alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
United States Department of Labor

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

__________________________________________

R.I., Appellant

and

U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, PALATINE 

PROCESSING & DISTRIBUTION CENTER, 

Palatine, IL, Employer

__________________________________________

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Docket No. 21-1379

Issued: October 27, 2021

Appearances: Case Submitted on the Record

Appellant, pro se

Office of Solicitor, for the Director

ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL

Before:

ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Chief Judge

JANICE B. ASKIN, Judge

VALERIE D. EVANS-HARRELL, Alternate Judge

On September 2, 2021 appellant filed an appeal from a January 28, 2021 decision of the 

Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). The Clerk of the Appellate Boards

assigned Docket No. 21-1379.

The Board has duly considered the matter and notes that the Board has jurisdiction to 

review final adverse decisions of OWCP issued under the Federal Employees’Compensation Act.1 

For final adverse decisions of OWCP issued on or after November 19, 2008, the Board’s review 

authority is limited to appeals which are filed within 180 days from the date of issuance of OWCP’s 

decision.2

The 180th day following the January 28, 2021 decision was July 27, 2021. As appellant 

did not file an appeal with the Board until September 2, 2021, more than 180 days after the

January 28, 2021 OWCP decision, the Board finds that the appeal docketed as No. 21-1379 is 

untimely filed. The Board is without jurisdiction to review the appeal. Appellant has not offered 

1

5 U.S.C. § 8149; 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3(a) (2009).

2

Id. at § 501.3(e).
2

a reason to explain the failure to timely file an appeal with supporting documentation sufficient to 

establish compelling circumstances.

The Board’s decisions and orders are “final upon the expiration of 30 days from the date 

of their issuance.”

3

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the appeal docketed as No. 21-1379 is dismissed.

Issued: October 27, 2021

Washington, DC

Alec J. Koromilas, Chief Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Janice B. Askin, Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Valerie D. Evans-Harrell, Alternate Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

3

Id. at § 501.6(d).
#### STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JOSEPH CARL BUNCH

No. 7510SC640

(Filed 19 November 1975)

Appeal by defendant from *McKinnon, Judge.*Judgment entered 8.. April, 1975 in Superior Court, Wake County., Heard in the Court of Appeals 13 November 1975.

*Attorney General Edmisten by Assistant Attorney General John M. Silverstein for the State.*

*Johnson, Gamble and Shearon by Richard O. Gamble for defendant appellant.*

MORRIS, PARKER and MARTIN, Judges.

No error.
United States Department of Labor

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

__________________________________________

P.B., Appellant

and

U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, POST OFFICE,

Merrifield, VA, Employer

__________________________________________

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Docket No. 21-0795

Issued: May 26, 2021

Appearances: Case Submitted on the Record

Appellant, pro se

Office of Solicitor, for the Director

ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL

Before:

ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Chief Judge

PATRICIA H. FITZGERALD, Alternate Judge

VALERIE D. EVANS-HARRELL, Alternate Judge

On April 29, 2021 appellant filed an appeal from an October 23, 2020 decision of the 

Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). The Clerk of the Appellate Boards

assigned Docket No. 21-0795.

The Board has duly considered the matter and notes that the Board has jurisdiction to 

review final adverse decisions of OWCP issued under the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act.1 

For final adverse decisions of OWCP issued on or after November 19, 2008, the Board’s review 

authority is limited to appeals which are filed within 180 days from the date of issuance of OWCP’s 

decision.2

The 180th day following the October 23, 2020 decision was April 21, 2021. As appellant 

did not file an appeal with the Board until April 29, 2021, more than 180 days after the October 23,

2020 OWCP decision, the Board finds that the appeal docketed as No. 21-0795 is untimely filed. 

The Board is without jurisdiction to review the appeal. Appellant has not offered a reason to 

 

1 5 U.S.C. § 8149; 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3(a) (2009).

2

Id. at § 501.3(e).
2

explain the failure to timely file an appeal with supporting documentation sufficient to establish 

compelling circumstances.

The Board’s decisions and orders are “final upon the expiration of 30 days from the date 

of their issuance.”

3

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the appeal docketed as No. 21-0795 is dismissed.

Issued: May 26, 2021

Washington, DC

Alec J. Koromilas, Chief Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Patricia H. Fitzgerald, Alternate Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Valerie D. Evans-Harrell, Alternate Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

 

3

Id. at § 501.6(d).
I 

111TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 505 

To amend section 119 of title 17, United States Code, to allow the secondary 

transmission to any subscriber in the State of Oklahoma of primary 

transmissions of local network stations in that State. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JANUARY 14, 2009 

Mr. BOREN introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee 

on the Judiciary 

A BILL 

To amend section 119 of title 17, United States Code, to 

allow the secondary transmission to any subscriber in 

the State of Oklahoma of primary transmissions of local 

network stations in that State. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SECONDARY TRANSMISSIONS TO SUBSCRIBERS 

4 IN OKLAHOMA. 

5 Section 119(a)(2)(C) of title 17, United States Code, 

6 is amended— 

7 (1) in clause (v), by striking ‘‘and (iv)’’ and in8 serting ‘‘(iv), and (v)’’; 


wwoods2 on PRODPC68 with BILLS
2 

•HR 505 IH

1 (2) by redesignating clause (v) as clause (vi); 

2 and 

3 (3) by inserting after clause (iv) the following 

4 new clause: 

5 ‘‘(v) SUBSCRIBERS IN THE STATE OF

6 OKLAHOMA.— 

7 ‘‘(I) ELIGIBILITY TO RECEIVE

8 TRANSMISSIONS OF LOCAL STATIONS

9 IN OKLAHOMA.—With respect to any 

10 subscriber described in subclause (II), 

11 the statutory license provided for in 

12 subparagraph (A) shall apply to the 

13 secondary transmission by a satellite 

14 carrier to that subscriber of primary 

15 transmissions of network stations lo16 cated in the State of Oklahoma. 

17 ‘‘(II) ELIGIBLE SUBSCRIBERS.— 

18 Subclause (I) applies to any sub19 scriber who— 

20 ‘‘(aa) resides in the State of 

21 Oklahoma but does not receive 

22 the secondary transmissions of 

23 any network station located in 

24 that State because of the assign25 ment of the subscriber to a local 


wwoods2 on PRODPC68 with BILLS
3 

•HR 505 IH

1 market receiving secondary 

2 transmissions of network stations 

3 located in another State; and 

4 ‘‘(bb) elects to receive the 

5 secondary transmissions of net6 work stations located in the State 

7 of Oklahoma instead of the sec8 ondary transmissions of network 

9 stations located in that other 

10 State.’’. 

Æ 


wwoods2 on PRODPC68 with BILLS
```

[Congressional Bills 111th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 5299 Introduced in House (IH)]

111th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 5299

   To temporarily prohibit United States loans to the International 
 Monetary Fund to be used to provide financing for any member state of 
                          the European Union.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                              May 13, 2010

Mr. Pence (for himself, Mrs. McMorris Rodgers, Mr. Lewis of California, 
 Mr. Hensarling, and Ms. Granger) introduced the following bill; which 
          was referred to the Committee on Financial Services

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
   To temporarily prohibit United States loans to the International 
 Monetary Fund to be used to provide financing for any member state of 
                          the European Union.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``European Bailout Protection Act''.

SEC. 2. TEMPORARY PROHIBITION ON UNITED STATES LOANS TO THE 
              INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND TO BE USED FOR FINANCING FOR 
              ANY MEMBER STATE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION.

    Section 17 of the Bretton Woods Agreements Act (22 U.S.C. 286e-2) 
is amended by adding at the end the following:
    ``(e) A loan may not be made under this section in a calendar year 
to enable the Fund to provide financing, directly or indirectly, to any 
member state of the European Union, until the ratio of the total 
outstanding public debt of each such member state to the gross domestic 
product of the member state, as of the end of the most recent fiscal 
year of the member state ending in the preceding calendar year, is not 
more than 60 percent.''.

SEC. 3. TEMPORARY UNITED STATES OPPOSITION TO INTERNATIONAL MONETARY 
              FUND FINANCING FOR ANY MEMBER STATE OF THE EUROPEAN 
              UNION.

    The Bretton Woods Agreements Act (22 U.S.C. 286 et seq.) is amended 
by adding at the end the following:

``SEC. 68. TEMPORARY OPPOSITION OF UNITED STATES TO INTERNATIONAL 
              MONETARY FUND FINANCING FOR ANY MEMBER STATE OF THE 
              EUROPEAN UNION.

    ``The Secretary of the Treasury shall instruct the United States 
Executive Director at the Fund to use the voice and vote of the United 
States to oppose the provision of financing by the Fund, directly or 
indirectly, to any member state of the European Union in a calendar 
year, until the ratio of the total outstanding public debt of each such 
member state to the gross domestic product of the member state, as of 
the end of the most recent fiscal year of the member state ending in 
the preceding calendar year, is not more than 60 percent.''.
                                 <all>
```
#### STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JOHN HENRY ALLEN

No. 7311SC245

(Filed 14 March 1973)

Criminal Law § 145.1— probation revocation — due process

Defendant was accorded full procedural due process in probation revocation proceedings in the district and superior courts.

Appeal by defendant from *Braswell, Judge,*23 October 1972 Session of Superior Court held in Lee County.

On 27 September 1971 defendant pleaded guilty in the District Court to five charges of nonfelonious larceny. He was sentenced to a term of one year in each case, said five one-year sentences to run consecutively. These sentences were suspended and defendant was placed on probation for a period of five years.

' On 13 October 1972 defendant was brought before the District Court upon allegations of violations of the terms of his probation. The District Court Judge found that defendant had violated the terms of the probationary judgment and probation was revoked. Defendant appealed to the Superior Court. •

*587On 27 October 1972 Judge Braswell found that defendant had failed to make certain monetary payments required by the probationary judgment; that defendant was convicted on 19 September 1972 of temporary larceny of an automobile; and that defendant was convicted on 26 September 1972 of driving a motor vehicle without an operator’s license. Judge Braswell found that defendant had thereby wilfully and without lawful excuse violated the terms and conditions of the probationary judgment. The defendant’s probation was revoked and commitment was issued to place the 27 September 1971 sentences into effect. Defendant appealed to this court.

*Attorney General Morgan, by Associate Attorney General Heidgerd, for the State.*

*A. B. Harrington III for the defendant.*

BROCK, Judge.

After defendant’s trial in September 1971 the trial judge provided defendant with an opportunity for rehabilitation without confinement. Defendant breached the faith the trial judge placed in him.

In the proceedings to inquire into alleged violations by defendant of the terms of his probation, defendant was accorded full procedural due process — and the right of two appeals. We have carefully reviewed the entire record and we find

No error.

Judges Vaughn and Graham concur.
WILLIAM C. DICKS
,
Petitioner,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA
, Respondent. ___________________________/ IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILE D

CASE NO. 1D 14

- 5800

Opinion filed May 7, 2015.

Petition for Belated Appeal

-- Original Jurisdiction

. William C. Dicks, pro se , Petitioner.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee , for Respondent.

PER CURIAM.

Petitioner is granted a be lated appeal of the October 28, 2014, order denying

motion for postconviction relief in Columbia County Circuit Court case number 2010

-

CF

- 000234. Upon issuance of mandate in this cause, a copy of this opinion shall be

provided to the clerk of the circuit court for treatment as the notice of appeal. Fla. R.

App. P. 9.141(c)( 6)(D).

WOLF, THOMAS, and OSTERHAUS, JJ., CONCUR.
Exhibit 32.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADDED BY

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the filing of the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended June 30, 2009 (the Report) by OptimumBank
Holdings, Inc. (the Company), I, Richard L. Browdy, Chief Financial Officer (Principal Accounting Officer) of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
that, to my knowledge:



|1. | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
|-- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|2. | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
|-- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                      |  |     |  |                                           
|--------------------- |  | --- |  | ------------------------------------------
|Date: August 14, 2009 |  | By: |  | /s/ Richard L. Browdy                     
|                      |  |     |  | Richard L. Browdy, Chief Financial Officer
EXHIBIT 32.1





CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Quarterly Report of Timberline Resources Corporation (the Company) on Form 10-

Q/A

 for the period ended March 31, 2009, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Randal Hardy, Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



|    |                                                                                                                      
|--- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|(1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



|    |                                                                                                                                                     
|--- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|(2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



Date:

June 2

, 2009

| |                                                                                                                                                              
| | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| | By:   /s/ Randal Hardy
_____________________________
Randal Hardy
Chief Executive Officer & Chief Financial Officer
Principal Executive and Financial Officer







The foregoing certification is being furnished solely pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Section 1350 of Chapter 63 of Title 18 of the United States Code) and is not being filed as part of the Report or as a separate disclosure document.
DISMISS; and Opinion Filed September 11, 2013.

S

In The

Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05-13-01083-CR

TOMMY MARK LAYMAN, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 2

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. F13-53590-I

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Bridges, Fillmore, and Lewis 

Opinion by Justice Fillmore

Tommy Mark Layman filed a notice of appeal which stated it was being filed within 

thirty days of July 5, 2013 and was appealing his conviction. We have received written 

confirmation from the Dallas County District Clerk that there is no judgment of conviction 

because the case has not yet proceeded to trial. 1

“Jurisdiction concerns the power of a court to hear and determine a case.” Olivo v. State, 

918 S.W.2d 519, 522 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). The jurisdiction of an appellate court must be 

legally invoked, and if not, the power of the court to act is as absent as if it did not exist. See id. 

at 523. As a general rule, an appellate court may consider appeals by criminal defendants only 

after conviction. Wright v. State, 969 S.W.2d 588, 589 (Tex. App.––Dallas 1998, no pet.). A 

 1 Although appellant is represented by counsel in the trial court, he filed a pro se notice of appeal. We sent appellant’s attorney and the 

Dallas County District Attorney’s Office a letter questioning our jurisdiction, but we did not receive a response from either.
–2–

court of appeals has no jurisdiction over an appeal absent a written judgment or an appealable 

order. See Gutierrez v. State, 307 S.W.3d 318, 321 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Nikrasch v. State, 

698 S.W.2d 443, 450 (Tex. App.––Dallas 1985, no pet.).

Because there is no judgment of conviction or other appealable order, we lack jurisdiction 

over this appeal. See Gutierrez, 307 S.W.3d at 321; Nikrasch, 698 S.W.2d at 450. Accordingly, 

we dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.

Do Not Publish

TEX. R. APP. P. 47

131083F.U05

/Robert M. Fillmore/

ROBERT M. FILLMORE

JUSTICE
–3–

Court of Appeals

S

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

JUDGMENT

TOMMY MARK LAYMAN, Appellant

No. 05-13-01083-CR V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the Criminal District Court 

No. 2, Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. F13-53590-I.

Opinion delivered by Justice Fillmore, 

Justices Bridges and Lewis participating.

Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, we DISMISS the appeal for want of 

jurisdiction.

Judgment entered this 11th day of September, 2013.

/Robert M. Fillmore/

ROBERT M. FILLMORE

JUSTICE
<PAGE>

                                                                      EXHIBIT 21

                          SUBSIDIARIES OF THE COMPANY

<Table>
<Caption>
                                                                              OTHER NAME, IF ANY,
                                           STATE OR OTHER JURISDICTION        THAT THE SUBSIDIARY
NAME                                            OF INCORPORATION              DOES BUSINESS UNDER
----                                       ---------------------------        -------------------
<S>                                        <C>                           <C>
BowSteel Corporation                             Delaware

BowSteel of Texas Corporation                    Delaware

ETCA G.P., L.L.C.                                 Texas

ETCA L.P., Inc.                                  Delaware

Extrusion Technology Corporation of
  America                                          Ohio

Galt Alloys, Inc.                                  Ohio

NATI Gas Company                                   Ohio

New Century Metals, Inc.                           Ohio

New Century Metals Southeast, Inc.               Delaware                New Century Metals and RTI LA

Pierce-Spafford Metals Company, Inc.            California

Reamet, S.A.                                      France

RMI Delaware, Inc.                               Delaware

RMI Metals, Inc.                                   Utah                  Micron Metals, Inc.

RMI Titanium Company                               Ohio

RTI Energy Systems, Inc.                           Ohio

RTI Europe Ltd.                               United Kingdom

RTI Fabrication, L.P.                             Texas

RTI France S.A.S.                                 France

RTI International Metals Gmbh                    Germany

RTI International Metals Limited              United Kingdom

RTI International Metals Srl                      Italy

Tradco, Inc.                                     Missouri

Weld-Tech Engineering Services, L.P.              Texas                  RTI Energy Systems

Weld-Tech G.P., Inc.                              Texas

Weld-Tech L.P., Inc.                             Delaware
</Table>
# C_2008209EN.01007202.xml

| 15.8.2008 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 209/72 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.8.2008

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 209/72

---

Order of the Civil Service Tribunal (Second Chamber) of 10 June 2008 — Baudelet-Leclaire v Commission

(Case F-40/07) (1)

1

(Staff cases - Open competition - Failure to include candidate's name on the reserve list - Equal treatment)

(2008/C 209/132)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicant: Cécile Baudelet-Leclaire (Brussels, Belgium) (represented by: M. Korving, lawyer)

Applicant:

Defendant: Commission of the European Communities (represented by: J. Currall and M. Velardo)

Defendant:

Re:

Application for annulment of competition EPSO/AST/7/05 — Field 2 — Project/Contract management on the grounds of the alleged discrimination between internal candidates from the Community institutions and external candidates

Operative part of the order

| 1. | The action is dismissed as manifestly unfounded. |
| --- | --- |

1.

The action is dismissed as manifestly unfounded.

| 2. | The parties are to bear their own costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

The parties are to bear their own costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 129, 9.6.2007, p. 28

1

---