alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### P. J. COBLE, Individually and t/a P. J. COBLE CONSTRUCTION CO. v. MARTIN FIREPROOFING GEORGIA, INC.

No. 7415DC1072

(Filed 7 May 1975)

Rules of Civil Procedure § 51— failure to apply law to evidence

The trial court in a breach of contract action failed to declare and explain the law arising on the evidence in violation of G.S. 1A-1, Rule 51(a) where the court merely recapitulated the evidence, stated the parties’ contentions, and recited certain general principles of contract law.

*672Appeal by defendant from *Paschal, Judge.*Judgment entered 26 July 1974 in District Court, Alamance County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 8 April 1975.

Plaintiff is a general contractor engaged in the construction of commercial and industrial buildings. Defendant is a manufacturer of roof deck. This action arises from a claim by the plaintiff against the defendant for breach of a contract to furnish labor and materials for the construction of the roof on the Hillsborough School Gymnasium in Orange County.

It is plaintiff’s contention that defendant submitted an offer to him to furnish labor and materials for the roof of the gymnasium. Plaintiff accepted the offer and, in reliance, submitted a bid for the construction of the building. When plaintiff was awarded the contract, he called on defendant to perform. Defendant refused, and plaintiff was forced to secure other services at a price $5,533.00 above defendant’s offer.

Defendant contends that the contract never existed because it was never approved by an authorized officer of Martin Fireproofing. The offer was first extended by one W. C. Bull, a salesman for defendant, but was never signed in the spaces marked “Approved . . . By.” Alternatively the defendant contends that even if a contract existed, the plaintiff’s claim should not be allowed in that defendant was never given a chance to perform.

The jury found that a contract between plaintiff and defendant existed and that defendant breached the contract, entitling plaintiff to $5,000.00 damages. Defendant appeals.

*Vernon, Vernon & Wooten, by Wiley P. Wooten, for the plaintiff-appellee.*

*Latham, Cooper and Ennis, by Thomas D. Cooper, Jr., for the defendant-appellant.*

BROCK, Chief Judge.

The resolution of a single argument is all that is necessary for the disposition of this appeal: Did the trial court violate the mandate of G.S. 1A-1, Rule 51(a), by failing to “declare and explain the law arising on the evidence?” We agree with defendant that it did, and order a new trial.

The charge given by the trial court merely recapitulated the evidence, stated the parties’ contentions, and recited certain gen*673eral principles of contract law. This will not suffice. *Investment Properties v. Norburn,*281 N.C. 191, 188 S.E. 2d 342 (1971). The law must be declared, explained, and applied to the evidence bearing on the substantial and essential features of a case. *Hawkins v. Simpson,*237 N.C. 155, 74 S.E. 2d 331 (1953).

New trial.

Judges Parker and Arnold concur.
# Fourth Court of Appeals

**San Antonio, Texas**

May 1, 2017

No. 04

- 15

- 00333

- CR

Mario Ismael GUTIERREZ

, Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas, Appellee

From the 227th J udicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2013CR4433 Honorable Philip A. Kazen, Jr., Judge Presiding



### ORDER

Sitting: Sandee Brya n Marion, Chief Justice Karen Angelini, Justice Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice

On April 13, 2016, this court affirmed appellant’s felony conviction for possession of a controlled substance. On June 29, 2016, the Court of Criminal Appeals denied ap pellant’s pro se petition for discretionary review. We issued mandate on July 29, 2016. On April 24, 2017, appellant filed a pro se request for “A De Novo Review of His Appeal in Habeas Corpus.”

If a trial court denies a petitioner’s post

- conviction app lication for writ of habeas corpus, the courts of appeals lack jurisdiction to review such a ruling. T EX

. C ODE C RIM

. P ROC

. A NN art. 11.07, § 3(a) (West 2015); Ex parte Simpson , 260 S.W.3d 172, 174 (Tex. App.

— Texarkana 2008, pet. ref’d). In this case, the re is no ruling by a trial court. To the extent appellant is asking for a ruling on an application for writ of habeas corpus, only the Court of Criminal Appeals possesses authority to grant relief in post

- conviction habeas proceedings when, as here, there is a final felony conviction. See T EX

. C ODE C RIM

. P ROC

. A NN

. art. 11.07, § 5; Ex parte Simpson , 260

S.W.3d at 174.

For these reasons, this court lacks jurisdiction to consider the merits of appellant’s request, and the request is DENIED._________________________________ Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said

court on this 1st day of May, 2017

.

___________________________________ Keith E. Hottle

Clerk of Court
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<PAGE>
 
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<CURRENCY> SWEDISH
       
<S>                             <C>                    <C>
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<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997             DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1997             JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1997             DEC-31-1998
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                  .1356                   .1240
<CASH>                                               0                   4,165
<SECURITIES>                                         0                       0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0                  60,828
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0                       0
<INVENTORY>                                          0                  30,888
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     0                 104,978
<PP&E>                                               0                   9,546
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                       0                 210,479
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                0                  32,573
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<COMMON>                                             0                   2,344
<OTHER-SE>                                           0                       0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                         0                 210,479
<SALES>                                        144,543                 165,104
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<CGS>                                           75,674                  71,272
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   75,674                  71,272
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0                       0
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<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 321                     745
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 34,935                  41,455
<INCOME-TAX>                                   (2,052)                   1,445
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0                       0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0                       0
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<CHANGES>                                            0                       0
<NET-INCOME>                                    36,987                  40,010
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     4.93                    5.14
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     2.43                    2.60
        

</TABLE>
United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 18-3508

___________________________

United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee

v.

Roy L. House, Jr.

lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant

 ____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Western District of Missouri - Kansas City

 ____________

 Submitted: August 12, 2019

Filed: August 15, 2019

[Unpublished]

____________

Before LOKEN, GRUENDER, and KOBES, Circuit Judges. 

____________

PER CURIAM.

Roy House, Jr. appeals after he pleaded guilty, under a plea agreement

containing an appeal waiver, to Hobbs Act robbery and a firearm offense, and the
district court sentenced him, as a career offender, to a total of 360 months in prison. 

1

His counsel seeks to withdraw, and has filed a brief under Anders v. California, 386

U.S. 738 (1967), arguing that the court erred in classifying House as a career

offender, and challenging the reasonableness of the sentence.

We will enforce the appeal waiver in this case because House entered into the

plea agreement and the appeal waiver knowingly and voluntarily, his arguments fall

within the scope of the appeal waiver, and no miscarriage of justice would result from

enforcing the waiver. See United States v. Scott, 627 F.3d 702, 704 (8th Cir. 2010)

(standard of review); United States v. Andis, 333 F.3d 886, 889–92 (8th Cir. 2003)

(en banc) (discussing enforcement of appeal waivers). Further, we have

independently reviewed the record under Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75 (1988), and

have found no non-frivolous issues for appeal falling outside the scope of the appeal

waiver. Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal based on the appeal waiver, and we

grant counsel leave to withdraw.

______________________________

The Honorable Roseann A. Ketchmark, United States District Judge for the

1

Western District of Missouri.

-2-
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, each of the undersigned officers of W&T Offshore, Inc. (the Company), hereby certifies, to the best of his knowledge, that the
Companys Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the period ended March 31, 2009 fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Exchange Act and that information contained in such Quarterly Report fairly presents, in
all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



|                  |  |                                                                            
|----------------- |  | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|Date: May 6, 2009 |  | /s/ TRACY W. KROHN                                                         
|                  |  | Tracy W. Krohn                                                             
|                  |  | Chief Executive Officer                                                    
|                  | 
|Date: May 6, 2009 |  | /s/ JOHN D. GIBBONS                                                        
|                  |  | John D. Gibbons                                                            
|                  |  | Senior Vice President, Chief Financial Officer and Chief Accounting Officer
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 05-7178

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, versus KEITH ALAN WATSON, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Henry Coke Morgan, Jr., Senior District Judge. (CR-99-23) Submitted: November 9, 2005 Decided: November 30, 2005 Before TRAXLER and SHEDD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Keith Alan Watson, Appellant Pro Se. Fernando Groene, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Newport News, Virginia, Robert Joseph Seidel, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).- 2 - PER CURIAM: Keith Alan Watson seeks to appeal the district court’s order dismissing for lack of jurisdiction Watson’s motion filed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b), but characterized by the district court as a successive 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000) motion. This court previously has reviewed the district court’s dismissal of this order in its review of Watson’s appeal from the district court’s dismissal of the underlying § 2555 motion. SeeUnited States v. Watson , No. 04-7455 (4th Cir. Aug. 30, 2005) (unpublished). Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability because Watson has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right, and we dismiss this appeal as duplicative. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c) (2000). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
United States Department of Labor

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

__________________________________________

C.R., Appellant

and

U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, GRAHAM POST 

OFFICE, Graham, TX, Employer

__________________________________________

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Docket No. 22-0332

Issued: July 13, 2022

Appearances: Case Submitted on the Record

Appellant, pro se

Office of Solicitor, for the Director

ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL

Before:

PATRICIA H. FITZGERALD, Deputy Chief Judge

JANICE B. ASKIN, Judge

JAMES D. McGINLEY, Alternate Judge

On December 27, 2021 appellant sought an appeal from a purported December 11, 2021 

decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). The Clerk of the Appellate 

Boards assigned Docket No. 22-0332.

The Board, having duly considered the matter, notes that its jurisdiction is limited to the 

review of final adverse decisions of OWCP issued under the Federal Employees’ Compensation 

Act.1 This jurisdiction encompasses any final adverse decision issued by OWCP within 180 days 

of the date appellant filed his/her appeal.2 The case record as transmitted to the Board does not 

contain a final adverse decision of OWCP issued within 180 days of docketing of the current 

appeal.

3

 As there is no final adverse decision issued by OWCP over which the Board may properly 

exercise jurisdiction, the Board concludes that the appeal docketed as No. 2 2-0332 must be 

dismissed. Accordingly,

1

5 U.S.C. § 8149; 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3(a).

2

20 C.F.R. § 501.3(e) provides in pertinent part: “Any notice of appeal must be filed within 180 days from the 

date of issuance of a decision of the OWCP.”

3

Id.
2

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the appeal docketed as No. 22-0332 is dismissed.

Issued: July 13, 2022

Washington, DC

Patricia H. Fitzgerald, Deputy Chief Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Janice B. Askin, Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

James D. McGinley, Alternate Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
IIB 

111TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 4773 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

JULY 14, 2010 

Received; read twice and referred to the Committee on Energy and Natural 

Resources 

AN ACT 

To authorize the Secretary of the Interior to lease certain 

lands within Fort Pulaski National Monument, and for 

other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with BILLS
2 

HR 4773 RFS

1 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

2 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Fort Pulaski National 

3 Monument Lease Authorization Act’’. 

4 SEC. 2. LEASE AUTHORIZATION. 

5 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of the Interior (re6 ferred to in this section as the ‘‘Secretary’’) may lease to 

7 the Savannah Bar Pilots Association, or a successor orga8 nization, no more than 30,000 square feet of land and im9 provements within Fort Pulaski National Monument (re10 ferred to in this section as the ‘‘Monument’’) at the loca11 tion on Cockspur Island that has been used continuously 

12 by the Savannah Bar Pilots Association since 1940. 

13 (b) RENTAL FEE AND PROCEEDS.— 

14 (1) RENTAL FEE.—For the lease authorized by 

15 this Act, the Secretary shall require a rental fee 

16 based on fair market value adjusted, as the Sec17 retary deems appropriate, for amounts to be ex18 pended by the lessee for property preservation, 

19 maintenance, or repair and related expenses. 

20 (2) PROCEEDS.—Disposition of the proceeds 

21 from the rental fee required pursuant to paragraph 

22 (1) shall be made in accordance with section 3(k)(5) 

23 of Public Law 91–383 (16 U.S.C. 1a–2(k)(5)). 

24 (c) TERMS AND CONDITIONS.—A lease entered into 

25 under this section— 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with BILLS
3 

HR 4773 RFS

1 (1) shall be for a term of no more than 10 

2 years and, at the Secretary’s discretion, for succes3 sive terms of no more than 10 years at a time; and 

4 (2) shall include any terms and conditions the 

5 Secretary determines to be necessary to protect the 

6 resources of the Monument and the public interest. 

7 (d) EXEMPTION FROM APPLICABLE LAW.—Except 

8 as provided in section 2(b)(2) of this Act, the lease author9 ized by this Act shall not be subject to section 3(k) of 

10 Public Law 91–383 (16 U.S.C. 1a–2(k)) or section 321 

11 of Act of June 30, 1932 (40 U.S.C. 1302). 

Passed the House of Representatives July 13, 2010. 

Attest: LORRAINE C. MILLER, 

Clerk. 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with BILLS
United States Department of Labor

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

__________________________________________

M.C., Appellant

and

U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, CASA GRANDE 

STATION, Petaluma, CA, Employer 

_________________________________________

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Docket No. 21-1343

Issued: February 28, 2022

Appearances: Case Submitted on the Record

Alan J. Shapiro, Esq., for the appellant1

Office of Solicitor, for the Director

ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL

Before:

ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Chief Judge

PATRICIA H. FITZGERALD, Alternate Judge

VALERIE D. EVANS-HARRELL, Alternate Judge

On September 9, 2021 appellant through counsel, filed a timely appeal from an

August 23, 2021 merit decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). 

The Clerk of the Appellate Boards assigned Docket No. 21-1343.

In a letter dated January 28, 2022, counsel requested that the appeal be dismissed.

The Board has duly considered the matter and concludes that counsel’s request f or the 

dismissal of the appeal should be granted. Accordingly, 

1

In all cases in which a representative has been authorized in a matter before the Board, no cla im f or a f ee f or 

legal or other service performed on appeal before the Board is valid unless approved by the Board. 

20 C.F.R. § 501.9(e). No contract for a stipulated fee or on a contingent fee basis will be approved by the Board.

Id. An attorney or representative’s collection of a fee without the Board’s approval may constitute a misdemeanor, 

subject to fine or imprisonment for up to one year or both. Id.; see also18 U.S.C. § 292. Demands for payment of 

fees to a representative, prior to approval by the Board, may be reported to appropriate authorities for investigation.
2

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT appellant’s request for the dismissal of the appeal 

is granted. The appeal docketed as No. 21-1343 is dismissed.

Issued: February 28, 2022

Washington, DC

Alec J. Koromilas, Chief Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Patricia H. Fitzgerald, Alternate Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Valerie D. Evans-Harrell, Alternate Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
```

[Congressional Bills 111th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 5051 Referred in Senate (RFS)]

111th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 5051

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                              May 12, 2010

Received; read twice and referred to the Committee on Homeland Security 
                        and Governmental Affairs

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 
 To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located 
at 23 Genesee Street in Hornell, New York, as the ``Zachary Smith Post 
                           Office Building''.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. ZACHARY SMITH POST OFFICE BUILDING.

    (a) Designation.--The facility of the United States Postal Service 
located at 23 Genesee Street in Hornell, New York, shall be known and 
designated as the ``Zachary Smith Post Office Building''.
    (b) References.--Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document, 
or other record of the United States to the facility referred to in 
subsection (a) shall be deemed to be a reference to the ``Zachary Smith 
Post Office Building''.

            Passed the House of Representatives May 11, 2010.

            Attest:

                                            LORRAINE C. MILLER,

                                                                 Clerk.
```
#### Joseph G. Cushman, Appellant, *v.*George D. Cook et al., Individually and as Copartners under the Firm Name of George D. Cook & Company, Respondents.

*Cushman*v. *Cook,*171 App. Div. 908, affirmed.

(Argued October 21, 1918;

decided November 12, 1918.)

Appeal from a judgment of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the first judicial department, entered November 9, 1915, affirming a judgment in favor of defendants entered upon a verdict. Plaintiff contended that he was induced by the false and fraudulent representations of the defendants to purchase from them 250 shares of the preferred stock of the Cafetal Carlota Coffee Company for which he paid in all the sum of $25,000 and that the said stock was worthless at the time of the sale to the knowledge of the defendants.

*Stuart M. Kohn*for appellant.

*Robert B. Honeyman*for respondents.

Judgment affirmed, with costs; no opinion.

Concur: His cock, Ch. J., Chase, Collin, Cuddebao.tt, Hogan and McLaughlin, JJ. Absent: Crane, J.
Exhibit 13.1

Certification Pursuant to
18 U.S.C. Section 1350,
as Adopted Pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

In connection with the Annual Report on Form 20-F of DaimlerChrysler AG (the "Company") for the year ended December 31, 2005 as filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on March 6, 2006 and amended by Amendment No.1 on Form 20-F/A on the date hereof (the "Report"), Dr. Dieter Zetsche, as
Chairman of the Board of Management of the Company, and Bodo Uebber, as Member of the Board of Management, Finance & Controlling / Financial Services, of the Company, each hereby certifies,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of his knowledge:



|/s/DIETER ZETSCHE |  |                                                                           
|----------------- |  | --------------------------------------------------------------------------
|Name:             |  | Dr. Dieter Zetsche                                                        
|Title:            |  | Chairman of the Board of Management /
Head of Mercedes Car Group          
|Date:             |  | June 30, 2006                                                             
|/s/BODO UEBBER    |  |                                                                           
|Name:             |  | Bodo Uebber                                                               
|Title:            |  | Member of the Board of Management
Finance & Controlling/Financial Services
|Date:             |  | June 30, 2006                                                             

This certification is furnished as an exhibit to the Report and accompanies the Report pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall
not be deemed filed by the Company for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.

---