United States Department of Labor

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

__________________________________________

B.W., Appellant

and

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, 

INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, 

Los Angeles, CA, Employer

__________________________________________

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Docket No. 18-0949

Issued: July 23, 2019

Appearances: Case Submitted on the Record

Appellant, pro se

Office of Solicitor, for the Director

DECISION AND ORDER

Before:

CHRISTOPHER J. GODFREY, Chief Judge

ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Alternate Judge

VALERIE D. EVANS-HARRELL, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION

On April 4, 2018 appellant filed a timely appeal from a December 18, 2017 merit decision 

of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). Pursuant to the Federal Employees’

Compensation Act1(FECA) and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the Board has jurisdiction over 

the merits of this case.

ISSUES

The issues are: (1) whether OWCP has met its burden of proof to terminate appellant’s 

wage-loss compensation and medical benefits effective January 10, 2017 as she no longer had

residuals or disability casually related to her accepted employment injury; and (2) whether 

appellant has met her burden of proof to establish residuals or continuing disability due to her 

accepted employment injury on or after January 10, 2017.

 

1 5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.
2

FACTUAL HISTORY

On September 1, 1988 appellant, then a 48-year-old secretary, filed an occupational disease 

claim (Form CA-2) alleging that she sustained a stress-related condition due to factors of her 

federal employment including hearing male coworkers making comments of a sexual and sexist 

nature. She indicated that she first became aware of her claimed condition on May 15, 1988 and 

first became aware of its relation to her federal employment on June 20, 1988. Appellant stopped 

work on June 8, 1988.

OWCP accepted appellant’s claim for depressive reaction.2 In reaching its determination, 

it accepted several compensable employment factors including that some of the men in appellant’s 

work group and a nearby group (including appellant’s manager) made remarks and jokes that were 

of a sexual nature or were demeaning to women.3

The case record contains a limited amount of medical records from the late 1980s through 

the early 2000s regarding the treatment of appellant’s psychiatric condition. In the early 1990s, 

appellant began to treat with Dr. Irvin D. Godofsky, a Board-certified psychiatrist. In an 

October 15, 1991 report, Dr. Godofsky indicated that appellant’s employment-related depressive 

condition had been compounded by nonwork-related conditions, including bipolar disorder, 

alcoholism (now in remission), and personality disorder (mixed) with schizotypal and narcissistic 

features.

Dr. Godofsky continued to treat appellant throughout the 1990s and into the early 2000s. 

In a report dated November 22, 2004, he noted that appellant was suffering from depressive 

disorder with atypical features, alcohol abuse (in remission), personality disorder (not otherwise 

specified), and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Dr. Godofsky noted that appellant’s 

condition was chronic and recurring with periods of relative remission and periods of significant 

relapse and dysfunction. He discussed appellant’s difficulties with tolerating relationships with 

supervisors or “authority.” Dr. Godofsky indicated that he did not believe that appellant or anyone 

could return to the premorbid state after suffering from a severe depressive disorder complicated 

by a serious personality disorder for over 16 years. He opined that appellant would not be 

psychologically capable of functioning in a work or vocational rehabilitation setting. 

Dr. Godofsky indicated that appellant had tried and failed to function in at least three nonstressful 

volunteer jobs over the years.

In a November 11, 2008 report, Dr. Godofsky noted that appellant was suffering from 

depressive disorder with atypical features, alcohol abuse (in remission), personality disorder (not 

otherwise specified), and PTSD. He explained that the PTSD condition was related to childhood 

trauma which was compounded by a physically and emotionally abusive marriage and which was 

“magnified and made chronic by the trauma the patient experienced while working for the 

[employing establishment].” Dr. Godofsky continued to find that appellant was disabled from all 

work.

 

2 OWCP began to pay appellant appropriate wage-loss compensation on the periodic rolls.

3 OWCP also accepted employment factors with respect to appellant’s seeking of medical treatment in 

February 1988 and a May 16, 1988 meeting regarding complaints of sexual harassment in the workplace.
3

In an August 25, 2008 report, Dr. Godofsky reported that appellant was suffering from 

recurrent major depressive disorder of moderate severity, PTSD, alcohol abuse (in remission), and 

personality disorder (not otherwise specified). He indicated that appellant’s PTSD was magnified 

and made chronic by “trauma” she experienced while working for the employing establishment. 

Dr. Godofsky continued to find that appellant was totally disabled. 

In August 2016 OWCP referred appellant for a second opinion examination to

Dr. Edward R. Ritvo, a Board-certified psychiatrist. It requested that he provide an opinion 

regarding whether appellant continued to have residuals or disability causally related to her 

accepted employment condition of depressive reaction. 

In a September 28, 2016 report, Dr. Ritvo detailed appellant’s factual and medical history. 

He provided summaries of reports which described the treatment of her multiple psychiatric 

problems over the years. Dr. Ritvo detailed the findings of the evaluation he conducted noting 

appellant reported that sometimes she became depressed, but that she was currently taking the 

medication Duloxetine which she felt was helpful. Appellant indicated that she had her own 

apartment and was able to take care of all her basic needs. Dr. Ritvo noted that appellant drove 

her own car and had friends with whom she attended movies and plays. He advised that appellant 

denied delusions, hallucinations, morbid mood changes, suicidal ideation, and any evidence of 

psychosis. During the evaluation, appellant made good eye contact and exhibited coherent thought 

processes. Dr. Ritvo felt that appellant was pleasant and friendly during the evaluation and he 

observed that she showed no signs of anxiety or depression. 

Dr. Ritvo provided a diagnosis of major depressive order, resolved. He noted that appellant 

had been in psychiatric treatment for many years, but apparently had responded well to such 

treatment. In response to a question regarding whether appellant continued to suffer from the 

depressive reaction as a result of the compensable factors of her former federal employment,

Dr. Ritvo responded, “The claimant has minimal if any residual symptoms of depression at this 

time.” He indicated that appellant was capable of working and noted that, given her apparent 

ability to function appropriately in her daily activities, she did not presently appear to be disabled. 

Dr. Ritvo advised that appellant did not appear to have any work-related limitations at that time. 

In an attached work capacity evaluation psychiatric/psychological conditions (Form OWCP-5a) 

dated October 5, 2016, he noted that appellant could perform her usual job on a full-time basis.

In a letter dated October 18, 2016, OWCP advised appellant of its proposed termination of 

her wage-loss compensation and medical benefits because she ceased to have residuals or disability 

causally related to her accepted employment injury. It informed her that the proposed termination 

action was based on the September 28, 2016 report of Dr. Ritvo, OWCP’s referral physician. 

OWCP afforded appellant 30 days to submit evidence or argument to challenge the proposed 

action. Appellant did not submit any evidence or argument within the allotted period.

By decision dated January 10, 2017, OWCP terminated appellant’s wage-loss 

compensation and medical benefits effective January 10, 2017 as she no longer had residuals or 

disability causally related to her accepted employment injury. It found that the weight of the 

medical evidence with respect to employment-related residuals/disability rested with the 

September 28, 2016 report of the referral physician, Dr. Ritvo.
4

On December 8, 2017 appellant requested reconsideration of the January 10, 2017 

decision.

Appellant submitted a November 17, 2017 report from Dr. Godofsky who advised that it 

remained his opinion that appellant continued to suffer from major depressive disorder, PTSD, and 

personality disorder (unspecified). He indicated that the major depressive disorder was a chronic, 

recurrent condition of “exacerbation and remission over a lifetime.” Dr. Godofsky noted that

Dr. Ritvo’s September 28, 2016 report was based on the day he spent with appellant in 

September 2016 while she was in a period of remission. He believed that Dr. Ritvo disregarded 

the years of ongoing experience he had with appellant throughout which he documented 

appellant’s recurrent exacerbations of depression, somatization, anxiety, and detachment. 

Dr. Godofsky posited that these recurrences were triggered by stressors that often replicated the 

trauma she experienced at the employing establishment of not being “heard” and being treated in 

ways that left her feeling helpless and demeaned.

By decision dated December 18, 2017, OWCP denied modification of its January 10, 2017 

decision, noting that appellant had not submitted medical evidence after the January 10, 2017 

termination action establishing that she had continuing residuals/disability of her accepted 

employment injury on or after January 10, 2017. 

LEGAL PRECEDENT -- ISSUE 1

Under FECA, once OWCP has accepted a claim it has the burden of justifying termination 

or modification of compensation benefits.4 OWCP may not terminate compensation without 

establishing that the disability ceased or that it was no longer related to the employment.5 Its

burden of proof includes the necessity of furnishing rationalized medical opinion evidence based 

on a proper factual and medical background.6

ANALYSIS -- ISSUE 1

The Board finds that OWCP met its burden of proof to terminate appellant’s wage-loss

compensation benefits effective January 10, 2017, but it has not met its burden of proof to 

terminate her medical benefits effective January 10, 2017.

The Board finds that the weight of the medical evidence with respect to whether appellant 

has employment-related disability is represented by the opinion of Dr. Ritvo, OWCP’s referral 

physician. The September 28, 2016 report of Dr. Ritvo establishes that appellant had no disability 

due to her accepted employment injury, depressive reaction, after January 10, 2017. 

 

4 L.L., Docket No. 18-1426 (issued April 5, 2019); C.C., Docket No. 17-1158 (issued November 20, 2018); I.J., 59 

ECAB 408 (2008); Vivien L. Minor, 37 ECAB 541 (1986).

5 A.D., Docket No. 18-0497 (issued July 25, 2018). In general the term disability under FECA means incapacity 

because of injury in employment to earn the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of such injury. See 

20 C.F.R. § 10.5(f).

6 See R.P., Docket No. 17-1133 (issued January 18, 2018).
5

In his September 28, 2016 report, Dr. Ritvo advised that appellant denied delusions, 

hallucinations, morbid mood changes, suicidal ideation, and any evidence of psychosis. During 

the evaluation, appellant made good eye contact and exhibited coherent thought processes. 

Dr. Ritvo felt that appellant was pleasant and friendly during the evaluation and he observed that 

she showed no signs of anxiety or depression. He provided a diagnosis of major depressive order, 

resolved. In response to a question regarding whether appellant continued to suffer from the 

depressive reaction as a result of the compensable factors of her former federal employment,

Dr. Ritvo responded, “The claimant has minimal if any residual symptoms of depression at this

time.” He indicated that appellant was capable of working and noted that, given her apparent 

ability to function appropriately in her daily activities, she did not presently appear to be disabled. 

Dr. Ritvo advised that appellant did not appear to have any work-related limitations at the present 

time and, in an attached October 5, 2016 form report, he noted that appellant could perform her 

usual job on a full-time basis.

The Board has reviewed the opinion of Dr. Ritvo and notes that it has reliability, probative 

value, and convincing quality with respect to its conclusions regarding appellant’s employmentrelated disability. Dr. Ritvo provided a thorough factual and medical history and accurately 

summarized the relevant medical evidence. He provided medical rationale for his opinion 

regarding appellant’s employment-related disability by explaining that he saw nothing in the 

medical history or his direct evaluation of appellant to show that she had continuing disability due 

to the accepted employment injury.

7

For these reasons, OWCP has met its burden of proof to terminate appellant’s wage-loss

compensation effective January 10, 2017. 

The Board further finds that Dr. Ritvo’s September 28, 2016 report does not contain a clear 

opinion that appellant ceased to have residuals of her accepted employment injury as he advised 

that appellant had some, albeit minor, residuals of this employment injury. 

Appellant relied upon the medical opinions of Dr. Godofsky. However, the case record 

does not contain a medical evaluation of appellant’s psychiatric condition which is 

contemporaneous with the September 28, 2016 evaluation by Dr. Ritvo. The last prior evaluation 

occurred more than two years prior, i.e., the August 25, 2014 evaluation of Dr. Godofsky. In 

addition, although Dr. Godofsky referenced “trauma” at the employing establishment in his 

August 25, 2014 report, he did not provide a clear opinion that appellant continued to have 

residuals/disability causally related to the accepted condition of depressive reaction.8

Therefore, the Board finds that OWCP has not met its burden of proof to terminate 

appellant’s medical benefits effective January 10, 2017.

 

7 See W.C., Docket No. 18-1386 (issued January 22, 2019); Melvina Jackson, 38 ECAB 443 (1987) (regarding the 

importance, when assessing medical evidence, of such factors as a physician’s knowledge of the facts and medical 

history, and the care of analysis manifested and the medical rationale expressed in support of the physician’s opinion).

8 See L.B., Docket No. 18-0533 (issued August 27, 2018) (finding that medical evidence which does not offer an 

opinion regarding the cause of an employee’s condition/disability is of no probative value on the issue of causal 

relationship).
6

LEGAL PRECEDENT -- ISSUE 2

After termination or modification of compensation benefits, clearly warranted on the basis 

of the evidence, the burden for reinstating compensation benefits shifts to the claimant.9 In order 

to prevail, the claimant must establish by the weight of the reliable, probative, and substantial 

evidence that he or she had an employment-related disability which continued after termination of 

compensation benefits.10

ANALYSIS -- ISSUE 2

The Board finds that appellant has not met her burden of proof to establish residuals or 

continuing disability due to her accepted employment injury on or after January 10, 2017.11

After OWCP’s January 10, 2017 decision terminating appellant’s compensation effective 

the same date, appellant submitted additional medical evidence to show she was entitled to wageloss compensation after January 10, 2017 due to her accepted employment injury. Given that the 

Board has found that OWCP properly relied on the opinion of Dr. Ritvo in terminating appellant’s 

wage-loss compensation effective January 10, 2017, the burden shifts to appellant to establish that 

she is entitled to wage-loss compensation after that date. The Board has reviewed the additional 

evidence submitted by appellant and notes that it is not of sufficient probative value to establish 

that she had disability due to her accepted employment injury after January 10, 2017.

Appellant submitted a November 17, 2017 report from Dr. Godofsky who advised that it 

remained his opinion that appellant continued to suffer from major depressive disorder, PTSD, and 

personality disorder (unspecified). He noted that Dr. Ritvo’s September 28, 2016 report was based 

on the day he spent with appellant in September 2016, while she was in a period of remission, and 

he believed that the report disregarded the years that appellant had recurrent exacerbations of 

depression, somatization, anxiety, and detachment. Dr. Godofsky posited that these recurrences 

were triggered by stressors that often replicated the trauma she experienced at the employing 

establishment of not being “heard” and being treated in ways that left her feeling helpless and 

demeaned.

The Board finds that Dr. Godofsky’s November 17, 2017 report is of limited probative 

value on the underlying issue of this case because he failed to provide adequate medical rationale 

in support of his opinion on causal relationship. Dr. Godofsky did not provide any discussion of 

the specific condition for which appellant’s claim was accepted, i.e., depressive reaction which 

was caused by several factors including exposure to sexual and sexist comments in the workplace. 

He made general references to “trauma” from her experience in the workplace, but he did not 

discuss specific findings on examination or diagnostic testing which supported his ostensible 

opinion that appellant had continuing residuals or disability from a condition which was suffered 

almost 30 years prior. The Board has held that a medical report is of limited probative value on the 

 

9 C.V., Docket No. 17-1159 (issued April 6, 2018); Wentworth M. Murray, 7 ECAB 570, 572 (1955).

10 Id.

11 For the reasons described above, OWCP did not meet its burden of proof to terminate appellant’s medical benefits 

effective January 10, 2017. Therefore, it is not necessary to discuss appellant’s entitlement to medical benefits when 

addressing the second issue of the case.
7

issue of causal relationship if it contains a conclusion regarding causal relationship which is 

unsupported by medical rationale.12 Therefore, Dr. Godofsky’s November 17, 2017 report is 

insufficient to establish appellant’s claim.

Appellant may submit new evidence or argument with a written request for reconsideration 

to OWCP within one year of this merit decision, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 8128(a) and 20 C.F.R. 

§§ 10.605 through 10.607. 

CONCLUSION

The Board finds that OWCP has met its burden of proof to terminate appellant’s wage-loss 

compensation effective January 10, 2017, but it has not met its burden of proof to terminate her 

medical benefits effective January 10, 2017. The Board further finds that she has not met her 

burden of proof to establish residuals or continuing disability due to her accepted employment 

injury on or after January 10, 2017.

ORDER

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the December 18, 2017 decision of the Office of 

Workers’ Compensation Programs is affirmed as modified to reflect that OWCP did not meet its 

burden of proof to terminate appellant’s medical benefits effective January 10, 2017.

Issued: July 23, 2019

Washington, DC

Christopher J. Godfrey, Chief Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Alec J. Koromilas, Alternate Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Valerie D. Evans-Harrell, Alternate Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

 

12 Y.D., Docket No. 16-1896 (issued February 10, 2017); C.M., Docket No. 14-0088 (issued April 18, 2014).