This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations fr om the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 STATE OF NEW MEXICO, 2 Plaintiff-Appellee, 3

v. No. 34,648 4 AMANDA COLE, 5 Defendant-Appellant. 6 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SAN JUAN COUNTY 7 John A. Dean, Jr., District Judge 8 Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General 9 Maris Veidemanis, Assistant Attorney General 10 Santa Fe, NM 11 for Appellee 12 McGarry Law Office 13 Kathleen McGarry 14 Glorieta, NM 15 for Appellant 16 MEMORANDUM OPINION 17 ZAMORA, Judge. 182 {1} Amanda Cole (Defendant) was charged w ith trafficking a controlled substance, 1 methamphetamine, and possession of drug paraphernalia. Defendant filed a motion 2 to suppress evidence retrieved from her f lip cell phone that wa s discovered during a 3 search of the vehicle in which she was a passenger. Defendant claimed that the 4 officers did not possess a valid warrant, and therefore seizure of the cell phone 5 violated her Fourth Amendment rights under the U.S. Constitution, as well as the 6 protections of Article II, § 10 of the New Mexico Constitution. The motion to 7 suppress was denied. Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea for trafficking, but 8 reserved the right to appeal the denial of the suppression motion. We affirm the 9 district court’s denial of Defendant’s motion. 10 I. BACKGROUND 11 {2} Defendant was a passenger in the back s eat of a vehicle owned and driven by 12 Kenneth Burrows (Burrows), who was under investigation by law enforcement for 13 trafficking methamphetamine and cocaine. During the investigation, officers worked 14 with a confidential informant (CI) to c onduct controlled purchas es of drugs. As a 15 result of the initial investigation, a sear ch warrant was obtained to stop and search 16 Burrows’s vehicle. When the vehicle was st opped, there were three individuals inside, 17 including Burrows, who was sitting in the driv er’s seat, his girlfriend who was in the 18 passenger seat, and Defendant who was in the back seat on the passenger side. The 193 officers discovered that Defendant was the subject of an out-of-state arrest warrant. 1 All three occupants and the vehicle were taken to the police station. 2 {3} When the vehicle was searched, pursuant to the sear ch warrant, officers found 3 multiple cell phones, drugs, drug paraphernalia, guns, and money. The cell phones, 4 made up of both flip phones and smart phone s, were discovered on the floorboard of 5 the front passenger seat. Ag ent Jacob Sanchez, a deputy with the San Juan County 6 Sheriff’s Office assigned to the Region II Narcotics Task Force, opened the phones 7 in order to find out who owned them. Agen t Sanchez discovered that one of the flip 8 cell phones belonged to Defendant. When Agent Sanchez opened Defendant’s flip cell 9 phone, he observed text message s concerning drug trafficking. He then closed the cell 10 phone and put it with the other items seizedas a result of the stop. Agent Sanchez 11 stated that a second search warrant was sought for the cell phone s because it is the 12 procedure followed when cell phones are seized. 13 {4} Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence taken from her flip cell phone. 14 Defendant argued that the officers’ actions in opening her flip cell phone and using 15 information obtained from the cell phone to s eek a second warrant to search her flip 16 cell phone amounted to an illegal search. Defe ndant claimed that the first warrant did 17 not apply to her or her property, and the second warrant was based on illegally-seized 18 evidence. In denying Defendant’s motion, th e district court found that Defendant did 194 not challenge the legality of the search warrant or the traffic stop related to Burrows 1 and his vehicle. The district court also found that multiple “unknown cell phones” 2 were located on the floorboard of the frontpassenger seat, and that law enforcement 3 officers did not remove the cell phones from th e occupants’ person, nor did they order 4 them to leave their phones in the vehicle. The district court further found that Agent 5 Sanchez opened “what turned out to be Defendant’s flip cell phone in order to 6 determine who it belonged to”; a message “on what turned out to be Defendant’s flip 7 cell phone was immediately visible on th e screen when opened; it contained 8 information associated with drug traffi cking”; and Agent Sanchez “immediately 9 closed what turned out to be Defendant’s [flip] cell phone” and sought a search 10 warrant for the cell phone. 11 II. DISCUSSION 12 A. Abandonment 13 {5} The district court denied Defendant ’s suppression motion, concluding that 14 Defendant did not have a legitimate exp ectation of privacy in her flip cell phone 15 because “she exited the vehicle and left her [flip] phone in the vehicle without taking 16 any steps to protect or safeguard its conten ts.” In other words, the district court 17 determined that Defendant abandoned her flip cell phone. We review de novo the 18 district court’s conclusion of law. See State v. Celusniak , 2004-NMCA-070, ¶ 27, 135 195 N.M. 728, 93 P.3d 10. On appeal, this Court may independently draw its own 1 conclusions of law. See Bounds v. State ex rel. D’Antonio , 2011-NMCA-011, ¶ 33, 2 149 N.M. 484, 252 P.3d 708. 3 {6} Abandonment is based on actions and inte nt, and the intent to abandon must be 4 shown by clear and unequivocal evidence. See Celusniak , 2004-NMCA-070, ¶ 26. The 5 basic question is whether Defendant disclaimed ownership of the cell phone or 6 physically relinquished it. See id. ¶ 28. Here, there is nothing to indicate that 7 Defendant denied ownership of the cell phone or was even asked if the cell phone 8 belonged to her. See id. ¶ 34 (pointing out that an offi cer can easily verify ownership 9 of an item by asking, and an officer should make such an inquiry before assuming that 10 the item is abandoned). There is no evidence inthe record to show that Defendant left 11 the cell phone in the vehicle with the intent to abandon it. As a resu lt, we hold that the 12 district court erred in concluding that Defendant abandoned the cell phone. See id. 13 ¶¶ 32-33 (holding that abandonment was not supported where the defendant did not 14 toss the purse out the window, did not leav e it in a public place, was not fleeing when 15 she left the purse, and did not put the purse in a place where the defendant had no 16 plans of returning). 17 {7} However, this Court can uphold the district court’s denial of the motion to 18 suppress if it is right for any reason. See State v. Gallegos , 2007-NMSC-007, ¶ 26, 196 141 N.M. 185, 152 P.3d 828 (stating that an appellate court will affirm a district 1 court’s decision if it is right for any reason, so long as it is not unfair to the appellant); 2 State v. Wilson , 1998-NMCA-084, ¶ 17, 125 N.M. 390, 962 P.2d 636 (stating that 3 fairness “tempers” the precept of affirming a decision of the district court as right for 4 any reason). Based on our review of the first affidavit for a search warrant, we 5 conclude that there already existed proba ble cause to search all cell phones found in 6 the vehicle. 7 B. There Was Probable Cause to Se arch Defendant’s Flip Cell Phone 8 {8} Defendant claims that the first searchwarrant did not c over her flip cell phone 9 because she was not specifically named in th e affidavit or warrant. The district court 10 concluded that the search warrant did not specify Defendant’s f lip cell phone and did 11 not contain probable cause to justify the search of her cell phone. We disagree. 12 {9} On review of the issuing court’s determination of probable cause when issuing 13 a warrant, “the reviewing court must determine whether the affidavit as a whole, and 14 the reasonable inferences thatmay be drawn therefrom, provide a substantial basis for 15 determining that there is probable cause to believe that a search will uncover evidence 16 of wrongdoing.” State v. Williamson , 2009-NMSC-039, ¶ 29, 146 N.M. 488, 212 P.3d 17 376 (overruling in part all previous case law to the extent that the cases applied a de 18 novo rather than substantial basis standard of review). On review, we consider the 197 information within the four corners of th e affidavit submitted in support of a search 1 warrant. See id. ¶ 31. “[A]n issuing court’s determination of probable cause must be 2 upheld if the affidavit provides a substan tial basis to support a finding of probable 3 cause.” Id. ¶ 29. There is probable cause when there is a reasonable basis to believe 4 an offense has been or is being committed inthe place that is the subject of the search 5 warrant. Id. “[T]he substantial basis standard of review is mo re deferential than the de 6 novo review applied to questions of law, butless deferential than the substantial 7 evidence standard applied to questions of fact.” Id. ¶ 30. Thus, “if the factual basis for 8 the warrant is sufficiently detailed in the s earch warrant affidavit and the issuing court 9 has found probable cause, the reviewing courts should not invalidate the warrant by 10 interpreting the affidavit in a hypertechni cal, rather than a commonsense, manner.” 11 Id. (alteration, internal quotati on marks, and citation omitted) . Here, the district court 12 that issued the first search warrant found, based on the affidavit, that there was 13 probable cause to search the person, place, and property described inthe affidavit, and 14 we give deference to the i ssuing court’s determination. 15 1. First Affidavit for Search Warra nt and Corresponding Search Warrant 16 {10} Agent Sanchez prepared the affidavit for the first search warrant of the vehicle 17 owned and driven by Burrows, a silver D odge Challenger. The search warrant was 18 executed on May 16, 2014, by a district court judge and authorized a nighttime search. 198 The affidavit described Burrows, the vehicl e that he would be driving into New 1 Mexico from California, though the timing was unknown, and stated that the items 2 believed to be concealed in the vehicl e included methamphetamine and narcotics, 3 paraphernalia, money, and items related to the sale of narcotics and 4 methamphetamine. The affidavit included requests to detainand search “any 5 occupants of the vehicle . . . proven to have a nexus with [the] person in control at the 6 time.” A detailed explanation of the use of cell phones in operations involving drug 7 distribution was included, as well as an e xplanation for why the information contained 8 in cell phones often indicates “who are supp liers or users of illegal drugs.” Through 9 training and experience, Agent Sanchez learned that drug distributors often use more 10 than one cell phone in their transactions. The affidavit further explained the lengthy 11 process involved in searching cell phones, computers, and other electronic storage 12 devices. Agent Sanchez requested “authority to search for cellular telephones and to 13 search for such information pertaining to the distribution of controlled substances.” 14 {11} In addition to the detailed informati on described above, the affidavit also 15 contained a section based on the partic ular investigation in this case. See State v. 16 Hinahara , 2007-NMCA-116, ¶ 21, 142 N.M. 475, 166 P.3d 1129 (stating that a search 17 warrant was sufficiently particular whenall items sought under the warrant were 18 potentially connected to the crimes being inve stigated as described in the affidavit). 199 The search warrant affidavit included a very detailed descripti on of surveillance of 1 Burrows and controlled purchases between the CI and Burrows during which audio 2 recordings, photographs, text messages, and information regarding contacts via cell 3 phones were collected. The information gathered by the CI and included in the 4 affidavit indicated that Burrows and his girlfriend planned to travel to California to 5 get a “big load” of dope that would be the best the CI ever had. The officers planned 6 to “conduct a traffic stop as [the vehicle] enter[ed] into San Juan County.” It was 7 around 10:00 p.m. when the officers identified and stopped the vehicle on its return 8 from California. The occupants inside the vehicle were Burrows, his girlfriend, and 9 Defendant. The vehicle was secured and taken to the Farmington Police Department 10 to execute the search warrant. 11 {12} The place to be searched in this case was a silver Dodge Challenger vehicle, 12 described in detail in the affidavit for s earch warrant. The search warrant applied to 13 the entire vehicle and the contents as desc ribed in the affidavit. There was reason to 14 believe that “methamphetamine/narcotics, paraphernalia, mone y and contraband, as 15 well as evidence relating to the sale of methamphetamine and/or other illegal 16 narcotics” were located in the vehicle. The warrant was not limited to a particular 17 person or a particular person’ s property. Instead, the warrant included any and all cell 18 phones found in the vehicle. The affiant de scribed the cell phones they believed would 1910 be inside the vehicle as containing info rmation “such as c ontact names, telephone 1 numbers, and text messages” related to drug trafficking. The affidavit specifically 2 requested authority “to search for ce llular telephones and to search for such 3 information pertaining to the distribution of controlled substances.” Within the 4 investigation portion of the affidavit, it wa s stated that the CI had exchanged text 5 messages with Burrows while he was en route to New Mexico. The CI had cell phone 6 numbers for both Burrows and Burrows’s girlfriend. 7 {13} All the cell phones discovere d during the search were located on the floorboard 8 of the front passenger side of the vehicle. Based on the district court’s findings, there 9 was no indication that the officers kne w who owned the cell phones found in the 10 vehicle, or why all of the cell phones were found on the floorboard of the front 11 passenger seat. Burrows’s girlfriend, who had been sitting in the front passenger seat, 12 told the officers that whatever was found inthe vehicle belonged to her. No other 13 occupant of the vehicle claimed ownership of any of the items found inside, and the 14 cell phones were not taken from the po ssession of any of the occupants. Cf. State v. 15 Light , 2013-NMCA-075, ¶¶ 43-45, 306 P.3d 534 (explaining that in situations 16 involving automobile searches, drivers and passengers possess a reduced expectation 17 of privacy in property they transport in vehi cles, as opposed to the search of a building 1811 in which the personal property of a person not subject to the search warrant has been 1 stored on premises that are open to the public). 2 {14} Defendant claims that she opposed the validity of the affidavit because the 3 language used in the affidavit was boilerplate language, though she never specified 4 what part of the affidavit she considered boilerplate language. As discussed above, the 5 search warrant included some broad statements, but also included specific and detailed 6 statements regarding surveillance during the investigation and the communications 7 between the subjects of the surveillance. Th is specific information sufficiently tied the 8 cell phones to the drug trafficking operation th at was the subject of the investigation. 9 {15} The statements in the affidavit fo r the first search warrant, along with 10 reasonable inferences derived from those st atements, provide a substantial basis to 11 support a determination of probable cause to support the search of the entire vehicle 12 for the type of evidence described in the affidavit, including “ cellular telephones and 13 . . . information pertaining to the distributi on of controlled substances.” Thus, the first 14 search warrant provided the officer with the authority to open the cell phones and look 15 for information connected to the trafficki ng investigation. Agen t Sanchez opened the 16 cell phones only to determine who owned th em and when doing so, he observed 17 information on the flip cell phone screen th at appeared to be connected to the drug 18 trafficking investigation. The officer act ed under the authority of the first search 1912 warrant when he opened the ce ll phones. For that reason, the district court’s decision 1 to deny Defendant’s suppression motion was correct. 2 {16} Defendant further argues that the State admitted at the motion to suppress 3 hearing that there was no probable cause in the first affidavit to justify a search of 4 Defendant’s flip cell phone. Ho wever, this Court is not bound by any concessions the 5 State may have made at the district court, and as noted, we have conducted our own 6 analysis. See State v. Caldwell , 2008-NMCA-049, ¶ 8, 143 N.M. 792, 182 P.3d 775 7 (“This Court . . . is not bound by the [s]t ate’s concession and we conduct our own 8 analysis[.]”). 9 {17} In passing, Defendant sugge sted in her motion to suppress and now on appeal 10 that the seizure of her flip cell phone violated“the greater protections of Article II, § 11 10 of the New Mexico Constitution.” Be yond that statement Defendant never 12 develops a supporting argument nor does she provide any legal authority to support 13 this statement. “[T]his Court’s policy is to refrain from reviewing unclear or 14 undeveloped arguments [that] re quire us to guess at what [a party’s] arguments might 15 be”; thus, we decline to review th is undeveloped argument any further. State v. 16 Urioste , 2011-NMCA-121, ¶ 29, 267 P.3d 820 (internal quotation marks and citation 17 omitted). 18 2. Second Affidavit for Search Warra nt and Corresponding Search Warrant 1913 {18} We note that after the officer opened th e cell phones in order to determine who 1 owned them, a second search warrant was obtained to search the cell phones. While 2 the first search warrant provided authority to open the cell phones to search for 3 evidence of drug trafficking, the second search warrant, although not technically 4 necessary, provided additional authority to conduct a search for such information 5 pertaining to the distribution of controlled substances. 6 III. CONCLUSION 7 {19} We hold that Defendant did not abandon the flip cell phone, and that Agent 8 Sanchez was properly acting under authority of the first search warrant when he 9 opened the flip cell phone to determine ownership. We affirm the district court’s 10 denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence taken from the flip cell phone. 11 {20} IT IS SO ORDERED. 12

13 M. MONICA ZAMORA, Judge 14 WE CONCUR: 15 16 JAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge 17 18 J. MILES HANISEE, Judge 19