United States Department of Labor

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

__________________________________________

T.S., Appellant

and

U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, POST OFFICE, 

Appleton, WI, Employer

__________________________________________

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Docket No. 20-1194

Issued: April 14, 2021

Appearances: Case Submitted on the Record

Appellant, pro se

Office of Solicitor, for the Director

DECISION AND ORDER

Before:

JANICE B. ASKIN, Judge

PATRICIA H. FITZGERALD, Alternate Judge

VALERIE D. EVANS-HARRELL, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION

On May 19, 2020 appellant filed a timely appeal from an April 8, 2020 merit decision of 

the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). Pursuant to the Federal Employees’

Compensation Act1(FECA) and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the Board has jurisdiction over 

the merits of this case.

ISSUE

The issue is whether appellant has met his burden of proof to establish an emotional 

condition in the performance of duty, as alleged.

 

1 5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.
2

FACTUAL HISTORY

This case has previously been before the Board.2 The facts and circumstances of the case 

as set forth in the Board’s prior decision are incorporated herein by reference. The relevant facts 

are as follows.

On September 10, 2014 appellant, then a 47-year-old clerk, filed an occupational disease 

claim (Form CA-2) alleging that he sustained emotional conditions, including post-traumatic stress 

disorder, anxiety disorder, and depressive disorder, causally related to factors of his federal 

employment.

3

 He maintained that his medical condition was caused by an incident that was 

handled improperly by management. Appellant stopped work on June 14, 2014.

In a development letter dated September 23, 2014, OWCP requested that appellant submit

additional factual and medical evidence in support of his emotional condition claim. It afforded

him 30 days to submit the requested evidence.

In response, appellant submitted statements prepared in September and October 2014 in 

which he alleged that he sustained stress because a coworker, L.C., falsely accused him on June 11, 

2010 of having placed poison or some other harmful substance in her drink on that date. He 

claimed that he was performing his regular work duties on June 11, 2010 when L.C. made this

accusation. Appellant maintained that L.C. attempted to have him arrested and she later confessed 

that she had made a false accusation. He asserted that management did not properly investigate 

the June 11, 2010 incident and failed to properly discipline L.C., resulting in L.C. returning to the 

same work unit where he worked in 2013.4

Appellant submitted a statement he prepared on July 7, 2010, as well as July 7, 2010

statements from coworkers, which contained similar content. The statements indicated that there

was no support for L.C.’s assertion that poison had been placed in her drink at work. Appellant 

also submitted medical evidence in support of his claim, including an October 15, 2014 attending 

physician’s report (Form CA-20) from Dr. Yazmin Fuentes, a Board-certified psychiatrist, who 

noted that he reported that on June 11, 2010 a coworker falsely accused him of poisoning her drink. 

Dr. Fuentes diagnosed post-traumatic stress disorder, major depression, and anxiety, and checked 

a box marked “Yes” indicating that the diagnosed conditions were caused or aggravated by the 

reported employment activity.

In a September 23, 2014 letter, an employing establishment official challenged appellant’s

emotional condition claim and argued that there was “[n]o fact of injury or causal relationship

established medically.”

In a development letter dated February 4, 2015, OWCP requested that the employing

establishment respond to appellant’s assertions. It afforded the employing establishment 30 days

to reply. In February 27, 2015 statements, V.G. and D.B., appellant’s supervisors, acknowledged 

that L.C. had claimed that someone tampered with her drink at work on June 11, 2010. Both V.G. 

 

2 Docket No. 19-0164 (issued November 13, 2019).

3 Appellant also claimed an elevated cholesterol condition due to work-related stress.

4 Appellant asserted that management wrongly transferred him to another employing establishment facility in 2014. 
3

and D.B. asserted that the June 11, 2010 incident was adequately investigated, and that all 

disciplinary actions relating to it were appropriately carried out. They maintained that, due to a 

January 31, 2013 decision of an arbitrator, management was obligated to allow L.C. to return to 

the work facility where appellant also worked, and that in 2014 he was properly excessed to 

another employing establishment facility due to his low seniority. In her February 27, 2015 

statement, V.G. indicated that a union official had advised that L.C. accused appellant of placing 

something in her drink. She also noted that, in July 2010, L.C. admitted that there was nothing 

placed in her drink at work on June 11, 2010 and that she “made up the story.” V.G. further 

advised that, soon after this retraction, the district attorney for Fond du Lac County, Wisconsin, 

charged L.C. with “obstructing an officer” and she entered an Alford plea to the obstruction charge 

and was sentenced to 12 months of deferred prosecution pending no further criminal activity.

By decision dated March 19, 2015, OWCP denied appellant’s emotional condition claim. 

It determined that he had not submitted sufficient evidence to establish a compensable employment

factor. OWCP found that appellant had not provided sufficient details and corroborating evidence

regarding his allegations.

On April 7, 2015 appellant requested a review of the written record before a representative

of OWCP’s Branch of Hearings and Review. He provided a statement, which was similar to those

previously considered, and provided additional medical evidence.

By decision dated September 25, 2015, OWCP’s hearing representative affirmed the 

March 19, 2015 decision. She determined that appellant had not established a compensable 

employment factor.

On September 20, 2016 appellant, through his then-counsel, requested reconsideration of 

the September 25, 2015 decision. In an accompanying brief dated September 15, 2016, thencounsel argued that the June 11, 2010 incident occurred while appellant was performing his regular 

duties and, therefore, constituted a compensable employment factor under the principles of Lillian 

Cutler.

5

 Appellant submitted additional medical reports, as well as statements from family 

members, which described the June 11, 2010 incident and the impact it had on him. 

By decision dated December 6, 2016, OWCP denied modification of the September 25, 

2015 decision.

On November 27, 2017 appellant, through counsel, requested reconsideration of the 

December 6, 2016 decision. In an accompanying brief dated November 21, 2017, then-counsel 

continued to argue that the June 11, 2010 incident, and the employing establishment’s mishandling 

of it, constituted compensable employment factors. Appellant submitted an August 29, 2016 

report in which Dr. Natalie A. Krah, a Board-certified psychiatrist, discussed his emotional 

condition.

By decision dated May 31, 2018, OWCP denied modification of the December 6, 2016

decision.

 

5 See Lillian Cutler, infra note 11.
4

Appellant appealed to the Board and, by decision dated November 13, 2019,6the Board set 

aside the May 31, 2018 decision and remanded the case to OWCP for further development. The 

Board noted that he had claimed that, while he was performing his regular duties on June 11, 2010, 

L.C. falsely accused him of placing poison in her drink, an action which he believed constituted a 

compensable employment factor. The Board indicated that the employing establishment had 

acknowledged that L.C. had in fact made a false accusation on June 11, 2010, but found that the 

case record remained vague with respect to the precise nature of the accusation and the 

circumstances under which it was made. Given the limited evidence in the case record from the 

employing establishment regarding the nature of the June 11, 2010 incident, the Board directed 

OWCP to request that the employing establishment provide additional evidence regarding the 

specific nature of the June 11, 2010 incident, to be followed by issuance of a de novo decision 

regarding appellant’s emotional condition claim. 

On remand, OWCP sent the employing establishment a January 3, 2020 letter, in which it 

requested the submission of a narrative statement from a knowledgeable supervisor regarding the 

June 11, 2010 work incident between appellant and L.C. where appellant “was falsely accused of 

putting something in [L.C.’s] drink.” It requested that the employing establishment collect and 

submit documents that would corroborate, refute, and/or provide additional insight into the 

June 11, 2010 work incident. 

In a March 20, 2020 e-mail, an employing establishment official, T.P., indicated that 

reference should be made to an attached February 2, 2018 decision of the Equal Employment 

Opportunity Commission (EEOC) in which the employing establishment prevailed on appellant’s 

claim of discrimination (in part based on disability) when he was excessed to the Appleton, 

Wisconsin facility in 2014. She asserted that the EEOC rejected his claim that he was excessed 

because of a June 11, 2010 incident where L.C. falsely accused him of poisoning her. T.P. 

indicated that the EEOC accepted the employing establishment’s evidence demonstrating that 

appellant was excessed because he was the most junior employee and L.C. had more seniority. 

She noted that the employing establishment investigated the June 11, 2010 incident and 

determined that L.C. should be removed for creating a hostile work environment and submitting 

false forms, including a Form CA-1 and PS Form 3971. 

T.P. advised that the employing establishment issued L.C. a notice of removal on 

August 17, 2010 and that the union grieved L.C.’s August 2010 removal. She noted that the 

employing establishment defended L.C.’s removal through arbitration, but the arbitrator ruled in 

L.C.’s favor on January 31, 2013. T.P. indicated that the arbitrator determined that on June 11,

2010, L.C. did believe that her drink had been tampered with, but that no one actually tampered 

with the drink. While the arbitrator concluded that the employing establishment had just cause to 

place L.C. in an off-duty, nonpay status following the incident, the arbitrator found no just cause 

for L.C.’s removal. T.P. advised that, accordingly, L.C. was reinstated without back pay following 

the January 31, 2013 arbitration decision and, due to L.C.’s seniority over appellant, the

reinstatement resulted in appellant being excessed to the Appleton, Wisconsin facility. She 

indicated that, based on the results of its investigation, the employing establishment accepted 

 

6 Supra note 2.
5

appellant’s version of events and removed L.C. to ensure that appellant was not further exposed to 

her behavior. 

T.P. attached a copy of the February 2, 2018 decision in which the EEOC concluded that

the employing establishment did not discriminate against appellant when it excessed him to the 

Appleton, Wisconsin facility in 2014. The EEOC determined that the excessing of appellant was 

legitimate because he was the most junior employee in his work facility. It was noted that 

appellant’s coworker, whom appellant believed falsely accused him of poisoning L.C.’s drink on 

June 11, 2010 had returned to the employing establishment, but was not subject to being excessed 

due to her seniority over appellant. 

By decision dated April 8, 2020, OWCP denied modification of its prior decision, finding 

that appellant had not met his burden of proof to establish an emotional condition in the 

performance of duty, as alleged. It explained that he had not established a compensable 

employment factor. 

LEGAL PRECEDENT

An employee seeking benefits under FECA7 has the burden of proof to establish the 

essential elements of his or her claim, including the fact that the individual is an employee of the 

United States within the meaning of FECA, that the claim was filed within the applicable time 

limitation, that an injury was sustained while in the performance of duty as alleged, and that any 

disability or specific condition for which compensation is claimed is causally related to the 

employment injury.8 These are the essential elements of each and every compensation claim 

regardless of whether the claim is predicated on a traumatic injury or an occupational disease.9

To establish an emotional condition in the performance of duty, a claimant must submit: 

(1) factual evidence identifying an employment factor or incident alleged to have caused or 

contributed to his or her claimed emotional condition; (2) medical evidence establishing that he or 

she has a diagnosed emotional or psychiatric disorder; and (3) rationalized medical opinion 

evidence establishing that the accepted compensable employment factors are causally related to 

the diagnosed emotional condition.10

Workers’ compensation law does not apply to each and every injury or illness that is 

somehow related to an employee’s employment. There are situations where an injury or an illness 

has some connection with the employment, but nevertheless does not come within the concept or 

coverage of workers’ compensation. Where the disability results from an employee’s emotional 

reaction to his or her regular or specially assigned duties or to a requirement imposed by the 

 

7 Supra note 1.

8 A.J., Docket No. 18-1116 (issued January 23, 2019); Gary J. Watling, 52 ECAB 278 (2001).

9 20 C.F.R. § 10.115(e); M.K., Docket No. 18-1623 (issued April 10, 2019); T.O., Docket No. 18-1012 (issued 

October 29, 2018); Michael E. Smith, 50 ECAB 313 (1999).

10 See S.K., Docket No. 18-1648 (issued March 14, 2019); M.C., Docket No. 14-1456 (issued December 24, 2014); 

Debbie J. Hobbs, 43 ECAB 135 (1991); Donna Faye Cardwell, 41 ECAB 730 (1990).
6

employment, the disability comes within the coverage of FECA.11 On the other hand, the disability 

is not covered where it results from such factors as an employee’s fear of a reduction-in-force or 

his or her frustration from not being permitted to work in a particular environment or to hold a 

particular position.12

A claimant has the burden of proof to establish by the weight of the reliable, probative, and 

substantial evidence that the condition for which he or she claims compensation was caused or 

adversely affected by employment factors.13 This burden includes the submission of a detailed 

description of the employment factors or conditions which he or she believes caused or adversely 

affected a condition for which compensation is claimed, and a rationalized medical opinion 

relating the claimed condition to compensable employment factors.14

In cases involving emotional conditions, the Board has held that, when working conditions 

are alleged as factors in causing a condition or disability, OWCP, as part of its adjudicatory 

function, must make findings of fact regarding which working conditions are deemed compensable 

factors of employment and are to be considered by a physician when providing an opinion on 

causal relationship, and which working conditions are not deemed factors of employment and may 

not be considered.15 If a claimant does implicate a factor of employment, OWCP should then 

determine whether the evidence of record substantiates that factor. When the matter asserted is a 

compensable factor of employment and the evidence of record establishes the truth of the matter 

asserted, it must base its decision on an analysis of the medical evidence.16

ANALYSIS

The Board finds that appellant has established a compensable employment factor with 

regard to a false accusation made against him by a coworker on June 11, 2010. 

The Board notes that appellant claimed that, while he was performing his regular duties on 

June 11, 2010, L.C., a coworker, falsely accused him of placing poison in her drink and he asserted 

that, therefore, he had established a compensable employment factor under the principles of Lillian 

Cutler.

17

 Appellant also claimed that management committed error and abuse with respect to

various administrative/personnel matters.

By decision dated November 13, 2019, the Board set aside OWCP’s May 31, 2018 decision 

denying appellant’s claim and remanded the case to OWCP for further development. With respect 

to the June 11, 2010 incident, the Board indicated that the employing establishment had 

 

11 See Lillian Cutler, 28 ECAB 125 (1976).

12 A.E., Docket No. 18-1587 (issued March 13, 2019); Gregorio E. Conde, 52 ECAB 410 (2001).

13 B.S., Docket No. 19-0378 (issued July 10, 2019); Pamela R. Rice, 38 ECAB 838, 841 (1987).

14 P.B., Docket No. 17-1912 (issued December 28, 2018); Effie O. Morris, 44 ECAB 470, 473-74 (1993).

15 See O.G., Docket No. 18-0359 (issued August 7, 2019); Norma L. Blank, 43 ECAB 384, 389-90 (1992).

16 Id.

17 See supra note 5.
7

acknowledged that L.C. had in fact made a false accusation on June 11, 2010, but found that the 

case record remained vague with respect the precise nature of the accusation and the circumstances 

under which it was made. Given the limited evidence in the case record from the employing 

establishment regarding the nature of the June 11, 2010 incident, the Board directed OWCP to 

request that the employing establishment provide additional evidence regarding the specific nature 

of the June 11, 2010 incident, to be followed by issuance of a de novo decision regarding 

appellant’s emotional condition claim. On remand, OWCP conducted further development of the 

June 11, 2010 incident involving him and L.C. and then issued an April 8, 2020 decision denying 

his emotional claim finding that he had not established a compensable employment factor.

The Board finds that appellant has, in fact, established a compensable employment factor 

with respect to L.C.’s false accusation that he placed poison in her drink at work on June 11, 2010. 

During the evidentiary development carried out after the Board remanded the case, OWCP 

received evidence, including a February 2, 2018 EEOC decision and a March 20, 2020 e-mail from 

T.P., an employing establishment official, which clarified the nature of the June 11, 2010 incident. 

T.P. indicated that the employing establishment accepted appellant’s version of events of the 

June 11, 2010 incident, i.e., that L.C. made a false accusation of placing poison in appellant’s drink 

during work hours, and that the employing establishment took action to remove L.C. from the 

workplace to ensure that appellant was not further exposed to her behavior.18 TP. advised that the 

employing establishment issued L.C. an August 17, 2010 notice of removal for, inter alia, creating 

a hostile work environment with respect to the June 11, 2010 incident. 

The Board finds that the June 11, 2010 incident occurred while appellant was performing

his regular work duties, and constitutes an employment factor under the principles of the Lillian 

Cutler case which dictate that disability from a reaction to a regular or specially assigned work 

duty or to a requirement imposed by the employment comes within the coverage of FECA.19 The 

Board has recognized that there may be coverage under FECA when friction and strain arise as an 

inherent part of the conditions of employment, or when work brings employees together and 

creates the conditions that result in an altercation or incident.20 In the present case, the work setting 

 

18 Previously, V.G. had advised that L.C. admitted in July 2010 that there was nothing placed in her drink at work 

on June 11, 2010 and that she “made up the story.” V.G. further noted that, soon after this retraction, the district 

attorney for Fond du Lac County, Wisconsin, charged L.C. with “obstructing an officer” and she entered an Alford 

plea to the obstruction charge and was sentenced to 12 months of deferred prosecution pending no further criminal 

activity.

19 See supra, note 5.

20 Under the friction and strain doctrine, the fact that employees with their individual characteristics (emotions, 

temper, etc.) are brought together in the workplace creates situations leading to conflicts which may result in physical 

or emotional injuries. Because these conflicts have their origin in the employment they arise out of and in the course 

of employment even though they have no relevance to the employee’s tasks. In other words, a conflict between 

employees involving a nonwork topic may be found to have occurred in the performance of duty because the 

employment brought the employees together and created the conditions which resulted in the conflict. However, the 

friction and strain doctrine does not apply to privately motivated quarrels or disputes imported from outside the 

employment. See A.B., Docket No. 15-0288 (issued May 21, 2015); F.S., Docket No. 10-1398 (issued May 12, 2011). 

See also Federal (FECA) Procedure Manual, Part 2 -- Claims, Performance of Duty, Chapter 2.804.12b (March 1994, 

January 1997).
8

brought together appellant and L.C., and created the conditions that resulted in the events of 

June 11, 2010.

21

 

In its prior decision dated November 13, 2019, the Board noted that appellant alleged 

wrongdoing with respect to administrative or personnel matters, but found that he had not 

submitted sufficient evidence to establish these allegations. The Board indicated that appellant 

claimed that management mishandled the investigation of the June 11, 2010 incident, had not 

properly disciplined L.C. with respect to the accusation made against him on June 11, 2010, and 

had improperly allowed L.C. to return to work in his work unit. The Board also noted that 

appellant asserted that management wrongly transferred him on a later date to another employing 

establishment facility. The Board concluded that he had not established employment factors with 

respect to administrative/personnel matters because he had not shown that the employing 

establishment committed error or abuse in carrying them out.

22

 

The Board notes that the aforementioned February 2, 2018 EEOC decision, submitted after 

the Board’s November 13, 2019 decision, found that the employing establishment did not 

discriminate against appellant when it excessed him to the Appleton, Wisconsin facility in 2014. 

Given that appellant has not substantiated error or abuse committed by the employing 

establishment in connection with any of the above-noted administrative/personnel matters, he has 

not established a compensable employment factor with respect to these matters.

In the present case, appellant has established a compensable factor of employment with 

respect to the false accusation made against him by a coworker at work on June 11, 2010. 

However, his burden of proof is not discharged by the fact that he has established an employment 

factor which may give rise to a compensable disability under FECA. To establish his occupational 

disease claim for an emotional condition, appellant must also submit rationalized medical evidence 

establishing that he has an emotional condition and that such conditions are causally related to the 

accepted compensable employment factor.23 Therefore, the case shall be remanded to enable 

OWCP to review the medical evidence of record and to determine whether he has established that 

his emotional condition is causally related to this compensable employment factor.24 Following 

this and such further development as may be deemed necessary, OWCP shall issue a de novo

decision on appellant’s emotional condition claim.

CONCLUSION

The Board finds that appellant has established a compensable employment factor with 

respect to a false accusation made against him by a coworker at work on June 11, 2010, i.e., that 

he poisoned her drink. The case is remanded to OWCP for further development.

 

21 The Board notes that there is no indication in the case record that the events of June 11, 2010 resulted from a 

dispute imported from outside the employment.

22 M.S., Docket No. 19-1589 (issued October 7, 2020); William H. Fortner, 49 ECAB 324 (1998). 

23 See supra note 10.

24 See M.D., Docket No. 15-1796 (issued September 7, 2016).
9

ORDER

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the April 8, 2020 decision of the Office of Workers’

Compensation Programs is affirmed in part and set aside in part. The case is remanded to OWCP 

for further proceedings consistent with this decision of the Board.

Issued: April 14, 2021

Washington, DC

Janice B. Askin, Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Patricia H. Fitzgerald, Alternate Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Valerie D. Evans-Harrell, Alternate Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board