United States Department of Labor

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

__________________________________________

J.C., Appellant

and

U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, LANSING VEHICLE 

MAINTENANCE FACILITY, Lansing, MI, 

Employer

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Docket No. 19-1940

Issued: February 10, 2021

Appearances: Case Submitted on the Record

Alan J. Shapiro, Esq., for the appellant1

Office of Solicitor, for the Director

ORDER REMANDING CASE

Before:

ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Chief Judge

CHRISTOPHER J. GODFREY, Deputy Chief Judge

VALERIE D. EVANS-HARRELL, Alternate Judge

On September 23, 2019 appellant, through counsel, filed a timely appeal from an 

August 12, 2019 merit decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). The 

Clerk of the Appellate Boards docketed the appeal as No. 19-1940. 

On May 16, 2018 appellant, then a 53-year-old vehicle maintenance facility (VMF) 

technician, filed a traumatic injury claim (Form CA-1) alleging that at 7:30 a.m. on April 26, 2018 

he hyperextended his left knee when he tripped on a ground rod and wire in a dark parking lot of 

 

1

In all cases in which a representative has been authorized in a matter before the Board, no claim for a fee for legal 

or other service performed on appeal before the Board is valid unless approved by the Board. 20 C.F.R. § 501.9(e). 

No contract for a stipulated fee or on a contingent fee basis will be approved by the Board. Id. An attorney or 

representative’s collection of a fee without the Board’s approval may constitute a misdemeanor, subject to fine or 

imprisonment for up to one year or both. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 292. Demands for payment of fees to a 

representative, prior to approval by the Board, may be reported to appropriate authorities for investigation.
2

the Grand Ledge Post Office (Grand Ledge) while in the performance of duty.2 On the reverse 

side of the claim form, the employing establishment, Lansing VMF, indicated that appellant was 

injured in the performance of duty on April 26, 2018 and stopped work on that date. It stated that 

it received notice of appellant’s injury on April 26, 2018, and it listed his regular work schedule 

as Monday through Friday from 6:00 a.m. to 2:30 p.m. The employing establishment indicated

that its knowledge of the facts about appellant’s injury agreed with appellant’s statements. On 

May 17, 2018 appellant’s supervisor C.V. signed the claim form and certified that the information 

given by the employing establishment and appellant was true to the best of his knowledge.

On May 17, 2018 the employing establishment controverted the claim and noted that 

appellant’s job consisted of traveling to different employing establishment facilities to work on 

vehicles in need of repair. It indicated that appellant’s supervisor C.V. provided a timeline of 

appellant’s duties for the date of April 26, 2018 which it alleged was evidence that appellant had 

not conducted vehicle repairs in Grand Ledge on April 26, 2018. The employing establishment 

also noted that appellant submitted medical records which indicated that he was injured on 

April 23, 2018.3 It concluded that appellant therefore had not established fact of injury, 

performance of duty, or causal relationship.

A May 17, 2018 e-mail from appellant’s supervisor, C.V., indicated that on April 26, 2018 

appellant only worked at the Holt, Eaton Rapids, and the employing establishment. C.V. noted 

that on April 26, 2018 appellant drove an employing establishment vehicle to the Holt VMF where 

he checked the oil of another employing establishment vehicle. Appellant then shuttled an 

employing establishment vehicle to the Eaton Rapids VMF where he checked the transmission 

fluid in another employing establishment vehicle. C.V. noted that appellant then repaired a 

window regulator and attended a meeting at the employing establishment.

By decision dated July 9, 2018, OWCP denied appellant’s traumatic injury claim finding 

that the evidence of record was insufficient to establish the factual component of fact of injury. It 

concluded, therefore, that the requirements had not been met to establish an injury as defined by 

FECA.

On June 26, 2019 appellant, through counsel, requested reconsideration. 

In support of his reconsideration request, appellant submitted an undated work order for a 

preventative maintenance inspection for postal truck 8204426. The start date for the inspection 

 

2 On April 23, 2018 appellant filed an additional traumatic injury claim, assigned OWCP File No. xxxxxx228,

alleging that he sustained a left knee strain while in the performance of duty on November 24, 2017. OWCP’s 

procedures provide that cases should be administratively combined when correct adjudication of the issues depends 

on frequent cross-referencing between files. See Federal (FECA) Procedure Manual, Part 2 -- Claims, File 

Maintenance and Management, Chapter 2.400.8(c) (February 2000). For example, if a new injury case is reported for 

an employee who previously filed an injury claim for a similar condition or the same part of the body, doubling is 

required. Id.; D.C., Docket No. 19-0100 (issued June 3, 2019); N.M., Docket No. 18-0833 (issued April 18, 2019); 

K.T., Docket No. 17-0432 (issued August 17, 2018). The Board therefore concludes that the case records for OWCP 

File Nos. xxxxxx228 and xxxxxx682 should be administratively combined upon return of the case record. 

3

Id.
3

was noted as April 19, 2018 and the end date was noted as April 30, 2018. The “VPO [Village 

Post Office]” was listed as “488379998-Grand Ledge-263900.” 

Appellant also submitted a vehicle pick/up return sheet dated April 19, 2018 which 

indicated that he had picked up and returned vehicles in Grand Ledge. 

By decision dated August 12, 2019, OWCP modified its July 9, 2018 decision finding that 

the evidence of record established that the incident occurred as alleged. It therefore found that 

appellant had established that he hyperextended his left knee over a ground rod while climbing 

into a vehicle in the Grand Ledge parking lot on April 26, 2018 at 7:30 a.m. OWCP however also 

found that appellant had not established that the incident occurred in the performance of duty as 

appellant had not established why he was at the Grand Ledge facility at 7:30 a.m. on 

April 26, 2018. 

The Board has duly considered the matter and finds that the case is not in posture for 

decision and must be remanded to OWCP for further development. 

The phrase “while in the performance of duty” has been interpreted by the Board to be the 

equivalent of the commonly found prerequisite in workers’ compensation law of “arising out of 

and in the course of employment.” In addressing this issue, the Board has stated: “In the 

compensation field, to occur in the course of employment, in general, an injury must occur: (1) at 

a time when the employee may reasonably be [stated] to be engaged in his or her master’s business; 

(2) at a place where he or she may reasonably be expected to be in connection with the 

employment; and (3) while he or she was reasonably fulfilling the duties of his or her employment 

or engaged in doing something incidental thereto.”

6

In deciding whether an injury is covered by 

FECA, the test is whether, under all the circumstances, a causal relationship exists between the 

employment itself, or the conditions under which it is required to be performed, and the resultant 

injury.4

OWCP’s procedures explain that certain categories of employees work on employing 

establishment premises for part of the day, and are required to travel for other parts of the working 

day. Claims for these employees when the alleged injury occurs on premises will be adjudicated 

in accordance with principles for all-on-premises injuries.5 These procedures further provide that 

if the injury occurs on employing establishment premises, the alleged injury will be considered in 

the performance of duty if the employee was performing assigned duties, or was engaged in an 

activity reasonably incidental to the employment.6 An affirmative response by the official superior 

on the claim form is sufficient to establish that the employee was in the performance of duty, unless 

the facts or other evidence indicate that the answer may not be correct. OWCP’s procedures also 

 

4 C.C., Docket No. 18-0445 (issued August 14, 2018); Mark Love, 52 ECAB 490 (2001).

5 Federal (FECA) Procedure Manual, Part 2 -- Claims, Performance of Duty, Chapter 2.804.5(c) (August 1992).

6

Id. at Chapter 2.804.4(a). 
4

provide that if conflicting statements are obtained from the official superior as to whether appellant 

was performing regular work at the time of the injury, a conference should be held.7

While OWCP has accepted that the incident occurred as alleged and the employing 

establishment contemporaneously provided an affirmative response from appellant’s supervisor 

that the incident occurred in the performance of duty, the employing establishment subsequently 

controverted the claim, by appellant’s supervisor’s statement indicating that appellant had not 

established that he was required to be at the Grand Ledge facility on the morning of April 26, 2018

to perform work duties. Appellant has however submitted evidence that a work order existed for 

vehicle maintenance work at the Grand Ledge facility from April 19 to 30, 2018. Since the 

evidence of record contains conflicting statements as to whether appellant was required to be at 

the Grand Ledge facility on April 26, 2018 to perform work activities, and that he was therefore 

in the performance of duty at the time of the accepted incident, this case will be remanded.

On remand OWCP shall properly consider all the evidence submitted at the time of the 

August 12, 2019 decision and to schedule a conference to clarify whether appellant sustained an 

injury in the performance of duty on April 26, 2018. Following such further development as 

OWCP deems necessary, it shall issue a de novo decision on the claim. Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the August 12, 2019 decision of the Office of 

Workers’ Compensation Programs is set aside and the case is remanded for further proceedings 

consistent with this order of the Board.8

Issued: February 10, 2021

Washington, DC

Alec J. Koromilas, Chief Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Valerie D. Evans-Harrell, Alternate Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

 

7 Supra note 5 at Chapter 2.804.4(c); see also O.L., Docket No. 16-0840 (issued August 28, 2017).

8 Christopher J. Godfrey, Deputy Chief Judge, who participated in the preparation of the order, was no longer a 

member of the Board after January 20, 2021.