WV DIA Westminster, LLC v. Mayor & Common Council of Westminster, No. 22, 

September Term, 2018

APPLICATION TO AMEND GENERAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN – QUASIJUDICIAL ACT VS. LEGISLATIVE ACT – JUDICIAL REVIEW – ERROR OF 

LAW – SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE – REMEDY – Court of Appeals held that Mayor 

and Common Council of Westminster (“Council”)’s decision denying application to amend 

General Development Plan for Wakefield Valley was quasi-judicial act, not legislative act, 

because decision was reached on individual grounds involving one parcel through 

deliberative fact-finding process involving testimony and weighing of evidence; 

accordingly, decision is subject to judicial review to determine whether substantial 

evidence in record as whole supports Council’s findings and conclusion and to determine 

whether Council’s decision is premised upon error of law. Court of Appeals held that 

Council was not prohibited from considering, among other things, zonal classification of 

property when determining whether to grant application. Court of Appeals held that 

substantial evidence in record as whole supported Council’s denial of application. Court 

of Appeals held that, because it affirmed, it need not determine whether remand or reversal 

was proper remedy, as neither remedy was applicable.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

OF MARYLAND

No. 22

September Term, 2018

______________________________________

WV DIA WESTMINSTER, LLC

v.

MAYOR & COMMON COUNCIL OF 

WESTMINSTER

______________________________________

Barbera, C.J.

Greene

*Adkins

McDonald

Watts

Hotten

Battaglia, Lynne A. (Senior 

Judge, Specially Assigned),

JJ.

______________________________________

Opinion by Watts, J.

______________________________________

Filed: January 18, 2019

*Adkins, J., now retired, participated in the 

hearing and conference of this case while an 

active member of this Court; after being recalled 

pursuant to the Md. Constitution, Article IV, 

Section 3A, she also participated in the decision 

and adoption of this opinion.

Circuit Court for Carroll County

Case No. 06-C-17-072911

Argued: October 10, 2018 
This case arises from the denial of an application to amend the General 

Development Plan for Wakefield Valley (“the Wakefield Valley GDP”), located in the City 

of Westminster in Carroll County, Maryland. In July 2016, WV DIA Westminster, LLC 

(“Developer”), Petitioner, filed an application to amend the Wakefield Valley GDP to 

permit construction of fifty-three homes on what is designated as “Parcel W” of a former 

golf course (“the Application”). In December 2016, the Mayor and Common Council of 

Westminster (“the Council”),1 Respondent, held a public hearing on the Application. In 

January 2017, the Council held another public hearing to consider whether to approve the 

Application; at the end of the hearing, the Council voted to deny the Application, and the 

president of the Council directed staff to prepare a written decision to that effect. In 

February 2017, Developer filed in the Circuit Court for Carroll County a petition for 

judicial review. In March 2017, the Council adopted Ordinance No. 876, denying the 

Application and incorporating an attached written decision, which set forth findings. 

Developer then filed an amended petition for judicial review. 

In July 2017, the circuit court heard argument on the amended petition for judicial 

review, and held the matter sub curia for review of the record. In November 2017, the 

circuit court issued a memorandum opinion and order, affirming the Council’s decision as 

set forth in Ordinance No. 876. In December 2017, Developer filed a notice of appeal. 

 

1Section 1 of the Charter of the City of Westminster creates a municipal corporation 

named “The Mayor and Common Council of Westminster.” Section 3 of the Charter of

the City of Westminster provides that the government of Westminster “shall be vested in 

and enforced by” the Mayor and Common Council; in other words, the Mayor and 

Common Council serve as the governing body for the City of Westminster. We refer to 

the Mayor and Common Council as “the Council,” as opposed to “the City.”
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While this case was pending in the Court of Special Appeals, Developer filed in this Court 

a petition for a writ of certiorari, which we granted. See WV DIA Westminster v. Mayor 

& Common Council of Westminster, 459 Md. 401, 187 A.3d 36 (2018).

Against this backdrop, we decide: (I) whether the Council’s decision denying the 

Application was quasi-judicial or legislative in nature; (II) whether the Council erred in 

considering the zonal classification of Parcel W in evaluating the Application; (III) whether 

there is substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the Council’s decision; and 

(IV) if the Council’s decision was premised upon an error of law or lacked substantial 

evidence, whether the appropriate remedy is to reverse and remand the matter with 

instructions to approve the Application or simply to remand the matter to the Council for 

further proceedings.

We hold that: (I) the Council’s decision denying the Application was a quasijudicial act, not a legislative act, because the decision was reached on individual grounds 

involving one parcel through a deliberative fact-finding process involving testimony and 

the weighing of evidence; accordingly, the decision is subject to judicial review to 

determine whether substantial evidence in the record as a whole supports the Council’s 

findings and conclusions and to determine whether the Council’s decision is premised upon 

an error of law; (II) the Council was not prohibited from considering, among other things, 

the zonal classification of Parcel W when determining whether to grant the Application; 

(III) substantial evidence in the record as a whole supports the Council’s denial of the 

Application; and (IV) because we affirm, holding that there is substantial evidence in the 

record as a whole to support the Council’s findings and conclusions and that the Council’s 
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decision is not premised upon an error of law, we need not determine whether a remand or 

a reversal is the proper remedy, as neither remedy is applicable.

BACKGROUND

The Application for amendment of the Wakefield Valley GDP sought to add fiftythree new houses on what is now designated as Parcel W on the Special Purpose Plat 

Resubdivision of “P” and “Q” Wakefield Valley, recorded in Plat Book 54 on Page 127 

among the Land Records of Carroll County. Parcel W comprises 38.2934 acres and is 

zoned C-Conservation; it is located along the southeastern side of Bell Road, across from 

Chadwick Drive, with part of the property abutting Fenby Farm Road. The property is part 

of the Wakefield Valley GDP, approved by the Council in 1978, which addressed the 

overall development of a number of parcels collectively called Wakefield Valley. With 

this background in mind, we trace the history of the approval of the Wakefield Valley GDP 

and subsequent amendments, as well as the adoption of a Zoning Ordinance.

As of 1978, Westminster did not have a Zoning Ordinance. In 1978, the Council 

approved “[t]he Wakefield Valley/Fenby Farm General Development Plan” for “734.56± 

acres of land . . . on the western edge of” Westminster, i.e., the Wakefield Valley GDP. 

The Wakefield Valley GDP consisted of three categories of land use—residential, 

commercial, and open space—with the “major open space use within the community [to 

be] a championship golf course.” According to the Wakefield Valley GDP, 

“[a]pproximately 483 ± acres or 66% of the site is devoted to residential, 20± acres or 3% 

to commercial, and 228± or 31% to open space use.” The Wakefield Valley GDP 

emphasized, however, that “[t]he [c]entral spine of the combined properties is formed by a 
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flood plain area and a new nine[-]hole golf course[,] which [would] be completed in the 

early summer of 1978.” The Wakefield Valley GDP stated that plans were “underway for 

the completion of the remaining nine holes” and that “construction of the second nine 

[would] be based on increased demand and continued development of the residential 

component of the project.” As originally approved, the Wakefield Valley GDP area 

included twenty-one parcels, designated alphabetically from “A” to “U.” According to the 

Wakefield Valley GDP, the overall gross density was to be 1.6 units per acre, with 31% of 

open space. And, as originally approved, the Wakefield Valley GDP envisioned a mixeduse development consisting of 670 to 768 residential units on approximately 734 acres, 

with 20 acres devoted to commercial use. 

The following year, in 1979, the Council adopted a Zoning Ordinance, now codified 

as Chapter 164 of the Code of the City of Westminster (“Westminster Code”). Because a 

variety of plans were in place before the adoption of the Zoning Ordinance—including the 

Wakefield Valley GDP—the Zoning Ordinance included a section expressly permitting 

development to occur based on the existing plans already approved by the Council and 

providing for amendments to those plans using the process described in an identified 

provision of the Zoning Ordinance. That section—now codified as Westminster Code § 

164-133B—provides, in pertinent part: 

All preliminary plans, final plans, revised preliminary or final plans and all 

development plans of any type which have been approved by the Mayor and 

Common Council and/or the Commission prior to November 5, 1979, shall 

continue to be approved and valid after said date, regardless of the zonal 

classification of the real property as to which such plans pertain, and said real 

property shall be developed in accordance with the provisions of such plans. 

Such plans may be amended in accordance with the procedures provided for 
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the amendment of development plans contained in § 164-188J of this chapter.

In turn, Westminster Code § 164-188J provides:

In considering a rezoning application which includes a development plan, the 

Common Council shall consider whether the application and the 

development plan fulfill the purposes and requirements set forth in this 

chapter. In so doing, the Common Council shall make the following specific 

findings, in addition to any other findings which may be found to be 

necessary and appropriate to the evaluation of the proposed reclassification:

(1) That the zone applied for is in substantial compliance with the use and 

density indicated by the Master Plan or sector plan and that it does not 

conflict with the general plan, the City’s capital improvements program or 

other applicable City plans and policies.

(2) That the proposed development would comply with the purposes, 

standards and regulations of the zone as set forth in Articles II through XV, 

would provide for the maximum safety, convenience and amenity of the 

residents of the development and would be compatible with adjacent 

development.

(3) That the proposed vehicular and pedestrian circulation systems are 

adequate and efficient.

(4) That by its design, by minimizing grading and by other means, the 

proposed development would tend to prevent erosion of the soil and to 

preserve natural vegetation and other natural features of the site.

(5) That any proposals, including restrictions, agreements or other 

documents, which show the ownership and method of assuring perpetual 

maintenance of those areas, if any, that are intended to be used for 

recreational or other common or other quasi-public purposes, are adequate 

and sufficient.

(6) That the submitted development plan is in accord with all pertinent 

statutory requirements and is or is not approved. Disapproval of a 

development plan by the Common Council shall result in a denial of the 

rezoning application of which the development plan is a part. 

At some point, the golf course acquired additional land to expand from an 18-hole 

course to a 27-hole course. In 1987, as a result of the acquisition for expansion of the golf 
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course, the Council approved an amendment to the Wakefield Valley GDP, redistributing 

the residential density and reconfiguring the golf course. Specifically, the 1987 

amendment transferred residential units from the golf course to the parcel known as “Parcel 

H,” resulting in a new allocation of residential units for that parcel.2 In a letter dated 

January 16, 1987, Carroll R. Dell, Westminster’s then-Director of Planning and Public 

Works, explained to Dr. Earl Griswold, a landowner, that, in approving the amendment to 

the Wakefield Valley GDP, “[i]t was noted that the gross residential density within the 

overall plan has been retained at a maximum of 768 units or approximately 1.45 per acre” 

and that “[t]he open space has increased to 241.6 acres or 47% of the total tract.” 

After various changes, the golf course eventually occupied the parcels identified on 

the original Wakefield Valley GDP as Parcels E, L, M, and T, and part of Parcel G. In 

1989, the Council approved a request to amend the Wakefield Valley GDP to reduce the 

number of residential units for Parcel H.3 The Council’s approval of the requested 

amendment, however, was subject to certain conditions, including a condition that was 

originally recommended by the Westminster Planning and Zoning Commission (“the 

Commission”) “[t]hat the approved [GDP] for Wakefield Valley be modified to show a 

reduction of the [] residential units and ten acres of commercial development on Parcel H.” 

 

2Under the 1978 Wakefield Valley GDP, Parcel H consisted of 7.6 acres and had a 

residential unit range of 15 to 20 units. Under the 1987 amendment to the Wakefield GDP, 

Parcel H’s acreage and residential unit range increased, with Parcel H consisting of 28.73 

acres and having a residential unit range of 167 to 214 units. 

3The request was to reduce the residential units approved for Parcel H from the 

maximum of 214, as provided in the 1987 amendment to the Wakefield Valley GDP, to 

55. 
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Under the 1989 amendment to the Wakefield Valley GDP, the overall gross density was to 

be 1.1 to 1.2 units per acre, with 47% of open space. Thus, from the 1987 amendment to 

the 1989 amendment, the overall gross density decreased, but the percentage of total area 

in open space remained the same.4 

In 2006, Woodhaven Building & Development, Inc. (“Woodhaven”) applied to 

amend the Wakefield Valley GDP to build 320 senior cottages on 167 acres, to be 

developed on nine holes of the existing 27-hole golf course. Woodhaven’s application 

sought to use density that had been allocated to Parcel H for its development, i.e., to 

reassign the density that previously existed for Parcel H. The Council denied the proposed 

amendment, and, in a written decision, the Council noted that Woodhaven had “the burden 

of proof and persuasion in order to secure approval of an amended development plan[,]” 

and determined that Woodhaven failed to “produce sufficient credible evidence and 

testimony to have met its burden of proof to show that all of the [necessary] elements ha[d] 

been met.” The Council acknowledged that Woodhaven had “presented some expert 

testimony in support of its application[,]” but concluded “that the testimony and evidence 

was inadequate, incomplete[,] and unpersuasive.” The Council concluded:

[T]he density previously allowed to Parcel H in the prior approved 

Development Plan terminated and was extinguished by the Council when it 

acted on an application [for amendment]. As a result, no such units remain 

available from Parcel H to be reassigned to [Woodhaven]’s proposal. 

Despite the absence of any dwelling units left available to Parcel H, 

[Woodhaven] still had the ability to request that the Council amend the 

Development Plan for its proposal. However, as discussed herein 

 

4

In 2001, there was another amendment to the Wakefield Valley GDP that 

established a density of thirteen dwelling units for a parcel owned by Carroll Lutheran 

Village. 
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[Woodhaven] did not meet its burden of proof and persuasion. 

The Council further concluded that the proposed amendment, among other things, was “not 

in substantial compliance with the use and density indicated by the development plan for 

Wakefield Valley[,]” was “not compatible with adjacent development[,]” and failed to 

address serious problems with water supply, traffic, and erosion. 

In 2009, the Council adopted a new Comprehensive Plan.5 Based on a 

recommendation from the Commission, the zoning for the golf course and undeveloped 

property in Wakefield Valley was changed from low-density residential zoning to 

conservation zoning, and the 2009 Comprehensive Plan specifically addressed the 

Wakefield Valley GDP as follows:

The 1978 [Wakefield Valley GDP] restricted the development of housing 

within the parcel where Wakefield Valley Golf Course and Conference 

Center exists today. However, the current land use is Low Density 

Residential even though the development plan will not allow any residential 

homes to be built in this area. The [Commission] recommended a land use 

change from Low Density Residential to Conservation to reflect the 

development plan and the existing land use. The existing land use for this 

parcel is the Wakefield Valley Golf Course and Conference Center 

surrounded by forest land and natural landscapes as well as a stream that runs 

from the southwest corner to the eastern portion of the parcel. This change 

reflects how the land is currently used; however, this change does not change 

the approved Development Plan for Wakefield Valley. The 2009 

Comprehensive Land Use Map has re-designated the land use of this 240 

acre parcel from Low Density Residential to Conservation.[6] 

 

5The following year, in 2010, the Council adopted a Comprehensive Zoning Map. 

6The 2009 Comprehensive Plan noted that analysis had shown that Westminster 

“has a limited housing unit capacity of 1,043 dwelling units[,]” and that, “to accommodate 

the projected population growth for the next 20 years, Westminster will need to increase 

the housing unit capacity of the City by at least 648 dwelling units.” The 2009 

Comprehensive Plan observed that, “[a]s of 2009, the City of Westminster had 106 acres 

of vacant residential land.”
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At some point, the golf course in Wakefield Valley ceased operations, and, in 2014, 

Developer purchased the land, comprising approximately 242 acres, and subdivided it into 

Parcels W, X, Y, and Z.7 On June 2, 2014, the Council, Developer, and a company known 

as Naganwest, LLC, entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (“the MOU”). In the 

MOU, Developer agreed that it would: procure groundwater appropriation permits; donate 

certain property in Wakefield Valley to Westminster and Carroll Lutheran Village subject 

to “retain[ing] any residential density units attributable to, or associated with, the land 

contributed to” Westminster or Carroll Lutheran Village; and “[s]ubmit an application for 

the appropriate zoning approvals to allow up to 70 single[-]family residential lots on the 

Wakefield Valley property[.]” Developer also agreed that it was “understood that th[e] 

MOU [was] not intended to limit or restrict the ordinary review authority of the [Council] 

(or any governmental agency) to impose conditions upon, or deny, the proposed 

development.” In return, in pertinent part, the Council eliminated two obligations owed by 

Naganwest, LLC concerning making a $1.5 million water contribution and constructing a 

pumping station, and agreed to “consider, in good faith, and in accordance with applicable 

laws and regulations, [Developer]’s application for zoning approvals necessary to allow 

construction of up to 70 single[-]family lots on the Wakefield Valley property.”8 

By deed dated February 26, 2016, pursuant to the MOU, Developer transferred 

approximately 188 acres of the golf course property, comprising Parcels Y and Z, to 

 

7Parcel W is 38.2934 acres; Parcel X is 16.0695 acres; Parcel Y is 171.0747 acres; 

and Parcel Z is 16.5896 acres. 

8On May 1, 2015, the Council, Developer, and Naganwest, LLC executed a First 

Amended MOU, amending a paragraph of the MOU that is not relevant in this case. 
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Westminster. 

On July 21, 2016, Developer filed the Application for amendment to the Wakefield 

Valley GDP, seeking to build 53 homes on the 38.2934 acres of Parcel W.9 On September 

8, 2016, Developer made an “informal presentation” to the Commission, and Developer 

and its representative “presented their proposed development and a summary of the 

[GDP].” In a memorandum dated October 6, 2016, from Bill Mackey, the Planning 

Director of Westminster, to the Commission, Mackey traced the status of the Wakefield 

Valley GDP as follows:

The Decision of the [] Council in 2006 . . . summarizes the process by which 

the [] Council extinguished 160 density rights in 2016 [sic] . . . . Records 

indicate that there are remaining unbuilt density rights on land owned by the 

Griswold family (20 dwelling units), Carroll Lutheran Village (13 dwelling 

units), Valentine family (two dwelling units), Fenby Farm (one dwelling 

unit), and two units on the former golf course. It appears that the Durbin 

House was considered an existing dwelling at one time. Parcels W, X, Y, 

and Z have two unbuilt rights. 

(Paragraph break omitted). According to Mackey, the Application sought “50 new density 

rights be created for Parcel W” and requested “use of all three existing density rights on 

the former golf course land (unbuilt plus Durbin).” In a “Conclusion” section, Mackey 

wrote:

In the big picture, the subject [Application] is not consistent with the 2009 

Comprehensive Plan, nor is it in keeping with the central purpose of the 

original [Wakefield Valley GDP]. That being said, the 2009 Comprehensive 

Plan does envision the property as Conservation under the zoning provisions.

If the land were to be developed in line with those provisions, the permitted 

density would be three units per acre, or roughly a dozen new houses. 

 

9Parcel X was to be donated to Carroll Lutheran Village, if and when the Council 

approved the Application. 
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Utilizing a cluster design approach, this density could be accommodated on 

14 acres including a street or plaza. It could allow for community facilities, 

open space preservation (in order to meet the required 31%), and a uniquely 

designed setting to provide a special sense of place. 

(Italics omitted). And, Mackey advised:

Staff recommends that the Commission consider “approval with 

recommended modifications,” pursuant to [Westminster Code] § 164-188 H. 

(1), in order to allow nine new density units and transfer the existing three 

units for a total of 12 density units with the condition that a cluster design be 

undertaken to maintain a minimum of 24 acres in open space land to preserve 

the required 31% open space. 

One week later, on October 13, 2016, the Commission held a public hearing, at 

which the Commission considered the Application. At the public hearing, Mackey 

reviewed his October 6, 2016 memorandum and the staff’s recommendation to allow a total 

of twelve density units for Parcel W. Members of the public also commented, with some 

individuals raising concerns about traffic and parking, water availability, effects on the 

open space, and flooding, among other things. The Commission ultimately voted to “leave

the record open for 30 days” and asked citizens to submit comments to the Planning 

Director. On November 17, 2016, the Commission held another public hearing. At that 

meeting, the Chair noted “that the Commission had received over 100 comments from the 

public” about the Application. One member of the Commission “reiterated that more 

support from the community [was] needed.” After discussing the Application, the 

Commission unanimously voted to recommend denial of the Application “as presented.” 

In a memorandum dated December 7, 2016, Mackey provided the Council with an 

overview, stating that the Application sought “to add 50 new density rights[,]” and that 

Westminster staff recommended twelve houses “total, which would reflect the current 
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zoning, noting that the zoning is not a requirement, since Wakefield Valley is subject to a 

plan that predates the zoning code.” Mackey also advised that over 100 households and 

organizations had submitted written comments concerning the Application and that thirteen 

members of the public commented at the Commission’s October hearing. Mackey 

explained that the “Commission recommended denial as presented, citing the extinguishing 

of development rights in 1989, potential loss of open space, and objections in comments 

from the public.” In the overview, Mackey stated that the Council was “required to utilize 

a quasi-judicial process to decide on the matter[,]” that the Council was required to “make 

specific findings in six areas pursuant to [Westminster Code] § 164-188 J.[,]” and that 

“[d]ocuments and testimony from [Developer], [Westminster] staff, the public and others 

are considered evidence.” In a section titled “Summary Conclusion,” Mackey wrote as 

follows:

Comparing the historical record with what is actually constructed today, it is 

evident that there is more open space and less density units than set forth in 

the original 1978 GDP; however, this is because, over time, more open space 

was included and less units were allowed in the various re-iterations of the 

plan.

* * *

Regarding open space, [Developer] is correct that there would be 40% open 

space remaining without Parcel W. However, in 1987[,] the [] Council 

included 47% for the open space, so open space was increased. At this point, 

the proposed 40% would be a reduction in open space from the 47% set forth 

in 1987. That being said, the final build-out of Carroll Lutheran Village 

could increase the total amount of open space. Also, if Parcel W were to be 

retained as open space only, then there would be a total of 45% open space. 

Therefore, unless other parcels were to contribute, the 47% cannot be met. 

Mackey also incorporated his October 6, 2016 memorandum, with additional 
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information and comments, and some deletions. As to existing density rights available, the 

modified memorandum noted:

The three density rights were not assigned to any of the four parcels (Parcels 

W, X, Y and Z) created by [Developer] out of the former golf course. The 

three units first appear in the record for M2 open space parcel in the 1987 

revision. [Westminster] staff had expressed early on that these could be 

assigned to Parcel W. 

(Underlining omitted). Mackey also modified the October 6, 2016 memorandum to strike 

two references to the “required 31%” open space. The modified memorandum 

recommended “‘approval with recommended modifications,’ in order to allow nine new 

density units and transfer the existing three units for a total of 12 density units with the 

condition that a cluster design be undertaken to maintain as much open space as possible.” 

On December 12, 2016, the Council held a public hearing on the Application. At 

the beginning of the public hearing, an attorney for Westminster recommended that the 

Council “adopt rules of procedure which you don’t presently have for quasi-judicial 

proceedings.” According to the attorney for Westminster, such rules of procedure had “not 

been necessary in the past but given the complication of the anticipated hearing[,]” the 

attorney “thought it would be better if [the Council] adopted local procedure prior to the 

beginning of the public hearing.” The Council approved and adopted “the rules of 

procedure for quasi-judicial proceedings as presented.”10 

 

10On other occasions during the public hearing, the Council and attorney for 

Westminster referred to the hearing as “a quasi-judicial” proceeding. For example, on one 

occasion, when there was applause, the Council President stated: “Please. This is a quasijudicial proceeding. There will be no outbursts, comments, interruptions, noises, anything 

from the audience. Thank you.” And, on another occasion, the attorney for Westminster 

reminded the Council that the proceeding was “a quasi-judicial hearing” and the Council 
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Mackey presented Westminster’s overview of the Application, and began his 

testimony by addressing the “quasi-judicial process[.]” Mackey explained:

[A] quasi-judicial process . . . is similar to a courtroom process but it is less 

formal. Evidence is submitted. People give testimony. It does follow a set 

of procedures. And after the public hearing[,] the [] Council would make a 

decision based on findings that they would make in a number of areas, and 

[the] Council uses the evidence presented during this hearing to support those 

findings. 

As part of this process[,] the Council must make findings in six areas 

pursuant to [Westminster Code] Subsection 164-188J[.] Those six findings, 

just to kind of summarize them briefly, [are] whether what is being proposed 

is consistent with the comprehensive plan, consistent with the zoning Code. 

If the traffic and pedestrian circulation proposed is acceptable[,] is the 

preservation of soils and vegetation such as trees, that’s number 4, 5 is there 

maintenance of common facilities being proposed, and does it indeed comply 

with all statutory requirements or not, and then you make a decision. And 

that’s the process that we’re about to undertake this evening. It’s a little bit 

different from the process that the [C]ommission uses which is a 

recommendation process only. 

Mackey provided an overview of the history of Wakefield Valley in general and 

Parcel W specifically. According to Mackey, in 1987, the Council “increase[d] open space 

to 47 percent for [] Wakefield Valley . . . because part of the 1987 amendment of Parcel K 

in Wakefield Valley was swapped for Parcel R in Fenby Farm and that changed the total 

acreage for both portions of the [GDP] and essentially lowered density in Wakefield 

Valley.” Mackey testified that, in 1989, the Council “reaffirmed” 47% open space, when 

the Council “extinguished 159 residential density units and 10 acres of commercial [space] 

as part of an amendment to approve the Fenby Farm subdivision which is actually created 

 

needed “to find facts in such a hearing [and] the witnesses are subject to crossexamination.” 
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from Parcel H in Wakefield Valley and Parcel R in Fenby Farm.” As to the current density 

units of Wakefield Valley, Mackey testified that there were 537 units constructed, ten 

unused units from various parcels, including three on the former golf course, and fifty-six 

“raw units for Carroll Lutheran Village[,]” for a total of 603 density units, which Mackey 

testified “is the lower end of the range of the approval as amended . . . in 1989.” As to 

open space, Mackey “confirm[ed] that the existing open space from all City-owned parcels, 

from [homeowner association]-owned parcels and Parcel X, if that is indeed turned to open 

space, for Wakefield Valley and Fenby Farm together is [] 40 percent.” Mackey testified, 

however, that “[i]f Parcel W were to be counted as open space, then there would be 45 

percent open space.” After being asked by the Council’s president whether several more 

developments had caused the open space to decline from 47% in 1987, Mackey testified: 

“Well, that I can’t really answer. I’m looking across the record, I’m pulling decisions and 

then we’re analyzing what’s there.” 

Mackey testified that Westminster staff recommended twelve density units for 

Parcel W, and he explained the reasoning behind that based on the history of the Wakefield 

Valley GDP, relying on Council’s 2006 decision, the 2009 Comprehensive Plan, and the 

2009 land use map. Mackey testified that Westminster staff “felt that the [Application]

presented [was] not consistent with the 2009 comprehensive plan and is not in keeping 

with the central purpose of the original [GDP].” Mackey explained, though, that, because 

“the 2009 comprehensive plan does envision the property as conservation in the zoning 

process there may be a way to find a compromise.” According to Mackey, if Parcel W 

were “developed in line with . . . the conservation zoning provisions, the permitted density 
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would be theoretically three units per acre[,] . . . yield[ing] about a dozen new houses.” 

And, Mackey suggested that, if Developer used “a cluster design approach[,] that density 

could be accommodated on a small amount of land, originally 14 acres was suggested, 

since . . . we sort of teased out open space a little more.” 

Mackey answered questions from members of the Council. In response to one 

question, Mackey testified that the Council was “not bound by either [his] recommendation 

or what [Developer] is suggesting, or what the [C]ommission” recommended, but instead 

could “come to an independent separate decision.” The attorney for Westminster then 

emphasized that the Council was “not bound by the Staff report” or “by what the 

[C]ommission did, but [that it had] an application before [it] that [it had] to adjudicate 

whether it is consistent with those factors in the ordinance.” The attorney for Westminster 

also explained that the Council “could impose conditions on an approval.” 

Mackey also responded to questions from Developer’s counsel. In response to one 

question, Mackey testified that, from his observations, “it appear[ed] that density was 

transferred in a variety of cases and in some cases extinguished[,]” and that, “as part of 

moving things around[,] the exchange back was that open space was increased so things 

were perhaps concentrated more in order to allow for more open space.” Mackey testified 

that, as proposed, the Application would not be consistent with the 2009 Comprehensive 

Plan. Mackey also testified that, in his view, the 2009 Comprehensive Plan “recogniz[ed] 

what [was] existing and also in the context sort of validat[ed] that that is the desire of 

[Westminster] for such property[,]” and “also include[d] some intent as well.” In response 

to a question from Developer’s counsel as to whether the Council “should consider changes 
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that have occurred in the area since 1978 in considering” the Application, Mackey testified: 

“If it relates to or bears upon a finding, then if there’s evidence on the record that relates to 

a finding that would be something that they could consider.” Shortly thereafter, Mackey 

finished testifying, and Developer began to present its case. 

Developer called five experts to testify about the Application. Edmund Cueman, 

whom the Council accepted as an expert in land use planning and design, testified that, 

from 1962 to 1971, he was the Planning Director for Worcester County, and, from 1971 to 

1995, he was the Planning Director for Carroll County. According to Cueman, as the 

Planning Director for Carroll County, he recalled when the Wakefield Valley GDP was 

developed, reviewed, and approved in 1978. In 1978, in his capacity as Planning Director, 

Cueman wrote a letter to Dell, the then-Director of Public Works and Planning, in which 

he commented on the Wakefield Valley GDP and discussed the overall density goal. 

Cueman testified that, based on his review of the Application, his familiarity with the 

property, the Wakefield Valley GDP, and the amendments, his investigation, and his 

review of the Zoning Ordinance, the Application was in substantial compliance with the 

use and density indicated by the Wakefield Valley GDP. 

Martin Hackett, the president of a local consulting firm that handled engineering, 

land planning, and surveying, was accepted by the Council on its own motion as an expert 

in land design; one member of the Council referred to Hackett as “one of the most qualified 

individuals in Carroll County.” Hackett testified that he worked with Developer on the 

Application, and he opined that the Application was in substantial compliance with the use 

and density indicated by the Wakefield Valley GDP. According to Hackett, because the 
- 18 -

Wakefield Valley GDP predated the Zoning Ordinance, “conventional zoning, just 

conventional Euclidian zone for properties out there, the zonal classification is not

relevant.” Hackett also testified that density in the Wakefield Valley GDP area fluctuated 

over time, stating: “People have decreased density, they’ve shifted density, whatever, 

certainly you can increase density as well . . . as long as you meet the criteria outlined in” 

Westminster Code § 164-188J. Hackett testified that that approval of the Application 

would result in less density per acre and more acres of open space than under the 1978 

Wakefield Valley GDP. Specifically, according to Hackett, the 1978 Wakefield Valley 

GDP envisioned a density of 1.6 dwelling units per acre, the density was 1.18 dwelling 

units per acre in 1989, and, if the additional units in the Application were approved, the 

density would be 1.27 dwelling units per acre. And, Hackett testified that, based on his 

calculations, under the 1978 Wakefield Valley GDP, there were approximately 200 acres 

of open space; at the time of the hearing, there were 242 acres of open space; and, if the 

Application were approved, there would be 208 acres of open space. 

According to Hackett, the Application was compatible with the Wakefield Valley 

GDP and surrounding development. Hackett testified that the Application did not have the 

water problems associated with the proposed 2006 amendment to the Wakefield Valley 

GDP. Hackett testified that the Application also met all the standards for pedestrian 

circulation, internal roads, grading, erosion, and sewers. Hackett explained that his 

investigation and preparation of the Application included 3D imaging. Hackett further 

testified that the Application helped satisfy the 2009 Comprehensive Plan’s call for more 

dwelling units, and he opined that the Application was in substantial compliance with the 
- 19 -

Wakefield Valley GDP and met all relevant criteria. 

Brian Biddle, the vice-president of a traffic consulting business, was accepted by 

the Council as an expert in traffic, and testified that he conducted a traffic study for the 

Application. Biddle opined that the Application complied with all traffic standards. Lisa 

Eckard, a certified general real estate appraiser, was accepted by the Council as an expert 

in real estate appraisal. Eckard opined that, if approved, the Application would not 

negatively affect property values in the area, and she opined that the Application was 

compatible with surrounding development. And, Melanie Moser, a registered landscape 

architect, was accepted by the Council as an expert in land use planning and design. Moser 

testified that the Application substantially complied with the use and density indicated by 

Wakefield Valley GDP, had an adequate erosion-prevention plan, and was compatible with 

the 2009 Comprehensive Plan. 

The Council heard from citizens who urged the Council to deny the Application. 

Thereafter, the Council adjourned the hearing. 

On January 9, 2017, the Council conducted another hearing to consider the 

Application. At the outset of the hearing, Mackey stated: “[T]he community ha[s] been 

alerted to the fact that the public hearing has been closed and that this hearing is for your

deliberation and discussion of the matter.” One member of the Council advised that, 

“[b]ecause this was a quasi-judicial hearing we were prohibited from discussing this 

amongst ourselves[.]” The Council President sought to clarify the procedure with which 

the Council was to deliberate the necessary criteria and make a decision, and the attorney 

for Westminster explained that, generally, “that occurs as a consequence of a discussion 
- 20 -

and debate about each of your views of the application of these six criteria to the facts that 

were adduced before you in the hearing last month.” 

The Council then discussed and debated the six factors set forth in Westminster 

Code § 164-188J.11 The Council voted that the Application failed to satisfy Westminster 

Code § 164-188J(1)—substantial compliance with the use and density indicated by Master 

Plan or sector plan, i.e., the Wakefield Valley GDP, and that it did not conflict with the 

general plan, the City’s capital improvements program, or other applicable City plans and 

policies. The Council further voted that the Application complied with Westminster Code 

§ 164-188J(2) through (5), and that Westminster Code § 164-188J(6) was irrelevant and 

generally not applicable.12 Thus, because one of the factors was not satisfied, the Council 

 

11As stated above, Mackey was present at the hearing while the Council deliberated. 

During the hearing, members of the Council asked Mackey questions. The attorney for 

Westminster reminded the Council that it had “to decide based on the record that was 

before” it, but stated that she did not “have a problem” with Mackey conveying some 

information that was already contained in the record. At a certain point, Developer’s 

counsel objected, stating: “The hearing is over. You’re entitled to deliberate. You’re not 

entitled to take additional evidence. . . . [W]e are in a quasi-judicial process where you are 

supposed to make a decision based on the facts that were put into the record[.]” Later, a 

member of the Council stated:

I think we all ought to make sure and be reflective of the fact that we’re 

making our decision based on all the information we heard during the hearing 

phase as well as the public input phase and not anything that was said this 

evening by [] Mackey. I think we understand that we have to put that out of 

our mind because clearly that probably isn’t completely in compliance with 

the quasi-judicial hearing aspect of what we’re required to do here. 

The other members of the Council agreed.

12With respect to the sixth factor, the minutes of the January 9, 2017 hearing stated 

that one member of the Council “shared that the sixth factor all goes back to the first 

factor,” and that “the Council found factor[] . . . six to fail.” 
- 21 -

voted to deny the Application, and “direct[ed] Staff to . . . generate an opinion based on 

[its] deliberations and the considered decisions of the elected officials.” 

One month later, on February 9, 2017, before the Council issued a written decision, 

Developer filed in the circuit court a petition for judicial review of the Council’s oral 

decision at the January 9, 2017 hearing denying the Application. 

A month after that, on March 13, 2017, the Council adopted Ordinance No. 876, 

denying the Application and incorporating an attached written decision, which set forth 

findings. The same day, the Mayor approved Ordinance No. 876. Ordinance No. 876 

stated, in pertinent part, that the Council had “determined that the [A]pplication [did] not 

meet[] the criteria set forth in [Westminster Code] § 164-188J[,]” and that the Mayor and 

the Council intended “to act unfavorably upon the [A]pplication[.]” Accordingly, 

Ordinance No. 876 stated that the Application was “denied for the reasons set forth in the 

accompanying decision attached hereto as Exhibit A.” 

The Council’s written decision described the Application, Westminster’s adoption 

of the Zoning Ordinance and the criteria of Westminster Code § 164-188J, the history of 

the Wakefield Valley GDP, and the adoption of the 2009 Comprehensive Plan. In the 

decision, the Council also discussed relevant law, stating:

[Developer] at no point requested rezoning of the property. [The 

A]pplication was, therefore, for permission to develop residential units on 

the property in excess of the number of such units previously allotted to the 

parcel that is currently in [Developer]’s ownership, notwithstanding the 

existing zoning for the property, based upon an analysis of the history, 

circumstances and residential unit allocations conferred upon the entire 

Wakefield Valley GDP area. . . . There is a strong presumption of correctness 

attaching to a comprehensive rezoning because it is a legislative function[.]
- 22 -

Even though the present matter impacts directly only a small part of 

the Wakefield Valley G[DP] area, it is analogous to Potomac Valley League 

v. [] County Council [for Montgomery County], 43 Md. App. 56[,] 61[, 403 

A.2d 388, 391-92] (1979)[,] in which the [C]ourt said that the Montgomery 

County Council had validly approved a comprehensive zoning, even though 

it involved only four parcels totaling 1.39 acres. The Court reasoned that the 

subject zoning was a culmination of a prior comprehensive zoning approved 

in 1974 and partially implement[ed] in a 1970 master plan. 

With respect to the Application, in the decision, the Council explained its reasons 

for “disapprov[ing] the proposed amendment to the Wakefield Valley” GDP, stating:

The open space requirement for the Wakefield [Valley] GDP area is 

47%. As development presently stands, the actual open space in the 

Wakefield Valley GDP area is 45%, including an undeveloped Parcel W. If 

Parcel W were to be developed in accordance with the [Application for] the 

proposed Fourth Amendment, the open space would be 40%.

The Council finds that the [Application] is not in substantial 

compliance with the use and density indicated by the master plan or sector 

plan and that it conflicts with the general plan, City’s capital improvement 

program or other applicable City plans and policies.

The language of [Westminster Code §] 164-133(B), which as counsel 

for [Developer] pointed out, apparently applies only to the property 

originally included in the Wakefield Valley [GDP] and to no other property 

in the City, indicates that the subject property is not the same as other parts 

of the City in terms of how the zoning evolved and how the plan for this 

property has progressed. The trajectory of past decisions has generally been 

to reduce the number of lots allocated to these parcels all across the area and 

generally increase the proportion of open space relative to residential space. 

The proposed plan does not fit into that trajectory and that sort of long range 

view of what Wakefield Valley is supposed to look like, not because it is

residential development but because of the density of it.

The residential density that is permissible in the Conservation zone is 

one unit per three acres, or 12 units for a 38-acre parcel. While the [] Council 

acknowledges that the development of the property is not strictly bound by 

the zonal classification, it finds that the Conservation zone designation of the 

subject property is useful guidance with respect to the City’s vision for the 

area. The [Application] varies from the type of density suggested by the 

zoning by a material and substantial amount for which the Council finds no 
- 23 -

justification in the evidence presented to it.

The Council specifically does not decide, in connection with the 

[A]pplication, that there is no possible proposal for residential density above 

one unit for three acres that [] it might find to be consistent with its vision for 

the Wakefield Valley [GDP] area. The Council notes that it does not view 

the Conservation zoning of the property as dispositive of the appropriate 

density, but is merely a guideline and consideration for a decision with 

respect to whether the [A]pplication before it is appropriate for approval. 

[The] Council accepts the observations of planning staff that, if the land were 

to be developed in accordance with the density permitted in the Conservation 

zone, a cluster design approach could be accommodated on 14 acres 

including the street or plaza, allowing for community facilities, open space 

preservation[,] and a uniquely designed setting to provide a special sense [of] 

place.

The Council concludes that there was no evidence that the 

[Application] does not satisfy the criteria of [Westminster Code] § 164-

188(J)(2)-(5) or the requirement of (J)(6) that the proposal be otherwise in 

accord with pertinent statutory requirements.

In accordance with [Westminster Code] § 164-188, the Council is 

permitted to make “any other findings which may be found to be necessary 

and appropriate to the evaluation of the proposed reclassification.” As it did 

in 2006, the Council recognizes the unfavorable recommendations advanced 

by its staff and [the] Commission, and incorporates those recommendations 

by reference. The [] Council finds that the medium density residential 

development proposed by [Developer] for this particular parcel will not serve 

the public interests of the residents of the City in retaining the low-density 

character of the Wakefield Valley general area. Much of the surrounding 

area is developed with larger lot residential subdivisions. While [the] 

Council acknowledges that some of the surrounding communities are 

constructed upon smaller lots, it notes the observation of Planning Staff that 

those communities would not likely meet the requirements of the City’s 

current design development guidelines. 

On March 16, 2017, Developer filed an amended petition for judicial review “for 

the sole purpose of including the written decision of the” Council. 

The parties filed in the circuit court memoranda of law addressing, among other 

things, whether there was substantial evidence in the record to support the Council’s 
- 24 -

determination that the Application was not in substantial compliance with the use and 

density indicated by the Wakefield Valley GDP. On July 6, 2017, the circuit court heard 

argument on the amended petition for judicial review and held the matter sub curia for 

review of the record. On November 17, 2017, the circuit court issued a memorandum 

opinion and order, affirming the Council’s decision as set forth in Ordinance No. 876 and 

concluding that “[t]he record as a whole show[ed] that the Council afforded [Developer] 

due process, deliberated appropriately[,] and supported its denial with substantial 

evidence.” In relevant part, the circuit court determined that the Council’s actions were 

quasi-judicial, and thus “subject to review by the substantial evidence test[,]” and that there 

was substantial evidence in the record supporting the Council’s denial of the Application. 

On December 19, 2017, Developer filed a notice of appeal. On May 4, 2018, while 

this case was pending in the Court of Special Appeals, Developer filed in this Court a 

petition for a writ of certiorari, raising the following four issues:

1. When a local government conducts a quasi-judicial hearing and vote, 

can it prevent judicial review by recasting its ultimate written decision 

as legislative in nature?

2. Does the phrase “regardless of zonal classification” in Westminster 

Code § 164-133B permit use of zonal classification as a guideline?

3. Does Westminster Code § 164-188J(1) permit the Council to rely on 

an informal trend that is not part of “the general plan, the City’s capital 

improvements program or other applicable City plans and policies”?

4. Is the proper remedy vacatur or outright reversal?

On June 1, 2018, before the Court of Special Appeals issued an opinion, this Court granted 

the petition. See WV DIA Westminster, 459 Md. 401, 187 A.3d 36.
- 25 -

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In Kenwood Gardens Condos., Inc. v. Whalen Props., LLC, 449 Md. 313, 324-25, 

144 A.3d 647, 654-55 (2016), this Court set forth the standard of review applicable to an 

administrative agency’s final decision, stating:

In reviewing the final decision of an administrative agency, . . . we 

look through the circuit court’s . . . decision[], although applying the same 

standards of review, and evaluate the decision of the agency. Our scope of 

review is narrow and is limited to determining whether there is substantial 

evidence in the record as a whole to support the agency’s findings and 

conclusions, and to determine if the administrative decision is premised upon 

an erroneous conclusion of law. We defer to the regulatory body’s factfinding and inferences, provided they are supported by evidence which a 

reasonable person could accept as adequately supporting a conclusion. 

However, if we determine that the agency’s decision is based on an erroneous 

conclusion of law, no deference is given to those conclusions.

(Cleaned up).

DISCUSSION

I. Quasi-Judicial Act vs. Legislative Act

The Parties’ Contentions

Developer contends that the Council’s decision denying the Application was a 

quasi-judicial decision, not a legislative act. Developer argues that quasi-judicial review 

requires examination of a parcel on individual grounds, utilizing a deliberative and 

testimonial fact-finding process. Developer asserts that the findings required by 

Westminster Code § 164-188J are the types of findings made by a governmental body 

during a quasi-judicial decision-making process. According to Developer, the Council’s 

actions with respect to Parcel W, i.e., the Application, were quasi-judicial, which the 

Council emphasized during testimony and deliberations. For example, Developer points 
- 26 -

out that witnesses testified under oath, the Council accepted certain witnesses as experts, 

the Council permitted cross-examination of witnesses, and the Council cited the quasijudicial standard during its deliberations and voting. Developer maintains that, by casting 

its decision as an exercise of legislative judgment, the Council applied an erroneous 

standard and thus legally erred, and Developer contends that the Council cannot now ask 

that this Court affirm its decision on the basis that the decision was a quasi-judicial decision 

supported by substantial evidence. 

As an initial matter, the Council responds that, whether the nature of its decision 

was legislative or quasi-judicial, it performed its responsibility correctly. The Council 

contends, however, that the proposed amendment to the Wakefield Valley GDP was a 

legislative act akin to comprehensive zoning, and that, as a legislative act, the Council’s 

decision enjoys a strong presumption of correctness subject to very limited judicial review. 

According to the Council, the Wakefield Valley GDP served as comprehensive zoning, or 

a mini-master plan, and, although the Application did not seek piecemeal zoning, the 

Council used the procedures applicable to piecemeal zoning to evaluate the necessary 

statutory factors. The Council argues that the circumstance that the Application affected 

only a portion of the Wakefield Valley GDP does not transform it from a legislative act 

into a quasi-judicial act. The Council asserts that the Application would have impacted the 

entire Wakefield Valley GDP area by diminishing the open space. The Council maintains 

that it did not err in conducting a public hearing that followed a quasi-judicial process and 

then issuing its decision as a legislative act, i.e., Ordinance No. 876. 
- 27 -

Relevant Law

Land use decisions by a local governmental body are categorized as either 

legislative or quasi-judicial in nature. See Md. Overpak Corp. v. Mayor and City Council 

of Balt., 395 Md. 16, 32-33, 909 A.2d 235, 244-45 (2006). Whether a governmental action 

is legislative or quasi-judicial in nature is significant because it dictates the scope of judicial 

review. See id. at 33, 909 A.2d at 245. Specifically, “legislative actions are subjected to a 

more limited review by the courts than are quasi-judicial actions[.]” Id. at 33, 909 A.2d at 

245 (citation omitted). In Kenwood, 449 Md. at 338, 144 A.3d at 662, we explained that 

legislative actions of local governmental bodies “are not subject to ordinary judicial 

review[,]” and are instead “subject to very limited review by the courts.” (Cleaned up). 

Indeed, “[j]udicial scrutiny of legislative action under the court’s ordinary jurisdiction is 

limited to assessing whether a government body was acting within its legal boundaries.” 

Id. at 338, 144 A.3d at 663 (cleaned up). By contrast, quasi-judicial actions are reviewed 

to determine “whether there is substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the 

agency’s findings and conclusions, and to determine [whether] the administrative decision 

is premised upon an erroneous conclusion of law.” Id. at 325, 344, 144 A.3d at 654-55, 

666 (cleaned up).

When a question arises as to whether a governmental body’s decision is legislative 

or quasi-judicial in nature “[i]n the land use and zoning context, the essential questions to 

be asked are: what property or properties are being examined, for what reason, and at whose 

behest?” Overpak, 395 Md. at 37, 909 A.2d at 247. To that end, this Court has developed 

a “standard for determining whether an act is legislative or quasi-judicial in nature[,]” 
- 28 -

which we recently reiterated in Kenwood, 449 Md. at 332, 144 A.3d at 659, stating:

The outcome of the analysis of whether a given act is quasi-judicial in nature 

is guided by two criteria: (1) the act or decision is reached on individual, as 

opposed to general, grounds, and scrutinizes a single property; and (2) there 

is a deliberative fact-finding process with testimony and the weighing of 

evidence.

(Quoting Overpak, 395 Md. at 33, 909 A.2d at 245). With respect to the first factor, 

“ordinarily, proceedings or acts that scrutinize individual parcels or assemblages for the 

consideration of property-specific proposed uses, at the owner’s or developer’s initiative, 

suggest a quasi-judicial process or act.” Kenwood, 449 Md. at 332, 144 A.3d at 659 

(cleaned up). These types of “individualized determinations are” distinguishable “from 

acts that primarily have broader, community-wide implications, which encompass 

considerations affecting the entire planning or zoning district.” Id. at 332-33, 144 A.3d at 

659 (cleaned up). As to the second factor, in Kenwood, id. at 333, 144 A.3d at 659, we 

explained:

The second element of the test ordinarily involves the holding of a 

hearing, the receipt of factual and opinion testimony and forms of 

documentary evidence, and a particularized conclusion as to the development 

proposal for the parcel in question. Accordingly, site-specific findings of 

fact are necessary not only to inform properly the interested parties of the 

grounds for the body’s decision, but also to provide a basis upon which 

judicial review may be rendered. We [have] pointed out . . . that the most 

weighty criterion is the fact-finding.

(Cleaned up).

This Court has consistently stated that comprehensive zoning is a legislative act. 

See, e.g., Anne Arundel Cty. v. Bell, 442 Md. 539, 553, 113 A.3d 639, 647 (2015) 

(“Comprehensive zoning is fundamentally legislative and no significant quasi-judicial 
- 29 -

function is involved. As comprehensive zoning encompasses a large geographical area, 

the process is initiated generally by a local government, rather than by a property owner or 

owners.” (Cleaned up)); Anderson House, LLC v. Mayor and City Council of Rockville, 

402 Md. 689, 723, 939 A.2d 116, 136 (2008) (“Comprehensive rezoning is a vital 

legislative function, and[,] in making zoning decisions during the comprehensive rezoning 

process, a zoning authority is exercising what has been described as its plenary legislative 

power.” (Cleaned up)); Nottingham Village, Inc. v. Balt. Cty., 266 Md. 339, 354, 292 A.2d 

680, 687 (1972) (“Zoning or rezoning in accordance with a comprehensive plan is a 

legislative function[.]” (Cleaned up)). 

By contrast, this Court has stated that piecemeal zoning is a quasi-judicial action. 

For example, in Bell, 442 Md. at 555, 113 A.3d at 648-49, we explained: 

Piecemeal zoning is accomplished by local zoning authorities through a 

quasi-judicial process. Notably, the act or decision reached through this 

quasi-judicial process is on individual, as opposed to general, grounds, and 

scrutinizes a single property. The piecemeal zoning process is decidedly unlegislative in nature, except at the end: it includes typically a deliberative 

fact-finding process, which entails the holding of at least one evidentiary 

hearing (generally), factual and opinion testimony, documentary evidence, 

cross-examination of the witnesses, and objections to the weighing of 

evidence. This process results in a particularized set of written findings of 

fact and conclusions of law as to the zoning proposal for the parcel or 

assemblage in question.

(Cleaned up). In Bell, id. at 553, 113 A.3d at 647, we succinctly summarized the distinction 

between the two types of zoning in terms of whether the act is legislative or quasi-judicial 

in nature, stating: “Original and comprehensive zoning are accomplished solely through 

legislative processes culminating in legislative acts, while piecemeal rezoning is achieved 

through a quasi-judicial process leading to a technical legislative act.” (Cleaned up).
- 30 -

In Overpak, 395 Md. at 22-23, 44, 909 A.2d at 238-39, 251, this Court held that the 

Mayor and City Council of Baltimore’s process for granting an industrial planned unit 

development (“PUD”) and subsequently approving a PUD amendment proposal was quasijudicial in nature. In concluding as much, we explained that the City Council’s 

consideration of the PUD amendment proposal at issue, which later became the subject of 

an ordinance signed by the Mayor, “was evaluated on both individual and general 

grounds[,]” stating:

[T]he [City] Council’s decisions to grant both [the] original request to 

designate [certain property] as an Industrial PUD and each of the three 

subsequent substantive amendments to the approved PUD were made upon 

grounds focused on a development plan for that plot of land only, and thus 

was considered on an individualized basis. This property alone was singled 

out for proposed amendment of its zoning, rather than the entire zoning 

district or planning area in which it is located. This individualized action 

was precisely the kind of change, focusing on the particulars involved with a 

specific property and its unique circumstances, contemplated by our previous 

cases as quasi-judicial in nature.

Id. at 40-41, 909 A.2d at 249 (citations omitted). We also highlighted the process used to 

examine the PUD amendment proposal, which included the holding of a hearing, the 

requirement that certain findings of fact be made, and the use of specific standards applied 

to those facts. See id. at 41, 909 A.2d at 250. 

We ultimately concluded “that the process for the approval of PUDs, and 

substantive amendments thereto, in Baltimore City is [] quasi-judicial character, rather than 

legislative in nature,” explaining:

It should also be noted that concurrent with this hearing and referral 

process, the [City] Council examined, and ultimately approved, the 

development plan, which is required to address thirteen separate 

considerations affecting the site of the proposed PUD or any substantive 
- 31 -

amendment to an approved PUD. The gravamen of these standards and the 

inquiry surrounding them is a detailed and thorough examination of the 

unique circumstances of a specific PUD proposal for a specific parcel, 

including the potential for adverse impacts on adjacent properties. This 

process of receiving evidence and creating a record upon which the City 

Council then must rely in deciding the ultimate question of whether the 

development plan, or amended plan, should be granted is quite analogous to 

the quasi-judicial processes analyzed in [two other cases]. In both of those 

cases, as was done here, findings of fact were made based on reports from 

governmental agencies and departments and a public hearing, wherefrom the 

final governmental decision-maker drew its findings as to the pending matter 

affecting a particular piece of property.

Id. at 43-44, 909 A.2d at 251 (cleaned up).

On the other hand, in Kenwood, 449 Md. at 332, 144 A.3d at 659, this Court held 

that, within the Baltimore County Council’s PUD-review process, “a preliminary finding 

of eligibility that allowed for the continued review of the PUD proposal by [Baltimore] 

County[,]” as embodied in a resolution, “was a legislative act in nature premised on a 

threadbare recital of relevant facts as submitted by the developer and evaluated on general, 

policy-based grounds.” We acknowledged that, on the surface, the resolution appeared to 

be quasi-judicial in nature because it pertained to a particular property, and the PUD 

approval process concerned only “one development project, the approval of which turned 

on concerns specific to that property.” Id. at 334, 144 A.3d at 660. Nevertheless, we noted 

that, in adopting the resolution, the Baltimore County Council “considered the PUD in a 

general context, taking into account legislative facts and the impact of the development on 

the community at large.” Id. at 334, 144 A.3d at 660. We observed that the Baltimore 

County Council focused only “minimally on the unique characteristics of the” property at 

issue, and instead focused largely “on public policy benefits” and, specifically, “the 
- 32 -

benefits that the PUD would confer to the surrounding community.” Id. at 334-35, 144 

A.3d at 660. Thus, we concluded that the Baltimore County Council’s action in adopting 

the resolution was legislative, not quasi-judicial, in nature. See id. at 335, 144 A.3d at 661. 

We further explained that, even if the first factor of the test to determine whether an 

action is quasi-judicial in nature were satisfied, the second factor was not satisfied because 

the Baltimore “County Council conducted no adjudicative hearings, nor did it consider 

documentary evidence or opinion testimony similar to the Baltimore City Council in 

Overpak, 395 Md. at 38, 909 A.2d at 248.” Kenwood, 449 Md. at 336, 144 A.3d at 661. 

Indeed, the only process involved the developer informing interested persons about the 

PUD, and then those persons could ask questions, make comments, or submit written 

comments to the Baltimore County Council. See id. at 336, 144 A.3d at 661. We explained 

that that “limited process [] that permitted members of the public to express their views 

about the PUD was a far cry from the evidentiary hearings that characterized the quasijudicial proceedings in Overpak, 395 Md. at 40-44, 909 A.2d at 249-51.” Id. at 336, 144 

A.3d at 661 (citation omitted). 

Analysis

In this case, in agreement with Developer, we hold that the Council’s decision in 

denying the Application was quasi-judicial, not legislative, in nature, and, as such, is 

subject to judicial review to determine whether substantial evidence in the record as a 

whole supports the Council’s findings and conclusions and to determine whether the 

Council’s decision is premised upon an error of law. See Kenwood, 449 Md. at 325, 344,

144 A.3d at 654-55, 666. We conclude that the Council’s decision in denying the 
- 33 -

Application satisfies the two-part test for determining whether a given action was quasijudicial in nature because it was reached on individual, as opposed to general, grounds, 

involving one parcel—Parcel W—and the decision was reached through a deliberative factfinding process involving testimony and the weighing of evidence. See id. at 332, 144 

A.3d at 659. 

We begin our analysis with the first criterion of the two-part test we reiterated in 

Kenwood, id. at 332, 144 A.3d at 659, namely, whether “the act or decision is reached on 

individual, as opposed to general, grounds, and scrutinizes a single property[.]” (Citation 

omitted). Here, contrary to the Council’s contention, it is evident that the Council reached 

its decision based on an examination of Parcel W on individual grounds, and is more akin 

to piecemeal rezoning than comprehensive rezoning. As this Court has stated, 

comprehensive zoning or rezoning is usually initiated by a local government—not a 

property owner or developer—and encompasses a large geographic area. See Bell, 442 

Md. at 553, 113 A.3d at 647. Piecemeal rezoning, on the other hand, involves scrutiny of 

a single property, and typically involves a deliberative fact-finding process, which 

generally consists of, among other things, holding an evidentiary hearing, receiving factual 

and opinion testimony and documentary evidence, and setting forth particularized written 

findings of fact and conclusions of law. See id. at 555, 113 A.3d at 648-49. In this case, 

Developer initiated the process by filing the Application seeking to amend the Wakefield 

Valley GDP; i.e., the Council did not initiate the amendment process. Moreover, the 

Application sought to amend the Wakefield Valley GDP only with respect to Parcel W, 

which comprises 38.2934 acres of the approximately 734.56 acres that make up the 
- 34 -

Wakefield Valley GDP area. In other words, the Application did not encompass a large 

geographic area, let alone the majority or entirety of the Wakefield Valley GDP area. And, 

the process utilized by the Council in considering the Application certainly included all of 

the hallmarks of a deliberative fact-finding process, such as the holding of an evidentiary 

hearing and the receipt of factual and opinion testimony, as well as documentary evidence.

As we stated in Kenwood, 449 Md. at 332, 144 A.3d at 659, “ordinarily, proceedings 

or acts that scrutinize individual parcels . . . for the consideration of property-specific 

proposed uses, at the . . . developer’s initiative, suggest a quasi-judicial process or act.” 

(Cleaned up). The process by which the Application was filed and considered strongly 

suggests a quasi-judicial process because it: (1) involved scrutiny of one particular parcel—

Parcel W; (2) for consideration of property-specific uses—the addition of 53 new homes 

on Parcel W; (3) at Developer’s initiative—Developer filed the Application. That the 

Application could possibly have had an impact on the entire Wakefield Valley GDP area, 

by affecting the open space or otherwise, does not mean that the Council’s decision was 

reached on general grounds, as opposed to individual grounds scrutinizing a single

property. Indeed, deciding whether to grant or deny the Application necessarily involved 

scrutiny of Parcel W. Thus, the first part of the test strongly suggests that the Council’s 

decision was quasi-judicial in nature.

As to the second part of the test to determine whether an action is quasi-judicial in 

nature—i.e., whether “there is a deliberative fact-finding process with testimony and the 

weighing of evidence[,]” id. at 332, 144 A.3d at 659 (citation omitted)—the process 

utilized in this case resulting in the adoption of Ordinance No. 876 and the incorporated 
- 35 -

written decision of the Council undeniably was a deliberative fact-finding process 

involving testimony and the weighing of evidence. As we have noted, of the two criteria 

to determine whether an action is quasi-judicial, the fact-finding process is “the most 

weighty criterion[.]” id. at 333, 144 A.3d at 659 (quoting Overpak, 395 Md. at 33, 909 

A.2d at 245). The deliberative fact-finding process utilized in this case involved all of the 

trademarks that we have identified as being ordinarily involved in such a process, including 

the holding of an evidentiary hearing, the receipt of factual and opinion testimony, the 

receipt of documentary evidence, and a particularized conclusion as to the development 

proposed for a particular parcel. See Kenwood, 449 Md. at 333, 144 A.3d at 659.

In this case, in considering the Application, the Council used a deliberative and 

testimonial fact-finding process. Importantly, the specific findings required by 

Westminster Code § 164-188J—including, among other things, whether an application 

substantially complies with the use and density indicated by the Master Plan or sector plan 

and does not conflict with other specified plans and policies, whether the proposed 

vehicular and pedestrian circulation systems are adequate and efficient, and whether the 

proposed development tends to prevent erosion of the soil and to preserve natural 

vegetation and other natural features of the site—are precisely the types of findings that a 

governmental body must make during a quasi-judicial decision-making process involving 

proposed development on a particular property. 

And, we observe that, notably, throughout the process—indeed, until the adoption 

of Ordinance No. 876 and the incorporated written decision of the Council—both 

Developer and the Council treated the process as quasi-judicial in nature. On December 
- 36 -

12, 2016, the Council held a public hearing on the Application. At the beginning of the 

hearing, the attorney for Westminster recommended that the Council adopt rules of 

procedure applicable to quasi-judicial proceedings, which the Council approved and 

adopted. Witnesses were sworn and testified under oath at the hearing, and were subject 

to cross-examination. During Mackey’s testimony, he discussed the quasi-judicial process 

and the Council’s role in that process. During the hearing, the Council’s President and 

attorney for Westminster referred to the hearing as a “quasi-judicial proceeding” and 

“quasi-judicial hearing[,]” respectively. And, the Council accepted certain witnesses as 

experts, and received numerous documents as evidence. At the second hearing on January 

9, 2017, the Council again cited the quasi-judicial standard, and clarified with the attorney 

for Westminster the process by which it was to deliberate and make a decision. And, at 

the end of the hearing, when the Council was voting, one member of the Council reminded 

the others that they were required to conduct a “quasi-judicial hearing[.]” In short, 

throughout the process, from the filing of the Application to the Council’s deliberation and 

oral fact-finding and voting, both parties treated the process as quasi-judicial. 

We further observe that the deliberative fact-finding process utilized by the Council 

to consider the Application is similar to the process used in Overpak, 395 Md. at 22-23, 

44, 909 A.2d at 238-39, 251, to approve a PUD amendment proposal, which we concluded 

was quasi-judicial in nature. As in Overpak, id. at 40-44, 909 A.2d at 249-51, among other 

things, the process in this case involved individualized consideration of a particular 

property, and not simply consideration of an entire planning area in which the property was 

located; holding a hearing; a statutory requirement to make certain findings of fact; use of 
- 37 -

specific standards applied to those facts; the receipt of evidence and creation of a record 

on which the Council was required to rely in deciding whether to approve the Application; 

and finding facts based on reports from governmental agencies and departments and a 

public hearing. 

By contrast, the deliberative fact-finding process in this case is vastly different from 

the preliminary finding of eligibility that this Court concluded was a legislative act in 

Kenwood, 449 Md. at 332, 144 A.3d at 659. For example, in Kenwood, id. at 336, 144 

A.3d at 661, the process involved was “limited” and only “permitted members of the public 

to express their views about the PUD[.]” Indeed, this Court characterized that process as 

being “a far cry from the evidentiary hearings that characterized the quasi-judicial 

proceedings in Overpak[.]” Kenwood, 449 Md. at 336, 144 A.3d at 661. Clearly, in this 

case, the process of the hearing, taking of testimony and documentary evidence, 

deliberating, and voting, cannot be said to have been a limited process.

Despite the proceeding before the Council meeting both criteria of the test to qualify 

as a quasi-judicial act, the Council persists in arguing that its decision was a legislative act. 

We are simply unpersuaded. As an initial matter, the circumstance that the Council issued 

its written decision in the form of an ordinance that incorporates a written decision is a red 

herring. We note that, in Overpak, 395 Md. at 22-23, 44, 909 A.2d at 238-39, 251, the 

Mayor and City Council of Baltimore approved and adopted by ordinance an amendment 

to an approved PUD, yet this Court nevertheless concluded that the process for approving 

substantive amendments to PUDs in Baltimore City was quasi-judicial in nature. Thus, 

that the Council approved Ordinance No. 876 and incorporated its written decision therein 
- 38 -

does not transform the process or the Council’s decision into a legislative one. Indeed, the 

Council cannot escape judicial review of its decision pursuant to the substantial evidence 

test simply by characterizing its decision as an exercise of legislative judgment and, thus, 

a legislative act.

In any event, that the Council claims that its action was legislative in nature does 

not make it so. Nor does it necessitate an automatic reversal where, throughout the process, 

the deliberations, and the vote and decision itself, the Council treated the matter as a quasijudicial one and acted accordingly. Indeed, perhaps, as the Council suggests on brief, its 

confusion can be explained by the circumstance that, because the Wakefield Valley GDP 

predates the Zoning Ordinance, the Wakefield Valley GDP operates like comprehensive 

zoning, i.e., a legislative act, whereas the provisions of the Zoning Ordinance provide that 

amendments to the Wakefield Valley GDP are to be governed by standards applicable to 

piecemeal zoning, i.e., a quasi-judicial act. Notwithstanding how the Council labels its act 

and the source of its apparent confusion, the record clearly demonstrates that the process 

utilized to consider and ultimately deny the Application was quasi-judicial in nature. Thus, 

having concluded that the Council’s decision in denying the Application was quasijudicial, not legislative, in nature, and that there was no error of law in that regard, the 

Council’s decision, like any other quasi-judicial decision, is subject to judicial review to 

determine whether substantial evidence in the record as a whole supports the Council’s 

findings and conclusions and to determine whether the Council’s decision is premised upon 

an error of law. See Kenwood, 449 Md. at 325, 344, 144 A.3d at 654-55, 666.
- 39 -

II. Consideration of Zonal Classification

The Parties’ Contentions

Developer contends that the Council erred in its application of Westminster Code § 

164-133B, which requires, in pertinent part, that the Wakefield Valley GDP “shall continue 

to be approved and valid . . . regardless of the zonal classification of the real property as to 

which such plans pertain[.]” Developer argues that the phrase “regardless of” means 

“without taking into account.” Developer asserts that the Council erred by using zoning as 

a guideline, and by suggesting that compliance with the conservation zoning of Parcel W 

was required. Developer maintains that, because the meaning of “regardless of” is 

unambiguous, the Council should not have considered Parcel W’s zonal classification, as 

it was not a permissible guideline. 

The Council responds that it correctly interpreted and applied Westminster Code § 

164-133B. The Council contends that it could consider the 2009 Comprehensive Plan as 

well as development that occurred in the Wakefield Valley area between 1978 and 2016. 

The Council asserts that Westminster Code § 164-133B makes clear that zonal 

classification does not affect the ability to develop property based on the 1978 Wakefield 

Valley GDP, prior to the adoption of the Zoning Ordinance. The Council maintains, 

however, that amendments to the Wakefield Valley GDP involve its discretion and require 

it to consider the overall area. The Council contends that Westminster Code § 164-188J, 

referenced by Westminster Code § 164-133B, further directs it to make any other necessary 

and appropriate findings, which, in turn, allows it to consider the passage of time, other 

amendments to the Wakefield Valley GDP, and the 2009 Comprehensive Plan. In other 
- 40 -

words, the Council argues that it was not strictly limited to considering only the six factors 

identified by Westminster Code § 164-188J in considering the Application. 

Relevant Law

Westminster Code § 164-133B provides, in its entirety: 

All preliminary plans, final plans, revised preliminary or final plans and all 

development plans of any type which have been approved by the Mayor and 

Common Council and/or the Commission prior to November 5, 1979, shall 

continue to be approved and valid after said date, regardless of the zonal 

classification of the real property as to which such plans pertain, and said 

real property shall be developed in accordance with the provisions of such 

plans. Such plans may be amended in accordance with the procedures 

provided for the amendment of development plans contained in § 164-188J 

of this chapter. Additionally, the Common Council may amend any such 

plans approved prior to November 5, 1979, to permit residential singlefamily attached dwellings in lieu of any commercial or business use, 

provided that it determines, after an opportunity for public comment, that 

there will be no increase in the gross allowable residential density beyond 

that originally approved and that such development will not have an adverse

impact upon the adjacent properties or the general character of the approved 

development plan. 

(Emphasis added). In turn, Westminster Code § 164-188J provides in its entirety:

In considering a rezoning application which includes a development plan, the 

Common Council shall consider whether the application and the 

development plan fulfill the purposes and requirements set forth in this 

chapter. In so doing, the Common Council shall make the following specific 

findings, in addition to any other findings which may be found to be 

necessary and appropriate to the evaluation of the proposed reclassification:

(1) That the zone applied for is in substantial compliance with the use and 

density indicated by the Master Plan or sector plan and that it does not 

conflict with the general plan, the City’s capital improvements program or 

other applicable City plans and policies.

(2) That the proposed development would comply with the purposes, 

standards and regulations of the zone as set forth in Articles II through XV, 

would provide for the maximum safety, convenience and amenity of the 

residents of the development and would be compatible with adjacent 
- 41 -

development.

(3) That the proposed vehicular and pedestrian circulation systems are 

adequate and efficient.

(4) That by its design, by minimizing grading and by other means, the 

proposed development would tend to prevent erosion of the soil and to 

preserve natural vegetation and other natural features of the site.

(5) That any proposals, including restrictions, agreements or other 

documents, which show the ownership and method of assuring perpetual 

maintenance of those areas, if any, that are intended to be used for 

recreational or other common or other quasi-public purposes, are adequate 

and sufficient.

(6) That the submitted development plan is in accord with all pertinent 

statutory requirements and is or is not approved. Disapproval of a 

development plan by the Common Council shall result in a denial of the 

rezoning application of which the development plan is a part. 

Analysis

Here, we conclude that, by its plain language, Westminster Code § 164-133B does 

not prohibit the Council from considering, among other things, the zoning classification of 

a property when determining whether to grant an application to amend a GDP. As 

discussed above, the Wakefield Valley GDP was approved in 1978, prior to the existence 

of a Zoning Ordinance in Westminster. In 1979, the Council adopted the Zoning 

Ordinance. To account for the various plans that were in place before the adoption of the 

Zoning Ordinance—including the Wakefield Valley GDP—the Zoning Ordinance 

included Westminster Code § 164-133B, which expressly permits development to occur 

based on the existing plans already approved by the Council. To that end, Westminster 

Code § 164-133B provides, in relevant part, that all development plans approved “prior to 

November 5, 1979, shall continue to be approved and valid after said date, regardless of 
- 42 -

the zonal classification of the real property as to which such plans pertain, and said real 

property shall be developed in accordance with the provisions of such plans.” Westminster 

Code § 164-133B made clear that, regardless of whatever zoning classification was 

designated for property, pre-existing development plans would still be approved and valid, 

and property would still be required to be developed in accordance with those development 

plans. In other words, when the sentence is read as a whole, it plainly shows that zonal 

classification does not affect the ability to develop property in accordance with an approved 

development plan that existed prior to the adoption of the Zoning Ordinance.

Westminster Code § 164-133B simply does not state that, in considering an 

amendment to a development plan, the Council is prohibited from considering the zonal 

classification of the property at issue. Developer misreads Westminster Code § 164-133B 

by taking the phrase “regardless of the zonal classification of the real property” out of 

context. When read as a whole, the section is clear—pre-existing approved development 

plans would continue to be valid after adoption of the Zoning Ordinance, regardless of the 

zonal classification of the property encompassed by those plans; i.e., zonal classification 

of property would not affect the validity of a development plan approved prior to adoption 

of the Zoning Ordinance and the ability to develop property in accordance with the 

provisions of that development plan. The section does not state, let alone mean, that the 

Council must consider amendments to development plans that occur after adoption of the 

Zoning Ordinance without regard for the zonal classification of the property at issue.

Indeed, with respect to amendments to development plans, Westminster Code § 

164-133B provides that “[s]uch plans may be amended in accordance with the procedures 
- 43 -

provided for the amendment of development plans contained in” Westminster Code § 164-

188J. And, Westminster Code § 164-133B provides that, if the Council “determines, after 

an opportunity for public comment, that there will be no increase in the gross allowable 

residential density beyond that originally approved and that such development will not 

have an adverse impact upon the adjacent properties or the general character of the 

approved development plan[,]” then the Council may amend a development plan “to permit 

residential single-family attached dwellings in lieu of any commercial or business use[.]” 

As such, with respect to amendments of development plans where an owner or developer 

seeks to develop residential single-family attached dwellings in lieu of any commercial or 

business use, Westminster Code § 164-133B explicitly states that the Council “may 

amend” for such a purpose, “provided that” the Council determines that there will not be 

an increase in gross allowable residential density beyond that originally approved, and that 

there will not be an adverse impact upon adjacent properties or the general character of the 

development plan; i.e., the Council is specifically directed to consider the originally 

approved gross allowable residential density, adjacent properties, and the character of 

development plan as a whole. And, significantly, Westminster Code § 164-133B speaks 

of amendments to development plans using the term “may”—that “[s]uch plans may be 

amended” and that the “Council may amend[.]” The use of the permissive word “may” 

reflects the discretion afforded to the Council when reviewing an application to amend a 

development plan.

Additionally, Westminster Code § 164-133B incorporates the entirety of 

Westminster Code § 164-188J, and directs that development plans may be amended in 
- 44 -

accordance with the procedures therein. Westminster Code § 164-188J provides, in 

pertinent part, that the Council must make specific findings with respect to six factors, as 

well as “any other findings which may be found to be necessary and appropriate to the 

evaluation of the” application to amend the development plan. The phrase “any other 

findings” is broad, and is limited only to those findings that the Council deems “to be 

necessary and appropriate” in evaluating an application to amend a development plan, thus 

vesting the Council with the discretion to determine which findings are “necessary and 

appropriate[.]” Thus, in evaluating an application to amend a development plan, the 

Council has the discretion and authority pursuant to Westminster Code §§ 164-133B and 

164-188J to make any findings that are “necessary and appropriate[.]” Plainly, the Council 

may determine that necessary and appropriate findings include such things as the zonal 

classification of the property under the applicable comprehensive plan, the history and 

development that has occurred in a development plan area over the years, and other 

amendments approved for the development plan.

In short, in considering the Application in this case, the Council was not limited to 

consideration of the six factors set forth in Westminster Code § 164-188J and nothing else. 

Rather, in accord with Westminster Code § 164-188J, in considering an application to 

amend a GDP, the Council could make “any other findings which may be found to be 

necessary and appropriate to the evaluation[,]” and nothing in Westminster Code § 164-

133B prohibited the Council from considering the zonal classification of Parcel W. Thus, 

we conclude that the Council did not legally err in considering, among other things, the 

conservation zoning designation of Parcel W in evaluating the Application.
- 45 -

III. Substantial Evidence

The Parties’ Contentions

Developer contends that, under the Council’s factual findings, the Application 

satisfied Westminster Code § 164-188J. As such, Developer argues that the Council’s 

rejection of the Application was legal error and there was not substantial evidence to 

support it. Developer points out that the Council found that all relevant considerations of 

Westminster Code § 164-188J(2) through (5) were satisfied, and that (6) was not relevant, 

thus binding the Council as to those matters. As to Westminster Code § 164-188J(1), 

Developer asserts that the “trend” relied on by the Council to deny the Application was not 

a “plan or policy” as contemplated by Westminster Code § 164-188J(1), but instead was 

an aspect of the Council’s erroneous reliance on zonal classification. According to 

Developer, the applicable Westminster policy, as evidenced in the 2009 Comprehensive 

Plan, is to direct and encourage residential development, such that the Council’s conclusion 

with respect to Westminster Code § 164-188J(1) lacked substantial evidence. Developer 

maintains that the Application complied with the 1978 Wakefield Valley GDP, and is 

consistent with the 2009 Comprehensive Plan. 

The Council responds that it properly exercised its authority to deny the Application, 

and that the record contains substantial evidence supporting its findings of fact and its 

conclusion that the Application did not satisfy the criteria of Westminster Code § 164-

188J. The Council contends that the evidence in the record, including the prior 

amendments to the Wakefield Valley GDP and the 2009 Comprehensive Plan, 

demonstrated that the density of the area had been reduced and open space generally 
- 46 -

increased. According to the Council, the Application and its requested proposed medium 

density “did not fit with the long-range view of Wakefield Valley.” The Council argues 

that, although there was no evidence that the Application did not satisfy several of the 

necessary statutory factors, the Application did not substantially comply with the use and 

density indicated by the Wakefield Valley GDP. The Council asserts that, in considering 

the Application, it also properly considered the 2009 Comprehensive Plan, which 

recommended conservation zoning for the property, thereby reiterating the open space 

intent for the area. The Council maintains that Developer simply failed to meet its burden 

of persuasion to show that the Application complied with the use and density indicated by 

the Wakefield Valley GDP. The Council contends that, because one factor was not 

satisfied, it properly denied the Application. 

Relevant Law

“Once [a] court determines [] that the administrative agency applied the proper 

standards prescribed by the statute at issue, judicial review of the agency’s conclusion is 

then tested by the substantial evidence test.” Montgomery Cty. v. Buckman, 333 Md. 516, 

519 n.1, 636 A.2d 448, 450 n.1 (1994) (cleaned up). “In applying the substantial evidence 

test, a reviewing court decides whether a reasoning mind reasonably could have reached 

the factual conclusion the agency reached.” Donlon v. Montgomery Cty. Pub. Schs., 460 

Md. 62, 74, 188 A.3d 949, 956 (2018) (cleaned up). Moreover, “[a] reviewing court should 

defer to the agency’s fact-finding and drawing of inferences if they are supported by the 

record[,]” and the “reviewing court must review the agency’s decision in the light most 

favorable to it; the agency’s decision is prima facie correct and presumed valid, and it is 
- 47 -

the agency’s province to resolve conflicting evidence and to draw inferences from that 

evidence.” Id. at 74, 188 A.3d at 956 (cleaned up).

In relevant part—and at issue in this case—Westminster Code § 164-188J(1) 

provides that the Council must make the following specific finding, “in addition to any 

other findings which may be found to be necessary and appropriate to the evaluation of the 

proposed reclassification:” “That the zone applied for is in substantial compliance with the 

use and density indicated by the Master Plan or sector plan and that it does not conflict 

with the general plan, the City’s capital improvements program or other applicable City 

plans and policies.”

Analysis

Having determined that the Council’s decision denying the Application is not 

premised upon an error of law, we turn to whether there is substantial evidence in the record 

as a whole to support the Council’s findings and conclusions. We hold that there is 

substantial evidence supporting the Council’s decision and, specifically, its determination 

that the Application failed to satisfy Westminster Code § 164-188J(1)—“That the zone 

applied for is in substantial compliance with the use and density indicated by the Master 

Plan or sector plan and that it does not conflict with the general plan, the City’s capital 

improvements program or other applicable City plans and policies.” Indeed, given the 

evidence in the record and applying the substantial evidence test, we conclude that “a 

reasoning mind reasonably could have reached the factual conclusion the [Council] 

reached[,]” Donlon, 460 Md. at 74, 188 A.3d at 956 (cleaned up)—namely, that the 

Application failed to substantially comply with the use and density indicated by the 
- 48 -

Wakefield Valley GDP, as amended over the years, and that it conflicts with the general 

plan or other applicable City plans and policies. 

As an initial matter, we note that Westminster Code § 164-188J(2) through (6) are 

not at issue. At the hearing on January 9, 2017, the Council voted that the Application 

complied with Westminster Code § 164-188J(2) through (5), and that Westminster Code § 

164-188J(6) was irrelevant and generally not applicable. In its written decision attached 

to Ordinance No. 876, “[t]he Council conclud[ed] that there was no evidence that the 

[Application did] not satisfy the criteria of [Westminster Code] § 164-188(J)(2)-(5) or the 

requirement of (J)(6) that the proposal be otherwise in accord with pertinent statutory 

requirements.” Thus, in essence, the parties agree that the Application satisfied 

Westminster Code § 164-188J(2) through (6), and substantial evidence in the record as a 

whole supports those findings, including the testimony of experts who testified on 

Developer’s behalf.

Thus, our focus is on Westminster Code § 164-188J(1). In its written decision, the 

Council explained that the Application failed to satisfy this subsection for several reasons, 

including: (1) the open space requirement for the Wakefield Valley GDP area is 47%, and 

approving the Application would result in 40% open space; (2) “[t]he trajectory of past 

decisions has generally been to reduce the number of lots allocated to the[] parcels all 

across the area and generally increase the proportion of open space relative to residential 

space[,]” and the Application failed to “fit into that trajectory” due to the proposed density; 

(3) the density proposed in the Application varied from the density permissible to property 

zoned conservation; and (4) the density proposed by the Application would not serve to 
- 49 -

“retain[] the low-density character of the Wakefield Valley area.” Substantial evidence in 

the record as a whole supports the Council’s findings and its determination that the

Application did not substantially comply with the use and density indicated by the 

Wakefield Valley GDP.

The record contains the following evidence supporting the Council’s findings. 

When the Wakefield Valley GDP was adopted in 1978, the open space requirement was 

set at 31%. The 1978 Wakefield Valley GDP specifically provided that “[a]pproximately 

483 ± acres or 66% of the site is devoted to residential, 20± acres or 3% to commercial, 

and 228± or 31% to open space use.” And, the “major open space use within the 

community” was to be “a championship golf course.” As to overall gross density, the 1978 

Wakefield Valley GDP provided for a residential unit range of 670 to 768, and overall 

gross density was to be 1.6 units per acre. 

In 1987, the Council approved an amendment to the Wakefield Valley GDP, 

redistributing residential density and reconfiguring the golf course. Specifically, the 1987 

amendment transferred residential units from the golf course to Parcel H, resulting in a new 

allocation of residential units for Parcel H and increasing the acreage of that parcel. The 

maximum allowable residential units for the Wakefield Valley GDP area remained the 

same, at 768 units; the overall gross density was approximately 1.45 units per acre; and the 

open space increased to 47%. In 1989, the Council approved an amendment to the 

Wakefield Valley GDP to reduce the maximum number of residential units for Parcel H

from 214 to 55. Approval of the amendment was conditioned on showing “a reduction of 

the [] residential units and ten acres of commercial development on Parcel H.” Under the 
- 50 -

1989 amendment, the overall gross density was set at 1.1 to 1.2 units per acre, with 47% 

open space. At some point, the open space decreased to 45%. 

In 2006, the Council denied an application to amend the Wakefield Valley GDP that 

sought to permit Woodhaven to build 320 senior cottages on 167 acres. Woodhaven had 

sought to reassign the density that previously existed for Parcel H, and the Council rejected 

that approach, explaining that the density previously allowed to Parcel H had been 

terminated and extinguished, and, thus, there were no residential units available from 

Parcel H to be reassigned to Woodhaven. In other words, the Council denied an 

amendment that would have increased density.

According to Mackey’s memorandum to the Council, in 1987, the open space for 

the Wakefield Valley GDP area was increased to 47%, and the total open space would be 

45% if Parcel W were to remain undeveloped, or 40% if the Application were approved 

and Parcel W developed. In other words, according to Mackey, approving the Application 

would result in a decrease of the open space. At the hearing, Mackey testified that, 

currently, Wakefield Valley consists of a total of 603 density units, which, according to 

Mackey, “is the lower end of the range of the approval as amended . . . in 1989.” Moreover, 

Mackey testified extensively as to why the Westminster staff’s recommendation was to 

deny the Application as proposed.

This evidence in the record demonstrates that, from the time that it was first 

approved in 1978 to the present, the Wakefield Valley GDP has been amended in ways that 

generally reduce the density and increase the open space. In 1978, the open space
- 51 -

requirement for the Wakefield Valley GDP area was 31%, but, in 1987, the open space 

requirement was increased to 47%, where it has remained as part of the goal of the 

Wakefield Valley GDP. As development presently stands, the actual open space in the 

area is 45%, which includes the open space of Parcel W if it remains undeveloped. If the 

Application were to be approved, however, and Developer were to build the 53 singlefamily homes proposed on Parcel W, then the open space would drop to 40%, which is 

contrary to the intent for the area as demonstrated through the amendments to the 

Wakefield Valley GDP. In short, the record provides substantial evidence supporting the 

Council’s findings with respect to open space and the trajectory of the Wakefield Valley 

GDP area to decrease density and increase open space. Moreover, the same evidence 

demonstrates that the Wakefield Valley GDP has historically been an area of low-density 

residential use and a generous open space requirement. 

As to the zonal classification, in 2009, the Council adopted a new Comprehensive 

Plan, and the zoning for the golf course and undeveloped property located in Wakefield 

Valley was changed from low-density residential zoning to conservation zoning. The 2009 

Comprehensive Plan specifically addressed the Wakefield Valley GDP, and noted that the 

change in zoning was to “reflect the development plan and the existing land use.” Mackey 

testified that, under conservation zoning provisions, the permitted density would be three 

units per acre, meaning that Parcel W could yield a dozen new houses, not fifty-three as 

proposed. This evidence supports the Council’s finding that the density proposed in the 

Application varied from the density permissible to property that is zoned conservation, and
- 52 -

that the zonal classification serves as “useful guidance with respect to the City’s vision for

the area.” 

By relying on the circumstance that the Application may have complied with the 

1978 Wakefield Valley GDP, Developer ignores the various amendments approved by the 

Council over the years, including amendments that significantly altered the density and 

open space requirements for the area. The Council properly considered those amendments 

in determining that the Application was not in substantial compliance with the use and 

density indicated by the Wakefield Valley GDP, and substantial evidence supports the 

Council’s findings and decision. Because the Council determined that the Application 

failed to satisfy all of the factors set forth in Westminster Code § 164-188J, it properly 

denied the Application.

IV. Remedy

The parties differ about the appropriate remedy. Developer contends that the 

appropriate remedy in this case to reverse and remand the matter with instructions to grant 

the Application. The Council responds that, if this Court determines that an error of law 

occurred, a remand for further proceedings is the appropriate remedy in this case, not 

reversal. 

Because we conclude that there is substantial evidence in the record as a whole to 

support the Council’s findings and conclusions, and that the Council’s decision is not 

premised upon an error of law, we affirm the circuit court’s judgment, which, in turn, 

affirmed the Council’s decision denying the Application, as set forth in Ordinance No. 876.
- 53 -

Accordingly, we need not determine whether a remand or a reversal is the proper remedy 

in this case, as neither remedy is applicable under the circumstances.

JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR 

CARROLL COUNTY AFFIRMED. PETITIONER 

TO PAY COSTS.