United States Department of Labor

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

__________________________________________

W.D., Appellant

and

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, DEFENSE 

LOGISTICS AGENCY, New Cumberland, PA, 

Employer

__________________________________________

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Docket No. 19-1654

Issued: February 19, 2021

Appearances: Case Submitted on the Record

Howard L. Graham, Esq., for the appellant1

Office of Solicitor, for the Director

DECISION AND ORDER

Before:

ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Chief Judge

JANICE B. ASKIN, Judge

PATRICIA H. FITZGERALD, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION

On August 1, 2019 appellant, through counsel, filed a timely appeal from a July 8, 2019 

merit decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). Pursuant to the 

Federal Employees’ Compensation Act2(FECA) and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the Board 

has jurisdiction over the merits of this case.

 

1

In all cases in which a representative has been authorized in a matter before the Board, no claim for a fee for legal 

or other service performed on appeal before the Board is valid unless approved by the Board. 20 C.F.R. § 501.9(e). 

No contract for a stipulated fee or on a contingent fee basis will be approved by the Board. Id. An attorney or 

representative’s collection of a fee without the Board’s approval may constitute a misdemeanor, subject to fine or 

imprisonment for up to one year or both. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 292. Demands for payment of fees to a 

representative, prior to approval by the Board, may be reported to appropriate authorities for investigation.

 

2 5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.
2

ISSUE

The issue is whether appellant has met his burden of proof to establish a stress-related

condition in the performance of duty, as alleged.

FACTUAL HISTORY

On May 12, 2016 appellant, then a 57-year-old supervisory information technology 

specialist, filed an occupational disease claim (Form CA-2) alleging that he developed 

hypertension over the prior two years due to stress from having an excessive workload and 

unrealistic deadlines. He advised that he first became aware of his claimed condition on May 15, 

2015 and realized its relation to his federal employment on April 1, 2016. On the reverse side of 

the form appellant’s immediate supervisor, B.M., expressed his belief that appellant had not 

established causal relationship. Appellant stopped work on May 3, 2016.

Appellant submitted a May 6, 2016 statement in which he indicated that he began working 

as a supervisor for the joint information operations branch of the employing establishment on 

June 14, 2014. He noted that, in early2013, the branch had undergone a massive reorganization,

which merged five different systems together with 20 employees. Appellant recounted that the 

branch conducted two major software installations per year prior to the reorganization, but 

conducted 12 to 15 major software installations per year thereafter, thereby causing chaos because

the installations interfered with each other.

3

 He asserted that the prior supervisor of the branch, 

C.J., did not like his positive progress supervising the branch and launched a campaign to 

undermine him by using false statements to get the Office of Inspector General to investigate him 

and by having upper management conduct an anonymous online survey in July 2015, entitled, 

“Speak up -- make a difference,” which he believed focused on him. Appellant advised that there 

were four computer development branches at the employing establishment, but maintained that his 

branch had more incident tickets associated with software changes than the three other branches 

combined. He asserted that he had to report an employee in his branch as potentially being an 

active shooter in the workplace due to his erratic behavior. Appellant claimed that he did not have 

a prehypertension condition until his branch reorganized in 2013 and asserted that his hypertension 

was caused by “excessive workload, excessive workplace stress, completely unrealistic deadlines, 

and upper management constantly harassing me and impeding my workplace efforts for the last 

two years.”

Appellant submitted an April 22, 2016 report from Dr. Thomas Minora, a Board-certified 

internist, who noted that appellant reported a correlation between stress from his job requirements 

and high blood pressure. Dr. Minora diagnosed generalized anxiety disorder and recommended 

that appellant take four weeks off work. On May 6, 2016 he indicated that he had treated appellant 

for borderline hypertension since 2013 and hypertension since 2015. Dr. Minora opined that 

appellant’s blood pressure was aggravated by workplace stress.

 

3 Appellant indicated that his branch also had to conduct software changes known as “incident reports” or “incident 

tickets.”
3

In a May 11, 2016 letter received by OWCP on May 12, 2016, the employing establishment 

controverted appellant’s claim on the basis that appellant had not established causal relationship 

between his claimed condition and his federal employment.

In a June 15, 2016 development letter, OWCP requested that appellant submit additional 

evidence in support of his claim, including a physician’s opinion supported by a medical 

explanation as to how the claimed employment factors caused or aggravated his hypertension

condition. It provided him a questionnaire, which posed questions regarding his claimed 

employment factors, as well as his claimed medical condition and its relationship to those factors. 

OWCP afforded appellant 30 days to respond.

In separate June 15, 2016 development letter, OWCP requested that the employing 

establishment provide comments from a knowledgeable supervisor on the accuracy of all 

statements provided by appellant relative to his emotional condition claim. It requested that 

various questions be answered, including whether there were aspects of his job that could be 

perceived as stressful (e.g., overtime, deadlines, quotas, travel, intense assignments, any conflict 

between appellant and coworkers/supervisors, etc.); whether accommodations had been made to 

reduce stress (e.g., reassignment, training, deadline adjustments, etc.); and whether there were 

staffing shortages or extra demands which affected appellant’s workload. OWCP requested that 

the employing establishment indicate whether it concurred with appellant’s claims and, if there 

were points of disagreement, to fully explain fully and provide appropriate supportive evidence. 

It afforded the employing establishment 30 days to respond.

In response, appellant submitted a July 1, 2016 statement in which he asserted that, since 

mid-2014, B.M. and another management official, J.C., created a hostile work environment and 

conducted a campaign of harassment against him, actions that ultimately led to B.M. improperly 

stripping him of handling the day-to-day operation of mid-tier applications commencing 

March 9, 2016. He maintained that B.M. and J.C. undermined him on a daily basis in which they 

assigned tasks and allocated resources/personnel impeded his ability to carry out his supervisory 

responsibilities, including engaging in travel duty and implementing training for both himself and 

his team members. Appellant asserted that the efforts to undermine him began when B.M. 

transferred B.F. into his branch without his knowledge or consent, despite his knowledge that B.F. 

was an employee with known problems. He claimed that on October 6, 2015 the fact that he orally 

admonished another employee for wasting government funds was “improperly leaked” to a private 

person and he was forced to apologize to the employee. As a result, the Office of Inspector General 

launched an investigation against him. Appellant asserted that J.C. improperly allowed another 

manager, D.G., to have unfettered access to employees of the four branches, an action which 

hampered his ability to manage his branch by making the best employees unavailable to receive 

assignments. He claimed that in 2015 he nominated five employees for performance awards, but 

none of them received the awards, thereby blocking his ability to provide positive rewards.

Appellant further alleged that, since he started his supervisory position in June 2014, his 

work branch had enormous problems with computer production servers, hardware, networks, and 

databases because they were administered by another organization. In particular, he indicated that 

production servers would run out of space for data and that the system designed to track workflow 

had configuration flaws, which were so significant that “virtually no one can determine the status 

of where a project is or how it was going.” Appellant maintained that J.C. did not provide adequate 
4

resources to address these circumstances, but rather blamed programmers and other employees for 

failing to fix problems beyond their control. He asserted that he advised B.M. and another 

manager, M.S., about problems with the workflow tracking system, but nothing was done about 

the problems and both individuals chastised him for bringing up the subject. Appellant indicated 

that production servers became unstable three times between February 2015 and January 2016 and 

that his team members uncovered several computers’ problems, including production servers,

which were running out of disc space and network load balancers that were sending all traffic to 

one server. He noted that, in June 2015, B.M. approved mandatory supervisory training classes 

for him, but that M.S. wrongly refused to sign the relevant paperwork and, as such, he was the 

only supervisor who was unable to take the classes. Appellant provided further details about the 

anonymous survey initiated by C.J., noting that results were sent by J.C. to other management 

officials on July 10, 2015. He maintained that C.J. lobbied his former supervisees to submit survey 

responses which were unfavorable to him and asserted that no others were subjected to such 

conduct.

4

 Appellant claimed that, due to the survey responses, he had to temporarily switch jobs 

with another manager. He indicated that, due to the fact that he was improperly relieved of 

handling the day-to-day operation of mid-tier applications, commencing March 9, 2016, he was 

not invited to a March 31, 2016 meeting regarding these applications.

In a July 13, 2016 statement, appellant claimed that 12 to 14 software installations were 

conducted per year because the earlier installations were never ready as scheduled and 

supplemental installations had to be created “on the fly.” He claimed that, at a June 26, 2014 

meeting, J.C. screamed at the attending managers about their inability to complete a vendor system 

module (VSM) project. Appellant asserted that, after C.J. “stormed out” of the meeting, she never 

cooperated with him again and undermined him at every possible opportunity in the future. He

indicated that, at an August 29, 2014 meeting, J.C. was “ranting and raving” about outages of the 

VSM and defense distribution system projects. Appellant asserted that, on that date, J.C. produced 

e-mails in which he indicated that system outages would have repercussions and admitted that the 

software bugs were caused by having too much work scheduled and by completing it too quickly. 

Between July and December 2014, many employees complained to appellant about B.F. not 

completing his assignments and appellant’s efforts to improve B.F.’s performance, including a 

number of counseling sessions, were to no avail.5 Appellant asserted that on September 10, 2014 

J.C., angrily demanded that he produce a situation report due to a computer outage. He claimed

that, in January and February 2015, he rated the performance of B.F. and another subordinate 

employee as partially successful, but asserted that management improperly changed the ratings for 

both to fully successful.

Appellant asserted that, in general, the complaints expressed by employees in the July 2015 

anonymous survey were about the aggressive scheduling of work and procedures being “messed 

up” since the 2013 reorganization. He claimed that he learned that J.C. was “livid” during a 

meeting regarding the survey and had threatened to force him to discuss the matter in front of the 

meeting attendees. In response to J.C.’s question regarding whether he had too much work, 

 

 

4 Appellant also claimed that S.K., a friend of C.J., spent most of her free time harassing him.

5 Appellant claimed that a legal department official wrongly denied him access to B.F.’s internet browser history, 

thereby frustrating his attempt to address B.F.’s improper use of the internet.
5

appellant responded that he had 140 active incident tickets while the other three programming 

managers (T.K, D.E., and M.L.) collectively had 70.6 He asserted that, during an August 2015 

investigation of B.F. for timecard fraud, J.C. and other managers “concocted a completely false 

and fraudulent narrative.” Appellant indicated that, during an April 13, 2016 management 

meeting, he expressed his concern that B.F. might become an active shooter. He asserted that a 

manager told him that there was little that the human resources could do about B.F. unless he was 

making threats about harming himself or others.

Appellant submitted the position description for a supervisory information technology 

specialist, an agency organization chart, a handout from a July 15, 2015 “town hall” meeting, and 

17 anonymous employee responses to questions from the survey entitled, “Speak up -- make a 

difference.” A number of the employees who answered the survey asserted that the 2013 

reorganization made communication among team members more difficult and that managers did 

not adequately respond to their concerns. One employee emphasized that there was too much 

work and that work deadlines were unreasonable.

Appellant submitted several e-mails documenting communications among management 

officials. In a February 2, 2016 e-mail, a manager of civilian information operations, R.J., 

expressed his opinion to J.C. that the increased number of “releases” conducted since the 

reorganization had led to “cutting corners” and a decrease in the quality of the releases. In a June 7, 

2016 e-mail, B.M. asserted to J.C. and another manager that his March 9, 2016 relief of appellant 

from the day-to-day operation of mid-tier applications did not cause or contribute to a hostile work 

environment. Rather, he advised that appellant had a “very challenging set of duties” and that a 

GS-13 project manager was hired to assist him with his duties as he was “getting overloaded.” 

B.M. noted that appellant had the largest number of employees to manage among the four 

branches. Regarding the change in appellant’s duties, he indicated, “This had nothing to do with 

his abilities or skills or diligence in his position. It was simply to assist him with his duties in a 

very challenging situation that would overload any supervisor to at least some degree.” B.M. 

asserted that he had nothing to do with B.F. being transferred into appellant’s branch and that he 

did not undermine the disciplinary actions appellant made with respect to his employees.

Appellant submitted an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) document, 

signed on July 1, 2016, which effectuated his filing of a formal EEOC complaint. He also

submitted additional medical evidence in support of his claim, including an April 1, 2016 report 

from Dr. Minora who diagnosed major depressive disorder (single episode).

In a July 13, 2016 letter, a human resources specialist for the employing establishment, 

J.B., advised that some stress comes with holding a GS-13 supervisory position, but asserted that 

appellant’s stress would be “nothing out of the ordinary.” She indicated that appellant never asked 

to work overtime and that it was rare for appellant’s team members to ask to work overtime. 

Appellant travelled very rarely for work, if at all. J.B. further maintained that appellant did not 

have quotas/deadlines to meet and, although his team had deadlines, it was able to meet them 

 

6 Appellant attached an active incident tickets chart, dated July 22, 2015, which shows that he had 140 active 

incident tickets and that the other three managers he identified collectively had approximately 70. He asserted that 

this report was representative of the amount of work he was assigned relative to other managers throughout his tenure 

as a supervisor. Appellant later submitted another version of the July 22, 2015 chart with different graphics.
6

within normal working hours. She asserted that appellant’s branch did the same work as the other 

three branches, although his branch had a few more people and required oversight of a more 

diverse group of systems. Because of these circumstances, appellant was the only supervisor in 

the four branches to have a GS-13 assistant to help with his workload. J.B. indicated that the 

assistant was hired many months prior to the May 2016 filing of appellant’s claim and asserted 

that the assistant provided significant aid. She maintained that appellant was not required to 

perform duties outside of his job description and that he was not subject to any unusual work 

demands or staffing shortages. J.B. indicated that, although she had to counsel appellant for being 

a little abrupt and having conflicts with his team members regarding his management, he had been

working to improve his work relationships. She indicated that appellant was generally able to 

perform his duties well.

By decision dated December 30, 2016, OWCP denied appellant’s claim, finding that he 

had not met his burden of proof to establish an emotional condition in the performance of duty, as 

alleged. It determined that he had not established a compensable employment factor with respect 

to the claimed instances of harassment/discrimination and wrongdoing regarding administrative 

matters.

On January 23, 2017 appellant, through counsel, requested a telephonic hearing before an 

OWCP hearing representative. During the hearing held on June 30, 2017 he testified that from 

2014 onwards he worked more than 40 hours per week about 75 percent of the time, but was not 

allowed to use overtime. Appellant claimed that he had to work as a supervisor for 19 weeks 

before being aided by the GS-13 assistant and that he received work-related telephone calls at 

home on weekends approximately 10 to 15 times per year. He claimed that he sustained 

hypertension, depression, and anxiety due to work-related stress.

After the hearing, appellant submitted a June 12, 2017 statement in which he asserted that, 

when he became supervisor of the joint information operations branch on June 14, 2014, he had to 

supervise up to 20 employees. He alleged that he and his supervisees had to deal with severe

outage problems, which were outside the scope of their computer coding duties and that he lacked 

the equipment software and support to do his job. Appellant claimed that he and other employees 

were “under constant coercion” to provide computer support while off duty on weekends/holidays 

and while using annual leave, but that overtime and compensatory time were “virtually banned”

to cover such time. Employees had to settle for credit time, which could not be accrued beyond 

24 hours. Appellant asserted that in July 2012 he was forced to go on travel duty status to 

Portsmouth, Virginia, and had to work 17 straight days, 12 hours per day, as a warehouse worker 

and hazardous material handler in extremely hot temperatures. He claimed that on one occasion 

J.C. tasked him with a project that was supposed to be handled by someone else and that he and 

other employees routinely had to bring their laptops home to provide weekend support. Appellant 

alleged that his branch was chronically understaffed.

In a June 28, 2017 statement, appellant provided responses to the July 13, 2016 statement

that J.B. provided on behalf of the employing establishment. He noted that, while it was 

technically true he did not have to meet a personal quota, there was a very aggressive schedule,

which was greatly accelerated after the 2013 reorganization and which included having him work 

on additional unscheduled projects. Appellant asserted that he was overloaded with work for the 

19 months he served as supervisor before the GS-13 assistant was hired in January 2016. 
7

Moreover, the GS-13 assistant had already worked in her branch and her old position remained 

unfilled between the January 2016 promotion and April 2016, thereby leaving him short of an 

employee for that period. Appellant also contested J.B.’s assertion that the GS-13 assistant “was 

a very significant aid.” He insisted that he was, in fact, understaffed in that three employees would 

not do any programming work and another employee was removed from his branch. Appellant

asserted that, while J.B. acknowledged that he oversaw a more diverse group of systems than the 

other three branch managers, he managed six different types of computer systems while the other 

managers each managed two types. He claimed that B.M. improperly charged him with being 

absent without leave (AWOL) on September 26, 2014. Appellant also submitted a May 25, 2017 

statement, which was similar to his previously submitted July 13, 2016 statement.

Appellant submitted an undated list of 20 employees which he identified as the employees 

he supervised. He also submitted several additional e-mails documenting communications 

between management officials. In an August 29, 2014 e-mail to several managers other than 

appellant, J.C. indicated that code was being tested on that date and that it looked like personnel 

would have to come in the next day, a Saturday, in order to finish the testing by September 2, 2014. 

In a July 3, 2015 e-mail, an information operations manager, A.K., advised appellant that most of 

the responses to the anonymous survey constituted complaints about the 2013 reorganization.

In a July 11, 2016 document, an EEOC counselor documented a June 7, 2016 interview he 

conducted with B.M. The counselor advised that B.M. denied discriminating against appellant or 

subjecting him to a hostile work environment. Regarding the relief of appellant from handling the 

day-to-day operation of mid-tier applications in March 2016, B.M. noted that appellant was 

assigned a GS-13 assistant because “he was getting overloaded.” He advised that appellant had 

the largest number of employees to manage between the four branches and noted that “his duties 

would overload any supervisor to some degree.” The counselor noted that B.M. maintained that 

the assignment of the day-to-day operation of mid-tier applications to another employee had 

nothing to do with appellant’s abilities, skills, or diligence and he indicated that appellant retained 

supervisory authority over his branch after the reassignment of duties. B.M. explained that he did 

not invite appellant to a meeting about VSM applications because he wished to reduce his 

workload. He advised that he had nothing to do with B.F. being transferred into appellant’s branch 

and asserted that he was within his rights as appellant’s supervisor to oversee appellant’s

supervision of B.F. B.M. maintained that he had no control over the selection of employees for 

awards and that he had nothing to do with the nominations appellant made for his employees.

Appellant also submitted additional medical evidence in support of his claim, including a 

July 11, 2017 report of Dr. William S. Chase, a clinical psychologist, and a July 28, 2017 report 

of Dr. Minora.

By decision dated August 11, 2017, OWCP’s hearing representative affirmed the

December 30, 2016 decision.

On October 26, 2017 appellant, through counsel, requested reconsideration of the 

August 11, 2017 decision. In an accompanying brief, counsel summarized appellant’s claims 

regarding the difficulties of carrying out his work duties and the claimed improper actions of 

management.
8

In an August 29, 2017 statement, appellant questioned why J.B., a human resources 

specialist, produced the July 13, 2016 letter responding to OWCP’s June 15, 2016 development 

letter given that he had never met her and she had no direct knowledge of his work duties and 

conditions. He also discussed a number of the documents he was submitting in conjunction with 

his statement. These documents included leave and earnings statements and other documents,

which show that he worked approximately 115 hours of overtime between mid-June and lateJuly 2012 when he was on travel duty status in Virginia. In two January 21, 2015 e-mails,

appellant advised B.M. about issues with computers, including VSM production servers running 

out of disc space, problems with production server load balancing, the disappearance of mainframe 

profiles, and users losing connectively. In a March 24, 2015 e-mail, R.J. directed appellant and 

another manager to have their key analysts and programmers take their laptops home in order to 

address calls that might be made regarding a computer installation to be carried out over weekend.

In an undated statement received by OWCP on December 13, 2018, appellant argued that 

the employing establishment did not adequately respond to OWCP’s directive in a June 15, 2016 

development letter that a knowledgeable supervisor comment on his work duties and conditions in 

the context of his claimed employment factors. He asserted that the July 13, 2016 letter produced 

by J.B. did not answer all of the questions posed by OWCP.

By decision dated July 8, 2019, OWCP denied modification of the August 11, 2017 

decision.

LEGAL PRECEDENT

An employee seeking benefits under FECA7 has the burden of proof to establish the 

essential elements of his or her claim, including the fact that an injury was sustained while in the 

performance of duty as alleged, and that any disability or specific condition for which 

compensation is claimed is causally related to the employment injury.8 These are the essential 

elements of each and every compensation claim regardless of whether the claim is predicated on a 

traumatic injury or an occupational disease.9

To establish an emotional condition in the performance of duty, a claimant must submit: 

(1) factual evidence identifying an employment factor or incident alleged to have caused or 

contributed to his or her claimed emotional condition; (2) medical evidence establishing that he or 

she has a diagnosed emotional or psychiatric disorder; and (3) rationalized medical opinion 

 

7 5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.

8 A.J., Docket No. 18-1116 (issued January 23, 2019); Gary J. Watling, 52 ECAB 278 (2001).

9 20 C.F.R. § 10.115(e); M.K., Docket No. 18-1623 (issued April 10, 2019); see T.O., Docket No. 18-1012 (issued 

October 29, 2018); see Michael E. Smith, 50 ECAB 313 (1999).
9

evidence establishing that the accepted compensable employment factors are causally related to 

the diagnosed emotional condition.10

Workers’ compensation law does not apply to each and every injury or illness that is 

somehow related to an employee’s employment. There are situations where an injury or an illness 

has some connection with the employment but nevertheless does not come within the concept or 

coverage of workers’ compensation. Where the disability results from an employee’s emotional 

reaction to his or her regular or specially assigned duties or to a requirement imposed by the 

employment, the disability comes within the coverage of FECA.11 On the other hand, the disability 

is not covered where it results from such factors as an employee’s fear of a reduction in force or 

his or her frustration from not being permitted to work in a particular environment or to hold a 

particular position.12

A claimant has the burden of proof to establish by the weight of the reliable, probative, and 

substantial evidence that the condition for which he or she claims compensation was caused or 

adversely affected by employment factors.13 This burden includes the submission of a detailed 

description of the employment factors or conditions which he or she believes caused or adversely 

affected a condition for which compensation is claimed, and a rationalized medical opinion 

relating the claimed condition to compensable employment factors.14

In cases involving emotional conditions, the Board has held that, when working conditions 

are alleged as factors in causing a condition or disability, OWCP, as part of its adjudicatory 

function, must make findings of fact regarding which working conditions are deemed compensable 

factors of employment and are to be considered by a physician when providing an opinion on 

causal relationship, and which working conditions are not deemed factors of employment and may 

not be considered.15 If a claimant does implicate a factor of employment, OWCP should then 

determine whether the evidence of record substantiates that factor. When the matter asserted is a 

compensable factor of employment and the evidence of record establishes the truth of the matter 

asserted, it must base its decision on an analysis of the medical evidence.16

 

10 See S.K., Docket No. 18-1648 (issued March 14, 2019); M.C., Docket No. 14-1456 (issued December 24, 2014); 

Debbie J. Hobbs, 43 ECAB 135 (1991); Donna Faye Cardwell, 41 ECAB 730 (1990).

 

11 Lillian Cutler, 28 ECAB 125 (1976).

 

12 A.E., Docket No. 18-1587 (issued March 13, 2019); Gregorio E. Conde, 52 ECAB 410 (2001).

 

13 B.S., Docket No. 19-0378 (issued July 10, 2019); Pamela R. Rice, 38 ECAB 838, 841 (1987).

 

14 P.B., Docket No. 17-1912 (issued December 28, 2018); Effie O. Morris, 44 ECAB 470, 473-74 (1993).

 

15 See O.G., Docket No. 18-0359 (issued August 7, 2019); Norma L. Blank, 43 ECAB 384, 389-90 (1992).

 

16 Id.
10

ANALYSIS

The Board finds that appellant has established a compensable factor of employment with 

regard to appellant’s allegations of overwork. 

Appellant has alleged that he sustained an emotional condition as a result of a number of 

employment incidents and work conditions. OWCP denied his emotional condition claim finding 

that he had not established a compensable employment factor. The Board must, therefore, initially 

review whether these alleged incidents are covered employment factors under the terms of 

FECA.17

The Board finds that appellant has established that several aspects of his regular work 

duties constitute overwork which the Board has found to be a compensable employment factor.18 

The case record contains evidence, particularly the statements of appellant’s immediate supervisor, 

B.M., which demonstrate that, since June 2014, he had, in B.M.’s own words, a “very challenging 

set of duties,” which would “overload any supervisor to some degree.” It is further established 

that, given appellant’s workload, a GS-13 project manager was hired in January 2016 to assist him 

(i.e., approximately 19 months after appellant started his supervisory position). The Board further 

finds that the case record contains evidence showing that a major reorganization of computer 

functions occurred in 2013, which resulted in appellant having to deal with a deterioration in 

communication among the four computer development branches of the workplace in his role as a 

supervisor of one of the branches. In addition, the case record establishes that appellant had to 

supervise approximately 20 employees, which was the largest number among the supervisors of 

the four branches, and that, at times, he had to address such matters as problematic software 

downloads, servers running out of disc space, computer traffic inappropriately being sent to one 

server, computer profiles being deleted, and users losing connectivity. It is also established that

on July 22, 2015 appellant had 140 active incident tickets he had to address, whereas the managers 

of the three other branches collectively had approximately 70. The case record also supports that 

appellant worked approximately 115 hours of overtime between mid-June and late-July 2012 when 

he was on travel duty status in Virginia. The Board thus finds that appellant has established a 

compensable employment factor of overwork. On remand OWCP shall consider the medical 

evidence with regard to whether appellant has established a diagnosed emotional condition 

casually related to this accepted employment factor of overwork.

With regard to appellant’s additional allegations concerning administrative and personnel 

matters, and harassment/discrimination, the Board finds that further development is required. 

In a June 15, 2016 development letter, OWCP requested that the employing establishment 

provide comments from a knowledgeable supervisor on the accuracy of all statements provided by 

appellant relative to his emotional condition claim. It requested that the employing establishment 

 

17 Y.W., Docket No. 19-1877 (issued April 30, 2020); Dennis J. Balogh, 52 ECAB 232 (2001).

18 The Board has held that overwork, when substantiated by sufficient factual information to corroborate an 

employee’s account of events, may be a compensable factor of employment. L.S., Docket No. 18-1471 (issued 

February 26, 2020); R.B., Docket No. 19-0343 (issued February 14, 2020).
11

indicate whether it concurred with appellant’s claims and, if there were points of disagreement, to 

fully explain and provide appropriate supportive evidence. In response, the employing 

establishment provided a July 13, 2016 letter from a human resources specialist for the employing

establishment, J.B. In addition to questions regarding whether J.B. would be considered a 

knowledgeable person who could appropriately respond to OWCP’s development letter,19 it is 

noted that J.B. did not adequately address appellant’s multiple claimed employment factors. There 

is no indication that the employing establishment made an attempt to obtain a statement from 

appellant’s immediate supervisor, B.M., or other knowledgeable management officials (such as 

J.C. and C.J.) concerning appellant’s additional alleged employment factors of administrative and 

personnel and harassment/discrimination.

20

 

While the claimant has the burden of proof to establish entitlement to compensation, OWCP 

shares responsibility in the development of the factual evidence, particularly when such evidence 

is of the character normally obtained from the employing establishment or other government 

source.21

For these reasons, the case shall be remanded to OWCP for further development of the factual 

evidence. This development should include an attempt to obtain a statement from appellant’s 

immediate supervisor, B.M., and any other knowledgeable parties whose input would be deemed 

necessary to adequately consider each of appellant’s additional claimed employment factors. If 

OWCP finds additional compensable employment factors in the course of its development of the 

factual evidence, it shall similarly evaluate the medical evidence and make a determination regarding 

whether appellant has established a diagnosed emotional condition casually related to the additional 

accepted compensable employment factors. After this and other such further development as 

deemed necessary, OWCP shall issue a de novo decision on this matter.

CONCLUSION

The Board finds that appellant has established a compensable factor of employment. The 

case is therefore remanded for consideration of the medical evidence with regard to causal 

relationship. The Board further finds that the case is not in posture for decision with regard to 

appellant’s additional alleged employment factors.

 

19 Appellant has asserted that he has never met J.B. and that she had no direct knowledge of his work duties and 

conditions.

20 It is noted that the above-referenced comments of B.M. were not solicited by the employing establishment as a 

response to OWCP’s June 15, 2016 development letter. Rather, the comments were memorialized in a June 7, 2016 

e-mail B.M. sent to J.C. and another manager, and a July 11, 2016 document in which an EEOC counselor detailed a 

June 7, 2016 interview with B.M.

 

21 See M.H., Docket No. 19-0930 (issued June 17, 2020); L.L., Docket No. 12-194 (issued June 5, 2012); N.S., 59 

ECAB 422 (2008).
12

ORDER

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the July 8, 2019 decision of the Office of Workers’

Compensation Programs is set aside, and the case is remanded to OWCP for further proceedings 

consistent with this decision of the Board.

Issued: February 19, 2021

Washington, DC

Alec J. Koromilas, Chief Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Janice B. Askin, Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Patricia H. Fitzgerald, Alternate Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board