### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON Marc h 1, 200 5 S es sio n
STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. RO SE M AR Y A DA MS

Direc t Appeal from the Circ uit Court for Weakley County No. CR3- 2004 William B. Acr ee, Jr ., Judge

No. W2004-01650-C CA-R 3-CD - F iled May 2, 2005

Af te r the tr ia l c ou rt

de nie d h e r m oti on to s up pr e ss, the de fe nd a nt, Ros e Ma ry Ad a ms, e nte re d a

be st interest g uilty p lea to possession with intent to deliver a Sche dule I I controlled substanc e, me thamph e ta min e , a

Cla ss C fe lon y , a ndto p os se ssi on of dr ug pa raphe rn a lia , a

Cla ss A misdemeanor. A fter c onducting a sente ncing hearing, the trial court se ntence d the def endant to four y ear s in the Communi ty

Correc tion prog ram a fter f our months of servic e in the county jail and fined the def endant $2,000 f

or the possession with intent to sell conviction. For the poss es s i on of drug p ar ap h e rn al i a

c o n v i c ti o n , t h e d e f

e n d a n tr e c e i v e d a

c o n c u rr e n ts e n t e n c e o f

e l e v e n m o n t h s a n d t w e n t ynine day s with all but four months suspended. T h e defe ndant now appe als a c ertified que stion of law cha lleng i ng the trial court’s denial of he r motion to suppress the evidenc e. We af firm the jud g me nt o f the tr ia l c ou rt

. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court Aff irm ed

J.C. M C L IN , J ., d el i v er ed t h e opinion of the c ourt, in which T H O M A S T. W O O D A LL and J AM ES C UR WO OD W I TT , J R ., J J ., joined.

Cha rl e s S. Ke lly , Sr ., Dy e rs bu rg , T e nn e sse e , f or the app e lla nt, Ros e Ma

ry Ad a ms.
Paul G . Su mme rs , A ttorney Gen eral a ndRe po rt e r; J. Ros s D y e r, As sis ta nt A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; Thomas A. Thomas, Distri ct Attorney Gene ral; and K evin McAlpin, Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee
. OP IN ION

At app ro xima te ly

5:0 0 a .m. on Oc tob e r 16, 20 03 , De pu ty Ste ve To ddof the Wea kle y Cou nty Sherriff ’s Depa

rtment responde d to a 911 ca ll involvi ng an automobile ac cident. When he a rrived at the sce ne, De puty

Todd saw t h e d ef

en d an t ’s vehicle overturne d in a ditch and notice d the de fe nd a nt i ns ide . D e pu ty To dd the n op e ne d the re ar do or of the ve hic le , a llo wi ng the de fe nd a nt t o climb out.-2-

Once th e d e f

e n d a n t w a s o u ts id e th e v e h ic le , D e p u ty T o d d n o ti c e d th a t s h e ap p e ar ed intox icated. D eputy

Todd then proc eede d to conduct a f ield sobriety

test, which re veale d that the d e f e n d a n t’ s p u p il s w e r e c o n s tric te d

. H e a ls o q u e s ti o n e d h e r a s to w h a t h ap p e n e d a n d a s k e d , “ [I ]s t h e r e a n y t h i n g y o u w a n tt o t e l l m e , R o s e m ar y ?”

B e fo re De pu ty To dd c on du c te d a ny fu rthe r s ob ri e ty te sts , h e a c c omp a nie d th e de fe nd a nt t o a n a mbu la nc e , whi c h ha d ar ri ve d at the sc e ne
. Af

te r the de fe nd a nt sig ne d a me dic a l r e le a se a ndtol d para medics that she wa s fine, De puty Todd resumed field sobriety testing. He asked the defe ndant to do the “one- leg stand” and the “walk-and- turn.” At the completion of t hese tests, Deputy Todd stated, “[Y]ou didn’t do very well, Rosemary . . . . I s there any thing e lse y ou want to t ell me? ” The d ef en d an tt h en p u l l ed a c o n t ac tl en s ca s e f ro mh erp an t s p o ck etan d gav e i tt o De p u t y T o d d , s t at i n g, “[w]ell t hat’s what I

had.”

Be fore opening the ca se, De puty Todd place d the def

endant under arr est for D.U .I . He then shined a fla shlight into her ve hicle, re vealing a discolore d vial “believe d to be used in the . . .
smo kin g of

. . . me thamph e ta min e .” De pu ty To ddfo un d me thamph e ta min e in the c on ta c t le ns c a se and twenty -five ba g s of methampheta mine and $300 in ca sh in the defe ndant’s purse

. After being indicted for posse ssion with intent to deliver me thamphetamine, possession of drug para pherna lia, and driving under the inf l u en ce , t h e defenda nt filed a motion to suppress the evidenc e. At the he aring on the m otion, Deputy Todd testified t hat, upon his arrival at t he ac cident
scene , the def

endant “ appea

red . . . unde r the influenc e of an intox icant or dr ug .” He stated that she voluntarily

g ave him the c ontact lens c ase and that the sea rch of her pur se, conta ct lense c ase, and vehicle oc curr ed af

ter he place d her unde r ar rest for D.U.I . The de fendant admitted that s he g ave Deputy Todd the contac t le ns case but de nied g iving her consent to se arc h. The trial c ourt denied t h e d ef en d an t ’s m o t i o n , s t at i n g: The testimony

is undi s p u t ed that [t he def endant] g ave O ffice r Todd the
c on ta ine r w hic h c on ta ine d me thamph e ta mi n eandc on se nte d to him loo kin g int o th a t. I think really

it’s undisputed that the sear ch wa s incident to a lawful a rre st. W hen the pe rs on wa s se arc he d - - wh e n the re st of the me th wa s fo un d, sh e wa s u nd e r a rr e st. That wa s Offic er Todd’ s testimony , and also [t he defe ndant’s] testimony . And for those rea sons, the Court finds that there w as conse nt to sear ch the container , and that the re ma ind e r of the se arc h wa s a sea rc h inc ide nt to a law fu l arr e st. Th e mot ionis denied.

The de fendant s u b s eq uently enter ed a be st interest g uiltyplea to possession of methamphetamine an d

to p o s s e s s io no f

dr u g p a r a p h e rn a li a , rese rving a ce rtified question cha lleng ing the trial court’s denial of the motion to s uppress. The D.U.I char g e wa s d i s m i ssed. At the sentenc ing he aring , the trial court found that no mitigating fac tors applied and stated, “[t] here ’s one
e nh a nc ing fa c tor , th a t is nu mbe r two , pre vio us his tory of c ri min a l c on du c t, m akin g re fe re nc e to this prior mi sdemea nor poss ession char g e.” The trial c ourt then sentenc ed the de fendant to four y ear s in the Communi ty Correc tions prog ram after four m onths of service in t he county jail and fined the-3-

defe ndant $2,000 for the possession with intent to s ell convi cti on. For the possession of drug p ar ap h e r n a l i a

c o n v i c ti o n , t h e tr i a l c o u r ti m p o s e d a c o n c u rr e n ts e n t e n c e o f

e l e v e n m o n t h s a n d t w e n t ynine day s with all but four months suspended. The de fendant then filed notice of appea l.

Ana lys is

B e fore addre ssi ng the me ri ts o f this app e a l, w e mus t f ir st d e te rm ine wh e the r a

pr op e rl y rese rved c ertified que stion is befor e us. Gene rally , an appeal li es from a guilty plea only when the defe ndant has prope rly

rese rved a

certified question of law f or appe al. See Te nn. R. Crim. P . 37(b). I n order to properly

certify a question, the de fendant must ensure that: (a) the judg ment, or docume nt to which the judg ment ref ers, contains a st atement of the certified question of law; (b) the question of la w i s state d so a s to c le arl y ide nti fy its sc op e a ndlim its ; ( c ) the jud g me nt o r d oc ume nt r e fl e c ts the conse nt o f t h e S t ate a nd trial court; and ( d) the judg ment or docume nt refle cts that all parties
a g re e that th e iss ue is d isp os iti ve of the c a se . I d. In th is c a se , the State do e s n ot c on te st the va lid ity of the c ertified que stion, the judgment form refere n ce s an order stating the certified question, the iss ue is d isp os iti ve , a ndthe sc op e of the qu e sti on is a de qu a te ly de fi ne d. Th us , w e c on c lud e that a c e rt if ie d q ue sti on is p ro pe rl y

be fo re us
. The de fendant asserts that the tria l cou rt s hould have g rante d her motion to suppress the methamphetamine and drug para pherna lia pursuant to the F ourth Amendment to the United States Constit ut i o n an d articleI , section 7 of the T ennesse e Constituti on. The de fendant, throug h her
certified questi on, asks: (1) whe ther she w as lawf ully arr ested; (2) whether

the war rantless sea

rch
was c onducted pur suant to one of the na rrowly define d exceptions to the warr ant re quirement; and (3) whe ther, a fter be ing in the a ccide nt, she could have voluntarily consent ed t o the sea

rch and various sobrie t y tests. By brief, the defe ndant pre sents the additional ar g ument that the offic er questioned her befor e rec iting her Miranda rig hts. Howeve r, the def endant is limited to the certifie d q u estion as re serve d by

the trial court, and conse quently we will re view only

the validity

of the
se arc h a ndarr e st.
The fa ctual finding s of t he trial court at a suppre ssion hearing are presumed c orre ct on appe al unless the evidenc e conta ined in the re cord preponde rate s ag ainst them. State v. Odom, 928 S.W .2d 18, 23 (Tenn. 1996) . The trial c ourt, as the trie r of f ac t , i s i n t h e b ett er position to assess the
cre dibilit y

of witnesses, as sign w eig ht and value to the e vidence , and re solve any conflicts in the evidenc e. I d. I n contra st, this Court conducts a de novo revie w of the tria l court’s c onclusions of law. State v. Ye arg an, 958 S.W.2d 626, 629 (Tenn. 1997).

The de fendant’s contentions all stem from a w arr antless se a r c hand ar rest, which she believes violated her

Fourth Amendment rights. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protec ts ag ainst unrea sonable sea rche s and seizu re s
. Ar t i cle I , section 7 of the T ennesse e Constit ution is “identical in intent and purpose w ith the Fourth Ame ndment.” State v. Downe y , 945 S.W .2d 102, 106 (Tenn. 1997) (quot i n g Sneed v. State, 423 S.W.2d 857, 860 (Tenn. 1968)). Warrantless searc hes are per se unre asonable under the Fourth Amendment and a rticle I , section 7 of the Te nnessee Constit ution unless they fall wit hin a fe w spec ifically established exceptions. See-4-

Katz v. Un ite d St a te s, 38 9 U .S. 34 7, 35 7 ( 19 67 ); Sta te v. Ty le r, 59 8 S. W.2 d 798 , 801 . (T e nn . Crim. App. 1 9 8 0 ). Before any

evidenc e obtained thr oug h a wa rra ntless searc h become s admissible, the State must es t ab lish bya pre pondera nce of the evidenc e that the se arc h falls within one of the
narr owly define d exceptions to the war rant require ment. Yea

rg an, 958 S.W .2d at 629. Two such exceptions to the warr ant re quirement include a sea rch inc ident to arre st and a sea rch c onducted pursuant to conse nt. See Schnec kloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973); see also Ne w York
v
. B e l t o n , 4 5 3 U

. S

. 4 5 4 , 4 5 7 ( 1 9 8 1 ) ( d i s c u s s i n g t h e p ar a m e t e r s o f a s e ar c h i n c i d e n tt o arr e s t )

. In
or de r t o ju sti fy

a se arc h in c ide nt t o a

rr e st, the se arc hin g of

fi c e r mus t ha ve pr ob able c a us e to a rr e st the individual in question. S ee B elton, 453 U.S. at 457. Probable cause to arr est exist s if the offic er has “f acts a nd circ umstances within [his] knowledg e and of which [he] had rea sonably trustworthy information . . . suffic ient to warr ant a pr udent man in be lieving that the [i ndividual in que stion] had committed or was c ommitt ing an offe nse.” B eck v. O hio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964).

The de fendant’s certified question challeng es her war rantless arr est. The defe ndant ar g ues that she did not consent to t he sobriety testing and that the phy sical trauma cause d by

the ac cident preve nted her ability to perf orm on the tests. I n responding to the defe ndant’s 911 ca ll, Deputy Todd was law fully

prese nt at the sce ne of the acc ident. His suspicion that the defe ndant was intoxi cate d justified the brief detention of the def endant to conf

irm that suspicion. The def endant’ s consent wa s not a pre requisite to D eputy Todd’s ability to perform sobriety testing. The defe ndant’s admission of cohe renc e to par amedics at the scene dispels her arg ument that she wa s incapa ble of pe rforming the field sobrie ty

testing. W h en t h e d efe ndant fa iled various fie ld sobriety tests, Deputy

Todd’s suspicion ripened into proba ble cause to arr est for D .U.I . Thus, we c onclude that the ar rest wa s lawful.

Once Deputy Todd place d the defe ndant under arr est, he eff ectuated a sea

rch of her pur se, c on ta c t le ns c a se , a ndve hic le . A s a se arc h i nci den t to a la wf ul a rr e st, the de fe nd a nt’ s c on se nt t o sear ch wa s immaterial. At the suppre ssion hearing , the trial court stated, “really its undisput ed that the se arc h w a s in c ide nt t o a la wf ul ar re st. ” We a g re e a ndc on se qu e ntl y c on c lud e that th is a

pp e a l is without merit.
Conclusion

B a se d u po n th e re c or d a ndthe fo re g oin g re a so ns , w e a ff ir m th e jud g me nt o f the tr ia l c ou rt

.

___________________________________ J .C. McL I N, J UDGE