United States Court of Appeals,

Eleventh Circuit.

No. 93-9183.

Brandon Joshua HANEY, by next friend, Guardian of his Property,

Margean Haney; Dana Shaun the Estate of Dana Shaun Haney, by

Margean Haney, Administratrix, Plaintiffs-Appellees-CrossAppellants,

v.

CITY OF CUMMING; and Wayne Lindsey, in his capacity as Chief of

Police for the City of Cumming, Defendants-Cross-Appellees,

Cumming Police Department; Sheriff's Department of Forsyth

County; Roslyn Haygood; D.O. Dampier; Jeff Lowe, Defendants,

Forsyth County; Wesley Walraven, in his individual capacity and

in his capacity as Sheriff of Forsyth County; Russell Matthews;

Rusty Griffin, Defendants-Appellants-Cross-Appellees.

Nov. 27, 1995.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Northern

District of Georgia. (No. 1:90-01438-CV-JTC), Jack T. Camp, Judge.

Before KRAVITCH, Circuit Judge, and GODBOLD and MORGAN, Senior

Circuit Judges.

MORGAN, Senior Circuit Judge:

The parties before us appeal the district court's ruling on

summary judgment in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action arising from a

prisoner suicide. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse the

district court's denial of summary judgment with respect to the

qualified immunity claims and dismiss the remaining issues for lack

of appellate jurisdiction.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On April 20, 1989, police officers for the City of Cumming,

Georgia, travelled to the local Days Inn hotel in response to a

telephone call from the hotel manager, advising them that a room

was being occupied by persons who had failed to pay for it. At the
 1

At the time of their arrests, both Haney and Hunt were high

on intoxicants. Hunt later admitted that she was not attempting

suicide when she swallowed the Xanax pills. Rather, she was

merely trying to keep her "high" going because she knew it would

be a long time before she would be able to take any other drugs. 

hotel, the police arrested Dana Shaun Haney and Jacqueline Hunt for

theft of services. Both women were taken to the city jail where

they were booked, during which time Hunt retrieved fifteen Xanax

pills from her purse and swallowed them.1 Later in the afternoon,

Police Chief Wayne Lindsey of the city police transferred Haney and

Hunt to the Forsyth County jail. While there, Hunt passed out and

was taken to a local hospital. The county deputies placed Haney in

a detoxification cell.

The next morning, Russell Matthews, Chief Criminal

Investigator for the Forsyth County Sheriff's Department, arrived

at the county jail to speak with Haney. Matthews was conducting an

investigation into local physicians who reportedly have written

excessive amounts of prescription drugs and thought Haney might

have some useful information. The two spoke for approximately

thirty to forty-five minutes, during which time Haney expressed

deep concern over Hunt's condition. After making inquiries of the

jailers, Matthews informed Haney that Hunt was in intensive care at

the hospital and could not receive any visitors.

Upon the conclusion of her interview with Matthews, Haney was

returned to the detoxification cell. Shortly thereafter, officer

Rusty Griffin, who was on duty at the jail that morning, found

Haney standing on the toilet in her cell and noticed that she had

torn up her mattress and pillow. When Griffin questioned her about

her conduct, Haney replied that she "might as well kill" herself.
 2

Griffin claims he informed Matthews that Haney had

mentioned killing herself, but Matthews denies that anyone ever

told him that she was contemplating suicide. 

 3During the transfer from the county jail, Haney appeared to

be in good spirits as she was laughing, talking, smoking, and

drinking coffee. 

Griffin then immediately located Matthews and brought him back to

the cell to observe Haney, who was found crying in the corner.2

After Matthews and Haney spoke for a while, she assured him that

she would behave, but told him she wanted to be taken back to the

city jail. Matthews and the county deputies made the necessary

arrangements, and Haney was transferred to the city jail shortly

after noon.3

 Unfortunately, no one from the county informed the

officers at the city jail that Haney had mentioned suicide, and

Haney was placed in an unsupervised cell. Within an hour, a

dispatcher at the city jail found Haney hanging from a horizontal

bar in her cell with a sheet around her neck. She was not

breathing. Attempts were made to revive her, but they proved

unsuccessful. Prior to Haney's death, there had never been a

suicide at either the Forsyth County or Cumming city jail.

As a result of the suicide, Margean Haney, as next friend of

Haney's minor son, Brandon Joshua Haney, and as administratrix of

Haney's estate (collectively hereinafter "Plaintiffs"), brought

suit under federal and Georgia law against the City of Cumming,

Cumming Police Chief Wayne Lindsey, Forsyth County, Forsyth County

Sheriff Wesley Walraven, Inspector Russell Matthews, and Officer

Rusty Griffin (collectively hereinafter "Defendants"). On March

18, 1991, the district court compelled the Plaintiffs to respond to

the discovery requests filed by the various Defendants. When the
Plaintiffs failed to comply, the district court dismissed their

complaint. The district court set aside its dismissal on October

23, 1991, pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 60(b), on the Plaintiffs'

counsel's testimony that he had failed to inform his clients of the

court's discovery order.

After the completion of discovery, the Defendants filed

motions for summary judgment. The district court granted summary

judgment in favor of the City of Cumming and Chief Lindsey, finding

they had no special reason for concern about Haney's condition when

she was transferred to the city jail. The district court denied

summary judgment on qualified immunity in favor of Matthews and

Griffin, finding that Haney's constitutional rights at issue were

clear at the time of her incarceration and that genuine factual

questions remained regarding the propriety of their conduct.

Summary judgment was granted in favor of Forsyth County and Sheriff

Walraven after the district court concluded that Griffin's training

and the county's inmate transfer policy were not facially

unconstitutional. Nevertheless, the district court denied summary

judgment for Forsyth County and Walraven as to Matthews' training

and discretion. Finally, summary judgment was granted in favor of

all the Defendants on the state law claims after the district court

found that the Plaintiffs had failed to adequately support such

claims.

This appeal and cross appeal stem from the district court's

rulings on summary judgment and its decision to reinstate the

Plaintiffs' complaint pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 60(b). We address

the necessary issues in the following discussion.
 4

The Plaintiffs and the Forsyth County Defendants argue that

it is proper for us to exercise appellate jurisdiction over the

remaining issues. The City of Cumming Defendants simply state

that they do not oppose such jurisdiction. Thus, no party

objects to our hearing these matters. Nevertheless, jurisdiction

cannot be conferred upon us by consent of all parties involved. 

We must decide the validity of our own authority to consider a

matter even in the absence of objection from an interested party. 

DISCUSSION

A. Appellate Jurisdiction

 At the outset, we must determine our jurisdiction over these

appeals since federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.

Winfrey v. School Board of Dade County, 59 F.3d 155, 157 (11th

Cir.1995). The primary issue presented to us for consideration is

whether the district court erred in denying summary judgment for

Matthews and Griffin with respect to their qualified immunity

defense. A trial court's denial of qualified immunity at the

summary judgment stage is immediately appealable. Mitchell v.

Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2817-18, 86 L.Ed.2d 411

(1985); McCoy v. Webster, 47 F.3d 404, 406 (11th Cir.1995). Thus,

we have jurisdiction over Matthews' and Griffin's appeal, but only

insofar as the district court's order turns on purely legal issues.

Johnson v. Jones, --- U.S. ----, ----, 115 S.Ct. 2151, 2156, 132

L.Ed.2d 238 (1995); Babb v. Lake City Community College, 66 F.3d

270 (11th Cir.1995).

 Our jurisdiction over the remaining claims presented to us on

appeal is a more problematic question.4

 This case is one that

involves multiple claims and multiple parties, and the district

court's order on summary judgment disposed of some but not all of

the claims and parties.
 5

We note that three exceptions to the final judgment rule

exist: (1) the collateral order doctrine, (2) the doctrine of

practical finality, and (3) the exception for intermediate

resolution of issues fundamental to the merits of the case. 

Lockwood v. Snookies, Inc. (In re F.D.R. Hickory House, Inc.), 60

F.3d 724, 725 (11th Cir.1995). None of these exceptions apply to

the issues remaining on this appeal. 

[A]ny order or other form of decision, however designated,

which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and

liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not terminate

the action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order

or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time

before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and

the rights and liabilities of all the parties.

FED.R.CIV.P. 54(b); see generally 10 CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER

& MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE §§ 2653-2661 (1983 &

Supp.1995). An order that disposes of some but not all claims may

be appealable if it is so certified by the district court pursuant

to Rule 54(b). Absent such a certification, as is the case here,

the district court's ruling is merely interlocutory and not an

appealable final decision over which we have jurisdiction. 28

U.S.C. § 1291; see Mesa v. United States, 61 F.3d 20 (11th

Cir.1995); Penton v. Pompano Constr. Co., 963 F.2d 321 (11th

Cir.1992); CHARLES A. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 102, at 756 (5th

ed. 1994).5

 The Plaintiffs and the Forsyth County Defendants argue that

we have the authority to exercise appellate jurisdiction over the

remaining claims since they are pendent to the qualified immunity

appeal. It is true that in the past we have used our discretion to

exercise pendent jurisdiction over additional issues when an appeal

appeared before us on the qualified immunity question. See, e.g.,

Kelly v. Curtis, 21 F.3d 1544 (11th Cir.1994). Earlier this year,

however, the Supreme Court rejected our practice of exercising such
 6

In Swint, the Supreme Court suggested that appellate review

might exist where an otherwise nonappealable question is

"inextricably interwoven" with an issue properly before us. Id.

at ----, 115 S.Ct. at 1212. On the facts of this case, however,

we find that no such jurisdiction exists since the issues

remaining on appeal are not inextricably interwoven with the

qualified immunity defense asserted by Matthews and Griffin. 

 7Likewise, we lack appellate jurisdiction to consider now

the Defendants' argument that the district court erred by

reinstating the Plaintiff's complaint pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P.

60(b). Such an order is interlocutory in nature and unreviewable

absent a final judgment. 

discretionary jurisdiction in Swint v. Chambers County Commission,

--- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 1203, 131 L.Ed.2d 60 (1995), finding our

purported pendent party appellate jurisdiction to be nonexistent

under these circumstances.6 In view of Swint, we must conclude

that our immediate authority to review the district court's denial

of Matthews' and Griffin's qualified immunity defense does not

include the authority to review at once the questions regarding the

denial or granting of summary judgment to the other Defendants. 7

See, e.g., L.S.T., Inc. v. Crow, 49 F.3d 679, 683 n. 8 (11th

Cir.1995). Thus, the only issue we now consider on appeal pertains

to Matthews' and Griffin's qualified immunity.

B. Qualified Immunity

 The Plaintiffs' complaint alleges that Matthews' and

Griffin's failure to prevent Haney's suicide violated her civil

rights as guaranteed by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Both

Matthews and Griffin claimed the protection of qualified immunity,

but the district court denied that argument at summary judgment.

Since issues of qualified immunity present questions of law, we

review the district court's decision de novo. Jordan v. Doe, 38

F.3d 1559, 1563 (11th Cir.1994).
 To prevail in a prisoner suicide case, a plaintiff must prove

that a defendant displayed deliberate indifference to a prisoner's

mental condition and the likely consequences of that condition.

Tittle v. Jefferson County Commission, 10 F.3d 1535, 1539-40 (11th

Cir.1994) (discussing governmental liability and not individual

liability). The deliberate indifference standard is a subjective

one, requiring that a defendant know of and disregard an excessive

risk to an inmate's health or safety. Farmer v. Brennan, --- U.S.

----, ----, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 1979, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994); Hardin

v. Hayes, 52 F.3d 934, 939 (11th Cir.1995). Nevertheless,

qualified immunity will shield from civil damages individual

government officials who perform discretionary functions "insofar

as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have

known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727,

2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982); see also Belcher v. City of Foley, 30

F.3d 1390, 1395 (11th Cir.1994); see generally Kit Kinports,

Qualified Immunity in Section 1983 Cases: The Unanswered

Questions, 23 GA.L.REV. 597, 600-07 (1989). Should the plaintiff

fail to show that the law was clearly established at the time in

question, the individual defendant is entitled to qualified

immunity. Belcher, 30 F.3d at 1400.

 In denying Matthews' and Griffin's claim of qualified

immunity at summary judgment, the district court relied heavily on

our decision in Waldrop v. Evans, 871 F.2d 1030 (11th Cir.1989), as

evidence that the law in 1989 was established that officers who

fail to notify competent authorities and take appropriate action
 8

We note that the district court did not have the benefit of

our Belcher decision at the time it ruled on the qualified

immunity defense. 

regarding an inmate's psychological needs can be liable under

section 1983. Waldrop was an action against doctors at a state

correctional facility stemming from a prisoner suicide. Last year

in Belcher, however, we held that Waldrop did not clearly establish

officer liability because it pertained only to the issue of

physician liability.8 Belcher, 30 F.3d at 1399-1400. Like the

case currently before us, Belcher involved a suit against police

officers in the wake of a prisoner suicide. Specifically, we

stated in Belcher as follows:

Waldrop could not have clearly established the law governing

the conduct of police officers in positions materially similar

to Officer Roberson's or any of the other defendant police

officers in this case, because Waldrop addressed the liability

of a physician.... The defendants in this case are not

physicians and are not responsible for meeting the medical and

psychiatric needs of inmates in a mental health evaluation

facility. They are police officers whose primary

responsibility is to enforce laws and to arrest persons

suspected of violating laws in their community. Because the

circumstances in Waldrop are not materially similar to the

circumstances in this case, Waldrop did not clearly establish

the law applicable to this case.

Id. (emphasis added). We further concluded in Belcher that case

law other than Waldrop failed to establish the law governing the

conduct of officers under the circumstances in question. Id. at

1401.

Both Matthews and Griffin are in a situation materially

similar to the defendants in Belcher. They are not physicians and

thus were not responsible for meeting the psychiatric and medical

needs of Haney at the time she was in the jail. Having found in

Belcher that case law as of 1991 did not clearly establish
constitutional or statutory rights in such a situation, it is clear

that there also were no such rights at the time of Haney's 1989

suicide. Contrary to the district court's conclusion, neither

Waldrop nor other case law clearly establish the law that is

applicable to this case. Accordingly, the district court erred

when it denied qualified immunity for Matthews and Griffin.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, the district court's denial of

qualified immunity to Matthews and Griffin is REVERSED. All other

issues brought before us are hereby DISMISSED for lack of appellate

jurisdiction.

REVERSED in part and DISMISSED in part.