IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA

No.430A19

Filed 18 December 2020

IN THE MATTER OF: J.J.H., K.L.R., J.J.H., S.S.S., J.M.S.

Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a1)(1) from order entered on 23 

September 2019 by Judge William B. Davis in District Court, Guilford County. This 

matter was calendared for argument in the Supreme Court on 23 November 2020,

but was determined on the records and briefs without oral argument pursuant to Rule 

30(f) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Mercedes O. Chut for petitioner-appellee Guilford County Department of Health 

and Human Services.

Battle, Winslow, Scott & Wiley, P.A., by M. Greg Crumpler, for appellee 

Guardian ad Litem.

Anné C. Wright for respondent-appellant mother.

ERVIN, Justice.

Respondent-mother Niesha W. appeals from the trial court’s order terminating 

her parental rights in the minor children, J.J.H.,

1 K.L.R., J.J.H., S.S.S. (Stacy), and 

J.M.S. After careful consideration of respondent-mother’s challenges to the trial 

 

1 J.J.H., K.L.R., J.J.H., S.S.S., and J.M.S. will be referred to throughout the remainder 

of this opinion, respectively, as “James,” “Kim,” “Jake,” “Stacy,” and “Joshua,” which are 

pseudonyms used to protect the identities of the juveniles and for ease of reading.
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court’s termination order2 in light of the record and the applicable law, we conclude 

that the challenged termination order should be affirmed.

I. Factual Background

On 4 April 2016, Guilford County Department of Health and Human Services 

filed juvenile petitions alleging that James, Jake, and Stacy were neglected and 

dependent juveniles and that Kim and Joshua were neglected juveniles and obtained

the entry of orders placing the children into the nonsecure custody of DHHS. In its 

petitions, DHHS alleged that the agency had an extensive child protective services

history with the family, having received eleven reports relating to the family between

8 October 2011 and 4 February 2016, nine of which had been substantiated. The

reports that DHHS had received described instances of inadequate supervision, 

including (1) an incident in which two-year-old Stacy had been taken to the hospital 

on two different occasions as the result of burns to her buttocks, hands, and arms; (2) 

an incident in which five-year-old Joshua had hit and kicked four teachers at his 

daycare facility, resulting in his suspension; (3) an incident in which the children 

were left in the care of their maternal grandmother, who suffered from seizures and 

called a social worker to report that respondent-mother made a practice of dropping

the children off at her house without permission even though the maternal 

 

2 The trial court terminated the parental rights of the fathers of the children in the 

challenged termination order as well. However, given that none of the children’s fathers have 

sought relief from the trial court’s termination order before this Court, we will refrain from 

discussing the proceedings relating to any of the children’s fathers in this opinion.
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grandmother could not care for them; (4) an incident in which the children were found 

alone at the home, with respondent-mother having explained that she had directed 

five-year-old Joshua to watch over the other children in her absence; (5) incidents in 

which Joshua had drawn pictures at school depicting sexual acts and explaining the 

human anatomy to his classmates, described sexual abuse by his older cousin who

served as the children’s nighttime babysitter, and attempted to engage in sexually 

inappropriate conduct with his younger siblings; (6) the fact that, even though James 

suffered from a birth defect that caused a large mass to grow in his nose, respondentmother had missed five different medical appointments relating to his treatment for 

that condition; (7) an incident in which the children had to be returned to school 

because respondent-mother was not at home when they got off the bus; and (8) an 

incident in which the utilities had been turned off in the home. Although DHHS had 

offered to provide in-home services to the family as a result of these incidents, 

respondent-mother had been resistant to these offers and had only participated in 

the proffered services on a sporadic basis.

The juvenile petitions further alleged that DHHS had received yet another 

child protective services report on 28 March 2016 which described an incident of

domestic violence that had occurred between respondent-mother and the father of 

James and Jake. According to respondent-mother, the father had assaulted her when 

he came to pick up Jake; however, the investigating officers saw no evidence that any 

such assault had occurred. The father, on the other hand, claimed that respondent-
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mother had attempted to run over him with her automobile while he was holding 

Jake. In the aftermath of this incident, respondent-mother had been arrested and 

charged with assault with a deadly weapon. In the course of the ensuing DHHS 

investigation, Joshua reported that he had witnessed physical altercations between 

respondent-mother and James’ and Jake’s father and that he had been aware of drug 

use and inappropriate sexual behavior in the family.

As a result of these allegations, DHHS held a team decision meeting on 4 April 

2016, in which respondent-mother had participated. According to the allegations 

contained in the juvenile petitions, respondent-mother had become upset during the

meeting, at which point she “stood up and violently jerked [James], who suffers from 

a brain tumor, seizures, and a facial tumor, from his caregiver.” Upon being told by

a social worker not to leave with James, respondent-mother pushed and struck the

social worker while holding James, resulting in intervention by agency security 

personnel. Although respondent-mother left the building with James, she 

subsequently reentered the building, handed James to another person, and, in an 

aggressive and threatening manner, approached the social worker, who was located

behind the reception desk, resulting in a situation in which the social worker had to 

use her feet to fend off respondent-mother’s assault and as the result of which

respondent-mother was charged with “Simple Assault and Battery/Affray.” At the 

conclusion of the team meeting, DHHS decided to seek nonsecure custody of the 

children.
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The juvenile petitions came on for an adjudication hearing on 29 September 

2016 and a dispositional and permanency planning hearing on 13 October 2016. On 

10 November 2016, Judge Lawrence McSwain entered an order finding the children

to be neglected and dependent juveniles as alleged in the DHHS petitions. On 28 

November 2016, Judge Randle Jones entered a disposition and permanency planning 

order finding that respondent mother had entered into a services agreement, or case 

plan, with DHHS on 27 April 2016 that included components relating to

“employment/income management,” “housing/environmental/basic physical needs,”

“parenting skills,” “mental health,” “substance abuse,” “family relationships/domestic 

violence[,]” and “visitation/child support/other[.]” In addition, Judge Jones found that 

respondent-mother had begun to comply with the provisions of her case plan and that 

she had attended weekly supervised visitation with the children since 2 September 

2016. Judge Jones determined that it was in the children’s best interests to remain 

in DHHS custody and ordered that they do so. In addition, Judge Jones established 

a permanent plan of reunification with a concurrent plan of adoption; allowed 

respondent-mother to have supervised visitation with the children for one hour per 

week, with DHHS having the authority to increase the frequency or duration of these

supervised visits; and ordered respondent mother to comply with the provisions of

her case plan and to submit to random drug tests.

After a permanency planning hearing that began on 9 November 2017, 

continued on 7 December 2017, and concluded on 1 February 2018, Judge Tonia 
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Cutchin entered an order finding that respondent-mother’s behavior had not changed 

even though she had complied with some aspects of her case plan and that the 

concerns that had brought the children into DHHS custody remained in existence. 

Judge Cutchin found that efforts to reunify the children with respondent-mother 

would not be successful, that it would not be possible to return the children to 

respondent-mother’s care within the next six months, that it would be in the

children’s best interests that termination of their parents’ parental rights be pursued,

and that adoption would benefit the children. As a result, Judge Cutchin changed

the permanent plan for the children to one of adoption with a secondary concurrent 

plan of reunification and ordered DHHS to pursue termination of parental rights.

On 16 August 2018, DHHS filed a petition seeking to have respondent-mother’s 

parental rights in the children terminated on the basis of neglect, N.C.G.S. § 7B1111(a)(1), and willful failure to make reasonable progress toward correcting the 

conditions that had led to the children’s removal from the family home, N.C.G.S. §

7B-1111(a)(2). The DHHS termination petition was heard before the trial court on

10 and 11 June 2019 and 8 and 10 July 2019. On 23 September 2019, the trial court 

entered an order terminating respondent-mother’s parental rights in the children. In 

its termination order, the trial court concluded that respondent-mother’s parental 

rights were subject to termination on the basis of neglect pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B1111(a)(1) and that the termination of respondent-mother’s parental rights would be
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in the children’s best interests. Respondent-mother noted an appeal to this Court 

from the trial court’s termination order.

II. Substantive Legal Analysis

In seeking relief from the trial court’s termination order before this Court, 

respondent-mother argues that the trial court erred by concluding that her parental 

rights were subject to termination on the basis of neglect, N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1), 

and that the termination of her parental rights would be in the children’s best 

interests. According to well-established North Carolina law, the termination of a 

parent’s parental rights in a child involves the use of a two-step process that consists 

of an adjudicatory stage and a dispositional stage. N.C.G.S. §§ 7B-1109, -1110; 

(2019); In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. 101, 110, 316 S.E.2d 246, 252 (1984). The 

petitioner bears the burden at the adjudicatory stage of proving the existence of one 

or more of the grounds for termination set out in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a) by “clear, 

cogent, and convincing evidence.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-1109(e), (f) (2019). In the event that

the trial court finds that the parent’s parental rights are subject to termination 

pursuant N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a), it must proceed to the dispositional stage, at which

it must “determine whether terminating the parent’s rights is in the juvenile’s best 

interest.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) (2019).

A. Grounds for Termination

As an initial matter, respondent-mother argues that the trial court erred by 

finding that her parental rights in the children were subject to termination. “We 
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review a trial court’s adjudication under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1109 ‘to determine whether 

the findings are supported by clear, cogent and convincing evidence and the findings 

support the conclusion of law.’ ” In re J.A.E.W., 375 N.C. 112, 116, 846 S.E.2d 268, 

271 (2020) (quoting In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. at 111, 316 S.E.2d at 253). “A trial 

court’s finding of fact that is supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence is 

deemed conclusive even if the record contains evidence that would support a contrary 

finding.” In re B.O.A., 372 N.C. 372, 379, 831 S.E.2d 305, 310 (2019) (citing In re 

Moore, 306 N.C. 394, 403–04, 293 S.E.2d 127, 132 (1982)). “Unchallenged findings of 

fact made at the adjudicatory stage are binding on appeal.” In re Z.V.A., 373 N.C. 

207, 211, 835 S.E.2d 425, 429 (2019) (citing Koufman v. Koufman, 330 N.C. 93, 97, 

408 S.E.2d 729, 731 (1991)). “The issue of whether a trial court’s findings of fact 

support its conclusions of law is reviewed de novo.” In re J.S., 374 N.C. 811, 814, 845 

S.E.2d 66, 71 (2020).

According to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1), a trial court may terminate the parental 

rights of a parent if the trial court determines that the parent has neglected the child. 

N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1) (2019). A neglected juvenile is defined, in pertinent part, as 

one “whose parent . . . does not provide proper care, supervision, or discipline; . . . or 

who is not provided necessary medical care; or who is not provided necessary remedial 

care; or who lives in an environment injurious to the juvenile’s welfare[.]” N.C.G.S. 

§ 7B-101(15).
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Generally, “[t]ermination of parental rights based upon 

this statutory ground requires a showing of neglect at the 

time of the termination hearing.” In re D.L.W., 368 N.C. 

835, 843, 788 S.E.2d 162, 167 (2016) (citing In re Ballard, 

311 N.C. 708, 713–15, 319 S.E.2d 227, 231–32 (1984)).

However, “if the child has been separated from the parent 

for a long period of time, there must be a showing of past 

neglect and a likelihood of future neglect by the parent.” 

Id. at 843, 788 S.E.2d at 167. When determining whether 

future neglect is likely, “the trial court must consider all 

evidence of relevant circumstances or events which existed 

or occurred either before or after the prior adjudication of 

neglect.” In re Ballard, 311 N.C. at 716, 319 S.E.2d at 232–

33. “The determinative factors must be the best interests 

of the child and the fitness of the parent to care for the child 

at the time of the termination proceeding.” Id. at 715, 319 

S.E.2d at 232.

In re J.O.D., 374 N.C. 797, 801–02, 844 S.E.2d 570, 575 (2020).3

In the challenged termination order, the trial court found that the children had

previously been adjudicated to be neglected juveniles on 29 September 2016. In 

addition, the trial court made extensive evidentiary findings that detailed the extent 

to which respondent-mother had made progress complying with the components of 

her case plan relating to “employment/income,” “housing,” “substance abuse,”

“parenting skills,” “mental health,” “family relationships/domestic violence,” and 

“visitation/child support/other.” After determining that respondent-mother had 

 

3 As we have noted in our recent opinion in In re R.L.D., No. 122A20, slip op. at 5 & 

n.3 (N.C. Dec. 11, 2020), a showing of past neglect and a probability of future neglect is not 

necessary to support a determination that a parent’s parental rights in a juvenile are subject 

to termination on the basis of neglect pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1) in light of the fact 

that such a determination is also permissible in the event that there is a showing of current 

neglect.
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made progress toward complying with the relevant provisions of her case plan, the

trial court found that:

On the whole, the evidence reports, observations, exhibits 

and testimony are that while [respondent-mother] has 

made substantial progress in activities on her case plan, 

and while she dearly loves her children, she lacks 

substantial capacity to meet the needs of the children, has 

inadequate plans for the future and has not demonstrated 

an ability to plan for obstacles.

As a result, the trial court concluded that respondent-mother’s parental rights in the 

children were subject to termination for neglect pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1) 

because:

29. Grounds have been proven to terminate the parental 

rights of [respondent-mother] . . . given that [she] . . . 

neglected the juveniles, the neglect continues to 

date, and there is a likelihood of the repetition of 

neglect if the juveniles were returned to [her], as 

follows:

a. Past neglect of the juveniles was proven by 

clear cogent and convincing evidence at the 

[a]djudication in the juveniles’ respective 

underlying cases.

b. The current ongoing neglect by [respondentmother] is evidenced by the fact that she has 

been resistant towards utilizing psychological 

services; she has refused to submit to random 

drug screens for long periods of time, which 

has impeded the monitoring of compliance; 

she has exhibited improper responses to 

stressful situations despite completion of 

anger management counseling; and has not 

proven the ability to care for herself and the 

children financially despite her employment. 
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[She] has made substantial strides and efforts 

towards complying with her case plan and 

there is no doubt that she dearly loves the 

juveniles, and would like to be reunited with 

them. Her lack of substantial capacity for 

analysis and forecasting problems and 

problem-solving issues as they arise, and 

planning for future circumstances presents 

substantial obstacles to her ability to provide 

appropriate care to the juveniles, and makes 

the likelihood of repetition of neglect high. 

Given [her] limitation to do these things, the 

substantial struggles, obstacles and needs of 

the juveniles, limited housing and 

transportation capacity of [her], if the 

juveniles were to return to her care there is a 

substantial likelihood of repetition of neglect, 

and the juveniles would not receive 

appropriate levels of care and supervision. 

. . . . 

e. Given that many of the conditions which led 

to removal still exist, there is a likelihood of 

repetition of neglect by [respondent-mother] 

in that [she has] failed and continue[s] to fail 

to comply with the components of [her] 

respective case plan[ ] to address the 

conditions that led to the removal of [her] 

children.

Although respondent-mother concedes that the children had previously been found 

to be neglected juveniles, she argues that the trial court’s ultimate findings that there 

was current ongoing neglect and a likelihood of repetition of neglect were not 

supported by the record evidence and the trial court’s evidentiary findings, 
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particularly given that, in her view, a number of the trial court’s evidentiary and 

ultimate findings lacked sufficient record support.

1. Sufficiency of the Evidentiary Support for the

Trial Court’s Findings of Fact

a. Employment/Income

In its order, the trial court found that respondent-mother “ha[d] not proven the 

ability to care for herself and the children financially despite her employment.” 

According to respondent-mother, the trial court erred by depicting her financial 

situation in this manner given its statement in Finding of Fact No. 18 that, “[a]t this 

time, [she] has sufficient income to provide for herself and the juveniles.” We do not 

find respondent-mother’s contention to this effect to be persuasive.

Finding of Fact No. 18 states that

[o]n or about December 2017 and while working at 

Wendy’s, [respondent-mother] completed a budget. The 

budget included rent of $495.00 per month, utilities, water, 

groceries, household supplies, gas, insurance, and her child 

support obligation of $126.00 per month. Her rent and 

other expenses have stayed the same. However, the budget 

did not list any medical expenses for herself or the 

juveniles, cost for clothing and shoes, or any potential child 

care/school cost, such as school supplies. At this time, 

[respondent-mother] has sufficient income to provide for 

herself and the juveniles. The budget presented appears to 

reflect an incomplete accounting of her own personal 

expenses for the month of December 2017, with no 

allowance for additional expenses that might be incurred if 

the juveniles came to reside with her. However, that 

budget reflects a monthly surplus of $471.80, an income in 

excess of her expenses that would potentially be applied to 

additional expenses if the juveniles were to come live with 
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her, and her current employment provides an even greater 

income.

As we read the language of the relevant finding, the trial court found that respondentmother’s budgeting skills contained certain deficiencies and made reference to the 

potential expenses that might be associated with the larger residence that the trial 

court determined elsewhere in the termination order that respondent-mother would 

need. As a result, when taken in context, we are satisfied that the trial court’s 

findings reflect, without directly stating, a nuanced determination that, while 

respondent-mother’s financial situation had improved in light of her ability to obtain 

higher-paying employment and even though she appeared to have sufficient financial 

resources in light of current conditions, the trial court continued to harbor 

reservations about respondent-mother’s ability to satisfy her own financial needs and 

those of all five children, particularly given that her budgeting skills appeared to be 

deficient, that a number of the children had special needs and that, as is discussed in 

more detail below, respondent-mother’s current living quarters were inadequate to 

house the entire family safely. As a result, we are not persuaded that the trial court’s 

determination that respondent-mother had “not proven the ability to care for herself 

and the children financially” should be disregarded in determining whether a 

repetition of neglect was likely to occur if the children were returned to respondentmother’s care.

b. Housing
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Next, respondent-mother argues that the trial court’s findings relating to the 

issue of housing do not support a conclusion that the children would probably 

experience a repetition of neglect given that she has maintained stable housing for 

almost two years and she has the financial capacity to pay for a larger home.

According to Finding of Fact. No. 18, respondent-mother’s

home is fully furnished and has two bedrooms and one 

bathroom. Initially, [respondent-mother] reported the 

children would sleep in one bedroom that has two sets of 

twin bunk beds and a single twin bed . . . . She also 

indicated that she would place a partition between the 

juveniles to separate the boys and the girls. . . . 

[Respondent-mother] was made aware . . . that her current 

housing plan was not appropriate, in light of the sexualized 

behaviors of [Joshua], and that [Joshua] needed his own 

room. [Respondent-mother] revised her plan and stated 

that she would be willing to give up her room to allow 

[Joshua] to have his own room and she will sleep in the 

living room. Between that time and now, [respondentmother] is taking steps to find more appropriate housing, 

but has been unable to find housing that is more 

appropriate for the juveniles, while also being affordable 

within her budget. . . . Given the variety of challenges that 

the various juveniles face, even a revised living plan within 

the current residence will not provide for sufficient space 

and opportunities for the juveniles in the home.

In addition, the trial court found that respondent-mother had taken steps to find more 

appropriate housing without actually locating a suitable residence that could be 

procured consistently with her existing budgetary constraints, noting that

“subsidized housing programs would not approve her for a residence that would be

scaled based on all the juveniles, unless or until they had a date as to when the 
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juveniles will be living with her.” In our view, since the trial court’s evidentiary 

findings of fact clearly show that respondent-mother had not been able to identify, 

much less obtain, housing that would be adequate to safely accommodate both 

respondent-mother and the children as of the conclusion of the termination hearing

despite the fact that she was on notice that her existing residence was deemed 

inadequate,

4 the challenged portion of the trial court’s housing-related finding of fact 

has ample record support despite the fact that she might have sufficient financial 

resources to rent an adequate residence upon locating one.

In seeking to persuade us to reach a contrary conclusion, respondent-mother 

argues, in reliance upon the decision of the Court of Appeals in In re A.G.M., 241 N.C. 

App. 426, 773 S.E.2d 123 (2015), that the trial court had erred by considering the 

suitability of her current housing situation in determining whether there was a 

likelihood of a repetition of neglect given (1) the fact that there was no reason to 

believe that the children would be allowed to live with her or have overnight visitation 

at her current resident in the immediate future and (2) the fact that she would be 

eligible for housing assistance that would permit her to obtain a larger home in the 

 

4 Admittedly, respondent-mother faces a dilemma arising from the fact that she 

cannot obtain additional housing assistance until a date upon which the children will begin 

living with her has been established and that she cannot obtain adequate housing in the 

absence of this increased amount of public housing assistance. However, since respondentmother has apparently not been able to even locate a residence that she could obtain in the 

event that additional housing assistance became available to her, we do not believe that the 

dilemma discussed in this footnote provides any basis for concluding that the relevant finding 

lacks sufficient record support.
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event that the children were returned to her care and the fact that she had already 

been able to obtain increased income through her employment. We do not find this 

argument persuasive.

In In re A.G.M., the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s determination

that the respondent’s parental rights were subject to termination on the basis of 

neglect pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1) on the grounds that the three-month

period of time between the entry of the dispositional order in the underlying juvenile 

proceeding and the termination hearing was insufficient to permit the making of a 

reasonable determination that future neglect would be probable. Id. at 441, 773 

S.E.2d at 134. In its opinion, the Court of Appeals added that:

[w]hile we agree that [r]espondent’s efficiency apartment 

at the time of the termination hearing would not be 

appropriate housing for the children if [r]espondent

continued to share the apartment with a man, DSS has 

failed to demonstrate how [r]espondent’s living conditions 

were inappropriate or harmful to the children while the 

children were living with their foster parents, without any 

contact with [r]espondent, and while [r]espondent was 

without any legitimate expectation that she would obtain 

overnight visitation rights, much less custody of the 

children, in the immediately foreseeable future.

Id. at 441–42, 773 S.E.2d at 134. Aside from the fact that the language upon which 

respondent-mother relies constitutes dicta and has “no effect as declaring the law,”

State v. Scoggin, 236 N.C. 1, 13, 72 S.E.2d 97, 105 (1952); see, e.g., In re T.R.P., 360 

N.C. 588, 597, 636 S.E.2d 787, 794 (2006), there was no indication that the respondent 

in A.G.M., unlike respondent-mother, had ever intended to bring the children to live 
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with her in her existing residence. As a result, we conclude that respondent-mother’s 

reliance upon In re A.G.M. is misplaced.

Finally, respondent-mother challenges the sufficiency of the record support for

the trial court’s housing-related findings concerning the dogs that are being kept at 

respondent-mother’s residence. According to respondent-mother, the record does not 

support the trial court’s findings that she owned “three” large dogs and that there 

were “several” 911 calls regarding the dogs. However, aside from the fact that certain 

reports that were admitted into evidence at the termination hearing make reference 

to the fact that three dogs were kept at respondent-mother’s residence and that there 

had been multiple 911 calls concerning these animals, respondent-mother admitted 

at the termination hearing that she owned two dogs, one “little Jack Russell” and one 

“American Bully,” and that law enforcement officers had been called to her home 

“more than one time” because the larger dog had broken loose from its chain and 

barked in an intimidating manner. In addition, a social work supervisor testified at 

the termination hearing that “two of the social workers who have been to the home 

have not even been able to get to the—the front door and had described the dog as 

being vicious.” As a result, regardless of the number of intimidating dogs that

actually occupied respondent-mother’s home, the record clearly shows that there were 

safety-related concerns applicable to respondent-mother’s residence given the 

apparently threatening nature of at least one of its canine residents. For that reason, 

we conclude that the trial court did not err by taking the concerns relating to 
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respondent-mother’s dogs into account in evaluating the likelihood that the children 

would be subject to a repetition of their earlier neglect in the event that they were 

returned to respondent-mother’s home. As a result, for all of these reasons, we hold

that the trial court did not err in considering respondent-mother’s housing situation

in determining whether it was probable that the children would be neglected if they 

were returned to respondent-mother’s care.

c. Substance Abuse

The trial court found that respondent-mother had obtained a substance abuse 

assessment in May 2016 and had completed the recommended substance abuse 

treatment in September 2016, with that treatment having included both individual 

and group sessions. Since she completed treatment, respondent-mother had not 

tested positive for the presence of illegal drugs. Although the trial court found that

respondent-mother had refused to participate in four drug screens between June and 

August 2017, it also found that respondent-mother’s

refusal to resume drug screens was not as a result of her 

resuming the use of illegal substances, but her frustration 

with [DHHS] and the [c]ourt. As a result, the [c]ourt d[id] 

not review them as a substantive violation of her case plan, 

in that they [were] not reflective of actual use of a 

controlled substance.

On the other hand, the trial court found that respondent-mother’s refusal to 

participate in the drug screening process was “reflective of [her] incapability to 

respond effectively to frustration in difficult situation[s] and to persist in appropriate 
IN RE J.J.H., K.L.R., J.J.H., S.S.S., J.M.S.

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behavior, despite those frustrations.” In addition, the trial court found that

respondent-mother had complied with all requests that she submit to drug screens

after October 2017, when DHHS representatives explained to her that her 

participation in the drug screening process had been required as part of her case plan 

and that DHHS was not trying to catch her using drugs.

As a result of the fact that respondent-mother has not challenged the

sufficiency of the record support for the evidentiary findings that the trial court made 

with respect to these substance abuse-related issues, those findings are binding upon 

us for purposes of appellate review. See In re Z.V.A., 373 N.C. at 211, 835 S.E.2d at 

429. Respondent-mother does, however, argue that the trial court erred by relying 

on substance abuse-related concerns in determining whether there was a likelihood 

of future neglect given the absence of any record support for the statement in Finding 

of Fact No. 29 that respondent-mother “ha[d] refused to submit to random drug 

screens for a long period of time, which has impeded the monitoring of compliance.” 

After carefully reviewing the record, we agree with respondent-mother that the 

record evidence and the trial court’s evidentiary findings do not support a 

determination that she refused to participate in the drug screening process for a “long 

period of time” or show that her temporary refusal to participate in the drug screening 

process had “impeded the monitoring of compliance.” In addition, we note that a

social worker acknowledged in her testimony that respondent-mother’s substance 

abuse did not continue to be an issue at the time of the termination hearing. As a 
IN RE J.J.H., K.L.R., J.J.H., S.S.S., J.M.S.

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result, we will disregard the challenged portion of the trial court’s findings relating 

to the issue of substance abuse in determining whether a repetition of neglect was 

probable in the event that the children were returned to respondent-mother’s care. 

See In re J.M., 373 N.C. at 358, 838 S.E.2d at 177.

In addition, respondent-mother disputes the trial court’s determination that 

her refusal to submit to drug screens was “reflective of [her] incapability to respond 

effectively to frustration in difficult situation[s] and to persist in appropriate 

behavior, despite those frustrations.” According to respondent-mother, her

compliance with the drug screening process after the purpose of that process had been

explained to her demonstrates that she has the ability to deal with frustrating 

situations. However, the record evidence and the trial court’s unchallenged 

evidentiary findings indicate that respondent-mother believed that “she had done 

enough for the [DHHS] and she would only do a drug screen if the [j]udge told her to 

do so.” In our view, the fact that respondent-mother subsequently complied with 

requests that she submit to drug screening does not negate the fact that she expressed

frustrations about the drug screening process in June, July, and August 2017. For 

that reason, we hold that the trial court did not err to the extent that it included 

respondent-mother’s reactions to requests that she participate in the drug screening 

process in determining whether a repetition of the neglect that the children had 

previously experienced was likely in the event they were returned to respondentmother’s care.
IN RE J.J.H., K.L.R., J.J.H., S.S.S., J.M.S.

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d. Parenting Skills

In addressing the extent of respondent-mother’s parenting skills, the trial 

court found that respondent-mother had completed a parenting/psychological 

evaluation with Dr. Edward Morris on 1 September 2016 and that the 

recommendations that had been made as a result of that evaluation had been 

incorporated into her case plan. In addition, the trial court made findings of fact that 

reflected a number of Dr. Morris’s opinions, including Dr. Morris’s concern that, “[i]f 

the motivation or incentive isn’t high enough to act in a certain way, she is not likely 

to give more than a cursory thought,” a pattern which he found to be “potentially 

harmful and [which could] compromise the physical safety and emotional security of 

the children.” In addition, the trial court pointed out Dr. Morris’s statement that, on 

occasions when the children’s medical, emotional, and educational needs were 

brought to respondent-mother’s attention, she “either dismisses or minimizes them.” 

Moreover, the trial court’s findings reflect that respondent-mother struggles to 

manage her relationships with other people and note her tendency to deny or 

externalize problems, her poor judgment, her disregard for expectations, her

resistance to changing her beliefs, and her lack of problem-solving skills. The trial 

court further found that respondent-mother had completed the Parenting 

Assessment Training Education program on 6 September 2016, that she had

completed a second phase of the PATE program, and that she had “also completed 

the From Darkness to Light program to better understand [Joshua’s] sexual acting 
IN RE J.J.H., K.L.R., J.J.H., S.S.S., J.M.S.

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out and to recognize its origins and safety concerns.” As a result of the fact that 

respondent-mother has not challenged the extent to which these findings have 

sufficient evidentiary support, they are binding for purposes of appellate review, see 

In re Z.V.A., 373 N.C. at 211, 835 S.E.2d at 429, and are entitled to be considered in 

determining the risk that the children will be neglected in the future.

e. Mental Health

Although respondent-mother has not challenged the sufficiency of the record 

support for the evidentiary component of the trial court’s mental health-related 

findings, she does argue that the record evidence and the trial court’s evidentiary

findings do not support the trial court’s ultimate finding that her “resistan[ce] 

towards utilizing psychological services” tended to show the existence of a risk of 

future neglect. In its termination order, the trial court found that DHHS had referred 

respondent-mother for a mental health assessment on 31 May 2016, that respondentmother had completed a Comprehensive Clinical Assessment on 9 June 2016, and 

that the assessment had resulted in recommendations that she participate in

individual mental health therapy and substance abuse-related group therapy. 

Respondent-mother began individual therapy on 6 July 2016 and “complied with 

therapy until she was discharged in May 2017.”

A social worker testified at the termination hearing that, even though

respondent-mother’s therapist had discharged her in 2017, the therapist “could not 

say that [respondent-mother] was actually done with the therapy or had like 
IN RE J.J.H., K.L.R., J.J.H., S.S.S., J.M.S.

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successfully completed it but that the mother stated on several occasions to the 

therapist that she had gotten all that she could out of therapy.” Another social worker 

testified that, in spite of the fact that DHHS had attempted to discuss the importance 

of continued therapy with respondent-mother, “[respondent-mother] was not willing 

to be open to kind of discuss[ing] anything else with the therapist,” that “the mother 

commented in the meeting [ ] that she didn’t . . . need therapy anymore,” and that 

respondent-mother “was just not open to receiving that at that time.” The social 

worker supervisor testified that she brought up the topic of therapy with respondentmother in a later meeting, at which point respondent-mother became “really upset” 

and “agitated” and “made the statement that unless the judge tells her to do it she 

does not care what DSS has to say.”

According to a permanency planning order entered on 22 August 2018 that was 

admitted into evidence at the termination hearings, a therapist who worked with 

respondent-mother’s eldest son had stated that “it [was] not in [Joshua’s] best 

interest for [respondent-mother] to be included in his therapy sessions” given that 

Joshua feared respondent-mother and that respondent-mother “continued to 

minimize [his] need for therapy.” Similarly, in a permanency planning order entered 

on 31 May 2019 that was also admitted at the termination hearing, the trial court 

found that, “[d]espite having completed Level I therapy and parenting classes, the 

mother has continued to minimize the reasons that the juveniles came into custody 

and even made comments regarding the juvenile(s) needing physical discipline 
IN RE J.J.H., K.L.R., J.J.H., S.S.S., J.M.S.

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(including that [her eldest son] just needed a ‘butt whooping’).” As a result, in light 

of the trial court’s evidentiary findings and the extensive record evidence concerning 

respondent-mother’s attitude toward the therapy process, we hold that the trial court 

had ample justification for determining that respondent-mother “ha[d] been 

resistant” to utilizing therapy and mental health services, so that, in spite of her 

claim that she had done everything that she had been asked to do, there were 

legitimate grounds for questioning whether she had appropriately benefitted from 

the therapy that she had received.

f. Family Relationships/Domestic Violence

The trial court found in Finding of Fact No. 18 that, even though respondentmother “[was] in compliance in that she has attended the required programs and met 

the goals, the [c]ourt [remains] concerned that her anger still remains an issue at 

times.” In its evidentiary findings, the trial court determined that respondent-mother

had completed anger management counseling in September 2016 and a domestic 

violence victim’s program in January 2017; that there were no known reports that 

she had been a victim or the perpetrator of violence since that time; that her “outlook 

and response ha[d] improved substantially”; that “[s]he ha[d] demonstrated increased 

maturity over the length of [the] case and responded to interventions”; and that, even 

so, “as recently as May 2019, [respondent-mother] became argumentative when the 

Social Worker praised one of the juveniles . . . for completing chores[,] [because she] 

did not believe the [s]ocial [w]orker’s report.”
IN RE J.J.H., K.L.R., J.J.H., S.S.S., J.M.S.

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Once again, respondent-mother has not challenged the trial court’s evidentiary 

findings relating to family relationships and domestic violence as lacking in sufficient 

evidentiary support. Respondent-mother does, however, argue that the trial court 

erred by determining that her “improper responses to stressful situations despite 

completion of anger management counseling” provided evidence that future neglect 

was probable. More specifically, respondent-mother contends that the trial court’s 

continued concern with her inappropriate responses to stressful situations rested

solely upon a May 2019 incident in which she “became argumentative” in interacting 

with the social worker. Respondent-mother’s argument with respect to this issue, 

when reduced to its essence, consists of an attempt to minimize the significance of 

this issue by asserting that her conduct during this incident was motivated by a 

concern for Joshua, directing our attention to her own testimony that Joshua had 

complained to her about the chores that he had been praised for completing, and

asserting that her conduct on this occasion actually reflected an increased ability to 

empathize with her children. According to respondent-mother, this isolated incident 

does not reflect the existence of a risk of future neglect given the absence of any 

indication that it had an adverse impact upon the children.

Once again, we do not find respondent-mother’s argument to be convincing. As 

we read the record, the trial court did not rely solely upon the May 2019 incident in 

determining that respondent-mother did not handle stressful incidents well, with this 

conclusion being evidenced by the fact that the trial court’s reference to the event that 
IN RE J.J.H., K.L.R., J.J.H., S.S.S., J.M.S.

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had occurred “as recently as May 2019” tends to suggest that the incident in question 

was only one of a number of incidents that revealed the existence of the underlying 

problem. This interpretation of the trial court’s findings is bolstered by the social 

worker’s testimony that respondent-mother would become loud and argumentative, 

on occasion, and that she had difficulty processing stressful subjects. In addition, the

social worker explained that respondent-mother was able to handle situations more 

effectively when everything was going to suit her, but that she raised her voice, 

argued, and would not believe the things that she was told on other occasions—a 

description of respondent-mother’s conduct that is consistent with that reflected in 

other portions of the record. In light of the manner in which respondent-mother 

tended to react to apparently stressful situations, the trial court had ample 

justification for expressing concern about the May 2019 incident. Finally, as we have 

already noted, the trial court found in other parts of the termination order that 

respondent-mother’s refusal to submit to requested drug screens in 2017 reflected an 

inability to react in an appropriate manner when frustrated. As a result, the trial 

court’s evidentiary findings and the record evidence amply support the trial court’s 

ultimate finding that respondent-mother continued to have difficulty controlling her 

anger, with this problem having an obvious bearing upon the probability that the 

children would be neglected in the future given the likelihood that respondent-mother 

would inevitably have to deal with difficult situations in the event that the children 

were returned to her care.
IN RE J.J.H., K.L.R., J.J.H., S.S.S., J.M.S.

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g. Visitation/Child Support/Other5

The trial court detailed respondent-mother’s attendance at visitation with the 

children over the course of the proceedings and summarized her attendance as “good 

at times and not good at other times.” According to the trial court, respondent-mother

missed at least twenty-two of her scheduled visits with the children, a record that she 

attempted to explain in various ways, such as by stating that the visits had “slipped

her mind” or that she had failed to confirm with DHHS in apt time. In addition, the 

trial court noted that, “on one occasion, when asked by the juveniles when they will 

come home, [respondent-mother] stated ‘when they let you all,’ ” and found that 

respondent-mother’s statement created “the concern that she values her and the 

juveniles’ happiness in the present moment, but fails to recognize that in the longterm, she will need to provide them with appropriate care and discipline.”

The trial court made additional findings relating to the visits that respondentmother had with Joshua and the efforts that she made to understand his 

inappropriate sexual behavior. The trial court determined that, in addition to her 

completion of the From Darkness to Light program, respondent-mother had

participated in therapeutic visits with Joshua from March to July 2017 and had

“spoken with [Joshua] about his behaviors and has reviewed his behavior folder with 

 

5 We will refrain from addressing the trial court’s findings relating to the issue of child 

support given that respondent-mother has not challenged those findings as lacking in 

sufficient record support and given that the trial court does not appear to have relied upon 

them in making its determination concerning the likelihood of future neglect.
IN RE J.J.H., K.L.R., J.J.H., S.S.S., J.M.S.

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him.” On the other hand, the trial court found that respondent-mother “ha[d] a

history of minimizing [Joshua’s] inappropriate behavior, including statements like, 

‘[h]e doesn’t act that way around me’ ” and had “endorsed harsh physical 

punishments in response to [Joshua’s] behavior, including, ‘[h]e just needs a butt 

whooping,’ ” while noting respondent-mother’s testimony “that she no longer holds 

[the] position that physical punishment is appropriate” and stating that,

due to her education throughout the process of this case, 

[respondent-mother] has learned additional tools for 

discipline, in that if the juveniles were to return home, she 

would tailor appropriate discipline to the specific needs of 

each juvenile, including using timeout, taking away toys, 

etc.[,] based on age and appropriate discipline for the 

juvenile involved.

In challenging the lawfulness of the trial court’s findings concerning the 

statements that she made about the manner in which the children should be 

disciplined, respondent-mother argues that these statements constitute “historic 

information,” did not reflect the nature of her thinking as of the time of the

termination hearing, and do not tend to suggest that future neglect of the children 

would be probable. However, given the content of the trial court’s finding concerning 

the nature of respondent-mother’s current position with respect to the manner in 

which the children should be disciplined, we hold that the trial court’s findings, taken 

in their entirety, adequately account for the changes that have occurred in 

respondent-mother’s views and are not, for that reason, erroneous.
IN RE J.J.H., K.L.R., J.J.H., S.S.S., J.M.S.

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In addition, respondent-mother argues that the trial court erred by finding 

that respondent-mother’s testimony that she did not want to make the children sad 

by imposing discipline upon them during visits creates a concern that she fails to 

recognize the need to provide adequate care and discipline for the children and that 

she is unable to appropriately address situations in which she is required to resolve 

problems. The concerns that the trial court expressed about respondent-mother’s 

willingness to address disciplinary and other difficult situations are consistent with

statements made by Dr. Morris, who found in his parenting/psychological evaluation

that respondent-mother “denies or externalizes the problems, minimizes their 

severity, or tries to maintain the fantasy at the expense of reality.” For that reason,

we have no difficulty in concluding that this aspect of respondent-mother’s challenge 

to the trial court’s findings lacks merit, particularly given that, while respondentmother may have developed improved insight concerning the manner in which 

discipline should be imposed, the record reflects the existence of an ongoing concern 

about the extent to which respondent-mother recognizes when the imposition of 

discipline is appropriate and when it is not.

The trial court also expressed concern that respondent-mother would be unable 

to manage the children’s “complicated schedules, including appointments for doctors, 

therapy, medication, school, occupational therapy, speech therapy, tutoring[,] and 

IEP meetings.” After noting that respondent-mother had experienced ongoing 

transportation difficulties, the trial court expressed concern about “whether she will 
IN RE J.J.H., K.L.R., J.J.H., S.S.S., J.M.S.

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have the ability to transport the minor children to their medical and school 

appointments.” In addition, the trial court noted that, even though respondentmother had testified that she would rely upon the help of family and friends in order 

to manage the children’s complex schedules, she had failed to identify these friends 

and family members “so that an evaluation [could] be made as to the ability of these 

individuals to meet the needs of the children.”

Respondent-mother challenges the validity of the trial court’s findings 

concerning her transportation-related issues and her ability to ensure that the 

children attended their medical and school appointments on a number of grounds.

First, respondent-mother argues that the trial court’s finding that the children have 

appointments for occupational therapy lacks sufficient evidentiary support. As 

DHHS agrees, the record does not contain any evidence tending to show that any of 

the children have occupational therapy appointments. On the other hand, the trial 

court’s error in this respect has very little bearing upon the proper resolution of this 

case given that the remainder of the challenged finding, which states that “[t]he 

juveniles . . . have complicated schedules, including appointments for doctors, 

therapy, medication, school, . . . speech therapy, tutoring[,] and IEP meetings,” has 

ample evidentiary support in light of the fact that each of the children suffers from 

various educational, medical, and psychological problems that require significant 

medication and therapeutic assistance.
IN RE J.J.H., K.L.R., J.J.H., S.S.S., J.M.S.

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As the record reflects, respondent-mother’s eldest son Joshua has been 

diagnosed with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, Oppositional Defiant 

Disorder, Post-traumatic Stress Disorder, and behavioral problems; attends therapy 

twice a week; and takes five prescription medications. Among other things, Joshua 

has engaged in “property damage and acting out towards his siblings” and “a large 

amount of inappropriate sexualized behaviors” and “continues to steal, provoke[ ] 

fights with peers, break rules, talk[ ] to himself, [and] act[ ] out fighting with toys.” 

After a psychological evaluation conducted in February of 2018, the examiner noted 

that Joshua had “disclosed a history of sexualized situations while living with his 

mother” and that his “inappropriate sexualized behaviors are reactive in nature to 

his past experiences.” As a result, the psychologist recommended that Joshua “not 

be left alone unsupervised with children three or more years younger than him at any 

time,” that “his access to the internet [should] be monitored closely in all settings,” 

and that he should have his own bedroom.

Although the needs of the other children are less substantial than those of 

Joshua, each of them faces challenges of his or her own. Stacy has been diagnosed 

with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder and Adjustment Disorder with 

Disturbance of Conduct, attends therapy twice a week, and takes two prescription 

medications. Jake formerly attended weekly play therapy to address his behavioral 

problems, but those sessions were discontinued in 2018. As of the time of the 

termination hearing, Jake was scheduled to begin monthly individual therapy. Kim 
IN RE J.J.H., K.L.R., J.J.H., S.S.S., J.M.S.

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receives speech therapy twice each week. James was born with a birth defect that 

created pressure within his nasal passage, causing the development of a mass in his 

nose that affected his brain, and experienced a brain tumor and seizures during his 

infancy. In spite of the fact that James received corrective surgery for his birth defect 

in 2016, he continues to suffer from medical issues, receives speech therapy twice a 

week, and displays behavioral issues including frequent temper tantrums. In light 

of the children’s extensive needs and respondent-mother’s failure to assure the trial 

court that she would have access to transportation in the future, respondent-mother’s 

arguments that “the missed medical appointments [related to James’s birth defect] 

that caused concern when the children were [placed into DHHS] custody . . . [are] no 

longer an issue[,]” and that, “[a]s to the other appointments, it is not as if each child 

has all those appointments[,]” do not strike us as persuasive.

Respondent-mother also argues that the trial court’s findings expressing 

concern about her (1) “ability to ensure that the juveniles attend scheduled 

appointments despite her claims that she now has the ability to schedule and manage 

appointments with a calendar reminder system” and her (2) “ability to transport the 

minor children to their medical and school appointments” “[g]iven [her] significant 

issues with transportation,” lack sufficient evidentiary support and do not tend to 

show a likelihood of future neglect. The trial court’s findings relating to this issue 

focus upon a visit that respondent-mother missed with the children on 21 May 2019. 

According to the trial court, respondent-mother failed to call to confirm the visit, took 
IN RE J.J.H., K.L.R., J.J.H., S.S.S., J.M.S.

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vacation time to go to a different city to look for a new car, and missed the scheduled

visit because it “slipped her mind[.]” In the trial court’s view, the missed visit created 

a legitimate concern about respondent-mother’s ability to schedule and manage the 

children’s appointments.

At the termination hearing, respondent-mother testified that, if the children 

were returned to her care, she would keep up with their medications and medical and 

school appointments using a calendar that she would link to her phone so that she 

would be alerted to the needs of the children. However, upon being asked about why 

she could not get to her weekly supervised visits with the children, respondentmother claimed that the underlying missed visit stemmed from a problem in making

the required day-ahead confirmation call. Although a confirmation call was required 

prior to each visit, respondent-mother testified that she simply forgets to make it. 

Upon being asked if it had occurred to her to adopt the calendar and reminder-based 

system that she had described in the testimony at the termination hearing, 

respondent-mother stated, even though she had reminders on her phone, “sometimes 

my phone—it just—it don’t go off for the call thing.” In our view, this evidence 

supports the trial court’s expression of concern about respondent-mother’s ability to 

schedule and manage the children’s medical and school appointments, with the 

existence of such difficulties clearly tending to show that there is a risk that future 

neglect will occur if respondent-mother becomes responsible for the children’s care.
IN RE J.J.H., K.L.R., J.J.H., S.S.S., J.M.S.

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After finding that respondent-mother had transportation-related difficulties 

and that these problems had impaired her ability to get to her scheduled visits with 

the children, the trial court noted that, “despite her transportation difficulties, 

[respondent-mother] has never missed a day of work or been late to work.” In 

addition, a social worker testified that she expected that the children would see 

providers in the community in which respondent-mother lived, rather than in

Greensboro, in the event that they were returned to respondent-mother’s care and 

that public transportation would be available for respondent-mother’s use. In light 

of the trial court’s findings that she had never missed work and the social worker’s 

testimony that the children would likely see local providers, respondent-mother 

argues that the trial court’s expression of concern about the impact of her 

transportation-related difficulties on the children lacked sufficient record support 

and did not support a determination that the children were likely to be neglected in 

the future.

Aside from the fact that there was no guarantee that the children’s 

appointments would be transferred to her local community or that public 

transportation would be adequate to serve respondent-mother’s needs, the simple 

facts of the matter remain, as the trial court’s evidentiary findings reflect, that 

respondent-mother had transportation difficulties, that the children had complicated 

schedules, and that respondent-mother had missed visiting with the children due to 

her own inattention. As a result, the trial court had legitimate grounds for being 
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concerned about respondent-mother’s ability to get the children to their numerous 

medical and school-related appointments even though the record contained evidence 

that would have supported a contrary inference, see In re B.O.A., 372 N.C. at 379, 831 

S.E.2d at 310 (stating that “[a] trial court’s finding of fact that is supported by clear, 

cogent, and convincing evidence is deemed conclusive even if the record contains 

evidence that would support a contrary finding”), and did not err by considering these 

difficulties in determining whether there was a probability that the children would 

be neglected if they were returned to respondent-mother’s care.

Finally, the trial court found that respondent-mother worked from “7:00 p.m. 

to 7:00 a.m.[,]” that “her plan of care would include family and friends,” and that “she 

has failed to provide sufficient information to [DHHS] or the [c]ourt so that an 

evaluation can be made as to the ability of these individuals to meet the needs of the 

children.” Although we note that respondent-mother has not challenged the 

sufficiency of the record support for these findings, so that they are binding for 

purposes of appellate review, In re Z.V.A., 373 N.C. at 211, 835 S.E.2d at 429, we note 

that many people with similar work schedules are able to provide more than adequate 

care for their children and do not believe that respondent-mother’s work schedule, 

standing alone, has any bearing upon the extent to which the neglect that the 

children had previously experienced is likely to be repeated if they are returned to 

respondent-mother’s care.
IN RE J.J.H., K.L.R., J.J.H., S.S.S., J.M.S.

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After reviewing the relevant portions of the record, we hold that the trial 

court’s finding that “[respondent-mother] has made substantial progress in activities 

on her case plan” has ample record support. On the other hand, the same is true of 

the trial court’s determination that, despite the commendable progress that 

respondent-mother had made in complying with the provisions of her case plan, “she 

lacks substantial capacity to meet the needs of the children, has inadequate plans for 

the future[,] and has not demonstrated an ability to plan for obstacles.” Simply put, 

the record supports the trial court’s determinations that respondent-mother has 

failed to acquire appropriate housing that is sufficient to safely accommodate the 

children’s special needs and behavioral issues; that respondent-mother continues to 

react inappropriately in stressful situations; that respondent-mother has failed to 

consistently visit with the children as a result of her inability to remember to confirm 

visits and her transportation-related problems; that there were reasons for concern 

about respondent-mother’s ability to manage the children’s complex schedules and 

appointments; and that respondent-mother had not provided a sufficient plan of care 

for the children.

2. Likelihood of Repetition of Neglect

Secondly, we must determine whether the trial court’s findings of fact support 

its conclusion that there is a likelihood that the neglect that the children had 

previously experienced would be repeated if they were returned to her care. See In 

re J.O.D., 374 N.C. at 807, 844 S.E.2d at 578 (noting that a determination that there 
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is a likelihood of repeated neglect is a conclusion of law, regardless of the manner in 

which it is labeled). According to respondent-mother, the trial court should have 

answered this question in the negative given that she had made substantial progress 

in satisfying the requirements of her case plan and given that the nature and the 

extent in the changes that she had made by the time of the termination hearing

provided no support for a determination that future neglect was probable. We 

disagree.

As this Court has previously noted, a parent’s compliance with his or her case 

plan does not preclude a finding of neglect. See In re D.W.P., 373 N.C. 327, 339–40, 

838 S.E.2d 396, 406 (2020) (noting the respondent’s progress in satisfying the 

requirements of her case plan while upholding the trial court’s determination that 

there was a likelihood that the neglect would be repeated in the future because the 

respondent had failed “to recognize and break patterns of abuse that put her children 

at risk”). Although respondent-mother had substantially complied with most of the

requirements of her case plan, many of the concerns that resulted in the children’s 

placement in DHHS custody continue to exist.

As we have previously noted, the trial court’s findings establish that

respondent-mother’s housing, while stable, could not safely accommodate the 

children given their special needs and behavioral issues, including Joshua’s 

inappropriate sexual behavior; that respondent-mother had failed to locate 

appropriate housing despite the fact that DHHS had raised concerns about the 
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adequacy of her current residence as early as February 2018; that respondent-mother 

continued to display inappropriate responses in stressful situations despite the fact 

that she had completed anger management classes; that respondent-mother had

missed at least twenty-two scheduled visits with the children; that there were 

legitimate concerns about respondent-mother’s ability to manage the children’s 

complicated schedules and to get the children to their various medical and 

therapeutic appointments; and that respondent-mother did not have an adequate

plan for dealing with her work-related commitments and transportation-related 

difficulties. As a result, after carefully reviewing the record, we have no difficulty in 

concluding that the trial court’s findings provide more than ample support for a 

determination that the children would likely be neglected in the event that they were 

returned to respondent-mother’s care. In fact, the making of a contrary 

determination would require us to conclude that, in spite of the fact that respondentmother has a limited ability to deal with frustrating situations, faces financial and 

housing-related difficulties, has trouble keeping track of her obligations (such as the 

children’s numerous appointments), and has limited access to transportation-related 

resources, respondent-mother will be able to provide minimally acceptable care for 

five children, one of whom has significant emotional problems and all of whom have 

special needs, by providing them with adequate housing; managing their emotional, 

medical, and interpersonal difficulties; and getting them to their appointments 

without a repetition of the neglect which they had previously experienced. All in all, 
IN RE J.J.H., K.L.R., J.J.H., S.S.S., J.M.S.

Opinion of the Court

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we conclude that the combination of respondent-mother’s weaknesses coupled with 

the challenges created by the children’s conditions provides compelling justification 

for a determination that a decision to return the children to respondent-mother’s care 

would almost certainly end in future neglect and that respondent-mother had been 

provided more than sufficient time to overcome the obstacles that she faced in 

attempting to provide adequate care for the children. As a result, we hold that the 

trial court did not err by determining that a repetition of neglect is likely if the 

children are returned to respondent-mother’s care and affirm the trial court’s

determination that respondent-mother’s parental rights in the children were subject 

to termination on the basis of neglect pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1). 

B. Dispositional Determination

In addition, respondent-mother contends that the trial court erred by

determining that it was in the children’s best interests that her parental rights be 

terminated. At the dispositional stage of a termination of parental rights proceeding,

the trial court is required to “determine whether terminating the parent’s rights is in 

the juvenile’s best interests” based upon a consideration of the following factors: 

(1) The age of the juvenile.

(2) The likelihood of adoption of the juvenile.

(3) Whether the termination of parental rights will aid 

in the accomplishment of the permanent plan for the 

juvenile.

(4) The bond between the juvenile and the parent.
IN RE J.J.H., K.L.R., J.J.H., S.S.S., J.M.S.

Opinion of the Court

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(5) The quality of the relationship between the juvenile 

and the proposed adoptive parent, guardian, 

custodian, or other permanent placement.

(6) Any relevant consideration.

N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a). We review the trial court’s determination concerning whether

the termination of a parent’s parental rights in a child would be in that child’s best 

interests for an abuse of discretion. See In re Z.A.M., 374 N.C. 88, 99–100, 839 S.E.2d 

792, 800 (2020). “Under this standard, we defer to the trial court’s decision unless it 

is ‘manifestly unsupported by reason or one so arbitrary that it could not have been 

the result of a reasoned decision.’ ” Id. at 100, 839 S.E.2d at 800 (quoting Briley v. 

Farabow, 348 N.C. 537, 547, 501 S.E.2d 649, 656 (1998)).

In this case, the trial court made the dispositional findings required by 

N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) by addressing the children’s ages, the likelihood that each child 

would be adopted, and the quality of the relationship between the children and the 

proposed adoptive parents, to the extent that any such person or persons had been 

identified. With respect to the children who did not yet have prospective adoptive 

parents, the trial court made findings addressing the relationship between the 

children and their foster parents.6 The trial court found that all of the children were 

bonded with their current placements and that each of them had adapted to their 

current placements well. After finding that each of the children had a bond with 

 

6 James, Kim, and Jake had been placed in pre-adoptive placements while Stacy and 

Joshua had not.
IN RE J.J.H., K.L.R., J.J.H., S.S.S., J.M.S.

Opinion of the Court

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respondent-mother, the trial court further found that Joshua’s relationship with 

respondent-mother was more reserved. Moreover, the trial court found that

termination of parental rights would assist in the effectuation of the children’s 

primary permanent plans of adoption by freeing them for the adoptive process. 

Finally, the trial court found that, while the children were bonded with one another,

the extent to which the children would be able to retain their existing connection in 

the event that they were adopted was outside DHHS’s control.

Although respondent-mother has not challenged the sufficiency of the 

evidentiary support for the trial court’s dispositional findings, she does argue that

“[t]he potential effect of having or not having any one or more of the siblings in the 

household is a relevant consideration and [that] the trial court erred in failing to 

address this.” In essence, respondent-mother asserts that the best interests of each 

child hinges upon the best interests of the other children and contends that the trial 

court should have made findings concerning the manner in which the best interests 

of each child would be affected by a decision to terminate her parental rights in 

certain of the other children, but not all of them. We disagree.

At the dispositional stage of a termination of parental rights proceeding, the 

trial court must determine the best interests of each child based upon his or her 

individual circumstances. N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a); see also In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. 

at 109, 316 S.E.2d at 251 (stating that “the fundamental principle underlying North 

Carolina’s approach to controversies involving child . . . custody [is] that the best 
IN RE J.J.H., K.L.R., J.J.H., S.S.S., J.M.S.

Opinion of the Court

-42-

interest of the child is the polar star”). In view of the fact that the trial court made 

the required dispositional findings with respect to each child and weighed the 

findings applicable to each child in making its dispositional decision, we are unable 

to conclude that the trial court’s findings are insufficient to support its dispositional 

decision.

In addition, respondent-mother argues that the termination of her parental 

rights was not in the best interests of the children given that each of them was bonded 

with her and each of the other children and that not all of the children were living in

pre-adoptive placements. However, the trial court’s findings demonstrate that it 

considered the children’s bonds with each other and with respondent-mother and the 

fact that all of the children did not have pre-adoptive placements. Although each of 

the factors upon which respondent-mother’s argument relies were appropriately 

considered in the trial court’s dispositional analysis, none of them is entitled to 

dispositive effect. See In re A.J.T., 374 N.C. 504, 512, 843 S.E.2d 192, 197 (2020) 

(stating that “[t]he absence of an adoptive placement for a juvenile at the time of the

termination hearing is not a bar to terminating parental rights”) (citing In re A.R.A., 

373 N.C. at 200, 835 S.E.2d at 424); In re Z.A.M., 374 N.C. at 100, 839 S.E.2d at 800 

(weighing the children’s bonds along with the other “best interest” factors). After 

carefully reviewing the record, we are satisfied that the trial court’s findings 

demonstrate that it conducted an appropriate and reasoned “best interests” analysis 

relating to each child. As a result, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its 
IN RE J.J.H., K.L.R., J.J.H., S.S.S., J.M.S.

Opinion of the Court

-43-

discretion by concluding that the termination of respondent-mother’s parental rights

would be in the children’s best interests.

III. Conclusion

Thus, for the reasons set forth above, we hold that the trial court did not err 

by determining that respondent-mother’s parental rights in the children were subject 

to termination on the basis of neglect pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1) and that 

termination of respondent-mother’s parental rights in the children would be in the 

children’s best interests. As a result, the trial court’s termination order is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.
Justice EARLS, dissenting.

The majority affirms the trial court’s order terminating respondent-mother’s 

parental rights in the minor children, agreeing with the trial court that “while 

[respondent-mother] made substantial progress in activities on her case plan, and 

while she dearly loves her children, she lacks substantial capacity to meet the needs 

of the children, had inadequate plans for the future and has not demonstrated an 

ability to plan for obstacles.” While these children have not been in their mother’s 

care for a long time, nevertheless I would hold that the trial court’s findings 

ultimately do not provide clear, cogent, and convincing support for the trial court’s 

conclusion that respondent-mother is unable to meet the needs of the children, has 

inadequate plans for the future, and has not demonstrated the ability to plan for 

obstacles. Further, I am concerned that in minimizing the importance of the 

substantial progress respondent-mother made on her case plan to the analysis of 

whether a ground existed to terminate parental rights, the majority devalues the 

efforts of parents across our State working to improve their parenting capacities and 

regain custody of their children by meeting the requirements imposed by local 

agencies. 

The facts the majority cobbles together to support the trial court’s order 

terminating respondent-mother’s parental rights on the grounds of neglect are not 

overwhelming. Moreover, they illustrate the danger that this parent is losing her 

children primarily because of her poverty, despite the fact she is employed full-time. 
IN RE J.J.H., K.L.R., J.J.H., S.S.S., J.M.S.

Earls, J., dissenting

-2-

It is hard to imagine what she could possibly do differently at this time, before she 

has custody of her children or even a reasonable expectation that they will be 

returned to her custody imminently, to satisfy the requirements of a larger home and 

better transportation. Her ability to plan for obstacles is surely affected by her 

finances. Earning a low income while working in a full-time job is not itself evidence 

that there is a likelihood of future neglect.

Employment/Income

The trial court found that respondent-mother’s budget reflected “a monthly 

surplus of $471.80, an income in excess of her expenses that would potentially be 

applied to additional expenses if the juveniles were to come live with her, and her 

current employment provides an even greater income.” The trial court found the 

budget surplus could be applied to medical expenses and/or potential childcare and 

school costs that she would incur if the children were to live with her, and it further 

found that while “[h]er rent and other expenses have stayed the same[,]” “her current 

employment provides an even greater income.” Based on its evidentiary findings, the 

trial court found “[respondent-mother] has seen a substantial increase in her earning 

capacity[,]” and, “[a]t this time, [she] has sufficient income to provide for herself and 

the juveniles.” 

According to the majority, the fact that respondent-mother obtained steady 

employment that allowed her to earn sufficient financial resources to provide for her 

children is not enough to address the concerns regarding this aspect of her case plan 
IN RE J.J.H., K.L.R., J.J.H., S.S.S., J.M.S.

Earls, J., dissenting

-3-

because “the trial court found that respondent-mother’s budgeting skills contained 

certain deficiencies.” In the majority’s view, respondent-mother’s failure to account 

for her children’s expenses in a budget that appears to have accurately accounted for 

her expenses at the time it was created in December 2017—more than a year after 

the children were taken out of her custody by DHHS—is sufficient evidence to support 

the conclusion that respondent-mother “ha[d] not proven the ability to care for herself 

and the children financially despite her employment.” But in concluding that the trial 

court’s findings “reflect, without directly stating, a nuanced determination that, while 

respondent-mother’s financial situation had improved in light of her ability to obtain 

higher-paying employment and even though she appeared to have sufficient financial 

resources in light of current conditions, the trial court continued to harbor 

reservations about respondent-mother’s ability to satisfy her own financial needs and 

those of all five children,” the majority reads into the trial court order a factual finding 

that simply is not there. And by identifying the respondent-mother’s “deficient” 

budgeting skills as evidence which supports the trial court’s supposed factual finding, 

the majority places inordinate weight on an incident of unclear significance which 

bears extremely limited probative value. In contrast to the majority, I would 

disregard the challenged portion of finding of fact twenty-nine concerning 

respondent-mother’s inability to provide for herself and the children financially. See

In re J.M., 373 N.C. 352, 358, 838 S.E.2d 173, 177 (2020).
IN RE J.J.H., K.L.R., J.J.H., S.S.S., J.M.S.

Earls, J., dissenting

-4-

Housing

The trial court found in finding of fact eighteen that respondent-mother “went 

to substantial effort to obtain independent housing” and “obtained her own housing 

in Thomasville, North Carolina.” She notified DHHS when she obtained housing, 

provided DHHS a copy of her lease dated 12 September 2017, and DHHS had 

completed home visits. Her home was a two-bedroom house and was fully furnished. 

Respondent-mother initially planned for the children to sleep in one bedroom with

two sets of twin bunk beds and single twin beds and a partition to separate the boys 

and girls. However, she revised her plan to allow Joshua to have his own bedroom 

after DHHS informed her in February 2018 that the initial arrangement was 

inappropriate due to Joshua’s sexualized behaviors. Nevertheless, the trial court 

found that “even a revised living plan within the current residence will not provide 

for sufficient space and opportunities for the juveniles” given “the variety of 

challenges that the various juveniles face,” including attention deficit/hyperactivity 

disorder, oppositional defiant disorder, behavioral problems, and academic struggles. 

The trial court additionally found that respondent-mother was taking steps to find 

more appropriate housing but had yet to find suitable housing within her budget, 

noting that “subsidized housing programs would not approve her for a residence that 

would be scaled based on all the juveniles, unless or until they had a date as to when 

the juveniles will be living with her.” Lastly, the trial court found that respondentmother “has three large dogs at the home”; “911 logs contained several calls to the 
IN RE J.J.H., K.L.R., J.J.H., S.S.S., J.M.S.

Earls, J., dissenting

-5-

home in reference to the dogs”; and a social worker was unable to approach the porch 

during an unannounced home visit in June 2019 because “there was a very large dog

barking viciously.”

It is clear from testimony at the termination hearing that there were no 

concerns regarding the cleanliness or maintenance of respondent’s home, and no 

concerns are reflected in the trial court’s findings or in the record. The testimony was 

that DHHS’s concerns related solely to the size of the home given the number of 

children, their challenges and needs, and the presence of the dogs. As the majority 

acknowledges, “respondent-mother faces a dilemma arising from the fact that she 

cannot obtain additional housing assistance until a date upon which the children will 

begin living with her has been established and that she cannot obtain adequate 

housing in the absence of this increased amount of public housing assistance.” I 

disagree with the majority’s conclusion that this “dilemma” is irrelevant in assessing 

the evidentiary record because respondent-mother “has apparently not been able to 

even locate a residence that she could obtain in the event that additional housing 

assistance became available to her.” It appears that the sole barrier to obtaining 

suitable housing is respondent-mother’s inability to access an expanded housing 

subsidy. Her maintenance and upkeep of her current apartment indicates that there 

is no cause to doubt that she will be able to provide a safe and appropriate home for 

the children if she obtained custody. There is no independent evidence in the record 

supporting the inference the majority draws that even if she obtained an expanded 
IN RE J.J.H., K.L.R., J.J.H., S.S.S., J.M.S.

Earls, J., dissenting

-6-

housing subsidy, she would be unable to obtain suitable housing. Thus, I would 

conclude that respondent-mother is correct that the evidence in the record does not 

support the trial court’s conclusion that her housing situation at the time of the 

termination hearing demonstrated a likelihood of repetition of neglect.1

Respondent-mother also challenges the findings related to the dogs. She 

contends the evidence does not support the findings that she owned “three large dogs”

or that there were “several” 911 calls regarding the dogs. I agree there was not clear, 

cogent, and convincing evidence to support the challenged findings. While prior 

records in the case indicated respondent-mother owned three large dogs, a social 

worker testified at the termination hearing that she only saw two dogs during her 

unannounced home visit, and respondent-mother testified that she owned two dogs, 

a “little Jack Russell” and an “American Bully.” Additionally, the evidence concerning 

911 calls related to the dogs did not indicate the number of calls or the reasons for 

the calls; the testimony was simply that there were 911 calls regarding the dogs. 

 

1 The majority argues that In re A.G.M. is inapposite because in the present case, 

there was evidence that respondent-mother “intended to bring the children to live with her 

in her existing residence.” However, In re A.G.M. stands for the proposition that a parent’s 

current lack of appropriate housing is not evidence of future neglect if the respondent-parent 

is willing and able to cure any deficiencies prior to having “any legitimate expectation that 

she would obtain . . . custody of the children.” In re A.G.M., 241 N.C. App. at 442, 773 S.E.2d 

at 134. In the present case, the mere fact that respondent-mother at one point contemplated 

that the children might live in her home does not negate the fact that if she were to gain 

custody of her children, she would be able to use her additional housing assistance to obtain 

more suitable housing.
IN RE J.J.H., K.L.R., J.J.H., S.S.S., J.M.S.

Earls, J., dissenting

-7-

Accordingly, I would disregard the challenged portions of the findings related to the 

dogs. 

Substance Abuse

The majority concluded that “the trial court’s evidentiary findings do not 

support a determination that she refused to participate in the drug screening process

for a ‘long period of time’ or show that her temporary refusal to participate in the 

drug screening process had ‘impeded the monitoring of compliance.’ ” Although I 

agree with the majority that “the fact that respondent-mother subsequently complied 

with requests that she submit to drug screening does not negate the fact that she 

expressed frustrations about the drug screening process in June, July, and August 

2017,” I would also recognize that the respondent-mother’s eventual acknowledgment 

of the importance of the drug screening requirement and her subsequent compliance 

is the kind of “considerable change in conditions [that] had occurred by the time of 

the termination proceeding” which must be examined in reaching an ultimate 

conclusion as to whether a ground exists for terminating her parental rights. In re 

Young, 346 N.C. 244, 250, 485 S.E.2d 612, 616 (1997). After accounting for these 

changes, I do not see how her brief period of missed drug screenings in 2017 supports 

terminating respondent’s parental rights today.

Mental Health

Respondent-mother correctly contends that although there was evidence 

indicating she was resistant to therapy at times, there was also evidence that she 
IN RE J.J.H., K.L.R., J.J.H., S.S.S., J.M.S.

Earls, J., dissenting

-8-

sought additional services on her own when DHHS expressed concern that she was 

no longer engaging in therapy. A social worker testified that respondent-mother 

sought therapy in Davidson County, but that there was a waitlist for services. Despite 

some evidence of resistance, the trial court failed to issue any evidentiary findings to 

support its determination that ongoing neglect was evidenced by respondent-mother’s 

resistance to psychological services. The evidentiary findings made by the trial court 

show respondent-mother engaged in recommended mental health services, as well as 

recommended substance abuse, parenting, domestic violence, and anger management 

courses. In contrast to the majority, I would disregard the portion of finding of fact 

twenty-nine regarding resistance to utilizing psychological services. 

Visitation/Child Support/Other

The majority’s analysis with regard to these aspects of respondent-mother’s 

case plan fails to address the trial court’s finding that respondent-mother “redirects 

[the children] as needed” during visits and does not adequately credit the clear 

finding that she “has learned additional tools for discipline, in that if the juveniles 

were to return home, she would tailor appropriate discipline to the specific needs of 

each juvenile.” Given this finding, the trial court’s other findings relating to 

respondent-mother’s previous statements evincing a belief in inappropriate forms of 

discipline should be treated as past conditions that are no longer present and thus 

not relevant to the determination of whether she is likely to neglect the children in 

the future by inappropriately disciplining them. I agree with the majority that the 
IN RE J.J.H., K.L.R., J.J.H., S.S.S., J.M.S.

Earls, J., dissenting

-9-

lack of detail at this stage concerning how respondent-mother’s work and family 

obligations could be met is an obstacle to reunification, but that obstacle, by itself, is 

too slim a reed upon which to base an ultimate finding of a likelihood of future neglect.

Conclusion

Respondent-mother argues the trial court erred by concluding there was a 

likelihood of repetition of neglect because she had made substantial progress on her 

case plan and the changed conditions existing at the time of the termination hearing 

do not support the conclusion that there was a likelihood of repetition of neglect. She 

summarizes her case plan progress, including her gainful employment; stable 

housing; completion of programs to address substance abuse, parenting skills, 

domestic violence, and anger management and to understand Joshua’s behavior 

issues; and general betterment of herself as compared to when the children were 

placed in DHHS custody. 

It is true that case-plan compliance does not preclude a conclusion that a 

repetition of neglect is likely. See In re D.W.P., 373 N.C. 327, 339–40, 838 S.E.2d 396, 

406 (2020). It is also true that although respondent-mother substantially complied 

with the requirements of her case plan, some issues and concerns that brought the 

children into DHHS custody remained. However, the fact that there is evidence 

suggesting that there may be ongoing concerns regarding respondent-mother’s 

circumstances is not equivalent to evidence that she is likely to neglect her children 

in the future, which must be judged against the enumerated standards for neglect 
IN RE J.J.H., K.L.R., J.J.H., S.S.S., J.M.S.

Earls, J., dissenting

-10-

defined by our Juvenile Code. N.C.G.S. § 7B-101(15). Further, while respondentmother’s substantial progress on her case plan does not preclude the court from 

finding that there is a likelihood of future neglect, evidence that she has made 

“progress on her case plan [ ] to become a better parent” does signify that she has 

taken steps “to reduce or remove the likelihood of future neglect.” In re C.N., 266 N.C. 

App. 463, 469, 831 S.E.2d 878, 883 (2019). As this Court has previously held, a trial 

court “may appropriately conclude that [a] child is neglected” only when “a parent 

has failed or is unable to adequately provide for his [or her] child's physical and 

economic needs, . . . and it appears that the parent will not or is not able to correct 

those inadequate conditions within a reasonable time.” In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. 

at 109, 316 S.E.2d at 252. In the present case, while there is evidence to support a 

conclusion that there are conditions in respondent-mother’s life that might make it 

difficult for her to attend to her children’s needs, there is not clear, cogent, and 

convincing evidence that these conditions make it likely that she will provide 

inadequate care. 

With regards to at least some of the relevant conditions, such as her present 

lack of suitable housing or her ability to provide financially for her children, the 

evidence indicates that she will be able to correct those inadequate conditions within 

a reasonable time. Although there may be a possibility that respondent-mother will 

face difficulties in adequately caring for her children, a mere possibility of future 

neglect is an insufficient basis upon which to permanently sever the parent-child 
IN RE J.J.H., K.L.R., J.J.H., S.S.S., J.M.S.

Earls, J., dissenting

-11-

bond. Cf. In re J.A.M., 372 N.C. 1, 9, 822 S.E.2d 693, 698 (2019) (when making 

“predictive” judgments about the future, “the trial court must assess whether there 

is a substantial risk of future . . . neglect of a child”) (emphasis added); In re F.S., 268 

N.C. App. 34, 43, 835 S.E.2d 465, 471 (2019) (“[T]he trial court must assess and find 

the probability that there is substantial risk of future neglect.”). In the present case, 

the evidence simply does not support the conclusion that respondent-mother is likely

to neglect her children in the future, nor does it support the conclusion the dissent 

reaches that “a decision to return the children to her care would almost certainly be 

doomed to failure.” Accordingly, I dissent from the majority’s decision to affirm trial 

court’s adjudication of neglect pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1) as grounds to 

terminate respondent-mother’s parental rights, and I would not reach the question of 

whether termination was in the best interests of the children.