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State of Nebraska, appellee, v. 

Jeremiah L. Connelly, appellant.

___ N.W.2d ___

Filed October 16, 2020. No. S-19-1139.

1. Motions to Suppress: Confessions: Constitutional Law: Miranda 

Rights: Appeal and Error. In reviewing a motion to suppress a 

statement based on its claimed involuntariness, including claims that 

law enforcement procured it by violating the safeguards established 

by the U.S. Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 

S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966), an appellate court applies a 

two-part standard of review. Regarding historical facts, an appellate 

court reviews the trial court’s findings for clear error. Whether those 

facts meet constitutional standards, however, is a question of law, 

which an appellate court reviews independently of the trial court’s 

determination.

2. Constitutional Law: Miranda Rights: Self-Incrimination. Miranda 

v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966), 

prohibits the use of statements derived during custodial interrogation 

unless the prosecution demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards 

that are effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination.

3. Miranda Rights: Police Officers and Sheriffs: Words and Phrases.

Under the Miranda rule, a “custodial interrogation” takes place when 

questioning is initiated by law enforcement after a person has been 

taken into custody or is otherwise deprived of his or her freedom of 

action in any significant way.

4. ____: ____: ____. The term “interrogation” under Miranda v. Arizona, 

384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966), refers not only 

to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of 

the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) 

that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.

Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library

www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/

11/27/2020 12:08 AM CST
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5. ____: ____: ____. A police officer’s course of inquiry related to and 

responsive to a volunteered remark by the accused is not “interrogation” 

for purposes of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. 

Ed. 2d 694 (1966).

6. Confessions: Appeal and Error. In making the determination of 

whether a statement is voluntary, a totality of the circumstances test 

is applied, and the determination reached by the trial court will not be 

disturbed on appeal unless clearly wrong.

7. Confessions: Evidence: Proof. To meet the requirement that a defend

ant’s statement, admission, or confession was made freely and voluntarily, the evidence must show that such statement, admission, or confession was not the product of any promise or inducement—direct, indirect, 

or implied—no matter how slight.

8. Confessions: Mental Competency. Mental illness, like age, education, 

and intelligence, is a relevant factor in the totality test when evaluating 

the voluntariness of a statement.

9. ____: ____. No per se rule invalidates the volunteered statement of a 

mentally ill defendant. Instead, such statement is subject to the general 

rule that a statement freely and voluntarily given without any compelling influences is admissible.

Appeal from the District Court for Douglas County: Shelly 

R. Stratman, Judge. Affirmed.

Thomas C. Riley, Douglas County Public Defender, and 

Leslie E. Cavanaugh for appellant.

Douglas J. Peterson, Attorney General, and Stacy M. Foust 

for appellee.

Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Funke, 

Papik, and Freudenberg, JJ.

Funke, J.

NATURE OF CASE

The appellant, Jeremiah L. Connelly, filed a motion to suppress in the district court for Douglas County, Nebraska, seeking to have statements he made to law enforcement suppressed 

in violation of his Miranda rights. The district court denied 

Connelly’s motion, finding Connelly’s pre-Miranda statements 
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were not made in response to an interrogation and his postMiranda statements were made voluntarily. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

Initial Arrest

On September 21, 2018, Omaha police officers Kirk Weidner 

and Mark Pruett were on routine patrol in the area of 90th 

Street and Bedford Avenue in Omaha, Nebraska. While patrolling the area, Weidner and Pruett observed a car exit a parking 

lot, cross two lanes of traffic, and run a stoplight. Upon pursuing the car, the officers observed the car parked in an alleyway 

and saw the driver exit the vehicle and head north. As Weidner 

and Pruett approached the vehicle, they received information 

from Omaha police dispatch of a report of a stolen car matching the description of the car they were observing. The officers 

gave chase on foot and apprehended the fleeing driver, later 

identified as Connelly.

Sgt. Tammy Mitchell, with the Omaha police’s auto theft 

unit, instructed Weidner and Pruett to transport Connelly to the 

police station for an interview. Connelly was placed in handcuffs and put in the back of the cruiser, but was not read his 

Miranda rights.

Once Weidner, Pruett, and Connelly arrived at the police 

station, they waited in the lobby because all of the interview 

rooms were occupied. In the lobby, Connelly voluntarily provided the officers with information about the auto theft. He 

told Weidner, “You guys are worried about this petty auto theft 

when you should be worried about her life.” When Weidner 

asked, “Whose life?” Connelly responded with a name that 

Weidner did not recognize. Connelly was then turned over to 

Mitchell for an interview.

Mitchell Interview

Mitchell and a detective entered the interview room where 

Connelly was seated. Mitchell noticed that Connelly had his 

jeans rolled up to his knees and that his legs were red and 

swollen. The interview proceeded as follows:
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5:43:19 P.M.

Mitchell: Are you having an allergic reaction, you 

think?

Connelly: I don’t know. It started Monday.

Pruett: He said it was from a sunburn, being outside all 

day yesterday, and then he said he had (inaudible) in the 

knees from running, so.

Connelly: No, it’s not from running.

Mitchell: Okay, what happened?

5:43:34 P.M.

Connelly: It’s from dumping her body in Fremont, 

that’s what it’s fucking from. “Mister-I-nearly-recordeverything,” piece of shit (referring to Pruett, one of the 

arresting officers). Hero of the fucking day out there, he 

don’t listen to a damn word.

Mitchell: Well, tell me, I’ll listen.

Connelly: He wants to give a shit about fucking cars all 

day dude, who cares about fucking cars?

Mitchell: Nobody does.

Connelly: Jeanna Wilcoxen. J-E-A-N-N-A, dude.

Mitchell: How do you know her?

Connelly: She’s in Fremont, that’s how I know her.

Mitchell: Okay, what’s she doing in Fremont? Is she 

in danger?

Connelly: You can’t help her no more.

Mitchell: What do you mean?

Connelly: She’s laying out there. You can fly over and 

find . . . (interrupted by Mitchell).

Mitchell: What do you mean? She—how do you spell 

“Jeanna?” J-E-A-N-N-A? Is that right?

Connelly: Wilcoxen.

Mitchell: Is she missing? Do we need to go help 

somebody—

Connelly: Don’t nobody even know dude?

Mitchell: Nobody knows she’s missing?
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Connelly: That’s the fucked up part. . . . They don’t 

even know she’s fucking gone.

Mitchell: What do you mean by gone?

Connelly: Like I ain’t never getting out of here and 

just want this shit to stop. I don’t know . . . I’ll tell you 

whatever you want to know.

Mitchell: I gotta know if she’s safe.

Connelly: I’ll tell you whatever you want to know.

. . . .

Connelly: No, it ain’t what he said, dude. It’s her, dude. 

It’s what I did to her.

Mitchell: Alright, it looks like it. What did you do 

to her?

Connelly: It’s coming back threefold.

Mitchell: What happened?

Connelly: Sunday night. From the laundromat on Q 

. . . .

Mitchell: Yeah. Tell me.

Connelly: She just wouldn’t listen man.

Connelly: Whatever I do comes back on me three 

times. (Connelly looks at his swollen legs and says, 

“Dude, look at that. You ever seen that shit?”)

Mitchell: Tell me about Jeanna.

Connelly: She’s in Fremont. She’s laying there at the 

end of the road. I don’t do drugs.

Mitchell: Alright.

. . . .

Connelly: Half, bunch of her stuff is in Columbus.

Mitchell: Half of her stuff is in Columbus?

Connelly: Just laying out in the truckstop. Some more 

of it is in South Omaha. Laying in an alley.

Mitchell: So you mean she was moving out? You were 

helping her move out?

Connelly: That’s where I threw it.

Mitchell: Oh, that’s where you threw it. Why’d you 

throw her stuff in an alley?
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Connelly: Why’d I burn the van up the other day?

Mitchell: I don’t know. I don’t know anything about a 

van. Tell me about that.

Connelly: My ’87 G20 van.

Mitchell: Yeah.

Connelly: That they found (inaudible) torched over 

there in South Omaha.

Mitchell: Yeah.

Connelly: They seen me running from it with whatever 

I could carry.

Mitchell: Why did that happen?

Connelly: Because it had her in it. It had her in it.

. . . .

Mitchell: What do you mean you had her? You gave 

her a ride?

Connelly: I had her in it for 3 or 4 hours. Gave her a 

ride to Fremont. Dumped her in the fucking ditch. Don’t 

nobody care about that girl, dude?

Mitchell: Is she alive?

Connelly: No, she’s not.

At about 51⁄2 minutes into the interview, Mitchell sent the 

detective out of the interview room. Connelly then stated that 

his legs were sunburned because he was outside for 2 hours the 

day before, contemplating jumping off a bridge to his death. 

The following exchange occurred:

Mitchell: Why’s that? Why would you do that?

Connelly: . . . If I smothered her . . . if I smothered 

her and told her that’s the best way to go out of all the 

ways to get killed, I oughta be able to man up and do it 

to myself right after.

Mitchell: So is that what happened to her?

Connelly: She got a duct-taped mask and she’s laying 

in Fremont at the end of a road in a ditch.

. . . .

Mitchell: What? Do you know what road you were 

driving on?
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Connelly: It ain’t covered. She’s not covered up . . . 

that’s the fucked up part.

Mitchell: What is she wearing?

Connelly: Duct tape.

Connelly starts to cry as he recounts how he “duct-taped” 

her, told her he was not going to rape her, and explained he 

just wanted to take “her money and her dope,” but that things 

got out of hand. Approximately 45 minutes into the interview, 

a homicide unit detective, David Preston, took over and led the 

remainder of the interview.

Preston Interview

Preston obtained Connelly’s date of birth and address, and 

for the first time, he read Connelly his Miranda rights and 

asked if, having been informed of his rights, he would still be 

willing to speak with him. Connelly answered yes, and Preston 

filled out a rights advisory form, which Connelly did not 

sign. Preston showed Connelly a map of Fremont, Nebraska, 

to assist in finding Jeanna Wilcoxen’s location. Preston then 

asked Connelly to “start back from the beginning” and to 

explain “what happened actually.” While recounting his story, 

Connelly made reference to a “beast” and hearing voices:

6:49:18 P.M.

Connelly: All this shit she’s been through. It was just 

perfect . . . I told her either way, the beast gets her or I get 

her, this is perfect (inaudible) right here.

Preston: A beast, what are you referring to?

Connelly: Just like, I don’t know, the beast, the hunger.

Preston: Your hunger?

Connelly: Doesn’t feel like me. It doesn’t feel like me 

at all. It feels like two or three versions of people (inaudible) that I pissed off somehow. I don’t really realize 

how I pissed them off but it felt like them when the actual 

incident happened, when I’m giving verbal directions and 

telling her all this shit, being aggressive to maintain control of the situation but staying calm. The staying calm 
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part was me, that was like, so it was like one, two, three 

. . . three driving forces, dude, just like dominating.

Preston: It wasn’t emotionally you, it physically was 

you?

Connelly: It was me, emotionally, I’m not trying to 

make it deeper than it is. It was my buddy Chicken Bone 

and my buddy Kona, are floating around in my head, 

every time I spoke, I sounded like them. It was distinctive. It’s like knowing the names to the voices you hear. 

Not crazy people who don’t know the names. I wronged 

both these guys and I don’t remember how or why they 

got so mad at me when we were such good buds in the 

beginning and what they’re doing here and now involved 

in this and then my stay calmness on top of that was the 

end of her, it’s what destroyed her. It’s simple. I’m not 

trying to get all psychological and shit.

Connelly then went on to explain how he killed Wilcoxen. 

At the conclusion of Connelly’s interview, because the location 

of Wilcoxen’s body still could not be determined, Weidner, 

Pruett, and Preston took Connelly to Fremont in an attempt to 

locate Wilcoxen. Wilcoxen’s body was eventually discovered 

in an area very close to what Connelly had described. Connelly 

also directed the officers to 53rd & Y Streets in Omaha, advising that was the location where the murder had occurred. He 

then took them to an alley at 34th & K in Omaha where they 

found a tablet computer belonging to Wilcoxen that Connelly 

had discarded. Connelly then led Preston to Council Bluffs, 

Iowa, and to Columbus, Nebraska, to look for Wilcoxen’s cell 

phone and his cell phone, but attempts to locate the cell phones 

were unsuccessful. The State later charged Connelly with first 

degree murder and tampering with physical evidence.

Motion to Suppress

Connelly filed a motion to suppress the statements he made 

to law enforcement. Connelly argued in support of his motion 

that (1) the statements were obtained without Connelly’s 
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being properly advised of his right to counsel and his right 

against compulsory self-incrimination; (2) the statements were 

obtained without a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver 

of his right to counsel and his right against compulsory selfincrimination; (3) the statements were not voluntary in that 

they were the product of threats, coercion, or inducements of 

leniency practiced upon him by law enforcement; and (4) the 

statements were the fruit of an unlawful arrest.

In a written order, the district court denied Connelly’s 

motion to suppress. First, the district court found that probable cause existed to support a warrantless arrest of Connelly. 

Second, the district court found Connelly’s pre-Miranda statements made to law enforcement were voluntary and not the 

result of an interrogation. The court determined the overall 

demeanor of Connelly’s interview indicated that Connelly was 

voluntarily providing information to law enforcement and that 

thus, Mitchell was not interrogating Connelly. Further, the 

court pointed out that when Mitchell inquired about Connelly’s 

swollen legs, he responded that he had sustained the injuries 

from “‘dumping her body in Fremont.’” The court noted there 

was no reason that Mitchell should have reasonably expected 

that her question would likely elicit an incriminating response. 

The district court further found that Connelly’s pre-Miranda

statements were admissible under the public safety exception, also referred to as the “rescue doctrine,” to the Miranda

requirements. 1

Third, for the sake of completeness, the district court found 

that even if Mitchell’s pre-Miranda interview amounted to an 

interrogation, Connelly’s post-Miranda interview would still 

be admissible because it did not rise to the level of a two-step 

interrogation. Fourth, the district court found that under the 

totality of the circumstances, Connelly knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. Fifth, the district court found 

1 See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 104 S. Ct. 2626, 81 L. Ed. 2d 550 

(1984).
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that the State met its burden in proving, by a preponderance 

of the evidence, that Connelly’s confession was voluntary. The 

court determined there was no evidence presented to suggest 

Connelly’s confession was the product of threats, coercion, 

or inducements of leniency. The court noted that instead, 

Connelly was cooperative with law enforcement and often volunteered information beyond what was requested.

Trial and Sentencing

A jury found Connelly guilty of first degree murder and tampering with physical evidence. The court sentenced Connelly to 

consecutive terms of life imprisonment without the possibility 

of parole for the first degree murder conviction and of 2 to 2 

years’ imprisonment for the tampering with physical evidence 

conviction. Connelly appeals.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Connelly assigns, consolidated and restated, that (1) the 

district court erred in overruling the motion to suppress both 

his pre-Miranda and post-Miranda statements and (2) there 

was insufficient evidence to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, 

Connelly’s statements were made voluntarily.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[1] In reviewing a motion to suppress a statement based on 

its claimed involuntariness, including claims that law enforcement procured it by violating the safeguards established by the 

U.S. Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona,

 2 an appellate court 

applies a two-part standard of review. Regarding historical 

facts, an appellate court reviews the trial court’s findings for 

clear error. Whether those facts meet constitutional standards, 

however, is a question of law, which an appellate court reviews 

independently of the trial court’s determination. 3

2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 

(1966).

3 State v. Guzman, 305 Neb. 376, 940 N.W.2d 552 (2020). See State v. 

Bormann, 279 Neb. 320, 777 N.W.2d 829 (2010).
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ANALYSIS

No Custodial Interrogation

Connelly argues his confession to Mitchell was a “nonMirandized” statement made during a custodial interrogation 

because Mitchell’s questions were designed to elicit an incriminating response from him. Neither party contests that Connelly 

was in custody during each interview. As such, we focus 

on whether Connelly was subject to an interrogation by law 

enforcement. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the 

trial court’s denial of Connelly’s motion to suppress his preMiranda statements, because we find Connelly volunteered 

those statements and was not subject to an interrogation.

[2] Miranda prohibits the use of statements derived during 

custodial interrogations unless the prosecution demonstrates 

the use of procedural safeguards that are effective to secure the 

privilege against self-incrimination. 4 The safeguards provided 

by Miranda “‘come into play whenever a person in custody 

is subjected to either express questioning or its functional 

equivalent.’” 5

[3,4] This court, in State v. Rodriguez,

 6 stated that under 

the Miranda rule, a “custodial interrogation” takes place when 

questioning is initiated by law enforcement after a person has 

been taken into custody or is otherwise deprived of his or her 

freedom of action in any significant way. We have also stated 

that the term “interrogation” under Miranda refers not only 

to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on 

the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to 

arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably 

likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. 7 An 

4 State v. Rodriguez, 272 Neb. 930, 726 N.W.2d 157 (2007). See Miranda, 

supra note 2.

5 Bormann, supra note 3, 279 Neb. at 326, 777 N.W.2d at 835.

6 See Rodriguez, supra note 4.

7 Id.; State v. Buckman, 259 Neb. 924, 613 N.W.2d 463 (2000). See Rhode 

Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 100 S. Ct. 1682, 64 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1980).
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objective standard is applied to determine whether there is an 

interrogation within the meaning of Miranda.

 8

[5] The relevant question to be asked is, “‘Would a reasonable and disinterested person conclude that police conduct, 

directed to a suspect or defendant in custody, would likely elicit 

an incriminating response from that suspect or defendant?’” 9

If the answer is yes, then there is interrogation requiring the 

recitation of Miranda warnings. 10 However, we have excluded 

from the definition of interrogation a police officer’s course of 

inquiry related to and responsive to a volunteered remark by 

the accused. 11

In Rodriguez, while in custody, the defendant made incriminating statements to a police officer before the officer could 

finish advising him of his Miranda rights. 12 The defendant’s 

remarks were made in an abrupt, rambling manner and not 

in response to any questioning by the officer. We determined, 

after a review of the interview tape, that the officer made several remarks that seemed focused toward calming the defend

ant rather than eliciting information, including telling him 

that he believed him. 13 We held that “[s]tatements made in a 

conversation initiated by the accused or spontaneously volunteered by the accused are not the result of interrogation and 

are admissible.” 14 We affirmed the trial court’s admittance 

of the defendant’s statements because the statements were 

spontaneous, excited remarks, which were not the result of 

police compulsion. 15

8 Bormann, supra note 3.

9 Id. at 327, 777 N.W.2d at 836 (quoting State v. Gibson, 228 Neb. 455, 422 

N.W.2d 570 (1988)).

10 Bormann, supra note 3.

11 Buckman, supra note 7. See, also, State v. Lamb, 213 Neb. 498, 330 

N.W.2d 462 (1983).

12 Rodriguez, supra note 4.

13 Id.

14 Id. at 944, 726 N.W.2d at 171.

15 Rodriguez, supra note 4.
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In State v. Lamb,

 16 after being placed in a holding cell and 

before any Miranda warnings had been given to him, the 

defendant told the police officer that he shot his wife. The 

defendant then asked the officer, “‘How would you like it?’” 

to which the officer replied, “‘What do you mean by that?’” 17

The defendant then replied, “‘I got tired of seeing her suffer 

so I shot her.’” 18 The officer later testified that at the time 

he asked the question, he was concerned about whether the 

defendant was uncomfortable, ill, or angry about being placed 

in the holding cell. We agreed with the trial court in the case 

that the officer’s question was a neutral and spontaneous one, 

not one calculated to obtain a confession. We also determined 

the officer’s question did not place the defendant under a 

compulsion to speak because the defendant was the one who 

initiated the conversation and the officer simply requested 

clarification of the defendant’s statement. 19

The facts concerning Connelly’s statements to Mitchell 

are substantially the same as the statements made in both 

Rodriguez and Lamb.

 20 A review of the interview tape shows 

an agitated Connelly volunteering incriminating statements 

before his Miranda warnings could be read to him.

Mitchell’s first question to Connelly concerned his red and 

swollen legs. Connelly responded that it was from “dumping [Wilcoxen’s] body.” Mitchell’s question was a neutral 

and spontaneous question not intended to elicit a confession, 

and Connelly’s statement was spontaneously volunteered. The 

interview tape also shows that Connelly appeared frustrated 

that the officers only cared about cars, rather than about a 

missing woman. This is evident when Connelly tells Mitchell 

that Pruett would not “listen to a damn word,” to which 

16 Lamb, supra note 11.

17 Id. at 501, 330 N.W.2d at 465.

18 Id.

19 See id.

20 See, Rodriguez, supra note 4; Lamb, supra note 11.
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Mitchell simply tells him that she will listen to him. Mitchell’s 

limited inquiry cannot be characterized as a knowing attempt to 

elicit an incriminating statement from Connelly. When Mitchell 

did ask Connelly clarifying questions, they were often related 

to and responsive to Connelly’s volunteered statements. At the 

time of these questions, law enforcement was not yet aware of 

the murder. There is no evidence in the record that Connelly 

was under any compulsion to speak about the murder.

Accordingly, although Connelly was in custody and his 

Miranda rights had not yet been read to him, his statements 

to Mitchell were not made in response to a custodial interrogation. Therefore, the district court did not err in finding that 

no custodial interrogation took place prior to the recitation of 

Connelly’s Miranda rights.

Public Safety Exception

The district court found the public safety exception, also 

referred to as the “rescue doctrine,” which has been adopted 

by the U.S. Supreme Court, to be an appropriate exception to 

admit Connelly’s pre-Miranda statements. 21 However, neither 

the rescue doctrine nor the public safety exception has yet been 

adopted by Nebraska appellate courts.

In New York v. Quarles,

 22 the U.S. Supreme Court held that 

a public safety exception to the Miranda requirements applies 

when police ask a subject questions necessary to protect the 

public or police from immediate danger. Because we determine that Connelly’s statements were not the result of police 

questioning, we need not address the applicability of the public 

safety exception. An appellate court is not obligated to engage 

in an analysis that is not necessary to adjudicate the case and 

controversy before it. 23

21 See Quarles, supra note 1.

22 Id.

23 State v. Goynes, 303 Neb. 129, 927 N.W.2d 346 (2019), cert. denied ___ 

U.S. ___, 140 S. Ct. 545, 205 L. Ed. 2d 345 (2019).
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Post-Miranda Statements

Connelly argues his post-Miranda statements made to Preston 

should be suppressed because detectives deployed an “ask first, 

warn later” tactic disapproved of by the U.S. Supreme Court 

in Missouri v. Seibert,

 24 and because the Miranda warnings he 

received did not cure the damage that was done.

In Seibert, the U.S. Supreme Court considered a police 

protocol in which a suspect was interrogated without Miranda

warnings until the suspect confessed, at which point, the officer would give Miranda warnings, ask for a waiver, and get 

the suspect to repeat the pre-Miranda confession. 25 The Court 

explained that the underlying assumption with the “questionfirst” tactic was that

with one confession in hand before the warnings, the 

interrogator can count on getting its duplicate, with trifling additional trouble. Upon hearing warnings only in 

the aftermath of interrogation and just after making a 

confession, a suspect would hardly think he had a gen

uine right to remain silent, let alone persist in so believing once the police began to lead him over the same 

ground again. 26

The plurality opinion held that such tactic effectively threatens to thwart the purpose of Miranda by reducing the risk that 

a coerced confession would be admitted. 27

However, as we have already determined, there was no preMiranda interrogation by Mitchell, and as such, there was no 

“question-first” tactic here. Therefore, the district court did 

not err in determining Connelly’s post-Miranda interview was 

admissible because it did not rise to the level of a two-step 

interrogation.

24 Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 124 S. Ct. 2601, 159 L. Ed. 2d 643 

(2004).

25 Id.

26 Id., 542 U.S. at 613.

27 Seibert, supra note 24. See, also, Miranda, supra note 2.
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Voluntariness of Statements

Connelly’s final assignment of error is that there was insufficient evidence presented to the jury to support its conclusion 

that his statements were voluntary.

[6] The especially damning nature of a confession requires 

the State to prove that an accused’s statement was voluntary 

before it is admissible. 28 In making this determination, a totality of the circumstances test is applied, and the determination 

reached by the trial court will not be disturbed on appeal unless 

clearly wrong. 29

[7] To meet the requirement that a defendant’s statement, 

admission, or confession was made freely and voluntarily, the 

evidence must show that such statement, admission, or confession was not the product of any promise or inducement—

direct, indirect, or implied—no matter how slight. However, 

this rule is not to be applied on a strict, per se basis. Rather, 

determinations of voluntariness are based upon an assessment 

of all of the circumstances and factors surrounding the occurrence when the statement is made. 30

[8,9] Connelly relies on our decision in State v. Dickson,

 31

where we cited to the Supreme Court’s decision in Rhode 

Island v. Innis 32 and stated that mental illness, like age, education, and intelligence, is a relevant factor in the totality test 

when evaluating the voluntariness of a statement. However, we 

also stated that no per se rule invalidates the volunteered statement of a mentally ill defendant. 33 We held that such statement 

is subject to the general rule that a statement freely and voluntarily given without any compelling influences is admissible. 34

28 See State v. Walker, 242 Neb. 99, 493 N.W.2d 329 (1992).

29 State v. Garner, 260 Neb. 41, 614 N.W.2d 319 (2000).

30 Walker, supra note 28.

31 State v. Dickson, 223 Neb. 397, 389 N.W.2d 785 (1986).

32 Innis, supra note 7.

33 Dickson, supra note 31.

34 See id.
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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets

307 Nebraska Reports

STATE v. CONNELLY

Cite as 307 Neb. 495

Connelly argues that his statements about hearing voices, 

his uncorroborated statements about discarding his cell phone 

in Columbus and disposing of evidence in Council Bluffs, his 

confusion while searching for Wilcoxen’s body near Fremont, 

and his erratic jumping from one subject to another indicated 

a mental illness sufficient to make his incriminating statements 

involuntary. However, a review of the interview tape indicates 

that Connelly described his crimes in detail, that his statements tracked chronologically, and that he understood what he 

was saying. Additionally, no evidence was offered to indicate 

that Connelly suffered from a mental illness or that he was 

under the influence of drugs or alcohol at the time the statements were given. Neither was there evidence that Connelly’s 

confession was the product of threats, coercion, or inducements of leniency.

Furthermore, the district court instructed the jury that it must 

disregard any statement from Connelly if it found that the State 

did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Connelly understood what he was saying and freely and voluntarily made the 

statement under all surrounding circumstances. An appellate 

court does not resolve conflicts in the evidence, pass on credibility of witnesses, or reweigh the evidence; such matters are 

for the finder of fact. 35 Connelly’s argument that his statements 

were not made voluntarily is without merit.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the district 

court denying Connelly’s motion to suppress. We conclude that 

Connelly’s pre-Miranda statements were made voluntarily and 

not in response to a custodial interrogation. We further conclude there was sufficient evidence for a jury to find Connelly 

made his post-Miranda statements voluntarily.

Affirmed.

35 State v. Ferrin, 305 Neb. 762, 942 N.W.2d 404 (2020).