alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### WILLIAM W. WISMAN, Appellant, v. HELEN FAYE WISMAN, Respondent.

No. 10545

April 9, 1980

608 P.2d 1110

*John F. O’Reilly,*Las Vegas, for Appellant.

*Manos & Cherry,*Las Vegas, for Respondent.

OPINION

*Per Curiam:*

On November 7, 1974, a decree of divorce was entered in the district court terminating the marriage of appellant William W. Wisman and respondent Helen Faye Wisman. In the decree the court ordered appellant to pay alimony to respondent in the amount of $1,000 per month until such time as respondent remarried, died, “or until further order of this Court.”

On April 8, 1977, appellant, seeking to reduce the amount of the alimony payments, filed a motion to modify the decree of divorce. The district court ruled that it was without power to hear the motion because it had not expressly retained jurisdiction to modify the divorce decree. Appellant thereafter moved the court to rehear its order denying the motion to modify. The court denied the motion for rehearing and this appeal followed.

*341In 1974, when the instant divorce decree was entered, unac-crued alimony payments could not be modified “unless the court expressly retained jurisdiction for such modification at the final hearing.” NRS 125.170.1 Here, appellant contends the language in the divorce decree which provides that alimony shall be paid “until further order of this Court” is a sufficient reservation of jurisdiction by the court to modify the decree. Therefore, he argues, the district judge erroneously determined that he was without power to hear the motion to modify. We agree.

In Lewis v. Lewis, 53 Nev. 398, 407-408, 2 P.2d 131, 134 (1931), this court stated that “if the right is reserved by the trial court to make additional or further orders .. . with reference to . . . alimony payments, and if a proper showing is made, the trial court has ample power and authority to modify and amend its decree in divorce cases in the foregoing respects.” Thus, the district court having conditioned the payment of alimony in this case “until further order”, it clearly retained the power to modify the divorce decree regarding alimony. Accordingly, the order of the district court denying appellant’s motion to modify is reversed and this case is remanded for further proceedings.

1

 NRS 125.170 was repealed in 1975. 1975 Nev. Stats., ch. 744 § 3, at 1589.
United States Department of Labor

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

__________________________________________

J.R., Appellant

and

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, 

U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION,

San Deigo, CA, Employer

__________________________________________

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)

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)

)

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)

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Docket No. 22-0424

Issued: July 29, 2022

Appearances: Case Submitted on the Record

Appellant, pro se

Office of Solicitor, for the Director

ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL

Before:

PATRICIA H. FITZGERALD, Deputy Chief Judge

JANICE B. ASKIN, Judge

VALERIE D. EVANS-HARRELL, Alternate Judge

On January 27, 2022 appellant filed a timely appeal from a January 7, 2022 merit 

decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). The Clerk of the 

Appellate Boards assigned Docket No. 22-0424.

In correspondence dated and received on May 17, 2022, appellant requested that the 

appeal be withdrawn.

The Board has duly considered the matter and concludes that appellant’s request for the 

withdrawal of the appeal should be granted.1 Accordingly, 

1 The Board’s decisions and orders are “final upon the expiration of 30 days from the date of their issuance. ” 

20 C.F.R. § 501.6(d).
2

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT appellant’s request for the withdrawal of the appeal 

is granted. The appeal docketed as No. 22-0424 is dismissed.

Issued: July 29, 2022

Washington, DC

Patricia H. Fitzgerald, Deputy Chief Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Janice B. Askin, Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Valerie D. Evans-Harrell, Alternate Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
# Fourth Court of Appeals **San Antonio, Texas**
MEMORANDUM OPINION
N o. 04

- 24

- 00060

- CR Jessie Marquis MACWILLIAMS , Appellant

v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee
From the 437th Judicial District Court , Bexar County, Texas Trial Court No. 2022CR10224 Honorable Joel Perez , Judge Presiding
PER CURIAM Sitting: Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice Lori I. Valenzuela , Justice
Delivered and Filed: Mar ch 6, 2024
DISMISSED FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION On January 25 , 2024, appellant pro se Jessie Marquis MacWilliams filed a notice of appeal from the trial court’s Agreed Judgment of C ompetency to Stand Trial. On January 30 , 2024, the
clerk’s record was file d in this court. The clerk’s record does not contain an appealable order. As a general rule, a criminal defendant’s right of appeal is limited to an appeal from a final judgment
of conviction. See T EX

. C ODE C RIM

. P ROC

. art. 44.02; see also State v. Sellers , 790 S.W.2d 316, 321 n.4 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (“A defendant’s general right to appeal under [article 44.02] and its predecessors has always been limited to appeal from a ‘final judgment,’ though the statute does04

- 24

- 00060

- CR

- 2

- not contain this limitation on its face.”). Moreover, “[t]he courts of appeals do not have jurisdiction to review interlocutory orders unless that jurisdiction has been expressly granted by law.” Ragston
v. State , 424 S.W.3d 49, 52 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (quoting Apolinar v. State , 820 S.W .2d 792, 794 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991))

. This record does not contain a final judgment, and i t appears we lack jurisdiction over an appeal from an Agreed Judgment of C ompetency to Stand Trial

. See T EX

. C ODE C RIM

. P ROC

. art. 46B.011 (“Neither the state nor the defendant is entitled to make an interlocutory appeal relating
to a determination or ruling under Article 46B.005.”) ; Fiala v. State , No. 04

- 17

- 00170

- CR, 2017 WL 3159439, at *1 (Tex. App.

— San Antonio July 26, 2017, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (dismissing appeal of competency determination for lack of jurisdiction).
We ordered MacWilliams to show cause by February 12 , 2024, why this appeal should not
be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction . No response was filed. Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction

.

PER CURIAM
DO NOT PUBLISH
**Exhibit 32.1**

**CERTIFICATIONPURSUANT TO18 U. S. C. SECTION 1350AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Vistula CommunicationsServices, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-QSB for the periodended March 31, 2006, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commissionon the date hereof (the “Report”), I, John Keith Markley, Chief ExecutiveOfficer of the Company, certify, to my best knowledge and belief, pursuant to18 U.S.C.§ 1350, adopted pursuant to §906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of2002, that:

1)               the Report fully complies with therequirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the SecuritiesExchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

2)               the information contained in the Reportfairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and resultsof operations of the Company.
|        | /s/ JOHN KEITH MARKLEY  |
|--------|-------------------------|
|   | John Keith Markley      |
|   | Chief Executive Officer |

 

Dated: May 22, 2006

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906,or other document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting thesignature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of thiswritten statement required by Section 906, has been provided to VistulaCommunications Services, Inc. and will be retained by VistulaCommunications Services, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and ExchangeCommission or its staff upon request.

----
Exhibit 11.2


                                 EARNINGS PER SHARE
                             FULLY DILUTED COMPUTATION
                ($ in millions, except share and per share amounts)


                                                 Six Months Ended
                                                    December 31,      
                                              ---------------------
                                                     
                                               1996           1995
                                              -------        ------   
  

Basis for computation of earnings per 
 common and common equivalent shares:
   Earnings from continuing operations        $ 81.0        $ 65.8
   Deduct dividends on 4 Percent
   cumulative preferred stock                    (.2)          (.2)
                                              --------      -------
   Earnings from continuing operations
    available to common shareholders            80.8          65.6
   Discontinued operations                      (2.1)         30.7
                                              --------      -------

   Available for common shareholders          $ 78.7        $ 96.3
                                              ========      ======= 


Number of shares:
  Weighted average shares outstanding      74,173,030   76,098,488
  Shares issuable upon exercise of
   stock options,net of shares assumed
   to be repurchased                        1,772,927    1,181,659
                                           ----------   ----------
                                           75,945,957   77,280,147
                                           ==========   ==========



Earnings per common share:
  Continuing operations                        $ 1.07      $ .85
  Discontinued operations                        (.03)       .40
                                               -------     -----

  Net earnings                                 $ 1.04     $ 1.25
                                               =======    ======
#### MARTHA STOKER, Appellant and Cross-Respondent, v. JIM MARSH AMERICAN CORPORATION, a Nevada Corporation, Doing Business as JIM MARSH AMERICAN JEEP, VOLVO AND TRIUMPH, Respondent and Cross-Appellant.

No. 7833

March 17, 1975

532 P.2d 1031

*Darrell Lincoln Clark,*of Las Vegas, for Appellant and Cross-Respondent.

*Scotty Gladstone*and *Douglas J. Shoemaker,*of Las Vegas, for Respondent and Cross-Appellant.

OPINION

*Per Curiam:*

Appellant Martha Stoker appeals a trial court decision in her favor for misrepresentations made to her in the purchase of a new automobile from respondent. She alleges the trial court erred in not awarding her punitive damages and also that the award of $1,150.00 in attorney’s fees was insufficient.

1. The testimony and evidence do not reveal the trial court *165abused its discretion in denying her request for punitive damages. Nevada Cement Co. v. Lemler, 89 Nev. 447, 514 P.2d 1180 (1973); Caple v. Raynel Campers, Inc., 90 Nev. 341, 526 P.2d 334 (1974).

2. Here, too, the award of attorney's fees lies in the sound discretion of the trial court. General Electric v. Bush, 88 Nev. 360, 498 P.2d 366 (1972); Brunzell v. Golden Gate Nat'l Bank, 85 Nev. 345, 455 P.2d 31 (1969). Although Mrs. Stoker claims that the attorney's fees charged her by her attorney (not the same attorney wh9 handled this appeal) will cost her as much as she recovered in her lawsuit. That fact is not the sole measure for an award of attorney's fees. Considering the factors ~f time of preparation, trial and the preliminaries, the $1,150.00 award granted her by the court was reasonable.

The respondent's cross-appeal which alleged that Mrs. Stoker's rescission of the purchase contract was not timely and therefore ineffective is without merit. Frontier Mobile Home Sales, Inc. v. Trigleth, 505 S.W.2d 516 (Ark. 1974); Fablok Mills, Inc. v. Cocker Machine & Foundry Co., 310 A.2d 491 (N.J. Super. 1973); Tiger Motor Company v. McMurtry, 224 So.2d 38 (Ala. 1969); Zoss v. Royal Chevrolet, Inc., 11 UCC Rep. Ser. 527 (1972).

Cross-appeal dismissed. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Exhibit 32.1

Certification required by Rule 13a-14(b) or Rule 15a-14(b) and Section 906 of the

Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of Permian Basin Royalty Trust (the Trust) on Form 10-K for the annual period
ended December 31, 2013 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), the undersigned, not in its individual capacity but solely as the trustee of the Trust, certifies pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to its knowledge:



| | (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and
| | --- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Trust.
| | --- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                    |  |  |  |                                    |  |                                           
|------------------- |  |  |  | ---------------------------------- |  | ------------------------------------------
|                    |  |  |  | BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., TRUSTEE FOR
|                    |  |  |  | PERMIAN BASIN ROYALTY TRUST       
|                    |  |  | 
|Date: March 3, 2014 |  |  |  | By:                                |  | /s/ Ron E. Hooper                         
|                    |  |  |  |                                    |  | Ron E. Hooper,                            
|                    |  |  |  |                                    |  | Senior Vice President,                    
|                    |  |  |  |                                    |  | Royalty Management and Trust Administrator

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to
the Permian Basin Royalty Trust and will be retained by the Permian Basin Royalty Trust and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
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<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUN-30-1998
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