United States Department of Labor

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

__________________________________________

S.C., Appellant

and

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 

Westbury, NY, Employer

__________________________________________

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Docket No. 20-0603

Issued: November 5, 2021

Appearances: Case Submitted on the Record

Appellant, pro se

Office of Solicitor, for the Director

DECISION AND ORDER

Before:

ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Chief Judge

PATRICIA H. FITZGERALD, Alternate Judge

VALERIE D. EVANS-HARRELL, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION

On January 24, 2020 appellant filed a timely appeal from a December 26, 2019 merit 

decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP).1 Pursuant to the Federal 

Employees’ Compensation Act2(FECA) and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the Board has 

jurisdiction over the merits of this case.

1 Appellant submitted a timely request for oral argument before the Board. 20 C.F.R. § 501.5(b). Pursuant to the 

Board’s Rules of Procedure, oral argument may be held in the discretion of the Board. 20 C.F.R. § 501.5(a). In 

support of appellant’s oral argument request, he asserted that oral argument should be granted because he would like 

to explain to the Board why his claim should be approved. He stated that he suffered a traumatic injury at work and 

sought professional counseling after the event. The Board, in exercising its discretion, denies appellant’s request for 

oral argument because the arguments on appeal can adequately be addressed in a decision based on a review of the 

case record. Oral argument in this appeal would further delay issuance of a Board decision and not serve a useful 

purpose. As such, the oral argument request is denied and this decision is based on the case record as submitted to 

the Board.

2

5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.
2

ISSUE

The issue is whether appellant has met his burden of proof to establish an emotional 

condition in the performance of duty, as alleged.

FACTUAL HISTORY

On July 5, 2019 appellant, then a 40-year-old air traffic controller, filed a traumatic injury 

claim (Form CA-1) alleging that on that date he developed mental trauma, stress, and anxiety as a 

result of working a radar position with an aircraft just prior to it crashing. On the reverse side of 

the claim form, the employing establishment acknowledged that he was injured in the performance 

of duty on July 5, 2019 and noted that he had stopped work on the date of injury. It indicated that 

its knowledge about the facts of appellant’s injury was consistent with his statements. 

In a development letter dated July 8, 2019, OWCP advised appellant that the evidence of 

record was insufficient to establish his claim. It advised him of the type of factual and medical 

evidence necessary to establish his claim and provided a questionnaire for his completion. OWCP 

afforded appellant 30 days to provide the necessary information. In a separate development letter

of even date, it requested that the employing establishment provide details regarding his claim and

indicate whether it concurred with his allegations. OWCP afforded the employing establishment 

30 days to provide the necessary information. 

OWCP subsequently received a July 9, 2019 duty status report (Form CA-17) containing 

an illegible signature which indicated that on July 5, 2019 a plane crashed, causing appellant to 

experience trauma. It noted that, as a result, he experienced sleeplessness, depression,and anxiety. 

A July 16, 2019 e-mail from J.S., appellant’s supervisor, indicated that he attached two 

audio files to his e-mail that demonstrated appellant’s calm behavior before and after the airplane 

accident, which consisted of an airplane crash landing in a lake and four passengers swimming to 

safety. He contended that appellant had not shared any concerns during the relief briefing between 

him and the relieving controller. J.S. indicated that the recorded voices and actions of appellant 

and the pilot revealed that when appellant terminated his radar services the airplane was on track, 

and he stated that appellant handled the situation in a routine manner. J.S. also stated that none of 

appellant’s actions caused the accident, and that appellant’s behavior had not changed from the 

time he took his break until when he found out about the accident. He related that appellant 

returned to work from his break without hesitation when he learned of the accident. 

A July 17, 2019 controversion letter from the employing establishment indicated that it 

was challenging appellant’s claim because he failed to establish that he was injured in the 

performance of duty. It contended thatthe crash occurred during his break, and none of his actions 

caused the accident. The employing establishment further contended that, because appellant was 

not in charge of the airplane during the accident, he was therefore not in the performance of duty. 

It additionally noted that, when he returned from his break, he was assigned to the radar position 

he worked at prior to his break, accepted it without hesitation, and worked an additional 18 minutes 

prior to learning of the accident, which was when he asked to be relieved from his position. The 

employing establishment stated that appellant did not exhibit any signs of stress immediately prior 
3

to or after his break, and that all of his transmissions with the aircraft appeared normal and gave 

no indication that he was experiencing difficulties.

In a July 18, 2019 response to OWCP’s development letter, the employing establishment 

noted that appellant had been on his break for 15 minutes when the airplane accident occurred, and 

that all actions by him and the airplane prior to his break appeared normal. It related that he took 

his break from 12:10 p.m. to 1:18 p.m., and that the last displayed image of the airplane was at 

12:25 p.m. The employing establishment further noted that, after his break, appellant worked for 

an additional 18 minutes.

An August 19, 2019 Form CA-17 containing an illegible signature indicated that on July 5, 

2019 a plane crashed and caused appellant to experience trauma, which further caused depression, 

anxiety, and sleeplessness. 

An August 20, 2019 report of work status (Form CA-3) indicated that appellant had

returned to work full-time, regular-duty work that same day. 

By decision dated August 22, 2019, OWCP denied appellant’s emotional condition claim, 

finding that the evidence of record was insufficient to establish a compensable employment factor 

as the cause of his alleged emotional condition and, thus, there was no injury sustained in the 

performance of duty. 

On September 6, 2019 appellant requested reconsideration. In an accompanying letter, he 

indicated that after he returned to work from his break on July 5, 2019 he was informed that the 

aircraft he was responsible for prior to his break was involved in an accident. Appellantstated that 

he was shocked because in his 22 years as an air traffic controller he had never been informed of 

something like that. He indicated that he had not recognized that he was in shock at the time and 

asked the controller-in-charge what was needed of him. The controller asked appellant to relieve 

his coworker working the same position that appellant had worked prior to his break. Appellant

sat at the position for 18 minutes and could not concentrate because he was focused on how the 

aircraft he had been in control of had crashed and what he could have done differently. Because 

he could not focus, he asked to be relieved of his position. Appellantindicated that he immediately 

went to see a psychologist. 

A June 9, 2019 initial evaluation report by Dr. Bruce Herman, a clinical psychologist,

indicated that appellant was referred to him for treatment by his supervisor D.W. due to anxiety 

resulting from a July 5, 2019 incident where he was working as an air traffic controller and was 

involved in an incident where an aircraft crash landed. He noted that, although appellant tried to 

continue working after the accident occurred, appellant was too anxious and on edge to continue 

working and was asked to leave. Dr. Herman opined that appellant’s depression, anxiety, and 

constant rumination over the July 5, 2019 incident was a direct result of his involvement in the 

incident. 

A September 19, 2019 attending physician’s report, Part B of an authorization for 

examination and/or treatment (Form CA-16), by Dr. Herman indicated that appellant experienced 

trauma due to “witnessing a plane crash” and suffered from sleeplessness, nervousness, and 
4

depression. He noted that he treated appellant from July 8 through August 19, 2019, and that

appellant could return to full-duty work on September 20, 2019. 

On September 27, 2019 appellant responded to OWCP’s development questionnaire and 

indicated that on Friday July 5, 2019 he was working a radar position and communicating with an

aircraft when it requested to land at Morristown Airport. He stated that, since another aircraft was 

landing at that airport, the requesting aircraft was not allowed to land there. Appellant asked the 

pilot to state his intentions and the pilot radioed he was going to attempt to land at Sussex Airfield. 

The pilot then radioed that he was going to land at Aeroflex-Andover Airport. Appellant related 

that both of those airports were small, uncontrolled airports within his jurisdiction. He informed 

the pilot that either of those airports “were fine,” and then, per his procedures, he instructed the 

pilot to switch frequencies before he ceased communication with him. A few minutes later, he

took his break. Appellant was subsequently informed by his operations manager A.D. that the 

aircraft appellant had last communicated with was involved in an accident. He asked if everyone 

was alright, and A.D. responded that the aircraft landed in a lake because it overshot the runway, 

and everyone swam to safety. Appellant felt relieved, but expressed that he had a knot in his 

stomach because there was damage to the aircraft. He related that he unknowingly went into shock

and returned to work in the same control position he had been working because his sector was 

extremely short-staffed and he knew that his coworkers needed to take breaks from their highly 

stressful jobs. After 18 minutes, appellant stopped work because he could not focus on the task 

before him. He related that he broke out into a sweat and was constantly thinking about the 

accident and what he could have done differently to better assist the pilot. Appellant thought that 

if he had suggested that the pilot land at Caldwell Tower, an airport that was closer to the 

employing establishment airport and had an air traffic control tower, instead of letting the pilot 

select an uncontrolled airport, perhaps the crash would not have occurred. He also related that he 

should have known by the sound of the pilot’s voice and indecision that he should have provided 

more assistance. After appellantrealized that he was replaying the scenario in his head and second 

guessing himself, he asked to be relieved from his position. His coworker N.B. asked if anything 

was wrong, and appellant responded “no” and then went outside to get some fresh air. 

Appellant later watched the radar replay and listened to an audio recording of his 

interactions with the pilot from the plane that crashed. He then filed a traumatic injury claim form

to report this traumatic experience. Appellant indicated that, for weeks, he was constantly 

distracted by the traumatic incident and continually thought about what he could have done to 

better assist the pilot. He noted that, even though he took time off, he still replayed the memory 

in his head, and that he needed the time off and assistance from his psychologist to help him get 

over the event. Appellant noted that he saw a psychologist that had successfully assisted many of 

his coworkers in dealing with the stressors of being an air traffic controller. He indicated that he 

had no preexisting emotional conditions. 

An October 2, 2019 controversion letter from the employing establishment indicated that 

it was irrelevant that appellant was responsible for the aircraft involved in the accident prior to the 

accident, because it is part of an air traffic controller’s job to pass off an aircraft to another air 

traffic controller once an aircraft is outside of their airspace. It related that, once the handing-off

occurs, the aircraft is no longer the previous air traffic controller’s responsibility. The employing 

establishment repeated previous arguments and asserted that, while any stress that appellant 
5

experienced due to the aircraft accident was understandable, it was not considered to have occurred 

in the performance of duty. 

An additional controversion letter from the employing establishment, dated October 16, 

2019, asserted that appellant’s medical documentationnoted that the aircraft actually crashed when 

it was under a different air traffic controller’s control, and appellant was not in the control room 

when it occurred. 

On November 26, 2019 OWCP denied modification of its August 22, 2019 decision. 

On December 22, 2019 appellant requested reconsideration. In an accompanying letter, he 

recounted the July 5, 2019 sequence of events and reiterated that his trauma came from being 

informed that an aircraft he had responsibility for had just crashed. Appellant worried that, because 

he had told the pilot that he could not land at a particular airport and had not directed the pilot to a 

closer airport with an air traffic control facility, the pilot made a poor decision to land at an 

unfamiliar airport and therefore crashed. 

A December 22, 2019 witness statement from N.B. indicated that on July 5, 2019 he saw 

appellant returning from his break and noticed that something was strange with appellant’s

demeanor. Appellant related that an aircraft he had just worked with was involved in an accident. 

N.B. indicated that he decided to keep an eye on appellant and could tell after appellant worked 

for 10 minutes that appellant was having trouble processing the information, and appellant

ultimately asked to be relieved from his position. Later in the day, appellant explained to N.B.

that he felt partially responsible for the accident, and appellant kept insisting that, if he had 

suggested a different airport, the accident may have not occurred. N.B. suggested that appellant 

seek professional help after many hours of discussing this issue. 

By decision dated December 26, 2019, OWCP denied modification of its November 26, 

2019 decision. 

LEGAL PRECEDENT

An employee seeking benefits under FECA3 has the burden of proof to establish the 

essential elements of his or her claim, including the fact that the individual is an employee of the 

United States within the meaning of FECA, that the claim was filed within the applicable time 

limitation, that an injury was sustained while in the performance of duty as alleged, and that any 

disability or specific condition for which compensation is claimed is causally related to the 

employment injury.4 These are the essential elements of each and every compensation claim 

regardless of whether the claim is predicated on a traumatic injury or an occupational disease. 5

3

Id.

4 A.J., Docket No. 18-1116 (issued January 23, 2019); Gary J. Watling, 52 ECAB 278 (2001).

5

20 C.F.R. § 10.115(e); M.K., Docket No. 18-1623 (issued April10, 2019); see T.O., Docket No. 18-1012 (issued 

October 29, 2018); see Michael E. Smith, 50 ECAB 313 (1999).
6

To establish an emotional condition in the performance of duty, a claimant must submit:

(1) factual evidence identifying an employment factor or incident alleged to have caused or 

contributed to his or her claimed emotional condition; (2) medical evidence establishing that he or 

she has a diagnosed emotional or psychiatric disorder; and (3) rationalized medical opinion 

evidence establishing that the accepted compensable employment factors are causally related to 

the diagnosed emotional condition.6

Workers’ compensation law does not apply to each and every injury or illness that is 

somehow related to an employee’s employment.7 There are situations where an injury or an illness 

has some connection with the employment, but nevertheless does not come within the concept or 

coverage of workers’ compensation. Where the disability results from an employee’s emotional 

reaction to his or her regular or specially assigned duties or to a requirement imposed by the 

employment, the disability comes within the coverage of FECA.8 

In cases involving emotional conditions, the Board has held that, when working conditions 

are alleged as factors in causing a condition or disability, OWCP, as part of its adjudicatory 

function, must make findings of fact regarding which working conditions are deemed compensable 

factors of employment and are to be considered by a physician when providing an opinion on 

causal relationship and which working conditions are not deemed compensable factors of 

employment and may not be considered.9 If an employee does implicate a factor of employment, 

OWCP should then determine whether the evidence of record substantiates that factor. As a rule, 

allegations alone by a claimant are insufficient to establish a factual basis for an emotional 

condition claim. The claim must be supported by probative evidence.10 If a compensable factor 

of employment is substantiated, OWCP must base its decision on an analysis of the me dical 

evidence which has been submitted.11

ANALYSIS

The Board finds that appellant has met his burden of proof to establish an emotional 

condition in the performance of duty, as alleged.

Appellant attributed his emotional condition to his regularly assigned job duties. He

alleged that he developed an emotional condition because he had provided landing instructions to 

the pilot of a plane minutes before its crash on July 5, 2019. The case record establishes that, on

6

See S.K., Docket No. 18-1648 (issued March 14, 2019); M.C., Docket No. 14-1456 (issued December 24, 2014); 

Debbie J. Hobbs, 43 ECAB 135 (1991); Donna Faye Cardwell, 41 ECAB 730 (1990).

7 T.G., Docket No. 19-0071 (issued May 28, 2019); L.D., 58 ECAB 344 (2007); Robert Breeden, 57 ECAB 

622 (2006).

8 L.H., Docket No. 18-1217 (issued May 3, 2019); Trudy A. Scott, 52 ECAB 309 (2001); Lillian Cutler, 28 ECAB 

125 (1976).

9 Y.W., Docket No. 19-1877 (issued April30, 2020); Dennis J. Balogh, 52 ECAB 232 (2001).

10 L.S., Docket No. 18-1471 (issued February 26, 2020); Charles E. McAndrews, 55 ECAB 711(2004).

11 M.A., Docket No. 19-1017 (issued December 4, 2019); NormaL. Blank, 43 ECAB 384, 389-90 (1992).
7

that date, appellant was responsible, as part of his regularly assigned job duties, for monitoring an 

aircraft and providing instructions regarding its landing prior to its crash. He was working a radar 

position when a pilot requested to land at Morristown Airport. Appellant responded that, since 

another aircraft was landing at that airport, the requesting aircraft was not allowed to land there. 

He asked the pilot to state his intentions and the pilot radioed he was going to attempt to land at 

Sussex Airfield. The pilot then radioed that he was going to land at Aeroflex-Andover Airport. 

Appellant advised that both of those airports were small, uncontrolled airports within his 

jurisdiction. He informed the pilot that either of those airports “were fine,” and then, per 

procedures, he instructed the pilot to switch frequencies before he ceased communication. The 

record establishes that the plane crashed 15 minutes later, while appellant was on break. Appellant 

was subsequently informed by operations manager A.D. that the aircraft appellant had just

communicated with was involved in an accident. At the time, he indicated that he had not 

recognized that he was in shock at the time and asked the controller-in-charge what was needed of 

him. Appellant was then instructed to return to the same control position that he had occupied due 

to understaffing. While in the position for 18 minutes he could not concentrate because he was 

focused on how the aircraft he had been in control of had crashed and what he could have done 

differently. Appellant kept replaying in his mind the landing instructions he gave to the pilot, 

worrying that the plane crashed because he had prohibited the pilot from landing at the pilot’s 

initial choice and did not direct the pilot to a closer airport with an air traffic control facility. 

Because he could not focus, he asked to be relieved of his position and immediately sought 

psychiatric treatment.

The Board has held that, were the disability results from an employee’s emotional reaction 

to his or her regular or specially assigned duties or to a requirement imposed by the employment, 

the disability is compensable FECA.12 The evidence of record is sufficient to establish that 

appellant experienced stress due to the performance of his regular assigned duties in that he 

provided landing instructions to the pilot and 15 minutes later the plane crashed as it overshot the 

runway. Furthermore, the employing establishment acknowledged on the claim form that he was 

injured in the performance of duty and noted that its knowledge about the facts of his injury was 

consistent with his statements. The Board thus finds that appellant has established a compensable 

work factor. 

The Board notes that this case is distinguishable from A.M.,

13 wherein an air traffic 

controller similarly alleged that he sustained an emotional condition after monitoring an airplane 

that subsequently crashed. In A.M. the air traffic controller aided the aircraft to ascend without 

issue and relinquished control. The plane subsequently crashed when he was on break due to a 

quick descent due to icing. The Board found that the incident did not arise out of his assigned 

duties, and his emotional reaction was therefore not in the performance of duty. In the current 

case, however, appellant’s landing instructions to the pilot, which were provided as part of his 

regularly assigned duties, set in motion the events that led to the plane’s crash on landing at an 

uncontrolled small airport. Therefore, the landing instructions he provided to the pilot forms the

12 L.H., Docket No. 18-1217 (issued May 3, 2019); Trudy A. Scott, 52 ECAB 309 (2001); Lillian Cutler, 28 ECAB 

125 (1976).

13 Docket No. 14-711(issued March 18, 2015). 
8

nexus that connects him to the plane crash and gives rise to a compensable factor of federal 

employment. 

As OWCP found that there were no compensable employment factors, it did not analyze 

or develop the medical evidence. Accordingly, the Board will set aside OWCP’s December 26, 

2019 decision and remand the case for consideration of the medical evidence with regard to 

whether appellant has established an emotional condition in the performance of duty causally 

related to the compensable employment factor, i.e., communicating landing instructions to a pilot

minutes before the plane crashing. After this and other such further development as deemed 

necessary, OWCP shall issue a de novo decision.

CONCLUSION

The Board finds that appellant has met his burden of proof to establish a compensable 

factor of employment. The Board further finds, however, that the case is not in posture for decision 

with regard to causal relationship between appellant’s diagnosed condition(s) and the accepted 

compensable employment factor. 

ORDER

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the December 26, 2019 decision of the Office of 

Workers’ Compensation Programs is set aside and the case is remanded for further proceedings 

consistent with this decision of the Board.

Issued: November 5, 2021

Washington, DC

Alec J. Koromilas, Chief Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Patricia H. Fitzgerald, Alternate Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Valerie D. Evans-Harrell, Alternate Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board