This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A13-0445

Daniel Garcia-Mendoza, 

Appellant, 

vs. 

2003 Chevy Tahoe, Vin #1GNEC13V23R143453, 

Plate #235JBM, et al., 

Respondents.

Filed March 2, 2015

Reversed and remanded

Rodenberg, Judge

Hennepin County District Court

File No. 27-CV-12-10889

Kirk M. Anderson, Anderson Law Firm, PLLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Julie K Bowman, Beverly J. Wolfe, 

Assistant County Attorneys, Minneapolis, Minnesota (respondent)

Considered and decided by Rodenberg, Presiding Judge; Hooten, Judge; and 

Stoneburner, Judge.



 

U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

RODENBERG, Judge

This case is on remand from the Minnesota Supreme Court “for further 

proceedings consistent with” its opinion in Garcia-Mendoza v. 2003 Chevy Tahoe, 852 

 

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to 

Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2

N.W.2d 659 (Minn. 2014). In that opinion, the supreme court concluded that appellant 

Daniel Garcia-Mendoza “has standing to challenge the forfeiture of the vehicle and cash 

and that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule applies to civil forfeiture actions.” 852 

N.W.2d at 668. On remand and at our request, the parties filed supplemental briefs to 

this court addressing five issues: (1) whether appellant is precluded from litigating the 

constitutional validity of the seizure because he did not seek return of the seized property 

and suppression under Minn. Stat. § 626.21 (2012); (2) whether respondent Hennepin 

County waived the argument under section 626.21 by reason of not having raised the 

issue to the district court; (3) whether appellant is collaterally estopped from relitigating 

the constitutional validity of the stop and search of the vehicle; (4) whether the record is 

sufficient to permit a reviewing court to consider the remaining issues; and (5) whether 

summary judgment was properly granted. 

We conclude that appellant may assert a constitutional challenge to the search and 

seizure without first seeking statutory relief under section 626.21. But we remand to the 

district court to address collateral estoppel and to resolve factual issues that have not yet 

been addressed. Should the district court determine that appellant’s claim is not barred 

by collateral estoppel, the district court should address appellant’s constitutional 

challenge to the stop and search of the vehicle under applicable Minnesota law, which 

also involves unresolved issues of genuine and material fact.

FACTS

Appellant was stopped by police on March 19, 2012 for driving 62 to 63 miles per 

hour in a 60-mile-per-hour zone. Garcia-Mendoza, 852 N.W.2d at 661. Police cited 
3

appellant for driving without a Minnesota driver’s license and arranged to have the

vehicle towed because neither appellant nor his passenger had a valid license to drive it, 

and the vehicle created a potential traffic hazard. Id. During the inventory search that 

preceded the tow, the officer found a substance that was later determined to be

methamphetamine. Id. The officer arrested appellant, searched him, and found $611 in 

cash on his person. Id. Respondent Hennepin County seized the vehicle and the cash, 

and appellant was charged with first-degree possession of a controlled substance. Id. 

Appellant’s timely demand for judicial determination of forfeiture under Minn. Stat. 

§ 609.5314, subd. 3 (2010), was stayed pending resolution of the state criminal charge.1

Id. Appellant claimed that the forfeiture was improper because the stop and search of the 

vehicle were invalid. Id.

Subsequently, “appellant was indicted in federal court on three counts alleging that 

appellant distributed methamphetamine on three different occasions from November 2, 

2011, to February 1, 2012; and a fourth count alleging that appellant possessed with the 

intent to distribute methamphetamine from March 19, 2012,” the same incident that was 

charged by Hennepin County. Id. In federal court, appellant moved to suppress the 

evidence seized in the March 19 stop and search of his vehicle as violating the Fourth 

Amendment, but the motion was denied. Id. at 661-62. He then “pleaded guilty to . . . 

count two of the federal indictment, which involved the distribution of controlled 

substances on December 22, 2011.” Id. at 662. As part of the plea agreement, the other 

 

1

 The civil forfeiture statutes have been revised. These amendments are inapplicable to 

this proceeding because they did not take effect until August 1, 2014. See id. at 665 n.6. 
4

three counts of the federal indictment were dismissed and appellant agreed to forfeit “any 

and all property constituting” proceeds, or used in the commission of the offense. Id. 

The state criminal charge of possession of methamphetamine was dismissed on March 

19, 2012. Id. at 661 n.2. 

The stay of the state forfeiture action was dissolved and respondent Hennepin 

County moved for summary judgment. Id. at 662. Respondent Hennepin County’s sole 

ground for seeking forfeiture of the property was that officers had found 

methamphetamine and money in the vehicle and appellant was convicted of distributing

methamphetamine in federal court. The record before the district court was sparse, and 

the transcript of the argument on the motion is a mere six pages in length. Appellant 

argued that there remained an unresolved and genuine issue of material fact because the 

Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule applies to civil forfeiture proceedings and because

“the evidence supporting forfeiture was illegally obtained and must be suppressed.” Id. 

The district court concluded that the exclusionary rule does not apply, but it “observed in 

dictum that if the legality of the stop and seizure was an issue, the court would have 

suppressed the evidence obtained on the ground that there was neither a reasonable or 

articulable suspicion for the March 19 stop, nor a legitimate basis for the expansion of it.” 

Id. (quotation omitted). The district court granted summary judgment based on federal 

law and appellant’s federal plea agreement.

On appeal from the order granting summary judgment, we affirmed the district 

court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of respondent Hennepin County but on 

different grounds. See Garcia-Mendoza v. 2003 Chevy Tahoe, No. A13-0445, 2013 WL 
5

6152304, at *4 (Minn. App. Nov. 25, 2013). Applying the rule of exclusive jurisdiction,

we reasoned that Minnesota had jurisdiction over the vehicle because the state had first 

assumed jurisdiction over it. Id. at *3 (citing Strange v. 1997 Jeep Cherokee, 597 

N.W.2d 355, 357 (Minn. App. 1999)). Because the state retained jurisdiction, we 

concluded that the district court should have applied state forfeiture law instead of relying 

on federal law. Id. Nonetheless, we affirmed the grant of summary judgment because 

appellant failed to rebut the evidentiary presumption that property in proximity to a 

controlled substance and vehicles used to transport controlled substances are presumed 

forfeited. Id. at *4; see Minn. Stat. § 609.5314, subd. 1(a)(1)(i), (2) (2010)).2 We

declined to extend the exclusionary rule to civil forfeiture actions, as no Minnesota case 

had previously applied the exclusionary rule to civil forfeitures. Garcia-Mendoza 2013 

WL 615304 at *3. We also did not “reach respondent Hennepin County’s argument that 

appellant was collaterally estopped from relitigating the March 19 stop and search.” Id.

The supreme court granted appellant’s petition for further review solely on the 

issue of whether the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule applies to civil forfeiture 

actions. Garcia-Mendoza, 852 N.W.2d at 662. The supreme court denied respondent 

Hennepin County’s request for conditional cross-review in which respondent Hennepin 

County argued that the court of appeals erred in “(1) failing to take judicial notice of the 

 

2 We note that the forfeiture statute in effect at the time the property in this case was 

seized did not require a conviction before the property may be forfeited. GarciaMendoza, 2013 WL 615304, at *4; see also Minn. Stat. § 609.5311, subd. 2(a)(2010)). 

The forfeiture statute has since been amended and now requires that “[a]n asset is subject 

to forfeiture by judicial determination” only if “a person is convicted of the criminal 

offense related to the action for forfeiture.” Minn. Stat. § 609.531, subd. 6a(b)(1) (2014).
6

federal district court’s order that the March 19 stop and search was lawful; and (2) failing 

to conclude that appellant is collaterally estopped from relitigating the legality of the 

March 19 stop and search.” Id. at 622 n.3. 

Relying on One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 85 S. Ct. 

1246 (1965), the supreme court held “that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule 

applies to civil forfeiture actions brought under Minn. Stat. §§ 609.531-.5319.” Id. at 

667. The United States Supreme Court in Plymouth Sedan had granted certiorari to 

resolve a split of authority on the question of whether the constitutional exclusionary rule 

applies to forfeiture actions. 380 U.S. at 696, 85 S. Ct. at 1248. In concluding that the 

exclusionary rule applies to civil forfeitures, the Supreme Court was persuaded by the 

fact that (1) forfeiture is quasi-criminal in nature, resulting in penalties that are sometimes 

greater than the criminal penalty; (2) an automobile is not contraband in the sense that it 

is not illegal to possess an automobile; and (3) it is the fruit of the search that makes use 

of the automobile illegal. Id. at 699-702, 85 S. Ct. at 1250-52. In concluding that the 

exclusionary rule applies to civil forfeitures, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that 

Plymouth Sedan “is on point and good law” and that the facts, as well as the forfeiture 

statutes at issue, are similar. Garcia-Mendoza, 852 N.W.2d at 666-67. 

After concluding that the exclusionary rule applies to civil forfeiture actions, the

supreme court reversed and remanded to this court “for further proceedings consistent 

with this opinion, including for consideration of the County’s other arguments.” Id. at 

668. Although respondent Hennepin County raised four issues in its brief to the supreme 

court, the supreme court did not grant review concerning any of them. Id. The supreme 
7

court also noted that “[t]he procedural posture and merits of the County’s additional 

arguments are disputed” but expressed “no opinion on whether the County forfeited its 

right to raise any of these issues on appeal.” Id. at 688-89. These additional issues 

include the collateral estoppel and statutory remedy issues that we directed the parties to 

address in their supplemental briefs on remand. 

D E C I S I O N

Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of material 

fact and a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.03. We 

review a grant of summary judgment to determine whether there are genuine issues of 

material fact and whether the district court erred in its application of the law. Mattson 

Ridge, LLC v. Clear Rock Title, LLP, 824 N.W.2d 622, 627 (Minn. 2012). 

Minnesota law provides that “[w]hen property has been used to facilitate drug 

trafficking or the property represents proceeds from such trafficking, that property is 

subject to forfeiture.” Garcia-Mendoza, 852 N.W.2d at 665 (citing Minn. Stat. 

§ 609.5311, subds. 2(a), 4(b) (2010)). Forfeiture is an in rem action, independent of any 

criminal prosecution. Id. “The prosecuting agency seeking to forfeit property benefits 

from an evidentiary presumption that money ‘found in proximity’ to controlled 

substances and motor vehicles containing felony-level amounts of controlled substances 

are subject to forfeiture.” Id. (citing Minn. Stat. § 609.5314, subd. 1(a)(1)(i), (2) (2010)). 

A person with an interest in the property bears the burden of rebutting “this presumption 

by producing sufficient evidence that (1) he or she owns the property; and (2) the 

property is not connected to drug trafficking.” Id. 
8

In support of the forfeiture action, respondent Hennepin County argued to the 

district court that appellant’s federal guilty plea to distribution of methamphetamine 

satisfied the evidentiary presumption that the 2003 Chevrolet Tahoe and cash are subject 

to forfeiture. Appellant contended that there were genuine issues of material fact because 

the March 19 traffic stop and search were unconstitutional, and that the items seized

could therefore not be forfeited. Although the district court suggested that the traffic stop 

and expansion of the stop were illegal under Minnesota law, it nonetheless granted 

summary judgment to respondent Hennepin County because the district court declined to 

apply the exclusionary rule to this civil forfeiture action. The district court held that 

federal law and the federal plea agreement required forfeiture of the property. Our earlier 

opinion held that Minnesota law governs the forfeiture, and the supreme court held that 

the legality of a stop and search is relevant to a forfeiture proceeding. With this 

procedural background in mind, we turn to the question of whether the district court’s 

grant of summary judgment was proper. 

First, respondent Hennepin County contends that appellant cannot challenge the 

constitutional validity of the seizure because he failed to file a motion under Minn. Stat.

§ 626.21. This argument fails.

“A person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure may move the district 

court for the district in which the property was seized . . . for the return of the property 

and to suppress the use, as evidence, of anything so obtained.” Minn. Stat. § 626.21. The 

word “may” as used in the statute signifies that it is permissive. See Agassiz & Odessa 

Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Magnusson, 272 Minn. 156, 165, 136 N.W.2d 861, 868 (1965) 
9

(stating that the legislature’s use of the word “may” is ordinarily given its literal meaning 

unless another intention is clear). As written, the statute does not require a person 

aggrieved by a search and seizure to do anything. Moreover, our caselaw indicates that 

section 626.21 is appropriate for use by persons seeking the return of property before a 

criminal complaint has been filed or in cases where there is no criminal proceeding, 

because otherwise the return of property would undermine a criminal prosecution. See 

Bonynge v. City of Minneapolis, 430 N.W.2d 265, 266 (Minn. App. 1988) (holding that a 

defendant has no right to appeal a section 626.21 order denying a motion to suppress and 

return when criminal prosecution had commenced). Indeed, we have said that “since the 

promulgation of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, the statute is superfluous for purposes 

of criminal prosecutions.” Id. Here, there were criminal prosecutions commenced in 

both state district court and in federal court. Appellant was not required to bring a 

section 626.21 claim to seek the return of property. Because appellant is not required to 

seek the return of property under section 626.21 before challenging the constitutional 

validity of the seizure, he has not waived his right to challenge the validity of the seizure. 

Respondent Hennepin County next contends that appellant is collaterally estopped

from relitigating the constitutional validity of the stop and search because the federal 

district court already denied his suppression motion. “Collateral estoppel precludes 

parties to an action from relitigating in subsequent actions issues that were determined in 

the prior action.” State v. Lemmer, 736 N.W.2d 650, 658 (Minn. 2007) (quotation 

omitted). The supreme court has stated that collateral estoppel functions like an 

evidentiary ruling: “Where collateral estoppel is applied, the party is simply precluded 
10

from presenting evidence that would result in the relitigation of a previously litigated 

issue.” Id. “Whether collateral estoppel precludes litigation of an issue is a mixed 

question of law and fact that is reviewed de novo.” Id. at 659. Collateral estoppel is 

appropriate when the following four elements are met: 

(1) the issue was identical to one in a prior adjudication; 

(2) there was a final judgment on the merits;

(3) the estopped party was a party or in privity with a party to 

the prior adjudication; and 

(4) the estopped party was given a full and fair opportunity to 

be heard on the adjudicated issue.

Ill. Farmers Ins. Co. v. Reed, 662 N.W.2d 529, 531 (Minn. 2003). But collateral estoppel 

is not rigidly applied, and a court “will not apply collateral estoppel if its application 

would work an injustice on the party to be estopped.” Lemmer, 736 N.W.2d at 659. 

Although appellant is the same party involved in the federal prosecution and the

state forfeiture proceeding, the issues concerning the constitutional validity of the stop 

may not be identical. Minnesota analyzes the reasonableness of each incremental 

intrusion during a traffic stop under the state constitution. See, e.g., State v. Askerooth, 

681 N.W.2d 353, 364 (Minn. 2004). The parties did not argue, and the district court did 

not consider, whether the federal district court examined the legality of the stop under the 

equivalent of the Askerooth incremental-intrusion analysis. Moreover, a collateralestoppel argument must first be raised before the district court. See Beaulieu v. Minn.

Dep’t of Human Servs., 825 N.W.2d 716, 723-24 (Minn. 2013) (holding that a collateral 

estoppel argument was not waived when the argument was sufficiently presented to the 

district court). The record presented here reflects that respondent Hennepin County did 
11

not specifically raise a collateral estoppel issue in its motion for summary judgment. We 

therefore conclude that remand is appropriate to permit the district court to consider 

whether appellant is collaterally estopped from raising a constitutional challenge to the 

stop and search of the vehicle. 

Finally, we conclude that the record is not sufficient for consideration of

appellant’s constitutional challenge to the stop and search of his vehicle. Appellant’s 

challenge to the stop and search was not fully litigated before the state district court 

because respondent Hennepin County dismissed its charge when appellant was indicted

in federal court. Respondent Hennepin County relied on appellant’s federal guilty plea as 

the basis for the forfeiture. The district court’s dictum concerning the perceived 

infirmities of the search and seizure was not a basis for the district court’s grant of 

summary judgment. And it seems plain to us that, on this record, there remain 

unresolved fact issues concerning whether the stop and the resulting search and seizure 

were constitutionally permissible under applicable Minnesota law. We therefore 

conclude that remand is required to permit the district court to fully consider the validity 

of the stop and search under Minnesota law, should the district court determine that 

appellant is not collaterally estopped from challenging the stop and search of his vehicle. 

Reversed and remanded.