1 Filed 6/4/15 P. v. Dollar CA3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT (Butte)

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THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. MICHAEL LESLIE DOLLAR, Defendant and Appellant. C076426 (Super. Ct. No. CM038932)

Defendant Michael Leslie Do llar pleaded no contest to voluntary manslaughter of his 16-month-old son (Pen. Code, § 192, subd. (a)) 1 and was sentenced to 11 years in state prison. At the time of sentencing, the trial court issued a criminal protective order pursuant to section 136.2 prohi biting defendant from contacti ng the victim’s mother and half siblings for a period of 10 years.

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.2 Defendant’s sole contention on appeal is that the trial court lacked authority to impose the protective order. The People conced e the error. We agree that the protective order was issued in error as the court lacked authority to impose it. Accordingly, we will order the protective order stricken. BACKGROUND On November 11, 2010, Or oville Police officers were di spatched to the Oroville Medical Center regarding De agan Jackson, a 16-month-ol d toddler who had sustained “severe head trauma,” includi ng “multiple skull fractures, subdural hematoma, and brain swelling.” Upon arrival, officers encount ered Deagan’s mothe r, Sabrina, who was visibly upset and concerned for her child. Sabrina explained that she had full custody of her son, but the child had been visiting his fa ther, defendant, at the time he was injured. Officers also met with de fendant, who was “calm and relaxed” and had an “odor of marijuana emit[ing] from [h is] person.” Officers observe d defendant talking on the phone in the hospital waiting room and “la ughing several times during the conversation.” Deagan was transported by life flight to the UC Davis Medical Center, where he died. An autopsy determined that Deagan died from “craniocerebral injuries, due to massive blunt force tr auma to the head.” On August 7, 2013 , an information was filed chargi ng defendant with one count of assault on a child causing death. (§ 273ab, subd. (a); count 1 .) On January 22, 2014, the information was amended to add one count of voluntary manslaughter. (§ 192, subd. (a); count 2.) That same day, defe ndant entered a plea of no c ontest to count 2, and count 1 was dismissed on the People’s motion. On March 26, 2014, the trial court deni ed probation and sentenced defendant to state prison for the upper term of 11 years. At the time of sentencing, the trial court also imposed a protective order prohibiting defenda nt from having any contact with Deagan’s mother, Sabrina, and his two ha lf siblings, M. and K., for a period of 10 years. The protective order was made pursuant to Judicial Council form CR-160 (rev. Jan. 1, 2009),3 which refers to sections 13 6.2, 1203.097, subd. (a)(2), 2 73.5, subd. (i), and 646.9, subd. (k) in its title. The trial court did not mark any of the boxes indicating the statutory authority for the order. However, the trial cour t’s minute order of the sentencing hearing, and the trial judge’s comments from the benc h, indicate that the protective order was entered pursuant to section 136.2. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. DISCUSSION On appeal, defendant contends, and the People concede, that the protective order was unauthorized and must be strick en. We agree with the parties. Section 136.2 primarily author izes trial courts to issue prejudgment restraining orders to protect victims and witnesses duri ng the pendency of the criminal action in which they are issued. ( People v. Ponce (2009) 173 Cal. App.4th 378, 383; People v. Stone (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 153 , 159.) Effective January 1, 2012, however, a new subdivision, subdivision (i), was added to s ection 136.2. In 2014 , when defendant was sentenced, section 136.2 required trial c ourts to consider the issuance of postjudgment protective orders “[i]n all cases in which a criminal defendant has been convicted of a crime of domestic violence as de fined in Section 13700 . . . .” (§ 136.2, subd. (i)(1).) “Domestic violence” is define d in section 13700 as “abuse committed against . . . a spouse, former spouse, cohabitant, former c ohabitant, or person with whom the suspect has had a child or is having or has had a da ting or engagement relationship.” (§ 13700, subd. (b).) “Abuse” is define d as “intentionally or reckle ssly causing or attempting to cause bodily injury, or placing another pers on in reasonable appreh ension of imminent serious bodily injury to himself or he rself, or another.” (§ 13700, subd. (a).) Here, defendant was convicted by plea of voluntary manslaughter of 16-month-old Deagan Jackson. Deagan was defendant’s s on, not “a spouse, former spouse, cohabitant, former cohabitant, or person w ith whom [defendant] has had a child or is having or has had a dating or engagement relationship.” Th erefore, defendant was not convicted of a4 crime of domestic violence within the meaning of section 13700, and the protective order pursuant to section 136.2, subd ivision (i)(1) was unauthorized. DISPOSITION The judgment is modified to strike the pr otective order; as modified, the judgment is affirmed. The trial court shall prepare an amended abstract of judgment reflecting this modification and forward a cer tified copy of the amended abst ract to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.

RAYE , P. J.

We concur:

DUARTE , J.

HOCH , J.