alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SLEP-TONE ENTERTAINMENT 

CORPORATION; PHOENIX 

ENTERTAINMENT PARTNERS, LLC,

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

 v. 

CANTON PHOENIX INCORPORATED, 

DBA Canton Phoenix; BING PAN ZHU, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

No. 14-36018

D.C. No. 3:14-cv-00764-PK

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Oregon

Michael W. Mosman, Chief Judge, Presiding

Submitted May 8, 2017**

Portland, Oregon

Before: BYBEE and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges, and RAKOFF,*** Senior District 

Judge.

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*** The Honorable Jed S. Rakoff, Senior United States District Judge for 

the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.

FILED

MAY 10 2017

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

This suit by Slep-Tone Entertainment Corporation raises trademark 

infringement claims against Canton Phoenix Incorporated and its owner, Bing Pan 

Zhu, arising out of Canton’s use of unauthorized copies of Slep-Tone’s karaoke 

accompaniment tracks bearing Slep-Tone’s registered trademarks.

1

 The district 

court dismissed Slep-Tone’s claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 

and affirm.

1. As we recently held in a case involving identical claims by Slep-Tone, the 

district court correctly dismissed the Lanham Act claims because Slep-Tone’s 

complaint instead sounds in copyright. Slep-Tone Entm’t Corp. v. Wired for Sound 

Karaoke & DJ Servs., LLC, 845 F.3d 1246, 1248-50 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing Dastar

Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 31-34 (2003)).

2. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend 

the complaint because Slep-Tone did not request below leave to amend to assert 

copyright claims, and any reassertion of its trademark claims would be futile. See

Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Publ’g, 512 F.3d 522, 532 (9th Cir. 2008).

AFFIRMED.

 

1 On appeal, the court has added Phoenix Entertainment Partners, LLC, the 

successor-in-interest to Slep-Tone Entertainment Corporation, as an additional 

appellant. We refer to these entities collectively as “Slep-Tone.”
I 

111TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 5239 

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to provide an additional 

25 percent allowance for the deduction of qualified residence interest 

with respect to a principal residence, and to waive recapture of the 

first-time homebuyer tax credit with respect to residences purchased 

during 2008. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MAY 6, 2010 

Mr. BOSWELL (for himself, Mr. BRALEY of Iowa, and Mr. LOEBSACK) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Ways 

and Means 

A BILL 

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to provide 

an additional 25 percent allowance for the deduction 

of qualified residence interest with respect to a principal 

residence, and to waive recapture of the first-time homebuyer tax credit with respect to residences purchased 

during 2008. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Homeowner Tax As5 sistance Act’’. 


tjames on DSKG8SOYB1PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 5239 IH

1 SEC. 2. SPECIAL ALLOWANCE FOR DEDUCTIBLE MORT2 GAGE INTEREST. 

3 (a) IN GENERAL.—Paragraph (3) of section 163(h) 

4 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by add5 ing at the end the following new subparagraph: 

6 ‘‘(F) TEMPORARY 25 PERCENT ALLOW7 ANCE FOR QUALIFIED RESIDENCE INTEREST

8 DEDUCTION.— 

9 ‘‘(i) IN GENERAL.—Any deduction al10 lowed under this section (determined with11 out regard to this subparagraph) that is 

12 attributable to qualified residence interest 

13 with respect to the principal residence 

14 (within the meaning of section 121) of the 

15 taxpayer shall include an allowance equal 

16 to 25 percent of such amount. 

17 ‘‘(ii) TERMINATION.—This subpara18 graph shall not apply to amounts paid or 

19 accrued after December 31, 2013.’’. 

20 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by 

21 this section shall apply to amounts paid or incurred after 

22 the date of the enactment of this Act. 


tjames on DSKG8SOYB1PROD with BILLS
3 

•HR 5239 IH

1 SEC. 3. WAIVER OF FIRST-TIME HOMEBUYER RECAPTURE 

2 FOR PURCHASES IN 2008. 

3 (a) IN GENERAL.—Subparagraph (D) of section 

4 36(f)(4)(D) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is 

5 amended— 

6 (1) by striking ‘‘after December 31, 2008’’ and 

7 inserting ‘‘on or after April 9, 2008’’, and 

8 (2) by striking ‘‘2009 AND’’ and inserting ‘‘2008, 

9 2009,’’. 

10 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by 

11 this section shall apply to residences purchased on or after 

12 April 9, 2008. 

Æ 


tjames on DSKG8SOYB1PROD with BILLS
* Pursuant to 5TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit 

## FILED December 12, 2006 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 05-11008 Conference Calendar

JOHN ART GARY, Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus DARREN PACE; CLARENCE GRAY JOHNSON; RANDON GRAY; SANDRA HICKS; BRUCE JONES; RENEE PERRY; JADA ANAE BRODY; S.W. GRIFFIS; TOMMY RALEY; RUSS UNDERWOOD; BRIAN CORRIGAN; RACHEL JONES, Defendants-Appellees.

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 3:05-CV-202

-------------------- Before KING, WIENER, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * John Art Gary, Texas state prisoner # 1282741, moves this court for leave to appeal in forma pauperis (IFP) following the district court’s dismissal of his civil rights complaint as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Gary’s motion for IFP is construed as a challenge to the district court’s determination that the appeal is not taken in good faith. See Baugh v. Taylor , 117 F.3d 197, 202 (5th Cir. 1997). This court’s inquiry intoNo. 05-11008 -2- whether the appeal is taken in good faith “is limited to whether the appeal involves ‘legal points arguable on their merits (and therefore not frivolous).’” Howard v. King , 707 F.2d 215, 220 (5th Cir. 1983) (citation omitted). Gary brought suit against several employees of a McDonald’s restaurant, alleging that he wrongfully was shot in the leg by one of the employees after he began a robbery of the restaurant but “changed his mind.” Gary also named as defendants several law-enforcement agents; however, he does not appeal from the district court’s dismissal of his claims against those defendants. Even were this court to accept Gary’s assertion that he submitted evidence sufficient to support his claim that the McDonald’s defendants conspired with state actors to protect the employee who shot him from criminal liability, Gary had no federal constitutional right to have the employee criminally prosecuted. See Oliver v. Collins , 914 F.2d 56, 60 (5th Cir. 1990). Gary thus fails to state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Woods v. Edwards , 51 F.3d 577, 583 (5th Cir. 1995). The motion for IFP is denied and the appeal is dismissed as frivolous. See Baugh , 117 F.3d at 202 n.24; 5 TH C IR . R. 42.2. Gary previously filed a civil rights complaint that was dismissed as frivolous. See Gary v. Collins , 6:91cv530 (E.D. Tex. May 26, 1992). The dismissal of the instant appeal asNo. 05-11008 -3- frivolous counts as two strikes. See Adepegba v. Hammons , 103 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 1996) . Because he has accumulated three strikes under § 1915(g), Gary is barred from proceeding IFP in any civil action or appeal filed while he is incarcerated or detained in any facility unless he is under imminent danger of serious physical injury. See § 1915(g). MOTION FOR IFP DENIED; APPEAL DISMISSED; 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)
BAR IMPOSED.
<PAGE>

                                                                   Exhibit 99.1

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


         In connection with the yearly report of Park-Ohio Industries, Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-K for the period ended December 31, 2002, as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), each
of the undersigned officers of the Company certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss.
1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to
such officer's knowledge:

         (1)   The Report fully complies with the  requirements of Section 13(a)
               or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (2)   The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
               material respects, the financial condition and results of
               operations of the Company as of the dates and for the periods
               expressed in the Report.


Dated: March 27, 2003


                           /s/ Edward F. Crawford
                           -------------------------------
                           Edward F. Crawford
                           Chairman, Chief Executive Officer and President



                           /s/ Richard P. Elliott
                           -------------------------------
                           Richard P. Elliott
                           Vice President and Chief Financial Officer



The foregoing certification is being furnished solely pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss.
1350 and is not being filed as part of the Report or as a separate disclosure
document.


A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been
provided to Park-Ohio Industries, Inc. and will be retained by Park-Ohio
Industries, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its
Staff upon request.
United States Department of Labor

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

__________________________________________

R.C. widow of H.C., Appellant

and

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, 

U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION 

SERVICES, Los Angeles, CA, Employer

__________________________________________

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Docket No. 21-0966

Issued: July 26, 2021

Appearances: Case Submitted on the Record

Appellant, pro se

Office of Solicitor, for the Director

ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL

Before:

JANICE B. ASKIN, Judge

PATRICIA H. FITZGERALD, Alternate Judge

VALERIE D. EVANS-HARRELL, Alternate Judge

On June 9, 2021 appellant filed an appeal from an August 6, 2018 merit decision of the 

Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP).1 The Clerk of the Appellate Boards

assigned Docket No. 21-0966.

The Board has duly considered the matter and notes that the Board has jurisdiction to 

review final adverse decisions of OWCP issued under the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act.2 

For final adverse decisions of OWCP issued on or after November 19, 2008, the Board’s review 

authority is limited to appeals which are filed within 180 days from the date of issuance of OWCP’s 

decision.3

 

1 The Board notes that appellant’s AB-1 form indicates that she is appealing from a purported April 23, 2021 

decision of OWCP; however, the case record does not contain a final adverse decision of that date. The most recent 

final adverse decision of OWCP is dated August 6, 2018.

2 5 U.S.C. § 8149; 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3(a) (2009).

3

Id. at § 501.3(e).
2

The 180th day following the August 6, 2018 decision was February 2, 2019. As appellant 

did not file an appeal with the Board until June 9, 2021, more than 180 days after the August 6,

2018 OWCP decision, the Board finds that the appeal docketed as No. 21-0966 is untimely filed. 

The Board is without jurisdiction to review the appeal. Appellant has not offered a reason to 

explain the failure to timely file an appeal with supporting documentation sufficient to establish 

compelling circumstances.

The Board’s decisions and orders are “final upon the expiration of 30 days from the date 

of their issuance.”

4

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the appeal docketed as No. 21-0966 is dismissed.

Issued: July 26, 2021

Washington, DC

Janice B. Askin, Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Patricia H. Fitzgerald, Alternate Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Valerie D. Evans-Harrell, Alternate Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

 

4

Id. at § 501.6(d).
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 4.45

                                PROMISSORY NOTE


AMOUNT: $200,000.00                                        DATE: OCT. 4, 2000


Twenty six days after date of receipt, for value received, the undersigned
(jointly and severally if more than one) promise(s) to pay to the order of:

                              AccuRec LLC.
                              Tax I.D.

The sum of Two Hundred Thousand dollars plus an interest equal to (8% annually)
           ----------------------------
payable at any place the holder may so designate. Interest to be paid at loan
pay off time.

The undersigned and any endorser or guarantors herefore, jointly and severally,
hereby agree that upon default in payment of performance of this note, or the
death, or any act of insolvency or bankruptcy on the part of any of them,
however expressed or indicated, then this note shall, at the option of the
holder, become immediately due and payable without presentment, demand, protest
or further attorney and/or agent of the holder, and the undesigned, and any
endorser or guarantors, jointly and severally, agree to pay all collection
costs, expenses, agents' fees, and reasonable attorney's fees.

The undersigned further states if he should default on said loan, the lender
shall be authorized to place a lien on the following collateral:

               1. All properties of Color Image, Inc


Borrowers Signature:                            Address:


/s/ Sueling Wang                                4350 Peachtree Ind. Blvd. #100
------------------------------------------
Sueling Wang, President Color Image, Inc.       Norcross, GA 30071

/s/ Ann Shieh
------------------------------------------
Witness

/s/ Morris E. Van Asperea
------------------------------------------
Witness
```

[Congressional Bills 111th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 5301 Introduced in House (IH)]

111th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 5301

      To extend the period during which the Administrator of the 
    Environmental Protection Agency and States are prohibited from 
  requiring a permit under section 402 of the Federal Water Pollution 
   Control Act for certain discharges that are incidental to normal 
                         operation of vessels.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                              May 13, 2010

Mr. LoBiondo (for himself, Mr. Mica, Mr. Taylor, Mr. Jones, Mr. Coble, 
   and Mr. Young of Alaska) introduced the following bill; which was 
     referred to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
      To extend the period during which the Administrator of the 
    Environmental Protection Agency and States are prohibited from 
  requiring a permit under section 402 of the Federal Water Pollution 
   Control Act for certain discharges that are incidental to normal 
                         operation of vessels.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. DISCHARGES INCIDENTAL TO NORMAL OPERATION OF VESSELS.

    Public Law 110-299 (122 Stat. 2995, 33 U.S.C. 1342 note) is amended 
in section 2(a) by striking ``during the 2-year period beginning on the 
date of enactment of this Act'' and inserting ``during the period 
beginning on the date of enactment of this Act and ending December 18, 
2013''.
                                 <all>
```
Exhibit 10.33

MAXWELL TECHNOLOGIES, INC.

9244 BALBOA
AVENUE

SAN DIEGO, CA 92123

December 19th, 2008

David Schramm

Dear
David:

You and Maxwell Technologies, Inc. (the Company) signed an offer letter dated July 9, 2007 (the Offer
Letter). To avoid potential adverse tax consequences imposed by Section 409A of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended (the Code), the Offer Letter is hereby amended by inserting the following new provisions at the end of
Section 8 of the Offer Letter:

Separation from Service. Wherever this Offer Letter refers to a termination of
employment, including (without limitation) a termination without Cause, the reference will be construed as a Separation. For all purposes under this Offer Letter, Separation means a separation from service, as defined in the
regulations under Section 409A of the Code. This paragraph supersedes any contrary provision of this Offer Letter.

Commencement of Severance Payments. Payment of the periodic salary continuation severance pay provided for under this Section 8 will begin on the first regularly scheduled payroll date that occurs on or after 45 days after your
Separation, but only if you have complied with the release and other preconditions set forth in this Section 8 before that date. For purposes of Section 409A of the Code, each salary continuation payment under Section 8 is hereby designated as a
separate payment. The Company will deliver the release referred to in this Section 8 to you within 30 days after your Separation. You must execute and return the release within the period of time set forth in the form of release.

Except as expressly set forth above, the Offer Letter will remain in effect without change.

You may indicate your agreement with this amendment of the Offer Letter by signing and dating the enclosed duplicate original of this letter agreement
and returning it to



---

David Schramm

December 19th,
2008

Page 2



me. This letter agreement may be executed in two counterparts, each of which will be deemed an original, but both of which together will constitute one and the same instrument.

Very truly yours,





MAXWELL TECHNOLOGIES, INC.By:

/s/ Tim HartName:

Tim HartTitle:

VP, CFO & Treasurer(On behalf of Compensation Committee)






|                                      
|--------------------------------------
|I have read and accept this amendment:
|                                      
|/s/ David Schramm                     
|David Schramm                         

Dated: 19thDecember 2008



2
<PAGE>

EXHIBIT 32

                          CERTIFICATE OF NURESCELL INC.
               CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER
                            PURSUANT TO SECTION 1350
               OF CHAPTER 63 OF TITLE 18 OF THE UNITED STATES CODE

I, Lawrence Shatsoff, President and Chief Financial Officer of Nurescell Inc.
(the "Company"), do hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350 that, to my
knowledge:

(1)      the Annual Report on Form 10-KSB of the Company for the year
         ended March 31, 2004, as filed with the Securities and Exchange
         Commission (the "Report"), fully complies with the requirements of
         Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)      the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
         material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of
         the Company.

DATED: July 2, 2004                        /S/    LAWRENCE SHATSOFF
                                           -------------------------------------
                                           PRESIDENT AND CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER
United States Department of Labor

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

__________________________________________

R.R., Appellant

and

U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, BELLEVUE POST 

OFFICE, Nashville, TN, Employer

__________________________________________

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Docket No. 21-0514

Issued: February 26, 2021

Appearances: Case Submitted on the Record

Appellant, pro se

Office of Solicitor, for the Director

ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL

Before:

ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Chief Judge

PATRICIA H. FITZGERALD, Alternate Judge

VALERIE D. EVANS-HARRELL, Alternate Judge

On February 17, 2021 appellant filed an appeal from a June 4, 2020 nonmerit decision of 

the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). The Clerk of the Appellate Boards

assigned Docket No. 21-0514.

The Board has duly considered the matter and notes that the Board has jurisdiction to 

review final adverse decisions of OWCP issued under the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act.1 

For final adverse decisions of OWCP issued on or after November 19, 2008, the Board’s review 

authority is limited to appeals which are filed within 180 days from the date of issuance of OWCP’s 

decision.2

The 180th day following the June 4, 2020 decision was December 1, 2020. As appellant 

did not file an appeal with the Board until February 17, 2021, more than 180 days after the June 4,

2020 OWCP decision, the Board finds that the appeal docketed as No. 21-0514 is untimely filed. 

The Board is without jurisdiction to review the appeal. Appellant has not offered a reason to 

 

1 5 U.S.C. § 8149; 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3(a) (2009).

2

Id. at § 501.3(e).
2

explain the failure to timely file an appeal with supporting documentation sufficient to establish 

compelling circumstances.

The Board’s decisions and orders are “final upon the expiration of 30 days from the date 

of their issuance.”

3

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the appeal docketed as No. 21-0514 is dismissed.

Issued: February 26, 2021

Washington, DC

Alec J. Koromilas, Chief Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Patricia H. Fitzgerald, Alternate Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Valerie D. Evans-Harrell, Alternate Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

 

3

Id. at § 501.6(d).
#### CHARLES THOMAS PATTON, Jr., Appellant, v. WARDEN, NEVADA STATE PRISON, Respondent.

No. 7287

January 6, 1975

530 P.2d 107

*2
      *Gary A. Sheerin,*State Public Defender, and *A. D. Demetras,*Deputy Public Defender, for Appellant.

*Robert List,*Attorney General, Carson City; *Robert E. Rose,*District Attorney, and *Kathleen M. Wall,*Deputy District Attorney, Washoe County, for Respondent.

OPINION

*Per Curiam:*

Charles Thomas Patton, Jr., pleaded guilty to the charge of assault with intent to commit rape and was sentenced to a term of ten years in .the Nevada State Prison.

The present appeal is taken from the order denying appellant’s petition for post-conviction relief and is based on the theory that his guilty plea was involuntarily made.

Appellant asserts, and the record supports him, that the sentencing judge gained from him no express waiver of the three constitutional rights mentioned in Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969) (the right to confrontation and to trial by jury and the privilege against self-incrimination). However, we have held that there need be no such express waiver when an accused is represented by counsel and it appears from the record that the guilty plea was otherwise voluntarily and intelligently entered with knowledge of its consequences. Armstrong v. Warden, 90 Nev. 8, 518 P.2d 147 (1974).

The record shows that the sentencing judge’s canvass was adequate under the requirements of *Armstrong.*Cf. Heffley v. Warden, 89 Nev. 573, 516 P.2d 1403 (1973).

Affirmed.