NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_____________ No. 14

- 1945

_____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v. MATTHEW MI T CHELL WILSON , Appellant

_____________ APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FO R THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA ( D.C. Crim. Action No. 4

- 13

- cr - 00175

- 001 ) District Judge: Hon orable Matthew W. Brann

_____________ Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

October 28, 2014

_____________ Before: MCKEE , Chief Judge , GREENAWAY , JR., a nd KRAUSE , Circuit Judges

. ( Filed : November 6, 2014 )

_____________ OPINION *

______________

* This disposition is not an opinion o f the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent

.2

GREENAWAY, JR. , Circuit Judge

. Appellant Matthew Wilson appeals the sentence imposed by the District Court following a guilty plea for making a false bomb threat in violation of 18 U.S. C. § 844(e)

. Wilson argues that the District Court did not give appropriate w eight to his mental health history and that the resulting sentence was substantively unreasonable. For the reasons that fol low, we will affirm the District Court ’ s judgment of conviction

. I. BACKGROUND Since we write primarily for the benefit of the parties, we recount only the essential facts.
On S eptember 12, 2013, Wilson ple d guilty to an information in the Middle District of Pennsylvania charging him with making a false bomb threat to a federal prison facility, in violation of 18 U.S. C. § 844(e). Following the guilty plea, Wilson was
released on a personal recognizance bond wit h pretrial services supervision. Supervision occurred in North Carolina. On November 26, 2013, Wilson self

- surrendered after a warrant was issued for alleged bail violations

. Wilson did not receive a bail revocation hearing and was detained until he appeared before the District Judge for sentencing for his § 844(e) violation

. At sentencing , the United States recommended a split

- sentence consisting of a period of imprisonment with credit for time served ( approximately four months and ten days) , followed by commitment to a community confinement facili ty or halfway house and a period of s upervised release. In response to the government’s recommendation, Wilson’s counsel argued that a sentence of time served with supervised release and3

mental health conditions would be appropriate. The District Court ad opted the factual findings and G uideline s calculation of the Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) in its entirety. Based on a Criminal History Category I and a total offense level 12, Wilson faced an advisory guidelines range of 10

- 16 months’ imprison ment. T he District C ourt imposed a senten ce of 16 months ’ imprisonment. Wilson filed a timely appeal of his sentence.

II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVI EW The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231

. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291

. We review a sentence for substantive reason ableness under an abuse of discretion standar d. United States v. Tomko , 562 F.3d 558, 567

– 68 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc).
III. ANALYSIS The only issue on appeal is whether the District Court ’ s sentence w as substantively unrea sonable . We conclude that the sentence was not substantively unreasonable

. An i nquiry into the substantive reasonableness of a sentence asks “ ‘ whether the final sentence, wherever it may lie within the permissible statutory range, was premised
upon appr opriate and judicious considera tion of th e relevant [18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) ] factors. ’ ” United States v. Doe , 617 F.3d 766, 770 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Schweitzer , 454 F.3d 197, 204 (3d Cir. 2006)). “ Absent procedural error, we will affirm the sentencing court ‘ unless no reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence on that particular defendant for the reason s the district court4

provided. ’” Id. (quoting Tomko , 562 F.3d at 568). The party challenging the sentence bears th e burden of demonstrating unrea sonableness. Tomko , 562 F.3d at 567. Applying this standard, we discern no abuse of discretion in the sentence imposed. The sentencing colloquy evidences t hat the District Court was thor ough in its consideration of the § 3553(a) factors. The District Court considered the “ nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant, ” noting specifically that Wilson has “ an extensive history of mental illness and has exhibited a repeated pattern of disturbing behavior and criminal acts. ” App. 92. 2 Furthermore, w e find no me rit to Wilson ’ s argument that the District Court failed to give sufficient weight to Wilson ’ s mental health history as a mitigating factor under § 3553(a) , and instead treated it as an aggravating factor. To the contrary, the District Court acknowledged W ilson ’ s “ extensive ” history of mental illness. Id. There is no basis in the record to infer that the District Court treated Wilson’s mental health as an aggravating factor and calculated the length of Wilson ’ s sentence to ensure that he receive certain r ehabilitative services. 3
The District Court ’ s sentence of 16 months ’ imprisonment for making a false bomb threat to a federal prison was substantively reasonable. The District Court fully

2 T he PSR detailed an extensive pattern of Wilson’s past troubling and unlawful behavior. See, e.g. , PSR ¶¶ 24

- 29 , 37, 42b, 44

- 45. For instance, prior to the bomb threat in this case, Wilson set fires, made bomb threats at his schools, and left threatenin g notes for family members. Id. ¶¶ 37, 44

- 45

. 3 Compare Tapia v. United States , 131 S. Ct. 2382, 2392 (2011) (finding that sentencing court impermissibly imposed a sentence for rehabilitative reasons when it determined that the defendant needed to be impr isoned “long enough to get the 500 Hour Drug Program.”).5

justified its sentence and gave appropriate consideration to the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors . The District Court ’ s sentence was within the Guidelines range and satisfies all of the elements of a substantively reasonable sentence. Wilson has not met his burden of showing that a reasonable sentencing court would not hav e imposed the same sentence.
IV. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of conviction of the District Court.