Filed 8/3/21 In re N.M. CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

In re N.M., a Person Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

2d Juv. No. B304412

(Super. Ct. No. MJ24625)

(Los Angeles County)

THE PEOPLE,

 Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

N.M.,

 Defendant and Appellant.

N.M. appeals a dispositional order declaring him a ward of 

the court and placing him home on probation. (Welf. & Inst. 

Code, § 602.) The order follows the juvenile court’s finding that 

N.M. committed assault by means of force likely to produce great 

bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(4)) and made criminal 

threats (Id., § 422, subd. (a)). N.M. contends the court erred 

when it found him competent to proceed to adjudication and 
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refused to appoint a second expert to opine on this issue. N.M. 

also contends the juvenile court lacked sufficient evidence to

sustain the allegations that he committed the charged offenses.

We affirm the dispositional order. 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Los Angeles County Sheriff deputy Adan Ordaz responded 

to a domestic disturbance call at a Lancaster home on July 8, 

2019. He saw appellant N.M. standing outside the house yelling 

profanities at the occupants of a car in the driveway. Deputy 

Ordaz detained N.M. in his patrol car and began interviewing 

those at the scene. 

N.M.’s mother, told the deputy that her son’s girlfriend K.F. 

walked into her bedroom visibly upset after an argument with 

N.M. K.F. did not want to talk about why she was upset. N.M.

entered the bedroom a few minutes later and the two minors 

walked out, only to resume arguing loudly. N.M.’s mother called 

911 when she tried but failed to calm them down. She told the 

deputy she saw her son pull K.F. into his bedroom, pick her up, 

then throw her to the floor. 

Deputy Ordaz recalled K.F. shaking and crying when he 

interviewed her. She said the argument began when she declined 

N.M.’s sexual advances and tried to leave his bedroom. He pulled 

her back into the bedroom and threw her on top of a mattress. 

He punched her multiple times in the arm and leg then choked

her hard enough to block her breathing for about 20 seconds. She 

ran to N.M.’s mother’s bedroom but N.M. persuaded her to come 

out. He again pulled her into his bedroom, picked her up, then 

“slammed” her to the ground. When K.F. told N.M. she would 

tell her brothers what he had done, he told her “he would get a 

gun and kill . . . her brothers and . . . her” if she did so. She said 
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she had previously seen appellant with a black and brown 

semiautomatic pistol he kept in the garage or his bedroom.

Deputy Ordaz searched both locations but found no weapon. 

K.F.’s parents were the occupants of the car in the 

driveway when Deputy Ordaz arrived. K.F.’s mother said K.F.

described how appellant grew angry when he “wanted her to have 

sex and she didn’t want to have sex, and he grabbed her and 

choked her and tried to pull her in the room.” N.M. came outside 

the house when they arrived and told them, “I’m not scared of 

you all. I’ll shoot you.” K.F.’s father1 told the deputy that he 

feared for their lives when N.M. went inside the house because he 

believed the boy would re-emerge with a gun and carry out his 

threat. 

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Defense counsel presented a psychological report in August 

of 2019 indicating N.M. might have difficulty helping counsel 

prepare his defense. The court suspended the proceedings and 

appointed Velia Inez Gonzalez, Ph.D. to evaluate him. It 

scheduled a competency hearing and ordered N.M. to remain in 

juvenile hall. 

Dr. Gonzalez interviewed N.M. and prepared a written 

evaluation. She concluded N.M. was incompetent and would not 

likely obtain competency in the foreseeable future.2 She 

1 K.F.’s father passed away two months later. His death 

was not related to this incident. 

2 Subdivision (e) of section 709 of the Welfare and 

Institutions Code states in relevant part that “[i]f the court finds, 

by a preponderance of [the] evidence, that the minor is 

incompetent, all proceedings shall remain suspended for a period 

of time that is no longer than reasonably necessary to determine 
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reiterated this opinion when testifying at the competency 

hearing. The court rejected her finding, denied defense counsel’s 

request to appoint a second expert, and reinstated the 

proceedings on the People’s amended felony petition. The 

adjudication hearing took place over three days in January of 

2020.

N.M.’s mother and K.F. changed their accounts of the 

incident when they testified at the hearing. N.M.’s mother

denied any physical contact occurred at all. She claimed to have 

called 911 only so police could calm down K.F. and remove her 

from the house. She also denied her son spoke to K.F.’s parents 

when they arrived to pick her up. K.F. denied the attack entirely 

and said she never spoke to a sheriff’s deputy. K.F.’s mother, in 

contrast, gave an account consistent with her initial interview 

with Deputy Ordaz. The juvenile court permitted Deputy Ordaz 

to testify about K.F.’s and N.M.’s mother’s initial statements to 

the extent they were inconsistent with their in-court testimony. 

(Evid. Code, § 770.) 

The juvenile court found two of the amended petition’s five 

counts true: (1) count one for assault by means of force likely to 

produce great bodily injury as to K.F. (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. 

(a)(4)); and (2) count three for making criminal threats, also to 

K.F. (Id., § 422, subd. (a)). It granted N.M.’s motion for directed 

verdict on the battery charge (count two) and found the People 

had not proven its criminal threats charges involving K.F.’s 

father and mother (counts four and five). It declared appellant a 

ward of the court and placed him home on probation for four

years and eight months. 

whether there is a substantial probability that the minor will 

obtain competency in the foreseeable future.” 
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N.M. appeals the court’s competency rulings and its 

sustaining of counts one and three of the amended petition. 

DISCUSSION

1. N.M.’s Competency

The law presumes minors age 14 and older are competent

to face juvenile delinquency proceedings. (Pen. Code, § 26.) The 

party asserting incompetency bears the burden of proving the 

minor “lacks sufficient present ability to consult with counsel and 

assist in preparing [his or her] defense with a reasonable degree 

of rational understanding, or lacks a rational as well as factual 

understanding, of the nature of the charges or proceedings 

against [him or her].” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 709, subd. (a)(2).) 

We review competency findings for substantial evidence, viewing 

the record “in the light most favorable to the juvenile court’s 

determination.” (In re R.V. (2015) 61 Cal.4th 181, 200.) The 

inquiry on appeal concerns “whether the weight and character of 

the evidence of incompetency was such that the juvenile court 

could not reasonably reject it.” (Id. at p. 203.)

N.M. asserts the juvenile court could not have reasonably 

rejected what amounted to undisputed evidence of his lack of 

competency. Dr. Gonzalez stated N.M.’s full scale IQ of 54 fell 

“significantly below normal range.” School records indicated he 

received special education services to address “weaknesses in 

attention, phonemic awareness, short-term auditory memory, 

visual processing and conceptualization.” Dr. Gonzalez 

administered the Juvenile Adjudicative Competence Interview 

(JACI) and concluded he did not “have a clear understanding of 

his current charges, the nature and purpose of a court trial, the 

role of a prosecutor and a probation officer, how to assist [his] 

lawyer in his defense, and a plea bargain.” Two psychological 
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evaluations performed the same year likewise doubted his 

competency. Appellant likens his case to In re R.V., supra, 61 

Cal.4th 181, in which the Supreme Court reversed a finding of 

competence where the court-appointed expert concluded the 

minor’s mental illness and developmental disabilities prevented 

him from assisting in his defense.

In re R.V. is an imperfect analogue. R.V.’s court-appointed

evaluator described the minor as “‘legitimately confused’” about 

what was occurring and as possibly suffering from a psychotic 

disorder such as schizophrenia. (In re R.V., supra, 61 Cal.4th at 

p. 206.) The minor could not articulate the reason for his 

detention or provide the evaluator with basic background 

information. (Id. at p. 204.) N.M.’s evaluator observed no such 

confusion. She found him “oriented to place, person, situation, 

and date” and described his thought content as “future-oriented 

and relevant to questions asked.” N.M. spoke clearly and 

coherently to her and displayed no inappropriate behaviors or 

perceptual disturbances. He described the nature of the charges 

against him, the roles of the prosecutor and defense counsel, and 

his willingness to participate in house arrest and therapy if it 

enabled him to return home. This prompted the court to conclude 

“that [N.M.], who otherwise communicates well and clearly, may 

need a little bit of extra time from counsel in understanding 

what’s going on with his case . . . even in the material that Dr. 

Gonzalez testified to, he understands what his case is about, he 

understands what it means to plead, to admit or not admit what 

happened, and when one would do that.” The evidence provided 

a substantial basis for the juvenile court to find N.M. competent 

to proceed despite his cognitive delays and learning difficulties.
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2. Defense Counsel’s Request to Appoint a Second Expert

to Opine on N.M.’s Competency

The juvenile court may appoint another expert to evaluate 

a minor’s competency if it finds the first expert’s methodology or 

reasoning flawed. (See In re R.V., supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 216 

[“When, as here, the expert concludes that the minor is

incompetent but the juvenile court finds flaws in the expert’s 

methodology and reasoning, the court should consider appointing 

a second expert to inform the court’s view that the first expert’s 

opinion is inadequate”].) N.M. argues the court abused its 

discretion by declining defense counsel’s request to appoint 

another expert after rejecting Dr. Gonzalez’s findings. 

We conclude no abuse occurred. The juvenile court found 

N.M. competent based on facts gleaned from Dr. Gonzalez’s live 

testimony, her written evaluation, and from psychological records 

and other documents submitted to her by defense counsel. The 

court parted ways with the expert because it felt she set the bar 

of juvenile competence too high, or, more specifically, as 

“expecting of a minor an understanding of a court proceeding that 

even an adult might be hard-pressed to have.” It cited the 

brevity of her interview as further skewing the evaluation by 

depriving N.M. of the time he needed to digest and verbalize 

appropriate responses to her JACI-generated questions. A trier 

of fact need not accept the testimony of an expert witness, even if 

uncontradicted. (Kennemur v. State of California (1982) 133 

Cal.App.3d 907, 923.) 

The record leaves little reason to believe yet another 

psychological evaluation and further expert testimony would 

have tipped the evidentiary scales, so to speak, toward N.M.’s 

incompetence. The court satisfied its obligation to consider 
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defense counsel’s request and exercised its discretion properly

when it denied that request. (See In re L.W. (2020) 44 

Cal.App.5th 44, 51, internal quotes omitted [“To show abuse of 

discretion, the appellant must demonstrate the juvenile court 

exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious or patently 

absurd manner . . .”].)

3. Allegations of Assault and Criminal Threats

The juvenile court found “true” the amended petition’s 

allegations that N.M. committed assault by means of force likely 

to produce great bodily injury and made criminal threats. Again, 

we review its findings for substantial evidence. (In re Ryan N. 

(2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1371.) “Even if different inferences 

can reasonably be drawn from the evidence, we cannot substitute 

our own inferences or deductions for those of the trial court.” (Id. 

at p. 1373.) Our review “begins and ends with a determination of 

whether, on the entire record, there is any substantial evidence, 

contradicted or uncontradicted, which will support the decision of 

the trier of fact. [Citations.]” (Ibid.)

Deputy Ordaz testified in detail about the account each 

witness provided when he arrived on scene. K.F. recalled N.M. 

choking her hard enough to block her breathing for 20 seconds. 

Later he picked her up and “slammed” her to the ground. K.F.’s 

mother told the deputy that her daughter gave the same account

the day of the attack. We consider this evidence sufficient to 

sustain the juvenile court’s finding beyond a reasonable doubt 

that N.M. assaulted K.F. by means of force likely to produce great 

bodily injury. Either act could have gravely injured or even killed 

K.F. (See People v. Armstrong (1992) 8 Cal. App. 4th 1060, 1066, 

citing People v. Covino (1980) 100 Cal.App.3d 660, 667 [“Great 
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bodily injury is bodily injury which is significant or substantial, 

not insignificant, trivial or moderate”].) 

The record contains substantial evidence of N.M.’s criminal 

threats as well. Deputy Ordaz recounted his conversation with 

K.F. about N.M.’s threat to shoot her brothers and her if she 

reported the assault. N.M.’s mother corroborated this account 

when she confirmed one of the responding deputies asked to 

search the garage for suspected weapons. In addition, K.F.’s 

mother testified how N.M. made a similar threat toward her 

husband when they arrived at N.M.’s mother’s home to pick up 

their daughter. Any conflict in the evidence created when later 

K.F. recanted her account of the incident was for the juvenile 

court to resolve. (In re Ryan N., supra, 92 Cal.App.4th at pp. 

1372-1373.)

DISPOSITION

The juvenile court’s dispositional order sustaining counts 1 

and 3 of the amended 602 petition is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

PERREN, J.

We concur:

GILBERT, P. J.

YEGAN, J.
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Hon. William A. Crowfoot, Judge

Superior Court County of Los Angeles

______________________________

Laini Millar Melnick, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Xavier Becerra, Rob Bonta, Attorneys General, Lance E. 

Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan 

Pithey, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Michael R. Johnsen, 

Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and David W. Williams, 

Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.