Cite as 2022 Ark. App. 138

ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION IV

No. CV-21-510

KERRI YOUNGER AND 

CHRISTOPHER WOMACK

APPELLANTS

V.

ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF 

HUMAN SERVICES AND MINOR 

CHILDREN

APPELLEES

Opinion Delivered March 30, 2022

APPEAL FROM THE YELL

COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, 

NORTHERN DISTRICT

[NO. 75NJV-20-12]

HONORABLE TERRY M. SULLIVAN, 

JUDGE

AFFIRMED

BART F. VIRDEN, Judge

The Yell County Circuit Court terminated the parental rights of appellants Kerri 

Younger and Christopher Womack to their three children, C.W.1 (born in 2009) and twins, 

C.W.2 and C.W.3 (born in 2011). The parents have filed separate appeals challenging the 

sufficiency of the evidence supporting grounds for termination. Womack also argues that 

the trial court erred in determining that termination of his rights is in his children’s best 

interest. We affirm the trial court’s decision as to both parents.

I. Background

The Arkansas Department of Human Services (DHS) removed C.W.1, C.W.2, and 

C.W.3 from Younger’s custody on May 20, 2020. In an affidavit attached to the petition for 
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emergency custody, a DHS family-service worker (FSW) attested that on May 4, someone 

had reported to the hotline that the children had seen Younger chopping up a white powdery 

substance with a credit card and ingesting it with a straw. The affidavit also indicated that 

DHS has been involved with the family since 2016 and that Younger has a history of drug 

charges for which she is on probation. The children were interviewed at the Children’s 

Advocacy Center in Benton County, and concern was expressed about “the amount of drug 

information these children had.” The FSW eventually reached Younger at her parents’ 

home. She denied the allegations of drug use and agreed to a drug screen but could not 

produce a sample, saying that she has kidney disease. The FSW was contacted by Younger’s 

family members, who were said to be fearful about the children’s safety due to Younger’s 

drug use. Womack was identified as the putative father. At the time of the removal, Womack 

was in a drug-rehabilitation program and living with his sister. 

Younger was instructed to comply with standard welfare orders. The children were 

adjudicated dependent-neglected on July 24, 2020, due to (1) parental unfitness as a result 

of the parents’ drug use, which affected their ability to supervise, care for, and protect the 

children; and (2) environmental neglect based on the parents’ failure to provide a safe and 

appropriate home for the children. The trial court ordered Younger and Womack to follow 

the case plan and court orders; cooperate with DHS and keep DHS informed; watch “The 

Clock is Ticking” video and complete parenting classes; obtain and maintain stable housing 

and employment; remain drug-free and submit to random drug screens; and, if requested by 
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DHS, submit to a drug-and-alcohol assessment and a psychological evaluation and attend 

AA/NA meetings.

The case was reviewed in November 2020. The trial court found that Younger and 

Womack were “in total noncompliance” with the case plan and court orders and that they 

were also homeless and unemployed. Among other things, the trial court ordered that the 

parents would be given only five minutes to log on to attend visitation with their children 

via Zoom and that they were to submit to a drug screen following the review hearing. 

The case was reviewed again in February 2021. The trial court kept the goal as 

reunification but added a concurrent goal of adoption following termination of parental 

rights because of the parents’ lack of progress. The trial court found that neither parent had 

complied with the case plan and court orders, including that they obtain stable housing and 

income, submit to random drug screens and hair-follicle testing, and stay after the previous 

hearing to be drug tested. Younger and Womack had submitted to a psychological 

evaluation, but they continually refused to watch “The Clock is Ticking” video and had not 

completed all twelve hours of parenting classes. The trial court noted that Younger had 

missed twenty-eight Zoom visits with the children, nineteen of which were “no-shows,” and 

had been late to an additional seven visits. Womack had missed nineteen Zoom visits with 

the children, seventeen of which were “no-shows,” and had been late to an additional seven 

visits. The trial court further found that both parents were then incarcerated in Benton 

County on, among other charges, possession-of-drug-paraphernalia and theft-by-receiving 

charges and that both parents were already on probation in Oklahoma stemming from drug 
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offenses in 2017. Womack had additional driving-related charges pending in Benton County 

and had active warrants in Perry and Franklin Counties. Younger was on probation in Pope 

County from drug charges in 2018. Both parents had legal issues pending. 

In May 2021, DHS filed a petition to terminate Younger’s and Womack’s parental 

rights to all three children on five grounds under Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(B) (Supp. 

2021): (i)(a) & (b) (one-year failure to remedy after removal from custodial and noncustodial 

parent); (ii)(a) (willful failure to provide significant material support and to maintain 

meaningful contact); (vii) (subsequent factors or issues); (viii) (sentenced in a criminal 

proceeding); and (ix)(a)(3)(A) & (B)(i) (aggravated circumstances—little likelihood that 

services will result in successful reunification). 

In a permanency-planning order entered in June 2021, the trial court changed the 

goal of the case from reunification to adoption following termination of parental rights. The 

trial court found that the parents had not complied with the case plan and court orders, did 

not have a stable home, had active warrants, and had felony charges filed against them since 

the last hearing. In addition, Womack had tested positive for methamphetamine on a hairfollicle test in May. The trial court also noted that “as shown by their testimony today, they 

do not see a problem with their actions.” 

A termination hearing was held in July 2021. The trial court heard testimony from 

both parents, along with FSW Kiley Burge. Following the hearing, the trial court terminated 

Younger’s and Womack’s parental rights to the children on at least three grounds, including 

one-year failure to remedy, subsequent factors or issues, and aggravated circumstances. The 
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trial court found that Burge had offered credible testimony that the children are highly 

adoptable due to their personalities, ages, and good physical health. The trial court further 

found that the children would be at risk of potential harm if returned to the parents due to 

their failure to comply with the case plan, their lack of any stability, and their continuous 

drug use and criminal activities. 

II. Standard of Review

Pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3), an order forever terminating parental 

rights shall be based on clear and convincing evidence of one or more grounds. Ark. Code 

Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(B). Proof of only one statutory ground is sufficient to terminate 

parental rights. Burks v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2021 Ark. App. 309, 634 S.W.3d 527. 

The trial court must also find by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the 

best interest of the child, including consideration of the likelihood that the child will be 

adopted if the termination petition is granted and the potential harm, specifically addressing 

the effect on the health and safety of the child, caused by returning the child to the custody 

of the parent. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(A). 

On appeal, termination-of-parental-rights cases are reviewed de novo. Burks, supra. 

Grounds for termination must be proved by clear and convincing evidence, which is that 

degree of proof that will produce in the finder of fact a firm conviction of the allegation 

sought to be established. Id. The appellate inquiry is whether the trial court’s finding that 

the disputed fact was proved by clear and convincing evidence is clearly erroneous. Id. A 

finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing 
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court on the entire evidence is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has 

been made. Bridges v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 50, 571 S.W.3d 506. In 

resolving the clearly erroneous question, we give due regard to the opportunity of the trial 

court to judge the credibility of witnesses. Id. We must also defer to the superior position of 

the trial court to weigh the credibility of the witnesses. Id. The trial court is in a far superior 

position to observe the parties before it. Id. 

In deciding whether to terminate parental rights, the trial court has a duty to look at 

the entire picture to determine how that parent has discharged his or her duties as a parent.

Scott v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 347, 552 S.W.3d 463. Even full 

compliance with the case plan is not determinative; the issue is whether the parent has 

become a stable, safe parent able to care for his or her child. Shaffer v. Ark. Dep’t of Human 

Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 208, 489 S.W.3d 182. Termination of parental rights is an extreme 

remedy and in derogation of a parent’s natural rights; however, parental rights will not be 

enforced to the detriment or destruction of the health and well-being of the child. Id.

III. Discussion

A. The Mother

Younger challenges the grounds alleged by DHS, including grounds that we are not 

convinced that the trial court found and relied on for termination. Because only one ground 

is sufficient to terminate parental rights, Burks, supra, we will address the subsequent-factors 

ground. Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(vii)(a) provides as a ground that 

other factors or issues arose subsequent to the filing of the original petition for dependency-
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neglect that demonstrate that placement of the juvenile in the custody of the parent is 

contrary to the juvenile’s health, safety, or welfare and that, despite the offer of appropriate 

family services, the parent has manifested the incapacity or indifference to remedy the 

subsequent issues or factors or rehabilitate the parent’s circumstances that prevent the 

placement of the juvenile in the custody of the parent.

Younger contends that no “legitimate” issues arose separate and apart from the reason 

for removal. She asserts that her arrest in February 2021 for possession of drug paraphernalia 

was not a legitimate subsequent factor. If Younger’s arrest for possession of drug 

paraphernalia had been the only subsequent factor, we might agree with her that it was not a 

“legitimate” issue sufficient to support termination of her parental rights; however, there 

were other factors to consider. 

As a preliminary matter, it seems that the trial court focused on Younger’s criminal 

activities as evidence supporting the subsequent-factors ground. The trial court found that 

Younger was already on probation in Arkansas and had a “deferment” in Oklahoma and 

that in February 2021, she had been arrested in Benton County, which put her probation 

and deferment in danger of being revoked. At the termination hearing, Younger said that

she is not worried about the status of her probation and “deferment” because she had 

resolved the matter in Benton County by going to jail. She claimed that her Oklahoma 

charges have been reduced to misdemeanors and that she is now paying monthly installments 

on her fines. She further claimed that the probation matter in Arkansas has been settled, 
8

but she had no paperwork to confirm that. Younger said that she has an upcoming hearing 

on her failure-to-appear charge but that she expects her probation to be reinstated. 

In this court’s de novo review, we can consider other evidence that came out at the 

hearing to support the subsequent-factors ground. In Crawford v. Arkansas Department of 

Human Services, 2019 Ark. App. 474, 588 S.W.3d 383, this court stated that 

[i]n the absence of a statute or rule requiring specific findings of fact or a timely 

request for specific findings under [Ark. R. Civ. P. 52], the appellate court will 

ordinarily presume that the trial court made the findings necessary to support its

judgment. “[W]hen the trial court fails to make certain findings of fact, the appellate 

court, under its de novo review, may nonetheless conclude that the evidence 

supported the decision.” In determining whether the circuit judge clearly erred in a 

finding, the appellate court may look to the whole record to reach that decision. 

Indeed, de novo review of the evidence makes it incumbent on the appellate court to 

review the entire record of the evidence presented to the circuit court.

2019 Ark. App. 474, at 3, 588 S.W.3d 383, 385 (citations omitted).

In addition to her argument that her arrest was not a legitimate subsequent factor, 

Younger contends that her failure to complete services does not rise to the level of the 

subsequent factors found in Camarillo-Cox v. Arkansas Department of Human Services, 360 Ark. 

340, 201 S.W.3d 391 (2005), in which the mother had married a convicted sex offender, 

and Johnson v. Arkansas Department of Human Services, 2015 Ark. App. 34, in which the mother 

was incarcerated at the time of the hearing due to her drug involvement. 

We have consistently recognized that a failure to comply with the case plan and court 

orders may serve as a subsequent factor on which termination of parental rights can be based. 

Easter v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 441, 587 S.W.3d 604. Younger was 

ordered to obtain stable housing and income. At the termination hearing, the court heard 
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testimony that Womack and Younger were living in a one-bedroom apartment belonging to 

another couple with special needs and that the apartment was being paid for with the 

disabled man’s “SSI check.” This court has held that “[a] stable home is one of a child’s most

basic needs.” Howell v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2009 Ark. App. 138, at 13. Moreover, the 

record indicates that Younger had not held down a job for four or five years before the 

children were removed from her custody. Younger admitted at the termination hearing that 

she did not have a job over the course of the entire case, which lasted for fourteen months, 

until just before the termination hearing. Younger claimed that she had been acting as a parttime caregiver for the woman with whom she and Womack were living and that she had 

been working in that role for approximately one month. Younger said that she had recently 

applied for a job at Outdoor Cap where Womack works. She further testified that she has 

been applying for jobs, including “at every burger joint that you can think of,” but that she 

is “too overqualified” because she has two college degrees. Younger demonstrated instability 

by failing to obtain housing of her own and failing to timely secure and hold down a job 

despite her advanced education. Smith v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 380, 555 

S.W.3d 896 (holding that failure to comply with a case plan, along with instability, is 

sufficient to support termination on the subsequent-factors ground).

The trial court also ordered Younger to submit to a drug-and-alcohol assessment and 

random drug screens. Younger testified at the termination hearing that her assessment is 

scheduled for after the termination hearing. Moreover, Younger claimed that she had tested 

negative on random drug screens and a hair-follicle test. FSW Burge, on the other hand, 
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testified that she had difficulty contacting Younger for random drug screens because Younger 

had not provided DHS with an address until much later in the case. Incidentally, Younger 

had been ordered to cooperate with DHS, and leaving no contact information for DHS 

shows a lack of cooperation. Younger had also been ordered to stay after a hearing for drug 

testing, but she left without being tested. Younger insisted at the termination hearing that 

neither she nor Womack has a drug problem. With this testimony, Younger manifested an 

indifference to remedying this subsequent issue given that she refused to acknowledge that 

she has a problem.

Moreover, Younger failed to complete parenting classes as ordered by the trial court 

and missed a significant number of visits with the children. Younger claimed that the 

number of required parenting classes had changed from six hours to twelve hours and that 

she could not finish the twelve hours until after classes resume in August following a break. 

Younger complained that she had difficulty logging on for Zoom visits and, at times, did not 

have a phone. FSW Burge testified that the parents had been instructed to text her if they 

had problems logging on and that, despite telling them that she would log on early, they 

would text her up to thirty minutes after the start time for the visit to say that they could not 

log on. See Guerrero v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2020 Ark. App. 160, 595 S.W.3d 437

(holding that evidence that Guerrero had never been in full compliance with the case plan 

and court orders, along with evidence that for the first nine months of the case, he missed 

eighteen visits with his child and fourteen drug screens, supported termination on 

subsequent-factors ground); Danes v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 388, 585 
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S.W.3d 731 (holding that Danes’s failure to exercise his visitation on a consistent basis, 

attending only nineteen of sixty-eight visits provided by DHS, was evidence supporting 

subsequent-factors ground).

Under these circumstances, we cannot say that the trial court clearly erred in finding 

that the subsequent-factors ground supported termination of Younger’s parental rights. 

B. The Father

Womack also challenges all of the grounds alleged by DHS in its petition to terminate 

his rights. Because only one ground is necessary to support termination, Burks, supra, we will 

address the subsequent-factors ground found by the trial court. Much of the analysis above 

regarding the subsequent factors that support the termination of Younger’s parental rights 

also applies to Womack. Womack did not obtain stable housing of his own and was instead 

living in a one-bedroom apartment belonging to a couple with disabilities. He explained that 

his incarceration had prevented him from obtaining housing approval from the U.S. 

Department of Housing and Urban Development, that rent had been raised on another 

apartment such that he could no longer afford it, and that he was currently on a waiting list 

for a two- or three-bedroom apartment, which may become available after the termination 

hearing. Regarding income, Womack testified that he had gotten a job at Outdoor Cap in 

April 2021—just three months before the termination hearing. 

Like Younger, Womack had been ordered to submit to random drug screens and a 

drug-and-alcohol assessment. Womack testified at the termination hearing that his 

assessment was scheduled to take place after the termination hearing. The trial court found 
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that Womack had disobeyed its order to remain after the November 2020 review hearing for 

drug testing. Further, Womack conceded that he had tested positive for methamphetamine 

on a hair-follicle test in May—just two months before the termination hearing, but he testified 

that his urine drug screen in May was negative. He claimed that he had not used drugs since 

December 2020, but the trial court was not required to believe this assertion. Bridges, supra. 

Womack admitted that he had not attended any AA/NA meetings as requested by DHS. 

Similar to Younger, Womack had put his probation in danger of being revoked in that he 

had been arrested in February 2021 on charges of possession of drug paraphernalia, theft by 

receiving, and a slew of driving-related offenses. Finally, Womack also failed to complete all 

twelve hours of parenting classes, and he missed a number of visits with his children, which 

are subsequent factors worth considering. Guerrero, supra; Danes, supra.

Womack further argues that DHS did not prove that he is indifferent to remedying 

the subsequent factors or issues. We disagree. Womack was given a case plan that he refused 

to follow for the most part despite having fourteen months within which to take advantage 

of services. Trout v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 359 Ark. 283, 158 S.W.3d 129 (2004) (holding 

that persistent failure to comply with the court’s orders demonstrated that the mother was 

either incapable of correcting the problems or indifferent to the need to do so). Womack 

also argues that DHS did not provide services to aid him with housing, employment, and his 

drug addiction. Womack, however, refused to cooperate with DHS, including not sharing 

what he called a “temporary” address in Ft. Smith, where he lived for six months. According 

to FSW Burge, Womack’s failure to provide DHS with his address contributed to DHS’s 
13

difficulty in providing some services. Nevertheless, DHS offered to provide appropriate 

services, which is all that the statute requires. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(vii). 

Moreover, the trial court repeatedly found that DHS had indeed offered appropriate services 

to the parents to assist them with regaining custody of their children; Womack simply failed 

to take advantage of those services. Under these circumstances, we cannot say that the trial 

court clearly erred in finding that the subsequent-factors ground supported termination of 

Womack’s parental rights.

Next, Womack challenges the potential-harm prong of the best-interest analysis. A 

potential-harm analysis must be conducted in broad terms, with the trial court considering 

the harm to the children’s health and safety that might occur from continued contact with 

the parent. Barnes v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 525. There is no requirement 

to find that actual harm would result or to identify the potential harm. Id. It is well settled 

that a parent’s past actions over a meaningful period of time are good indicators of what the 

future may hold. Easter, supra. 

Womack argues that he is “clean, employed, not incarcerated, and has housing.”

Although Womack insisted that he had not used drugs since December 2020, the trial court 

was not required to believe this assertion. Even assuming that Womack was “clean,” he 

nevertheless did not have housing of his own and had only recently secured a job. The trial 

court ordered him to obtain stable housing and income. Womack had done neither. 

Unstable housing and being unavailable for random drug screens demonstrate potential 

harm. Williams v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2021 Ark. App. 386; see also Stockstill v. Ark. 
14

Dep’t of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 427, 439 S.W.3d 95 (holding evidence of potential 

harm sufficient where father’s housing was uncertain, he missed visitation, and he failed to 

participate in early part of case). It is true that Womack was not incarcerated at the time of 

the termination hearing, but he continued to engage in criminal activities and failed to 

appear for court, which put his probationary status and freedom in jeopardy. Moreover, 

evidence that supports the subsequent-factors ground for termination also supports a

potential-harm finding. See Johnson v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2020 Ark. App. 313, 603 

S.W.3d 630. We cannot say that the trial court clearly erred in finding that termination was 

in the best interest of Womack’s children.

Finally, Womack contends that, because C.W.2 and C.W.3 desired to see their 

parents, it was not in the children’s best interest to be denied in-person visitation. According 

to Womack, Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-325(o) (Supp. 2021) requires that DHS provide him 

with in-person visits. At the termination hearing, FSW Burge testified that, given that the 

parents had not consistently attended virtual visits via Zoom and had been late logging on 

for visits, she did not schedule any in-person visits because she did not want the children to 

be disappointed should their parents fail to show up for the in-person visit. While we tend 

to agree that Womack should have received some in-person visits—even during the COVID19 pandemic—we are not clear how DHS’s failure to provide this service has any bearing on 

whether continued contact with Womack represents potential harm to the health and safety 

of the children. Further, Womack did not raise any statutory argument below with respect 

to in-person visitation. Thus, the specific argument that he now raises on appeal is not 
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preserved for review. Perry v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2021 Ark. App. 193, 625 S.W.3d 

374 (holding that we will not address arguments raised for the first time on appeal, even in 

termination cases). 

Affirmed. 

ABRAMSON and MURPHY, JJ., agree.

James & Streit, by: Jonathan R. Streit, for separate appellant Kerri Younger.

Dusti Standridge, for separate appellant Christopher Womack.

Andrew Firth, Ark. Dep’t of Human Services, Office of Chief Counsel, for appellee.

Dana McClain, attorney ad litem for minor children.