alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. RAYMOND A. JONES

No. 7026SC500

(Filed 18 November 1970)

Constitutional Law § 31; Escape § 1— right to subpoena witnesses — stipulation by solicitor as to what witness would have testified

In this prosecution for escape from prison, defendant’s contention that the trial court erred in proceeding to trial without allowing defendant to subpoena witnesses after defendant, while being questioned by the court as to the voluntariness of his plea of guilty, stated that he desired a certain witness to testify, *held*without merit where the solicitor stipulated what the witness would have testified if present at the trial, and defendant agreed that the stipulation was satisfactory and stated that he did not still want the witness present.

Appeal by defendant, Raymond A. Jones, from *Anglin, J.,*9 April 1970 Session, Mecklenburg Superior Court.

The defendant Raymond A. Jones was charged in a bill of indictment, proper in form, with felonious escape in violation of G.S. 148-45 (a).

The defendant, an indigent, represented by his court-appointed attorney, entered a plea of guilty. From a judgment of imprisonment of eight months, the defendant appealed to the North Carolina Court of Appeals.

*Attorney General Robert Morgan and Assistant Attorney General Millard R. Rich, Jr., for the State.*

*Richard A. Vinroot for defendant appellant.*

HEDRICK, Judge.

The defendant contends that the court committed prejudicial error in proceeding to trial without allowing the defendant to subpoena witnesses. This contention is without merit. The record discloses that when the defendant was being questioned by the judge as to the voluntary character of his plea of guilty, the defendant stated that he would like to have as a witness one Major Hugh A. Logan, Jr., for this witness could and would explain to the court that he, the Major, had told a Lt. Jordan to transfer the defendant, a prisoner, over to the Highway Patrol Office to a job that he was physically able to do. The solicitor stipulated that if the witness was present he would so testify. The court asked the defendant if the stipulation was satisfactory *727and if he still wanted the witness present. The defendant stated: “No, sir, that is fine.” The record further discloses that the defendant entered a written plea of guilty, and that the trial judge signed an adjudication that the defendant’s plea was “ . . . freely, understanding^ and voluntarily made, without undue influence, compulsion or duress, and without promise of leniency.”

We have carefully examined the entire record and determine that the defendant pleaded guilty to a valid bill of indictment; that the sentence imposed is within the maximum prescribed for a violation of the statute, and that the defendant had a fair trial in the superior court free from prejudicial error.

No error.

Chief Judge Mallard and Judge Parker concur.
## I N T H E C O U R T O F C R I M I N A L A P P E A L S O F T E X A S NO. WR-94,922-02

EX P ARTE MARCUS DEWAYNE JOSHUA , Applicant

ON AP P LICATION F OR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORP US CAUSE NO. 21-0005CR IN THE 87TH DISTRICT COURT

F ROM LEON COUNTY

Per curiam . S L A U G

H T E R , J. f

iled a concurring opinion. O P I N I O N Applicant was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. H e filed this application for a writ of habeas c orpus in the county of conviction, and the district clerk forwarded it to this Court. S

ee T E X . C O D E C R

I M . P R O C . art. 11.07. Applicant contends that he w as denied his rig ht to an appeal because counsel f a iled to timely file a notice of appeal. B a sed on the record, the trial court has found that counsel f ailed to timely file a notice of appeal. Relief is g ranted. E

x parte Axel , 757 S.W .2d 369 (Tex . Crim. App. 1988); J ones v. State , 98 S.W .3d 700 (Tex

. Crim. App. 2 0 03). Applicant may file an out-of-time appeal of his conviction in cause number 21-0005CR from the 87th District Court of L eon County

.2

I t appears that Applicant is represented by counsel. I f Applicant is not r e p r e s e nt ed by counsel, then within ten day s from the date of this Court’s mandate, the trial court shall determine whether Applicant is indig ent. I f Applicant is indig ent and wants to be represented b y counsel, the trial court shall appoint counsel to represent h im on direct appeal. Should Applicant decide to a ppeal, he must file a w ritten notice o f a

ppeal in the trial court within thirty d ay s f rom the da t e o f t h i s C o u rt’s mandate. Copies of this opinion shall be sent to the T e xa s D e p a r t m e nt o f C r i m i n al J u stice–Correctional I nstitutions Division and the B oard of Pardons and Paroles.

Delivered: October 25, 2023 Do not publish
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOSE JAIME MARTINEZ

- TORIBIO,

AKA Jose Martinez

- Toribio,

Petitioner

,

v.

DANA BOENTE, Acting Attorney General,

Respondent. No. 15

- 72965

Agency No. A200

- 242

- 701

MEMORANDUM *

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted January 18, 2017 **

Before: TROTT, TASHIMA , and CALLAHAN , Circuit Judges.

Jose Jaime Martinez

- Toribio

, a native and citizen of Mexico, petition s for

review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing h is appeal

from an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying his application for

cancellation of removal

. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

FEB 3 2017

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLER K

U.S. COURT OF APPEAL S2 15

- 72965

for substantial evidence the agency ’ s continuous physical presence de terminati on

.

Gutierrez v. Mukasey, 521 F.3d 1114, 1116 (9th Cir. 2008)

. We deny the petition

for review.

Substantial evidence supports t he agenc y’s determination that Martinez

Toribio failed to establish the requisite continuous physical presence for

cancellation of removal, where he presented inconsistent testimony with no

corroboration regarding the length of his departure from the United States in 2004

.

S ee 8 U.S.C. § § 1229a(c)(4)(B)

- (C)

, 1229b( b )(1)(A)

.

The r ecord does not support Martinez

- Toribio’s contentions that the IJ failed

to address or consider evidence, and that the IJ unfairly questioned his credibility.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
<PAGE>

                                                                    Exhibit 23.1

            Consent of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm

We consent to the incorporation by reference in Registration Statement Nos.
333-76399, 333-98931, 333-122067 and 332-111236 on Form S-8 of our report dated
September 10, 2004 (June 28, 2005 as to Note 15), relating to the financial
statements and financial statement schedule of Accredo Health, Incorporated
appearing in the Annual Report on Form 10-K/A (Amendment No. 1) of Accredo
Health, Incorporated for the year ended June 30, 2004.


/s/Deloitte & Touche LLP


Memphis, Tennessee
June 28, 2005
#### Placido LaBOY, Jr. v. Richard P. ZULEY, et al.

No. 90 C 545.

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, E.D.

Oct. 29, 1990.

Placido LaBoy, Jr., pro se.

*185Kelly R. Welsh, Corp. Counsel by Justin P. Erbacci, Asst. Corp. Counsel, Chicago, Ill., for defendants.

ORDER

BUA, District Judge.

After plaintiff Placido LaBoy, Jr. was convicted of armed robbery and attempted criminal sexual assault, he filed this civil action against three Chicago police officers who were involved in his arrest. Asserting a variety of constitutional violations, La-Boy contends that he was unlawfully arrested and convicted. Defendants moved to dismiss LaBoy’s complaint in its entirety. On October 4, 1990, 747 F.Supp. 1284, this court entered an order dismissing most of LaBoy’s claims. LaBoy now seeks to vacate the October 4 order.

In his motion to vacate, LaBoy does not raise any new legal or factual issues warranting reconsideration of the order. Rather, LaBoy merely contends that he was deprived of the opportunity to present oral argument in opposition to defendants' motion to dismiss, and that this deprivation violated his rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Contrary to LaBoy’s position, there is no constitutional right to oral argument on a motion to dismiss. *See Fried v. Fried,*113 F.R.D. 103, 106 n. 9 (S.D.N.Y.1986). Many federal judges, in fact, do not hear oral arguments on any motions. The local rules of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois provide that it is within the court’s discretion to allow oral argument on a motion. N.D.Ill.R. 12(q).

In any event, oral arguments were not necessary for a fair and proper resolution of defendants’ motion to dismiss. This court fully considered the arguments raised in the briefs submitted by both sides. LaBoy simply has not presented any viable argument in support of the motion to vacate this court’s prior ruling.

Accordingly, LaBoy’s motion to vacate the October 4, 1990 order is denied.
**Exhibit
      32(b)**







**CERTIFICATION
      PURSUANT TO**


**18
      U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**


**AS
      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**


**SECTION
      906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**





In
      connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of New River Pharmaceuticals
      Inc. (the “Company”) for the period ending April 2, 2006, as filed with the
      Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Krish
      S. Krishnan, Chief Operating Officer, Chief Financial Officer and Secretary
      of
      the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to
§ 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





(1) the
      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
      Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and





(2) the
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
      the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.







/s/
                Krish S. KrishnanKrish
                S. KrishnanChief
                Operating Officer,Chief
                Financial Officer and Secretary(Principal
                  financial and accounting officer)May
                12, 2006
EXHIBIT
      23.1









**CONSENT
      OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM**








Implant
      Sciences Corporation


Wakefield,
      MA





We
      hereby
      consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements on
      Forms S-3 (No.’s 333-109677, 333-111434, 333-117366, 333-124058, 333-127167,
      333-129911) and Forms S-8 (No's 333-42816, 333-111117, 333-138292, 333-144892)
      of our report dated October 12, 2007, relating to the consolidated
      financial statements which appears in the Annual Report to Shareholders, which
      is included in this Annual Report on Form 10-K of Implant Sciences
      Corporation for the year ended June 30, 2007.










/s/UHY
      LLP


Boston,
      MA


October
      12, 2007
#### STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. GERALD EDWARD JONES

No. 7520SC606

(Filed 19 November 1975)

Appeal by' defendant from *Long, Judge.*Judgment entered 18 February 1975 in Superior Court, Union County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 23 October 1975.

*Attorney General Edmisten, by Associate Attorney Cynthia Jean Zeliff, for the State.*

*James E. Griffin, for the defendant.*

BROCK, Chief Judge, HEDRICK and CLARK, Judges.

No error.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
       
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<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998             DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1998             JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1998             DEC-31-1997
<CASH>                                      25,292,229               4,775,153
<SECURITIES>                                         0                       0
<RECEIVABLES>                                1,196,681                 386,961
<ALLOWANCES>                                   (53,000)                (11,000)
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<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            27,264,596               6,301,408
<PP&E>                                       3,483,301               2,366,756
<DEPRECIATION>                              (1,414,549)               (715,928)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              30,477,384               8,513,848
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<COMMON>                                        79,038                  29,250
<OTHER-SE>                                           0                       0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                30,477,384               8,513,848
<SALES>                                      3,349,165               1,135,141
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             3,349,165               1,135,141
<CGS>                                        2,131,593               1,358,293
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               10,494,769               5,481,005
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0                       0
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<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (8,969,788)             (5,437,018)
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<DISCONTINUED>                                       0             (2,383,519)
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<NET-INCOME>                               (8,969,788)             (7,820,537)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (1.53)                  (1.63)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (1.53)                  (1.63)
        


</TABLE>
I 

111TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 5038 

To repeal the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

APRIL 15, 2010 

Mr. HENSARLING (for himself and Mr. BACHUS) introduced the following bill; 

which was referred to the Committee on Financial Services 

A BILL 

To repeal the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Fair Access to Credit 

5 and Job Creation Act of 2010’’. 

6 SEC. 2. REPEAL OF THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT 

7 OF 1977. 

8 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Community Reinvestment 

9 Act of 1977 (12 U.S.C. 2901 et seq.) is hereby repealed. 


srobinson on DSKHWCL6B1PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 5038 IH

1 (b) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.—Section 48 of the 

2 Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 1831y) is here3 by repealed. 

Æ 


srobinson on DSKHWCL6B1PROD with BILLS
#### STATE ex rel. Melvin STOKES v. STATE of Louisiana.

No. 2002-KH-2218.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Sept. 5, 2003.

In re Stokes, Melvin;—Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of East Feliciana, 20th Judicial District Court Div. B, Nos. E-82-9-*1031495, E-82-9-496, E-82-9-497; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2002 KW 731.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; *State ex rel. Glover v. State,*93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.
**Exhibit 31.2****CERTIFICATIONS**I, N. Michael Dion, Executive Vice President & Chief Financial Officer of Pinnacle Foods Group Inc.(the “Registrant”), certify that:1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Pinnacle Foods Group Inc.; 2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material factor omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of thecircumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the periodcovered by this report; 3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included inthis report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results ofoperations and cash flows of the Registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in thisreport; 4. The Registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for establishing andmaintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and15d-15(e)) for the Registrant and have: (a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosurecontrols and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that materialinformation relating to the Registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, ismade known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period inwhich this report is being prepared;  (b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the Registrant’s disclosure controls andprocedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of thedisclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this reportbased on such evaluation; and  (c) Disclosed in this report any change in the Registrant’s internal control overfinancial reporting that occurred during the Registrant’s most recent fiscal quarterthat has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, theRegistrant’s internal control over financial reporting; and5. The Registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our most recentevaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the Registrant’s auditors and theaudit committee of the Registrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalentfunctions): (a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operationof internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adverselyaffect the Registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financialinformation; and  (b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employeeswho have a significant role in the Registrant’s internal control over financialreporting.     Date: August 9, 2005         /s/ N. MICHAEL DION              N. Michael Dion
EXHIBIT 32.2

# CERTIFICATION OF
PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL OFFICERPURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,  AS ADOPTED PURSUANT
TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

Solely
for the purposes of complying with 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section
906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, I, the undersigned Chief Financial Officer of
Flexible Solutions International, Inc. (the Company), hereby certify that, to
the best of my knowledge, the Annual Report on Form 10-KSB/A (Amendment No. 3) of the
Company for the year ended December 31, 2004 (the Report) fully complies with
the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that
the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the
financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

|                   |                        
|------------------ | -----------------------
|Date: May 23, 2006 | /s/ Daniel B. OBrien  
|                   | Daniel B. OBrien      
|                   | Chief Financial Officer
Exhibit 32.1



CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER

PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



I, Russell J. Howard, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge the Annual Report of Maxygen, Inc. on Form 10-K for the annual period ended December 31, 2003 fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that information contained in such Annual Report on Form 10-K fairly presents in all material respects the financial condition and results of operations of Maxygen, Inc.



By:

/s/    Russell J. HowardName:

Russell J. HowardTitle:

Chief Executive OfficerDate:

March 12, 2004




I, Lawrence W.
Briscoe, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge the Annual Report of Maxygen, Inc. on Form 10-K for the annual period ended December 31,
2003 fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that information contained in such Annual Report on Form 10-K fairly presents in all material respects the financial condition and results
of operations of Maxygen, Inc.



By:

/s/    Lawrence W. BriscoeName:

Lawrence W. BriscoeTitle:

Chief Financial OfficerDate:

March 12, 2004
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 02-60035 Summary Calendar

DAVID VASQUEZ-DE LA O, Petitioner,

versus JOHN ASHCROFT, ATTORNEY GENERAL, Respondent.

-------------------- Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

(A29 769 161)

-------------------- September 3, 2002 Before BARKSDALE, DeMOSS, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * David Vasquez-De La O (“Vasquez”) has filed a petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeal’s (BIA’s) order denying his appeal of an immigration judge’s denial of a motion to reopen his immigration proceedings. Vasquez argues that the BIA erroneously dismissed his appeal when it concluded that the Legal Immigration Family Equity Act (“LIFE Act”), Pub. L. No. 106-553, and the LIFE Act amendments of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, whichNo. 02-60035 -2- granted additional time for seeking relief from deportation pursuant to the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act (“NACARA”), Pub. L. No. 105-100, tit. II, 111 Stat. 2193, amended by Pub. L. No. 105-139, 111 Stat. 2644, did not extend the deadline for Vasquez’s motion to reopen. After reviewing the administrative record, the briefs of the parties, and applicable statutes and regulations, we conclude that Vasquez has not shown error in the BIA’s determination that Vasquez failed to comply with the time period set forth in NACARA’s implementing regulations. See 8 C.F.R § 3.43(c)(1) and (2) (2001). Additionally, we find no error in the BIA’s determination that the LIFE Act Amendments did not extend the NACARA deadline for Vasquez, since Vasquez was not subject to the bar of section 241(a)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5). See LIFE Act Amendment § 1505(a)(1) and (2). To the extent that Vasquez presents factual and legal arguments that were not presented in his appeal to the BIA, those issues were not administratively exhausted and this court does not have jurisdiction to consider such issues. See Wang v. Ashcroft , 260 F.3d 448, 453 (5th Cir. 2001). Accordingly, the BIA’s decision is AFFIRMED.