alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
### IN THE TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10
- 08
- 00412
- CR JAMES MONROE LANG , Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS , Appellee

From the 85th District Court Brazos County, Texas Trial Court No. 05
- 06031
- CRF
- 85

MEMORANDUM OPINION
A jury convicted James Mon roe Lang of driving while intoxicated, with a child passenger under the age of fifteen. The trial court sentenced Lang to two years in State jail. Lang’s appellate counsel filed an Anders brief presenting one potential issue

. See Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 18 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1967) . Although
info rmed of his right to do so, Lang did not file a pro se brief. Nor did the State file a
brief. We affirm

.Lang v. State Page 2

In one potential issue, appellate counsel addresses whether Lang received ineffective assistance of counsel, identifying several instances when couns el acted or failed to act which Lang now contends were improper

. To prove ineffective assistance, an appellant must show that: (1) counsel’s performance was deficient; and (2) the defense was prejudiced by counse l’ s deficient performance. See Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.
Ed. 2d 67 4 (1984) ; see also Wiggins v. Smith , 539 U.S. 510, 521, 123 S. Ct. 252 7, 2535, 156 L. Ed. 2d 471 (2003)

. The record is silent as to any reasons explaining trial counsel’s actions and we will not so speculate. See Thompson v. State , 9 S.W.3d 808, 814 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999)

. Absent a record revealing trial counsel’s strategy or motivation, Lang cannot defeat the strong presumption that trial counsel’s actions fell within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Id

. An ineffective assistance claim is better raised through an application for a writ of habeas corpus. See Rylander v. State , 101 S.W.3d 107, 110 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003)

. INDEPENDENT REVIEW Having conducted an independent review of the record, we find this appeal to be wholly frivolous. We affirm the judgment. Pursuant to Rule of Appellate Procedure
48.4 , counsel m ust send Lang a copy of our decision by certified mail, return receipt requested, at Lang’s last known address. T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 48.4

. Counsel must also notify Lang of his right to file a pro se petition for discretionary review. Id .; see also Ex parte
Owens , 206 S.W.3d 670, 673

- 74 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) ; Villanueva v. State , 209 S.W.3d 239, 249 (Tex. App.

— Waco 2006, no pet.) . We grant counsel’s motion to withdraw,Lang v. State Page 3

effective upon counsel’s compliance with the aforementioned notification requirement as evidenced by “a let ter [to this Court] certifying his compliance.” See T EX
. R. A PP
. P.
48.4

.

FELIPE REYNA Justice Before Chief Justice Gray, Justice Reyna , and Justice Davis (Chief Justice Gray concurring with note)* Affirmed Opinion delivered and filed March 31, 2010 Do not publish [CR 25 ]

* (Chief Justice Gray concurs in the judgment to the extent it affirms the trial court judgment. A separate op inion will not issue.)
June 16, 2015



### JUDGMENT 

## The Fourteenth Court of Appeals

IN THE INTEREST OF A .L.H., A CHILD

NO. 14

- 14

- 01029

- CV

________________________________ This cause, an appeal from a judgment terminating parental rights signed December 17, 2014, was heard on the transcript of the record. We have inspected the record and find no error in the judgment. We order the judgment of the court below AFFIRMED

. We further order this decision certified below for observance. We further order that mandate be issued immediately.
```

[Congressional Bills 111th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 5133 Referred in Senate (RFS)]

111th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 5133

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             June 10, 2010

Received; read twice and referred to the Committee on Homeland Security 
                        and Governmental Affairs

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 
 To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located 
  at 331 1st Street in Carlstadt, New Jersey, as the ``Staff Sergeant 
  Frank T. Carvill and Lance Corporal Michael A. Schwarz Post Office 
                              Building''.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. STAFF SERGEANT FRANK T. CARVILL AND LANCE CORPORAL MICHAEL 
              A. SCHWARZ POST OFFICE BUILDING.

    (a) Designation.--The facility of the United States Postal Service 
located at 331 1st Street in Carlstadt, New Jersey, shall be known and 
designated as the ``Staff Sergeant Frank T. Carvill and Lance Corporal 
Michael A. Schwarz Post Office Building''.
    (b) References.--Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document, 
paper, or other record of the United States to the facility referred to 
in subsection (a) shall be deemed to be a reference to the ``Staff 
Sergeant Frank T. Carvill and Lance Corporal Michael A. Schwarz Post 
Office Building''.

            Passed the House of Representatives June 9, 2010.

            Attest:

                                            LORRAINE C. MILLER,

                                                                 Clerk.
```
United States Department of Labor

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

__________________________________________

F.I., Appellant

and

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, U.S. ARMY 

WATERVLIET ARSENAL, Watervliet, NY, 

Employer

__________________________________________

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Docket No. 21-0814

Issued: June 16, 2021

Appearances: Case Submitted on the Record

Alan J. Shapiro, Esq., for the appellant1

Office of Solicitor, for the Director

ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL

Before:

ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Chief Judge

PATRICIA H. FITZGERALD, Alternate Judge

VALERIE D. EVANS-HARRELL, Alternate Judge

On May 5, 2021 appellant, through counsel, filed an appeal from a January 31, 2020 merit 

decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). The Clerk of the Appellate 

Boards assigned Docket No. 21-0814.

The Board has duly considered the matter and notes that the Board has jurisdiction to 

review final adverse decisions of OWCP issued under the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act.2 

For final adverse decisions of OWCP issued on or after November 19, 2008, the Board’s review 

 

1

In all cases in which a representative has been authorized in a matter before the Board, no claim for a fee for legal 

or other service performed on appeal before the Board is valid unless approved by the Board. 20 C.F.R. § 501.9(e). 

No contract for a stipulated fee or on a contingent fee basis will be approved by the Board. Id. An attorney or 

representative’s collection of a fee without the Board’s approval may constitute a misdemeanor, subject to fine or 

imprisonment for up to one year or both. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 292. Demands for payment of fees to a 

representative, prior to approval by the Board, may be reported to appropriate authorities for investigation.

2 5 U.S.C. § 8149; 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3(a) (2009).
2

authority is limited to appeals which are filed within 180 days from the date of issuance of OWCP’s 

decision.3

The 180th day following the January 31, 2020 decision was July 29, 2020. As appellant 

did not file an appeal with the Board until May 5, 2021, more than 180 days after the January 31, 

2020 OWCP decision, the Board finds that the appeal docketed as No. 21-0814 is untimely filed. 

The Board is without jurisdiction to review the appeal. Appellant has not offered a reason to 

explain the failure to timely file an appeal with supporting documentation sufficient to establish 

compelling circumstances.

The Board’s decisions and orders are “final upon the expiration of 30 days from the date 

of their issuance.”

4

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the appeal docketed as No. 21-0814 is dismissed.

Issued: June 16, 2021

Washington, DC

Alec J. Koromilas, Chief Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Patricia H. Fitzgerald, Alternate Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Valerie D. Evans-Harrell, Alternate Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

 

3

Id. at § 501.3(e).

4

Id. at § 501.6(d). Appellant may file a petition for reconsideration of this order prior to the expiration of the 30 

days. See id. at 501.7(a).
```

[Congressional Bills 111th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 5086 Introduced in House (IH)]

111th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 5086

   To amend the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 to prohibit an 
  authorized committee of a candidate for election for Federal office 
from disbursing any amount received as a contribution to the committee 
until the committee posts on a public Internet site the identification 
  of the person who provided the contribution, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             April 20, 2010

Mr. Sensenbrenner introduced the following bill; which was referred to 
                 the Committee on House Administration

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
   To amend the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 to prohibit an 
  authorized committee of a candidate for election for Federal office 
from disbursing any amount received as a contribution to the committee 
until the committee posts on a public Internet site the identification 
  of the person who provided the contribution, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Online Disclosure for Access to 
Campaign Funds Act of 2010''.

SEC. 2. REQUIRING AUTHORIZED COMMITTEES OF FEDERAL CANDIDATES TO POST 
              IDENTIFICATION OF CONTRIBUTORS PRIOR TO DISBURSING FUNDS.

    (a) In General.--Section 302 of the Federal Election Campaign Act 
of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 432) is amended by adding at the end the following 
new subsection:
    ``(j)(1) The treasurer of each authorized committee shall establish 
a separate account for the committee consisting exclusively of 
contributions received by or on behalf of the committee, and shall 
deposit each contribution received by the committee into the account 
immediately upon receipt.
    ``(2) Amounts in the account established under paragraph (1) may 
not be used to make disbursements by or on behalf of the committee but 
may be used only for transfers to other accounts of the committee.
    ``(3) The treasurer of an authorized committee shall ensure that 
the balance of the account established under paragraph (1) is equal to 
the total amounts deposited into the account reduced by the total 
amount of all contributions deposited into the account with respect to 
which the treasurer has posted on a publicly accessible Internet site 
of the committee the identification of the person who made the 
contribution.''.
    (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) shall 
apply with respect to contributions received on or after the date of 
the enactment of this Act.
                                 <all>
```
United States Department of Labor

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

__________________________________________

B.P., Appellant

and

DEPARTMENT OF VETERAN AFFAIRS, 

BIRMINGHAM VA MEDICAL CENTER, 

Birmingham, AL, Employer

__________________________________________

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Docket No. 21-1013

Issued: July 26, 2021

Appearances: Case Submitted on the Record

Appellant, pro se

Office of Solicitor, for the Director

ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL

Before:

JANICE B. ASKIN, Judge

PATRICIA H. FITZGERALD, Alternate Judge

VALERIE D. EVANS-HARRELL, Alternate Judge

On June 24, 2021 appellant filed an appeal from a November 8, 2019 merit decision of the 

Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). The Clerk of the Appellate Boards

assigned Docket No. 21-1013.

The Board has duly considered the matter and notes that the Board has jurisdiction to 

review final adverse decisions of OWCP issued under the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act.1 

For final adverse decisions of OWCP issued on or after November 19, 2008, the Board’s review 

authority is limited to appeals which are filed within 180 days from the date of issuance of OWCP’s 

decision.2

The 180th day following the November 8, 2019 decision was May 6, 2020. As appellant 

did not file an appeal with the Board until June 24, 2021, more than 180 days after the November 8,

2019 OWCP decision, the Board finds that the appeal docketed as No. 21-1013 is untimely filed. 

The Board is without jurisdiction to review the appeal. Appellant has not offered a reason to 

 

1 5 U.S.C. § 8149; 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3(a) (2009).

2

Id. at § 501.3(e).
2

explain the failure to timely file an appeal with supporting documentation sufficient to establish 

compelling circumstances.

The Board’s decisions and orders are “final upon the expiration of 30 days from the date 

of their issuance.”

3

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the appeal docketed as No. 21-1013 is dismissed.

Issued: July 26, 2021

Washington, DC

Janice B. Askin, Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Patricia H. Fitzgerald, Alternate Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Valerie D. Evans-Harrell, Alternate Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

 

3

Id. at § 501.6(d).
### Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan

Marilyn Kelly,
Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanag h
Elizabeth A. Weave r

Maura D. Corriga n Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markma n Diane M. Hathaway,
J ustices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

_______________________________________ __ Clerk March 23, 2009

p0316 

# Order

March 23, 2009

137391

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 137391 COA: 284870 Calhoun CC: 98-001925-FC LAURENCE DEANE COY II, Defendant-Appellant.

________________ _______________ __________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the A ugust 6, 2008 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because the defendant’s motion for relief from judgment is prohibited by MCR 6.502(G).
**EXHIBIT 32.2**

 

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO**

**18 U. S. C. SECTION 1350**

**AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**

**SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

Inconnection with the Amendment No. 1 on Form10-QSB/A to the Quarterly Report of Vistula CommunicationsServices, Inc. (the “Company”) for the period ended March 31, 2005 as filed with theSecurities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, GeorgeR. Vaughn, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, to my bestknowledge and belief, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 1350, adopted pursuant to§906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

 

1)               the Report fully complies with therequirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the SecuritiesExchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

 

2)               the information contained in the Reportfairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and resultsof operations of the Company.

 

 
|   | /s/  GEORGE R. VAUGHN  |   |
|--------|-----------------------------|--------|
|   | George  R. Vaughn           |
|   | Chief  Financial Officer    |

 

 

Dated:January 30, 2006

 

Asigned original of this written statement required by Section 906, orother document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting thesignature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of thiswritten statement required by Section 906, has been provided to VistulaCommunications Services, Inc. and will be retained by VistulaCommunications Services, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and ExchangeCommission or its staff upon request.

 

----
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be

published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 01-11122 Summary Calendar

OILLE FITZGERALD JOHNSON, Plaintiff,

versus LUBBOCK COUNTY, TX.; ET AL., Defendants, RICHARD HAYNES; JOSEPH LANZA; JOHN S. POWELL, STEVE SUMNER; REBECCA HAMILTON, Appellants.

________________________________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas USDC No. 5:00-CV-255-C

________________________________________________

March 8, 2002 Before POLITZ, STEWART, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Richard Haynes, Joseph Lanza, John S. Powell, Steven Sumner, and Rebecca Hamilton, attorneys for Ollie Fitzgerald Johnson, appeal a sanction order imposed1 See Scaife v. Associated Air Center, Inc. , 100 F.3d 406, 411 (5th Cir. 1996).
2 by the district court, warning that future misconduct would warrant the imposition of severe sanctions. They contend that the sanction order is too ambiguous to be enforceable. They also maintain that the district court did not make a specific finding that their actions constituted misconduct or a disruption in the district court’s proceedings. The record reflects that the district court did make a specific finding that the appellants made misrepresentation to the court by misquoting the language of the court’s previous orders to file a more definite statement regarding their fraud claims, and by omitting certain language from the previous orders. The district court did not abuse its discretion in issuing a warning that any future misconduct by the appellants would warrant the imposition of sanctions. 1 AFFIRMED.
I 

111TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 5335 

To amend the Public Health Service Act to authorize the Secretary of Health 

and Human Services to make grants to eligible local educational agencies 

for the purpose of reducing the student-to-nurse ratio in public elementary and secondary schools. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MAY 18, 2010 

Mr. MARSHALL (for himself and Mr. CASTLE) introduced the following bill; 

which was referred to the Committee on Energy and Commerce 

A BILL 

To amend the Public Health Service Act to authorize the 

Secretary of Health and Human Services to make grants 

to eligible local educational agencies for the purpose of 

reducing the student-to-nurse ratio in public elementary 

and secondary schools. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Nurses for Impover5 ished Schools Act’’. 


jbell on DSKDVH8Z91PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 5335 IH

1 SEC. 2. REDUCING STUDENT-TO-NURSE RATIOS IN PUBLIC 

2 SCHOOLS. 

3 Title VIII of the Public Health Service Act (42 

4 U.S.C. 296 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the 

5 following: 

6 ‘‘PART J—SCHOOL NURSES 

7 ‘‘SEC. 861. REDUCING STUDENT-TO-NURSE RATIOS. 

8 ‘‘(a) DEMONSTRATION GRANTS.—The Secretary, act9 ing through the Director of the Centers for Disease Con10 trol and Prevention, may make demonstration grants to 

11 eligible local educational agencies for the purpose of reduc12 ing the student-to-nurse ratio in public elementary and 

13 secondary schools. 

14 ‘‘(b) REPORT.—Not later than 24 months after the 

15 date of the enactment of this section, the Secretary shall 

16 submit to the Congress a report on the results of the dem17 onstration grant program carried out under this section, 

18 including an evaluation of the effectiveness of the program 

19 in improving the student-to-nurse ratios described in sub20 section (a) and an evaluation of the impact of any result21 ing enhanced health of students on learning. 

22 ‘‘(c) DEFINITIONS.—For purposes of this section: 

23 ‘‘(1) The terms ‘elementary school’ and ‘sec24 ondary school’ have the meanings given to those 

25 terms in section 9101 of the Elementary and Sec26 ondary Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 7801). 


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3 

•HR 5335 IH

1 ‘‘(2) The term ‘eligible local educational agency’ 

2 means a local educational agency in which— 

3 ‘‘(A) not less than 20 percent of the stu4 dents served by the agency are from families 

5 with incomes below the poverty line (as defined 

6 in section 9101 of the Elementary and Sec7 ondary Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 

8 7801)); and 

9 ‘‘(B) the student-to-school nurse ratio in 

10 public elementary and secondary schools is 750 

11 or more students to every school nurse. 

12 ‘‘(3) The term ‘nurse’ means a licensed nurse. 

13 ‘‘(d) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—To 

14 carry out this section, there are authorized to be appro15 priated such sums as may be necessary for each of the 

16 fiscal years 2011 through 2015.’’. 

Æ 


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#### RANDOLPH MOORE, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent.

No. 17900

May 18, 1988

754 P.2d 841

*Earl T. Ayers,*Las Vegas, for Appellant.

*114
      *Brian McKay,*Attorney General, Carson City; *Rex Bell,*District Attorney, *James Tufteland,*Deputy District Attorney, *Daniel M. Seaton,*Deputy District Attorney, Clark County, for Respondent.

OPINION

By the Court,

Springer, J.:

This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction and the subsequent sentence of death. Once again we are faced with the problematic issue of prosecutorial misconduct. In support of his claim of a fundamentally unfair trial, Randolph Moore submits more than twenty alleged incidents of prosecutorial misconduct occurring at his penalty hearing.

Randolph Moore, Dale Flanagan and two others were jointly tried and subsequently convicted of the murders of Carl and Colleen Gordon. The underlying facts of this case have been adequately set forth in our opinion in the case of Flanagan v. State, 104 Nev. 105, 754 P.2d 836 (1988). In addition, a substantial portion of the incidents of prosecutorial misconduct currently propounded by Randolph Moore have been directly addressed in the *Flanagan*opinion. Having meticulously reviewed Moore’s claims of misconduct and for the reasons set forth in *Flanagan,*we conclude that Moore was indeed denied a fair penalty hearing.

We have carefully examined Moore’s remaining assignments of error concerning the judgment of conviction and find them to be without merit. However, the cumulative effect of the prosecutor’s extensive misconduct at the penalty hearing is of such magnitude as to render Moore’s penalty hearing fundamentally unfair. Accordingly, we reverse Moore’s sentence and remand this case for a new penalty hearing. In all other respects, we affirm the judgment of conviction.

Young and Mowbray, JJ., concur.

Gunderson, C. J., and Steffen, J.,

concurring and dissenting:

We agree that any improprieties which may have occurred during the guilt phase of the trial were not prejudicial. However, for the reasons set forth in the dissent to Flanagan v. State, 104 Nev. 105, 754 P.2d 836 (1988), we respectfully dissent from the majority opinion insofar as it requires a new penalty hearing.