1 Pursuant to FederalRule of Appellat e Proce dure 43 (c )(2), Secretaryof the Departmentof Homeland Securit y MichaelChertoff

is aut omatical ly

substi tuted f

or former SecretaryThomas Ridge as a res pondent in t his cas e. 2 The Hon or ab le Leo na rdB. San d, Dis tric t Judg e f orth e So uthe rnDi s tri ct of New York, si tti ng by des ignati on. 1 05-3250-a g Nguye n v. Che rtoff UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE SEC ON D C IRC UIT
Au gus t Te rm, 2006 (Argued: January

31, 2007 Decided: Sept ember 13, 2007)

Do cke t No
. 05-3250-ag
P HONG T HANH N GUYEN , Petitioner,

— v. — M ICHAE L C HERT OFF , 1 S ECRETARY OF THE D EPART MENT OF H OMELAND S ECURI TY ,

A LBERT O G ONZAL ES , U NITED S TATES A TTORNEY G ENERAL , Respondents.
Before: P OOLER AND R AGGI , Circuit Judges , AND S AND , Distri ct Judge. 23 Because th e te rm “m or al t ur pi tu de ” is un de fin ed by statute, this court has been

inclined to defer to the B oard of Im migra tion Appe al’s ( “B IA ’s”) c ons truc tion
. See Rodriguez v. Gonzales , 451 F.3d60, 63 (2d Cir. 200 6) (“The BIA has exp lained that the term ‘moral t urpit

ude’ gene rally enc ompasses: ‘ conduct that shocks the publi c conscie nce as bei ng 2 Petition for revi ew of an order of the Board of Immigrat ion Appeals hol ding Nguyen
remo vable under the e xpanded 1996 defini tion of aggrav ated felo ny, see 8 U. S. C. § 1101(a)( 43)(A), de spit e a judi cial recommendat ion aga inst d epo rtatio n, see 8 U. S. C. § 1251(b)(2) (1988) (rep ealed 199 0), entered at the time of petitioner’s 1989 convict ion for the q ualif

ying felon y. G RANTED AND R EMANDED .

E RIC W. S CHULTZ , Sac ks, K olk en & Sch ultz, B uffalo, N ew Yo rk, for Petitioner
. R USS ELL V ERBY , Assis tant Unit ed State s Attorne y, forTerrance P. Flynn, UnitedStates Attorney , Wester n Distri ct of New York, Buffalo, New Yo rk, for R espo nden ts .
R EENA R AGGI , Circuit

Judge : Vietnamese nationa l Phong Thanh Nguyen is a legalpermanent r esident of the United States who, in 1989, t

wo years after

entering thi s count ry , ple aded guil ty to a dis turbi ng crime: the rape of a five- year -old chi ld. Alt hough Nguyen’s r ape conviction did not then renderhim deporta

ble as an a ggravate d felon pursuant to 8 U.S .C. § 1 251 (a)(4) (1 988 ), it did renderhim deporta

ble for t he commission of a

crime of moralturpi tud e , see id
. 3 A sta teinhere ntly base, vi le, or depraved, and co nt ra ry t o the accept ed rules of morali ty and the duties owed between persons or to soc iety in genera l. Moral turpi tude has bee n defined as an act which is per se morally reprehens ible and intrinsically wrong or malum in se , so it is the nat ure of the actitself and not the statutory proh ibition of it which renders a crime one of mo ral turpitu de. A mo ng th e tests to d eterm ine if a crime invo lves m oral turp itude is whe ther the act is accom panied b y a vicious motive o r a corrupt m ind.’” (quoti ng Hamdan v. INS , 98 F.3d 183, 186 (5th Cir . 1996)) ). The conduct that Nguy en pleadedguilty to falls within t his defi niti on. 4 M in dful that Congre ss has now consol idate d what were previ ously known as deportation and exclusi on proceedi ngs int o a singl e categor y cal led removalproceedi n gs, see Eva ngelista v. Ashcroft , 359 F .3d 145, 14 7 n.1 (2d C ir. 2004); Hen de rs on v . I NS , 157 F.3d 106, 111 n.5 (2dCir. 1998) , we use the terms “rem oval” and “ depo rtation” interch ange ably in thi s opini on. 3 sentencing judge, however, effectively shiel ded Nguyen from removal on eithe r ground by issui ng a judic ial r ecommendation against deportati on (“JRAD”) pursuantto then e xist ing 8 U.S .C. § 125 1(b)(2) (198 8) (repealed 1 990). 4 Subsequentto these even ts, Con gress b oth p rospe ctively re pe al edth e J RAD stat ute,
see Immigrat ion Act of 19 90 ( “I MMACT ”), Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 505, 104 Stat . 4978, 5050, and r etroac tivel y exp and ed th e de finit ion of a ggr ava ted felon y to inc lud e, inter alia , the rape of aminor and crimes of viole nce resul ting in a term of i mprisonmentof at l east one year, see Illegal Immigrat ion Reform and Immig rant Resp onsibility Act of 199 6 (“IIRIR A”), Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 321(a), 110 Stat. 3009-546, 627- 28 (codi fied at8 U. S. C. § 1101(a)( 43)(A) & (F)). Against t he backdrop of t

hese legi slat ive d evelopment s, Immigrat ion Judge ( “IJ”) Phill ip J. Montante, Jr., in a decisi on rendered January 16, 2003, concludedthat N guyen’ s JRA D d id no t preclu de his depo rta tion as an aggravated fel on.4

Nguyen now p e titions for review of the April 28, 2004 order of t he Board of Immigration Ap peals (“BIA”) affi rming thi s ruling, as wellas the I J’s deni al of Nguyen’s a

pplications for
w aive r of dep ortation unde r former § 212(c) of the Imm igration and N ationality Act (“INA ”), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c ) (re pealed 1996) ; asylum; withholding of removal ; and rel ief under the Co nve ntio n A gain st T ortu re (“ CA T” ). See In re Phong Thanh Nguyen , No. A 27 847 596 (B. I. A. Apr. 28, 2 004 ), aff’g No. A 27 847 596 (Im mig. Ct. B uffalo, Jan. 16 , 2003). For the rea sons st ated her ein, we conclude that , while Nguyen is certa inly now depo rtable as an a ggr avate d fe lo n, th e r el evantst atut oryte xt s s upp ort h is JRA D defen se. A cc or di ng ly, we grant Ngu yen’s petition for review , and w e reman d his case to the BIA with directions that, con sistent w ith this opin ion, it give effect to the JRAD . In l ight of t his rul ing,
we nee d no t disc uss Ng uyen ’s oth er ch allen ges to re mo val. I. Factual

Background A. Ngu y en ’s St at e Co nvi ct io n a nd t he Grantof

a J RAD Phong Thanh Nguyen enter ed the Unit ed State s as a refugee from Vietnam in 1987. In 198 8, he b ecam e a leg al perm anen t residen t. By guilty plea entere d on April 5, 1989, Nguyen was convicte d in Massachusetts of t he forcib le rape of

a minor c hild, the five-yearold daughter of a family friend, in violati on of M ass. Gen . Law s Ann . ch. 265 § 2 2A (1 989), and indecent

assaul t and battery

of a minor chi ld in vi olati on of Mass. Gen . Laws Ann. ch. 26 5 § 13B (1989). Because these crimes involved moral t urpit ude, they r ender ed N gu ye n depo rtable pursua nt t o 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a )(4) ( 1988). I n sentencing Nguyen to a t en-y ear5

term of im pr iso nm en t fo r th e r ap e a nd a s us pe nd ed tw o- an d- on e- ha lf- ye arte rm of impris onment fo r th e in de ce nt as sa ul t an d b att er y, the presid ing state cour t judge , appa rently acti ng at the behest of the victim’s mother, i ssued a formal judicial recommendation against Ngu yen’s deportation, in accordance wit h 8 U.S .C. § 125 1(b )(2). The record affo rds us little further insigh t into this decisi on, and this proc eeding pre sents us with no occasi on to quest ion the JRAD’s merits. Similarly , the record o ffers no exp lanat ion for t he fact t hat Nguyen
serv ed o nly on e year of h is sta te pr ison sen tenc e be for e be ing par oled
. B. Nguyen’s I mmigrati on Proceedings In 1990, Congress rep eale d th e JR AD statu te. See IM M AC T § 5 05(a ), 104 Stat. at 5050. Wh ile th e legisla tio n pr eclu ded the a wa rd o f fu ture JR AD s, see United Stat es v. Koziel , 954 F.2 d 831, 834-35 ( 2d Cir. 1992) (holdi ng that, after repeal of JRAD statute, sentencing court could not recommend against deportation of alien whose crimina l conduct occurred priorto repeal ), i t did not revoke JRADs such as Nguyen’ s enter ed before t he statutory rep eal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1240. 10(d) (providing for continued effectiveness of JRADs ente red before No vem ber 29, 1 990 ). Congress subsequent ly

broadened the defini tion of aggravat ed felony

to in clud e, inter alia , the rape or sexua l abuse of a minor and crimes of viole nce resul ting in a term of impris onment of a t leas t on e year . See IIRIR A § 321 (a), 110 Stat. at 3009-627- 28 (codifi ed at 8 U. S. C. § 1 10 1( a) (4 3) (A ) & (F )). As a result o f the re troactiv e app lication o f this5 Pursuantto the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-296, § 441, 116 Stat
. 2135, 219 3 (co dified at 6 U.S.C. §§ 202(3) , 251), the INS was diss olvedand r espo nsibility for enforci ng federalimmigrat ion laws pas sed to t he Bureau of Immigration and Cus t oms Enforcem ent. S ee Un i t edSt at es v. Sh i t i anWu , 419 F.3d 142, 146 n.3 (2d C ir. 2005). Nevertheless, bec ause t he re mov al pr oc ee di ngs he re at is su e c omme nc edund er INS au th or ity, on this petition for r eview we reference only that a gency a s the aut

horit y for the cha lleng ed g ove rnm ent a ction
. 6 expanded definitio n, see id. § 1101(a)( 43) (disc ussed infra at [12-16] ), t he Immigrat ion and Naturali zati on Service ( “INS”) 5 initiate d removal proceedi ngs against Nguyen, al leging t

hat his Massachusett s conviction now qualif ied him for

deportation as an aggr avated fel on. Nguyen mov edto te rmina te th e r emo va l p ro ce ed in gs as pr ec lu de d by hi s J RAD. A lte rn ati ve ly, he appli ed for a waiver of removal under former INA § 212(c), as wellas for asy lum, withholding of r emoval, and CAT protection. The IJ den ied N guyen’ s requ este d reli ef , findin g that th e IIR IRA ame ndm ents rendered hi m de por

ta bl e a s an a ggr av at edfe lo n de sp it e h is JRAD. The BIA af firme d this decisi on, holding that, while Nguyen’ s JRAD remained effecti ve to bar hi s deport ation f or
a crime of moralturpi tude, IIRIRA’s ret roactive expansion of t

he defini tion of

aggravat ed felo ny effec tivel y crea ted a new gro und for rem ova l no t cov ered by the JR AD
. C. Nguyen’s Fede ral Court Action In M ay 2 00 4, N gu yen att em pt ed to ch all en ge th e I N S o rd er of re m ov al b y f

ili ng a petition for a w rit of ha beas corp us in th e U nited S tates D istrict Co urt for th e W este rn Distri ct of New Y ork. Pur suant t o the REAL ID A ct of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, § 106(a ),7

119 Stat. 231, 310 (codified at 8 U .S.C. § 125 2(a)( 5)), the d is tri ct court trans ferred t

he petit ion to th is co urt, w her e w e co nve rted it to th e pe ndi ng p etitio n fo r rev iew
. II. Discussi on A. Juris dicti on and Standard of Review Juris dicti on in thi s ca se depends o n 8 U .S.C. § 125 2. W hile tha t statute g enera lly strips federalcourts of juri sdict ion t o rev ie w fina l orders of rem oval based on an a lien’s commissionof

an a ggr ava ted felon y, see id. § 1252(a)( 2)(C), it mai ntains their juri sdict ion to re solve con stitutio nal c halle nge s an d qu estio ns o f law , see id. § 125 2(a)(2 )(D); Xiao Ji Chen v. Unite d States Dep’t of Justice , 471 F.3d 31 5, 32 4 (2d Cir. 2006), i ncluding “questi ons of law rai sed in petiti ons for revi ew of removal order s based on aggr avated felony
con victi ons ,” Vargas-Sarmi ento v. United Stat es Dep’t of Justi ce , 448 F.3d 159, 164 (2d Cir. 2006). Th e ph rase “qu estio ns o f law ” en com pas ses, inte r alia , que stions of statutory inter pre tatio n. See Juana De La Rosa v. United St ates Dep’t of Homeland Sec. , 489 F.3d 551, 554 n.2 (2 d C ir. 2007 ); Bug ay ong v. INS , 442 F.3d 67, 72 ( 2d C ir. 20 06)
. Among such questi ons are an alien’s s tatutory eligib ilityfor removal and reli ef from rem ova l. See Lew is
v. Gonzales , 481 F.3d 125, 128 (2d Cir. 200 7); Sepulveda v. Gonzales , 407 F.3d 59, 62-63 (2d Cir. 200 5). N guyen’ s petition prese nts suc h a qu estion o f law beca use h is claim to JRAD
re li ef de pe nds en tire ly

on t he in te rp re tati on o f v ar io us pr ovi si ons of th e INA. W e a pp ly de novo review to que sti ons of law rais ed in pet iti ons for re view of removal
or ders. See , e.g. , Khouzam v. Ashcroft , 3 61 F .3 d 16 1, 165 (2 d Ci r. 200 4) . A lt hou gh w e8

general ly accord subs tanti al defer ence to th e BI A’s re as ona bl e i nt er pr et at io n of

th e INA, a statute that i t is ch arg ed w ith ad min isterin g, see Abimbola v. Ashcroft , 378 F.3d 173, 175 (2d Cir. 2004), see also Chevron, U.S. A., Inc. v. NaturalRes. Def. Council , Inc. , 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984), no such deferenc e is warr anted where, as in this case, the challeng ed BIA decisi on is un pub lishe d, see Mizrahi v. Gonzales , 492 F.3d 156, 158 (2d Cir. 2007) (not ing that “unpublis hed BIA decisions do not const itut e agencyinter pretations of law warranti ng Chevron defe rence ”), and , in any ev ent, the te xt o f the statut e is clea r, see Kruse v. W ell s Fargo Home M ortgage, Inc. , 383 F.3 d 49 , 55 ( 2d C ir. 20 04)
. B. Ngu yen’s JRAD B ars His Deport ation on t he Gro und that H is M assac huse tts Convicti on Now Q ualif ies as an Aggravated Fel ony The resol ution of t

his petiti on turns on t

he scope of prot ecti on afforde d by Ngu yen’s 1989 JRA D. N guyen s ubm its th at h is JRA D a bsolu tely shields h im fro m the use o f his M assac huse tts convict ion as a ground for depor tati on, ei ther as a crime of moralturpi tude
or an agg ra v ated felony. R espo nden ts assert th at Ng uyen’s JR AD preclu des d epor tation o nly “on any appl icabl e ground[] for deportation in ef

fect i n 1989, to wit , moral turpi tude” or an “aggravat ed felony

convict ion as define d in 1989 .” Respo ndents’ B r. at 22 & n.8 (em phas is added ). Because Nguyen’s crime of convi ction was not defined as an aggravat ed felony in 1989, respondents i nsist tha t the e xpanded 1996 defini tion of a ggravate d felony creat ed a
new grou nd o f dep ortability fro m w hic h the JR AD cann ot shield him. In supp ort of th is argu men t, respondent s point us to United Stat es v. Yacoubian , 24 F .3d 1, 7 (9th Cir. 1994 ).9

F or the reasons stated herein, we conclud e that neither the statutory text nor Yaco ubia n sup por ts res pon den ts’ ar gum ent.

1. The Rele vant S tatutory T exts The law is w ell established that statutory constr uction be gins with text

because i f the language of a statute is “una mbigu ous,” no f urther inquiry is re quired. Ro binso n v. S hell O il Co. , 519 U.S . 337, 3 40-4 1 (19 97); accord Mizrahi v. Gonzales , 492 F.3d at 158 (coll ecti ng cases). The tex ts relevant to our an alysis fall into thre e categories: stat utes (a) pr oviding for the de portation of aggravated fel ons, ( b) affording reli ef from deport ation on t he
reco mm end ation of a sen tenc ing jud ge, a nd ( c) d efin ing “ag gra vate d fe lon ies.”

a. Statut oryProvisi ons for the Deportat ion of Aggravat ed Felons The INS sought to depor t Nguyen on t

he ground that he was an aggravat ed felon purs uant to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)( 2)(A)(i ii) . That s ecti on stat es that “[a]ny alie n w ho i s convict ed of an aggravat ed felony at an y time afte r admissi on is deportable .” Id. For purposes of

our re view , itis i mportant to note that thi s sect ion is effecti vely a recodi ficat ion of 8 U.S .C. § 125 1(a)(4)(B) (19 88), s ee Bell v. Reno , 218 F.3d 86, 88 (2d Cir. 2000) (discussing statutory pedigree), w hich in turn is the se ction re feren ced in the JR AD statute to d efin e the sco pe o f its p rote ction , see 8 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (2)
. See infra at [11]
. Congress firs t identifie d an aggravat ed felony convict ion as a groundfor deport ation6 Section1251(a)( 2)(A)(i ii) read: “Any ali en who is convict ed of an aggravat ed felony

at any time aft er entr

y i s deport able. ”
7 This change was part of th e ne w te rmin olo gy en dor sed by IIR IRA
. See 8 U. S. C. § 1101(a)( 13)(A) (defining ter ms “admissi on” and “a dmitt ed” as “the l awful entr y of t he alien into the U nited Sta tes” ). 10 in the Anti- Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100- 690, 102 Stat . 4181. The r elevant provision in effect at t

he time Nguyen’s JRAD was entered, read as follows: Any alie n in the Unit ed States
. . . shall , upon the order of t he Attorney

Ge neral, be deported who . . . [(A)] is convict ed of a crime i nvolving moralturpi tude committed

within five year s after

entry and either sentence d to confi nement or confinedtheref

or in a prison or c orrective ins tit ution, for a y ear ormore, or who at any t ime after

entry is convi cted of

two crimes involving moral tur pitude, not aris ing out of a sing le sc hem e of crim inal m isco ndu ct, rega rdles s of whether confinedtherefor an d reg ardles s of w hethe r the co nvictio ns w ere in a single trial ; or . . . (B) is convict ed of an aggravat ed felony at a ny t im e a fte r e nt ry. 8 U.S .C. § 125 1(a)(4) (1988 ) (emph asis added ). In 1990, IMMA CT redesignat ed § 1251(a)( 2)(B), withoutc han ge, as 8 U. S. C. § 1251(a)( 2) (A) (iii) (Supp. II 1990). 6 See 104 St at . at 5 080 . Th en, in199 6, II RIRA § 305(a )(2) , 110 Stat . at 3009-597-98, again re designat ed the aggr avated fel ony pr ovisi on
as 8 U .S.C . § 1227(a)( 2)(A)(i ii) . In doi ng so, Congres s made a single chan ge to the statutory text, subst i tuti ng the word “admiss ion” for t he word “entry .” Com pare 8 U. S. C. § 1251(a )(4)(B) (198 8) and id. § 1251( a)( 2)(A) (ii i) ( Su pp. II 199 0) with id. § 1227 (a)(2)(A)(iii) (Supp. II 199 6). 711

As this statuto ry develo pm ent m akes p lain, since 1988 and t hrough vari ous recodificati ons, Congress has cons ist ently identi fied an al ien’s convict ion for an aggravated felo ny as a gro und for dep orta tion
.

b. The JRA D S tatute Until 1990, the INA afforded al iens who received judicialrecommend ations against deportation an important exception t o removal. This JRA D sta tute state d: The provisi ons of subsection (a) (4) of t his sec tionrespecting the deportation of an alie n con victed of a c rime o r crime s shall n ot app ly . . . if the c ourt sentencing suc h al ie n fo r s uchcr ime shallmake, atthe time of first imposing ju dgme nt or pas sing sen tenc e, or wit hin thirty d ays the reaf ter, a recommendationto the Attorney General that such al ien shal l not be de ported, due notice havin g bee n giv en pr ior to m aking such recom men dati on to the repres entat ives of the interested S tate, the Service, and p rosecution au thori ties , who shall be granted an opp ortunity to make rep resentations in the m atter. 8 U .S.C . § 12 51( b)(2 ) (19 88) (rep eale d 19 90)
. At th e t ime of Nguyen’s c onvicti on, the referenc ed “provis ions of subs ecti on (a)(4 ),”
as noted ea rlier, id entified two ground s rendering a n alien dep ortable: a conv iction for a
cr ime of moral t

urpit ude and a conviction for an a gg ravate d fel ony. See id. § 1251(a)( 4) (1988). Section 1251(b)(2) makes plain t hat these two grounds for de portation “shal l not app ly” to aliens wh o re ceiv e JR AD s. See Janvier v. Unite d States , 793 F.2d 449, 452 (2d Cir. 1986) (co nstruing § 1 251(b)(2 ) to gi ve “the se ntenci ng judge conclusive autho rity to decide whether a particul ar convic tionshou ld be dis regard ed as a bas is for d epor tation” ); see also UnitedSta tes v. Yacoubian , 24 F.3d at 6 (recogni zing that JRAD must be “‘given12

abso lute binding ef

fect upondeportation effort s by t he INS’ on the basi s of [ground spec ifie d in] 8 U .S.C . § 1251(a )(4)” (quoti ng United S tates v. Bodre , 948 F.2d 28, 34 (1st Cir. 1991 ))). The text i s equally pl ain, however, that a JRAD protects against de po rtation only

on the grounds specifi ed in § 125 1(a )(4). See United Stat es v. Quintana , 914 F .2d 14 09, 14 11 (1 0th Cir. 1990) (“[T]he recomm endation provision is appli cable only t o offenses desc rib ed in § 1251(a)( 4) and no other depo rtable o ffen ses.”); Ovi awe v. INS , 853 F.2d 1428, 1433 (7th Cir. 1988) (“The pl ain language of § 1251(b)( 2) permit s the j udicia l recommendationto bar depo rta tion on ly

when the deport ation i s based on § 1251(a )(4)” and does not bar the consider ationof aggravat ed felony convict ion “when d epor tatio n is base d on another statu tory pr ovi sion .”). T hus, in determining the scope of Nguyen’s claimed JRAD protection, we must consider whether expansi ons in the INA’s defini tion of “ aggravat ed felony ,” particu la rly those enacted aft er the 1990 repeal of the JRAD statut e, cre ate new and dist inct grounds for deportation separat e from those arti culat ed in § 1251(a) (4) and i ncorporated into its succ essor statu tes. F or re aso ns s tated in th e ne xt se ction , we con clud e tha t they d o no t.

c. Th e S tat ut or y D ef in itio n o f “ A gg ra va ted Fe lo ny” When, in 1988, the INA first identi fied an al ien’s aggravat ed felony conviction as a ground for deport ation, the Act defined aggr avatedfelony to i nclude a relatively small cl ass of crimes: mu rder, specifi ed drug and fi rearms offens es, as well as cons piracie s and attem pts to com mit su ch crim es. See 8 U.S .C. § 110 1(a)(43) (198 8); Bell v. Reno , 218 F.3d at 88.8 The sam e struc tural distin ction b etwe en the grou nds for de portatio n and gene rally

applic able definitio ns e xiste d at th e tim e of Ng uyen ’s 19 89 c onv ictio n. Com pare 8 U.S .C. § 1251 (1988) with id. § 1101 (1988). 13 In 1990, IMMA CT added to this lis t cri mes of viole nce resul ting in prison s entenc es of at leastfive years. See IM MA CT § 501 (a )( 3) , 1 04 Stat . at 5 048 (c odi fi ed at 8 U.S .C. § 1101(a)( 43) (1990)). With the 1996 enac tmentof IIRIRA, Congress f urther broadened the defini tion, identi fyi ng a large number of cri mes as aggravat ed feloni es, not ably , for pur poses of our re view , rape a nd th e sex ual ab use o f a m inor as we ll as crimes of vi olence for which the term of im priso nm ent is at lea st on e year . See IIRIRA § 321(a), 110 Stat. at 3009-627- 28 (codifi ed at8 U. S. C. § 11 01( a)(4 3)(A ) & (F) ( Su pp. I I 19 96) ). Respondents ur ge us to vi ew this defi niti onal expansi on as creating new grounds for deportation dis tinct

from § 125 1(a)(4 ) and , ther efo re, n ot sh ielde d by N guye n’s J RA D. Respondents’ arg um ent is unc onv incin g fo r sev eral r eas ons . F irst , it conflat es the grounds for deport ation wit h the defi niti on of

those grounds. The INA distingui shes between these concepts, specifying the grounds t hat can ren der an alien d eportable in on e statutory secti on and defini ng those gr ounds as gener ally applic able t erms in anot her
. Com pare 8 U.S .C. § 1227 (li sti ng grounds rende ring an al ien deportable) with id. § 110 1 (provi ding defini tions applicable to the IN A, including definition for ag gravated felony). 8 T his s tructure easily perm its Congress to mani fest i ts i ntent to creat e new grou nds for de portatio n sim ply by addin g sub section s to § 12 27. Acc or di ngly , w e have no reason t o infer s uch inte nt from9 Among these i s a new subsect ion rendering deport able any alie n “conv icte d of a crim e of dom estic vio lenc e, a crim e of stalk ing , or a cri me of child abuse , child n eglec t, or child abandonment.” IIRIRA § 350 , 110 S tat. at300 9- 639 -4 0 ( cod if ie d at 8 U. S. C. § 122 7(a )(2)( E)( i) (Su pp. I I 19 96) ) (em pha sis ad ded ). See gene rally In r e RodriguezRodriguez , 22 I . & N. Dec. 991, 996 ( B.I.A. 1999) (not ing that child a buse has b een b road ly definedto include “anyform of cruel ty to a chi ld’s phy sical , moral or mental well-being” (quo ting Black’s L aw D ictionary 239 (6th ed. 1990 ))) . Congress appears not to hav e intende d this new deportat ion ground t o apply to ali ens such as Nguyen because, by it s terms, it is l imit ed “to co nv icti ons . . . occurring aft er the date of the enactment of this Act,” i.e
. , afte r Se ptem ber 30, 1 996
. See IIR IRA § 35 0(b ), 11 0 S tat. at 3 009 -64 0. 14 the broadening of

an establ ished gr ound’s gener al definitio n. See gene rally Dodd v. United States , 545 U .S. 353, 357 (2005) (ob serving that co urts presum e that Con gre ss “s ays in a statute wha t it means and mean s in a statute wh at it says”). Indee d, this conc lusion is reinfor ced by t

he fact t hat, at the same time t hat Congress , in I IRIRA, exp ande d th e defini tionof aggravat ed felony , it separat ely

amended § 1227 to create a numbe r of ne w grounds for de portation. 9 A seco nd an d eve n m ore p ersua sive re ason for u s to rejec t respo nden ts’ argu men t is Congres s’s ex plicit dir ecti on to give r etroac tive e ffect t o IIRIRA’s expanded definiti on of ag gravate d felony . The concluding sentence of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a )(43) s tat es : “N otw ithstand in g a ny other provision o f law (includ ing any effective d ate), the term [aggravat ed felony ] appli es regardl ess of whether the convi ctionwas entered be fore, on, or after September 30, 1996.” Such retr oacti ve appli cati on hard ly indicates an inte nt to cre ate
new grounds for de portation dist inct f rom the aggravated fel ony gr ound first reco gnize d in 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a )(4). Rather, retr oacti ve appli cati on signal s Congress’ s int ent to have a15

single expan ded d efin ition for aggravated felony apply uniformly to al l INA provisions, regardless of their effective dates
. See g enera lly Kuhali v. Reno , 266 F.3d 93, 110-11 (2d Cir. 2001) (const

ruing I IRIRA amendments to definition of a ggravate d fe l ony to ap ply retroac tively to petition er’s 19 80 co nvictio n); s ee also B ell v. Reno , 218 F.3d at 89 (construing IIRIR A a men dm ents to a pply retroa ctively to peti tioner ’s convi ction f or sexual abuse of a m in or). In sh ort, w e con clude that the expa nded defin ition ap plies eq ually to determi ning an alien’s dep or tabi li ty und er8 U. S. C. § 1227(a)( 2)(A)(i ii) and to det ermining the scope of

JRAD protection af

forded by

8 U.S.C. § 1251(a )(4) & (b) . In Nguy en’s cas e, this means that, just

as responde nts may

rely on IIRIRA’s expanded definiti on of aggravat ed felony to argue petiti one r’ s de portabi li ty on t hat gr oun d, petit io ner

may re ly on t he s ame definitio n to claim JR AD pro tectio n fr om dep orta tion on t hat g rou nd. Ha d C ong ress inte nded for “a ggra vated felon y” to have differ ent meanings in these two c ont exts , o ne w ould expe ct it to hav e stated that IIR IRA ’s def initiona l ame ndm ents applie d re tro ac tiv ely exceptto the e xtent s uch appli cati on expande d pr eviousl y afforded JRAD reli ef. We may ass ume, after all, that Congre ss was aware of the adm inistrative rule giving continue d effe ct to exist ing JRADs when it mandated re troactive appl icat ion of the expanded 199 6 de finit ion of a ggr ava ted felon y. See g enera lly Lorilla rd v. Po ns , 434 U.S. 575, 580-81 (1978) ; 1A Norman J . Si nge r, Sta tutes and StatutoryConstruct ion § 22.35, at 409-10 (6th ed. 2002 ). Ou r con clusion casts no doubt on Congress’s exist ing power to def ine what will s ubject

an alien to remo val an d t o e na ct s uc h c ha ng es re tro ac tiv ely. See , e.g. , INS16

v. St . C yr , 533 U .S. 289 , 325 n .55 (2 001 ); Kuhali v. Reno , 266 F .3d at 1 11; United Stat es v. Koziel , 954 F.2d at 834. Congress’s clear authori ty

to change its mind is, nevertheless, constr ainedby the s tatut ory lan gua ge it e mp loys. Bec ause Co ngre ss plac ed no JRA D lim it
on its retroactive definition of a ggravated felony, neither the BIA nor th is court may do so. 2. Yacoubian Does Not Support the Agency Decisi on Respondents’ relianc e on th e N inth C ircuit’s d ecision in United Stat es v. Yacoubian , 24 F.3d 1, to supp ort the BIA’s re ject ion of Nguyen’ s JRAD defense merits lit tle di scussi on. The case is plainly di sti nguishabl e. The “new grou nd” th at rend ered Y acou bian d epor table d espite h is earli er rece ipt of
a JRA D w as no t any def initiona l expa nsion of the mo ral turpitude or aggravat ed felony grounds specifi ed in8 U. S. C. § 1251(a)( 4), but , rat her, a ground for which JRAD relief ha s
neverbee n av ailab le, i.e
. , a co nv ict io n f or un law fu lly p os se ss in g o r c ar ryin g “ an y firearm or destr uctive device” as defined by feder al law, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a )(2)( C) (Supp. I I 1990) (recodi fiedat id. § 12 27( a) (2 )( C) (Su pp. I I 19 96) ). See United Stat es v. Yacoubian , 24 F.3d at 6. We agree that , if Nguy en’s Massa chusett s conviction support ed deportation on any § 1227 ground other

than moral turpi tude or aggravat ed fe lo ny , h e t oo c oul d no t c la im JRAD protection. See United Stat es v. Quint ana , 914 F.2d at 141 1; Ovi awe v. INS , 853 F.2d at 1431. But that

is not this case. Nothing in Yacoubian presumes to address the JRAD effect of a retro acti ve expansion in the defi niti on of aggravat ed felony , a ground for deportation that has long quali fied for JRAD reli ef. For r easons al ready discuss ed, we conclude t hat the17

retr oacti ve redefin iti on simu ltaneo usly e xpands the aggr avated fel ony gr ound for deport ation and the scope of JRAD protection from deportat ion on that ground. III. Conclusion To summarize, we conclude that Nguyen’s 198 9 M assac huse tts conviction for the r ape of a min or qu alifies a s an a ggra vated felon y under IIRIR A’s e xpan ded d efiniti on of t hat te rm. Ne verthe le ss, be ca us e thi s e xpande d de fi ni ti on a ppl ie s r etro ac ti ve ly

to al l INA provisi ons without r egard to t heir ef fecti ve dates, we conclude that , at th e s ame time that t

he defini tionrenders Nguyen depor tabl e as an a ggr avate d fe lo n un der 8 U. S. C. § 1227(a)( 2)(A)(i ii) , it

affords hi m protect ion from depo rtat ion as an aggravated fel on pursuant to 8 U .S.C . § 12 51( a)(4 ) & (b) in ligh t of h is JR AD
. A cc or di ng ly, Ng uyen’s p etition fo r review is GR AN TE D a nd h is case is REMAND ED to the B IA w ith directions that the agencygive effect to his JRAD consistent wit h th is op inio n.