2015 UT App 185

_________________________________________________________

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.

EVAN D. BOYLES,

Defendant and Appellant.

Opinion

No. 20130578-CA

Filed July 30, 2015

Second District Court, Ogden Department

The Honorable W. Brent West

No. 111901766

Evan D. Boyles, Appellant Pro Se

Dee W. Smith, Branden B. Miles, and Brody E. 

Flint, Attorneys for Appellee

JUDGE JOHN A. PEARCE authored this Opinion, in which JUDGES

STEPHEN L. ROTH and MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN concurred.

PEARCE, Judge:

¶1 This case considers whether police officers executing a 

search warrant for a single-level, three-bedroom house needed to 

obtain a new warrant after they encountered a locked interior 

door sporting a no-trespassing sign. We conclude that the trial 

court did not err by determining that the locked door and sign 

were insufficient to provide a reasonable officer notice that the 
State v. Boyles

20130578-CA 2 2015 UT App 185

bedroom behind the door was a separate residence.

1 We

therefore affirm the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion 

to suppress the evidence found in that bedroom.

BACKGROUND

¶2 A confidential informant told the police that he had 

purchased methamphetamine from James Fitts on multiple 

occasions. According to the informant, he had purchased the 

drugs at Fitts’s residence and Fitts stored his merchandise in his 

bedroom.

¶3 Under police direction, the informant then made two 

controlled purchases of drugs from Fitts. The informant first 

went to the house and bought methamphetamine from Fitts 

using marked money. After this purchase, the informant 

reported that three people lived in the house: James Fitts, Evan 

D. Boyles, and K.Z. The second controlled purchase also took 

place at the house. The informant noted that Boyles had been 

‚present at the location‛ during the second transaction.

¶4 The police sought a search warrant. The affidavit

supporting the warrant request recounted the facts the 

informant provided. The affidavit also detailed Fitts’s and 

Boyles’s criminal histories. The affidavit noted that Boyles 

resided at the house, that he had ‚an extensive history of 

Possession of Illegal Narcotics,‛ and that four of Boyles’s nine 

prior convictions had involved drugs.

2 The police requested a 

 

1. For the purposes of this opinion, we assume, without 

deciding, that the bedroom was a separate residence.

2. According to the affidavit, Boyles had been convicted of 

possessing methamphetamine twice and had pled guilty to 

possessing methamphetamine with intent to distribute on a third 

occasion.
State v. Boyles

20130578-CA 3 2015 UT App 185

search warrant to seize methamphetamine and drug 

paraphernalia from James Fitts, the house, and the house’s

curtilage. Specifically, the affidavit described the property to be 

searched as including ‚all outbuildings, garages, sheds, vehicles, 

trailers, boats, locked containers, and other property contained 

within the property lines (curtilage).‛ Citing officer safety and 

the possibility of evidence being destroyed, the affidavit asked 

‚that the police officers executing the search warrant not be 

required to give notice of authority (no-knock) and be able to 

execute the search warrant day or night.‛ A district court judge 

reviewed the affidavit and issued a warrant to search Fitts and 

the house.

¶5 Police officers executed the warrant on July 12, 2011. 

When the officers arrived, Boyles and his girlfriend were in the 

backyard. Boyles and Fitts were detained while the officers

searched the house. While the officers did not know the ‚entire 

layout of the home‛ when they entered, one officer later testified 

that he ‚had an idea‛ which room was Fitts’s.

¶6 While searching the house, the officers encountered a 

locked door with a no-trespassing sign hanging on it. Officers 

broke down the door and discovered a bedroom containing drug

paraphernalia. When asked, Boyles admitted that the locked 

bedroom was his. The officers also found heroin in another 

room, later identified as Fitts’s bedroom.3

¶7 The State charged Boyles with possession of drug 

paraphernalia. Boyles elected to represent himself at the pretrial 

proceedings and at trial. Boyles filed a motion to suppress the 

evidence discovered in his bedroom. After a hearing on the 

 

3. The record does not reveal the order in which the officers 

searched the two rooms nor does it reveal the point at which the 

officers confirmed that the bedroom containing heroin was 

Fitts’s.
State v. Boyles

20130578-CA 4 2015 UT App 185

motion, the trial court found that the officers had acted in good 

faith in obtaining the warrant and that the warrant allowed the 

officers to search the entire property. The trial court further 

found (1) that Boyles ‚maintain*ed+ a separate, locked bedroom 

within the home‛; (2) that although ‚the officers had reason to 

believe there were multiple people living in the home, there is no 

evidence that the police officers knew that [Boyles] maintained 

exclusive control over a particular bedroom‛; and (3) that there 

‚was no indication that the bedroom was intended to be a 

separately occupied portion of the home like an apartment.‛ The 

court concluded that the ‚scope of the search warrant reasonably 

included *Boyles’s+ room‛ and therefore denied the motion to 

suppress. A jury convicted Boyles of possession of drug 

paraphernalia, a class A misdemeanor. Boyles appeals.

4

ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶8 Boyles contends that the trial court erred by denying his 

motion to suppress. He argues that the officers lacked probable 

cause to search his bedroom and that the warrant failed to 

properly describe the place to be searched. In an appeal from the 

denial of a motion to suppress evidence, we review the trial 

 

4. Boyles was represented by appointed counsel throughout the 

appellate process. Counsel filed briefs and participated in oral 

argument. After the oral argument in this matter, counsel sought 

to withdraw because Boyles expressed dissatisfaction with his 

representation and threatened to file legal action against him. 

Counsel requested that Boyles be appointed a new attorney or be 

allowed to proceed pro se. We granted the motion to withdraw 

and remanded to the district court. At a subsequent hearing, the 

district court noted that this matter had been fully briefed and 

argued and that ‚*a+ll parties agreed that the case can be 

submitted to the Appellate Court for decision.‛ The district court 

also permitted Boyles to proceed pro se.
State v. Boyles

20130578-CA 5 2015 UT App 185

court’s factual findings for clear error and its conclusions of law 

for correctness. State v. Rogers, 2014 UT App 89, ¶ 4, 325 P.3d 884.

ANALYSIS

¶9 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 

protects the ‚right of the people to be secure in their persons, 

houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 

seizures.‛ ‚*T]he touchstone of [Fourth] Amendment analysis 

has been the question whether a person has a constitutionally 

protected reasonable expectation of privacy.‛ Oliver v. United 

States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984) (citation and internal quotation 

marks omitted). We assume, without deciding, that Boyles had a 

reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to his bedroom

independent of that which he enjoyed as to the house as a whole.

¶10 Police officers generally need a warrant to search a place

in which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy. See

Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 164 (1978) (‚The bulwark of 

Fourth Amendment protection, of course, is the Warrant Clause, 

requiring that, absent certain exceptions, police obtain a warrant 

from a neutral and disinterested magistrate before embarking 

upon a search.‛). Before issuing a search warrant, a magistrate 

must determine that probable cause exists to conduct the search, 

id.; often, this determination is based upon an affidavit filed by 

the investigating officer. ‚[A] warrant affidavit must set forth 

particular facts and circumstances underlying the existence of 

probable cause, so as to allow the magistrate to make an 

independent evaluation of the matter.‛ Id. at 165.

I. Validity of the Search Warrant

¶11 Boyles contends that the affidavit in his case 

‚misrepresented the true nature of the living arrangement‛ and 

was therefore invalid. He argues that ‚*t+his deprived the 
State v. Boyles

20130578-CA 6 2015 UT App 185

magistrate of the ability to accurately assess probable cause for 

the entire structure, since he did not know that Mr. Boyles had a 

separately accessed and rented space.‛5 He asserts that, ‚*h+ad 

the court known that fact, it would have granted the search 

warrant, but excepted Mr. Boyles’ room from the search.‛

¶12 ‚When the Fourth Amendment demands a factual 

showing sufficient to comprise ‘probable cause,’ the obvious 

assumption is that there will be a truthful showing.‛ Franks, 438 

U.S. at 164–65 (emphasis omitted) (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted). ‚This does not mean ‘truthful’ in the 

sense that every fact recited in the warrant affidavit is 

necessarily correct, for probable cause may be founded upon 

hearsay and upon information received from informants, as well 

as upon information within the affiant’s own knowledge that 

sometimes must be garnered hastily.‛ Id. at 165. Rather, a 

warrant affidavit ‚is to be ‘truthful’ in the sense that the 

information put forth is believed or appropriately accepted by 

the affiant as true.‛ Id.

¶13 A warrant is not necessarily invalidated by the later 

discovery that some of the information supporting the warrant is 

inaccurate. Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 85–86 (1987). In 

Garrison, police officers possessed a valid warrant to search ‚the 

person of Lawrence McWebb and ‘the premises known as 2036 

Park Avenue third floor apartment’‛ for drugs. Id. at 80. When 

the police applied for the warrant and when they began their 

search, they reasonably believed there was only one apartment 

on the third floor. Id. While executing the warrant, the officers 

entered a vestibule on the third floor and encountered two open 

doors. Id. at 81. They began searching and discovered 

 

5. Boyles’s basis for claiming that his room was ‚separately 

accessed‛ is unclear. Every indication in the record before us 

suggests that Boyles and the officers accessed the room using an 

interior door in the house.
State v. Boyles

20130578-CA 7 2015 UT App 185

incriminating evidence including heroin. Id. However, they then 

realized that the third floor was in fact divided into two 

apartments—one occupied by McWebb and the other by 

Garrison. Id. The officers stopped searching Garrison’s 

apartment once the separate nature of the apartments became 

apparent. Id. Garrison was charged with and convicted of drug 

possession on the basis of the heroin found in his apartment. Id.

at 80.

¶14 The United States Supreme Court framed the question 

before it as, ‚*W+hether that factual mistake invalidated a 

warrant that undoubtedly would have been valid if it had 

reflected a completely accurate understanding of the building’s 

floor plan.‛ Id. at 85. The Court noted that the warrant’s 

‚description of *the place to be searched+ was broader than 

appropriate because it was based on the mistaken belief that 

there was only one apartment on the third floor of the building 

at 2036 Park Avenue.‛ Id. But ‚the discovery of facts 

demonstrating that a valid warrant was unnecessarily broad 

does not retroactively invalidate the warrant.‛ Id. Because the 

officers could not have reasonably known of their factual 

mistake at the time they applied for the warrant, the Court 

concluded that the warrant was validly issued. Id. at 85–86.

¶15 Boyles contends that the warrant in this matter was 

invalid because the investigating police officer should have 

alerted the magistrate that the area to be searched included an 

enclave over which Boyles exercised exclusive control and thus 

entertained a reasonable expectation of privacy. See United States 

v. Acosta, 965 F.2d 1248, 1252 (3d Cir. 1992) (‚*O+nly when the 

defendant has the right to keep a place private and subject to his 

exclusive control would reasonable expectations of privacy 

attach.‛); cf. State v. Loya, 2001 UT App 3, ¶ 24, 18 P.3d 1116 

(noting that a defendant may lose whatever reasonable 

expectation of privacy he or she has regarding a hotel room

when he or she no longer exercises exclusive control of the 

room). Boyles’s contention presupposes that the investigating 

officer knew or believed that each of the three residents of the 
State v. Boyles

20130578-CA 8 2015 UT App 185

house rented separate rooms from the owner and maintained 

exclusive control over their respective rooms, yet omitted that

information from the affidavit. But the record gives us no reason 

to believe that the officer knew Boyles maintained exclusive 

control over a particular bedroom or any bedroom at all. Nor 

does Boyles point to any record evidence suggesting that the 

officer had such knowledge when he swore the affidavit.

¶16 Instead, Boyles relies on the officer’s response to the 

question, asked at trial, ‚*Did+ you know which bedroom was 

*Fitts’s+ before you executed the warrant?‛ The officer answered 

that he ‚had an idea of which one was [Fitts’s.+‛ Boyles assumes

from this that if the officer knew which bedroom belonged to 

Fitts, the officer must also have known which bedroom belonged 

to Boyles. Boyles’s reliance on this colloquy depends on the 

uncertain assumptions that (1) if Fitts had a bedroom, Boyles 

must have had one as well and (2) all the residents of the house 

treated their respective rooms as areas over which they exercised 

exclusive control. The officer’s trial testimony falls short of 

supporting an inference that the officer knew, at least at the time 

he sought the warrant, that Boyles maintained his bedroom as a 

separate residence inside the house.

¶17 Boyles does not identify any other relevant information 

known to the officer but omitted from the affidavit. As a result, 

Boyles has not carried his burden of showing that the officer 

knowingly misrepresented information in the affidavit so as to 

render the resulting warrant invalid.

6

 

6. Boyles may be arguing that the investigating officer should 

have inferred that the three residents of the house each

maintained bedrooms as separate residences within it and that 

the officer should therefore have included such an inference in 

the affidavit. But all of the information from which that inference 

could possibly be drawn was presented to the magistrate, and 

(continued...)
State v. Boyles

20130578-CA 9 2015 UT App 185

II. Officers’ Good Faith in Executing the Warrant

¶18 Boyles contends that the officers executing the search 

warrant did not act in good faith.

7 Specifically, he asserts that the 

 

(<continued)

the magistrate was therefore in an equal position to assess that 

possibility. The affidavit presented to the magistrate noted that 

three people resided at the house, that two of those people (Fitts 

and Boyles) had criminal histories involving drugs, that Fitts had 

sold drugs to the informant, that Boyles was ‚present at the 

location‛ during one of the controlled purchases, and that the 

informant believed Fitts kept the drugs in his bedroom. We 

therefore cannot conclude that the officer acted improperly by 

refraining from drawing the inference in his affidavit that Boyles 

possessed a bedroom in which he had a separate reasonable 

expectation of privacy.

7. The issue of whether the officers executed the warrant in good 

faith does not appear to have been raised in Boyles’s pro se 

motion to suppress or in his arguments at the suppression 

hearing. As a result, the trial court’s findings concerned the 

scope of the search warrant and did not specifically address the 

officers’ good faith in conducting the search. Issues that are not 

preserved are generally considered to have been waived. 

Wohnoutka v. Kelley, 2014 UT App 154, ¶ 3, 330 P.3d 762. 

However, ‚*o+ur preservation requirement is self-imposed and is 

therefore one of prudence rather than jurisdiction.‛ Patterson v. 

Patterson, 2011 UT 68, ¶ 13, 266 P.3d 828. ‚Consequently, we 

exercise wide discretion when deciding whether to entertain or 

reject matters that are first raised on appeal.‛ Id. Here, Boyles 

represented himself at the time of the motion and hearing. 

Although a pro se defendant is required to adhere to procedural 

rules and the law, his or her lack of technical knowledge of law 

and procedure should be accorded every consideration that may 

reasonably be indulged. Orem City v. Bovo, 2003 UT App 286, 

(continued...)
State v. Boyles

20130578-CA 10 2015 UT App 185

officers’ ‚prior knowledge, coupled with their discoveries on the 

scene through questioning and the discovery of a locked door 

with a no trespassing sign,‛ should have led them to the 

conclusion that the bedroom behind the door was a ‚private 

space in which Mr. Boyles had manifested an objectively 

reasonable expectation of privacy.‛ He urges that the officers 

‚should have limited their investigation to the areas over which 

Mr. Fitts—the only person against whom they had probable 

cause—had the ability to control, such as his bedroom, the 

kitchen or other common areas over which he had access.‛8

¶19 The United States Supreme Court has instructed that in 

the course of executing a warrant, police officers may encounter 

 

(<continued)

¶ 12, 76 P.3d 1170. Because Boyles was self-represented at the 

time of the motion and hearing, and because the State did not 

raise a preservation challenge to Boyles’s appeal, we exercise our 

discretion to address the merits of the good-faith-search issue.

8. Several of Boyles’s arguments assert that the officer admitted 

that he lacked probable cause to search Boyles’s bedroom. Boyles

relies on the officer’s testimony, ‚I did not have probable cause 

that [Boyles was] per se the one distributing the 

methamphetamine. I was given information that [he lived] there 

and that [he was] a user, but I did not have probable cause.‛

However, Boyles takes this testimony out of context. The officer 

was responding to the question Boyles posed: ‚Why didn’t *the+ 

affidavit list [Boyles] as a person to be taken into custody if you 

knew [he] was a resident there and there was drugs [sic] being 

done there at the location?‛ Read in context, the officer was 

admitting that he lacked probable cause to arrest Boyles, not that 

he lacked probable cause to search Boyles’s bedroom. Boyles 

does not explain why the absence of probable cause for the arrest 

of a person necessarily translates into a lack of probable cause to 

search a bedroom.
State v. Boyles

20130578-CA 11 2015 UT App 185

new information that would put a reasonable officer on notice 

that the existing warrant is overly broad. When that occurs, the 

officer should seek a new warrant. In Maryland v. Garrison, after 

holding that later discoveries did not alone render the 

previously issued warrant invalid, the Supreme Court turned to 

the question of ‚whether the execution of the warrant violated 

*Garrison’s+ constitutional right to be secure in his home.‛ 480 

U.S. 79, 86 (1987). ‚*T+he validity of the search of *Garrison’s+

apartment pursuant to a warrant authorizing the search of the 

entire third floor depends on whether the officers’ failure to 

realize the overbreadth of the warrant was objectively 

understandable and reasonable.‛ Id. at 88.

¶20 The Supreme Court concluded that, ‚*p+rior to the 

officers’ discovery of the factual mistake, they perceived 

McWebb’s apartment and the third-floor premises as one and 

the same; therefore, their execution of the warrant reasonably 

included the entire third floor.‛ Id. Accordingly, ‚the officers’ 

conduct was consistent with a reasonable effort to ascertain and 

identify the place intended to be searched within the meaning of 

the Fourth Amendment.‛ Id. Because the incriminating evidence 

was discovered before the point at which the warrant no longer 

supported the search, i.e., when the officers realized (or 

reasonably should have realized) that the third floor comprised 

two separate residences, suppression of that evidence was 

improper. Id. at 88–89; see also United States v. Kyles, 40 F.3d 519, 

524 (2d Cir. 1994) (‚If, during the search, the officers become 

aware that the warrant describes multiple residences, the officers 

must confine their search to the residence of the suspect.‛).

¶21 Here, the question before us focuses on whether the 

officers realized or should have realized that Boyles’s bedroom 

was a separate residence. The trial court concluded that the 

searching officers had no indication that Boyles’s bedroom was 

an enclave within and separate from the rest of the house. On 

appeal, Boyles challenges the trial court’s conclusions that, 

although ‚the officers had reason to believe there were multiple 

people living in the home, there is no evidence that the police 
State v. Boyles

20130578-CA 12 2015 UT App 185

officers knew that [Boyles] maintained exclusive control over a 

particular bedroom‛ and that there ‚was no indication that the 

bedroom was intended to be a separately occupied portion of the 

home like an apartment.‛9

¶22 Boyles identifies four categories of evidence that he 

argues should have tipped the officers off to the existence of his 

private enclave within the house: (1) ‚their prior knowledge,‛ (2) 

‚their discoveries on the scene through questioning,‛ (3) the 

locked door, and (4) the no-trespassing sign on that door.

¶23 Boyles does not specify what evidence comprises the first 

two categories. We assume that by ‚prior knowledge,‛ Boyles 

refers to the fact that the investigating officer knew that three 

people resided at the house. But three people—even people 

possessing different last names—may well reside in a house 

together without dividing the house into separate residences. Cf.

Commonwealth v. Smith, 898 S.W.2d 496, 501 (Ky. Ct. App. 1995) 

(‚The multiple-occupancy rule [for analyzing whether a 

reasonable expectation of privacy exists] is predicated upon the 

thesis that occupants of a single living unit, whether related or 

not, generally have at least some access to each other’s 

bedrooms.‛ (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); 

State v. Sheehan, 524 A.2d 1265, 1270 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 

1987) (same). The existence of multiple unrelated people who 

reside in the house does not lead inexorably to the conclusion 

 

9. The trial court’s written ruling included these sentences as 

part of its findings of fact. However, at least as applied to 

Boyles’s unpreserved good-faith-search contention, see supra ¶ 18 

n.7, they appear to be conclusions of law. Because the trial 

court’s findings withstand the scrutiny of our non-deferential 

correctness review—the most favorable standard to Boyles—we 

apply that standard because application of a more deferential 

standard would not change the outcome in this case. See State v. 

Rogers, 2014 UT App 89, ¶ 4, 325 P.3d 884.
State v. Boyles

20130578-CA 13 2015 UT App 185

that those unrelated persons live in separate residences under 

the same roof. See United States v. Hinds, 856 F.2d 438, 441 (1st 

Cir. 1988) (explaining that ‚the mere presence of more than one 

family in a building [does not] automatically change[] its 

character from single family to multifamily‛). Indeed, courts 

have treated a variety of factors as relevant to the separateresidence inquiry. See, e.g., id. at 441–42 (‚There were no 

indications, such as separate doorbells or mailboxes, that more 

than one family‛ resided at the building to be searched); Kyles, 

40 F.3d at 524 (‚Factors that indicate a separate residence include

separate access from the outside, separate doorbells, and 

separate mailboxes.‛); United States v. Cannon, 264 F.3d 875, 879 

(9th Cir. 2001) (considering an officer’s discovery of a separate 

bathroom and ‚a wood burning stove, cooking stove, 

refrigerator, and sink‛ within what originally appeared to be a 

garage and concluding that the building was ‚a separate 

dwelling for which a separate warrant was required‛); United 

States v. Fennell, 496 F. Supp. 2d 279, 281 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (‚Indicia 

of a separate residence include separate entrances, separate 

doorbells, separate house numbers, name plates, and 

mailboxes.‛); United States v. Maneti, 781 F. Supp. 169, 175 

(W.D.N.Y. 1991) (‚The dwelling does not have separate visible 

doorbells, mailboxes, speaking tubes, name plates, or apartment 

numbers to indicate multiple residency.‛); State v. Ramirez, 195 

P.3d 460, 463 (Or. Ct. App. 2008) (‚*P+ertinent considerations‛ as 

to whether a separate unit exists include ‚the actual physical

structure of the residence,‛ ‚whether there are separate 

entrances or separate numbers on doors in the residence,‛ the 

presence of locks, and whether other occupants have access).

¶24 We also assume that ‚*the officers’+ discoveries on the 

scene through questioning‛ refers to Boyles’s claim that, during 

the search, he informed one of the officers that he had a separate 

room. As noted above, the record does not indicate at what point 

during the search Boyles gave this information to the officer 

questioning him. Boyles was outside when the search began and 

remained in the backyard during his questioning. As a result, the 

record does not support an inference that Boyles gave this 
State v. Boyles

20130578-CA 14 2015 UT App 185

information to the questioning officer before the searching 

officers discovered the drug paraphernalia in Boyles’s 

bedroom.10

¶25 Even if Boyles had claimed to the searching officers that 

his room was a separate residence, it is not clear that those 

officers were required to accept his claim at face value. See

United States v. Esterline, 287 F. App’x 693, 699 (10th Cir. 2008). In 

Esterline, police officers arrested Virgil Counts after discovering 

drugs and a pair of drug-dusted digital scales in his car. Id. at 

695. The officers obtained a search warrant for Counts’s 

residence. Id. ‚Upon arrival, the officers encountered *Counts’s+ 

architecturally unique residence. It consisted of a fusion of 

several rectangular shaped trailer houses physically attached to 

one another to form a single unit.‛ Id. ‚The doors between each 

structure were combined in such a manner [as] to permit 

passage from one trailer to another without going outside.‛ Id.

The building was identified by a single address. Id. A search of 

this sejungible structure revealed the defendant Douglas

Esterline, his drug stash, and his illegal firearm. Id. Esterline 

informed the officers that he had rented the front part of one of 

the trailers—consisting of a living room, a kitchen, and a 

bedroom—as a separate residence. Id. at 696. Esterline’s portion 

of the trailer had a separate lock. Id.

¶26 Esterline was charged with various crimes and 

unsuccessfully sought to suppress the evidence discovered in his 

portion of the trailer. On appeal, Esterline asserted that, ‚when 

the police discovered he had a separate bedroom during the 

search*,+ they were required to limit their search to *Counts’s+ 

portion of the trailer.‛ Id. at 698. However, despite Esterline’s 

protestations that he rented part of the structure as a separate 

residence, the searching officers ‚were not required to simply 

 

10. The trial court did not include a finding about this issue in its 

denial of the suppression motion.
State v. Boyles

20130578-CA 15 2015 UT App 185

take Esterline’s word at face value.‛ Id. at 699; see also United 

States v. Canestri, 518 F.2d 269, 273 (2d Cir. 1975) (explaining that 

police executing a search warrant were not required to accept as 

true the declaration of the owner of a single-family house to the 

effect that one of the rooms belonged to a party omitted from the 

warrant, because limiting the search’s scope upon such 

declarations would frustrate the purpose of the search warrant).

¶27 In light of this persuasive case law, even if Boyles had 

informed the searching officers that he maintained his bedroom 

as a separate residence before they entered it, that information

alone would not automatically translate into a finding that the 

officers were on notice that the bedroom was actually a separate 

residence. Even if the claim had been made to the searching 

officers, it would be a fact, among others, for the court to weigh 

in deciding whether ‚the officers’ failure to realize the 

overbreadth of the warrant was objectively reasonable and 

understandable.‛ Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 88 (1987).

¶28 With respect to the import of the locked interior door 

displaying a no-trespassing sign, neither Boyles nor the State 

cites any controlling authority concerning whether a reasonable 

officer encountering these indicia must be on notice that a 

separate residence lies behind the door. Nor does Boyles 

confront the State’s dual contentions that (1) nothing on the door 

or sign suggested that the locked room belonged to Boyles and 

(2) a locked door in a house used for drug transactions suggests 

a ‚stash room‛ used to store drugs and money.

¶29 Instead, Boyles cites several cases from other jurisdictions

suggesting that no-trespassing signs indicate a reasonable 

expectation of privacy such that a search warrant is required.

These cases arose in a variety of factual settings, none of which 

are similar to that presented in this matter. See State v. Roubique, 

421 So. 2d 859, 862 (La. 1982) (no-trespassing sign posted at 

entrance of driveway); People v. Scott, 593 N.E.2d 1328, 1338 (N.Y. 

1992) (no-trespassing signs posted every twenty to thirty feet 

around 165 acres of rural land); State v. Kochel, 2008 ND 28, ¶ 2, 
State v. Boyles

20130578-CA 16 2015 UT App 185

744 N.W.2d 771 (no-trespassing sign posted outside a mobile 

home with an addition); McCuller v. State, 999 S.W.2d 801, 804–05 

(Tex. App. 1999) (no-trespassing sign posted outside of a home);

Johnson v. Commonwealth, 496 S.E.2d 143, 149 (Va. Ct. App. 1998)

(in a commercial business property, no-trespassing signs placed 

in warehouse and adjacent dock areas). Not one of those cases 

addresses the question before the trial court—whether a notrespassing sign on a bedroom door inside a house should cause 

a reasonable officer already in possession of a search warrant for 

the house to reconsider the continued validity of that warrant as 

to the area beyond the door.

¶30 Boyles also identifies a case in which the United States 

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered whether

police officers overstepped the authority of an otherwise valid 

warrant. See Mena v. City of Simi Valley, 226 F.3d 1031 (9th Cir. 

2000). In Mena, officers were investigating a drive-by shooting 

and came to suspect Raymond Romero. Id. at 1034. The officers 

knew that Romero lived in a ‚residence with a large number of 

subjects residing in a residence designed for one family.‛ Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted). Even so, they obtained a 

warrant to search the entire house and its curtilage, as well as 

any vehicles parked nearby that belonged to the occupants of the 

house. Id. at 1035. During the execution of the warrant, the 

officers noticed that ‚some of the rooms were locked, many with 

padlocks on the outside of the doors.‛ Id. ‚Nevertheless, the 

officers proceeded to force entry into these locked rooms,‛ id., 

and discovered that ‚the rooms were set up as studio apartment 

type units, with their own refrigerators, cooking supplies, food, 

televisions, and stereos,‛ id. at 1038. Iris Mena was in one of the 

rooms, and the officers detained her. Id. at 1035. 

¶31 Mena brought a civil rights suit against the officers, 

alleging inter alia that they had obtained an overbroad search 

warrant and executed an overbroad search. Id. at 1036. The 

officers unsuccessfully moved for summary judgment on the 

ground that they were entitled to qualified immunity. Id. On 

appeal from the denial of summary judgment, the Ninth Circuit 
State v. Boyles

20130578-CA 17 2015 UT App 185

determined that the search warrant was not overbroad, because 

there was ‚absolutely no evidence in the record‛ that the officers 

‚knew or should have known prior to the application for the 

warrant that [the house] was a multi-unit dwelling.‛ Id. at 1037. 

It therefore ruled that the officers were entitled to qualified 

immunity on the overbroad-warrant claim. Id. at 1038. The court 

then determined that ‚a reasonable jury considering all the facts 

could determine that it was unreasonable for the officers to 

continue the search‛ after discovering the padlocked doors with 

studio-apartment-type rooms behind them; accordingly, the 

court affirmed the denial of qualified immunity on the 

overbroad-search claim. Id. at 1039. Contrary to Boyles’s 

assertion, the Mena court did not hold that padlocked doors 

were necessarily sufficient to put the officers on notice that the 

warrant was overbroad; rather, the court merely determined that 

summary judgment was inappropriate because a jury could find 

that padlocked doors and studio-apartment-type rooms were 

sufficient for that purpose.

¶32 Boyles also points us to a federal trial court case from 

Oregon in which the court suppressed evidence officers 

discovered in a defendant’s rented room while they conducted a 

search pursuant to a warrant for the entire house. See United 

States v. Greathouse, 297 F. Supp. 2d 1264 (D. Or. 2003). The 

district court reasoned that a thirteen-month lapse between the 

acts giving rise to probable cause and an agent requesting a 

search warrant was ‚simply too long‛ and that the probable 

cause was therefore stale. Id. at 1273. As an alternative basis for 

suppressing the evidence, the court determined that agents

‚should have known there were separate residences within the 

house and should have stopped and obtained a second warrant 

for the defendant’s bedroom.‛ Id. at 1275. Specifically, the court 

noted that the door to the defendant’s room ‚had a ‘Do Not 

Enter’ sign posted,‛ that there was an ‚apparent absence of any 

familial or other connection between the residents‛ of the house, 

and that when the agents executed the search warrant, the 

owner of the house ‚immediately advised‛ them that ‚the 

defendant was a renter and that he lived in the back bedroom.‛
State v. Boyles

20130578-CA 18 2015 UT App 185

Id. at 1274–75. Since the issuance of Greathouse, no court has 

adopted this aspect of its analysis. Indeed, one court dismissed it

as ‚dicta, which we are not bound to follow.‛ People v. Gomez,

No. A119510, 2008 WL 5050583, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 26, 

2008).

¶33 In contrast, the United States Court of Appeals for the 

Second Circuit has determined that a locked door is not 

sufficient to put officers on notice that the room behind the door 

may be a separate residence. See United States v. Kyles, 40 F.3d 

519, 524 (2d Cir. 1994). In Kyles, two masked and armed robbers 

held up a bank. Id. at 521–22. Their getaway car was later found, 

containing some of their loot and a pizza parlor job application 

filled out by Basil Kyles. Id. at 522. The job application listed an 

address, and the police officers obtained a warrant to search the 

property at that address. Id. When officers executed the warrant, 

they were greeted by Basil’s mother. Id. During the search, they 

encountered a locked door. Id. Basil’s mother informed the 

officers that the room belonged to another of her sons, Geoffrey 

Kyles, and that only Geoffrey had the key to the room. Id.

Undeterred, the officers broke down the door and discovered 

some of the heisted bills inside. Id. When Geoffrey arrived at the 

house, he was arrested and charged with armed bank robbery.

¶34 Before trial, Geoffrey moved to suppress the evidence 

discovered in his room, arguing ‚that his bedroom was a 

separate residence not covered by the warrant because the door 

was locked, only he possessed the key, and he was not named in 

the affidavit underlying the search warrant.‛ Id. at 522–23. The 

trial court denied the motion, ruling that ‚Geoffrey’s exclusive 

possession of the key to his bedroom, by itself, did not render his 

bedroom a separate residence.‛ Id. at 523. On appeal, the Second 

Circuit concluded that the warrant authorized the officers to 

‚break the lock and search the room‛ because the bedroom was 

not a ‚separate residential unit.‛ Id. at 524. The Second Circuit 

explained that ‚*f+actors that indicate a separate residence 

include separate access from the outside, separate doorbells, and 

separate mailboxes,‛ and determined that the absence of these 
State v. Boyles

20130578-CA 19 2015 UT App 185

features left the officers with ‚no reason to believe Geoffrey’s 

room was a separate residence‛ despite the mother’s statement 

that the only key to the room was held by Geoffrey. See id.

¶35 Several other courts have also declined to find locks 

dispositive of the issue. For example, the Hawaii Supreme Court

explained that a ‚lock on *the defendant’s+ bedroom door *does+ 

not, by itself, automatically elevate his bedroom to the status of a 

separate residential unit.‛ State v. Anderson, 935 P.2d 1007, 1018 

(Haw. 1997). The Idaho Court of Appeals held that ‚there was 

very little, if anything, to create a belief that [there] were 

separate subunits‛ within a house despite ‚the presence of locks 

on the doors—which [an] officer testified was not uncommon in 

single residences occupied by several people.‛ State v. Reynolds, 

218 P.3d 795, 800 (Idaho Ct. App. 2009). And a Delaware trial 

court noted that ‚[a] lock on a bedroom door does not 

automatically make a bedroom a separate living unit.‛ State v. 

Kwalalon, No. 1312012959, 2015 WL 721255, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. 

Feb. 13, 2015).

¶36 The lesson we draw from these cases is simple: there is no 

bright-line rule that a locked door and no-trespassing sign

always denote a separate residence. Rather, the determination of 

whether a reasonable officer should have been on notice that an 

interior door led to a separate residence is a factually intensive 

inquiry that takes into account all of the attendant 

circumstances.

¶37 The officers executing the search warrant in this matter 

entered a home that possessed none of the indicia that appellate 

courts have deemed sufficient to indicate that the persons 

residing there intended to establish separate residences. The 

home had a single entrance with a single doorbell and a single 

mailbox. Unlike the situation presented in Greathouse, the record 

does not reflect that the officers were immediately advised that 
State v. Boyles

20130578-CA 20 2015 UT App 185

Boyles maintained a separate residence behind the locked door.11

Although the locked door bore a no-trespassing sign, there was 

no indication that the room belonged to Boyles. Indeed,

testimony before the trial court asserted that a locked door in a 

house used in sale of drugs was consistent with a ‚stash room‛ 

where money and drugs are stored. The record is devoid of any 

indication that there was anything in Boyles’s bedroom that 

would suggest a separate residence. Based on the record before 

us, we conclude that the trial court correctly determined that, 

under these circumstances, there were not sufficient indicia to 

put a reasonable officer on notice that Boyles’s bedroom was a 

separate residence. We further conclude that the trial court did 

not err in ruling that the officers relied in good faith on the 

warrant they possessed and that the evidence uncovered 

pursuant to that warrant should not be suppressed.

III. Rule 24(j) Letters

¶38 After he filed his reply brief, Boyles submitted two letters

pursuant to rule 24(j) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

The first raises a contention that ‚the State illegally enhanced 

*Boyles’s+ sentence from a Class B misdemeanor . . . to a Class A 

misdemeanor.‛ Boyles complains that ‚the jury [first] needed to 

find [Boyles] guilty of the underlying offense [before] it could 

conduct a second proceeding to determine the existence of the 

enhancement.‛

¶39 A rule 24(j) letter is limited to citation of supplemental 

authorities and is neither an opportunity for a party to further 

argue their case, see Beynon v. St. George–Dixie Lodge No. 1743, 

Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks, 854 P.2d 513, 519 (Utah 

1993), nor an appropriate method to raise new appellate claims, 

cf. Washington v. Kraft, 2010 UT App 266U, para. 13 at *4 (noting 

 

11. An advisement they would not have been required to accept 

at face value in any event. See supra ¶¶ 25–27.
State v. Boyles

20130578-CA 21 2015 UT App 185

that issues not adequately discussed in an appellant’s opening 

brief are deemed waived in order to prevent the resulting 

unfairness to the appellee, who would have no opportunity to 

respond to the appellant’s arguments). Indeed, a letter of 

supplemental authority must contain ‚a reference either to the 

page of the brief or to a point argued orally to which [the 

supplemental authorities+ pertain.‛ See Utah R. App. P. 24(j). We 

will not address the merits of the issues raised for the first time 

in this rule 24(j) letter. In any event, Boyles’s sentence was not 

enhanced at all. Rather, he was actually charged with a class A 

misdemeanor and the jury was instructed accordingly.12

¶40 The second rule 24(j) letter is a photocopy of a pro se 

mandamus petition filed by Boyles and several other individuals 

in a separate case.13 Like the first rule 24(j) letter, the second rule 

24(j) letter addresses issues not raised in Boyles’s opening brief, 

the merits of which we therefore do not address.

CONCLUSION

¶41 Boyles has not identified any information that the officer 

knew, or should have known, but withheld from the magistrate. 

He has therefore not shown that the search warrant issued by 

the magistrate was invalid. We assume, without deciding, that 

 

12. Boyles’s counsel acknowledged the hurdles faced by the 

argument advanced in the first rule 24(j) letter and described the 

letter as ‚being filed in an Anders fashion.‛ See Anders v. 

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); State v. Clayton, 639 P.2d 168, 169–

170 (Utah 1981) (explaining that Anders briefs address issues that 

a defendant wishes to raise but that his or her counsel believes 

are without merit).

13. This court denied the mandamus petition in a December 15, 

2014 order.
State v. Boyles

20130578-CA 22 2015 UT App 185

Boyles had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his bedroom, 

but conclude that, based on the record facts, a reasonable officer 

would not have known that the bedroom was a separate 

residence. The trial court therefore did not err in denying the 

motion to suppress.

¶42 Affirmed.

_____________