UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-4731

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

ROGER TRENT MELCHOR,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle

District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Thomas D. Schroeder, 

District Judge. (1:13-cr-00028-TDS-1)

Submitted: June 12, 2014 Decided: July 31, 2014

Before NIEMEYER, WYNN, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Jeffrey M. Brandt, ROBINSON & BRANDT, P.S.C., Covington, 

Kentucky, for Appellant. Ripley Rand, United States Attorney, 

JoAnna G. McFadden, Assistant United States Attorney, 

Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Roger Melchor appeals the seventy-four-month aggregate 

sentence of imprisonment imposed by the district court following 

his guilty plea to conspiracy to commit bank fraud, in violation 

of 18 U.S.C. § 1349 (2012), and aggravated identity theft, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1) (2012). On appeal, Melchor 

contends that the district court erred by applying sentencing 

enhancements for abuse of a position of trust, pursuant to U.S. 

Sentencing Guidelines Manual (“USSG”) § 3B1.3 (2012), and for 

the number of victims, pursuant to USSG § 2B1.1(b)(2)(A)(i).* We 

affirm.

We review sentences for reasonableness “under a 

deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v. United 

States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). “The first step in this review 

requires us to ensure that the district court committed no 

significant procedural error, such as . . . improperly 

calculating . . . the Guidelines range.” United States v. 

Osborne, 514 F.3d 377, 387 (4th Cir. 2008). When reviewing the 

district court’s application of the Sentencing Guidelines, we 

review findings of fact for clear error and questions of law de 

 * Melchor’s challenges pertain only to the fifty-month term 

imposed on the conspiracy charge. The consecutive twenty-four 

month term imposed on the identity theft charge was the 

statutory mandatory term.
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novo. Id. The burden is on the government to establish by a 

preponderance of the evidence that a sentencing enhancement 

should be applied. See United States v. Manigan, 592 F.3d 621, 

628-29 (4th Cir. 2010).

Melchor contends that he did not occupy a position of 

trust and therefore the enhancement was incorrectly applied to 

him. Section 3B1.3 applies if “the defendant abused a position 

of trust and that abuse significantly contributed to the 

commission or concealment of the [underlying offense].” United 

States v. Akinkoye, 185 F.3d 192, 203 (4th Cir. 1999); see USSG 

§ 3B1.3 & cmt. n.1. However, in addition to a defendant in a 

position of trust from the perspective of the victims, the 

enhancement also applies to “[a] defendant who exceeds or abuses 

the authority of his or her position in order to obtain . . . 

any means of identification.” USSG § 3B1.3 cmt. n.2(B). We 

have concluded that the enhancement applies to an individual in 

a case similar to Melchor’s. See United States v. Abdelshafi, 

592 F.3d 602, 610-12 (4th Cir. 2010). Therefore, because 

Melchor abused his position to obtain the means of 

identification that made his fraud possible, the district court 

did not err in applying this enhancement.

Lastly, Melchor argues that the district court erred 

in applying a two-level enhancement for the number of victims 

because only victims who suffered a financial loss may be
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counted for purposes of the Guidelines. Section 2B1.1 provides 

that “[i]f the offense involved 10 or more victims . . . 

increase by 2 levels.” USSG § 2B1.1(b)(2)(A)(i). The 

application notes state that, “in a case involving means of 

identification[,] ‘victim’ means . . . any individual whose 

means of identification was used unlawfully or without 

authority.” USSG § 2B1.1(b)(2) cmt. n.4(E). Application Note 

4(E) specifically states that this definition of victim exists 

independently from the general definition of victim in 

Application Note 1, id., which requires “actual loss” or “bodily 

injury.” USSG § 2B1.1 cmt. n.1. Therefore, the district court 

did not err by considering the individuals whose identifying 

information was stolen by Melchor to be victims for purposes of 

the Guidelines, making the enhancement appropriate.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. 

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED