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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

NICHOLAS POULIDES, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

PENNSYLVANIA 

 Appellant 

v.

AMERICAN THEATRE ARTS FOR YOUTH, 

INC. AND LAURIE WAGMAN, 

 Appellees Nos. 2586 EDA 2013 

Appeal from the Judgment Entered July 23, 2013 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Civil Division at No(s): 120501883 

BEFORE: PANELLA, J., LAZARUS, J., AND JENKINS, J. 

MEMORANDUM BY: JENKINS, J. FILED SEPTEMBER 12, 2014 

 The issue in this appeal is whether the lower court abused its 

discretion in denying attorney fees to Nicholas Poulides after Poulides 

prevailed in his action under the Wage Payment and Collection Law 

(“WPCL”), 43 P.S. § 260.1 et seq. We conclude that the court properly 

denied attorney fees to Poulides, and we affirm. 

 Poulides filed an action under the civil remedy section of the WPCL, 43 

P.S. § 260.9a, against his employer, American Theater Arts for Youth, Inc. 

(“American Theatre”) and its president, Laurie Wagman, seeking unpaid 

wages of $35,000.00, liquidated damages1

 of $8,750.00 and attorney fees. 

 

1

 The WPCL defines the plaintiff’s right to recover liquidated damages as 

follows: 
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Since Poulides demanded less than $50,000.00, the case proceeded to 

compulsory arbitration. The board of arbitrators awarded Poulides 

$4,902.03 in unpaid wages. Poulides did not request attorney fees during 

the arbitration, and neither side took a de novo appeal from the award of the 

board of arbitrators to the trial division of the Court of Common Pleas. 

After the 30-day appeal period expired, Poulides reduced the award to 

judgment. Seven days later, Poulides filed a bill of costs seeking $27,000 in 

attorney fees under the fee-shifting provision of the WPCL, 43 P.S. § 

260.9a(f)2

. American Theatre and Wagman filed exceptions to Poulides’ bill 

 

Where wages remain unpaid for thirty days beyond 

the regularly scheduled payday, or, in the case 

where no regularly scheduled payday is applicable, 

for sixty days beyond the filing by the employe of a 

proper claim or for sixty days beyond the date of the

agreement, award or other act making wages 

payable, or where shortages in the wage payments 

made exceed five percent (5%) of the gross wages 

payable on any two regularly scheduled paydays in 

the same calendar quarter, and no good faith contest 

or dispute of any wage claim including the good faith 

assertion of a right of set-off or counter-claim exists 

accounting for such non-payment, the employe shall 

be entitled to claim, in addition, as liquidated 

damages an amount equal to twenty-five percent 

(25%) of the total amount of wages due, or five 

hundred dollars ($500), whichever is greater. 

43 P.S. §260.10. This appeal does not involve any issues concerning 

liquidated damages. 

2 Section 260.9a(f) provides: “The court in any action brought under this 

[civil remedy] section [of the WPCL] shall, in addition to any judgment 
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of costs claiming that Poulides was not entitled to attorney fees, and the 

prothonotary sustained these exceptions. Poulides appealed the 

prothonotary’s decision by filing a motion in the Motions Court of the Civil 

Division of the Court of Common Pleas. The Motions Court affirmed the 

prothonotary’s decision denying attorney fees, and Poulides filed a timely 

appeal to this Court. 

Poulides filed a timely 5-page Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement in which he 

raised 3 issues: 

1. The prothonotary erred in stating it did not have 

the power to tax counsel fees. 

2. If the failure to award fees by either the 

prothonotary or this Honorable Court was due to 

timeliness of the application for fees, such was 

error. 

3. This Honorable Court should have determined and 

awarded reasonable fees upon plaintiff’s appeal of 

the bill of costs order. 

The Motions Court issued a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion stating that Poulides 

waived all issues because his concise statement was excessively long: 

“[Poulides’] 1925(b) Statement is five (5) pages long, yet manages to raise 

three (3) issues. . . [Poulides’] inability to comply with Pa. R.A.P. 1925(b) 

has precluded this Court from providing a clear and meaningful review of its 

claims.” Despite this alleged deficiency, the Motions Court went on to review 

the merits of the issues. 

 

awarded to the plaintiff or plaintiffs, allow costs for reasonable attorneys' 

fees of any nature to be paid by the defendant.”
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We first address the Motions Court’s conclusion that Poulides waived 

all issues in his Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. Waiver issues such as this are 

issues of law; thus, our standard of review is de novo. Pocono Manor 

Investors, LP v. Pennsylvania Gaming Control Board, 927 A.2d 209, 

216 (Pa.2007). 

In view of our recent decision in Maya v. Johnson & Johnson 

McNeil–PPC, Inc., -- A.3d --, 2014 WL 3586390 (Pa.Super., July 22, 

2014), we disagree with the Motions Court’s conclusion that Poulides waived 

the issues articulated in his Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. In Maya, the trial 

court determined that the appellant waived all issues on appeal because his 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement was 11 pages long with 23 paragraphs and 

“numerous subparagraphs.” Judge Ford Elliott, joined by Judges Wecht and 

Musmanno, disagreed, reasoning: 

The trial court advocates waiver, citing this court's 

decision in Kanter v. Epstein, 866 A.2d 394 

(Pa.Super.2004), appeal denied, 880 A.2d 1239 

(Pa.2005), cert. denied, Spector, Gadon & 

Rosen, P.C. v. Kanter, 546 U.S. 1092 (2006), in 

which this court held that where an appellant's 

concise statement raises an unduly large number of 

issues (104 in Kanter), the purpose of Rule 1925 is 

effectively subverted. However, Rule 1925(b) was 

revised in 2007 and now states, ‘Where nonredundant, non-frivolous issues are set forth in an 

appropriately concise manner, the number of errors 

raised will not alone be grounds for finding waiver.’ 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(iv). In addition, in Eiser v. 

Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 938 A.2d 

417 (Pa.2007) (plurality), our Supreme Court held 

that a litigant will not suffer the loss of appellate

review due to the volume of issues raised in the 
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absence of bad faith. The Eiser court also 

distinguished Kanter on the basis that Kanter was a 

relatively straightforward breach of contract action 

while the lawsuit in Eiser was a complicated one 

with a voluminous record. The court in Eiser

observed that ‘on rare occasions a party may, in 

good faith, believe that a large number of issues are 

worthy of pursuing on appeal.’ Id. at 427 (footnote 

omitted). Instantly, as in Eiser, the subject lawsuit 

is complex and the record contains thousands of 

pages of testimony. Furthermore, there is no 

evidence of bad faith or an attempt to thwart the 

appellate process. We note that McNeil did winnow 

down the number of issues actually argued in its 

brief on appeal. Therefore, we decline to find waiver. 

Id., 2014 WL at 3586390, *4, n. 4. Poulides’ Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement 

is far more concise than the 11-page, 23-paragraph Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) 

statement that the Maya court found acceptable. Poulides raises only three 

non-redundant, non-frivolous issues and describes each issue in detail in his 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. His statement does not impede appellate 

review. 

Turning to the merits of this appeal, we review a trial court's 

determination regarding the award of attorney fees for an abuse of 

discretion. Kraft v. Downey, 68 A.3d 329, 332 (Pa.Super.2013) (citation 

omitted). An abuse of discretion requires more than a difference of opinion 

as to the conclusion reached; rather, discretion is abused “if in reaching a 

conclusion, the law is overridden or misapplied, or the judgment exercised is 

manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will, 

as shown by the evidence of record.” Id. at 332-33.
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Relying on Connor v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 820 A.2d 1266 

(Pa.Super.2003), the Motions Court held that Poulides forfeited his right to 

obtain attorney fees by failing to request them during compulsory arbitration 

and failing to file a de novo appeal from the arbitrators’ award. We agree 

with the Motions Court’s analysis. The plaintiff in Connor filed a compulsory 

arbitration action under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (“MMWA”), 15 

U.S.C. § 2301 et seq., and the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer 

Protection Law (“UTPCPL”), but he failed to request attorney fees during the 

arbitration. The arbitration panel awarded him $2,000, and neither side 

appealed. The plaintiff then filed a motion seeking attorney fees under the 

MMWA3

 and the UTPCPL4. The Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County 

ruled against plaintiff, and this Court affirmed. We determined that the term 

“court” in the MMWA and UTPCPL includes arbitration boards, since 

 

3 The MMWA provides in relevant part: “If a consumer finally prevails in any 

action brought under paragraph (1) of this subsection, he may be allowed by 

the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate 

amount of costs and expenses (including attorneys' fees based on actual 

time expended). . .” 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(2) (emphasis added).

4

 The UTPCPL states in relevant part: 

The court may, in its discretion, award up to three 

times the actual damages sustained, but not less 

than one hundred dollars ($100), and may provide 

such additional relief as it deems necessary or 

proper. The court may award to the plaintiff, in 

addition to other relief provided in this section, costs 

and reasonable attorney fees. 

73 P.S. § 201-9.2(a) (emphasis added).
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arbitration boards “routinely undertake[] ‘court’ functions” such as admission 

of evidence, resolution of factual questions and assessment of damages. 

Id., 820 A.2d at 1271. No reason existed to treat the question of attorney 

fees differently from any other question that arbitrators customarily decide 

in a case. Id. Therefore, the plaintiff waived his right to attorney fees by 

failing to request them before the arbitration board or to appeal de novo to 

the Court of Common Pleas. Id. at 1270-71. 

Connor’s reasoning applies to this case, because the statutes that 

Connor construed are similar to the WPCL. The WPCL, as stated above, 

provides that “the court” shall allow reasonable attorney fees in addition to 

any judgment awarded under the WPCL’s civil remedy statute. 43 P.S. § 

260.9a(f). In view of Connor’s determination that “court” includes 

arbitration boards, Poulides was required either to request attorney fees 

before the arbitration board or to appeal de novo5

to the Court of Common 

Pleas. Connor, supra, at 1270-71. His failure to take either step precludes 

him from recovery of attorney fees. 

 

5

 The Rules of Civil Procedure define a de novo appeal from the board of 

arbitrators in a compulsory arbitration case as follows: “An appeal by any 

party shall be deemed an appeal by all parties as to all issues unless 

otherwise stipulated in writing by all parties.” Pa.R.Civ.P. 1309. The trial 

“shall be de novo.” Pa.R.Civ.P. 1311(a). During trial, the WPCL plaintiff 

bears the burden of proving unpaid wages and liquidated damages and must 

also request attorney fees at a timely juncture in the trial process. This case 

does not call upon us to decide the point in de novo trial proceedings when 

the plaintiff must request WPCL attorney fees. 
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We note that in two decisions, one of which post-dates Connor, our 

Supreme Court has construed a statute’s use of “court” as synonymous with 

“judge”. See Mishoe v. Erie Ins. Co., 824 A.2d 1153 (Pa.2003); Wertz v. 

Chapman Township, 741 A.2d 1272 (Pa.1999). In Mishoe, for example, 

the Court held that there was no right to a jury trial in a bad faith insurance 

action under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8371. Section 8371 provides that “[i]n an 

action arising under an insurance policy, if the court finds that the insurer 

has acted in bad faith toward the insured, the court may” award interest, 

punitive damages, and court costs and fees. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8371 (emphasis 

added). Mishoe reasoned that there was no right to a jury trial because the 

legislature chose the term “court” instead of “jury.” Id., 824 A.2d at 1156. 

The Mishoe court gathered multiple authorities for the proposition that 

“court” and “judge” “are essentially synonymous for purposes of section 

8371,” and that “‘court’ is a concept that is meant to be limited to judges.” 

Id. at 1157-58 & n. 5, 7. 

But while Mishoe deems “court” and “judge” synonymous, it does not 

address whether “court” and “arbitration board” are also synonymous, the 

issue resolved in Connor. Therefore, Connor continues to remain good law 

notwithstanding the decision in Mishoe. 

Poulides also argues that the Motions Court could have awarded 

attorney fees following his appeal from the Prothonotary’s decision to reject 

the demand for attorney fees in his bill of costs. We agree with the Motions 
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Court that under Connor, an appeal from the prothonotary is not the proper

procedure for obtaining attorney fees in a WPCL action that begins as an 

arbitration action. In such circumstances, Connor requires the WPCL 

plaintiff to seek attorney fees either before the arbitration panel or in a de 

novo appeal from the arbitration board to the trial division. Since Poulides 

failed to take either step, he waived his right to attorney fees. 

Order denying attorney fees affirmed. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 9/12/2014