In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 11-2319

MANUEL GALVAN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

THOMAS NORBERG, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 1:04-cv-04003—Edmond E. Chang, Judge.

ARGUED APRIL 4, 2012—DECIDED MAY 7, 2012

Before EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge, and FLAUM and

MANION, Circuit Judges.

FLAUM, Circuit Judge. Manuel Galvan filed a § 1983

action against Chicago police officers Thomas Norberg

and Alan Lucas, seeking damages arising from a traffic

stop, a vehicle search, and an arrest. Galvan contends

that the officers lacked probable cause, whereas the

officers maintain that they were following up on an

anonymous tip that Lucas had received. After the jury
2 No. 11-2319

returned a verdict in favor of defendants Norberg and

Lucas, Galvan moved for a new trial. Judge Shadur

granted the motion but without giving defendants an

opportunity to respond. He ruled that the verdict was

against the manifest weight of the evidence, reasoning

that Lucas had fabricated the tip and that the other

officers offered false testimony to support this fabrication. Judge Shadur then recused himself, and the case

was reassigned to Judge Chang. Defendants moved to

reconsider the new trial order. Judge Chang granted

their motion and reinstated the verdict.

We conclude that Judge Chang did not abuse his discretion by reconsidering the new trial grant, a non-final

order, and determining that the jury’s verdict was not

against the manifest weight of the evidence. There was

no direct evidence contradicting Lucas’s testimony

about the tip, there was other evidence to support

this testimony, and the jury was able to weigh the inconsistencies and make credibility determinations. We therefore affirm the district court’s reinstatement of the

verdict in favor of defendants.

I. Background

A. Factual Background

Officer Lucas claims that he was standing near the

front desk in the police station on December 30, 2002

when he answered a phone call. The caller asked whether

any “narcs” were working, referring to police officers in

civilian dress and unmarked cars. After Lucas told the
No. 11-2319 3

caller that no narcs were available, the caller asked whether

a “blue belly,” meaning a general police officer, was

available. Lucas identified himself as one, and

the caller responded that he had information about the

transportation of approximately 200 pounds of marijuana.

When describing the tip at trial, Lucas testified that

the informant had stated that “two dudes” would be

driving in a “tricked out” and “shiny clean” black pickup

truck. The truck would be traveling south on Pulaski

Avenue in the vicinity of Irving Park Road during the

“time frame of 4 or 5 o’clock in the evening until 6 o’clock

or thereabouts.” At trial, Lucas could not remember

whether the informant had told him the race or

nationality of the truck’s occupants, although Lucas

had testified in a March 2005 deposition that the

informant had said that the men were Hispanic. Lucas

testified at trial that the informant had told him that

the occupants’ ages were “between 25 and 30, 25 or

35, something like that,” though he had testified in his

deposition that “[the caller] told me 25 or 30.” Norberg,

Lucas’s partner, testified at trial that Lucas had told

him that there would be two Hispanic males between

the ages of 25 and 30 in the pickup truck, although

Norberg had previously testified in a deposition that

there would be “one to two” men. In his deposition,

Norberg stated that he did not know the caller’s gender,

but at trial he stated that Lucas had told him that the

caller was male. Norberg admitted that he testified that

the caller was male because Lucas had told him this

detail during the week before the trial.
4 No. 11-2319

After receiving the tip, Lucas attended roll call at the

police station. Lucas told Norberg about the tip, but he

could not recall whether he had also told Lieutenant

Joseph Porebski, that evening’s watch commander.

Porebski stated in a signed but undated affidavit that

Lucas had approached him with the anonymous tip—

that “a black shiny clean trick line pickup truck

occupied by two Hispanic males would be traveling

southbound on Pulaski near Irving Park Road between

4 p.m. and . . . 6 p.m. [and] this pickup truck will be

transporting hundreds [of] pounds of marijuana.” At

trial, Porebski testified that he remembered being told

that “there would be a large movement of marijuana . . .

in a truck,” as well as other details that he could no

longer remember. He remembered thinking that the

tip was “fairly good” and worth following up on.

After roll call, Lucas and Norberg began their patrol

and set up a moving surveillance. Lucas and Norberg

stopped a truck matching the tip’s description around

5:30 p.m. According to Norberg’s trial testimony, the

pickup made an “evasive move from the left lane to

the curb lane and also [did] not us[e] his turn signals.”

Lucas similarly testified that the pickup “dart[ed] to the

far right lane quickly.” Norberg testified that he

stopped the truck partially because of this traffic offense

and partially because it matched the informant’s description. Lucas agreed that the maneuver constituted a

traffic offense but believed that they had stopped the

truck solely because it matched the description.

Norberg approached the driver’s side of the truck, and

Lucas approached the passenger’s side. Norberg told
No. 11-2319 5

Manuel Galvan, who had been driving, that he had

been stopped for a traffic violation. Norberg testified

at trial that he smelled burnt marijuana through the

open window, though he did not mention this observation in his earlier deposition or in the case report. Lucas

testified that he saw a small bag that looked like a bag

of marijuana fly through the air from the driver’s side

to the passenger’s side, landing on the floor of the

pickup. Norberg testified that he saw Galvan throw

two bags over to the passenger’s side. Both officers

testified that they then saw the passenger, later identified as Juan Luna, kick two bags against the passenger’s side door. The case report, however, stated that

Galvan threw the bags to the floor and then Luna

kicked the bags over to the driver’s side. Both officers

asserted that the report’s statement was incorrect as to

the direction of Luna’s kick. At trial, Galvan denied

throwing the drugs, but he did not deny that the bags

were in the truck or that they belonged to him.

The officers removed both men from the truck and

searched it. Lucas testified that they searched the truck

because they planned to tow it (pursuant to a police

provision requiring the towing of a vehicle believed to

contain marijuana), and police procedure requires a

search prior to towing. Norberg testified to this reason

and added they also searched the pickup because it

matched the tip’s description. The officers found two

bales of plant material wrapped in plastic in the truck

bed. Because one of the bags was ripped open, the

officers could see the material. Lucas told Norberg,

“I think this is reefer.” Lucas also burned and smelled the
6 No. 11-2319

material, leading him to conclude that the bales were

cannabis (as the tip had predicted). Luna and Galvan

insisted that the bales were hay from a recent nativity

play at St. Wenceslaus Church. The officers nevertheless arrested Galvan and Luna for being in possession

of marijuana in the amount of approximately $661,000.

The officers brought the vehicle and the suspected

cannabis to the police station. Lucas burned a sample

from one of the bales for Lieutenant Porebski and

Sergeant Lawrence Casey. At trial, Casey testified

that he did not remember whether the bales looked

like marijuana, although he had stated in his 2005 deposition that “if I had to guess, I would say . . . it looked

more like hay than a bale of marijuana.” Casey could

not remember whether the burnt sample smelled like

hay or marijuana. Porebski testified that he was initially

unsure that the bales were marijuana, but he became

convinced that they were after consulting a drug

reference book and smelling an unlit sample.

Galvan was charged with possession of 100,000 grams

of marijuana. Lucas completed the case report that evening. The report referenced the anonymous tip, stating

that “Caller told the [officer] that a black pickup truck . . .

would be in the vicinity of Irving and Pulaski, and

that inside the truck would be approximately 200

[pounds] of cannabis.” At trial, Lucas characterized the

report as “a summary,” admitting that it did not

include other details about the tip.

Seven gray bins containing the plant material and

baling twine found in the truck bed were sent to the
No. 11-2319 7

The laboratory also determined that the two small bags 1

were indeed marijuana and indicated this in a report dated

January 14, 2003.

Illinois State Police Crime Laboratory. Test results

revealed that these samples were not marijuana. The

results were laid out in a report dated January 2, 2003,

which was allegedly faxed to the attention of Officer

Norberg on January 3. Lucas and Norberg have denied 1

ever receiving this report. Because Galvan could not

post bond and the officers were not aware of the

negative lab results for the bales, Galvan remained in

custody. While preparing for a preliminary hearing, the

Office of the State’s Attorney received the negative test

results. On January 21, the Office filed a writ to bring

Galvan from jail and moved to dismiss the criminal

charges. On January 23, the motion was granted, and

Galvan was released from custody.

B. Procedural Background

Galvan filed a § 1983 action against Officer Norberg,

Officer Lucas, Officer Jorge Rivera, Cook County

Sheriff Michael Sheahan, and the City of Chicago,

alleging federal claims of false arrest and imprisonment,

malicious prosecution, and failure to supervise, direct,

and discipline; and state law claims of malicious prosecution, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and

indemnity. Galvan subsequently agreed to dismiss

Sheahan and the City of Chicago as defendants, and

the district court dismissed the claims against Rivera.
8 No. 11-2319

The case against Norberg and Lucas went to trial, which

was presided over by Judge Shadur. The jury was asked

to consider whether Officers Norberg and Lucas

stopped the pickup truck without reasonable suspicion

and whether they arrested Galvan without probable

cause. After deliberating for less than a day, the jury

returned a verdict for defendants Norberg and Lucas

as to both claims.

1. The Granting of a New Trial

On August 20, 2009, Galvan moved for judgment as a

matter of law and alternatively for a new trial. Defendants

were not given an opportunity to provide a written

response to this motion. On September 2, 2009, Judge

Shadur held a hearing and indicated that he would

“probably want to hear from” defense counsel. Judge

Shadur did not ultimately give either party the

opportunity to respond before he denied the motion for

judgment as a matter of law and granted the motion for

a new trial. He focused on the impeachment of Lucas,

Norberg, and Porebski, and the fact that the case report

did not contain many of the details that the officers

later testified to:

I almost without exception rely on the ability of jurors

to get things right. I am sorry to say that what I saw

and heard in this case represented the most

distressing falsehoods coming from the mouths of

some members of the Chicago Police Department, a

force for which I have always had respect and I have

always sought to credit, because I believe so

strongly in law enforcement.
No. 11-2319 9

Allen [sic] Lucas’ testimony was I believe patently

false and indeed perjurious. His account of the

so-called “anonymous tip” was nothing more as I

heard it than a total arrest fabrication. And the rest of

his story spring boarded [from] that basic lie.

Just as distressing I will say, was also the closing

of ranks by other members of the Chicago Police

Department in an effort to buttress that fabrication

on his part.

. . . 

Just look at the Lucas story. If it’s to be believed

there was someone out there familiar with gang

lingo and familiar with drugs from the way that

he spoke, [and] he knew that a pickup truck of a

particularly distinctive appearance—the shiny, clean,

tricked up or tricked out[,] special paint, black, all

of these particulars, was going to be driving in a

specific direction north to south on Pulaski Road

in that afternoon, occupied by two males, sometimes

described as just two males, sometimes as Hispanic

males, depending on when Lucas testified at his[]

deposition or during the trial. And that truck was

going to be carrying a large quantity of marijuana.

Look what happened: A miracle happened. A miracle

happened. . . . Now why do I say a miracle? Just

exactly that kind of truck fitting that particularize[d]

description to a tee . . . and occupied by two males

was driving down that very street in that very direction during the specified time frame. And that second

truck was carrying a large quantity of hay. Mirabile
10 No. 11-2319

dictu. You know, to say that crediting such a patently

bogus after the fact horror story is contrary to

the manifest weight of the evidence is frankly a

major understatement. It’s sad to say that. But Lucas

I think demonstrated himself to have no respect for

the truth. . . .

As for the story of the two bags of user marijuana, if that stood alone it might be said that a

fact-finding body, a jury, might reasonably buy

either side’s argument about credibility. But you see

it doesn’t stand alone. It has to be looked at in light

of the fake description that Lucas gave. And regrettably that was . . . coupled with the big, big lie

about the purported justification for the stop. Where

officers are so demonstrably untrustworthy on the

big picture, the strong inference is that the two bags

of marijuana would also be a cover story, if I can

make a bad pun “a plant” to sanitize the officer’s

grossly illegal, indeed unconstitutional conduct.

At the end of the hearing, Judge Shadur recused himself.

2. The Reinstatement of the Jury’s Verdict

Defendants filed a motion to reconsider with Judge Hart,

the newly assigned judge. The case was then reassigned

to Judge Chang, who solicited supplemental briefs. On

May 18, 2011, Judge Chang granted defendants’ motion

and reinstated the jury’s verdict.

Judge Chang began his analysis by addressing the

propriety of his reconsideration of the new trial decision.

Judge Chang stated that non-final orders can be revised
No. 11-2319 11

Judge Chang rejected defendants’ broader argument that a 2

judge lacks the authority to discredit a witness’s testimony on

a new trial motion unless the testimony is indisputable.

Judge Chang explained that the trial judge cannot remove

evidence from consideration unless no reasonable jury could

believe it, but that the trial judge retains the authority to find

testimony not credible in light of the manifest weight of the

evidence. 

at any time before the entry of a final judgment, though

he also noted case law cautioning judges to revise decisions only in extraordinary circumstances. Judge Chang

determined that the “law of the case” doctrine operated

with less force because defendants had not been given

an opportunity to respond to plaintiff’s motion for a

new trial. Judge Chang further concluded that he had

“a freer hand” to reconsider, since Judge Shadur “did

not rely on first-hand observations of the witnesses’

demeanor, body language, or tone of voice.”

Judge Chang agreed with defendants that the jury’s

verdict was not against the manifest weight of the trial

evidence. He pointed out that there was no direct 2

evidence contradicting Lucas’s testimony about the

details of the tip or his receipt of the tip. Judge Chang

determined that Judge Shadur’s ruling was based on his

“common-sense notion that the tip was too good to be

true” rather than on “actual evidence, let alone a manifest

weight of evidence, that required the jury to reject the

testimony that Lucas had received the tip.” Judge Chang

identified specific facts indicating that the tip was not

too good to be true, namely that the tip was inaccurate

as to the occupants’ ages and that the information
12 No. 11-2319

could have been provided by “[a]ny person familiar

with Luna’s or Galvan’s work schedule and with Luna’s

truck.” Judge Chang also determined that the testimony from Lucas, Norberg, and Porebski provided sufficient evidence for the jury to find that Lucas had

actually received the tip. Judge Chang pointed out that

the reference to the tip in the case report meant that

Lucas would have had to start laying the foundation

for the cover-up even before the lab report indicated

that the bales were not marijuana. Judge Chang noted

how quickly this fabrication would have had to occur

and the level of cooperation needed from Norberg

and Porebski. Judge Chang pointed to evidence other

than the tip, including the traffic offense and the two

bags of suspected marijuana, that could support a

finding of probable cause. Finally, Judge Chang

rejected Galvan’s argument that the verdict was against

the manifest weight of the evidence because the officers’ testimony was conflicting and inconsistent.

Judge Chang emphasized that the jury heard the

evidence and made its credibility determinations.

Galvan appeals Judge Chang’s reinstatement of the

jury’s verdict and urges us to reinstate Judge Shadur’s

grant of a new trial. 

II. Discussion

A. The Decision to Reconsider Plaintiff’s Motion for

a New Trial

The grant of a new trial (in civil cases) is a non-final,

non-appealable order. See Allied Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc.,
No. 11-2319 13

Although we refer to the motion before Judge Chang as a 3

motion to reconsider, the motion is not a traditional Rule 59(e)

motion to reconsider, which can only follow a “judgment.”

Judge Shadur’s grant of a new trial had the effect of vacating the

judgment that normally follows the jury’s verdict. Rule 54(b)

governs non-final orders and permits revision at any time

prior to the entry of judgment, thereby bestowing sweeping

authority upon the district court to reconsider a new

trial motion.

449 U.S. 33, 34 (1980); Latino v. Kaizer, 58 F.3d 310, 314

(7th Cir. 1995). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b)

provides that non-final orders “may be revised at any

time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all

the claims and all the parties’ rights and liabilities.” FED.

R. CIV. P. 54(b); see also Marconi Wireless Tel. Co. v.

United States, 320 U.S. 1, 47 (1943). Because the grant of

a new trial is an interlocutory order and thus subject

to revision by the district court, the district court has

the discretionary authority to reconsider a new trial order.

See Gallimore v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 635 F.2d 1165, 1170-

72 (5th Cir. 1981); see also Peterson v. Lindner, 765 F.2d 698,

704 (7th Cir. 1985) (stating that a judge has the power

to reconsider an interlocutory order at any time before

final judgment). Here, Judge Chang did not err by

deciding to reconsider the new trial order. He properly 3

relied on the order’s interlocutory status as giving

him the authority to reconsider and revise it.

Judge Chang also stated that, under the “law of the case”

doctrine, judges should refrain from reopening issues

decided in earlier stages of the case absent extraordinary
14 No. 11-2319

Based on the interlocutory nature of an order granting a new 4

trial, some courts have ruled that the law of the case doctrine

has no force at all in this context. See, e.g., Langevine v. District

of Columbia, 106 F.3d 1018, 1022 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Day v. Amax,

Inc., 701 F.2d 1258, 1263 (8th Cir. 1983). But see United States

v. O’Keefe, 128 F.3d 885, 891 (5th Cir. 1997) (applying the

doctrine to a grant of a new trial).

circumstances. See Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating

Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 817 (1988); United States v. Harris, 531

F.3d 507, 513 (7th Cir. 2008). We have recognized,

however, that the law of the case doctrine is discretionary and does not preclude a district court from reopening a decided issue. See Harris, 531 F.3d at 513; see

also Avitia v. Metro. Club of Chicago, Inc., 49 F.3d 1219, 1227

(7th Cir. 1995) (referring to the doctrine as “no more

than a presumption, one whose strength varies with

the circumstances”). We nevertheless advise judges 4

that, because litigants have a right to expect consistency

even if judges change, the second judge should

“abide by the rulings of the first judge unless some new

development, such as a new appellate decision, convinces

him that his predecessor’s ruling was incorrect.” Fujisawa

Pharm. Co. v. Kapoor, 115 F.3d 1332, 1339 (7th Cir. 1997);

see also Brengettcy v. Horton, 423 F.3d 674, 680 (7th Cir.

2005) (noting that the law of the case doctrine is less

controlling when the disputed issue is not presented

in “precisely the same way” to the later judge).

Judge Chang correctly determined that the law of the

case doctrine applies with less force in this case since the

prior order was interlocutory and since a “new develop-
No. 11-2319 15

ment” occurred: defendants had not been given the

opportunity to respond to the initial new trial ruling

and thus Judge Chang was confronted with the first

adversarial presentation of the new trial issue. Additionally, although Judge Chang did not preside over

the trial, he was well equipped to reconsider the new

trial grant. Judge Chang aptly recognized that he had

a “freer hand” in reconsidering the ruling because

Judge Shadur “did not rely on first-hand observations

of the witnesses’ demeanor, body language, or tone of

voice.” Judge Shadur relied on his common-sense notion

of the case (i.e., that the tip was too good to be

true), rather than on any in-court observations. Thus,

Judge Chang possessed both the authority and the

ability to reconsider the new trial order.

Because we conclude that Judge Chang properly exercised his discretion in deciding to reconsider the grant

of the new trial, we now must consider whether

Judge Chang acted within his discretion in reinstating

the jury’s verdict in favor of defendants.

B. The Decision to Reinstate the Jury’s Verdict

The ruling on a motion for a new trial is a matter committed to the district court’s discretion, see Latino, 58

F.3d at 314, and we review a district court’s ruling on

a motion for a new trial for abuse of discretion, see Davis

v. Wis. Dep’t of Corrs., 445 F.3d 971, 979 (7th Cir. 2006).

Our review of a decision denying a new trial is

“extremely deferential,” as opposed to our “somewhat

more exacting” review of a decision granting a new trial.
16 No. 11-2319

See In re Innovative Constr. Sys., 793 F.2d 875, 888 (7th Cir.

1986). We review the evidence in the light most favorable

to the verdict. See Lewis v. City of Chicago Police Dep’t,

590 F.3d 427, 444-45 (7th Cir. 2009). Judge Shadur

granted the new trial based on his conclusion that the

verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence; Judge Chang then reconsidered this ruling and

reinstated the jury’s verdict. We review Judge Chang’s

decision to determine whether he abused his discretion

in concluding that no new trial was warranted because

the verdict was not actually against the manifest weight

of the evidence.

We have recognized that “[if], after evaluating the

evidence, the district court is of the opinion that the

verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence, a

new trial is appropriate.” Mejia v. Cook Cnty., 650 F.3d

631, 633 (7th Cir. 2011). Although “the district court has

the power to get a general sense of the weight of the

evidence, assessing the credibility of the witnesses and

the comparative strength of the facts put forth at trial,”

id. at 633, we have cautioned that “[t]he district court’s

power to grant a new trial on weight grounds is not

unlimited: a certain deference to the jury’s conclusions

is appropriate,” id. at 633 n.1. The district court also

has less freedom to overturn a jury verdict in cases involving issues that are easily understood by laypeople.

See Latino, 58 F.3d at 314. We recently clarified the

standard for a district court’s assessment of a motion

for a new trial:

In conducting its own assessment of the evidence

presented, the district court cannot remove a piece
No. 11-2319 17

of evidence from the calculus merely because the

court believes it was not credible and then, with that

piece excluded, grant a motion for a new trial

because the verdict is now against the weight. Latino

v. Kaizer, 58 F.3d 310, 315-17 (7th Cir. 1995). In weighing the facts, the district court is bound to the same

evidence the jury considered, and can strike a piece

of evidence from its weighing process only if “reasonable persons could not believe” it because it

“contradicts indisputable physical facts or laws.” Id.

at 315. Put simply, if the evidence was admitted

before the jury, the district court is usually stuck with

it in ruling on a motion for a new trial, for better

or worse.

Mejia, 650 F.3d at 633-34. We have similarly expressed

that the party moving for a new trial “must demonstrate

that no rational jury could have rendered a verdict

against [him].” King v. Harrington, 447 F.3d 531, 534

(7th Cir. 2004); see also Latino, 58 F.3d at 315 (“[N]ew trials

granted because the verdict is against the weight of

the evidence are proper only when the record shows

that the jury’s verdict resulted in a miscarriage of

justice or where the verdict, on the record, cries out to

be overturned or shocks our conscience.”).

Judge Chang provided a detailed explanation as to

why the jury’s verdict was not against the manifest

weight of the evidence. He emphasized that “there was

no direct evidence” contradicting Lucas’s testimony

about receiving a tip or about the tip’s details.

Judge Chang criticized Judge Shadur’s opinion for
18 No. 11-2319

“rel[ying] on what it viewed as the common-sense

notion that the tip was too good to be true. But there was

no actual evidence, let alone a manifest weight of

evidence, that required the jury to reject the testimony

that Lucas had received the tip.” Judge Chang concluded that the combination of Lucas’s, Norberg’s, and

Porebski’s testimony supplied sufficient evidence for the

jury to find that Lucas had actually received the anonymous tip. Judge Chang also found the case report

to serve as additional evidence in support of the verdict. He further pointed out that if the tip was an “after-the-fact cover-up,” Lucas would have had to

start laying the groundwork before the lab reports

came back negative and would have had just two hours

between the arrest and the report to fabricate the

story. Judge Shadur’s perception of the anonymous tip

is understandable, given the conflicting testimony and

the lack of details in the case report; however, the

standard for granting a new trial requires the jury’s

verdict to be against the manifest weight of the evidence.

See Mejia, 650 F.3d at 633. We agree with Judge Chang’s

assessment that sufficient evidence was presented to the

jury to support its verdict.

We also agree with Judge Chang’s view that the tip

was not necessarily too good to be true. He pointed to

the discrepancy about the occupants’ ages as illustrating

that the tip was not perfect. Judge Chang stated that

the jury could have plausibly concluded that “the tipster

in fact was someone with some familiarity with Galvan

or Luna” or that “there was indeed a tipster who saw

another truck matching the same details, and that

Galvan was in the wrong place at the wrong time.” Accord-
No. 11-2319 19

ing to Judge Chang, a person familiar with the truck and

with Luna or Galvan’s work schedule would have been

able to provide all of the information in the tip. The hay

sat in the truck for four days, allowing ample time

for someone to observe it, and anyone who had seen

the truck would have been able to describe it to police.

The tip could have been provided by someone who

mistook the hay for marijuana or by someone who

knew that it was hay but wanted Luna or Galvan arrested.

Thus, Judge Chang properly concluded that the jury’s

verdict rests on plausible theories of the evidence presented.

Judge Chang acknowledged that portions of the testimony were inconsistent or conflicting, but he reasoned

that “[t]he jury heard all of the conflicting and inconsistent

testimony, bad memories and impeachment and all,

and then did precisely what it is called upon to do,

which is make a credibility determination that was not

manifestly outweighed by other evidence.” Judge Chang

further explained that the jury could have attributed

the inconsistencies to “the passage of time and the

fading of memories.” Judge Chang did not abuse his

discretion by deferring to the jury’s credibility determinations. The jury weighed the evidence, including the

conflicting testimony, and arrived at a verdict that

is supported by the evidence—or at least a verdict that

is not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Our task is not to determine whether Officer Lucas

fabricated the anonymous tip but rather to determine

whether Judge Chang abused his discretion in
20 No. 11-2319

By requiring adherence to the manifest weight standard, we 5

ensure that the district court gives the appropriate level of

deference to the jury’s determinations. See Mejia, 650 F.3d at

633 n.1.

5-7-12

concluding that the jury’s verdict was not contrary to

the manifest weight of the evidence. In this case, regard- 5

less of whether the district court believed that the jury

arrived at the correct outcome, there was no direct evidence contradicting Lucas’s testimony about the details

of the tip or the fact that he received it. It was well

within the province of the jury to decide whether the

inconsistencies called into question the existence of the

tip. The case report, Norberg’s testimony, and Porebski’s

testimony all support Lucas’s testimony and the jury’s

verdict. Judge Shadur’s theory that Lucas fabricated the

tip and obtained the cooperation of other officers is

plausible, but the theory that defendants presented

(and the jury accepted) is also plausible. We therefore

hold that Judge Chang did not abuse his discretion by

concluding that the verdict was not against the manifest

weight of the evidence and reinstating the jury’s verdict.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s

decision to reconsider the motion for a new trial and

reinstate the jury’s verdict.