FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee/

Cross-Appellant,

 v.

MONGOL NATION, 

Unincorporated Association, 

Defendant-Appellant/

Cross-Appellee.

Nos. 19-50176 

19-50190

D.C. No.

2:13-cr-00106-

DOC-1 

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

David O. Carter, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted September 23, 2022

Pasadena, California

Filed January 6, 2023

Before: Sandra S. Ikuta, Danielle J. Forrest, and Holly A.

Thomas, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge H.A. Thomas
2 UNITED STATES V. MONGOL NATION

SUMMARY*

Criminal Law

On Mongol Nation’s appeal of its conviction and 

sentence for violations of the Racketeer Influenced and 

Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), and the Government’s 

cross-appeal from the district court’s order denying 

forfeiture of certain collective membership marks, the panel 

affirmed the district court’s judgment.

Mongol Nation is an unincorporated association whose 

members include the official, or “full-patch,” members of 

the Mongols Gang. A jury convicted the association of 

substantive RICO and RICO conspiracy violations; it also 

found various forms of Mongol Nation property 

forfeitable. That property included the collective 

membership marks—a type of intellectual property used to 

designate membership in an association or other 

organization. The district court denied forfeiture of those 

marks, holding that the forfeiture would violate the First and 

Eighth Amendments. 

In Mongol Nation’s appeal, it argued for the first time 

that it is not an indictable “person” under RICO because the 

indictment alleges that the association was organized for 

unlawful purposes only. The panel concluded that this 

unpreserved argument is non-jurisdictional. Reviewing for 

plain error, the panel did not resolve the Government’s 

contention that Mongol waived it. The panel wrote that 

regardless of the merits of Mongol Nation’s argument, it 

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has 

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
UNITED STATES V. MONGOL NATION 3 

mischaracterizes the allegations in the indictment. Because 

the indictment expressly contemplated that the association 

may exist for other purposes—perhaps including lawful 

ones—the indictment is not facially inconsistent with 

Mongol Nation’s interpretation of the definition of “person” 

in the RICO statute, even if that interpretation is correct. As 

such, Mongol Nation cannot establish that the district court 

plainly erred by allowing it to be prosecuted under RICO. 

On the Government’s cross-appeal of the order denying 

its second preliminary order of forfeiture, the panel did not 

need to decide whether forfeiture of the membership marks 

would violate the First and Eighth Amendments, as the 

district court held. Nor did the panel reach the question 

whether the marks may be forfeitable without the transfer of 

any goodwill associated with the marks, or any other 

trademark issues. The panel held that the forfeiture was 

improper for a different reason—the Government effectively 

sought an order seizing and extinguishing the Mongols’ right 

to exclusive use of its marks without the Government itself 

ever seizing title to the marks. Because RICO provides no 

mechanism for forfeiture without a transfer of title to the 

Government, the panel held that denial of the preliminary 

order of forfeiture was warranted on these grounds. 

COUNSEL

George L. Steele (argued), Law Office of George L. Steele, 

La Cañada, California; Stephen P. Stubbs, Las Vegas, 

Nevada; for Defendant-Appellant.

Bram M. Alden (argued), Assistant United States Attorney, 

Criminal Appeals Section Chief; Christopher Brunwin, 

Assistant United States Attorney; Tracy L. Wilkison, Acting 
4 UNITED STATES V. MONGOL NATION

United States Attorney; Office of the United States Attorney, 

Los Angeles, California; for Plaintiff-Appellee.

John D. Loy, David E. Snyder, and Monica N. Price, First 

Amendment Coalition, San Rafael, California, for Amici 

Curiae First Amendment Coalition and California Attorneys 

for Criminal Justice.

OPINION

H.A. THOMAS, Circuit Judge: 

This case concerns the Government’s ability to prosecute

an unincorporated association for violations of the Racketeer 

Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 

U.S.C. §§ 1961 et seq., and to subsequently seek forfeiture

of that association’s intellectual property. 

Defendant Mongol Nation is an unincorporated 

association whose members include the official, or “fullpatch,” members of the Mongols Gang. The Government has 

been prosecuting the Mongols Gang since at least 2008, 

leading to the convictions of more than 70 individual 

members under RICO and various other criminal statutes. 

Following those convictions, the Government indicted 

Mongol Nation (the unincorporated association) on charges 

of substantive RICO and RICO conspiracy violations. A jury 

convicted the association on both charges. It also found 

various forms of Mongol Nation property forfeitable. That 

property included certain collective membership marks—a 

type of intellectual property used to designate membership 

in an association or other organization. The district court 

denied forfeiture of those marks, holding that under the 
UNITED STATES V. MONGOL NATION 5

circumstances of this case forfeiture would violate the First 

and Eighth Amendments.

Mongol Nation appealed its conviction and sentence, 

and the Government cross-appealed the order denying 

forfeiture of the marks. The parties’ cross-appeals present 

two issues. First, did the district court lack jurisdiction 

because Mongol Nation does not qualify as a “person” as 

defined by RICO; and second, did the district court err in 

denying forfeiture of the Mongol Nation marks?

We affirm. There was no defect in the district court’s

jurisdiction stemming from RICO’s definition of “person,”

and we agree with the district court that denial of forfeiture 

was appropriate under these circumstances.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL 

HISTORY

Defendant Mongol Nation is “an unincorporated 

association comprised of ‘official’ or ‘full-patch’ members 

of the Mongols Gang,” a violent, drug trafficking 

organization. United States v. Mongol Nation, 693 F. App’x 

637, 638 (9th Cir. 2017).

1

The current proceedings against Mongol Nation are the 

latest step in a series of related prosecutions, including the 

prior prosecutions and guilty pleas of dozens of individual 

members of the Mongols Gang.

2 Because those prior 

1 The phrase “full patch” refersto the Mongols Gang’s practice of issuing

incentives, such as tattoos and patches, to reward its members for, among

other things, their commission of violent acts.

2 Of the 79 gang members originally indicted, 77 pleaded guilty, one died

before the disposition of any charges, and one was found not competent

to stand trial.
6 UNITED STATES V. MONGOL NATION

prosecutions also involved attempts by the Government to 

effect forfeiture of the collective membership marks at issue 

here, we briefly recount the history of those earlier 

proceedings.

A. Prior Related Proceedings: Cavazos and Rivera

In its earlier prosecution of individual Mongols

members—including that of the former leader of the 

Mongols, lead defendant Ruben Cavazos, Sr.—the 

Government sought forfeiture of two registered collective 

membership marks owned by Mongol Nation.

3 Cavazos, 

2011 WL 13143670, at *1; id., ECF No. 1 (Indictment);

3 The first mark at issue in that case was the word, “MONGOLS,” and

the second mark was an image that depicts an individual seated on a

motorcycle and contains the initials “M.C.” See Rivera v. Carter, No.

2:09-cv-2435, 2009 WL 8753486, at *1 & n.1 (C.D. Cal. July 31, 2009);

see also note 5, infra.

Sometime after October 22, 2008, Mongol Nation was incorporated in

California under the full name Mongols Nation Motorcycle Club, Inc.

United States v. Cavazos, No. CR08-01201, 2011 WL 13143670, at *2

(C.D. Cal. June 28, 2011). Before that, Mongol Nation had been using

the “MONGOLS” and “M.C.” marks since approximately 1969. Rivera,

2009 WL 8753486, at *6; see also Order, Cavazos, 2011 WL 13143670,

ECF No. 4481 at 1. Either Mongol Nation or Mongols Nation

Motorcycle Club, Inc. have continued to use the marks for membership

identification since that time. Rivera, 2009 WL 8753486, at *6; see also

Order, Cavazos, 2011 WL 13143670, ECF No. 4481 at 1.

As the district court explained in Rivera, because they have used the

collective membership marks continuously since 1969 (and have also

registered the marks), Mongols Nation Motorcycle Club, Inc. and

Mongol Nation “have acquired and maintained exclusive ownership in

the collective membership mark[s] at issue.” Rivera, 2009 WL 8753486,

at *6; see also Order, Cavazos, 2011 WL 13143670, ECF No. 4481 at 1;

see also United States v. Mongol Nation, 370 F. Supp. 3d 1090, 1119

(C.D. Cal. 2019).
UNITED STATES V. MONGOL NATION 7 

Rivera, 2009 WL 8753486, at *1 & n.1. Pursuant to an 

application by the Government, the district court enjoined

the Cavazos defendants from taking “any action that would 

affect the availability, marketability or value of the 

MONGOLS trademark” and ordered defendants “to 

surrender for seizure all . . . [items] bearing the [mark].” 

Rivera, 2009 WL 8753486, at *1. 

In response to that order, Ramon Rivera—a member of 

Mongol Nation who was not charged in Cavazos—filed a 

civil action seeking an injunction to prevent the Government 

from seizing property based solely on the fact that it bore the 

relevant marks. Id., ECF. No. 1 (Complaint). The district 

court granted a preliminary injunction. It found that Mongol 

Nation (the unincorporated association) and Mongols Nation 

Motorcycle Club, Inc. were the exclusive owners of the 

marks, rather than Cavazos or any other individual member

of the organizations, and that the marks were therefore not 

forfeitable under RICO in the context of the Cavazos 

prosecutions. Rivera, 2009 WL 8753486, at *7.

4 The district 

court ultimately granted summary judgment to Rivera. Id., 

ECF No. 90 (Summary Judgment Order). 

Meanwhile, criminal proceedings continued in Cavazos.

Following Cavazos’ guilty plea, the Government continued 

to seek forfeiture of the marks. See Cavazos, 2009 WL 

10680370, at *1–3. On June 15, 2010, the district court 

entered a preliminary order of forfeiture (POF) concerning 

the marks, finding that they “b[ore] some nexus to the 

4 In dicta, the district court also made some “observations regarding the

application of the First Amendment to th[e] case,” including its tentative

conclusion that plaintiff Rivera had a right protected by the First

Amendment’s freedom of association to display the Mongols’ collective

membership marks. Id. at *10–11. 
8 UNITED STATES V. MONGOL NATION

criminal enterprise in which . . . defendants were involved.” 

Id. at *1, 3. In response, Mongols Nation Motorcycle Club, 

Inc. filed a petition to vacate or amend the order under 18 

U.S.C. Section 1963(l), asserting a property interest in the 

marks. Id. at *1.

The district court granted Mongols Nation Motorcycle 

Club, Inc.’s petition and vacated the POF. It concluded that 

the marks were not forfeitable because: (1) RICO authorizes 

forfeiture only of property belonging to a defendant, and 

(2) the “club,” rather than any indicted defendant, 

maintained exclusive ownership of the marks. See id. at *3–

4.

B. The Present Proceedings against Mongol Nation

Following those earlier prosecutions, Mongol Nation, 

the defendant in this case, was indicted for substantive RICO 

and RICO conspiracy violations. 

Mongol Nation successfully moved the district court to 

dismiss the indictment “on the ground that there is no 

meaningful distinction between the association Mongol 

Nation and the enterprise of the Mongols Gang.” Mongol 

Nation, 693 F. App’x at 637 (internal quotation marks 

omitted). We reversed, holding that “Mongol Nation was 

alleged to be part of a larger whole, the Mongols Gang, 

which is comprised of additional individuals who together 

form the alleged enterprise.” Id. at 638. We declined to 

address Mongol Nation’s challenges to the Government’s 

efforts to effect forfeiture of the Mongols’ membership

marks as “premature” and “not ripe for review.” Id. 

On remand, the Government filed a superseding 

indictment (FSI), and the case proceeded to a jury trial. The 

jury found Mongol Nation guilty on two counts: substantive 
UNITED STATES V. MONGOL NATION 9 

RICO (Count I) and RICO conspiracy (Count II). See 18 

U.S.C. § 1962(c)–(d). Mongol Nation filed post-trial 

motions for judgment of acquittal and for a new trial, which 

were denied. 

The FSI also contained forfeiture allegations. The 

Government sought forfeiture of (among other things): “(1) 

all rights associated with the collective membership marks 

described in the FSI and the Government’s Bills of 

Particulars . . . (collectively, the ‘Marks’)”; and (2) “items of 

personal property bearing any of the Marks, which . . . were 

seized in connection with [the investigation].”5 See Mongol 

5

 Images of the three Marks at issue in this case are reproduced below: 

At some point, all three Marks were registered with the U.S. Patent and

Trademark Office. At the time the district court was considering whether
10 UNITED STATES V. MONGOL NATION

Nation, No. CR 13-0106-DOC-1 (C.D. Cal.), ECF Nos. 264 

(Gov’t’s Forfeiture Mem.), 269 (Gov’t’s Third Bill of 

Particulars). 

The district court conducted a jury trial on the forfeiture 

allegations. The jury found that none of the relevant property 

was forfeitable under Count I—the substantive RICO count. 

As for Count II—the RICO conspiracy count—the jury 

found the following property forfeitable: (1) the Marks, 

(2) relevant items bearing the Marks, and (3) weapons, 

ammunition, and body armor. Following the forfeiture trial, 

the Government filed a motion for a POF concerning that 

property under RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1963, including forfeiture 

of all rights associated with the Marks. 

The district court denied the Government’s POF motion 

in part. The district court granted the requested forfeiture of

the Mongols’ weapons, ammunition, body armor, and 

specific Mongols property seized during raids by federal 

agents. But it denied forfeiture of the “rights associated” 

with the “collective membership marks” on the ground that 

forfeiture in these circumstances would violate the First and 

Eighth Amendments. Mongol Nation, 370 F. Supp. 3d at

1114–16, 1120. 

As to the First Amendment, the district court held that 

forfeiture of all rights to the Marks would impermissibly 

prevent or discourage Mongols members from displaying 

the Marks. Id. at 1112–13. The district court reasoned that 

such display constitutes “expressive conduct . . . 

communicat[ing] a person’s association with the Mongol 

Nation, and his or her support for their views.” Id. According 

to grant forfeiture, two of the marks were registered and one registration

had been cancelled. 
UNITED STATES V. MONGOL NATION 11

to the district court, the first “POF—which would vest title 

[to the Marks] in the United States—[would] function[] as a 

prior restraint on future speech” and also regulate speech 

based on its content. Id. at 1114. Applying strict scrutiny 

review, the court concluded that the POF was not sufficiently 

tailored to the Government’s compelling interest in 

punishing and dismantling criminal organizations. 

Id. at 1114–15. 

Turning to the Eighth Amendment, the district court

reasoned that the first POF would violate the amendment’s

prohibition on excessive fines because forfeiture of the 

Marks would be “harsh and grossly disproportionate” to 

Mongol Nation’s crime of RICO conspiracy. Id. at 1119. The 

district court reasoned that the Marks, which “were acquired 

in 1969 upon first use and have been maintained through 

continuous use for decades[,] . . . have immense intangible, 

subjective value to the Mongol Nation and its members,” 

which outweighs the gravity of the RICO conspiracy 

offense. Id. at 1120. Accordingly, the district court found 

that the first POF would violate the “gross disproportionality 

test to determine Constitutional excessiveness” under the 

Eighth Amendment. See id. at 1118. 

While the district court rested its denial of the first POF 

upon these two constitutional grounds, its opinion also 

included some “observations regarding the feasibility of any 

transfer of the collective membership marks” under 

trademark law. Id. at 1121. The district court ultimately 

concluded that transfer of the marks “may not be legally 

possible” under trademark principles. Id. at 1121–25. 

Following the district court’s decision denying the first 

POF, the Government filed a second, narrower forfeiture 

application concerning the Marks. This second POF was 
12 UNITED STATES V. MONGOL NATION

designed specifically to “mitigate [the aforementioned] 

constitutional concerns.” Instead of providing for transfer of 

the Marks to the Government, the second proposed POF 

provided: 

Defendant shall and hereby does forfeit any 

and all right(s) it holds as the owner of the 

Marks, whether pursuant to federal, state or 

common law, to limit, restrain, or in any way 

prohibit, through legal process or otherwise, 

any other individual or entity from using or 

displaying the Marks, in commerce or 

otherwise. Defendant’s title to the Marks is 

hereby extinguished, but such title is not

transferred to, and shall not vest in, the 

United States. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963(f). This 

order does not, and shall not, have any 

[e]ffect on the right(s) of Defendant and its 

individual members to continue their lawful 

use and display of the Marks.

The district court summarily denied this second POF as 

well. At sentencing, the district court referenced its order 

denying the first POF, reaffirming its conclusion that the 

“collective membership marks are not forfeitable” under the 

First and Eighth Amendment. The district court granted

forfeiture of the Mongols’ “tangible” property, like the vests, 

patches, and clothing bearing the Marks, as well as the

Mongols’ weapons and armor. But the district court denied 

forfeiture of the rights concerning the Marks. The court also 

sentenced Mongol Nation to five years’ probation and 

imposed a $500,000 fine and an $800 special assessment.
UNITED STATES V. MONGOL NATION 13

Mongol Nation timely appealed its conviction and 

sentence. The Government timely cross-appealed the denial 

of the second POF. 

II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Section 1291. We 

review de novo questions of law, including constitutional 

issues, see United States v. Kuchinski, 469 F.3d 853, 857 

(9th Cir. 2006), and questions of statutory interpretation, see 

United States v. Paulk, 569 F.3d 1094, 1095 (9th Cir. 2009). 

Arguments seeking to overturn a criminal jury’s verdict that 

are not renewed in a post-trial motion for judgment of 

acquittal are reviewed for plain error. United States v. 

Eriksen, 639 F.3d 1138, 1148 (9th Cir. 2011). “Plain error is 

(1) an error that (2) is plain, (3) affects substantial rights, and 

(4) seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public 

reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. 

Blinkinsop, 606 F.3d 1110, 1114 n.2 (9th Cir. 2010). 

A district court’s decision not to impose a forfeiture 

judgment is reviewed de novo. United States v. Phillips, 704 

F.3d 754, 762 (9th Cir. 2012). 

III. DISCUSSION

We first consider Mongol Nation’s appeal, in which it 

argues that its conviction and sentence must be vacated 

because it is not an indictable “person” under RICO. It is 

undisputed that Mongol Nation never raised this argument 

in the district court. We conclude that this unpreserved 

argument is non-jurisdictional, and that Mongol Nation has

not established that the district court plainly erred by not 

dismissing the indictment. 

We next turn to the Government’s cross-appeal of the 

order denying the second POF. We conclude that forfeiture 
14 UNITED STATES V. MONGOL NATION

was correctly denied, although for different reasons than the 

district court. Because we conclude that RICO’s plain text

renders the Government’s second POF a legal impossibility, 

we need not decide whether forfeiture of the Marks would 

violate the First and Eighth Amendments.

A.

Mongol Nation contends that it does not qualify as a 

“person” under RICO and that the indictment against it 

should therefore have been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

It reasons that (1) RICO limits the definition of “person” to 

entities capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in 

property, 18 U.S.C § 1961(3); (2) under California law, 

unincorporated associations, like Mongol Nation, can own 

property, but only if the association exists for a “lawful 

purpose,” Cal. Corp. Code §§ 18035(a), 18105; and (3) the 

indictment expressly alleged that Mongol Nation exists 

exclusively for an unlawful purpose. Mongol Nation argues 

that it thus cannot qualify as either a property-owning 

unincorporated association under California law or, by 

extension, a RICO “person.”

The Government argues that Mongol Nation has waived 

this argument by failing to raise it in a pre-trial challenge to 

the indictment under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 

12(b)(3), or, in the alternative, that Mongol Nation’s claim, 

which it did not raise in a post-trial motion for judgment of 

acquittal, does not amount to plain error. See Eriksen, 639 

F.3d at 1148 (explaining that arguments not renewed in a

motion for judgment of acquittal are reviewed for plain 

error). While it is undisputed that Mongol Nation did not 

raise this argument below, Mongol Nation responds that the 

issue is jurisdictional, and therefore not waivable.
UNITED STATES V. MONGOL NATION 15

Mongol Nation’s attempt to characterize its challenge to 

the indictment as “jurisdictional” is meritless. As a threshold 

matter, “[i]n every federal criminal prosecution, subjectmatter jurisdiction is conferred by 18 U.S.C. § 3231.” United 

States v. Ratigan, 351 F.3d 957, 962 (9th Cir. 2003). Because 

“a district court has jurisdiction of all crimes cognizable 

under the authority of the United States[,] . . . the objection 

that the indictment does not charge a crime against the 

United States”—for instance, by failing to charge a statutory 

“person”—“goes only to the merits of the case.” United 

States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630–31 (2002) (alterations 

omitted) (quoting Lamar v. United States, 240 U.S. 60, 65 

(1916)). 

We do not resolve the government’s contention that 

Mongol Nation has waived its argument concerning RICO 

personhood and that review of this issue is governed by 

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(c)(3). Even assuming 

Mongol Nation’s argument is not waived and is thus

reviewed for plain error, the argument fails. 

Mongol Nation proceeds from a faulty premise. It

contends that it cannot qualify as a RICO person because the 

indictment alleges that the association was organized for 

unlawful purposes only. Regardless of the merits of this 

argument—a matter about which we express no view—it

mischaracterizes the allegations in the indictment 

concerning the association’s purpose. The indictment alleges 

that “[t]he purposes of the Mongols Gang . . . included, but 

were not limited to,” several unlawful purposes. Because the 

indictment expressly contemplated that the association may 

exist for other purposes—perhaps including lawful ones—it 

is not facially inconsistent with Mongol Nation’s 

interpretation of the definition of “person” in the RICO 

statute, even if we assume that interpretation is correct. As 
16 UNITED STATES V. MONGOL NATION

this fundamental premise of Mongol Nation’s challenge to 

the indictment fails, it cannot establish that the district court 

plainly erred by allowing it to be prosecuted under RICO. 

B.

We next consider the Government’s cross-appeal from 

the district court’s denial of the second POF. 

After a guilty verdict in a criminal case, a district court 

“must determine what property is subject to forfeiture under 

the applicable statute” for “any count in an indictment or 

information regarding which criminal forfeiture is sought.” 

Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b)(1)(A). Here, RICO’s penalty 

provision mandates forfeiture of (among other things) (1)

any interest the defendant has acquired or maintained in 

violation of RICO; (2) any property or contractual right of 

any kind affording a source of influence over a RICO 

enterprise; and (3) any property constituting, or derived 

from, any proceeds obtained from racketeering activity in 

violation of RICO. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a). Both “tangible and 

intangible personal property” are subject to forfeiture under 

this provision. Id. § 1963(b)(2). 

Where, as here, the Government seeks forfeiture of 

specific property, the factfinder must determine whether the 

Government has “established the requisite nexus between 

the property and the offense.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 

32.2(b)(1)(A), (b)(5). When the jury finds such a nexus, 

RICO “provides no discretion:” forfeiture is mandatory. 

United States v. Busher, 817 F.2d 1409, 1415 (9th Cir. 

1987); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (defendants “shall 

forfeit” covered property). Nevertheless, “the district court 

must avoid unconstitutional results by fashioning forfeiture 

orders that stay within constitutional bounds.” Busher, 817 

F.2d at 1415. Where there are dispositive “statutory 
UNITED STATES V. MONGOL NATION 17

grounds” for denial of forfeiture, the court “need not reach 

[any] constitutional issue.” See United States v. Kenney, 789 

F.2d 783, 784 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986). 

Here, the district court held that both the first and second 

POFs would violate the First and Eighth Amendments and 

suggested (though did not hold) that forfeiture of the Marks 

would also be effectively impossible under principles of 

trademark law. We need not decide whether these

conclusions, including the district court’s constitutional 

holdings, were correct. We find that forfeiture here was 

improper for a different reason—namely, the Government’s 

contemplated method of forfeiture is not permitted by

RICO’s forfeiture provision. We therefore affirm on this 

basis without reaching the district court’s constitutional

rationales.

6 Because we decide on these grounds, we also do 

not reach the question whether the Marks may be forfeitable 

without the transfer of any goodwill associated with the 

Marks, or any other trademark issues. 

We begin by examining whether and how ownership of 

the Marks would purportedly transfer from Mongol Nation 

to the Government under the second POF. Presumably in an 

effort to neutralize the district court’s constitutional 

concerns with the first POF, the Government’s second POF 

sought to “forfeit[] only . . . narrowly-defined intellectual 

property rights . . . that are associated with the Marks.” 

6

 “We may affirm a district court’s judgment on any ground supported

by the record, whether or not the decision of the district court relied on

the same grounds or reasoning we adopt.” Atel Fin. Corp. v. Quaker Coal

Co., 321 F.3d 924, 926 (9th Cir. 2003). And “this court must apply its

view of the law asitseesit,” even where the parties have failed to address

a dispositive question of law. United States v. Comstock Extension Min. 

Co., 214 F.2d 400, 403 (9th Cir. 1954). 
18 UNITED STATES V. MONGOL NATION

Specifically, the POF sought to extinguish those rights 

Mongol Nation “holds as the owner of the Marks, whether 

pursuant to federal, state or common law, to limit, restrain, 

or in any way prohibit, through legal process or otherwise, 

any other individual or entity from using or displaying the 

Marks, in commerce or otherwise.” 

The second POF further provided that while 

“Defendant’s title to the Marks [would be] extinguished,” 

title to the Marks would “not transfer[] to, and shall not vest 

in, the United States,” nor would the order “affect . . . the 

right(s) of Defendant and its individual members to continue 

their lawful use and display of the Marks.” In short, the 

Government effectively sought an order seizing and 

extinguishing the Mongols’ right to exclusive use of its 

Marks without the Government itself ever seizing title to the 

Marks. 

In trying to mitigate the constitutional problems the 

district court raised in addressing the first POF, the 

Government has created a new problem: the method of 

forfeiture contemplated by the second POF is precluded by 

the plain language of RICO’s forfeiture provision. The 

RICO statute provides that “all right, title, and interest in 

property [forfeitable under RICO] vests in the United States

upon the commission of the act giving rise to forfeiture under 

this section.” 18 U.S.C. § 1963(c) (emphasis added). But as 

explained above, the entire premise of the second POF is that 

it “expressly would not vest title to the forfeited marks in the 

government.” Gov’t’s Reply at 24. The second POF is thus 

facially inconsistent with RICO’s forfeiture provision: 

RICO provides no mechanism for forfeiture to occur without 

a transfer of title to the Government. Denial of the POF was

therefore warranted on these grounds. 
UNITED STATES V. MONGOL NATION 19

When confronted with this conflict between the text of 

RICO’s forfeiture provision and its second proposed POF at 

oral argument, the Government responded that we should 

remand to the district court with directions to enter the first 

POF if vestiture of title to the Marks is statutorily required 

under RICO. The Government, however, never appealed the 

district court’s denial of its first POF, choosing instead to 

propose the second POF at issue here. We therefore decline 

to reach any issues regarding the propriety of entry of the 

first POF.

* ** *

Mongol Nation’s unpreserved argument regarding 

RICO’s definition of “person” and the Government’s 

challenge to the denial of its second POF each fail. The 

district court’s judgment is in all respects 

AFFIRMED.