61496 Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 204 / Monday, October 24, 2005 / Notices 

REPORTING BURDEN

Emergency order item No. Respondent 

universe 

Total annual 

responses 

Average time per 

response 

Total annual 

burden hours 

Total annual 

burden cost 

(1)—Instruction On Railroad Operating Rule—Operation of manual 

main track in non-signal territory.

685 Railroads; 

100,000 employees.

100,000 instruction 

sessions.

60 minutes ........... 100,000 ................ $4,700,000. 

—Instruction Records .................. 685 Railroads ....... 100,000 records ... 2 minutes ............. 3,333 .................... 126,654. 

(2) Hand-Operated Main Track 

Switches—Confirmation of Switch 

Position.

6,000 Dispatchers 60,000 verbal confirmations.30 seconds ........... 500 ....................... 20,500. 

—Review of SPAF by Train Dispatcher.6,000 Dispatchers 15,000 reviews ..... 10 seconds .......... 42 ......................... 1,974. 

(3) Switch Position Awareness Form 

(SPAF).

100,000 employees.20,000 forms ........ 3 minutes ............. 1,000 .................... 47,000. 

(4) Job Briefings .................................. 100,000 employees.60,000 briefings ... 1 minute ............... 1,000 .................... 47,000. 

(5) Radio Communication—Crewmember communication with engineer.100,000 employees.60,000 verbal 

communications.

15 seconds ........... 250 ....................... 11,750. 

—Notation of Inoperable Radio 

on SPAF.

900,000 Crew 

members.

500 form entries ... 5 seconds ............ 3 ........................... 141. 

(6) Operational Tests and Inspections 685 Railroads ....... Burden Covered 

Under OMB No. 

2130–0035.

Burden Covered 

Under OMB No. 

2130–0035.

Burden Covered 

Under OMB No. 

2130–0035.

Burden Covered 

Under OMB No. 

2130–0035. 

(7) Distribution of Emergency Order—

Copies to Employees.

685 Railroads; 

100,000 Employees.

100,000 copies .... 2 seconds ............ 56 ......................... 2,128. 

—Written Receipt and Acknowledgment of Copy.685 Railroads; 

100,000 Employees.

100,000 receipts + 

100,000 records.

1 second + 1 second.56 ......................... 2,380. 

(8) Relief—Petitions For Special Approval.685 Railroads ....... 10 petitions ........... 60 minutes ........... 10 ......................... 380. 

Form Number(s): N/A. 

Respondent Universe: 685 Railroads; 

100,000 Railroad Employees. 

Frequency of Submission: One-time; 

On occasion. 

Total Responses: 715,510. 

Total Annual Estimated Burden: 

106,250 hours. 

Status: Emergency Review. 

Description: FRA has determined that 

public safety compels the issuance of 

Emergency Order No. 24 and 

necessitates this collection of 

information in order that railroads 

modify their operating rules and take 

certain other actions necessary to ensure 

that their employees who operate handoperated main track switches in nonsignaled territory restore the switches to 

their proper (normal) position after use. 

The Emergency Order is intended to 

reduce the risk of serious injury or death 

both to railroad employees and the 

general public. 

Pursuant to 44 U.S.C. 3507(a) and 5 

CFR 1320.5(b), 1320.8(b)(3)(vi), FRA 

informs all interested parties that it may 

not conduct or sponsor, and a 

respondent is not required to respond 

to, a collection of information unless it 

displays a currently valid OMB control 

number. 

Authority: 44 U.S.C. 3501–3520. 

Issued in Washington, DC, on October 19, 

2005. 

Belinda Ashton, 

Acting Director, Office of Budget, Federal 

Railroad Administration. 

[FR Doc. 05–21250 Filed 10–21–05; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–06–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Railroad Administration 

[FRA Emergency Order No. 24; Docket No. 

FRA–2005–22796, Notice No. 1] 

Emergency Order Requiring Special 

Handling, Instruction and Testing of 

Railroad Operating Rules Pertaining to 

Hand-Operated Main Track Switches 

SUMMARY: The Federal Railroad 

Administration (FRA) of the United 

States Department of Transportation 

(DOT) has determined that public safety 

compels issuance of this Emergency 

Order (EO) requiring railroads to modify 

their operating rules and take certain 

other actions necessary to ensure that 

railroad employees who dispatch nonsignaled territory or who operate handoperated main track switches (switches) 

in non-signaled territory, ensure the 

switches are restored to their proper 

(normal) position after use. For 

purposes of this EO, ‘‘employee’’ means 

an individual who is engaged or 

compensated by a railroad or by a 

contractor to a railroad to perform any 

of the duties defined in this EO. This EO 

is intended to reduce the risk of serious 

injury or death both to railroad 

employees and the general public. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Douglas H. Taylor, Staff Director, 

Operating Practices Division, Office of 

Safety Assurance and Compliance, FRA, 

1120 Vermont Avenue, NW., RRS–11, 

Mail Stop 25, Washington, DC 20590 

(telephone 202–493–6255); or Alan H. 

Nagler, Senior Trial Attorney, Office of 

Chief Counsel, FRA, 1120 Vermont 

Avenue, NW., RCC–11, Mail Stop 10, 

Washington, DC 20590 (telephone 202–

493–6038). 

AUTHORITY: Authority to enforce Federal 

railroad safety laws has been delegated 

by the Secretary of Transportation to the 

Federal Railroad Administrator. 49 CFR 

1.49. Railroads are subject to FRA’s 

safety jurisdiction under the Federal 

railroad safety laws. 49 U.S.C. 20101, 

20103. FRA is authorized to issue 

emergency orders where an unsafe 

condition or practice ‘‘causes an 

emergency situation involving a hazard 

of death or personal injury.’’ 49 U.S.C. 

20104. These orders may immediately 

impose ‘‘restrictions and prohibitions 

* * * that may be necessary to abate the 

situation.’’ (Ibid.) 

Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 204 / Monday, October 24, 2005 / Notices 61497 

BACKGROUND: FRA’s regulations, at 49 

CFR part 217, require each railroad to 

instruct its employees on the meaning 

and application of its code of operating 

rules, and to periodically test its 

employees to determine their level of 

compliance. Railroad operating rules 

pertaining to the operation of switches 

provide that the normal position for a 

main track switch is lined and locked 

for movement on the main track when 

not in use. Another related operating 

rule provides that, where trains or 

engines are required to report clear of 

the main track, such a report must not 

be made until the switch and derail, if 

provided, have been secured in their 

normal position. Where no signal or 

other system is in service that indicates 

through wayside or cab signals, or both, 

the possibility that a main track switch 

may not be in its normal position, 

compliance with these railroad 

operating rules is the critical element in 

ensuring route integrity for main track 

movements. 

There may be more than one cause 

that contributes to non-compliance with 

these important operating rules. One 

recurrent scenario of non-compliance 

occurs when a train crew has exclusive 

authority to occupy a specific track 

segment until they release it for other 

movements and that train crew goes off 

duty without lining and locking a handoperated main track switch in its normal 

position. In that scenario, the train 

crew’s mistake in leaving a main track 

switch lined for movement to a 

secondary track was the last act or 

omission that resulted in a catastrophic 

accident. 

During the years 2000 through 2003, 

railroads reported no more than three 

accidents per year that were caused by 

improperly lined hand-operated main 

track switches in non-signaled territory 

and one of the most serious of those 

wrecks was caused by vandalism. 

During that four year period, there were 

ten total injuries and two fatalities (all 

to railroad employees). 

In comparison, in 2004 there was a 

sharp increase in the frequency and 

severity of collisions resulting from 

improperly lined main track switches as 

shown on the attached charts. In 2004, 

there were a total of eight accidents 

resulting in eight injuries to railroad 

employees. The increase in the number 

of accidents and injuries did not go 

unnoticed by the industry as some 

railroads amended their operating rules 

to address this issue. 

On January 6, 2005, the issue of 

improperly lined main track switches 

became national news as the media 

reported on a catastrophic accident that 

occurred in Graniteville, South 

Carolina. This accident occurred when 

a Norfolk Southern Railway Company 

(NS) freight train was unexpectedly 

diverted from the main track onto an 

industrial lead. The NS train struck a 

standing train on the industrial lead, 

derailing three locomotives and 16 cars. 

The collision resulted in the rupture of 

a tank car containing chlorine, fatal 

injuries to eight citizens and one 

railroad employee, the evacuation of 

5,400 local residents, and injuries to 630 

people. Damages to equipment and track 

totaled more than $2.3 million. FRA 

immediately began deliberating on a 

course of action to prevent this type of 

accident. [The National Transportation 

Safety Board (NTSB) is investigating 

this accident, and will officially 

determine the probable cause of the 

accident which FRA is expressly not 

doing.] 

On January 8, 2005, a BNSF Railway 

Company (BNSF) freight train was 

unexpectedly diverted onto an 

industrial track in Bieber, California. 

The BNSF train struck two loaded grain 

cars, derailing seven locomotives and 14 

cars. Two railroad employees were 

injured. Damages to equipment and 

track totaled more than $1 million. 

FRA decided to start a rulemaking 

proceeding and took action on January 

10, 2005, to abate the safety risks during 

the proceeding by issuing Safety 

Advisory 2005–01, Position of Switches 

in Non-Signaled Territory (Safety 

Advisory). The issuance of a safety 

advisory is an opportunity for the 

agency to inform the industry and the 

general public regarding a safety issue, 

to articulate agency policy, and to make 

recommendations. FRA explained in the 

Safety Advisory that ‘‘[a] review of 

FRA’s accident/incident data shows 

that, overall, the safety of rail 

transportation continues to improve. 

However, FRA has particular concern 

that recent accidents on Class I railroads 

in non-signaled territory were caused, or 

apparently caused, by the failure of 

railroad employees to return manual 

(hand-operated) main track switches to 

their normal position, i.e., lined for the 

main track, after use. As a result, rather 

than continuing their intended 

movement on the main track, trains 

approaching these switches in a facingpoint direction were unexpectedly 

diverted from the main track onto the 

diverging route, and consequently 

derailed.’’

FRA also explained what we could do 

if the emergency situation did not abate. 

That is, in the Safety Advisory, FRA 

stated that we would consider ‘‘the need 

for any additional action to address this 

situation, such as regulatory action or 

additional advisories. We are 

considering the form that any additional 

action might take, its specific content, 

and any necessary variations based on 

differing types of operations * * *. We 

are committed to taking whatever action 

appears necessary to prevent any further 

death or serious injury that might arise 

from additional failures to comply with 

the basic operating rules concerning the 

proper positioning of main track 

switches.’’

FRA’s decision to make 

recommendations was based in part on 

the fact that several railroads had 

already initiated voluntary actions to 

enhance the applicable railroad 

operating rules during the last few 

months of 2004. FRA wanted to give all 

railroads the same opportunity to selfcorrect in the expectation that it would 

suffice to ameliorate this problem until, 

as discussed below, a rule could be 

issued. Furthermore, the purpose of the 

Safety Advisory was to heighten 

employee awareness of the importance 

of restoring main track switches to their 

normal position in non-signaled 

territory. A key element of the Safety 

Advisory was to promote and enhance 

intra-crew communication about the 

operation and position of main track 

switches. 

With the exception of a similar 

accident that occurred on CSX 

Transportation (CSX) in Banks, 

Alabama, on January 11, 2005, one day 

after publication of the Safety Advisory, 

and an accident, with relatively minor 

results, that was caused by an employee 

of a contractor to the Nashville and 

Eastern Railroad (NERR), in Mt. Juliet, 

Tennessee on February 23, 2005, there 

was a respite of nearly six months in 

accidents resulting from improperly 

lined main track switches in nonsignaled territory. During this respite, 

FRA began a rulemaking on this subject 

and other human factor causes of 

accidents. For about the last decade, 

FRA has sought recommendations from 

its standing Federal advisory committee 

on most of the subjects on which FRA 

proposed to issue substantive safety 

rules. In FRA’s view, this process 

produces better rules because it 

generates more substantive participation 

in rulemakings from experts 

representing both management and 

labor, and yields better and faster 

compliance with the final rule from the 

regulated community which helped 

craft it. On May 18, 2005, at the first 

opportunity to address this subject, the 

Railroad Safety Advisory Committee 

(RSAC or Committee) agreed to take up 

the task of reviewing how to reduce 

human factor caused train accidents/ 

incidents and related employee injuries. 

The full Committee formed a smaller 

61498 Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 204 / Monday, October 24, 2005 / Notices 

Operating Rules Working Group 

(Working Group) comprised of people 

expert in this subject to do the bulk of 

the work in formulating 

recommendations to complete the task, 

and a target date of February 10, 2006, 

was established for the Working Group 

to report its findings and 

recommendations back to the full RSAC. 

Since May, the Working Group has 

met twice and progress toward a 

consensus recommendation has been 

made. One of the key elements in those 

discussions is the proper operation of 

main track switches in non-signaled 

territory. Through the Working Group’s 

activities, FRA has already heard 

comments on this issue from 

organizations representing every 

affected party within the industry. The 

Working Group has three additional 

meetings scheduled in order to meet the 

February deadline for 

recommendations. FRA’s goal is to 

publish a proposed rule in 2006, and a 

final rule soon thereafter. 

Working with a Federal advisory 

committee to generate consensus 

recommendations takes many meetings 

over a number of months, and 

rulemaking can take many more 

months. During the time it takes to 

accomplish these tasks, new accidents 

can occur that require more immediate 

action. That has happened here. After 

six months, the Safety Advisory no 

longer worked well enough to prevent 

more accidents. 

First, in July 2005, two accidents, 

with relatively minor results occurred. 

As the results were minor, and, FRA 

believed awareness was heightened due 

to the publication of the Safety Advisory 

and the RSAC’s activities, FRA did not 

identify an emergency situation in July. 

The following is a synopsis of those two 

accidents. 

• July 7, 2005—Willamette & Pacific 

Railroad (WPRR), Sheridan, Oregon—a 

maintenance of way work train was 

parked in a siding and the switch was 

left lined for the siding. A local freight 

train, operating at a speed of 12 miles 

per hour (mph), was unintentionally 

diverted into the siding due to an 

improperly lined switch. The freight 

train struck the lead locomotive of the 

standing work train. Both locomotives 

derailed. 

• July 9, 2005—Dakota, Minnesota 

and Eastern Railroad (DME), Florence, 

Minnesota—the crew of an eastward 

BNSF light locomotive consist departing 

DME property and returning to BNSF 

trackage, failed to restore the junction 

switch to its normal position. 

Subsequently, an eastward DME train, 

operating at a speed of 38 mph, 

encountered an improperly lined 

switch. As a result, the lead locomotive 

derailed and was destroyed. 

Beginning six weeks later, three more 

accidents occurred with more serious 

results. The three recent accidents 

described below occurred over a 28-day 

period and clearly demonstrate the need 

for additional action beyond the Safety 

Advisory, as these three collisions, 

overall, resulted in fatal injuries to one 

railroad employee, non-fatal injuries to 

eight additional railroad employees, an 

evacuation of civilians, and railroad 

property damage of approximately two 

million dollars. Furthermore, each of 

these accidents could have been worse, 

as each had the potential for additional 

deaths, injuries, property damage or 

environmental damage. Two of the 

accidents could have involved 

catastrophic releases of hazardous 

materials as these materials were 

present in at least one of the train 

consists that collided. 

• August 19, 2005—Kansas & 

Oklahoma Railroad (KO), Nickerson, 

Kansas—an eastward loaded grain train 

was operating at a speed of 26 mph 

when it encountered an improperly 

lined switch at the west end of the 

siding. The train struck a standing cut 

of cars, resulting in the derailment of 

two locomotives and two freight cars. 

The locomotive engineer was severely 

injured. 

• August 21, 2005—Union Pacific 

Railroad (UP), Heber, California—an 

eastward freight train operating at a 

speed of 30 mph encountered an 

improperly lined switch at the west end 

of a siding. The train struck a standing 

cut of cars, resulting in the derailment 

of two locomotives and two freight cars. 

The control compartment on the lead 

locomotive was completely destroyed. 

The three crewmembers survived only 

by quickly throwing themselves on the 

floor of the locomotive immediately 

before impact. Considering the 

destruction to the locomotive control 

compartment, the crewmembers likely 

would have been seriously injured or 

killed, but for their quick action. The 

locomotive engineer, conductor and 

trainman were taken to a local hospital 

where they were treated and released. 

• September 15, 2005—UP, 

Shepherd, Texas—a southward freight 

train operating at a speed of 36 mph, 

collided head-on with a northward UP 

freight train that was standing in a 

siding. The collision occurred when the 

southward train encountered an 

improperly lined switch at the north 

end of the siding. The southward train 

struck the standing train and derailed 

two locomotives and 13 cars. The two 

locomotives and the four leading cars of 

the standing train were also derailed. 

The engineer of the standing train was 

fatally injured and four other 

crewmembers were injured. Eleven of 

the 13 cars contained hazardous 

materials. Although, no hazardous 

materials release occurred, a 

precautionary evacuation of 500 people 

was ordered by local authorities for a 

period of 12 hours. 

Each of the accidents that precipitated 

the Safety Advisory and this EO either 

resulted in, or had the potential to result 

in, serious injuries, fatalities, and 

catastrophic releases of hazardous 

materials. As previously stated, the 

industry achieved only a temporary 

respite from accidents of this type after 

the Safety Advisory’s publication, 

instead of the long-term solution that 

FRA expected. The sudden and recent 

occurrence of five of this type of 

accident is a clear indication that the 

Safety Advisory has lost its 

effectiveness. Only with additional 

action can FRA secure compliance with 

these important railroad operating rules. 

FRA considered issuing another Safety 

Advisory, but that might at best only 

provide another temporary pause. As 

described above, FRA is currently 

seeking a permanent solution through 

rulemaking. The issuance of this EO is 

intended to accomplish what the Safety 

Advisory could not: Implement safety 

practices that will abate the emergency 

until FRA can complete rulemaking 

after receiving the RSAC’s expert 

advice. 

Finding and Order: Collisions, deaths 

and injuries resulting from improperly 

lined main track switches began in 2004 

to rise very sharply as shown on the 

attached charts. FRA’s issuance of a 

Safety Advisory in early January 2005, 

recommending practices designed to 

prevent such events, led to a nearly six 

month respite. The sharply rising and 

accelerating trend of collisions, deaths 

and injuries resulting from improperly 

lined main track switches, which the 

Safety Advisory abated only 

temporarily, constitutes an emergency 

situation involving a hazard of death or 

personal injury which FRA must act to 

stop. 

Even considering the nearly sixmonth respite from January 12 through 

July 6, the Nation has experienced more 

accidents resulting from improperly 

lined hand-operated switches on main 

track in non-signaled territory than it 

experienced in any of the previous five 

years. To date in 2005, there were nine 

accidents resulting in 640 injuries and 

10 fatalities. Given the cloud of chlorine 

that covered much of Graniteville, 

South Carolina, on January 6, 2005, as 

a result of one of these accidents, it is 

fortuitous that the death toll is not 

Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 204 / Monday, October 24, 2005 / Notices 61499 

significantly higher; in addition, the 

same could be said for the Nickerson, 

Kansas and Shepherd, Texas accidents 

that occurred on August 19, 2005 and 

September 15, 2005 respectively as 

trains involved in those accidents were 

transporting tank cars containing 

hazardous materials. Any reasonable 

extrapolation of the current trends of 

wrecks, deaths, and injuries makes clear 

that more accidents of this type will 

occur in the absence of this EO, that 

many of those accidents will result in 

injuries or deaths, or both, that a 

significant percentage of those wrecks 

will involve trains carrying hazardous 

materials, and that each of those wrecks 

will pose a significant risk that a large 

amount of hazardous material will be 

released. Considering the severity of 

accidents related to improperly lined 

hand-operated main track switches in 

non-signaled territory, the prevalence of 

hazardous materials on trains in nonsignaled territory, and the recent and 

dramatic increase in the rate of 

occurrence of these accidents, decisive 

action is necessary now. 

FRA concludes that non-compliance 

with certain operating rules and 

practices on the Nation’s railroads 

concerning the proper positioning of 

hand-operated main track switches in 

non-signaled territory lacking the 

safeguards of facing point protection is 

a combination of unsafe conditions and 

practices which causes an emergency 

situation involving an imminent and 

unacceptable hazard of death or 

personal injury. FRA further concludes 

that reliance solely on employee 

compliance with railroad operating 

rules related to the operation of handoperated main track switches in nonsignaled territory, without a Federal 

enforcement mechanism, is inadequate 

to protect the public safety. 

FRA also considered whether to apply 

this EO nationwide or limit it to those 

railroads that have had recent accidents. 

A review of the 2005 accidents reveals 

that four major railroads and four other, 

smaller railroads were involved in 

accidents. On June 12, 2004, an alert 

Amtrak engineer made a full service 

application of the train brake and 

stopped three car lengths into a siding, 

thereby avoiding a potentially serious 

accident on CSX track in Apex, North 

Carolina. Going back to 2000, five 

additional smaller railroads were 

involved in accidents. Over the last six 

years, 41% of this type of accident has 

had at least one train consist involved 

that was carrying hazardous material, 

i.e., 11 out of 27 accidents. Given the 

wide distribution of the accidents across 

various railroads, the similarity of 

physical conditions and operating 

practices among railroads of all sizes 

nationwide, the high number of new 

and inexperienced operating employees 

on many railroads, and the very high 

potential for serious harm, limiting the 

EO’s effectiveness to only a small 

number of railroads would be an 

unjustifiable risk to public safety and 

the safety of railroad employees. 

Accordingly, pursuant to the 

authority of 49 U.S.C. 20104, delegated 

to me by the Secretary of Transportation 

(49 CFR 1.49), it is hereby ordered that 

each railroad and its employees, 

including employees of a contractor to 

a railroad, who operate hand-operated 

main track switches in non-signaled 

territory and who dispatch non-signaled 

territory, do, at a minimum, the 

following: 

(1) Instruction 

Each employee subject to this EO 

shall be instructed on this EO and the 

railroad’s operating rules relating to the 

operation of hand-operated main track 

switches in non-signaled territory. The 

subject matter of the instruction shall 

include, but not be limited to: 

• Operation of main track switches; 

• Position of main track switches; 

• Restoring main track switches to 

their normal position; 

• Securing (locking) main track 

switches; 

• Correspondence of switch targets to 

switch position; 

• Clearing limits of main track 

authority; 

• Job briefings; and 

• Switch Position Awareness Form 

(SPAF). 

After receiving initial instruction, all 

employees must receive periodic 

instruction, in accordance with 49 CFR 

217.11. Railroads shall maintain records 

of both initial and periodic instruction 

available for inspection and copying by 

representatives of the FRA during 

normal business hours. These records 

shall be maintained for a period of at 

least two years following the end of the 

calendar year during which the 

instruction was conducted. 

(2) Hand-Operated Main Track 

Switches 

Employees operating hand-operated 

main track switches in non-signaled 

territory shall be qualified on the 

railroad’s operating rules relating to 

their operation. No employee is 

permitted to operate or verify the 

position of a hand-operated main track 

switch in non-signaled territory unless 

that person is qualified on the railroad’s 

operating rules relating to their 

operation. 

Employees operating hand-operated 

main track switches in non-signaled 

territory are individually responsible for 

the proper operation of these switches, 

including restoration to their normal 

position after use. Employees operating 

hand-operated main track switches in 

non-signaled territory must visually 

ensure that: 

• Hand-operated main track switches 

are properly lined for the intended 

route; and 

• The switch points fit properly and 

the switch target, if so equipped, 

corresponds with the switch’s position. 

The normal position of a main track 

switch shall be designated by the 

railroad and the switch must be lined 

and locked in that position when not in 

use, except when the switch is left in 

the charge of a crewmember of another 

train or the train dispatcher directs 

otherwise. When switches are not being 

operated, they must be locked, hooked 

or latched if so equipped. 

Before releasing the limits of a main 

track authority, the employee releasing 

the limits must report to the train 

dispatcher that all hand-operated main 

track switches operated have been 

restored to their normal position, unless 

the train dispatcher directs otherwise. 

The train dispatcher must confirm the 

switch positions with the employee 

releasing the limits before clearing the 

limits of the authority. Additionally, in 

the case of a train, the train dispatcher 

must confirm that both the conductor 

and engineer have initialed the SPAF as 

required. 

(3) Switch Position Awareness Form 

(SPAF) 

Employees operating hand-operated 

main track switches in non-signaled 

territory shall complete a SPAF. 

Employees are individually responsible 

for the proper completion of these 

forms. The form must contain: 

• Train symbol, job number or other 

unique identifier; 

• Date; 

• Subdivision; 

• Employee’s name; in the case of a 

train, both the Engineer’s and 

Conductor’s names; 

• Name and location of each main 

track switch operated by any employee; 

• Time switch was initially reversed; 

• Time switch was finally returned to 

the normal position; 

• Initials of the employee handling 

the switch; 

• Engineer’s initials for each entry; 

and 

• Conductor’s signature when the 

form is completed. 

Entries made with respect to a 

specific hand-operated main track 

switch in non-signaled territory must be 

recorded as soon as practicable after the 

61500 Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 204 / Monday, October 24, 2005 / Notices 

switch is reversed, and as soon as 

practicable after the switch is returned 

to its normal position before leaving the 

location. All information required on 

the SPAF must be entered before an 

employee reports clear of the limits of 

the main track authority. SPAFs shall be 

retained for a period of five days and 

made available to representatives of the 

FRA for inspection and copying. 

(4) Job Briefings 

Job briefings shall be conducted by 

employees in connection with the 

operation of hand-operated main track 

switches in non-signaled territory: 

• Before work is begun; 

• Each time a work plan is changed; 

and 

• At completion of the work. 

(5) Radio Communication 

In the case of a train, each time a 

crewmember operates, i.e., changes the 

position of, a hand-operated main track 

switch in non-signaled territory, the 

crewmember shall communicate with 

the engineer by radio while physically 

at the switch location, stating the switch 

name and location, and the position of 

the switch (normal/reverse). Before 

movement may occur, the engineer must 

acknowledge that information by radio. 

If radios become inoperable, all 

crewmembers must conduct a job 

briefing regarding the use of handoperated main track switches in nonsignaled territory before use, noting the 

inoperable radio on the SPAF. 

(6) Operational Tests and Inspections 

The railroad’s program of operational 

tests and inspections under 49 CFR part 

217 shall be revised as necessary to 

include the requirements of this EO, and 

shall specifically provide for a 

minimum number of such tests per year. 

(7) Distribution of Emergency Order 

A copy of this EO shall be provided 

to all employees affected by this EO. A 

written receipt or acknowledgment must 

be retained permanently for each 

affected employee. 

Relief: Petitions for special approval 

to take actions not in accordance with 

this EO may be submitted to the 

Associate Administrator for Safety, who 

shall be authorized to dispose of those 

requests without the necessity of 

amending this EO. In reviewing any 

petition for special review, the 

Associate Administrator for Safety shall 

only grant petitions in which a 

petitioner has clearly articulated an 

alternative action that will provide, in 

the Associate Administrator for Safety’s 

judgment, at least an equivalent level of 

safety as this EO provides. A copy of 

this petition should be submitted to the 

Docket Clerk, Department of 

Transportation Central Docket 

Management System, Nassif Building, 

Room Pl-401, 400 Seventh St., SW., 

Washington, DC 20590. The form of 

such request may be in written or 

electronic form consistent with the 

standards and requirements established 

by the Central Docket Management 

System and posted on its Web site at 

http://dms.dot.gov. 

FRA recognizes that certain railroad 

operating rules or equipment used by 

some railroads already provide a level of 

safety equivalent to this EO. If all of a 

railroad’s hand-operated main track 

switches in non-signaled territory are 

covered by one or more of the protective 

measures identified below, a railroad 

need not apply for relief from this EO 

as relief shall be deemed automatically 

granted. Relief from this EO is 

automatically granted when: 

• Operating rules require trains to 

approach all facing point hand-operated 

switches in non-signaled territory 

prepared to stop; 

• Hand-operated main track switches 

in non-signaled territory (unless out of 

service) are protected by distant switch 

indicators; or 

• Hand-operated main track switches 

in non-signaled territory are protected 

by switch point indicators, e.g., BNSF’s 

automatic switches and CSX’s self 

restoring switches, unless these 

switches are operated by hand. 

Penalties: Any violation of this EO 

shall subject the person committing the 

violation to a civil penalty of up to 

$27,000. 49 U.S.C. 21301, 28 U.S.C. 

2461, and see 69 FR 30591 (May 28, 

2004). ‘‘Person’’ is defined by statute to 

include corporations, companies, 

associations, firms, partnerships, 

societies, and joint stock companies, as 

well as individuals. 1 U.S.C. 1. FRA 

may, through the Attorney General, also 

seek injunctive relief to enforce this EO. 

49 U.S.C. 20112. 

Effective Date and Notice to Affected 

Persons: Upon issuance of this EO, 

railroads shall immediately initiate 

steps to implement this EO. Railroads 

shall complete implementation no later 

than November 22, 2005. Notice of this 

EO will be provided by publishing it in 

the Federal Register. 

Review: Opportunity for review of this 

EO will be provided in accordance with 

49 U.S.C. 20104(b) and section 554 of 

Title 5 of the United States Code. 

Administrative procedures governing 

such review are found at 49 CFR part 

211. See 49 CFR 211.47, 211.71, 211.73, 

211.75, and 211.77. 

Issued in Washington, DC on October 19, 

2005. 

Joseph H. Boardman, 

Administrator. 

BILLING CODE 4910–06–P 

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61502 Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 204 / Monday, October 24, 2005 / Notices 


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61504 Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 204 / Monday, October 24, 2005 / Notices 

[FR Doc. 05–21253 Filed 10–21–05; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–06–C 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Pipeline and Hazardous Materials 

Safety Administration 

[Docket: RSPA–98–4957] 

Request for Public Comments and 

Office of Management and Budget 

(OMB) Approval of an Existing 

Information Collection (2137–0601) 

AGENCY: Pipeline and Hazardous 

Materials Safety Administration 

(PHMSA), Department of Transportation 

(DOT). 

SUMMARY: This notice requests public 

participation in the Office of 

Management and Budget (OMB) 

approval process for the renewal of an 

existing PHMSA information collection. 

In compliance with the Paperwork 

Reduction Act of 1995, this notice 

announces that the Information 

Collection Request (ICR) described 

below has been forwarded to OMB for 

extension of the currently approved 

collection. The ICR describes the nature 

of the information collection and the 

expected burden. PHMSA published a 

Federal Register Notice soliciting 

comments on the following information 

collection and received none. The 

purpose of this notice is to allow the 

public an additional 30 days from the 

date of this notice to submit comments. 

DATES: Comments must be submitted on 

or before November 23, 2005. 

ADDRESSES: Send comments to the 

Office of Information and Regulatory 

Affairs, Office of Management and 

Budget, 725 17th Street, NW., 

Washington, DC 20503, Attention DOT 

Desk Officer. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

William Fuentevilla, (202) 366–6199, by 

e-mail at William.Fuentevilla@dot.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Comments 

are invited on whether the proposed 

collection of information is necessary 

for the proper performance of the 

functions of the Department, including 

whether the information will have 

practical utility; the accuracy of the 

Department’s estimate of the burden of 

the proposed information collections; 

ways to enhance the quality, utility, and 

clarity of the information to be 

collected; and ways to minimize the 

burden of the collection of information 

on respondents, including the use of 

automated collection techniques of 

other forms of information technology. 

PHMSA published a Federal Register 

Notice with a 60-day comment period 

for this ICR on August 11, 2005 (70 FR 

46915). 

Underwater pipelines are being 

abandoned at an increasing rate as older 

facilities reach the end of their useful 

life. This trend is expected to continue. 

In 1992, Congress responded to this 

issue by amending the Pipeline Safety 

Act (49 U.S.C. 60108(c)(6)(B)). The Act 

directs the Secretary of Transportation 

to require operators of an offshore 

pipeline facility, or a pipeline crossing 

navigable waters, to report the 

abandonment to the Secretary of 

Transportation in a way that specifies 

whether the facility has been abandoned 

properly according to applicable Federal 

and State requirements. PHMSA’s 

regulations for abandonment reporting 

can be found at 49 CFR 192.727 and 

195.402. 

This information collection supports 

the DOT strategic goal of safety by 

reducing the number of fatalities, 

injuries, and amount of property 

damage. 

As used in this notice, ‘‘information 

collection’’ includes all work related to 

preparing and disseminating 

information related to this 

recordkeeping requirement including 

completing paperwork, gathering 

information and conducting telephone 

calls. 

Type of Information Collection 

Request: Renewal of Existing Collection. 

Title of Information Collection: 

Pipeline Safety Reports of Abandoned 

Underwater Pipelines 

Respondents: Gas and hazardous 

liquid pipeline operators. 

Estimated Number of Respondents 

per Year: 10. 

Estimated Number of Responses per 

Respondent: 1. 

Estimated Total Annual Burden on 

Respondents: 60 hours. 

Issued in Washington, DC, on October 18, 

2005. 

Florence L. Hamn, 

Director of Regulations, Office of Pipeline 

Safety. 

[FR Doc. 05–21140 Filed 10–21–05; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–60–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Pipeline and Hazardous Materials 

Safety Administration 

[Docket: RSPA–98–4957] 

Request for Public Comments and 

Office of Management and Budget 

(OMB) Approval of an Existing 

Information Collection (2137–0600) 

AGENCY: Pipeline and Hazardous 

Materials Safety Administration 

(PHMSA), Department of Transportation 

(DOT). 

SUMMARY: This notice requests public 

participation in the Office of 

Management and Budget (OMB) 

approval process for the renewal of an 

existing PHMSA information collection. 

In compliance with the Paperwork 

Reduction Act of 1995, this notice 

announces that the Information 

Collection Request (ICR) described 

below has been forwarded to OMB for 

extension of the currently approved 

collection. The ICR describes the nature 

of the information collection and the 

expected burden. PHMSA published a 

Federal Register Notice soliciting 

comments on the following collection of 

information and received none. The 

purpose of this notice is to allow the 

public an additional 30 days from the 

date of this notice to submit comments. 

DATES: Comments must be submitted on 

or before November 23, 2005. 

ADDRESSES: Send comments to the 

Office of Information and Regulatory 

Affairs, Office of Management and 

Budget, 725–17th Street, NW., 

Washington, DC 20503, Attention DOT 

Desk Officer. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

William Fuentevilla, (202) 366–6199, by 

e-mail at William.Fuentevilla@dot.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Comments 

are invited on whether the proposed 

collection of information is necessary 

for the proper performance of the 

functions of the Department, including 

whether the information will have 

practical utility; the accuracy of the 

Department’s estimate of the burden of 

the proposed information collections; 

ways to enhance the quality, utility, and 

clarity of the information to be 

collected; and ways to minimize the 

burden of the collection of information 

on respondents, including the use of 

automated collection techniques of 

other forms of information technology. 

PHMSA published a Federal Register 

Notice with a 60-day comment period 

for this ICR on August 11, 2005 (70 FR 

46914). 

Congress expressed concern with 

unskilled pipeline personnel in the 

Pipeline Safety and Reauthorization Act 

of 1988 (Pub. L. 100–561). This Act 

authorized the Secretary of 

Transportation to require all individuals 

responsible for the operation and 

maintenance of pipeline facilities to be 

properly qualified to safely perform 

their tasks. The operator qualification 

requirements are described in the 

pipeline safety regulations at 49 CFR 

part 192, subpart N and 49 CFR part 

195, subpart G.