Filed 4/25/23 In re B.T. CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

In re B.T., a Person Coming Under the 

Juvenile Court Law.

ORANGE COUNTY SOCIAL 

SERVICES AGENCY,

 Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

M.R.,

 Defendant and Appellant.

 G062013

 (Super. Ct. No. 20DP1184)

 O P I N I O N

Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County, Vibhav 

Mittal, Judge. Affirmed.

William D. Caldwell, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for 

Defendant and Appellant.

Leon J. Page, County Counsel, Karen L. Christensen and Aurelio Torre, 

Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

No appearance for the Minor.

* * *
2

B.T. was removed from M.R.’s (Mother) care when he was nine months 

old. The juvenile court eventually ended Mother’s reunification services and set a 

hearing to terminate her parental rights under Welfare and Institutions Code 

section 366.26.

1

 Prior to the hearing, she filed a petition under section 388 seeking to 

have reunification services reinstituted. Following a combined hearing, the court denied

Mother’s section 388 petition and terminated her parental rights. As to the section 388 

petition, the court found Mother had not shown a change in circumstances, nor had she 

shown that resuming reunification services was in B.T.’s best interests. As for the 

termination of parental rights, the court rejected Mother’s argument for application of the 

parental-benefit exception (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)) and sibling-relationship 

exception (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(v)).

Mother challenges the juvenile court’s order on appeal. We find no error.

As to the section 388 petition, the court initially ended reunification services because of 

Mother’s inconsistent visitation. While Mother’s visitation later improved, it still 

remained inconsistent at the time of the hearing on the section 388 petition. With regard 

to the termination of her parental rights, Mother has failed to show that severing B.T.’s 

relationship with her or with B.T.’s sibling, R.T., would be sufficiently detrimental to 

B.T. to override the strong presumption in favor of adoption. Thus, we affirm the court’s 

order.

I

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. Prior Dependency Cases of B.T.’s Siblings

A few years prior to B.T.’s birth, Mother was involved in dependency cases 

concerning B.T.’s half sibling, K.S., and full-sibling, B.J.T. Both were declared 

1

 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
3

dependents of the juvenile court in 2017. Jurisdiction was based on Mother’s substance 

abuse, unresolved mental health issues, and domestic violence between Mother and 

B.J.T.’s father, who is also B.T.’s father (Father). The dependency case involving K.S. 

was terminated in December 2017, with K.S. being left in her father’s care with exit 

orders. As to B.J.T., Mother and Father’s parental rights were terminated in July 2018, 

and he was adopted by his paternal grandmother in March 2019.

B. B.T.’s Removal

B.T. was born in December 2019. He was taken into protective custody on 

September 17, 2020, based on allegations of general neglect. At the time, B.T., B.J.T., 

Mother, Father, and the boys’ paternal grandmother shared an apartment. Mother and 

Father had been living together since December 2019, in violation of a criminal 

protective order protecting Mother from Father. Nearly two weeks before B.T. was taken 

into protective custody, Mother had taken B.T. and B.J.T. for a walk around their 

apartment complex. Mother purportedly started a fire in the complex after B.J.T. 

requested that she do so. B.J.T. helped stomp the fire out with his feet. A few days later, 

a bag containing methamphetamine and heroin was found on the floor of Mother and 

Father’s bedroom. Father admitted to using drugs. Mother also had a history of 

substance abuse. When B.T. was taken into protective custody, Mother was on probation 

for multiple DUI’s. Her probation was scheduled to end in February 2024. Days before 

B.T.’s birth, she had been terminated from a residential drug treatment program after 

testing positive for opiates. Prior to B.T.’s removal, she had failed to submit to drug 

testing for probation on multiple occasions as she repeatedly claimed to have COVID-19 

symptoms.

On September 21, 2020, the Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA)

filed a petition claiming jurisdiction over B.T. was proper under section 300, subdivisions

(b)(1) and (j). As to jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b)(1), the petition 
4

repeated the allegations above regarding the drugs found in the home and the fire at the 

apartment complex. It also alleged Mother and Father had unresolved substance abuse 

issues, a long history of domestic violence, and criminal histories. Mother had multiple 

arrests and/or convictions for driving under the influence of alcohol and driving with a 

suspended license. As to jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (j), which pertains to 

abuse or neglect of a sibling, the petition summarized the dependency cases of B.J.T. and 

K.S.

A few days after SSA filed the petition, the juvenile court ordered that B.T. 

be detained from Mother and Father. Mother was authorized “liberal” video and phone 

calls and eight hours of supervised visitation per week. The court also authorized SSA to 

perform random drug and alcohol tests on Mother and Father.

C. Jurisdiction and Disposition Hearings

Prior to the jurisdiction and disposition hearings, SSA recommended that 

the petition be sustained, that B.T. be declared a dependent of the juvenile court, that 

Mother and Father be denied reunification services, and that the court schedule a hearing 

under section 366.26 to terminate parental rights. SSA believed reunification services 

would not be in B.T.’s best interests based on K.S. and B.J.T.’s dependency cases and 

Mother and Father’s history of substance abuse. SSA noted that Mother had been offered 

services in K.S. and B.J.T.’s dependency cases, but she continued to have the same 

substance abuse issues. For instance, at the time, Mother was facing termination from 

her DUI court program for failing to mitigate the reasons for her past offenses. The 

probation officer also reported that Mother had recently tested positive for methadone. 

Mother was also briefly jailed in December 2020 for violating the terms of her probation.

B.T. was placed in the care of his paternal cousin (the caregiver) and her 

spouse in November 2020, and he has remained with them throughout this case. Mother 
5

entered inpatient drug treatment in January 2021. Around this time, SSA learned Mother 

was pregnant with another child of Father.

On January 6, 2021, the juvenile court sustained the jurisdictional petition

and set a disposition hearing.

2

 At the disposition hearing on March 18, 2021, the court 

declared B.T. a dependent of the juvenile court, removed B.T. from parental custody, 

bypassed reunification services for Mother and Father, and scheduled a section 366.26 

hearing.

D. The First Section 388 Petition

After the disposition hearing, Mother completed inpatient drug treatment 

and began participating in a parenting education program. As to visitation, Mother was 

approved for 8 hours per week of supervised in-person visits. She initially declined inperson visits due to the COVID-19 pandemic and scheduled weekly virtual visits instead. 

Mother missed several virtual visits during this period, and SSA noted that, initially, she 

did “not make an effort to participate in the[se] visits.” Generally, the visits she attended

only lasted for around 20 minutes and had limited interaction. For example, Mother did 

“not stay in front of the computer screen for the duration of the entire visit” which meant 

B.T. was “mainly looking at the background of an office.” Mother requested in-person 

visits in late April 2021. When in-person visitation resumed, she was attentive to B.T.’s 

needs and played appropriately with him. Mother gave birth to B.T.’s sibling, R.T., in 

June 2021.

On July 13, 2021, Mother filed a petition under section 388 requesting 

family reunification services. As changed circumstances, she cited her completion of an 

inpatient drug program and current residence in a women’s shelter with her new child, 

R.T. SSA recommended granting the petition because Mother had addressed her 

2

 The juvenile court dismissed several counts pertaining to the Father that are not 

relevant to this appeal.
6

substance abuse issues and had “put herself in a position to be given the opportunity to 

reunify with the child.” Further, her visits with B.T. had been positive, and she had 

shown good parenting skills while handling both B.T. and R.T. As part of its case plan, 

SSA recommended that Mother complete a domestic violence program and a parenting 

class, participate in counseling and a substance abuse group, and submit to random 

alcohol and drug testing, among other things.

The juvenile court granted Mother’s section 388 petition on August 11, 

2021. It took the section 366.26 hearing off calendar, approved SSA’s proposed case 

plan, and set a review hearing for February 2022 (the status review hearing). The status 

review hearing was continued several times and eventually held on May 18, 2022.

E. The Reunification Period

In the leadup to the status review hearing, Mother completed her residential

substance-abuse treatment program, moved into her own apartment, and secured 

employment. She completed her parenting class and participated in counseling. She 

nearly finished her domestic violence program, needing one more class for completion.

Mother’s drug patch registered three positive tests for methamphetamine in 

December 2021 and January 2022, but she denied any use. All of her subsequent tests 

were negative.

As to visitation, Mother had eight weekly hours of supervised visits but

typically visited B.T. for seven hours once a week. Visitation was inconsistent, and 

Mother reported to SSA that visits were “a little bit long.” SSA reported that as of late 

October 2021, Mother had only visited B.T. once in the past five weeks. In early 

December 2021, SSA noted that since B.T. had been placed with the caregiver in 

November 2020, Mother had only visited 15 times and was late (anywhere from 10 

minutes to two hours) for six of those visits. Mother only visited once during a threemonth span from late October 2021 to late January 2022.
7

Mother’s visitation marginally improved in early 2022. She visited with 

B.T. for a total of 21 hours in January and February 2022, i.e., three visits over two

months. In March 2022, she visited for 14 total hours but missed two weeks of visits 

because R.T. was sick. The record does not list her total visitation hours for April 2022, 

but it shows she missed two visits that month. Mother claimed she missed the first visit 

due to a scheduled drug test with her probation officer that could not be done until 9:00

a.m., which conflicted with the visit. But her probation officer reported that drug testing 

began at 7:00 a.m., so Mother could have tested prior to her visit with B.T. rather than 

cancelling it. The second visit was canceled due to Mother’s illness. The visits that did 

occur went well. B.T. engaged with Mother, called her “‘mama,’” and gave hugs to his 

younger brother, R.T.

B.T.’s development during this period was generally normal. He was 

mentally and emotionally stable, but he experienced speech delays and began receiving

speech therapy.

Though Mother had made progress and participated in services during this 

period, SSA was concerned by her inconsistent visitation and her ability to remain sober

due to the three positive drug tests. As such, it recommended terminating reunification 

services and scheduling a section 366.26 hearing.

The juvenile court agreed with SSA. At the status review hearing on May 

18, 2022, it terminated Mother’s reunification services and scheduled a section 366.26 

hearing. Despite this, its order contained a plan to gradually liberalize Mother’s 

visitation. If Mother consistently attended all supervised visits with B.T. for six 

consecutive weeks, the order authorized SSA to increase her visitation hours by two 

hours per week until she reached 14 total hours per week. Once the 14-hour mark was 

met, if Mother attended all supervised visits with B.T. for four consecutive weeks, SSA 

was authorized to gradually begin transitioning to unsupervised visits.
8

F. The Second Section 388 Petition

Following the status review hearing, Mother consistently tested negative for 

drugs. She continued to comply with the terms of her probation and made progress on 

her services.

As to visitation, in late May 2022, Mother reported having a new work 

schedule and requested to visit on Saturdays from 9:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m., reducing her 

visitation from seven hours to four hours per week. SSA asked Mother to provide 

additional days or times for visits with B.T. so she could have her full eight hours, but she 

did not respond until late July 2022. Mother consistently visited for four hours a week

from late May 2022 to late August 2022. Though she was late to several visits, she only 

cancelled one visit during this period to celebrate R.T.’s birthday. Mother increased 

visits from four to seven hours per week starting August 20, 2022. The visits were 

generally good. B.T. referred to Mother as “‘Mom,’” and he listened to her directions. 

He also appeared excited to see R.T. and to watch TV.

On September 13, 2022, Mother filed a second petition under section 388, 

requesting implementation of family maintenance services and cancellation of the section 

366.26 hearing. She argued there had been changed circumstances since the status 

review hearing, specifically, she had “tested negatively for drugs, attended all her 

programs and maintained the sibling, [R.T.], on family maintenance in her home.” She 

argued family maintenance would be better for B.T. because she had “frequent and 

continued contact [with B.T.], . . . a bonded relationship with the child, and the child 

would be placed with his sibling [R.T.]” The juvenile court scheduled the petition to be 

heard at the same time as the section 366.26 hearing.

Prior to the section 366.26 hearing, SSA reported that Mother continued to 

test negative for all substances and remained employed. As to visitation, Mother missed 

a visit on September 3, 2022, because she was ill. She then cancelled another visit on 

October 1, 2022, 10 minutes before it was supposed to start, because she did not feel 
9

well. Mother also ended at least three visits several hours short. For two of these 

instances, she claimed she had to drug test for probation. But SSA noted that Mother’s 

probation officer had previously reported that Mother could test before or after visits so 

she would not miss time with B.T. For the third instance, Mother decided mid-visit to 

leave early. Prior to leaving, she was overheard telling another parent that her “visits 

with [B.T.] were too long.” By the time the caregiver arrived at the facility to pick up 

B.T., Mother had left and B.T. was being supervised by facility staff.

SSA recommended that the juvenile court terminate Mother’s parental 

rights and that B.T. be referred for adoption. By that time, B.T. had been with the 

caregiver and her spouse for 22 months or roughly two-thirds of his life. The caregiver

and her spouse were committed to B.T., they wanted to adopt him, B.T. appeared 

comfortable with them, and they had demonstrated the ability to meet his needs.

G. The Combined Section 388 and Section 366.26 Hearings

The joint hearing on Mother’s second section 388 petition and under 

section 366.26 began on October 17, 2022 and concluded on October 31, 2022. At the 

hearing, Mother testified that during visits, B.T. called her “Mom,” and would hug her 

and R.T. at the beginning and end of each visit. She acknowledged that she did not see 

him for a four-to-five month period while she was in her inpatient drug treatment 

program, but she believed B.T. should be returned to her care because they still shared a 

bond, and B.T. also had a bond with R.T.

A social worker from SSA testified that Mother had recently been visiting 

for seven hours a week even though she had been granted eight hours of visitation. 

Because Mother had not visited consistently, she had not obtained additional visitation

hours under the court’s graduated plan after the status review hearing. The social worker 

was unaware of B.T. ever asking to see either Mother or R.T. outside of visits. She 

further testified that Mother had only inquired about B.T.’s speech therapy on one 
10

occasion and that Mother had never attended any of his medical or speech therapy 

appointments.

The caregiver testified that although she and Mother had been in direct 

contact, Mother had never reached out about B.T.’s well-being. B.T. never asked for 

Mother or R.T. while in her care, nor did B.T. ever talk about Mother. Mother had never 

requested to attend any of B.T.’s medical appointments, nor had she ever followed up 

with the caregiver about them.

Following the presentation of evidence, the juvenile court denied Mother’s 

section 388 petition and terminated her parental rights. As to the section 388 petition, the 

court noted that Mother had not met either prong of the two-prong test. For the first 

prong, Mother had failed to show changed circumstances. The court explained that it had 

initially set a section 366.26 hearing due to Mother’s inconsistent visitation. Mother’s 

record of visitation continued to be inconsistent and she had voluntarily decreased her 

weekly visitation hours at times. For the second prong, the juvenile court found Mother 

had not shown reunification services were in B.T.’s best interest. B.T had substantial 

connection with the caregiver, whom he had lived with for nearly two years. Mother’s 

relationship with B.T. did not “rise to the level of a substantial positive emotional 

attachment.” Likewise, B.T.’s relationship with R.T. was “minimal at this stage.”

As for termination of Mother’s parental rights, the juvenile court found 

B.T. to be adoptable. It then denied Mother’s requests for application of the parentalbenefit exception or the sibling-relationship exception. As to the former, Mother had not 

shown regular visitation and contact with B.T. Further, she had not shown that B.T. had 

a substantial positive emotional attachment to her. B.T. was nearly three years old and 

had been out of Mother’s custody for the majority of his life. She had failed to 

consistently visit him, which prevented the necessary emotional attachment from 

forming. Likewise, there was no showing that termination of parental rights would be 

detrimental to B.T.
11

As to the sibling-relationship exception, the juvenile court explained that 

the relationship between B.T. and R.T. was limited. They had not been raised in the 

same home. B.T. had already been removed from Mother’s care by the time R.T. was 

born. While the two had shared visits together, visitation was inconsistent. Nor was 

there any evidence of shared significant experiences between them.

Mother appeals the juvenile court’s order, arguing it erred by denying her 

section 388 petition and by terminating her parental rights.

II

DISCUSSION

A. The Section 388 Petition

“The essence of a section 388 petition is the petitioner’s assertion that she 

or he can demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that new evidence or a 

change of circumstances exists warranting a finding that the best interests of the minor 

child will be served if a previous order of the court is changed, modified or set aside.” 

(In re Marcos G. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 369, 382.) Section 388 petitions are analyzed 

under a two-prong standard. “‘The petitioner has the burden of showing by a 

preponderance of the evidence (1) that there is new evidence or a change of 

circumstances and (2) that the proposed modification would be in the best interests of the 

child.’ [Citation.] ‘[T]he change in circumstances must be substantial.’” (In re J.M.

(2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 833, 845.) Here, the juvenile court found that Mother had failed 

to establish either prong.

We begin with the first prong. “If the juvenile court has ruled the moving 

party failed to carry his or her initial burden to demonstrate new evidence or change of 

circumstance, . . . the question for the reviewing court is whether that finding is erroneous 

as a matter of law.” (In re Matthew M. (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 1186, 1194.) Mother must 

show the evidence compels a finding in her favor. (In re I.W. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 
12

1517, 1528, disapproved of on other grounds by Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 

Cal.5th 989, 1010, fn. 7.) “Specifically, the question becomes whether [Mother’s] 

evidence was (1) ‘uncontradicted and unimpeached’ and (2) ‘of such a character and 

weight as to leave no room for a judicial determination that it was insufficient to support 

a finding.’” (In re I.W., at p. 1528.)

As explained above, the juvenile court found there had been no change in 

circumstances as to visitation. Mother has failed to show any error in this finding. While 

Mother’s visitation became more consistent from May 2022 onward, the record reflects 

she did not consistently visit for her full eight hours per week. Rather, from late May to 

late August 2022, she only visited for four hours a week, only half of her full allotment. 

Further, she was late to several of these visits. Likewise, in September and October 

2022, Mother missed multiple visits, and she ended at least three visits several hours 

short. In one of those instances, Mother left B.T. alone at the care facility before the 

caregiver arrived and was heard commenting that her visits with B.T. “were too long.”

Significantly, a section 388 petition must show a substantial change. 

Further, the petition must show the change in circumstance is largely complete and not 

simply a work in process. (In re Ernesto R. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 219, 223.) 

“A petition which alleges merely changing circumstances . . . would mean delaying the 

selection of a permanent home for a child to see if a parent, who has repeatedly failed to 

reunify with the child, might be able to reunify at some future point, does not promote 

stability for the child or the child’s best interests.” (In re Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 

38, 47, italics added, disapproved of on other grounds by In re Caden C. (2021) 11 

Cal.5th 614, 636, fn. 5 (Caden C.).) The above evidence does not compel a finding that 

Mother had shown a changed circumstance as to visitation. At most, she has established 

changing circumstances, which is insufficient to meet the burden of a section 388 

petition. Since Mother has not met her burden on the first prong, we need not address the 
13

juvenile court’s finding as to the second prong. (In re J.M., supra, 50 Cal.App.5th at p. 

845.)

We note that Mother has also argued the juvenile court erroneously 

conflated the requirements for a section 388 petition with the standards for termination of 

parental rights under section 366.26. We disagree. As set forth above, the court made 

separate findings on the section 388 petition and on termination of parental rights. The 

court simply explained that some of its findings as to the parental-benefit exception 

overlapped with its finding that granting the section 388 petition was not in B.T.’s best 

interests. This analysis was not improper, as one of the factors to consider in evaluating 

the child’s best interests under section 388 is “the strength of the child’s bond with his or 

her new caretakers compared with the strength of the child’s bond with the parent.” (In 

re Ernesto R. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 219, 224.) Much of the same evidence was 

relevant to evaluating the strength of B.T.’s bond with Mother for purposes of the

parental-benefit exception. The court did not, as Mother argues, deprive her of any rights 

under section 388. Further, to the extent any error occurred, it would have only effected

the court’s analysis on the second prong, not the first prong.

B. Termination of Parental Rights

“[T]he goal at the section 366.26 hearing is ‘specifically . . . to select and 

implement a permanent plan for the child.’ [Citations.] To guide the court in selecting 

the most suitable permanent arrangement, [section 366.26] lists plans in order of 

preference and provides a detailed procedure for choosing among them. . . . [T]he court 

must first determine by clear and convincing evidence whether the child is likely to be 

adopted. [Citation.] If so, and if the court finds that there has been a previous 

determination that reunification services be terminated, then the court shall terminate 

parental rights to allow for adoption. [Citation.] But if the parent shows that termination 

would be detrimental to the child for at least one specifically enumerated reason, the 
14

court should decline to terminate parental rights and select another permanent plan. 

[Citation.] As we have previously explained, ‘[t]he statutory exceptions merely permit 

the court, in exceptional circumstances [citation], to choose an option other than the 

norm, which remains adoption.’” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 630-631, italics 

added.)

1. The Parental-Benefit Exception

The parental-benefit exception, “is limited in scope.” (Caden C., supra, 11 

Cal.5th at pp. 631-632.) A parent must prove three elements by a preponderance of the 

evidence to establish the exception: “(1) regular visitation and contact, and (2) a 

relationship, the continuation of which would benefit the child such that (3) the 

termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child.” (Id. at pp. 631, 636-

637.) The juvenile court found Mother had not met any of these elements.

We begin with the first element, regular visitation and contact. This 

element “is straightforward. The question is just whether ‘parents visit consistently,’ 

taking into account ‘the extent permitted by court orders.’ [Citation.] Visits and contact 

‘continue[] or develop[] a significant, positive, emotional attachment from child to 

parent.’ [Citation.] Courts should consider in that light whether parents ‘maintained 

regular visitation and contact with the child’ [citation] but certainly not to punish parents 

or reward them for good behavior in visiting or maintaining contact — here, as 

throughout, the focus is on the best interests of the child.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th 

at p. 632.)

The first element is reviewed under the substantial evidence standard. 

(Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 639-640.) Under this standard, the juvenile court’s 

“determinations should ‘be upheld if . . . supported by substantial evidence, even though 

substantial evidence to the contrary also exists and the . . . court might have reached a 

different result had it believed other evidence.’” (Id. at p. 640.) Here, the court’s
15

visitation finding is supported by substantial evidence. In the beginning of this 

dependency proceeding, Mother missed several virtual visits with B.T. Further, the visits 

that did occur only lasted for around 20 minutes and had limited interaction. After 

transitioning to in-person visits, Mother had significant gaps between visits. SSA

reported that in late October 2021, Mother had only visited B.T. once in the past five 

weeks. Further, no visitation appears to have occurred in November or December 2021.

Visitation slightly improved starting in January 2022. From January to 

March 2022, Mother visited for 35 total hours. But this equals less than 12 hours per 

month on average, when she had been approved for eight hours of visitation per week. 

She also missed several visits in April 2022. While Mother became more consistent with 

visitation from May 2022 onward, she generally only visited for four hours a week, half 

the amount of her allotment. After she increased visitation to seven hours per week in 

late August 2022, she ended multiple visits several hours short. And, as documented 

above, she once abruptly ended one visit early and left B.T. in the care of the supervising 

facility before the caregiver could arrive to pick him up.

Given the long gaps between visits during the early portion of this 

dependency case and Mother’s inability to utilize all of her allotted visitation hours

throughout this case, the juvenile court’s finding on the visitation element is supported by 

the record. We acknowledge that several times Mother had reasonable excuses for 

missing visits, such as illness. But the visitation element is not meant “to punish parents 

or reward them for good behavior in visiting or maintaining contact.” (Caden C., supra, 

11 Cal.5th at p. 632.) Rather, it is intended to ensure children have sufficient visitation to 

build a significant emotional connection to their parent. (See ibid.) As such, we focus 

not on Mother’s reasons for missing visits but on the impact irregular visitation had on 

B.T. Given his young age, the reasons behind the missed visits are irrelevant. Each 

missed visit deprived him of an opportunity to bond with Mother, regardless of her 

reasons.
16

Even if Mother could establish the first element, she has not met her burden 

under the third element, i.e., she has not shown termination of parental rights would be 

detrimental to B.T. Two standards of review are applied to this element. The juvenile 

court’s factual findings are reviewed for substantial evidence. But “the ultimate decision 

— whether termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child due to the 

child’s relationship with his parent — is discretionary and properly reviewed for abuse of 

discretion.” (Caden C., supra,11 Cal.5th at p. 640.) “An abuse of discretion is only 

demonstrated when no reasonable judge could have made the challenged order.” (In re 

Marriage of Barth (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 363, 374.)

In evaluating the third element, the juvenile court “decides whether the 

harm of severing the relationship outweighs ‘the security and the sense of belonging a 

new family would confer.’” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 633-634.) “When the 

relationship with a parent is so important to the child that the security and stability of a 

new home wouldn’t outweigh its loss, termination would be ‘detrimental to the child due

to’ the child’s beneficial relationship with a parent.” (Ibid.) “In many cases, ‘the 

strength and quality of the natural parent/child relationship’ will substantially determine 

how detrimental it would be to lose that relationship, which must be weighed against the 

benefits of a new adoptive home.” (Id. at p. 634.)

“‘Adoption is the Legislature’s first choice because it gives the child the 

best chance at [a full] emotional commitment from a responsible caretaker.’” (In re 

Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 53.) To depart from this legislative preference, a “‘parent 

must show more than frequent and loving contact, an emotional bond with the child, or 

pleasant visits—the parent must show that he or she occupies a parental role in the life of 

the child.’” (In re A.G. (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 973, 995.) “[T]his type of relationship 

typically arises from day-to-day interaction, companionship and shared experiences, and 

may be continued or developed by consistent and regular visitation after the child has 
17

been removed from parental custody.” (In re S.B. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 289, 298-299, 

italics omitted.)

Here, B.T. was removed from Mother’s care when he was only nine months 

old. He has spent the vast majority of his life with the caregiver and her spouse. Nothing 

in the record suggests he and Mother have developed the type of bond necessary to apply 

the parental-benefit exception. SSA’s reports show Mother and B.T. have a loving 

relationship and have shared pleasant visits together. But this evidence alone in 

insufficient to show that she occupies a parental role in B.T.’s life. (In re A.G., supra, 58 

Cal.App.5th at p. 995.) Moreover, the record shows B.T. does not talk about Mother 

outside of visits, which indicates their relationship – while loving – is limited. As such, 

nothing in the record shows the bond between Mother and B.T. is so strong that it must 

be prioritized over B.T.’s potential adoption.

2. Sibling-Relationship Exception

The sibling-relationship exception “provides an exception to termination of 

parental rights when ‘[t]here would be substantial interference with a child’s sibling 

relationship.’” (In re D.O. (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 166, 173.) It is intended “to preserve 

long-standing sibling relationships that serve as ‘anchors for dependent children whose 

lives are in turmoil.’” (In re Isaiah S. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 428, 437.) When evaluating 

the exception, juvenile courts consider a nonexclusive list of factors, including, 

“‘[(1)] whether the child was raised with a sibling in the same home, [(2)] whether the 

child shared significant common experiences or has existing close and strong bonds with 

a sibling, and [(3)] whether ongoing contact is in the child’s best interest, including the 

child’s long-term emotional interest, as compared to the benefit of legal permanence 

through adoption.’” (In re D.O., supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at p. 173.)

The sibling-relationship exception is rarely applied. (In re D.O., supra, 247 

Cal.App.4th at p. 174.) Mother had the burden below to prove this exception. (Id. at p. 
18

173.) On appeal, “we apply the substantial evidence standard to the juvenile court’s 

underlying factual determinations, and the abuse of discretion standard to the court’s 

weighing of competing interests.” (Id. at p. 174.)

Nothing in the record shows application of this exception is warranted. 

B.T. and R.T. never lived in the same home. The two siblings only encountered each 

other during Mother’s visits with B.T., which, as set forth above, were inconsistent. 

Further, B.T. did not ask about R.T. outside of visits. While B.T. gave R.T. hugs during 

visits and was excited to play with him, this is insufficient to establish the exception. In 

In re Daisy D. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 287, 293, the child visited “with her half siblings 

between two and four times a month” for two years. While “the minor clearly enjoyed 

the time she spent with her half siblings, there was no evidence that the detriment she 

might suffer if visits ceased presented a sufficiently compelling reason to forgo the 

stability and permanence of adoption by caretakers to whom she was closely bonded.” 

(Ibid.) Likewise, nothing in the record indicates any harm B.T. may suffer by severing 

his relationship with R.T. outweighs the benefits of adoption.

III

DISPOSITION

The juvenile court’s order is affirmed.

MOORE, J.

WE CONCUR:

O’LEARY, P. J.

BEDSWORTH, J.