Opinion issued October 23, 2014

In The

Court of Appeals 

For The 

First District of Texas 

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NO. 01-13-00899-CR

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ANTONIO BRAVO, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 183rd District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Case No. 1375810

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant, Antonio Bravo, was charged by indictment with unauthorized use 

of a vehicle.1

 Appellant pleaded not guilty. The jury found him guilty and 

 1 See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.07(a) (Vernon 2011).
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assessed punishment at 5 years’ confinement. In one issue on appeal, Appellant 

argues the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction.

We affirm.

Background

A day or two before January 31, 2013, Laura Merino reported her car was 

stolen. She identified the vehicle at trial as a Toyota Camry. Late at night on 

January 31, Officer M. Saldana saw a maroon Toyota with its tail light out. He 

reported the license plate number to police dispatch. The dispatch notified him 

that the car had been reported as stolen.

Officer Saldana called for back-up police assistance. When they arrived, 

Officer Saldana turned on the emergency lights on his car. Appellant, the driver of 

the car, pulled over and parked in a hotel parking lot. After parking, Appellant got 

out of the car and began to run. Officer Saldana and other officers pursued 

Appellant. A short distance later, Appellant submitted to the police.

Officer Saldana testified at trial that he called Merino and that she confirmed 

she was the owner of the vehicle Appellant had been driving. Merino testified that 

she could not recover the vehicle at the time the police contacted her and opted to 

have the car taken to an impound lot. Her parents later recovered the car from an 

impound lot along with her possessions from inside the car. They subsequently 

sold the car. Merino never saw the car again after it was stolen.
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Sufficiency of the Evidence

In his sole issue on appeal, Appellant argues the evidence is insufficient to 

support his conviction.

A. Standard of Review

We review the sufficiency of the evidence establishing the elements of a 

criminal offense for which the State has the burden of proof under a single 

standard of review. Matlock v. State, 392 S.W.3d 662, 667 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) 

(citing Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 895 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010)). This 

standard of review is the standard enunciated in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 

319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979). Winfrey v. State, 393 S.W.3d 763, 768 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2013). Pursuant to this standard, evidence is insufficient to support a 

conviction if, considering all the record evidence in the light most favorable to the 

verdict, no rational fact finder could have found that each essential element of the 

charged offense was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 

319, 99 S. Ct. at 2789; In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 1071 

(1970); Laster v. State, 275 S.W.3d 512, 517 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); Williams v. 

State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We can hold evidence to be 

insufficient under the Jackson standard in two circumstances: (1) the record 

contains no evidence, or merely a “modicum” of evidence, probative of an element 

of the offense, or (2) the evidence conclusively establishes a reasonable doubt. See 
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Jackson, 443 U.S. at 314, 318 & n.11, 320, 99 S. Ct. at 2786, 2789 & n.11; see 

also Laster, 275 S.W.3d at 518; Williams, 235 S.W.3d at 750.

The sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard gives full play to the responsibility 

of the fact finder to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and 

to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. Jackson, 443 U.S.

at 319, 99 S. Ct. at 2789; Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2007). An appellate court presumes that the fact finder resolved any conflicts in 

the evidence in favor of the verdict and defers to that resolution, provided that the 

resolution is rational. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326, 99 S. Ct. at 2793. In viewing 

the record, direct and circumstantial evidence are treated equally; circumstantial 

evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing the guilt of an actor, and 

circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to establish guilt. Clayton, 235 

S.W.3d at 778. Finally, the “cumulative force” of all the circumstantial evidence 

can be sufficient for a jury to find the accused guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 

See Powell v. State, 194 S.W.3d 503, 507 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).

B. Analysis

A person commits the offence of unauthorized use of a vehicle “if he 

intentionally or knowingly operates another’s boat, airplane, or motor-propelled 

vehicle without the effective consent of the owner.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.

§ 31.07(a) (Vernon 2011). Operating a vehicle is only unlawful if the defendant is 
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actually aware that he operates the vehicle without the owner’s consent. Gardner 

v. State, 780 S.W.2d 259, 262–63 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989); Edwards v. State, 178 

S.W.3d 139, 144–45 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.).

Appellant argues that the State failed to establish that he was driving the 

vehicle without the owner’s consent because it failed to establish that he was 

driving Merino’s car. We disagree. At the end of the State’s examination of 

Officer Saldana, the following exchange occurred:

Q. Now, did you also contact the complainant in this case 

regarding the car?

A. I did.

. . . .

Q. All right. And did you confirm she was the owner of the 

vehicle?

A. Yes.

Officer Saldana only testified about one vehicle. At the start of trial, the State 

arraigned the defendant in front of the jury. In that process, Merino was identified 

as the complainant. Likewise, the jury charge identified Merino as the 

complainant. Merino testified that she had not authorized anyone to use her car. 

Appellant identifies two cases in which courts have found a gap in the 

evidence failing to connect the car the defendant was driving to the car that was 

reported stolen. See Winn v. State, 828 S.W.2d 284, 285–86 (Tex. App.—Houston 
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[14th Dist.] 1992, no pet.) (police described car defendant was pulled over in as 

blue and brown Chevy Astro van; owner testified her Chevy Astro van was blue 

and grayish); Hooper v. State, 788 S.W.2d 24, 25 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 

1987, no pet.) (license plate of owner’s car was different from license plate of car 

defendant found in; owner’s car returned before defendant’s arrest). These cases 

are distinguishable by the simple fact that, in this case, there is evidence 

establishing that Appellant was driving Merino’s car.

We hold the evidence is sufficient to support the judgment of conviction. 

We overrule Appellant’s sole issue.

Conclusion

We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Laura Carter Higley

Justice

Panel consists of Justices Higley, Bland, and Sharp.

Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).