J-S24033-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

KAYLA FLOOD

v.

JONATHAN SLAUGHTER 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 154 MDA 2023

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 21, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Civil Division at No(s): 

2022-CV-1767-AB

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED JULY 13, 2023

Appellant Jonathan Slaughter appeals nunc pro tunc from the 

September 21, 2022, judgment of sentence entered in the Court of Common 

Pleas of Dauphin County following his conviction at a non-jury trial on the 

charge of indirect criminal contempt, 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6114, stemming from his 

violation of a Protection From Abuse (“PFA”)1 order. After a careful review, 

we affirm. 

The relevant facts and procedural history are as follows: On March 11, 

2022, Kayla Flood (“the victim”) filed a petition for a PFA order against 

Appellant, who is the father of her minor child. On that same date, the trial 

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6101 et seq.
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court filed a temporary PFA order, effective March 11, 2022. On March 23, 

2022, the trial court entered a final PFA order against Appellant, effective 

March 23, 2022, and expiring on September 23, 2022,2 which provided:

1. [Appellant] shall not abuse, harass, stalk, threaten, or attempt 

to use physical force against [the victim] in any place where 

[she] might be found.

2. [Appellant] shall not contact [the victim], or any other person 

protected under this order, by telephone or by any other 

means, including through third persons.

3. Additional findings of this order are set forth below. 

PFA order, filed 3/23/22, at 1.

In its additional findings, the trial court specifically provided 

“[Appellant] may not post any remark(s) and/or images regarding 

[the victim], on any social network(s), including, but not limited to, 

Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, or any other electronic networks.” Id.

at 3 (bold in original). 

On July 13, 2022, Lower Paxton Township Police Officer Melinda 

Welcomer filed a criminal complaint against Appellant charging him with one 

count of indirect criminal contempt under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6114 for violation of 

the final PFA order. Relevantly, Officer Welcomer averred in the affidavit of 

probable cause:

[Appellant] did post the following on Instagram on 6/25/22 

under the screen name “bklynandeverywhere.” The main page has 

a photo of [Appellant] and has the name “Jonathan Slaughter” on 

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2 Subsequently, on September 21, 2022, the trial court extended the final PFA

order to expire on September 23, 2023. 
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it. The post said the following: “You get a nigga locked up who 

didn’t hit you to end up w/ one who actually does. Karma is a 

bitch. I don’t condone hitting women ESPECIALLY pregnant ones. 

Just saying when you’re evil it comes back around to you.” 

It should be noted that [Appellant] mentioned to [the 

victim] at a later date about knowledge he received about [the 

victim] allegedly being abused by her current boyfriend. [The 

victim] is also pregnant.

Police Complaint, Affidavit of Probable Cause, filed 7/13/22, at 4

(capitalization in original).

On September 21, 2022, Appellant proceeded to a non-jury trial at 

which he was represented by counsel. At trial, the victim testified she and 

Appellant were in a romantic relationship “off and on” from 2013 until 2020, 

and they have a seven-year-old son together. N.T., 9/21/22, at 4. The victim 

testified she and Appellant are in an “ongoing custody case.” Id. 

The victim testified that, on July 1, 2022, at 6:30 p.m., she and 

Appellant were communicating on the parenting app provided for under the 

parties’ custody order. Id. at 6, 8, 10. During the conversation, Appellant 

made “some comments about [the victim’s] current boyfriend beating [her] 

up[.]” Id. at 6. Specifically, when the victim asked Appellant why their son 

was hungry after he had been in Appellant’s care, Appellant responded their 

son had eaten “only once that day.” Id. at 7. When the victim asked him 

why their son had eaten only once, Appellant responded their son told 

Appellant that the victim’s “dude beat [her] in front of [their son], and [the 

victim] then beat [their son] for telling [Appellant about the victim’s] 
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business.” Id. Appellant told the victim she should be more concerned about 

these incidents than about why their son had eaten only once while he was in 

Appellant’s custody. Id. 

The victim testified a friend subsequently told her Appellant had posted 

comments on his Instagram page, which is “bklynandeverywhere,” and on 

July 13, 2022, she looked at Appellant’s Instagram page. Id. at 6-8. She 

testified she knew it was Appellant’s Instagram account because they had 

been in “some type of relationship for years, and [that had] always been his 

Instagram account.”3 Id. at 8. The victim saw comments on Appellant’s social 

media page “referring to the incident that he had brought up between him and 

[the victim] on the parenting app.” Id. at 6. Specifically, Appellant had 

posted the following comment: “You get a nigga locked up that hit you to end 

up with one who actually does. Karma is a bitch.” Id. at 9. She noted the 

caption of the post indicated: “I don’t condone hitting women, especially 

pregnant ones. Just saying when you’re evil it comes back around to you.” 

Id. 

The victim testified that, although she did not learn of or read the

comments on Appellant’s Instagram account until July 13, 2022, the account 

reflected the comments were posted on June 25, 2022. Id. at 13. She noted 

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3 The Commonwealth also offered into evidence an exhibit, which showed a 

photo on Instagram under the username “bklynandeverywhere.” Id. at 9. 

The victim confirmed the photo was of Appellant and his daughter. Id.
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that during the time the comments were posted on Appellant’s Instagram 

account, as well as at the time of trial, she was pregnant. Id. She also noted 

that in 2020 Appellant assaulted her, and he served “some jail time” in 

connection with the assault. Id. at 11-12. Accordingly, given she was 

pregnant, she had been the object of his previous assault resulting in his jail 

time, and the comments were similar to those made to her by Appellant on 

the parenting app, the victim concluded the post on Appellant’s Instagram 

page was about her. Id. at 10-11. The victim testified she, thus, went to the 

police station to report Appellant’s violation of the trial court’s PFA order. Id. 

at 10. 

On cross-examination, the victim testified she neither told Appellant that 

she was dating someone else nor that she was pregnant. Id. at 14. However, 

she testified that, during the July 1, 2022, parenting app communication, 

Appellant mentioned to her that their son had told him about the victim’s 

pregnancy. Id. She noted Appellant had custody of their son prior to 

Appellant’s posting of the comments on his Instagram account on June 25, 

2022. Id. She also noted the last time she saw Appellant in person was on 

May 23, 2022, during a custody mediation proceeding, at which time her 

pregnancy “was showing.” Id. at 15. 

Further, on cross-examination, the victim admitted that, during the time 

she was romantically involved with Appellant, he mentioned a person by the 

name of “True” who was from New York. Id. at 20. However, she noted this 
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was “early on” in their relationship, so her memory about “True” was “vague.” 

Id. at 21. She admitted Appellant’s Instagram post did not mention her by 

name. Id. 

Sasha Hall testified she is Appellant’s current paramour. Id. at 22. She 

testified that, after elementary school closed for the summer, she began to 

help Appellant with the custody exchanges for his son. Id. at 24. Specifically, 

beginning in early June of 2022, she often took the child to meet the victim 

for custody exchanges. Id. She testified she neither knew nor saw evidence 

that the victim was pregnant in June of 2022. Id. She admitted that, if the 

victim’s pregnancy had been evident to her, she would probably have told 

Appellant. Id. 

On cross-examination, Ms. Hall confirmed that, beginning in June of 

2022, she often met the victim in the parking lot of a grocery store to 

exchange custody of the child. Id. at 26. She admitted that both women 

would exit their respective vehicles during the exchanges. Id. She reiterated 

that, while she noticed the victim was “thick” or “heavyset,” she did not realize 

this was because of a pregnancy. Id. 

Appellant admitted he posted the comments at issue on his Instagram 

account. Id. at 31. However, he denied the comments were about the victim; 

but rather, he testified the comments were about True’s son, Kahlil. Id. 

Specifically, he testified as follows on direct examination:
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Q. There’s been testimony by [the victim] that she believes 

[the Instagram post] was about her. Would you like to clarify for 

the Judge and the Court who that was actually about?

A. That was about my friend, True, who she said that she 

knows. Actually, it’s about his son. His son was in a relationship—

it’s—I know True from New York. And there’s a little community 

that we know each other; we have mutual friends and everything 

else. And his son was in a relationship that was kind of the 

neighborhood news. He was taking care of this young lady and 

real nice to her and everything else, and it was like it seemed like 

[an] ideal relationship for the most part. And then—

Q. What was his son’s name?

A. Kahlil.

Q. And what happened?

A. Oh, things went sour. He got—to be—to be honest, he 

got caught cheating on her, and when [his girlfriend found out], 

she called the cops on him, got him locked up. And now the reason 

why I sent the post was because of the current situation is that 

he was with her, taking care of her, and not doing—and her 

daughter and everything else and treating her real good, and now 

she’s in an abusive relationship with someone else who was 

driving a car and spending her money and not treating her as good 

as Kahlil did and actually abusing her as well.

Q. And is that young lady pregnant?

A. Yes, she is.

Q. And how did you find out about all this information?

A. Through my friend, True.

Id.at 31-32. 

Appellant denied the comments on his Instagram page were “geared 

toward [the victim].” Id. at 32. He testified he was not aware the victim was 

pregnant until he was “handcuffed for this case at [his] parole agent’s office,

and [he] was reading the affidavit for why [he] was arrested.” Id. He testified 

he pays no attention to the victim’s personal relationships, except that he is 
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concerned since his son told him that he was afraid of the victim’s boyfriend 

because he saw the man hit the victim. Id. at 33. He noted his son did not 

tell him that the victim’s boyfriend hit her until after he posted the comments 

on Instagram. Id. Prior to this, he had no reason to believe the victim was 

being abused by her boyfriend. Id. at 34. 

Appellant admitted he “regretfully” assaulted the victim in 2020. Id. at 

37. He testified he is currently on parole for other offenses unrelated to the 

victim, and the victim is aware that if he is convicted of another criminal 

offense, his parole could be revoked. Id. at 37, 41. He suggested this is the 

victim’s motivation in claiming the comments on Instagram are about her. Id. 

at 37.

On cross-examination, Appellant testified as follows:

Q. You discussed briefly on direct this girl—it was True, 

gentleman, and then it was about this girl. What’s that girl’s 

name?

A. Sharita.

Q. How do you spell that?

A. S-h-a-r-i-t-a.

Q. And your testimony on direct was that this post on 

Instagram was directed towards this Sharita?

A. Yes.

Q. Are you friends with that Sharita?

A. Yes. It was—it was a general post—you asked me, it was 

a general post just put out there for the people in the 

neighborhood that knew about the situation.

Q. Oh, so it wasn’t directed towards Sharita this time 

around?
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A. It was, like I said, a general post to put—like I said, 

people in the neighborhood knew what was going on and people 

in—that’s what it was about, yes.

Q. So you weren’t trying to blast, quote unquote, Sharita?

A. The situation was so, yes.

Q. And do you follow those people from, quote unquote, the 

neighborhood?

A. Yeah, yes, we do follow each other.

Q. What’s Drew’s name?

A. True.

Q. True, what’s his name?

A. Alfred Pont.

Q. Do you follow him on Instagram?

A. He doesn’t really do Instagram.

Q. What about Kahlil?

A. That’s his son. No, I don’t follow him on Instagram.

Q. So three of the names you provided to the Court you 

don’t follow on Instagram?

A. Yeah. Like I said—

Q. But you were just being a nice person putting out a 

general public service announcement?

A. It was more than just a public service announcement. 

Like I said, it was people in the neighborhood that—that follow the 

post that I was addressing.

***

Q. Let’s talk about the post directly....So, you’re saying to 

this Court, and I’m referencing the caption: I don’t condone hitting 

women, especially pregnant women. Just saying when you’re evil 

it comes back around to you.

A. Yes.

Q. That’s the general public service announcement you were 

testifying to?

A. Yes.

Q. Not directed towards the victim?
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A. Definitely not. It was directed toward Sharita and that 

situation because she got him locked up for infidelity.

Id. at 39-42.

Appellant indicated that, before he posted the comments on Instagram 

on June 25, 2022, he had no knowledge that the victim was pregnant or that 

she was allegedly being abused by her new boyfriend. Id. at 42. 

At the conclusion of all testimony, the trial court indicated:

The Court can’t set aside its common sense and reason. And 

despite the arguments of counsel in this matter, it’s clear to me 

beyond a reasonable doubt that this post was directed to the 

victim in this case, and therefore, we’ll find [Appellant] guilty on 

indirect criminal contempt. 

Id. at 48. 

The trial court sentenced Appellant to three months’ probation and a 

fine of $300.00. On September 30, 2022, Appellant filed a timely, counseled 

post-sentence motion, which the trial court denied on October 5, 2022.

4

 On 

November 7, 2022,5 Appellant filed an untimely notice of appeal; however, on 

January 19, 2023, Appellant discontinued his appeal, and on January 20, 

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4 We note the trial court’s order summarily denied Appellant’s post-sentence 

motion without providing Appellant with notice of his appeal rights. See 

Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(B)(4) (pertaining to the contents of an order denying a postsentence motion). 

5 The thirtieth day to file an appeal from the denial of post-sentence motions 

was Friday, November 4, 2022. See Pa.R.A.P. 903(a).
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2023, Appellant filed a timely collateral petition under the PCRA6 seeking to 

have his appeal rights reinstated nunc pro tunc. On January 23, 2023, the 

court granted Appellant’s petition to reinstate his appeal rights nunc pro tunc, 

and on January 26, 2023, Appellant filed the instant counseled notice of 

appeal. All Pa.R.A.P. 1925 requirements have been met.

On appeal, Appellant sets forth the following issue in his “Statement of 

Questions Presented” (verbatim):

1. Did the Commonwealth fail to establish that Mr. Slaughter 

acted with wrongful intent when he posted a comment without 

mentioning the complainant’s name, there were alternative 

credible circumstances for the posting, and the complainant 

discovered the statement days after their posting?

Appellant’s Brief at 6 (suggested answer omitted).

Broadly, we start from the premise that contempt convictions are 

reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See Commonwealth v. Haigh, 874 

A.2d 1174, 1177 (Pa.Super. 2005). In giving latitude to the trial court’s 

discretion, our task is to ascertain whether the facts support that court’s 

ultimate determination. Id. at 1176-77.

As with any claim that contests whether there was sufficient evidence 

to sustain a conviction, we employ a well-settled series of legal precepts:

The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the 

evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in 

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6 Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-46. We note the 

petition was filed within one year of when Appellant’s judgment of sentence 

became final. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). 
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the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient 

evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the 

crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying [the above] test, 

we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for 

the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and 

circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not 

preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a 

defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the 

evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no 

probability of fact may be drawn from the combined 

circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of 

proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by 

means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying 

the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and all 

evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the trier 

of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the 

weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part or none 

of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. DiStefano, 782 A.2d 574, 582 (Pa.Super. 2001) 

(citations and quotation marks omitted).

A charge of indirect criminal contempt consists of a claim 

that a violation of an Order or Decree of court occurred outside 

the presence of the court. Commonwealth v. Padilla, 885 A.2d 

994 (Pa.Super. 2005). “Where a PFA order is involved, an indirect 

criminal contempt charge is designed to seek punishment for 

violation of the protective order.” Id. at 996. As with those 

accused of any crime, “one charged with indirect criminal 

contempt is to be provided the safeguards which statute and 

criminal procedures afford.” Id. at 996–97 (citation omitted). To 

establish indirect criminal contempt, the Commonwealth must 

prove: 1) the Order was sufficiently definite, clear, and specific to 

the contemnor as to leave no doubt of the conduct prohibited; 2) 

the contemnor had notice of the Order; 3) the act constituting the 

violation must have been volitional; and 4) the contemnor must 

have acted with wrongful intent. Commonwealth v. Ashton, 824 

A.2d 1198, 1202 (Pa.Super. 2003).

Commonwealth v. Brumbaugh, 932 A.2d 108, 110 (Pa.Super. 2007).
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Here, the PFA order provided, in relevant part: “[Appellant] may not 

post any remark(s) and/or images regarding [the victim], on any 

social network(s), including, but not limited to, Facebook, Instagram, 

Twitter, or any other electronic networks.” PFA Order, filed 3/23/22, at 

3 (bold in original). 

Appellant does not dispute the trial court’s order was definite, clear, and 

specific to him as to leave no doubt of the conduct prohibited. See 

Brumbaugh, supra. He also does not dispute that he had notice of the order. 

See id. Furthermore, Appellant does not dispute that he knowingly and 

voluntarily posted the comments on his Instagram page. Id.

However, Appellant contends there is insufficient evidence his

Instagram post was directed at or otherwise about the victim, who is protected 

by the PFA order. Rather, he contends the evidence reveals his Instagram 

post was about a situation involving his friend’s son, Kahlil, and Kahlil’s exgirlfriend, who are not protected by the PFA order. Accordingly, he avers there 

is no evidence his actions violated the PFA order or that he acted with a 

wrongful intent in posting the comments. 

In finding no merit to Appellant’s sufficiency claim, the trial court 

indicated the following:

The [trial] court found [the victim] and her testimony to be 

credible. Here testimony was corroborated by specific information 

contained in the social medial posts that related to events in [the 

victim’s] life. The [trial] court did not find [Appellant] credible and 

was not persuaded by his argument that he was referring to a 

third person in his social media posts. The personal nature of the 
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information in the social medial posts and the [trial] court’s 

assessment of the parties’ testimony led it to find [Appellant] in 

contempt of the PFA [order]. 

In conclusion, this matter was determined by the credibility 

of the parties. The [trial] court did not find [Appellant’s] 

explanation about his conduct to be credible. [Appellant’s] 

conduct violated the provision of the PFA prohibiting posting about 

[the victim] on social media. For these reasons, the [trial] court 

found [Appellant] to be in indirect criminal contempt.

Trial Court Opinion, filed 1/5/23, at 2-3. 

In light of the trial court’s credibility determinations, which are within its 

purview, and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth, as verdict winner, we agree with the trial court that the 

evidence is sufficient to establish that Appellant’s Instagram post was about 

the victim. 

For example, Appellant and the victim were previously paramours, and 

they share a child. The victim testified that, as referenced in Appellant’s

Instagram post, during the end of their romantic relationship, the victim 

accused Appellant of assaulting her, and Appellant served jail time for the 

assault. N.T., 9/21/22, at 11-12. The victim further testified that, as 

referenced in Appellant’s Instagram post, the victim was pregnant, and within 

a week of Appellant posting the comments, he admitted to the victim that he 

knew about her pregnancy. Id. at 13-14. Moreover, the victim testified that, 

as referenced in Appellant’s Instagram post, she and Appellant had a 

conversation via the court’s parenting app wherein Appellant made comments 

reflecting his belief that the victim’s current boyfriend assaulted her. Id. at 7. 
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This conversation occurred less than a week after Appellant posted the 

comments on his Instagram page. Id. Accordingly, although Appellant 

refrained from using the victim’s name, we agree with the trial court that the 

circumstantial evidence led to the inescapable conclusion that Appellant’s 

comments were referring to the victim. See DiStefano, supra (setting forth 

standard of review for sufficiency claims).

Under such circumstances and guided by the overarching purpose of the 

PFA to prevent abuse, we find ample evidentiary support for the trial court’s 

determination that Appellant possessed the wrongful intent to violate the PFA

order. Brumbaugh, supra. Appellant’s wrongful intent can be imputed by 

virtue of the substantial certainty that his posting of the comments about the 

victim would be in violation of the PFA order. See Brumbaugh, supra. See 

also Haigh, supra (holding judges should use common sense and consider 

context and surrounding factors in making determination as to whether 

violation of a PFA order is truly intentional). Thus, we reject Appellant’s 

argument that no wrongful intent attended his Instagram comments, which 

were posted following the entry of the PFA order against him. Consequently, 

we find no merit to his sufficiency challenge.

For all of the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

Affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 07/13/2023