In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 13-3660

GENERAL PARKER,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

KEVIN LYONS, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Central District of Illinois.

No. 11-1441 — Joe Billy McDade, Judge.

SUBMITTED JUNE 27, 2014 — DECIDED JULY 7, 2014 *

Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and FLAUM and SYKES, Circuit

Judges.

PER CURIAM. An Illinois statute bars persons convicted of

certain crimes from holding public office. See 10 ILCS

§ 5/29-15. General Parker sought to run for a seat on the school

After examining the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral *

argument is unnecessary. Thus the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the

record. See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
2 No. 13-3660

board of Peoria School District 150. The state’s attorney for

Peoria County filed suit in state court to bar Parker, who had

been convicted of felony theft in the 1980s, from pursuing that

office. After a brief hearing held on short notice, a state court

ordered Parker’s name removed from the ballot and enjoined

him from running. Parker then sued several defendants in

federal court, including the state’s attorney. He argued that

they enforced the statute in violation of due process and equal

protection by denying him a chance to defend himself and

targeting him based on his race (African American). He also

attacked the constitutionality of the law on its face. The district

court dismissed the suit as barred by the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine, immunity, and claim preclusion. We conclude that

immunity,notRooker-Feldman, bars the enforcement claims and

that, even if claim preclusion did not preclude Parker’s facial

attack on the statute, that challenge fails on the merits. We

therefore affirm the judgment.

For purposes of this appeal, we take as true the factual

allegations in Parker’s complaint. Seeking a seat on his local

school board, in December 2010 Parker filed a nominating

petition for the seat and a statement asserting that he was

eligible to hold the office. See 105 ILCS §§ 5/9-1, 5/9-10; 10 ILCS

§ 5/10-5. Two months later—about a week before the ballots

were to be printed for the April 5 election—Kevin Lyons, the

state’s attorney for Peoria County, filed a quo warranto complaint in Illinois circuit court to block Parker’s candidacy. The

purpose of a quo warranto action generally “is to question

whether a person lawfully holds title to office.” McCready v. Ill.

Sec’y of State, 888 N.E.2d 702, 712 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008); 735 ILCS

§ 5/18-101.
No. 13-3660 3

Lyons asserted in the complaint that Parker was barred by

statute from holding the office of school board member

because he was convicted in the early 1980s of felony theft. The

statute in question prohibits “[a]ny person convicted of an

infamous crime ... from holding any office of honor, trust, or

profit, unless such person is again restored to such rights by

the terms of a pardon for the offense or otherwise according to

law.” 10 ILCS § 5/29-15. Felony theft is an “infamous crime”

under the statute, see People ex rel. City of Kankakee v. Morris,

467 N.E.2d 589 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984), and Parker never received

a pardon for his conviction. (The statute does not bar persons

convicted of felonies from all elective office; those who

complete their criminal sentence may run for and hold any

office created by the Illinois Constitution. See 730 ILCS

§ 5/5-5-5(b); Buchmeier v. United States, 581 F.3d 561, 564 (7th

Cir. 2009); People v. Hofer, 843 N.E.2d 460, 464–65 (Ill. App. Ct.

2006).) Lyons requested a declaration that Parker was not

eligible to hold office on the school board and an injunction

barring his name from appearing on the ballot. 

On the first day of the quo warranto proceedings, of which

he had less than a day’s notice, Parker argued that the presiding judge, Judge Brandt, was biased and requested 48 hours to

file a recusal motion. The judge gave him one day. On the

second day, Judge Brandt granted Parker’s request to substitute a judge as a matter of right. See 735 ILCS § 5/2-1001(a)(2).

Minutes later, the hearing continued before a different judge,

Judge Shore. Proceeding without counsel and having had less

than two days to research and present his case, Parker moved

to dismiss, challenging the propriety of the suit. The judge

denied the motion. Parker then defended the suit on three
4 No. 13-3660

grounds: the statute barring those convicted of infamous

crimes from holding public office does not apply to the office

of school board member, the state’s attorney was selectively

enforcing the statute, and the rushed hearings were unjust. 

At the end of the hearing, the state court rejected Parker’s

arguments. Judge Shore ordered that Parker was “barred from

holding or running for [the office of] school board member,”

enjoined him from running in the upcoming election, and

ordered his name removed from the ballot. Parker appealed,

repeating the arguments he had made in circuit court and

challenging for the first time the statute’s constitutionality. The

appellate court affirmed the circuit court’s judgment and

concluded that the constitutional arguments Parker had not

raised in circuit court were forfeited. In the meantime, the

election was held without Parker’s name on the ballot, and

another candidate, Debbie Wolfmeyer, who is white, was

elected to the school board.

While Parker’s appeal in state court was pending, he filed

this suit in federal court against Lyons (who, Parker acknowledges, is no longer a state’s attorney), Peoria County, and other

defendants. Through several amendments to his complaint,

Parker brings two types of claims. The first is a claim that the

defendants improperly enforced the statute in the quo warranto

proceeding. He argues that, in violation of due process, the

defendants “orchestrated the quo warranto action in a manner

which was designed to deprive [Parker] of a fair hearing” by

“arrang[ing] for the case to be heard by [Lyons’s] good friend

Judge Brandt” and providing Parker “with wholly inadequate

notice.” Parker adds that, for several reasons (including racial

bias), the enforcement against him violated equal protection.
No. 13-3660 5

His second claim is a facial attack. He argues that the Illinois

statute on its face violates his “implied right to run for public

office,” a right that he says is guaranteed under the Constitution. 

The district court dismissed all claims. First, on his claims

that the defendants improperly enforced the statute, the court

ruled that Rooker-Feldman barred the due-process theory and

that the equal-protection theory failed on a number ofgrounds:

Lyons enjoyed prosecutorial discretion and immunity; Peoria

County was not a municipality liable for Lyons’s actions

because state’s attorneys are officials of the state, not the

county; and the other defendants were either not state actors

or were immune. Second, the court decided that claim preclusion barred Lyons’s facial constitutional challenges to the

Illinois statute because Parker could have raised his constitutional arguments in the quo warranto proceedings and did not

do so. 

On appeal, Parker first challenges the district court’s

application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. We conclude that

Rooker-Feldman does not apply here for two reasons. First, that

doctrine divests district courts of jurisdiction only in cases

where “the losing party in state court filed suit in federal court

after the state proceedings ended.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi

Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 291 (2005) (emphasis added).

Parker sued in federal court while his appeal from the state

circuit court’s judgment was pending in Illinois Appellate

Court. Since Saudi Basic Industries, all federal circuits that have

addressed the issue have concluded that Rooker-Feldman does

not apply if, as here, a state-court appeal is pending when the

federal suit is filed. See Nicholson v. Shafe, 558 F.3d 1266, 1279
6 No. 13-3660

(11th Cir. 2009); Guttman v. Khalsa, 446 F.3d 1027, 1032 n.2 (10th

Cir. 2006); Dornheim v. Sholes, 430 F.3d 919, 923–24 (8th Cir.

2005); Mothershed v. Justices of the Supreme Court, 410 F.3d 602,

604 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005); Federación de Maestros de Puerto Rico v.

Junta de Relaciones del Trabajo de Puerto Rico, 410 F.3d 17, 25 (1st

Cir. 2005). As the Ninth Circuit explained, Saudi Basic Industries

clarified that “[p]roceedings end for Rooker-Feldman purposes

when the state courts finally resolve the issue that the federal

court plaintiff seeks to relitigate in a federal forum.”

Mothershed, 410 F.3d at 604 n.1 (emphasis added). It added that

if the state-court appeal is pending at the time the federal

action is filed, the necessary final resolution in the state system

is not present. We agree with this reasoning and conclude that

Rooker-Feldman does not bar the claims of federal-court

plaintiffs who, like Parker, file a federal suit when a state-court

appeal is pending.

In the present case, there is a second reason why RookerFeldman does not apply. Parker alleges that Lyons (the only

defendant about whom Parker develops an argument on

appeal) vitiated the state-court process by collaborating with

a friendly judge to rush the case to a foreordained judgment.

Because his claims are premised on detailed allegations that

the winning party obtained a favorable civil judgment by

corrupting the state judicial process, Rooker-Feldman does not

bar them. See Johnson v. Pushpin Holdings, LLC, 748 F.3d 769,

773 (7th Cir. 2014); Loubser v. Thacker, 440 F.3d 439, 441–42 (7th

Cir. 2006); Nesses v. Shepard, 68 F.3d 1003, 1005 (7th Cir. 1995).

Though they are not foreclosed by Rooker-Feldman, Parker’s

claims that Lyons improperly enforced the statute nonetheless

fail. To the extent that Parker is suing Lyons in his official
No. 13-3660 7

capacity as a state officer, damages are barred by the Eleventh

Amendment. See Nat’l Cas. Co. v. McFatridge, 604 F.3d 335, 342

(7th Cir. 2010); Garcia v. City of Chi., 24 F.3d 966, 969 (7th Cir.

1994). And to the extent that he is suing Lyons in his individual

capacity, damages are barred by absolute prosecutorial

immunity. See Fields v. Wharrie, 672 F.3d 505, 516 (7th Cir.

2012); Thomas v. City of Peoria, 580 F.3d 633, 638–39 (7th Cir.

2009). Finally, injunctive relief against Lyons is unavailable.

Parker contends that Lyons must be enjoined from using his

“racial bias” to enforce the statute against blacks. But Lyons is

no longer a state’s attorney, and Parker alleges no racially

biased enforcement by anyone else. Thus he may not obtain an

injunction against Lyons. 

This brings us to Parker’s argument that the Illinois statute

is unconstitutional on its face. He contends that the district

court erroneously used claim preclusion to bar these challenges. The district court was required to apply Illinois’s law

of claim preclusion. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738. But as Parker points

out, in Illinois claim preclusion “is an equitable doctrine that is

not applied when it is ‘fundamentally unfair to do so.’” In re

Dollie's Playhouse, Inc., 481 F.3d 998, 1001 (7th Cir. 2007); cf.

Federated Dept. Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 400–01 (1981)

(no equitable exception under federal law of claim preclusion

for antitrust defendants there). The defendants acknowledge

that Parker had only two days to defend himself in state court,

and Parker asserts that on such short notice he could not obtain

counsel or develop his constitutional claims. We need not

decidewhether Illinois would recognize an equitable exception

to claim preclusion in these circumstances. Even if it did,

Parker’s challenges fail on the merits. 
8 No. 13-3660

Parker argues that future prosecutions against him under

this statute should be enjoined under Ex parte Young, 209 U.S.

123 (1908). He appears to believe that Young allows him to

proceed against the State of Illinois. But the current state’s

attorney, not the state itself, is the proper defendant under

Young, which “permit[s] private citizens to sue state officials in

their official capacities to require them to comply with federal

law on an ongoing basis.” McDonough Assocs., Inc. v. Grunloh,

722 F.3d 1043, 1049 (7th Cir. 2013) (emphasis added). The

problem here is that no injunction based on Young is possible

for the simple reason that Parker has not stated a claim that the

state statute violates federal law. See Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub.

Serv. Comm’n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002). 

Contrary to Parker’s contentions, the statute does not

violate equal protection. The right to run for or hold public

office is not a fundamental right, Brazil-Breashears v. Bilandic, 53

F.3d 789, 792–93 (7th Cir. 1995), and felons are not a suspect

class, Talley v. Lane, 13 F.3d 1031, 1034 (7th Cir. 1994); thus, a

ban on felons running for elective office is valid if it is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. See Clements v.

Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 963 (1982). Illinois’s stated interest in

barring felons from elective office is to ensure “public confidence in the honesty and integrity of those serving in state and

local offices.” People v. Hofer, 843 N.E.2d 460, 464 (Ill. App. Ct.

2006). Parker does not dispute the legitimacy of this interest,

nor has he argued that the statute does not rationally further it.

Moreover, even if a higher level of scrutiny applied to restrictions on the right of ex-felons to hold office, the claim would

fail. The Supreme Court has held that states may deprive

convicted felons of the right to vote—a right that, unlike
No. 13-3660 9

Parker’s interest in running for office, is fundamental and

subject to strict scrutiny. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 56

(1974); see Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181,

210 (2008) (voting is a fundamental right). Parker responds that

the statute violates equal protection because it has a disparate

impact on black men. But an assertion of disparate racial

impact does not state an equal-protection claim. Parker must

allege that the legislature acted with a discriminatory purpose,

and he does not do so. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676

(2009); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976). 

Likewise, Parker has not persuaded us that the ban violates

the First Amendment. To succeed, he must demonstrate that

the state’s legitimate interest in the integrity of its elections

does not justify its ballot restriction. See Stone v. Bd. of Election

Comm’rs for the City of Chi., 750 F.3d 678, 681 (7th Cir. 2014);

Brazil-Breashears, 53 F.3d at 792. Parker asserts broadly that

“speech or expression is entitled to constitutional protection”

but that rhetoric does not identify an insufficiency in the state’s

legitimate interest in keeping those convicted of serious crimes

off the ballot. Although a ballot disqualification based on a 30-

year-old felony conviction may be harsh, Parker gives us no

reason to conclude that the state is not entitled to adopt this

rule. Moreover, if Parker believes that his special circumstances

warrant it, he remains free to seek an executive pardon so that

he may run for school board. See 10 ILCS § 5/29-15; Delgado v.

Bd. of Election Comm’rs of the City of Chi., 865 N.E.2d 183, 185

(Ill. 2007).

We have considered Parker’s other arguments and conclude that they lack merit.

AFFIRMED.