J. A17039/20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA :

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

v. :

:

RASHEEN GRAYSON, : No. 3320 EDA 2019

:

 Appellant :

Appeal from the Order Entered October 30, 2019,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County

Criminal Division at No. CP-23-CR-0002674-2014

BEFORE: BOWES, J., McCAFFERY, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: Filed: August 25, 2020

Rasheen Grayson appeals from the October 30, 2019 order, entered in 

the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County, dismissing his first petition 

filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”).1 We affirm.

Following a jury trial, appellant was convicted of possession with intent 

to deliver a controlled substance.2 Appellant was sentenced to 6-12 years’

imprisonment. Appellant filed a direct appeal challenging the sufficiency of 

the evidence, after rejecting a plea bargain which would have granted him a 

sentence of 21⁄2-5 years’ imprisonment. This court affirmed the judgment of 

 

1 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.

2 35 Pa.C.S.A. § 780–113(a)(30).
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sentence. See Commonwealth v. Grayson, 2016 WL 417400 (Pa.Super. 

Feb. 2, 2016), appeal denied, 140 A.3d 11 (Pa. 2016).

On November 23, 2016, appellantfiled pro se the instant PCRA petition. 

PCRA counsel was appointed. The PCRA court sent notice of its intent to 

dismiss appellant’s petition without a hearing on April 24, 2018. Appellant 

filed an objection. Appellant’s PCRA petition was dismissed on July 9, 2018.

Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and a Rule 1925(b) statement, 

alleging that the PCRA court erred in dismissing his petition without an 

evidentiary hearing. On appeal, this court remanded with instructions to hold 

a limited evidentiary hearing, at which appellant’s trial counsel could testify 

about the circumstances surrounding appellant’s rejection of the 

Commonwealth’s plea deal. See Commonwealth v. Grayson, 213 A.3d 

1047 (Pa.Super. 2019).3

The PCRA court held an evidentiary hearing on October 10, 2019, 

wherein appellant’s trial counsel testified as to her representation of 

appellant.4 As found by the PCRA court:

. . . [trial counsel] testified that she has been an 

attorney for a total of nineteen years, eighteen of 

which she has spent employed as an Assistant Public 

Defender at the Delaware County Office of the Public 

Defender. [She] testified that her entire area of 

practice is criminal law. In her time as a Public

Defender, [she] has negotiated hundreds of pleas on 

 

3 This court affirmed the legality of the sentence.

4 Appellant also testified.
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behalf of criminal defendants and has conducted 

approximately 100 trials, bench and jury combined. 

In regard to appellant, [trial counsel] testified that she 

received an offer from the Commonwealth at the 

pre-trial conference of 30-to-60 months in exchange 

for [a]ppellant pleading guilty to the PWID charge. In 

conjunction with her standard practice, [trial counsel]

testified that she went downstairs to the holding cells 

and communicated that offer to [a]ppellant. In 

addition, she explained the concept of sentencing 

guidelines, including what the mitigated, standard, 

and aggravated range meant as well as the difference 

between misdemeanor and felony charges and their 

degrees. 

As she tells all of her clients, [trial counsel] told 

[a]ppellant that it was his decision if he wanted to 

proceed to trial or to accept the offer. However, she 

did advise [a]ppellant that she had not received full 

discovery yet and that it would be a good idea to wait 

until that was complete before making that decision. 

Appellant agreed that he wanted time for [trial 

counsel] to receive full discovery. Pursuant to her 

usual course of practice, [trial counsel] advised the 

ADA that [a]ppellant would not be accepting the offer 

that day; however, asked that the offer remain open 

and requested that a trial date be selected. The case 

was listed . . . for April 12, 2014. 

At [that time, trial counsel] informed th[e PCRA c]ourt 

that she had extensive conversations with [a]ppellant 

in regard to his options to accept the plea or go to 

trial. [Trial counsel] testified that she specifically 

remembers going out to the prison to visit [a]ppellant 

and review the guidelines; most particularly that the 

mandatory minimums that would have been 

applicable to [a]ppellant were most likely going to be 

deemed unconstitutional. [Trial counsel] testified that 

she explained to [a]ppellant the difference between a 

mandatory minimum and a maximum sentence using 

the physical sentencing guideline sheet specific to 

[a]ppellant[] and the charges he was facing. In 

addition, [trial counsel] pointed out the difference 
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between a mitigated sentence, standard range

sentence, and an aggravated range sentence, which 

was 42 months here. [She] also was aware that 

[a]ppellant had an extensive criminal history, one of 

the longer criminal histories she had ever seen. 

When asked if she told [a]ppellant to reject the plea 

and go to trial because, at most, he would only be 

facing three years, [trial counsel] testified that she 

does not recall ever telling [a]ppellant that, and, that 

it would be out of her habit and routine practice to so 

do. In her years of practice, [she] has been asked by 

numerous clients if they should take the plea or go to 

trial, and her answer is always that the decision is 

theirs to make, and that trials can be 50/50, there is 

no magic eight ball to use to predict the outcome. A 

conversation [trial counsel] would have, and also did 

have with [a]ppellant, was what potential trial 

strategies would be, if there were any witnesses they 

could call, and what the possible arguments would be 

from the prosecution. 

On cross, [trial counsel] agreed that she personally 

did not put the statutory minimum and maximums on 

the record but recalls speaking to [a]ppellant about 

them. 

PCRA court opinion, 12/11/19 at unnumbered 7-9 (citations to notes of 

testimony omitted). 

The PCRA court denied appellant’s PCRA petition on October 30, 2019. 

Appellant timely appealed. On November 14, 2019, the PCRA court ordered 

appellant to file a concise statement of matters complained of on appeal, 

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), and appellant timely complied. Thereafter, 

the PCRA court filed its Rule 1925(a) opinion.

Appellant raises the following issue:
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Whether the PCRA Court erred in denying 

[a]ppellant’s [a]mended [p]etition where the record 

clearly showed that trial counsel was ineffective in 

advising [a]ppellant regarding the plea offer of 21⁄2 to 

5 years (30 to 60 months) where trial counsel failed 

to properly advise [a]ppellant regarding his maximum 

sentence exposure of 20 years (240 months) if found 

guilty, such that [a]ppellant believed, based on trial 

counsel’s ineffective advice, that if found guilty he 

could only be sentenced to 3 to 6 years (36 to 

72 months), and based on that incorrect advice, 

[a]ppellant rejected the plea offer of 21⁄2 to 5 years 

(30 to 60 months), which [a]ppellant would have 

accepted if he had been effectively advised regarding

his maximum sentence exposure such that [a]ppellant 

was prejudiced by counsel’s ineffectiveness in 

violation of Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S.Ct. 1376 (2012)?

Appellant’s brief at 4 (bolding and italics added).

When reviewing the propriety of an order denying PCRA relief, this court 

is limited to determining whether the evidence of record supports the 

conclusions of the PCRA court and whether the ruling is free of legal error. 

The PCRA court’s findings will not be disturbed unless there is no support for 

them in the certified record. Commonwealth v. Lippert, 85 A.3d 1095, 

1100 (Pa.Super. 2014), appeal denied, 95 A.3d 277 (Pa. 2014). If appellant 

raises a question of law, our standard of review is de novo and our scope of 

review is plenary. This court “may affirm a PCRA court’s decision on any 

grounds if the record supports it.” See Commonwealth v. Rigg, 84 A.3d 

1080 (Pa.Super. 2014) (citation omitted).

Regarding the effectiveness of counsel,

[I]n order to obtain relief based on [an ineffective

assistance of counsel] claim, a petitioner must 
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establish: (1) the underlying claim has arguable 

merit; (2) no reasonable basis existed for counsel’s 

actions or failure to act; and (3) petitioner suffered 

prejudice as a result of counsel’s error such that there 

is a reasonable probability that the result of the 

proceeding would have been different absent such 

error.

Commonwealth v. Steckley, 128 A.3d 826, 831 (Pa.Super. 2015), citing

Commonwealth v. Reed, 971 A.2d 1216, 1221 (Pa. 2009). Further, “[t]rial

counsel is presumed to be effective, and a PCRA petitioner bears the burden 

of pleading and proving each of the three factors by a preponderance of the 

evidence.” Commonwealth v. Perry, 128 A.3d 1285, 1289 (Pa.Super. 

2015) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 141 A.3d 479 (Pa. 2016).

Here, appellant acknowledges there was a plea offer of 21⁄2 to 5 years’ 

incarceration which was relayed to him by trial counsel. However, appellant 

argues that 

trial counsel failed to properly advise him regarding 

his maximum exposure at sentencing such that 

[a]ppellant believed that if he were found guilty he 

would only receive a sentence of 3 to 6 years’ . . . As

a result of trial counsel’s failure to properly advise him 

of his maximum exposure, [a]ppellant [maintains he] 

rejected the plea offer, which he would have taken if 

he had been properly advise[d]. Appellant [claims he] 

was prejudiced by trial counsel’s failure when he was 

sentenced to . . . 6 to 12 year[’s incarceration]

followed by 3 years of probation.

Appellant’s brief at 13.

After reviewing the testimony of appellant and trial counsel, the PCRA 

court made the following findings:
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Based upon the evidence presented at the hearing, 

[the PCRA c]ourt does not find that [a]ppellant has 

proved, by a preponderance of the evidence, that 

(1) the claim has arguable merit, (2) counsel’s action 

or inaction was not based upon a reasonable trial 

strategy and (3) [a]ppellant suffered prejudice 

because of counsel’s act or omission. [The PCRA 

c]ourt finds the testimony of [trial counsel] to be 

credible. [Trial counsel] has spent the last nineteen 

years practicing criminal law, specifically at the trial 

level, working with sentence guidelines on a regular 

basis. It is her common practice and routine to lay 

out the options for a defendant but never to advise 

them as to whether or not they should accept a plea 

offer or go to trial. Furthermore, the maximum 

sentence and minimum sentences are clearly written 

on the sentencing guideline form, which by 

[a]ppellant’s own admission, [trial counsel] reviewed 

with him. In addition, [the PCRA c]ourt finds it 

incredible that [a]ppellant was so “shocked” by his 

sentence yet the claim was never raised prior. 

Appellant has been committing criminal offenses for 

the better part of twenty years yet professes to have 

never heard about a maximum sentence,[

5] entirely 

implausible to this Court. In addition, [trial counsel] 

explained that she told [a]ppellant on the pretrial 

conference date that she did not have all of the 

discovery yet, so it would be best to wait and made 

an educated decision, which matches the record, yet 

[a]ppellant’s rendition was that [trial counsel] came 

down and told him right away to go to trial and that 

she would of [sic] back upstairs and get a date to 

select a jury.

PCRA court opinion, 12/11/19 at unnumbered 12.6

 

5 Appellant’s actual words were that he had never heard of a “statutory limit.” 

(Notes of testimony, 10/10/19 at 18.)

6 We note that the PCRA court’s order stated that after review, it found “that 

counsel’s representation of [p]etitioner was not ineffective. Counsel took 

careful time with [p]etitioner to explain his options and the pros and cons of 

either decision.” (PCRA court order, 10/30/19 at n.2.)
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After a review of the certified record and the testimony given at the 

PCRA hearing, we find the aforementioned findings and conclusions of the 

PCRA court were supported by the record.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 8/25/20