[Cite as Dieringer v. Sawmiller, 2012-Ohio-4880.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT 

AUGLAIZE COUNTY 

 

SANDRA DIERINGER, ET AL., 

 PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS, CASE NO. 2-12-04 

 v. 

BRADLEY O. SAWMILLER, ET AL., O P I N I O N 

 DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES. 

 

Appeal from Auglaize County Common Pleas Court 

Trial Court No. 2011-CV-0080 

Judgment Affirmed 

Date of Decision: October 22, 2012 

 

APPEARANCES: 

J. Alan Smith and Austin M. Klaus for Appellants 

Brian J. Bradigan for Appellees, Bradley Sawmiller and Dana Gilbert 

Christopher W. Carrigg and Jennifer M. Brill for Appellee, 

 Motorists Mutual Insurance Company 

Michael W. Sandner and Joshua M. Kin for Appellee, Grange 

Insurance Company 
Case No. 2-12-04 

-2- 

ROGERS, J. 

{¶1} Plaintiffs-Appellants, Sandra Dieringer and Michael Dieringer 

(collectively, the “Dieringers”), appeal the judgment of the Court of Common 

Pleas of Auglaize County granting summary judgment in favor of DefendantAppellee, Motorists Mutual Insurance Company (“Motorists Mutual”), on the 

Dieringers’ request for a declaratory judgment. On appeal, the Dieringers contend 

that the trial court erroneously granted summary judgment because there is a 

genuine issue of material fact as to whether Sandra suffered a “bodily injury” that 

is covered under the terms of their insurance policy with Motorists Mutual. For 

the reasons that follow, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

{¶2} This matter arose from an automobile accident on September 8, 2010. 

Bradley Sawmiller, a minor, was driving his automobile in a westbound direction 

on Parkway Drive in St Mary’s Township when he struck Nancy Hertenstein, who 

was walking westbound on the side of the street. Hertenstein was severely injured 

and she died as a result. At the time of the accident, Hertenstein was walking with 

Sandra, her sister. Although Sawmiller’s automobile did not strike Sandra, she 

witnessed the accident and its resulting effect on her sister. Sandra has suffered 

significant emotional distress from the accident. 

{¶3} When the accident occurred, the Dieringers had an automobile 

insurance policy with Motorists Mutual (the “Policy”). The Policy included a 
Case No. 2-12-04 

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medical payment provision that read as follows: “We [Motorists Mutual] will pay 

for reasonable expenses incurred for necessary medical and funeral services 

because of bodily injury * * *.” (Docket No. 1, Policy, p. 5). Additionally, the 

Policy contained the following uninsured motorist provision: 

We will pay compensatory damages which an insured is legally 

entitled to recover from the owner or operator of: 

1. An uninsured motor vehicle as defined in Sections 1., 2., and 4. 

of the definition of an uninsured motor vehicle because of bodily 

injury * * *. 

2. An uninsured motor vehicle as defined in Section 3. of the 

definition of an uninsured motor vehicle because of bodily injury 

sustained by an insured. Id. at 17. 

Further, the Policy defined “bodily injury” as “bodily harm, sickness or disease, 

including death that results.” Id. at 1. The Dieringers sought recovery for 

Sandra’s injuries from the accident under the foregoing provisions. But, Motorists 

Mutual rejected their claim. 

{¶4} On April 13, 2011, the Dieringers filed their complaint alleging 

various personal injury claims against Sawmiller, his parents, and unidentified 

persons allegedly responsible for the negligent entrustment of the automobile to 

Sawmiller. Michael, Sandra’s husband, asserted derivative claims for loss of 

consortium. The Dieringers also requested a declaratory judgment as to their 

rights and Motorists Mutual’s duties under the Policy. 

{¶5} After discovery was taken, including Sandra’s deposition, Motorists 

Mutual filed its motion for summary judgment on January 13, 2012. One of the 
Case No. 2-12-04 

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bases for the motion was that Sandra did not suffer any bodily injury, as that term 

is defined in the Policy’s medical payment and uninsured motorist provisions, and 

that consequently Sandra’s injuries were not covered.1

 

{¶6} On February 6, 2012, the Dieringers filed their opposition to the 

motion for summary judgment. They argued that Sandra’s Posttraumatic Stress 

Disorder (“PTSD”) caused physical injuries, which brought her injuries under the 

terms of the Policy. Several medical studies and reports regarding PTSD-related 

physical injuries were attached to the Dieringers’ opposition. 

{¶7} Also attached was the affidavit of Dr. Joel Steinberg, a board-certified 

psychiatrist and internist. Dr. Steinberg’s affidavit indicated that on August 2, 

2011, he “performed a comprehensive psychiatric evaluation” of Sandra that 

lasted two hours and 20 minutes. (Docket No. 51. Exhibit 1, p. 1). He also 

indicated that Sandra underwent four psychological tests, took seven written tests 

regarding her emotional health, and answered a health questionnaire. Dr. 

Steinberg also stated that he reviewed the accident report and Motorists Mutual’s 

motion for summary judgment and its recitation of the Policy’s definition of 

bodily injury. 

{¶8} Based on these items, Dr. Steinberg attested that as a result of 

Sandra’s witnessing the accident, she “is suffering from significant psychiatric 

 

1

 We note that Motorists Mutual also argued in its motion that summary judgment was appropriate because 

the Dieringers were not “insureds” under the Policy’s terms. The trial court did not address this contention 

and Motorists Mutual has not raised it on appeal, so we need not consider it. 
Case No. 2-12-04 

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symptomatology [and] has psychiatric problems she never had before September 

8, 2010, including my diagnosis that she is suffering from Posttraumatic Stress 

Disorder * * *.” Id. at 2-3. Dr. Steinberg went on to state that Sandra’s symptoms 

amount to a bodily injury under the Policy because PTSD causes the following 

physical harms: 

[PTSD] causes brain cell damage and objectively verifiable physical 

injury to the human brain; 

[PTSD] shortens the life expectancy of persons who suffer from it; 

[PTSD] causes atrophy of the memory circuits (hippocampal gyrus); 

[PTSD] is associated with the development of a number of other 

somatic (bodily) problems, such as the premature development of 

coronary artery disease and other conditions. Id. at 3. 

{¶9} After hearing the arguments, the trial court granted Motorists Mutual’s 

motion for summary judgment on February 7, 2012. The trial court’s judgment 

included the following relevant language: 

While [the Dieringers’] theory is well reasoned, it flies in the face of 

existing case law that consistently excludes [PTSD] injuries from 

coverage under similar [policy] language. Following the line of 

cases in Ohio that the appellate courts have consistently applied 

[finding that] posttraumatic distress is not a bodily injury, the court 

declines [the Dieringers’] request to overturn the body of case law 

that consistently has declined to recognize the cause of action being 

pursued * * *. (Docket No. 52, p. 1-2). 

As a result, the trial court found that the Policy’s provisions for medical payments 

and uninsured motorist coverage did not cover Sandra’s injuries, dismissed the 

Dieringers’ claim against Motorists Mutual, and certified its order under Civ.R. 
Case No. 2-12-04 

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54(B).2

 The Dieringers’ claims against the other defendants remain before the 

trial court, where the proceedings have been stayed pending the disposition of this 

appeal. 

{¶10} The Dieringers filed this timely appeal, presenting the following 

assignment of error for our review. 

Assignment of Error No. I 

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY GRANTING SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF APPELLEE MOTORISTS 

BECAUSE GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT 

EXISTED AS TO WHETHER APPELLANT SANDY 

DIERINGER SUFFERED “BODILY INJURY” AS THE 

RESULT OF THE AUTOMOBILE/PEDESTRIAN ACCIDENT 

WHICH OCCURRED ON SEPTEMBER 8, 2010. THE TRIAL 

COURT ERRED BY GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN 

FAVOR OF THE APPELLEE MOTORISTS BECAUSE IN 

ORDER TO DO SO THE JUDGE HAD TO IMPROPERLY 

WEIGH THE UNDISPUTED MEDICAL EVIDENCE AND 

COMPLETELY IGNORE THE UNOPPOSED AFFIDAVIT OF 

JOEL STEINBERG, M.D. WHICH CLEARLY STATED THE 

OPINION OF DR. STEINBERG THAT SANDY DERRINGER 

SUFFERED “BODILY INJURY” AS DEFINED BY THE 

MOTORIST POLICY AND FURTHER THE AFFIDAVIT 

PROVIDED UNDISPUTED EVIDENCE THAT RECENT 

ADVANCEMENTS IN MEDICAL SCIENCE HAVE SHOWN 

THAT POSTTRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER (AND/OR 

EXPOSURE TO EXTREME EMOTIONAL TRAUMA) 

CAUSES ACTUAL (OBJECTIVELY VERIFIABLE) 

PERMANENT PHYSICAL INJURY TO THE HUMAN 

BRAIN. THEREFORE THE TRIAL COURT COULD NOT 

 

2

 We note that the trial court’s judgment only referred to the Policy’s uninsured motorist provision and that 

Motorist Mutual’s motion only discussed that provision and the medical payment provision. However, the 

Dieringers’ complaint asserted that both these provisions and the Policy’s property damage section covered 

Sandra’s injuries. Since the property damage section, like the medical payments and uninsured motorist 

provisions, only covers “bodily injuries,” we read the trial court’s judgment to bar coverage for Sandra’s 

injuries under all of the provisions alleged in the Dieringers’ complaint. 
Case No. 2-12-04 

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DECIDE THE ISSUE AS A MATTER OF LAW BECAUSE IT 

WAS AN ISSUE OF FACT TO BE SUBMITTED TO THE 

JURY.3

 

{¶11} In their sole assignment of error, the Dieringers argue that the trial 

court improperly granted summary judgment in favor of Motorists Mutual and that 

instead the evidence shows that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to 

whether Sandra suffered a bodily injury that is covered under the Policy. 

Specifically, the Dieringers argue that the trial court improperly weighed the 

evidence, ignored Dr. Steinberg’s affidavit, and disregarded medical evidence that 

PTSD causes physical injury. We disagree. 

Summary Judgment Standard 

{¶12} An appellate court reviews a summary judgment order de novo. 

Hillyer v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 131 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (8th Dist. 

1999). Accordingly, a reviewing court will not reverse an otherwise correct 

judgment merely because the lower court utilized different or erroneous reasons as 

the basis for its determination. Diamond Wine & Spirits, Inc. v. Dayton 

Heidelberg Distr. Co., 148 Ohio App.3d 596, 2002-Ohio-3932, ¶ 25 (3d Dist.), 

citing State ex rel. Cassels v. Dayton City School Dist. Bd. of Ed., 69 Ohio St.3d 

 

3

 This is an entirely improper form for an assignment of error. Assignments of error must indicate the 

purportedly erroneous trial court judgment and provide a concise statement of the assignment’s basis. See

Russell v. United Missionary Baptist Church, 92 Ohio App.3d 736, 738 (12th Dist. 1994) (describing the 

purposes of assignments of error and issues presented); Loc.R. 11(B) (“Assignments of error * * * should 

be specifically applied to the error claimed.”). This paragraph-long assignment of error is clearly not 

concise and it provides an extended outline of argument, which is neither appropriate nor suggested. As a 

result, future assignments of error should not be presented for our review in this manner. 
Case No. 2-12-04 

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217, 222 (1994). Summary judgment is appropriate when, looking at the evidence 

as a whole: (1) there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and (2) the moving 

party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Civ.R. 56(C). In conducting this 

analysis the court must determine “that reasonable minds can come to but one 

conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the motion for 

summary judgment is made, [the nonmoving] party being entitled to have the 

evidence or stipulation construed most strongly in the [nonmoving] party’s favor.” 

Id. If any doubts exist, the issue must be resolved in favor of the nonmoving 

party. Murphy v. Reynoldsburg, 65 Ohio St.3d 356, 359 (1992). 

{¶13} The party moving for summary judgment has the initial burden of 

producing some evidence which demonstrates the lack of a genuine issue of 

material fact. Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 293 (1996). In doing so, the 

moving party is not required to produce any affirmative evidence, but must 

identify those portions of the record which affirmatively support his argument. Id. 

at 292. The nonmoving party must then rebut with specific facts showing the 

existence of a genuine triable issue; he may not rest on the mere allegations or 

denials of his pleadings. Id.; Civ.R. 56(E). 

PTSD’s Coverage as a “Bodily Injury” Under Insurance Policies 

{¶14} We apply the precepts of contract interpretation when construing 

insurance policies. See, e.g., Yeager v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 166 Ohio St. 71 
Case No. 2-12-04 

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(1956), paragraph two of the syllabus. Insurance coverage is assessed by 

interpreting the contract “in conformity with the intention of the parties or 

gathered from the ordinary and commonly understood meaning of the language 

employed.” King v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 35 Ohio St.3d 208, 211 (1988). When 

the policy is clear and unambiguous, the court “may look no further than the four 

corners of the insurance policy to find the intent of the parties.” (Citation 

omitted.) Crow v. Dooley, 3d Dist. No. 1-11-59, 2012-Ohio-2565, ¶ 8. 

{¶15} This matter revolves around our interpretation of the term “bodily 

injury” in the Policy. Courts throughout the state have found that bodily injury 

does not include emotional or mental distress. See, e.g., Bentley v. Progressive 

Ins. Co., 4th Dist. No. 02CA10, 2002-Ohio-6532, ¶ 28 (citing cases). Most 

relevantly, in Erie Ins. Co. v. Favor, 129 Ohio App.3d 644 (10th Dist. 1998), the 

court applied this interpretation and found that PTSD-related emotional injuries 

were not bodily injuries covered under an automobile insurance policy. Id. at 648-

49. 

{¶16} The Dieringers present a novel argument in an attempt to further 

develop its case law in light of recent medical advancements. Essentially, they 

claim that these advancements have allowed doctors to find that PTSD produces 

significant changes in neuroanatomy, including cell damage and brain atrophy, 

reduces life expectancy, and has a connection with other bodily diseases, including 
Case No. 2-12-04 

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coronary artery disease. The medical materials in the record are quite compelling 

in establishing that PTSD may lead to physical injuries that are covered under the 

bodily injury definition in the Policy. But, the materials do not suggest that 

physical injuries are certain to follow from a PTSD diagnosis. 

{¶17} The Dieringers suggest that Dr. Steinberg’s affidavit cures this 

problem. The affidavit includes his medical conclusions that (1) Sandra suffers 

from PTSD; and (2) she therefore has suffered physical injuries that are covered 

by the Policy.4

 However, there is no evidence in the record from which Dr. 

Steinberg could reach the second conclusion. As noted in the medical materials 

furnished by the Dieringers, there are a variety of available methods to map the 

living human brain, such as X-rays, computed tomography scans, magnetic 

resonance imaging, and magnetoencephalography. These methods are capable of 

showing the type of physical injuries that PTSD is alleged to cause. But, the 

record shows that Sandra did not undergo any of these scans. Without results 

from these scans, there is no evidence that Sandra has suffered any 

neuroanatomical changes, i.e. bodily injuries, as a result of her PTSD. Further, Dr. 

Steinberg’s affidavit does not include any evidence that Sandra has suffered any of 

the other possible physical effects from PTSD. 

 

4

 We note that while Dr. Steinberg is a preeminent physician, he is unqualified to give an opinion as to the 

legal applicability of an insurance policy’s provisions. 
Case No. 2-12-04 

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{¶18} In sum, the Dieringers presented evidence that PTSD has the 

potential to cause physical injuries. However, they failed to present any evidence 

that Sandra herself was suffering from PTSD-related physical injuries. As a result, 

there is merely evidence that Sandra has a disorder that could have caused 

physical injuries. Consequently, the Dieringers failed to satisfy their burden of 

production to survive the summary judgment stage. In light of our finding, we 

cannot find that the trial court improperly weighed the evidence or disregarded the 

medical materials provided by the Dieringers with their opposition to Motorists 

Mutual’s motion. 

{¶19} Accordingly, we overrule the Dieringers’ sole assignment of error. 

{¶20} Having found no error prejudicial to the Dieringers, in the particulars 

assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

Judgment Affirmed 

SHAW, P.J., concurs in Judgment Only. 

PRESTON, J., concurs. 

/jlr