FILED 

JANUARY 10, 2017 

In the Office of the Clerk of Court 

WA State Court of Appeals, Division Ill 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHING TON 

DIVISION THREE 

INLAND EMPIRE DRYWALL SUPPLY ) 

CO., a Washington corporation, 

Appellant, 

V. 

WESTERN SURETY COMPANY (Bond 

No. 58717161), 

Respondent. 

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No. 34022-8-111 

PUBLISHED OPINION 

PENNELL, J. - Washington law allows for the recording of a bond to free up 

property encumbered by a construction lien. When this happens, the bond is substituted 

for the property and a lien claimant can take legal action against the bond. The question 

we confront here is who must be sued when a claim is filed against a lien release bond. 

The procedural statute governing lien release bonds unambiguously identifies only the 
No. 34022-8-III 

Inland Empire Dry Wall Supply Co. v. W. Sur. Co. 

bond surety as an interested party. This is consistent with general suretyship principles, 

which allow a claimant to seek relief directly against a surety. Because the trial court 

erroneously ruled that a claim against a lien release bond could not be made solely against 

a surety, the judgment in this matter is reversed. 

FACTS1 

Inland Empire Dry Wall Supply Company (Inland) entered into a credit and sales 

agreement with Eastern Washington Drywall & Paint (EWD&P) for a construction 

project. EWD&P had been subcontracted by Fowler General Construction (Fowler), the 

project's general contractor, to provide labor and materials for the project. Over the 

course of the construction project, Inland purportedly supplied $124,653.05 in drywall 

materials to EWD&P. 

Fowler provided EWD&P with funds to pay Inland, but EWD&P never paid 

Inland and eventually ceased working on the project. Inland ultimately initiated a lien 

against the project for money owed. It filed a preclaim lien notice against the owner of 

the project, Western States Development Corporation, as required by RCW 60.04.031. 

Inland then timely recorded the lien as required by RCW 60.04.091. 

1 While the facts material to this decision are largely not in dispute, they are 

construed in the light most favorable to the appellant. 

2 
No. 34022-8-III 

Inland Empire Dry Wall Supply Co. v. W. Sur. Co. 

In order to release the project from Inland's lien, Fowler obtained a release of lien 

bond in the amount of $186,979.57 from Western Surety Company (Western). The bond 

identifies Fowler as the "Princip~l," Western as the "Surety," and Inland as the "Obligee." 

Clerk's Papers at 84-85. 

After the lien release bond was recorded, Inland filed an action against Western in 

Spokane County Superior Court to recover on its lien. Fowler was not named a party to 

the suit. Western answered Inland's complaint and raised several affirmative defenses, 

including that by failing to name and include Fowler as a necessary and indispensable 

party, Inland had not satisfied the statute of limitations requirements in chapter 60.04 

RCW. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. 

Relying on our decision in Ca/Portland Co. v. Leve/One Concrete, LLC, 180 Wn. 

App. 379, 321 P.3d 1261 (2014), the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of 

Western. The trial court reasoned that under Ca/Portland, when legal action is taken to 

foreclose on a lien release bond, the statute of limitations under RCW 60.04.141 for 

service of the lawsuit on a property owner is replaced by an analogous statute of 

limitations requiring service on a bond's principal and surety. The court ruled that 

because Inland only named Western as a party and served it as the bond's surety, the 

statute of limitations was not met and Western was discharged from liability and entitled 

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Inland Empire Dry Wall Supply Co. v. W. Sur. Co. 

to judgment in its favor. Inland filed a motion for reconsideration, but the motion was 

denied. Inland appeals. 

BACKGROUND 

This case concerns chapter 60.04 RCW, also known as the "mechanics' lien" or 

"construction lien" statute. See Ca/Portland, 180 Wn. App. at 385-86. This statute sets 

forth a lien procedure to protect the financial interests of persons contributing labor, 

materials or equipment to a construction project. If construction costs are not paid, the 

statute allows a lien to be placed against the construction project property as a method for 

financial recovery. Given the burdens on property imposed by construction liens, the 

statute sets forth strict time limits. One asserting a claim of lien must bring an action to 

foreclose the lien within eight months of recording the claim. RCW 60.04.141. The 

property owner must be served with notice of the suit within 90 days. Id. A lien claimant 

who fails to comply with these time constraints loses all rights to recover on the lien. See 

Bob Pearson Constr. Inc. v. First Cmty. Bank of Wash., 111 Wn. App. 174, 178, 43 P.3d 

1261 (2002). 

Apart from protecting the rights of property owners by requiring strict time 

compliance, the statute also sets forth a bond procedure that can be used to free up 

construction project property from a lien prior to resolution of claims. RCW 60.04.161. 

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Inland Empire Dry Wall Supply Co. v. W. Sur. Co. 

Under the lien release bond statute, a variety of persons disputing the validity of a lien can 

obtain and record a bond, including a property owner, a contractor or a lender. Id. While 

the statute allows for flexibility with respect to who can initiate a bond, it has strict 

requirements for bond sureties. A surety must be authorized to issue bonds in the state 

and must comply with federal bonding requirements. The statute also states a bond 

"surety shall be discharged from liability under the bond" if "no action is commenced to 

recover on a lien within the time specified in RCW 60.04.141." Id. In other words, strict 

time frames for filing suit apply in the lien release bond context, not just the regular lien 

context. 

The procedure for obtaining relief against a lien release bond under RCW 

60.04.161 has been the source of considerable confusion. Relevant here, questions have 

arisen with respect to who the necessary parties are when a bond has been obtained to 

release property from a lien. Without a bond, the statute is fairly straightforward. The 

owner of the real property must be made a party to the suit, along with any person who, 

prior to commencement of the action, has a recorded interest in the property which the 

lien claimant seeks to have affected. RCW 60.04.141, .171. But who must be served 

when a bond releases a piece of property? This is the source of the parties' dispute. 

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Inland Empire Dry Wall Supply Co. v. W Sur. Co. 

We attempted to resolve this confusion in Ca/Portland. In that case, like this one, 

a general contractor recorded a lien release bond prior to the filing of suit. Unlike this 

case, the lien claimant served both the general contractor as lien principal and the surety 

company. However, the owner of the underlying real property was not sued. Initially, the 

trial court dismissed the lien claim, holding the real property owner was a necessary party. 

We reversed. As we explained, because a bond operates to release real property from 

being encumbered by a lien, once the bond is recorded, the real property owner is no 

longer an interested party. Instead, the bond replaces the property and suit is sufficient so 

long as it is against the bond. Ca/Portland, 180 Wn. App. at 387-88. Given this context, 

the property owner need not be included as a party for a claimant's case to go forward. 

In Ca/Portland, we stated a real property owner is not a necessary party to a suit 

against a lien release bond; instead, inclusion of the bond principal and surety is 

"sufficient." Id. at 388. This statement forms the basis of Western's current position. 

According to Western, the foregoing statement means Inland was required to sue both 

Western (as the surety) and Fowler (as the bond principal) in order to proceed on its lien. 

We disagree. All we said in Ca/Portland was that a suit against both a bond principal and 

bond surety is sufficient for compliance with the lien release bond statute. The ruling did 

not address whether suit against both is necessary. 

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No. 34022-8-111 

Inland Empire Dry Wall Supply Co. v. W. Sur. Co. 

ANALYSIS 

Resolution of this case turns on statutory construction, which we review de novo. 

Dep't of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wn.2d 1, 9, 43 P.3d 4 (2002). Our 

"fundamental objective" in this analysis "is to ascertain and carry out the Legislature's 

intent." Id. Where a statute's meaning is plain on its face, construction aids such as 

legislative history are unnecessary to determine the legislature's intent. While the current 

statute is not a model of clarity, its terms are sufficiently plain to resolve the parties' 

dispute without resorting to aids of construction. Ca/Portland, 180 Wn. App. at 388. 

As previously noted, we are asked to resolve the statutory question of who is a 

necessary party when a bond has been recorded to replace a construction lien. For initial 

guidance, we look to RCW 60.04.141, which sets procedures to be followed when a bond 

has not been filed. In this context, service of a lawsuit to enforce a lien must be made on 

"the owner of the subject property" within a tight statutory timeframe. RCW 60.04.141 

(suit must be filed within eight months and served within ninety days). By designating 

the "owner of the subject property" as the entity that must be served, the construction lien 

statute clearly contemplates that the "owner of the subject property" is a necessary party 

to a lien foreclosure claim. See Bob Pearson, 111 Wn. App. at 178. 

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No. 34022-8-III 

Inland Empire Dry Wall Supply Co. v. W. Sur. Co. 

Once a lien release bond is recorded, the procedural statute shifts from RCW 

60.04.141 to RCW 60.04.161. This change alters the governing legal landscape. With a 

bond, real property is no longer encumbered. Ca/Portland, 180 Wn. App. at 386-87; 

DBM Consulting Eng'rs, Inc. v. US. Fid. & Guar. Co., 142 Wn. App. 35, 40, 170 P.3d 

592 (2007). The lien release bond operates as a substitute for the property. Id. at 41. As 

a result, the parties interested in a foreclosure action are different. Unlike RCW 

60.04.141, RCW 60.04.161 makes no mention of the "owner of the subject property" as 

an entity necessarily impacted by a suit. 2 Instead, the statute states it is the "surety" who 

must be included in a suit in a timely manner. RCW 60.04.161 ("if no action is 

commenced [within the time frame set by RCW 60.04.141], the surety shall be discharged 

from liability") (Emphasis added.) This substitution of the "surety" in RCW 60.04.161 

for the "owner of the subject property," as used in RCW 60.04.141, indicates the 

legislature's plain intent that when a lien release bond is filed, the surety shall be 

substituted for the property owner as the entity that must be sued to recover on a lien. 

The omission of any reference to the bond principal is significant and indicates the 

legislature's intent that a bond principal need not be included. 

2 The only reference in RCW 60.04.161 to the owner of the property subject to a 

lien is in the context of identifying the owner as one of several entities that may dispute a 

lien and record a bond. 

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No. 34022-8-111 

Inland Empire Dry Wall Supply Co. v. W. Sur. Co. 

Confusion over who must be sued in this case appears to lie in the belief that, 

regardless of the existence of a lien release bond, suit must be filed against a property 

owner. Because a bond principal might be considered the lien release bond's owner, 

Western claims Inland was required to include Fowler in its suit. We disagree. When it 

comes to a bond, the term "owner" is no longer technically applicable. Under the law of 

suretyship, once a bond has been obtained, the applicable terms are the obligee ( or 

claimant or creditor), the principal obligor, and the secondary obligor ( or surety). See 

RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY§ 82 (AM. LAW INST. 1941); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 

SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY, at IX-XI (AM. LAW INST. 1996). The parties' relationship 

to the bond is created by contract. There is no "owner" in this context. 

The legislature appears to have understood this terminology. Nowhere in the bond 

in lieu of claim statute (RCW 60.04.161) is there any indication a bond lien claimant must 

sue an "owner." Nor does this statute incorporate the requirement ofRCW 60.04.141 that 

service of suit be effected on an "owner." The lien release statute only incorporates the 

provisions ofRCW 60.04.141 as to the timing of an action. It does not incorporate the 

requirements ofRCW 60.04.141 regarding who must be sued.3 

3 If the legislature had intended RCW 60.04.141 to apply to the lien release bond 

context it would not have specifically limited the applicability ofRCW 60.04.141 to 

issues of timing. 

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No. 34022-8-III 

Inland Empire Dry Wall Supply Co. v. W Sur. Co. 

Contrary to the position taken by our dissenting colleague, neither RCW 60.04.141 

nor RCW 60.04.171 is directly applicable in the bond context. Both RCW 60.04.141 and 

.171 discuss the procedures for foreclosing on a "lien" and the disposition of related 

"property." But once a bond is filed, property is no longer encumbered. DBM 

Consulting, 142 Wn. App. at 42 ("A lien bond releases the property from the lien, but the 

lien is then secured by the bond"). Only the bond is at risk. Although the subject matter 

of the proceeding is still the validity of the originally recorded claim of lien, Id. at 40, this 

continuity of subject matter does not control who must be made party to the suit. See 

Ca/Portland, 180 Wn. App. at 391.4 

Just as it makes little sense, in the context of a bond, to require suit against an 

"owner," it also makes little sense to incorporate the "property" concepts discussed in 

RCW 60. 04 .141 and .171. The whole point of a bond is to release property from being 

tied up in litigation. Once a bond is filed, the statute operates to substitute the bond for 

the property. In like manner, application of the bond statute operates to substitute the 

bond surety for the property owner as the individual that must be sued in a timely manner. 

Contrary to Western' s protests, there is no practical or logical impediment to 

4 Given this subject matter, it is not surprising that RCW 60.04.161 refers to an 

action against a bond as one involving an effort to recover on a lien. We therefore 

disagree with the reliance placed on this portion of the statute by our dissenting colleague. 

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No. 34022-8-III 

Inland Empire Dry Wall Supply Co. v. W. Sur. Co. 

pursuing a bond claim against only the surety. General suretyship principles apply. 

Under those principles, a bond lien claimant such as Inland "has two sets of rights, one set 

against the principal obligor and the other against the secondary obligor," also known as 

the surety. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY§ 50 cmt. a. The 

failure of the claimant to take action against the principal "does not discharge the 

[surety]" unless provided by statute or other authority. Id. at§ 50(1). This rule works no 

injustice to the surety because, to the extent the surety requires the principal's assistance, 

the surety "may seek enforcement of the principal obligor's duty of performance." Id. at 

cmt. a. Accordingly, "even if the [claimant] has not sought enforcement of the underlying 

obligation, the [claimant's] inaction generally affords no equitable basis for a claim of 

discharge by the [surety]." Id. See also Hutnick v. US. Fid. and Guar. C~., 47 Cal. 3d 

456, 468-69, 763 P.2d 1326, 253 Cal. Rptr. 236 (1988) (service on surety sufficient to 

allow claim against mechanic's lien bond). See also Warren v. Washington Trust Bank, 

92 Wn.2d 381,390 n.l, 598 P.2d 701 (1979) ("it is the general rule that, even though the 

creditor has a security interest in property of the principal, he may proceed first against 

the surety before resorting to the security interest"). 

The general suretyship principle that a claimant may seek relief only against a 

surety is fully consistent with Washington law. This is true under the lien release bond 

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Inland Empire Dry Wall Supply Co. v. W. Sur. Co. 

statute, which only contemplates suit against the surety. RCW 60.04.161. It is also true 

under generally applicable surety law, chapter 19.72 RCW. In fact, RCW 19.72.090 

recognizes suits will sometimes be laid directly against sureties. The only caveat is that in 

such circumstances, the principal must sometimes be allowed to intervene as a defendant. 

By the plain terms ofRCW 60.04.161, Inland was only required to name Western, 

as the bond surety, as a defendant to its bond foreclosure action. While Inland could have 

also named Fowler, as the bond principal, it was not required to do so. Inclusion of 

Fowler may have streamlined the case and would have obviated the need for this appeal, 

but it was not a statutory prerequisite. Because Inland satisfied the statute of limitations 

for inclusion of a necessary party under RCW 60.04.161, the trial court's judgment in 

favor of Western is reversed. 

ATIORNEY FEES 

Both parties request an award of attorney fees and costs pursuant to RCW 

60.04.181(3). Because this matter is remanded for further proceedings, an award at this 

juncture is premature. On remand, the trial court may award to Inland reasonable attorney 

fees and expenses incurred in the trial and appellate courts if the trial court determines 

Inland to be the prevailing party. RAP 18.l(i). We decline to make an award of costs 

pursuant to RAP Title 14. 

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Inland Empire Dry Wall Supply Co. v. W Sur. Co. 

CONCLUSION 

Based on the foregoing, we reverse and remand for proceedings not inconsistent 

with this opinion. 

I CONCUR: 

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No. 34022-8-111 

FEARING, C.J. (dissenting)-This appeal asks two questions. First, must the 

principal or purchaser of a construction lien release bond, under RCW 60.04.161, be 

joined and served as a party when a claimant against the bond sues to recover on the 

bond? Second, is the principal or purchaser of the construction lien release bond, under 

RCW 60.04.161, an indispensable or necessary party in a lawsuit brought by a bond 

claimant? Despite answering the first question in the negative, the majority addresses 

only the first question. I answer the first question in the positive and thus dissent. 

Language in chapter 60.04 RCW and the nature and purpose of the lien release bond 

demandjoinder of the bond's principal in that the bond claimant must still adjudicate his 

construction lien in the action against the bond. Joinder of the bond principal also avoids 

duplicitous litigation. I need not answer the second question, but my answer to the first 

question subsumes an answer that the bond principal is a necessary party to an action on 

the lien release bond. 

FACTS 

On October 15, 2012, Inland Empire Dry Wall Supply, Co. (Inland Empire) and 
No. 34022-8-III 

Inland Empire Dry Wall Supply, Co. v. Western Surety Co. 

Eastern Washington Drywall & Paint, LLC (Drywall & Paint) entered a contract, under 

which Inland Empire agreed to sell building supplies on open account to Drywall & 

Paint, a construction subcontractor. Pursuant to the contract and beginning in April 2014, 

Inland Empire began supplying to Drywall & Paint construction supplies for the building 

project, Bella Vista Apartments in Richland. Western States Development Corporation 

(Western States) owned the apartment project, and the owner hired Fowler General 

Construction (Fowler) as general contractor. Fowler, in tum, hired Drywall & Paint to 

install the drywall on the project. 

During the course of the project, Drywall & Paint purchased $124,653.05 worth of 

drywall materials from Inland Empire. According to Inland Empire, Drywall & Paint 

paid nothing for the purchases. According to Fowler, Inland Empire collected some 

payment since Fowler refused to release some payments to Drywall & Paint without 

Inland Empire receiving the payments. Fowler insists that Inland Empire has failed to 

properly account for payments from Drywall & Paint. 

On April 16, 2014, Inland Empire served a preclaim notice to Western States and 

Fowler. On September 26, 2014, Inland Empire recorded a claim of lien with the Benton 

County auditor's office on the apartment project realty. On November 17, 2014, Fowler 

purchased and recorded a release of lien bond from Western Surety Company (Western 

Surety) with the Benton County auditor's office in the amount of $186,979.57 to release 

the construction lien on the apartment real property. The bond names Fowler as the 

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No. 34022-8-111 

Inland Empire Dry Wall Supply, Co. v. Western Surety Co. 

principal. The bond reads as always in awkward language: 

RELEASE OF LIEN BOND 

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS, That Fowler General 

Construction, Inc., as Principal and Western Surety Company, as Surety, 

are held and firmly unto Inland Empire Drywall Co., as Obligee, in the 

amount of One Hundred Eighty Six Thousand Nine Hundred Seventy Nine 

& 57/100 (186,979.57) DOLLARS, AND, WHEREAS, Inland Empire 

Drywall Co. on September 26, 2014, filed a Lien Number 2014-024259 

against the property known as Bella Vista Apartments Phase II and owned 

by Western States Development Corporation, AND, WHEREAS, Fowler 

General Construction, Inc. does not wish to pay said lien until the validity 

of the lien can be properly determined or adjudicated. 

NOW, THEREFORE, if the said Principal and Surety shall hold 

harmless the said Obligee from and against any loss, costs or expenses 

which may accrue due to the filing of said lien, then this obligation to be 

null and void, otherwise to remain in full force and effect. 

Clerk's Papers (CP) at 23 (emphasis added). Both Fowler and Western Surety signed the 

bond. 

Before Inland Empire filed suit, it demanded direct payment of the lien from 

Western Surety. An agent of Western Surety replied: 

The referenced bond states that Fowler does not wish to pay the lien 

until the validity of the lien can be properly determined or adjudicated. 

RCW 60.04.161 states that the condition ofthe bond shall be to guarantee 

payment of any judgment upon the lien. Thus, if judgment is entered 

against Fowler, and Fowler does not satisfy the judgment, then demand can 

be made against the Release of Lien Bond. It does not appear that a lawsuit 

has been filed nor a judgment entered against Fowler. At this time, 

Western surety is not obligated to satisfy your demand for payment to 

Inland Empire Drywall & Supply. 

CP at 82. 

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Inland Empire Dry Wall Supply, Co. v. Western Surety Co. 

Western Surety's counsel represents Fowler in a separate action brought by 

Fowler against Drywall & Paint. 

PROCEDURE 

Inland Empire filed this lawsuit to recover against or foreclose on the lien release 

bond. Inland Empire only named Western Surety as a defendant. The trial court 

dismissed this suit because of Inland Empire's failure to join and serve Fowler as a 

defendant. Contrary to the majority, I would affirm. 

LAW AND ANALYSIS 

This appeal requires comparing and contrasting three related construction lien 

statutes found in chapter 60.04 RCW. Chapter 60.04 RCW creates a construction lien, 

formerly known as a mechanic's or materialman's lien, which binds real estate improved 

by construction in favor of one who furnishes labor, professional services, equipment, or 

material for the improvement. RCW 60.04.021. Our first crucial statute is RCW 

60.04.141, which establishes a statute of limitations for foreclosing on the lien and 

demands service of process on the property owner. The statute reads in relevant part: 

Lien-Duration-Procedural limitations. 

No lien created by this chapter binds the property subject to the lien 

for a longer period than eight calendar months after the claim of lien has 

been recorded unless an action is filed by the lien claimant within that time 

in the superior court in the county where the subject property is located to 

enforce the lien, and service is made upon the owner of the subject property 

within ninety days of the date of filing the action. 

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Inland Empire Dry Wall Supply, Co. v. Western Surety Co. 

(Emphasis added.) We must decide if the service proviso ofRCW 60.04.141 still 

controls after a lien release bond replaces the real property as security, and, if so, who 

becomes the owner of the property. 

Our next critical statute is RCW 60.04.161, which permits the owner of the real 

estate encumbered by the lien or a contractor on the construction project to post a bond in 

order to release the lien on the real property. The statute reads in pertinent part: 

Bond in lieu of claim. 

Any owner of real property subject to a recorded claim of lien under 

this chapter, or contractor, subcontractor, lender, or lien claimant who 

disputes the correctness or validity of the claim of lien may record, either 

before or after the commencement of an action to enforce the lien, in the 

office of the county recorder or auditor in the county where the claim of 

lien was recorded, a bond issued by a surety company ... equal to or 

greater than the amount of the bond to be recorded. The bond shall contain 

a description of the claim of lien and real property involved, and be in an 

amount equal to the greater of five thousand dollars or two times the 

amount of the lien claimed if it is ten thousand dollars or less, and in an 

amount equal to or greater than one and one-half times the amount of the 

lien if it is in excess of ten thousand dollars. . . . The condition of the bond 

shall be to guarantee payment of any judgment upon the lien in favor of the 

lien claimant entered in any action to recover the amount claimed in a 

claim of lien, or on the claim asserted in the claim of lien. The effect of 

recording a bond shall be to release the real property described in the 

notice of claim of lien from the lien and any action brought to recover the 

amount claimed. Unless otherwise prohibited by law, if no action is 

commenced to recover on a lien within the time specified in RCW 

60.04.141, the surety shall be dischargedfrom liability under the bond. If 

an action is timely commenced, then on payment of any judgment entered 

in the action or on payment of the full amount of the bond to the holder of 

the judgment, whichever is less, the surety shall be discharged from 

liability under the bond. 

(Emphasis added.) 

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Our final decisive statute is RCW 60.04.171, which discusses the lien foreclosure 

suit. The first paragraph of the statute declares: 

Foreclosure-Parties. 

The lien provided by this chapter, for which claims of lien have been 

recorded, may be foreclosed and enforced by a civil action in the court 

having jurisdiction in the manner prescribed for the judicial foreclosure of a 

mortgage. The court shall have the power to order the sale of the property. 

In any action brought to foreclose a lien, the owner shall be joined as a 

party. The interest in the real property of any person who, prior to the 

commencement of the action, has a recorded interest in the property, or any 

part thereof, shall not be foreclosed or affected unless they are joined as a 

party. 

(Emphasis added.) We must decide, in part, whether RCW 60.04.171 covers an action to 

foreclose or realize on the lien release bond, and, if so, who is the owner. 

We are always to construe a statute in order to apply the intent of the Washington 

Legislature. Department of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wn.2d 1, 9, 43 

P.3d 4 (2002). We are also to read a statute together with related statutes in an attempt to 

discern the wish of the legislature. This court construes the meaning of a statute by 

reading it in its entirety and considering its relation with other statutes. Department of 

Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wn.2d at 11. Statutes relating to the same 

subject matter are to be read together as constituting a unified whole, to the end that a 

harmonious, total statutory scheme evolves which maintains the integrity of the 

respective statutes. State v. Haggin, 195 Wn. App. 315,319,381 P.3d 137 (2016). 

The majority writes that the only statute controlling a suit to recover on the lien 

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release bond is RCW 60. 04 .161. I disagree. This statement disregards the connection 

between the lien release bond and the original construction lien and violates the principle 

that we construe as one related statutes. The majority also writes that RCW 60.04.161 

reads that the surety must be included in the suit in a timely manner and implies that only 

the surety must be sued. I find no language in the statute about serving or joining the 

surety in the lawsuit, let alone stating that the surety is the only party to be served or 

joined. 

In this instance, we should fastidiously peruse the three statutes to discern the will 

of the legislature with regard to whether the principal of the lien release bond must be 

joined and served as a party when the bond's obligee forecloses. The statutes are not 

models of clarity. But after reading the statutes together, recognizing the purpose behind 

the statutes, and reviewing case law, the answer arises that the bond principal must be 

joined in the lawsuit. 

The majority emphasizes a phrase near the end ofRCW 60.04.161, the statute that 

creates the lien release bond. The phrase declares: " ... if no action is commenced to 

recover on a lien within the time specified in RCW 60.04.141, the surety shall be 

discharged from liability under the bond." According to the majority, the language 

suggests that only the surety, and not the bond's principal, need be joined in the lawsuit 

to foreclose on the lien release bond. But the majority stretches the language beyond its 

elasticity. The language says nothing about the parties to invite to the suit. The phrase 

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Inland Empire Dry Wall Supply, Co. v. Western Surety Co. 

does not state that only the surety must be sued or that conversely the principal need not 

be joined in the suit. 

The three statutes refer to only one suit, a suit to foreclose on a lien. RCW 

60.04.161 states that, even after the posting of the bond, the claimant proceeds with an 

action to foreclose on a lien. RCW 60.04.171 demands that the claimant join the "owner" 

in an action to foreclose a lien. The three statutes only describe one procedure regardless 

of whether the bond has replaced the land as security for payment. 

Note that the phrase emphasized by the majority does not mention filing a suit to 

collect on the bond, but rather a suit to foreclose on the lien. To repeat, the statute reads: 

" ... if no action is commenced to recover on a lien within the time specified in RCW 

60.04.141, the surety shall be discharged from liability under the bond." RCW 60.04.161 

( emphasis added). This language confirms that the rules relating to foreclosing a lien 

under RCW 60 .04.141 and .171 control a suit against the bond, regardless of whether we 

employ the terminology "action to foreclose the lien on the bond" or "action to recover 

on the bond." 

RCW 60.04.161 uses the indefinite article "a" when referring to foreclosure of a 

lien release bond. To repeat a second time, the statute reads, in an important section: 

" ... if no action is commenced to recover on a lien within the time specified in RCW 

60.04.141, the surety shall be discharged from liability under the bond." (Emphasis 

added.) Use of the indefinite article further shows that the same procedure for 

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No. 34022-8-III 

Inland Empire Dry Wall Supply, Co. v. Western Surety Co. 

foreclosing on the construction lien encumbering land operates when foreclosing on the 

lien release bond. To keep the surety liable on the bond, the claimant must file an action 

to recover on a lien or the lien. 

One sentence in RCW 60.04.161 declares: "The condition of the bond shall be to 

guarantee payment of any judgment upon the lien in favor of the lien claimant entered in 

any action to recover the amount claimed in a claim of lien, or on the claim asserted in 

the claim of lien." This sentence assumes that, despite the posting of the bond, the 

claimant continues with a foreclosure of lien action. Thus, recovery against the bond 

demands foreclosing the lien and utilizing the lien foreclosure process. One of the 

conditions of the lien foreclosure is that the owner of the property be served and joined. 

A sentence in the succeeding statute, RCW 60. 04.171 demands: "In any action 

brought to foreclose a lien, the owner shall be joined as a party." (Emphasis added.) 

Note that the legislature employed the indefinite article again. This language suggests 

that the owner, in addition to the surety, must be joined as a party in a lien release bond 

foreclosure. Under such a reading, we need to identify the "owner" in the bond 

foreclosure. 

I also note that chapter 60.04 RCW does not present an alternate procedure for 

foreclosing on a lien release bond instead of foreclosing on land encumbered by the 

construction lien. Since the legislature did not provide for an alternate procedure and 

since we must construe the statutory scheme as a whole, I conclude that the language of 

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No. 34022-8-III 

Inland Empire Dry Wall Supply, Co. v. Western Surety Co. 

RCW 60.04.141 and .171 requiring service on the "owner" extends to a suit on the lien 

release bond. 

Inland Empire argues that we must construe the construction lien statutes liberally 

and thereby rule in its favor. RCW 60.04.900 states: 

RCW 19.27.095, 60.04.230, and 60.04.011 through 60.04.226 and 

60.04.261 are to be liberally construed to provide security for all parties 

intended to be protected by their provisions. 

Case law provides flesh for RCW 60.04.900 and ascertains when courts will 

employ a liberal construction of the statutes. Under Washington decisions, statutes 

creating liens are in derogation of the common law and are to receive a strict 

construction. Tsutakawa v. Kumamoto, 53 Wash. 231,236, 101 P. 869, 102 P. 766 

( 1909). Their operation will not be extended for the benefit of those who do not clearly 

come within the terms of the act. Williams v. Athletic Field, Inc., 172 Wn.2d 683, 695, 

261 P.3d 109 (2011). RCW 60.04.900 means that, when the court determines that 

persons come within the operation of the act, the statutes will be liberally applied to 

them. Williams v. Athletic Field, Inc., 172 Wn.2d at 695. 

The rule of liberal construction applies in favor of Inland Empire and almost 

persuades me to join the majority. Still we cannot use the liberal construction 

requirement to support a strained or unrealistic interpretation of statutory language. 

Senate Republican Campaign Committee v. Public Disclosure Commission, 133 Wn.2d 

229,243, 943 P.2d 1358 (1997). I have already read the statutes to the contrary. This 

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Inland Empire Dry Wall Supply, Co. v. Western Surety Co. 

reading demands that the bond claimant follow the procedures needed to foreclose on the 

construction lien. The nature of the lien release bond as later discussed in other decisions 

confirms this reading. 

The majority asserts that the prevailing view in America is that the principal need 

not be joined as a party when the obligee sues the surety. The majority cites Restatement 

(Third) of Suretyship & Guaranty§ 50 (1996) for the prevailing rule. The majority may 

be correct as to this prevailing view. Nevertheless, I question the view's relevance when 

we must review a statutory scheme that substitutes a lien release bond for a construction 

lien on real property. 

74 Am. Jur. 2d Suretyship § 102 (2016) reads, in part: 

A surety may in all cases be sued jointly with the principal. If the 

obligation is joint and not several, all the obligors must be joined as parties 

defendant. However, if the obligation is joint and several, the creditor has 

the right to proceed against the surety alone, or if the creditor chooses, it 

may sue the principal, and at the same time bring an action also against the 

surety, and prosecute both suits concurrently until the creditor obtains 

satisfaction from one of them. 

(Footnotes omitted). 

Both Fowler and Western Surety, respectively as principal and surety, bound 

themselves to Inland Empire. Both principal and surety agreed to hold Inland Empire 

harmless from any release of the lien on the real property. Both Fowler and Western 

Surety signed the bond. Nevertheless, the bond does not read that the parties suffer joint 

and several liability. 

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No. 34022-8-III 

Inland Empire Dry Wall Supply, Co. v. Western Surety Co. 

Even assuming joint and several liability of Fowler and Western Surety, cases 

conflict with 74 Am. Jur. 2d Suretyship § 102. The only case cited by Am. Jur. 2d for the 

proposition that the creditor may join only the surety is Morgen & Oswood Construction 

Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 167 Mont. 64,535 P.2d 170 (1975), 

wherein the bond specifically read that the principal and surety undergo joint and several 

liability. A series of Texas cases hold that, when the surety bond provides for joint and 

several liability of the surety and principal, the principal is a necessary party to suit on the 

bond. Great American Insurance Company v. Sharpstown State Bank, 422 S.W.2d 787 

(Tex. Civ. App. 1967); Iley v. Tapick, 368 S.W.2d 809 (Tex Civ. App. 1963). In Smith v. 

Rogers, 34 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930), the court considered a principal on a 

sheriffs bond to be a necessary party. 

Hutnick v. US. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 47 Cal. 3d 456, 763 P.2d 1326, 253 Cal. 

Rptr. 236 (1988) supports the majority's decision. A landscaper recorded a mechanic's 

lien against property on which it had performed services. After the landscaper filed suit 

to foreclose on the lien, a purchaser of the land posted a lien release bond from U.S. 

Fidelity & Guaranty. Eight months after posting the bond, the landscaper served the 

lawsuit papers on the bonding surety. Shortly thereafter the landscaper filed an amended 

complaint to add a cause of action for foreclosure on the bond. A California statute read: 

"Any action on the lien release bond shall be commenced by the claimant within six 

months of the recording of the lien release bond." CAL. CIV. CODE§ 3144.5. The surety 

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No. 34022-8-III 

Inland Empire Dry Wall Supply, Co. v. Western Surety Co. 

sought to dismiss the claim against it because the landscaper failed to sue on the bond 

within six months of the bond's recording and because the landscaper failed to serve the 

lawsuit on the land purchaser, who was also the principal on the surety bond. The 

California court rejected the surety's arguments. 

The Huntnik court identified the purpose behind the lien release bond and its 

operation. The bond provides a means by which, before a final determination of the lien 

claimant's rights and without prejudice to those rights, the property may be freed of the 

lien, so that it may be sold, developed, or used as security for a loan. The recording of 

the lien release bond does not extinguish the lien. Rather the bond replaces the land as 

the object to which the lien attaches. The recordation of the bond in effect transfers the 

claim of lien from the owner's land to the bond. The court adopted the reasoning of other 

courts when writing: 

[A] cause of action to foreclose a mechanic's lien is substantially the 

same whether relief is sought against the liened property or against a bond 

which has been substituted for the property. Thus it has been said that the 

bond "does not change the relation or rights of the parties otherwise than in 

substituting its obligations for the [property] subject to the lien, and it was 

not within the legislative purpose in permitting the substitution to 

deteriorate the lienor's rights." 

47 Cal. 3d at 463 (quoting Harley v. Plant, 210 N.Y. 405,410, 104 N.E. 946 (1914)). 

The court reasoned that the landscaper's amendment to foreclose on the bond rather than 

the real property did not commence a new cause of action. Therefore, the landscaper had 

commenced the claim against the surety timely. The same reasoning supports a 

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Inland Empire Dry Wall Supply, Co. v. Western Surety Co. 

conclusion that the bond claimant must follow the procedural rules of the construction 

lien foreclosure statutes, including the Washington statutory provisions of joining the 

owner of the property. 

The Hutnick court later addressed what parties the lien claimant should join to a 

foreclosure of the lien release bond. The court cited previous California case law when 

writing: 

"The defendants on the bond cause of action are the principal and 

the sureties." This is so because when the release bond is recorded, the 

bond obligations of both principal and surety are substituted for the 

property as the object to which the mechanic's lien attaches. 

4 7 Cal. 3d at 469 ( quoting CAL. CONTINUING EDUC. OF BAR, CALIFORNIA MECHANICS' 

LIENS AND OTHER REMEDIES§ 2.61, at 111 (2d ed. 1988)). Despite identifying the bond 

principal as a defendant in the bond action, the California high court ruled that the 

landscaper need not have served the principal with the summons and complaint in order 

to proceed against the surety. The court declared: 

Still to be addressed is the more general question raised by the Court 

of Appeal regarding the surety's liability when the lien claimant has not 

served the release bond principal as a defendant in the foreclosure action. 

The present case directly raises this problem because although plaintiffs 

have named Anderson, the new owner of the property and the principal on 

the bond, as a defendant in this action, Anderson has not been served and 

has not appeared. 

We may assume arguendo that a judgment on a lien release bond 

would not be directly enforceable against a principal who had not been 

served and had not appeared in the action. This does not mean, however, 

that the surety will be compelled to defend the action alone and unassisted 

by the principal. If only the surety is joined, the resulting judgment will be 

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No. 34022-8-111 

Inland Empire Dry Wall Supply, Co. v. Western Surety Co. 

binding on the principal, provided only that the surety has given notice to 

the principal "and an opportunity at the surety's request to join in the 

defense." (Code Civ. Proc.,§ 1912.) A principal notified of the action by 

the surety will have the same motivation to defend the action as if formally 

named as a party, because the judgment will be equally conclusive as a 

determination of the principal's liability. Consequently, the surety has the 

means to call upon the principal to defend the lien foreclosure action. 

4 7 Cal. 3d at 469 ( citations omitted). 

Hutnick can be distinguished. The California statute, unlike the Washington 

statute, specifically mentioned "any action on the lien release bond." 47 Cal. 3d at 464. 

Washington also does not have a statute by which the principal is bound by a judgment 

against the surety if the surety gives the principal notice of the suit. The Hutnick decision 

mentions no California statutes requiring the owner of property to be joined in the suit. 

Three Washington decisions provide help in answering the first question on appeal 

in favor of demanding service on the bond principal. All three support the proposition 

that an action on the lien release bond is tantamount to foreclose on the construction lien. 

In DBM Consulting Engineers, Inc. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 142 

Wn. App. 35, 170 P.3d 592 (2007), DBM Consulting Engineers recorded a lien against 

the owner of real estate to secure a debt DBM asserted it was owed under a contract. The 

owner obtained a lien bond to allow it to sell the property. DBM sued the owner for 

breach of contract and to foreclose the lien and prevailed at trial on the contract claim. 

DBM did not seek a judgment on its foreclosure claim. DBM then sued the bond surety 

to compel it to pay DBM the amount of the bond. This court held that, because DBM 

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No. 34022-8-III 

Inland Empire Dry Wall Supply, Co. v. Western Surety Co. 

failed to obtain a judgment on the lien in its first suit and only obtained a judgment on the 

breach of contract claim, the surety was not obligated to pay on the lien bond. 

In DBM Consulting Engineers, this court interpreted the language ofRCW 

60.04.161, the lien bond statute. I have already discussed the relevant sentence in the 

statute, which states: "The condition of the bond shall be to guarantee payment of any 

judgment upon the lien in favor of the lien claimant entered in any action to recover the 

amount claimed in a claim of lien, or on the claim asserted in the claim of lien." 142 Wn. 

App. at 39 (quoting RCW 60.04.161) (emphasis omitted). This court agreed with the 

surety that the sentence declares that the bond only guarantees payment of a judgment on 

the lien. When the lien claimant forecloses on the lien, the judgment is paid from the 

bond. The purpose of such a bond is to transfer the lien from the property to the bond to 

permit alienation of the property. The bond is not a concession that the lien is valid and 

correct. Thus, the claimant must still adjudicate the validity of the lien. Since DBM 

failed to adjudicate its lien in the first lawsuit, res judicata barred the second lawsuit. 

Failure to adjudicate the lien was fatal to the claim against the surety. 

Olson Engineering, Inc. v. Key Bank National Association, 171 Wn. App. 57, 286 

P.3d 390 (2012) also supports the conclusion that the construction lien foreclosure 

statutes control suits on the lien release bond since the bond claimant must still prove the 

validity of its lien. If the action on the bond is tantamount to foreclosure of the 

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No. 34022-8-111 

Inland Empire Dry Wall Supply, Co. v. Western Surety Co. 

construction lien, the bond claimant must follow the procedural requirements of the lien 

foreclosure statutes, including the requirement that the owner be joined. 

The third important Washington decision is this court's newly minted decision in 

Ca/Portland Co. v. Leve/One Concrete, LLC, 180 Wn. App. 379,321 P.3d 1261 (2014). 

CalPortland answers the question of who is the "owner of the property" when the bond 

replaces the real property lien. 

CalPortland provided building materials to LevelOne Concrete, a subcontractor 

working on the construction of a new Costco building for which Ferguson Construction 

served as general contractor. LevelOne Concrete failed to pay for the materials, and 

CalPortland recorded a lien against the real property. Before any lawsuit, Ferguson 

Construction posted a lien release bond issued by Travelers Casualty and Surety. The 

trial court dismissed CalPortland's suit on the bond because CalPortland failed to join 

Costco as a defendant. The surety relied on RCW 60.04.141, which requires the lien 

claimant to serve the suit on the owner of the property. This court reversed since Costco 

need not have been served with process after Ferguson Construction substituted the lien 

release bond for the construction lien on the real property. Costco was no longer the 

"owner" of the relevant property. 

This court in Ca/Portland noted the purpose and operation of the lien release 

bond. RCW 60.04.161 allows a party to file a bond to free the real property for 

conveyance by transferring the lien to the bond. Filing the bond does not destroy the lien 

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No. 34022-8-111 

Inland Empire Dry Wall Supply, Co. v. Western Surety Co. 

entirely, but instead transfers the lien from the real property to the bond. The lien bond 

releases the property from the lien, but the lien is then secured by the bond. The plain 

language of the statute established that Costco's realty was no longer "property subject to 

the lien" for purposes of RCW 60. 04 .141 's procedural requirement. 

Ca/Portland does not involve our situation on appeal of the lien claimant failing to 

serve the principal under the lien release bond. Some dicta, however, could be read to 

demand that the principal of the bond be served. This court wrote: 

The bond did not name Costco as a principal or surety. Thus, when 

CalPortland filed suit, Costco did not have an ownership interest in any 

property "subject" to the lien within the meaning ofRCW 60.04.141. In 

fact, the plain terms of the statute rendered Costco's property immune from 

"any action brought to recover the amount claimed" by CalPortland. RCW 

60.04.161. CalPortland, therefore, had no duty to serve Costco with the 

summons and complaint. The only parties with an interest in the bond were 

Ferguson and Travelers: the principal and surety named in the security. 

Thus, the trial court erred in relying on CalPortland's failure to serve 

Costco in granting summary judgment to Ferguson. 

Ca/Portland Co. v. Leve/One Concrete LLC, 180 Wn. App. at 388. As a party with an 

interest in the bond, the bond's principal should be identified as its owner. Ca/Portland's 

dictum thereby supports the conclusion that the principal of the surety is the owner who 

must be served in the lien release bond foreclosure action. 

Foreign decisions also support my conclusion that the principal of the lien release 

bond should be joined and served as a party in the action to recover on the bond. A 

closely aligned decision is Synchronized Construction Services, Inc. v. Prav Lodging, 

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No. 34022-8-111 

Inland Empire Dry Wall Supply, Co. v. Western Surety Co. 

LLC, 288 Va. 356, 764 S.E.2d 61 (2014). The Virginia high court addressed the 

commonwealth's version of a lien release bond statute. The court noted that the bond 

replaces the real property as the subject of the foreclosure, and, in turn, parties with an 

interest in the bond, including the principal, are necessary parties to the foreclosure. The 

court wrote: 

Certain "parties in interest" may, in accordance with the rules set 

forth by the General Assembly, post a bond after a mechanic's lien 

enforcement action has been filed. A properly posted bond releases the real 

estate from the mechanic's lien enforcement action. We have previously 

recognized that this bonding-off process only "substitutes the bond for the 

real estate" that had been subject to the mechanic's lien. Because the real 

estate is no longer subject to the mechanic's lien enforcement action once a 

bond is properly posted, the "subject matter" or res of the suit is no longer 

the real estate, but is instead the posted bond itself. 

This has a logical impact on the necessary party analysis. If no bond 

has been posted the inquiry turns upon which parties have a real property 

interest in the real estate subject to the mechanic's lien, but when a bond is 

posted the inquiry focuses upon which parties have a pecuniary interest in 

the bond itself which is "likely either to be defeated or diminished" by the 

plaintiffs "claim against the bond." 

To this end, we have previously considered which parties constitute 

"necessary parties-defendant to [a] bond enforcement suit." The principal 

on the bond and the surety on the bond are necessary parties. However, the 

owner of real estate, the trustee under the deed of trust, and the beneficiary 

of the deed of trust are no longer necessary parties when their only relation 

to the litigation is their respective real property interests in the real estate 

that had been subject to the mechanic's lien, but that was no longer 

encumbered once the bond had been posted in accordance with Code§ 43-

70. 

764 S.E.2d at 66 (citations omitted) (alteration in original). 

In a 4 to 3 decision, the Synchronized Construction Services court held that the 

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No. 34022-8-III 

Inland Empire Dry Wall Supply, Co. v. Western Surety Co. 

general contractor, who had no pecuniary interest in the bond posted to release the real 

property lien, was not a necessary party to the foreclosure on the bond. The general 

contractor did not pay for the bond. A lender and the property owner purchased the bond. 

The three dissenters considered the general contractor to also be a necessary party to the 

suit since the bond needed to pay only if the subcontractor, who filed the lien, was 

obligated to pay the general contractor. The general contractor should have the 

opportunity to assert any claims or defenses it might have against payment to the 

subcontractor. The general contractor should have the opportunity to protect itself 

against claims of the subcontractor. 

Another Virginia decision is illustrative. In Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Norair 

Engineering Corp., 86 Va. Cir. 138 (2013), the court held that, when a lien release bond 

replaces a mechanic's lien, the owners of the real property are no longer necessary 

parties. Instead, the bond principal and surety are necessary parties. The court dismissed 

the suit. Although the bond principal was named a party in other causes of action within 

the same lawsuit, the bond claimant failed to name the principal as a defendant in the 

cause of action seeking to foreclose on the bond. 

George W Kane, Inc. v. NuScope, Inc., 243 Va. 503,416 S.E.2d 701 (1992), 

teaches of the need to join the principal in the bond foreclosure action. In order to 

recover against the bond, the claimant must prove a valid lien and the amount of the lien. 

Therefore, the same parties as required to enforce the lien should be present in the bond 

20 
No. 34022-8-111 

Inland Empire Dry Wall Supply, Co. v. Western Surety Co. 

recovery action. The principal of the bond, who is often the general contractor or the 

hirer of the claimant, has an interest in the outcome of the suit. The principal generally 

has information critical to the resolution of the dispute. 

A series of New York cases also supports the conclusion that the principal of the 

lien release bond must be joined in a suit to recover on the bond. Under New York law, 

all persons should be made parties defendant, in the bond suit, who would be proper 

parties to an action for the foreclosure of the lien in case a bond had not be given. Henry 

Quentzel Plumbing Supply Co. v. 60 Pineapple Residence Corp., 126 Misc. 2d 751,483 

N.Y.S.2d 927 (1984); Von Den Driesch v. Rohrig, 45 A.D. 526, 61 N.Y.S. 341 (1899); 

Genninger v. Frank A. Wahlig Co., 116 N.Y.S. 578 (N.Y.C. City Ct. 1909); Morton v. 

Tucker, 145 N.Y. 244, 40 N.E. 3 (1895); Sheffield v. Robinson, 80 N.Y. Sup. Ct. (73 

Hun) 173, 25 N.Y.S. 1098 (1893). The New York and Virginia cases may conflict with 

the ruling in Ca/Portland Co. v. Leve/One Concrete, LLC, 180 Wn. App. 379 (2014) in 

that, in Washington, the owner of the improved real property need not be joined in the 

bond foreclosure suit. Nevertheless, the foreign cases illustrate the need to at least 

require the bond principal to be joined as a party. 

Joining the bond principal in the bond recovery suit serves another purpose. The 

principal must reimburse the surety for any money paid by the surety. First Interstate 

Bank of Washington, N.A. v. Ne/co Enterprises, Inc., 64 Wn. App. 158, 162-63, 822 P.2d 

1260 (1992); Leuning v. Hill, 79 Wn.2d 396, 400-01, 486 P.2d 87 (1971); Eder v. Nelson, 

21 
No. 34022-8-III 

Inland Empire Dry Wall Supply, Co. v. Western Surety Co. 

41 Wn.2d 58, 62, 247 P.2d 230 (1952). Typically an indemnity agreement between the 

principal and surety confirms this common law rule. Fairness then asks that the principal 

be able to litigate the validity of the lien. I assume that the surety will often notify the 

principal of the suit, but I cannot be assured that notification will always occur. 

Demanding that the bond claimant join the bond principal imposes minimal burden on 

the claimant compared to the harm that could result without the presence of the principal 

in the lawsuit. 

Inland Empire observes that counsel representing Western Surety in this appeal 

and at the trial court level in this suit also represents Fowler in a lawsuit brought against 

Drywall & Paint. I do not find this observation controlling on the outcome of the appeal. 

No case stands for the proposition that a party need not be served and joined in a suit if 

that party's counsel in another lawsuit represents another party in the pending suit. In 

other lien release bond cases, the surety's attorney may not represent the bond's principal 

in another suit. 

Fearing, C .J. 0-1 

22