See T EX . F AM . C O D E A NN . § 15 3
. 4 3 1

- . 4 3 4 (V ernon S up p . 20 0 8 ). 1 

## NO. 12-07-00188-CV

IN THE COUR T OF APP EALS TWELFTH COURT OF APP EALS D ISTRICT

TYLER, TEX AS

IN TH E IN TER EST § APP EAL FRO

M T HE OF T. D. J. , § CO UN TY CO UR T AT

LAW A CHI LD § CHER OK EE CO UN

TY, T EXAS
MEMORA NDUM OPIN ION Appellant Joy ce A skins appeals the t rial cour t’s order setting a side the dec ree g ranting g randpa rent a cce ss and its denial of her motio n fo r n ew trial. On appea l, Askins presents two issues. We rever se and r emand.
B ACKG ROUND Appel l ee S ea son Gayler is the mother of T.D.J. and Askins is the child’s pate rnal g ra ndmot he r. On May 9, 20 03 , As kin s fi le d a pe tit ion in Ka uf man Co un ty

fo r g ra nd pa re nt a c c e ss ag ainst Gayl er, statingthat the par ents of the c hild were divorce d, and re questing acc ess during wee kends and the summer. Gay ler filed a m o tion challeng ing the constitutionalit y of the g ra nd pa re nt p os se ssi on

and a c c e ss p ro vis io ns of the Te xas F a mil y Cod e , a mot ion to d ism iss 1 Askins’s petition, and an answ er, spe cial ex ce ptions, and motion t o strike. Gay ler a nd Askins sig ne d Ru le 11 a g re e me nts a llo wi ngAs kin s p os se ssi on of the c hil d d

ur ingwe e ke nd s, ho lid ay s, an d s u m m e r . I nA p r i l 2 0 0 5 , t h e t r i a l c o u rt t e r m i n a t e d t h e p ar e n t
- c h i l d

r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e nT
. D
. J. and his biologic al father, Askins’s son. On August 29, 2005, the t rial court signe d a fina l decr ee g ranting g randpa

rent a cce ss, a llowing Askins posse ssion of T.D.J. during we ekends, holiday s, and2

summer. On Octobe r 2, 2006, Ga

y ler filed a motion to set aside or, a lternatively , a petition to modify the dec ree g rantingg randpa rent a cce ss. Accor di n g t o Ga y l er, both the holding in Troxel v. Granv ill e , 5 30 U. S. 57 (2 00 0) and se c tio n 15 3. 43 3( 2) of the Te xas F a mil y Cod e fo rm e d th e ba sis for va catingthis order. F urther, she alleg ed that since T.D.J.’s biol og ical father’s rights had been terminated, a

ny relationship ex is t i ng betwee n T.D.J. and Askins through that c onnection wa s terminated. G ayler a lso filed a motion to transfe r t he ca se to Cheroke e County , which wa s g rante d. The trial c ourt set a hear ing on Gay ler’s motion to set aside or modify for Apr il 16, 2007. At that hear ing, ne ither Askins or her counsel a ppear ed and the trial court took judicial notice tha t no tic e of the he ari ngwa s se nt t o A sk ins ’s c ouns e l. G ay le r t e sti fi e d th a t th e pa re nt- c hil d relationship between T.D.J and his biologica l fathe r, Askins ’s son, had be en ter minated and that the Texas Family

Code wa s am en d ed af

ter the or der g rantingAskins gr andpar ent ac cess wa s s i gn ed

. Gayler a lso stated that afte r the orde r wa s signe d, Askins had exercised he r visitation sp or a dic a lly , mi sse d s e ve ra l vi sit a tio ns , a nd fa ile d to inf

or m G ay le r t

hat sh e wo uld

no t be a ble to exercise her visitation. Acc ording to G ayler, on numerous occ asions Askins violated an injunction ag ainst allowing any

contac t betwee n T.D.J. and his bi og raphic al father. Gay ler stated that Askins had not see n T.D. J. i n two y ea rs . She also testified that Askins left some inappr opriate a nd thr e a te nin g me ssa g e s fo r he r re g ard ing As kin s’ s e ff or ts to loc a te T. D. J. Ga

y le r be lie ve d it wa s in T.D.J.’s best int ere sts that the trial court vac ate the pr ior order g rantingg randpa

rent a cce ss, and terminate a ll acce ss and communication betwe en T.D.J. and Askins. At the conc lusion of the hear ing, the trial court g rante d the m otion. I n its order , the trial court found that all ties, biologica l or otherwise , had been terminated betwee n the biologic al father an d T
. D. J
. , t h u s t erm i n at i n g an y re l at i o n s h i p b et we en As k i n s an d T
. D. J
. t h at wo u l d ex i s tt h ro u gh that connec tion. Additionally , the trial cour t found that Askins had repeatedly violated the orde r g ranting g ran dp ar en t acc ess and that Askins had little or no c ontact with the child for approximately

two y ear s prec eding the hea ring . Fur ther, the tria l court found that t h e orde r g ra nti ngg ra nd pa re nt a c c e ss w a s n ot i n c omp lia nc e wi th se c tio n 15 3. 43 3( 2) of the Te xas F a mil y Code, that Askins did not overcome the presumption that a fit pare nt a cts in the best intere st of her c hil d, and

that A sk ins did

no t pr ov e or pres ent any e vid e nc e that de nia l of a c c e ss w ou ldW e no te tha t se c tio n 1 6 1 .2 0 6 (c ) o f t h e T e x a s F a m ily C o d e go v e rn ing o rd e rs ter m ina ting p a re n ta l righ ts 2 s t at es t hat “ [ n] ot hi ng i n t hi s ch apt er pre cl udes or af f ect s t he r i gh t s of

a bi ol ogi cal or adop t i ve mat er nal or pat er nal gr andpar ent t o re as onabl e a cce s s un der C hapt er 153
. ” See T EX . F AM . C O D E A NN . § 1 6 1
. 2 0 6 (c) (V ernon S up p . 20 0 8 ). 3 signific antly

impair the child’s phy sical health or emoti onal well being

. Askins filed a motion for new tria l, which the trial c ourt denied. This a ppeal f ollowed.
G R A N D PAR ENT A C C ESS I n her se cond issue, Askins contends that the trial court a bused its discretion by

g ranting Gayler’s motion to set aside or, a lternatively , petition to modify the dec ree g rantingg randpa rent acc ess. Specific all y , she ar g ues that the trial c ourt based its dec ision on section 153.433 of the Texas Family

Code instead of se cti on 156.101. Fur ther, Askins conte nds that the trial cour t’s interpre tation of sections 153.433 and 153.434 of the Texas Family Code was f

lawed a s it relates to the eff ect of the termination of T.D .J
. ’s b iologica l father ’s rig hts on her ability to file suit for g ra nd pa re nt a c c e ss. 2 I n addre ssing this issue, we must first determine whe ther sec tion 153.433 or 156.101 of the Te xas F a mil y

Code app lie s. Th e dis tin c tio n b e tw e e n s e c tio n 1 53 .4 33 g ov e rn ingan o ri g ina l su it fo r gr an d p ar en tp o s s es s i o n o r ac ce s s , an d s ec t i o n 1 5 6
. 1 0 1 go v ern i n g a mo d i fi ca t i o np ro ce ed i n g, is more than proc edura l or semantic. In reC.A .M .M . , 243 S.W .3d 211, 215 (Tex. App.–Houston [14t h Dist.] 2007, pet. denied) . Chapter 153 and Chapter 156 are distinct statutory scheme s that inv o lv e d if

f e r e n t i s s u e s. In re

V .L .K. , 24 S.W .3d 338, 343 (Tex. 2000). The leg islature has de te rm ine d that the sta

nd ard and burd e n of

pr oo f a re dif fe re nt i n o ri g ina l and

mod if ic a tio n s uit s. Id. Un d er C h ap t er 153, t h e l egi s l at u re co d i fi eda “ p ar en t al p re s u mp t i o n ” i nan o ri gi n al p ro ce ed i n g. See id. at 34 1; In reC.A .M .M . , 2 43 S.W. 3d

a t 21 5. Re g ard ingg ra

nd pa re nt p os se ssi on

or a c c e ss, the par ental pre sumption i s that a par ent acts in the best interest of the pare nt’s child. T EX . F AM . C ODE ANN . §153.433(2) ( Ver non Supp. 2008). A court c annot orde r g randpa rent possession or a c c e s s u n l e s s t h e r e qu e s t i n g g r an d p ar e n to v e r c o m e s t h i s p r e s u m p t i o nb y p r o v i n g b y a pr e po nd e ranc e of

the e vid e nc e that de nia l of po sse ssi on

of or a c c e ss t o th e c hil d w ou ld signific antly

impair the child’s phy sical hea lth or emotional well being

. Id . I n a modification procee ding under Chapter 156, the leg islature did not impose differ ent4

burdens on pa

rents and nonpa

rents. In r eV

.L .K. , 2 4 S
. W
. 3 d

at 3 4 3
. No r d o e s C h ap t er 1 5 3 's pare ntal presumption apply in a Chapter 156 modific ation proce eding

. Id . at 344. Instead, sec tion 156.101 states that a tria l court m ay m o dify an orde r that provides f or the a ppointment of a conser vator of a child, that provides the ter ms and conditions of conser vatorship, or that provide s for the posse ssion of or ac cess to a c hild if (1) modification w o u l d b e i n the best intere st of the child and (2) the circumstances of the child, conser vator, or other party

aff ecte d by the orde r have materia lly

and substantially

chang ed since the date of the re ndition of the order. T EX . F AM . C ODE ANN . § 156.101(1)( A) (V ernon Supp. 2008). Her e, Askins filed a

n o ri gi n al petition for g randpa rent a cce ss. On Aug ust 29, 2005, the trial court sig ned a fi n al decr ee g rantingAskins gr andpar ent ac cess. The rea fter, G ayler filed a motion to s et aside the decr ee or, alternatively , a petition to modify the dec ree and, on Apr il 16, 2007, the trial cour

t signed an o rd er g rantingGay ler’s motion. Be cause this appeal doe s not conce rn the orig inal g randpa rent acc ess suit, but instead, the order g rantingGay ler’s motion, we conclude that the modification statute of the Texas Family Code g overns this issue. See Spencer v . V aug hn , N o. 03 -0 5- 00 07 7- CV , 2 00 8 WL61 54 43 , at *8 (T e x. Ap p. –Aus tin Mar. 6, 20 08 , p e t. filed) ( mem. op., not desig nated f or publication). A t rial court’s modification is review ed for abuse of discretion. In r eP. M. B. , 2 S.W .3d 618, 621 (Tex. App.–Houston [14t h Dist.] 1999, no pet.). I t is an abuse of discretion for

a trial court to rule w ithout supporting evidenc e. Id. Under an abuse of di scre tion standard, the leg al and fa c tua l su ff

ic ie nc y of the e vid e nc e are no t in de pe nd e nt g ro un ds of e rr or , b ut a

re re le va nt f a c ts i n assessing whether the trial court abused its discretion. In re Ferguson , 9 2 7 S. W. 2 d 7 6 6 , 7 6 9 ( T e x. Ap p. –T e xar

ka na 19 96 , n o w ri t)

. I n the a

bs e nc e of su c h a c le ar a

bu se of dis c re tio n, an a

pp e llate court should not substitut e its judgme nt for that of the trial court. Id. I n this case, ther e wa s insuffi ci en t ev idence at the Apr il 16, 2007 hearingthat the c ir c ums tanc e s o f t

he c hil d, c on se rv a tor , or oth e r part y a ff e c te d by the or ig ina l or de r h a d mate ri a lly and substantially chang ed since the date of the rendition of the orde r. See T EX . F AM . C ODE ANN . § 156 .1 01 (1) (A ); In re M.N.G. , 113 S.W .3d 27, 36 (Tex. App.–For t Worth 2003, no pet.). Fur ther, the tria l court’s orde r g ranti n g Gay ler’s motion did not include a findingthat there was a mate ri a l and

su bs tanti a l c ha

ng e in t he c ir c ums tances of th e c hil d, c on se rv a tor , o r o the r p art yI n h er f i r s t i s s ue, Ask i ns ar gu es t hat t he t r i al cour t abus ed i t s di s cr et i on i n den y i ng he r mo t i on f or n ew 3 tria l. B e c a u se he r se c o n d issu e is d isp o sitive , w e ne e d no t ad d re ss th e m o tio n fo r n e w trial. See T EX . R. A PP . P. 47. 1. 5 aff ecte d by the orig inal order

. I nstead, the trial court based its de cision on section 153.433(2) of the Texas Fa

mily Code and improper ly

imposed a burde n on Askins to establish the unfitness of Ga y le r o r p re se nt e vid e nc e that den ia l of ac c e ss wo uld sig nif ic antl y imp a ir T. D. J.’s ph y sic a l he a lth or e m o t i o n al well being

. See In reV .L .K. , 2 4 S. W.3 d at 34 4; In re M.N.G. , 113 S.W .3d at 36. Be cause there was insuffic ient evidenc e of a nd the t rial court’s order

did not find a materia l and substantial chang e in the cir cumstance s of the child, conse rvator, or other pa rty af fe ct ed b y the orig inal order , the trial cour t abused its discretion in gra nting Ga y ler’s motion. See M.N.G. , 113 S.W. 3d a t 36 ; In r eP. M. B. , 2 S.W .3d at 621. Ther efor e, Askins’s sec ond issue is sustained. 3

D I S P OS I T I ON Having sustained Askins’s second issue, w e re v e rse the trial cour t’s order on motion to s et aside decre e gra

nting g randpa

rent a cce ss and re mand

the matter f

or fur ther proc eeding s consistent with this opi nion.



### S AM GRI FF I T H J ustice
Opinion delivere d November 26, 2008. Pane l co ns i s t ed of

Wor t hen , C. J. , Gri

f f i t h, J. , an d Hoyl e, J.

(PUBL I SH)