IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Khalil Hammond

, :

Appellant :

:

v. :

: Robert Michael Krak, D.M.D., : Superintendent Louis Folino, : Secretary John E. Wetzel, Dorina : No. 605 C .D. 201 9

Varner and John or Jane Does #1

- 3 : Submitted: February 7 , 20 20

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge

HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON

, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY

JUDGE COVEY FILED: April 22, 2020

Khalil Hamm ond (Hammond) appeals pro se from the Greene County

Common Pleas Court’s (trial court) April 1 1 , 2019 order denying Hammond’s

Motion to Void Judgment for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction (Motion). The sole

issue before this Court is whether the trial c ourt properly denied Hammond’s Motion.

After review, we affirm.

Hammond is currently an inmate at the State Correctional Institution

(SCI) at Houtzdale. Hammond was an inmate at SCI

- Frackville o n May 13, 2015,

when he filed a complaint against Robert Mi chael Krak, D.M.D., Department of

Corrections (DOC) Superintendent Louis Folino, DOC Secretary John E. Wetzel, and

Dorina Varner (collectively, Defendants) , asserting state tort claims of medical

negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress, and federal civil rights

claims pursuant to Section 1983 of United States Code (Section 1983)

, 42 U.S.C. §

1983, relating to his dental care during his confinement in SCI

- Frackville2

(Complaint)

. On July 10, 2015, Defendants filed preliminary objections i n the nature

of a demurrer (Preliminary Objections) raising the following: (1) improper service;

(2) failure to state a violation of the Eighth Amendment of the United States

Constitution ; (3) failure to state a violation of the First Amendment of the Unit ed

States Constitution ; (4) failure to state a procedural due process claim under the

Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution ; (5) failure to adequately

allege personal involvement of any named defendant; and (6) failure to set forth any

tor t claims falling within an enumerated exception to sovereign immunity.

On July 20, 2015, the trial court sustained Defendants ’ P reliminary

O bjections and dismissed the C omplaint with prejudice (2015 Judgment)

. On

September 23, 2015, Hammond filed an unti mely appeal from the trial court’ s July

20, 2015 order, and on October 9, 2015, this Court quashed the appeal. On April 4,

2019, Hammond filed the Motion arguing that the trial court lacked subject matter

jurisdiction when it sustained Defendants ’ Prelimi nary O bjections in 2015 because

the C omplaint raised federal constitutional claims under Section 1983. On April 1 1

,

2019, the trial court denied Hammond’ s M otion because “the case ha[d] been

litigated and resolved in favor of [Defendants][.]” Trial Ct. A pril 11, 2019 Order.

Hammond appealed to this Court. 1 On February 18, 2020, Hammond file d an

application for oral argument.

Initially, the Pennsylvania Superior C ourt has explained:

‘ Unlike a judgment entered by confession or by default,

which remains w ithin the control of the court indefinitely and may be opened or vacated at any time upon proper

cause shown, a judgment entered in an adverse proceeding ordinarily cannot be disturbed after [it has become final] .’

1 In reviewing the trial court ’s order denying the Motion , “this C ourt is limited to

determining whether the trial court made errors of law or clearly abused its discretion. ” Campagna

v. Brandon Knitwear, Inc.

, 797 A.2d 405 , 407 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002)

.3 Simpson v. Allstate Ins. Co.

, . . . 504 A.2d 335, 337 ( [Pa. Super.] 1986) (citations omitted)

. . . .

Although the inability of a court to grant relief from a judgment entered in a contested action after the appeal period has expired is not absolute, the discretionary power of the court over su ch judgments is very limited. Generally, judgments regularly entered on adverse proceedings cannot be opened or vacated after they have become final,

unless there has been fraud or some other circumstance ‘so grave or compelling as to

constitute ‘extraord inary cause ’ justifying intervention by the court.’

Simpson

, . . . 504 A.2d at 337 [] (citations omitted)

. . . .

Shelly Enters., Inc. v. Guadagnini , 20 A.3d 491, 493

- 94 (Pa. Super. 2011) ( footnote

and emphasis omitted) (quoting Orie v. Stone

, 601 A.2d 12 68, 1270 ( Pa. Super.

1992), appeal dismissed as improvidently granted

, 622 A.2d 286 ( Pa. 1993) )

. A final

“ order can be opened or vacated [] upon a showing of

. . . lack of jurisdiction over the

subject matter [.]” Stockton v. Stockton , 698 A.2d 1334, 1337 (Pa. Super. 1997)

.

Here, Hammond asserts that the trial court did not have subject matter

jurisdict ion to enter the 2 015 Judgment, thus, the trial court could not dismiss the

Motion on the sole basis that it was a final order. Accordingly, this Court wil l

examine the Motion’s merits. 2

Hammond argues that the trial court did not have subject matter

jurisdiction to grant the 2015 Judgment because the C omplaint contai ned federal

claims. Defendants rejoin that because state courts have concurrent jurisdict ion over

S ection 1983 claims , Hammond has not presented any basis for vacating the 2015

Judgment.

2 “[T] his Court may affirm a trial court’ s order on other grounds where affirmance is

required for different reasons than those on which [the trial court] based its decision .” Watkins v.
Pa. Dep’t of Corr. , 196 A.3d 272, 274 n.3 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018).4 It is well

- settled law that

c ommon pleas courts have subject matter jurisdiction ‘ over tort actions for money damages that are premised on either

common law trespass or a civil action for deprivation of civil rights under [Section 1983].’ Miles [ v. Beard ], 847

A.2d [ 161 ,] 164 [ (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004) ]. Further, where the core of the complaint is a tort action, original jurisdiction lies in common pleas court rega rdless of an ancillary request for declaratory relief.

Wilson v. Marrow , 917 A.2d 357, 362 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007).

Here, H a mmond’s Complaint provided:

[ Hammond ] brings this civil rights action for declaratory, injunctive and monetary relief for violations o f his rights under [the] Eighth, Fourteenth and [F] irst Amendments of the United States Constitution, pursuant to [Section 1983].
[ Hammond ] also brings state law claims of [m]edical [n]egligence, and [i]ntentional infliction of emotional
distress, and con spiracy.

Complaint at 1 (emphasis added); see also Complaint at 18 (Count I X Intentional

In fliction of Emotional Distress), 19 (Count X Intentional Infliction of Emotional

Distress , Count XI N egligence), 20 (Count XII Conspiracy), 22 (Relief Sought).

Beca use Hammond’s Complaint contained a “ tort action [] for money damages

. . .
premised on

. . . a civil action for deprivation of civil rights under [Section 1983] [,]”

the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction to sustain Defendants’ Preliminary

Objectio ns and dismiss the Complaint. Wilson , 917 A.2d at 362

. Accordingly, the

trial court properly dismissed the Motion

.

For all of the above reason s , the trial court’s order is affirmed. 3

__________________________ ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

3 Hammon d’s application for oral argument is dismissed as moot.IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Khalil Hammond, :

Appellant :

:

v. :

: Robert Michael Krak, D.M.D., : Superintendent Louis Folino, : Secretary John E. Wetzel, Dorina : No. 605 C.D. 2019

Varner and John or Jane Does #1

- 3 :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 22 nd day of April , 20 20

, the Greene County Common

Pleas Court’s April 1 1 , 2019 order is affirmed. Khalil Hammond ’s application for

oral argument is dismissed as moot.

___________________________ ANNE E. COVEY, Judge