,” because plaintiff is both the policyholder and the claim beneficiary. We agree. But the 

task before us is to answer the legal question expressly left open by the Court, i.e., whether, given 

Meemic’s holding and reasoning, “a clause voiding a policy for postprocurement fraud would be 

valid as applied to fraud by an individual who is both a policyholder and the claim beneficiary.” 

Meemic, ___ Mich at ___; slip op at 16 n 15. The dissent fails to offer any explanation how Bahri

remains viable as applied to postprocurement fraud in light of Meemic.
7

law only to the extent that it is consistent with the no-fault act and common law as explained in 

Meemic. In other words, it applies only in cases of fraud in the inducement.5

Our dissenting colleague focuses much of her argument on the evidence of statements made 

by plaintiff that appear to be false. We agree that given the evidence before us, plaintiff likely 

testified falsely at one or both depositions. Sorting out the truth is a jury function, however. And 

here, the task is complicated by the fact that determining whether plaintiff was truthful may hinge 

on an assessment of the credibility of others, including her friend for whom she testified in a 

separate case. Moreover, this case does not involve a single claim for benefits, but many such 

claims. Sorting out whether plaintiff testified falsely about her eligibility for replacement care 

benefits, for example, does not tell us whether she was entitled to recover medical benefits for 

reasonable and necessary medical care. Assessing truth and weighing evidence are not within a 

judge’s purview under MCR 2.116(C)(10). Sabbagh v Hamilton Psychological Servs, PLC, 329 

Mich App 324, 346; 941 NW2d 685 (2019).

We agree with the dissent that plaintiff’s statements are fodder for impeachment and some 

are likely admissible as substantive evidence. The question in this case is not whether plaintiff 

committed postprocurement fraud—that is an inherently fact and credibility-driven analysis. The 

question is whether the fraud provision in defendant’s policy is enforceable as to postprocurement 

fraud so as to enable a court to sustain a preemptive denial of all coverage, even where some or all 

of claim is meritorious. A fact-finder is free, and has always been free, to conclude that some or 

all of plaintiff’s claimed benefits were properly denied by defendant. And the trial court is free to 

conclude that the claim “was in some respect fraudulent or so excessive as to have no reasonable 

foundation,” in which case it may award the insurer its attorney fees. MCL 500.3148(2). But the 

no-fault act makes clear that those determinations must take place at the end of a trial, not before 

one has begun.

III. CONCLUSION

Meemic held that antifraud provisions in no-fault policies apply to fraud in the inducement 

but not to allegations of postprocurement fraud. Accordingly, the policy provision on which 

defendant and the trial court relied is “invalid and unenforceable” to the degree a no-fault insurer 

seeks to apply it to allegations of postprocurement fraud in a claim under a mandatory coverage, 

as in this case. Meemic, ___ Mich at ___; slip op at 24. The order of summary disposition is 

 

5 Meemic also allowed that a fraud exclusion may be “valid as applied to a party’s failure to 

perform a substantial part of the contract or one of its essential terms.” Meemic, ___ Mich at ___; 

slip op at 16. Here, however, as Meemic demonstrates, there is no basis to conclude that a PIP 

policy’s fraud provision is an essential term as the contract would be binding and fully consistent 

with the no-fault act without the provision. The terms that are essential to a PIP policy are those 

defined in the Act. “As a general rule, Michigan’s no-fault insurance system is a comprehensive 

scheme of compensation designed to provide sure and speedy recovery of certain economic losses 

resulting from motor vehicle accidents.” Bazzi v Sentinel Ins Co, 502 Mich 390, 396; 919 NW2d 

20 (2018) (quotation marks and citations omitted).
8

reversed and the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain 

jurisdiction.

/s/ Douglas B. Shapiro 

/s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher