JIM MATTOX 

Attorney General 

Supreme Court Building 

P. 0. Box 12546 

Austin. TX. 76711. 2546 

5121475-2501 

Telex 9101674.1367 

Telecopier 5121475-0266 

714 Jackson. Suite 700 

Dallas. TX. 75202-4506 

2141742.6944 

4624 Alberta Ave.. Suite 160 

El Paso. TX. 79905.2793 

9151533-3464 

-.h 

1 Texas, Suite 700 

..,us,on. TX. 77002-3111 

7131223.5666 

606 Broadway, Suite 312 

Lubbock, TX. 79401.3479 

6061747~5236 

4309 N. Tenth. Suite B 

McAllen, TX. 76501.1665 

5121662-4547 

200 Main Plaza, Suite 400 

San Antonio, TX. 76205-2797 

5121225.4191 

An Equal OppOrtUnitYI 

Affirmative Action EmP~oVef 

The Attorney General of Texas 

September 19, 1983 

Honorable James W. Smith, Jr. 

Frio County Attorney 

P. 0. Box V 

Pearsall, Texas 78061 

opinion No. JM-74 

Ik: Whether penalties established 

by section 6.06(e) of the Tax Code 

for late payment of taxing entity 

assessments may be rescinded 

Dear Mr. Smith: 

You ask us two questions regarding section 6.06(e) of the Tax 

Code. This section governs the method by which taxing units pay to 

the appraisal district their portions of the appraisal district’s 

expenditures as allocated by section 6.06(d), Tax Code. Section 

6.06(e) of the Tax Code provides the following: 

Unless the governing body of a unit and the chief 

appraiser agree to a different method of payment, 

each taxing unit shall pay its allocation in four 

equal payments to be made at the end of each 

calendar quarter, and the first payment shall be 

made before January 1 of the year in which the 

budget takes effect. A payment is delinquent if 

not paid on the date it is due. A delinquent 

payment incurs a penalty of 5 percent of the 

amount of the payment and accrues interest at an 

annual rate of 10 percent. If the budget is 

amended, any change in the amount of a unit’s 

allocation is apportioned among the payments 

remaining. (Emphasis added). 

Your first question is: 

If one taxing entity is allowed to pay without 

penalty and interest, should any other penalty and 

interest paid by another taxing entity be 

refunded? 

Your second question is: 

If payments are accepted without payment of 

-- penalty and interest, what other recourse would 

p. 316 
Honorable James W. Smith, Jr. - Page 2 (JM-74) 

the Frio County Appraisal District have for 

collecting due funds? 

We answer your first question in the negative, because we conclude 

that the appraisal district is without authority to waive or rescind 

the penalty and interest to any taxing unit which tenders a delinquent 

payment. Because we answer your first question in the negative, we 

deem it unnecessary to answer your second question. 

Under settled nrincinles of law. the imnosition of uenalties 

falls within the poiice power of the iegislature. Waters-Pierce Oil 

Company v. Texas, 212 U.S. 86, 107 (1909); First Texas~P! cudential 

Insurance Company v. Smallwood, 242 S.W. 498, 505 (Tex. ,Civ. App. - 

Beaumont 1922, no writ). Moreover, remission by general statute of 

penalties which have accrued and are due political subdivisions is 

constitutional. Jones v. Williams, 45 S.W.2d 130, 137 (Tex. 1931). 

But, in this instance remission cannot be accomplished, because there 

is no statutory provision permitting it. At no place in the code is 

the appraisal district given the authority to rescind or waive the 

penalty and interest imposed by section 6,06(e) of the Tax Code. 

Generally, the powers of such governmental agencies as counties, 

townships, and school districts are more strictly construed than those 

of incorporated municipalities. Tri-City Fresh Water Supply District 

No. 2 of Harris County v. Mann, 142 S.W.2d 945, 948 (Tex. 1940). For 

examule. . a county has no nowers or duties exceut those which are 

clearlv set forth and defined bv the constitution and the state 

statutes. Harrison Count y v. City of Marshall, 253 S.W.2d 67, 69 

(Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1952, writ ref'd); Wichita County v. 

Vance, 217 S.W.2d 702, 703 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1949, writ 

ref' n.r.e.). See also Miller v. El Paso County, 150 S.W.Zd 1000 

(Tex. 1941). Analogously, we hold that an appraisal district can 

exercise only those powers and duties which are clearly set forth in 

the constitution and statutes of this state. Therefore, absent 

specific statutory authority, we conclude that an appraisal district 

is without authority to rescind or waive the penalty imposed by 

section 6.06(e) of the Tax Code. 

SUMMARY 

An appraisal district is without authority to 

rescind or waive the penalty and interest imposed 

by section 6.06(e) of the Tax Code upon taxing 

units which are delinquent in paying their 

allocation of the appraisal district's 

expenditures. 

JIM MATTOX 

Attorney General of Texas 
. . 

Honorable James W. Smith, Jr. - Page 3 (JM-74) 

TOM GREEN 

First Assistant Attorney General 

DAVID R. RICHARDS 

Executive Assistant Attorney General 

Prepared by Jim Moellinger 

Assistant Attorney General 

APPROVED: 

OPINION COMMITTEE 

Rick Gilpin, Chairman 

Jon Bible 

David Brooks 

Colin Carl 

Jim Moellinger 

Nancy Sutton 

p. 318