alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### RICHARD ALLENDER BABCOCK, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent.

No. 7721

May 21, 1975

535 P.2d 786

*Samuel T. Bull,*of Reno, for Appellant.

*Robert List,*Attorney General, Carson City; *Larry R. Hicks,*District Attorney, and *Kathleen M. Wall,*Assistant Chief Deputy District Attorney, Washoe County, for Respondent.

*313OPINION

*Per Curiam:*

Richard Babcock was found guilty of embezzlement. The charge arose from his conduct as a supervisor in the Bingo Parlor in the Sparks Nugget.

On June 5, 1973, during the nighttime after the Bingo Parlor was closed and locked, Babcock obtained a key to the Bingo Parlor from the cashier’s department, entered and forced open a drawer containing the tip money totaling $842.00 and proceeded to lose the money at gambling.

The record on appeal establishes that the supervisors, such as Babcock, were responsible for the collecting, holding and distribution twice each month of the gratuities taken, which were kept in the drawer from which Babcock removed the money. None of the employees had given Babcock his permission to take all of the money for himself. He contends on appeal, however, that he cannot be held for embezzlement because he was joint owner of the money and a person cannot steal from himself.

His argument is known only in early legal history. At one time the common-law rule was that a person could not commit an embezzlement of property that he co-owned. The old principle has been modified either by statute or by interpretation. Commonwealth v. Bovaird, 95 A.2d 173 (Pa. 1953). It shall be no defense to a prosecution for embezzlement that the property appropriated was partly the property of the accused and the property of another. The accused is still guilty of taking for his own use monies that belong to someone else. His portion is disregarded for this determination.

While Nevada has not included the foregoing recognition in the statutes pertaining to embezzlement (NRS 205.300), we do analogize to NRS 205.265 wherein part ownership is no defense to larceny.

Other discussions advanced by appellant are without merit.

Affirmed.
Court of Appeals

Sixth Appellate District of Texas

JUDGMENT

Jennifer Jill Whitehead, Appellant

No. 06-13-00054-CR v.

The State of Texas, Appellee

Appeal from the 3rd District Court of 

Anderson County, Texas (Tr. Ct. No. 

30256). Opinion delivered by Justice 

Carter, Chief Justice Morriss and Justice 

Moseley participating.

As stated in the Court’s opinion of this date, we find no error in the judgment of the court 

below. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

We note that the appellant, Jennifer Jill Whitehead, has adequately indicated her inability 

to pay costs of appeal. Therefore, we waive payment of costs.

RENDERED JUNE 19, 2014

BY ORDER OF THE COURT

JOSH R. MORRISS, III

CHIEF JUSTICE

ATTEST:

Debra K. Autrey, Clerk
**Exhibit 32.1**

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

In connection with the Annual Report of Implant Sciences Corporation, a Massachusetts corporation (the “Company”) on Form 10-K/A  for the fiscal year ended June 30, 2014, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Glenn D. Bolduc, President, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge:

(1)

The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)

The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.

|  

/s/ Glenn D. Bolduc

 

Glenn D. Bolduc

 

President, Chief Executive Officer 

Date: October 28, 2014

 

This certification accompanies each report of the Company on Form 10-Q and Form 10-K pursuant to §906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not, except to the extent required by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, be deemed filed by us for purposes of §18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.

A signed original of this written statement required by §906 has been provided to us and will be retained by us and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or our staff upon request. |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
Exhibit 32.2




CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002




In connection with the quarterly report of Otelco Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the period ended September 30, 2010, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Curtis L. Garner, Jr., Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:




1.
The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and




2.
The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.




/s/ Curtis L. Garner, Jr.Curtis L. Garner, Jr.Chief Financial OfficerNovember 4, 2010
----

            COMMISSION REGULATION (EC) No 1064/2004

of 1 June 2004         

establishing the standard import values for determining the entry price of certain fruit and vegetables

THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community,

Having regard to Commission Regulation (EC) No 3223/94 of 21 December 1994 on detailed rules for the application of the import arrangements for fruit and vegetables (1), and in particular Article 4(1) thereof,

Whereas:

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

The standard import values referred to in Article 4 of Regulation (EC) No 3223/94 shall be fixed as indicated in the Annex hereto.

Article 2

This Regulation shall enter into force on 2 June 2004.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 1 June 2004.

For the Commission

J. M. SILVA RODRÍGUEZ            

Agriculture Director-General

----

(1)OJ L 337, 24.12.1994, p. 66. Regulation as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 1947/2002 (OJ L 299, 1.11.2002, p. 17).

----

ANNEX

to the Commission Regulation of 1 June 2004 establishing the standard import values for determining the entry price of certain fruit and vegetables

----

(1)  Country nomenclature as fixed by Commission Regulation (EC) No 2081/2003 (OJ L 313, 28.11.2003, p. 11). Code ‘            999            ’ stands for ‘of other origin’.

----
#### MARVIN LEE HULETT, Jr., Appellant, v. SHERIFF, CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA, Respondent.

No. 7988

March 11, 1975

532 P.2d 607

*140[Rehearing denied April 7,1975]

*Morgan D. Harris,*Public Defender, Clark County, and Robert L. Stott, Deputy, for Appellant.

*Robert List,*Attorney General, Carson City; *George E. Holt,*District Attorney, and *Daniel M. Seaton,*Chief Deputy, Clark County, for Respondent.

OPINION

*Per Curiam:*

In this appeal from an order denying a pretrial petition for habeas corpus, we believe evidence at the preliminary examination justified the magistrate’s determination that there was probable cause to hold appellant for trial. NRS 171.206. At *141this juncture we need not and do not decide whether such evidence would support a conviction. Cf. McDonald v. Sheriff, 89 Nev. 326, 512 P.2d 774 (1973).

At the hearing on the habeas petition, the district court granted habeas as to the counts in the information charging extortion and robbery, and to that part of count I which charged murder during the commission of a burglary.

Because the remaining counts (I and II), charging first degree murder and kidnapping, allude to “extorting information” appellant contends the entire information is fatally defective and that the trial court erred in refusing to grant habeas as to those counts.

We do not agree. At most, the challenged language amounts to surplusage. In 1868, this court first held that surplusage in an information or indictment does not necessarily render it fatal. See State v. Lawry, 4 Nev. 161 (1868). If the words taken to be surplusage are stricken, and there remains sufficient language to constitute a proper charge of all the elements of the crime, the indictment or information remains valid. State v. Harkin, 7 Nev. 377 (1872). Here, if the challenged language in counts I and II is stricken, the remaining language is sufficient to charge a public offense in words sufficient to give appellant notice of the offenses charged. *Harkin, supra.*Cf. People v. Randazzo, 310 P.2d 413 (Cal. 1957).

> “If appellant deems such surplusage prejudicial, he may move [in the trial court] to have it stricken under NRS 173.-085.” Carson v. Sheriff, 87 Nev. 357, 359, 487 P.2d 334, 335 (1971).

Affirmed.
```

[Congressional Bills 111th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 5254 Introduced in House (IH)]

111th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 5254

                For the relief of Simaya T. K. Eversley.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                              May 6, 2010

Mr. Davis of Illinois introduced the following bill; which was referred 
                   to the Committee on the Judiciary

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
                For the relief of Simaya T. K. Eversley.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. PERMANENT RESIDENT STATUS FOR SIMAYA T. K. EVERSLEY.

    (a) In General.--Notwithstanding subsections (a) and (b) of section 
201 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, Simaya T. K. Eversley shall 
be eligible for issuance of an immigrant visa or for adjustment of 
status to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence 
upon filing an application for issuance of an immigrant visa under 
section 204 of such Act or for adjustment of status to lawful permanent 
resident.
    (b) Adjustment of Status.--If Simaya T. K. Eversley enters the 
United States before the filing deadline specified in subsection (c), 
he shall be considered to have entered and remained lawfully and shall, 
if otherwise eligible, be eligible for adjustment of status under 
section 245 of the Immigration and Nationality Act as of the date of 
the enactment of this Act.
    (c) Deadline for Application and Payment of Fees.--Subsections (a) 
and (b) shall apply only if the application for issuance of an 
immigrant visa or the application for adjustment of status is filed 
with appropriate fees within 2 years after the date of the enactment of 
this Act.
    (d) Reduction of Immigrant Visa Number.--Upon the granting of an 
immigrant visa or permanent residence to Simaya T. K. Eversley, the 
Secretary of State shall instruct the proper officer to reduce by 1, 
during the current or next following fiscal year, the total number of 
immigrant visas that are made available to natives of the country of 
the alien's birth under section 203(a) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act or, if applicable, the total number of immigrant visas 
that are made available to natives of the country of the alien's birth 
under section 202(e) of such Act.
    (e) Denial of Preferential Immigration Treatment for Certain 
Relatives.--The natural parents, brothers, and sisters of Simaya T. K. 
Eversley shall not, by virtue of such relationship, be accorded any 
right, privilege, or status under the Immigration and Nationality Act.
                                 <all>
```
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<ARTICLE>                     5
<MULTIPLIER>                                   1,000
<CURRENCY>                                   DOLLARS

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          SEP-25-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             OCT-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-25-1999
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                      1
<CASH>                                             382
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<PP&E>                                          18,364
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<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  35,631
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           52,678
<BONDS>                                              0
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<COMMON>                                         2,270
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<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    35,631
<SALES>                                         93,346
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                93,346
<CGS>                                           89,661
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   50,769
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               (1,617)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               6,415
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (51,882)
<INCOME-TAX>                                        10
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (51,892)
<DISCONTINUED>                                   1,286
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (50,606)
<EPS-BASIC>                                   (7.25)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (7.25)


</TABLE>
#### STANLEY C. DEARING, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent.

No. 7194

July 26, 1974

525 P.2d 601

*Gary A. Sheerin*and *H. Rodlin Goff,*State Public Defender, Carson City, for Appellant.

*Robert List,*Attorney General, Carson City; *Roy A. Woof-ter,*District Attorney, and *Charles L. Garner,*Chief Deputy District Attorney, Clark County, for Respondent.

*298OPINION

*Per Curiam:*

*■*Dearing was arrested for burglary in Las Vegas. After being detained for 1 day, he posted bond. Two days later, he was arrested on a violation of a parole warrant from California. No bail was set. Dearing now seeks credit on his burglary prison term for the time he spent in custody on the parole warrant.

The instant case does not satisfy the requirements set forth in Anglin v. State, 90 Nev. 287, 525 P.2d 34 (1974), that bail be set. California recently held that a parolee has no right to bail when arrested or held for a parole violation. In re Law, 10 Cal.3d 21 (1973). NRS 176.055 exempts from sentence credit “confinement . . . pursuant to a judgment of conviction for another offense.” Since parole is granted subsequent to a conviction, the statutory exclusion applies, and this state characterization is both rational and reasonable. McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263 (1973).

The order of the district court denying Dearing’s petition is affirmed.
#### BARBARA F. PHILLIPS, APPELLANT, v. INCLINE MANOR ASSOCIATION, a Nevada Corporation, Respondent.

No. 7525

January 29, 1975

530 P.2d 1207

Herbert F. Ahlswede, of Incline Village, for Appellant.

*70
      *Hibbs & Bullís, Ltd..,*and *Roger E. Newton,*of Reno, for Respondent.

OPINION

*Per Curiam:*

This appeal by Phillips is from an order of the district court setting aside a default judgment entered in her favor against the defendant domestic corporation.

Service of process was attempted by leaving a copy of the summons and complaint with the fourteen-year-old son of the president of the defendant corporation at the president’s residence. Service was ineffective for failure to comply with the requirements of NRCP 4(d)(1) which designates the manner in which a domestic corporation is to be served. Cf. Certain-Teed Prods. v. District Court, 87 Nev. 18, 479 P.2d 781 (1971). Consequently, the default judgment entered thereon was void, and the court properly set it aside. NRCP'60(b) (3).

The record indicates that after entry of default judgment, the defendant corporation also moved to quash service of process, which motion apparently was considered simultaneously with the defendant’s motion to set aside the default judgment. The district court granted said motion to quash. This was error, since the defense of insufficiency of service of process was waived by the responsive pleading filed in aid of the motion to set aside the default judgment. NRCP 12(b).

Accordingly, in its action setting aside the default judgment, the district court is affirmed; its action quashing service of process is reversed.
<PAGE>   1
 
                                                                      EXHIBIT 24
 
                       CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANTS
 
     We consent to the inclusion in this Annual Report on Form 10-K for the
period ended December 31, 1998, and to the incorporation by reference in the
Registration Statements on Forms S-8 (File Nos. 2-77496, 33-10631, 33-56772,
33-82560, 333-19265, 333-31391, 333-31393 and 333-65547) and Forms S-3 (File
No's. 333-02001, 333-27189 and 333-48097) of our report dated March 11, 1999, on
our audits of the consolidated balance sheets of International Remote Imaging
Systems, Inc. and subsidiaries as of December 31, 1998 and 1997, and the
consolidated results of their operations and their cash flows for each of the
years in the three-year period ended December 31, 1998.
 
/s/ PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP
 
Los Angeles, California
March 30, 1999
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                  3-Mos
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                    DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                       JUN-30-1998
<PERIOD-END>                         SEP-30-1998
<CASH>                               76,155,034
<SECURITIES>                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                        1,148,572
<ALLOWANCES>                         0
<INVENTORY>                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                     72,999,716
<PP&E>                               0
<DEPRECIATION>                       45,636,971
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                       112,193,285
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                0
<BONDS>                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                0
<PREFERRED>                          0
<COMMON>                             0
<OTHER-SE>                           0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>         112,193,285
<SALES>                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                     34,441,017
<CGS>                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                     15,080,547
<LOSS-PROVISION>                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                   3,362,814
<INCOME-PRETAX>                      0
<INCOME-TAX>                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                      101,295,597
<CHANGES>                            0
<NET-INCOME>                         108,545,353
<EPS-PRIMARY>                        0
<EPS-DILUTED>                        0
        



</TABLE>
<PAGE>
                                                                      Exhibit 23

                        Consent of Independent Auditors

We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements Form
S-8 No. 333-93655 pertaining to the Employee Stock Purchase Plan; Fourth Amended
and Restated Employees Stock Option Plan; Form S-8 No. 333-03783 pertaining to
the Nonemployee-Directors' Equity Compensation Plan; and Form S-8 Nos. 33-88020
and 33-22545 pertaining to the Employees Stock Option Plan of The Ackerley
Group, Inc. of our report dated February 8, 2002 (except for Note 9, as to which
the date is March 18, 2002), with respect to the consolidated financial
statements of The Ackerley Group, Inc. included in the Annual Report (Form 10-K)
for the year ended December 31, 2001.

                                                           /s/ Ernst & Young LLP

Seattle, Washington
March 29, 2002
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ANA MARIA RIVAS DE TAMACAS

and ROBERTO IVAN TAMACAS

PORTILLO,

 Petitioners,

 v.

ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General,

 Respondent.

No. 09-70351

Agency Nos. A098-952-565

A098-952-566

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Argued and Submitted June 16, 2014 

Seattle, Washington

Before: REINHARDT and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges, and SETTLE, District

Judge.

**

FILED

JUN 25 2014

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

 * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

** The Honorable Benjamin H. Settle, District Judge for the U.S. District

Court for the Western District of Washington, sitting by designation.
Ana Maria Rivas de Tamacas and Roberto Ivan Tamacas Portillo, natives

and citizens of El Salvador, petition for review of the Board of Immigration

Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing their appeal from an immigration judge’s

decision denying their applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and

protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction

pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition.

Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s finding that petitioners failed to

meet their burden of showing they suffered past persecution on account of

membership in a particular social group. See Ayala v. Holder, 640 F.3d 1095,

1097–98 (9th Cir. 2011) (per curiam). Likewise, the petitioners failed to

demonstrate an objective well-founded fear of future persecution. See ArriagaBarrientos v. U.S.I.N.S., 937 F.2d 411, 414 (9th Cir. 1991) (petitioner must

establish a pattern of persecution closely tied to petitioner to establish a wellfounded fear). Petitioners were not personally harmed or personally threatened,

there is no persuasive evidence that the killings of their family members were

efforts to harm or attack petitioners emotionally, and there is no persuasive

evidence that the killings were motivated by family membership. 

The BIA’s finding with regard to imputed political opinion is also supported

by substantial evidence. The motive of the assailants is unknown and it was

2
reasonable to conclude that the incidents were random acts of violence. See

Ochave v. I.N.S., 254 F.3d 859, 866 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Because petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence to show they were

eligible for asylum, they necessarily failed to make the more stringent showing that

they were eligible for withholding of removal. See Zehatye v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d

1182, 1190 (9th Cir. 2006). 

Petitioners did not make any argument regarding the BIA’s denial of CAT

relief in their opening brief. Therefore their CAT claim is waived. See MartinezSerrano v. I.N.S., 94 F.3d 1256, 1259 (9th Cir. 1996). 

AFFIRMED.

3