In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

Nos. 19-1441 & 19-1547 

GERALD WINFIELD, 

Petitioner-Appellee, Cross-Appellant, 

v.

STEPHANIE DORETHY, Warden, 

Respondent-Appellant, Cross-Appellee. 

____________________ 

Appeals from the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. 

No. 1:10-cv-04878 — Sharon Johnson Coleman, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED JANUARY 7, 2020 — DECIDED APRIL 13, 2020 

____________________ 

Before BRENNAN, SCUDDER, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges. 

ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. Gerald Winfield confessed to police 

that he shot Jarlon Garrett. Based on that confession, a judge 

on the Circuit Court of Cook County convicted Winfield of 

attempted murder. Winfield was also accused of killing 

Dominick Stovall in the same shooting, but the trial judge acquitted him of that charge because no credible witness had 

placed Winfield at the scene of the crime and his confession 

did not mention Stovall. The judge rejected Winfield’s 
2 Nos. 19-1441 & 19-1547 

argument that his confession had been coerced, as well as his 

half-hearted alibi defense, and sentenced him to thirty years’ 

imprisonment. In his direct appeal, Winfield’s new counsel 

raised one unsuccessful argument—that the judge had 

abused his discretion at sentencing. 

These appeals require us to consider the performance of 

Winfield’s trial and appellate counsel. The Illinois state courts, 

on post-conviction review, concluded that trial counsel’s 

presentation of Winfield’s alibi was not so deficient that it violated the Constitution, but they did not address the performance of appellate counsel to any meaningful degree. The 

district court, therefore, applied the stringent and deferential 

standard of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 

(AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), to Winfield’s claim that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel and denied that 

part of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. On the matter of 

appellate counsel, the district court concluded that AEDPA 

did not apply because the claim had not been “adjudicated on 

the merits in State court,” id., but had instead been overlooked. It considered the claim without any deference to the 

state courts’ denial of relief. Through that lens, and although 

it believed it to be a close case, the court found appellate counsel had rendered ineffective assistance by omitting an argument that there was insufficient evidence to convict because 

Winfield’s confession was uncorroborated. 

Both parties have appealed. The state argues that the district court erred in granting relief on the appellate counsel 

claim; Winfield contends that the court erred in denying relief 

on the trial counsel claim. We affirm the judgment in part and 

reverse it in part, as we conclude that Winfield is not entitled 

to habeas corpus relief under either theory. 
Nos. 19-1441 & 19-1547 3

I. Background 

A. Trial and Direct Appeal 

On the afternoon of October 17, 1998, Garrett and Stovall 

were walking on West Huron Street, in Chicago, when someone shot at them. Stovall was killed and Garrett, injured, 

though who shot them—or even how many people shot 

them—was not immediately clear. Police arrested Winfield as 

the primary suspect. He ultimately was indicted for the murder of Stovall, the attempted murder of Garrett, and lesser included offenses. He proceeded to a bench trial. 

The state’s first eyewitness—and “[t]he only real credible 

witness” according to the trial judge—was Lonnie Hartman. 

Hartman had been sitting in his car, facing north, when he 

saw a black SUV traveling southbound on North Central Park 

Avenue. The SUV stopped at the corner of Huron, and a man 

exited the vehicle’s passenger side. The man shot at Stovall 

and Garrett before reentering the car and driving off. Hartman could not identify the shooter, though he described him 

as at least six feet tall and about 25 years old. Winfield was 

only 5ʹ7ʺ and 19 at the time of the shooting. Consistent with 

that difference, Hartman denied that Winfield was the shooter 

he had seen, though he declined to rule out the possibility that 

there were other shooters he could not see. 

In contrast to his assessment of Hartman, the trial judge 

described the testimony of the state’s second witness, Lorenzo 

Curry, as “worthless.” Curry said he knew Winfield, Garrett, 

and Stovall from playing dice with the three of them about a 

month before the shooting. At that dice game, Winfield’s 

brother, Terrance, had bumped into Stovall’s arm, causing 

him to drop the dice into a bad roll and leading to a fight. On 
4 Nos. 19-1441 & 19-1547 

the day of the shooting, Curry was sitting on a porch near the 

intersection of Huron and Central Park. He, too, testified that 

he saw a black SUV stop at the corner, but he saw at least two 

shooters exit: Winfield and another man. Both men returned 

to the car after the shooting. Few details of this testimony 

matched what Curry had told police or the grand jury, so the 

trial judge noted his “extensive impeachment,” among other 

credibility problems. 

The trial judge described the testimony of the last witness, 

Garrett, the surviving victim, as “not much better” than 

Curry’s. Garrett spoke about the dice game in terms like 

Curry’s, and said he also saw a black SUV pull up at the corner of Huron and Central Park before Winfield emerged, began shooting, and hit Garrett twice, in the hip and arm. The 

trial judge did not credit Garrett’s identification largely because he had told police after the shooting that he did not 

know the shooter, who he said had returned to the car. 

Weeks after the crime, Garrett and Curry both identified 

Winfield through a photo array and line-up conducted by a 

detective. The detective testified to these identifications, as 

well as a custodial statement that Winfield gave. An Assistant 

State’s Attorney had written down the statement, Winfield 

had signed it, and at trial, the detective read it into the record. 

In the statement, Winfield explained that Terrance had 

bumped into Stovall at the dice game, leading to a fight. Winfield thought he and Stovall had mended their relationship 

until a few weeks later, when members of Garrett and 

Stovall’s gang beat Terrance. By the day of the shooting, he 

had started carrying a gun because Garrett had shot at him 

recently. When members of his gang offered him a ride in a 

black SUV, Winfield joined them as they drove southbound 
Nos. 19-1441 & 19-1547 5

on Central Park until the car stopped at the corner of Huron. 

There, Winfield spotted Garrett and Stovall. He said that he 

then exited the vehicle and started shooting at Garrett (without mentioning Stovall) while another person fired in the 

same direction. Contrary to all witnesses’ testimony, though, 

he stated that the car drove off without him, so he had to flee 

on foot. 

Winfield’s statement also asserted he had voluntarily 

given it based on no promises, and that the detective and ASA 

had treated him well. He testified otherwise at trial and said 

he had been abused and the ASA had promised that they 

would release him if he signed some papers (which he did 

without reading them). The detective and ASA denied these 

assertions. 

When his trial counsel asked him where he was on the day 

of the shooting, Winfield responded, “I probably say I was at 

home,” and denied being involved in a shooting. Counsel did 

not follow up on this testimony and no other evidence was 

introduced to support it. Winfield otherwise confirmed 

through his testimony that he and Terrance had argued with 

Stovall at the dice game. 

As the trial judge summed the evidence up, “no credible 

witness” placed Winfield at the scene. Given this gap and the 

open question of how many shooters there were, the judge 

had doubts that Winfield was responsible for Stovall’s murder, either as the killer or on an accountability theory. So, he 

acquitted Winfield of all charges relating to Stovall. 

Garrett’s attempted murder was different, however, and 

the difference was Winfield’s confession. As the judge put it, 

the lack of a credible witness was not a problem because he 
6 Nos. 19-1441 & 19-1547 

had Winfield’s “assurance he was present.” The judge declined to find that law enforcement had coerced his confession, reasoning that Winfield was too intelligent to believe 

that police would let him go just for signing papers. 

The judge framed the remaining question as whether there 

was enough evidence to convict based on the statement, “or 

stated differently, whether the State has proven the corpus delicti of any crimes that this statement confesses.” 

The corpus delicti of an offense is simply proof apart from 

a confession that a crime occurred. See United States v. Kerley, 

838 F.2d 932, 939 (7th Cir. 1988). Under common law, proof of 

the corpus delicti was required for conviction based on a confession, but that rule no longer holds weight in federal courts 

or those of many states. Id. at 940. In Illinois, however, the 

common law rule maintains its vitality. See People v. Lara, 983 

N.E.2d 959, 964 (Ill. 2012), as modified on denial of rehʹg (2013). 

The trial judge understood the corpus delicti rule to require that the elements of attempted first-degree murder—

that Winfield “intended unjustifiably to take a life”—be 

proved with evidence “outside of the confession of the defendant or aliunde the defendant’s confession.” The judge 

saw this proof in the mere fact that Garrett had been shot 

twice. The judge continued, however, and found the necessary intent also in the statement itself, which described Winfield’s conflict with Garrett that led him to carry a gun. From 

these admissions, the judge said, “no other conclusion can be 

drawn but that he intended to kill him.” Accordingly, the 

judge convicted Winfield of attempted murder. 

At sentencing a few months later, the trial judge opined at 

length about sentencing theories and described rehabilitation 
Nos. 19-1441 & 19-1547 7

as “almost a joke.” Still, he emphasized, he was “fully aware” 

that he had “to take into consideration the rehabilitative potential of the defendant.” The judge, however, thought this 

potential rested “somewhere between nil and zero” and sentenced Winfield to 30 years’ imprisonment. 

Winfield obtained new appellate counsel, who challenged 

only the judge’s sentencing decision. He contended that the 

judge had not weighed Winfield’s potential for rehabilitation. 

The Illinois Appellate Court rejected this argument, pointing 

to the judge’s express statements that he had considered Winfield’s rehabilitative potential and simply found it lacking. 

The Illinois Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. 

B. State Post-Conviction Review 

Winfield soon filed a petition for post-conviction review, 

alleging he had been deprived of the effective assistance of 

appellate counsel in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth 

Amendments. In particular, he criticized counsel for not raising an argument based on the sufficiency of the evidence or 

the corpus delicti. After some procedural hiccups (including 

a mistaken dismissal), Winfield filed an amended petition 

raising three new claims relating to both his trial and appellate counsel. He alleged trial counsel was ineffective for not 

moving to quash his arrest warrant and suppress his confession, and for failing to interview, investigate, or call alibi witnesses—his family. Regarding appellate counsel, his 

amended petition claimed counsel had overlooked “obvious 

and significant issues ... such as, sufficiency of evidence.” 

Winfield attached to this amended petition affidavits from 

his family members, attesting that on the date of the shooting 

Winfield was sleeping at their shared home. He also attached 
8 Nos. 19-1441 & 19-1547 

his own affidavits, though neither related to his alibi. One attested to the truth of the contents of his first petition (which, 

again, addressed only appellate counsel), and the other said 

that he had told trial counsel his confession had been coerced. 

The Circuit Court of Cook County held an evidentiary 

hearing solely on the claim that trial counsel failed to investigate alibi witnesses. Winfield himself did not testify at the 

hearing, but his family members did. His aunt recalled the 

day of the shooting because it was Sweetest Day. She had 

spent the day preparing her daughter for a homecoming 

dance and saw Winfield sleeping in his room until she left for 

the dance that evening. She told the court that she had given 

Winfield’s trial counsel this information (though she could 

not recall when), but counsel had not asked her to testify. 

Winfield’s mother offered a similar story. She was helping her 

niece get ready for the dance and saw Winfield asleep at the 

time of the shooting. She testified that she told this to trial 

counsel shortly after retaining him, but counsel “didn’t respond well with it” and told her “he was going to do it the 

way he wanted to.” 

The court next heard from Winfield’s trial counsel. As this 

hearing took place about seven years after the trial, counsel 

could not remember many details about his preparation for 

the case. When the state asked counsel if Winfield had ever 

told him of an alibi, counsel responded that Winfield had always denied he did the shooting: “the problem was he did 

mention an alibi”—a different one. Winfield had thought he 

might have been at a store at the time of the shooting. Counsel 

investigated that story but found it wanting. Winfield’s family 

had produced a receipt with a printed time that did not line 

up with the shooting. Counsel could not recall if he spoke 
Nos. 19-1441 & 19-1547 9

with Winfield’s aunt, but he “specifically” did not remember 

speaking with Winfield’s mother. Had he been made aware of 

a verifiable alibi, he explained, he would have pursued it, 

even post-trial. 

The Circuit Court denied Winfield’s petition for post-conviction relief. Applying the two-pronged analysis of Strickland 

v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the court concluded that 

Winfield had not demonstrated deficient performance of trial 

counsel and did not reach the second prong, whether he was 

prejudiced. The court found that neither Winfield nor his family had told counsel of his home alibi, and so counsel could 

not have been ineffective for failing to present witnesses to 

support that story. Even assuming counsel had been aware of 

Winfield’s alibi and the witnesses, the court continued, it 

nonetheless would have found that the decision not to call impeachable family members was reasonable. 

Moving on to appellate counsel, the Circuit Court mistakenly framed Winfield’s claim to be “that appellate counsel 

was ineffective for not raising the issue of trial counsel’s own 

incompetence.” The omission of this argument was neither 

deficient nor prejudicial, the court said, because “the underlying claims of ineffectiveness lack support.” The court did 

not mention sufficiency of the evidence or any other appellate 

argument independent of trial counsel. 

Winfield appealed the post-conviction decision raising 

what he identified as a single issue: whether the Circuit Court 

had erred in finding trial counsel was not ineffective. Nevertheless, he maintained that appellate counsel had overlooked 

“significant issues, such as, sufficiency of evidence.” 
10 Nos. 19-1441 & 19-1547 

The Illinois Appellate Court upheld the Circuit Court’s 

findings that Winfield had simply never informed trial counsel he was at home at the time of the shooting, and that, even 

if he had, it was reasonable not to call family members as witnesses. It further found no prejudice in light of “the overwhelming evidence” of Winfield’s guilt, namely “his inculpatory statement, and the two eyewitness identifications of him 

as the shooter.” On the issue of appellate counsel, the Appellate Court treated Winfield’s claim as wholly derivative of the 

claim regarding trial counsel, just as the Circuit Court had. 

Thus, both arguments failed together. The Illinois Supreme 

Court again denied leave to appeal. 

C. District Court and Prior Appeal 

At this point, Winfield proceeded to federal court seeking 

a writ of habeas corpus. His petition continued his two real 

claims: first, trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present 

alibi witnesses, and second, appellate counsel was ineffective 

for failing to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence. 

The state answered the petition and asserted that, although deference was owed to the state court’s resolution of 

the first claim under AEDPA, the second had neither been adjudicated on the merits in state court, nor procedurally defaulted, and so the district court was tasked with reviewing 

that claim de novo. Accepting this concession, the court permitted discovery, including a deposition of appellate counsel. 

Appellate counsel, like trial counsel before him, had limited memory of his case preparation, which, at that point, was 

nearly a decade and a half ago. He based most of his recollection on what he had written in the brief itself, as he thought it 

accurately reflected what was in his mind at the time. He 
Nos. 19-1441 & 19-1547 11

suspected that an argument based on the sufficiency of the 

evidence would have failed considering the trial judge’s finding that the confession was voluntary. Moreover, he noted 

that there was “physical evidence supporting the confession 

because Mr. Garrett ... was, in fact, shot.” And though the witnesses disagreed on the details, counsel thought there was 

some corroborating statements in that they all testified to seeing the crime occur. Altogether, he suspected he had believed 

at the time that there existed only a remote possibility of overturning the conviction based on sufficiency of the evidence. 

Winfield thought otherwise and pressed his claim that appellate counsel was ineffective for not challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. The thrust of his argument was that 

the Illinois courts were searching in their review of convictions and would have acquitted him on these facts, even if a 

federal court would not have. Winfield further contended that 

a reasonable attorney would have challenged the state’s proof 

of the corpus delicti. The record, in his view, did not contain 

evidence that anyone had intended to kill Garrett (as opposed 

to his merely being hit by two stray bullets). Moreover, he 

posited that his confession was uncorroborated, because no 

one had asked Garrett about the time he shot at Winfield, supposedly prompting Winfield to carry a gun. 

The district court concluded that appellate counsel was ineffective for not raising a corpus delicti argument, though not 

the same one Winfield pressed. It summarized Illinois’s corpus delicti rule as requiring the state to both establish that a 

crime occurred and corroborate the confession. The court accepted the trial judge’s logic, contrary to Winfield’s argument, 

that the mere fact that Garrett was shot twice was proof that 

an attempted murder occurred. But, the court concluded, the 
12 Nos. 19-1441 & 19-1547 

evidence did not corroborate the confession and connect Winfield to that attempt. Hartman—the sole credible witness—

had testified that there was one shooter, not two; this shooter 

was not Winfield; and the shooter left the scene by car (not on 

foot, as Winfield said he had). Though the court accepted that 

“tangential components” of Winfield’s statement had been 

corroborated, it concluded there was a reasonable probability 

that this was not enough under Illinois law and granted the 

petition. 

The state moved to amend the judgment, arguing that the 

district court had misconstrued Illinois’s corpus delicti rule, 

which it said requires proof only that a crime occurred before 

the state can use a confession to convict. The court acknowledged it was a close case, with no clear rule and authorities 

going each way, but was convinced its result was still right. 

The state also tried to walk back its concession that 

AEDPA deference did not apply to the appellate counsel 

claim, but the district court deemed the argument waived. On 

the state’s appeal, we reversed that determination and remanded after concluding that the standard of review owed 

under AEDPA is not waivable. Winfield v. Dorethy (Winfield I), 

871 F.3d 555, 560 (7th Cir. 2017). 

On remand, Winfield maintained that AEDPA did not apply to his appellate counsel claim. Regardless of the state’s 

earlier concession, he argued that both state courts had in fact 

overlooked his arguments about appellate counsel and not 

adjudicated them on the merits. He also revived his trial counsel claim, contending he was entitled to relief despite AEDPA. 

The district court denied the petition insofar as it sought a 

new trial based on ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The 
Nos. 19-1441 & 19-1547 13

court deferred to the Illinois courts’ finding that Winfield had 

never told counsel that he was home at the time of the shooting and that one factual finding defeated Winfield’s claim. 

Moving back to appellate counsel, the district court agreed 

that the state courts had not adjudicated the claim on the merits. It found that this was the rare case where a petitioner had 

rebutted the strong presumption that state courts adjudicate 

all claims on their merits. Both state courts had “inadvertently 

overlooked” Winfield’s appellate counsel claim, and so the 

district court concluded it would still review the claim de 

novo. It reached the same result it had before and ordered the 

state to reopen Winfield’s appeal. 

The state appealed the grant of relief. The district court 

granted Winfield a certificate of appealability on the denial of 

his trial counsel claim, and he cross-appealed. 

II. Standard of Review 

We start by laying down some groundwork applicable to 

both appeals before diving into the specifics of each one. We 

review de novo the district court’s decisions on a petition for 

writ of habeas corpus. Schmidt v. Foster, 911 F.3d 469, 476 (7th 

Cir. 2018) (en banc), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 96 (2019). 

Under AEDPA, a federal court can grant a petition for writ 

of habeas corpus after a state-court adjudication of the merits 

only if that adjudication “(1) resulted in a decision that was 

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, 

clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision 

that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts 

in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)–(2); Schmidt, 911 F.3d at 476. This 
14 Nos. 19-1441 & 19-1547 

is a high standard. Unreasonable means more than incorrect. 

Rather, the state court’s ruling must be “so lacking in justification that there was an error ... beyond any possibility of 

fairminded disagreement.” Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 12, 19–20 

(2013) (alteration in original) (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 

562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011)). To be subject to that deference, 

though, the claims must have been “adjudicated on the merits” in state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 

449, 472 (2009). 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), provides the 

clearly established federal law for both of Winfield’s claims. 

A petitioner raising a Strickland claim is required to demonstrate two things. First, he must show that counsel provided 

constitutionally deficient performance, meaning counsel 

made errors so serious he “was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Id.

at 687. In assessing counsel’s performance, courts are expected to “indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Id. at 689. Under AEDPA, a federal court must be 

“doubly deferential” and give a deferential look at counsel’s 

performance through the “deferential lens” of AEDPA. Cullen 

v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 190 (2011) (quoting Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 121 n.2 (2009)). Second, the petitioner 

must show that this deficient performance prejudiced his defense—meaning there is a “reasonable probability that, but 

for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 

Failing to prove either element defeats a petitioner’s claim. Id.

at 697. 
Nos. 19-1441 & 19-1547 15

III. Winfield’s Appeal – Trial Counsel 

We now turn to Winfield’s appeal. Winfield concedes that 

AEDPA applies to his claim of ineffective assistance of trial 

counsel. We conclude that he cannot overcome the double 

layer of deference we owe to the state court’s finding that 

counsel performed reasonably. Winfield fails to identify any 

basis to reject the state court’s presumptively valid factual 

finding that Winfield never told counsel that he was at home 

at the time of the shooting. 

Winfield asserts that the state court’s decision was “based 

on an unreasonable determination of the facts.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(d)(2). We start with the presumption that a state court’s 

determination of a fact is correct. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). To rebut that presumption, a petitioner must show that the finding 

was unreasonable by clear and convincing evidence. Id.; Janusiak v. Cooper, 937 F.3d 880, 888 (7th Cir. 2019). A finding 

cannot be unreasonable if “reasonable minds reviewing the 

record might disagree about the finding in question.” Brumfield v. Cain, 135 S. Ct. 2269, 2277 (2015). 

The evidence before the Circuit Court presented a classic 

credibility dispute, on whose resolution reasonable minds 

could differ and which we have “no license” to disturb. Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 434 (1983). Winfield’s aunt and 

mother said they told trial counsel they could testify regarding Winfield’s whereabouts at the time of the shooting. Counsel, however, “specifically” denied any recollection of talking 

to Winfield’s mother and could not remember if he spoke 

with Winfield’s aunt. Counsel also said that he would have 

presented a verifiable alibi, had anyone made him aware of 

one. The Circuit Court evidently believed counsel over 
16 Nos. 19-1441 & 19-1547 

Winfield’s family and inferred from the fact that counsel did 

not present the home alibi that he was not aware of it. 

Winfield has pointed to no clear and convincing evidence 

that it was unreasonable to credit counsel’s testimony. When 

questioned whether Winfield told him of an alibi, counsel answered that “the problem was he did mention an alibi”—“the 

alibi” was that he was at a store. Counsel investigated this 

story with the help of Winfield’s family, and found it wanting. 

Counsel was further asked to confirm only that he had spoken 

to Winfield about his trial testimony before he gave it. From 

this, Winfield infers that counsel must have known of the alibi 

that he testified to at trial. Even assuming Winfield told counsel exactly what he was going to say at trial, what Winfield 

said during his trial testimony was indefinite: “I probably say 

I was at home.” Winfield himself never offered anything more 

than this equivocal statement; he neither testified at the postconviction hearing nor submitted an affidavit about his discussions with counsel. It was not unreasonable for the state 

courts to infer that, when counsel spoke of “the alibi” he investigated and “an alibi” that Winfield mentioned, he had investigated the only verifiable alibi Winfield had offered. 

Winfield emphasizes that trial counsel admitted to not remembering his trial preparation and “never claimed that 

Winfield definitively ruled out being at home.” True, but that 

is far from enough to rebut AEDPA deference. At best, Winfield has identified a gap in the record. The absence of evidence, however, cannot overcome either of the layers of deference we owe to the state court’s adjudication of counsel’s 

performance under AEDPA and Strickland. Titlow, 571 U.S. at 

22–23. Without clear and convincing evidence otherwise, it 

was not unreasonable for the state courts to find, as a matter 
Nos. 19-1441 & 19-1547 17

of fact, that Winfield never told counsel he was home at the 

time of the shooting and that counsel was unaware he had 

witnesses who could testify so. 

From that finding, the state courts reasonably concluded 

that counsel’s failure to investigate or present Winfield’s alibi 

was not constitutionally deficient performance. The Supreme 

Court recognized in Strickland itself that the scope of an attorney’s duty to investigate defenses is informed by the “information supplied by the defendant.” 466 U.S. at 691. If Winfield told counsel only that he was at a store, and counsel 

checked that alibi and found it wanting, then the Illinois Appellate Court could reasonably conclude that the Constitution 

mandates nothing more. Cf. Morris v. Bartow, 832 F.3d 705, 711 

(7th Cir. 2016) (concluding Strickland was not applied unreasonably when state courts found defendant had not claimed 

his plea was coerced). Winfield does not argue otherwise. 

We need not address the state court’s other findings—that 

counsel properly refused to call familial witnesses (assuming 

he knew of them) and that Winfield was not prejudiced. We 

affirm the denial of relief on the trial counsel claim. 

IV. The State’s Appeal 

That brings us to the state’s appeal. The state contends that 

the district court erred in issuing a writ of habeas corpus on 

Winfield’s claim that he received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. It principally argues that the district court 

erred in reviewing the claim de novo and not with the deference provided by AEDPA. Alternatively, it contends that even 

with plenary review, Winfield has not established the elements of a Strickland claim. 
18 Nos. 19-1441 & 19-1547 

We agree with this latter argument. Even if we owe no deference to the state court’s determination of the claim, we 

would reverse the district court’s judgment granting habeas 

relief to Winfield. We start by briefly explaining why we are 

assuming without deciding that the state court is not owed 

AEDPA deference before addressing the claim on its merits. 

A. AEDPA 

As in our previous appeal in this case, the primary dispute 

between the parties is whether the deferential view of AEDPA 

applies to this claim. See Winfield I, 871 F.3d at 560. That question depends, as we have noted, on whether the claim was 

“adjudicated on the merits.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

The Supreme Court has instructed that “[w]hen a federal 

claim has been presented to a state court and the state court 

has denied relief, it may be presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits in the absence of any indication or state-law procedural principles to the contrary.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 99. In Richter, the state court gave no reasons 

for denying relief, but the Court has extended this presumption to state courts that have addressed some but not all 

claims. See Johnson v. Williams, 568 U.S. 289, 300–01 (2013). 

The presumption is rebuttable, if a petitioner provides 

“reason to think some other explanation for the state court’s 

decision is more likely.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 99–100. One such 

situation is when “the evidence leads very clearly to the conclusion that a federal claim was inadvertently overlooked in 

state court.” Williams, 568 U.S. at 303; Sarfraz v. Smith, 885 F.3d 

1029, 1036 (7th Cir. 2018). 

The district court determined that this is precisely what 

happened here. Though Winfield consistently asserted that 
Nos. 19-1441 & 19-1547 19

appellate counsel had failed to raise “significant issues, such 

as, sufficiency of evidence,” the Illinois Appellate Court never 

mentioned those issues or considered appellate counsel’s performance in any way separate from trial counsel’s. 

The state raises several reasons why the district court’s 

analysis was inconsistent with the presumption that state 

courts adjudicate claims on their merits. For our limited purposes here, we need address only its strongest. The Appellate 

Court found that overwhelming evidence eliminated any 

prejudice from trial counsel’s failure to present alibi witnesses. Giving the “benefit of the doubt” to the state courts, as 

we are required, Brady v. Pfister, 711 F.3d 818, 826 (7th Cir. 

2013), we agree that this finding implicitly means the Illinois 

Appellate Court thought a sufficiency of the evidence argument would have been frivolous for appellate counsel to 

raise.1

The logic is simple. If one believes it improbable that a factfinder would acquit with new, favorable evidence, then, necessarily, one could not also believe it possible that the same 

factfinder was obligated to acquit without that evidence. 

Moreover, counsel could neither have performed deficiently 

nor prejudiced Winfield by failing to raise a doomed argument. See McNary v. Lemke, 708 F.3d 905, 921 (7th Cir. 2013); 

see also Howard v. Gramley, 225 F.3d 784, 790 (7th Cir. 2000) 

1 Winfield asserts that the state forfeited this argument in this court by 

waiting until its reply brief to raise it (although it had raised it in the previous appeal and in the district court). We explained in the last appeal, 

however, that “the actions of the state courts essentially speak for themselves, rather than depend upon characterizations by the stateʹs prosecuting arm.” Winfield I, 871 F.3d at 561. We defer to the state court’s adjudication, not to the state’s interpretation of that adjudication. 
20 Nos. 19-1441 & 19-1547 

(recognizing overlap between the two Strickland prongs in 

claims of ineffective appellate counsel).

Thus, the Illinois Appellate Court’s finding that there was 

“overwhelming evidence” resolved both prongs of Winfield’s 

appellate counsel claim. Having found the state court’s “specific reasons” for denying relief, the next question is whether 

that explanation was reasonable thereby requiring our deference. Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018). 

The Appellate Court pointed to Winfield’s “inculpatory 

statement and the two eyewitness identifications of him as the 

shooter.” The trial judge, however discredited both of those 

eyewitness identifications and found that no witness placed 

Winfield at the scene of the crime. We are hesitant to say, in 

this case, that Winfield’s statement alone can reasonably be 

deemed “overwhelming”—as opposed to merely sufficient—

evidence of guilt. Cf. Harris v. Thompson, 698 F.3d 609, 630–31 

(7th Cir. 2012) (rejecting state’s argument that confession is 

overwhelming evidence of guilt for harmless-error purposes). 

The state insists that the judge did not fully discredit Garrett. We question that, considering the judge’s explicit comment that no evidence placed Winfield at the scene, but even 

the state agrees that Curry’s testimony is out. Reducing the 

eyewitness identifications from two to one might be enough 

to make the Appellate Court’s decision unreasonable. See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 528 (2003) (recognizing that partial 

reliance on an erroneous factual finding can be unreasonable); 

Ben-Yisrayl v. Buss, 540 F.3d 542, 550 (7th Cir. 2008) (same). 

Although we could remand again for the district court to 

decide these issues (and other criticisms Winfield has levied 

against the “overwhelming evidence” finding), we see little 
Nos. 19-1441 & 19-1547 21

point in doing so. Even if Winfield can get around the deference of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), he still must prove that he is “in 

custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of 

the United States” under § 2254(a). See Mosley v. Atchison, 689 

F.3d 838, 853 (7th Cir. 2012); Ben-Yisrayl, 540 F.3d at 550; see 

also Adorno v. Melvin, 876 F.3d 917, 919 (7th Cir. 2017) (denying 

habeas relief on de novo review, assuming petitioner could 

rebut Richter presumption on remand).2 

We therefore accept, for the sake of argument, that the district court properly reviewed Winfield’s appellate counsel 

claim de novo. The court nevertheless erred in granting relief. 

B. Appellate Counsel 

To prove that he is entitled to a writ of habeas corpus, Winfield must show that his appellate counsel overlooked an argument that was both “’obvious and clearly stronger’ than issues that appellate counsel did raise.” Walker v. Griffin, 835 

F.3d 705, 709 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting Sanders v. Cotton, 398 

F.3d 572, 585 (7th Cir. 2005)); see also Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 

259, 285, 288 (2000) (describing this standard as an application 

of Strickland). The issue that counsel overlooked can be one 

purely of state law and we may still resolve the federal constitutional question whether counsel’s omission was both deficient and prejudicial under Strickland. See Shaw v. Wilson, 721 

F.3d 908, 914–15 (7th Cir. 2013). 

2 We have said that a petitioner is not entitled to de novo review 

“simply because the state court’s rationale is unsound.” Whatley v. Zatecky, 

833 F.3d 762, 775 (7th Cir. 2016) (citing Brady, 711 F.3d at 827). Instead, we 

defer to the state court’s judgment (notwithstanding its reasons). Id. We 

need not decide if or how this standard might apply here. Winfield is not 

entitled to relief even under de novo review. 
22 Nos. 19-1441 & 19-1547 

Winfield identifies two arguments that, he says, meet this 

hurdle. First, he raises a “general” sufficiency argument—

there was simply not enough evidence to convict him of attempted murder. Second, he asserts the corpus delicti argument—the evidence did not corroborate his confession. (We 

call the first argument general because a corpus delicti argument is a type of sufficiency argument. See, e.g., Lara, 983 

N.E.2d at 969; People v. Harris, 776 N.E.2d 743, 752–54 (Ill. App. 

Ct. 2002) (explaining how the two arguments interact).) 

1. General Sufficiency of the Evidence 

Winfield continues to pursue the general sufficiency argument, though that is not the basis on which he obtained relief. 

Under federal law and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, there is sufficient evidence to convict 

when “after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable 

to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found 

the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable 

doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). We have 

described this Jackson standard as a “nearly insurmountable 

hurdle.” United States v. Torres-Chavez, 744 F.3d 988, 993 (7th 

Cir. 2014). Winfield recognizes that we would almost certainly uphold his conviction on direct appeal. See, e.g., United 

States v. Curtis, 324 F.3d 501, 507 (7th Cir. 2003) (affirming 

murder conviction based on defendant’s admissions and the 

victim’s “bullet-riddled body”). 

He insists, however, that Illinois courts do not apply the 

same standards as federal courts, but instead a more generous 

one that would lead to acquittal here. In support of this argument, he relies on two decisions in which the Illinois Appellate Courts vacated convictions despite the defendants’ 
Nos. 19-1441 & 19-1547 23

admissions: People v. Rivera, 962 N.E.2d 53 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011), 

and People v. Rodriguez, 728 N.E.2d 695 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000). 

The first and most obvious problem with this argument is 

that both cases cited Jackson as the governing standard. Rivera, 

962 N.E.2d at 60; Rodriguez, 728 N.E.2d at 707. That makes 

sense, as the Illinois Supreme Court adopted Jackson in People 

v. Young, 538 N.E.2d 461, 473 (Ill. 1989), and continues to follow it, e.g., People v. Drake, 131 N.E.3d 555, 561 (Ill. 2019). We 

have not found a single case in which an Illinois court has said 

its own review is more searching or defendant-friendly than 

Jackson requires. 

All Winfield directs us to is language in Rivera, Rodriguez, 

and a great many Illinois decisions, that “[a] conviction will 

be reversed where the evidence is so unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory that there remains a reasonable doubt of 

defendantʹs guilt.” People v. Washington, 969 N.E.2d 349, 355 

(Ill. 2012). Though the United States Supreme Court does not 

use this precise formulation, we do not see how it is anything 

more than a rephrasing of the holding in Jackson that “a 

properly instructed jury may occasionally convict even when 

it can be said that no rational trier of fact could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” 443 U.S. at 317. That seems to be 

how the Illinois Supreme Court understands it—even when it 

relies on that language to vacate a conviction, it still cites Jackson as the governing standard. See People v. Smith, 708 N.E.2d 

365, 369–70 (Ill. 1999). We have even said that this formulation 

was neither “contrary to” Jackson nor “meaningfully different” from it. Cabrera v. Hinsley, 324 F.3d 527, 533 (7th Cir. 

2003). Courts sometimes vacate convictions despite the high 

hurdle of Jackson. See, e.g., United States v. Garcia, 919 F.3d 489, 
24 Nos. 19-1441 & 19-1547 

496 (7th Cir. 2019). That they do so is no reason to believe that 

they were, in fact, applying a different, less onerous standard. 

Factually, Rivera and Rodriguez do nothing to demonstrate 

that a general sufficiency argument would succeed for Winfield. Rivera involved a unique situation in which a series of 

acquittals and conclusive DNA evidence left the state with 

only a convoluted and improbable theory on which to sustain 

its conviction. 962 N.E.2d at 63. There is nothing so improbable about the state’s theory here. And although Rodriguez involved admissions, they were of facts that the state posited 

only the murderer would know, not a confession to the crime, 

like Winfield’s. 728 N.E.2d at 709. 

The district court was right to skip over the general sufficiency argument. Winfield all but concedes there was not a 

reasonable probability the argument would succeed under 

the Jackson standard, and that is the standard the Illinois 

courts apply. It follows that counsel neither performed deficiently nor prejudiced Winfield by omitting this argument. 

2. Corpus Delicti 

We next turn to the argument on which the district court 

granted relief: corpus delicti. As noted above, a corpus delicti 

argument is a type of sufficiency argument. E.g., Lara, 983 

N.E.2d at 969. The key difference is that Illinois courts stringently (and intentionally) enforce the corpus delicti rule to assess confession evidence more carefully than Jackson alone demands. See id. at 982 (Thomas, J., concurring) (recognizing 

that the federal courts and several state courts have abandoned corpus delicti rule); People v. Sargent, 940 N.E.2d 1045, 

1057 (Ill. 2010) (rejecting request to abandon rule). 
Nos. 19-1441 & 19-1547 25

The corpus delicti is, traditionally, nothing more than the 

commission of a crime. See Kerley, 838 F.2d at 939; Lara, 983 

N.E.2d at 964. It encompasses both the existence of an injury 

and the fact that the injury had a criminal cause. People v. 

Furby, 563 N.E.2d 421, 425 (Ill. 1990); 1 Kenneth S. Broun et al., 

McCormick on Evidence § 146 (8th ed. 2020). Under some formulations of the common law, a conviction based on a confession could not stand unless the corpus delicti had been 

proved through independent evidence. See David A. Moran, 

In Defense of the Corpus Delicti Rule, 64 Ohio St. L.J. 817, 817 

(2003). This rule evolved out of a concern that the state might 

obtain a conviction based on a confession to a crime that never 

occurred. In perhaps the most dramatic example of this error, 

three people were hanged for murder even though the victim 

was still alive. Perrys’ Case, 14 How. St. Tr. 1312 (Eng. 1661). 

In this traditional sense, it is indisputable that there was 

evidence of the corpus delicti here, and Winfield conceded as 

much at argument. Someone attempted to murder Garrett; he 

was shot at between two and fifteen times. (He was hit twice, 

and police found fifteen shell casings.) Multiple shots permit 

a factfinder to infer an intent to kill, as the trial judge did here. 

E.g., People v. Howery, 687 N.E.2d 836, 856 (Ill. 1997). 

The district court thought that the corpus delicti rule also 

extends to whether Winfield was the shooter and requires the 

state to corroborate the confession. The court candidly 

acknowledged, however, that some authorities supported this 

reading of the rule and others did not, so it was a close case 

with no definitive answer and no case directly on point. 

We need not decide the scope of the corpus delicti rule or 

whether the state met the requirements of it. See Crockett v. 

Butler, 807 F.3d 160, 168 (7th Cir. 2015) (explaining that habeas 
26 Nos. 19-1441 & 19-1547 

review cannot correct perceived errors of state law). As the 

district court recognized, the issue before the federal courts is 

whether the argument that the state had not met its burden 

was both obvious and clearly stronger than the argument that 

appellate counsel raised on appeal. Only if both conditions 

are met can we say that appellate counsel’s performance fell 

below the constitutional minimum. See Makiel v. Butler, 782 

F.3d 882, 898 (7th Cir. 2015). 

That the underlying corpus delicti argument is close and 

novel cuts against Winfield on both prongs. First, it implies 

that the argument is not all that strong, even if it could ultimately have prevailed. “[T]he comparative strength of two 

claims is usually debatable.” Shaw, 721 F.3d at 915. Reasonable minds can differ on the relative strength of an argument 

that ekes out a win compared to one that falls just short. Strickland instructs that we must be “highly deferential” to counsel’s choices to avoid the temptation of hindsight. Morris, 832 

F.3d at 710. Counsel is entitled to—expected to—“select[] the 

most promising issues for review” and “focus[] on one central 

issue if possible.” Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751–52 (1983). 

Winfield cannot succeed by proving only that the corpus delicti argument is not frivolous. Indeed, the Constitution does 

not obligate appellate counsel to raise every nonfrivolous argument. Id. at 751. 

Although the state court rejected the sentencing argument 

raised on direct appeal, it was not quite so weak as to be “the 

equivalent of filing no brief at all,” or “effectively a substitute 

for a [no-merit] brief,” like the sufficiency argument in Shaw, 

721 F.3d at 915. The Illinois Appellate Court has reversed 

when judges have failed to consider a defendant’s rehabilitative potential. E.g., People v. Jeter, 616 N.E.2d 1256, 1264 (Ill. 
Nos. 19-1441 & 19-1547 27

App. Ct. 1993). The problem was that the trial judge did not 

ignore Winfield’s rehabilitative potential, he just found that 

he had none. 

Second, a close case makes the argument less obvious. 

“Strickland does not guarantee perfect representation, only a 

‘reasonably competent attorney.’” Richter, 562 U.S. at 110. The 

more precedents one must distinguish (and the more carefully one must do so) to reach a favorable result, the less unreasonable it likely is for an appellate lawyer not to spot the 

issue and brief it. This is especially true where, as here, the 

legal issue is still unclear twenty years later. See Loden v. 

McCarty, 778 F.3d 484, 501 (5th Cir. 2015) (finding no deficient 

performance when law was unclear at time of appeal); cf.

Shaw, 721 F.3d at 916–17 (discussing circumstances in which 

counsel performs deficiently by not predicting change in the 

law). Counsel had Jeter to support his sentencing argument, 

even if it turned out not to be enough. Winfield, however, has 

still not identified any case that directly supports his corpus 

delicti argument—only general principles that could favor 

him if the court were to interpret them a certain way. 

These ambiguities in the law are not enough to carry his 

burden to prove that the corpus delicti argument was obvious 

such that any reasonable attorney would have raised it. Winfield faced two questions before he could prevail on a corpus 

delicti argument. One, was the state obligated to corroborate 

the details of his confession? Two, did the state fail to corroborate them? His petition could potentially succeed only if a 

reasonable attorney would find a basis to argue that both answers are yes. Although we, like the district court, see no definitive answer to these questions in the decisions of the Illinois Supreme Court, we think the implied answer to both is 
28 Nos. 19-1441 & 19-1547 

no. The state was likely not required to corroborate Winfield’s 

confession beyond proving the traditional corpus delicti, and 

even if it were, it likely succeeded. We, thus, cannot say that 

counsel was not acting as counsel when he failed to argue otherwise. 

In assessing the obviousness of this argument, it is best to 

start with what the Illinois Supreme Court considers “the 

most precise explanation” of the corpus delicti rule. Lara, 983 

N.E.2d at 967 (citing People v. Willingham, 432 N.E.2d 861, 864 

(Ill. 1982)). This version was set out in People v. Perfecto: 

The rule is that an uncorroborated confession is insufficient to convict, but the corpus delicti is not required to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt exclusively by evidence aliunde 

the confession or admissions of the accused, nor 

is it necessary that it be established by evidence 

other than that which tends to connect the defendant with the crime. “The true rule is that if 

there is evidence of corroborating circumstances 

which tend to prove the corpus delicti and correspond 

with the circumstances related in the confession, both 

the circumstances and the confession may be considered in determining whether the corpus delicti is sufficiently proved in a given case.” 

186 N.E.2d 258, 258–59 (1962) (citations omitted) (emphasis 

added) (quoting People v. Gavurnik, 117 N.E.2d 782, 785 (Ill. 

1954)). 

Winfield and the district court read the emphasized sentence to mean that the evidence must always both “tend to 

prove the corpus delicti” and “correspond with the 
Nos. 19-1441 & 19-1547 29

circumstances related in the confession,” i.e., corroborate the 

confession, to sustain a conviction. The district court found 

that the state had met the first prong but failed the second. 

The state contends the evidence must meet only one prong 

because the rule is actually disjunctive. Under its reading of 

Perfecto, corroboration is necessary only before the confession 

“may be considered in determining whether the corpus delicti 

is sufficiently proved.” Though it is not “required” to prove 

the traditional corpus delicti exclusively with evidence independent of the confession, it may do so. And if it does (as we 

explained is true here), then the confession need not be corroborated more. Another way to phrase this reasoning is that 

the independent proof of the corpus delicti is itself sufficient 

corroboration. Cf. United States v. Fleming, 504 F.2d 1045, 1049 

(7th Cir. 1974) (Stevens, J.) (concluding that proof of traditional corpus delicti is sufficient but not necessary to corroborate confession under federal law). 

The Illinois Supreme Court’s frequent emphasis that the 

corpus delicti and the identity of the offender are separate 

concepts supports the state’s argument. See, e.g., Lara, 983 

N.E.2d at 964; People v. Cloutier, 622 N.E.2d 774, 784 (Ill. 

1993).3 In People v. Holmes, 367 N.E.2d 663 (Ill. 1977), the court 

made explicit the disjunctive test the state advocates: “It is 

enough if the other evidence either tends to show that a crime 

did in fact occur or to corroborate the confession.” Id. at 665 

(emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quoting People v. 

3 The ordinary rule is that we resolve the performance prong based on 

the law at the time of the appeal (here 2001). See Shaw, 721 F.3d at 915. 

Nevertheless, we cite to Lara, a 2012 case, because both parties rely on it, 

neither contends that it represents a change in the law, and it cogently 

synthesizes preexisting caselaw. See Lara, 983 N.E.2d at 966–71. 
30 Nos. 19-1441 & 19-1547 

Norcutt, 255 N.E.2d 442, 446 (Ill. 1970)). That the victim was 

shot and died was enough to prove the corpus delicti of murder. Id. More recently, the Illinois Appellate Court (relying on 

Holmes) has said that “it is not a requirement of corpus delicti

that evidence apart from the confession tend to connect defendant to the crime charged.” People v. Valladares, 994 N.E.2d 

938, 960 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013). It was a failure to connect Winfield 

to the crime—to prove identity—that led to relief here.

We think the state’s reading likely reflects the proper interpretation of the corpus delicti rule. The state could comply 

with the traditional rule by proving through independent evidence that a crime occurred. Alternatively, if there were insufficient independent evidence that the crime occurred, the 

state could follow Perfecto and corroborate the confession with 

evidence corresponding to the circumstances of the confession. Either independent evidence or the confession plus the 

corroborating evidence together could be used to establish 

that a crime occurred—the ultimate requirement of the corpus 

delicti rule. Willingham, 432 N.E.2d at 865. Once the state 

passed this legal hurdle, all that was left was to prove the 

other element, identity, as a factual matter, and it could do 

that with the confession alone. See People v. Taylor, 317 N.E.2d 

97, 102 (Ill. 1974).4

4 It is notable that this interpretation of the corpus delicti rule appears 

to be the one under which everyone was operating until the district court’s 

order. The state trial judge, though bolstering his conclusion with the confession, initially found the corpus delicti from the fact that Garrett was 

shot twice. Appellate counsel likewise pointed to this simple fact to explain why he did not bring a sufficiency argument. Indeed, even Winfield 

pressed in the district court a corpus delicti theory that there was no 
Nos. 19-1441 & 19-1547 31

Although we doubt the state was required, as a matter of 

law, to corroborate the confession to any degree more than to 

prove that someone attempted to murder Garrett, we accept the 

district court’s point that there might be room to argue otherwise. Some cases use “and” instead of Holmes’s “or”; others 

discuss corroboration, despite independent proof of the corpus delicti; many, in that discussion, further emphasize that 

this corroborating evidence proved a connection between the 

crime and the accused. (Willingham, 432 N.E.2d at 864–66, 

does all three.) Even under this interpretation, though, the Illinois Appellate Court would not vacate the conviction unless 

the proof fell short of corroborating the confession. We think 

it far from obvious that it did. 

The Illinois Supreme Court has expressed just how low the 

bar is for corroboration. It requires “far less independent evidence to corroborate a defendant’s confession under the corpus delicti rule than to show guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” 

Lara, 983 N.E.2d at 970; accord Furby, 563 N.E.2d at 426; 

Willingham, 432 N.E.2d at 864. Moreover, “there is no requirement that the independent evidence and the details of the confession correspond in every particular.” Furby, 563 N.E.2d at 

428. The law requires “only some ‘consistency’ ‘tending to 

confirm and strengthen the confession.’” Lara, 983 N.E.2d at 

970 (quoting Furby, 563 N.E.2d at 421). 

The district court identified two inconsistencies between 

Hartman’s testimony and Winfield’s statement that it thought 

made it obvious that an Illinois Court might deem the 

evidence anyone had attempted to murder Garrett—i.e., that the traditional rule had not been met (and thus corroboration was necessary).
32 Nos. 19-1441 & 19-1547 

confession uncorroborated. The first was the number of shooters, the second, Winfield’s exit.5

The first of these discrepancies—that Hartman saw only 

one shooter who was not Winfield—is immaterial. It is not 

even an inconsistency. Hartman declined to rule out the possibility that there might have been a second shooter he could 

not see. Even if he had not been so candid, the Illinois Supreme Court has held that eyewitness testimony that there 

were two robbers “did not necessarily create inconsistencies” 

with a confession that the defendant was the third robber. 

Willingham, 432 N.E.2d at 866. 

The second difference is more substantial: all the witnesses 

(including Curry and Garrett) said the shooter(s) returned to 

the car and no one saw anyone fleeing on foot, as Winfield 

said he did. This is an inconsistency, but again, Illinois law 

does not require perfect parity between the evidence and the 

confession. Furby, 563 N.E.2d at 428. All that is needed is a 

“loose[] ‘correspondence’”; “corroboration of only some of 

the circumstances related in a defendant’s confession is sufficient.” Lara, 983 N.E.2d at 970–71. 

The independent evidence corresponded with Winfield’s 

statement in many critical respects. Hartman confirmed that 

a black SUV traveled south on Central Park and stopped at 

the corner of Huron when at least one shooter exited the 

5 We, like the district court, accept that the trial judge discredited both 

Garrett and Curry’s testimony. As we noted above, the state argues that 

the court partially credited Garrett’s testimony. We doubt that is true, but 

a state court might reasonably disagree. This possibility is just one more 

barrier in the way of a finding that a corpus delicti argument is both obvious and clearly stronger than counsel’s sentencing argument. 
Nos. 19-1441 & 19-1547 33

vehicle and began firing. Further, Winfield’s own testimony 

was independent evidence that he and his brother had an argument with Stovall at a dice game weeks before the shooting, 

just as he stated to the detective. See Willingham, 432 N.E.2d at 

866 (relying on defendant’s trial testimony about events before crime as corroborating evidence). An Illinois court would 

likely deem this enough to ensure that Winfield’s confession 

was “reasonably reliable,” allowing the trial judge to consider 

it in his “role in deciding credibility issues, weighing the evidence and drawing reasonable inferences, and resolving evidentiary conflicts.” Lara, 983 N.E.2d at 971–72. Certainly, it 

was not unreasonable for Winfield’s counsel to conclude that 

these inconsistencies were for the trial judge, not the Appellate Court, to resolve and so a sufficiency argument had only 

a remote possibility of success, if that. 

The district court thought the Illinois courts might dismiss 

this independent evidence as confirming only tangential components of the statement, as in People v. Lambert, 472 N.E.2d 

427 (Ill. 1984) (per curiam). One crucial difference between 

this case and Lambert is that in the latter there was no independent evidence that a crime occurred at all. Id at 429. The 

state was, thus, undoubtedly obligated to corroborate the defendant’s confession to sexual assault of a child under any 

reading of the rule. The independent evidence, however, 

showed only that the alleged child victim spent a single night 

in the defendant’s ordinary sleeping quarters (a basement) 

and that a few weeks later, the child’s rectum appeared “pinkish and swollen.” Id. There was no evidence of a cause for this 

inflammation (criminal or otherwise) and the child never 

complained of being assaulted. All the evidence confirmed 

was the opportunity to commit a crime, which is to say that 

the defendant slept where his bed was. 
34 Nos. 19-1441 & 19-1547 

Here, the independent evidence did not line up only with 

confessed facts of Winfield’s daily life but with details of how 

the crime occurred: the car’s color, path of travel, and his underlying motive for the shooting. The corpus delicti rule does 

not require that the evidence and confession “precisely align 

... on each element of the charged offense, or indeed to any 

particular element of the charged offense.” Lara, 983 N.E.2d at 

972. It is difficult to see why a reasonable attorney would expect an Illinois court to deem these key facts tangential relative to Winfield’s purported escape method. 

The district court carved a careful path for Winfield to 

raise a nonfrivolous corpus delicti argument. Even if that path 

exists, though, it is not an obvious one. It is narrow and winds 

carefully around many barriers, both factual and legal. It is so 

complex that we cannot say that all reasonably competent attorneys would spot it. Nor can we be sure the path had a favorable end. For our purposes, we need not be certain where 

it leads; it suffices to say that counsel’s decision to take a different way was not constitutionally deficient. We therefore vacate the district court’s grant of habeas corpus relief. 

V. Conclusion 

Winfield argued that two of his lawyers mishandled his 

case. He said his trial counsel should have presented an alibi 

defense, but the state court reasonably found he was not constitutionally obligated to present a defense of which he was 

simply not aware. Likewise, we conclude that the Constitution did not obligate Winfield’s appellate counsel to discover 

and present a complex and novel legal argument that may or 

may not have succeeded. We affirm the denial of relief and 

reverse the grant of relief, so that Winfield’s petition for writ 

of habeas corpus is denied in full.