IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

Assigned on Briefs November 29, 2007

ESTATE OF HENRY ATLAS QUALLS

AMOS E. QUALLS v. H. J. Q. KLUTTS, EXECUTRIX

 Appeal from the Probate Court for Perry County

No. PB-325 Timothy L. Easter, Judge

No. M2006-02776-COA-R3-CV - Filed January 9, 2008

This is the second appeal by the appellant who again has asked this court to review the Probate Court

of Perry County’s denial of his petition. In that petition, the appellant contested the manner in which

the Executrix of his late father’s estate administered the estate. We have determined the issue is res

judicata and thereby affirm the trial court. We have also determined the appeal is devoid of merit

and, therefore, the Executrix is entitled to recover her reasonable expenses incurred on appeal. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Probate Court Affirmed

FRANK G.CLEMENT,JR., J., delivered the opinion ofthe court, in which PATRICIA J.COTTRELL,P.J.,

M.S., and ANDY D. BENNETT, J., joined.

Amos E. Qualls, Fayetteville, Tennessee, Pro Se.

Kimberly M. Hinson, Linden, Tennessee, and Larry Joe Hinson, Hohenwald, Tennessee, for the

appellee, H. J. Q. Klutts, Executrix.

OPINION

This is the second appeal by Amos E. Qualls from an adverse ruling by the probate court

concerning the administration of his late father’s estate. The petition in the Probate Court of Perry

County filed by Mr. Qualls (“the petitioner”) contested the manner in which his sister, the Executrix

of his late father’s estate, administered the estate. The petitioner challenged his sister’s

administration of the estate and sought to recover property he contended the Executrix was

unlawfully withholding. 

The probate court denied the petition and approved the Executrix’s final accounting, which

decisions the petitioner appealed to this court. We affirmed the decision of the probate court in 2005

and remanded the matter. Being dissatisfied with the decision of this court, the petitioner filed an

Application for Permission to Appeal to the Supreme Court of Tennessee, which was considered and

denied by the Court on December 27, 2005. Being dissatisfied with that result, the petitioner then

filed a “Motion to Reconsider” which was denied on January 26, 2006. Thereafter he filed an
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“Application for Permission to Appeal,” which was denied by the Supreme Court on January 30,

2006. The petitioner filed yet another “Petition to Reconsider,” which was denied by the Supreme

Court on March 29, 2006. Following the Supreme Court’s fourth denial of the petitioner’s

applications for relief, the case was remanded to the Probate Court of Perry County. On remand, the

petitioner filed a “Motion for Immediate Bench Trial” seeking to re-try the issues previously

determined by the probate court and this court. That motion was denied by the probate court. This

appeal followed. 

In this appeal the petitioner raises the issue of whether the trial court erred in denying the

petitioner’s Motion for Immediate Bench Trial. The answer to the question presented is “no,” the

trial court did not err in denying the motion because the issues the petitioner sought to litigate were

res judicata. 

ANALYSIS

In the first appeal by the petitioner, he filed with this court a Statement of the Evidence

pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 24(c) in lieu of a verbatim transcript of the testimony. After the

Appellee, the Executrix, objected to the petitioner’s Statement of the Evidence, the probate court

ruled that the petitioner’s statement of the evidence was inaccurate and incomplete. We

subsequently determined that without a sufficient record, we could not adequately review the

decision of the probate court to dismiss the petition, and, for that reason, we affirmed the decision

of the probate court. 

Our decision was appealed to the Supreme Court of Tennessee. That court denied the appeal,

thereby affirming our decision, wherein we had affirmed the decision of the Probate Court of Perry

County. Thus, the matter was remanded to the probate court for further proceedings consistent with

our opinion. Unfortunately, the petitioner has misconstrued our decision and the significance of the

decision of the Supreme Court in this matter. For a better understanding of the matter, we will

conduct a summary review of what has previously occurred in this matter.

The petitioner’s father, Henry Atlas Qualls (“Decedent”) died a resident of Perry County,

Tennessee, on May 18, 2000. The Decedent was predeceased by his wife and was survived by their

three children: Henrietta Qualls Klutts (“Executrix”), Jerry Franklin Qualls, and Amos Eugene

Qualls (“the petitioner”). The Decedent executed his Last Will and Testament on August 5, 1998,

wherein he appointed his daughter as the Executrix of his estate. Significantly, the will also

contained an in terrorem clause, which states:

Every heir, legatee, devisee, or beneficiary under this Will who shall contest in any

court any provision of this instrument shall not be entitled to any devises, legacies,

or benefits under this Will or any codicil hereto or any trust created hereby, and any

and all devises, legacies, and portions of the income or corpus of my estate,

otherwise provided to be paid to such person, shall lapse and shall be paid,

distributed and passed as though such person had died prior to my death leaving no

living lawful descendants. My Executrix herein named are specifically authorized to
On March 18, 2000, the Decedent executed a quitclaim deed conveying his real property to Executrix and 1

reserving in himself a life estate.

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defend at the expense of my estate any consent or attack of any nature upon this Will

or any codicil hereto, or upon any paragraph or provision hereto.

The will of the Decedent also provided that his real property would go to the Executrix, and 1

any money or securities held by the Decedent would be divided in equal shares among his three

children. As for his personal property, the Decedent’s will directed as follows:

I hereby direct that all my personal property shall be disposed of as follows:

(A) I first direct that so much of my personal property that consists of Indian relics,

carvings, and art works that I have created shall be divided in the following manner:

Each of my children shall, in turn, (starting first with Amos Eugene

Qualls, then second with Jerry Franklin Qualls, and third with

Henrietta Joy Klutts) pick an item, and continue in turns picking one

item at a time until each of them shall have chosen as many items as

they desire: provided however that if there are any items in this

category remaining after each shall have had as many opportunities

as possible, or they desire, then the devise of such remaining items

shall lapse and become a part of the residue of my estate. (It is my

wish, although not an absolute direction, that the Indian relics, so far

as possible be kept together as a whole collection and not sold at any

auction or sale that my [sic] be part of the administration of my

estate.)

(B) I direct secondly, that so much of my personal property that consists of items that

were given to myself and my late wife as gifts from my children, Amos Eugene

Qualls, Jerry Franklin Qualls, and Henrietta Joy Klutts, shall be distributed to the

child which gave such item as a gift in the first instance.

(C) Thirdly I direct that such items of personalty as remain after the devise and

distribution shall become part of the residue of my estate and disposed of as

hereinafter described.

Section XII of the will, titled Residuary Estate, directed that “all items of personal property

which shall become a part of residuary estate shall be sold at auction and the net proceeds of such

sale shall be given, in equal shares, to my children, Amos Eugene Qualls and Jerry Franklin Qualls,”

and that the remainder of the residuary estate “shall be distributed in equal shares to my children,

Amos Eugene Qualls, Jerry Franklin Qualls, and Henrietta Joy Klutts.”
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The Executrix timely filed a petition in the Probate Court of Perry County seeking to admit

the will to probate. The petition was granted and the Executrix proceeded to administer the estate.

The Decedent’s children apparently participated in the selection of personal property in accordance

with the will. Thereafter, in August of 2002, the Executrix conducted a public sale auctioning the

remaining personal property. The sale produced $3,912.41 for the estate. 

Subsequently, the Executrix filed a proposed final accounting, which was met by the

petitioner’s motion to reject the Executrix’s final accounting. The petitioner then submitted a

supplemental filing to the chancery court setting forth a history of animosity with the Executrix, his

sister, and accusations that the Executrix had failed to properly distribute the personal property.

After conducting a hearing on the petition, the Chancellor dismissed the petition by order

entered May 12, 2003, and approved the final accounting that had been submitted by the Executrix.

On June 11, 2003, the petitioner filed a petition for reconsideration, which the Chancellor summarily

denied. Thereafter, the petitioner filed the first of his appeals to this court, asking this court to

review the Chancellor’s May 12, 2003 order. 

The first appeal filed by the petitioner set forth in excess of thirty issues. As this court noted

in our first opinion, 

Mr. Qualls concedes the futility of this approach by making the following statement

in his brief:

As a practical matter, the court is not expected to take the necessary

time to rule on all those issues listed here on an individual basis.

[Appellant] would be happy to receive the remedies requested-and

prays that the court rule in his favor. Maybe some of the issues can be

combined and dealt with in a more general manner, rather than with

specificity as set forth here, or maybe the court could choose which

issues are most significant to rule on.

Qualls v. Klutts, No. M2003-01850-COA-R3-CV, 2005 WL 1887121, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug.

9, 2005).

After reviewing the plethora of issues raised, the court determined “the single issue for this

Court’s resolution can be stated as follows: whether the trial court erred in dismissing the

Appellant's petition contesting the Appellee’s final accounting and manner of administering the

estate. For the following reasons, we must affirm the trial court’s decision.” Id. at *4. In our analysis

set forth in the opinion following the first appeal we noted:

After evaluating the Appellant’s statement of the evidence, the trial court entered an

order noting that, while it did contain some of the evidence produced at the hearing,

it also included the Appellant’s unsworn comments and personal observations and

omitted the testimony of the Appellee offered under direct examination. The trial

court noted in its order of February 24, 2004, that the Appellee testified that some of
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the items of personal property requested by the Appellant were either stolen or had

been given to her by the Decedent or her mother prior to their deaths. Otherwise, she

denied withholding the other items requested by the Appellant. The trial court found

the Appellee’s testimony to be truthful, and we find nothing in the limited record to

subvert this finding. See Wells v. Tenn. Bd. of Regents, 9 S.W.3d 779, 783 (Tenn.

1999) ( “[A]ppellate courts will not re-evaluate a trial judge’s assessment of witness

credibility absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.”).

Qualls, 2005 WL 1887121, at *4. In the analysis the court went on to note:

The Appellant utilizes a significant portion of his brief to argue that the trial court

erred in applying the in terrorem clause in the Decedent’s will to his petition. Our

Supreme Court has previously ruled as follows:

This Court has recognized that a forfeiture provision in a will is not

void as against public policy. Tate v. Camp, 147 Tenn. 137, 149, 245

S.W. 839, 842 (1922); Thompson v. Gaut, 82 Tenn. 310, 314 (1884).

However, it has been the rule since Tate v. Camp, that a forfeiture

provision will not be enforced where a contest is pursued “in good

faith and upon probable cause.” After considering decisions from

other jurisdictions, the Court in Tate v. Camp approved the following

from South Norwalk Trust Co. v. St. John, 92 Conn. 168, 101 A. 961,

963 (1917), “‘Where the contest has not been made in good faith, and

upon probable cause and reasonable justification, the forfeiture

should be given full operative effect. Where the contrary appears, the

legatee ought not to forfeit his legacy.’” Tate v. Camp, 147 Tenn. at

155-56, 245 S.W. at 844.

Winningham v. Winningham, 966 S.W.2d 48, 51 (Tenn. 1998). We cannot determine

if the Appellant’s petition was filed in good faith and upon probable cause because

our ability to review the facts necessary to making such determination is hampered

by an incomplete and inaccurate statement of the evidence. Likewise, even if we

were inclined to address each and every issue presented by the Appellant in his brief,

the state of the record prevents an adequate review of those issues as well.

Qualls, 2005 WL 1887121 at *5. From there, the court concluded that “without a statement of the

evidence which accurately reflects the evidence presented to the trial court, we must presume that

the record, had it been accurately presented to this Court, would contain sufficient evidence to

support the trial court’s decision.” Id. For the foregoing reasons, the court, in the first appeal,

affirmed the probate court’s decision to dismiss the petition, and remanded with costs of the appeal

taxed to the petitioner. Id.

In this, the second appeal of the same action, the petitioner raises the issue of “whether the

trial court erred in denying [the petitioner’s] ‘Motion for Immediate Bench Trial.’” The answer to

the question presented is “no,” the trial court did not err in denying the motion. 
The petitioner raised two additional issues on appeal. There is, however, no factual basis to support the issues

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raised. Thus, we decline to conduct an analysis of the wholly unsupported issues.

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The single issue in the first appeal was whether the trial court erred in dismissing the

petitioner’s petition contesting the Executrix’s final accounting and manner of administering the

estate. In that appeal, this court affirmed the probate court’s decision to deny the petitioner’s

original petition. By making the motion following remand of the case to the probate court, the

petitioner was seeking a trial on the merits of the underlying petition as though it had not yet been

decided. It, however, had been decided by the probate court, which decision was affirmed by this

court. Moreover, when the petitioner sought further review by the Tennessee Supreme Court, that

court declined the petition. As a consequence, the original decision of the probate court was

affirmed in all respects and the issue was no longer subject to trial on the merits. For these reasons,

we again affirm the probate court; this time affirming its decision to deny the petitioner’s motion for

another bench trial of the issue that is, and has been, res judicata.

Having addressed the dispositive issue on appeal, we now consider whether this appeal is 2

frivolous, as the Executrix contends. A frivolous appeal is one that has no reasonable chance of

success. Lovelace v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 632 S.W.2d 553, 555 (Tenn. 1982). A frivolous appeal

is one that is “devoid of merit,” or one in which there is “little prospect that the appeal can ever

succeed.” Morton v. Morton, 182 S.W.3d 821, 838 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (citing Industrial Dev. Bd.

of the City of Tullahoma v. Hancock, 901 S.W.2d 382, 385 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995)). 

Our Supreme Court has stated that successful litigants should not have to bear the expense

of groundless appeals. Davis v. Gulf Ins. Group, 546 S.W.2d 583, 586 (Tenn. 1977). The Tennessee

General Assembly has also taken a stand on the issue by proclaiming:

When it appears to any reviewing court that the appeal from any court of record was

frivolous or taken solely for delay, the court may . . . award just damages against the

appellant, which may include, but need not be limited to, costs . . . and expenses

incurred by the appellee as a result of the appeal.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-1-122.

A frivolous appeal is one that is devoid of merit, and we have determined that this appeal is

certainly devoid of merit. Therefore, the Executrix is entitled to recover her reasonable expenses

incurred on appeal. 

IN CONCLUSION

The judgment of the probate court is affirmed in all respects, and this cause is remanded to

the trial court for a determination as to the damages due pursuant to the provisions of Tenn. Code

Ann. § 27-1-122. Costs of this appeal are taxed to the petitioner, Amos Eugene Qualls, for which

execution may issue if necessary. 
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___________________________________ 

FRANK G. CLEMENT, JR., JUDGE