IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

The Falls Community Association, Inc. :

:

v. : No. 1884 C.D. 2017

: Argued: September 18, 2018

Jorge Coelho, :

Appellant :

BEFORE: HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President Judge

HONORABLE ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge (P)

HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

BY JUDGE SIMPSON FILED: October 11, 2018

This appeal involves the authority of a trial court to clarify a final order 

after more than 30 days, and the impact of clarification orders on our jurisdiction. 

The Court of Common Pleas of Pike County (trial court) issued an order denying 

Jorge Coelho’s (Debtor) petition to set aside a sheriff’s sale of his property to Falls 

Community Association, Inc. (Purchaser). Neither party appealed this order within 

30 days. Instead, both parties subsequently requested clarification as to the effect of 

the sale on the mortgage debt. Months later, the trial court issued two orders 

purporting to incorporate its final order and confirming the parties’ liabilities 

concerning the mortgage as a result of the sale. Debtor timely appealed only the 

second clarifying order, challenging the trial court’s decision on the merits. Because 

the trial court lacked authority to issue its clarifying orders, and we discern no 

extraordinary circumstances warranting acceptance of an untimely appeal as to the 

final order, we lack subject matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, we quash the appeal. 
2

I. Background

Purchaser, a nonprofit corporation, maintains common facilities in the 

planned community known as The Falls at Saw Creek in Pike County, Pennsylvania. 

Debtor owned property in the community, located at 140 English Court, Bushkill, 

Pennsylvania (Property). As a community association under the Uniform Planned 

Community Act, 68 Pa. C.S. §§5101-5114, Purchaser had authority to impose

assessments and to recover fees and costs associated with their collection. 

Since 2005, Debtor resided at the Property. As an owner, Debtor was 

a member of the community association required to pay assessments. However, 

Debtor became delinquent in his payments to Purchaser.

Purchaser initiated a collection action against Debtor, seeking payment 

of unpaid assessments, related interest and attorney fees. Debtor filed a counterclaim. 

After discovery, the matter was presented to an arbitration panel, which ruled in 

Purchaser’s favor in the amount of $16,491.50. Neither party appealed. 

After entering the award as a judgment against Debtor, Purchaser filed 

a writ of execution on the judgment in March 2016. The Prothonotary issued the 

writ and directed levy on the Property. The sheriff then listed the Property for sale. 

The notice of sheriff’s sale did not contain any special conditions. After 

a number of continuances, the sale occurred on September 21, 2016. Purchaser was 

the sole bidder, purchasing the Property for sheriff’s costs, ($1,329.19). The Property 

remained subject to a mortgage now serviced by Ditech Financial, LLC (Bank). 
3

In October 2016, Debtor filed a motion to set aside the sheriff’s sale 

(Motion). He contended the negative equity in the Property precluded Purchaser 

from realizing the amount of the judgment against him. He also argued Purchaser 

could not take possession of the Property until after it satisfied the mortgage debt. 

The trial court stayed delivery of the deed and held a hearing on the Motion.

At the hearing, Debtor testified about the purchase price ($132,000) and 

the amount of the debt secured by the mortgage (approximately $84,000). 

Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 289a-90a. Other than himself, he presented no witnesses

as to value of the Property. Debtor testified that other comparable properties in the 

community were listed for sale as low as $27,000, and as high as $63,000. Id. at 291a. 

By order dated February 7, 2017, the trial court denied Debtor’s Motion 

(Merits Order), thereby allowing delivery of the deed. The sheriff recorded the deed 

the following week. Original Record (O.R.) at 80. Instead of appealing the Merits 

Order, Debtor filed a petition for clarification inquiring whether Purchaser needed

to pay the mortgage debt in full or meet other conditions before taking possession. 

He asserted Purchaser could not take possession without satisfying the mortgage or 

becoming the sole mortgagor. Purchaser answered Debtor’s petition, objecting to 

the necessity for clarification and arguing that satisfying the mortgage was not a 

precondition to possession. During the 30 days it maintained jurisdiction, the trial 

court issued an order listing the clarification petition for argument.1 O.R. at 82.

Relevant here, the trial court did not indicate it was reconsidering the Merits Order.

 

1 Prior to the hearing on the petition for clarification, Debtor was denied access to the 

Property, prompting a petition for special injunction to permit his entry. Purchaser also filed an 

action in ejectment against Debtor. The parties agreed to permit Debtor’s entry until the pending 

litigation (petition to set aside and action in ejectment) resolved. 
4

The trial court subsequently clarified the Merits Order on June 6, 2017 

(First Clarification). The First Clarification incorporated the Merits Order “in its 

entirety” and added an explanation regarding the status of the mortgage. O.R. at 88. 

As to Debtor’s inquiry regarding whether Purchaser was required to pay the first 

mortgage debt, the trial court answered yes, because it took the Property subject to 

the mortgage. However, the trial court explained Purchaser did not need to satisfy 

the mortgage or take additional steps to assume the mortgage prior to taking 

possession of the Property. 

Within 30 days, Purchaser sought clarification of the First Clarification 

because the trial court’s explanation indicated Purchaser assumed the mortgage, as 

though Purchaser was the sole mortgagor. Purchaser advised that the Bank believed 

Purchaser was solely liable for the mortgage based on the First Clarification. 

Purchaser asked the trial court to confirm that Debtor remained liable for the 

mortgage, in personam, based on the mortgage note. Notably, the trial court took 

no action within 30 days of the First Clarification. 

Months after the appeal period on the Merits Order lapsed, on August 

11, 2017, the trial court issued a second clarification incorporating the First 

Clarification “in its entirety.” O.R. at 90 (Second Clarification). It explained that 

Purchaser was liable “in rem for nonpayment of the mortgage,” whereas “[Debtor] 

[was] liable in personam.” Id.

Within 30 days of the Second Clarification, Debtor filed a notice of 

appeal in the Superior Court. The Superior Court transferred the appeal to this Court 
5

based on Purchaser’s status as a nonprofit corporation. In their briefs, the parties 

addressed only the validity and effect of the sheriff’s sale under the Merits Order. 

Ascertaining a question as to whether the trial court had the authority to issue the 

First Clarification or the Second Clarification (collectively, Clarification Orders), 

this Court directed the parties to address “the appealability of the trial court’s filings” 

during oral argument. See Cmwlth. Ct. Order, 8/30/18 (per curiam). 

After argument, this matter is ready for disposition. 

II. Discussion

Debtor argues the trial court abused its discretion in denying his Motion

based on inadequacy of the purchase price. He asks us to remand to the trial court 

to confirm that Purchaser is solely responsible for the mortgage, both in rem and 

in personam. Notably, Debtor did not seek this declaration in his Motion. 

Purchaser responds that the sheriff’s sale was valid, and Debtor’s 

challenges to the adequacy of the price are unavailing, if not waived. 

Acknowledging it took the Property subject to the mortgage, Purchaser emphasizes 

its liability is limited to an in rem proceeding by the Bank to enforce its mortgage. 

Before considering the merit of these arguments, we examine our 

jurisdiction. In addition to timeliness, we scrutinize the authority of the trial court 

to issue the orders in question.2 

 

2 Of note, Debtor identified three orders (the Clarification Orders and the Merits Order) as 

the “Orders in Question” in his brief. See Appellant’s Br. at 2.
6

A. Jurisdiction

Notwithstanding that neither Debtor nor Purchaser questioned the 

appealability of the Clarification Orders, because jurisdiction is a prerequisite to 

considering the merits, it “may be raised by the court sua sponte if necessary.” 

LeFlar v. Gulf Creek Indus. Park No. 2, 515 A.2d 875, 879 (Pa. 1986). Indeed, 

subject matter jurisdiction is so fundamental that “such jurisdiction cannot be 

obtained by consent of the parties, or by waiver or estoppel.” In re Borough of 

Valley-Hi, 420 A.2d 15, 17 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1980). Thus, “we are not only permitted, 

but required to determine if the trial court’s order is appealable.” Brophy v. Phila. 

Gas Works & Phila. Facilities Mgmt. Corp., 921 A.2d 80, 86 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007).

In the matter before us, Debtor appealed only the Second Clarification 

within the 30-day appeal period mandated by Pa. R.A.P. 903(a). Although this 

appeal is timely as to the Second Clarification, the trial court’s jurisdiction to issue 

that order six months after the Merits Order is questionable. 

During argument, Debtor’s counsel took the position that the Merits 

Order was incorporated into the later Clarification Orders such that it is properly 

before this Court on that basis. Debtor had no response to this Court’s inquiries 

regarding the source of the trial court’s authority to issue the Clarification Orders. 

The Judicial Code aids our resolution of this question. 

Pursuant to Section 5505 of the Judicial Code, “[e]xcept as otherwise 

provided or prescribed by law, a court upon notice to the parties may modify or 

rescind any order within 30 days after its entry ... if no appeal from such order has 
7

been taken or allowed.” 42 Pa. C.S. §5505. During this 30-day period, the trial court 

has broad discretion to act, and may reexamine its order. Arches Condo. Ass’n v. 

Robinson, 131 A.3d 122, 128-29 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015). 

“Where a trial court desires additional time to reexamine its ruling, it 

must expressly grant reconsideration or vacate its order within 30 days ....” Kurowski 

v. Office of Open Records (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 2289 C.D. 2012, filed December 27, 

2013),slip op. at 5 n.7, 2013 WL 6858424, at *2 n.7 (unreported). A trial court retains 

jurisdiction beyond the 30-day period and tolls the appeal period only by issuing an 

order expressly granting a motion for reconsideration. Oak Tree Condo. Ass’n v. 

Greene, 133 A.3d 113 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016). Other than through an express grant of 

reconsideration, a trial court may not extend its jurisdiction beyond this 30-day 

period by issuing a subsequent order and thereby create a new time period for appeal. 

Eachus v. Chester Cty. Tax Claim Bureau, 612 A.2d 586 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1992). 

Relevant here, “[a]fter the 30[-]day time period, the trial court is 

divested of jurisdiction.” Ness v. York Twp. Bd. of Comm’rs, 123 A.3d 1166, 1169 

(Pa. Cmwlth. 2015); see City of Philadelphia v. Frempong (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 959 

C.D. 2016, filed September 19, 2018) (unreported) (quashing appeal when trial court 

lacked jurisdiction to issue orders appealed). The trial court may then intervene to 

alter an order in cases of fraud or another circumstance that is “so grave or 

compelling as to constitute extraordinary cause justifying [its] intervention.”3 Board 

of Sup’rs v. Quarture, 603 A.2d 295, 298 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1992) (emphasis added).

 

3 Qualifying circumstances customarily entail an oversight or act by the court, or failure of 

the judicial process that denies the losing party knowledge of the final order and commencement 

of the appeal period. DeMarco v. Borough of E. McKeesport, 556 A.2d 977 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1989); 

Mfrs. & Traders Trust Co. v. Greenville Gastroenterology, SC, 108 A.3d 913 (Pa. Super. 2015).
8

Here, the trial court issued the Clarification Orders well beyond the 30-

day period. The trial court issued the Second Clarification, which is the only order 

timely appealed, almost six months after its jurisdiction ceased. The trial court 

issued the First Clarification almost four months after issuing the Merits Order. 

Thus, absent extraordinary circumstances, or an extension of its jurisdiction by a 

motion for reconsideration, the trial court lacked authority to issue both Clarification 

Orders.

The Merits Order was clear and enforceable on its terms. Cf. Retenauer 

v. Flaherty, 642 A.2d 587 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994) (permitting trial court’s correction of 

order beyond 30 days because without clarification allocating damages amongst 

defendants, the parties lacked sufficient information to appeal the order). As an 

order denying a petition to set aside a sheriff’s sale, the Merits Order was final and

appealable under Pa. R.A.P. 341. See Nationstar Mortg., LLC v. Lark, 73 A.3d 1265 

(Pa. Super. 2013). By operation of law, Purchaser took the Property subject to the

existing priority mortgage, which remained a lien against its title. Nat’l Penn Bank 

v. Shaffer, 672 A.2d 326 (Pa. Super. 1996). A purchaser at a sheriff’s sale does not 

assume the personal liability on a mortgage note.

 In our view, Debtor did not request modification of the Merits Order. 

Nor did Debtor request clarification of any of the language in the Merits Order. 

Rather, and significantly, Debtor asked the trial court to explain consequences of a

sheriff sale, specifically, the legal effect of the sheriff’s sale on the mortgage debt. 

The mortgage was not the subject of the trial court’s Merits Order. The Merits Order 

pertained to the sheriff’s sale and the transfer of title to the Property.
9

Here, the Clarification Orders did not clarify any of the language of the 

Merits Order to render the matter appealable. The Merits Order was sufficiently clear 

to enable Debtor to appeal it without any clarification. Debtor cited no deficiency in 

the Merits Order that precluded an appeal without clarification, and we discern none. 

The rights Purchaser obtained to the Property did not change by virtue of the 

Clarification Orders. Therefore, it was incumbent upon Debtor to appeal the Merits 

Order within 30 days of its issuance. 

Further, we do not construe the petition for clarification as a motion for 

reconsideration. Although the trial court acted within 30 days when it issued an 

order scheduling a hearing on Debtor’s clarification petition, it did not expressly 

grant reconsideration or vacate the Merits Order. Thus, the trial court did not extend 

its jurisdiction beyond the 30-day appeal period, or toll the period to appeal. Greene; 

King v. Riverwatch Condo. Owners Ass’n, 27 A.3d 276 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011), appeal

denied, 50 A.3d 693 (Pa. 2012); see Pa. R.A.P. 1701(b)(3).

That the trial court scheduled argument on Debtor’s petition for 

clarification for a date more than a month after issuing the Merits Order does not 

affect our analysis. The trial court lacked authority to extend its own jurisdiction in 

that manner, and could not by entering new clarifying orders, extend the appeal 

period. Eachus; see Frempong; see also In re Greist, 636 A.2d 193 (Pa. Super. 1994) 

(issuance of rule to show cause setting forth briefing schedule and hearing date did 

not toll time period in which to appeal).
10

We discern no deficiency in the Merits Order warranting the trial 

court’s intervention beyond the 30-day period. The record reveals no extraordinary 

circumstances permitting the trial court’s exercise of jurisdiction beyond the 30-day 

period, and the parties identified none. Absent a necessity for correction or 

extraordinary circumstances not present here, there is no justification for issuing the 

Clarification Orders. In sum, the trial court lacked authority to issue the 

Clarification Orders. Accordingly, the Second Clarification is a nullity, leaving this 

Court without an appealable order. Frempong. Therefore, we quash the appeal. 

Eachus.

B. Merits

Because we lack subject matter jurisdiction over the appeal, we do not 

consider the validity of the sheriff’s sale.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we quash the appeal.

 

ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

The Falls Community Association, Inc. :

:

v. : No. 1884 C.D. 2017

:

Jorge Coelho, :

Appellant :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 11th day of October, 2018, Appellant Jorge Coelho’s 

appeal of the Court of Common Pleas of Pike County’s order dated August 11, 2017, 

is QUASHED.

 

ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge