*********************************************** 

The “officially released” date that appears near the beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was 

released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions 

and petitions for certification is the “officially released” 

date appearing in the opinion. 

All opinions are subject to modification and technical 

correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut 

Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of 

discrepancies between the advance release version of an 

opinion and the latest version appearing in the Connecticut 

Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports 

or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest version is to 

be considered authoritative. 

The syllabus and procedural history accompanying the 

opinion as it appears in the Connecticut Law Journal and 

bound volumes of official reports are copyrighted by the 

Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not 

be reproduced and distributed without the express written 

permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. 

*********************************************** 
CHERYL A. JENKINS v. MICHAEL A. JENKINS

(AC 39231)

Keller, Bright and Pellegrino, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court

dissolving her marriage to the defendant and denying her motions to

vacate an arbitration award related to the dissolution matter. During

the dissolution proceedings, the parties had agreed to enter into arbitration for the resolution of various issues and further agreed that they

would not have the arbitration proceedings recorded. During arbitration,

the arbitrator precluded the testimony of the plaintiff’s psychiatrist

because the plaintiff failed to introduce a letter, on which the psychiatrist

partially based his evaluation of the plaintiff’s claims of abuse by the

defendant, as an exhibit prior to the proceedings. Thereafter, the trial

court accepted the arbitrator’s award and rationale, and rendered judgment dissolving the marriage. On appeal, the plaintiff claimed, inter alia,

that the arbitrator improperly precluded the testimony of her psychiatrist

in violation of statute (§ 52-418 [a] [3]). Held:

1. The trial court did not err in denying the plaintiff’s motion to vacate the

arbitration award on the basis of the arbitrator’s refusal to hear the

testimony of the plaintiff’s psychiatrist: that court properly concluded

that the plaintiff failed to meet her burden to show that she was deprived

of a full and fair hearing, as the arbitration agreement provided that the

arbitrator controlled the admission of evidence and in the absence of

any recordings of the arbitration proceedings, the trial court properly

considered the length of the proceedings and the arbitrator’s rulings,

and determined that the plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to

present her case, the arbitration award and rationale revealed that the

plaintiff testified at the proceedings regarding her claims of abuse, and

the arbitrator referenced the contents of the letter in the arbitration

rationale, which indicated that she considered it in structuring the award;

moreover, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the psychiatrist’s testimony would have impacted the outcome of the proceedings and how

such testimony would have persuaded the arbitrator that the defendant

was more at fault, as the testimony likely would have been duplicative

of the evidence already before the arbitrator, and, thus, it was unlikely

that the testimony would have negated evidence that indicated that the

plaintiff contributed to the breakdown of the marriage.

2. The plaintiff could not prevail on her claim that the arbitration award

should have been vacated because the arbitrator was biased against her

in violation of § 52-418 (a) (2), the trial court having properly concluded

that the plaintiff failed to meet her burden of demonstrating that the

arbitrator was partial; because there was no record of the arbitration

proceedings, the trial court relied on testimony at the hearing on the

motions to confirm and to vacate the arbitration award in determining

whether the arbitrator was biased in violation of § 52-418 (a) (2), and

the only evidence the plaintiff produced at that hearing in support of

her claim was her own testimony and that of her financial expert,

whose testimony only partially corroborated the plaintiff’s account of

the arbitrator’s statements and behavior toward the plaintiff.

Argued October 9—officially released December 18, 2018

Procedural History

Action for the dissolution of a marriage, and for other

relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Stamford, where the court, Colin, J., approved

the agreement of the parties to enter into binding arbitration as to certain disputed matters; thereafter, the

arbitrator issued an award and entered certain orders;

subsequently, the defendant filed a motion to confirm

the arbitration award, and the plaintiff filed motions to
vacate the award; thereafter, the matter was tried to

the court, Colin, J.; judgment granting the defendant’s

motion to confirm, denying the plaintiff’s motions to

vacate, and dissolving the parties’ marriage and granting

certain other relief, from which the plaintiff appealed

to this court. Affirmed.

Pamela M. Magnano, with whom, on the brief, was

Cheryl A. Jenkins, for the appellant (plaintiff).

George J. Markley, for the appellee (defendant).
Opinion

PELLEGRINO, J. The plaintiff, Cheryl A. Jenkins,

appeals from the trial court’s judgment denying her

motion to vacate an arbitration award in a dissolution

of marriage matter which, in addition to dissolving the

marriage, included orders of alimony and a division of

the parties’ assets and other financial orders.1 On

appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial court erred

when it refused to vacate the arbitrator’s award because

the arbitrator (1) precluded the testimony of an expert

witness in violation of General Statutes § 52-418 (a) (3),

and (2) treated one party more favorably than the other

in violation of General Statutes § 52-418 (a) (2). We

disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the

trial court.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to the resolution of this appeal. The plaintiff and

the defendant, Michael A. Jenkins, were married on

August 31, 2008. In December, 2013, the plaintiff commenced the present dissolution action.

In November, 2015, the parties entered into an arbitration agreement (agreement) for the resolution of several

issues relating to the dissolution of their marriage. Arbitration proceedings took place before Elaine Gordon

(arbitrator) on December 1, 2, and 21, 2015. The parties

attended the proceedings with counsel and agreed that

they would not have the proceedings recorded.2

On February 3, 2016, the arbitrator issued an award

and rationale for the award. The plaintiff subsequently

filed motions in the Superior Court to vacate the award.3

After holding a full evidentiary hearing on the plaintiff’s

two operative motions on March 28, 2016, the trial court,

Colin, J., denied the plaintiff’s motions to vacate the

arbitration award. This appeal followed. Additional

facts and procedural history will be set forth as necessary.

The plaintiff’s claims arise under ‘‘General Statutes

§ 52-418 (a), which sets forth the standard of review

governing an application to vacate, correct or modify

an arbitration award, [and] provides in relevant part:

Upon the application of any party to an arbitration, the

superior court for the judicial district in which one of

the parties resides . . . shall make an order vacating

the award if it finds [that] . . . (2) . . . there has been

evident partiality or corruption on the part of any arbitrator; [or] (3) if the arbitrators have been guilty of

misconduct in refusing to . . . hear evidence pertinent

and material to the controversy or of any other action

by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced

. . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dept. of

Transportation v. White Oak Corp., 319 Conn. 582, 598

n.3, 125 A.3d 988 (2015).

We begin by setting forth the relevant standard for

reviewing a trial court’s judgment affirming an arbitra-
tion award. ‘‘This court has for many years wholeheartedly endorsed arbitration as an effective alternative

method of settling disputes intended to avoid the formalities, delay, expense and vexation of ordinary litigation. . . . When arbitration is created by contract, we

recognize that its autonomy can only be preserved by

minimal judicial intervention. . . . Since the parties

consent to arbitration, and have full control over the

issues to be arbitrated, a court will make every reasonable presumption in favor of the arbitration award and

the arbitrator’s acts and proceedings. . . . The party

challenging the award bears the burden of producing

evidence sufficient to invalidate or avoid it . . . .’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bridgeport v.

Kasper Group, Inc., 278 Conn. 466, 473–74, 899 A.2d

523 (2006).

Although a trial court’s review of an arbitrator’s decision is limited, our review of a trial court’s decision to

dismiss a motion to vacate an arbitration award under

§ 52-418 (a) (3) involves a question of law and, thus, is

plenary. See id., 476. We review a trial court’s decision

to dismiss a motion to vacate an arbitration pursuant

to § 52-418 (a) (2), which involves factual findings by

the trial court, under the clearly erroneous standard.

See Haynes Construction Co. v. Cascella & Son Construction, Inc., 36 Conn. App. 29, 32–33, 647 A.2d 1015,

cert. denied, 231 Conn. 916, 648 A.2d 152 (1994)

(applying clearly erroneous standard when reviewing

trial court’s decision vacating arbitration decision on

basis of arbitrator’s evident partiality). ‘‘Determining

whether a trial court’s decision is clearly erroneous

involves a two part function: where the legal conclusions of the court are challenged we must determine

whether they are legally and logically correct and

whether they find support in the facts set out in the

memorandum of decision; where the factual basis of

the court’s decision is challenged we must determine

whether the facts set out in the memorandum of decision are supported by the evidence or whether, in light

of the evidence and the pleadings in the whole record,

these facts are clearly erroneous.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Id., 32.

I

The plaintiff first claims that the trial court erred in

denying her motion to vacate the arbitration award on

the basis of the arbitrator’s refusal, in violation of § 52-

418 (a) (3), to allow testimony from Carl Mueller, a

psychiatrist called by the plaintiff to establish that she

was physically and sexually abused by the defendant.

Specifically, the plaintiff claims that the trial court erred

in denying her motion because, by precluding Mueller

from testifying, the arbitrator ‘‘prejudiced the plaintiff’s

ability to prove that the defendant . . . abused her and

was primarily at fault for the breakdown of the marriage.’’ We disagree.
The following additional facts and procedural history

are relevant to the resolution of this claim. Prior to the

arbitration proceedings, the plaintiff disclosed Mueller

as a potential expert witness. When the defendant

deposed Mueller on July 2, 2015, Mueller testified that

he had reviewed a letter that the defendant sent to the

plaintiff requesting that she set up and record sexual

encounters with other individuals, and that the letter

was part of the basis of his expert opinion. Although

Mueller was asked, in advance of the deposition, to

bring ‘‘documents [he] obtained, created, reviewed or

relied upon in connection with [the] matter,’’ Mueller

failed to produce the letter at the deposition because

the original was in the plaintiff’s possession and he did

not have a copy of it. The plaintiff failed to produce the

letter at any point prior to the arbitration proceedings,

despite her obligation to do so by the terms of the

agreement.4

On December 2, 2015, the plaintiff called Mueller to

testify. When Mueller was called to testify, the plaintiff

offered the letter as an exhibit. The defendant then

objected to Mueller’s testimony on the basis of the

plaintiff’s failure to disclose the letter prior to the beginning of the proceedings. The arbitrator precluded Mueller’s testimony in its entirety because the defendant

made numerous requests for the disclosure of the letter,

prior to this point, which the plaintiff ignored.

On December 8, 2015, the plaintiff filed a motion with

the arbitrator to have Mueller’s testimony admitted. The

arbitrator treated the motion as a request for reconsideration of the ruling that she had made, and, in a written

ruling, denied the motion, stating: ‘‘The plaintiff had

the ability to cure the problem of the letter’s absence

from the file for months. By not producing it and by

not complying with the agreement to premark exhibits,

the plaintiff consciously created the problem for which

she now seeks consideration and relief.’’

The plaintiff claims that the trial court erred in denying her motion to vacate on the basis of the arbitrator’s

preclusion of Mueller’s testimony because it was integral in ‘‘ruling on the crucial issue of the causes of the

breakdown of the marriage, and in structuring awards

. . . in the matter.’’ Additionally, the plaintiff claims

that, even if she wrongfully failed to produce the letter,

the preclusion of Mueller’s testimony was not an appropriate sanction. The defendant argues that the trial

court did not err in denying the plaintiff’s motion to

vacate the arbitration award because, under the circumstances, precluding Mueller’s testimony was squarely

within the arbitrator’s authority. We agree with the

defendant.

‘‘[A]rbitrators are accorded substantial discretion in

determining the admissibility of evidence. . . . Indeed,

it is within the broad discretion of the arbitrators to
decide whether additional evidence is required or would

merely prolong the proceeding unnecessarily. . . .

This relaxation of strict evidentiary rules is both necessary and desirable because arbitration is an informal

proceeding designed, in part, to avoid the complexities

of litigation.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

McCann v. Dept. of Environmental Protection, 288

Conn. 203, 214, 952 A.2d 43 (2008).

An arbitrator’s broad discretion with regard to the

admission of evidence, however, is limited by § 52-418

(a) (3).5

‘‘[T]his court has stated that § 52-418 (a) (3)

does not mandate that every failure or refusal to receive

evidence, even relevant evidence, constitutes misconduct. . . . To establish that an evidentiary ruling, or

lack thereof, rises to the level of misconduct prohibited

by § 52-418 (a) (3) requires more than a showing that

an arbitrator committed an error of law. . . . Rather,

a party challenging an arbitration award on the ground

that the arbitrator refused to receive material evidence

must prove that, by virtue of an evidentiary ruling, [she]

was in fact deprived of a full and fair hearing before

the [arbitrator]. . . . [A]n arbitration hearing is fair if

the arbitrator gives each of the parties to the dispute

an adequate opportunity to present its evidence and

argument. . . . If the evidence at issue is merely cumulative or irrelevant, the arbitrator’s refusal to consider

it does not deprive the proffering party of a full and

fair hearing.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.,

215. ‘‘Additionally, to vacate an arbitrator’s award on

the ground of misconduct under § 52-418 (a) (3), the

moving party must establish that it was substantially

prejudiced by the improper ruling.’’ Bridgeport v.

Kasper Group, supra, 278 Conn. 476.

In the present case, the trial court concluded that

the plaintiff failed to meet her burden to show that she

was deprived of a full and fair hearing because the

arbitrator refused to hear Mueller’s testimony. The trial

court first noted that paragraph 17 of the arbitration

agreement provided that the arbitrator ‘‘shall control

the admission of evidence.’’ Furthermore, because the

parties agreed not to record the arbitration proceedings,

no record of the proceedings was provided to the trial

court. In the absence of a record, the trial court considered the length of the arbitration proceedings and the

arbitrator’s rulings, and determined that the plaintiff

had a full and fair opportunity to present her case. We

agree with the trial court.

Mueller’s opinion regarding the plaintiff’s claims of

abuse was based, in large part, on interviews Mueller

conducted with the plaintiff,6 and the letter the defendant had written to the plaintiff. Although Mueller was

not permitted to testify, the arbitration award and rationale reveal that the plaintiff testified at the arbitration

proceedings regarding her claims of abuse. The arbitrator also referenced the contents of the letter in her
arbitration rationale, indicating that she considered it

in structuring the award.

Moreover, the plaintiff failed to show that Mueller’s

testimony would have impacted the outcome of the

proceedings. The arbitrator stated: ‘‘[I]t is impossible

to be persuaded that either party is more at fault for

the breakdown of the marriage.’’ The plaintiff did not

demonstrate how Mueller’s testimony would have persuaded the arbitrator that the defendant was more at

fault. Indeed, it is unlikely that Mueller’s testimony,

which likely would have been duplicative of evidence

already before the arbitrator, would have negated evidence that indicated the plaintiff contributed to the

breakdown of the marriage. On the basis of the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court did not err in

denying the plaintiff’s motion to vacate on the basis of

the arbitrator’s refusal to hear Mueller’s testimony.

II

The plaintiff next claims that the trial court erred in

failing to vacate the arbitration award on the basis of

the arbitrator’s alleged partiality in violation of § 52-

418 (a) (2).7 The plaintiff argues that the trial court

should have vacated the award because, ‘‘[t]hroughout

the arbitration hearings, the [a]rbitrator’s behavior

directed at the plaintiff was belligerent and aggressive.’’

Specifically, the plaintiff alleges that the arbitrator

‘‘warned [the plaintiff] that repeated trips [to the bathroom] would not be tolerated,’’ ‘‘screamed at the plaintiff,’’ and slammed the door to the room where the

plaintiff was meeting with her attorney and financial

expert, causing ceiling tile debris to fall down from the

ceiling onto the plaintiff’s head, called the plaintiff a

‘‘fallen Catholic,’’ and addressed the defendant’s attorney in Hebrew. We conclude that the plaintiff’s claim

is without merit.

The following additional facts and procedural history

are relevant to the resolution of this claim. On March

2, 2016, following the arbitrator’s entry of an award,

the plaintiff filed a motion to vacate the award, in which

she argued that the arbitrator was not impartial. On

March 28, 2016, the trial court heard testimony on the

plaintiff’s motion.

The plaintiff testified that during the arbitration proceedings, the arbitrator, without knocking, came into

a room where she, her financial expert, Cheri Mazza,

and her counsel, were meeting privately. Upon entering

the room, the arbitrator screamed, and ‘‘slammed the

door so hard that she knocked loose a ceiling tile’’ that

fell on the plaintiff’s head. The plaintiff also testified

that during the arbitration hearing on December 21,

2015, the arbitrator held a conversation in Hebrew with

the defendant’s counsel, Eric Broder, and then said to

the plaintiff, ‘‘oh, you fallen Catholics, you wouldn’t

get that.’’
Broder testified that, contrary to the plaintiff’s claims

that the arbitrator warned her that she would not be

permitted to take frequent bathroom breaks, the plaintiff ‘‘constantly needed to take breaks, which were

granted by [the arbitrator] throughout whether it was

for the bathroom, for lunch or whatever . . . .’’ Broder

also testified that he did not speak Hebrew to the arbitrator and that he did not hear the arbitrator address

the plaintiff as a ‘‘fallen Catholic.’’

Finally, Mazza testified regarding the arbitrator’s

alleged outburst. Mazza said that she witnessed the

arbitrator ‘‘burst into the room’’ without knocking and

‘‘slam the door’’ on the way out. Mazza also was present

when the abitrator returned to the room and ‘‘apologize[d] for the outburst.’’ Mazza did not, however, see

a ceiling tile fall when the arbitrator slammed the door.

Mazza stated: ‘‘I don’t believe the entire ceiling tile fell.

There was just some debris that she claimed had fallen

into her hair.’’ After the hearing, and considering the

testimony of the plaintiff, Broder, and Mazza, the trial

court determined that the plaintiff failed to present

sufficient evidence for it to conclude that the arbitrator

was not impartial.

‘‘A party seeking to vacate an arbitration award on the

ground of evident partiality has the burden of producing

sufficient evidence in support of the claim. An allegation

that an arbitrator was biased, if supported by sufficient

evidence, may warrant the vacation of the arbitration

award. . . . The burden of proving bias or evident partiality pursuant to § 52-418 (a) (2) rests on the party

making such a claim, and requires more than a showing

of an appearance of bias. . . . In construing § 52-418

(a) (2), [our Supreme Court] concluded that evident

partiality will be found where a reasonable person

would have to conclude that an arbitrator was partial to

one party to the arbitration. To put it in the vernacular,

evident partiality exists where it reasonably looks as

though a given arbitrator would tend to favor one of

the parties.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Toland

v. Toland, 179 Conn. App. 800, 814, 182 A.3d 651, cert.

denied, 328 Conn. 935, 183 A.3d 1174 (2018).

In the present case, because there was no record of

the arbitration proceedings, the trial court relied on

the testimony presented at the March 28 hearing in

determining whether the arbitrator was biased in violation of § 52-418 (a) (2). The only evidence that the

plaintiff produced in support of her claim was her own

testimony and that of Mazza. Mazza’s testimony, however, only partially corroborated the plaintiff’s account

of the arbitrator’s so-called outburst. The plaintiff failed

to present any evidence beyond her own testimony in

support of her claims that the arbitrator warned her

against taking bathroom breaks, spoke to the defendant’s counsel in Hebrew, and called the plaintiff a

‘‘fallen Catholic.’’ In Toland, this court concluded that
a plaintiff failed to meet her burden to show partiality

under § 52-418 (a) (2) when the plaintiff presented evidence from the transcript of the arbitration proceedings

that demonstrated that the arbitrator ‘‘expressed some

frustration and impatience’’ with the plaintiff. Id., 815.

In the present case, the plaintiff provided the trial court

with even less credible evidence of bias. Accordingly,

we conclude that the trial court did not err in concluding

that the plaintiff failed to meet her burden of demonstrating that the arbitrator was partial under § 52-418 (a) (2).

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 The plaintiff does not specifically contest any of the orders of alimony

or other financial orders awarded by the arbitrator.

2 Specifically, the parties agreed to the following: ‘‘[The arbitrator] may

tape record all or part of the arbitration for her own use, which recording

shall not be deemed an official evidential record, nor used in any subsequent

proceedings. Any such recording shall be the property of [the arbitrator] and

shall be promptly destroyed after the final award and period for correction

of the award. Neither party shall procure appropriate services to record the

proceedings of the [arbitration] proceedings.’’

3 The plaintiff filed three motions to vacate the award. The trial court

marked off one of the motions as moot. The other two motions sought to

vacate the award on the basis of the arbitrator’s preclusion of an expert

witness and arbitrator’s bias, respectively. The trial court held a single

hearing on both of the remaining motions on March 28, 2016.

4 The agreement provided: ‘‘[The parties and their counsel] will, within

the bounds of advocacy, fully cooperate with each other. They will cooperate

in . . . the exchange of exhibits and discovery. [The arbitrator] may access

sanctions . . . and other relief to a litigant for the other party’s failure to

comply with the arbitration process or any of [the arbitrator’s] rulings or

directives.’’ It further provided in relevant part: ‘‘By November 23, 2015,

except by separate agreement of the parties, counsel shall exchange with

each other copies of all exhibits they intend to submit at the arbitration

. . . .’’

5 General Statutes § 52-418 (a) (3) provides in relevant part: ‘‘Upon the

application of any party to an arbitration, the superior court for the judicial

district in which one of the parties resides . . . shall make an order vacating

the award if it finds [that] . . . the arbitrators have been guilty of misconduct in refusing to . . . hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy or of any other action by which the rights of any party have been

prejudiced.’’

6 Mueller was not the plaintiff’s treating psychiatrist; rather, the plaintiff’s

counsel hired Mueller to interview the plaintiff in connection with providing

expert testimony in the dissolution proceedings. Mueller interviewed the

plaintiff three times for a total of three and one-half hours. During these

interviews, Mueller did not administer any kind of formal test to assess the

veracity of the plaintiff’s claims of abuse. Mueller reviewed the plaintiff’s

medical records, but failed to speak to the plaintiff’s physicians or therapists.

The medical records that Mueller reviewed in forming his opinion were

introduced during the arbitration proceedings and were available to the

arbitrator in crafting the arbitration award.

7 General Statutes § 52-418 (a) (2) provides in relevant part: ‘‘Upon the

application of any party to an arbitration, the superior court for the judicial

district in which one of the parties resides . . . shall make an order vacating

the award if it finds [that] . . . there has been evident partiality or corruption on the part of any arbitrator.’’