United States Department of Labor

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

__________________________________________

S.F., Appellant

and

U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, POST OFFICE, 

Nescopeck, PA, Employer

__________________________________________

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Docket No. 19-1835

Issued: May 14, 2020

Appearances: Case Submitted on the Record

Alan J. Shapiro, Esq., for the appellant1

Office of Solicitor, for the Director

DECISION AND ORDER

Before:

ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Chief Judge

CHRISTOPHER J. GODFREY, Deputy Chief Judge

PATRICIA H. FITZGERALD, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION

On September 3, 2019 appellant, through counsel, filed a timely appeal from a July 18, 

2019 merit decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). Pursuant to the 

Federal Employees’ Compensation Act2(FECA) and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the Board 

has jurisdiction over the merits of this case.

 

1

In all cases in which a representative has been authorized in a matter before the Board, no claim for a fee for legal 

or other service performed on appeal before the Board is valid unless approved by the Board. 20 C.F.R. § 501.9(e). 

No contract for a stipulated fee or on a contingent fee basis will be approved by the Board. Id. An attorney or 

representative’s collection of a fee without the Board’s approval may constitute a misdemeanor, subject to fine or 

imprisonment for up to one year or both. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 292. Demands for payment of fees to a 

representative, prior to approval by the Board, may be reported to appropriate authorities for investigation.

2 5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.
2

ISSUE

The issue is whether appellant has met her burden of proof to establish a medical condition

causally related to the accepted November 15, 2018 employment incident.

FACTUAL HISTORY

On December 7, 2018 appellant, then a 43-year-old rural carrier associate, filed a traumatic 

injury claim (Form CA-1) alleging that on November 15, 2018 she injured her back, neck, and left 

shoulder when her vehicle slid off a road and hit a pole while in the performance of duty. She

stopped work on the date of injury and returned to work on November 19, 2018. 

In a December 18, 2018 development letter, OWCP informed appellant that additional 

factual and medical evidence was necessary to establish her claim. It advised her of the type of 

factual and medical evidence needed and provided a questionnaire for her completion. OWCP 

afforded appellant 30 days to respond. 

Appellant submitted reports signed by Kyle Woolfolk, a certified physician assistant. In a 

December 4, 2018 report, Mr. Woolfolk noted a history of a motor vehicle accident (MVA) and

diagnosed a cervical sprain. He requested that appellant be excused from work on December 3 

and 5, 2018. In a December 4, 2018 return to work note, Mr. Woolfolk provided restrictions due 

to recent MVA/cervical sprain. A December 17, 2018 x-ray report indicated that linear lucency in 

the superior scapula may represent a fracture. On December 11, 17 and 20, 2018 Mr. Woolfolk 

continued to diagnose a cervical strain. He opined that appellant could work with restrictions. 

In reports dated December 11, 13, and 20, 2018, Dr. Albert J. Alley, an osteopath and

Board-certified family practitioner, reported that appellant was involved in a MVA on 

November 15, 2018. He noted that the problem was described as an “arm injury (left shoulder, 

left hip, and cervical spine-post MVA)” and involved a workers’ compensation claim. An 

assessment of cervical strain status post MVA and contusion of left scapula were provided. In a 

December 26, 2018 report and duty status report (Form CA-17), Dr. Alley noted the November 15, 

2018 date of injury and diagnosed left neuropathy and left trapezius strain. 

On December 21, 2018 appellant accepted a modified assignment. 

The employing establishment controverted the claim on January 15, 2019.3 

By decision dated January 25, 2019, OWCP denied appellant’s claim finding that the 

evidence of record was insufficient to establish that the employment incident occurred as alleged. 

Thus, it concluded that she had not established an injury as defined by FECA. 

On February 6, 2019 appellant, through counsel, requested a telephonic hearing before an 

OWCP hearing representative. The hearing was held on May 24, 2019. Appellant testified 

 

3

It included statements from coworkers dated December 19 and 21, 2018 pertaining to appellant’s ownership and 

work at a consignment store and her grievance claims. 
3

regarding the November 15, 2018 employment incident, her medical treatment, and statements 

made by the employing establishment. 

Evidence received prior to and after the telephonic hearing of May 4, 2019 included copies 

of medical records, x-rays, and treatment rendered on November 15, 2018 from an emergency 

room. Dr. Frank J. Giugliano, Board-certified in emergency medicine, noted that appellant 

presented with complaints of low back pain following a MVA during which her vehicle slid off 

the road. The history of injury was noted as “belted mail lady in truck/slid into telephone pole/pain 

in low back and neck/history of lumbar disc operated on 2003/no recent back issues.”

Dr. Giugliano diagnosed lumbar sprain with secondary diagnosis of car driver injured in collision 

with fixed or activity. 

Additional reports from Mr. Woolfolk were received along with a December 27, 2018 

cervical x-ray report noting degenerative changes.

In a May 9, 2019 report, Dr. Sergey Filatov, a physical medicine and rehabilitation 

specialist, released appellant to full-duty work on May 13, 2019 without restrictions. 

In a June 20, 2019 letter, the employing establishment continued to controvert appellant’s 

claim.4 

By decision dated July 18, 2019, OWCP’s hearing representative affirmed the denial of 

appellant’s claim, as modified, finding that, while she had established that the November 15, 2018 

employment incident occurred as alleged, the medical evidence of record was insufficient to 

establish that appellant’s diagnosed medical conditions were causally related to the accepted 

employment incident. 

LEGAL PRECEDENT

An employee seeking benefits under FECA5 has the burden of proof to establish the 

essential elements of his or her claim, including that the individual is an employee of the United 

States within the meaning of FECA, that the claim was timely filed within the applicable time 

limitation of FECA,6that an injury was sustained in the performance of duty as alleged, and that 

any disability or medical condition for which compensation is claimed is causally related to the 

 

4 This was based on the history of injury provided, appellant’s continuation of regular-duty work, including 

overtime, until December 4, 2018, witness statements, and her outside activities. The employing establishment also 

discussed other claims filed by her. 

5 Supra note 2.

6 F.H., Docket No. 18-0869 (issued January 29, 2020); J.P., Docket No. 19-0129 (issued April 26, 2019); Joe D. 

Cameron, 41 ECAB 153 (1989).
4

employment injury.7 These are the essential elements of each and every compensation claim, 

regardless of whether the claim is predicated upon a traumatic injury or an occupational disease.8

To determine whether a federal employee has sustained a traumatic injury in the 

performance of duty, it first must be determined whether fact of injury has been established. There 

are two components involved in establishing fact of injury. First, the employee must submit 

sufficient evidence to establish that he or she actually experienced the employment incident at the 

time, place, and in the manner alleged. Second component is whether the employment incident 

caused a personal injury and can be established only by medical evidence.9

The medical evidence required to establish causal relationship between a claimed specific 

condition and an employment incident is rationalized medical opinion evidence.10 The opinion of 

the physician must be based on a complete factual and medical background of the employee, must 

be one of reasonable medical certainty, and must be supported by medical rationale explaining the 

nature of the relationship between the diagnosed condition and specific employment factors 

identified by the employee.11

In a case where a preexisting condition involving the same part of the body is present and 

the issue of causal relationship therefore involves aggravation, acceleration, or precipitation, the 

physician must provide a rationalized medical opinion that differentiates between the effects of the 

work-related injury or disease and the preexisting condition.12

ANALYSIS

The Board finds that appellant has not met her burden of proof to establish that her 

diagnosed medical conditions were causally related to the accepted November 15, 2018 

employment incident.

Appellant was initially seen in an emergency room by Dr. Giugliano. In his November 15, 

2018 report, Dr. Giugliano provided an accurate history of injury and diagnosed lumbar sprain 

with secondary diagnosis of injury due to collision. While his opinion generally supports causal 

relationship between the accepted November 15, 2018 employment incident and appellant’s 

 

7 L.C., Docket No. 19-1301 (issued January 29, 2020); J.H., Docket No. 18-1637 (issued January 29, 2020); 

James E. Chadden, Sr., 40 ECAB 312 (1988).

8 P.A., Docket No. 18-0559 (issued January 29, 2020); K.M., Docket No. 15-1660 (issued September 16, 2016); 

Delores C. Ellyett, 41 ECAB 992 (1990).

9 T.H., Docket No. 19-0599 (issued January 28, 2020); K.L., Docket No. 18-1029 (issued January 9, 2019); John J. 

Carlone, 41 ECAB 354 (1989).

10 S.S., Docket No. 19-0688 (issued January 24, 2020); A.M., Docket No. 18-1748 (issued April 24, 2019); 

Robert G. Morris, 48 ECAB 238 (1996).

11 T.L., Docket No. 18-0778 (issued January 22, 2020); Y.S., Docket No. 18-0366 (issued January 22, 2020); 

Victor J. Woodhams, 41 ECAB 345, 352 (1989).

12 Federal (FECA) Procedure Manual, Part 2 -- Claims, Causal Relationship, Chapter 2.805.3e (January 2013); see 

also L.S., Docket No. 18-0518 (issued February 19, 2020). 
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diagnosed lumbar sprain, he did not provide sufficient rationale explaining his opinion. Without 

explaining how appellant’s diagnosed lumbar sprain was caused or contributed to the accepted 

November 15, 2018 employment incident, Dr. Giugliano’s opinion is of limited probative value.13 

Such rationale is especially important in this case as he noted her preexisting lumbar condition.14 

As such, the Board finds that this report is insufficient to establish the claim.15

Appellant submitted medical reports from Dr. Alley, dated December 11, 13, 20, and 26, 

2018, which diagnosed cervical strain status post MVA, left scapula contusion, left trapezius strain,

and neuropathy of left upper extremity. Dr. Alley, however, failed to provide a detailed history of 

injury pertaining to the accepted November 15, 2018 employment incident. He generally noted 

that appellant had been in a November 15, 2018 MVA involving a workers’ compensation claim. 

Without a proper understanding of the employment incident, an opinion on causal relationship is 

of limited probative value as the physician is unable to describe how the incident caused the 

diagnosed conditions.

16

 Furthermore, Dr. Alley’s generalized statements do not establish causal

relationship because they merely repeat appellant’s allegations and are unsupported by adequate 

medical rationale explaining how the November 15, 2018 employment MVA incident actually 

caused the diagnosed conditions.17 As his reports lack the specificity and detail needed to establish 

a November 15, 2018 employment-related traumatic injury, they are of limited probative value.18

The record also contains several reports from Mr. Woolfolk, a physician assistant. The 

Board has held notes signed solely by a physician assistant are not considered medical evidence 

as these providers are not considered “physician[s]” as defined under FECA and are not competent 

to render a medical opinion under FECA.19 Thus, these reports do not constitute medical evidence 

and have no weight or probative value.20

 

13 See A.P., Docket No. 19-0224 (issued July 11, 2019).

14 Supra note 12. 

15 See C.F., Docket No. 19-1748 (issued March 27, 2020); D.B., Docket No. 17-1845 (issued February 16, 2018); 

T.H., Docket No. 14-0326 (issued February 5, 2015).

16 See J.C., Docket No. 19-0310 (issued June 18, 2019); L.M., Docket No. 14-0973 (issued August 25, 2014); R.G.,

Docket No. 14-0113 (issued April 25, 2014); K.M., Docket No. 13-1459 (issued December 5, 2013); A.J., Docket No. 

12-0548 (issued November 16, 2012).

17 T.W., Docket No. 18-1436 (issued April 10, 2019).

18 J.C., supra note 16; P.O., Docket No. 14-1675 (issued December 3, 2015); S.R., Docket No. 12-1098 (issued 

September 19, 2012).

19 Section 8101(2) of FECA provides that medical opinions can only be given by a qualified physician. This section 

defines a physician as surgeons, podiatrists, dentists, clinical psychologists, optometrists, chiropractors, and 

osteopathic practitioners within the scope of their practice as defined by state law. H.K., Docket No. 19-0429 (issued 

September 18, 2019); K.W., 59 ECAB 271, 279 (2007); David P. Sawchuk, 57 ECAB 316, 320 n.11 (2006). A report 

from a physician assistant will be considered medical evidence if countersigned by a qualified physician. Supra note 

12 at Chapter 2.805.3a(1) (January 2013).

20 A.A., Docket No. 19-0957 (issued October 22, 2019); K.H., Docket No. 18-0036 (issued September 16, 2016).
6

Appellant also submitted diagnostic imaging studies in the form of x-rays. The Board has 

held that diagnostic studies, standing alone, lack probative value on the issue of causal relationship 

as they do not provide an opinion as to whether there is a relationship between an employment 

incident and a claimant’s diagnosed conditions.21 This evidence is therefore insufficient to 

establish appellant’s claim.

As appellant has not submitted rationalized medical evidence explaining how her 

diagnosed medical conditions are causally related to the accepted November 15, 2018 employment 

incident, the Board finds that she has not met her burden of proof to establish her claim.22

On appeal counsel contends that OWCP’s July 18, 2019 decision is contrary to fact and 

law. He has not, however, provided evidence to support his generalized contention. As explained 

above, appellant has not submitted rationalized medical evidence to establish causal relationship 

between her diagnosed conditions and the accepted November 15, 2018 employment incident. As 

such, she has not met her burden of proof.

Appellant may submit new evidence or argument with a written request for reconsideration 

to OWCP within one year of this merit decision, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 8128(a) and 20 C.F.R. 

§§ 10.605 through 10.607.

CONCLUSION

The Board finds that appellant has not met her burden of proof to establish a medical 

condition causally related to the accepted November 15, 2018 employment incident.

 

21 See I.C., Docket No. 19-0804 (issued August 23, 2019).

22 J.J., Docket No. 19-1783 (issued March 30, 2020); E.G., Docket No. 19-0914 (issued October 18, 2019).
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ORDER

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the July 18, 2019 decision of the Office of Workers’

Compensation Programs is affirmed.

Issued: May 14, 2020

Washington, DC

Alec J. Koromilas, Chief Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Christopher J. Godfrey, Deputy Chief Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Patricia H. Fitzgerald, Alternate Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board