In the 

Indiana Supreme Court

Arthur P. BAIRD, ) Supreme Court Cause No. 

 Petitioner, ) 54S00-0505-SD-240 

 ) 

 v. ) Montgomery Circuit Court 

) Cause No. CR85-66 

STATE of Indiana, ) 

 Respondent. ) 

ORDER CONCERNING SUCCESSIVE PETITION 

FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF IN CAPITAL CASE

Introduction 

 Petitioner Arthur P. Baird stands convicted of three counts of murder and sentenced to 

death after having completed the review to which he is entitled as a matter of right. Baird now 

requests permission to litigate additional collateral claims in state court, the primary focus of 

which is the claim he should not have been sentenced to death because he was mentally ill when 

he committed the murders. Because we conclude Baird has not shown a reasonable possibility 

he is entitled to relief, we deny his request. 

Background 

 On the evening of September 6, 1985, Baird strangled his pregnant wife, Nadine. In 

telephone conversations that evening, he lied to Nadine’s mother, telling her that Nadine was 

sick. The next morning, Baird stabbed and killed his parents, Kathryn and Arthur I. Baird was 

arrested the following day as he sat watching a baseball game. He confessed the killings to 

police, saying he had lost control and had just gone “berserk." Evidence showed Baird believed 

the federal government was about to pay him $1 million for his advice on how to solve the 

national debt, and that he had made plans to use the money to purchase a farm for $575,000, the 

closing for which was scheduled for September 7. In fact, Baird was in debt and had been laid 

off recently from a factory job. There was no evidence of any financial motive for the murders 

or of any bad relationship between Baird and the victims. 

 Various psychiatrists and other mental health professionals examined Baird. Baird 

described himself to them as having no motive in committing the murders. He told them that he 

had tried to resist the compulsion to kill but had been unable to overcome it. One psychiatrist 

opined that Baird had been legally insane when he committed the murders. The others opined 

that he had had the requisite capacity to appreciate the wrongful nature of his conduct. They all 

opined his ability to conform his actions to the requirements of the law had been impaired by a 

mental illness, though the precise nature of the illness was variously described. 

 Baird was charged with three counts of murder and one count of feticide. See I.C. § 35-

42-1-1(1) (murder) and I.C. § 35-42-1-6 (feticide). The State sought the death penalty, alleging 
the multiple murders as the aggravating factor that made Baird eligible. See I.C. § 35-50-2-

9(b)(8). He was offered a plea agreement that called for a term of years, but on the day 

scheduled for the hearing, he told the trial court he had changed his mind about accepting it. 

Trial Record at 600. 

 At the conclusion of the guilt phase of the trial, the jury rejected the options of finding 

Baird not guilty by reason of insanity or guilty but mentally ill. See Ind. Code § 35-41-3-6 (“A 

person is not responsible for having engaged in prohibited conduct if, as a result of mental 

disease or defect, he was unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of the conduct at the time of the 

offense); I.C. 35-36-1-1 (“‘Mentally ill’” means having a psychiatric disorder which 

substantially disturbs a person’s thinking, feeling, or behavior and impairs the person’s ability to 

function.”). Instead, the jury found Baird guilty as charged. 

 At the conclusion of the penalty phase, the jury unanimously recommended the death 

sentence be imposed for the murders of Baird’s mother and father, but recommended the death 

sentence not be imposed for the murder of his wife. See I.C. § 35-50-2-9(e) (providing that a 

jury may recommend the death penalty only if it finds the state has proved the aggravating 

circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt and that any mitigating circumstances are outweighed 

by the aggravating circumstance.). 

 The Montgomery Circuit Court followed the jury’s recommendation and sentenced Baird 

to death. The trial court also imposed a sixty-year sentence for the murder of Baird’s wife and 

an eight-year sentence for the feticide. 

 The convictions and sentences were affirmed at each stage of subsequent review. On 

direct appeal, we addressed at some length Baird’s argument that in sentencing him to death, the 

trial court had erred in refusing to consider two mitigating circumstances: whether Baird “was 

under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance when the murder was 

committed,” and whether his “capacity to appreciate criminality of [his] conduct or to conform 

that conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired as a result of mental disease 

or defect.” See I.C. § 35-50-2-9(c)(2) & (c)(6). We independently reweighed the aggravating 

and mitigating circumstances, and determined the death sentence was appropriate for the murder 

of Baird’s parents: 

[W]e are inclined to find that appellant's mental condition at the time of the 

murders of his parents is entitled to some mitigating value. The psychiatric 

evidence supports a determination that appellant has an obsessive-compulsive 

disorder. The testimony was uncontradicted that appellant sincerely believed that 

the federal government was going to give him one million dollars for his ideas on 

how to solve the country's economic problems, and that he and Nadine would use 

the money to purchase and equip a 253 acre farm. There was no basis in 

experience for this belief. At this time appellant had no income, was in debt, and 

Nadine was pregnant. Appellant was so obsessed with the idea of buying this 

farm that he set a closing date at which time he was to tender a $50,000 certified 

check, and as he finally realized that his grandiose plans would be exposed as a 

mere fantasy to the persons whose derision would be most destructive to him he 

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was compelled to protect himself from them. We find that appellant was under 

the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance when the murders were 

committed, but find this mitigating factor to be in the low range. We also find 

that the mitigating circumstances of appellant's regular employment, church 

participation, military service, law abiding nature, and good character in the 

community each to be in the low range. Appellant's lack of prior criminal history 

is a mitigating factor in the medium range. Upon review, we find that these 

mitigating circumstances as we have determined and evaluated them are 

outweighed by the sole aggravating circumstance, namely, the murders of 

Kathryn and Arthur Paul Baird, I, having already committed the murder of Nadine 

Baird, an aggravating circumstance in the highest range. Appellant's sentence is 

not arbitrary or capricious and is not manifestly unreasonable. 

Baird v. State, 604 N.E.2d 1170, 1182 (Ind. 1992), reh’g denied (1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 

893 (1993). In the post-conviction appeal, Baird claimed the jury would not have recommended 

the death penalty had it heard the opinion of another mental health expert that Baird suffered 

from a “delusional disorder” that rendered him unable to control his behavior, but we concluded: 

[E]ven if the jury, and this Court on direct appeal, did not know that “delusional 

disorders” as such existed, each was equipped with the facts of Baird’s bizarre 

conduct and with the psychiatrists’ conclusions that Baird was volitionally 

impaired. [The new testimony] simply does not mandate a new interpretation of 

the facts. . . . The testimony to which Baird points is cumulative not pathbreaking 

and provides no assurance that a different result would probably have been 

reached. Accordingly, Baird’s claim that the death sentence was excessive, 

disproportionate, or inappropriate is barred by res judicata, and the standard for 

revisiting the issue based on new evidence is not met. 

Baird v. State, 688 N.E.2d 911, 914-15 (Ind. 1997), reh’g denied (1998), cert. denied 525 U.S. 

849 (1998). We affirmed the trial court’s judgment denying relief. 

 

 The federal district court denied a petition for writ of habeas corpus in Baird v. Davis, 

No. TH 98-70-C-M/F (S.D. Ind. Jul. 17, 2003) (unpublished order), affirmed in Baird v. Davis, 

388 F.3d. 1110 (7th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. ____, 125 S.Ct. 1849 (Apr. 18, 2005). As 

to Baird’s mental illness, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals noted that the United States 

Supreme Court has not yet ruled out the execution of persons who kill under an irresistible 

impulse and has made clear that in balancing aggravating and mitigating circumstances, courts 

are not required to give any fixed weight to any particular mitigating circumstance. The majority 

view of that court also called Baird’s claim that we had overlooked the relevant mitigating 

circumstance in Indiana Code § 35-50-2-9(c)(6) as having no merit. 388 F.3d at 1117. 

 Baird has thus completed the review of the convictions and death sentence to which he is 

entitled as a matter of right. We have jurisdiction because Baird is sentenced to death. See Ind. 

Appellate Rule 4(A)(1)(a). 

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Indiana’s Post-Conviction Rules 

 As just indicated, Baird has already availed himself of our rule that permits a person 

convicted of a crime in an Indiana state court one collateral review of a conviction and sentence 

in a post-conviction proceeding. See Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1. To litigate another or 

“successive” post-conviction claim, Baird needs our permission. We will authorize such a 

proceeding to go forward only “if the petitioner establishes a reasonable possibility that the 

petitioner is entitled to post-conviction relief.” P-C.R. 1 (12)(b). In deciding whether Baird has 

made the required showing, we consider the applicable law, the petition, materials from his prior 

appeals and post-conviction proceedings including the record, briefs and court decisions, and any 

other material we deem relevant. See id. 

 Baird, by counsel, has filed a “Motion For Permission to Proceed on a Successive PostConviction Relief Petition,” and has tendered a “Proposed Successive Petition For PostConviction Relief.” The State filed its “Verified Response in Opposition to Motion for 

Permission to Proceed on a Successive Post-Conviction Relief Petition,” and Baird was allowed 

to file “Arthur Baird’s Reply.” 

 Baird’s lengthy, 71-page petition does not follow the form prescribed by our rules. See

P-C. R. 1 (12)(a); Appendix to Rule PC 1. In particular, the petition does not concisely state his 

claims and distilling them has been difficult, but we have endeavored to address them 

nevertheless. 

The Claims

1. Baird’s mental illness does not render the death sentence illegal. We discern 

Baird’s general claim to be that he should not have been sentenced to death because he was 

mentally ill when he committed the murders. As explained below, we conclude the claim is 

procedurally defaulted because it was not raised in his earlier appeals, is barred by the doctrine 

of res judicata because it has already been decided against him, or is without merit. We do not 

discern a claim that Baird is presently not competent to be executed, and in any event, Baird has 

not shown he would be entitled to such protection. 

a. Baird has not shown he is entitled to relief under international law. Baird claims 

that international treaties, agreements to which the United States is a party and customary 

international law prohibit death sentences for mentally ill persons. See Proposed Successive 

Petition (hereafter “Succ. Pet.”) at 12-16. This claim appears to have been available to Baird at 

least as early as his first post-conviction proceeding, and Baird provides no support for his 

assertion that it was not. See, e.g., Reply at 3. Though he cites some materials published after 

his state-court proceedings, the general tenor of those materials was widely available earlier and 

we are not convinced that international law on the subject of the execution of mentally ill persons 

has significantly changed since his earlier appeals to us. As such, this claim is procedurally 

defaulted. See Stevens v. State, 770 N.E.2d 739, 761 (Ind. 2002) (summarily denying prisoner’s 

challenge that Indiana’s lethal injection procedure violates international law; claim was 

procedurally defaulted in post-conviction proceedings because the claim had been available on 

direct appeal but not raised). 

4
 Even were we to consider this claim on the merits, we would conclude that Baird has not 

met the required showing of reasonable possibility of success. He cites three documents as 

prohibiting his execution: the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (the 

“Covenant”), the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (the “Declaration”), and the 

Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 

(“CAT”). None of these documents specifically discuss execution of mentally ill persons. In 

addition, prisoners like Baird lack standing to claim relief under the documents. See, e.g., Sosa 

v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, ___, 124 S.Ct. 2739, 2767 (2004) (holding that the 

Declaration does not of its own force impose obligations as a matter of international law, and 

though the Covenant is a binding source of international law, the United States ratified the 

Covenant on the express understanding that it did not itself create obligations enforceable in 

American courts). 

 b. Baird has not shown he is entitled to relief under the Eighth Amendment to the 

United States Constitution. Baird argues that sentencing to death a person who has a mental 

illness is contrary to the Constitution’s Eighth Amendment, which prohibits “cruel and unusual 

punishment.” See Succ. Pet. at 17-37. In his two prior appeals, we rejected various claims Baird 

raised that the death sentence was excessive, disproportionate, or inappropriate. See Baird v. 

State, 604 N.E.2d at 1182-84 (direct appeal); Baird v. State, 688 N.E.2d at 913-15 (postconviction appeal). To the extent Baird’s present claim is the same as those we have already 

decided, his present claim is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. See, e.g., Wallace v. State, 

820 N.E.2d 1261, 1263 (Ind. 2005); Stevens, 770 N.E.2d at 746. To the extent the claim was 

available to Baird in his prior proceedings but was not raised then, the claim is procedurally 

defaulted. See, e.g., Wallace, 820 N.E.2d at 1264; Stevens, 770 N.E.2d at 746. 

 What remains is Baird’s assertion that “evolving standards of decency,” “changes in the 

legal landscape,” and “the development of a national consensus” since his state-court 

proceedings are such that a death sentence now constitutes cruel and unusual punishment for a 

person with a mental illness. We conclude Baird has not met his burden of showing a reasonable 

possibility of relief on this claim. 

 The United States Supreme Court has held that a death sentence is an unconstitutional 

punishment for persons who are insane, see Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 410, 106 S.Ct. 

2595, ___ (1986), who are mentally retarded, Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321, 122 S.Ct. 

2242, 2252 (2002), and who are juveniles, see Roper v. Simmons, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 

1194 (2005). But as the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals noted, the Supreme Court “has not yet 

ruled out the execution of persons who kill under an irresistible impulse.” Baird v. Davis, 388 

F.3d at 1114. We decline to recognize a new exception under the Eighth Amendment in Baird’s 

case. 

 c. Baird has not shown he is entitled to relief under Indiana law. Baird argues that 

sentencing to death a person who suffers from a serious mental illness is contrary to Article I, 

section 16 of the Indiana Constitution, which states, in part, that “[c]ruel and unusual 

punishments shall not be inflicted” and “[a]ll penalties shall be proportioned to the nature of the 

offense.” See Succ. Pet. at 40-53. We have already considered and rejected the various claims 

Baird raised in his direct appeal and post-conviction appeal about whether the death sentence 

5
was excessive, disproportionate, or inappropriate. To the extent Baird’s present claim is the 

same as those we have previously decided, it is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. See, e.g., 

Wallace, 820 N.E.2d at 1263. To the extent the claim was available to Baird in those prior 

appeals but was not raised, the claim is procedurally defaulted. Id. at 1264. 

 As with his Eighth Amendment claim, what remains is Baird’s assertion that “evolving 

standards of decency,” “changes in the legal landscape,” and “the development of a consensus” 

in Indiana since his prior state-court proceedings are such that a death sentence for a person with 

a mental illness violates the state constitution. We conclude Baird has not met his burden of 

showing a reasonable possibility of relief on this claim. 

 Indiana’s death penalty scheme takes into account a person’s mental health, as Baird’s 

case demonstrates. A jury may decide the defendant is not guilty by reason of insanity or guilty 

but mentally ill. Once convicted, a defendant’s mental status is considered again in the penalty 

phase as a mitigating circumstance. See I.C. § 35-50-2-9(c). In Harris v. State, 499 N.E.2d 723, 

727 (Ind. 1986), this Court held that sentencing to death a defendant found guilty but mentally ill 

was not unconstitutional. A more recent decision noted that no other defendant who had been 

found guilty but mentally ill had been sentenced to death. See Prowell v. State, 741 N.E.2d 704, 

718 n.8 (Ind. 2001). But this fact does not render Baird’s death sentence unconstitutional. In 

any event, Baird’s jury rejected the option of finding him guilty but mentally ill. See also 

Corcoran v. State, 774 N.E.2d 495 (Ind. 2002) (affirming death sentence on direct appeal for 

quadruple killing by defendant diagnosed with schizotypal personality disorder; rejecting 

argument that death sentence was manifestly unreasonable). We decline to decide that 

developments since Harris render the death penalty unconstitutional for Baird. 

 

 2. Baird was not abandoned by counsel in his first post-conviction proceeding. 

Baird claims his attorney made two mistakes during the first post-conviction proceeding by 

failing: (a) to argue that we had not considered the mitigating circumstances in Indiana Code § 

35-50-2-9(c)(6); and (b) to challenge whether jurors might have allowed their own knowledge of 

Baird to influence their decision to sentence him to death. 

 Because Baird challenges the performance of his post-conviction attorney, his claims are 

subject to Graves v. State, 823 N.E.2d 1193, 1195-97 (Ind. 2005). In Graves, we discussed the 

multiple safeguards concerning counsel for criminal defendants, and noted that post-conviction 

proceedings, which are not criminal actions, need not be conducted under the same standards for 

trial and appellate counsel stated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 

L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Instead, we reiterated that the standard is whether "counsel in fact appeared 

and represented the petitioner in a procedurally fair setting which resulted in a judgment of the 

court,” and we reaffirmed our prior holding that a claim of defective performance in a postconviction proceeding “poses no cognizable grounds for post-conviction relief.” Graves, 823 

N.E.2d at 1196 (noting however, that a contention that petitioner’s post-conviction counsel did 

not provide adequate legal assistance could provide a prisoner with a basis for replying to a state 

claim of prior adjudication or abuse of process). 

 a. Our consideration of mitigating circumstances. Baird claims his post-conviction 

counsel was ineffective because counsel failed to direct our attention to the mitigating 

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circumstance in Indiana Code § 35-50-2-9(c)(6), as a result of which, Baird asserts, we failed to 

consider the evidence that Baird had been unable to conform his conduct to the requirements of 

the law when he murdered his parents. See Succ. Pet. at 55-64. 

 Counsel appeared for Baird in the post-conviction proceeding and filed a 98-page brief in 

the appeal that followed, much of which was devoted to arguing the death sentence was error. 

Clearly, Baird was not abandoned by counsel. Under the standard discussed in Graves, he has no 

cognizable claim. 

 To the extent Baird asserts a free-standing claim that we committed error by not 

considering the (c)(6) mitigator, the claim is procedurally defaulted for not having been raised in 

the direct appeal or the post-conviction appeal. See, e.g., Conner v. State, 829 N.E.2d 21, 24 

(Ind. 2005); Stevens, 770 N.E.2d at 746. 

 This claim is also barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The Seventh Circuit majority 

expressly rejected it as having no merit. See Baird v. Davis, 388 F.3d at 1117. We addressed the 

propriety of Baird’s sentence and discussed the evidence that Baird was “volitionally impaired” 

at some length in both appeals. See Baird v. State, 604 N.E.2d at 1182-84 (direct appeal); Baird 

v. State, 688 N.E.2d at 913-14 (post-conviction). We did not exclude consideration of the (c)(6) 

mitigating circumstance. Rather, we gave that circumstance less weight than Baird advocated. 

To the extent Baird requests that we review his sentence again, we decline. 

b. Jurors who knew or may have known Baird from work. Baird asserts that jurors 

who had worked for the same company as Baird (or were married to people who had) may have 

had information about Baird’s behavior that may have influenced their reaction to the evidence 

concerning Baird’s mental health and this information may have been shared with other jurors 

during deliberations. See Succ. Pet. at 64-69. Baird claims post-conviction counsel’s failure to 

investigate and raise this claim denied him a procedurally fair post-conviction proceeding. 

 Baird fails to state a cognizable claim under Graves. Baird’s petition shows that postconviction counsel investigated a potential claim of this nature by contacting at least one of the 

jurors. That counsel chose not to present claims counsel believed would not likely prevail is 

neither abandonment by counsel nor did that decision deprive Baird of a procedurally fair postconviction proceeding. Cf. Bieghler v. State, 690 N.E.2d 188, 194 (Ind. 1997) (“[T]he reviewing 

court should be particularly sensitive to the need for separating the wheat from the chaff in 

appellate advocacy, and should not find deficient performance when counsel’s choice of some 

issues over others was reasonable in light of the facts of the case and the precedent available to 

counsel when that choice was made.”) To the extent Baird’s highly speculative claim includes 

the performance of trial or appellate counsel, the claim is procedurally defaulted. See Stevens, 

770 N.E.2d at 746. 

Conclusion 

 Baird has not met his burden of establishing a reasonable possibility that he is entitled to 

post-conviction relief. Accordingly, we decline to authorize the filing of a successive petition for 

post-conviction relief. A date for execution of the death sentence will be set by separate order. 

7
 The Clerk is directed to send a copy of this order to all counsel of record and to West 

Group for publication in the bound volumes of this Court’s decisions. 

Done at Indianapolis, Indiana, this 19th day of July, 2005. 

/s/Randall T. Shepard 

 Chief Justice of Indiana 

Shepard, C.J., and Dickson, Sullivan and Boehm, JJ., concur. 

Rucker, J., concurs with separate opinion. 

Rucker, J., concurring. 

Largely for the reasons the majority expresses, I concur with the decision to deny Baird’s 

request to file a successive petition for post-conviction relief. I write separately only to 

emphasize that Baird makes no claim based on his present mental state. I continue to believe 

that a sentence of death is inappropriate for a person suffering a severe mental illness. See

Corcoran v. State, 774 N.E.2d 495, 502 (Ind. 2002) (Rucker, J., dissenting). However, nowhere 

in his lengthy petition does Baird contend that he is now mentally ill and thus should not receive 

the ultimate penal sanction. Instead, Baird makes a variety of claims based on his mental illness 

at the time of the murders. But some of these claims already have been decided against Baird in 

earlier appeals. And others could have been raised in those same appeals but were not. In either 

event they are not now available for collateral review. With this additional understanding, I 

agree Baird has not met his burden of establishing there is a reasonable possibility that he is 

entitled to post-conviction relief. 

8