[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 

State v. Griffin, Slip Opinion No. 2014-Ohio-4767.] 

NOTICE

This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 

an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested 

to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 

65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 

other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 

made before the opinion is published. 

SLIP OPINION NO. 2014-OHIO-4767 

THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. GRIFFIN, APPELLEE. 

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 

may be cited as State v. Griffin, Slip Opinion No. 2014-Ohio-4767.] 

Criminal law—R.C. 2923.32—Jury instructions—Definition of “enterprise.” 

(Nos. 2013-1129 and 2013-1319—Submitted May 27, 2014—Decided 

October 30, 2014.) 

APPEAL from and CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals of Montgomery County, 

No. 24001, 2013-Ohio-2230. 

_______________________ 

PFEIFER, J. 

BACKGROUND

{¶ 1} Appellee, De’Argo Griffin, was convicted of, among other things, 

engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity. The convictions were affirmed. 2d Dist. 

Montgomery No. 24001, 2012-Ohio-503. The Second District Court of Appeals 

granted Griffin’s application to reopen his appeal to allow him to argue that his 

appellate counsel had been ineffective for failing to challenge the jury instructions 

defining the term “enterprise.” The court of appeals ultimately concluded that the 

jury instructions had been inadequate, based on that district’s decision in State v. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

2

Franklin, 2d Dist. Montgomery Nos. 24011 and 24012, 2011-Ohio-6802, and 

reversed the conviction for engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity. 2d Dist. 

Montgomery No. 24001, 2013-Ohio-2230. 

{¶ 2} The court of appeals certified that its judgment is in conflict with 

the Ninth District Court of Appeals’ judgment in State v. Habash, 9th Dist. 

Summit No. 17073, 1996 WL 37752 (Jan. 31, 1996). We agreed that a conflict 

exists, 137 Ohio St.3d 1456, 2013-Ohio-4657, 1 N.E.3d 423, and ordered the 

parties to brief the following issue: 

In a trial for engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity under 

R.C. 2923.32, is an instruction sufficient to convey the law on the 

element of “enterprise” when the instruction states the elements of 

the offense, provides the statutory definitions of “enterprise” and 

“pattern of corrupt activity,” and informs the jury that it has to find 

both beyond a reasonable doubt? 

 

{¶ 3} We also accepted jurisdiction over the state’s discretionary appeal. 

136 Ohio St.3d 1509, 2013-Ohio-4657, 995 N.E.2d 1212. The state presents one 

proposition of law: 

 

In a trial for engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity under 

R.C. 2923.32, a jury instruction which states the elements of the 

offense, provides the statutory definitions of the elements, and 

informs the jury that it has to find both an “enterprise” and a 

“pattern of corrupt activity” beyond a reasonable doubt is 

sufficient to convey the law on the element of “enterprise.” The 

court is not required to instruct the jury using language from 

federal case law on the element of “enterprise.” 
January Term, 2014 

3

{¶ 4} We consolidated the cases sua sponte. 137 Ohio St.3d 1456, 2013-

Ohio-4657, 1 N.E.3d 423. The issue certified and the proposition of law are 

sufficiently similar that we will address them as one issue. 

ANALYSIS

{¶ 5} Jury instructions are critically important to assist juries in 

determining the interplay between the facts of the case before it and the applicable 

law. We have stated that jury instructions “must be given when they are correct, 

pertinent, and timely presented.” State v. Joy, 74 Ohio St.3d 178, 181, 657 

N.E.2d 503 (1995), citing Cincinnati v. Epperson, 20 Ohio St.2d 59, 253 N.E.2d 

785 (1969), paragraph one of the syllabus. We also stated that a “court must give 

all instructions that are relevant and necessary for the jury to weigh the evidence 

and discharge its duty as the factfinder.” Id., citing State v. Comen, 50 Ohio St.3d 

206, 553 N.E.2d 640 (1990), paragraph two of the syllabus. Even so, it is clear 

that there must be a limit. No purpose is served, for instance, by requiring courts 

to present redundant jury instructions or instructions that are so similar to other 

instructions to be presented as to be confusing. 

{¶ 6} The trial court issued the following instruction with respect to 

“enterprise” and “pattern of corrupt activity”: 

Mr. Griffin is also charged with engaging in a pattern of corrupt 

activity. So before you can find the defendant guilty you must find 

beyond a reasonable doubt * * * that the defendant, from on or 

about the 13th day of May 2006 to on or about the 2nd day of 

April 2009, and in Montgomery County, Ohio, while employed by 

or associated with an enterprise, conducted or participated in 

directly or indirectly the affairs of the enterprise through a pattern 

of corrupt activity * * *. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

4

Now enterprise includes any individual, sole proprietorship, 

partnership, limited partnership, corporation, trust, union, 

government agency or other legal entity, or any organization, 

association or group of persons associated in fact although not a 

legal entity. Enterprise includes illicit as well as licit enterprises. 

Participate in. Participate means to take part in, and is not 

limited to those who have directed the pattern of corrupt activity. 

Participate encompasses those who have performed activities 

necessary or helpful to the operation of the enterprise, whether 

directly or indirectly, without an element of control. 

Corrupt activity means engaging in, attempting to engage 

in, conspiring to engage in, or soliciting, coercing or intimidating 

another person to engaging in any of the following conduct: 

Possession of one gram or more of cocaine, possession of 

one gram or more of crack cocaine, possession of one gram or 

more of heroin, trafficking in heroin, trafficking in cocaine, 

trafficking in crack cocaine. 

Now pattern of corrupt activity means two or more 

incidents of corrupt activity, whether or not there has been a prior 

conviction, that are related to the affairs of the same enterprise, are 

not isolated, and are not so closely related to each other and 

connected in time and place that they constitute a single event. 

Thus, when deciding this matter of engaging in pattern of 

corrupt activity, I would suggest that you first determine if the 

State has met this burden of proving a pattern of corrupt activity 

beyond a reasonable doubt. 

* * * 
January Term, 2014 

5

Now if you decide that there are two or more incidents of 

corrupt activity, then you must further decide beyond a reasonable 

doubt if they occurred while Mr. Griffin was employed by or 

associated with an enterprise, conducted or participated in, directly 

or indirectly, the affairs of the enterprise through a pattern of 

corrupt activity. Again, each of these incidents must be considered 

separate and apart from each other. Now if you find the State 

failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt any one of the essential 

elements of the offense of engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity, 

your verdict must be not guilty as to that charge. 

{¶ 7} The entire jury charge in this case comprises over 46 pages of 

transcript. The portion relevant to this case comprises three pages. The 

definitions given to the jury for “enterprise,” “pattern of corrupt activity,” and 

“corrupt activity” quote subsections of R.C. 2923.31. 

{¶ 8} We are convinced that the jury instructions, when read and 

understood together, adequately convey the entirety of the substantive law that 

Griffin would have incorporated from another source. Griffin asked for a 

definition of “enterprise” based on United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 101 

S.Ct. 2524, 69 L.Ed.2d 246 (1981), or Boyle v. United States, 556 U.S. 938, 129 

S.Ct. 2237, 173 L.Ed.2d 1265 (2009), to convey that “enterprise” requires that the 

people in the organization have acted in concert and with a common purpose. It is 

difficult to summarize certain legal principles into terms that lay people can use to 

reach factual conclusions. There are times when more information is not better. 

There are times when more information is more likely to confuse than to inform a 

jury. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

6

{¶ 9} The verdict also conveys the essence of the substantive law, 

lending more support to our conclusion that the jury was appropriately and 

adequately informed on the issue before us. It states as follows: 

We the Jury, being duly impaneled, find the Defendant, 

De’Argo Griffin, GUILTY of the offense of Engaging in a Pattern 

of Corrupt Activity, in that we do find beyond a reasonable doubt 

that the defendant, from on or about the 13th day of May, 2006, to 

on or about the 2nd day of April, 2009, and in Montgomery 

County, Ohio, while employed by or associated with an enterprise, 

conducted or participated in, directly or indirectly, the affairs of the 

enterprise through a pattern of corrupt activity. 

{¶ 10} All the elements that Griffin sought to have included in the jury 

instructions were included, though in a different form than he requested, and those 

elements were also included in the verdict. According to Griffin, the key 

elements that should have been included in the jury instructions are that the 

members of the enterprise had to have a common purpose and that they had to 

have acted in concert. We have no difficulty concluding that the concepts of 

“common purpose” and “acting in concert” are included in the concepts of 

“associating with an enterprise” and “conducting or participating in the affairs of 

that enterprise.” 

{¶ 11} Although the context was different, we note that “there are 

limitations in the English language with respect to being both specific and 

manageably brief, and it seems to us that although the prohibitions may not satisfy 

those intent on finding fault at any cost, they set out in terms that the ordinary 

person exercising ordinary common sense can sufficiently understand and comply 

with, without sacrifice to the public interest.” United States Civ. Serv. Comm. v. 
January Term, 2014 

7

Natl. Assn. of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO, 413 U.S. 548, 578-579, 93 S.Ct. 2880, 

37 L.Ed.2d 796 (1973). The Supreme Court was discussing whether the plaintiffs 

in that case should have known that their conduct was prohibited. Id. at 579. The 

court concluded that the plaintiffs could quibble about various definitions, but, 

ultimately, they should have known that their conduct was proscribed. Id. at 578-

579. 

{¶ 12} Similarly here, Griffin is quibbling about definitions—and it is 

obvious that different definitions could have been given. We are somewhat 

handicapped in that no alternative jury instructions were presented for our review. 

Griffin’s reference to Boyle and Turkette, however, is sufficient for us to 

understand the instructions that he sought. It is clear to us that the instructions 

sought by Griffin were so similar in content to those that the court presented to 

the jury that they were not “necessary for the jury to weigh the evidence and 

discharge its duty as the factfinder.” Joy, 74 Ohio St.3d at 181, 657 N.E.2d 503, 

citing Comen, 50 Ohio St.3d 206, 553 N.E.2d 640, at paragraph two of the 

syllabus. We also conclude that the jury instructions offered, which included 

extensive quotations from relevant statutes, sufficiently conveyed the law 

regarding the term “enterprise.” 

{¶ 13} Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals, and 

we remand to the trial court for sentencing. We also answer the certified question 

in the affirmative. 

Judgment reversed 

and cause remanded. 

FARMER, O’DONNELL, KENNEDY, FRENCH, and O’NEILL, JJ., concur. 

LANZINGER, J., dissents. 

SHEILA FARMER, J., of the Fifth Appellate District, sitting for O’CONNOR, 

C.J. 

_________________________ 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

8

LANZINGER, J., dissenting. 

{¶ 14} While I agree with the majority that “[t]here are times when more 

information is not better” and that “[t]here are times when more information is 

more likely to confuse than to inform a jury,” majority opinion at ¶ 8, this is not 

one of those times. 

{¶ 15} De’Argo Griffin was jointly tried with Anthony Franklin, and both 

were convicted of drug-offense crimes and of engaging in a pattern of corrupt 

activity under Ohio’s Racketeer Influences and Corrupt Organizations Act 

(“RICO”), specifically R.C. 2923.32. Each defendant appealed. Franklin’s RICO 

conviction was reversed on the ground that the jury instruction explaining the 

term “enterprise” was inadequate.1 The state did not appeal that judgment. 

Griffin’s convictions were affirmed at first,2

 but after Franklin’s RICO conviction 

was reversed, the court of appeals also reversed Griffin’s RICO conviction.3 I 

would affirm the judgment of the court of appeals that treated both defendants 

similarly. 

{¶ 16} This is the type of case in which written instructions would have 

helped the jury. How should the crucial element of “enterprise” be defined in a 

state RICO case? R.C. 2923.32 provides that “[n]o person employed by, or 

associated with, any enterprise shall conduct or participate in, directly or 

indirectly, the affairs of the enterprise through a pattern of corrupt activity or the 

collection of an unlawful debt.” 

{¶ 17} I believe that the statutory language is insufficient. There is no 

question that R.C. 2923.31(C) was read as part of the instructions. The trial court 

stated during its charge that 

 

1

 State v. Franklin, 2d Dist. Montgomery Nos. 24011 and 24012, 2011-Ohio-6802. 2

 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 24001, 2012-Ohio-503. 

3 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 24001, 2013-Ohio-2230. 
January Term, 2014 

9

enterprise includes any individual, sole proprietorship, partnership, 

limited partnership, corporation, trust, union, government agency 

or other legal entity, or any organization, association or group of 

persons associated in fact although not a legal entity. Enterprise 

includes illicit as well as licit enterprises. 

(Emphasis added.) 

{¶ 18} As currently written, the statute is very broad, and although it does 

not say exactly what an enterprise is, it tells us what it includes. It is something, 

either a legal entity or not a legal entity. In fact, the Ninth District Court of 

Appeals makes the confounding observation that the word “enterprise” may 

“encompass a single individual.” See State v. Habash, 9th Dist. Summit No. 

17073, 1996 WL 37752, *6 (Jan. 31, 1996). 

{¶ 19} Griffin asked for additional language to convey to the jurors that 

“enterprise” requires an entity in which people in the organization have acted in 

concert with each other and with a common purpose. Presumably, this is to 

distinguish the situation in which two individuals commit crimes at the same time, 

but not necessarily together or for a common purpose. R.C. 2923.31(C) does not 

include the defendant’s proposed recitation of federal law, on which Ohio’s RICO 

statute was based. “[I]t is prejudicial error in a criminal case to refuse to 

administer a requested charge which is pertinent to the case, states the law 

correctly, and is not covered by the general charge.” State v. Scott, 26 Ohio St.3d 

92, 497 N.E.2d 55 (1986), citing State v. Nelson, 36 Ohio St.2d 79, 303 N.E.2d 

865 (1973). Griffin’s request for clarification of the term “enterprise” was not 

redundant or confusing, because it supplemented the meaning of the term. 

{¶ 20} An additional jury instruction on the term “enterprise” could have 

been fashioned from language in Boyle v. United States, 556 U.S. 938, 945-946, 

129 S.Ct. 2237, 173 L.Ed.2d 1265 (2009) (an enterprise requires a showing of at 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

10

least three structural features: (1) purpose, (2) relationships among those 

associated with the enterprise, and (3) sufficient longevity to permit the associates 

to pursue the purpose), or in United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583, 101 

S.Ct. 2524, 69 L.Ed.2d 246 (1981) (an enterprise is “proved by evidence of an 

ongoing organization, formal or informal, and by evidence that the various 

associates function as a continuing unit”). The requested instruction on the term 

should have been given. 

{¶ 21} I would therefore affirm the judgment of the court of appeals and 

also answer the certified question in the negative. 

_________________________ 

Mathias H. Heck Jr., Montgomery County Prosecuting Attorney, Kirsten 

A. Brandt, and Carley J. Ingram, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellant. 

Harris, Meyer, Heckman & Denkewalter, L.L.C., and Darrell L. Heckman, 

for appellee. 

Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Peter Galyardt, Assistant 

Public Defender, for amicus curiae, Office of the Ohio Public Defender. 

_________________________