Filed 5/28/24 Huang v. Pabianova CA2/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

FANG HUANG

,
Plaintiff and Respondent

,

v.

MARIE PABIANOVA

,
Defendant and Appellant

. B3 21951

(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No.

BD615033 )

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Michael R. Powell , Judge

. Affirmed

. Maria Pabianova, in pro. per.; and Holstrom, Block &

Park e , and Ronald B. Funk for Defendant and Appellant.
Fang Huang, in pro. per.

, for Plaintiff and R espondent.

__________________________________________2 This is the third time the parties, a former husband and
wife, have come before us. Following the dissolution of their
marriage, the parties sought mutual restraining orders under the
Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA; Fam. Code, § 6200

et seq. 1 )

. The trial court held a hearing on both requests that
included live witness testimony presented over several days. At
the conclusion of the hearing, the court granted the former
husband’s request and denied the former wife’s request for a

domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) . The former wife

contends the order must be reversed because the court failed to
comply with section 6305 and conducted the hearing in violation

of her due process rights

. We affirm the order.

FACTS AND PROCEDUR AL BACKGROUND

A. Marriage and Dissolution
Fang Huang (husband) and Marie Pabianova (wife)
married in January 2010. They separated in October 2014, and
the judgment of dissolution ending their marriage was entered in
January 2018. They have two children

— C

. (born in 2010) and A

. (born in 2012).
In their stipulated judgment of dissolution, wife and
husband agreed to joint legal and physical custody of the

children.

B. Earlier Proceedings and Existing DVRO Requests
In May 2021, the juvenile court dismissed a Welfare and
Institutions Code section 300 petition against husband for

insufficient evidence. Wife acknowledged she was the reporting

1 S tatutory references are to the Family Code unless
otherwise indicated.3

party. The petition alleged h usband physically abused the

children.

On Novem ber 18, 2021, a criminal protective order issued
in August 2021 against husband as to his daughter A

. was
terminated.
On November 30, 2021

, wife filed a request for a DVRO to
protect herself against husband. She described harassment and

threats text ed by husband in the middle of the night, prompting
her to go to the hospital for chest pain and medical tests.
On December 10, 2021, husband filed a request for a DVRO
to protect himself and his children against wife. Husband
asserted the children report ed they had been forced by wife to
make false allegations of physical and sexual abuse against him

to authorities.

C. DVRO Proceedings
On January 27, 2022, husband appeared, represented by
counsel and wife appeared, representing herself. Wife objected to
husband calling the children to testify. The trial court decided to
interview the children instead and asked the parties to submit
questions for the court to ask.
Next, the trial court explained the parties were to adhere to

certain rules for the conteste d hearing: At the court’s discretion,
time limits would be imposed on direct and cross

- examination, so
the parties were to use their time wisely; declarations would be
admitted to the extent they did not lack foundation or rest on
hearsay; the court would question the parties about their
allegations and ask if they rested on their declarations; if one
party failed to demonstrate a prima facie case, that party’s DVRO
request would be dismissed, otherwise the court would allow the
parties to continue questio ning the witnesses. Neither party had4

questions or objected to these rules or the order of the
presentation of evidence. The hearing was subsequently
continued to February 16, 2022.
At the continued hearing on February 16, 2022, wife was
represented by c ounsel. The trial court restated its rules for the
contested hearing, including the need to develop a prima facie
case to avoid dismissal. The court reminded the parties it would
first proceed with wife’s DVRO request by questioning her.
Again, neither party objected.
The court stated it would first hear wife’s DVRO request,
because she filed first. Wife completed her presentation of
evidence and rested. The hearing was then continued to May 2,

2022

. On May 2, 2022, the hearing resumed. The trial cour t questioned husband, as it did with wife prior to examination by

counsel. Husband completed his presentation of evidence and

rested. Following argument by counsel, the trial court denied
wife’s request. The court concluded there was no justification for
issuing a DVRO. The court found the text messages did not
constitute abuse. Contrary to wife’s DVRO request

, there was no

admissible evidence the messages affected wife medically. The

court discounted wife’s claim that husband’s texts were distressing because, rather than block the messages, she
responded to them well after the original text from husband. The
court found the parties’ texts reflected immaturity and poor
communication between parents that required serious

intervention. The court ordered the parties to use the5

TalkingParents app or Our Family Wizard to communicate in the

future. 2
Next was the presentation of evidence for husband’s DVRO

request. The parties each submitted questions for their two

children. The children separately testified in a series of question

and

- answer exchanges with the trial court in chambers. The
hearing recessed until the following day.
On May 3, 2022, the hearing resumed. The tri al court
again questioned husband and wife prior to examination by

counsel

. After husband completed his presentation of evidence,
the parties rested. When the hearing concluded, the trial court
granted husband’s DVRO request. The court concluded wife ha d
abused husband through their children. The court found wife
had abused her children by compelling them to falsely report

husband as an abuser to authorities. The court believed the
children’s testimony and disbelieved wife’s conflicting testimony

. The court ordered sole legal and physical custody of the children
be granted to husband. Wife timely appealed. 3

DISCUSSION

I. Section 6305

Wife first contends the trial court’s failure to follow the
dictates of section 6305 in assessing the parties’ mutual DVPO
requests constituted reversible error.

2 T alkingParents and Our Family Wizard are both on

- line coparenting communication tools authorized by family courts.

3 W ife was represented by appellate counsel when her opening brief was filed. She filed her reply brief in pro pria

persona , no longer represented by counsel. Husband represents himself on appeal.6 A. Governing Law
“Under the DVPA, a court may issue a restraining order to
prevent domestic violence or abuse if the party seeking the order
‘shows, to the satisfaction the court, reasonable proof of a past act

or acts of abuse.’ ” ( Melissa G. v. Raymond M. (2018) 27
Cal.App.5th 360, 367.) “ Abuse” means intentionally or recklessly
causing or attempting to cause bodily injury to, sexual assault,
placing a person in reasonable apprehension of imminent serious
bodily injury, attacking, striking, stalking, threatening,
battering, harassing, destroying person al property, or disturbing
the peace of the other party. ( §§ 6203, 6320; see K.L. v. R.H.
(2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 965, 977

– 978.)
The statute at issue here is section 6305, which governs
mutual restraining orders. Under section 6305, a court “ shall not

iss ue a mutual order enjoining the parties from specific acts of

abuse ” unless “ (1) [b]oth parties personally appear and each
party presents written evidence of abuse or domestic violence”
using a mandatory Judicial Council form; and “ (2) [t]he court

makes de tailed findings of fact indicating that both parties acted
as a primary aggressor and that neither party acted primarily in

self

- defense.” ( § 6305, subd. (a)(1) & (2).) In the absence of such
factual findings, the order is voidable. ( Melissa G. v. Raymo nd

M.

, supra , 27 Cal.App.5th at p. 368.) “ As used in section 6305,
the phrase ‘mutual order’ may refer to a single order restraining
two opposing parties from engaging in the acts of abuse described

in section 6320 or two separate orders which together accomplish
the same result as a single order. ” ( Ibid. )

B. Standard of Review

On appeal “[t] he question of whether a trial court applied

the correct legal standard to an issue in exercising its discretion7

is a question of law [citation] requiring de novo review. ” ( Eneaji

v. Ubboe (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1457, 1463.) If a trial court
applies the wrong legal standard in ruling, we may nonetheless
affirm if we determine there is no reasonable probability the

court would have reac hed a more favorable result had it applied

the correct standard. ( Loeffler v. Medina (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th

1495, 1504 , fn. 11 .)

C. Wife’s Contentions
Because the parties’ DVPO requests were to be tried
together on the same day, wife contends the trial court was
required to comply with section 6305. The obvious response to
wife’s contention is the court never issued a mutual restraining
order. In this instance, the court denied wife’s DVPO request
and granted husband’s DVPO request. What’s more, if both
requests had been granted, we question whether the resulting
restraining order would have been “mutual”

— given wife was
seeking to protect herself solely from husband and husband was
seeking to protect himself and his children from wife.

Nonetheles s, wife contends because the trial court was
presented with what were clearly mutual DVPO requests, it had
to apply section 6305 and make the requisite findings. Wife is
not challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support the
findings made. Rather she maintains at length the findings
made are wrong, because they are based on the court’s faulty
analysis of the evidence. As K.L. v. R.H.

, supra , 70 Cal.App.5th
965 explained, “ [I] n making [the findings required by section
6305] the court ‘ shall consid er ’ both the intent of the law
protecting domestic violence victims and the specific
circumstances of the history of domestic violence in the case
before it. [Citations.] Specifically, the statute mandates that the8

court determine which of the parties is the ‘most significant’
aggressor. [Citation.] Such a determination requires that the
acts of the parties be weighed against each other. As a result, in
deciding whether mutual restraining orders should issue, the
trial court must consider the parties’ respective alleged acts of
domestic violence in concert, and not separately.” ( Id. at p. 979.)
Wife argues here, by having one DVPO request adjudicated after
the other rather than trying them together, the court improperly
considered the part ie s ’ claims and history of abuse separately
without weighing them against each other to make its findings.
According to wife, this prevented the court from engaging in a
thorough evaluation of the parties DVPO requests under section

6305.

D. No Prejudicial Error
Assuming without deciding the trial court committed the
error wife posits, she has not met her burden to show prejudicial

error. To establish prejudice, an appellant must demonstrate

there was a “ ‘ “ reasonable probability that in the absence of .

. .

err or, a result more favorable to the appealing party would have

been reached. ” ’ ” ( County of Los Angeles v. Williamsburg

National Ins. Co. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 944, 955.)
If the court had conducted the hearing as urged by wife,
there is no reasonable pro bability the court would have granted
her DVPO request and denied husband’s DVPO request. The

record shows the court did not find wife at all believable. The
court expressly discounted her testimony that husband’s text
messages were abusive and that she did not pressure her
children to falsely claim husband was abusive. In terms of her
children, the court told w ife: “But the bottom line is this. I
believe that, in fact, you are saying [husband is a sexual abuser]9

to the children because I believe the ch ildren. I believe what
they’re saying. I believe your daughter saying that you’re always
talking about [husband]. And therefore, you’re using those
children and causing them [to lie]

— their problem is you.” As
wife’s discredited testimony was the linchp in of both DVPO
requests, she would not have benefited from a more favorable

outcome had the requests been tried jointly.

II. Due Process Claim

Wife asserts the trial court so restricted both the time and
manner of the presentation of evidence that it amounted to a
denial of her due process rights.

A. Standard of Review

“ We independently review due process claims ‘ because “ the
ultimate determination of procedural fairness amounts to a
question of law. ” ’ ” ( Roth v. Jelley (2020) 45 Cal.App. 5th 655,
666.)

B. Wife Forfeited Her Claim

“ Trial courts have ‘ substantial discretion in the conduct of
judicial business, ’ which includes the inherent power to control

the litigation before them. [Citation.] ‘ “ ‘ That inherent power
entitles trial courts to exercise reasonable control over all
proceedings connected with pending litigation

. . . in order to

insure the orderl y administration of justice. ’ ” ’ [Citation.] ‘ [ O ] ne important element of a court ’ s inherent judicial authority in this
regard is “ the power

. . . to control the disposition of the causes on
its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for coun sel,

and for litigants. ” ’ ” ( People v. Cota (2023) 97 Cal.App. 5th 318,
333.)

At the outset, this trial court told the parties how it

conducted hearings on DVPO requests. The court advised it10

would impose time limits and examine witnesses if deemed

neces sary. The court e

- mailed these instructions to the parties

and repeated them during the hearing. The court’s clear intent

was to manage its heavy docket by making sure the proceedings

before it would be orderly and efficient. At no time did the
parties or their attorneys object to any instructions or the way in

which the hearing was being conducted. Wife has forfeited her

due process claim by failing to raise it in the trial court. (See
People v. Cardona (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 516, 523 [“We further
conclude appellant forfeited any due process claim by failing
either to raise it, or to object to the procedures used, in the trial
court”].)

C. No Due Process Violation
Wife makes conclusory assertions the trial court violated
her due process righ ts. From the cases wife cites in her opening
brief, it appears she first contends the trial court improperly
questioned witnesses before allowing the attorneys to question

them. “A trial judge may examine witnesses to elicit or clarify
testimony [citatio ns]. Indeed, ‘ it is the right and duty of a judge

to conduct a trial in such a manner that the truth will be

established in accordance with the rules of evidence. ’ ” ( People v. Rigney (1961) 55 Cal.2d 236, 241.) Here, the trial court examined

the witnes ses to elicit testimony in an organized fashion. We also

note that, not infrequently, counsel had difficulty formulating
questions to elicit certain testimony. At that point, the trial court

would intervene to rephrase the question and the witness was
ab le to answer. Our independent review of the record confirms

the court’s examination was proper and did not hinder the
parties ’ ability to present their cases.11 Wife also maintains the trial court was impatient and
unfairly limited the parties’ time. The court was frustrated or
critical of counsel. This occurred chiefly when counsel ignored an
admonishment by the court, interrupted the court posed
ambiguous questions to witnesses

, misnumbered or misplaced
documentary evidence or repeatedly failed to r espond directly to
the court’s questions. After reviewing the record, we conclude the

court ’ s comments did not rise to such a level that they cause us to

lack confidence in the fairness of the proceedings

. ( People v.
S now (2003) 30 Cal.4th 43, 78 [“ ‘[ i ] t is well within [a trial court ’ s]
discretion to rebuke an attorney, sometimes harshly, when that
attorney asks inappropriate questions, ignores the court ’ s instructions, or otherwise engages in improper or delaying

behavior ’ ”]. )

Nor did the trial court unfairly limit the parties’ time to

present their DVPO requests. The hearing lasted four days. Wife

had adequate time to present evidence and to provide a defense.

She points to nothing in the record that suggest s otherwise.
Lastly, wife’s contention the trial court prejudged the

evidence has no merit. The court was the finder of fact. There
was nothing improper about the court communicating its
thoughts to the parties to guide them in the presentation of
evidence so their issues could be fully addresse d and fairly

resolved.
In sum, the court did not violate wife’s due process rights.12 DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. Fang Huang is to recover his costs
on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

LUI, P. J.

We concur:

CHAVEZ, J.

HOFFSTADT, J.