alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<PAGE>   1

                                                                      EXHIBIT 23


                          INDEPENDENT AUDITORS' CONSENT


We consent to the incorporation by reference in Registration Statement Nos.
333-68755, 333-91347, 333-84187, 333-69385, 333-92437, 333-32448, 333-37918,
333-39184, 333-42498, 333-42772, 333-42728, 333-48224, 333-48262 and 333-44094
of Conexant Systems, Inc. on Form S-8 and Registration Statement Nos. 333-82399,
333-70085, 333-30596, 333-32468, 333-38890, 333-42500 and 333-48270 of Conexant
Systems, Inc. on Form S-3 of our report dated October 16, 2000, except for note
17, as to which the date is November 30, 2000, appearing in this Annual Report
on Form 10-K of Conexant Systems, Inc. for the year ended September 30, 2000.

/s/ DELOITTE & TOUCHE LLP

Costa Mesa, California
December 11, 2000
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 00-4141

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

MICHAEL AARON LITTLE,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Fox, District Judge.

(CR-99-132-F)

Submitted: September 8, 2000 Decided: October 19, 2000

Before LUTTIG and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Douglas E. Kingsberry, THARRINGTON, SMITH, L.L.P., Raleigh, North

Carolina, for Appellant. Janice McKenzie Cole, United States Attorney, Anne M. Hayes, Assistant United States Attorney, Jennifer

May-Parker, Assistant United States Attorney, Raleigh, North

Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Michael Aaron Little appeals his sentence following his plea

of guilty to a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 751(a) (1994), escape from

federal custody. Little asserts that the district court committed

plain error when it failed to assure that Little received a copy of

the revised Presentence Investigation Report and discussed the

Report with his attorney. Assuming without deciding that the district court erred, we find that Little fails to establish that he

suffered any prejudice. See United States v. Lockhart, 58 F.3d 86,

88-89 (4th Cir. 1995). Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s

order of judgment and conviction. We dispense with oral argument

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in

the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
#### WILBUR GEORGE HENRY, Appellant, v. SHERIFF, CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA, Respondent.

No. 10397

February 7, 1978

574 P.2d 1011

*Jeffrey D. Sobel,*Las Vegas, for Appellant.

*Robert List,*Attorney General, Carson City; *George E. Holt,*District Attorney, and *L. J. O’Neale,*Deputy District Attorney, Clark County, for Respondent.

*67OPINION

*Per Curiam:*

Pursuant to a True Bill returned by the Clark County Grand Jury, Wilbur George Henry was charged by indictment with the felonious possession of stolen property (NRS 205.275). A pretrial petition for writ of habeas corpus was denied, and Henry has appealed contending (1) a lack of “admissible” evidence to establish probable cause; and (2) prosecutorial abuse.

Even if we accept Henry’s claim that some of the evidence was inadmissible, his claim is without merit. In unchallenged evidence presented to the grand jury, the lessee of a 1976 Lincoln Continental automobile testified that “right after lunch” on April 5, 1977, he had left the automobile in the care of a hotel valet parking service. He also testified that when he called for the automobile the next day it could not be found.

In other unchallenged evidence an undercover police officer testified that on April 5, 1977, about 1:40 in the afternoon he met with Henry who stated that he wanted to sell a 1976 Lincoln automobile which he [Henry] had just stolen from a hotel parking lot. The officer testified that Henry “wanted a large sum of money,” and after lengthy negotiations Henry was paid $1,000, and the officer took possession of the vehicle.

1. Although the present record shows some of the recited evidence is circumstantial, it is, in our view, sufficient to sustain the district judge’s determination. This Court has consistently upheld convictions based on circumstantial evidence. *See, for example,*O’Brien v. State, 88 Nev. 488, 500 P.2d 693 (1972), and its progeny! *A fortiori,*such evidence will support a finding of probable cause.

Moreover, we have also held that “possession of stolen property by an accused person gives rise to an inference of guilt_” Staab v. State, 90 Nev. 347, 350, 526 P.2d 338, 340 (1974). *A fortiori,*the police officer’s testimony that Henry had *68possession of the automobile supports the district judge’s determination. The grand jury was entitled to conclude that probable cause existed to believe that appellant possessed stolen property for his own gain with knowledge of its stolen character. *See,*NRS 205.275(1).

2. In support of the assertion of prosecutorial abuse, Henry suggests the district attorney, by failing to instruct the grand jury as to applicable law, manipulated it by electing to pursue the charge of “possession of stolen property” rather than “grand larceny” which, according to Henry, was the appropriate offense and is more difficult to prove.1 This claim is without merit. “The matter of the prosecution of any criminal case is within the entire control of the district attorney. . . .” Cairns v. Sheriff, 89 Nev. 113, 115, 508 P.2d 1015, 1017 (1973); NRS 173.045 and NRS 252.110.

Affirmed.

1

 The maximum penalty which can be assessed for either offense is 10 years imprisonment.
AFFIRM; and Opinion File December 17, 2013.

In The

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-13-00244-CR

REGINALD FITZGERALD BROWN, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 5

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. F06-85756-L

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices FitzGerald, Lang, and Fillmore

Opinion by Justice FitzGerald

Reginald Fitzgerald Brown appeals from the adjudication of his guilt for sexual assault of 

a child. The trial court assessed punishment at ten years’ imprisonment. On appeal, appellant’s 

attorney filed a brief in which she concludes the appeal is wholly frivolous and without merit. 

The brief meets the requirements of Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). The brief 

presents a professional evaluation of the record showing why, in effect, there are no arguable 

grounds to advance. See High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 811 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 

1978). Counsel delivered a copy of the brief to appellant. We advised appellant of his right to 

file a pro se response, but he did not file a pro se response.
-2-

We have reviewed the record and counsel’s brief. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 

827 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (explaining appellate court’s duty in Anders cases). We agree the 

appeal is frivolous and without merit. We find nothing in the record that might arguably support 

the appeal.

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

/Kerry P. FitzGerald/

KERRY P. FITZGERALD

JUSTICE

Do Not Publish

TEX. R. APP. P. 47

130244F.U05
-3-

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

JUDGMENT

REGINALD FITZGERALD BROWN, 

Appellant 

No. 05-13-00244-CR V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

Appeal from the Criminal District Court 

No. 5 of Dallas County, Texas (Tr.Ct.No. 

F06-85756-L).

Opinion delivered by Justice FitzGerald, 

Justices Lang and Fillmore participating.

Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the trial court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.

Judgment entered December 17, 2013.

/Kerry P. FitzGerald/

KERRY P. FITZGERALD

JUSTICE
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-6845

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

TERRENCE MOODY,

Defendant – Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

Maryland, at Baltimore. William D. Quarles, Jr., District 

Judge. (1:06-cr-00074-WDQ-9)

Submitted: July 29, 2010 Decided: August 12, 2010

Before MOTZ, KING, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Terrence Moody, Appellant Pro Se. Kwame Jangha Manley, 

Assistant United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for 

Appellee. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Terrence Moody appeals the district court’s order 

denying his motion for reduction of sentence pursuant to 18 

U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (2006). We have reviewed the record and 

find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the 

reasons stated by the district court. See United States v. 

Moody, No. 1:06-cr-00074-WDQ-9 (D. Md. May 21, 2010). We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the 

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
|  | (1) | the      Small Business Issuer's Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter      ended March 31, 2009 (the "Report"), to which this statement is filed as      an exhibit, fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)      of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 as amended;  and |
|--|-----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|  | (2) | the      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Small      Business Issuer. |
|--|-----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|  Dated:  May      5, 2009 |  By: |   /s/      Louis E. Ryan                               |
|------------------------------------------|-----------|------------------------------------------------------------------|
|                                     |      |           Louis E. Ryan                      |
|                                     |      |           Chief Executive Officer,           |
|                                     |      |           Chief Financial Officer, and       |
|                                     |      |           Chairman of the Board of Directors |
#### STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. LESTER ALLEN CROUCH

No. 7925SC172

(Filed 4 September 1979)

1. Criminal Law §§ 34.4, 86.2— prior convictions of drunk driving — stipulation — cross-examination for impeachment proper

In a prosecution for driving under the influence, third offense, the trial court did not err in allowing the State to cross-examine defendant concerning his prior convictions of driving under the influence, though defendant had stipulated for the purpose of trial that he had been so previously convicted, since the evidence sought by defendant’s cross-examination was for impeachment purposes and was therefore competent.

2. Criminal Law § 7— entrapment —insufficiency of evidence

In a prosecution for driving under the influence, third offense, evidence was insufficient to support defendant’s contention that he was entrapped.

Judge Mitchell concurred in the result.

*730APPEAL by defendant from *Browning, Judge.*Judgment entered 4 October 1978 in Superior Court, CATAWBA County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 22 May 1979.

The decision of this Court dismissing defendant’s appeal for failing to comply with the Rules of Appellate Procedure (41 N.C. App. 612, 255 S.E. 2d 192 (1979)) was vacated by order of the Supreme Court 31 July 1979, and the case was remanded to this Court for further consideration on the merits.

*Attorney General Edmisten, by Assistant Attorney General William B. Ray and Deputy Attorney General William W. Melvin, for the State.*

*Ingle and Joyner, by John D. Ingle, for defendant.*

MARTIN (Harry C.), Judge.

Defendant was convicted of operating an automobile while under the influence of intoxicating liquors, third offense, and sentence was imposed. Defendant appealed.

[1] Defendant contends the court erred in allowing the state to cross-examine him concerning prior convictions of driving under the influence of intoxicants when he had stipulated for the purpose of trial that he had been so previously convicted. N.C. Gen. Stat. 15A-928. The evidence sought by the cross-examination of defendant was for impeachment purposes and not as substantive evidence of an element of the offense charged. Such evidence was held competent in *State v. Guinn,*32 N.C. App. 595, 233 S.E. 2d 73 (1977). Defendant’s assignment of error is overruled.

[2] Defendant next contends he was entrapped. The evidence does not support this contention. The trial judge submitted the issue of entrapment to the jury and by its verdict the question was resolved against defendant.

Defendant received a fair trial, free of prejudicial error.

No error.

Judge PARKER concurs.

Judge MITCHELL concurred in the result.
EXHIBIT
      32.1




**CERTIFICATION
        PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**
 **AS
        ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906**
 **OF
        THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**
 
 Pursuant
        to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, the undersigned Officer of Opexa Therapeutics,
        Inc.(the “Company”), hereby certifies, to such officer’s knowledge, that the
        Company’s Annual Report on Form 10-KSB/A for the year ended December 31, 2006
        (the “Report”) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or Section
        15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that the
        information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
        the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
 
 
 
 By:
        /s/DAVID B. MCWILLIAMS
 David
        B.
        McWilliams
 President
        and Chief Executive Officer
 
 
 Date:
        November 29, 2007
111TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 5051 

AN ACT 

To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service 

located at 23 Genesee Street in Hornell, New York, 

as the ‘‘Zachary Smith Post Office Building’’. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 
2 

•HR 5051 EH

1 SECTION 1. ZACHARY SMITH POST OFFICE BUILDING. 

2 (a) DESIGNATION.—The facility of the United States 

3 Postal Service located at 23 Genesee Street in Hornell, 

4 New York, shall be known and designated as the ‘‘Zachary 

5 Smith Post Office Building’’. 

6 (b) REFERENCES.—Any reference in a law, map, reg7 ulation, document, or other record of the United States 

8 to the facility referred to in subsection (a) shall be deemed 

9 to be a reference to the ‘‘Zachary Smith Post Office Build10 ing’’. 

Passed the House of Representatives May 11, 2010. 

Attest: 

Clerk. 

111TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 5051 

AN ACT 

To designate the facility of the United States PostOffice Building’’. Hornell, New York, as the ‘‘Zachary Smith Post al Service located at 23 Genesee Street in
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
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<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1998
<CASH>                                           24623
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                 57970
<PP&E>                                               0
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  313970
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           173170
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                          4348
<OTHER-SE>                                      136452
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    313970
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                     0
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                220611
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 601
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  35604
<INCOME-TAX>                                       660
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              34944
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     34944
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     .008
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
11TH COURT OF APPEALS

EASTLAND, TEXAS

JUDGMENT

Todd William Barr, * From the 42nd District

 Court of Taylor County,

 Trial Court No. 24291A.

Vs. No. 11-11-00184-CR * June 13, 2013

The State of Texas, * Memorandum Opinion by McCall, J.

 (Panel consists of: Wright, C.J.,

 McCall, J., and Willson, J.)

This court has inspected the record in this cause and concludes that there is 

no error in the judgment below. Therefore, in accordance with this court’s 

opinion, the judgment of the trial court is in all things affirmed.
Elizabeth E. LETENDRE v. CURRITUCK COUNTY, North Carolina

No. 352P18

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

January 30, 2019

George B. Currin, Attorney at Law, Raleigh, for Long, Michael, et al

Jonathan E. Hall, Attorney at Law, Michael Joseph Crook, Attorney at Law, Raleigh, for LeTendre, Elizabeth E.

Donald I. McRee, Jr., Currituck County Attorney, G. Nicholas Herman, Attorney at Law, Chapel Hill, for Currituck County

***ORDER***

The following order has been entered on the motion filed on the 17th of October 2018 by Plaintiff for Temporary Stay:

"Motion Dissolved by order of the Court in conference, this the 30th of January 2019."

Upon consideration of the petition filed by Plaintiff on the 17th of October 2018 for Writ of Supersedeas of the judgment of the Court of Appeals, the following order was entered and is hereby certified to the North Carolina Court of Appeals:

"Denied by order of the Court in conference, this the 30th of January 2019."

Upon consideration of the petition filed on the 17th of October 2018 by Plaintiff in this matter for discretionary review of the decision of the North Carolina Court of Appeals pursuant to G.S. 7A-31, the following order was entered and is hereby certified to the North Carolina Court of Appeals:

"Denied by order of the Court in conference, this the 30th of January 2019."
#### Johanna Stoeckle *vs.*George W. Gray.

*Action on Promissory Note—Affidavit of Defense—Pleading and Practice.*

1. In an action on a promissory note against an endorser, an affidavit of defense setting forth that “the said promissory note was never protested according to law ” is sufficient.

2. Where there is any doubt, the Court will never give judgment.

*(December*4, *1897.)*

Lore, C. J., and Spruance and Boyce, J. J., sitting.

*Harry Emmons*for the plaintiff.

*f. Harvey Whiteman*for the defendant.

Superior Court, New Castle County,

November Term, 1897.

Action on a promissory note against an endorser. The affidavit of defense filed set out that “ the said promissory note was never protested according to law.”

*118
      *Mr. Emmons*asked for judgment notwithstanding the affidavit of defense, contending that the facts upon which it was claimed the note was not protested according to law should appear in the affidavit. That it did not state a fact but only a mere inference, and that it was for the Court to say whether -or not the protest was made according to law.

*Mr.*Whiteman-.—The affidavit of the cause of action shows it was not protested according to law.

Spruancs, J:—

The affidavit and copy of the cause of action filed by the plaintiff show that the note was made by Mills to the order of Gray and Stoeckle and by them endorsed. Therefore the connection of Gray with the note is shown to be that of an endorser. He is not liable unless the note was protested. In his affidavit of defense he states that he has a legal defense and that, the note was not protested according to law. This is sufficient.

Tore, C. J:—

If it was not protested according to law, it could not bind the defendant. The rule is, that where there is any doubt we never give judgment. We think that this is sufficient to carry it over.

Judgment refused.
Exhibit 10.13

NAMED EXECUTIVE OFFICER COMPENSATION

The following are adjustments to base salary, cash bonus payments for 2008 work, and grants of incentive stock were approved for the
Company's CEO and the persons expected to be named executive officers in its proxy statement for the 2009 Annual Meeting of Shareholders.

The
persons expected to be named executive officers in the proxy statement are (i) Chairman of the Board, President and Chief Executive Dominic Ng, (ii) Executive Vice
President and Chief Financial Officer Thomas J. Tolda, (iii) Vice-Chairman and Director Julia Gouw, (iv) Executive Vice President and Director of Corporate Banking Wellington
Chen, and (v) Executive Vice President, Credit Administration, Donald Chow. None received an adjustment to salary, a cash bonus or a grant of incentive stock, except that
(i) Vice-Chairman Julia Gouw retired from management at the end of 2008 and so no longer receives a salary; she will be an outside director in 2009 and will receive director fees at
the same rate as other outside directors) and (ii) Thomas J. Tolda received a bonus of $210,000 which was contractually agreed as a minimum first year bonus at the time he joined the company as
CFO in April of 2008.

The
Company will provide additional information regarding the compensation paid to the named executive officers for the 2008 fiscal year in its Proxy Statement for the 2009 Annual
Meeting of Shareholders.

---



QuickLinks
**Exhibit 32.1**

 

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO 

SECTION 906 OF THE 

SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 

 

In connection with the Quarterly Report of New Century Financial Corporation (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the period ending September 30, 2005 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the“Report”), I, Robert K. Cole, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to my knowledge: 

 

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of theSecurities Exchange Act of 1934; and 

 

(2) The information contained in theReport fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company. 

 

 

A signed original of thiswritten statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request. 

 

The foregoing certification is being furnished with the Company’s Form 10-Q for theperiod ending September 30, 2005 pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350. It is not being filed for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and it is not to be incorporated by reference into any filing of theCompany, whether made before or after the date hereof, regardless of any general incorporation language in such filing.