IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

Assigned on Briefs May 5, 2015

ANESHA MCKINNON v. STATE OF TENNESSEE

Direct Appeal from the Criminal Court for Shelby County

No. 12-02824 John W. Campbell, Judge

No. W2014-01514-CCA-R3-PC - Filed September 4, 2015

The Petitioner, Anesha McKinnon, filed a petition for post-conviction relief in the Shelby 

County Criminal Court, alleging that her trial counsel was ineffective and that her guilty 

plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered. The post-conviction court denied the 

petition, and the Petitioner appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court. 

Tenn. R. App. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court is Affirmed.

NORMA MCGEE OGLE, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ROBERT W.

WEDEMEYER AND ROGER A. PAGE, JJ., joined.

J. Walker Pritchard (on appeal) and Ebony N. Dawkins (at trial), Memphis, Tennessee, 

for the appellant, Anesha McKinnon.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Rachel E. Willis, Senior Counsel; 

Amy P. Weirich, District Attorney General; and Lessie Rainey, Assistant District 

Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

I. Factual Background

On June 6, 2013, the Petitioner pled guilty to aggravated robbery, a Class B 

felony. The plea agreement provided that the Petitioner would receive the minimum 

sentence of eight years and that she would serve one hundred percent of the sentence. At 

the plea hearing, the State recited the following factual basis for the plea:
- 2 -

Had the matter gone to trial, the State‟s proof would be 

that on January 8th of 2012 at approximately 5 p.m. officers 

with the Memphis Police Department responded to a call at 

4097 Saint Pierre located in the Grahamwood Point 

Apartments. When the Memphis police officers arrived on 

the scene the victim, Lanetria Redmond, reported that she 

came to the Grahamwood Point Apartments to meet a male 

known to her as South Memphis. 

Redmond reported that when she arrived, a male came 

to her vehicle and they talked for several minutes and then he 

returned to his apartment. Redmond reported two females 

approached her and demanded money at gunpoint. One of the 

females got into Redmond‟s vehicle and took her wallet and 

two cell phones while the other female held Redmond at 

gunpoint. During the course of the investigation Brandon 

Jones was developed as a suspect and Redmond identified 

him in a photographic [lineup] as South Memphis, the person 

responsible for setting up the robbery. 

On January 11th, 2012, Jones was arrested and he did 

waive his Miranda Rights and give a statement to being 

present during the planning of the robbery and receiving 

proceeds. Through further investigation [the Petitioner] was 

developed as a suspect and Redmond later identified her in a 

photographic lineup as one of the females that robbed her.

On January 12th, 2012 [the Petitioner] was arrested. 

She was brought to 201. She waived her Miranda Rights and 

confessed to being present during the robbery – during the 

planning of the robbery and receiving proceeds from the 

robbery but denied participation. 

The Petitioner stipulated to the facts as recited by the State. She stated that she 

had reviewed the guilty plea with trial counsel, that he had answered her questions 

regarding the plea, that he had done everything she asked, and that she was satisfied with 

his representation. She futher stated that she signed the plea form, that she understood 

the rights she was waiving by pleading guilty, and that no one had threatened her into 

pleading guilty. The Petitioner said that she was entering the guilty plea “freely and 

voluntarily” and that she had no questions about what she was doing. 
- 3 -

Thereafter, the Petitioner filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief, alleging 

that trial counsel was ineffective and that her guilty plea was not knowingly and 

voluntarily entered. 

At the post-conviction hearing, the Petitioner testified that originally she was

represented by the public defender‟s office but that her family later hired trial counsel.

She said that she and trial counsel met and discussed the facts of the case, including the 

discovery materials. She told trial counsel that she had been diagnosed with the 

following mental health problems: “[b]ipolar [disorder], anxieties, mania and postpartum

[depression], and . . . paranoi[d schizophrenia].” However, trial counsel never sent the 

Petitioner for a mental evaluation. 

The Petitioner said that she had taken Tegretol, which helped with her mania and 

bipolar depression, but that she stopped taking the medication in September 2012 because 

she was pregnant with twins. She resumed taking the medication in February 2013 and 

continued until April 2013 when she again became pregnant. She gave birth in January 

2014 and resumed taking her medication six weeks later. When she was off her 

medication, she could not make decisions on her own; she had mood swings, memory 

loss, and anxiety attacks; and she “griev[ed] the loss of [her] children.”

The Petitioner acknowledged that prior to entering the guilty plea, she was not in 

custody and that she missed a court date on January 17, 2013. She explained that she told 

trial counsel that she was on “bed rest” after having surgery and assumed that he would 

inform the court that she could not attend court that day. She said that after she was off 

bed rest, she called trial counsel about the missed court date and learned that a warrant 

had been issued for her arrest. 

The Petitioner said that she was arrested in June 2013, and a day or two later, she 

was taken into the courtroom. She did not recall speaking with trial counsel between 

January and June. She pled guilty one or two days after she was taken into custody. She

said that she did not speak with trial counsel until they were in court. The Petitioner said

that from prior conversations with trial counsel, she thought she might be allowed to 

plead guilty to a lesser offense with a potential sentence of two years. Instead, counsel 

told her that the State had offered a sentence of eight years at eighty-five percent.1 The 

Petitioner told counsel the offer was not what they had discussed, and counsel offered to 

speak with the State and attempt to negotiate a lesser sentence. However, when he 

returned, he told the Petitioner that if she did not plead guilty that day, she would be 

 

1 According to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-501(i), an offender convicted of aggravated 

robbery “shall serve one hundred percent (100%) of the sentence imposed by the court less sentence 

credits earned and retained. However, no sentence reduction credits authorized by § 41-21-236 or any 

other provision of law, shall operate to reduce the sentence imposed by the court by more than fifteen 

percent (15%).”
- 4 -

charged with felony failure to appear, which carried a consecutive sentence of three 

years. 

The Petitioner said that when she heard the offer, she panicked because she had 

expected counsel to “talk it out with me or explain it a little better . . . .” The Petitioner

said that she was innocent, “not educated,” and had “no diploma.” She was depending on 

trial counsel to help her but believed he did not want to fight for her; therefore, she felt 

that she was in a “no win” situation. The Petitioner said that before she signed the plea 

agreement, trial counsel went over the paperwork, which included “the 8/85, the time that 

I had to sign, nothing new.” She said that she was not having a manic episode when she 

signed the plea form. 

The Petitioner acknowledged that she said “yes to a lot of stuff” at the guilty plea 

hearing but claimed that she “blanked out” and was thinking about the three children she 

had lost. She conceded that trial counsel informed her that she did not have to accept the 

State‟s offer and could proceed to trial. She felt, however, that she “had nobody to fight 

with me.” 

On cross-examination, the Petitioner said that she had been taking Tegretol since 

she gave birth in February 2014. Previously, she had taken “Lipium,” which did not

work very well. 

The Petitioner said that after her arrest in January 2012, she was represented by a 

public defender until around October 30, 2012, when her family hired trial counsel. She 

said that she was out on bond at the time but that she never went to counsel‟s office. She 

said that she only met with him on court dates and that he never visited her in jail. She 

recalled meeting with him twice in court. During the first meeting, they discussed trying 

to negotiate with the State for a lesser offense and a lesser sentence. Her next meeting

with trial counsel was on the day she pled guilty. 

The Petitioner stated that when she spoke with trial counsel about her mental 

health issues, he told her that “they not trying to hear none of that.” She did not ask trial 

counsel if she could have a trial because she was not thinking about it. She said that she 

responded affirmatively to the trial court‟s questions because she was not on her 

medication and was panicking. She said that originally trial counsel told her the sentence 

might be eight years at thirty percent. She acknowledged, however, that trial counsel told 

her before she signed the agreement that the State‟s offer was an eight-year sentence at 

eighty-five percent.

Trial counsel testified that he was hired to represent the Petitioner. He said they 

never met at his office because the Petitioner “had a transportation issue,” and they “kind 

of just agreed to meet at court.” He recalled that the Petitioner‟s family was very 
- 5 -

involved in her case. He met with the Petitioner twice before she failed to appear in court 

in January. On November 30, he met with the Petitioner, her mother, and a friend and 

discussed the discovery materials at length. The Petitioner was confused about why her 

co-conspirators had not been charged, and they talked about criminal responsibility. The

Petitioner had given a statement to the police “limit[ing] her involvement,” but he 

explained to her that “legally that distinction wasn‟t going to matter.” They also 

discussed the State‟s plea offer of eight years at eighty-five percent. Trial counsel 

believed it was “a good offer” because the Petitioner had been identified by the coconspirators and had made a statement implicating herself. Additionally, he was 

concerned because the State had photographs of a baby in the backseat of the victim‟s 

car, and he did not “want it to turn into a second count of aggravated robbery or at least 

aggravated assault against, you know, this child in the backseat.” Trial counsel tried to 

get the State to agree to a Class C felony, but the State would not agree to an offense 

lower than a Class B felony. The Petitioner was scheduled to enter a guilty plea that day, 

but she asked that the case be reset so she could be home for her daughter‟s birthday. 

Trial counsel said that when the Petitioner missed her court date on January 7, he 

thought the State might rescind the offer. He said that the Petitioner never told him she

was unable to come to court because of surgery. When trial counsel spoke with the State 

in June, he asked for “alternative probation” because the Petitioner was pregnant again. 

The State was upset because the Petitioner had failed to appear at her last court date and 

offered a nine-year sentence. The State also informed counsel that if the Petitioner did 

not plead guilty, she would be charged for failure to appear and, if convicted, receive a 

mandatory consecutive sentence. After extensive negotiations, the State agreed to 

reinstitute the offer of eight years at eighty-five percent. He acknowledged that the plea 

process “was probably more rushed than [he] would have liked” but stated that “it was 

sort of if she wants to do this today she can do it, [the State did not] want to deal with this 

anymore.” 

Trial counsel said that when he relayed the offer to the Petitioner, he explained 

that the State “had us over a barrel.” The Petitioner was upset because she thought the 

State would be more lenient because of her pregnancy. The Petitioner wanted more time 

to think, but trial counsel advised her that if she took more time, the eight-year offer 

would be rescinded. 

Trial counsel said that initially the Petitioner wanted to take the case to trial. 

However, after he explained the law of criminal responsibility, she began losing interest

in a trial. 

Trial counsel did not recall the Petitioner‟s informing him that she had mental 

health issues. He asserted that if he had known of any mental issues, he would have 

arranged for an evaluation. He stated that he never saw anything in the Petitioner‟s 
- 6 -

behavior that gave him concern and that he believed the Petitioner “understood what was 

going on.” 

On cross-examination, trial counsel said that he met with the Petitioner two or 

three times prior to the guilty plea. On the morning of the plea, he kept the Petitioner 

updated on the negotiations and discussed the “issues with the case.” Counsel recalled 

that he and the Petitioner had extensive discussions regarding her case prior to that day 

“so it wasn‟t like the first time we‟re talking about any of this.” They talked for thirty to 

forty-five minutes before she pled guilty. Trial counsel acknowledged that he did not 

speak with the Petitioner between January and June, but he asserted that he did not know 

where she was or how to get in touch with her during that time. 

The post-conviction court found that counsel was not ineffective and that the 

Petitioner knowingly and voluntarily pled guilty to avoid facing an additional conviction 

and sentence. The court observed that the Petitioner presented no mental health 

evidence, outside of her own testimony, to demonstrate that she had any mental disease 

or defect that affected her competency. Moreover, trial counsel never saw anything that 

suggested competency issues. The court further found that the Petitioner was responsible 

for failing to appear and was in danger of incurring another conviction and sentence. 

Accordingly, the post-conviction court denied the petition. 

II. Analysis

To be successful in a claim for post-conviction relief, a petitioner must prove the 

factual allegations contained in the post-conviction petition by clear and convincing 

evidence. See Tenn. Code Ann. ' 40-30-110(f). “„Clear and convincing evidence means 

evidence in which there is no serious or substantial doubt about the correctness of the 

conclusions drawn from the evidence.‟” State v. Holder, 15 S.W.3d 905, 911 (Tenn. 

Crim. App. 1999) (quoting Hodges v. S.C. Toof & Co., 833 S.W.2d 896, 901 n.3 (Tenn. 

1992)). Issues regarding the credibility of witnesses, the weight and value to be accorded 

their testimony, and the factual questions raised by the evidence adduced at trial are to be 

resolved by the post-conviction court as the trier of fact. See Henley v. State, 960 

S.W.2d 572, 579 (Tenn. 1997). Therefore, the post-conviction court‟s findings of fact are 

entitled to substantial deference on appeal unless the evidence preponderates against 

those findings. See Fields v. State, 40 S.W.3d 450, 458 (Tenn. 2001).

A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is a mixed question of law and fact. 

See State v. Burns, 6 S.W.3d 453, 461 (Tenn. 1999). We will review the post-conviction 

court‟s findings of fact de novo with a presumption that those findings are correct. See

Fields, 40 S.W.3d at 458. However, we will review the post-conviction court‟s 

conclusions of law purely de novo. Id. 
- 7 -

When a petitioner seeks post-conviction relief on the basis of ineffective 

assistance of counsel, “the petitioner bears the burden of proving both that counsel‟s 

performance was deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense.” Goad v. 

State, 938 S.W.2d 363, 369 (Tenn. 1996) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 

687 (1984)). To establish deficient performance, the petitioner must show that counsel‟s 

performance was below “the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal 

cases.” Baxter v. Rose, 523 S.W.2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975). To establish prejudice, the 

petitioner must show that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel‟s 

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A 

reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 

outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Further,

[b]ecause a petitioner must establish both prongs of the 

test, a failure to prove either deficiency or prejudice provides 

a sufficient basis to deny relief on the ineffective assistance 

claim. Indeed, a court need not address the components in 

any particular order or even address both if the [petitioner] 

makes an insufficient showing of one component.

Goad, 938 S.W.2d at 370 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697). Moreover, in the context 

of a guilty plea, “the petitioner must show „prejudice‟ by demonstrating that, but for 

counsel‟s errors, [she] would not have pleaded guilty but would have insisted upon going 

to trial.” Hicks v. State, 983 S.W.2d 240, 246 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998); see also Hill v. 

Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985).

When a defendant enters a plea of guilty, certain constitutional rights are waived, 

including the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to confront witnesses, and the 

right to a trial by jury. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969). Therefore, in 

order to comply with constitutional requirements a guilty plea must be a “voluntary and 

intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant.” North 

Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31 (1970). In order to ensure that a defendant 

understands the constitutional rights being relinquished, the trial court must advise the 

defendant of the consequences of a guilty plea, and determine whether the defendant 

understands those consequences. Boykin, 395 U.S. at 244. 

In determining whether the petitioner‟s guilty plea was knowing and voluntary, 

this court looks to the following factors: 

the relative intelligence of the defendant; the degree of [her]

familiarity with criminal proceedings; whether [she] was 

represented by competent counsel and had the opportunity to 

confer with counsel about the options available to [her]; the 
- 8 -

extent of advice from counsel and the court concerning the 

charges against [her]; and the reasons for [her] decision to 

plead guilty, including a desire to avoid a greater penalty that 

might result from a jury trial. 

Blankenship v. State, 858 S.W.2d 897, 904 (Tenn. 1993).

The post-conviction court noted that at the guilty plea hearing, the Petitioner stated 

that she was satisfied with the representation of counsel, that he had answered all of her 

questions, that she understood her guilty plea, and that she wanted to plead guilty. This 

court has previously stated that “[a] petitioner‟s solemn declaration in open court that his 

or her plea is knowing and voluntary creates a formidable barrier in any subsequent 

collateral proceeding because these declarations „carry a strong presumption of verity.‟” 

Tina G. Strickland v. State, No. E2013-01118-CCA-R3-PC, 2014 WL 605442, at *5

(Tenn. Crim. App. at Knoxville, Feb. 14, 2014) (quoting Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 

63, 74 (1977)), perm. to appeal denied, (Tenn. June 23, 2014). 

Regarding the Petitioner‟s claim that her guilty plea was not knowing and 

voluntary, the post-conviction court essentially discredited the Petitioner‟s testimony that 

she suffered from a mental disease or defect that affected her competency and accredited 

trial counsel‟s testimony that he never saw anything that suggested competency issues. 

The post-conviction court noted that counsel advised the Petitioner of the strength of the 

State‟s case, the charges she faced, and the potential sentence. The court also found that 

the Petitioner knowingly and voluntarily pled guilty to avoid facing an additional 

conviction and sentence. Trial counsel testified that the Petitioner had known about the 

eight-year offer since November and had intended to accept the offer at that time. 

Regardless, the fact “[t]hat the petitioner would have liked more time to consider the 

offer . . . does not equate to a deprivation of the effective assistance of counsel.” Trina 

Dawn Holdway Johnson v. State, No. E2011-00348-CCA-R3-PC, 2012 WL 134238, at 

*4 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Knoxville, Jan. 18, 2012). The Petitioner is not entitled to relief.

III. Conclusion

Based upon the foregoing, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. 

_________________________________ 

NORMA MCGEE OGLE, JUDGE