alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
United States Department of Labor

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

__________________________________________

R.T., Appellant

and

U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, KENSINGTON POST 

OFFICE, Kensington, MD, Employer

__________________________________________

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Docket No. 20-0323

Issued: April 9, 2021

Appearances: Case Submitted on the Record

Appellant, pro se

Office of Solicitor, for the Director

ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL

Before:

ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Chief Judge

JANICE B. ASKIN, Judge

VALERIE D. EVANS-HARRELL, Alternate Judge

On November 26, 2019 appellant sought an appeal from a May 9, 2019 merit decision of 

the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). The Clerk of the Appellate Boards 

assigned Docket No. 20-0323.

The Board has duly considered the matter and notes that the Board has jurisdiction to 

review final adverse decisions of OWCP issued under the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act 

(FECA).1 For final adverse decisions of OWCP issued on or after November 19, 2008, the Board’s 

review authority is limited to appeals which are filed within 180 days from the date of issuance of 

OWCP’s decision.2

The 180th day following the May 9, 2019 decision was November 5, 2019. As appellant 

did not file an appeal with the Board until November 26, 2019, more than 180 days after the May 9, 

2019 decision, the Board finds that the appeal docketed as No. 20-0323 is untimely filed. The 

Board is without jurisdiction to review the appeal. Appellant has not offered a reason to explain 

her failure to timely file an appeal with supporting documentation sufficient to establish 

 

1 5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.; 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3(a).

2 20 C.F.R. § 501.3(e) (2009).
2

compelling circumstances. Because there is no adverse, final decision issued by OWCP within 

180 days of the November 26, 2019 filing of the instant appeal, the Board concludes that the appeal 

docketed as No. 20-0323 must be dismissed.3 Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the appeal docketed as No. 20-0323 is dismissed.

Issued: April 9, 2021

Washington, DC

Alec J. Koromilas, Chief Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Janice B. Askin, Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Valerie D. Evans-Harrell, Alternate Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

 

3 The Board’s decisions and orders are “final upon the expiration of 30 days from the date of their issuance.” 20 

C.F.R. § 501.6(d).
```

[Congressional Bills 111th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 5038 Introduced in House (IH)]

111th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 5038

           To repeal the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             April 15, 2010

 Mr. Hensarling (for himself and Mr. Bachus) introduced the following 
    bill; which was referred to the Committee on Financial Services

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
           To repeal the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Fair Access to Credit and Job 
Creation Act of 2010''.

SEC. 2. REPEAL OF THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT OF 1977.

    (a) In General.--The Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 (12 U.S.C. 
2901 et seq.) is hereby repealed.
    (b) Conforming Amendment.--Section 48 of the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 1831y) is hereby repealed.
                                 <all>
```
[Federal Register Volume 70, Number 202 (Thursday, October 20, 2005)]
[Notices]
[Page 61144]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 05-21024]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

National Institutes of Health


National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute; Notice of Closed 
Meeting

    Pursuant to section 10(d) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, as 
amended (5 U.S.C. Appendix 2), notice is hereby given of the following 
meeting.
    The meeting will be closed to the public in accordance with the 
provisions set forth in sections 552b(c)(4) and 552b(c)(6), Title 5 
U.S.C., as amended. The grant applications and the discussions could 
disclose confidential trade secrets or commercial property such as 
patentable material, and personal information concerning individuals 
associated with the grant applications, the disclosure of which would 
constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.

    Name of Committee: Heart, Lung, and Blood Initial Review 
Group.Heart, Lung, and Blood Program Project Review Committee.
    Date: December 1, 2005.
    Time: 8 a.m. to 5 p.m.
    Agenda: To review and evaluate grant applications.
    Place: Holiday Inn Chevy Chase, 5520 Wisconsin Avenue, Chevy 
Chase, MD 20815.
    Contact Person: Jeffrey H. Hurst, PhD, Review Branch, Division 
of Extramural Affairs, National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute/
NIH, 6701 Rockledge Drive, RM 7208, Bethesda, MD 20892, (301) 435-
0303, <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#224a5750515648624c4a4e404b0c4c4b4a0c454d54"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="eb839e99989f81ab8583878982c5858283c58c849d">[email protected]</span></a>.

(Catalogue of Federal Domestic Assistance Program Nos. 93.233, 
National Center for Sleep Disorders Research; 93.837, Heart and 
Vascular Diseases Research; 93.838, Lung Diseases Research; 93.839, 
Blood Diseases and Resources Research, National Institutes of 
Health, HHS)

    Dated: October 11, 2005.
Anthony M. Coelho, Jr.,
Acting Director, Office of Federal Advisory Committee Policy.
[FR Doc. 05-21024 Filed 10-19-05; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4140-01-M


</pre><script data-cfasync="false" src="/cdn-cgi/scripts/5c5dd728/cloudflare-static/email-decode.min.js"></script></body>
</html>
#### STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JAMES CORBET STRICKLAND

No. 7118SC151

(Filed 24 February 1971)

1. Burglary and Unlawful Breakings § 8; Constitutional Law § 36— validity of sentence — cruel and unusual punishment

Sentence of six to ten years imprisonment which, was imposed upon defendant’s conviction of felonious breaking and entering was within the statutory limits and did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. G.S. 14-2; G.S. 14-54.

2. Criminal Law § 161— exception to the judgment — appellate review

An exception to the j'udgment presents the face of the record for review.

Appeal by defendant from *Collier, Superior Court Judge,*7 September 1970 Criminal Session of Superior Court of GUIL-FORD County.

Defendant was charged with breaking and entering and larceny and receiving. The jury returned a verdict of guilty of felonious breaking and entering. From judgment entered on the verdict, defendant appealed. He was represented at trial by court-appointed counsel, appeals in *forma pauperis,*and is represented on appeal by court-appointed counsel.

*Attorney General Morgan by Staff Attorney Price for the State.*

*Z. H. Howerton, Jr. attorney for defendant appellant.*

MORRIS, Judge.

[1] Defendant’s only assignment of error is to the signing and entry of the judgment. Counsel candidly states in his brief that in his opinion the trial was free from prejudicial error but that defendant contends the court abused its discretion in imposing a sentence which was cruel and unjust punishment. This contention is, of course, without merit. Sentence imposed was imprisonment for not less than six nor more than ten years. The offense with which defendant was charged is a violation of G.S. 14-54 which denominates the offense of a felony punishable under G.S. 14-2. G.S. 14-2 provides for punishment “by fine, by imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years, or by both, in the *541discretion of the court.” It has been repeatedly held that punishment within the limits authorized by statute is not cruel and unusual punishment within the constitutional prohibition. *State v. Powell,*6 N. C. App. 8, 169 S.E. 2d 210 (1969), and cases there cited.

[2] An exception to the judgment presents the face of the record proper for review. *State v. Price,*8 N. C. App. 94, 173 S.E. 2d 644 (1970). We have reviewed the record proper for error and find none.

Affirmed.

Judges Brock and Vaughn concur.
<PAGE>

                                                                  Exhibit 10.30

October 9, 2001

Mr. Richard Ghiossi
1738 Montemar Way
San Jose, CA 95125

Dear Richard:

I'm pleased to offer you the position of Chief Marketing Officer (CMO); Senior
Vice President, Marketing and Strategy with Sagent Technology, Inc. In this
exempt position, you will be the leader of our Marketing and Planning staffs,
reporting directly to Ben Barnes. Your start date will be October 16, 2001.

Your compensation will consist of salary, bonus, available employee benefit
programs and a stock option grant. Your semi-monthly salary will be $7,291.66
annualized to $175,000.00. Your target at plan is $262,500 based upon a 50%
bonus of $87,500, with successful achievement of mutually-agreed upon
objectives. This bonus will be paid annually and on a pro-rated basis for 2001.
You will receive a stock option grant of 150,000 shares subject to approval by
the Stock Option Committee. The grant will vest ratably over 48 months. You will
be eligible for the Executive Change in Control policy, a copy of which is
attached.

Sagent Technology, Inc. is an "at will" employer, and consequently, employment
at Sagent is for no definite period of time and can be terminated at the will of
either Sagent or the employee at any time and for any reason, with or without
cause.

As an employer based in the United States, Sagent Technology, Inc. is required
to verify that its employees are eligible to work in the United States. On your
first day of employment, you will be required to certify that you are a citizen
or lawful permanent resident or an alien authorized to work in the U.S. Please
bring your Employment Eligibility Verification (Form I-9) and acceptable
supporting documents (as listed on the reverse side of the I-9 Form) to your
first day of work. If you expect to have any difficulty in producing these
documents, please contact our Human Resources Department prior to your
employment to discuss alternative suitable documentation.

<PAGE>

You will be required to sign a statement agreeing to hold the company's
proprietary information confidential during and after your employment. You will
also be required to sign a statement that you have not brought any former
employer's proprietary information or any of their clients' proprietary
information with you. You will be required to sign an inventions agreement that
assigns to the company any patentable inventions that you create through your
work with the company.

Please indicate your acceptance of this offer by signing below and faxing back
to me at 650-815-3433. If you have any questions please feel free to contact me.

All of the members of Sagent Technology, Inc. look forward to working with you
and appreciate the talents you bring to your position and the company.

Sincerely,

Anne Crumm
Vice President, Human Resources

Accepted by:

_____________________________      ____________________     ___________________
Richard Ghiossi                    Today's Date             Start Date

Attach: Executive Change in Control Policy
<PAGE>
                                                                 Exhibit 10.10

                                  Amendment to
                              Employment Agreement
                              --------------------


This Amendment (the "2002 Amendment") is entered into as of this 25th day of
March, 2002 by and between Knoll, Inc. (the "Company") and Burton B. Staniar
("Executive") as follows:

WHEREAS, Executive and Company desire to amend that certain February 29, 1996
Employment Agreement which was amended and restated as of January 1, 2000
(the "Employment Agreement");

NOW, THEREFORE, in exchange for consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of
which is hereby acknowledged, the parties agree as follows:

     1.  Section 3.01(a) is amended to change the "Base Salary" from $200,000
         to $250,000.

     2. Section 3.01(c) is deleted in its entirety.  Executive shall no longer
        be entitled to a "Service Bonus".

     3. Section 3.01(d) is amended to change the target bonus from "125% of
        Executive's Base Salary" to "100% of Executive's Base Salary" as of
        January 1, 2002.

     4. Section 5.04 is amended to change "125% of the Executive's then
        current Base Salary" to "100% of the Executive's then current Base
        Salary".

     5. The effective date of this 2002 Amendment is January 1, 2002.

     6. Except as specifically set forth in this 2002 Amendment, the Employment
        Agreement shall remain unchanged.

     7. This 2002 Amendment may be executed in one or more counterparts, each
        of which shall be deemed to be an original but all of which together
        will constitute one and the same instrument.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, each of the parties hereto has duly executed this 2002
Amendment as of the date first above written.

                                           KNOLL, INC.


/s/ Burton B. Staniar                      By: /s/ Barry L. McCabe
--------------------------                     -------------------------
Burton B. Staniar
                                           Name: Barry L. McCabe
                                                 -----------------------

                                           Its: Senior Vice President
                                                ------------------------
#### JENNINGS AMERICAN LEGION HOSPITAL v. Margarita DAIGLE.

No. 2001-C-3294.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Sept. 5, 2003.

In re Jennings American Legion Hospital;—Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Cer-tiorari and/or Review Office of Workers’ Compensation District 4, No. 98-05778; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 01-621.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant the writ.

TRAYLOR, J., would grant the writ.
FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

_____________________________

No. 1D18-3906

_____________________________

NADER G. ABDELMASIH,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

_____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County.

Russell Healey, Judge.

June 26, 2019

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

ROBERTS, ROWE, and KELSEY, JJ., concur.

_____________________________

Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

_____________________________
2

Nader G. Abdelmasih, pro se, Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Virginia Chester Harris, 

Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit 

## FILED February 23, 2006 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 05-40479 Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus JORGE MARTINEZ-GASCA, Defendant-Appellant.

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas USDC No. 5:04-CR-1796-ALL

-------------------- Before GARZA, DENNIS, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * Jorge Martinez-Gasca pleaded guilty to illegal reentry after deportation and was sentenced to 45 months of imprisonment and three years of supervised release. Martinez-Gasca argues that the district court erred in ordering him to cooperate in the collection of a DNA sample as a condition of supervised release and that this condition should therefore be vacated. This claim is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because it is not ripe for review. See United States v. Riascos-Cuenu , 428 F.3d 1100, 1101-No. 05-40479 -2- 02 (5th Cir. 2005), petition for cert. filed (Jan. 9, 2006) (No. 05-8662). Martinez-Gasca’s constitutional challenge to the “felony” and “aggravated felony” provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) is foreclosed by Almendarez-Torres v. United States , 523 U.S. 224, 235 (1998). Although Martinez-Gasca contends that Almendarez-Torres was incorrectly decided and that a majority of the Supreme Court would overrule Almendarez-Torres in light of Apprendi v. New Jersey , 530 U.S. 466 (2000), we have repeatedly rejected such arguments on the basis that Almendarez-Torres remains binding. See United States v. Garza-Lopez , 410 F.3d 268, 276 (5th Cir.), cert. denied , 126 S. Ct. 298 (2005). MartinezGasca properly concedes that his argument is foreclosed in light of Almendarez-Torres and circuit precedent, but he raises it here to preserve it for further review.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED; APPEAL DISMISSED IN PART.
#### STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. GEORGE PARROTT

No. 7315SC187

(Filed 31 January 1973)

Criminal Law § 146 — appeal from guilty plea

Where defendant pled guilty to assaulting a public officer while the officer was attempting to discharge a duty of his office, the only question presented on appeal was whether error appeared on the face of the record proper. . ¡

*333ON *Certiorari*to review judgment' of *Godwin, Judge,*entered at the 12 June 1972 Session of Superior Court held in Ala-mance County.

Defendant was charged by warrant with assault on a public officer while such officer was attempting to discharge a duty of his office, a violation of G.S. 14-33. (c) (4). In the district court he was tried, convicted and sentenced. On appeal to superior court, he tendered a plea of guilty. Before accepting the plea, the trial judge questioned defendant and defendant signed and swore to a written transcript of the plea. Thereupon the trial judge entered an order making findings of fact as to the circumstances under which the plea was entered and adjudicating that defendant’s plea of guilty was freely, understanding^ and voluntarily made. From judgment imposing prison sentence of 12 months, defendant gave notice of appeal. This Court subsequently granted his petition for certiorari to perfect his appeal. Having been found to be indigent, defendant was represented in district court, in the superior court, and in this Court, by court-appointed counsel.

*Attorney General Robert Morgan by Associate Attorney George W. Boylan for the State.*

*John H. Snyder for defendant.*

PARKER, Judge.

Defendant having pled guilty, the sole question presented is whether error appears on the face of the record proper. *State v. Roberts,*279 N.C. 500, 183 S.E. 2d 647. We have carefully examined the record, and no error appears. The judgment of the superior court is

Affirmed.

Judges Britt and Vaughn concur.
<PAGE>

                                                                      EXHIBIT 24


                                POWER OF ATTORNEY

            I, the undersigned Director and/or Officer of Conexant Systems,
Inc., a Delaware corporation (the "Company"), hereby constitute DWIGHT W.
DECKER, DENNIS E. O'REILLY, JASMINA THEODORE BOULANGER and PETER R. KOLYER, and
each of them singly, my true and lawful attorneys with full power to them and
each of them to sign for me, and in my name and in the capacity or capacities
indicated below, the Company's Annual Report on Form 10-K for the fiscal year
ended September 30, 2002, and any amendments thereto.

<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
         Signature                              Title                         Date
         ---------                              -----                         ----
<S>                            <C>                                       <C>

   /s/ Dwight W. Decker           Chairman of the Board of Directors     December 10, 2002
-----------------------------        and Chief Executive Officer
Dwight W. Decker                    (principal executive officer)


/s/  Donald R. Beall                           Director                  December 12, 2002
-----------------------------
Donald R. Beall


/s/ Richard M. Bressler                        Director                  December 6, 2002
-----------------------
Richard M. Bressler


/s/ Ralph J. Cicerone                          Director                  December 10, 2002
-----------------------------
Ralph J. Cicerone


/s/ Hossein Eslambolchi                        Director                  December 4, 2002
-----------------------------
Hossein Eslambolchi


/s/ F. Craig Farrill                           Director                  December 12, 2002
-----------------------------
F. Craig Farrill


/s/ Balakrishnan S. Iyer                       Director                  December 13, 2002
-----------------------------         Senior Vice President and
Balakrishnan S. Iyer                   Chief Financial Officer
                                    (principal financial officer)



/s/ Jerre L. Stead                             Director                  December 12, 2002
-----------------------------
Jerre L. Stead



/s/ J. Scott Blouin                    Senior Vice President,            December 9, 2002
-----------------------------  Chief Accounting Officer and Controller
J. Scott Blouin                     (principal accounting officer)

</TABLE>
#### Eleanor Maher, Respondent, v C & A Auto Parts, Inc., et al., Appellants, et al., Defendant.

[718 NYS2d 97]

—In an action, *inter alia,*to recover damages for wrongful death, the defendants C & A Auto Parts, Inc., Robert Bergstrand, and Arthur Leuck appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Berke, J.), dated December 16, 1999, which denied their motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against them.

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, the motion is granted, the complaint and all cross claims are dismissed insofar as asserted against the appellants, and the action against the remaining defendant is severed.

The plaintiff commenced this action, *inter alia,*sounding in strict liability in tort and common-law negligence to recover damages for the death of her husband caused by a bite he received from a dog which was allegedly owned and/or kept on premises controlled by the appellants. The bite resulted in only one or two small puncture wounds on the decedent’s hand, but, tragically, he died several days later after developing an infection which, because his spleen had previously been removed, led to septic shock.

To recover in strict liability in tort for a dog bite, a plaintiff must prove that the dog has vicious propensities and that the owner or the person in control of the premises where the dog was kept knew or should have known of such propensities *(see, Saboe v Splish Splash at Adventure Land,*272 AD2d 315; *Lugo v Angle of Green,*268 AD2d 567).

In opposition to the appellants’ motion in which they made a prima facie showing of their entitlement to summary judg*460ment, the plaintiff failed to come forward with proof in evidentiary form that the dog had vicious propensities (see, *Lugo v Angle of Green, supra).*The plaintiff also failed to raise any question of fact regarding the appellants’ alleged negligence (see, *Luts v Weeks,*268 AD2d 568). Consequently, the Supreme Court erred in denying the appellants’ motion.

It is unnecessary to address the appellants’ remaining contention. Bracken, Acting P. J., Santucci, Altman and Florio, JJ., concur.