NUMBER 13-11-083-CR

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI -EDINBURG 

 

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellant,

v.

RUBEN V. CASTILLO, Appellee.

 

On appeal from the County Court at Law No. 4

of NuecesCounty, Texas.

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before JusticesRodriguez, Benavides, and Vela 

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Vela

This is a State’s appeal challenging the trial court’s order granting a motion to 

suppress. By two issues, the State urges that: (1) the police officer had reasonable 
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suspicion to stop a vehicle driven by appellee Ruben V. Castillo; and (2) the police officer 

properly detained Castillo under the community-care doctrine. We agree with the State's 

first issue and reverse and remand.

I. BACKGROUND

AppelleeRuben V. Castillo was charged by complaint with the offense of operating 

a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 

49.04(a) (West Supp. 2011). Officer King of the Nueces County Sheriff’s Department 

testified at the motion to suppress hearing that Castillo was traveling westbound on FM 

3386 at about midnight. She observed Castillo’s vehicle traveling approximately thirty 

miles per hour in an area where the speed limit was sixty-five miles per hour, and Castillo 

was traveling in the middle of both lanes. Castillo's vehicle was about 150 to 200 feet 

from the officer when she made the stop. There were no other vehicles on the road at 

that time. According to Officer King, Castillo ―was on the right-hand lane, and went over 

into the left, back to the right, went over to the shoulder a tad bit and then back over to the 

left and then he—he was driving in the middle of the two lanes going westbound.‖ Officer 

King testified that the posted night-time speed limit where the stop occurred was sixty-five 

miles per hour at night, but Castillo was traveling at about thirty miles per hour when the 

stop occurred. According to Officer King, at one point, the vehicle went over partially 

onto the shoulder of the road. At another point, the vehicle went into the left-hand lane. 

Officer King testified that she had been with the sheriff's department for about a 

year, was a certified police officer, and had been working traffic as well as taking calls for 

only a few months when the stop occurred. Officer King opined that she believed she 
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could lawfully stop someone from driving too slow because ―at that point with everything 

we had put together he’s—you know, he could be a danger to himself. We don’t know 

what the situation is.‖ The trial court, after hearing evidence, granted Castillo’s motion to 

suppress.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, an appellate court must 

apply a standard of abuse of discretion and overturn the trial court's ruling only if it is 

outside the zone of reasonable disagreement. Martinez v. State, 348 S.W.3d 919, 922

(Tex. Crim. App. 2011); State v. Dixon, 206 S.W.3d 587, 590 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).

The appellate court must apply a bifurcated standard of review, which gives almost total 

deference to a trial court's determination of historic facts and mixed questions of law and 

factsthat rely upon the credibility of a witness, but we apply a de novo standard of review 

to pure questions of law and mixed questions that do not depend on credibility 

determinations. Martinez, 348 S.W.3d at 923; Guzman v. State,955S.W.2d85, 87–89

(Tex. Crim. App. 1997).

Officer King was the only witness to testify during Castillo's evidentiary hearing. 

The historical facts elicited from the testimony are not at issue; the issue is whether these 

uncontroverted facts created a reasonable suspicion such that the officer was justified in 

initiating the stop. See Martinez, 348 S.W.3d at 923. Thus, we review the record de 

novo. Id. 
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III. APPLICABLE LAW

A law enforcement officer may stop and briefly detain a person for investigative 

purposes on less information than is constitutionally required for a probable cause arrest. 

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968). In order to stop or briefly detain an individual, an 

officer must be able to articulate something more than an inchoate and unparticularized 

suspicion or hunch. Id. at 27. The reasonableness must be examined in terms of the 

totality of the circumstances. Foster v. State, 326 S.W.3d 609, 613 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2010); Woods v. State, 956 S.W.3d 33, 38(Tex. Crim. App. 1997). The reasonableness 

of the detention will be justified when the detaining officer has specific, articulable facts, 

which, when taken in conjunction withrational inferences from those facts, lead the officer 

to conclude that the person has been or soon will be engaged in criminal activity. Curtis 

v. State, 238 S.W.3d 376, 380–81 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). 

IV. ANALYSIS

The trial court had before it uncontroverted evidence that the stop took place at 

midnight; that Castillo was not only weaving within a single lane, but was in the right-hand 

lane, and went over into the left, back to the right, went over to the shoulder, then back 

over to the left; and finally that he was driving in the middle of the two lanes going 

westbound. The testifying officer had not worked for the sheriff’s department for long, 

but was a certified officer. The officer also noted that Castillo was going thirty miles per 

hour in a sixty-five mile per hour zone. 

The trial court made findings that: (1) Officer King initiated the stop around 

midnight; (2) the vehicle Castillo was driving at a "speed of about thirty mph and there was 
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no minimal speed limit except the only speed limit was up to seventy mph during the day 

time and sixty-five mph at night;" (3) Castillo was in the right-hand lane and he went over 

into the left, back to the right, went on the improved shoulder, back to the left and was 

driving in the middle of the two lanes going westbound; (4) Officer King was approaching 

Castillo about 150 to 200 feet away when the officer saw him; (5) when the stop was 

initiated, no other vehicles were on the road; (6) Castillo did not come close to causing an 

accident at the time he was stopped; (7) the officer agreed that it was ―fair to say" that if 

Castillo was about to turn on McKinzie Road he would have thus slowed down; and (8) 

the court found no reasonable suspicion to make a stop because no hazard existed. 

Erratic or unsafe driving may furnish a sufficient basis for a reasonable suspicion 

that the driver is intoxicated even absent evidence of violation of a specific traffic law. 

See Cook v. State, 63 S.W.3d 924, 929 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. ref'd) 

(holding that while erratic driving may not have constituted a traffic violation, it may 

provide reasonable suspicion that hewas driving while intoxicated); McQuarters v. State,

58 S.W.3d 250, 255 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2001, pet. ref'd) (stating that the State is not 

required to prove a defendant violated a traffic law. Even if officer's testimony failed to 

establish reasonable suspicion that the defendant violated a traffic law, it did raise 

sufficient facts to justify a stop based on reasonable suspicion that he was intoxicated); 

Gajewski v. State, 944 S.W.2d 450, 453 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no pet.) 

(finding that although the defendant's driving may not have constituted a traffic violation, 

that did not negate a stop based on reasonable suspicion that defendant was 

intoxicated). Time of day is also a relevant factor in determining reasonable suspicion. 
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Foster, 326 S.W.3d at 613. 

Here, under the applicable standard of review, there were articulable facts, 

combined with rational inferences from those facts, based on the officer’s experience, 

that justified a reasonable suspicion that Castillo was driving while intoxicated. See Ortiz 

v. State, 930 S.W.2d 849, 853, 856 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1996, no pet.) (noting that officers' 

observation of defendant's vehicle that weaved left, hit the grassy median, kicked up 

some dirt and grass, and then continued to weave within his lane two or three times gave 

them reasonable suspicion that he was driving while intoxicated); Fox v. State, 900 

S.W.2d 345, 347 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1995, pet. dism'd) (holding that officer's 

observation of defendant's vehicle's speed fluctuating between forty and fifty-five mph 

and weaving within his own lane provided sufficient specific facts to create a reasonable 

suspicion that some activity out of the ordinary was occurring or had occurred). 

Therefore, we conclude that the trial court erred in granting Castillo's motion to 

suppress for lack of reasonable suspicion that he was driving while intoxicated. 

Considering the uncontested facts, the totality of the circumstances, and the inferences 

therefrom, we hold that the trial court erred in granting the suppression motion. We 

sustain the State’s first issue.

By issue two, the State argued that Castillo’s "peculiar" driving allowed the officer 

to detain Castillo under the community care-taking doctrine. Because our ruling with 

respect to the first issue is dispositive of this appeal, we will not address the State’s 

second issue. See TEX.R.APP.P. 47.1. 
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V. CONCLUSION

We reverse the trial court's judgment and remand for proceedings consistent with 

this opinion. 

ROSE VELA

Justice

Do not publish.

TEX.R.APP.P. 47.2(b).

Delivered and filed the 

16th day of February, 2012.