F OR P UB LIC AT ION


### U N I TED STA TES C O U R T O F A PPEA LS F O R T H E N IN T H C IR C U IT

A L B E R T C UNNI NGHAM ,

Petitioner-Appellant ,

v.
R OB E R T K. W ONG ,

Respondent-

Appellee

. No. 09-99008

D.C. No. 2:02-CV-07170- GHK
OPI NI ON

Appea l from the United States District Court fo r t he Ce ntr a l D istri c t of

Ca lif or nia Geor g e H. King , District J udg e, Presiding Argued and Submitted Ma rc h 8 , 2 01 2—Pa sa de na , Ca lif or nia Filed January

8, 2013

Be fore : Harr

y Preg erson, Ronald M. Gould,
a nd Ric ha rd C. T a llm an, Cir c uit

Judg e s. Opinion by

J udg e Ta llman; Partial Concurre nce a

nd Partial Dissent by

J udg e Preg ersonC UN NI NG HA M V

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2

T hi s s ummary cons t i t ut es n o part of t he op i ni on of

t he cour t

. I t ha s * b een p repa red b y co urt s t af f f o r t he co nveni ence o f

t he read er. SUMMAR

Y *

Habeas Corpus/Death Pe nalty The pa nel af firmed the district c ourt’s denia l of a 2 8 U. S

. C

. § 2 2 5 4 h ab ea s co rp u s p et i t i o nch al l en gi n g a conviction and c apital sentenc e for robber y /murder. The pa nel first held t hat the state c ourt’s re jection of pe tit ion er Cun nin g ham’ s p ro se c uto ri a l mi sc on du c t c la ims was not unre asonable . The pa nel explaine d t h at t he prosec utor did not violate Bradyby suppressing eith er the vic tim ’s me dic a l r ecords or his a uto ps y re po rt be c a us e Cunningham’s attorney s posses s ed the salient fa cts that
wo uld have a llo we d th e m to a c c e ss t his easi ly a tta ina ble
e vid e nc e

. Th e pa

ne l he ld that Cunnin g ham pr oc e dura lly d e f a u l t e d o nh i s c l a i m t h a tt h e p r o s e c u t o r i mp r o p e r ly
su g g e ste d to the jur

y that Cunn ing ham ha d c ha ng e d h is
a pp e ara nc e fo r t ri a l.
The panel next af

firmed the denial of relief as t o al l of Cunnin g ham’ s c la ims of ine ff e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of cou ns e l. Cunn in g h am c la im e d

th a t h is a tt o r

n e y s s h o u ld

h ave investigated medica l rec ords that appa rently contra dicted the second vic tim’s account of how his shooting injury

occur red, but the panel he ld that the evidenc e wa s cumulative of other evidenc e and a

rg ument prese nted at trial that pointed out the dis c re pa nc y . Cunn ing ham a lso c la ime d th a t c ouns e l sh ou ld have inve stigated an autops y repor t documenting the discovery of c as h on the victim after the shooting, but theC UN NI NG HA M V

. W ONG 3

panel observe d that other e vidence still supported the r obbery conviction. Cunningha

m claimed that counse l should have pres e n te d a li b i e v id e n c e , b u t t

h e p an e l o b s e r

v e d th at suc h
e vid e nc e wa s we a k and c on sis te nt wi th C un nin g ham’ s guil t. Cunningham claimed that counse l should have objec ted to the prosec utor’s comments denigr ating the def ense te am during closing argument, but the panel he ld that there w as no rea sonable likelihood th at the outcome would have bee n differ ent h ad counsel objected. Cunning ham claimed that c ouns e l sh ou ld h a ve ob

je c te d t o th e pr os e c uto r’ s c omm e nts on his chang ed appe ara

nce, but the panel held that it was a n acc eptable de fense s t rate g y to withhold objections to an opponent’s opening statement, and Cunningham w as not prejudice d by

counsel’s pe rfor

mance . Finally , Cunningham claimed that c ounsel d i d not adequately investigate and prese nt further m itigatingevidenc e at the pe nalty phase, but the pane l held that he was not prejudice d when the te stimony
wa s cu mu la tiv e a nd

mig ht h a ve op e ne d th e do or to ag g ravating e vidence

. The pa nel also held that the state court did not
unrea sonably

apply clea rly es t ab lished fede ral lawor unrea sonably

deter mine the fa cts when it found no Miranda violation, a n d t h at any

err or in admitting Cunning ham’s statement into evi d ence was ha rmless bec ause he did not
a c tua lly c on fe ss. Finally , the panel held that Cunningham’s claims did not
re su lt i n c umu la tiv e e rr or re qu ir ingre ve rs a l. Judg e Pr e g e rs on

c oncurr ed in

pa rt and dis se nte d in

pa rt

. He would g rant ha

beas r el i ef

as to Cunningham’s claim of ineffe ctive assistanc e in fa iling to ca ll an expert witness at the penalty phase.C UN NI NG HA M V

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4
CO UN SEL

Jer ry L . N e wt on , Car

me l, C a lif

or nia ; N or man D . Jam e s, Cor va lli s, Mo nta

na , f or Pe tit ion e r- Ap pe lla

nt.
Edmund G. Br own J r., Attorney Gene ral of California; Dane R. Gi ll e tte , Ch ie f A ssi sta nt A tto rn e y

Ge ne ra l; Pa

me la C. Ha manaka, S enio r A ssi sta

nt A tto rn e y

Ge ne ra l; A . Sc ott Ha y wa rd and L anc e E. Wint e rs , D e pu ty Attor ne y s G e ne ra l, L os Ang eles, California , for Responde nt-Appellee

.

OP IN ION

TAL L MAN, Circuit J udg e: Petitioner-Appellant Albe rt Cunningha m (“Cu n n ingha m”) appea ls the district court’s denia l of hi s petition for a writ of habea s corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Cunningham was convicted of

robber y /murder in California

state cour t and was
se nte nc e d to de a th i n 1 98 8. He ra ise s te n ind iv id ual c la ims
a lle g inge rr or

in b oth the g uil t and

pe na lty ph a se s o f h is Ca lif or nia c ri min a l pr oc e e din g s. Hi s claims g e ne ra lly fa ll int o thr e e c a te g o r i e s : 1 ) p r o s e c u t o r i a l m i s c on du c t; 2) ineff ective a ssistance of c ounsel; and 3) imprope r admission of post-arr est statements. W e have jurisdiction
un de r 2 8 U .S. C. § 22 53 , a nd we a ff ir m.
I

A
At a bo ut 9 :00 p. m. o n De c e mbe r 1, 19 85 , Ca rm e n T re to (“Tr eto”) , the murder

victim, drove hi s white-over -blac kC UN NI NG HA M V

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Buic k L eSabre to t h e Pair of Ac es B ar in Pasade na, Ca lif or nia . T re to h a d ju st r e c e ive d $ 1, 40 0 o r $ 1, 50 0 in c a sh fo r a jo b, and he c arr ie d th e mon e y in v ari ou s p la c e s o n h is person. Juvenal Galleg os, the bar’ s doorman, and A ng el Ga lle g os , th e mana g e r, bo th s aw T re to at th e ba r t hat ni ght,
rec og nizi ng that he wa s very drunk.
At about 11:00 p.m., J uan C ebre ros (“ Cebrer os”), a nother victim and the s urviving ey ewitness to the murde r, ar rived at the Pa ir of Ac e s w ithhis br oth e r, F a vio . Ce br e ro s a nd Tr e to play ed pool tog ether

. Be tween 7:00 p.m. and 2:00 a.m., both Angel a nd J uvenal Galleg os, as well as Cebr eros, saw Cunningham at the bar

. Th e y de sc ri be d Cunn ing ham a s an Af ri c an- Am e ri c an ma le in his forties, slender

and about 5 f

eet 10 in ches tall. The witnesses said Cunning ham was w ear in g a maroon threepiece pinstripe suit and tie as we ll as thick g lasses with dark rims. He had a

mustache a

nd g oatee , and his hair wa s shoulder-le ng th. He also ha d a distinctive g old front tooth. Around 1:30 a.m., Cunning ham left the Pair of Ace s and enter ed Rickey ’s L oung e, anothe r nea rb y b ar. Witnesses at Ric k e y ’ s r e c o g n iz e d

Cun n in g h a m a s a ls o h a v in g b e e nth ere ear lier that eve ning. Cunning ham started pla y ing pool at Rickey ’s with the boy friend of the bar tender , who not iced that Cu n n i n gh am kept his left hand c lose to his body and folded his arms to ke ep his c oat from opening , as if to conce al something. A fter a

bout half an hour, Cunningham visited the restroom a

nd rema ined i nside until the bartende r announc ed the bar was c losing. He then left the r estroom and the ba r.
Ce br e ro s le ft

the Pa ir of Ac e s f or home abo ut t

he same ti me , ju s t b e f

o r e 2 :0 0 a

. m. A lt

h o u g h o th e r

p a tr o n s urg edC UN NI NG HA M V

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6

Tr e to t o g o h ome a nd so ber up, h e wa s a pp are ntl y the la st person to lea v e. As Treto f inally stag g ere d out of the bar , Juve na l G a lle g os saw a

bo ut $ 40 0 in

$1 00 and

$5 0 b ill s sti c kin g ou t of

Tr e to’ s sh ir

t po c ke t.
A s h o rtt i m e l a t e r , C e b r e r o s , w o r r i e d f o r T r e t o ’ s s a f

e t y, re tur ne d to the Pa ir of Ac e s in his own ve hic le to o ff e r T re to a ride home. Tre to was standing by a lamppost in front of the b ar w h e n Ce b r e r o s dr o v e u p

. Ce b r e r o s p ar

k e d in the lot behind the bar , then walke d to t h e front of the bar to speak with Treto. De spite his obvious i ntox ication, Tre to insist ed on driving he and Ce brer os to Treto’s re sidence in Treto’s Buic k. Treto had rea ched the driver’ s side door and had bent down to insert the key

when a man later

identified as Cunningham approa ched from the dire ction of Rickey ’s L oung e.
Cebrer os, who was standi n g next t o Treto, he ard Cunningham demand, “He y amig o, g ive me the money .” He
saw C un nin g ham po int

a g un a t T re to a s he d e c lare d, “ Th is is a .357 mag num.” Treto turned to f ace Cunningham and
e xten de d his hand s. With ou t warn ing , Cunn ing ham su dd e nly fired, hitting Treto in the chest. Cebrer os turned and r an but was shot in the thigh as h e fl ed. De spite his bullet wound, Cebrer os manag ed to reach a near by fast-f ood restaur ant wher e he ha d someone c all the police. Shortly afte r the robbery occur

red, two diff

ere nt office rs working in the neig hborhood saw an Af rica n-Amer ican man with long ha ir and g lasses driving eastbound fr om the scene in a wh ite -a nd -b la c k c a

r w ithits he a dli g hts of

f. On e of the se office rs, Pasade na Police Of ficer Hal Edwards, wa s dispatched to the scene of the shooting. On arr ival, he found Treto lying on his ba ck in a pool of blood. One of Tre t o’sC UN NI NG HA M V

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sh oe s h a d b e e n r e mov e d a nd a sma ll amou

nt of c a sh
re m ai n edo nt h e gr o u n d

. Hi s ca r w as al s o m i s s i n g.
Another first responde r, Offic er J ohn Thomas , was instructed to collec t evidenc e and photog raph the scene . He fo un d s ome bil ls an d c oin s o n th e g ro un d a nd e ig ht $ 1 b ill s in Tr e to’ s p ants po c ket, bu t he t e sti fi e d th a t T re to’ s w a lle t, s h o e s , s h i rt , an d

j a c k e tw e r e a l l e mp t y.
Offic ers Car

ter and Or

tiz arr ived on the sce ne. Cebre ros spoke with Ortiz in S panish. Pasadena fireme n, including Parame dic Sean Eng lish, tre ated Cebrer os at the sce ne bef ore he wa s taken to Huntington Memorial Hospital. Whi le at the ho s p it a l, Ce b r e r o s d e s c r ib e d h is a s s a il an t t o D e te c ti v e L ee Ba roni as havinga brow n suit, glasse s, and a be ard.

Treto died at the hospital from uncontrolled ble eding and
car diac a rre st. A bullet was re covered fr o m his spine on autopsy , and a f

orensic e x amination reve al ed that it was capa ble of be ing f

ired fr om either a

.38 s p ec i al o r .357 mag num revolver

. Approxim ately

forty -two hours af

ter the r obbery

/murder, Treto’ s car

was discove red in Compton. The ca r had be en stripped and abandone d and conta ined no usable pr ints other than those of Tr eto’s wife. I t had rained between the shooting and the discove ry

of the c ar.
On De c e mbe r 1 3, 19 85 , Cunn ing ham r e turn ed to patronize the Pair of A ces. A ng el and Juv en al Gallegos immediately

rec og nized Cunni ng ham as having be en pre sent the nig ht of the murder and ca lled the police. Of fice r De lg a d o ar

r iv e d , ar r e s te d Cun n in g h a m, an d to o k h im to theC UN NI NG HA M V

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8
Pasadena Police Station. Cebrer os identified Cunningha m as the murder er f

rom a photog raphic lineup.

B
After C u n n i ng ham’s ar

rest on De cembe r 13, 1985, the L os Ang eles County

Di s t ri ct Attorney

filed a f

elony complaint char g ing him with (1) mur der of Treto dur ing the
course of a robber

y ; (2) robbe ry

of Tre to; (3) attempted murder of

Cebrer os by

infliction o f g reat bodily injury ; (4) attempted robbe ry

of Cebre ros; and (5) posses s i o n of a firea rm by a fe lon. Cunningham wa s arr aig ned in Fe bruar y 1986 and plea ded not g uilty to all char g es. In November 1986, befor e t ri al in the murder case , the District Attorney fi le d a se pa rate c omp la int

a g a ins t Cunn ing ham fo r f or c ibl y so do mizin g a

fe llo w i nmate in the L os An g e le s Co un ty Jail

. The guilt phase of C unningha m’s trial beg an on Jul y

27, 19 88 . T he tr ia l w a s h eld befo re L os An g e le s Co un ty Superior Court J udg e Gi l b er t Alston. Cunni ng ham was
re pr e se nte d by app oin te d c ouns e l, M ic ha e l U do vic (“Udovic”) a

nd Terr ence Be nnett (“B ennett”) . Assistant District Attorney Susan Wondries (“Wondries”) handled the prosec ution. On Aug ust 17, 1988, the jury convicted Cunnin g ham on

a ll c ounts

. I n a sepa rate proce eding from August 22–23, the jury found as true that Cun n i ng ham had two pr ior felony convictions. One of

the fe lonies was Cunning ham’s prior
c on vic tion f

or se c on d- de g re e mur de r f

or the kil lin g of

El la Mae F ellows in 1976. The other felony was Cunni n gh am’s
a ssa ult wi th a de a dly we a

po n on a po lic e of

fi c e r, a crime dis c us se d at le ng th l a te r i n th e pe na lty ph a se of the tr ia l.C UN NI NG HA M V

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C
Th e pe na lty

ph a se of Cunnin g ham’ s tr ia l be g an o n A ugus t 24, 1988. The de fense chose to pre sent its case in mi tigation first. The mitiga ting e vidence demonst r a te d (1) Cunningham’s terrible c h i ldhood; (2) family love for Cunningham despite his misdeeds; (3) Cunning ham’s previous positive a djustment to prison life; an d (4) Cunningham’s version of his prior c rimes, includ i n g the murder of Ella Mae F ellows, his shootout wit h police off icer s following his the ft of a taxi cab, and the mo s t re cent alleg ation of forced sodomy

. The defense called a s witnesses (1) Cunnin g ham’ s mo the r, Ros a Va ug hn ; ( 2) John nie Washington, a p as tor at Cunningha m’s churc h and for

mer boarde r at Rosa Va

ug hn’s hom e; (3) Ma

rily n Cox , an emp l oy ee of

Volt Temporar

y Service s, Cunningham’ s employ er; a

nd (4) Cunning ham himself.

Ros a Va ug hn te sti fi e d a s to Cunnin g ham’ s d if fi c ult persona l history . She told the jury that Cunningham’s fathe r, Al be rt Sr ., be a t he r wh ile sh e wa s pre g na nt a nd c a us e d h e r t o fall on her

stomach. She also mentioned that Cun n i ng ham
su ff e re d a “ fo rc e ps de liv e ry ” at bi rt h, c a us ingho le s in

his head that took months t o h eal. Rosa Vaug hn left Cunni ng ham’ s f

a the r w he n Cunn ing ham w a s st ill an in fa nt, iso la tin g the c hil d f

ro m any po sit ive ma le ro le mod e ls.
Cunnin g ham sh ow e d in te lle c tua l pr omi se in hi s e arl y y ear s, mo v i n g u p a g rade in elementar y school. But he experience d ong oing psycholog ical proble ms t h at plag ued him for t he re st of his life; problems for whic h Rosa Vaug hn
so ug ht a dv ic e fr om n e ur olo g ist s, ps y c hiatr ist s, and min ist e rs

.C UN NI NG HA M V

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10
C u n n i n gh am h add i ff

i cu l t i es with Vaug

hn’s new husba

nd, L eland Young , whom she marrie d in 1954 when Cunning ham
was seve n y ear s old. Yo u n g “didn’t under stand children,” and ofte n “strappe d” Cunning ham. Rosa said that Young had no patience or under stan ding a nd was ve ry

neg ative towar d the y oung boy . Not surprising ly , Young ’s beatings did not
cor r e c t C u n n in g h a m’ s o n g o in g b e h a v io r a l p r o b le ms , and Rosa Vaug hn sent Cunningha m off to live wit h Albert Sr.
w h e n C u n n i n g h a m w a s e i g h t y e ar s o l d

. A l t h o u g h the mos t vivid descriptions of Alber t Sr. came from Cunning ham himself, Rosa Va u gh n explained that by the time she sent Cunningham to live with his fathe r, Alber t Sr. was an alcoholic, dr

ug -dea ler, pimp, and a

g ambler. S he re called Albert Sr. on ce beatingCunningham so badly that blood fl ow e d f ro m Cunn ing ha

m’ s p e nis

. Vaug hn testified, and Cunning ham l at er c onfirmed, that when he was e ight y ear s old he stole his uncle’s c ar. V aug hn did no t di sc ipl ine Cunnin g ham f or that pa rt ic ular fo ra

y int o joy ri din g , b ut d id te ll h im i t w a s w ro ngto s te a l. N on e the le ss, Cunningham beg an t o steal prope rty with increa sing fre quency . He stole a

nother c hil d ’s b i cy cle e ven thoug h he had a ne w one himself. A neur ologist eve ntually told Vaug hn that Cunningham had a c ompulsion t o steal fr om people.
Around this same time in Cunning ham’s adolesc ence , he be g an to sh owsig ns of

vio le nc e . At a g e 12 , h e wa s p la c e d in juv e nil e ha ll fo r t

hr ow ingro c ks a t a

pla y ma te ’s mot

he r. Th is
wa s Cunn ing ham’ s f

ir st i nc arc e ratio n, bu t c e rt a inl y no t hi s la st. He sp e nt m

uc h o f t he re ma ind e r o f h is you th in de te nti on fa c ili tie s, mos tly

fo r s te a lin g c ars

. Vaughn testified a s to Cunningham’s diff iculties following his relea se fr om prison after servinga sentenc e forC UN NI NG HA M V

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a uto the ft in t he e arl y 19 70 s. Cunnin g ham, b y the n a n a du lt, had met and ma

rried Shar on Spears, with w hom he fathe red a daug hter, F elicia. The marria g e wa s an un h ap p y one, howeve r, and Spea

rs dec ided to leave Cunningham. This sent Cunningham into a deep depression, and he attempted suicide in 1972 by

shooting him self with either a rifle or a shotg un. The gun moved as Cunn i n g ham pulled the trig g er, a nd instead of be ing struc k in the che st, as planned, Cunning ham was wounde d by a bullet in the a bdomen. He r equire d eig ht hours of surge ry and a y ear to rec over, a nd the injury

cause d him on g oin g pr ob le ms w ithg a str iti s and pa nc re a tit is. Vaug hn spoke about Cunning ham’s prior mur der
c on vic tio n f

or the kil lin g of

El la Mae Fe llo ws . Sh e a lso spoke about Cunning ham’s shootout with police in whic h he shot an offic er thre e times in t h e chest. She said that Cunningham showed remorse for bot h crimes a nd explained that he wa s h a llu c inatin g on dr ug s.
Vau g hn spoke at leng th about Cunningham’s positive contributions wheneve r he w as in pris on. She believed that Cunningham had bec ome “insti t utionaliz ed” a nd that he could help fe llow prisoners if g iven a life sentenc e in lieu of the de a th p e na lty . Sh e te sti fi e d a bo ut l e tte rs he ha d w ri tte n to her a sking f

or books so he c ould he lp illiterate inmates lea rn to r ea d an d write. He also completed bible a nd minist ry course s in prison, eventua lly becoming an ordained minister. H e h e l p e d

h i s f e l l o w p r i s o n e r s f

i n d t h e i r o w ns p i r i tu a l i t y. Vaug hn also fo cused on the positive view g uards a nd other off icer s held of Cunning ham. She re ad seve ral laudatory “chr onos” that co rrections office rs had wr itten. Th e se re po rt s d e sc ri be d Cunn ingham a s a he lpf ul,
c on sc ie nti ou s in ma te wh o w a s a po sit ive inf lue nc e on oth e rs

.C UN NI NG HA M V

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12 Vaug hn r e a d

th e n a me an d

r an k o f e a c h o f f ic e r w h o had
su bmi tte d th e se many

po sit ive pr iso n r e po rt s. Vaug hn also t es t ified about F elicia Cunning ham and Sha ro n Sp e ars . V a

ug hn ex pl aine d th a t F e lic ia

ha d s pe nt a considera ble amount of time living with her, a nd that Sharon Spears a lso shared f

reque n t s tories about F elicia a nd her
a c c omp lis hme nts

. Finally , Vaug hn wept, telling the jury that Cunningham “is my only child,” and that without him, “Ijust would have nobody left.” She pleade d with the jury to give Cunningham a life se ntence

. The ne x t defe nse witness was J o hnnie Washington, a minist er f

rom Cunningha

m’s churc h who was living in a rente d room at Rosa Va ug hn’s hous e o n the nig ht of the murder. H e testified that he loved Cunn i n gham as a person and as a brother in Christ. He told the j u ry o f a p o wer ful
se rm on Cunnin g ham ha d d e liv e re d to the ir c on g re g a tio n in the months before the murder

. He testified that Cunningham had also taug ht Sunday

school and org anized a y outh choir. Marily n Cox , a worke r from Cunningham’s em ploy er, briefly testified that Cunningha

m had worke d as a temp for a few wee ks. She confirm ed that he wa s working at Kaise r Pe rm ane nte a t th e tim e of his arr e st.
T h e final defense mitigation witness was Cunning ham himself. He testified a

bo u t h i s terrible c hildhood, repeating much of the te stimony

g iven by his mother. Cunningham provided fur ther de tails a b o u t the neg ative role his fa t h er play ed in his childhood. Albert Sr., who ha dC UN NI NG HA M V

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a lso se rv e d ti me in p ri so n, tol d Cunn ing ham that be ingin j a il was “ no thing.” He a lso showed Cunn i n gh am the g uns he ke pt i n th e ho us e , e ve ntu a lly te a c hin g Cunnin g ham ho w t o shoot. Cunning ham testified that, under his father’s tutela g e, he be c a m e ane xp e rtm ar k s m anan d

c o u l d e a s i l y s h o o twi th
on e ha nd

. He de sc ri be d h is f

a the r’ s h ou se a s a

br oth e l. H is fathe r’s prostitutes would turn tricks while Cunning ham was prese nt, and o n e of the women molested Cunning ham sexually when he was e ight year s old. Cunningham e x plained that he was inca rce rate d for much of his y ou th b e c a

us e of aut o thef

ts, and thi s c on tin

ue d in to adulthood. I n add i t i o n to the auto thefts, he disc ussed the
c ir c ums tanc e s o f his pr ior fe lon ie s. As to t he mur de r o f E lla Mae F ellows in 1975, C u nningha m claimed that he w as not her pimp but t h at he spent a lot of time with her, protec ting her. He cla imed that the two of them ha d taken ha llu c ino g e nic dr

ug s and tha t he on ly plea de d guil ty to murder be cause he could not re member e x actly what happene d at the time of he r death.
As to the assault with a de adly wea pon on a police of

fice r in 1980, Cunningham c laimed to be conf used as to the office r’s identity

as a pe ac e o ff

i cer . Cunningham told the jury that he had slipped out a bathroom window of a g ambling house in ord er to sec ure his winning s after a ca rd g ame. When he w as p ulled over later that nig ht, he thoug ht the offic ers we re try

ing to r ob him. He test i fi ed that he w as shot twe lve times in the incident and only fired i n s elfdefe nse. He felt remorse for the office r he ha d shot and later
w r o t e h i m a

l e t t e r o f a p o l o g y.
Cumulative to his m other’s te stimony , Cunningham focuse d as much a s he could on t h e t heory that he wa sC UN NI NG HA M V

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14
instit utionaliz ed. He discus s ed the good wor ks he had perf ormed duringhis quarter -ce ntury in prison, expl aining that he had w ritten to thousands of people per month to g ive them the word of God following his or dination a s a minister.
On cr oss-examination, Cunningham admitted that he had be e n d isc ipl ine d in

pr iso n f or sto ri ng mari

jua na in h is r e c tum , and for sharinga ce ll with a prisoner who ha d a we apon. He
a lso a dmitted

to b e ingdis mis se d f

ro m pr iso n jo bs and

to taking part in fig hts. W hen conf ronted with the re ce nt char g es of f

orce d sodomy , he ex plained that he had eng ag ed in consensual sex ac ts w ith other male prisone rs, but that the county jail alleg ations ag ainst him were f alse. The prose cution’s ca s e i n ag g ravation painted a much differ ent pictu re. The prosec ution offer ed evide nce that (1) Cunn i n gh am ’s m u rd er o f E l l a M ae Fe l lows was preme ditated; (2) Cunning ham re sisted arre st and intentionally

shot a police off

icer thr ee times during the pursuit and shootout following his c ab theft; (3) Cunning ham
was violent towa

rd his f amily ; a nd (4) Cunning ham was not a model prisoner

. As to the Fe llows murder, the inve stigating of fice r and
corone r t estified that Fe llows’s body turned up in a vaca nt lot
sever al day s after

her murde r. Ther e we re drag m ar ks and tire tra ck s , indicating that the body had bee n dumped there

. She was we aringa blue- g ray pants uit and had eig ht stab wounds over he r left br east, many of which would have be en instantly fata l. Office rs s ea rche d Cunningham’s apar tment and found a

bloody steak knife like the one use d in the killing, a bo x with J esus Christ’s imag e on the c over containing a Polaroid phot o of F ellows wea ring the exact blue-g ray pantsuit w o rn at he r death, and a mag azineC UN NI NG HA M V

. W ONG 15

dep ic ti n g a

h o r r o r mo v ie in w h ic h th e f

ic ti o n a l v ic ti m h ad wounds similar to Fellows’s. Cunningham w as later arr ested driving Fe llows’s car

. As to Cunning ham’s shootout with police, one of the office rs involved testified that he a nd his partner

rec ei v ed a descr iption of a stolen cab w hile on patrol. They saw the c ab, pulled it o v er , and told the driver to “fre eze.” The driver, Cunningham, sped awa

y in the cab, leadingthe offic ers on a high- speed c hase. H e eve ntually collided with a par

ked ca r befor e fleeing on foot. As the off icer s rac ed ar ound a cor

ner, Cunnin g ham turn e d a

nd sh ot o ne of them

thr e e tim e s, pr op e lli ng the of

fi c e r fi ft e e n fe e t ba c kw ard s a nd c a us inghim to lose consciousness. M i ra culously , Cunningham hit the of fi c e r t w i c e i n h i s b u l l e t

- p r o o f v e s t an d o n c e i n h i s b e lt buckle. The officer rec overe d, but suffer ed fr om depre ssion and eve ntually

left the for ce.
W h i l e o n parole from his assault with a de adly wea pon sentenc e, Cunning ham ha d a violent clash with Sharon Spear s , h is e x- w if

e

. I n th e s u mm e r o f 1 9 8 5 , ju s t a few months before the Treto murder, Spears beca me upset when she ca ug ht Cunningham c heating . Cunningham rea cted by beatingher with a paddle . Spears summoned the police and Cunningham was sent bac k to prison. Finally , as t o his pre-tria l behavior in the L os Ang eles County J ail, the prosecut ion presente d evidenc e of Cunningham’s forc ed sodomy char g e. One of Cunningha m’s fellow inmates fro m t he L os Ang eles County “pill module” testified that he sa

w Cunningha

m strike a fe llow prisoner on the hea d, forc e him to his knees, put him in a full-ne lson he a dlo c k, and ins e rt his e re c t pe nis int o th e vic tim ’s re c tum

. Th e a c t di d n ot a

pp e ar c on se ns ua l to the e y e wi tne ss.C UN NI NG HA M V

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16

T h e d istric t c o u rt h e ld a n e v id e n tiar y h e a rin g o n two o f C u n n ing h a m ’s 1

c la im s. T h e p a rtie s c o n c e d e tha t un d e r th e S u p re m e C o u rt’s d e c isio n in Cul l e n v

. Pi nh ol

s t er , 13 1 S. Ct

. 138 8 (2011 ) , we may not cons i der evi d ence rai sed f

o r t he f i rs t tim e d u ri ng t he d i st ri ct co urt ’ s evi d ent i ary h e a rin g . O u r d e c isio n thu s re sts so le ly o n the re c o rd b e fo re the s ta te c o u rt. Ba sed on all of this evidenc e, the jury rende red a

verdic t of death on September 2, 1988. The trial judg e denie d Cunnin g ham’ s p os t- tr ia l mo tio ns a nd e nte re d ju dg me nt i n J une 1989.

D
On automatic dire ct appe al, the California Supreme Court aff irmed Cunningham’s conviction and de ath sentenc e. See P eo ple v. Cunningham , 2 5 C a l

. 4 t h 9 2 6 ( 2 0 0 1 )

. T h e U. S. Sup re me Court

de nie d Cunn ing ham’ s p e tit ion fo r c e rt ior ari

. Cun nin gh am v . Ca lif

or nia , 534 U.S. 1141 (2002).

I n 1998, while his direct a ppeal w as st ill pending be fore the Ca lif or nia Sup re me Court , Cunn ing ham a lso fi le d w ith that court a

p et i t i o n for a

writ of habe as cor

pus. The cour

t denied the pe tition i n a summary order in 2002. Cunningham filed his fede ral ha beas pe tition on September 10, 2004. The district court de nied the petition on May 1, 2009. Cunningham sought a Certificate of 1 Ap pe a la bil ity fo r t e n o f t

he fi ft e e n c la im s ra ise d in his petition, and the di strict court gra nted a Certificate f

or all ten.

II
We reviewde novo the district court’s denial of ha beas corpus r elief. Estrella v. Ollison , 668 F.3d 593, 597 (9th Cir.C UN NI NG HA M V

. W ONG 17

2011). We g rant much g reater de fer ence , h o we v er , to the
un de rl y ingst ate c ourt

de c isi on s in

thi s c a se . B e c a

us e Cunningham filed his f

ed er al habea s petition in 2004, our
re vie w i s g ov e rn e d by

the An tit e rr or ism

and Ef fe c tiv e De a th Penalty Act of 1996 ( “AED PA ”), Pub. L . No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214. Under AED PA, we defer t o the state c ourt’s merits-base d dispositi on of C unningha m’s claims unless the state’s a djudication:

(1) r esulted i n a decision that was contra ry to, or i nvolved an unr easona ble application of, clea rly established Fe dera l law, as de termined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) r esulted in a de cision that was base d
on an unr e a so na

ble de te rm inatio n o f t

he fa c ts in l ig ht o f t

he e vid e nc e pr e se nte d in t he State co u rt p ro ce ed i n g. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Under § 2254(d)(1 ), a dec ision is an “unre asonable application” of clea rly established fede ral law if it “identifies the c orre ct g overning leg al principle fr om [ the Supreme Court’s] dec isions but unrea sonably applies t hat principle to the fa cts of th e p ri soner’ s case .” Holland v. Jack son , 542 U.S. 649, 652 (2004) (pe r cur iam) (inter nal quotation marks omitted). Under § 2254(d)( 2), a state court make s “ an unr e a so na

ble de te rm inat ion

of the fa c ts” wh e n it fai l s to consider a

nd weig h rele vant evidenc e that wa s proper ly prese nted to it. Ta

ylor v. Maddox , 366 F.3d 992, 1000–01 (9th Cir. 2004).

I f the state c ourt adjudicates the merits of a claim without
art ic ulatin g its re a so ning, a re vie wi ngfe de ra l c ourt mus t e xami ne the re c or d su

pp or tin g the de c isi on un de r the sameC UN NI NG HA M V

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18
defe rential AED PA standard. Se e Gr e e ne v . Lamb e rt , 2 8 8 F. 3 d 1 0 8 1 , 1 0 8 8

– 8 9 ( 9 t h C i r. 2 0 0 2 ) ( ci t i n g Delgado v. Le wis , 2 23 F .3 d 9 76 , 9 81 –8 2 ( 9th Cir . 2 00 0) ). W it h this defe rential standa

rd in m i n d , we turn to Cunning ham’s ten
c la ims

. III
A s s tate d a b o v e , Cun n in g h a m’ s c la im s c anb e g rouped into three c ateg ories. F irst, Cunningham a rg ue s that Assistant District Attorney

Susan Wondries co mmitt ed misconduct during the g uilt phase of his tria l. Second, he ar g ues that he suffe red ine ffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel during both the g uil t and pe na lty ph a se s o f t

he tr ia l. Th ir d, he argue s tha t hi s arr esting office r vi olated his rig hts under Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and that his statemen t to the office r should have be en excluded.

A
We first addre ss Cunningham’s c laims of prosec utorial misconduct. Cunningham argues that A.D.A . Wondries failed to disclose evidenc e in violation of Brady v. M aryland , 37 3 U .S. 83 (1 96 3) . H e a lso a rgue s th a t sh e imp ro pe rl y imp lie d th a t he c ha

ng e d h is a

pp e ara nc e fo r t ri a l to a vo id ide nti fi c a tio n b y

wi tne sse s.
1

I n Brady , the Supreme Court he ld that the p ro s ecution’s failure to disclose materia l evi d ence to a cr iminal defenda nt vio la te s th e de fe nd ant’ s ri g ht to a fa ir tr ia l. T o s ta te a

c la im under Brady , a criminal defe ndant must e stablish that (1) the withheld evidenc e was favor able to the defe ndant; (2) theC UN NI NG HA M V

. W ONG 19

g overnme nt suppressed the e vidence ; and (3) the g overnme nt’s s u p pression pre judiced the de fenda

nt. See Smith v. Almada , 640 F.3d 931, 939 (9th Cir. 2011) (a pply ing the Bradytest). Under Brady ’s suppression prong , if “the defe ndant is awa

re of the essential fac ts enabling him to take advanta g e of a

ny exculpatory

evidenc e,” the g overnme nt’s failure to bring the evidenc e to the dire ct atte n t ion of the defe nse does not constitute “suppr ession.” Ra le y v. Ylst , 4 7 0 F. 3 d 7 9 2 , 8 0 4 (9 t h C i r. 2 0 0 6 ) ( qu o t i n g United States v. Br own , 582 F.2d 197, 200 ( 2d Cir. 1978)).
The Bradyru le wa s c le arl y e sta bli sh e d f e de ral law i n 2002 when the California Supreme C o u rt denied Cun n in g h a m’ s s tate h a

b e a s p e ti ti on. Se e Be nn v . La mb e rt , 2 8 3 F. 3 d 1 0 4 0 , 1 0 5 2 ( 9 t h C i r. 2 0 0 2 ) ( ex p l ai n i n g Brady constitutes clear ly

established Sup reme Court prece dent). The California Supreme Court did not ar ticulate its rea soning fo r d e nyingCunnin g ham’ s Brady claims so we must revie w the fa cts independe ntly

to determine w h ether

the cour t’s de c isi on wa s unr e a so na

ble . We ho ld t

hat it wa s n ot.
I n Cunn ing ham’ s f

ir st Brady claim, he argues t hat A.D.A. Won dr ie s su

pp re sse d vic timCe br e ro s’ s me dic a l r e c or ds

. Cunningham’s claim is simil ar to the pe titioner’s complaint in Raley . 4 70 F.3d at 803–804. I n that case , the petitioner argued that the pr osecutor suppres s ed the petitioner’s own medical r ecor ds. We held that, beca use the pe tit i o n er “possessed the salient fac ts reg ardingthe exist ence of the
rec ords he c laims were withhel d ” s u ch that def ense c ounsel “could have soug ht the documents throug h discovery ,” ther e was no suppre ssion under B rady

. Id. at 8 0 4 (c i t i n g United States v. Griggs , 713 F.2d 672, 674 (11th Cir. 1983)). Ap p l y i n g R aley , Cunningham’s attorney s possessed the

“ sa lie nt f a c ts” tha t w ou ld h a ve a llo we d th e m to ac c e ssC UN NI NG HA M V

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20
Cebrer os’s medica l rec ords. They knew he had bee n shot and
wa s t re at edb y

m ed i ca l p er s o n n el fo l l o wi n g t h e s h o o t i n g. There was no suppre ssion of this easily attainable e vidence

. I n Cunningham’s second B r a dy claim, he a rg ues that A.D.A. Wondries suppre ssed Tre to ’s autopsy repor t. The repor t inventoried $455.25 in ca sh found on Tre to’s person
a ft e r t he sh oo tin g . Cunn ing ham’ s atto rn e y s w e re ob vio us ly
awa re that T re to h a d b e e n k ill e d. Th e y c ou ld h a ve e a sil y soug ht his autops y

repor t throug h discovery . Moreove r, the
rec ord demonstrates that Wondries offer ed the a utopsy repor t a s a n e xhibi t a t tria l, a

nd the re po rt

wa s a dmi tte d in to evidenc e with no objection fr om the def ense. B eca

use the repor t was ava ila b l e to def

ense c ounsel and the jury as admitted evidenc e, it was not suppre ssed under Brady . T hu s, the California Supre me Cou rt d i d not unrea sonably deny Cunnin g ham’ s Bradyc la ims

. 2
Cunnin g ham’ s o the r p ro se c uto ri a l mi sc ondu c t c la im relates to Wondries’s argument about Cunn in gh a m’s chang ed appea ranc e.
On at least ten diff

ere nt occa sions between Septe mber 1986 and April 1988, while Cunningham w as i n car cer ated
awa iting trial, Cun n i ng ham’s attorne y s reque sted that he be
a ble to se e a de nti st be c a

us e of se ve re de nta l hy

g ie ne iss ue s. His teeth we re so bad that a dentist e ventually had to remove them all. The re sulting toothlessness preve nted Cunningha m from eating pr operly

for months until he finally rec eived de nt ures bef

or e tr ia l. T he de ntu

re s d id n ot i nc lud e a

g old front tooth.C UN NI NG HA M V

. W ONG 21

During her ope nin g s tatement, Wondries hig hlighted Cun n i n g h a m ’ s a

p p e ar an c e , ar g u i n g t h a ti tw a s s u b s t an t i a lly differ ent from whe n he wa s arr ested. She li s t ed fo r t he jury that Cunningham “has shave d differ ently than the night of the incident. And the hair is completely differ ent now, ver

y , very short. And h e’ s had some de ntal work done .” She then dis pla y e d p ho tog ra

ph s o f Cun

nin g ham take n s ho rt ly

a ft e r h is
arr est, telling the jury

that “[y ]ou can see the differ ence

. He’ s done a lot to try

and cha ng e h i s appea

ranc e.” Cunning ham argues that this focus on h i s appea ranc e wa s improper b e c a u s e h i s d e n t a l w o r

k w a s m e d i c a l l y n e c e s s ar

y.
On di rec t appea l, the California Supreme Court denied this claim on pro ce dural g rounds in a re asoned opinion. P e o p lev

. Cu n n in g

ham , 25 Cal. 4th at 1000. The cour t explained that “[a]s a g ener al rule a defe ndant may

not complain on appe al of prose cutorial miscon d u ct unless in a timely fash i on—and on the same g round—the de fenda nt [requested] an assignment of misconduct and [also] reque sted that the jury be admonished to disreg ard the impropriety .” Id. (i nte rn a l qu otatio n ma

rk s o mit te d) (b ra ckets in o ri g ina l) (q u o t i n g Pe op le v . A

y ala , 23 Cal. 4th 225, 284 (2000)). Cunningham’s attorney s d i d not object to Wondries’s op e nin g state me nt and fa ile d to se e k an a dmo nit ion . B e c a us e an adm on iti on

c ou ld h a ve c ur e d th e e rr or , th e c ourt he ld Cunningham’s claim proc edura lly barr ed. Id.
As the Sup re me Cou

rt e xpla ine d in the lin e of

fe de ra lis m case s beg inning wi t h Michigan v. Long , 463 U.S. 1032 (1983), f eder al cour

ts “will not review a question of fe dera l law d e c ide d b y

a state c ourt

if the de c isi on of that c ourt re sts on a state la

w g round t hat is independe nt of the fe dera l question and adequate to support the judg ment.” Coleman v. Thompson , 501 U.S. 722, 729 (1991) (deny ing ha beas r elief)

.C UN NI NG HA M V

. W ONG

22
The rule “is based upon e quitable consider ati ons of fede ralism and comity ” and applies when a st ate court denies a cla im on procedur al g rounds. Lam br ix v . Sing le tar y , 520 U.S. 518, 523 (1997).

I n this cas e, the California Supre me Court devoted two full para g raphs to its holding that Cunning ham’s cla im was proce durally

barr ed. People v . Cunningham , 25 Cal

. 4 t h at 1 0 0 0

– 0 1

. G i v e n t h i s a d e qu a t e an d i n d e p e n d e n tsta te proce dural g round, see Ric h v. Calderon , 187 F.3d 106 4, 1070 (9th Cir. 1999), and be cause Cunningham has not shown an e x ception to the proc edura l rule, see discussion of ine ff e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of c ouns e l inf

ra , we may

not consider this c laim on fede ral ha

beas r eview. Se e Cor

re ll v . S te war t , 137 F.3d 1404, 1416–18 ( 9th Cir. 1998).

B

We n o w t u rn to Cunningham’s claims of inef fec tive
a s s i s t an c e o f c o u n s e l

. C u n n i n g h a m ar g u e s t h a th i s a t t o r n e ys wer e in e f

f e c ti v e f o r ( 1 ) f a il in g to p r e s e n t e v id e n c e of Cebrer os’s medica l rec ords and Tr eto’ s au topsy repor t; (2) fa ili ngto p re se nt a lib i e vid ence; (3 ) f a ili ngto o bje c t to A.D

. A

. Wo n dr ie s ’ s c lo s in g a r g u me n t a ll e g e d ly d e n ig r a ting defe nse counse l; (4) fa iling to obj ect to evide nce a nd arguments about Cunningha m’s chang ed appe ara

nce; and (5) fa ili ngto pr e se nt ad dit ion a l mitig a tin g e vid e nc e a t th e pe na lty ph a se . T he Ca lif

or nia Sup re me Court

re je c te d th e se c la ims in its sum mary

denial of Cunningham’s state habe as petition.
Th e Sup re me Court e sta

bli sh e d the law state c ourt s mu st a pp ly wh e n re vie wi ngine ff e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e c la ims in Strickland v. W

ashington , 4 6 6 U.S. 668 (1984). To prove ineffe ctive assistanc e under the familiar Strickland standard,C UN NI NG HA M V

. W ONG 23

Cunning h a m h a d

to d e mo n s tr a te to th e s tate c o u rt ( 1 ) “ th at counsel’s r ep re sentation fell below a n objective standa

rd of
re a so na ble ne ss” and

(2 ) “that the re is a r e a so na ble pr ob a bil ity that, but for counsel’s unprofessional err ors, the re sult of the proce eding would have been differ ent.” W illiams v. Taylor , 5 2 9 U. S

. 3 6 2 , 3 9 0

– 9 1 (2 0 0 0 ) ( qu o t i n g Strickland , 466 U.S. at 688, 694) (inter

nal quotation marks omitted).
Under Strickland ’s first prong , Cunningham w as re quired to show that his counsels’ performanc e “f ell below an objectiv e standa

rd of r easona

bleness,” Strickland , 4 66 U. S.
a t 68 8, or

wa s “ outs ide the wi de ra ng e of pr of e ssi on a lly competent a ssistance,” id. a t 69 0. I n re vie wi ng couns e ls’ pe rf or manc e un de r t

his fi rs t pr on g , th e state c ourt mus t “beg in with the premise that ‘unde r the c ir cu mstances, the challeng ed ac tion[ s] m ight be co nsidered sound tria l strateg y .’” Cullen v. Pinholster , 131 S. Ct . 1388, 1404 (2011) (a l t er at i o ni no ri gi n al ) ( qu o t i n g Strickland , 466 U.S. at 689). The c ourt must be “hig hly defe rential,” and must evaluate the
c ha lle ng e d c on du c t fr om the pe rs pe c tiv e of de fe ns e c ouns e l. Strickland , 466 U.S. at 689.
Under Strickland ’s sec ond prong , C u n ningha m was r e qu ir e d to s h o w a

“ r e a s o n a b le p r o b a b il it y th at, b u t f

or c ouns e l’ s un

pr of e ssi on a l e rr or s, the re su lt o f t he [tr ia l] wo uld have b ee n d i fferent.” Id. a t 69 4. “ A r e a so na ble pr ob a bil ity is a probability

sufficie nt to u n d er mine confide nce in the
o u tc o me.” Id. Cunningham would have ha d to show “a ‘substantial,’ not j ust ‘conc eivable,’ likelihood of a diff ere nt result.” Pinholster , 1 3 1 S

. C t

. at 1 4 0 3 (q u o t i n g Har r i n g t on v. Richte r , 131 S. Ct . 770, 792 (2011))

. Be cause AEDPA’s standa rd of r eview a

pplies here , we take the alre ady -def

ere ntial r eview of counse l’s perf ormanc eC UN NI NG HA M V

. W ONG

24

m an d a t e d b y Stric kland

and mag nify

it “throug h the ‘def ere ntial lens of § 2254(d).’ ” Id. (q u o t i n g Knowles v. Mirzayance , 556 U.S. 1 1 1 , 121 n.2 (2009)) . Our re view of Cunnin g ham’ s in e ff

e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e c la ims “ is thu s ‘ do ub ly defe rential.’” Id. (q u o t i n g Mirzayance , 556 U.S. at 123). To pr e va il und e r t

his dif fi c ult standard, Cunn ing ham “ mus t demo n s trate that it was nece ssarily unrea sonable for

the California Supreme Court to co n cl u de: (1) that he had not
overc ome the strong presumption of competenc e; and ( 2) that he had failed to unde rmine confide nce in the jury ’s sentenc e of death.” Id.

1
As an an a logue to h is Bradyclaims, Cunningham argues that his attorney s wer e ineffec tive in failing to investigate (1) Cebrer os’s medica l rec ords indicating an entr y wound to the front of his thigh; and (2) Treto’ s autopsy repor t documenting the dis c ov e ry of $4 55 .2 5 on Tr e to’ s pe rs on or in hi s eff e c ts afte r the shooting . Be cause the state ha s conce ded that
a tto rn e y s U do vic and

B e nn e tt w e re de fi c ien t in fa ili ngto addre ss this evidence, w e nee d o n l y d ecide whether Cunningham was pre

judiced.
As to the first claim re g arding Cebr eros’ s medical
rec ords, Cebrer os testified at trial that he wa s shot in the back of the legas he r an aw ay

from Cunning ham. He te stified that he wa s shot through the thigh with the bul let exit ing the front of his le g , known colloquially as a “throug h and t h roug h” wound. Off

icer Thomas, one of

the offic ers at the scene shortly afte r the shooting , an d Parame dic Eng lish, who was
a lso e arl y to t he sc e ne , b oth

or ig ina lly

no te d in the ir repo rt s that the bullet enter ed th e fr o n t and exited the back of Ce br e ro s’ s le g , c on tr ary

to C e br e ro s’ s te sti mony

a t tr ia l.C UN NI NG HA M V

. W ONG 25

B e n n e t tp r e s e n t e d

t h i s a p p ar e n ti n c o n s i s t e n c y t o t h e j u r y. He r ead fr o m T homas’s re port that “[Victim] No. 2 was fo u n d t o h av e s i n gl e gu n s h o two u n d i nu p p er r i gh tl eg. Po s sibly entry wound in the front of

the leg , the exit wound in t h e b a c k o f t h e s a m e l e g

. ” L i k e w i s e , P ar a m e d i c E ng lis h t est ified that “my

repor t stated that the wound wa s—that
e nte re d h e re and

e xite d— well, en te re d in

the fr on t of

his thigh a nd exit ed in the back of his thigh.” Udovic pre sented this report to the jury , highlig hting the e ntry - and e x it-wound
no ta tio ns

. Sheriff’ s Deputy

Robert R. Hawkins, the pr os ecution’s ballistics ex pert, wa s not at the sce ne of the crime a nd did not examine Cebrer os’s wound. He did view photos of Cebrer os’s leg , howeve r. He conclude d that “it would be very difficult—impossible—for me to tell y ou which wa s entry , which wa s exi t.” He stated that “both the front a nd the back look similar.” O n cross-e x amin at i on, Be nnett asked Hawkins if he could have deter mined an entry

or exit wound if he had examined Cebrer os at the sce ne. Ha wkins expl ained that he would “pr obably

rely more upon the c lothing than the leg itself,” pr es umably

by looking f

or powde r re sidue. Be nnett then aske d if Haw kins was eve r shown Cebre ros’s pa nts , a nd Ha wk ins state d th a t he wa s n ot.
I n h is c los ingargume nt, B e nn e tt c a lle d atte nti on to t he se discrepa ncies in the entry - and exit -wound descr iptions. He sp ecifically

noted that Haw kins was neve r able to view Cebrer os’s p an t s to develop an e x pert opinion on the issue. Be nnett highlig hted the fa ct that both Eng lish an d Thomas orig inally descr ibed the wound as enter ing the fr o n t of Cebrer os’s thigh. A nd he m ad e p l ain the adve rse infe renc e the jury could dra w from the disc repa

ncy : “Mr. Cebre ros isn’t
re a lly te lli ng us wh a t ha

pp e ne d out the re that ni g ht. ” B e nn e ttC UN NI NG HA M V

. W ONG

26
conclude d his discussion of the entry and ex it wounds by telling the jur

y that “[t] hey

don’t want y ou to kno w the re al
answe r to this because it might have thrown their c ase into a tiz zy .”
Ce br e ro s’ s med ic a l c ha

rt s w e re no t di sc us se d at tr ia l. Huntington Eme rg ency R o om phy sician Dr. Robe rt Goldwebe r later

stated in a de clar ation filed during Cunningham’s state habe as proc eeding s t hat he made notations on Cebreros’ s char t indicating a

possible entry wound on the fro n t o f t h e thi g h and an e x it wound on the back. L i k ew ise, Nanc y

Roge rs, R.N., the eme rg ency room nurs e wh o a lso tr e a te d Ce br e ro s a fter t he sh oo tin g , s ta te d in a dec laratio n filed duringstate habe as proc eeding s that her notes indicated a frontal entra nce w ound and re ar e x it wound. Cunningham argues that he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to present t h es e reports at trial. The district court
c or re c tly re c og nize d th a t he wa s n ot.
Cebrer os’s medica l rec ords would have been c umulative of evide nce a lrea dy

prese nted to the jury

. Be nnett discussed the e ntr anc e - a

nd e xit- wo un d d isc re pa

nc y a t le ng th dur inghis examinations of Office r Thomas, Para medic Eng lish, and Deputy Hawkins. And he hammere d on the issue during
c los ingargume nt. Gi ve n a ll this e vid e nc e and argume nt, it i s hig hly do ub tf ul t hat a dd iti on a l n ot a tio ns fr om n on -e xpe rt s showing a “possible” front al entry wound would have discredited Ce b re ros’s testi mony any further as to cre ate a re a so na ble pr ob a bil ity tha t th e ou tc ome of

the tr ia l w ou ld have be e n d if

fe re nt.
As to t he se c on d c la im r e g ard ing Tr e to’ s a uto ps y re po rt , th e repor t in c lud e s a

no ta tio n th a t $4 55 .2 5 w a s r e tur ne d to Treto’ s wife by

the Medica l E x aminer’ s Offic e. Cunning hamC UN NI NG HA M V

. W ONG 27

argues that, had counse l properly prese nted this evidence , he could have impeache d Cebrer os’s testimony th at a robbery had taken place

. This claim also fails, however, be cause even if the jur y ha d k no wn a bo ut t he mon e y , the re wa s still a mpl e evidenc e supporting a robbe ry conviction.

F ir st, it w a s no t un re a so na ble fo r the Ca lif

or nia Sup re me Court to hold that, even if pre sented with evide nce of $455.25 discovere d on Treto’ s person, the jury would still have f

ound that Treto ha d been r obbed of money . Treto’ s wife testified
a t tr ia l th a t, on the nig ht o f t he mur de r, Tr e to l e ft

ho me wi th around $1,400 or $1,500 in cash, and that he ke pt the money hid de n o n v ari ou s p art s o f h is b od y , in c lud ing h is w a lle t. Offic er Thoma s testified that he found two do l l ar s and two
c e nts on the g ro un d a

ro un d Tr e to a s w e ll a s e ig ht $ 1 b ill s in Treto’ s front pants pocke t. But he a lso ex plained that Tre to’s wallet , s h ir

t, an d ja c k e t c o n ta in e d n o mo n e y an d th a t o n e of Treto’ s shoes had been remove d while the other was lef t on. Tog ether , this evidence would indicate a partially succe ssful and hurr ied sea

rch f or money by Treto’ s k i l ler. The jury proper ly considere d this evidenc e and rea sonably found that a robbe ry had been committed e ven thoug h the robbe r did not ste a l e ve ry

la st d oll ar. Th e jur

y c ou ld h a ve re a so na

bly maintained this finding e ven if confr onted with evidenc e of additional money

on Treto’ s person. Second, eve n if the j u ry had found that Treto wa s not robbed of cash, it would have found that he was still robbed of his a uto mob ile . T re to’ s B uic k w a s mis sin g a ft e r h is
mur de r. Ce br e ro s tes tif

ie d tha t Cunn ing ham shot Tr e to w hil e Treto wa s holding his key s at the driver ’s side door. Two law enfor ceme nt office rs re p o rt ed see ing a simil ar c ar be ing driven a wa y from the sc ene by

a drive r matching Cunningham’s d es cr i p t i o n

. Gi v en t h i s s ubstantialC UN NI NG HA M V

. W ONG

28

c ir c ums tanti a l evi de nc e that a rob be ry ha d ta ke n p la c e —b oth of c a s h an d

c ar

— i tw a s n o tu n r e a s o n a

b l e f o r t h e C a l i f o r nia Supreme Court to rule that Cunning ham was not pr ej u d iced by couns e ls’ fa ilure to p ro be de e pe r i nto the re ma ini ngc a sh on Treto’ s person.
2 Cunningham also claims he su f f e r e d in e f f e c ti v e a s s is tance of counse l due to U dovic and B ennett’s f ailure to pre sent alibi evidenc e. At trial, De tective B aroni re counted that Cunningham stated during his post-arre st inter view that he had g one home around 10:00 p.m. on the nig ht of the murder , arr ived to a dark house wher e ever y one was a sleep, a

nd went straig ht to bed. Cunningham argues that three impo rt ant piece s of
su pp or tin g e vid e nc e we re no t pr e se nte d to e sta bli shan a lib i. First, Cunn i n gh am’s mother, Rosa V aug hn, submitt ed a decla ration in Cunningham’s state habe as proc eeding explaining that Cunningha m returne d to her home “ betwee n 2:00 and 2:30 a.m.” on the night of the murder . She said she
was a wake painting the den at the time. Rosa Va ug h n was no t c a lle d to te sti fy

a t th e g uil t ph a se of

the tr ia l. Second, Aubr ey

Vaug hn, Rosa Vaug hn’s husband,
su bmi tted a

de c laratio n d

ur ingstate ha

be a s p ro c e e din g s, stating that he saw Cunningham e arly the next m orning when Cunningham was g etting r eady for wor k. Au b rey

Vaug hn
wa s n ot c a lle d to te sti fy

a t tr ia l. Third, C unningha

m’s ex-wife, Sharon Spea rs, submitted a d ec l ar at i o ni nC u n n i n gh am ’s s t at e h ab ea s p ro ce ed i n gsC UN NI NG HA M V

. W ONG 29

stating that Cunningham did not stay at her home the nig ht of the mur de r. Spe ars wa s n ot c a lle d to te sti fy a t tr ia l.
As th e d is tr ic t c o u rt o b s e r v e d , Cun n in g h a m’ s p r o f

fer ed
a lib i e vid e nc e is e xtre mel y we a k. F ir st, the e vid e nc e is consistent with Cunningham ’s g uilt. C unningha m’s arr ival at his mother’s home two miles fr om the murder scene shortly afte r the murde r took place would seem to support the notion that he drove dire ctly home from the Pair

of Ac es af

ter robbing and

mur de ri ngTr e to a

nd wo un din g Ce br e ro s. Aubre y Va ug hn and Sha ro n Sp e ars ’s state me nts wo uld a lso support this findi n g. Second, Rosa Va ug hn’s dec laration would tend to show that Cunningham lied to the police about his where ab o uts on the night in question. Thus, the Ca lif or nia Sup re me Court

re a so na bly de te rm ine d th a t U do vic
and Benne tt w e re no t in e ff e c tiv e fo r f

a ili ngto p re se nt t

his evidenc e.
3 Cunningham also argues that he suf fer ed inef

fec tive
a ssi sta nc e of c ouns e l w he n U do vic and B e nn e tt f

a ile d to object to Wondries’s comments denig rating the def ense te am during her c losing arg ument. Wondries’s alleg edly improper comments included: You know, the judg e told y ou ear lier that y ou have thr e e ve ry

fi ne a tto rn e y s, and I have to te ll you it’ s r e a lly

be e n a ple a sure bei ng a

ble to w or k w ith Mr. Ud ov ic and

Mr . B e nn e tt. You have seen them in action. They are e xtre me ly fi ne . A nd

wh a t is the ir

job ? Th e ir job is to create straw men. Their job is to put up smoke, red he rring s. An d they ’ve done aC UN NI NG HA M V

. W ONG

30
heck o f a

g oo d jo b. An d my

job is t o straig hten that out and show y ou wher e the tr uth lie s. So l e t’ s d o th a t.
As we ex plained in United States v. Nec oeche a , 986 F.2d 12 73 , 1 28 1 ( 9th

Cir . 1 99 3) , “ [b]e c a

us e many lawy e rs re fr a in from objec ting dur in g opening statement and c losing
argume nt, a

bs e nt e g re g iou s mi sst a te me nts , th e fa ilure to ob je c t du ri ngc los ingargume nt a nd op e nin g statemen t is within the ‘wide ra

ng e’ of per missibl e prof

essional leg al conduct.” Under Necoe chea , Udovic and B ennett’s de cision
no t to ob je c t to Won dr ie s’ s c omm e nts , p os sib ly to a vo id highlig hting them, wa s a re asonable strateg ic dec ision.
Under Strickland ’s seco n d prong , even if Udovic and B e nn e tt s ho uld

have ob

je c te d, th ere is n o r e a so na ble lik e lih oo d th a t th e ou tc ome of Cu nn ing ham’ s tr ia l w ou ld have be en diffe rent ha d Wondries’s statement bee n stricken from the r ecor d. The c omments were a s i n g le par ag raph of a twenty -pag e ar g ument and the tria l ju d g e explained to the jury that closing ar gu m ents are not evidence

. See Fe ath e rston e v . E

ste lle , 948 F.2d 1497, 1507 (9th Cir. 1991) (h old ing , o n h a

be a s re vie w, that c ouns e l’ s fa ilure to ob je c t to improper a

rg ument at t rial di d not prejudice petitioner whe re other e vidence supported a guilty verdic t and the jury was told closing a

rg ument was not evide nce)

. Moreove r, we have e x plained that “ p rosec utors must have
rea sonable latitude to fa shion closing arguments, and thus can argue re asonable infere nces ba sed on the e vidence , including that one of the two sides is ly ing.” Necoe chea , 986 F.2d at 12 76 . T hu s, in p ri or case s, we have ru le d th a t c omm e nts si mi lar to t

ho se ma de in t

his c a se did

no t c on sti tut e pla in
err or, mea

ning that they

did not have “a

n impact on [theC UN NI NG HA M V

. W ONG 31

defe ndan t ’s] substantial rig hts.” See U nited States v. Ma tth e ws , 240 F.3d 806, 819 (9th Cir. 2001), rev’d on other grounds , 278 F.3d 880, 882 ( 9th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (upholding the par

ts of the orig inal three -judg e pane l perta ining to the de fenda nt ’s conviction, including the dis c us sio n of pr os e c uto ri a l mis c on du c t)

. F or the se reason s, we h o ld th a t th e Ca li f o r n ia Su p r e me Co u rt d id not
u n r e a s o n a

b l y a p p l y Strickland

in denying this par

ticular ine ff e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e c la im.

4
As an a nalog ue to another of his prosec utorial misconduct claims, Cunn i n g ham ar g ues that Udovic a nd Be nnett wer e ineffe ctive for

failin g to object to Wondries’s opening statement and follow-up e vidence relating to Cunning ham’s chang ed appe ara

nce.
As stated above , Wondries noted fo r the jury Cunningham’s chang ed hair, fa cial hair , and tee th during her opening statement. Wondries also elicite d testimony from Ce br e ro s, Ke ith And ers on (t he man w ho pla

y e d p oo l w ith Cun n i n gham at Riley ’s bar ), and O ffice rs Delg ado and Ba roni that Cunningha

m’s appea

ranc e had c hang ed . The men testified that: (1) Cunni ng ham’s hair was shorter at trial and had g ray

or white in it not present at the time of the incident or a

rre st; (2) Cunni ng ham’s facial hair was c hang ed in that he no long er ha d a g oatee ; (3) the r ims of Cunningham’s g lasses we re da rk er the nig ht of the incident than they wer e at trial; (4) Cunning ham had lost weig ht since his arre st; and (5) t h e g old ring or ca p on Cunningham’s up pe r t oo th w a s n o lo nger ther e . A s to the mis sin g g old toot h, W on dr ie s a sk e d th e c ourt to d ir e c t Cunn ing ham to stand up an d re v ea l his teeth to the jury . Wit h no objectionC UN NI NG HA M V

. W ONG

32
from Udovic or

Be nne tt , Cu

nn in gh am complied, showing that he no long er ha d the g old cap.

I n response t o Wondries’s elicitation of testimony
c on c e rn ingCunnin g ham’ s c ha ng e d a pp e ara nc e , Be nn e tt of fe re d Cu nn ing ham’ s c ounty

ja il m e dic a l r ecords int o evidenc e as Exhib i t 25. Wondries did not object. The medical r ecor ds demonstrate that Cunningham had sever al t e e t h r e m o v e d

f o r d e c ay.
I n h i s closing argument, Be nnett direc tly addre ssed the evidenc e of chang ed appea ranc e. He told the members of the jur y that th e y c ou ld r e vie w C un nin g ham’ s d e ntal re c or ds to see that his teeth, including his g old tooth, were only repla ced be c a us e the y we re “rot tin g ou t of

his he a d. ” B e nn e tt e xpla ine d to the jur

y that:
Ms. Wondries would have y ou infer from the chang es in [C unningham’s] appear ance that he’s, somehow , undertaken a c onscious eff ort to chang e his appe ara

nce. T hat’s not true. Th e r ea s o n ab l e i n fe re n ce s from [C unnin gham’s] chang e in appe ara nce ha ve no thi ngto d o w ith[Cun nin g ham’ s] t ry ingto dece ive y ou, somehow, but, rather , with the fac t he’s lost 35 pounds beca use j ail food isn’t wonder ful . . . .
Under the first prongof the Strickla nd te st, c ouns e ls’ conduct did no t fall below a n objective standa

rd of
rea sonablene ss. As expl ained a bove, withholding obje ctions to a n o pp on e nt’ s o pe ning s ta te me nt i s a c c e pta ble de fe ns e strateg y
. See Ne coec hea , 986 F.2d at 1281.C UN NI NG HA M V

. W ONG 33

As to wh e the r Cunnin g ham wa s pr e jud ic e d by

Udovic and B ennett’s f

ailure to objec t to Wondries’s statement and fo llo w- up e vid e nce, we ho ld t hat he wa s n ot. B e nn e tt adequately

addre ssed Wond ri es’s stateme nt and all the witness testimony

about Cunningha

m’s dental wo rk by of fe ri ngdo c ume nta

ry e vid e nc e tha

t Cunnin g ham c ha

ng e d h is teeth due to medic al nece ssity . He f urther hig hlighted the po int duri ngc los ingargume nt.
Mo re o v er, a lthough the g old tooth was cer tainly an important part o f t he cha

ng ed appe ara

nce, Cunning ham has ide nt if ie d n o me dic a l ne c e ssi ty fo r c utt inghis ha ir

sh or t, wea ring differ ent g lasses, or shaving his g oatee . Thus, even without any

ref ere n ce to Cunning ham’s tee th, Cunningham still chang ed his appear an ce thr oug h strictly voluntary
measure s from which the jury could h ave properly

inferr ed consciousness of g uilt. See United St ates v. Foppe , 993 F.2d 1444, 1450 (9th Cir. 1993). I t was thus not unrea sonable for t h e C alifornia Supre me Court to deny this claim under Strickland

. 5

F ina lly , Cunn ing ham c la ims tha t U do vic and

B e nn e tt we re ine ff

e c tiv e be c a

us e the y fa ile d to a de qu a te ly

inv e sti g a te and pre sent furthe r mitigating evidenc e at the penalty phase. Cunningham arg ues that the de fense should have c alled as wi tne sse s ( 1) Sha

ro n Sp e ars , h is e x-w if e ; ( 2) F e lic ia Cunningham, his daug hter; (3) Rudy Fe h renkamp and Art Knoll, corre ctions office rs at San Que ntin St ate Pris o n ; and (4 ) D r. Willi a m Vi c ary or Dr

. Mic ha e l Cob ur n, ps y c hiatr ist s wh o h a d p re vio us ly

e xami ne d Cunn ing ham.C UN NI NG HA M V

. W ONG

34
Ud ov ic and B e nn e tt a pp e ar to c on c e de tha

t th e ir perf ormanc e wa s deficie nt at the pena lty phas e. W e thus choose to a ddress the California Supreme Court’s a pplication of Strickland ’s prejudice prong

. Under this prong, “t he qu e sti on is w he the r t

he re i s a re a so na

ble pr ob a bil ity that, absent the error s, the s entenc er .

. . would have c oncluded that the ba lanc e of a g g ra

vatin g and

mit ig a tin g c ir c ums tanc e s d id not warr ant death.” Strickland , 466 U.S. at 695. This inquiry
re qu ir e s u s to “ re we ig h th e e vid e nc e in a g g ra vatio n a g a ins t the totali t y o f available mitigating e vidence .” W iggins v. Sm ith , 539 U.S. 510, 534 (2003).
Th e Sup re me Court ’s re c e nt r e je c tio n of a p e na lty -p ha se ineffe ctive assistanc e cla im in Cullen v. Pinholster is instructive her e. 131 S

. C t. 1388 (2011). In that case , the petitioner pre sented mitigating testimony fr o m his mot her, explaining his terrible c hildhood an d h is many periods of i n carce ration. Id. at 1408–09. The state prese nted
a g g ra vatin g e vid e nc e of the pe tit ion e r’ s p ri or vio le nt c ri me s, his mis be havio r i n p ri so n, and his his tor

y of do me sti c violence. Id. at 1408. The jury returne d a v er d i ct of de ath. I n his state habea s proce eding s, the peti t i o n er pr esente d ad d it io n a l e v id e n c e o f h is a b u s iv e u p b r in g in g a s w ell as
e xpe rt ps y c hiatr ic e vid e nc e of his “ ps y c ho pathi c pe rs on a lity traits.” Id. a t 14 05 . T he Sup re me Court , appl y ingAE DPA de ference, hel d th a t, b e c a us e the ne w e vid e nc e (1 ) w ou ld have be e n c umu la tiv e ; and (2 ) wo uld have op e ne d th e do or to a g g ra vatin g e vidence , “ [t]he re is n o r e a so na ble pr ob a bil ity that the additional evidenc e

. . . would have cha n ged t he jury ’s ver dict.” Id. a t 1 4 0 9

. We r e a c h th e s a me c onclusion in this case. Cunningham a

rg ues that he w as pre

judiced by

not having Sharon Spear s and F elicia Cunningham te stify on his behalf.C UN NI NG HA M V

. W ONG 35

Bo t h s u b m i t t edd ec l ar at i o n s i nt h e s t a t e h ab ea s p ro ce ed i n g. Sharon Spear s would have testified that she l oved Albert and that, besides his unf

aithfulness, he was a g ood h u s band. Fe li c ia Cun n in g h a m w o u ld h a v e te s ti f ie d th a t s h e lo v e d her fa the r a nd sh e wo uld

have p le a de d f

or his lif e . Sh e a lso would have te stified that her f ather “wa s never

violent towards me, my

half-br other Ur iah, or my mother.” The Ca lif or nia Sup re me Court

did no t unre a so nably

de ny thi s c la im. First, thi s “new ” testimony was c umulative of testimony
a lr e a dy pr e se nte d de sc ri bin g fa mil ia l lov e fo r C un nin g ham. See P inholster , 13 1 S. Ct. a t 13 99

. Ros a Va ug hn and John nie Washington ade quately

showed that Cunni ng ham was loved and had f amily who would miss him. Rosa Vaug hn discussed Fe licia and Shar on Spears, g iving the impre s s i on that they
wer e a r e lati v e ly c lo s e - kn it f a mi ly an d d e mo n s tr a ti n g to the jury that Cunningham w as a loving husband and f ather. Cunnin g ham hi mse lf re a d many tho ug htf ul c ard s and

po e ms he had cre ated for S pear s and Felicia, showing that he car ed d e e p ly f o r th e m. T h u s , th e p r im ar y mi ti g a ti o n v a lu e of Spe ars and

F e lic ia Cunnin g ham’ s te sti mony wa s a de qu a te ly prese nted at the pe nalty

phase. Second, Spears and Fe licia Cunningham would have be en subject to t

h o r o u gh c r oss-examination. Had Spears attempted to test i fy that Cunningham was a g ood husband, the prosec utio n woul d have c erta inly confr onted her

with the
rec ent police complaint she filed ag ainst him for beating her with a paddle. Cf. Darde n v. W ainwright , 477 U.S. 168, 186 (1 98 6) (d e ny i n g h a b e a s c l a i m o f pe na lty -p ha se ine ff e c tiv e ne ss be c a

us e “ if de fe ns e c ouns e l ha d atte mpt e d to pu t on e vid e nc e that pe tit io ner w a s a fa mil y man” it w ou ld have op e ne d the d oo r to a g g ra vatin g e vid e nc e of

hisC UN NI NG HA M V

. W ONG

36
transg ressions). L ikewise, if F elicia Cunningham testified that Cunn ing ham w a s n e ve r v iol e nt, the pr os e c uti on wo uld have a sked her about hi s rec ent vi olence ag ainst her mother

. See id. (“A ny

attempt to por t ra y petitioner as a nonviolent
man w ou ld h a ve op e ne d th e do or fo r t he State to r e bu t with
e vid e nc e of

pe tit ion e r’ s p ri or

c on vic tio ns .” ). Gi venthi s inevitable ag g ravating e vidence , it was not unreasonable for the California Supre me Court to determine tha t Cunningham
wa s no t pr e

jud ic e d by the a

bs e nc e of Spe ars and F e lic ia C u n n i n g h a m ’ s t e s t i m o n y. Cunningham next argues that his cou nsel should have el i ci t ed t es t imony

from Corre ctions Offic ers Rudy Fe hrenka m p an d Art Knoll. The of fice rs worke d at San Qu e nti n w hil e Cunningh a m w a s im pr iso ne d th e re . B oth of fi c e rs wo uld

have te sti fi e d, a s sta te d in the ir de c lara tio ns in the state ha

be a s p ro c e e din g , th a t th e y found Cun nin g ham to be a ve ry g ood inmate who made his unit “a pleasa nt environment for

ever y one.”
The Californ i a S u

p re m e C o u rt re as o n ab l y

d et er m i n edthat Cunnin g ham w a s n ot p re jud ic ed by

c ouns e l’ s f

a ilure to prese nt this t estimony . Fir s t , the evidenc e would have been cumulative of Rosa V aug hn’s t es t i m ony . Vaug hn rea d at le a st fo ur la

ud a tor y re po rt s fr om c or

re c tio ns of

fi c e rs , r e po rt s that are prac tically identical to those filed by Fe hrenka mp and Kn oll . Cunn ing ham a lso sp oke a t g re a t le ng th a bo ut h is po sit ive re la tio ns hip s with of fi c e rs and his g oo d b e havio r i n pris o n

. T h e ju

r y c e rta in ly c o n s id e r e d

th a t s o me c o r

r e c tions office rs had positive views of Cunningham, ev en without F e h r e n k a mp an d

K n o l l ’ s t e s t i m o n y.
Se c on d, F e hr e nk a mp a

nd Kn oll wo uld

have be e n easy targ ets for the prosec ut i o n on cross-e x amination. The twoC UN NI NG HA M V

. W ONG 37

T h e d isse n t i n c o rr e c tly infe rs fro m this se n te n c e tha t we “a p p a re n tly 2

c o n c e d [e ] th a t C u n n ing h a m ’s co u n se l wa s d e ficie n t.” D isse n t a t 4 5 . W e m ake no such co ncess i o n. W e m erel y f i nd t hat we can resol ve C un ni ng ham’ s cl ai m o n t he prej udi ce prong al one. ha d o nly kn ow n Cunn ing ham f

or a fe w m on ths ou t of

his deca des of incar cer ation. They also had no knowle dg e of the
rec ent sodomy

char g e broug ht ag ainst Cunningham in 1986.

F ina lly , Cunn ing ham argue s th a t he wa s p re jud ic e d b y

his
c ouns e ls’ fa ilure to c a ll D r. Willi a m V ic ary , a ps y chi atr ist who evaluated C unningha m in 1988, or Dr. Micha el Coburn, a psy ch i atrist who eva luated Cunning ham in 1975. Dr. Vic ary

would have ( 1) testi fied a bout Cunningham’s nightmar ish ch ildhood; and (2) conc luded that Cunningha m suffe red f

rom a “ chronic underly ing d ep ressive me ntal illness ” for

which alc oholism was “a major exacer bating fac tor.” Dr . Coburn would have t est ified that Cunningha m was too intox icated at the t ime of the F ellows murder to have
a c t e d d e l i b e r a t e l y.
Th e Ca lif or nia Sup re me Court

did n ot u nr e a so na bly a pp ly Strickland ’ s p r e

j u d i c e p r o n g t o D r

. V i c ar y’ s t e s t i m o n y. As

2 to C un nin g ham’ s c hil dh oo d, Dr . V ic ary ’s test im on y wo uld have “ larg e ly

du pli c a te d th e mit ig a tio n e vid e nc e a t tr ia l” prese nted per sonal l y

by Cunningham and his mother. Pinholster , 131 S. Ct . at 1409.

A s t o t h e e v i d e n c e t h a tw a s n o t p r e s e n t e d t o t h e j u r

y, namely Dr. Vic ary ’s expert o p inion that Cunni ng ham suffe red “ chronic underlying de pressive me ntal illness,” the jur y c ould h a ve e a sil y

inf e rr e d o n it s o wn

that su c h il lne ss plag ued Cunning ham. He te stif i ed p ersona lly

to depre ssion so deep that it ca

used him to attempt suicide. A psy chiatrist’sC UN NI NG HA M V

. W ONG

38 testimony further ing that description could have actua lly hurt Cunningham by

showing the jury

that he was “simply

bey ond reha bil i t at ion.” Id. a t 14 10 (c itatio n o mit te d) . A s to his
c h r o n ic a lc o h o li s m, Cun n in g h a m t e s ti f ie d th a t h e drank
c on sis te ntl y

a ll thr ou g h h is lif

e a ft e r h is f

a the r g a ve him alcohol whe n he wa s eig h t y ea rs old. The jury hear d Cunningham’s own admission that “ Ican do a ny thing unde r the influenc e of a lcohol.”

M o r e o v e r , a s w a s th e c a s e in P i n holster , Dr. Vic ary ’s te sti mony “ wo uld have op e ne d the do or to r e bu tta l by a state expert.” Id. ; see also W

ong v. Be lmontes , 130 S. Ct . 383, 388 (2009) ( explaining that “e x pert testimony discuss i ng [petit ioner’s] mental state, see king to e x plain his behavior , or putting it in some favo ra b l e contex t would have e x posed [petit ioner] to” damag ing e vidence in ag g ravation). Given that the state c ould have c alled a r ebuttal expert, “c ounsel fac ed a se rious risk that a mitigation ca se could turn out to be ag g ravating.” Pi nh ols te r v . A y e rs , 590 F.3d 651, 707 (9th Cir. 2009) (e n banc) (Kozinski, C .J ., dissenting) , rev’d sub nom. Cullen v. Pinholster , 131 S. Ct . 1388 (2011).
Th e pr inc ipa l f

law in the dis se nt’ s ana ly sis is i ts c omp le te failure to apply

the “doubly

defe rential” standard of

revie w under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Knowles v. Mirzayance , 5 56 U. S. 11 1, 12 3 (2 00 9)

. I ns te a d of a sk ing wh e the r it wa s o bje c tiv e ly
unrea sonable for

the California Supre me Court to conclude that Cunningham had not shown th at Dr. Vic ary ’s opinion
wo uld un de rm ine c on fi de nc e in t he jur y ’s imp os iti on

of de a th as the a p p ropriate penalty , the dissent simply rew eig hs the de fe nse cas e a s if

re vie wi ngthe qu e sti on

on dir e c t a pp e a l. Do ingso ig no re s th e Sup re me Court’s a dmo nit ion in Harrington v. Richte r , 131 S. Ct. 770 (2011), that we do not g ra nt h a be a s r e lie f o ve rt

ur nin g the Ca lif

or ni a Sup re meC UN NI NG HA M V

. W ONG 39

Court ’s Strickland analy sis unless we can say no “fa irminded jurists could disagr ee” that i t s application of Strickland was objectively unrea sonable. Id. at 786 (“It bear s repe ating that
even a strong case for r elief doe s no t m ean the state cour t’s
c o n t r ar y c o n c l u s i o n w a s u n r e a s o n a b l e

. I f t h i s s t an d a rd

is difficult to meet, that is bec ause it wa s meant to be.” ) (citation omitted)).

Dr

. Cob ur n’ s te sti mony a

bo ut Cunnin g ham’ s me nta l st a te at the time of the F ellows murder woul d also have been cumulative. Cunningham a nd Rosa Vaug hn both t es tified that Cunn ing ham w a s und e r t he inf lue nc e of dr ug s and c ou ld not remembe r the de tails of Fe llows’s death. Dr. Coburn’s t e s t i m o n y w o u l d

a l s o h a v e i n v i t e d

r e b u t t a l t e s t i m o n y.
C Cunningham argues that the trial court err ed in admitting De te c tive Baron i’ s t est im on y abo ut Cu nn in gha

m’ s p os t- a rr e st interview in violation of M ira n d a v

. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436 (1966), a nd Edwards v. Arizona , 451 U.S. 477 (1 9 8 1 ). On direc t appea l, the California Supreme Court determined that Cunningham suffer ed no such violation. Cunningha m argues that the cour

t’s decision wa s both an unre asonable application of c le arl y e sta bli sh e d la w a nd wa s b a se d o n an unr e a so na ble de te rm inatio n o f t

he fa c ts.
On Dec ember 16, 1985, Detec tive Ba roni and his par

tner interviewe d C u nningha

m in a Pasadena

City J ail interview
ro om. Th e int e rv ie w wa s n ot t a pe -r e c or de d. At

tr ia l, U do vic moved to exclude evidenc e of Cunning ham’s interv i ew and the cour t con d u cted a

n evidentiar

y hear ing out of

the p r e s e n c e o f

t h e j u r y.C UN NI NG HA M V

. W ONG

40
Detec tive Ba

roni testified that he advised Cunningha m of his Miranda rig hts and Cunningha m si gn ed a wa iver for

m re co rd i n g C u n n i n gh am ’s i n i t i al ed re s p o n s es t o ea ch wa rn i n g. After Cunningham w as advised of his r ights, he said, “I want to h a ve a n a t t o r

n e y p r e s e n t

. I w i l l t a l k t o y o u n o w u n t il I think I need one . Idon’t nee d one pre sent at this time.” Ba roni then aske d him, “Do y ou want to talk to an attorne y or do y ou wa n t t o talk to me without an attorney ? ” to which Cu nningha

m replied, “ I ’ll talk to y ou until I think I need a n attorney .” B aroni then r epea ted the same question and
rec eived the sam e answer. While Bar oni conce ded that he may have s aid something to Cunningham immediately afte r Cunningham s ai d “I want an attorney ,” his comments wer e limit ed to assuringCunn i n gham he c ould have a n attorney pr e se nt. Cunningham testified to a much diffe rent s eq uence of events. He said that afte r he r equeste d an attorne y , as much
a s a min ute pa sse d b e fo re he sa id “ Iwi ll t a lk t o y ou no w unti l Ithink I need an attorney .” Cunningham said that during the int e ri m, B aro ni t old

him no t to wo rr

y a bo ut a ny thi ngand sa id

“ Ibe lie ve y ou

are inn oc e nt. ” Th e tr ia l c ourt ult imate ly
cre dited Detec tive Ba

roni’s ver sion of even t s and allowe d him to t e sti fy to t he se fa c ts at tr ia l.
The Cali fornia Supre me Court conclude d that Cunn in g h am v a li d ly

w a iv e d h is r ig h ts b a s e d

o nB aroni’s version of the interview

. See P eople v . Cunningham , 2 5 Ca l. 4th at 993–94. The c ourt deter mined that Cunningham’s “initial statement”—the “I want an a ttorney ” stateme nt—was “an una mbigu o u s reque st for counse l.” People v

. Cunningham , 2 5 C al

. 4 t h at 9 9 3 ( c i t i n g Davis v. U nited States , 5 12 U. S. 4 52 , 4 59 (1 99 4) ). Th e c ourt re a so ne d th a t, beca use Cunningha

m invoked h is right to counse l, he “wa sC UN NI NG HA M V

. W ONG 41

not subject to f

urther interrog ation by the police until counsel was made available to him.” Id. Ba sed on B aroni’s ve rsion of eve nts, however , Ba roni ’s only

statement af

ter Cunn in g h am i n v o k e d

w a s a c la r if ic a ti o nth a t C u n n ing ham could have an attorne y

pre s ent i f he w anted one . The c ourt rea soned that this statement did not amount to “interrog ation” under Rh od

e Is lan d v. In nis , 446 U.S. 291 ( 1980), and thus no Miranda vio la tio n o c c ur

re d b e c a us e Cunnin g ham e le c te d to proce ed without a lawy er pr esent. I d. at 993–94. The c ourt d i d n o tu n r e a s o n a b l y a

p p l y Miranda , Edwards , or In nis in
rea ching this decision.
C unningha

m’s alternative Miranda argument is that the California Supreme Court’s relianc e on B aroni ’s ver sion of the eve nts—as oppos ed to Cunningha m’s own self- serving te sti mony —r e su lte d in

a de c isi on base d o n a

n unr e a so na

ble de te rm inatio n o f t

he fa c ts.
Un de r A ED PA, we “ mus t be pa rt ic ula rl y de fe re nti a l to our state- court c olleag ues” on que stio n s of fa ct. Taylor , 366 F.3d at 999–1000. There are two sections of § 2254 that g overn state court finding s of fac t: §§ 2254(d)( 2) and ( e)( 1). I n revie wing evidenc e presented to the s tate cour t, we re ly on § 2254(d)( 2). Se e Kesse r v . Ca mb ra , 465 F.3d 351, 358 n.1 (9th Cir. 2006). Under

§ 2254(d)( 2), a fede ral c ourt “may not second- g uess a state court’s fac t-finding proce ss unless, after
re vie w of the state -c ourt re c or d, it de te rm ine s that th e state court wa s not merely

wrong , but actua lly

unrea sonable.” Taylor , 366 F.3d at 999 (discussing § 2254( d)(2) ).

L oo kin g a t th e re c or d be fo re us , it wa s n ot u

nr e a so na ble fo r t he tr ia l c ourt and

the Ca lif or nia Sup re me Court

to c re dit Ba roni’s testimony

over Cunning ham’s. A c rimi n al defe ndant’s vague testimony , s tanding alone, doe s notC UN NI NG HA M V

. W ONG

42
demonstrate that a

n office r’s c ontrary

version of the fac ts was wrong

. Cf

. Taylor , 3 66 F .3 d at 10 06 (h old ingthat th e state court unreasona

bly cre dited the officer w hen the pe titioner’s att orney provided a ccur ate c orrobor ation of the pe titioner’s version of the post-arr est interview)

. Th e Ca lif or nia Sup re me Court

a lso re a so na

bly he ld t hat, e v e n if th e r e w as a Mi r a nda violation, the admission of the unlawfully

obtain ed ev idence was ha rmless. People v

. C u n n ingham , 2 5 C al

. 4 t h at 9 9 4 (c i t i n g A r iz o n a v. Fu lm ina nte , 499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991) (Rehnquis t , C .J ., c on c ur ri ng )) . Re c og nizi ngtha

t Cunnin g ham di d n ot a c tua lly confe ss to the crime during his post-arre st interview, the c ourt rea soned t hat th e s ta te me n ts “ a t m o s t r e v e a led [C unningha

m’s] l ack of

vera city .” I

d. I n light of the entire
rec ord and the other damag ing e vidence ag ainst him, the
c ourt re a so na bly de te rm ine d th a t Cunn ing ham’ s st a te me nt, even if err oneously

admitted, was ha

rmles s

. See B recht v

. Abrahamson , 507 U.S. 619 (1993).

D Finally , Cunningham a

rg ues that cumulative err or by the prosec utor, his counsel , an d the cour t require s reve rsal. A petitioner may

demonstrate that “eve n if no single err or we re pr e j u d i c i a l , w h e r e t h e r e ar e s e v e r a l s u b s t an t i a l e r

r o r s , ‘ t he ir
c umu la tiv e e ff

e c t ma y ne ve rt he less be so pr e

jud ic ia l a s to require reve rsal.’” Kill ian v . P oo le , 2 82 F .3 d 1 20 4, 12 11 (9 th C i r. 2 0 0 2 ) ( qu o t i n g United St a t es v. de Cruz , 82 F.3d 856, 86 8 ( 9th Cir . 1 99 6) ). Re vie wi ng a ll o f C un nin g ham’ s c la ims toge ther a s a whole, w e fail to see c umulative err or re quiring
re ve rs a l.C UN NI NG HA M V

. W ONG 43

Li ke t he major i t y , I woul d a f f i r m t he di s t r i ct cour t ’ s deni al of ha beas 1 reli ef o n C un ningh am ’ s g u i l t -p h a se i nef f ect i ve assi st anc e of

coun s el cl ai ms. Cunn i ng ham can not es t abl i s h “ a r eas onabl e pr ob abi l i t y t hat , ha d t he ev i dence b een d i s cl ose d t o t he def ens e, t he r es ul t o f

t he [ gu i l t

- phas e] woul d hav e been di f

f er ent

. ” U ni t ed St at es v. B ag l ey , 473 U

. S. 667, 682 ( 1985)

. I a l s o co n cu r i n t h e maj or i t y ’ s r es ol u t i on of Cun n i n g h am’ s n on p en a l t y-p h a se i ne f

f ec t i ve - assist an ce claim s. The district court proper ly denied Cunning ham’s petition fo r a wr it o f h a

be a s c or pu s.
AF F IRMED.

PR E GER SON, Circuit J udg e, conc urringin part and dissenting in par

t : 1 The majority

conclude s that

th e Ca lifornia Supreme Court was not unre asonab l e in holding that Cunningham wa s not prej u d i ce d by

his counsel’s fa ilure to prese nt Dr. Will iam Vicar y , M.D., a psy chiatrist, as a m i t igating witness dur ing the pena lt y p h a s e o f h is tr ia l. T h e ma

jo r it y r e a s o n s th a t D r. Vi c ary ’s te sti mony

wo uld have be e n d

up lic ativ e and

wo uld have op e ne d the do or to a “ dama g ing ” re bu tta l b y a state e xpe rt

. I n d oin g so , th e ma

jor ity fa ils to c on sid e r t

hat th is
ev idence would have g one dire ctly to three of

the eleve n fac tors the j u ry

was re quired to consider in evaluating whether death or life wit hout the pos sibili ty of par ole was the appropr iate sente nce unde r California Pena l Code § 190.3. Fu rt hermore , without Dr. Vica ry ’s testimony , the jury

was prese nted with no direc t scientific test i m ony demonstrating that “at the time of the offe nse the c apac ity of the de fenda

ntC UN NI NG HA M V

. W ONG

44

to a pp re c ia te the c ri min a lity of his c on du c t or to c on fo rm

his
c on du c t to the re qu ir e me nts of law was impa ir e d a s a

re su lt of menta l d i sease or def ect or the ef fec ts of intox ication.” Cal. Penal Code § 190.3. Dr. Vicar y ’s testimony

would have filled that g ap. He would have ex p l ai n ed that as a result of Cunningham’s horrific childhood, Cunningham was later
un a ble to “ c on fo rm

his be havio r t o s oc ie ty ’s no rm s. ” Thus , Dr. Vic ary ’s testimony

would have be en the only scien tif ic evidenc e direc tly demonstrating the “c ausal ne x us” betwe en Cunningham’s abusive c hildhood and his crime.

Iwould hold that, based on the r ecor d before i t , the California Supreme Court unr easona bly applied Strickland v. W ashingt on , 466 U.S. 668 (1984). I would thus gr ant Cunningham’s habea s relief on his penalty -phase ineffe ctive
a ssi sta nc e c la im.

I.
“An inef fec tive assistance of counsel claim has two components: A petitioner must show that counsel’s perf ormanc e wa s deficie nt, and that the def iciency prejudice d the def ense.” Harrington v. Richter , 131 S

. C t. 770, 785 (2011).

Un de r 2 8 U .S. C. § 22 54 (d )( 1) , a fe de ra l c ou rt may

on ly g rant a state prisoner habea s relief if the st at e court’s adjudication of the prisoner’ s claim “wa s contra ry t o, or inv o lv e d anu n r e a s o n a

b le a p p li c a ti o no f

, c le ar ly e s ta b li shed Fe dera l law, as d et er m ined by the Supreme Court of the United S tates.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Sec tion 2254(d)(1)’ s “unre asonable application” applies even wher e, like h er e, the re ha s b e e n a

su mma ry de nia l by the Ca lif or nia Supr e me Court. H a r r in g to n v

. R ichter , 131 S. Ct . 770, 784 (2011).C UN NI NG HA M V

. W ONG 45

“Where a state c ourt’s dec isi on is unacc ompanied by an explanation, the habea s petitioner’s burde n still must be met by showing there was no re asonable basis for the state cour t to deny relief .” Id

. To satisfy this standa rd, t h e p et i t i oner mus t sh owthat th e state c ourt de c isi on wa s “ ob je c tive ly
unrea sonable,” not just i ncorr ect or err oneous. Id. at 785.
II. Deficient P erform ance of Cun nin gham ’s Counsel Cunningham claims that his counsel was de ficient be c a us e his a tto rn e y s fa ile d to inve sti g a te or pr e pa re a pe na lty p h a s e d e f

e n s e

. S p e c i f

i c a l l y, h e a l l e g e s t h a th i s a t t o r n e ys failed to c all a key expert witness, Dr. Vica ry , to testify . The
ma jor ity fa ils to d isc us s th e de fi c ie nc y pr ong , a pp are ntl y c on c e din g that Cunn ing ham’ s c ouns el was de fi c ie nt. Thus , the only questions before this court are whether Cunningham’s counsel’s de ficient perf ormanc e pre

judiced Cunningham and if so whether the California Supre me Court
was unre asonable in finding a lack of prejudice

III. Pr ejudice & U nreasonable App lication of Stri ckland by the Calif

ornia Su prem e Court

Be cause we find Cunningham’s c ounsel defic ient, we must d e te r mi n e w h e th e r

th e Ca li f

o r n ia Su p r e me Co u rt unrea sonably

applied Strickland in holding Cunni ng ham was not prejudice d by

that defic ienc y . The pre judice prongof Strickland re qu ir e s a sh ow ing that “ the re is a reason a ble probability

that, but for counse l’s u n p rofe ssional error s, the result of the pr ocee ding w ou l d have be en diffe rent.” Strickland , 4 66 U. S. at 69 4. “ A r e a so na ble pr ob a bil ity is a probability sufficie nt to undermine conf idence in the outcome.” Id. I n Ca lif

or nia , ho we ve r, to imp os e a death sentenc e, a jury must be unanimous; there fore , CunninghamC UN NI NG HA M V

. W ONG

46

n e e d o n l y d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t , b u tf o r h i s c o u n s e l ’ s d e f

i c i e n c y, there was a

“re asonable probabilit y

that at least one juror would have” voted ag ainst sentencing Cunningham to death. W iggins v . S

mi th , 539 U.S. 510, 537 (2003); Cal. Penal Code § 190.4(b).

To a s s e s s t h a tp r o b a

b i l i t y i na c a p i t a l p e n a l t y

p h a se proce ed i n g , we must “re weig h the evidenc e in ag g ravation ag ainst the totality

of ava ilable mitigatingevidence.” W iggins , 539 U.S. at 534. That includes evidence “adduc ed at trial, and th e ev i dence adduce d in the habea s proce eding [s] .” W

illiams v. Taylor , 529 U.S. 362, 397–98 (2 00 0) . H ow e ve r, “ re vie w und e r § 22 54 (d )( 1) is limite d to the record that wa s befor e the state court that adjudicate d the
c la im o n th e me r it s.” P i nholster , 131 S. Ct . at 1398. Acc ording ly , our re view is limit ed to onl y the same e vidence that w a s ava ila

ble to t he Ca lif or nia Sup re me Court

. A. Cunn ingh am w as prejudiced by hi s counsel’s fail ur e to c allDr . V ic ar y t o t e st ify be c aus e th e r e is
a r e as ona ble pr oba bili tyth athis t e st im onywould have changed the jury’s ver dict.
Had Cunni ng ham’s attorney s called Dr. Vica ry to testify
and su bmi tted his re po rt

int o e vid e nc e , th e re is a

re a so na ble pr ob a bil ity that th e te sti mony

wou ld have c ha

ng e d at le a st one juror’ s vote. Dr. Vic ary is a Diplomate of the A merica n Boa rd of Ps y ch i atry

and Ne urolog y

and a D iplomate of the Am e ri c an B oa

rd of F or e ns ic Psy c hiatr

y
. Ove r the pa st twenty -five y ear s, he has be en qualifie d as a sc ientific expert and has te stified at about 5 0 0 trials reg ardingthe mental health of c ri minal defe ndants. Scientific and e x pert testimony contains an “ aura

of spec ial reliability

and trustworthiness.” United S tates v. Amaral , 488 F.2d 1148,C UN NI NG HA M V

. W ONG 47

1152 (9th Cir. 1973)

. Admissible e x pert testimony is meant to p ro vid e the jur

y wi th “ a

pp re cia ble he lp” in t

he ir deter minations. Id. Her e, Dr. Vicar y ’s testimony

and re port would offe r an illuminating me dical per spective on Cunningham’s b eh av ior by shedding light on his prior convictions, substance abuse, tra umatic fa mily backgro u nd, and mental illness. T h i s evidenc e would have added signific ant mitigatingweig ht by appre ciably

helping the jury to u nd e rs tand Cunnin g ham’ s me nta l c a pa c ity duri nghis
c ri me s. Prior to draftinghis ten-pag e m ed i cal r eport, Dr . Vicar y me t w ith Cunnin g ham on six dif fe re nt o c c a sio ns , s po ke wi th Cunningham’s mother, re viewed police , autopsy , and re cent ps y c ho log ic a l te sti ng re po rt s, and vie we d Cunnin g ham’ s ja il medical c hart. F rom all this information, Dr. Vica ry c on c luded that Cunn ing ham su ff e re d f ro m a “ c hr on ic underlying depre ssive mental illness” for which alcohol wa s a “major ex ace rbating fac tor.” He further found that Cun nin g ha m ha s “ l o n g -s ta nd ing se ri ou s p sy c hia tr ic pr ob le ms. ” Withre g ard

to C un nin g ham’ s tr a

umat ic fa mil y experience , Dr. Vic ary

noted that those ex perie nces “ cause d a major impairme nt in his self-e steem.” He fur ther found that Cunningham’s problems in school “led to additional neg ative experience s such as be ing r ejec ted by peer s. ” Dr. Vicar

y repor ted that Cunningha

m’s “sense of unworthiness a ppear s to have led him to s abotag e his own succ ess whethe r that
occur red in tre atment, work or

interper sonal relationships.”
Dr. Vic ary

fur t her note d that Cunningham has “[f]or many y ear s... s u ff

ered from sy

mptoms of anx iety

and depre ssion” and that alc oh o l abuse “ exacer bated his mental de te ri or a tio n. ” He no te d th at Cunn ing ham w ou ld k e e p h is “dee per thoug hts and fee lings to himself” a nd “storeC UN NI NG HA M V

. W ONG

48
frustrations unti l rare , ag g ressive outbursts,” u s u a ll y trig g ere d by alcohol, would occ ur.
F ina lly , a lth ou g h Dr

. Vi c ary fo un d that it “ se e ms hig hly lik e ly that [Cunnin g ham’ s] futur e a dju stm e nt i n p ri so n w ill be po sit ive ,” Dr . V ic ary fel t tha t w ith ou t pr op e r a c c e ss t o psy chiatric trea tment and m ed i ca t i o n in prison, Cun ningham’s ser io us ps y chi atr ic p rob lem s “co ul d cu lmi na te in a psy chotic bre akdown or suicide attempt.”
Dr. Vic ary

made this deter

m ination without any

prior medical, psy cholog ical, socia l, or family history from Cunningham’s trial counsel. Ha d Dr. Vic ary known more
a bo ut C un nin g ham’ s p a st, D r. Vic ary state d th a t he wo uld have do ne fu

rt he r i nq uir y int o Cunn ing ham’ s p ote nti a l br a in dama g e

. He wo uld have a dmi nis te re d a Wexler A du lt I ntellige nce T est and Reitan test. Depending on the re sult, he would have the n order ed a “full battery of neur opsy cholog ical testing.”

Neve rtheless, if c alled as a witness, in addi t ion to the
c on c lus ion s f

ro m hi s r e po rt

no te d a bo ve , Dr

. Vic ary

wo uld have e x plained “the neg ative ef fe ct s of experienc ing suc h a dy sf un c tio na l f

a mil y lif e a s a c hil d and

wo uld have be e n a

ble to provide some conte x t and explanation for Mr. Cunnin g ham’ s late r a

pp are nt i na

bil ity to c on fo rm

his behavior to society ’s norms.” He would have further testified that “ the re is an

inc re a se d c ha

nc e of su bs tanc e a bu se in families wher e t h er e is a pattern of alcoholism . . . [and] [w]ith [Cunn ing ham’s ] fa mil y his tor y , [D r. Vi c a

ry ] wo uld have b ee n able to put Mr. Cunning ham’s alc oholism and oth e r s ub sta

nc e a bu se in a re a dil y un de rs tand a

ble fa mil y c on te xt.” Dr . V ic ary

a lso wo uld

have ex pl aine d f

ro m a medical standpoint, Cunningha m’s “violent behavior . . . asC UN NI NG HA M V

. W ONG 49

be ingint imate ly and dir e c tly re late d to his c hr on ic and a c ute substance a

buse.”
1. Dr. Vic a ry ’s testim ony w ould not have been dup licative.
Th e ma jor ity c on c lud e s th a t th is o ve rw he lmi ng ly mitigating y et excluded testimony would have be en duplicative of te stimony

that was a lrea dy

prese nted to the jury either by

Cunningham personally or his mother. I disag ree

. First, the major ity

is incorre ct t h at Dr. Vicary ’s expert op ini on that Cunn ing ham s uff e re d f ro m a “ c hr on ic
un de rl y ingde pr e ssi ve me nta l il lne ss” c ou ld have be e n “ e a sil y i n f e r r e d ” b y t h e j u r

y t h r o u g h C un n i n g h a m ’ s o w nt e s t i m o n y.
The idea that Cunningham in his own trial had the
s o p h i s t i c a t i o n t o art i c u l a t e h i s o w n d i a g n o s i s t o t h e jur y is completely

without merit. There is not h i n g t o sug g est that Cunnin g ham w a s e ve n a

wa re that he su ff

e re d fr om “ c hr on ic underlying de pressive me ntal illness.”

Moreov e r , ane xp e rt o p in io nis v e r y d if f e r e n t f r o m a lay opinion, e specia lly a defe ndant’s opinion. An e x pert opinion is one from a

n objective third pa

rty that car ries an “ aura

of specia l reliability

and trustworthiness” and bestows upon the jury “appr ecia

ble help” in unde rstanding matters with which they are unfa m iliar. Amaral , 4 88 F .2 d at 11 52 ; See I vk ov ic & H ans, Jurors’ Evaluations of Expert Testimony : J udg ing the Messeng er a

nd the Messag e, 28 L aw & Soc. I nquiry 441, 445 (2003) ( noting that the “ majority of jurors” who participated in a study

“ag ree d that expert testimon y was c ru c ia l to the ou tc ome of

the ir c a se s” (c iti ngCha

mpa g ne e t.C UN NI NG HA M V

. W ONG

50 al., Ex pert Wit ness in the Courts: An Empirical Examination, 76 J udicature 5–10 (1992)) ). A defenda nt’s testimony , on the other ha nd, may be viewed by

the jury as a de sperate attempt to save him self. I n fac t, in this case , Cunningham’s counsel
conce ded duringclosing arguments that Cunningham did not have muc h cre dibilit y

wit h t h e jury . His counsel stated: “[Cunningham] would have not much c red ibilit y with y ou. Idon’t think he has much c redibility with y ou.”

Her e, the major ity

assumes the jury

is i n formed in the fi el d o f psy chiatry

enoug h so that it could deduce from Cunnin gh am’ s te sti mony tha t “ su c h il lne ss p la g ue d” him

. The majority

also assumes that the jury g ave the same we ight to Cunningham’s te stimony as it would Dr. Vica ry ’s te sti mony . In a

c a se wh e re the re su lt of

its a ff ir ma tio n is a death sentence , the m ajority sadly fails t o perc eive the impac t of its loo se a ssumpt ion s.
F inally , w hil e Cunnin g ham’ s c ouns e l and the state prosec utor made Cunning ham’s mental he alth a fa ctor for the jur y to co ns ide r i n d e c idi ngCunnin g ham’ s p un ish me nt, the ir
ar g u m e n t s c o u l d n o t r e p l a c e e x p e rt m e n t a l h e a l t h t e s t i m o n y. Cunni ng ham’ s c ouns e l r e pe a te dly imp lie d d

ur ingthe ir closing arguments that Cunningham was not mentally sound. Cu nningha

m’s counsel c alled him “twisted,” “ strang e,”

“ c ra zy ,” and

“ wa rp e d. ” He sa id C un nin g ham’ s a c tio ns did
no t “ make se ns e ” and

that “ the re ’s so me thi ngwr on g ” wi th Cunningham . He state d that Cunningham, in fact, “ neede d some psy cholog ical help at a ver y earl y age.” He note d Cunnin g ham to ok

a c tio ns tha

t w e re no t ju sti fi e d b y

“ mos t rational minds.” He further stated that Cunningham had a “proble m from the g it-g o.”C UN NI NG HA M V

. W ONG 51

I ndeed, the prosec utor eve n put the quest i o n t o the jury whether Cunningham suffer ed fr om some mental illness that would in some way

acc ount f or his behavior . I n her c losing argument, the prosec utor stated that: “Cunning ham desc ribed him se lf a s b e ingsic k. He ne e ds ps y c hiatr ic he lp. ” She tol d the jury that Cunningham’ s sentenc ing r eports stated that “psy cholog ical help” was re commended. She c ommented that Cunningham himself descr ibed t hat he had been “ in and out of psy cholog y

in the jail sy stem.” B ut, she also ar g ued that “ [t]her e is n’t a

ma g ic pil l th a t ma

ke s so me bo dy

wh o is this ty pe of person into the ty

pe of person that you are .” She then told the jury

mom en t s l at er, “ I f this isn’t a case that de se rv e s th e de a th p e na lty , w ho do e s? Who de se rv e s it if thi s m and o e s n o t ?” Despite Cunning ham’s counse l’s and the prosecutor’ s statemen t s t hat Cunningha m had some ty

pe of me ntal defic iency , the jury

did not have the b enef it of expert tes ti mo ny to pro vi de dir ect evi den ce of su ch defi cie nci es. By sug g esting a “c ausal nex us” between Cunni ng ham’s abusive childhood and his crime, e x pert testim ony could have “impact[ed] th e quality and streng th of the mitigation evidenc e” a

nd offe red a p ersuasive explanation of C u n n ingha

m’s crimes. State v. Tucke r , 1 6 0 P. 3 d 1 7 7 , 201 (C a l. 2 00 7) ; se e als o D ou gla s v . W oo dfo rd , 3 16 F.3d 1079, 1090 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that counsel’s f ailure to pre sent expert testimony

explaining a po s sible causa l link between defe ndant’s childhood and his cr i me was pr ejudicial). There fore , the testimony from Dr . Vicar y woul d not be cumulative, but instead hig hly probative in unde rstanding the
e ff e c t of Cunnin g ham’ s c hil dh oo d a bu se and me nta l il lne ss on his c ri me s.C UN NI NG HA M V

. W ONG

52
2. There is no e vidence in the rec ord that we m ay

consider to conclude that Dr . Vicary’ s test im ony w ould have “opened the door to rebuttal.” The majority

conclude s that even if D r. Vic ary had prese nted evidenc e of Cunning ham’s depr essive mental ill ne ss, su c h te sti mony “wo ul d ha ve op e ne d th e do or to rebuttal by

a state e x pert.”
As bo t h p art i e s c o n c e d e i nt h e i r s up ple me nta l br ie fs , pursuant to Pinholster t h i s court ca n now consider

only the
e vid ence that w a s b e fo re the Ca lif or nia Sup re me Court , including e x hibits, declarat ions, deposition transcripts, and evidentiar y hear ing te stimony

first i n troduce d in the district court ha beas pr ocee dings. The majo ri ty itself rec og nized that, “w e may

no t c on sid e r e vid e nc e ra ise d f or the fi rs t ti me during the di strict court’s e videntiary hear ing.” The de cision in thi s cou

rt mus t “r e st[] sole ly on the re c or d b e fo re the state court.”
Th e Ca lif or nia Sup re me Court

wa s o nly pr e se nte d w ith Dr. Vicar y ’s re port and his additional dec laration. As desc r ib e d a b o v e , D r

. V ic ar

y ’ s r e p o rt w o u ld

n o t h a v e b een du pli c a tiv e and wo uld have pr ov ide d va lua ble ins ig ht f

ro m a me dic a l pe rs pe c tiv e to he lp a id t he jur y in i ts w e ig hty decision whe ther to sentenc e Cunning ham to deat h

. As the Supreme Court recently

explained, even whe re a

state expert undermines a

defe nse expert’s conc lus i o n s , “it [i s] not
re a so na ble to d isc ount e nti rel y

the e ff e c t th a t [th e e xpe rt ’s ] testimony might have had on the j ury .” Porter v. Mc Cullom , 130 S. Ct . 447, 455 (2009) ( per c uriam).C UN NI NG HA M V

. W ONG 53

3
. I t wa s pr e

j ud ic ia l t o e x c lu de D r . V ic a r y ’s st at e m e nt s.
Ev e n thro ug h th e “ de fe re nti a l le ns of § 2 25 4( d) ,” the re is
a re asonable probability that the testimony

could have chang ed at least one juror’ s decision. See P inholster , 1 31 S. Ct. at 1403.

D r

. V ic ar y ’ s te s ti mo n y

w o u ld n o t o n ly h a v e p r ovided insight on Cunningham’s condition at tr ial, but it would have also helped e x plai n Cunningham’s past behavior and culpability . The Supreme Court h as re cog nized the importance of evide nce re g ardingthe def endant’ s limi ted mental ca

pacity for mitigation pu rposes. Smith v. Texas , 54 3 U .S. 37 , 4 5 ( 20 04 ); see also Pe nry v. Ly nugh , 4 92 U. S. 302, 319 (1989) (“e vidence about the def endant’ s ba c k gr o und and chara ct er is relevant be cause of the be lief, long held by this society , that defe ndants who commit crimi n al acts that
are a ttr ibuta

ble to a dis a dv anta g e d b a c kg ro un d, or to emotional or mental problems, may be less culpab l e than defe ndants who have no such excuse”)

. I n addition, under Calif o rnia Pena l Code § 190.3, Ca lif or nia jur or s must c o n s id e r spec ific fa ctors in deter mining whether to sentence a def

endant to d eath, including mental health fa ctors. In Cunningham’s ca s e, three of the e leven fa c tor s ju ro rs we re ins tr

uc te d to c on sid e r d ir e c tly rela te d to Cunnin g ham’ s me nta l he a lth : 1) “ wh e the r or no t the of fe ns e was c ommitt ed while the defe ndant was unde r the influenc e of extreme mental or emotional disturbance ”; 2) whether “at the tim e of

the of fens e the c a

pa c ity of the de fe nd ant t o a ppreci a te the c ri min a lity

of his c on du c t or

to c on for m h is
c on du c t to there qu ire me nts of l aw w as im

pa ire d a s a re

su ltC UN NI NG HA M V

. W ONG

54 of mental disease or defe ct or t he ef fec ts of intox ication”; and 3) a “ catc h-all” f

actor , which re quired the jury to consider: Any other circ umstance which extenuates the g ra v i t y o f t h e c r i m e e v e n t h o u g h i t i s n ot a leg al excuse for the c rime and a ny other sy mpathetic or othe r aspe ct of the def endant’ s c ha ra c te r o r r e c or d [th a t the de fe nd ant o ff e rs ]
as a b asi s for a

sentenc e less than de ath, whether or not related to the offe nse for which he is on trial. You must d i sreg ard a ny jury instruction give n to y o u i n the g uilt or inn oc e nc e ph a se of

thi s tr ia l w hic h c on fl ic ts
w it h th is p r in c ip le ].
Thus , it be c a me c ru c ia l to have a n e xpe rt c or ro bo rate Cunnin gham’ s own

te sti mony

that he su ff

e re d f ro m a traumatic c hildhood and some ty pe of mental illness. See Tho ma s v . Ch ap

pe ll , 678 F.3d 1086, 1105 (20 1 2 ) ( holding that the failure of defe nse counsel to ca l l a corroborating witness resulted in pre

judice to the def

endant)

. Dr. Vic ary

noted that as a result of Cunningham’ s “chr onic under ly ing depre ssive mental illness,” Cunningha m had diffic ulty

con t rol ling his impulses, had ag g ressive
o u t b u r s t s , an d

e n g a g e d i n s e l f

- d e s t r u c t i v e a c t s

. S i g n i f

i c an t l y, Dr. Vic ary

noted that alcoho l wa s a “ma jor exacer

bating fac t o r.” On the nig ht of Tre to’s murder, e vidence indicates t h a tC u n n i n g h a m dr an k a tm u l t i p l e b ar s

. A d d i t i o n a l l y, evidenc e exists t hat Cunningha m was under

the i nfluenc e of
a l c o h o l d u r i n g t h e m u r d e r o f

E l l a M a e F e l l o w s

. A c c o r d i n g l y, Dr. Vic ary ’s testimony

would have sig nificantly aided the jury in highlig hting Cunni ng ham’s mental pr oblems, whichC UN NI NG HA M V

. W ONG 55

may have r ender ed Cunning ham less culpable in the ey es of at least one juror. The majority

relies on Pinh olste r as instructive, but certain fac tual differ ence s betwee n Pi nh ols te r an d t h i s c a se allow for a more favor able finding for prejudice in this case. I n Pinholster , the defendant’s attorney s failed to ca ll any witness other than the defe ndant’s mother to testify at the penalty phase of

his capital ca se. 131 S. Ct. at 1396. Pin ho lst e r’s a tto rn e y

ha d p re vio us ly

c on su lte d p sy c hiatr ist Dr . Joh n St a lbe rgwh o n ote d Pi nh ols te r’ s “ ps y cho pathi c pe rs on a lity

tr a its ,” dia g no se d him w ithanti so c ia l pe rs on a lity disorder, a

nd conclude d that he “wa s not unde r the influenc e of extreme mental or

emotional disturbance ” a t the time of t h e murders. Id. I nh is s tate h a b e a s p e ti ti o n , Pi n h olster
argue d th a t his a tto rn e y

wa s in e ff

e c tiv e a t th e pe na lty

ph a se of his t ri al. He submit ted a de clar ation of psy chiatrist Dr. Geor g e Woods who diagnose d Pinhols ter with bipolar mood d i sorder and seizure disorde rs. Id. Pinhols ter a lso included a dec laration from Dr. Stalberg who stated that Pinholster’s attorney only provided him with some pol i ce repor ts and a 1978 probation repor

t. Id. Dr. Stalbergtestified that had he kn o w na b o u t t h e a d d it io n a l m a te r ia l, h e w o u ld have conducte d “fur

ther inqui ry ” before c oncluding that Pinhols ter suffe red only fr o m a per sonality disorder. Id. Dr. Stalberg did no t, h ow e ve r, re tr a c t hi s e arl ie r d ia g no sis

. Pinhols ter reveled in his criminal hist ory , brag g ing a bout be inga “ pr of e ssi on a l r ob be r” and

e xplai ning that hi s occupation was that of a “c rook.” Id. a t 14 08 , 1 40 5. He a lso tes t i fi ed that he wa s a white supre macist and that he fre quently

car ved swastikas into other people’s prope rty as “a sideline to a robbe ry .” Id. T h e st ate pr esente d evidenc e duri ngthe pe na lty

ph a se tha t Pinho lst e r ha d thr e a te ne d to kil lC UN NI NG HA M V

. W ONG

56
the State’s lea d witness, assaulted a man with a straig ht razor, and kidnapped a

nother pe rson with a knife

. Id. at 1408. The Supreme Court ultimately conclude d that there was no prejudice in f

ailing to c all Dr. Stalberg beca use there was “ no rea sonable proba

bility that the additional evidenc e Pinholster prese nted in his state habea s proce eding s would have chang ed the jury ’s ver dict.” Id. at 1408–09.
This case prese nts a closer call than Pinholster . F ir st, unlike Pinholster , th e State in t his c a se po sse sse d le ss aggr av at i n g ev i d e n ce p er t ai n i n g t o C u n n i n gh am

. Al t h o u gh the State desc ribed Cunning ham’s pre vious crimes, including second de g ree murder, s odomy , and an a ssault on a police office r, Cunningha

m did not display the same callous lac k of
remorse or desire for crime as Pinhols ter. Sec ond, Dr. Vic ary wo uld no t on ly have dis c us se d a

so c ia l di so rder , but w ou ld have a lso e xpla ine d th a t Cunn ing ham su ff e re d f ro m “ c hr on ic depre ssive mental illness” for which alcoholism was a “ma jor
exacer bating fac tor.” This diag nosis would not only provide insight into the crime f

or which he was sentenc ed to death, but also expl ain Cunningha m’s mental s tate during his prior convictions. Finally , Pi nh ols te r did not concer n the fa ilure of
c ouns e l to pr e se nt e vid e nc e that w ou ld d ir e c tly a dd re ss statut or y mit ig a tin g fa c tor s th a t the jur y wa s r e qu ir e d to consider. F or these r easons, Dr . Vicar y ’s expert opinion about Cunningha

m’s mental hea lth could reasonably have
cause d at least one juror to strike a dif fer ent balanc e.
IV. Conclusion

B e c a u s e C u n n i n g h a m ’ s a t t o r

n e y f a i l e d t o c a l l D r

. V i c ar

y, the jury lacke d a sig nifica nt piece of mitigating evidenc e when it dec ided to sentenc e C unningha m to death. Positi ve and neg ative fa ctors “migh t cause a sente ncer to determineC UN NI NG HA M V

. W ONG 57

that a life se ntence , rathe r than death at the hands of the state, is the approp ri ate punishm ent for the particula r def endant.” L am br igh t v . S

c hr iro , 4 9 0 F

. 3 d

1 1 0 3 , 1 1 1 5 ( 9 th

Ci r

. 2 0 07). Th e c ourt mus t “ ‘t re a t[ ] ea c h d e fe nd ant i n a c a pit a l ca se wi th that deg ree of re spect due [t o] t h e uniqueness of the individual,’ and dete rmin[e] whether or not he is dese rving of
e xec uti on on ly a ft e r t a kin g his un iqu e lif e c ir c umstan ces, dis a bil iti e s, and

tr a its int o a c c ount, [as ] is c on sti tut ion a lly require d.” Id

. (q u o t i n g Loc k e tt v . O hio , 438 U.S. 586, 605 (19 7 8 ) )

. A s s u c h , “ th e Co n s ti tuti o nr e qu ir e s th a t ‘ the sentenc er in c apital ca ses m u s t b e per mitted to consider any relev ant mitigatingfac tor.’” Porter , 130 S. Ct . at 454–55 (q u o t i n g Eddings v. Oklahoma , 455 U.S. 104, 112 (1982)).

In t h i s c a s e , a

d i f f e r e n tr e s u l tw a s s u

b s t a n t i a l l y l i k e l y. See P inholster , 131 S. Ct . at 1403. C unningha m has de m o n s t r a t e d

t h e r e i s a

r e a s o n a b l e p r o b a b i l i t y t h a ta tl e a st one juror w ould have struc k a diffe rent b alance bec ause of
new e vidence provided by Dr. Vic ary

sho wing Cunningham’s less culpable mindset. Mitiga ting menta l h ealth evidence fr om a qu a lif ie d e xpe rt wi tne ss hol ds str on g we ig ht i n a de a th penalty sentenc ing. I t should not be brushed off a s easily as the majority

has done.

Be cause Cunningham’s counsel’s de fi c ie ncy deprive d the sentenc ing jur

y the opportunity to w eig h this subst antial piece of mitigating e vidence , the conf idence of Cunningh am ’s death sentence is sufficiently undermined. Cunning ham was prejudice d and the Califor nia Supreme Court’s c ontrary finding was a

n unrea sonable a

pplication of Strickland

.