### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 6 -00 572 -CV

Vi lla ge of Sa lad o , A ppe lla nt

v. Lone Star Storage Trailer , II Ltd. an d Lon e Star Stor age Trailer , Appellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF B ELL COUNTY , 169TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. 213,08 4-C , HO NORAB LE J. F . CLAWSO N JR. , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N
T h e V i l l a g e o f

S a l a d o ( t h e “ V i l l a g e ” ) an n e x e d p r o p e rt y a l o n g i t s e a s t e r

nb o u n d ar

y, including pr operty

owned by

L one Star Storag e Tra iler I I , L tc. and L one Star Storag e Tra iler (cumulatively , “L one Star” ). L one Star filed a decla ratory judgme nt action, askingthe district court to d ec l ar e the anne x ation ordinanc e void. B oth the Villag e and L one Star filed motions for summary judgme nt. The district c ourt g rante d L one Star’s motion, denie d the Village’ s m o t i on,
and de c lare d t he or din anc e vo id. Th e Vi lla g e a pp e a ls t he jud g me nt o f t

he dis tr ic t c ourt . We wi ll
reve rse the judg ment of the district cour t in part, rende r judg ment in part, and r emand f or further proce eding s.
BACK GR OUND The dispute in this case a ros e fr o m t he anne x ation of land by the Villag e. The annexation was a voluntar y annexation initiated under section 43.025 of the loca l gove rnment code ,Sub se c tio n 4 3. 02 5( d) state s th a t a “ mun ic ipa lity may no t be e nla rg e d und e r t

his se c tio n to 1 exceed the a

rea require ments established by Section 5.901.” Te x . L oc. Gov’ t Code Ann. § 43.025(d) (We st 2 00 8) ; see also id. § 5.901 (West 2008) (listing size limi ts for g ener al-lawmunicipalities of va ri ou s po pu latio ns ). L on e Star do e s no t a sse rt that the ann e xati on of the pr op e rt

y in q ue sti on wo uld violate the ar ea r equire ments of sec tion 5.901. 2 wh ic h au tho ri zes ind ivi du a ls l ivi ngin a re a s n e xt to a

“ Ty pe B g e ne ra l- la

w m un ic ipa lity ” to r e qu e st annexat i o n b y t he municipality
. See Te x. L oc . G ov ’t Cod e Ann. § 4 3. 02 5 ( Wes t 20 08 ); se e als o id. § 5.002 (West 2008) (def ining Ty pe B g ener al-lawmunicipality). In order to initi ate a n annexation under sec tion 43.025, “a majority of the qua lified voters of a n are a contiguous to [ the] municipality

[m ust] vote in favor

of b ec o m ing a

part of the municipality .” Id. § 43.025(a) . I f a
ma jor it y vote in f

a vo r o f a nn e xati on is o bta ine d, thr e e of

the vo te rs mus t “ pr e pa

re an a ff ida vit ” stating that the voting requireme nt had bee n met and must “file the a ffidavit with the mayor of the
mun ic ipa lity ” in o rd e r f

or the ann e xati on

pr oc e ss to c on tin

ue . On c e the may or re c e ive s the a ff ida vit , the may or must “ce rti fy t h e fi l ed affidavit to the g overningbody of the municipality .” Id. § 43.025(b). Af

ter re ceivingthe ce rtifi ed af fidavit, the g overningbody “may annex the are a” “ by ordinanc e.” Id. I f these r equire ments are satisfied, t he area become s part of the municipality on “the eff ective date of the ord i n an ce.” Id. § 43.025(c)
. On appe al, no par ty asser ts that the proce dural 1 require ments (majority

vote, ce rtification, issuance of ordinanc e) w ere not met. The a rea annexed was e ast of the Villag e. Althoug h the ar ea a nnexed w as owne d by
se ve ra l in div idu a ls, L on e Star o wn e d a pp ro xima te ly

fo ur te e n ac re s of the land

ann e xed . A t th e tim e of the a nnexation, L one Star’s pr operty ran a long the Villag e’s e astern bounda ry , and L one Star’s proper ty was the only part of the proper ty annexed that touched the Villag e’s bo u n d ar y . I n o t herI n th e ir mot ion s, bo th partie s a sk e d f or a tto rn e y ’s fe e s. As me nti on e d p re vio us ly , in its 2 judgme nt, the district court denie d the Villag e’s moti on in its entirety , but it also denied L one Star’s reque st for attorne y ’s fe es. 3 words, althoug h the annexation incorporated prope rty that was e ven fur

ther e ast of the Villag e than L one Star’s pr operty , none of the other prope rty direc tly abutted the Villag e’s bounda ries. After the ordinanc e wa s issued, L one Star filed a decla ratory judgme nt action asking the district court to dec lare the anne x ation ordinanc e void. See Tex. Ci v. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 37 .0 01 -. 01 1 (We st 20 08 ) (U nif or m De c lara

tor y Judg me nt A c t) ; see also id. § 37.004 (West 2008) (allowing individuals “ whose rig hts, status, or other leg al relations a re aff ecte d by a . . . municipal ordinanc e . . . [to] have de termi n ed an y question of construc tion or validity arising under the
. . . ordinanc e . . . an d obtain a dec laration of rig hts, status, or other leg al re lations thereunde r”) . The Villag e and L one Star filed c ompeting motions for summar y judgme nt. The district court g rante d L one Star’s motion, denie d the Villag e’s motion, and decla red the annexation ordinance void. The 2 Villag e appe als the district court’ s judgme nt.
STA ND AR

D O F RE VI EW F or a tr a dit ion a l summa

ry jud g me nt m oti on

to b e g ra nte d, the mov ant m

us t e sta bli sh that no g enuine issue of

materia l fac t exi sts and that he is entitled to judgme nt as a m at t er of law. Te x. R. C iv. P. 1 66 a (c ). Th e burd e n of pr oo f is on th e mov ant, and “ we ind ulg e e ve ry

re a so na ble infere nce a

nd resolve a

ny doub t s i n t h e n onmovant’s favor.” Southwestern Elec. Power Co.

v . Grant , 73 S.W. 3d

21 1, 21 5 ( Te x. 20 02 ). Ap pe llate c ourt s r e vie w a dis tr ic t c ourt ’s de c isi on

to g rant a summary judgme nt de novo, Texas Mun. Power Agenc y v. P ublic Util. Comm’n , 253 S.W .3d 184, 192 (Tex. 2008), and we must affirm the summary judgme nt if any o f t h e grounds are4

meritorious, Texas W

orkers’ Comp. Comm’n v. Patient Advoc ates of Tex. , 136 S.W
. 3 d 6 4 3 , 6 48 (Tex. 2004)
. “When both pa rties move for summar

y judgme nt and the trial c ourt g rants one motion and denie s the other, the r eviewing court should r eview the summary judgme nt evidence prese nted by bo th s ide s and

de te rm ine a ll q

ue sti on s p re se nte d and re nd e r the jud g me nt the tr ia l c ourt sh ou ld have r ender ed.” Id.

The issues ra ised in this appea l involve statutory construction, which is a question of law that is reviewe d de novo. See B ragg v. Edwards Aquifer Auth. , 71 S.W .3d 729, 734 (Tex. 2002); US A W as te Se rv s. of H ou sto n, In c . v . S

tra y ho rn , 150 S.W .3d 491, 494 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, pet. denied) . I n construing a statute, we must ascer tain the leg islature’s intent in ena cting the statute. Fleming Foods of Tex. v . Rylander , 6 S.W .3d 278, 284 (Tex. 1999) . I n making this determination, courts should look to the plain meaningof the wor ds used in the statute. See Fireman ’s F u nd County Mut. Ins. Co. v . Hidi , 13 S.W .3d 767, 768-69 (Te x . 2000). We presume that ever y word wa s deliberately

chosen a

nd that excluded words we re le ft o u t o n p u rpose. US A W as te Se rv s. , 1 5 0 S .W.3d at 494. I n deter mining leg islative intent, we may also consider

the “c onsequenc es of
a pa rt ic ula r c on stru c tio n. ” Te x. Go v’ t Co de Ann. § 3 11 .0 23 (We st 2 00 5) ; se e City of A us tin v. Southwestern Be l l T

el

. Co. , 92 S.W .3d 434, 442 (Tex. 2002). Courts should not construe a statutory provision in a manner

that leads to absur d results “if the pr o v i sion is subj ect to anothe r,
more rea sonable c onstruction or interpr etation.” C& H N ationwi de, Inc. v. Thompson , 903 S.W .2d 315, 322 n.5 (Tex. 1994), disapproved on other grounds by Battaglia v. Alexande r , 177 S.W .3d 893, 909 (Tex. 2005)).5 DI SCU SSIO N I n two issues, the Villag e contends that the district c ourt err ed by g rantingL one Star’s summary judgme nt beca

use the a nnexation complied with the requireme nts of section 43.025 and was, ther efor e, prope r. In response , L one Star contends that the district court’s judg ment should be upheld bec a

u s e th e an n e xa ti o nd id

n o t c o mp ly

w it h a ll o f th e r e qu ir e me n ts o f

s e c ti o n4 3
. 025. Specifica lly , L one Star a sserts that the annexation was im proper beca use L one S tar is the owner of all of the prope rty

that is “contig uous to” the Vil lag e and beca use L one S tar did not consent to the
ann e xati on . St a te d d if

fe re nt ly , L on e Star c on te nd s th a t in div idu a ls w ho re sid e on pr op e rt y that is not contiguous to or ne x t to a municipality may not se ek to c omply with the “contiguous” anne x ation require ment by

including the proper

ty that is actua lly contig uous to the m unicipality within the are a to be anne x ed without the contig uous proper ty owner ’s conse nt. See B lack’ s Law Dictionar

y 222 (6 t h ab ri d geded
. 1 9 9 1 ) ( d ef i n i n g “c o n t i gu o u s ” a s m ea n i n g “[ i ] ncl o s e p ro x i m i t y ; n ei ghb o ri n g; adjoining; .
. . in a ctual close contac t; touching at a point or alonga boundar y ”). B eca use L one Star did not consent to the anne x ation, it contends that the anne x ation was improper
.

We disag ree with L one Star’s c ontentions for severa l rea sons. First, sec tion 43.025 does not disting uish be tween voters who own proper ty along a municipality ’s borde rs and those w ho do not; rather, a ll that is required is that a major ity of the “ qualified voter s” in the ar ea to be annexed vote in favor

of anne x ation. See Tex. L oc. Gov’ t Code Ann. § 43.025(a) . I n addition, the provision does not specif

y an exception t o t h e majority rule for circ umstances in which one proper ty owner owns all of t h e p ro perty

that runs alongthe boundar y betwee n the municipality and the a rea to be
an n ex ed. More over, by

allowing the provision to be satisfied by a majority

vote rather than6

un anim ou s c on se nt, the le g isl atur e sp e c if ic a lly a llo we d fo r ann e xati on in s itu a tio ns in whic h n ot a ll of the interested parties desire annexation. Nothing in se ction 43.025 persua des us that L one Star’s ob je c tio n s ho uld

be tr e a te d d if

fe re ntl y tha n a ny oth e r vot e r’ s. F ur

the rm or e , the pr ov isi on

se e ms t o contemplate that determinations re g ardingwhether the “contiguous” require ment has bee n met are to be made in lig ht of the whole “ are a” to be annexed. See Te x. L oc . G ov ’t Cod e Ann. § 4 3. 02 5; see also Black’s Law Dictionary 70 (6 th a br idg e d e d. 19 91 ) ( de fi nin g “ are a ” a s “ a re g ion ” ); W

ebster’s Ne w Co lle

gia te Di c tio na ry

60 (1973) (def

ining “ar ea” as “surf

ace included within a set of lines” ). There is no dispute that t h e an nexed are a as a whole wa s contig uous to the Villag e. See City of W aco v. City of Mc Gregor , 523 S.W. 2d 64 9, 65 3 (T e x. 19 75 ) (s tatin g that are a wa s c on tiguo us to city beca use ar ea touc hed city

in ge og raphic al sense)
. Second, L one Star’s c onstruction of the a nnex at i o n provision would frustrate the i n t ent of the le g islature and le ad to ar bitrary results. By

enac ting se ction 43.025, the leg islature intended for

the voters in an a

rea to decide if they

should be anne x ed. Unde r circ umstances similar to the ones in this case, L one Star’s inter pretation would deprive the ma jority of voters the rig ht aff orded the m by

the leg islature and w ould elevate the rig hts of owner s of prope rty abutting
m u n i c i p a l i t i e s o v e r t h o s e i n d i v i d u a l s r e s i d i n g o n

p r o p e rt y f u rt h e r aw ay f r o m t h e m u n i c i p a l i t i e s . In
a dd iti on , under L on e S tar ’s int e rp re tatio n, ann e xati on wo uld be imp ro pe r e ve n if

e ve ry sin g le qualified voter

of a la rg e ar ea de sired anne x ation in the event that the owner of proper ty along the bo un da ry be tw e e n th e mun ic ipa lity and the are a to b e ann e xed

did no t de sir e ann e xati on . T his would be true reg ardle ss of t he relative si ze of the prope rty owned by

the per son ag ainst annexation compar ed to the remainder of the area to be annexed. Howeve r, under this interpre tation, annexationAl tho ug h L on e Star l imi ts i ts a rgume nt t o s itu a tio ns in whic h one pr op e rt y ow ne r o wn s a ll 3 of the pr op e rt

y in an a re a to be ann e xed that a

bu ts a mun ic ipa lity ’s bo un da

ry , th is c on str

uc tio n w ou ld also fore stall a

nnexation throug h majority vote when more than one pr operty owner owns the land abutting a municipality

and all of those owners do not conse nt to the annexation. Nothing in the lang uag e of the statute bestows t his additional veto power on owner s of prope rty located a long the border s of municipalities. Moreove r, under L one Star’s inter

pretation, indivi duals with a potential v e t o p o w e r

w o u l d n o tb e l i m i t e d

t o t h o s e i n d i v i d

u a l s t h a to w np r o p e rt y a

b u t t i n g t h e m u n i c i p a l i t y; instead, the c ontiguous nature of a n are a to be a

nnexed could be broke n at any point where a rowof proper ty owner s spanning the area to be annexed objects t o the proposed annexation. As a pra ctical matter, interpr eting the statute to permit this ty pe of ve to power w ould result in multi ple, seque ntial ann e xati on

pr oc e dure s. Th e statut e do e s n ot r e qu ir e ann e xati on by a c c re tio n o f o ne ro w o f p ro pe rt y at a time; rather, a ll that it requires is that more voter s in an are a contiguous to a municipality favor annexation than oppose it.
7 would be allowe d in near ly identical cir cumstance s provided that one of the voters f

avoring
ann e xati on

ow ne d p ro pe rt

y that a lso a

bu tte d the mun ic ipa lity ’s bo un da ry . Th is same re su lt w ou ld
occur in circumstanc es in which the point of c ontact with the municipality by the prope rty

own ed by the individual in favor of annexation is inconsequential compar ed to the point of contac t by the pr op e rt y ow ne d b y

the ind ivi du a l a g a ins t ann e xati on . We c ann ot a do pt a c on str uc tio n th a t w ou ld le a d to su c h d isp arate re su lts
. 3

I n it s bri e f, L on e Star a sse rt s th a t g ive n th e un iqu e c ir c ums tanc e s p re se nt i n th is c a se and bec ause the only

rea son its property

was include d in t h e ar ea to be anne x ed wa s to make the
rema inder of the are a contig uous to the Villag e, we should determine whe ther the r equire ments of
se c tio n 4 3. 02 5 w e re ind ivi du a lly me t f or L on e Star’ s p ro pe rt

y and fo r the re ma ind e r of the pr op e rt

y annexed. I f the two subar eas a re viewed separately , L one S tar insi sts that the re quirements of 43.025
are not met beca

use the re mainder of

the prope rty

was not contig uous to the Villag e. As support for its ass ertion t hat this Court should ex amine the two suba rea s indiv i d u al l y , L one Star c ites to City of W aco v. City of Mc Gregor . I n that case , the City of Waco8

soug ht to have one of the City of McGre g or’s annexation or dinance s decla red void. 523 S.W.2d at 650. The ordina

nce a nnexed the City

of McGr eg or’s ai rport and a strip of land that wa s 261 fee t wide and that stretched f or five mile s from the c ity to the airport. Id. At the time the ca se wa s decide d, the re levant statutory provision only

authorized a c ity

to annex property

that was located within the city ’s extraterr itorial jurisdiction but ex cepte d p ro p er t y t h at the city owns from the limit ation. Id. a t 65 2; see Act of A pril 25, 1963, 5 8 t h L eg. , R.S., ch. 160, §7(A), 1963 Te x . Gen. L aws 44 7, 45 0; T e x. L oc . G ov ’t Cod e Ann. § 43. 05 1 (We st 2 00 8) (c on ta ini ngc ur re nt v e rs ion ); see also id. § 42.021 (West 2008) (def ining “ extraterritorial jurisdiction” a s “unincorpor ated a rea that is contiguous to the c o rp o rate boundarie s of the municipality ”). When re ading the statutory provision in lig ht of its prior prec edent, the supr eme c ourt deter mined that the City

of McGr eg or may “anne x all proper

ty which is within its ex trater ritorial jurisdictio n o r which it owns so long a s the annexed land is contig uous and adja cent to its corpor ate limits.” City of W aco , 523 S.W .2d at 652. Ultimately , the supreme court de termined that the Cit y of McGr eg or could not prope rly annex the strip beca use par t of the strip to be anne x ed wa s not l o cated within the Cit y of McGr eg or’s extraterritorial jurisdiction and wa s not own ed b y t h e C i ty of McGr eg or. Id. at 654. B eca use the strip a nnexation wa s improper, the supr eme c ourt also conc luded that the anne x ation of the a irport
wa s im pr op e r b e c a

us e , w ith ou t th e str ip, the a ir po rt wa s n ot c on tiguo us to t

he bo un da

ri e s o f t he City of McGr eg or. Id.

Although the supreme c ourt did analy ze the strip separately

from the airport in City of W aco , that ty

pe of analy sis is not war

rante d in this case. In City of W aco , the City

of McGr eg or owned the airport that it desired to annex. For that rea son, the City

of McGr eg or would have beenUnlike t he narrow strip and airport at issue in City of W aco , the ann e xed are a

in t his c a se 4 ran a long the Villag e’s pr eexisti ng boundary line and wa s near

the Villag e. 9 a uth or ize d to ann e x the a ir po rt pr ov ide d that the re ma ind e r o f t he are a to b e ann e xed

c omp lie d w ith the other pr ere quisites, includi n g contig uity , require d under the rele vant statutes and c ase la w. Be cause the airpor

t was only

made c ontiguous to the City of McGr eg or t hroug h the anne x ation of
a nar row strip betwe en the City and the a irport, t he supreme court focuse d its analy sis on whether the City of McGr eg or had the authority to annex the strip. I n this case, the Villag e was not attempting to anne x a strip of land in orde r to rea ch proper ty that it alrea dy

owned f or the purpose of anne x ing the owned property , nor has a ny asser tion b e e nma d e th a t a

n y p art o f th e an n e xe d

ar e a w a s lo c a te d

o u ts id e th e V il la g e ’ s e xtr a te r r itor ial j u ri s d i cti on. For

these re asons, it is not necessar y or appr opriate to viewthe anne x ed ar ea in a 4 piece meal fa shion. Rather, we must follow the statutory direc tive and det ermine whether the entire a rea satisfies the statutory

prer equi s i t es . This seems par ticularly true in this case wher e the anne x ation was initiated by voters i n t h e ar ea t o be anne x ed. See Tex. L oc. Gov’ t Code Ann. § 43.025.

For these rea sons, we ag ree with the Villag e’s a ssertion that the district court e rre d by g ranting L one Star’s motion for summar y judgme nt and by

denying the Villag e’s motion.
CO NC LU SION I n light of the prec eding , we r ever se the district cour t’s ju d g me nt gr anting L one Star’s motion for summary

judgme nt, denying the Villag e’s motion for summary judgme nt, and dec laring the anne x ation v o i d
. Fu rther, w e re nder judg ment that the anne x ation ordinanc e is valid and10

e nf or c e a ble . F ina lly , b e c a

us e the Vi lla g e so ug ht atto rn e y ’s fe e s in its mot ion

fo r s umm ary

jud g me nt,
see Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 37.009 (West 2008) (allowing court to issue attorney ’s fe es in declar atory

judgme nt action), we rema nd that issue to the district court so that it may deter mine what amount of attorney ’s fe es, if any , the Villag e is entitled to.

David Pury ear , J ustice Be fore Chief J ustice L aw a nd J ustices Pury ear

and He nson Chief J ustice L aw Not Par ticipating Reverse d and Rende red in pa rt; Reverse d and Remande d in part Filed: Apr il 10, 2009