Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-271 | October 10, 2018 Page 1 of 16

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Brian A. Karle

Ball Eggleston, PC

Lafayette, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Henry A. Flores, Jr.

Deputy Attorney General 

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Jonathan M. Fuchs,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

October 10, 2018

Court of Appeals Case No.

18A-CR-271

Appeal from the Tippecanoe 

Superior Court

The Honorable Steven Meyer, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

79D02-1610-F1-17

Riley, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-271 | October 10, 2018 Page 2 of 16

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

[1] Appellant-Defendant, Jonathan Fuchs (Fuchs), appeals his conviction for one 

Count of child molesting, as a Level 1 felony, Ind. Code § 35-42-4-3(a); and one 

Count of child molesting, as a Level 4 felony, I.C. § 35-42-4-3(b).

[2] We affirm. 

ISSUES

[3] Fuchs presents two issues on appeal, which we restate as the following: 

(1) Whether the State presented sufficient evidence beyond a reasonable doubt 

to support Fuchs’ convictions; and 

(2) Whether Fuchs’ aggregate sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of 

the offenses and his character. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

[4] In 2016, B.S. (Mother), her boyfriend (Boyfriend), and her four children, 

including seven-year-old K.S., resided in a four-bedroom house in Tippecanoe 

County, Indiana. The biological father to Mother’s children is M.S. (Father), 

and Mother and Father have “a split custody schedule.” (Transcript Vol. II, p. 

123). Father resides with his long-term girlfriend (Girlfriend), and when the 

children visit, Girlfriend cares for them. 

[5] Fuchs and Mother are friends. In the summer of 2016, Fuchs would visit 

Mother’s house, and K.S. encountered Fuchs during those visits. That same 
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summer, Fuchs moved into Mother’s home and began renting the blue 

bedroom. Fuchs appears to have groomed K.S. by buying K.S. toys and 

clothes, taking him to restaurants, and playing with him in the house. One time 

when K.S. was in Fuchs’ bed “in the blue bedroom,” Fuchs placed his hands on 

K.S.’ penis and also used his “mouth” to suck K.S.’ “private part.” (Tr. Vol. II, 

p. 79). On another occasion, while K.S. was in his bedroom, Fuchs led K.S. 

into the closet where he pulled down his pants and showed his penis to K.S. 

According to K.S., Fuchs’ “private area . . . had red dots and black hair.” (Tr. 

Vol. II, p. 81). After showing his penis to K.S., Fuchs pulled down K.S.’ pants 

and “used his hands . . . to hold [K.S.’] private part.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 83). 

Fuchs advised K.S. to keep his actions “secret.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 86). K.S. 

indicated that when the molestations occurred, Mother, Boyfriend, and his 

siblings, were all present at the house; however, “they were probably 

downstairs.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 88). 

[6] On October 13, 2016, while K.S. and his siblings were at Father’s and

Girlfriend’s house, Girlfriend initiated a conversation with the children “about 

body safety.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 97). Girlfriend advised the children that “if 

someone were to touch them” in their “private area,” they should report the 

incident. (Tr. Vol. II, pp. 97, 98). After her talk, Girlfriend observed K.S.’

“facial expression” change, and K.S. “looked like he [had] just” seen “a ghost.” 

(Tr. Vol. II, p. 99). 

[7] On October 14, 2016, the next day, Father and Girlfriend took K.S. to the 

Tippecanoe County Sherriff’s Department, but they were referred to the 
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Heartford House, a child advocacy center, for a forensic interview. After the 

interview, Father took K.S. to Riley Children’s Hospital for a sexual assault 

examination. 

[8] On October 17, 2016, Detective Matthew Budreau (Detective Budreau) 

executed a search warrant at Mother’s home. Detective Budreau informed 

Fuchs that he was investigating claims of child molesting. Fuchs agreed to be 

questioned and drove himself to the sheriff’s department. After he was read his 

Miranda rights, Fuchs stated that he loved and cared for K.S., and at times, he 

would go to K.S.’ bedroom to play with him, and he often helped K.S. build a 

“fort” in the closet. (State’s Exh. 1R. at 15:00). He added that he would also 

“snuggle” with K.S. at bedtime. (State’s Exh. 1R at 06:35). While Fuchs 

consistently denied any inappropriate sexual contact with K.S., he stated that 

he frequently bathed K.S., and one time, he accidently “touched” K.S.’ penis, 

while dressing K.S. (State’s Exh. 1R at 06:35). 

[9] On October 24, 2016, the State filed an Information, charging Fuchs with

Count I, child molesting, a Level 1 felony; Counts II, III, and IV, child 

molesting, Level 4 felonies; and Count V, child solicitation, a Level 5 felony. A 

three-day jury trial was conducted on November 14 through November 16, 

2017. At the close of the State’s evidence, Fuchs moved for a directed verdict 

on Counts III through V, which the trial court granted. Thereafter, the jury 

returned guilty verdicts for Count I, Level 1 felony child molesting, and Count 

II, Level 4 felony child molesting. On January 8, 2018, the trial court sentenced 

Fuchs to the Department of Correction to serve thirty-four years on Count I, a 
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consecutive term of eight years on Count II, for an aggregate sentence of fortytwo years, however, the trial court suspended ten years of his aggregate 

sentence to probation. 

[10] Fuchs now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[11] Fuchs claims that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of one Count 

of child molesting as a Level 1 felony and one Count of child molesting as a 

Level 4 felony. When reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence, it is well 

established that our court does not reweigh evidence or assess the credibility of 

witnesses. Walker v. State, 998 N.E.2d 724, 726 (Ind. 2013). Instead, we 

consider all of the evidence, and any reasonable inferences that may be drawn

therefrom, in a light most favorable to the verdict. Id. We will uphold the 

conviction “‘if there is substantial evidence of probative value supporting each 

element of the crime from which a reasonable trier of fact could have found the 

defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Id. (quoting Davis v. State, 813 

N.E.2d 1176, 1178 (Ind. 2004)). 

[12] To convict Fuchs of Level 1 felony child molesting as charged, the State was 

required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Fuchs, a person of at least 

twenty-one years of age, knowingly or intentionally performed other sexual 

conduct with K.S., a child under fourteen years of age. I.C. § 35-42-4-3(a). 

Other sexual conduct includes “an act involving . . . a sex organ of one (1) 
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person and the mouth . . . of another person.” I.C. § 35-31.5-2-221.5. As for 

Fuchs’ Level 4 felony child molesting conviction, the State was required to 

establish that he, “with a child under fourteen (14) years of age, perform[ed] or 

submit[ted] to any fondling or touching, of either [K.S. or himself], with intent 

to arouse or to satisfy the sexual desires of either [K.S. or himself.]” I.C. § 35-

42-4-3(b). On appeal, Fuchs challenges the identification evidence, arguing that 

K.S. was unable to state whether he was present in the courtroom. 

[13] At Fuchs’ trial, referring to Fuchs by his first name—i.e., Jonathan—the State 

asked K.S. the following questions 

Q. And do you know a person named Jonathon [sic] Fuchs? . . . 

A. Yes.

* * *

Q. Okay. Now how do you know Jonathon [sic] Fuchs?

A. Well I met him first thing whenever he came over at our 

house.

Q. And, whose house was that?

A. My mom’s.

Q. And do you see the person you know as Jonathon Fuchs 

sitting in the courtroom today?
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A. No, not right now.

Q. Okay. Now, did Jonathon, when Jonathon lived at your 

mom’s house, what color bedroom did he stay in?

A. A blue one.

(Tr. Vol. II, p. 77). Based on K.S.’ response that he could not state whether

Fuchs was present in the courtroom, Fuchs posits that the evidence was 

insufficient to support his child molesting convictions. In advancing his claim, 

Fuchs relies on J.Y. v. State, 816 N.E.2d 909 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. 

[14] In J.Y., the victim, an African-American eight-year-old girl, was riding her bike 

in the alley behind her house in South Bend, Indiana, when she encountered 

two Caucasian, teenage boys who were brothers. Id. at 911. One or both of the 

boys forced the victim into a van parked off of the alley. Id. Inside the van, the 

younger brother removed the victim’s clothes, began to rub his penis on the 

outside of the victim’s vagina, and ejaculated onto her abdomen and the van’s 

seat cushion. Id. During that time, the older brother was standing right outside 

the van. Id. When the younger brother exited the van, the older brother 

entered the van and began rubbing his penis on the outside of the victim’s 

vagina. Id. The victim shouted out “No!,” and the boy stopped without 

ejaculating. Id. The victim then exited the van and went home. Id. During an 

interview, the victim described the boys as Caucasian, teenage brothers, one of 

whom she thought was named Michael. Id. The police determined that three 

Caucasian, teenage brothers—T.Y., J.Y., and C.L.Y.—lived in the house 
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behind which the van was parked. Id. at 912. The police compiled a photo 

array consisting of six pictures, three of which were photos of the brothers. Id. 

The victim identified J.Y. and C.L.Y. from the array. Id. The police also 

located two semen stains in the van. Id. DNA testing revealed that C.L.Y. was 

the source of the semen. Id. The State subsequently filed delinquency petitions 

against J.Y. and C.L.Y., alleging two Counts of child molesting, one as a Class 

B felony and one as a Class C felony when committed by an adult. Id. At the 

factfinding hearings, the victim was not able to identify J.Y. or C.L.Y. as her 

assailants in court. Id. However, she was able to testify that they lived in a 

green house, and she identified a photograph of their house. Id. At the close of 

the evidence, J.Y. and C.L.Y. were adjudicated as delinquents. Id. J.Y. and 

C.L.Y. filed separate appeals. 

[15] In J.Y.’s appeal, we determined that the photo array was impermissibly 

suggestive because there were remarkable differences in appearance between 

J.Y. and his brothers and the other three boys, including their clothing and 

demeanor, and the difference in the quality and composition. Id. at 915. As 

such, we concluded that the juvenile court abused its discretion when it 

permitted the victim’s out-of-court identification of J.Y. into evidence. Id. 

Further, we found that the remaining evidence, including the fact that the 

victim had been unable to state whether J.Y. and C.L.Y. were present in the 

court room and the DNA evidence of the semen which only supported a 

reasonable inference that J.Y. could have been one of the two boys who might 

have committed the offense, was insufficient to prove that J.Y. was one of the 
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perpetrators. Id. at 916-17. Therefore, we reversed the adjudication of J.Y. as a 

delinquent. 

[16] In C.L.Y.’s appeal, however, we reached a different conclusion. Specifically, 

we determined that even if the suggestive photo array was not considered, the 

victims’ description of the perpetrators and their house, along with the presence 

of C.L.Y.’s semen in the van, was sufficient to prove that C.L.Y. was one of the 

perpetrators. C.L.Y. v. State, 816 N.E.2d 894, 904 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. 

denied. 

[17] Relying on the holding espoused in J.Y., Fuchs then argues 

The same result is required in this case. Although it is true that 

K.S. used Fuchs’s name at trial, it was done first at the prompting 

of the deputy prosecuting attorney. [] Most importantly, K.S. 

testified that the person K.S. referred to as “Jonathan” was not 

present in the courtroom. [] The State made no other effort to 

ask K.S. whether the perpetrator was present in the courtroom, 

or to ask K.S. for a physical description of the perpetrator. 

(Appellant’s Br. pp. 14-15). 

[18] Turning to the present facts, we find J.Y. easily distinguishable and C.LY. more 

persuasive to the facts at hand. Unlike J.Y. and similar to C.L.Y., the State 

presented other corroborating evidence of Fuchs’ identity, and additional 

evidence connecting Fuchs to the crimes in question. During his interview with 

the police, Fuchs claimed that before he moved in at Mother’s house, he would 

visit frequently, and sometimes, he would spend the night. Prior to K.S.’
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testimony that he was unable to locate Fuchs in the courtroom, K.S. stated that 

he first encountered “Jonathan Fuchs . . . whenever he came over at our 

house.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 77). K.S. indicated that the house he was referring to 

was Mother’s home, and that Fuchs occupied the blue bedroom after moving 

in. Mother corroborated K.S.’ testimony. 

[19] During his interview with the police, Fuchs stated that while he lived at K.S.’ 

house, he would sometimes “snuggle” with K.S., and also play with K.S. either 

in his bedroom or in K.S.’ bedroom closet building fortresses. (State’s Exh. 1R 

at 06:35). Additionally, Fuchs stated that he helped K.S. with his baths and 

would use a wash cloth to clean K.S.’ penis. Notwithstanding Fuchs’ claim 

that K.S. needed help with his baths, Mother testified that K.S. “could do most 

of . . . his bathing by himself” and “only needed help rinsing.” (Tr. Vol. III, p. 

33). Mother then testified that she was not always present when Fuchs 

provided care for K.S. 

[20] When the State showed K.S. drawings of the front and back sides of a boy and 

asked K.S. to circle the body part which he was referring to as his private part, 

K.S. circled the boys’ genitalia. When asked to detail the events that occurred 

in the blue bedroom, K.S. testified that while he was under the blanket “in 

Jonathon’s [sic] bedroom,” Fuchs sucked his private part. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 80).

K.S. additionally stated that at another instance, Fuchs led him to his bedroom 

closet and revealed his penis to him. When asked “whose idea was it for you to 

see [Fuchs’] private part in the closet,” K.S. responded, “Jon’s.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 

82). K.S. described Fuchs’ genitalia having “red dots and [] black hair,” (Tr. 
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Vol. II, p. 81). After Fuchs exposed his penis to K.S., he proceeded to pull 

down K.S.’ pants and then he touched K.S.’ penis. K.S. indicated that his 

entire family was “probably downstairs” when the incidents occurred. (Tr. Vol. 

II, p. 88). K.S. also testified that Fuchs requested him to keep his actions 

“secret.” (Tr. Vol. II 86). However, when he finally disclosed the molestation 

to Girlfriend, he “knew it was the right thing to do.” (Tr. Vol. II, p.92).

[21] Here, we find that this is not a case in which the only evidence linking the 

assailant to the scene was the victim’s use of assailant’s first name, as occurred 

in J.Y. Notwithstanding K.S.’ inability to state if Fuchs was present in the 

courtroom, the State offered extensive corroborating evidence of probative 

value regarding the identity of Fuchs. K.S. testified that he knew Fuchs before 

he moved into Mother’s home, and after Fuchs moved in, Fuchs occupied the 

blue bedroom. Indeed, Girlfriend testified that Fuchs was the “only Jonathan 

Fuchs” that K.S. knew at the relevant time period, and following the body 

safety talk, K.S. disclosed to her that Fuchs had molested him. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 

101). 

[22] The State also presented evidence that Fuchs was able to spend time alone with 

K.S., which provided Fuchs with the opportunity to commit the crimes. In 

light of the foregoing, we conclude that there was sufficient corroborating 

evidence of probative value regarding the identity of Fuchs to convict Fuchs of 

one Count of child molesting as a Level 1 felony, and one Count of child 

molesting as a Level 4 felony. 
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II. Inappropriate Sentence

[23] Fuchs also contends that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of 

the offenses and his character. Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) empowers us to 

independently review and revise sentences authorized by statute if, after due 

consideration, we find the trial court’s decision inappropriate in light of the 

nature of the offense and the character of the offender. Reid v. State, 876 N.E.2d 

1114, 1116 (Ind. 2007). The “nature of offense” compares the defendant’s 

actions with the required showing to sustain a conviction under the charged 

offense, while the “character of the offender” permits a broader consideration of 

the defendant’s character. Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1224 (Ind. 2008); 

Douglas v. State, 878 N.E.2d 873, 881 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). An appellant bears 

the burden of showing that both prongs of the inquiry favor a revision of his 

sentence. Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1080 (Ind. 2006). Whether we 

regard a sentence as appropriate at the end of the day turns on our sense of the 

culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to 

others, and a myriad of other considerations that come to light in a given case. 

Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1224. Our court focuses on “the length of the aggregate 

sentence and how it is to be served.” Id. 

[24] The advisory sentence is the starting point the legislature has selected as an 

appropriate sentence for the crime committed. Abbott v. State, 961 N.E.2d 1016, 

1019 (Ind. 2012). For his Level 1 felony child molesting, Fuchs faced a 

sentencing range of twenty to forty years, with the advisory sentence being 

thirty years. I.C. § 35-50-2-4. The trial court sentenced Fuchs to thirty-four 
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years. For his Level 4 felony child molesting conviction, Fuchs faced a 

sentencing range of two to twelve years, with the advisory sentence being six 

years. I.C. § 35-50-2-5.5. The trial court sentenced Fuchs to a consecutive 

eight-year term, for an aggregate sentence of forty-two years, with ten years 

were suspended to probation. 

[25] Turning to the nature of his offenses, in the summer of 2016, Fuchs moved into 

Mother’s home. During his interview with the police, Fuchs claimed that while 

residing at Mother’s home, he assumed a caregiving role to K.S. and K.S.’ 

siblings. Indeed, Mother had no reservations leaving K.S. and her other 

children in the care of Fuchs. In a span of two months, Fuchs appears to have 

groomed K.S. by buying him toys, taking him to restaurants, playing video 

games with him, and building forts in the bedroom closet. After Fuchs gained 

K.S.’ trust, he began molesting him. One time when K.S. was in Fuchs’ 

bedroom, Fuchs pulled down K.S.’ pants and used using his mouth to perform 

oral sex on K.S. K.S. also described another incident where Fuchs led him to 

the closet, where Fuchs revealed his penis to him, and thereafter Fuchs touched

his penis. 

[26] Concerning the character of the offender, Fuchs claims that he “has a strong 

work history,” has maintained “steady employment ever since graduating high 

school,” has “contributed to his community, volunteering as a soccer coach for 

many years,” and “[p]erhaps most importantly, [he] has absolutely no criminal 

history.” (Appellant’s Br. pp. 17-18) (italics in original). While fashioning 

Fuchs’ sentence, the trial court considered all these mitigating factors; however, 
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the trial court was “troubled” by the fact that Fuchs abused his position of trust 

with K.S. by molesting a vulnerable child. who was autistic and had behavioral

problems. Fuchs’ acts of molesting a young child over whom he had a position 

of trust reflects poorly on his character, and that fact does not convince us that 

his sentences are inappropriate. 

[27] Fuchs further argues that the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentences 

was inappropriate. The decision to impose consecutive sentences lies within 

the discretion of the trial court. Gross v. State, 22 N.E.3d 863, 869 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2014), trans. denied. A trial court is required to state its reasons for 

imposing consecutive sentences. Id. Moreover, a single aggravating 

circumstance may justify the imposition of consecutive sentences. Gilliam v. 

State, 901 N.E.2d 72, 74 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). Here, the trial court found not 

just one, but a number of aggravating circumstances, including the fact that 

Fuchs was aware that K.S. had autism and behavioral problems; Fuchs held a 

position of trust with K.S. when he molested K.S.; and the overall seriousness 

of his crimes. 

[28] Fuchs contends that his case compares favorably to Rivers v. State, 915 N.E.2d 

141, 143 (Ind. 2009), where Rivers was convicted of two Counts of Class A 

felony child molesting and one Count of Class C felony child molesting for 

molesting his seven-or-eight-year-old niece on two occasions. The trial court 

imposed consecutive thirty-year, advisory terms for the Class A convictions and 

a concurrent four-year term on the Class C felony conviction for a total of sixty 

years. Id. The supreme court, in examining Rivers’ character, noted that he 
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had no criminal history, maintained steady employment, and served as a father 

figure to the victim for a number of years before committing his crimes. Id. 

The victim also testified “that her relationship with Rivers was good and that 

the two of them did a lot of family activities together prior to his crimes.” Id. 

Regarding the nature of the offenses, our supreme court noted that “[t]he record 

does not indicate his crimes occurred over a long period of time, however, or 

that there was any other sexual misconduct on Rivers’ part. Rather, the record 

indicates Rivers molested [the victim] on two occasions (charged as three) in a 

relatively short period of time. . . .” Id. at 144. As such, the supreme court 

concluded that Rivers’ convictions should run concurrently rather than 

consecutively. Id.

[29] In exercising our power to review and revise sentences, we may compare 

sentences of those convicted of the same or similar offenses, although such 

comparison is not required. Corbally v. State, 5 N.E.3d 463, 471-72 (Ind. Ct.

App. 2014). Although the defendant in Rivers, like Fuchs, did not commit the 

crimes over a long period of time, did not commit any other sexual misconduct, 

and only molested his victim on two occasions, Fuchs did not stop on his own 

accord. See Rivers, 915 N.E.2d at 144. The defendant in Rivers molested his 

victim twice and stopped, with no other occurrence for seven years; whereas,

Fuchs was prevented from committing another offense after K.S. disclosed the 

molestations to Girlfriend and a police investigation ensued. Here, we 

conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing consecutive 
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sentences. In sum, we conclude that Fuchs’ aggregate term of forty-two years is 

not inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and his character. 

CONCLUSION 

[30] Based on the foregoing, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence to 

sustain Fuchs’ convictions, and his sentence is appropriate in light of the nature 

of the offenses and his character.

[31] Affirmed 

[32] Vaidik, C. J. and Kirsch, J. concur