23-500-cv (L)

Lewis v. The Government of England and the United Kingdom

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION 

TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND 

IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS 

COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT 

FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR 

AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION ”SUMMARY ORDER“). A 

PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT 

REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. 

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 

held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City 

of New York, on the 15th day of December, two thousand twenty-three.

PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS,

RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,

WILLIAM J. NARDINI,

Circuit Judges.

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MARION T.D. LEWIS, Individually and on Behalf of 

all others similarly situated,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. Nos. 23-500-cv, 23-544-cv

THE GOVERNMENT OF ENGLAND AND THE 

UNITED KINGDOM, THE INSTITUTION OF THE 

BRITISH MONARCHY OR THE CROWN, ATTN: 

RT HON VICTORIA PRENTIS MP in her capacity as 

Attorney General for the United Kingdom and the 

Monarchy or Crown; and MICHAEL TOMLINSON 

in his capacity as Solicitor General of the United 

Kingdom and Crown,
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 Defendants-Appellees.*

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FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: Marion T.D. Lewis, pro se, New 

York, NY

FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES: No appearance

Appeal from orders of the United States District Court for the Southern

District of New York (Jennifer L. Rochon, Judge).

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED,

AND DECREED that the orders of the District Court are AFFIRMED.

Marion T.D. Lewis, an attorney proceeding pro se, appeals from orders of 

the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Rochon, 

J.) denying her motions for class certification, reconsideration of that denial, and 

a preliminary injunction. Lewis brought an action asserting injuries arising 

from the lasting historical harms of the transatlantic slave trade and moved to 

certify two classes in which she would serve as both class counsel and class 

representative. She also sought a preliminary injunction that would require the 

Defendants, the Government of England and the United Kingdom and the 

British monarchy, to place $3 billion in escrow pending the outcome of her suit. 

* The Clerk of Court is directed to amend the caption as set forth above.
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The District Court denied both motions and denied Lewis’s motion for 

reconsideration as to the certification motion. We assume the parties’ 

familiarity with the underlying facts and the record of prior proceedings, to 

which we refer only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm. We have 

Article III jurisdiction because at least some of Lewis’s claims arise under the 

Fourteenth Amendment. S. New Eng. Tel. Co. v. Glob. NAPs Inc., 624 F.3d 123, 

132 (2d Cir. 2010).†

We turn first to Lewis’s appeal of the District Court’s order denying class 

certification.‡ We review a district court’s denial of a motion for class 

† It is not immediately apparent that we have statutory jurisdiction, given the immunity 

conferred to the Defendants under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. See 28 

U.S.C. §§ 1604, 1605. We have previously assumed hypothetical jurisdiction “where 

there is no doubt that we have Article III jurisdiction, where the statutory jurisdictional 

issue is novel and not addressed by the parties, and where the merits turn on a 

straightforward textual analysis.” In re Fogarty, 39 F.4th 62, 70 n.11 (2d Cir. 2022). 

Given the similar situation presented here, we do the same. 

‡ Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f), we “may permit an appeal from an order 

granting or denying class-action certification,” but “[a] party must file a petition for 

permission to appeal with the circuit clerk within 14 days after the order is entered.” 

Lewis has not petitioned for permission to appeal. We may nonetheless proceed to the 

merits of Lewis’s appeal of the certification order because the fourteen-day filing 

requirement is “a nonjurisdictional claim-processing rule” that “can be waived or 

forfeited by an opposing party.” Nutraceutical Corp. v. Lambert, 139 S. Ct. 710, 714 

(2019). Because Lewis’s opposing party has not entered an appearance in this matter, 

we decline to raise the potential objection to the appeal of our own accord.
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certification for abuse of discretion. In re Petrobras Sec., 862 F.3d 250, 260 (2d Cir. 

2017). A district court may certify a class only if, among other requirements, a 

plaintiff shows that “(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is 

impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the 

claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or 

defenses of the class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately 

protect the interests of the class.” Elisa W. v. City of New York, 82 F.4th 115, 122 

(2d Cir. 2023) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)). 

We conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in 

determining that the fourth requirement of Rule 23(a) – adequate representation 

– was not satisfied. The adequate representation inquiry “considers the 

competency of class counsel and the existence of conflicts that might impair its 

representation.” Seijas v. Republic of Argentina, 606 F.3d 53, 57 (2d Cir. 2010). 

We have accordingly affirmed the disqualification of a pro se attorney as a class 

representative, questioning the “professional propriety of [the plaintiff’s] 

wearing two hats, one as class representative and the other as class counsel.” 

Lowenschuss v. Bluhdorn, 613 F.2d 18, 20 (2d Cir. 1980). We thus hold that the 

District Court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Lewis could not 
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adequately represent the class and serve as class counsel. Cf. Kay v. Ehrler, 499 

U.S. 432, 437 (1991) (“Even a skilled lawyer who represents himself is at a 

disadvantage in contested litigation.”). 

For the same reasons, we affirm the District Court’s denial of Lewis’s 

motion for reconsideration. Lewis has abandoned the only new argument she 

made on reconsideration, namely that an exception to our rule against class 

representatives serving as class counsel should exist for class counsel who agree 

to forgo attorneys’ fees. 

Turning to the District Court’s denial of Lewis’s motion for a preliminary 

injunction, we review for abuse of discretion, JTH Tax, LLC v. Agnant, 62 F.4th 

658, 666 (2d Cir. 2023), and affirm. Lewis failed to show “a ‘real or immediate 

threat’ of injury” and thus “lack[ed] standing to pursue injunctive relief.” 

Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc., 834 F.3d 220, 239 (2d Cir. 2016) (quoting City of Los 

Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111 (1983)). Lewis argues that she suffers from an 

ongoing harm without explaining how requiring the Defendants to set aside 

money in escrow would alleviate that harm. Lewis also argues that she will be 

unable to collect damages from the Defendants if an injunction is not granted, 

but as support for that proposition she cites only the Defendants’ failure to 
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appear in this action. The alleged harm is too “conjectural or hypothetical” to 

support standing for a preliminary injunction. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 

330, 339 (2016) (quotation marks omitted). 

We have considered Lewis’s remaining arguments and conclude that they 

are without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the orders of the District Court are 

AFFIRMED.

FOR THE COURT: 

Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court