alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**RIVER ROCK ENTERTAINMENT AUTHORITY(A Governmental Instrumentality of the Dry Creek Rancheria Band of Pomo Indians)**

**Exhibit 32.2**

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO****18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,****AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO****SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

In connection with the Quarterly Report of River Rock Entertainment Authority (the “Authority”) on Form 10-Q for the quarter ending June 30, 2005 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Yuan Fang (Yvonne) Mao, Chief Financial Officer of the Authority, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

     (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Authority.

By: /s/ Yuan Fang (Yvonne) Mao               Yuan Fang (Yvonne) MaoChief Financial OfficerAugust 15, 2005

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the River Rock Entertainment Authority and will be retained by the River Rock Entertainment Authority and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

----
#### Timothy W. FARMER, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, Respondent.

No. 04-3421.

United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.

March 8, 2005.

*ORDER*

Upon consideration of the unopposed motion of Timothy W. Farmer to voluntarily dismiss his petition for review (MSPB CH0351030193-I-1),

IT IS ORDERED THAT:

(1) The motion is granted.

(2) Each side shall bear its own costs.
United States Department of Labor

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

__________________________________________

M.S., Appellant

and

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, 

U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION, 

Laredo, TX, Employer

__________________________________________

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Docket No. 22-0641

Issued: April 28, 2022

Appearances: Case Submitted on the Record

Appellant, pro se

Office of Solicitor, for the Director

ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL

Before:

ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Chief Judge

PATRICIA H. FITZGERALD, Deputy Chief Judge

VALERIE D. EVANS-HARRELL, Alternate Judge

On March 25, 2022 appellant filed an appeal from an April 26, 2021 nonmerit decision of 

the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). The Clerk of the Appellate Boards

assigned Docket No. 22-0641.

The Board has duly considered the matter and notes that the Board has jurisdiction to 

review final adverse decisions of OWCP issued under the Federal Employees’ Compensation 

Act.1 For final adverse decisions of OWCP issued on or after November 19, 2008, the Board’s 

review authority is limited to appeals which are filed within 180 days from the date of issuance 

of OWCP’s decision.2

The 180th day following the April 26, 2021 decision was October 23, 2021. As appellant 

did not file an appeal with the Board until March 25, 2022, more than 180 days after the

April 26, 2021 OWCP decision, the Board finds that the appeal docketed as No. 22-0641 is 

untimely filed. The Board is without jurisdiction to review the appeal. Appellant has not offered 

1

5 U.S.C. § 8149; 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3(a) (2009).

2

Id. at § 501.3(e).
2

a reason to explain the failure to timely file an appeal with supporting documentation sufficient 

to establish compelling circumstances. Because there is no final adverse decision issued by 

OWCP within 180 days of the filing of the instant appeal, the Board concludes that the appeal 

docketed as No. 22-0641, must be dismissed.3 Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the appeal docketed as No. 22-0641 is dismissed.

Issued: April 28, 2022

Washington, DC

Alec J. Koromilas, Chief Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Patricia H. Fitzgerald, Deputy Chief Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Valerie D. Evans-Harrell, Alternate Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

3 The Board’s decisions and orders are “final upon the expiration of 30 days from the date of their issuance.” Id.

at § 501.6(d).
Exhibit 4.3

                 SECOND AMENDMENT TO PURCHASE AND SALE AGREEMENT

      This SECOND AMENDMENT TO PURCHASE AND SALE AGREEMENT, is made this 21st
day of February, 2002 by and between DEAN WITTER REALTY INCOME PARTNERSHIP I,
L.P. ("Seller") AND THE VLASS GROUP, LLC, ("Purchaser").

                               W I T N E S S E T H

      WHEREAS, Purchaser and Seller entered into that certain Purchase and Sale
Agreement dated January 18, 2002 and as amended by First Amendment to Purchase
and Sale Agreement dated February 13, 2002 (the "Contract"); and

      WHEREAS, the Contract provides for a Due Diligence Period (as defined in
Contract) which expires on February 22, 2002; and

      WHEREAS,  Purchaser and Seller desire to extend the Due Diligence Period
to 1:00 p.m. on February 28, 2002;

      NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the sum of TEN AND NO/100
DOLLARS ($10.00), and other good and valuable considerations, the receipt and
sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged, the parties hereto do hereby amend
the Contract to extend the due diligence period to 1:00 p.m. on February 28,
2002.

      Except as hereinabove set forth, the Contract shall remain unaltered and
in full force and effect.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have signed and sealed this Second
Amendment as of the day and year first above written.

PURCHASER:                          SELLER:

THE VLASS GROUP, LLC, a Georgia     DEAN WITTER RELATY INCOME
Limited liability company           PARTNERSHIP I, L.P., a Delaware limited
                                    partnership

By: /s/  Michael B. Vlass                 By: DEAN WITTER REALTY
    ------------------------                    INCOME PROPERTIES I, INC.,
         Michael B. Vlass                       a Delaware corporation, its
         Manager                                Managing general partner


                                    By: /s/ Robert B. Austin
                                       --------------------------------
                                          Robert B. Austin
                                          Vice President
<Page>
                                                                    Exhibit 23.2


                CONSENT OF ERNST & YOUNG INDEPENDENT AUDITORS


We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements on
Form S-3 (Nos. 333-64499, 333-76846 and 333-101141) and Registration
Statement (Form S-8 No. 333-42816) pertaining to the 1998 Incentive and
Nonqualified Stock Option Plan, 1992 Stock Option Plan and 1998 Employee
Stock Option Purchase Plan of Implant Sciences of our report dated August 23,
2003 (except for Note 16, as to which the date is October 7, 2002), with
respect to the financial statements of Implant Sciences Corporation included
in the Annual Report (Form 10-KSB) for the year ended June 30, 2003.



Boston, Massachusetts
September 26, 2003
**Exhibit32.1**

 

**CERTIFICATIONOF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER**

 

I, Saed Mohseni, Chief Executive Officer, in connection with the Reporton Form 10-Q of McCormick and Schmick’s Seafood Restaurants, Inc. for thequarterly period ended June 26, 2004 (the “Report”), hereby certify inaccordance with 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of theSarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

 

1.               The Report fully complies with therequirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of1934 and

 

2.               The information contained in the Reportfairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and resultsof operations of McCormick and Schmick’s Seafood Restaurants, Inc.

 

 
|   | /s/ SAED MOHSENI                  |   |
|--------|-----------------------------------|--------|
|   | Saed Mohseni                      |
|   | Chief Executive Officer           |
|   | Dated:  August 26, 2004 |

 

1

----
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
COMPANY'S AUDITED CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FOR THE YEAR ENDED
MARCH 31, 2000 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          MAR-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             APR-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-2000
<CASH>                                          26,945
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    8,700
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                     25,078
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                74,455
<PP&E>                                          62,958
<DEPRECIATION>                                  14,021
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 478,385
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          338,748
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                         1,519
<OTHER-SE>                                   (631,882)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   478,385
<SALES>                                          8,700
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 8,700
<CGS>                                           21,377
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                3,953,931
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 6,778
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              12,709
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (3,986,095)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                        (3,986,095)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                               (3,986,095)
<EPS-BASIC>                                     (0.29)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.29)


</TABLE>
COURT OF APPEALS

EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

EL PASO, TEXAS

JOSE VALDEZ-MARTINEZ,

 

 Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

 State.

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

No. 08-17-00193-CR

Appeal from the

171st District Court

of El Paso County, Texas 

(TC# 20160D03097)

O R D E R

The Court GRANTS the State’s third motion for extension of time within which to file 

the brief until January 10, 2019. NO FURTHER MOTIONS FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO 

FILE THE STATE’S BRIEF WILL BE CONSIDERED BY THIS COURT.

It is further ORDERED that the Hon. Jaime E. Esparza, the State’s attorney, prepare the 

State’s brief and forward the same to this Court on or before January 10, 2019.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 27th day of November, 2018.

PER CURIAM

Before McClure, C.J., Rodriguez and Palafox, JJ.
NO. 07-10-0042-CV IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT AMARILLO
PANEL B FEBRUARY 22, 2010

__________________________ IN THE MATTER OF THE MARRIAGE OF JESSICA N. ROQUE AND JOSE LUIS ROQUE

__________________ _________ FROM THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 3 OF LUBBOCK COUNTY; NO. 2008-545,444; HONORABLE JUDY PARKER, JUDGE

__________________ _________ Before QUINN, C.J., a nd CAMPBELL and HANCOCK, JJ.

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Jose Luis Roque filed a notic e of appeal on February 1, 2010. However, he did not pay the required filing fee of $175. See Tex. R. App. P. 5 & Appendix. By letter of February 3, we inform ed appellant that failure to pay the filing fee within ten days of the letter might result in dismissal according to Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.3(c). Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(c). The deadlin e passed without payment of the filing fee.
Finding appellant has not pai d the filing fee required by rule, and finding that we have given notice to all parties, we dism iss the appeal pursuant to Rule 42.3(c).It is so ordered.

James T. Campbell Justice
**Exhibit 23.1**

**Consent of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm**

We consent to the incorporation byreference in Registration Statements (Nos. 333-126062, 333-86686, 333-86688, 333-53278, 033-88634, 333-41632, 333-41634, 333-41670, 333-28459, 333-07831 and 333-144060) on Form S-8 and Registration Statements (Nos. 333-131073, 333-135249, and333-138943) on Form S-3 of Maxwell Technologies, Inc. of our reports dated February 19, 2009 relating to our audits of the consolidated financial statements, financial statement schedule and internal control over financial reporting, whichappear in this Annual Report on Form 10-K of Maxwell Technologies, Inc. for the year ended December 31, 2008. 

/s/MCGLADREY & PULLEN, LLP 

San Diego, California 

February 19, 2009
EXHIBIT 32.1 

 

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 

18 U.S.C. SECTION1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO 

SECTION 906 OF THE 

SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 

 

In connection withthe Quarterly Report of New Century Financial Corporation (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the period ending March 31, 2005 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Robert K.Cole, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to my knowledge: 

 

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of theSecurities Exchange Act of 1934; and 

 

(2) The information contained in theReport fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company. 

 

 

A signed original of thiswritten statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request. 

 

The foregoing certification is being furnished with the Company’s Form 10-Q for theperiod ending March 31, 2005 pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350. It is not being filed for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and it is not to be incorporated by reference into any filing of the Company,whether made before or after the date hereof, regardless of any general incorporation language in such filing.
#### LINDA Y. WINTERS v. STEVIE D. WINTERS

No. 7121DC314

(Filed 23 June 1971)

Appeal by plaintiff from *Billings, District Judge,*16 February 1971 Session of District Court held in Forsyth County.

*Barbara C. Westmoreland for plaintiff appellant.*

*David V. Liner for defendant appellee.*

MALLARD, Chief Judge.

On 25 January 1971 the parties consented to a judgment which provided, among other things, for the payment by defendant to appellant’s attorney for services rendered for the benefit *596of the minor child, Sharon Denise Winters. At the same session of court, 25 January 1971, a motion was heard for additional attorney fees for appellant’s attorney. The district judge entered an order on 16 February 1971 holding that counsel fees to said attorney “are denied as a matter of law, based on N.C. G.S. 50-13.6, since the Court finds that the plaintiff is no longer the spouse of the defendant.” From this order the plaintiff appealed to this court. The only question sought to be presented on this appeal is not properly presented on this record. The appeal is therefore dismissed.

Appeal dismissed.

Judges Parker and Vaughn concur.
#### In the Matter of G. Douglas and Mary TIBBITTS, Bankrupt, Appellants, v. James E. CUSSEN, Trustee, et al., Appellees.

No. 25814.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

April 12, 1972.

Rehearing Denied May 23, 1972.

David J. Langum (argued), of Christ-enson, Hedemark & Langum, San Jose, Cal., Loren Dahl, Sacramento, Cal., for appellants.

Joseph S. Genshlea, (argued), of Downey, Brand, Seymour & Rohwer, Thomas W. Olson, Jr., Cloyd T. Clowdus, Bryte M. Peterson, Ref. in Bankruptcy, Sacramento, Cal., for appellees.

Before CHAMBERS and TRASK, Circuit Judges, and MURRAY,** District Judge.

**

 Honorable W. D. Murray, Senior United States District Judge for the District of Montana, sitting by designation.

PER CURIAM:

On this appeal from two bankruptcy orders, we affirm.

We conclude that the finding of un-feasibility of an arrangement plan was not clearly erroneous.

The objection as to adequate notice to the bankrupts and creditors was not raised below. It is not a case of no notice. Thus, we do not think it presents here a naked question of power to act.
<PAGE>
 
[LETTERHEAD OF WILLIAMSON PETROLEUM CONSULTANTS, INC. APPEARS HERE]



               CONSENT OF WILLIAMSON PETROLEUM CONSULTANTS, INC.


As independent oil and gas consultants, Williamson Petroleum Consultants, Inc.
hereby consents to (a) the use of our reserve reports entitled "Evaluation of
Oil and Gas Reserves to the Interests of Bellwether Exploration Company in
Certain Properties, Effective June 30, 1996, for Disclosure to the Securities
and Exchange Commission, Williamson Project 6.8369" dated August 20, 1996 and
"Evaluation of Oil and Gas Reserves to the Interests of Bellwether Exploration
Company in Certain Properties, Effective June 30, 1995, for Disclosure to the
Securities and Exchange Commission, Williamson Project 5.8286" dated August 30,
1995 and b) all references to our firm included in or made a part of the
Bellwether Exploration Company Annual Report on Form 10-K to be filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission or about September 29, 1997.


                                     /s/ Williamson Petroleum Consultants, Inc.
                                     ------------------------------------------
                                     WILLIAMSON PETROLEUM CONSULTANTS, INC.


Houston, Texas
September 29, 1997
EXHIBIT 32.1

CERTIFICATION OF

PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICER

PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

(SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002)

In connection with the accompanying Annual Report on Form 10-K of
Maxwell Technologies, Inc. for the year ended December 31, 2008, I, David J. Schramm, Chief Executive Officer of Maxwell Technologies, Inc., hereby certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge:

(1) such Annual Report on Form 10-K of Maxwell Technologies,
Inc. for the year ended December 31, 2008, fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

(2) the information contained in such Annual Report on Form 10-K of Maxwell Technologies, Inc. for the year ended December 31, 2008,
fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Maxwell Technologies, Inc. at the dates indicated.

This certification has not been, and shall not be deemed, filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission.



|                  |  |  |  |                                                                    
|----------------- |  |  |  | -------------------------------------------------------------------
|                  |  | 
|February 20, 2009 |  |  |  | /S/    DAVID J. SCHRAMM                                            
|                  |  |  |  | David J. Schramm                                                   
|                  |  |  |  | President and Chief Executive Officer (Principal Executive Officer)

A signed copy of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to Maxwell Technologies,
Inc. and will be retained by Maxwell Technologies, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
#### DAN SLACK, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent.

No. 7737

November 25, 1974

528 P.2d 703

*374
      *Morgan D. Harris,*Public Defender, and *Philip M. Pro,*Deputy Public Defender, Clark County, for Appellant.

*Robert List,*Attorney General; *Roy A. Woof ter,*District Attorney, and *Daniel M. Seaton,*Deputy District Attorney, Clark County, for Respondent.

OPINION

*Per Curiam:*

The appellant, convicted of robbery, asks that we set aside his conviction for want of evidence to support it. The evidence of his guilt is ample. The appellant shall receive credit on his prison term for detention in the county jail pending trial and sentencing. Anglin v. State, 90 Nev. 287, 525 P.2d 34 (1974).

Affirmed.
#### FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE, Appellant, v. ANNE FRANCIS WARNEY, Respondent.

No. 17049

May 27, 1987

737 P.2d 501

[Rehearing denied September 23, 1987]

*217*Beckley, Singleton, DeLanoy, Jemison & List, C. Eric Funston*and *Daniel F Polsenberg,*Las Vegas, for Appellant.

*Gene T. Porter*and *William R. Brenske,*Las Vegas, for Respondent.

OPINION

*Per Curiam:*

Respondent Anne Warney was injured in a one-car accident involving her then-husband’s 1976 Granada. Farmers Insurance Exchange (Farmers) had issued policies on that vehicle and the husband’s 1973 Datsun, and Anne and her husband were named insureds.1 However, an exclusion clause in the policies precluded liability coverage as to injuries suffered by the named insured. Therefore, Anne sought summary judgment to the effect that the accident vehicle was “uninsured” under applicable law, so that she could collect under the uninsured motorist coverage of both vehicles. Her motion was granted. We reverse.

This court held in Estate of Neal v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 93 Nev. 348, 566 P.2d 81 (1977), that exclusion clauses such as the one here at issue cannot eliminate the statutorily mandated minimum liability coverage. Anne argues that *Estate of Neal*is no longer law because it relied on former NRS 698.200(3), now repealed. However, NRS 485.3091 perpetuates the same provision as the former statute, although in different words: minimum liability coverage is required in every automobile liability policy. Accordingly, *Estate of Neal*continues to be a correct statement of Nevada law.2

It follows that the accident vehicle was not “uninsured;” Anne could not look to uninsured motorist coverage for recovery. Therefore, the order granting summary judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings.

1

 The driver at the time of the accident had no applicable insurance of his own.

2

 We reject Anne’s contention that Farmers invited a ruling to the contrary, and that Farmers denied liability coverage.