alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# Europeiska unionens C 280A/9 au

| | ISSN 1977-1061 |
| --- | --- |
| Europeiska unionens
  officiella tidning | C 280A |
| | |
| Svensk utgåva | Meddelanden och upplysningar | 66 årgången9 augusti 2023 |

ISSN 1977-1061

Europeiska unionens

officiella tidning

C 280A

Svensk utgåva

Meddelanden och upplysningar

66 årgången9 augusti 2023

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| Innehållsförteckning | Sida |
| --- | --- |
| | V   Yttranden |
| | ADMINISTRATIVA FÖRFARANDEN |
| | Europeiska rekryteringsbyrån (Epso) |
| 2023/C 280 A/01 | Meddelande om ändring av meddelande om allmänt uttagningsprov – Epso/AD/402/23 – Handläggare (AD 6) inom följande områden: 1. Mikroekonomi/makroekonomi, 2. Finansiell ekonomi, 3. Industriell ekonomi ( EUT C 220 A, 22.6.2023 ) | 1 |

Innehållsförteckning

Sida

V   Yttranden

ADMINISTRATIVA FÖRFARANDEN

Europeiska rekryteringsbyrån (Epso)

2023/C 280 A/01

Meddelande om ändring av meddelande om allmänt uttagningsprov – Epso/AD/402/23 – Handläggare (AD 6) inom följande områden: 1. Mikroekonomi/makroekonomi, 2. Finansiell ekonomi, 3. Industriell ekonomi ( EUT C 220 A, 22.6.2023 )

( EUT C 220 A, 22.6.2023 )

1

---

| SV | |
| --- | --- |

SV

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V Yttranden

ADMINISTRATIVA FÖRFARANDEN

Europeiska rekryteringsbyrån (Epso)

| 9.8.2023 | SV | Europeiska unionens officiella tidning | CA 280/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

9.8.2023

SV

Europeiska unionens officiella tidning

CA 280/1

---

Meddelande om ändring av meddelande om allmänt uttagningsprov – Epso/AD/402/23 – Handläggare (AD 6) inom följande områden: 1. Mikroekonomi/makroekonomi, 2. Finansiell ekonomi, 3. Industriell ekonomi

(
  Europeiska unionens officiella tidning C 220 A av den 22 juni 2023
  )

(2023/C 280 A/01)

Sidan 1

| I stället för: | ”Sista ansökningsdag: den 25 juli 2023 kl. 12.00 (centraleuropeisk tid)” |
| --- | --- |

I stället för:

”Sista ansökningsdag: den 25 juli 2023 kl. 12.00 (centraleuropeisk tid)”

| ska det stå: | ”Sista ansökningsdag: den 26 juli 2023 kl. 12.00 (centraleuropeisk tid)”. |
| --- | --- |

ska det stå:

ska det stå

”Sista ansökningsdag: den 26 juli 2023 kl. 12.00 (centraleuropeisk tid)”.

Sidan 5

| I stället för: | ”Gör en webbansökan via
  Epsos webbplats (2)
  senast den 25 juli 2023 kl. 12.00 (centraleuropeisk tid).” |
| --- | --- |

I stället för:

I stället för

”Gör en webbansökan via
  Epsos webbplats (2)
  senast den 25 juli 2023 kl. 12.00 (centraleuropeisk tid).”

| ska det stå: | ”Gör en webbansökan via
  Epsos webbplats (2) senast den 26 juli 2023 kl. 12.00 (centraleuropeisk tid)”. |
| --- | --- |

ska det stå:

ska det stå

”Gör en webbansökan via
  Epsos webbplats (2) senast den 26 juli 2023 kl. 12.00 (centraleuropeisk tid)”.

---

(2)  https://epso.europa.eu/sv/job-opportunities/open-for-application.

2

---
#### Stephen MURPHY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 2D02-2953.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

April 30, 2003.

FULMER, Judge.

Stephen Murphy challenges the order of the trial court denying his motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). We reverse the trial court’s order and remand for further proceedings.

In his motion, Murphy alleged that he pleaded to trafficking in more than 28 but less than 200 grams of cocaine. He further alleged that the three-year manda*347tory minimum term of imprisonment imposed by the trial court pursuant to section 893.135(1)(b)(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1999), is illegal based on our opinion in *Taylor v. State,*818 So.2d 544 (Fla. 2d DCA), *review dismissed,*821 So.2d 302 (Fla.2002). A claim that a mandatory minimum sentence was illegally imposed is cognizable in a rule 3.800(a) motion where the error is apparent on the face of the record. *See Sims v. State,*838 So.2d 658 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); *Leath v. State,*805 So.2d 956 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001).

*Taylor*held that chapter 99-188, Laws of Florida, which provided for the imposition of mandatory minimum prison sentences for certain drug offenses, is unconstitutional because it violates the single subject rule of the Florida Constitution. In denying the motion, the trial court found: “As of April 29, 2002, the Florida Legislature cured the single subject rule violation by reenacting the provisions originally contained in Chapter 99-188.... In so doing, the Florida Legislature provided for the retroactive application of each reenactment to July 1, 1999.” However, in *Green v. State,*839 So.2d 748 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003), this court has since held that the reenactment of the sentencing provisions of chapter 99-188 cannot be applied retroactively because this would violate the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the United States and Florida Constitutions.

Murphy alleged that he committed the offense of trafficking in cocaine on July 17, 1999, which is within the *Taylor*window. *See Green,*839 So.2d at 750 n. 1. Murphy has therefore presented a facially sufficient claim. *See Sims,*838 So.2d 658. We reverse the order of the trial court and remand for further consideration of Murphy’s claim. If Murphy is correct that the trial court imposed a mandatory minimum pursuant to section 893.135(l)(b)(l)(a) where the offense was committed within the *Taylor*window, the trial court shall resentence him under the 1997 version of that statute. *See Green,*839 So.2d 748. We certify conflict with the Fourth and Fifth District cases with which we disagreed in *Green.*

Reversed and remanded with instructions.

WHATLEY and SALCINES, JJ., concur.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<CIK> 0001067541
<NAME> HOME INTERIORS & GIFTS, INC.
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1998
<CASH>                                          41,024
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    8,323
<ALLOWANCES>                                       348
<INVENTORY>                                     31,010
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                83,213
<PP&E>                                          58,656
<DEPRECIATION>                                  36,882
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 132,448
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           93,069
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                         1,523
<OTHER-SE>                                   (415,597)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   132,448
<SALES>                                        490,223
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               490,223
<CGS>                                          242,343
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  389,212
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               (6,583)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              27,532
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 80,062
<INCOME-TAX>                                    31,807
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             48,255
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    48,255
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
#### STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. MICKEY DIXON

No. 754SC117

(Filed 7 May 1975)

Appeal by defendant from *Fountain, Judge.*Judgment entered 9 September 1974. Heard in the Court of Appeals 11 April 1975.

*Attorney General Edmisten by Associate Attorney Noel Lee Allen for the State.*

*' Edward G. Bailey for the defendant.*

PARKER, VAUGHN and CLARK, Judges.

No error.
Order entered August 23, 2016

In The

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-16-00126-CV

IN THE ESTATE OF ROBERT S. KAM, DECEASED

On Appeal from the Probate Court No. 3

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. PR-15-2286-3

ORDER

Before the Court is the July 20, 2016 “Response of Appellee to Motion of Appellant to 

Dismiss or to Abate Appeal and Objection to Request for Judicial Notice.” Appellee’s response 

is not to a motion filed by appellant. Rather, it is a response to appellant’s reply brief. We 

construe appellee’s response as a sur-reply brief. On the Court’s own motion, we DIRECT the 

Clerk of this Court to file appellee’s July 20, 2016 response as a sur-reply brief.

/s/ ELIZABETH LANG-MIERS 

JUSTICE
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER

I, William T. Freeman, Chief Executive Officer, in connection with the
Report on Form 10-Q of McCormick & Schmicks Seafood Restaurants, Inc. for the quarterly period ended March 28, 2009 (the Report), hereby certify in accordance with 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

1. The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

2. The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial
condition and results of operations of McCormick & Schmicks Seafood Restaurants, Inc.



|                       
|-----------------------
|/s/ WILLIAM T. FREEMAN 
|William T. Freeman     
|Chief Executive Officer

Dated: May 6, 2009
Exhibit 32.1



CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER



Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, each of the undersigned officers of W&T Offshore, Inc. (the Company), hereby certifies, to the best of his knowledge, that the Companys Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the period ended March 31,
2005 fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that information contained in such Quarterly Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of
operations of the Company.



|                   |  |                        
|------------------ |  | -----------------------
|Date: May 12, 2005 |  | /s/ TRACY W. KROHN     
|                   |  | Tracy W. Krohn         
|                   |  | Chief Executive Officer
|                   | 
|Date: May 12, 2005 |  | /s/ W. REID LEA        
|                   |  | W. Reid Lea            
|                   |  | Chief Financial Officer
#### STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ALAN YOUNG

No. 715SC51

(Filed 26 May 1971)

Larceny § 7— sufficiency of evidence

There was plenary evidence to support defendant's conviction of the felonious larceny of 34 men’s suits having a value of $2,286.75.

Appeal by defendant from *Cowper, Judge,*8 June 1970 Session of Superior Court held in New Hanover County.

Defendant, am indigent represented by court-appointed counsel, waived a bill of indictment and pleaded not guilty to the charge of felonious larceny set forth in an information signed by the solicitor. The jury found defendant guilty as charged, and from judgment of imprisonment for a term of three years, defendant appealed.

*Attorney General Robert Morgan by Staff Attorney James L. Blackburn for the State.*

*George H. Sperry for defendant appellant.*

PARKER, Judge.

Appellant’s counsel states that he has carefully reviewed the record, but has been unable to find any prejudicial error therein. We have also examined the record and find no prejudicial error.

Defendant and his counsel signed a written waiver of indictment as G.S. 15-140.1 requires for trial upon an information. The information charged that defendant stole 34 men’s suits *441of a value of $2,285.75 from Ketteridge Suit Market by breaking and entering. The State presented plenary evidence to support the charge. Police officers found defendant with the stolen suits at 3:00 a.m. in a station wagon parked near the side entrance to the premises which had been broken into and from which the suits had been removed without authority from the owner. Defendant testified, but apparently the jury did not accept his explanation.

In the trial and judgment appealed from we find

No error.

Chief Judge Mallard and Judge Vaughn concur.
```

[Congressional Bills 111th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 5215 Introduced in House (IH)]

111th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 5215

    To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to repeal the $2,500 
          limitation on health flexible spending arrangements.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                              May 5, 2010

   Mr. Akin introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                      Committee on Ways and Means

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
    To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to repeal the $2,500 
          limitation on health flexible spending arrangements.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. REPEAL OF $2,500 LIMITATION ON HEALTH FLEXIBLE SPENDING 
              ARRANGEMENTS.

    Section 125 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by 
striking subsection (i) and by redesignating subsections (j) and (k) as 
subsections (i) and (j), respectively.
                                 <all>
```
COMMON CAUSE, Dawn Baldwin Gibson, Robert E. Morrison, Cliff Moone, T. Anthony Spearman, Alida Woods, Lamar Gibson, Michael Schacter, Stella Anderson, Mark Ezzell, and Sabra Faires v. Daniel J. FOREST, in his Official Capacity as President of the North Carolina Senate; Timothy K. Moore, in his Official Capacity as Speaker of the North Carolina House of Representatives; and Philip E. Berger, in his Official Capacity as President Pro Tempore of the North Carolina Senate

No. 307P18

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

October 24, 2018

Burton Craige, Attorney at Law, Raleigh, Narendra K. Ghosh, Attorney at Law, Chapel Hill, Paul E. Smith, Attorney at Law, for Common Cause, et al

Alexander McC. Peters, Senior Deputy Attorney General, Matthew Thomas Tulchin, Special Deputy Attorney General, Ann W. Matthews, Special Deputy Attorney General, for Forest, Daniel J., et al *390***ORDER***

Upon consideration of the petition filed by Plaintiffs on the 19th of September 2018 in this matter for discretionary review under G.S. 7A-31 prior to a determination by the North Carolina Court of Appeals, the following order was entered and is hereby certified to the North Carolina Court of Appeals:

"Denied by order of the Court in conference, this the 24th of October 2018."
#### STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. GREGORY A. LANFORD and RICHARD D. OLDCORN

No. 744SC249

(Filed 1 May 1974)

Appeal by defendants from Tillery■, *Judge,*10 September 1973 Session of Superior Court held in Onslow County.

Defendants were tried on their pleas of not guilty to the charges contained in a bill of indictment, proper in form, charging the offenses of felonious breaking and entering and felonious larceny. The jury found both defendants guilty of both charges. From judgments on the verdict imposing prison sentences, defendants appealed.

*Attorney General Robert Morgan by Assistant Attorney General Millard R. Rich, Jr. for the State.*

*William J. Morgan for defendant appellants.*

PARKER, Judge.

Defendants’ counsel, after diligently examining the transcript, has been unable to assign error. We have also carefully examined the record and find

No error.

Chief Judge Brock and Judge Baley concur.
----

            COMMISSION REGULATION (EC) No 977/2004

of 14 May 2004         

fixing the minimum selling price for skimmed-milk powder for the 60th individual invitation to tender issued under the standing invitation to tender referred to in Regulation (EC) No 2799/1999

THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community,

Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 1255/1999 of 17 May 1999 on the common organisation of the market in milk and milk products (1), and in particular Article 10 thereof,

Whereas:

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

For the 60th individual invitation to tender pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 2799/1999, in respect of which the time limit for the submission of tenders expired on 11 May 2004, the minimum selling price and the processing security are fixed as follows:

Article 2

This Regulation shall enter into force on 15 May 2004.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 14 May 2004.

For the Commission

Franz FISCHLER            

Member of the Commission

----

(1)OJ L 160, 26.6.1999, p. 48. Regulation as last amended by Commission Regulation (EC) No 186/2004 (OJ L 29, 3.2.2004, p. 6).

(2)OJ L 340, 31.12.1999, p. 3. Regulation as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 2132/2003 (OJ L 320, 5.12.2003, p. 4).

----
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 05-6097

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

MARK EDWARDS, JR.,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western

District of Virginia, at Roanoke. James P. Jones, Chief District

Judge. (CR-00-87-JPJ; CA-03-205-7-JPJ)

Submitted: May 19, 2005 Decided: May 25, 2005

Before LUTTIG, MOTZ, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Mark Edwards, Jr., Appellant Pro Se. Steven Randall Ramseyer,

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Abingdon, Virginia, for

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:

Mark Edwards, Jr., seeks to appeal the district court’s

order denying his Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) motion for reconsideration

of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000) motion. The order is not appealable

unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of

appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000). A certificate of

appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the

denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000).

A prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable

jurists would find that his constitutional claims are debatable and

that any dispositive procedural rulings by the district court are

also debatable or wrong. See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322,

336-38 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); Rose v.

Lee, 252 F.3d 676, 683-84 (4th Cir. 2001). We have independently

reviewed the record and conclude that Edwards has not made the

requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of

appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately

presented in the materials before the court and argument would not

aid the decisional process. 

DISMISSED
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 96-6124

CHARLES STANFIELD,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

RICHARD A. LANHAM, SR.; SEWALL SMITH, Warden;

THEODORE PURNELL, Chief of Security; PAMELA

SORENSEN; LUCILLE BAGLEY; PATRICIA GOINS; D.

BRIDELL; JOSEPH ZBOZIEN; WILLIAM FILBERT,

Assistant Warden; Francis Edmonds,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

Maryland, at Baltimore. Benson E. Legg, District Judge. (CA-94-

52-L)

Submitted: April 30, 1996 Decided: May 30, 1996

Before WIDENER, NIEMEYER, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Charles Stanfield, Appellant Pro Se. John Joseph Curran, Jr.,

Attorney General, Audrey J. S. Carrion, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY

GENERAL OF MARYLAND, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Appellant noted this appeal outside the thirty-day appeal

period established by Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1), failed to obtain an

extension of the appeal period within the additional thirty-day

period provided by Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5), and is not entitled to

relief under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6). The time periods established

by Fed. R. App. P. 4 are "mandatory and jurisdictional." Browder v.

Director, Dep't of Corrections, 434 U.S. 257, 264 (1978) (quoting

United States v. Robinson, 361 U.S. 220, 229 (1960)). The district

court entered its order on December 19, 1995; Appellant's notice of

appeal was dated January 19, 1996, and filed on January 22, 1996.

Appellant's failure to note a timely appeal or obtain an extension

of the appeal period deprives this court of jurisdiction to consider this case. We therefore dismiss the appeal. We dispense with

oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would

not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
Exhibit 4.2

                 FIRST AMENDMENT TO PURCHASE AND SALE AGREEMENT

      This FIRST AMENDMENT TO PURCHASE AND SALE AGREEMENT, is made this 13th day
of February, 2002 by and between DEAN WITTER REALTY INCOME PARTNERSHIP I, L.P.
("Seller") AND THE VLASS GROUP, LLC, ("Purchaser").

                               W I T N E S S E T H

      WHEREAS, Purchaser and Seller entered into that certain Purchase and Sale
Agreement (the "Contract") dated January 18, 2002; and

      WHEREAS, the Contract provides for a Due Diligence Period (as defined in
Contract) which expires on February 15, 2002; and

      WHEREAS,  Purchaser and Seller desire to extend the Due Diligence Period
to 5:00 p.m. on February 22, 2002;

      NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the sum of TEN AND NO/100
DOLLARS ($10.00), and other good and valuable considerations, the receipt and
sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged, the parties hereto do hereby amend
the Contract to extend the due diligence period to 5:00 p.m. on February 22,
2002.

      Except as hereinabove set forth, the Contract shall remain unaltered and
in full force and effect.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have signed and sealed this First
Amendment as of the day and year first above written.

PURCHASER:                          SELLER:

THE VLASS GROUP, LLC, a Georgia     DEAN WITTER RELATY INCOME
Limited liability company           PARTNERSHIP I, L.P., a Delaware limited
                                    partnership

By: /s/  Michael B. Vlass                 By: DEAN WITTER REALTY
    ------------------------                    INCOME PROPERTIES I, INC.,
         Michael B. Vlass                       a Delaware corporation, its
         Manager                                Managing general partner


                                    By: /s/ Robert B. Austin
                                       --------------------------------
                                          Robert B. Austin
                                          Vice President