J-A07001-20

2020 PA Super 197

A.A. AND A.M. INDIVIDUALLY AND 

AS PARENTS AND NATURAL 

GUARDIANS ON BEHALF OF J.A., A 

MINOR

v.

STEPHAN R. GLICKEN, M.D.; LEHIGH 

VALLEY PHYSICIAN GROUPHAZLETON; LEHIGH VALLEY 

HOSPITAL-HAZLETON, AND LEHIGH 

VALLEY HOSPITAL AND HEALTH 

NETWORK 

Appellants

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1104 MDA 2019

Appeal from the Order Entered June 21, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County Civil Division at No(s): 

201701972

BEFORE: OLSON, J., DUBOW, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.

OPINION BY OLSON, J.: FILED AUGUST 14, 2020

Appellants, Stephan R. Glicken, M.D. (individually, Dr. Glicken), Lehigh 

Valley Physician Group-Hazleton (individually, LVPGH), Lehigh Valley 

Hospital-Hazleton (individually, LVHH), and Lehigh Valley Hospital and Health 

Network (individually, LVHHN), appeal from an order entered on June 21, 

2019 in the Civil Division of the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County 

that, among other things, denied Appellants’ motion to seal a petition to 

approve a minor’s settlement agreement in a medical malpractice action. We 

affirm.
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The relevant factual and procedural background in this matter is as 

follows. A.A. and A.M. (collectively, Appellees), acting individually and as 

parents and natural guardians of J.A., a minor, commenced this medical 

malpractice action by filing a complaint on February 23, 2017. The complaint 

alleged, among other things, that J.A. sustained injuries after Dr. Glicken

negligently performed a newborn circumcision on J.A. at LVHH. Thereafter, 

on March 1, 2019, the parties reached a settlement agreement. In addition 

to resolving the parties’ disputed legal claims and fixing the amount of 

compensation to be paid, the agreement included a confidentiality provision 

in which Appellees agreed to refrain from comment on any aspect of the 

litigation, including the facts of the case as well as the existence, terms, and 

conditions of the settlement.

On or around April 20, 2019, Appellees filed a petition to approve the 

settlement agreement reached on behalf of the minor, J.A. See Pa.R.C.P. 

2039(a) (“No action to which a minor is a party shall be compromised, settled 

or discontinued except after approval by the court pursuant to a petition 

presented by the guardian of the minor.”). On June 4, 2019, the trial court 

heard argument on Appellees’ petition to approve the settlement. At the same 

time, Appellants orally requested that the trial court enter an order sealing 

the petition to approve the settlement of J.A.’s claims. The trial court, on June 

6, 2019, issued an order denying Appellants’ oral request, but allowed 

Appellants 10 days to file a written motion. On June 17, 2019, Appellants filed 

a motion to seal the petition to approve the settlement of J.A.’s claims.
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The trial court convened a hearing to address Appellants’ motion on June 

21, 2019. At the hearing, Appellants argued that their motion to seal 

furthered two general interests, reduction of the chilling effect that disclosure 

would have on future settlements and preservation of the parties’ interest in 

privacy. Appellants did not, however, introduce witnesses or other evidence 

to substantiate their claims. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court 

denied Appellants’ motion to seal the petition to approve the minor’s

settlement agreement. The court, however, temporarily sealed the 

agreement for 30 days and for the pendency of any related appeal.

Appellants filed a notice of appeal to this Court on July 3, 2019. On July 

5, 2019, the trial court ordered Appellants to file a concise statement of errors 

complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Appellants timely 

complied on July 23, 2019, complaining that the trial court abused its 

discretion in denying their motion to seal the petition to approve J.A.’s 

settlement agreement. The trial court filed its opinion on September 5, 2019.1

Appellants raise the following issue for our review:

Did the trial court err in denying Appellants’ uncontested motion 

to seal [J.A.’s] settlement agreement in the instant matter?

Appellants’ Brief at 4.

Before we address the merits of Appellants’ claim, we confront the 

related issues of whether Appellants challenge an appealable order and 

____________________________________________

1 Appellees have not filed a brief before this Court or otherwise participated in 

this appeal.
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whether we may properly exercise appellate jurisdiction in this case. This 

Court may raise jurisdictional issues sua sponte. See Zablocki v. Beining, 

155 A.3d 1116, 1118 (Pa. Super. 2017) (“it is well-settled that [Superior 

Court] may raise the issue of [its] jurisdiction sua sponte”), appeal denied, 

172 A.3d 1121 (Pa. 2017). Since jurisdictional grounds for this appeal were 

not immediately apparent,

2

this Court, on September 12, 2019, directed 

Appellants to show cause why this appeal was not subject to quashal as taken 

from an unappealable interlocutory order. See Per Curiam Order, 9/12/19. 

Appellants responded to our show cause order on September 20, 2019, and 

we discharged our show cause order on September 25, 2019. See Per Curiam 

Order, 9/25/19. Our order of September 25, 2019 referred the jurisdictional 

issues to the merits panel for review.

Appellants’ docketing statement declared that Appellants appealed from 

a final order as provided in Pa.R.A.P. 341. In their response to our show cause 

order, however, Appellants argued that jurisdiction was proper under the 

collateral order doctrine, as set forth in Pa.R.A.P. 313. See Appellants’ 

Response to Rule to Show Cause, 9/20/19, at 3. Specifically, Appellants 

argued that their challenge to the trial court’s June 21, 2019 order was

separable from the underlying action because their claims addressed the 

____________________________________________

2 Appellants did not appeal from a judgment but instead challenged an order 

denying their motion to seal a petition to approve a settlement agreement 

reached on behalf of a minor.
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propriety of sealing a petition to approve a settlement entered on behalf of a 

minor and, as such, could be resolved without considering the merits of the 

malpractice litigation. Appellants next asserted that the confidentiality of a 

settlement agreement reached on behalf of a minor implicated deeply rooted 

public policy concerns which extend beyond the current appeal. Here, 

Appellants pointed out that the order denying their motion to seal constituted 

an abuse of discretion because it was contrary to the agreement of all litigants

and because public disclosure of the terms of the settlement agreement 

contravened public policies aimed at protecting the interests of minor 

plaintiffs. Lastly, Appellants argued that their claims would be irreparably lost 

if appellate review was not immediately undertaken since the case would be 

discontinued in view of the resolution of the parties’ dispute.

Pennsylvania law establishes:

[A]n appeal may be taken from: (1) a final order or an order 

certified as a final order (Pa.R.A.P. 341); (2) an interlocutory 

order as of right (Pa.R.A.P. 311); (3) an interlocutory order 

by permission (Pa.R.A.P. 312, 1311, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 702(b)); 

or (4) a collateral order (Pa.R.A.P. 313).

Pace v. Thomas Jefferson University Hosp., 717 A.2d 539, 

540 (Pa. Super. 1998)[.] 

A collateral order is defined in Rule 313 as follows:

Rule 313. Collateral Orders

* * *

(b) Definition. A collateral order is an order separable from 

and collateral to the main cause of action where the right 

involved is too important to be denied review and the 
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question presented is such that review is postponed until final 

judgment in the case, the claim will be irreparably lost.

Pa.R.A.P. 313(b). Our Supreme Court explained:

[T]he collateral order doctrine is a specialized practical 

application of the general rule that only final orders are 

appealable as of right. Thus, Rule 313 must be interpreted 

narrowly, and the requirements for an appealable collateral 

order remain stringent in order to prevent undue corrosion of 

the final order rule.

Melvin v. Doe, [836 A.2d 42, 47 (Pa. 2003).]

Stahl v. Redcay, 897 A.2d 478, 485 (Pa. Super. 2006), appeal denied, 918 

A.2d 747 (Pa. 2007).

Consistent with the definition that appears in our appellate rules, our 

Supreme Court has identified three elements that define a collateral 

order - separability, importance, and irreparable loss if review is postponed. 

See Ben v. Schwartz, 729 A.2d 547, 550 (Pa. 1999). An issue is separable 

if it can be examined without analysis of the claims presented in the underlying 

litigation. See id. at 552. To determine whether an issue is sufficiently 

important to support application of the collateral order doctrine, “[a court 

should] weigh the interests implicated in the case against the costs of 

piecemeal litigation.” Id. “[I]t is not sufficient that the issue be important to 

the particular parties. Rather it must involve rights deeply rooted in public 

policy going beyond the particular litigation at hand.” Id., quoting Geniviva 

v. Frisk, 725 A.2d 1209, 1213-1214 (Pa. 1999). “[A]n issue is important if 

the interests that would potentially go unprotected without immediate 
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appellate review [] are significant relative to the efficiency interests sought to 

be advanced by adherence to the final judgment rule.” Finally, irreparable 

loss results from postponement if no effective means of review exist after the 

entry of final judgment. See Schwartz, 729 A.2d at 552.

After careful consideration, we conclude that appellate review is 

appropriate under the collateral order doctrine. Appellants’ challenge to the 

trial court’s June 21, 2019 order requires that we balance the parties’ interest 

in confidentiality against the public’s right of access to judicial records. As 

such, the present appeal is entirely separable from the merits of the 

underlying medical malpractice action. In addition, although we have not 

located a prior case discussing the public’s right to examine judicial records 

pertaining to a minor plaintiff, we note that the nature, scope, and extent of

the public’s right of access to judicial records, in general, has long been 

recognized as a matter deeply rooted in public policies that extend beyond the 

present appeal. See R.W. v. Hampe, 626 A.2d 1218, 1220 (Pa. Super. 

2006) (explaining importance of public’s access to civil trials and observing 

that community’s common law right of access to judicial proceedings and 

inspection of judicial records is beyond dispute). Bearing in mind that the 

parties have already resolved their dispute and it is likely that this case will 

be discontinued on remand, immediate appellate review of the interests at 

stake assumes even greater importance and urgency in view of the diminished 

concern for judicial efficiency and the reduced likelihood of piecemeal 
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litigation. Lastly, and for related reasons, we agree with Appellants that their 

claims will be irreparably lost if this appeal is denied since it is improbable that 

an appealable order will furnish Appellants an opportunity to raise their claims 

in the future. Because Appellants’ challenge to the trial court’s June 21, 2019 

order meets the prerequisites for the collateral order doctrine, we shall 

proceed to the merits of Appellants’ claims. See id. (order partially sealing 

record in medical malpractice case appealable as a collateral order as it is 

separable from main cause of action, implicates issues too important to be 

denied review, and poses risk of irrevocable harm if left to stand until final 

disposition).

We turn now to the merits of Appellants’ claim that the trial court 

improperly denied their motion to seal the petition for approval of the 

settlement agreement. A trial court's decision to grant or deny closure of the 

record will be reversed by this Court only upon a determination that the trial 

court abused its discretion. Id.

“In order to justify closure or sealing the record a party must overcome 

the common law presumption of openness.” Id. Fundamental to democratic 

government, public access to civil trials enhances the quality of justice, affords 

a broader understanding of the operation of the courts, and promotes 

confidence in and respect for our judicial system. See id. at 1220-1221. To 

rebut the presumption of openness, and to obtain closure of judicial 

proceedings and records, a party must demonstrate “good cause.” See
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Goodrich Amram 2d § 223(a):7. Good cause exists where closure is 

“necessary in order to prevent a clearly defined and serious injury to the party 

seeking” it. Id.

Appellants argue that the trial court abused its discretion in denying 

their motion because they established good cause to believe that definite and 

serious injuries would result from the court’s refusal to seal the petition to 

approve J.A.’s settlement. In their brief, Appellants maintain that disclosure 

of the terms of the parties’ settlement agreement could adversely affect J.A. 

and chill future settlement of malpractice litigation. See Appellants’ Brief at 

9. Appellants also complain that the trial court wrongly disregarded the 

parties’ agreement in refusing to seal the petition for approval. Id. According 

to Appellants, the trial court’s ruling will dissuade cooperation between future 

litigants and frustrate the settlement of personal injury actions.

After careful review, we are unable to conclude that the trial court erred 

or abused its discretion. As a preliminary matter, the trial court correctly 

concluded that Appellants did not meet their burden of showing good cause 

for sealing the record in this case. Although Appellants broadly alleged that 

the challenged order would chill settlement in future malpractice actions, they 

offered no evidence to substantiate this claim. Moreover, the trial court 

correctly observed that the chilling effect on settlements is insufficient, 

standing alone, to overcome the compelling public interest in open records. 

See Trial Court Opinion, 9/5/19, at 5. Additionally, Appellants did not show 
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that public disclosure of the petition to approve would result in particularly 

serious embarrassment. In fact, Appellants have not rebutted the trial court’s 

observation that disclosure of the petition to approve would not harm any 

litigant’s interest in privacy since many documents already in the public sphere

reveal the salient facts in this case. See id. at 6. Lastly, Appellants have not 

shown that the trial court improperly disregarded the parties’ agreement 

regarding nondisclosure. Instead, the record and the trial court’s opinion 

confirm that the court denied Appellants’ motion to seal because good cause 

to overcome the presumption favoring public access did not exist.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 08/14/2020