IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Franklin Montano, :

:

Petitioner :

:

 v. : No. 732 C.D. 2021

: Submitted: December 17, 2021

Advance Stores Company, Inc. :

t/a Advance Auto Parts :

(Workers’ Compensation :

Appeal Board), :

:

Respondent :

BEFORE: HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge

HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

OPINION BY JUDGE WOJCIK FILED: June 27, 2022

Franklin Montano (Claimant) petitions for review of the Order of the 

Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board) affirming the Decision and Order of 

a workers’ compensation judge (WCJ) that denied Claimant’s Petition to Reinstate 

Compensation Benefits (Reinstatement Petition) pursuant to the provisions of the 

Workers’ Compensation Act (Act).1 We affirm.

On May 30, 2017, Claimant sustained injuries to his back and right 

shoulder when boxes of windshield washer fluid fell on him while in the course and 

scope of his employment as a general laborer in the warehouse of Advance Stores 

Company, Inc. t/a Advance Auto Parts (Employer). On June 13, 2017, Claimant 

1 Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended, 77 P.S. §§1-1041.4; 2501-2710.
2

returned to work in a modified-duty position as a trainer with Employer. On 

September 19, 2017, Employer issued a medical-only Notice of Compensation 

Payable (NCP) for a work-related injury of an upper back area strain/tear with noted 

right shoulder pain. On August 13, 2018, Claimant was discharged from his 

employment with Employer based on his job performance as a trainer. That same 

day, Claimant filed the Reinstatement Petition seeking the reinstatement of 

temporary total disability (TTD) benefits for his work-related injuries because he 

was “terminated while on modified duty because of work injury related medical 

restrictions.” Certified Record (CR) Docket Entry 2 at 1.

While the Reinstatement Petition was pending, on September 12, 2018, 

Sagi Kuznits, M.D., performed a microdiscectomy to treat a right L4-5 disc 

herniation in Claimant’s back. On June 14, 2019, Todd Chertow, M.D. performed 

a right shoulder manipulation under anesthesia; lysis of adhesions; debridement of 

intra-articular sided tear of the rotator cuff; superior labral debridement; debridement 

of the subacromial space; and subacromial decompression to treat Claimant’s right 

shoulder adhesive capsulitis; partial thickness joint-side rotator cuff tear; labral tear; 

and adhesions. Both Dr. Kuznits and Dr. Chertow related Claimant’s diagnoses and 

treatment to his May 30, 2017 work-related injuries.

Employer’s medical expert, Amir Fayyazi, M.D. concurred with Dr. 

Kuznits’ opinion that Claimant sustained an L4-5 disc herniation work-related 

injury. However, Dr. Fayyazi opined that Claimant may have only suffered a right 

shoulder sprain and strain from which Claimant had fully recovered at the time of 

his examinations on March 13, 2019, and October 16, 2019.

Following hearings, on June 17, 2020, the WCJ issued a Decision and 

Order disposing of the Reinstatement Petition in which he explained:
3

19. Counsel essentially agreed that the medical issues 

were not the primary disputed issue. That was why much 

of the medical evidence was offered by reports and records 

despite alleged disability exceeding 52 weeks. The 

medical issue in this matter is Claimant’s work restriction 

status during this litigation. All doctors (Kuznits, 

Chertow, and Fayyazi) essentially agreed that Claimant 

suffered low back and shoulder injuries, although the exact 

diagnoses were at variance and from which Claimant had 

not fully recovered, but he was capable of working. All 

agreed that, following the September 12, 2018 back 

surgery and the June 14, 2019 shoulder surgery, Claimant 

would have a period of total disability from all work. 

However, Dr. Fayyazi credibly explained that when he 

saw Claimant on March 13, 2019, (six months after the 

back surgery), and October 16, 2019, (four months postshoulder surgery), Claimant was capable of performing 

light-duty work (which I find to be within the job duties 

that he had as a trainer, as credibly described by 

[Employer’s head trainer, Genoveva] Ramos). . . . I do 

find the opinions of Claimant’s treating physicians more 

credible on diagnoses as they treated and performed 

surgeries. Otherwise, I find Dr. Fayyazi’s releases to 

light-duty work during each of his examinations to be 

largely unchallenged and credible.

Reproduced Record (RR) at 10a.

Rather, the primary disputed issue in the hearings before the WCJ was 

the cause of the termination of Claimant’s employment. As noted above, in the 

Reinstatement Petition, Claimant alleged that he was terminated “because of work 

injury related medical restrictions.” CR Docket Entry 2 at 1. At the WCJ’s hearings, 

Claimant testified that when he returned to work following his injuries, he was 

assigned to train other employees in his modified-duty training position and that his 

supervisor was Ms. Ramos. He stated that he was never disciplined during the eight 

years that he worked for Employer, and that when there was an issue with his 

paperwork, Ms. Ramos pointed it out and had him correct it. Claimant testified that 
4

at no time did Ms. Ramos indicate that she thought that he was falsifying the training 

forms. He stated that when he was fired on August 13, 2018, he reviewed the 

correction report containing that allegation, but he refused to sign it because he did 

not agree with it. He testified that he already suspected that he would be fired when 

he was called to the office that day because Employer’s new manager was routinely 

firing employees. Claimant stated that he believed that the real reason for his 

termination was because he was speaking with Mario, a union representative, about 

signing up for a union organization three days prior to his termination. He testified 

that he pursued a union grievance related to his discharge, but he was not reinstated.

In contrast, Ms. Ramos testified by deposition that she was the head 

trainer at Employer’s auto parts distribution center, and that she is responsible for 

scheduling the trainers; overseeing the training; ensuring that the trainers complete 

the training classes; and making sure that the training paperwork was properly

completed. She stated that she was Claimant’s “go-to” trainer, making sure that he 

trained employees correctly. She testified that she had personally trained Claimant 

in several areas and that he underwent additional training to learn how to train other 

employees on various pieces of equipment. Ms. Ramos stated that when Claimant 

was assigned to light-duty status after his injuries, he performed more training recertification during which he observed other employees who were being trained. RR 

at 224a-26a.

Ms. Ramos testified that on August 9, 2018, she sent her supervisor an 

email, advising the supervisor that Claimant was not completing his paperwork 

correctly, and that she was concerned that this could later result in a failed safety 

audit. She stated that she reviewed various training forms that Claimant had 

completed, and highlighted instances where he had documented that training had 
5

been completed, but the equipment being used for the training did not have the 

functions that were indicated on the forms. She testified that this demonstrated that 

Claimant was moving through the training without regard to actually training or 

reviewing the specific items indicated on the forms. Ms. Ramos stated that she had 

informally counseled Claimant on numerous occasions and that she officially 

counseled him two times on this subject. RR at 230a-40a, 244a-46a, 264a-74a.

Ms. Ramos testified that Employer had a progressive discipline 

program under which employees are to first receive a verbal warning, and then a 

written warning, before action is taken. She stated that she did not have any evidence 

of either verbal or written warnings before Claimant’s employment was terminated 

on August 13, 2018. She testified that she was not involved in the disciplinary 

action. She stated that she was aware that there was a unionization effort in 

Employer’s distribution center around the time of Claimant’s termination. RR at 

247a-50a, 252a.

2

2 Employer also submitted the August 13, 2018 Team Member Correction Report (Report) 

underlying Claimant’s termination that was executed by Employer’s Manager, Matthew Walters. 

See RR at 275a. Claimant identified the Report as the document that was presented to him at the 

meeting with Mr. Walters prior to his termination, and which he refused to sign. Id. at 75a. The 

Report was admitted into evidence as a business record without objection as Employer’s Exhibit 

D-1. See id. at 76a, 155a-56a. The Report states, in relevant part:

[Claimant] is a certified DC trainer and as a DC trainer, our Team 

Members and the DC depends on his skill set to help drive our Safety 

Culture. When [Claimant] accepted the role, it was expected of him 

to ensure that all team members are trained accurately and all 

paperwork was completed accurately and on time.

[Claimant], on several occasions it was brought to our attention that 

you were submitting Safety Documentation [that was] incomplete. 

We sat down with you and provided you with feedback, [and] when 

it happened again, we sat down with you for a second time and 

(Footnote continued on next page...)
6

With respect to the foregoing testimony, the WCJ made the following 

determinations:

17. I find Claimant’s testimony concerning his work 

injury, physical condition, symptomology, and treatment 

course, including his low back surgery and right shoulder 

surgery, competent and credible. I do not find credible his 

testimony that he was discharged from his job because of 

his work injury fifteen months earlier or his interaction 

with union organization efforts. His discharge occurred 

well more than a year after his injury, during which time 

Employer consistently accommodated his work 

restrictions, and he continued to perform meaningful and 

provided you with feedback as well as provide you with samples on 

how the forms were to be completed.

During these conversations, it was brought to your attention several 

times that you are responsible for completing the information 

accurately. If the documents are not accurate and[/]or incomplete 

our DC is not in compliance and it shows that we don’t care for our 

Team Members’ Safety and Development.

After several conversations, you continued to submit incomplete 

paperwork and signed off that they were done. This is falsifying 

information. As you know all [Employer] equipment operators need 

to carry proof of certification in order to operate the equipment they 

are certified on. Improper or incomplete training documents prevent 

compliance and that creates an eminent level safety violation. 

Submitting signed, incomplete training documents is also 

falsification of company documents. As a result, [Claimant’s] 

employment with [Employer] is hereby terminated.

Id. at 275a. The WCJ found this document to be credible. See id. at 8a; see also Virgo v. Workers’ 

Compensation Appeal Board (County of Lehigh-Cedarbrook), 890 A.2d 13, 20 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005) 

(“Under th[e business record] exception, it is not essential to produce either the person who made 

the entries or the custodian of the record at the time the entries were made or that the witness 

qualifying the business records even has personal knowledge of the facts reported in the business 

record.”) (citation omitted); id. at 21 (“Because the [documents] were admitted without objection, 

they fall within the business record exception and constitute substantial evidence to support a 

finding that Claimant’s discharge was the result of her ‘bad faith.’”).
7

necessary work, training other individuals; Ms. Ramos 

corroborated this testimony. His firing was not pretextual. 

His suggestion that he was discharged for possible 

unionization activities was speculation and, if true, which 

I find that it was not, it would have been unrelated to his 

work injury.

18. I find the testimony of Ms. Ramos competent and 

credible that she had legitimate concerns about Claimant’s 

performance as a trainer, which she conveyed to him, and 

eventually to her superiors, out of her concern for the 

training records’ integrity. She counseled Claimant before 

reporting him up the chain. Her account was corroborated 

by the documentation, which she explained, that supported 

Employer’s justification for Claimant’s discharge. (Since 

she was not involved with his termination, she would have 

had no need to see his human resources file.) Whether one 

considers it “falsification” or carelessness, the effect on 

Employer’s operation was the same. Claimant was not 

fulfilling his required tasks, and adverse consequences 

could ensue (either audit failure or lack of safety due to 

incomplete training). I find that there were legitimate 

performance reasons, unrelated to Claimant’s earlier work 

injury, for his August 13, 2018 discharge from 

employment. Both Claimant and Ms. Ramos confirmed 

that he would have continued to work had he not been 

fired.

RR at 9a-10a.

Ultimately, based on all of the evidence presented, the WCJ found the 

following relevant facts. On May 30, 2017, Claimant suffered a work-related right 

L4-5 disc herniation, resulting in the September 12, 2018 microdiscectomy and 

decompression procedure, and from which he is not fully recovered. Claimant also 

suffered a work-related right shoulder partial thickness joint-sided rotator cuff tear 

and labral tear, causing adhesions and adhesive capsulitis, resulting in the June 14, 

2019 surgery, including manipulation under anesthesia; lysis of adhesions; 

debridement of intra-articular-sided tear of the rotator cuff; labral debridement; 
8

debridement of the subacromial space; and subacromial decompression, from which 

he is not fully recovered. Because his post-injury wages did not equal or exceed his 

pre-injury wages, Claimant was partially disabled after his May 30, 2017 workrelated injuries. As a result, he is entitled to temporary partial disability (TPD) 

benefits between May 30, 2017, and August 13, 2018, the date on which he was 

discharged for reasons unrelated to his work-related injuries when modified-duty 

work was available to him. Because Claimant was still under work restrictions when 

he was terminated, the WCJ awarded TPD benefits from August 14, 2018, to 

September 11, 2018, as well. RR at 11a.

The WCJ found that Claimant was totally disabled from September 12, 

2018, to March 12, 2019, due to his work-related back surgery after which he was 

capable of performing the light-duty job for Employer from which he was 

legitimately discharged. As a result, he was entitled to TTD benefits for that period 

of time. Because Claimant could have performed light-duty work but for his earlier 

discharge from employment, the WCJ awarded TPD benefits from March 13, 2019, 

to June 13, 2019. RR at 11a.

The WCJ found that Claimant was totally disabled from June 14, 2019, 

to October 15, 2019, due to his work-related shoulder surgery after which he was 

again capable of performing the light-duty job for Employer from which he was 

legitimately discharged. As a result, he was entitled to TTD benefits for that period 

of time. Because Claimant could have resumed performing the light-duty work but 

for his earlier discharge from employment, and continuing thereafter, he is entitled 

to TPD benefits from October 16, 2019, and continuing, until changed in accordance 

with the provisions of the Act. RR at 11a-12a. Based on the foregoing, the WCJ 

issued an order granting Claimant’s Reinstatement Petition, which the WCJ treated 
9

as a claim petition for burden of proof purposes, and awarded the TPD and TTD 

benefits as outlined above. See id. at 14a.

Claimant appealed the WCJ’s Decision and Order to the Board, arguing 

that the WCJ erred in failing to award total disability benefits following the 

termination of his employment by concluding that he was terminated for reasons 

unrelated to his work-related injuries, and because Employer failed to follow its 

progressive disciplinary policy prior to his termination. However, the Board rejected 

Claimant’s first claim of error, observing:

The WCJ concluded that [Employer] met its burden of 

showing that Claimant’s loss of earnings was caused by a 

termination for cause and that it was unrelated to his work 

injury. Specifically, the WCJ accepted Ms. Ramos’s 

testimony that Claimant had a pattern of incorrectly filling 

out training forms, which he had been warned about [] 

multiple times, which ultimately led to his termination 

from [Employer]. The WCJ also made findings that the 

termination, which occurred 15 months after his work 

injury, was not in any way related to his work injury or 

restrictions he continued to have for that work injury. 

Consequently, the substantial, competent evidence of 

record supports th[e] WCJ’s conclusion that [Employer] 

met its burden of showing that Claimant’s termination 

proved that his current earnings loss was not related to his 

work injury and amounted to a lack of good faith. Thus, 

the WCJ properly did not order [Employer] to pay total 

disability benefits after the termination.

RR at 22a-23a.

Finally, the Board also rejected Claimant’s second claim of error, 

explaining:

[T]here was no evidence submitted that [Employer] 

specifically violated any of its discipline policies, as Ms. 

Ramos was unaware whether Claimant had received any 

written warnings before being terminated, although [she] 
10

testified he had received numerous verbal warnings. We 

note [Employer’s] burden was only to prove Claimant’s 

termination was not caused by the disability arising from 

the work-related injury and amounted to a lack of good 

faith, which it established through Claimant’s for cause 

termination for a pattern of erroneously filling out 

paperwork.

RR at 23a (footnote omitted). Accordingly, the Board issued the Order affirming 

the WCJ’s Decision and Order, and Claimant filed the instant petition for review.3

On appeal, Claimant contends that the Board erred in affirming the 

WCJ’s Decision and Order, and Claimant’s TTD payments should be reinstated, 

because: (1) there was no testimony establishing that Claimant was terminated for 

“bad faith” willful misconduct; (2) the WCJ sustained Claimant’s hearsay objection 

to Ms. Ramos’s testimony regarding the basis for his termination so it is not 

competent evidence, and her testimony was not credible4; (3) Employer failed to 

3 Our review in workers’ compensation proceedings is limited to determining whether 

constitutional rights have been violated, whether an error of law has been committed, and whether 

necessary findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence. Volterano v. Workmen’s 

Compensation Appeal Board (Travelers Insurance Company), 639 A.2d 453, 455-56 (Pa. 1994).

4 As this Court has explained:

Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable 

person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. In 

performing a substantial evidence analysis, this Court must view the 

evidence in a light most favorable to the party [that] prevailed before 

the factfinder. Moreover, we are to draw all reasonable inferences 

which are deducible from the evidence in support of the factfinder’s 

decision in favor of that prevailing party. Furthermore, in a 

substantial evidence analysis where both parties present evidence, it 

does not matter that there is evidence in the record which supports a 

factual finding contrary to that made by the WCJ; rather, the 

pertinent inquiry is whether there is any evidence which supports 

the WCJ’s factual finding. It is solely for the WCJ, as the factfinder, 

to assess credibility and to resolve conflicts in the evidence. In 

(Footnote continued on next page...)
11

carry its burden of proving some “bad faith” willful misconduct on Claimant’s part; 

and (4) Employer failed to follow its progressive discipline policy in terminating 

Claimant.

Relevant to our disposition of these claims, the Pennsylvania Supreme 

Court has explained:

Where a claimant establishes that a work-related 

injury prevents a return to the time-of-injury job, a loss of 

earnings capacity is established. Once such a loss has been 

demonstrated, the claimant should generally be entitled to 

benefits, unless the employer can demonstrate that 

employment is available within the claimant’s restrictions. 

Consistent with the purposes of the Act, as well as our 

decisional law and the decisions of the Commonwealth 

Court, as a general rule, where a work-related disability is

established, a post-injury involuntary discharge should be 

considered in connection with the separate determination 

of job availability rather than as dispositive of loss of 

earnings capacity.

[U]nder this approach, a partially disabled employee who, 

by act of bad faith, forfeits his employment would not be 

eligible for total disability benefits, as suitable 

employment was in fact available but for the employee’s 

own wrongful conduct. Conversely, a partially disabled 

employee who acts in good faith to undertake work with 

restrictions would not be deprived of benefits that he 

plainly would have received had no light duty employment 

addition, it is solely for the WCJ, as the factfinder, to determine what 

weight to give to any evidence. As such, the WCJ may reject the 

testimony of any witness in whole or in part, even if that testimony 

is uncontradicted.

Sharkey v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Federal Express), 786 A.2d 1035, 1038 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2001) (citation omitted and emphasis added). Accordingly, we will not accede to 

Claimant’s request to review the WCJ’s credibility determinations or to make additional findings 

based on assertions in his appellate brief.
12

been offered merely because the employer subsequently 

elects to terminate such employment.

In summary, we hold that a claimant who has 

established a partial disability due to a work-related injury 

should generally continue to receive partial disability 

benefits by virtue of his loss in earnings capacity, even 

though subsequently discharged from employment, 

because the loss in earnings capacity remains extant.

Whether the same claimant may receive total disability 

benefits depends upon whether the employer can 

demonstrate that suitable work was available or would 

have been available but for circumstances which merit 

allocation of the consequences of the discharge to the 

claimant, such as claimant’s lack of good faith.

Vista International Hotel v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Daniels), 742 

A.2d 649, 657-58 (Pa. 1999) (citations and footnotes omitted). An employer can 

establish a lack of good faith, or bad faith, when the employer proves that it 

discharged the claimant for misconduct. Sauer v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal 

Board (Verizon Pennsylvania, Inc.), 26 A.3d 531, 536 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011). Whether 

a claimant acted in bad faith, for purposes of a post-injury discharge, is a finding of 

fact for the WCJ. Champion v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Glasgow, 

Inc.), 753 A.2d 337, 340 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000).

Even if it is assumed, as Claimant alleges, that Ms. Ramos’s testimony 

is not competent and substantial evidence to prove that he was discharged for bad 

faith, as outlined above, the Report was admitted into evidence as a business record 

without objection. See RR at 76a, 155a-56a. The Report specifically outlines the 

bases for Claimant’s termination, i.e., that he continued to “submit incomplete 

paperwork and signed off that they were done,” “[a]fter several conversations,” 

thereby “falsifying information,” and that “[s]ubmitting signed, incomplete training 

documents is also falsification of company documents.” Id. at 275a. In addition, 
13

the WCJ found the Report to be credible evidence. See id. at 8a. As a result, the 

Report constitutes substantial competent evidence supporting the WCJ’s finding of 

bad faith on Claimant’s part underlying the termination of his employment with 

Employer. See Virgo, 890 A.2d at 21 (“Because the[ documents] were admitted 

without objection, they fall within the business record exception and constitute 

substantial evidence to support a finding that Claimant’s discharge was the result of 

her ‘bad faith.’”).

Moreover, Employer’s purported failure to follow its progressive 

discipline policy does not compel the award of TTD benefits because it in no way 

affects the WCJ’s finding of bad faith on Claimant’s part. Indeed, as the Supreme 

Court has explained:

The issue is whether, through no fault of the claimant, the 

injury has again [a]ffected claimant’s earning ability. This 

issue is not one of misconduct akin to that found in the 

unemployment benefits setting; it is a question centering 

solely on whether the claimant’s injury is again affecting 

his ability to earn. An award of unemployment 

compensation benefits, on the other hand, turns on a 

question of “willful misconduct,” i.e., on the presence or 

absence of a defined level or degree of misconduct. The 

conduct standards are therefore quite different in the two 

settings. Or, more strictly stated, in the [workers’]

compensation arena, there is no conduct standard as such.

Bortz v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Reznor Division of FL 

Industries), 683 A.2d 259, 262 (Pa. 1996) (citations omitted). See also Vista 

International Hotel, 742 A.2d at 657 (“[U]nder this approach, a partially disabled 

employee who, by act of bad faith, forfeits his employment would not be eligible for 

total disability benefits, as suitable employment was in fact available but for the 

employee’s own wrongful conduct.”).

Thus, as the Board correctly determined:
14

We note that Claimant cites to two unemployment 

compensation cases, Cipriani v. [Unemployment 

Compensation Board of Review], 466 A.2d 1102 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 1983), and Brady v. [Unemployment 

Compensation Board of Review], 544 A.2d 1085, 1086 

(Pa. Cmwlth. 1988), for the proposition that failure to 

follow a progressive discipline policy does not establish 

that a termination was for “willful misconduct.” However, 

the unemployment concept of “willful misconduct” is not 

the standard in workers’ compensation, which goes by the 

lesser “lack of good faith” standard, which [Employer] 

was able to meet in this case. See Virgo[, 890 A.2d at 19] 

(holding that the stricter unemployment compensation 

willful misconduct standard is not the standard to 

determine lack of good faith in the context allocating fault 

in a workers’ compensation case). Consequently, we must 

reject Claimant’s argument based upon these cases.

RR at 23a-24a n.1.

Claimant may not collaterally attack the WCJ’s determination of his 

bad faith precluding the award of workers’ compensation benefits under the Act by 

injecting standards applicable to the award of unemployment compensation benefits

under the Unemployment Compensation Law (Law).

5

 Stated simply, Employer’s 

purported failure to follow its progressive discipline policy does not affect the WCJ’s 

5 Act of December 5, 1936, Second Ex. Sess., P.L. (1937) 2897, as amended, 43 P.S. 

§§751-918.10. Specifically, where an employer has a policy identifying conduct that will result 

in employee discipline, including discharge, the employer has defined these offenses as

disqualifying “willful misconduct” for purposes of Section 402(e) of the Law, 43 P.S. §802(e). 

Brady v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 544 A.2d 1085, 1086 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

1988). An employee cannot be found to have committed disqualifying willful misconduct where 

the employer’s policy did not warn that such behavior could result in a dismissal. PMA 

Reinsurance Corporation v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 558 A.2d 623, 626 

(Pa. Cmwlth. 1989). Additionally, where an employer’s policy provides for progressive discipline, 

the employer has identified the process that the employer will follow in response to employees’ 

misconduct. Id. at 625-26. Once an employer identifies the process that will lead to discharge, 

the employer’s failure to follow the steps outlined in its progressive disciplinary policy will 

preclude a denial of unemployment compensation benefits due to willful misconduct. Id.
15

determination, supported by substantial competent evidence as outlined above, “that 

suitable work was available or would have been available but for circumstances 

which merit allocation of the consequences of the discharge to the claimant, such as 

claimant’s lack of good faith.” Vista International Hotel, 742 A.2d at 658.

Accordingly, the Board’s order is affirmed.6

MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge

6

It is well settled that this Court may affirm a Board order on any basis appearing in the 

record. White v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Good Shepherd Rehab Hospital), 666 

A.2d 1128, 1131 n.6 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1995).
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Franklin Montano, :

:

Petitioner :

:

 v. : No. 732 C.D. 2021

: 

Advance Stores Company, Inc. :

t/a Advance Auto Parts :

(Workers’ Compensation :

Appeal Board), :

:

Respondent :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 27th day of June, 2022, the order of the Workers’ 

Compensation Appeal Board dated June 2, 2021, is AFFIRMED.

__________________________________

MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge