alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1996
<CASH>                                           4,803
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   40,679
<ALLOWANCES>                                    11,461
<INVENTORY>                                     10,157
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                45,694
<PP&E>                                          32,429
<DEPRECIATION>                                  21,324
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  60,650
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           37,014
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                      6,277
<COMMON>                                            16
<OTHER-SE>                                      17,343
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    60,650
<SALES>                                         74,995
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                87,882
<CGS>                                           47,193
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   49,888
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                50,713
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 973
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (13,671)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (13,671)
<DISCONTINUED>                                 (6,689)
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (20,360)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (1.46)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (1.46)


</TABLE>
**Exhibit32.1**

 

 

 

CERTIFICATION OF THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C.SECTION 1350,AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

 

 

 

In connection with the Quarterly Report ofInternational Aluminum Corporation (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the periodending September 30, 2004, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission(the “Report”), I, Cornelius C. Vanderstar, the Chairman of the Board and ChiefExecutive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that tomy knowledge:

 

1.                           The Reportfully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of theSecurities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

2.                           The informationcontained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, thefinancial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 

 

 
| Date:    November 9, 2004 | /s/ CORNELIUS C.  VANDERSTAR |
|-------------------------------------|------------------------------|
|                                | Cornelius C. Vanderstar      |
|                                | Chairman of the Board  and   |
|                                | Chief Executive Officer      |

 

 

1

----
EXHIBIT
32.1




CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO


18
U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002




In
connection with the Quarterly Report of Diatect International Corporation (the
"Company") on Form 10-KSB for the year ended December 31, 2007 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, David
Andrus, Principal Executive Officer and Principal Accounting Officer, certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to Section906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:




(1) The
Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and




(2) The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.











March
      18, 2008
            /s/ David
      AndrusDavid
      S. AndrusPrincipal
      Executive OfficerPrincipal
      Financial Officer

























---
#### MARY SOGGE, aka MARY JOHNSON, Appellant, v. RICHARD SOGGE, Respondent.

No. 9294

March 2, 1978

575 P.2d 590

*John Peter Lee,*Las Vegas, for Appellant.

*Bell, Leavitt & Green, Las*Vegas, for Respondent.

OPINION

*Per Curiam:*

Richard and Mary Sogge were granted a divorce on January 9, 1973. Pursuant to the decree, appellant Mary Sogge was awarded custody of the four minor children, with respondent Richard Sogge accorded reasonable visitation rights.

On May 13, 1976, respondent moved to modify the decree to change control and custody of the children. Appellant, in turn, filed a motion on June 11, 1976, for attorney’s fees and deposition costs to enable her to oppose respondent’s motion. Appellant’s affidavits filed in support of her motion stated she had received no support payments since April 30, 1976, had no money on hand or in any account, and could not afford to retain an attorney to represent her interests.

*89Respondent’s affidavit filed in opposition to appellant’s motion stated he had given appellant $520,000 plus child support since the divorce. After a hearing on the motion, the trial judge ordered respondent to pay appellant’s counsel $600 as and for costs, specifically reserving his final ruling on the motion.

On October 4, 1976, the court awarded respondent custody of the children. The court also denied appellant’s motion for attorney’s fees and costs and ordered the parties to pay their own costs. Appellant contends the district court erred in denying her motion for attorney’s fees. We disagree.

The award of attorney’s fees in divorce proceedings lies within the sound discretion of the trial judge and where, as here, the record is barren of any evidence of abuse of that discretion, the trial judge’s determination will not be disturbed on appeal. Woodruff v. Woodruff, 94 Nev. 1, 573 P.2d 206 (1978); Applebaum v. Applebaum, 93 Nev. 382, 566 P.2d 85 (1977); Fletcher v. Fletcher, 89 Nev. 540, 516 P.2d 103 (1973).

Affirmed.
[Federal Register Volume 70, Number 202 (Thursday, October 20, 2005)]
[Notices]
[Page 61174]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 05-21015]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS


Clinical Science Research and Development Service Cooperative 
Studies Scientific Merit Review Board; Notice of Meeting

    The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) gives notice under Public 
Law 92-463 (Federal Advisory Committee Act) that a meeting of the 
Clinical Science Research and Development Service Cooperative Studies 
Scientific Merit Review Board will be held on November 2-3, 2005, at 
the Sheraton National Hotel--Arlington, 900 South Orme Street, 
Arlington, VA 22204. The sessions are scheduled to begin at 8 a.m. and 
end at 3 p.m.
    The Board advises the Chief Research and Development Officer 
through the Director of the Clinical Science Research and Development 
Service on the relevance and feasibility of proposed studies, the 
adequacy of the protocols, and the scientific validity and propriety of 
technical details, including protection of human subjects.
    The sessions each day will open to the public from 8 a.m. to 8:30 
a.m. for the discussion of administrative matters and the general 
status of the program. The sessions will be closed from 8:30 a.m. to 3 
p.m. for the Board's review of research and development applications.
    During the closed sessions of the meeting, discussions and 
recommendations will deal with qualifications of personnel conducting 
the studies, staff and consultant critiques of research proposals and 
similar documents, and the medical records of patients who are study 
subjects, he disclosure of which would constitute a clearly 
unwarrantwed invasion of personal privacy. As provided by section 10(d) 
of Public Law 92-463, as amended, closing portions of this meeting is 
in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552b(c)(6) and (c)(9)(B).
    Those who plan to attend should contact Dr. Grant Huang, Assistant 
Director, Cooperative Studies Program (125), Department of Veterans 
Affairs, 810 Vermont Avenue, NW., Washington, DC 20420, at (202) 254-
0183.

    Dated: October 13, 2005.

    By direction of the Secretary.
E. Philip Riggin,
Committee Management Officer.
[FR Doc. 05-21015 Filed 10-19-05; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8320-01-M
#### CAMERON M. McRAE and wife, ALETA M. McRAE v. JERRY MOORE and wife, JENNETTE MOORE

No. 7613DC1

(Filed 19 May 1976)

Appeal and Error § 6; Rules of Civil Procedure § 54— judgment not adjudicating all claims — premature appeal

Purported appeal is premature where the judgment appealed from adjudicates fewer than all the claims of the parties and contains no finding by the trial judge that there is no just reason for delay. G.S. 1A-1, Rule 54(b).

Appeal by plaintiffs from *Satols, Judge.*Judgment entered 24 September 1975 in District Court, Brunswick County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 13 April 1976.

This is a civil action wherein plaintiffs, Cameron M. Mc-Rae and wife, Aleta M. McRae, seek specific performance of an *508option contract with defendants, Jerry Moore and wife, Jennette Moore, to purchase a house and lot located in Brunswick County, North Carolina. In their complaint, plaintiffs alleged that they entered into an option to purchase a piece of property from defendants described as follows:

“Rt. #1, Box 379-A Causeway RD Brunswick Cty., Supply, N. C. Approximately 105 x 209.7 lot size presently occupied by Cameron M. & wife Aleta M. McRae as Residence and Real Estate Office.”

They alleged further that prior to the expiration of the option agreement they “notified the defendants that they were exercising the option and tendered to the defendants the full purchase price . . . ” , but defendants refused to convey the property.

In their answer, defendants admitted entering into the option with plaintiffs but denied that plaintiffs had exercised the option in accordance with its terms. They likewise filed a counterclaim for rent and for damages allegedly resulting from the filing of a *lis pendens*on the property by plaintiffs.

After a trial without a jury, the judge made findings and concluded that plaintiffs were not entitled to specific performance. The court also concluded that plaintiffs were indebted to defendants for unpaid rent and entered a judgment on defendants’ counterclaim for rent in the amount of $375.00. Plaintiffs appealed.

*Powell and Smith by William A. Powell for plaintiff appellants.*

*Mason H. Anderson by Douglas W. Baxley for defendant appellees.*

HEDRICK, Judge.

The court made no adjudication of defendants’ counterclaim for damages allegedly resulting because plaintiffs filed a *lis pendens*on the property after the expiration of the option, which prevented defendants “from selling their property or from using it as collateral to obtain money badly needed in their business affairs.” Thus, the judgment from which plaintiffs appeal adjudicates fewer than all the claims of the parties.

Since the trial court made no determination that “there is no just reason for delay,” the judgment “does not terminate the *509action as to any of the claims,” G.S. 1A-1, Rule 54(b), and is not now appealable. *Durham v. Creech,*25 N.C. App. 721, 214 S.E. 2d 612 (1975) ; *Leasing, Inc. v. Dan-Cleve Corp.,*25 N.C. App. 18, 212 S.E. 2d 41 (1975), *cert. denied*288 N.C. 241, 216 S.E. 2d 910 (1975) ; *Arnold v. Howard,*24 N.C. App. 255, 210 S.E. 2d 492 (1974).

Appeal dismissed.

Chief Judge Brock and Judge Clark concur.
#### STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JOE LEWIS MOORE

No. 7418SC396

(Filed 15 May 1974)

Appeal by defendant from *Kivett, Judge,*at the 8 October 1973 Criminal Session of Guilford Superior Court.

Heard in the Court of Appeals 23 April 1974.

The defendant was indicted for armed robbery and convicted of common-law robbery. The State’s evidence tended to show that the prosecuting witness, George Lester Anderson, on the afternoon of 5 December 1972, was walking to the bus stop on the corner of McCulloch Street and Asheboro Street in Greensboro, North Carolina. Mr. Anderson was jumped by two men, Rudolph “Sonny” Gentry and the defendant, Joe Lewis Moore, who knocked Mr. Anderson to the ground and began patting his pockets. Mr. Anderson kicked his assailants and got to his feet. At this time a third assailant, Tommy Lee Miller, came out of the nearby hedge and struck Mr. Anderson in the head with a knife. Miller held the knife to Mr. Anderson’s throat while the defendant grabbed Anderson’s feet and pulled them from under him. Defendant then ripped open Mr. Anderson’s pants pocket and took his billfold, which contained $415.00. The defendant also took Mr. Anderson’s watch. Miller, Gentry and the defendant then fled. From a verdict of guilty of common-law robbery and a sentence of 10 years, the defendant appealed.

*Attorney General Robert Morgan by Assistant Attorney General Claude W. Harris for the State.*

*Public Defender Wallace C. Harrelson for defendant appellant.*

CAMPBELL, Judge.

This appeal presents only the face of the record for our review. We have reviewed the record and find no prejudicial error.

No error.

Judges Morris and Vaughn concur.
United States Department of Labor

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

__________________________________________

C.D., Appellant

and

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, PUGET 

SOUND NAVAL SHIPYARD & 

INTERMEDIATE MAINTENANCE FACILITY, 

Bremerton, WA, Employer

__________________________________________

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Docket No. 20-1516

Issued: May 28, 2021

Appearances: Case Submitted on the Record

Appellant, pro se

Office of Solicitor, for the Director

ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL

Before:

ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Chief Judge

PATRICIA H. FITZGERALD, Alternate Judge

VALERIE D. EVANS-HARRELL, Alternate Judge

On August 10, 2020 appellant sought an appeal from two July 29, 2020 merit decisions of 

the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). The Clerk of the Appellate Boards 

assigned Docket No. 20-1516.

The Board, having duly considered the matter, notes that the Board has jurisdiction to 

review final adverse decisions of OWCP issued under the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act.1 

The case record as transmitted to the Board does not contain a final adverse decision of OWCP 

issued within 180 days from the date of docketing of the current appeal.2 

As there is no final adverse decision issued by OWCP over which the Board may properly 

exercise jurisdiction, the Board concludes that the appeal docketed as No. 20-1516 must be 

dismissed. Accordingly,

 

1 5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.; 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3(a).

2 20 C.F.R. § 501.3(e) provides in pertinent part: “Any notice of appeal must be filed within 180 days from the 

date of issuance of a decision of the OWCP.”
2

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the appeal docketed as No. 20-1516 is dismissed.

Issued: May 28, 2021

Washington, DC

Alec J. Koromilas, Chief Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Patricia H. Fitzgerald, Alternate Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Valerie D. Evans-Harrell, Alternate Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
**Avis juridique important**

*|*

# 31998R1400

**Commission Regulation (EC) No 1400/98 of 30 June 1998 amending Regulation (EEC) No 2235/92 laying down detailed rules for the application of the aid for the consumption of fresh milk products in the Canary Islands***Official Journal L 187 , 01/07/1998 P. 0054 - 0055*

COMMISSION REGULATION (EC) No 1400/98 of 30 June 1998 amending Regulation (EEC) No 2235/92 laying down detailed rules for the application of the aid for the consumption of fresh milk products in the Canary Islands

THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community,

Having regard to Council Regulation (EEC) No 1601/92 of 15 June 1992 concerning specific measures for the Canary Islands with regard to certain agricultural products (1), as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 2348/96 (2), and in particular Article 11 thereof,

Whereas Article 1 of Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2235/92 (3), as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 1802/95 (4), provides for the grant of aid for the human consumption of fresh cows' milk products produced in the Canary Islands within the limit of consumption requirements in those islands; Whereas, in view of the shift in local consumption habits towards more skimmed-milk products, and as a result of a request by the Spanish authorities, the list of fresh milk products set out in the Annex to Regulation (EEC) No 2235/92 should be amended;

Whereas the measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Management Committee for Milk Products,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1 

The Annex to Regulation (EEC) No 2235/92 is hereby replaced by the Annex to this Regulation.

Article 2 

This Regulation shall enter into force on the day of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Communities.

It shall apply from 1 July 1998.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 30 June 1998.

For the Commission

Franz FISCHLER

Member of the Commission

(1) OJ L 173, 27. 6. 1992, p. 13.

(2) OJ L 320, 11. 12. 1996, p. 1.

(3) OJ L 218, 1. 8. 1992, p. 105.

(4) OJ L 174, 26. 7. 1995, p. 27.

ANNEX 

'ANNEX

List of products eligible for the Community aid referred to in Article 11(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1601/92:

1. drinking milk;

2. cream;

3. yoghurt;

4. fresh cheese with a fat content by weight of dry matter of not less than 40 %`.
#### JUSTIN H. JOHNSON, Appellant and Cross-Respondent, v. MARCIA J. WHIPPLE, Respondent and Cross-Appellant.

Nos. 9407 and 9757

May 17, 1978

578 P.2d 1189

[Rehearing denied June 28, 1978]

*Hawkins, Rhodes, Sharp & Barbagelata*and *M. Craig Haase,*of Reno, for Appellant and Cross-Respondent.

*Vargas, Bartlett & Dixon*and *Philip G. Satre,*of Reno, for Respondent and Cross-Appellant.

*260OPINION

*Per Curiam:*

This appeal concerns numerous allegations of breach of trustee duty committed by appellant Johnson in his management of a trust substantially funded from the estate of his father, Edgar Johnson. The action was initiated by Johnson’s sister Marcia, a beneficiary of the inter vivos trust.

However, as conceded by both parties before this court in oral argument, Edgar’s will was never offered for probate. This failure precludes us from considering the merits of this appeal, because Edgar’s property cannot have passed to the trust without probate. In re Estate of Zimmerman, 485 P.2d 215 (Kan. 1971); In re Campbell’s Estate, 280 P.2d 686 (Wash. 1955); Reed v. Hayward, 144 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1943); Further, we are unwilling to infer a tacit agreement among the heirs at law to suppress the will and accomplish the pour-over by extrajudicial means. In re Estate of Harper, 446 P.2d 738 (Kan. 1968); Estate of Horger, 358 P.2d 484 (Ore. 1960); *see,*NRS 136.050, 163.220-250.

Moreover, we decline Marcia’s invitation to posit the existence of a constructive trust based on Johnson’s appointment as executor of his father’s estate. *See,*Pedroli v. Scott, 47 Nev. 313, 221 P. 241, 31 A.L.R. 841 (1923). Until Edgar’s will is proved, there is no way in which to ascertain the identity of any beneficiaries of such a creation. Reed v. Hayward, *supra.*This being so, Marcia has no standing to challenge Jonhnson’s management of the property in Edgar’s estate.

Because the inter vivos trust here involved remains substantially unfunded, and because those portions of the district court order appealed from mainly concern the rights and property erroneously thought to have passed to the trust under *261Edgar’s will, we believe probate to be a necessary prerequisite to a proper consideration of the issues involved in this appeal.

Reversed and remanded.
United States Department of Labor

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

__________________________________________

B.N., Appellant

and

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, U.S. 

FOREST SERVICE, Albuquerque, NM,

Employer

__________________________________________

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Docket No. 21-0623

Issued: May 21, 2021

Appearances: Case Submitted on the Record

Appellant, pro se

Office of Solicitor, for the Director

ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL

Before:

ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Chief Judge

PATRICIA H. FITZGERALD, Alternate Judge

VALERIE D. EVANS-HARRELL, Alternate Judge

On March 9, 2021 appellant filed a timely appeal from a September 16, 2020 merit decision

of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). The Clerk of the Appellate Boards

assigned Docket No. 21-0623.

In a letter received May 8, 2021, appellant requested that the appeal be dismissed.

The Board has duly considered the matter and concludes that appellant’s request for the 

dismissal of the appeal should be granted. Accordingly, 
2

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT appellant’s request for the dismissal of the appeal is 

granted. The appeal docketed as No. 21-0623 is dismissed.

Issued: May 21, 2021

Washington, DC

Alec J. Koromilas, Chief Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Patricia H. Fitzgerald, Alternate Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Valerie D. Evans-Harrell, Alternate Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
I N THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
MIDDLE DISTRICT

**ESTATE OF ROBERT H. AGNEW, MARGARET ALZAMORA, INDIVIDUALLY** 
**AND AS EXECUTRIX OF THE ESTATE OF ROBERT H. AGNEW, WILLIAM AND**  **SHEILA HENNESSY, H/W, MARGARET HENNESSY, JAMES AND CHRISTINE**  **HENNESSY, H/W AND PAUL AND EILEEN JANKE, H/W,** 

**v.**

**DANIEL R. ROSS, ESQUIRE, MEGAN MCCREA, ESQUIRE AND ROSS &**  **MCCREA, LLP No. 347 MAL 2015** 

**Petition for Allowance of Appeal from the Order of the Superior Court** 

O R DER

P E R CURIAM

AND NOW **, this 9 th**  **day of September, 2015, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal**

**is** GRANTED **. The issues, as stated by petitioners, are:**

**(1) Whether the Superior Court erred when it determined, in a published decision, contrary to Guy v. Liederbach, 501 Pa. 47, 459 A.2d 744 (1983),**  **as well as reported Superior Court decisions, Gregg v. Lindsay, 437 Pa. Super. 206, 649 A.2d 935 (1994), Cardenas v. Schober, 2001 Pa. Super.**  **253, 783 A.2d 317 (2001) and Hess v. Fox Rothschild, 20[0]7 Pa. Super. 133, 925 A.2d 798 (Pa. Super. 2007), an executed testamentary** 
**d o**  **cument naming a third party as a beneficiary was not a prerequisite for that third party to have standing to bring a legal malpractice action based**  **on breach of contract as third party intended beneficiary of contract against the testator’s attorney?** **[347 MAL 2015] - 2**

**(2) Whether the Superior Court so far departed from accepted judicial**  **practices or abused its discretion in failing to apply the clear precedent of**  **Guy v. Liederbach, as well as other reported Superior Court decisions,**  **Gregg v. Lindsay, Cardenas v. Schober and Hess v. Fox Ro thschild, when**  **it determined an executed testamentary document naming a third party as**  **a beneficiary was not a prerequisite for that third pa rty to have standing to**  **bring a legal malpractice action based on breach of cont ract as third party**  **intended beneficiary of contract against the testator’s a ttorney?** 

**(3) Whether the Superior Court erred when it determ ined, in a published**  **decision, evidence of the intent of the promisor (the testator’s attorney)** 
**alone was sufficient to establish an issue of fact to defea t summary**  **judgment on the issue of a third party’s standing to pu rsue a legal**  **malpractice breach of contract action against a testator’ s attorney?**