alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
```

[Congressional Bills 111th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 466 Introduced in House (IH)]

111th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 466

 To amend title 38, United States Code, to prohibit discrimination and 
 acts of reprisal against persons who receive treatment for illnesses, 
injuries, and disabilities incurred in or aggravated by service in the 
                          uniformed services.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            January 13, 2009

Mr. Doggett (for himself, Mr. Bishop of New York, Mr. Edwards of Texas, 
 Mr. Filner, Ms. Eddie Bernice Johnson of Texas, Mr. McGovern, and Mr. 
    Ortiz) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                     Committee on Veterans' Affairs

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To amend title 38, United States Code, to prohibit discrimination and 
 acts of reprisal against persons who receive treatment for illnesses, 
injuries, and disabilities incurred in or aggravated by service in the 
                          uniformed services.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Wounded Veteran Job Security Act''.

SEC. 2. DISCRIMINATION AGAINST PERSONS WHO RECEIVE TREATMENT FOR 
              ILLNESSES, INJURIES, AND DISABILITIES INCURRED IN OR 
              AGGRAVATED BY SERVICE IN THE UNIFORMED SERVICES AND ACTS 
              OF REPRISAL PROHIBITED.

    (a) Prohibition of Discrimination and Acts of Reprisal.--Section 
4311 of title 38, United States Code, is amended--
            (1) in subsection (a)--
                    (A) by inserting after ``uniformed service'' the 
                following: ``, or who has an illness, injury, or 
                disability determined by the Secretary of Veterans 
                Affairs to have been incurred in or aggravated by such 
                service,''; and
                    (B) by striking ``or obligation'' and inserting 
                ``obligation, or receipt of treatment for that illness, 
                injury, or disability''; and
            (2) in subsection (c)--
                    (A) by striking ``or obligation for service'' the 
                first time it appears and inserting ``obligation for 
                service, or receipt of treatment for an illness, 
                injury, or disability incurred in or aggravated by 
                service''; and
                    (B) by striking ``or obligation for service'' the 
                second time it appears and inserting ``obligation for 
                service, or receipt of treatment''.
    (b) Effective Date.--The amendments made by subsection (a) shall 
apply with respect to treatment received on or after the date of the 
enactment of this Act.
                                 <all>
```
Exhibit 10.7



PROMISSORY NOTE

FOR VALUE RECEIVED, CyPost Corporation, ("the Payer") of 900-1281 West Georgia
Street, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada V6E 3J7, promises to pay to or to
the order of Bayshore Trading, LTD, LTD. U.S., ("the Payee") of Shirley House,
50 Shirley Street, P.O. Box N-8426, Nassau, Bahamas the sum of TWO HUNDRED
FOURTY SEVEN THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED TWENTY SEVEN UNITED STATES DOLLARS and
SEVENTY CENTS ($247,427.70) with eight percent (8%) interest thereon, the sum
total principal and interest being due and payable ON DEMAND BY BAYSHORE
TRADING, LTD, LTD. U.S. IN WRITING.

CYPOST CORPORATION ACKNOWLEDGES THAT ITS BOARD OF DIRECTORS BY WAY OF
WRI1TENRESOLUllON HAS APPROVED THIS NOTE.

FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the Payer and all endorsers of this Note hereby waive
presentment for payment, notices or formalities to which they might be entitled
and do hereby agree to pay all costs and expenses (including all legal costs)
paid or incurred in collecting the monies owed hereunder after the same shall
become due and payable under the laws of the Common Wealth of the Bahamas.
Dated at Vancouver, B.C. this 19th  day Of June 2001.

CyPost Corporation.

/s/ Robert Sendoh
-----------------
Robert Sendoh
Chairman of the Board
CyPost Corporation


<PAGE>
#### The Kirke La Shelle Company, Respondent, *v.*Catherine C. Armstrong, as Administratrix of the Estate of Paul Armstrong, Deceased, Appellant.

*Kirke La Shelle Co.*v. *Armstrong,*173 App. Div. 232, affirmed.

(Argued June 4, 1918;

decided July 12, 1918.)

Appeal from a judgment, entered June 16, 1916, upon an order of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the first judicial department overruling defendant’s exceptions, ordered to be heard in the first instance by the Appellate Division, denying a motion for a new trial and directing judgment in favor of plaintiff upon the verdict directed by the trial court. The complaint alleged that defendant’s intestate, a playwright, entered into a written agreement with one Kirke La Shelle, a producer of plays, wherein he (Armstrong) held himself out to be the author and owner of a copyrighted play entitled *“*The Heir to Hoorah,” and further .represented that his title thereto was good and perfect, and that he was in a position to convey title to said play to said Kirke La Shelle, together with the exclusive rights to perform and produce the play before the public; that by reason of the foregoing representations said Kirke La Shelle and his assignors were induced to purchase and produce the play; that thereafter action was brought against them by a third party for infringement of copyright and judgment recovered therein, wherefore plaintiff demanded judgment against defendant for the amount of that judgment, together with the amount expended in defending the litigation and the purchase money paid, alleging false and fraudulent representations. The defendant denied the material allegations in the complaint and invoked the Statute of Limitations as a bar to. recovery.

*583
      *Phelan Beale*for appellant.

*Reese D. Alsop*and *Leavitt J. Hunt*for respondent.

Judgment affirmed, with costs; no opinion.

Concur: His cock, Ch. J., Chase, Collin, Cuddeback, Hogan, Cardozo and McLaughlin, JJ.
#### MICHAEL MATTHEWS, Appellant, v. WARDEN, NEVADA STATE PRISON, Respondent.

No. 7624

January 16, 1975

530 P.2d 760

*Horace R. Goff,*State Public Defender, and *G. A. Sheerin,*Deputy State Public Defender, for Appellant.

*Robert List,*Attorney General, Carson City; *Robert E. Rose,*District Attorney, and *Kathleen M. Wall,*Deputy District Attorney, Washoe County, for Respondent.

*8OPINION

*Per Curiam:*

Matthews, who had pleaded guilty to the charge of uttering a forged instrument, appeals from an order denying his second petition for post-conviction relief premised on the contention that his guilty plea was involuntarily entered. Since his first post-conviction petition did not challenge the voluntariness of his plea, and since his second petition did not explain why he had previously failed to assert such challenge, the district court denied relief. This was permissible. Rogers v. Warden, 86 Nev. 359, 468 P.2d 993 (1970); Johnson v. Warden, 89 Nev. 476, 515 P.2d 63 (1973).

Affirmed.
#### ICIA ELLEN TRYBA, Appellant, *v.*RICHARD E. FRAY, Individually and Doing Business as Fray Western Plumbing & Heating Co., BOB BEEKS and SECURITY PROPERTIES CORPORATION, Respondents.

No. 4148

October 15, 1958.

330 P.2d 499.

*Stewart, Horton and Campbell,*of Reno, for Appellant.

*Vargas, Dillon and Bartlett,*of Reno, for Respondent Richard E. Fray.

*Goldwater, Taber and Hill,*of Reno, for Respondent Bob Beeks.

*Peter Echeverría, of*Reno, for Respondent Security Properties Corporation.

*321OPINION

On Motion To Dismiss

*Per Curiam:*

Respondents have moved to dismiss this appeal upon the ground that appellant has failed to serve upon them a copy of the transcript of testimony which forms a part of the record on appeal.

The appeal was taken upon the original papers on file in the court below, pursuant to order of the trial judge entered under the provisions of Rule 75 (i) NRCP. Respondents rely on the provisions of Rule 75 (o) NRCP with reference to an appeal upon the original papers ordered by this court. That rule provides in part “Appellant shall furnish counsel for each party appearing separately a copy of such transcript.”

Rule 75 would appear to be in a state of confusion as to the necessity for service upon opposing parties of a copy of the transcript of testimony included in a record on appeal. Rule 75 (b) dealing with the transcript appears clearly to contemplate that no copies need be provided, but that the copy filed with this court shall be available for the use of the other parties.

Undoubtedly the rule should be clarified to eliminate apparent inconsistencies. Until such clarification is accomplished it is the view of this court that Rule 75 (o) should be read consistently with Rule 75 (b) and that no copy of the transcript in the case need be served upon opposing counsel.

Motion denied.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. William Patrick MORAN, Appellant.

No. 71-2266.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Feb. 17, 1972.

Certiorari Denied May 22, 1972.

See 92 S.Ct. 2051.

*1067Jose G. Otero (argued), San Diego, Cal., for appellant.

Lyn I. Golberg, Asst. U. S. Atty. (argued), Harry D. Steward, U. S. Atty., Stephen G. Nelson, Acting Chief, Crim. Div., San Diego, Cal., for appellee.

Before ELY, CARTER and CHOY, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Moran was convicted of having smuggled aliens into the United States, an offense proscribed by 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a) (1). Driving his automobile from Mexico into the United States, he was requested to open the vehicle’s trunk during a border inspection. This being done, a United States Customs Inspector discovered the aliens in the trunk compartment, and Moran’s arrest and prosecution followed.

In urging reversal, Moran presents two principal contentions. The first is that since the Government returned one of the aliens, a fifteen-year old youth, to Mexico before the time of Moran’s trial, Moran was improperly deprived of any favorable testimony which the alien might possibly have presented in his behalf. We reject the contention for two reasons: (1) There was apparently no pretrial effort to maintain the presence of the alien in this country until the time of the trial. (2) Assuming, *arguendo,*that the Government’s representatives should have made the self-determination to hold the alien youth available until the time of the trial, any such assumed irregularity was, in the light of the record, harmless beyond all reasonable doubt.

The second contention made by Moran is that the District Court improperly admitted evidence as to a prior similar act in which Moran had been involved. While this argument is in some respects forceful, we have concluded that the point, in this case, is not of such force as to require reversal.

A third point, collateral to Moran’s second main contention, is that the prosecution violated the rule of Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965). The argument is ingenious but, in our opinion, without merit.

Affirmed.
Exhibit 32.1

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of Global Gold Corporation (the "Company")
on Form 10-KSB for the year December 31, 2006 as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (the "Report"), I, Van Z. Krikorian, the Chairman and Chief
Executive Officer of the Company, certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as
adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

   Date: March 30, 2007                     /s/ Van Z. Krikorian
                                            Van Z. Krikorian
                                            Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
##### 



EXHIBIT 13 Certification Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
(Subsections (a) and (b) of Section 1350, Chapter 63 of Title 18, United States Code) Pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections (a) and
(b) of section 1350, chapter 63 of title 18, United States Code), the
undersigned officer of Swisscom AG, a Swiss company (the Company), hereby
certifies, to such officers knowledge, that: The Annual Report on Form 20-F for the year ended December 31, 2003 (the
Report) of the Company fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a)
or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and information contained in
the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition
and results of operations of the Company. Date: May 3, 2004 /s/ Jens AlderJens Alder
Chief Executive Officer




---



##### 



Certification Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
(Subsections (a) and (b) of Section 1350, Chapter 63 of Title 18, United States Code) Pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections (a) and
(b) of section 1350, chapter 63 of title 18, United States Code), the
undersigned officer of Swisscom AG, a Swiss company (the Company), hereby
certifies, to such officers knowledge, that: The Annual Report on Form 20-F for the year ended December 31, 2003 (the
Report) of the Company fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a)
or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and information contained in
the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition
and results of operations of the Company. Date: May 3, 2004 /s/ Ueli DietikerUeli Dietiker
Chief Financial Officer
[No. 24022.

Department One.

November 22, 1932.]

#### Joseph L. Lane, *Respondent,*v. Bertha F. Lane, *Appellant.*
      *1*

*Eimon L. Wienir,*for appellant.

*William A. Gilmore,*for respondent.

Reported in 16 P. (2d) 206.

Millard, J.

— This is an action by a husband for divorce from his wife upon the ground of cruelty. Plaintiff, a practicing physician, and defendant, a university graduate, intermarried in King county in 1910. No children were born of this marriage. At the time of the divorce in December, 1931, the ages .of the husband and wife were fifty-one years and forty-five years, respectively. Upon the trial, findings of fact, conclusions of law and an interlocutory decree were entered for the plaintiff. From the decree granting a divorce to the plaintiff, denying alimony to the defendant and providing for division of the community property, the defendant has appealed.

In our opinion, no good purpose would be served by setting out the specific charges on which the husband based his complaint, or detailing the evidence relating *216to those charges. Oar examination of the record convinces as that the evidence amply snstains the findings and the interlocntory order.

The appellant is not entitled to alimony. She is an edacated woman, a lingaist, qnalified to teach or parsae some other gainfal occapation or profession, if she so desires. Of the property, all of which was commanity property of the aggregate valae of $23,189, the coart awarded $12,853 to the wife, in addition to nineteen hundred dollars received by her from April to December, 1931, as temporary alimony and attorney’s fees. That is, the wife received approximately fifteen thonsand dollars. That was an eqnitable division of the property and the appellant has no jnst caase for complaint.

The order appealed from is affirmed.

Tolman, C. J., Parker, Mitchell, and Holcomb, JJ., concar.
#### INVESCO FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC. v. C. D. ELKS, D/B/A C. D. ELKS TRUCK LINE

No. 762SC38

(Filed 19 May 1976)

Appeal and Error § 30— testimony admitted without objection — subsequent motion to strike

Where testimony is first admitted without objection, a subsequent motion to strike the testimony is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, and its ruling thereon will not be disturbed unless an abuse of discretion has been shown.

Appeal by defendant from *Walker, Judge.*Judgment entered 15 October 1975 in Superior Court, Beaufort County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 5 May 1976.

*McMullan & Knott, by Lee E. Knott, Jr., for 'plaintiff ap-pellee.*

*Leroy Scott and Stephen A. Graves, for defendant appellant.*

VAUGHN, Judge.

This is an action to recover the balance due by defendant on a contract in connection with his purchase of a truck. The verdict was for the plaintiff in the amount sued for.

The tenth assignment of error is the only one brought forward on appeal. It presents defendant’s exception to the denial of his motion to strike testimony of plaintiff’s witness relating *513to the amount owed plaintiff by defendant as reflected in plaintiff’s records. On page 18 of the record it appears that the witness testified that the balance due was $8,134.58. That testimony and other testimony of the evidence relating to the account was admitted without objection. Thereafter, on cross-examination, defendant elicited testimony calculated to show that the witness was not familiar with the records about which he testified. Defendant’s motion to “strike all his testimony” was denied.

Where, as here, testimony is first admitted without objection, a subsequent motion to strike the testimony is addressed to the sound discretion of the court and its ruling will not be disturbed unless an abuse of discretion has been shown. The conflicts in the witness’ testimony went to his credibility for resolution by the jury.

Defendant brings forward only one exception and that one fails to show prejudicial error.

No error.

Judges Britt and Arnold concur.
# Eiropas Savienības C 280A/2023

| | ISSN 1977-0952 |
| --- | --- |
| Eiropas Savienības
  Oficiālais Vēstnesis | C 280A |
| | |
| Izdevums latviešu valodā | Informācija un paziņojumi | 66. gadagājums2023. gada 9. augusts |

ISSN 1977-0952

Eiropas Savienības

Oficiālais Vēstnesis

C 280A

Izdevums latviešu valodā

Informācija un paziņojumi

66. gadagājums2023. gada 9. augusts

---

| Saturs | Lappuse |
| --- | --- |
| | V   Atzinumi |
| | ADMINISTRATĪVAS PROCEDŪRAS |
| | Eiropas Personāla atlases birojs (EPSO) |
| 2023/C 280 A/01 | Paziņojums, ar ko groza paziņojumu par atklāto konkursu – EPSO/AD/402/23 – Administratori (AD 6) šādās jomās: 1. Mikroekonomika/makroekonomika 2. Finanšu ekonomika 3. Rūpniecības ekonomika ( OV C 220 A, 22.6.2023. ) | 1 |

Saturs

Lappuse

V   Atzinumi

ADMINISTRATĪVAS PROCEDŪRAS

Eiropas Personāla atlases birojs (EPSO)

EPSO

2023/C 280 A/01

Paziņojums, ar ko groza paziņojumu par atklāto konkursu – EPSO/AD/402/23 – Administratori (AD 6) šādās jomās: 1. Mikroekonomika/makroekonomika 2. Finanšu ekonomika 3. Rūpniecības ekonomika ( OV C 220 A, 22.6.2023. )

( OV C 220 A, 22.6.2023. )

1

---

| LV | |
| --- | --- |

LV

---

V Atzinumi

ADMINISTRATĪVAS PROCEDŪRAS

Eiropas Personāla atlases birojs (EPSO)

| 9.8.2023 | LV | Eiropas Savienības Oficiālais Vēstnesis | CA 280/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

9.8.2023

LV

Eiropas Savienības Oficiālais Vēstnesis

CA 280/1

---

Paziņojums, ar ko groza paziņojumu par atklāto konkursu – EPSO/AD/402/23 – Administratori (AD 6) šādās jomās: 1. Mikroekonomika/makroekonomika 2. Finanšu ekonomika 3. Rūpniecības ekonomika

(
  Eiropas Savienības Oficiālais Vēstnesis C 220 A, 2023. gada 22. jūnijs
  )

(2023/C 280 A/01)

1. lappusē:

| tekstu: | “Pieteikumu iesniegšanas termiņš: 2023. gada 25. jūlijs, plkst. 12.00 (dienā) pēc Briseles laika” |
| --- | --- |

tekstu:

“Pieteikumu iesniegšanas termiņš: 2023. gada 25. jūlijs, plkst. 12.00 (dienā) pēc Briseles laika”

| lasīt šādi: | “Pieteikumu iesniegšanas termiņš: 2023. gada 26. jūlijs, plkst. 12.00 (dienā) pēc Briseles laika”. |
| --- | --- |

lasīt šādi:

lasīt šādi:

“Pieteikumu iesniegšanas termiņš: 2023. gada 26. jūlijs, plkst. 12.00 (dienā) pēc Briseles laika”.

5. lappusē:

| tekstu: | “Kandidātiem pieteikums jāiesniedz tiešsaistē

  EPSO tīmekļa vietnē (2)
  līdz 2023. gada 25. jūlija plkst. 12.00 (dienā) pēc Briseles laika” |
| --- | --- |

tekstu:

tekstu

“Kandidātiem pieteikums jāiesniedz tiešsaistē

  EPSO tīmekļa vietnē (2)
  līdz 2023. gada 25. jūlija plkst. 12.00 (dienā) pēc Briseles laika”

| lasīt šādi: | “Kandidātiem pieteikums jāiesniedz tiešsaistē

  EPSO tīmekļa vietnē (2) līdz 2023. gada 26. jūlija plkst. 12.00 (dienā) pēc Briseles laika”. |
| --- | --- |

lasīt šādi:

lasīt šādi

“Kandidātiem pieteikums jāiesniedz tiešsaistē

  EPSO tīmekļa vietnē (2) līdz 2023. gada 26. jūlija plkst. 12.00 (dienā) pēc Briseles laika”.

---

(2)  https://epso.europa.eu/lv/job-opportunities/open-for-application.

2

---
Exhibit 32.2

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER

I, Michelle M. Lantow, Chief Financial Officer, in connection with the Report on Form 10-Q of McCormick & Schmicks Seafood Restaurants, Inc. for the quarterly period ended
March 30, 2011 (the Report), hereby certify in accordance with 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

1. The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

2. The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of McCormick & Schmicks Seafood
Restaurants, Inc.



|                       
|-----------------------
|/s/ MICHELLE M. LANTOW 
|Michelle M. Lantow     
|Chief Financial Officer

Date: May 6, 2011
#### STATE of Maine v. Ronald K. PARSONS.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Submitted on Briefs April 26, 1990.

Decided April 30, 1990.

Janet Mills, Dist. Atty., Patricia A. Ma-dor, Asst. Dist. Atty., South Paris, for state.

James Andrews, Norway, for defendant.

Before McKUSICK, C.J., and ROBERTS, WATHEN, GLASSMAN, CLIFFORD, HORNBY and COLLINS, JJ.

HORNBY, Justice.

The District Court (South Paris, *Sheldon, J)*found that the police officer “reasonably] apprehen[ded] from perceived facts” that an occupant of the defendant’s vehicle was a juvenile violating the terms of her conditional release. This finding satisfies the standard of a reasonable suspicion based on specific and articulable facts that we have demanded, *State v. Chapman,*495 A.2d 314, 317 (Me.1985), to justify a further investigatory intrusion— here, shining a flashlight into the vehicle to confirm the identification and advise the juvenile that she would be reported to her juvenile case worker. Accordingly, the police officer’s resulting discovery of the defendant’s physical condition as operator of the vehicle was not improper. The Superi- or Court (Oxford County, *Perkins, J.)*therefore properly affirmed the decision of the District Court denying the defendant’s motion to suppress and affirmed the conviction of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or with excessive blood alcohol. 29 M.R. S.A. § 1312-B (Supp.1989).

The entry is:

Judgment affirmed.

All concurring.