Opinion issued November 30, 2012.

In The

Court of Appeals 

For The 

First District of Texas 

————————————

NO. 01-10-01019-CV

———————————

ANTONELLA APUZZO DI PORTANOVA AND PAUL PIERO DI

PORTANOVA, Appellants

V.

RICHARD E. MONROE, JR., GUARDIAN OF THE ESTATE OF UGO DI 

PORTANOVA, WARD, A PARTIALLY INCAPACITATED PERSON; 

JAMES PATRICK SMITH, GUARDIAN AD LITEM FOR UGO DI 

PORTANOVA, WARD, A PARTIALLY INCAPACITATED PERSON; AND 

TINA LAMATTA, GUARDIAN OF THE PERSON OF UGO DI

PORTANOVA, WARD, A PARTIALLY INCAPACITATED PERSON, 

Appellees

On Appeal from the Probate Court No. 2

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Case No. 94467438
2

O P I N I O N

In this appeal, we consider whether a suit for non-dispositive administrative 

consolidation of several trusts, filed by guardians of a partially incapacitated 

person pursuant to Section 112.054 of the Texas Property Code, triggered an in 

terrorem1clause in the wills creating the trusts, thus resulting in a forfeiture of the 

ward’s interest in the trusts. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

The Parties

Ugo Di Portanova is the 74-year-old grandson of H.R. and Lillie Cullen. 

Ugo is partially incapacitated2and has lived with Annunziata and Umberto 

LaMatta since 1974. In 1998, Tina LaMatta was appointed as guardian of Ugo’s 

person. Richard Monroe is the guardian of Ugo’s estate. James Patrick Smith is 

Ugo’s guardian ad litem. Collectively, we refer to LaMatta, Monroe, and Smith as 

“the Guardians.”

Paul Piero Di Portanova and Antonella Apuzzo Di Portanova [“the Di 

Portanovas”] were adjudicated to be Ugo’s half-siblings by a 1996 judgment in a 

paternity suit filed in an Italian court. The Di Portanovas and Ugo share the same 

 

1 An in terrorem or “no contest” clause in a will is a clause that provides that a 

beneficiary who contests the will forfeits his interest thereunder. See Ferguson v. 

Ferguson, 111 S.W.3d 589, 599 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, pet. denied).

2

The trial court has described Ugo as a person “of limited mental capability,” but 

has nonetheless recognized that he is sufficiently competent to exercise 

testamentary capacity.
3

father—Paolo Di Portanova, but Ugo’s mother is Lillie Cullen Di Portanova, the 

daughter of H.R. and Lillie Cullen, and the Di Portanovas’ mother is D’Alesandro 

Filament, a woman from Naples, Italy.

Max Butler, Robert Hux, and Robert A. Higley [“the Trustees”] were cotrustees of the H.R. Cullen and Lillie C. Cullen New Louisiana Trust, a trust 

established by the Cullens in their wills for the benefit of their grandson, Ugo. The 

Trustees have settled their interest in this case, and are not parties to this appeal.

The Cullens’ Wills and Codicils Create a Discretionary Trust

H.R. and Lillie Cullens’ wills each contained a codicil that provided for the 

creation of certain trusts to hold their Louisiana property, which, at the time, 

consisted mostly of certain mineral interests. Ugo was the beneficiary of two such 

trusts—one created under each will. In 1996, the trial court granted a judgment 

merging the trusts, and the H.R. Cullen and Lillie C. Cullen New Louisiana Trust 

(“the New Louisiana Trust”) was created.3 After the trusts were merged, all 

Louisiana properties were sold and there are no assets in the New Louisiana Trust 

located in the State of Louisiana. 

The codicils establishing the trusts provide in relevant part that “the Trustee, 

from time to time, may distribute to the person for whom such Trust was created 

 

3 No party objected to the 1996 judgment, nor alleged that the merger of those trusts 

violated the in terrorem clause in the wills.
4

such amounts of such Trust Estate as, in the discretion of the Trustee, are in the 

best interests of such person . . . .” The codicils further provide that upon Ugo’s 

death, “the Trust Estate of such Trust shall be distributed to such person’s heirs-atlaw under the Louisiana statutes of descent and distribution in effect at that time . . 

.”4

The Cullen wills that created the trusts contained a provision making each 

testator’s spouse the trustee, or, if deceased, the testator’s daughters. The 

provision also contained provisions regarding the appointment of successor 

trustees, as follows:

I appoint my [wife or husband] Trustee of all Trusts created or 

continued herein. If my wife shall, for any reason, fail or cease to act, 

I appoint my daughters, AGNES CULLEN ARNOLD, MARGARET 

CULLEN MARSHALL, AND WILHEMINA CULLEN 

ROBERTSON, to serve as a Board of substitute or successor Trustees. 

If any one or more of the substitute or successor Trustees shall, for 

any reason, fail or refuse to act, the remaining Trustees shall appoint 

(by written instrument filed in the Court in which this Will is first 

probated) a sufficient number of substitute or successor Trustees so 

that there shall be three (3) Trustees acting at all times; provided, 

nevertheless, that, in the interval prior to the appointment of such 

substitute or successor Trustees, the remaining Trustee or Trustees 

shall have and exercise all powers which might be exercised by the 

full Board of three (3) Trustees. If, at any time or for any reason, 

there is no Trustee acting hereunder, a new full Board of three (3) 

Trustees shall be appointed (by written instrument filed in the Court in 

which this Will is first probated) by the senior Judge (in years of 

service in such capacity) of the District Court of the State of Texas, 

 

4 As Ugo’s only living relatives through their mutual father, the Di Portanovas 

claim that they would be Ugo’s “heirs-at-law.” Thus, the Di Portanovas claim to 

be contingent beneficiaries of the Cullens’ wills.
5

the jurisdiction of which includes any part of Harris County, Texas, 

acting as an individual. In all appointments to said Board, it is my 

request that preference be given to my relatives and those of my [wife 

or husband]; however, anything to the contrary herein 

notwithstanding, not more than one member of said Board so 

appointed shall be an income beneficiary under any Trust created 

herein.

The Previous Lawsuit and Appeal

In 2003, the Guardian of Ugo’s estate filed an “Application to Make TaxMotivated Gifts for the Benefit of Annunziata LaMatta and Family,” in which he 

sought to use over five million dollars from the New Louisiana Trust to fund a new 

trust to be established for the benefit of Annunziata LaMatta and her family. The 

Guardian of Ugo’s estate also sought a judgment declaring that the Cullens’ wills 

permitted such a distribution. 

On November 23, 2004, the trial court signed a Final Declaratory Judgment, 

in which the trial court declared that the Cullens’ wills and codicils authorized the 

Trustees to make the proposed gifts to the LaMattas, including the payment of the 

federal gift taxes owing thereon. The final judgment also declared that the 

Guardian had not violated the in terrorem clauses by filing the petition for 

declaratory judgment, participating in the proceedings, or filing the application to 

make tax-motivated gifts for the benefit of the LaMatta family.

On appeal, this Court held that the trial court (1) correctly determined that 

the Guardian’s filing the petition for declaratory judgment, participating in the 
6

proceedings, and filing the application to make tax-motivated gifts for the benefit 

of the LaMatta family request for a declaratory judgment did not violate the in 

terrorem clauses in the Cullens’ wills, but (2) it lacked jurisdiction to determine 

whether the LaMatta trust should be funded because that was a matter that should 

have been left to the Trustees’ discretion. Di Portanova v. Monroe, 229 S.W.3d 

324, 333–34 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. denied). Accordingly, this 

Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment declaring that the in terrorem clauses had 

not been violated, but vacated and dismissed the portion of the judgment declaring 

that the Trustees were authorized to make the proposed distribution to LaMatta. 

Id. at 327.

Proceedings on Remand

On October 28, 2009, the Guardians filed an “Original Petition For 

Declaratory Judgment, To Modify and Administratively Consolidate Eight Trusts 

for Ugo Di Portanova, And to Change Trustees.” In this petition, the guardians 

alleged as follows:

[Guardians] ask this Court to order the modification of the terms of 

eight trusts [including the H.R. Cullen and Lillie C. Cullen New 

Louisiana Trust] operated by ten separate trustees for the benefit of a 

partially incapacitated, 73-year old ward, Ugo, and to make 

corresponding arrangements for changes in the ten trustees 

administering those trusts. Petitions seek this relief for nondispositive, administrative purposes. Granting this request will result 

in consistent, financially-transparent, institutional, trust-department 

accounting for the benefit of Ugo and save an estimated $313,000 in 
7

unnecessarily duplicative trustees’ fees, expenses and administrative 

charges on an annual basis.

All trustees of the eight trusts agreed to resign, with the exception of the three 

trustees of the New Louisiana Trust—Hux, Butler, and Higley. These three 

trustees did not resign, but filed a counterclaim.

The Di Portanovas intervened and filed a counterclaim opposing the 

administrative, non-dispositive trust consolidation. They also alleged that the in 

terrorem clause of the Cullen wills had been violated.

As the case was being tried, the trial court temporarily adjourned the 

proceedings to permit the guardians and the three trustees of the New Louisiana 

Trust to settle their differences. On July 29, 2010, the Guardians and the Trustees 

entered into a Rule 11 partial settlement agreement, in which no party admitted to 

any wrongdoing or omission of responsibility. On October 12, 2012, the parties, 

with the exception of the Di Portanovas, presented the trial court with a Settlement 

Agreement. In the agreement, the Trustees agreed to resign in exchange for a

release of liability and a judicial discharge from the Court.

After the Trustees settled their differences with the guardians, the trial 

reconvened. At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court (1) declared that it had the 

power to grant the Guardians’ request for relief under sections 112.054(a)(2) and 

(3) and 112.054(b), as well as section 604 of the Texas Probate Code, and (2) 

signed a “Judgment of Non-Dispositive, Administrative Consolidation of Eight 
8

Trusts Operated for the Benefit of the Ward, Ugo Di Portanova.” As a part of the 

consolidation, the trial court modified the eight trusts involved to permit it to 

appoint successor trustees for those that had resigned.5 The trial court further 

found “that [the Di Portanovas] have failed to bear their burden of proving their In 

Terrorem counterclaim for alleged violations of the In Terrorem Clauses in the 

Cullen Wills and codicils.”

THE IN TERROREM CLAUSES

In three related issues on appeal, the Di Portanovas contend that the trial 

court erred in concluding that the in terrorem clauses in the Cullen wills had not 

been violated. Specifically, they argue that the “no-contest provision prohibits any 

action, of any kind, at any time, on any ground whatsoever, brought for the 

purpose of varying, modifying, or setting aside any provision of the will.” The Di 

Portanovas argue that, because the present suit violated the in terrorem clause by 

seeking to modify how successor trustees are named, Ugo’s interest in the trust 

created by the wills must be forfeited, and the property of the trusts should be 

transferred to them as Ugo’s “heirs-at-law.” The Guardians respond that (1) the 

suit filed pursuant to section 112.054 of the Property Code does not violate the in 

 

5

The Cullen wills each provided that the testator’s spouse would be the trustee, 

followed by the testator’s three daughters if the spouse was unable to act. If one 

of the daughters was unable to act, the remaining daughters would appoint a 

trustee, so that there would be three trustees. If there were no remaining trustees, 

the wills provided that the senior judge in Harris County would appoint a new 

board of three trustees.
9

terrorem clause because it is not contrary to the testators’ intent; and (2) if it does 

violate the clause, such violation will not trigger a forfeiture because the suit was 

filed in good faith based on probable cause. 

Each of the Cullens’ wills contains the following in terrorem or “no contest” 

clause:

Should any beneficiary hereunder, or anyone duly authorized to act 

for such beneficiary, institute or direct, or assist in the institution or 

prosecution of, any action or proceeding of any kind in any court, at 

any time, for the purpose of modifying, varying, setting aside or 

nullifying any provision hereof relating to my Louisiana estate on 

any ground whatsoever, all interest of such beneficiary, and the 

issue of such beneficiary, to my Louisiana estate shall cease, and the 

interest of such beneficiary, and such beneficiary’s issue, in and to my 

Louisiana estate shall be paid, assigned, transferred, conveyed, and 

delivered to, or for the benefit of, those person who would take such 

beneficiary’s interest in my Louisiana estate if such beneficiary died 

intestate, unmarried, and without issue on the date of the institution of 

the above described action or proceeding. 

(Emphasis added).

Applicable Principles of Law

An in terrorem clause in a will or a trust typically makes the gifts in the 

instrument conditional on the beneficiary not challenging or disputing the validity 

of the instrument. See, e.g., In re Estate of Hamill, 866 S.W.2d 339, 341 n.1 (Tex. 

App.—Amarillo 1993, no writ) (“The term, in terrorem, as applied to wills refers 

to a legacy given upon condition that the beneficiary will not dispute the validity or 

disposition of the will.”). In terrorem clauses are designed to dissuade beneficiaries 
10

from filing vexatious litigation, particularly as among family members, that might 

thwart the intent of the grantor. See Lesikar v. Moon, 237 S.W.3d 361, 369–70 

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. denied).

In terrorem clauses allow the intent of the testator to be given full effect and 

avoid vexatious litigation, often among members of the same family. Gunter v. 

Pogue, 672 S.W.2d 840, 842–43 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1984, writ ref’d 

n.r.e.); see also Ferguson v. Ferguson, 111 S.W.3d 589, 599 (Tex. App.—Fort 

Worth 2003, pet. denied) (stating the purpose of the in terrorem clause is to 

dissuade beneficiaries from challenging gifts made in the will). If the intention of a 

suit is to thwart the settlor’s intention, the in terrorem clause should be enforced. 

Ferguson, 111 S.W.3d at 599. A violation of the in terrorem clause will be found 

only when the acts of the parties clearly fall within its express terms. Hamill, 866 

S.W.2d at 342–43. Thus, we narrowly construe in terrorem clauses to avoid 

forfeiture, while also fulfilling the settlor’s intent. McLendon v. McLendon, 862 

S.W.2d 662, 678 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1993, writ denied).

Does this Suit filed pursuant to Section 112.054 of the Property Code Trigger a 

Forfeiture under the In Terrorem Clauses?

The first issue this Court must decide is whether this suit, which was filed 

pursuant to Section 112.054 Property Code, thwarts the testator’s intent, thus 

triggering a forfeiture.
11

Section 112.054 of the Property Code provides trustees and beneficiaries the 

statutory right to seek judicial modification of trust provisions under certain 

circumstances, and provides in pertinent part:

(a) On the petition of a trustee or a beneficiary, a court may order that 

the trustee be changed, that the terms of the trust be modified, that 

the trustee be directed or permitted to do acts that are not 

authorized or that are forbidden by the terms of the trust, that the 

trustee be prohibited from performing acts required by the terms of 

the trust, or that the trust be terminated in whole or in part, if:

. . . .

(2) because of circumstances not known to or anticipated by the 

settlor, the order will further the purposes of the trust; [or]

(3) modification of administrative, nondispositive terms of the 

trust is necessary or appropriate to prevent waste or avoid 

impairment of the trust’s administration[.]

(b)The court shall exercise its discretion to order a modification or 

termination under Subsection (a) in the manner that conforms as 

nearly as possible to the probable intention of the settlor. . . . .

TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 112.054(a)(2), (3), (b) (Vernon 2007). The trial court 

found that consolidation of the trusts was appropriate under the above-referenced 

statute and stated as follows:

Because of circumstances not known to or anticipated by the settlors, 

the original terms of the Eight Trusts would substantially impair the 

accomplishment of the purposes of the Eight Trusts in ways H.R. 

Cullen, Lillie C. Cullen, and Lillie Cranz Portanova (collectively, the 

“Cullen Trustors”) could not have anticipated, e.g., that Ugo would be 

subject to a guardianship of this complexity and cost; that no relative 

would be serving as trustee of the Eight Trusts; that Jack Trotter 

(“Trotter”) and Monroe would serve as successive Guardians of Ugo’s 
12

Estate, LaMatta as Guardian of Ugo’s Person, and Smith as Ugo’s 

Guardian ad Litem. The Cullen Trustors could not have anticipated 

the expense and professional fees needed to care for Ugo and to 

manage assets placed in trust for his benefit. The Cullen Trustors 

could not have anticipated the significant changes in federal tax law 

which now emphasize the need for comprehensive coordination of 

investment decisions affecting the administration of the Eight Trust 

and the income of the beneficiary.

The trial court then ordered the consolidation of the eight trusts, including the New 

Louisiana Trust, and, in connection with the consolidation, changed the trust 

instruments to provide that successor trustees would be named by the Judge of 

Harris County Probate Court No. 2, rather than “the” senior district court judge in 

Harris County, and also modified how the trustees would be compensated.

The Di Portanovas do not challenge the trial court’s decision to order 

consolidation. Similarly, they do not argue now nor did so before the trial court 

that the trial court overstepped its authority by providing that successor trustees 

would be named by the trial court rather than “the” senior judge in Harris County. 

Instead, they argue only that by seeking any consolidation of the trusts, the 

Guardians have caused a forfeiture of Ugo’s interest under the will.

Texas courts have addressed a myriad of different types of lawsuits with 

similarly expansive in terrorem clauses to determine whether the purpose of the 

suit was to thwart the settlor’s intention and concluded that the following suits do 

not trigger forfeitures: (1) to recover an interest in devised property; (2) to compel 

an executor to perform duties; (3) to ascertain a beneficiary’s interest under a will; 
13

(4) to compel the probate of a will; (5) to recover damages for conversion of estate 

assets; (6) to construe a will’s provisions; (7) to request an estate accounting or 

distribution; (8) to contest a deed conveying a beneficiary’s interest; (9) to 

determine the effect of a settlement; (10) to challenge an executor appointment; 

(11) to seek redress from executors who breach fiduciary duties; and (12) 

presenting testimony in a will contest brought by other beneficiaries. See Gerry 

W. Beyer, Rob G. Dickenson & Kenneth L. Wake, The Fine Art of Intimidating 

Disgruntled Beneficiaries with In Terrorem Clauses, 51 SMU L. REV. 225, 255–58

(1998).

In McLendon, 862 S.W.2d at 667, the will at issue contained an in terrorem

clause that prohibited any “attempts to attack, modify or impair the validity of the 

provisions hereof[.]” The court concluded that the breach of fiduciary suit against 

the executors named in the will did not contest the validity of the will itself. Id. at 

679. The court further held that the in terrorem clause was not breached, basing its 

decision on the premise that “the right to challenge a fiduciary’s actions is inherent 

in the fiduciary/beneficiary relationship. Id.

In Estate of Newbill, 781 S.W.2d 727, 728 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1989, no 

writ), the in terrorem clause prohibited “directly or indirectly contest[ing] or 

attack[ing] this will or any of its provisions.” The will also named a beneficiary, 

Joe Newbill, as executor without bond and as trustee of the corpus of the estate. 
14

Id. Another beneficiary, Bennie Newbill, filed suit challenging Joe’s statutory

qualification to serve as executor. Id. at 729. The court held that Bennie’s suit did 

not violate the in terrorem clause because:

[w]e do not believe such an action can be considered as an effort to 

vary the purpose and intent of the textatrix within the purview of the 

forfeiture clause we are considering. To hold otherwise would be 

inconsistent with the obvious intent of the law to make sure that an 

applicant is properly qualified to execute the fiduciary duty necessary 

in the administration of a decedent’s estate.

Id.

In Conte v. Conte, 56 S.W.3d 830, 831 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 

2001, no pet.), the in terrorem clause prohibited any beneficiary or remainderman 

from contesting or challenging “this trust or any of its provisions,” “in any manner, 

directly, or indirectly.” The trust further provided that the grantor’s surviving 

spouse and children would serve as co-trustees. Id. Soon thereafter, one cotrustee sued to remove another co-trustee. Id. The court held that the in terrorem

clause was not violated by the suit because the trust did not have any provisions 

regarding the removal of trustees. Id. at 832. However, the court went further and, 

citing McClendon and Newbill, stated as follows:

An action to remove a trustee, like an action to remove an executor, is 

not an effort to vary the grantor’s intent. [Appellant’s] interpretation 

of the in terrorem clause would deprive [appellee] of her statutory 

rights under the trust provisions of the Texas Property Code, as the 

proposed construction of the in terrorem clause in Newbill would have 

deprived the beneficiaries of the statutory right to ensure that the 

executor was qualified. 

Id. at 833 (emphasis added).
15

Following this line of authority, we hold that the filing of this suit for 

judicial modification of the administrative terms of a trust, pursuant to section 

112.038 of the Property Code, is not an action that was intended to thwart the 

Cullens’ intent. First, no provision in the wills nor in the trusts they created forbids 

consolidation of the trusts. Thus, nothing in any trust prohibits administrative 

consolidation of the New Louisiana Trust with other trusts that were also 

established for Ugo’s benefit. In fact, such a consolidation also occurred in 1996, 

and no party argues that the 1996 consolidation triggered the in terrorem clauses. 

To hold otherwise would deprive Ugo of a statutory right provided by the Probate 

Code, of which neither the wills nor the trusts express an intent to deprive him. 

We agree with Conte and Newbill—an in terrorem clause like this one does not 

deprive a beneficiary of a right afforded by statute related to trust administration 

when such administrative changes are not prohibited by the testator in the will and 

no party is challenging the changes as one that defeats testator intent. This suit, 

filed pursuant to section 112.054(a)(2), does not violate the Cullens’ intent, 

because there are “circumstances not known to or anticipated by the settlor,” and 

the order 

will “further the purposes of the trust.” We note, however, that any modification 

under this section must “conform[] as nearly as possible to the probable intent of 

the settlor.” TEX. PROP. CODE § 112.054(b).
16

The overarching purpose of all of these trusts is to “provide for the needs of 

the current income beneficiary, Ugo.” This suit for modification of administrative, 

nondispositive terms of the trust, pursuant to section 112.054(a)(3), cannot violate 

the Cullens’ intent because the purpose of the suit to consolidate them is “to 

prevent waste or avoid impairment of the trust’s administration”—the very intent 

expressed in the trusts themselves. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 112.054(a)(3).

Finally, the consolidation of trusts reduced the total number of trustees from 

10 to three, which is the number required by the Cullens’ wills for the New 

Louisiana Trust. The resignation of numerous trustees to effectuate the 

consolidation necessitated changes to the trust provisions regarding the 

appointment and compensation of successor trustees. These modifications are the 

not the type of change that thwart the settlor’s intent in establishing the trusts as 

expressed in the Cullens’ wills. Administrative changes to these trusts, absent 

express prohibition or any challenge to their intended purpose as purely 

administrative, do not trigger the in terrorem clauses in the wills unless their effect 

is to undermine the wills’ provisions.

To the extent that one of the trial court’s modifications may have been 

neither authorized by the trust or by the Probate Code—namely, the modification 

which places successor trustee appointment power in the trial court, rather than the 

senior judge of Harris County—the Di Portanovas never specifically objected that 
17

this modification exceeded the trial court’s authority, nor do they challenge it on 

appeal. Rather, they argue that any administrative change, even one to which they 

have no objection, triggers the clause. But no Texas case has construed a clause 

like this one so broadly. See Conte, 56 S.W.3d at 831–33; McLendon, 862 S.W.2d 

at 679; Newbill, 781 S.W.2d at 729. As the Di Portanovas do not challenge any 

substantive change to the will or trust as thwarting the Cullens’ intent in 

establishing the trusts, the in terrorem clause is not a sword they can wield to 

establish a forfeiture.

Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err in concluding that the in 

terrorem clauses had not been violated by the filing of an action pursuant to 

section 112.054 of the Probate Code because (1) Ugo had a statutory right to seek a 

judicial modification under the circumstances set forth in section 112.054 of the 

Probate Code, which the wills themselves do not prohibit, and (2) the modification 

of administrative, nondispositive terms of the trust regarding the appointment and 

compensation of successor trustees are not changes that thwart the Cullens’ intent, 

which was to provide income for their grandson, Ugo, overseen by at least three 

trustees. 
18

CONCLUSION

The trial court did not err in concluding that the in terrorem clauses of the 

Cullen wills were not violated when the Guardians filed suit pursuant to Section 

112.054 of the Property Code seeking an administrative consolidation of eight 

trusts into one and modifying the successor trustee provisions because (1) Ugo had 

a statutory right to seek such a consolidation and (2) modification of the 

nondispositive, administrative provisions of the trust did not thwart the testators’ 

intent as set forth in the wills themselves, and no party challenges the 

modifications to be anything other than administrative, as opposed to dispositive.

Because the in terrorem clauses were not violated, we need not address 

whether the Guardians filed the suit in good faith, and decline to do so.

We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Sherry Radack

Chief Justice 

Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Bland and Huddle.