J-S78023-18

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

JOHN C. GUERRA 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 3438 EDA 2017

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered May 4, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0011956-2014

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and STEVENS*, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: FILED APRIL 08, 2019

John C. Guerra appeals from the judgment of sentence entered following 

his convictions for numerous charges relating to his running a prostitution ring 

involving adult women and a minor. Guerra argues the evidence presented at 

trial was insufficient to support the convictions, that the trial court abused its 

discretion in allowing the Commonwealth to admit certain evidence, and that 

the court abused its discretion in sentencing Guerra. We affirm.

In December 2010, the Commonwealth filed charges against Guerra. He 

evaded arrest until his apprehension in August 2014. Guerra waived his right 

to a jury trial, and proceeded to a bench trial in June 2016. 

The trial court thoroughly recounted the evidence presented at Guerra’s 

bench trial. See Trial Court Opinion, filed 4/11/18, at 1-7. In short, the 

Commonwealth presented evidence that between 2008 and 2010, Guerra

recruited young women to work for him as prostitutes, and assisted them in 
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posting advertisements online to solicit customers for sex. He also provided 

cell phones for the women to use to contact customers, and hotel rooms;

received money the customers paid the women in exchange for sex; and 

provided the women with drugs and money. Guerra knew the women were 

addicted to drugs, and he supplied them with large amounts of crack cocaine 

and heroin. He made the women work for days at a time without sleep, used

violence and sexual violence to keep them from leaving or withholding money, 

and prohibited them from seeking medical attention. Several other men 

assisted Guerra, including Elton Cromwell, Eddie Mendez, and Dwayne 

Thomas. 

Three victims, M.S., T.W., and A.H., testified at trial. Of note, A.H. 

testified that she was a minor when she began working for Guerra, and that 

when Cromwell and Guerra discovered she was a minor, she stayed at 

Guerra’s family home until Guerra made the decision that she would continue

working. A.H. also testified that Cromwell went to her parents’ house after 

charges were filed against him, and that this made her feel scared.

The Commonwealth also presented the testimony of Detective Derrick 

Stigerts, whom the Commonwealth offered as an expert in human trafficking,

and Trooper Michael Peterson. Trooper Peterson testified that during the 

course of his investigation, he viewed the contents of a laptop found at the 

hotel where A.H. was found, which contained images and advertisements, 

some of which were introduced into evidence. Trooper Peterson said he 

interviewed five women who had worked for Guerra in two different hotel 
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rooms, including M.S., T.W., and A.H. Trooper Peterson stated that, through 

the investigation, he was able to identify the extent of Guerra’s involvement 

in trafficking and prostitution, as well as the three other men in the 

organization. Trooper Peterson testified that based upon his investigation, he 

had concluded that Guerra “was in charge of an illegal, corrupt 

organization[.]” N.T., 6/29/16, at 97.

Guerra objected on the basis that the testimony was a legal conclusion. 

The court agreed that the ultimate issue was for the court, but stated it would 

allow Trooper Peterson to testify as to the basis for his conclusion. Id. at 97-

98. Trooper Peterson testified that “through interviewing witnesses that 

testified and did not testify, all of their statements were clearly identifying 

each individual’s roles in this organization. Some ladies put [Guerra] at the 

top of the pyramid.” Id. at 98. Trooper Peterson stated he “concluded that 

[Guerra’s] role was a leader of a corrupt organization, including prostitution.” 

Id. Guerra again objected, and the court overruled the objection. Id. at 99.

The Commonwealth confirmed that it was not offering Trooper Peterson as an 

expert witness. Id. The prosecutor then asked Trooper Peterson about his 

training and experience in the Organized Crime Unit, and his opinion as to why 

there was no financial trail implicating Guerra in the crimes. Trooper Peterson 

answered, “The head[s] of corrupt organizations always attempt to insulate 

themselves from their underlings . . . because they don’t want to be implicated 

as being the ring leader.” Id. at 101.
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Guerra presented the testimony of M.T. and R.H., the mothers of 

children by Guerra and Cromwell, respectively, who had worked as prostitutes. 

Both women testified that A.H. had worked for Cromwell, and not Guerra; that 

Guerra had never threatened or assaulted any of the women working for him; 

and that Guerra did not force anyone to stay against their will. M.T. further 

testified that Guerra and Cromwell were friends, but did not work together or 

share employees, computers, phones, or money, and that M.S. would steal 

from Guerra to support her drug habit.

Guerra testified in his own defense. He admitted he had sex with A.H. 

on the first night of her arrival, but denied that A.H. had ever worked for him, 

and asserted that A.H. had worked for Cromwell, who had decided to take her 

back to work after discovering her minor status. Guerra denied working jointly 

with Cromwell or anyone else. He admitted that T.W. and M.S. had both 

worked for him, and that he would buy drugs in bulk to supply to his 

employees. But he denied that he had forced any of the women to work, or 

had threatened them. He denied that he was violent toward T.W. or had raped 

M.S., and stated that he had only slapped M.S. with an open fist on one 

occasion, because she owed him money.

The trial court convicted Guerra of trafficking of a minor, trafficking of 

persons, conspiracy to traffic persons, corrupt organizations, promoting 

prostitution, sexual exploitation of a child, unlawful contact with a minor, 

corruption of a minor, simple assault, criminal use of a communication facility, 
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and possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute.1 The court 

sentenced Guerra to an aggregate of 37 to 74 years’ confinement, with 

sentences on seven charges running consecutively, and four charges running 

concurrently.

Guerra filed a post-sentence motion. The motion was denied by 

operation of law in September 2017, and Guerra filed a timely notice of appeal.

Guerra raises the following issues:

1. Did the Commonwealth present sufficient evidence to find 

[Guerra] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt?

2. Did the [c]ourt abuse its discretion in [s]entencing [Guerra] to 

an aggregate period of 37 to 74 years?

3. Did the [c]ourt [err] in permitting the investigating officer to 

testify as to his opinion that [Guerra] was the head of a corrupt 

organization thereby depriving [Guerra] of a fair trial?

4. Did the [c]ourt [err] in allowing testimony, elicited by the 

Commonwealth, involving an alleged threat by Elton Cromwell 

against a witness testifying against [Guerra] without establishing 

any connective link to [Guerra]?

Guerra’s Br. at 4. 

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

In his first issue, Guerra argues that the evidence was insufficient to 

support his convictions. Specifically, related to the charge of corrupt 

organizations, Guerra argues that there was insufficient evidence that he was 

involved in an enterprise. Guerra asserts that the trial testimony established 

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1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3002(b), 3002(a), 903, 911(b)(1), 5902(b)(1), 6320(a), 

6318(a)(5), 6301(a)(1)(i), 2701(a), 7512(a) and P.S. § 780-113(a)(30), 

respectively.
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that he operated separately from Cromwell, Mendez, and Thomas. Guerra also 

argues that there was no evidence establishing that income he earned from 

trafficking persons or distributing drugs was reinvested in that pursuit, such 

as financial records showing Guerra paid for hotel rooms, telephones, or online 

advertisements. 

Guerra also argues that there was insufficient evidence he committed 

sexual exploitation of a child, unlawful contact with a minor, or trafficking of 

a minor. Guerra asserts A.H. testified she worked exclusively for Cromwell;

there was no testimony or forensic computer evidence indicating that Guerra 

took photographs of A.H. or posted her advertisements; and there was no 

evidence that Guerra conspired with Cromwell to traffic A.H.

Regarding trafficking of the other two women, Guerra contends that 

M.S. testified she came to Philadelphia seeking to work as a prostitute. After 

voluntarily working for Guerra, she started working for Guerra’s brother, 

Jason, after Jason threatened Guerra by showing him a firearm. Guerra 

contends that the testimony indicates he hit M.S. not to prevent her from 

leaving his employment, but in response to her stealing money to feed her 

drug habit. 

Guerra argues that T.W. testified that she autonomously worked for 

Mendez, and then for Guerra, and then for Guerra’s brother, Jason. Guerra 

asserts that T.W. testified that Guerra was only violent towards her during the 

times she was working for one of the other men. Guerra adds that defense 
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witnesses testified that he did not force any of the women to work for him, 

and that they could come and go as they pleased.

Guerra further argues that as he did not engage in trafficking, no 

conspiracy to commit trafficking existed.

Upon a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, “we must determine 

whether, when viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict winner, the 

evidence at trial and all reasonable inferences therefrom are sufficient for the 

trier of fact to find that each element of the crime charged is established 

beyond a reasonable doubt.” Commonwealth v. Green, 2019 PA Super 39 

(Feb. 12, 2019). “The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every 

element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly 

circumstantial evidence.” Id. (citation omitted).

The trial court discussed the elements of the contested charges, and the 

evidence presented by the Commonwealth that met each element of those 

crimes. See Tr. Ct. Op. at 12-18 (corrupt organizations); 18-23 (conspiracy 

to traffic persons); 23-25 (sexual exploitation of a child); 30-32 (corruption 

of minors); 33-38, 44-45 (trafficking of a minor); 33-35, 38-45 (trafficking of 

persons); 45-50 (unlawful contact with a minor). After a review of the record, 

the applicable law, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm on the basis of the wellreasoned opinion of the Honorable Sean F. Kennedy, which we adopt and 

incorporate herein. See id.
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II. Sentencing

Guerra argues that the court abused its discretion in sentencing him to 

an aggregate period of 37 to 74 years’ incarceration. As Guerra challenges

discretionary aspects of his sentence, we must first determine whether we will 

allow the appeal. Commonwealth v. Heaster, 171 A.3d 268, 271 (Pa.Super. 

2017), appeal denied, 181 A.3d 1078 (Pa. 2018). We will only do so if: (1) 

the appeal is timely; (2) the issue was preserved; (3) the brief includes a 

Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) statement; and (4) the statement raises a “substantial 

question that the sentence appealed from is not appropriate under the 

Sentencing Code.” Id. at 271-72 (quoting Commonwealth v. Moury, 992

A.2d 162, 170 (Pa.Super. 2010)). “A substantial question exists only when 

the appellant advances a colorable argument that the sentencing judge’s 

actions were either: (1) inconsistent with a specific provision of the Sentencing 

Code; or (2) contrary to the fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing 

process.” Commonwealth v. White, 193 A.3d 977, 982 (Pa.Super. 2018)

(quoting Commonwealth v. Griffin, 65 A.3d 932, 935 (Pa.Super. 2013)).

In his Rule 2119(f) statement, Guerra argues that the court’s sentence 

was contrary to fundamental sentencing norms because (1) the sentence was 

excessive, and the court stated at sentencing that it did not find any evidence

supported a mitigated sentence, even though Guerra presented mitigating 

evidence, and (2) the trial court erred when it calculated Guerra’s prior record 

score. See Guerra’s Br. at 14-15.
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Guerra’s appeal is timely. Guerra preserved the claim that his sentence 

was excessive because the court failed to consider mitigating evidence, as he 

raised that issue in his post-sentence motion, in which he contended that his

sentence was excessive and highlighted reasons supporting a mitigated the 

sentence. We have previously held that an excessive sentence claim in 

conjunction with an assertion that the court failed to consider mitigating 

factors raises a substantial question. White, 193 A.3d at 983 (quoting 

Commonwealth v. Caldwell, 117 A.3d 763, 769-70 (Pa.Super. 2015) (en 

banc)).2 Guerra has therefore raised a substantial question warranting our 

review, and we will allow the appeal.

However, in relation to Guerra’s claim that the sentencing court abused 

its discretion by employing an incorrect prior record score when calculating 

the Sentencing Guidelines ranges, we find the claim to be waived. In his Rule 

1925(b) statement of errors raised on appeal, Guerra framed his sentencing 

issue simply as, “Whether the Court abused its discretion in Sentencing the 

Defendant to an aggregate period of incarceration of 37 to 74 years.” Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(b) Statement, 11/27/17, at 2 (unpaginated). Although in its Rule 

1925(a) opinion, the trial court acknowledged that it departed from the 

Sentencing Guidelines when sentencing Guerra, and that it calculated the 

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2 We have also noted that “prior decisions from this Court involving whether 

a substantial question has been raised by claims that the sentencing court 

‘failed to consider’ or ‘failed to adequately consider’ sentencing factors has 

been less than a model of clarity and consistency.” White, 193 A.3d at 983

(quoting Caldwell, 117 A.3d at 769-70).
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Guidelines ranges based on a prior record score of 5, the court did not address 

Guerra’s claim that the prior record score was incorrect.

We conclude that the trial court’s failure to address the calculation of 

Guerra’s prior record score was a direct result of Guerra’s failure to specify 

that issue in his Rule 1925(b) statement. When a vague Rule 1925(b) 

statement leaves a trial court to speculate as to the bases for relief, a finding 

of waiver is warranted. Commonwealth v. Hodges, 193 A.3d 428, 432 

(Pa.Super. 2018); see also Commonwealth v. Pukowsky, 147 A.3d 1229, 

1236 (Pa.Super. 2016) (“A Rule 1925(b) statement ‘which is too vague to 

allow the court to identify the issues raised on appeal is the functional 

equivalent of no [Rule 1925(b)] Statement at all,’ and will result in waiver”)

(citation omitted). The absence of the trial court’s opinion on the issue has 

hindered our review, and therefore we will not consider the waived issue of 

Guerra’s prior record score.

Returning to Guerra’s preserved sentencing issue, Guerra argues that 

his sentence of 37-74 years’ incarceration, consisting of consecutive sentences 

above the Guidelines ranges, was excessive in light of the mitigating evidence, 

which the court ignored. Specifically, Guerra contends that the following 

factors should have mitigated his sentence: he chose to be tried without a 

jury; he admitted to committing several of the crimes charged, “essentially 

only contesting his involvement in a corrupt organization and his involvement 

with the minor victim”; and, during allocution, he took responsibility for his 

actions and apologized for being short-sighted and selfish, and stated that he 
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completed the WINGS program while in prison. Guerra’s Br. at 43. Guerra also 

argues that the sentence is excessive because its length “will ensure the 

likelihood that [Guerra will] probably never be released from incarceration.” 

Id. at 41.

“Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the sentencing 

judge.” Commonwealth v. Peck, 2019 PA Super 8 (Jan. 8, 2019) (quoting 

Commonwealth v. Sheller, 961 A.2d 187, 190 (Pa.Super. 2008)). The 

Sentencing Guidelines offer recommended ranges for sentence lengths, and a

court may depart from the sentence recommended by the Guidelines if 

necessary. Id. An appellate court must vacate a sentence outside the 

Guidelines if the sentence is “unreasonable.” Id.; see also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 

9781(c)(3).

In its opinion, the court stated that it explained on the record at the 

time of sentencing its reasons for sentencing Guerra above the Guidelines, 

including the effect of the crimes on the victims, the danger Guerra poses to 

the community, and Guerra’s four-year flight from police. See Tr. Ct. Op. at 

61 (quoting N.T., 5/4/17 (Sentencing), at 28-29). The court further 

commented that it considered all relevant factors in imposing an above 

Guidelines sentence, including Guerra’s personal characteristics, such as his 

contrition and potential for rehabilitation; the court specifically noted Guerra’s

laughter during the testimony of a Commonwealth witness. Id. at 63. The 

court also reviewed the gravity of the offenses, and explained that it 

purposefully sentenced Guerra to consecutive sentences, as Guerra was not 
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entitled to a “volume discount” for the quantity of crimes he committed. Id.

at 61-62, 64-65. Moreover, the trial court had the benefit of a pre-sentence

investigation report at the time of sentencing. See Commonwealth v. 

Finnecy, 135 A.3d 1028, 1038 (Pa.Super. 2016) (we presume court was 

aware of relevant sentencing information when it had the benefit of a 

presentence investigation report).

We therefore find no basis to Guerra’s claim that his sentence was 

excessive or that the court failed to consider mitigating evidence. We perceive 

no abuse of discretion or unreasonableness in the court’s sentence, and affirm 

on the basis of the trial court opinion. See Tr. Ct. Op. at 58-65.

III. Trooper Peterson’s Testimony

In his third issue, Guerra argues that the court erred in overruling his 

objection when Trooper Peterson testified he believed Guerra was the head of 

an organization. Guerra’s Br. at 47. Guerra points out that the Commonwealth 

asked Trooper Peterson about his training and experience in the Organized 

Crime Unit before asking his opinion as to why there was no financial trail 

implicating Guerra in the crimes. According to Guerra, Trooper Peterson’s 

testimony was not sufficient to allow a lay person to conclude that Guerra was 

the head of an organization, but was instead based on the Trooper’s 

specialized knowledge, and therefore constituted impermissible expert 

testimony. Id.

“A trial court has broad discretion to determine whether evidence is 

admissible and a trial court's ruling on an evidentiary issue will be reversed 
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only if the court abused its discretion.” Commonwealth v. Huggins, 68 A.3d 

962, 966 (Pa.Super. 2013) (quoting Commonwealth v. Cook, 676 A.2d 639, 

647 (Pa. 1996). We do not disturb a ruling admitting evidence “unless that 

ruling reflects manifest unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice, bias, or illwill, or such lack of support to be clearly erroneous.” Id. (quoting 

Commonwealth v. Minich, 4 A.3d 1063, 1068 (Pa.Super. 2010)). As our 

scope of review over an evidentiary question is plenary, we may review the 

ruling within the context of the entire record. Id.

Here, the trial court admitted the evidence because it was “rationally 

based on the witness’s perception” rather than his technical knowledge. Tr. 

Ct. Op. at 67 (quoting Pa.R.E. 701(a)). The court likened the case to 

Commonwealth v. Blessitt, 852 A.2d 1215 (Pa.Super. 2004) (en banc), 

overruled on other grounds by Commonwealth v. O’Berg, 880 A.2d 597 

(Pa. 2005). In Blessitt, a Pennsylvania State Trooper who purchased drugs 

from the defendant in a controlled drug purchase opined at trial that the 

defendant had handed off the purchase-money to another individual before 

being arrested, because in the trooper’s experience with controlled drug 

purchases, an individual selling drugs only “sometimes” still has that money 

when he is arrested. Id. at 1218. On appeal, we affirmed the admission of the 

lay testimony regarding controlled drug purchases. Id.

While a lay witness may not testify based on scientific, technical, or 

other specialized knowledge beyond that of a layperson, see Pa.R.E. 701, 702, 

“[a] witness may state relevant facts known to him, because of experience, 
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even though he is not regarded as an expert whose opinion would be 

admissible on a hypothetical inquiry.” Commonwealth v. Bennett, 370 A.2d 

373, 375 (Pa. 1977); see, e.g., Commonwealth. v. Grabowski, 549 A.2d 

145, 151 (Pa.Super. 1988) (holding lay witness who operated auto body shop 

competent to testify to his conclusion drawn from personal experience 

operating a body shop). 

We agree with the trial court that Trooper Peterson’s testimony did not 

rely on specialized or technical knowledge, and was within the realm of 

understanding of a layperson. Trooper Peterson’s opinion that Guerra was the 

head of an organization was rationally based on his interviews with five women 

who had worked for Guerra, three of whom testified at trial. Likewise, his 

testimony that a head of an organization would not leave a financial trail was 

based on his personal experience, rather than technical knowledge.

We note Guerra has not appealed on the basis that Trooper Peterson’s 

testimony was based in part upon inadmissible hearsay. Regardless, we 

presume that a judge, sitting as finder of fact in a non-jury trial, disregards 

inadmissible hearsay testimony. Commonwealth v. Dent, 837 A.2d 571, 

582 (Pa.Super. 2003). We therefore affirm the trial court’s ruling on Guerra’s 

objection to Trooper Peterson’s testimony.

IV. Testimony that Cromwell Threatened A.H. 

In his final issue, Guerra argues the court erred in admitting A.H.’s 

testimony that Cromwell threatened her. Guerra’s Br. at 50. While A.H. did 

not testify to any specific statements made by Cromwell, Guerra complains 
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that A.H. testified that Cromwell visited her parents, which scared her. Guerra 

contends that the testimony about Cromwell’s actions was inadmissible 

because it was not relevant to the charges against Guerra, as there was no 

evidence establishing any conspiracy between Guerra and Cromwell existed 

at the time. Guerra also argues that A.H’s testimony constituted double 

hearsay.

Guerra has waived review of this issue by failing to make a timely 

objection to the testimony at the time of trial. See Pa.R.E. 103(a)(1); 

Commonwealth v. Bryant, 855 A.2d 726, 740 (Pa. 2004). Were the issue 

not waived, we would agree with the trial court’s analysis that the statements 

were properly admitted as statements by a co-conspirator in furtherance of a 

conspiracy. See Tr. Ct. Op. at 68-72. We add that A.H.’s testimony did not 

contain hearsay, as she did not testify as to any direct statements, or even 

the content of the statements, made by Cromwell to her parents. In addition, 

A.H.’s testimony was cumulative of the testimony of Trooper Peterson, who 

testified regarding Cromwell’s visit to A.H.’s parents, testimony which Guerra 

does not challenge. See N.T., 6/29/16, at 76-77, 81-82, 91-93.

As none of Guerra’s issues merit relief, we affirm the judgment of 

sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/8/19
Circulated 03/29/2019 11:27 AM

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 

PHILADELPHIA COUNTY 

FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

CRIMINAL DIVISION 

COMMONWEAL TH OF PENNSYLVANIA 

FILEO 

2018 APR I I PH 3: 04 

OFFICE OF ,J!JOIGlAL RECORDS 

CRIMJiili.L O!VfSiON 

FIRST JiJ01Cl1\L DISTRICT 

OF PtNNSYLYAWA 

CP-51-CR-11956-2014 

vs. 

JOHN GUERRA 

KENNEDY, SEAN F., J. 

OPINION 

CP-51-CR-0011956-2014 Comm. v Guerra. John C. 

Opinion 

IIIIIII Ill 111111111111111 

8094386261 

April 11, 2018 

John Guerra ("the Appellant") appeals from a judgment of sentence entered in the 

Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, following his convictions for Trafficking of 

Persons - Minor (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3002(a)); Trafficking of Persons (18 Pa.C.S.A. 3002(a)); 

Criminal Conspiracy to Traffic Persons (18 Pa.CS.A. § 903); Sexual Exploitation of a Child (18 

Pa.C.S.A. § 6320(a)); Corrupt Organizations (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 91 l(b)(l)); Sexual Abuse of a 

Child (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6318(a)(5)); Promoting Prostitution - Own House of Prostitution (18 

Pa.C.S.A. § 5902(b)(l); Possession with Intent to Distribute (35 Pa.C.S.A. § 780-113(a)(30)); 

Criminal Use of a Communication Facility (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 7512(a)); Corruption of a Minor (18 

Pa.C.S.A. § 6301(a)(l)(i)); and Simple Assault (18 Pa.C.S.A.§ 2701(a)). The relevant facts and 

procedural history are as follows. 

FACTS 

In February of 2009, information was provided to the Pennsylvania State Police by law 

enforcement officials in Montgomery County, Maryland regarding a prostitution ring that was 

being operated within their jurisdiction. After investigating, the Pennsylvania State Police began 
an investigation into the activities of John Guerra. The Appellant recruited young, vulnerable 

women from areas within the City and County of Philadelphia for the purpose of engaging in 

prostitution. 

M.S. left Pittsburgh for Philadelphia and was approached by another girl en route. N.T. 

6/28/2016 at 54. This girl stated that M.S. should come with her and brought M.S. to a home in 

Philadelphia where she met the Appellant. The first night that M.S. met the Appellant, she 

informed him that she was addicted to crack cocaine. Id at 58. The Appellant approached M.S. 

with the proposition that she could work from him performing "dates" by posting advertisements 

online soliciting customers for sex. Id at 57. M.S. made it clear to The Appellant that she needed 

crack cocaine to survive daily and The Appellant responded that she could obtain narcotics 

through him. Id at 59. 

The next day after their first meeting, The Appellant brought M.S. shopping for the 

purpose of purchasing clothing for the photos to be used in the advertisements. N.T. 6/28/2016 at 

60. the Appellant and another girl took photos of M.S. and posted the advertisements to 

Craigslist. Id. M.S. was then brought to a hotel in Northeast Philadelphia to perform "dates." Id 

at 62. The advertisements that were posted contained a phone number for a phone that was given 

to M.S. by the Appellant for the purpose of scheduling "dates." Id at 68. 

M.S. was earning upwards of $1,000 per day from sexual services that she advertised on 

Craigslist. M.S. did not keep this money and it was immediately given to the Appellant. N.T. 

6/28/2016 at 67. In the initial stages of working for the Appellant, there was only one other man 

working with the Appellant, but as time went on the Appellant brought other people from New 

York to assist and expand the operation. Id at 71. These persons included Elton Cromwell, Eddie 

Mendez and Dwayne Thomas. Id. M.S. witnessed the Appellant giving narcotics to Cromwell 

2 
and after she performed dates would purchase more crack cocaine from Cromwell. Id at 75. M.S. 

also stated that the Appellant himself collected money after "dates" and distributed narcotics. Id 

at 76. 

the Appellant engaged in a pattern of violence towards M.S. to keep her under his 

control. On the night of her 22nd birthday, M.S. had been awake for three straight days 

performing "dates" and was under the influence of crack cocaine. N.T. 6/28/2016 at 82. M.S. 

owed money to the Appellant from the previous three days. After she had been missing, the 

Appellant found M.S. in a hotel and severely beat M.S. in one hotel room and then brought her 

across the hall into the bathroom of a second hotel room where the beating continued. Id at 83. 

On another occasion, after the Appellant found M.S. in possession of missing money, he chased 

her around a hotel room with an extension cord and attempted to beat her with it. Id at 86. After 

catching M.S., the Appellant had forcible anal sex with M.S. and gave her heroin after the attack. 

Id at 86-87. M.S. was also sold to Jason the Appellant to work for him for some amount of time 

because Jason Guerra was having money problems and the Appellant was teaching Jason how to 

traffic girls. Id at 89. 

In June 2008, victim T.W. encountered ex-boyfriend Eddie Mendez in a Target parking 

lot in Philadelphia. N.T. 6/29/2016 at 6-7. T.W. agreed to accompany Mendez back to a hotel 

room and entered his vehicle. Id at 7. While en route to the hotel, Mendez stopped and picked up 

John the Appellant. Id. Mendez brought T. W. to the Roosevelt Inn on Roosevelt Boulevard in 

the City and County of Philadelphia. Id at 8. Upon entering the room and observing two other 

girls, Mendez approached T.W. and sought to recruit her to work as a prostitute. Id at 9. The 

Appellant informed T.W. of the prices that she was to charge each customer for her sexual 

service and stated that she must "check in" with him before and after each customer. Id at 10. 

3 
The Appellant also provided T. W. with a pre-paid cellular phone for use to receive calls from 

customers. Id at 12. 

The Appellant took pictures of T.W. for the purpose of creating advertisements to be 

placed on Craigslist and Backpage to solicit customers. N.T. 6/29/2016 at 13. After these 

pictures were taken, the Appellant posted the advertisements on Craigslist and Backpage. Id at 

14. The online advertisements contained a picture of T.W. along with a phone number- for the 

phone given to T. W. by the Appellant - for the exclusive purpose of getting customers for her 

sexual services. At this time, the Appellant was renting two hotel rooms and would sleep in the 

hotel rooms with the girls that he had recruited. Id at 15. For her services, T.W. was never 

provided cash. Id at 43. Instead, she was taken to the mall each Sunday and permitted to spend 

$600 on items there. Id. 

Like M.S., T. W. was victim to a pattern of physical abuse meant to instill compliance. 

One on occasion, the Appellant assaulted T.W. so severely that he left a bruise in the shape of his 

hand on T.W.'s face. N.T. 6/29/2016 at 28. The reason for this assault was because T.W. had left 

and attempted to work for the Appellant's brother. Id. After trying to leave the Appellant, T.W. 

was assaulted by the Appellant with such severity that T. W. had bruises that were visible around 

her ribs, experienced painful breathing and had a lump visible from these assaults. Id at 29 T.W. 

"wasn't allowed" to seek any medical treatment for these injuries. Id. Mendez and the Appellant 

would not allow T.W. to take days off from working. Id at 19. 

On July 30, 2008, the minor victim - A.H. - was approached by the Appellant in a 

vehicle with Elton Cromwell in the Kensington neighborhood of Philadelphia. N.T. 6/28/2016 at 

145. A.H. was a runaway that was homeless and living on the streets when approached by the 

Appellant. Id. The two men asked her which drugs she used and A.H. responded that she used 

4 
cocaine. Id at 148. After the Appellant promised her a place to stay, A.H. entered the vehicle and 

was taken to motel room. Once A.H. was brought to the hotel room and she observed it was 

occupied by multiple girls that she believed to be involved with prostitution. Id at 151, 15 7. The 

girls that had been present in the room exited the room upon their arrival and both Cromwell and 

the Appellant had sexual intercourse with the minor A.H. Id at 152. After A.H. had sexual 

intercourse with both the Appellant and Cromwell, they explained to A.H. that they would an 

advertisement for her and she would have to begin posting advertisements on Craigslist to solicit 

customers for sexual services. Id at 159. A.H. was provided a cellular telephone, for which she 

did not pay, whose number was placed into the Craigslist advertisements. Once A.H. began 

posting advertisements, she performed 10 to 15 dates per day, seven days per week, awake for 

multiple days at time from cocaine use and could never refuse customers. Id at 166-171. A.H. 

used a laptop that the Appellant stated was his laptop to make these postings. N.T. 6/29/2016 at 

171. Initially, A.H. used a picture of herself from a MySpace account, but then used pictures that 

were taken of her by Cromwell. N.T. 6/28/2016 at 191. If one of the dates was to be performed 

off site from the hotel, A.H. was driven by a member of the organization. Id at 176. 

A.H. would post multiple advertisements per day on websites to solicit customers. N.T. 

6/28/2016 at 161. There were approximately ten other girls that were staying in two rooms that 

were rented by the Appellant. Id at 164. After performing sexual acts in exchange for money, 

A.H. would immediately give the money received to another member of the Appellant's 

organization. Id at 167. A.H. was never allowed to keep the money, but instead would receive 

crack cocaine; she used approximately $500 worth of crack cocaine per day in exchange for 

performing "dates." Id at I 66. A.H. testified that she would receive the crack cocaine from either 

Cromwell or Eddie Mendez. Id at 168. A.H. was subjected to acts of violence to keep her in line; 

5 
this included punches to the upper torso called "ribshots." Id at 172-73. A.H. witnessed acts of 

violence by the Appellant towards other women and was scared of him. Id at 180. A.H. 

witnessed the Appellant hit another victim that worked for him and heard him viciously assault 

another taking place in the hotel room above hers. Id at 174, 176. 

At one point, it was soon discovered that A.H. was a minor during her work for the 

Appellant. The girls that had been staying in the same hotel room with A.H., Cromwell and the 

Appellant all packed their belongings. N .T. 6/28/2016 at 182. A.H. was then taken to the 

Appellant's family home on Tackawanna Street in Philadelphia while waiting for a decision on 

how to proceed. Id at 183. The decision was ultimately left to the Appellant whether or not A.H. 

would come back and continue working as a prostitute. Id at 196. The Appellant decided to allow 

A.H. to continue working, and after a few days at his family's home, picked up A.H. and brought 

her back to the hotel. Id at 184. A.H. continued working for the Appellant and he made no effort 

to contact A.H's family or tell A.H. to no longer prostitute herself. 

The Appellant was the head of an organization that recruited and preyed upon vulnerable 

girls. The girls were forced to perform upwards of ten to fifteen dates per day. N.T. 6/28/2016 at 

171. The organization included at least three other persons identified as Elton Cromwell, Eddie 

Mendez and Dwayne Thomas. There existed a structure within the organization with Cromwell 

and Mendez described as puppets and taking orders from the Appellant. N.T. 6/29/2016 at 19-20. 

Mendez was also a driver for all the girls within the organization and drove them to meet 

customers for sexual services when the encounters did not take place at the hotel. N.T. 6/28/2016 

at 187. Early in the organization's history the Appellant would collect the money the girls made 

himself; however, as time moved forward and other people became involved in the organization 

the the Appellant employees collected the money instead. Id at 80. The Appellant was directly 

6 
responsible for distributing narcotics to these vulnerable girls. The Appellant was fully aware 

these girls suffered from substance abuse issues because the girls were asked about their drug use 

within minutes of encountering him. N.T. 6/28/20.16 at 59, 148. The Appellant supplied these 

girls with large amounts both crack cocaine and heroin. N.T. 6/29/2016 at 184. One victim that 

did not use narcotics was permitted to spend $600.00 every Sunday at the mall, but was never 

permitted to hold the cash or be paid in cash. N.T. 6/29/2016 at 43. The Appellant headed an 

organization that preyed on vulnerable girls, demanded behavior consistent with his expectations 

or face violence and had multiple employees working for him to oversee and control the 

operation. 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

The Appellant was charged in December, 2010 as the result of an investigation being 

submitted to the Statewide Investigating Grand Jury. The Appellant then became a fugitive from 

justice until his apprehension by troopers from the Pennsylvania State Police Organized Crime 

Unit in August, 2014. On October 21, 2014, a preliminary hearing was held, at which his charges 

were held for court. On November 11, 2014, he was formally arraigned on his charges. 

The Appellant remained in custody until his bench trial began on June 28, 2016 before 

the Honorable Sean F. Kennedy. On June 29, 2016, he was convicted at his bench trial of all 

thirteen counts. On May 4, 2017, the Appellant was sentenced by the Honorable Sean F. 

Kennedy to a total term of 37-74 years confinement. On May 5, 2017, the Appellant filed a 

timely post-sentence motion. On September 5, 2017, the Appellant's post-sentence motion was 

denied by operation oflaw. On September 29, 2017, he filed a timely Notice of Appeal to the 

Superior Court of Pennsylvania. 

7 
MATTERS COMPLAINED ON APPEAL 

The Appellant's l 925(b) asserts: 

1. Whether the evidence was sufficient to find Appellant guilty of Possession with Intent to 

Distribute in violation of35 Pa.C.S.A. § 780-l 13(a)(30); Corrupt Organization in 

violation of 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 91 l(b)(l); Conspiracy-Trafficking of Persons in violation of 

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 903; Sexual Exploitation of Children in violation of 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 

6320(a); Criminal Use of a Communication Facility in violation of 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 

7512(a); Promoting Prostitution - Own House of Prostitution in violation of 18 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 5902 (b)(l); Corruption of Minors in violation of 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 630l(a)(l)(i); Simple 

Assault in violation of 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2701(a); Trafficking of Persons (2 counts) in 

violation of 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3002(a); and Sexual Abuse of a Minor in violation of 18 

Pa.C.S.A. § 63 l 8(a)(5) beyond a reasonable doubt. 

2. Whether the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. 

3. Whether the Court abused its discretion in Sentencing the Appellant to an aggregate 

period of 37 to 74 years. 

4. Whether the Court erred in permitting the investigating officer to testify as to his opinion 

that the Appellant was the head of a corrupt organization thereby depriving Appellant of 

a fair trial. · 

5. Whether the Court erred in allowing testimony elicited by the Commonwealth involving 

an alleged threat by Elton Cromwell against a witness testifying against the Appellant 

without establishing any connective link to the Appellant. 

6. Whether the Court erred in allowing testimony from Commonwealth's witness (M.S.) to 

testify as to uncharged conduct, specifically, that the Appellant anally raped her and 

strangled her without providing defense counsel with prior Notice of Intent to Admit 

Prior Bad Acts pursuant to PA Rule of Evidence 404(b) thereby depriving the Appellant 

of a fair trial. 

7. Whether the Court erred in allowing testimony from Commonwealth's witness (A.H.) to 

testify as to uncharged conduct, specifically, that the Appellant raped her knowing that 

she was a minor without providing defense counsel with prior Notice of Intent to Admit 

Prior Bad Acts pursuant to PA Rule of Evidence 404(b) thereby depriving Appellant of a 

fair trial. 

DISCUSSION 

I. Sufficiency Claim - The evidence presented at trial was sufficient to find guilt 

beyond a reasonable doubt on all charges. 

In his first principle point of appeal, the Appellant incorrectly asserts that the evidence 

was insufficient to sustain his convictions on all counts. For myriad of reasons, the sufficiency 

claims asserted by Mr. the Appellant as to all charges are without merit. The trial court will 

8 
discuss the evidentiary sufficiency for each conviction. The appellate scope of review of a 

challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is well-established. The appellate court must review 

the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict winner to determine whether there is 

sufficient evidence to allow a jury to find every element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 

The Superior Court has further held that: 

In applying the above test, [the appellate court] may not weigh the 

evidence and substitute [its] judgment for the fact-finder. In addition, [the 

appellate court] notes that the facts and circumstances established by the 

Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts 

regarding a defendant's guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the 

evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact 

may be drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth may 

sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable 

doubt by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying the 

above test, the entire record must be evaluated and all evidence actually received 

must be considered. Finally, the finder of fact while passing upon the credibility 

of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part or 

none of the evidence. 

Commonwealth v. Tejada, 107 A.3d 788, 792-93 (Pa. Super. 2015). The facts and circumstances 

established by the Commonwealth need not "be absolutely incompatible with the defendant's 

innocence." See Commonwealth v. Aguado, 760 A.2d 1181, 1185 (Pa. Super. 2000). Where no 

single bit of evidence "will by itself conclusively establish guilt, the verdict will be sustained 

where the totality of the evidence supports the finding of guilt." Commonwealth v. Thomas, 561 

A.2d 699, 704 (Pa. 1989). 

Thus, our appellate courts have recognized that proof of guilt may be inferred entirely 

from evidence of circumstances that attended the commission of the crime. See Commonwealth 

v. Brewer, 876 A.2d 1029, 1032 (Pa. Super. 2005). The "fact that the evidence establishing a 

defendant's participation in a crime is circumstantial does not preclude a conviction where the 

evidence coupled with the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom overcomes the presumption of 

9 
innocence." Id. Nevertheless, the requirement of the law remains that in order to secure a 

conviction, the "facts and circumstances proved must be of such a character as to produce a 

moral certainty of the guilt of the accused beyond any reasonable doubt." Commonwealth v. 

Bybel, 611 A.2d 188, 189 (Pa. 1992). Finally, an appellate court will review the entire trial 

record, even evidence which is impermissibly introduced, when evaluating a sufficiency claim. 

See Commonwealth v. Sanders, 42 A.3d 325, 329 n.1 (Pa. Super. 2012). 

The trial court believes the entire record more than adequately meets the necessary 

threshold to establish each element of every charged offense has been proven beyond a 

reasonable doubt. For reasons that follow, the claims by the Appellant fail and each is without 

merit. 

a. Possession with Intent to Deliver 

The Appellant first raises the claim that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his 

conviction for Possession with Intent to Deliver. The trial court disagrees. To sustain a 

conviction for PWID, the Commonwealth "must prove both the possession of the controlled 

substance and the intent to deliver the controlled substance." Commonwealth v. Lee, 956 A.2d 

l 024, l 028 (Pa. Super. 2008). At trial, there was extensive testimony presented from victim M.S. 

where she stated that she received crack cocaine directly from Mr. the Appellant and would 

receive disproportionately low amounts of narcotics compared to the money she had paid. N.T. 

6/28/2016 at 74-75. For instance, M.S. testified that she if she paid $120 to the Appellant, she 

would only receive $20 of crack cocaine in return. Id at 75. This would, in turn, force M.S. to 

work more frequently, or have more "dates," for the Appellant in order to satisfy her daily drug 

habit. 

10 
Perhaps the most convincing testimony supporting the sufficiency of the evidence for the 

PWID conviction comes from the Appellant himself. The Appellant stated that around the time 

of the charged events he sold both crack cocaine and heroin. N.T. 06/29/2018 at 184. The 

Appellant admitted that he "started picking [narcotics] up in large quantities so that it would be 

cheaper." Id. The Appellant then testified he would purchase approximately $500 worth of 

heroin at a time, break it down and sell to the girls and make a profit. Id at 185-86. The 

Appellant also testified that he would purchase approximately $100 of crack cocaine for 

distribution amongst the girls he had in his employ. Id at 186. The Appellant plainly stated he 

"would go down to Kensington and buy it . . So [the Appellant] would go down to Kensington 

Ave and get it. [The Appellant would] come back up, you know. And then when [he] g[a]ve it to 

them, they g{a]ve [the Appellant] the money that they ha[d]." N.T. 06/29/2016 at 173. 

Alternatively stated, the Appellant would purchase illegal narcotics and sell the controlled 

substances to the girls working for him at the hotels. 

The Appellant attempts justification for his distribution of controlled substances to the 

victims through claims he was attempting to protect the girls from the dangers of the streets. 

Perhaps, the Appellant fails to consider the possibility he is one very such danger from which he 

sought to protect the girls. The Appellant stated that it was "safer for them to stay at the hotel 

room." N.T. 6/28/2016 at 187. However, in the same breath, the Appellant stated that he "wasn't 

making money off of crack from giving it to them. I was making money off the dope." and that 

the girls did not want to procure narcotics themselves from certain areas because "people get 

locked up and you get beat up. You know, they got robbed." Id. The trial court duly notes the 

seemingly personal hardship he must have endured in only profiting from the sales of one 

controlled substance to the victims. However, in his quest for benevolence, the Appellant meets 

11 
the two necessary elements for conviction of PWID through his possession of a controlled 

substance and the intent to distribute the controlled substance. Therefore, the trial court did not 

err in finding there was sufficient evidence to prove the two elements needed for conviction 

beyond a reasonable doubt. 

b. Corrupt Organizations 

The Appellant next challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction 

for corrupt organizations. To secure a conviction under the charged subsection of the Corrupt 

Organizations Act, the Commonwealth must prove a defendant received income, either directly 

or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity in which the defendant participated as a 

principal to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part or proceeds of such income in the 

acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 

911 (b )( 1 ). A pattern of racketeering activity is defined as a "course of conduct requiring two or 

more acts of racketeering activity." 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 91 l(h)(4). A non-exhaustive list of 

racketeering activity, in relevant part, can include acts indictable under Chapter 30, relating to 

human trafficking, of the Crimes Code; an offense indictable under section 13 of the act of April 

14, 1972, known as The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device, and Cosmetic Act (relating to the 

sale and dispensing of narcotic drugs; or a conspiracy to commit any of the offenses set forth in 

subparagraph (i) or (ii). 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 91 l(h)(l)(i)-(iii). Further, an enterprise is defined as any 

"individual, partnership, corporation, association or other legal entity, and any union or group of 

individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity, engaged in commerce and includes 

legitimate as well as illegitimate entities and governmental entities." 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 911 (h)(3). 

First, the Appellant engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity. Again, racketeering 

activity is defined as "any offense indictable under Chapter 30 of Title 18 (relating to human 

12 
trafficking)." 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 91 l(h)(l)(i). Racketeering activity as also defined as "any offense 

indictable under [the Controlled Substances Act]." 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 911 (h)(l )(ii). Racketeering 

activity also occurs where there is any conspiracy to commit any of the offenses set forth at 

subsections (i) and (ii). The trafficking of persons, both of adults and a minor in this case, is 

indictable under Chapter 30 of the Crimes Code; consequently, the trafficking of persons is 

"racketeering activity." The Appellant trafficked in one minor person, A.H., and at least two 

persons over age 18, M.S. and T.W. Likewise, the possession with the intent to distribute 

narcotics is indictable under the Controlled Substances Act; thus, also making such an offense 

"racketeering activity." By his own admission, the Appellant possessed controlled substances 

with the intent to distribute the narcotics. N.T. 6/29/2016 at 173. Further, a conspiracy to commit 

any offense set forth in subparagraphs (i) or (ii) of the Corrupt Organizations Act constitutes 

racketeering activity. The Appellant's involvement in the conspiracy to traffic persons is 

considered "racketeering activity." All of these acts constitute a "pattern of racketeering activity" 

pursuant to the definition provided in the Corrupt Organizations Act. 

The Commonwealth is also required to establish that the Appellant received income from 

his pattern ofracketeering. The first "racketeering activity" from which the Appellant drew 

income stemmed from his trafficking of persons through forced labor. The trial court will later 

discuss in greater detail the specifics of his engaging in trafficking of persons. However, for the 

purposes of demonstrating the Appellant drew a profit from trafficking of persons through forced 

labor, the very poignant testimony of T.W. demonstrates how the Appellant drew his income 

from the forced labor: . 

13 
Commonwealth: And after each date, were you directed to something specific 

with the money that you got? 

T.W.: Either hand it to whichever guy was in the room- it would either be [the 

Appellant], Eddie or-when [Cromwell] came along, it would be [Cromwell]. 

Commonwealth: And so . . how much money would you estimate you were 

making a day? 

T.W.: About a thousand. 

Commonwealth: Did you ever try to take any days off? 

T.W.: You weren't allowed. 

Commonwealth: When you say "you weren't allowed to," who wouldn't allow 

you? 

T.W.: Eddie or [the Appellant] wouldn't allow you to. 

N.T. 6/29/2016 at 19. T.W. further stated that both Eddie Mendez and Elton "Marvin" Cromwell 

took orders directly from the Appellant. Id at 20. The minor victim, A.H., also offered similar 

testimony that she would give her money to the driver that brought her to a location and the 

drivers subsequently gave that money to the Appellant. N.T. 06/28/2016 at 204. The record 

reflects that: (1) the Appellant, and not the girls themselves, drew the income from the sexual 

encounters the girls earned; and (2) the fact he did not "allow" the girls days off epitomizes the 

concept of forced labor. Therefore, it can be concluded that the Appellant received income 

through the "racketeering activity" of trafficking in persons. 

The next "racketeering activity" from which the Appellant drew income was through his 

possession of a controlled substance with the intention to distribute it. One victim, M.S., testified 

at trial how after performing a date she would pay $120 for crack cocaine, but would just receive 

around $20 worth of the controlled substance. N.T. 6/28/2016 at 75. M.S. further testified that 

she witnessed Elton Cromwell and other persons getting the crack cocaine to be sold to them 

from the Appellant. Id at 74. The minor victim, A.H., testified that she received crack cocaine 

14 
from Cromwell after each date and purchased around $500 of crack cocaine per day. Id at 166. 

The next logical step given this testimony from A.H. is provided by M.S. that she witnessed the 

Appellant giving controlled substances to Cromwell for distribution and sale among the girl. It 

follows that the crack cocaine purchased from Cromwell by A.H. likely came from the 

Appellant. Finally, the testimony from the Appellant himself points towards his making a profit 

through his distribution of controlled substances. The Appellant testified that around the time of 

the charged events he sold both crack cocaine and heroin. N.T. 06/29/2018 at I 84. The Appellant 

admitted that he "started picking [narcotics] up in large quantities so that it would be cheaper." 

Id. The Appellant then testified he would purchase approximately $500 worth of heroin at a time, 

break it down and sell to the girls and make a profit. Id at 185·86. In short, the Appellant plainly 

admits to making a profit from the distribution of narcotics. Therefore, it can be concluded that 

the Appellant received income through the "racketeering activity" of possessing a controlled 

substance with the intention to distribute the controlled substance. 

Second, having concluded that the Appellant engaged in a pattern racketeering activity, 

the trial court next turns to the question of whether an enterprise existed within the meaning of 

the Corrupt Organizations Act. The Appellant's organization was formed for the purpose of 

trafficking persons and providing sexual services at the behest of his victims constitutes an 

"enterprise," which is defined as any "individual, partnership, corporation, association ... and 

any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity, engaged in 

commerce and includes legitimate as well as illegitimate entities." 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 91 l(h)(3). 

Trooper Michael Peterson described the Appellant's operation as "organized crime." N.T. 

6/29/2016 at 103. There was, in fact, an organized effort in the Appellant's management of his 

criminal enterprise, with himself at the top. Investigation revealed that he had at least three other 

' 

15 
people working for him in this enterprise: Elton "Marvin" Cromwell, Eddie Mendez, and 

Dwayne Thomas. Id at 65. The victims working for the Appellant also confirmed this command 

structure. There exists little dispute that Eddie worked as a driver for the Appellant by 

transporting girls to meet customers. The minor victim, A.H., testified that Eddie worked for the 

Appellant and drove her to meet customers. N.T. 6/28/2016 at 187. Victim M.S. also testified 

that Eddie drove her places. Id at 126. The Appellant himself admitted that he paid Eddie 

Mendez $50 each time he drove one of the girls to meet a customer. N.T. 6/29/2016 at 202. M.S. 

testified that she believed the Appellant was in charge of Cromwell, Eddie Mendez and Dwayne 

Thomas. N.T. 6/28/2016 at 72. The minor victim, A.H., also testified that Dwayne Thomas 

worked for the Appellant. Id at 188. A.H. also testified that she witnessed Cromwell taking 

orders from the Appellant. Id at 196. Thus, there was a group of individuals engaged in 

commerce, providing forced sexual labor, whose sole purpose was to generate income from the 

victims. 

Third, the trial court is required to determine whether the income from the Appellant's 

"pattern of racketeering activity" was used in the establishment or operation of the enterprise. 

The trial court has little doubt the income received from the "racketeering activity" was used to 

establish or maintain the enterprise. For example, nothing in the record states that the Appellant 

had any type of legitimate employment during this time. However, there is testimony from the 

Appellant stating that he paid rent for two homes; one home was rented for $500 per month and 

the second was rented for $650 per month. N.T. 6/29/2016 at 175. One of the homes, the one 

located on Tackawanna Street, was the home to which A.H. was brought after the Appellant 

discovered her true age. The Appellant further testified that he "always had girls at the hotel 

ready. So if you wanted to be at the house, you could be at the house. If you wanted to go to the 

16 
hotel, you'd go to the hotel." Id at 176. Regarding the house, he stated that the girls "needed a 

place to stay when they wasn't working. So they asked if I could get a house and stuff like that. 

That was the purpose behind that." Id at 175. 

Next, M.S. testified that Cromwell, Dwayne "D-Boy" Thomas, and Eddie "were like [the 

Appellant's] people, and, like, [the Appellant] came and brought them down there so, like, they 

could make money and, like, expand . . I mean the more you branch out and like have more 

girls." N.T. 6/28/2016 at 73. M.S. testified that in the beginning there was only the Appellant and 

another man, named Dre, but slowly "other people were coming down from New York. And 

then, like, they would end up with like a girl. Like, [the Appellant] would put them somewhere 

in the hotel with us." Id at 71. The Appellant started with a small number of people and as his 

enterprise grew, he reinvested the money collected from the trafficked victims to bring additional 

persons and recruiting more victims. 

There are expenses that come with the operation of a human trafficking ring: the costs to 

post advertisements on line, the renting of hotel rooms, payment for food and other goods for the 

girls. T.W. testified that early in the operation she did not post, or pay for, the advertisements 

online herself; rather, T.W. testified that the Appellant was responsible for the payment and 

posting of advertisements. N.T. 6/28/2016 at 14. M.S. testified that all money was eventually 

given to the Appellant and that if she "wanted to eat or like food was to be ordered, like, that 

never came out of my own pocket because, like, I never had my own cash . . Because it was 

given to [the Appellant]. Like if I needed to do something or wanted to go do something, like get 

my nails done," then M.S. was required to ask the Appellant or one of his employees. Id at 66- 

67. The Commonwealth expert on trafficking in persons, Detective Stigerts, stated that the 

"business end of it is the girls make the money through their prostitution acts, and they provide 

17 
the money actually to the traffickers. The traffickers take care of all their expenses." Id at 36. 

Detective Stigerts testified that these expenses included posting the advertisements) renting hotel 

rooms, travel, food, drugs, and getting hair and nails done for the girls. Id. 

There was sufficient testimony presented at trial to convict the Appellant on the charge of 

Corrupt Organizations. The Appellant engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity through his 

trafficking in persons and delivering controlled substances. There existed an enterprise, although 

illegitimate, through a group of persons whose objective was to engage in commerce. The 

income received from the pattern of racketeering activity was used to establish and maintain the 

enterprise. In fact, the testimony of the Commonwealth expert unsurprisingly struck very close to 

the behavior exhibited by the Appellant and he opined that the ultimate concerns of such 

traffickers are "making money and how much money can the girls make for them." N.T. 

6/28/2016 at 3 5. The trial court is inclined to agree and, therefore, found the evidence presented 

at trial sufficient to convict the Appellant for Corrupt Organizations. 

c. Conspiracy - Trafficking Persons 

The Appellant next contends that there was insufficient evidence to support his 

conviction for conspiracy. The Appellant was charged by the Commonwealth with conspiracy 

under three alternative theories: (1) conspiracy to traffic a minor person; (2) conspiracy to traffic 

persons; and (3) conspiracy for promoting prostitution. N.T. 06/29/2016 at 217. To sustain a 

conviction for criminal conspiracy, the Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt 

that the defendant: (1) entered into an agreement to commit or aid in a criminal act with another 

person or persons; (2) with a shared criminal intent; and that (3) an overt act was done in 

furtherance of the conspiracy. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 903; See Commonwealth v. Devine, 26 A.3d I 139, 

1147 (Pa. Super.2011). The overt act necessary to establish criminal conspiracy need not be 

18 
committed by the defendant; it need only be committed by a co-conspirator. See Commonwealth 

v. McCall, 911 A.2d 992, 996 (Pa. Super. 2006). The conduct of the alleged parties and the 

circumstances surrounding such conduct may create a web of evidence linking the accused to the 

alleged conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. The conspiratorial agreement "can be inferred 

from a variety of circumstances including, but not limited to, the relation between the parties, 

knowledge of and participation in the crime, and the circumstances and conduct of the parties 

surrounding the criminal episode." Id. 

Here, the Commonwealth charged the Appellant with criminal conspiracy. Regarding the 

charge of criminal conspiracy in particular, the Superior Court reiterated the following precepts: 

An explicit or formal agreement to commit crimes can seldom, if ever, be proved 

and it need not be, for proof of a criminal partnership is almost invariably 

extracted from the circumstances that attend its activities." Commonwealth v. 

Johnson, 719 A.2d 778, 785 (Pa. Super. 1998) (en bane), appeal denied, 739 A.2d 

1056 (1999) (citations omitted). Therefore, where the conduct of the parties 

indicates that they were acting in concert with a corrupt purpose in view, the 

existence of a criminal conspiracy may properly be inferred. Commonwealth v. 

Snyder, 483 A.2d 933, 942 (Pa. Super. 1984). This court has held that the 

presence of the following non-exclusive list of circumstances when considered 

together and in the context of the crime may establish proof of a conspiracy: (1) 

an association between alleged conspirators, (2) knowledge of the commission of 

the crime, (3) presence at the scene of the crime, and ( 4) participation in the 

object of the conspiracy. Commonwealth v. Swerdlow, 636 A.2d 1173, 1177 (Pa. 

Super. 1994). 

Commonwealth v. Kinard, 95 A.3d 279, 293 (Pa. Super. 2014). The trial court will address the 

conspiracy to traffic a minor as this was the conspiracy charge under which the Appellant was 

sentenced. 

Although an explicit or formal agreement can seldom be proved, direct testimony was 

presented at trial that illuminates the existence of such an agreement. For instance, at trial, 

witness M.S. gave the following testimony: 

19 
Defense Counsel: Did you ever hear [the Appellant] and [Cromwell] agree 

to any kind of criminal enterprise? 

M.S.: Yes. Like, he showed [Cromwell] - like, Here's this girl, like, and 

this is what we're doing down here and like, now, you're in on it and, like, 

this is what we do. Yes. 

N .T. 06/28/2016 at 124. This testimony in itself vocalizes, and demonstrates, the existence of a 

conspiracy. The testimony from M.S. provides evidence of a conspiracy to traffic persons in a 

formal agreement. However, further discussion is required to ascertain the true depths of the 

conspiracy- namely, whether the parties acted in concert with one another to traffic a minor, had 

the shared criminal intent and committed an overt act. 

Regarding the minor, A.H., there was extensive testimony at trial to implicate the 

Appellant in a conspiracy to traffic a minor. Initially, when A.H. first came into contact with 

Cromwell and the Appellant, she was walking down Kensington A venue when she was 

approached by both men riding in the same car. Id at 147. After A.H. got into the vehicle, she 

was asked what drugs she used and told them she used cocaine. Id at 148. After getting into the 

vehicle, the Appellant and Cromwell brought A.H. to a room at the Ramada Inn on Roosevelt 

Boulevard that was occupied by a number of girls, who A.H. understood to be prostitutes, who 

left upon their arrival. Id at 150. Afterwards. A.H. had sexual intercourse with both the Appellant 

and Cromwell while the other remained in the room. Id at 157. Shortly thereafter, A.H. began 

working as a prostitute and used cocaine in between dates. A.H. stated that while she would have 

solicitors for her services come to her hotel room, Cromwell would go to the Appellant's room to 

wait while she finished. Id at 164. A.H. testified during trial that although she usually gave the 

money she earned from dates to Cromwell, or Elton Cromwell, there may have been occasion 

she "maybe" witnessed Cromwell giving the money to the Appellant. N. T. 06/28/2016 at 167. At 

another point in her testimony, A.H. stated that she witnessed the "drivers" give money to the 

20 
Appellant and that Cromwell used the same driver as the Appellant. Id at 204. Further, A.H. 

testified that she witnessed Cromwell taking orders from the Appellant. Id at 196. 

Perhaps the most cogent argument to inculpate the Appellant in the conspiracy to traffic a 

minor comes after his discovery of her true age. There appears to be no factual dispute that until 

a certain time, A.H. had misrepresented her age until her minor status was discovered. At that 

time, A.H. directly informed the Appellant that she was, in fact, a minor and his response was to 

tell A.H. to "pack up [her] stuff and [the Appellant] was going to let [A.H.] stay at his wife's 

house for a couple days." N.T. 06/28/2016 at 182. A.H. further stated that while she, the 

Appellant and Cromwell were in the hotel room after the discovery of her age she 

"remember[ed] it being left up to John whether they [the Appellant and Cromwell] were going to 

keep me after finding out how old I was." Id at 197. After the Appellant took A.H. to his wife's 

house, he did not tell A.H. that he wanted nothing to do with an underage prostitute, did not tell 

A.H. that she should return home, and did not try to contact A.H. 's parents. Id at 195. 

Alternatively stated, the Appellant did nothing to prevent A.H. from continuing work for him 

and failed to tell A.H. to cease working for him. Subsequent to A.H. having spent time at the 

Appellant's home on Tackawanna Street, A.H. was picked up from the residence and driven 

back to a hotel by both Cromwell and the Appellant. N.T. 06/28/2016 at 184. 

Addressing the four factors laid out in Kinard, the Appellant participated fully in the 

commission of conspiracy to traffic a minor. One victim, A.H., described the Appellant and 

Cromwell as being "good friends," and operated what could be labeled a business. N.T. 

06/28/2016 at 186, 195. Mr. Cromwell was known to take orders from the Appellant. Id at 196. 

Under the second factor present in Kinard, the Appellant had full knowledge about the crime. 

The Appellant made the decision, after allowing A.H. to stay at his home, to return A.H. to the 

21 
hotel with Cromwell under the assumption she would begin working again. In fact, Cromwell 

looked to the Appellant to make a decision on how to handle the situation after discovering that 

A.H. was a minor. 

The basic elements for conviction of Criminal Conspiracy under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 903 

require a demonstration that two or more persons: (1) entered into an agreement to commit or aid 

in a criminal act with another person or persons; (2) with a shared criminal intent; and that (3) an 

overt act was done in furtherance of the conspiracy. The Commonwealth proved the existence of 

an agreement beyond a reasonable doubt. The Commonwealth had one witness, M.S., present 

when such an agreement was made. However, inferences to the Appellant's agreement to 

commit the criminal act may also be drawn from the Appellant's presence at the hotel, his 

presence when recruiting victims to be trafficked and his position as the head of the organization. 

Next, the Commonwealth demonstrated a shared criminal intent when the Appellant, with Elton 

Cromwell, picked up A.H. from his family home and brought her back to the hotel to continue 

her work in prostitution. The shared criminal intent may also be inferred from the distribution of 

narcotics that the Appellant picked up for use by other victims that the Appellant claims does not 

work for him. Finally, the overt act done in furtherance of the conspiracy was completed when 

the Appellant picked up A.H. for the first time and recruited her for prostitution; or alternatively, 

the overt act can be inferred from when he brought A.H. back to the hotel for the express purpose 

of continuing her work in prostitution. There existed a network designed and operated by the 

Appellant that included drivers for transporting A.H., and other trafficking victims, to other 

locations to meet customers for sexual services. Within the network and organization headed by 

the Appellant, there were individuals assigned to collect money from the trafficking victims after 

"dates" and for the distribution of narcotics. A.H. was exposed to - and worked within the 

22 
conspiracy headed by the Appellant - the drivers, the individuals who collected her money, gave 

her narcotics, provided her cellular phones, and provided money for A.H. to post advertisements. 

Here, the entire record more than adequately supports a finding that the evidence was 

sufficient at trial to sustain a conviction for conspiracy to traffic a minor. It would be orthogonal 

to logic and reason to find the Appellant was somehow insulated or unaware of the victim's 

minority status. After a brief respite at his home, A.H. was returned to the hotel to continue the 

work for which she was recruited. Therefore, the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence 

to prove each required element of Criminal Conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt. 

d. Sexual Exploitation of Children 

The Appellant next contends the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to sustain a 

conviction for sexual exploitation of children. The crime of Sexual Exploitation of Children is 

defined in the Crimes Code as: 

§ 6320. Sexual Exploitation of Children. 

(a) Offense Defined - A person commits the offense of sexual 

exploitation of children if he procures for another person a child 

under 18 years of age for the purpose of sexual exploitation. 

(c) Definitions -As used in this section, the following words and 

phrases shall have the meanings given to them in this subsection: 

"Procure." To obtain or make available for sexual 

exploitation. 

"Sexual Exploitation." Actual or simulated sexual activity 

or nudity arranged for the purpose of sexual stimulation or 

gratification of any person. 

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6320(a)(c). Therefore, the Commonwealth must prove that a defendant: (1) 

obtained or made available a person under 18 years of age; (2) for the purpose of any actual or 

simulated sexual activity for the purpose of sexual stimulation or gratification of any person. 

23 
Here, there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the Appellant's conviction for 

sexual exploitation of children. The first night that the Appellant and Cromwell encountered 

A.H., a person under 18 years of age, they "told [A.H.] that they would post an ad for me and 

that I could work for them to stay there." N.T. 6/28/2016 at 159. A.H. further clarified and stated 

that the advertisements would be posted on Craigslist for erotic services. Id. A.H. defined erotic 

services as having sexual intercourse with customers in exchange for money. Id. These Craigslist 

and Backpage advertisements were posted multiple times per day with photographs of A.H. and 

included a phone number for customers to contact A.H. for her sexual services. Id at 161. M.S. 

testified that she knew A.H., a minor, was performing sex acts for money. N.T. 6/28/2016 at 

133-34. M.S. further testified that she witnessed A.H. giving the money earned from these sex 

acts to Cromwell. Id at 134. There was testimony that Cromwell may have turned this money 

over to the Appellant. Id at 167. 

Further, there is more than adequate testimony to support the Appellant's conviction for 

sexual exploitation of children corresponding to his actions after finding out A.H.' s true age. 

The Appellant told A.H. to "pack up [her] stuff and [the Appellant] was going to let [A.H.] stay 

at his wife's house for a couple days." N.T. 06/28/2016 at 182. After allowing a short number of 

days to pass, A.H. was picked up from the residence and driven back to a hotel by both 

Cromwell and the Appellant. Id at 184. A.H. returned to the hotel and continued to post 

advertisements online in soliciting customers to have sexual intercourse in exchange for 

currency. N.T. 6/29/2016 at 22. The Appellant did not tell A.H. that he wanted nothing to do 

with an underage prostitute, did not tell A.H. that she should return home, and did not try to 

contact A.H. 's parents. Id at 195. The conclusion that is drawn from these actions is that the 

Appellant had knowledge that A.H. was soliciting customers for sexual services in the hotel prior 

24 
to her stay at his home, and that without any intervention such conduct would continue after her 

return to the same hotel. 

The Appellant made a minor available through posting her photograph in online 

advertisements with a phone number included through which customers contacted her. There 

may also be argument made that the Appellant made A.H. available for sexual exploitation 

through the rental of hotel rooms for A.H. to complete sexual acts with customers. A.H. was 

procured or made available "for another person" within the meaning of§ 6320 because the 

online advertisements were directed towards any person who came upon A.H.'s advertisement 

on Craigslist or Backpage. There can be little dispute that the advertisements were for the 

purpose of "sexual exploitation" within the meaning of the statute. Again, sexual exploitation is 

defined as actual or simulated sexual activity for the sexual stimulation or gratification of another 

person. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6320(c). A.H. explicitly stated that the purpose of the advertisements was 

to solicit customers for sexual intercourse in exchange for money. N.T. 6/28/2016 at 159. These 

other persons contacted A.H. and subsequently had sexual intercourse with her. Therefore, the 

evidence is sufficient to sustain the Appellant's conviction for sexual exploitation of children. 

e. Criminal Use of a Communication Facility 

In his fourth point of appeal concerning the sufficiency of the evidence, the Appellant 

contends the evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction for criminal use of a 

communication facility. In addressing the Appellant's conviction of criminal use of a 

communication facility, the crime is defined in relevant part as follows: 

A person commits a felony of the third degree if that person uses a 

communication facility to commit, cause or facilitate the commission or the 

attempt thereof of any crime which constitutes a felony under this title []. Every 

instance where the communication facility is utilized constitutes a separate 

offense under this section. 

25 
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 7512(a). A "communication facility" includes both a computer connected to the 

internet and telephones. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 7512(c). Thus, to sustain a conviction under 18 

Pa.C.S.A. § 7512, the Commonwealth must prove that a defendant intentionally, knowingly, or 

recklessly used a communication facility, and that, in doing so, the defendant intentionally, 

knowingly, or recklessly facilitated the commission or attempted commission of the underlying 

felony. See Commonwealth v. Moss, 852 A.2d 374, 381 (Pa. Super. 2004). Here, the Appellant 

testified during trial and admitted to several underlying felonies that would provide sufficient 

evidence to find the Appellant used a communication facility to facilitate the commission of an 

underlying felony. The trial court will discuss the Appellant's use of a communication facility as 

it relates to his conviction for the felony § 5902(b )(1) prostitution charge. 

Here, there was extensive testimony from multiple witnesses, including the Appellant, at 

trial that inculpated the Appellant in the use of an internet connected computer and telephones to 

facilitate prostitution. One victim, M.S., testified that the Appellant took explicit photographs of 

her and posted her pictures on Craigslist, one prominent website used to draw customers, in 

advertisements to "get the phone calls." N.T. 6/28/2016 at 61. M.S. further testified that the 

Appellant is the person responsible for taking pictures, creating the advertisements, placing 

M. S. 's telephone number in the Craigslist advertisement to draw customers and making sure that 

M.S. answered these phone calls for potential dates. Id at 68. 

In the next instance, another victim, T.W., testified to her experience with the Appellant 

and his facilitation of prostitution through a communication facility. T.W. explained that she was 

given a prepaid cellular phone by the Appellant and this phone number was placed into Craigslist 

advertisements by the Appellant for the purpose of organizing "dates" for T. W. N.T. 6/29/2016 

at 12. The victim, T. W., also testified that the Appellant "took photos of [T.W.] and then put 

26 
them up [on Craigslist]." Id. The photographs that the Appellant took of T.W. at the Roosevelt 

Inn for the Craigslist advertisement were clearly for the purpose of drawing customers for sexual 

encounters as T. W. was "bent over the bed, and, like [her] backside towards the photos where 

[T.W.] was poking [her] butt out and leaning against the door." Id at 14. Thus, a second witness 

testified that the Appellant took explicit photographs of T.W. and was responsible for posting 

advertisements on Craigslist, embedded with the phone number for the prepaid phone provided 

by the Appellant, for the purpose of securing customers for T.W. 

The third instance of the Appellant facilitating the commission of a felony, promoting 

prostitution, through a communication facility comes, once again, from the Appellant himself. 

The Appellant does not deny that victims M.S. and T.W. worked for him as prostitutes. N.T. 

6/28/2016 at I 66. The Appellant admits that he would direct the victims under his employment 

to post advertisements to websites soliciting customers; especially in cases where the girls may 

owe money to him. Id at I 72. The Appellant also admits during his testimony that he took 

pictures of girls for the purpose of posting the picture on Craigslist and Backpage. Id at 200. 

Therefore, the Appellant admits to taking the photographs knowing that these photos would be 

used to solicit customers. 

The elements for criminal use of a communication facility require the Commonwealth to 

prove the defendant used a communication facility to facilitate the commission of the underlying 

felony. Here, there was direct testimony from witnesses who confirmed that the Appellant was 

the person responsible for taking their pictures and using the provocative photographs in 

advertisements to seek customers for his escort service. Even under the defense theory that the 

Appellant himself did not post the advertisements, a theory which the trial court does not find 

credible, he still made laptops and cellular phones available to the girls to post advertisements for 

27 
their services. N.T. 6/29/2016 at 12, 171. There exists little doubt, clarified from the Appellant's 

own testimony, that the Appellant promoted prostitution. For instance, defense counsel concedes 

in closing that the defense has no argument to the felony prostitution charge. Id at 218. 

Additionally, defense counsel stated that there is no argument against the criminal use of 

communication facility with prostitution as the underlying felony. Id. Accordingly, there was 

sufficient evidence presented at trial that the Appellant facilitated the commission of a felony 

through a communication facility. Therefore, the trial court did not err in finding sufficient 

evidence was presented at trial to prove the elements of criminal use of a communication facility 

beyond a reasonable doubt. 

f. Promoting Prostitution - Own House of Prostitution 

The Appellant, in his fifth point of appeal contests the sufficiency of the evidence for his 

conviction of Promoting Prostitution - Owning a House of Prostitution. In relevant part, the 

crime of promoting prostitution in the Crimes Code is defined as: 

b) Promoting prostitution.-- A person who knowingly promotes prostitution of 

another commits a misdemeanor or felony as provided in subsection (c) of this 

section. The following acts shall, without limitation of the foregoing, constitute 

promoting prostitution: 

(1) owning, controlling, managing, supervising or otherwise keeping, 

alone or in association with others, a house of prostitution or a prostitution 

business; 

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5902(b )( l ). Regarding the elements of the crime of promoting prostitution, the 

Superior Court has stated that to sustain a conviction of promoting prostitution, the 

Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt: ( 1) the existence of a prostitution 

business; and (2) that the accused actively participated in the "running, control, supervision, or 

keeping of the prostitution business." See Commonwealth v. Dobrinoff, 784 A.2d 145, 147·148 

(Pa. Super. 2001). Prostitution is defined as "sexual relations for hire." Dobrinoff, 784 A.2d 148. 

28 
Furthermore, the appellate courts have found that a "business" is "a commercial activity engaged 

in for gain." Commonwealth v. Potts, 460 A.2d 1127, 1135 (Pa. Super. 1983) ( defendant who 

agreed to engage in sexual activity and accepted an advance payment of $140 was engaged in 

prostitution as a business). Additionally, ownership and control of the building are not essential 

to a conviction; only the use of the building for the purpose of prostitution is required. 

Commonwealth v. Michaelangelo, 5 Pa. D. & C.2d 92, 94 (Pa. Beaver C. 1955). 

Here, there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction of promoting prostitution 

beyond a reasonable doubt. The first element of the offense requires the existence of a 

prostitution business. The Appellant states that he was a pimp. N.T. 6/29/2016 at 166. He admits 

that he had upwards of eight women working for him as prostitutes. Id at 189. The Appellant 

admits that T.W. and M.S. worked as prostitutes for him. Id at 166. Two victims, M.S. and T.W., 

testified that they worked for the Appellant as prostitutes. This represents, for all intents and 

purposes, the existence of a prostitution business. 

The second element of the offense requires that the Commonwealth prove that the 

Appellant participated in the "running, control, supervision, or keeping of the prostitution 

business." T.W. testified that the Appellant placed the advertisements online, took photos to 

place in the advertisements, gave her telephones to receive phone calls from customers, collected 

money from the victims after their "dates," and was in charge of the group including Eddie 

Mendez and Elton Cromwell. Id at 11, 13, 19, 32. M.S. testified that the first night she met the 

Appellant that she was told by the Appellant that she could work for him as a prostitute. N.T. 

6/28/2016 at 57. M.S. testified that there were at least six girls working for the Appellant, that 

M.S. gave the money to the Appellant after each date and that he brought in additional persons to 

help expand the number of girls working for him Id at 65, 67, 73. 

29 
Given that the Appellant himself admits that he ran a prostitution business and was a 

pimp, it would appear logical to conclude that there existed a prostitution business and that the 

Appellant was involved in the management of the prostitution business. The testimony from 

victims M.S. and T.W. only serve as further evidence that the Appellant formed the prostitution 

ring and actively participated in the management of the business. Therefore, there was sufficient 

evidence presented at trial to support the Appellant's conviction for promoting prostitution 

beyond a reasonable doubt. 

g. Corruption of Minors 

The Appellant asserts that the evidence presented by the Commonwealth at trial was 

insufficient to prove the necessary elements for conviction of Corruption of Minors beyond a 

reasonable doubt. The Appellant was convicted of Corruption of Minors defined in the Crimes 

Code as: 

§ 6301. Corruption of Minors 

(a) Offense Defined.- 

(1) (i) Except as provided in subparagraph (ii), whoever, being of the age of 18 

years and upwards, by any act corrupts or tends to corrupt the morals of any 

minor less than 18 years of age, or who aids, abets, entices or encourages any 

such minor in the commission of any crime, or who knowingly assists or 

encourages such minor in violating his or her parole or any order of court, 

commits a misdemeanor of the first degree. 

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6301. The Pennsylvania Superior Court in Commonwealth v. Leatherby, 116 

A.3d 73, 82 (Pa. Super. 2015), expounded on the definition of the corruption of minors, holding, 

"[actions that] would offend the common, sense of the community and the sense of decency, 

propriety and morality, which most people entertain," are those which shall be considered 

corrupting a minor. Commonwealth v. Pankraz, 554 A.2d 974, 977 (Pa. Super. 1989), 

quoting Commonwealth v. Randall, 133 A.2d 276 (Pa. Super. 1957). 

30 
Here, the Appellant was charged and convicted under§ 630l(a)(l)(i). The first part of 

subsection ( a)( 1 )(i) requires the defendant to perform any act "that "corrupts or tends to corrupt 

the morals of any minor less than 18 years of age." 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6301(a)(l)(i). The 

requirement under § 6301 ( a)(l )(i) requires only the performance of any single act that corrupts 

or tends to corrupt a minor, and does not require more than a single act for conviction under this 

subsection. See Commonwealth v. Kelly, 102 A.3d 1025, 1033 (Pa. Super. 2014). The Appellant 

recruited the minor, A.H., for the purpose of engaging in prostitution. There was evidence 

presented at trial that the Appellant and Cromwell, while operating a vehicle, approached A.H. 

on Kensington Avenue and asked her to get into their car. N.T. 6/28/2016 at 147. A.H. was asked 

which drugs she used and upon informing the two that she used cocaine, she got into the car was 

transported to the Ramada Inn on Roosevelt Boulevard. Id at 148. The Appellant and Cromwell, 

after telling A.H. they had a place for her to stay, took her to a room filled with multiple girls 

where A.H. "realized what they had going on there" and the girls were "prostituting." Id at 150- 

51. A.H. then testified that the Appellant informed her that they would post online 

advertisements for A.H. so that she could exchange sexual intercourse with customers for 

money. Id at 159. A.H. then testified that she performed 10 to 15 "dates" per day exchanging 

money for sexual intercourse. Id at 168. A.H. further testified that if she did not feel like doing a 

"date" on a certain day, she could not refuse and knew there would be consequences for such a 

refusal. Id at 171. Therefore, the Appellant recruited A.H. for the purpose of prostitution and 

required her to perform sexual acts in exchange for money. 

The trial court found that A.H. worked as a prostitute for the Appellant and his 

organization while under the age of 18. Forcing a child to work as a prostitute "would offend the 

common sense of the community and the sense of decency, propriety and morality, which most 

31 
people entertain." Commonwealth v. Pankraz, 554 A.2d 974, 977 (Pa. Super. I 989). The trial 

court found there was sufficient evidence that the Appellant did traffic the minor, A.H. 

Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence to conclude that exposure to such a lifestyle would 

tend to corrupt a minor. Therefore, there was sufficient evidence to convict the Appellant of 

Corruption of a Minor. 

h. Simple Assault 

The Appellant next contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction 

for simple assault. Pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2701, a person "is guilty of assault ifhe: (1) 

attempts to cause or intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to another." I 8 

Pa.C.S.A. § 270l(a). Bodily injury is defined as "[i]mpairment of physical condition or 

substantial pain." 18 Pa. C.S .A. § 230 I. A person acts intentionally with respect to a material 

element of an offense when "it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to 

cause such a result." 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 302(b)(l)(i). As intent is a subjective frame of mind, it "is of 

necessity difficult of direct proof." See Commonwealth v. Matthews, 870 A.2d 924, 929 (Pa. 

2005). Intent can be proven by "direct or circumstantial evidence; it may inferred from acts or 

conduct or from the attendant circumstances." Id. 

Here, the evidence is more than sufficient to sustain the Appellant's conviction for 

Simple Assault. It was well within the province of the factfinder to conclude the Appellant 

intended to cause bodily injury to the victim. The victim, M.S., testified at length about the 

multiple times that she was beaten at the hands of the Appellant. M.S. testified that on one 

occasion, on her birthday, the Appellant found the victim after she had not returned to her room 

and took her into the bathroom and punch the "shit out of me in my rib or like whatever . . Like, 

I got beat up." N.T. 06/28/2016 at 83-84. The victim testified at length about receiving "punches 

32 
to the ribs" called "ribshots," from the Appellant and received "ribshots" on the evening of her 

birthday. Id. M.S. then testified to another occasion after trying to leave the Appellant where she 

was beat up by "G" and it was extremely painful. Id at 91. In perhaps the most chilling episode, 

M.S. testified that she was attacked by the Appellant and three other persons in a room at the 

Roosevelt Inn in Philadelphia so severely that she suffered blows to the head, broken ribs, 

labored breathing, and severe bruising. Id at 92-94. The response by the Appellant and his 

cohorts was to supply M.S. with heroin and have her perform four "dates." Id at 95. Another 

victim, A.H., testified to being in a hotel room directly above M.S. and the Appellant and hearing 

through the floor M.S. scream as the Appellant assaulted her. Id at 174-75. 

The Appellant testified in his own defense and stated during cross-examination that "I 

smacked [M.S.]," and that he smacked her a "couple of times" with an open hand and with 

enough force to give the victim a black eye. N.T. 06/29/2016 at 177-78, 180. There is little room 

for doubt that the Appellant intended to cause substantial pain to the victim through his action of 

striking M.S. in the face and upper torso. During closing argument, defense counsel stated to the 

simple assault charge that the defense had "no argument." Id at 219. The testimony of victims, 

the admission by the Appellant of assaulting M.S. and all other relevant factors lead to a 

conclusion that the evidence is beyond sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 

Appellant is guilty of simple assault. 

i. Trafficking of Persons 

Next, the Appellant argues that the Commonwealth's evidence was insufficient to prove 

the elements of Counts Fifteen and Sixteen, Trafficking of Persons. The trial court first notes that 

the Appellant was convicted under the previous Pennsylvania human trafficking statute. The 

Appellant was convicted of two separate counts under this statute. The first conviction is a first 

33 
degree felony under§ 3002(b) because one victim was under age 18. The second conviction is a 

second degree felony because the victim was not a minor. The former 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3002 

defined trafficking of persons as: 

§ 3002. Trafficking of persons. 

(a) Offense defined.-- A person commits an offense if the person 

knowingly traffics or knowingly attempts to traffic another person, 

knowing that the other person will be subjected to forced labor or 

services. 

(b) Grading.>- An offense under subsection (a) shall be graded a felony of 

the second degree unless the other person suffers bodily injury or the other 

person is an individual under 18 years of age, in which case it shall be 

graded as a felony of the first degree. 

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3002. Under this Section, traffic is defined as "recruits, entices, harbors, 

transports or provides or obtains by any means." 18 Pa.C.S.A § 3001. Additionally, under this 

Section, forced labor has been defined as: 

Labor or services that are performed or provided by another person which 

are obtained or maintained when a person: 

(1) attempts to cause, causes or by threat of physical menace puts 

another person in fear of bodily injury; 

(2) physically restrains or threatens to physically restrain another 

person unlawfully; 

(3) abuses or threatens to abuse the law or legal process; 

(4) possesses except as required by Federal immigration law or 

regulation, destroys, conceals, removes or confiscates any actual or 

purported passport or other immigration document of another 

person, or any other actual or purported government identification 

document of another person; 

(5) engages in criminal coercion of another person. 

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3001. Therefore, for conviction, the Crimes Code requires the Commonwealth to 

prove: (1) that the Appellant "did traffic or knowingly attempt to traffic another person;" and (2) 

that the Appellant "knew that the other person would be subjected to forced labor or services." 

The trial court first heard extensive testimony from an expert witness, Detective Derrick 

Stigerts, a member of the FBI Crimes Against Children Task Force. The expert witness cast 

34 
considerable light upon the methods employed by traffickers to recruit and maintain control over 

vulnerable girls for the singular purpose of employing the victims as sex workers. Detective 

Stigerts stated that traffickers will recruit victims, and often minors, from "places where 

runaways are in an attempt to recruit them." N.T. 6/28/2016 at 31. The recruiting starts with the 

the traffickers "talking to the girls and trying to find out what the vulnerabilities are of the 

women and girls. And by vulnerabilities, I mean anything from they're runaways, they don't 

have a place to stay, to they don't have any family structure." Id. After the trafficker has 

identified the vulnerability, the trafficker "preys[s] on the vulnerabilities. They provide those 

things for the victim for the victims that they're actually recruiting." Id. The testimony from 

Detective Stigerts provided a frame of reference for the behavior that is commonplace among 

human traffickers and is conduct that matches that of the Appellant. 

1. Minor Victim - A.H. 

The Appellant contends that there was insufficient evidence presented by the 

Commonwealth at trial to sustain the conviction for Trafficking of Persons - Minor. The trial 

court disagrees. A thorough review of the record establishes that sufficient evidence was 

presented to meet the necessary thresholds to sustain the Appellant's conviction. 

a. Element One - Did Knowingly Traffic 

The first element in trafficking of persons requires the Commonwealth to prove beyond a 

reasonable doubt that the defendant did knowingly or attempted to traffic another person. By 

definition, a person traffics another when a person recruits, entices, harbors or transports another. 

Here, the Appellant and Cromwell, while operating a vehicle, approached A.H. on Kensington 

Avenue and asked her to get into their car. N.T. 6/28/2016 at 147. A.H. was asked which drugs 

she used and upon informing the two that she used cocaine, she got into the car and was 

35 
transported to the Ramada Inn on Roosevelt Boulevard. Id at 148. The Appellant and Cromwell, 

after telling A.H. they had a place for her to stay, took her into a room filled with multiple girls 

where A.H. "realized what they had going on there" and the girls were "prostituting." Id at 150- 

51. Thus, the first element required for proving trafficking is sufficiently proven through the 

Appellant's recruitment and enticing of A.H. through offering her narcotics, offering her a place 

to stay knowing that she was homeless and would accept his offer. Likewise, the Appellant 

further trafficked A.H. because he transported A.H. initially to the Ramada Inn for the explicit 

purpose of A.H. becoming a prostitute. 

The second instance in which �he record sufficiently demonstrates the Appellant 

trafficked A.H. within the scope of this Section comes through his conduct after the discovery of 

her minor status. In that instance, the Appellant told A.H. to "pack up [her] stuff and [the 

Appellant] was going to let [A.H.] stay at his wife's house for a couple days." N.T. 06/28/2016 at 

182. After a few days at the Appellant's home, A.H. was picked up from the residence and 

driven back to a hotel by both Cromwell and the Appellant. N.T. 06/28/2016 at 184. At that time, 

the Appellant did not tell A.H. to stop performing work as a prostitute. Id at 195. The Appellant 

did not attempt to contact A.H. 's parents or otherwise intervene. The only likely conclusion to be 

drawn from the Appellant transporting A.H. back to a hotel, after she had spent the several 

previous months living and working as a prostitute in hotels, is that A.H. would continue to 

support herself by means of prostitution for Cromwell and the Appellant. Therefore, the 

Appellant transported - and trafficked - A.H. from his home on Tackawanna Street in 

Philadelphia to a motel for the purpose of being subjected to forced labor. 

b, Element Two -Trafficked Knowing Other Person Would Be Subjected to 

Forced Labor 

36 
The second element in trafficking of persons requires the Commonwealth to prove 

beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant trafficked the person knowing the other person 

would be subject to forced labor. Forced labor, in relevant part here, is defined as labor or 

services that are performed or provided by another person which are obtained or maintained 

when a person: ( 1) attempts to cause, causes or by threat of physical menace puts another person 

in fear of bodily injury. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3001. The trial court will first address A.H.'s fear of the 

Appellant and the result this had in her conduct and forced labor. As a secondary matter, given 

the Appellant was convicted of conspiracy to traffic persons, and his co-conspirator Elton 

Cromwell pled guilty to the charge, the trial court will address the second element within a frame 

of one conspirator's conduct in furtherance of the conspiracy being attributable to coconspirators. Under either theory, there is sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 

that the Appellant trafficked A.H. knowing she would be subject to forced labor. 

Forced labor results when a person attempts to cause, causes or threatens physical harm 

to another person to obtain or maintain services from that other person. One of the hallmarks of 

forced labor under§ 3002 is whether the fear of physical harm induces the service. The service 

she was forced to perform included sexual intercourse for money, also called "dates." A date is 

the actual act of prostitution between the customer and the prostitute. N.T. 6/28/2016 at 26. A.H. 

testified at trial that she was "afraid" of the Appellant because he was more intimidating than 

Cromwell or the others because "he was more violent towards the girls that worked for him." Id 

at 180. Under this logic, if A.H. did work for the Appellant, then he would not be violent towards 

her nor would she have reason to fear violence from the Appellant. A.H. stated that she saw the 

Appellant at the hotel "every day, every couple of days." Id at 173. During this time, A.H. 

testified that she was witness to the Appellant's acts of violence towards the other girls on 

37 
numerous occasions. Id. One such incident that A.H. heard was the beating of one victim, M.S., 

through the ceiling of her hotel room who was in the room directly above with the Appellant. 

A.H. heard screaming from M.S. and an elevated voice from the Appellant and later saw M.S. 

being helped walking to a car by several men. Id at 176. A.H. testified that she was the subject of 

violence at the hands of Elton Cromwell, an individual who worked as a "puppet" for the 

Appellant. N.T. 6/28/2016 at 180; N.T. 6/29/2016 at 19-20. A.H. further testified that if she did 

not feel like doing a "date" on a certain day, she could not refuse and knew there would be 

consequences for such a refusal. Id at 171. The fact A.H. could not refuse a "date" only further 

illustrates that she felt compelled, or forced, to perform labor within the meaning of the statute. 

Therefore, there was sufficient evidence presented at trial to prove that the Appellant personally, 

and as a co-conspirator, trafficked a minor person. 

2. Adult Victim - M.S. 

The Appellant next contends that there was insufficient evidence presented at trial to 

prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt for Trafficking of Persons. For reasons that follow, 

there was more than sufficient evidence presented to demonstrate that the Appellant did 

knowingly traffic a person and trafficked such person knowing the victim, M.S., would be 

subjected to forced labor. 

a. Element One - Did Knowingly Traffic 

The first element in trafficking of persons requires the Commonwealth to prove beyond a 

reasonable doubt that the defendant did knowingly or attempted to traffic another person. By 

definition, a person traffics another when a person recruits, entices, harbors or transports another. 

Here, there was sufficient evidence presented at trial to demonstrate the Appellant did knowingly 

traffic the adult victim, M.S., within the meaning of the statute. The first method through which 

38 
he trafficked the adult victim, M.S., was through his enticement of controlled substances. M.S. 

testified that during a Greyhound bus trip from Pittsburgh to Philadelphia she encountered a girl 

named "Star" who told her that she should come with her because M. S.' s destination was unsafe, 

according to an assessment by Star. N.T. 6/28/2016 at 54-55. Star brought M.S. to a row-home in 

Philadelphia that was occupied by five or six other girls and the Appellant. Id at 56-57. M.S. 

flatly told The Appellant that she was addicted to crack cocaine. Id at 59. It was during this first 

encounter with the Appellant that he provided her free crack cocaine and offered her the 

opportunity to work for him doing "dates" and have a constant supply for controlled substances. 

Id at 57-59, 62. The Appellant recruited M.S. to provide sexual services through the internet, 

enticed her with the promise of drugs and harbored M.S. by paying for hotel rooms in which 

M.S. would stay during her employment with the Appellant. The Appellant preyed upon the 

vulnerability of a young woman's drug addiction for his financial interest and treated her 

accordingly. 

The second manner in which the Appellant trafficked a person within the statutory 

meaning of the first element required for conviction is through the Appellant's passage of M.S. 

to his brother, Jason Guerra. Under this Section, trafficking of a person includes "providing" any 

person to another person for the purpose of forced labor. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3001. The victim, M.S., 

testified at trial that Jason Guerra was "having problems like where he was living and, like 

needed help, and that was the solution." N.T. 6/28/2016 at 89. M.S. testified that the Appellant 

essentially stated to his brother that Jason should "come up here [Philadelphia] and I'll show you 

how to do this and like, you can get some money." Id. M.S. further testified that her 

understanding of why she was going with Jason Guerra was simply to make money for Jason 

39 
Guerra. Id. The Appellant had every intention of teaching his brother, Jason, how to make money 

through prostituting vulnerable women, and his first victim was M.S. 

b. Element Two - Trafficked Knowing Other Person Would Be Subjected to 

Forced Labor 

The second element the Commonwealth is required to prove to support a conviction for 

Trafficking of Persons is that a defendant trafficked a person knowing the other person would be 

subject to forced labor. Forced labor results when a person attempts to cause, causes or threatens 

physical harm to another person to obtain or maintain services from that other person. One of the 

hallmarks of forced labor under § 3002 is whether the fear of physical harm induces the service. 

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3001. At trial, there was more than sufficient evidence to conclude beyond a 

reasonable doubt that the Appellant trafficked victim M.S. with the knowledge that she would be 

subject to forced labor; with much of that forced labor originating from the Appellant himself. 

The record is littered with instances in which M.S. was subject to forced labor. As an 

initial matter, the trial court is swayed by the testimony given by M.S. regarding the violence she 

endured at the hands of the Appellant. M.S. testified that she was the victim of a beating by four 

persons - led by the Appellant - that saw her suffer broken ribs. N.T. 6/28/2016 at 94. After 

asking members of the group to be brought to a hospital for medical attention, M.S. was 

informed she "had to do four dates before anything." Id. The victim, after having just been 

beaten by a group of four individuals, is forced to perform sexual services with four customers 

before being granted the ability to seek medical help. M.S. described another occasion during 

which she was chased through a hotel room by the Appellant wielding an extension cord and 

when caught she was forcibly anally raped by the Appellant. Id at 86-87. On yet another 

occasion, M.S. testified that after the Appellant found her in a hotel hallway, after not being able 

to locate her because she was hiding, began beating her in one hotel room and proceeded to a 

40 
second hotel room where she was beaten in that room's bathroom. Id at 81-83. There appears to 

be no shortage of conduct by the Appellant that would qualify as actual bodily injury required 

under the definition of forced labor. 

However, the trial court also notes the inability of M.S. to freely leave the Appellant. 

M.S. testified directly that she did not think she could leave him. N.T. 6/28/2016 at 88. On one 

particular occasion, M.S. recounted how she had attempted to leave the Appellant and went to 

"another room . . farther down on Roosevelt Boulevard . . And like, he came and [the 

Appellant] came and got me and I got beat up." Id at 90. M.S. testified that she often received 

ribshots - punches to the upper torso area - from the Appellant to maintain compliance with his 

wishes. Id at 84. The reason that M.S. cites for these "ribshots" is that she "may or may not have 

like disappeared or like tried to leave and like go to another hotel or something." Id. M.S. was in 

constant fear that the Appellant would come and find her during the times she attempted to leave. 

Id. The trial court believes the fear M.S. experienced, along with her various failed efforts to 

leave, qualify as forced labor. Therefore, the evidence submitted at trial was more than sufficient 

to prove the required elements of Trafficking of Persons beyond a reasonable doubt. 

3. Adult Victim -T.W. 

The Appellant contends that there was insufficient evidence presented at trial to prove his 

guilt beyond a reasonable doubt for Trafficking of Persons. The trial court has addressed the 

sufficiency of the evidence for one adult victim, M.S. However, in an abundance of caution, the 

trial court will also address the Trafficking of Persons claim at it relates to a second adult victim 

that testified at trial, T.W. For reasons that follow, there was more than sufficient evidence 

presented to demonstrate that the Appellant did knowingly traffic T. W. and trafficked such 

person knowing the victim, T.W., would be subjected to forced labor. 

41 
a. Element One - Did Knowingly Traffic 

The first element in trafficking of persons requires the Commonwealth to prove beyond a 

reasonable doubt that the defendant did knowingly or attempted to traffic another person. By 

definition, a person traffics another when a person recruits, entices, harbors or transports another. 

Here, there was sufficient evidence presented at trial to demonstrate the Appellant did knowingly 

traffic the adult victim, T.W., within the meaning of the statute. T.W. testified that in June, 2008 

she ran into Eddie Mendez at a Target in the City of Philadelphia, at which time Mendez invited 

T.W. to get into his car and visit a hotel with him. N.T. 6/29/2016 at 6-7. On the way to the hotel, 

Mendez stopped the car and picked up the Appellant who both traveled with T. W. to the 

Roosevelt Inn on the Roosevelt Boulevard. Id at 8. Upon entering the hotel room, T.W. saw 

other girls in the room and was almost immediately propositioned to begin prostituting. Id. the 

Appellant personally informed T.W. about the prices she was to charge for her services and that 

T.W. was to "check in with either [the Appellant] or Eddie" each time a customer arrived and 

left. Id at 10. The Appellant gave T. W. a phone to receive calls for sexual services - from 

Craigslist - and stated that the Appellant posted the advertisements on Craigslist for her. Id at 12, 

14. T. W. further testified that the Appellant would pay for hotel rooms and stay in the hotel 

rooms with the victims. Id at 15. 

The second method in which T.W. was trafficked was, similar to M.S., through her 

eventual transfer by the Appellant to work for Jason Guerra. T. W. testified that although she was 

not present for the conversation between the Appellant and Jason Guerra, some arrangement had 

been made at the hotel by the airport that provided for her transfer to Jason Guerra. Id at 23. This 

testimony is consistent with the version provided by M.S. during her testimony about M.S.'s own 

transfer to Jason Guerra. The instructions that T.W. received from Jason Guerra were duplicative 

42 
of those by the Appellant: that "the same rules that apply with [the Appellant] apply with me." Id 

at 25. These rules would include how much to charge customers for sexual services, how to 

handle money and the requirement to check in with Jason Guerra. Therefore, T.W., was 

recruited, enticed and transferred within the meaning of "trafficked" to satisfy the first element 

beyond a reasonable doubt. 

b. Element Two -Trafficked Knowing Other Person Would Be Subjected to 

Forced Labor 

The second element the Commonwealth is required to prove to support a conviction for 

Trafficking of Persons is that a defendant trafficked a person knowing the other person would be 

subject to forced labor. Forced labor results when a person attempts to cause, causes or threatens 

physical harm to another person to obtain or maintain services from that other person. One of the 

hallmarks of forced labor under § 3002 is whether the fear of physical harm induces the service. 

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3001. At trial, there was more than sufficient evidence to conclude beyond a 

reasonable doubt that the Appellant trafficked victim T.W. with the knowledge that she would be 

subject to forced labor; with much of that forced labor originating from the Appellant himself. 

T.W. testified that on one occasion, after she had gone to work for his brother, the 

Appellant severely beat her. T.W. stated that she "had [the Appellant's] handprints bruised on 

the side of my face. J still have a cracked rib to this day. [The Appellant] would punch on me, 

slap me, whatever he felt like doing at the time." N.T. 6/29/2016 at 28. The Appellant had 

slapped T.W. with such force that "he left his fingerprints bruised to the side of [her] face." Id at 

30. T.W. testified that the Appellant assaulted her on another occasion when she tried to leave 

working for him. Id. T.W. had bruises that were visible around her ribs, experienced painful 

breathing and had a lump visible from these assaults. Id at 29. Perhaps most tellingly, T.W. 

stated that she "wasn't allowed" to seek any medical treatment for these injuries. Id. T. W. further 

43 
testified that Mendez and the Appellant would not allow T.W. to take days off from working. Id 

at 19. T.W. also testified she was the victim of assaults from Mendez, a lower member of the 

Guerra organization. Id at 28. Summarily, T.W. stated that she stayed because "you either lose 

your life or stay. I'm not willing to lose my life." Id at 47. The Appellant indoctrinated into his 

victims an intense fear for the consequences of leaving or non-compliance through actual and 

physical harm. This fear and pattern of physical assaults more than meets the required definition 

of forced labor. Therefore, there is sufficient evidence in the record to demonstrate the 

Commonwealth proved the second element, that T.W. was trafficked knowing she would be 

subjected to forced labor, beyond a reasonable doubt. 

4. Conclusion 

Here, the Commonwealth was required to prove two elements beyond a reasonable doubt 

to secure a conviction for Trafficking of Persons: (1) that the defendant did knowingly traffic or 

attempted to traffic another person; and (2) that a defendant trafficked a person knowing the 

other person would be subject to forced labor. The Commonwealth brought two charges against 

the Appellant for Trafficking of Persons; the first for trafficking a minor and the other for 

trafficking an adult. More than sufficient evidence has been presented that the Appellant 

recruited the minor, A.H., and enticed her within the meaning of "knowingly traffic" required in 

the first element. The record also supports that the Appellant trafficked A.H. knowing that she 

would be subjected to forced labor. The Commonwealth also presented sufficient evidence that 

the Appellant trafficked both adults, M.S. and T.W., within the meaning of the statute. The 

Commonwealth also presented sufficient evidence that the Appellant trafficked both M.S. and 

T.W. knowing that both would be subject to forced labor. Therefore, the trial court believes that 

44 
sufficient evidence supports the convictions on both counts and that the Commonwealth proved 

all required elements beyond a reasonable doubt. 

j. Unlawful Contact with a Minor - Sexual Abuse 

The Appellant next contends that the evidence presented at trial is insufficient to sustain 

his conviction for Unlawful Contact with a Minor- Sexual Abuse in violation of 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 

6318(a)(5). The offense of Unlawful Contact with a Minor is defined in the Crimes Code as: 

§ 6318. Unlawful Contact with minor 

(a) Offense defined. A person commits an offense if he is intentionally in contact 

with a minor, or a law enforcement officer acting in the performance of his duties 

who has assumed the identity of a minor, for the purpose of engaging in an 

activity prohibited under any of the following, and either the person initiating the 

contact or the person being contacted is within this Commonwealth: 

(5) Sexual abuse of children as defined in section 6312 (relating to sexual abuse 

of children). 

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6318(a)(5). The grading under subsection (b) of§ 6318 provides that a violation 

of subsection (a) is: (1) an offense of the same grade and degree as the most serious underlying 

offense in subsection (a) for which the defendant contacted the minor; or (2) a felony of the third 

degree. The underlying charge rises out of§ 6312( c) - Sexual Abuse of Children through 

dissemination of photographs, videotapes, computer depictions and films. However, our 

Supreme Court has held that § 6318 does not require that a defendant be convicted of the 

substantive offense for which he contacted the minor, let alone be charged with it. 

Commonwealth v. Reed, 9 A.3d I 138, I 146 (Pa. 2010). 

Although the Commonwealth need not prove the substantive offense, a brief discussion 

of the underlying offense remains useful. The underlying charge for the Appellant was sexual 

abuse of children under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6312(c). This subsection, in relevant part, states that: 

any person who knowingly sells, delivers, disseminates, transfers, displays, or 

exhibits to others, or who possesses for the purpose of sale, distribution, delivery, 

45 
transfer, display or exhibition any book, magazine, pamphlet, slide, photograph, 

film, videotape, computer depiction or other material depicting a child under the 

age of 18 years engaging in a prohibited sexual act or in the simulation of such act 

commits an offense. 

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6312( c ). Under subsection (g) of Section 6312, a prohibited sexual act is defined 

as sexual intercourse as defined in section 3101, masturbation, sadism, masochism, bestiality, 

fellatio, cunnilingus, lewd exhibition of the genitals or nudity if such nudity is depicted for the 

purpose of sexual stimulation or gratification of any person who might view such depiction. 18 

Pa.C.S.A. § 6312(g). Therefore, a conviction may result under§ 6312(c) if a person knowingly 

disseminates, transfer or displays any photograph or computer depiction of a child under 18 

years of age engaged in the lewd exhibition of the genitals or nudity if the nudity is depicted for 

the purpose of sexual stimulation of any person who might view such depiction. 

The Appellant is charged with unlawful contact with a minor with sexual abuse of a child 

as the substantive charge. Under Section 6318, a person commits an offense if he is intentionally 

in contact with a minor for the purpose of engaging in the dissemination or transfer of any 

photograph or computer depiction of a person under 18 years of age engaged in the lewd 

exhibition of the genitals or nudity if the nudity is depicted for the purpose of sexual stimulation 

of any person who might view such depiction. 

Here, the Appellant and a group of others, by way of their relationship to each other, 

agreed to commit a crime, and with shared intent, committed over acts in furtherance of the 

conspiracy to traffic a minor person, promote prostitution and, by the nature of their business, 

had unlawful with a minor. The Appellant may be held accountable under a theory of accomplice 

liability or as a co-conspirator. 

46 
There was sufficient evidence in the record to support the Appellant's conviction for 

unlawful contact with a minor under a theory of accomplice liability or as a co-conspirator. 

Regarding accomplice liability, the Crimes Code states: 

Liability for conduct of another; complicity 

(a) General rule.-A person is guilty of an offense if it is committed by his own 

conduct or by the conduct of another person for which he is legally accountable, 

or both. 

(b) Conduct of another.-A person is legally accountable for the conduct of 

another person when: 

(1) acting with the kind of culpability that is sufficient for the commission 

of the offense, he causes an innocent or irresponsible person to engage in 

such conduct; 

(2) he is made accountable for the conduct of such other person by this 

title or by the law defining the offense; or 

(3) he is an accomplice of such other person in the commission of the 

offense. 

( c) Accomplice defined.-A person is an accomplice of another person in the 

commission of an offense if: 

(1) with the intent of promoting or facilitating the commission of the 

offense, he: 

(i) solicits such other person to commit it; or 

(ii) aids or agrees or attempts to aid such other person in planning 

or committing it; or 

(2) his conduct is expressly declared by law to establish his complicity. 

(d) Culpability of accomplice.-When causing a particular result is an element of 

an offense, an accomplice in the conduct causing such result is an accomplice in 

the commission of that offense, if he acts with the kind of culpability, if any, with 

respect to that result that is sufficient for the commission of the offense. 

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 306. The evidence in this case, viewed in a light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth as the verdict-winner, demonstrates the Appellant's active participation in the 

contacting and recruitment of A.H., aiding and agreeing to aid Elton Cromwell in posting 

advertisements of A.H. to solicit customers. The Appellant aided in the commission of the 

offense through providing computers, transportation, and hotel rooms that permitted Cromwell to 

commit the offense. 

47 
The Appellant is also liable as a co-conspirator. Accomplice liability and conspiracy are 

not one and the same crime. Commonwealth v. McClendon, 874 A.2d 1223, 1229 (Pa. Super. 

2005). Conspiracy requires proof of an additional factor which accomplice liability does not: the 

existence of an agreement. Commonwealth v. Murphy, 795 A.2d 1025 (Pa. Super. 2002). To 

sustain a conviction for criminal conspiracy, the Commonwealth must establish that: (1) the 

defendant entered into an agreement to commit or aid in an unlawful act with another person or 

persons; (2) he did so with a shared criminal intent; and (3) an overt act was done in furtherance 

of the conspiracy. Commonwealth v. Devine, 26 A.3d 1139, 1147 (Pa. Super. 2011). However, 

an "explicit or formal agreement to commit the crimes can seldom, if ever, be proved and it need 

not be, for proof of a criminal partnership is almost invariably extracted from the circumstances 

that attend its activities." Commonwealth v. Geiger, 944 A.2d 85, 90 (Pa. Super. 2008). 

Circumstantial evidence may provide proof of the conspiracy. Commonwealth v. Greene, 702 

A.2d 547, 554 (Pa. Super. 1997). The conduct of the parties and the circumstances surrounding 

such conduct may create a web of evidence linking the accused to the alleged conspiracy. Id. 

Additionally, in respect to the overt act, it need "not be committed by the defendant; it 

need only be committed by a co-conspirator." Commonwealth v. Hennigan, 753 A.2d 245, 253 

(Pa. Super. 2000). The intent required for criminal conspiracy is "identical to that required for 

accomplice liability. In both crimes a defendant must act with the intent of promoting or 

facilitating the offense." Commonwealth v. Murphy, 795 A.2d 1025, 1038 (Pa. Super. 2002). 

The trial court will briefly revisit the existence of a conspiracy as it relates to this charge. 

At trial, the Appellant was emphatic in his assertion that the minor, A.H., did not work for him. 

He went through extreme lengths to distance himself from any activity that included A.H. 

However, the trial court "while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the 

48 
evidence produced, is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence." Commonwealth v. 

Tejada, 107 A.3d 788, 792-93 (Pa. Super. 2015). The trial court heard from the investigating 

officer of the Pennsylvania State Police that the "heads of corrupt organizations always attempt 

to insulate themselves from their underlings ... because they don't want to be implicated as the 

ring leader." N.T. 6/29/2016 at 101. During his testimony after discovering A.H. was a minor, 

the Appellant stated that Cromwell "don't [sic] have no money" to get a hotel room for A.H. or 

do anything with her. Id at 194. A.H. testified that the Appellant always had one or two hotel 

rooms at any given time. N.T. 6/28/2016 at 164. Accordingly, the trial court found that the 

Appellant was responsible for providing the hotel room after discovering her minor status that 

allowed for the continued sexual abuse of a child and unlawful contact with a minor. 

Regarding speci fie details of the transmission of the computer depictions of a minor there 

is little doubt that such images were posted. Through all the denials of his involvement with 

A.H., the trial court found salient one detail that the Appellant perhaps let slip during his 

testimony. Regarding A.H., the Appellant unequivocally states that "she used my computer." 

N .T. 6/29/2016 at 171. Trooper Peterson provided a forensic computer report at trial that 

documented the retrieval of the Craigslist advertisements for erotic services and pictures of A.H. 

used in the advertisements. Id at 62-64. There is no question that A.H. was under the age of 18 at 

the time these postings were made to Craigslist. Id. A.H. testified that one picture was taken, by 

Cromwell, at the Roosevelt Inn while she worked for Cromwell and the Appellant. N.T. 

6/28/2016 at 191. The purpose of the pictures was to draw interest in A.H. from potential 

customers, therefore such pictures would have been "the lewd exhibition of the genitals or nudity 

if the nudity is depicted for the purpose of sexual stimulation of any person," as required under § 

6312(c). 

49 
The "web of evidence" points to the existence of a conspiracy headed by the Appellant. 

There is a chain of money that goes: (1) from a customer to the victims after a sexual encounter 

in exchange for money; (2) from the victims to a driver or the person assigned to watch them; (3) 

from the drivers or persons assigned to watch the victims to the Appellant. N.T. 6/28/2016 at 

204. There is a common thread in which the victims, in only the first of several methods of 

control, are supplied narcotics by the Appellant. M.S. testified that she witnessed the Appellant 

giving narcotics to Cromwell for distribution to the victims. Id at 75-75. A.H. testified that it was 

the Appellant's decision whether to continue to allow her working for the organization. There 

was testimony that the Appellant brought Cromwell, Eddie Mendez and Dwayne Thomas into 

the organization to help it expand. N.T. 6/28/2016 at 73. There exists in the record an explicit 

reference that one victim, M.S., heard an agreement being made between Cromwell and the 

Appellant regarding the criminal enterprise. Id at 124. Therefore, given the existence of a 

conspiracy, the Appellant is responsible for the acts of his co-conspirators that further the 

conspiracy. The unlawful contact with a minor charge is strongly supported with evidence 

throughout the record that supports the Appellant is responsible both as a member of the 

conspiracy and under accomplice liability. Therefore, there was sufficient evidence to support 

the Appellant's conviction for Unlawful Contact with a Minor - Sexual Abuse. 

II. Weight of the Evidence Claim -The verdicts were not against the weight of the 

evidence. 

In his second principle point of appeal, the Appellant claims that the verdict was against 

the weight of the evidence. Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 607 states that a "claim 

that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence shall be raised with the trial judge in a 

motion for new trial" in a written or oral motion before the court prior to sentencing, or in a postsentence motion. Pa.R.Crim.P. 607(a)(l-3). The comment to Rule 607 establishes that the 

so 
"purpose of this rule is to make it clear that a challenge to the weight of the evidence must be 

raised with the trial judge or it will be waived." Pa.R.Crim.P. 607, comment. The failure to 

challenge the weight of the evidence presented at trial in an oral or written motion prior to 

sentencing or in a post-sentence motion will result in the waiver of the claim. Commonwealth v. 

Bond, 985 A.2d 810, 820 (Pa. 2009). The Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion and 

raised claims that verdicts were against the weight of the evidence. However, the Appellant in 

his post-sentence motion raised only claims that the verdicts for Trafficking of Persons (a Minor) 

and Corrupt Organizations were against the weight of the evidence. Therefore, pursuant to 

Pa.R.Crim.P. 607, the Appellant is deemed to have waived any weight of the evidence claims for 

the other remaining convictions. 

In reviewing a weight of the evidence claim, the appellate court focuses solely on 

whether the trial court abused its discretion; it does not consider the underlying question of 

whether the verdict itself was against the weight of the evidence. Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 

A.2d 745, 751 (Pa. 2000). The essence of appellate review for a weight claim appears to lie in 

ensuring that the "trial court's decision has record support. Where the record adequately supports 

the trial court, the trial court has acted within the limits of its discretion." Commonwealth v. 

Clay, 64 A.3d 1049, 1054- 55 (Pa. 2013). Because the trial judge "has had the opportunity to 

hear and see the evidence presented, an appellate court will give the gravest consideration to the 

findings and reasons advanced by the trial judge when reviewing a trial court's determination 

that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. Commonweal!h v. Johnson, 910 A.2d 60 

(Pa. 2006). Rather, the role of the trial judge is to determine that notwithstanding all the facts, 

certain facts are so clearly of greater weight that to ignore them or to give them equal weight 

with all the facts is to deny justice. Widmer, 744 A.2d at 745. 

51 
A weight claim actually concedes sufficiency of the evidence, as the appellate court is to 

focus only on quality of the trial court's discretion. See Widmer, 744 A.2d at 751. Therefore, the 

"test is not whether the court would have decided the case in the same way, but whether the 

verdict is so contrary to the evidence as to make the award of a new trial imperative so that right 

may be given another opportunity to prevail." Commonwealth v. Whiteman, 485 A.2d 459, 462 

(Pa. 1984). The evidence must be "so tenuous, vague and uncertain that the verdict shocks the 

conscience of the court." Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 820 A.2d 795, 806 (Pa. Super. 2003). 

Accordingly, in order to reverse a trial court's ruling on a weight of the evidence claim, it "must 

determine that the verdict is so contrary to the evidence as to 'shock one's sense of justice."' 

Commonweallh v. Hitner, 910 A.2d 721, 733 (Pa. Super. 2006). 

a. Trafficking of Persons (Minor) 

The Appellant first contends that his conviction for Trafficking of Persons - Minor was 

against the weight of the evidence. However, there was ample support in the record to 

demonstrate that the Appellant was properly convicted of 18 Pa. C.S .A. § 3002 and does not 

shock one's sense of justice. The Appellant contended in his post-sentence motion that the 

evidence was "not of sufficient weight to convict for Trafficking of Persons (a Minor) since the 

minor testified that Petitioner was not her pimp and did not engage in any trafficking or 

profiteering from said minor." Def. Post-Sent'g Mot. 4. The Appellant appears to conflate the 

standard of review for weight of the evidence claims with that of sufficiency of the evidence. 

The trial court previously addressed the sufficiency of the evidence for the Appellant's 

Trafficking of Persons (Minor) conviction. However, in the interest of justice, the trial court 

will address the weight of the evidence claim as it relates to the Trafficking of Persons (Minor) 

conviction. Given that weight of the evidence claims are reviewed under an abuse of discretion 

52 
standard, the trial court does not believe that it abused its discretion in finding there was ample 

support in the record to support the Appellant's conviction under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3002. 

Under the Trafficking of Persons statute, the Commonwealth must prove: (1) that the 

Appellant "did traffic or knowingly attempt to traffic another person;" and (2) that he "knew 

that the other person would be subjected to forced labor or services." The record supports that 

the Appellant did knowingly traffic another person. Traffic is defined as "recruits, entices, 

harbors, transports or provides or obtains by any means." 18 Pa.C.S.A § 3001. The Appellant 

and Cromwell, while operating a vehicle, approached A.H. on Kensington Avenue and asked 

her to get into their car. N.T. 6/28/2016 at 147. A.H. was asked which drugs she used and upon 

informing the two that she used cocaine, she got into the car was transported to the Ramada Inn 

on Roosevelt Boulevard. Id at 148. The Appellant and Cromwell, after telling A.H. they had a 

place for her to stay, took her into a room filled with multiple girls where A.H. "realized what 

they had going on there" and the girls were "prostituting." Id at 150-51. 

The second instance in which the Appellant "trafficked" A.H. is through his 

transportation of A.H. from his home, after her true age was discovered, back to the hotel to 

continue engaging in acts of prostitution. After finding out that she was a minor, the Appellant 

told A.H. to "pack up [her] stuff and [the Appellant] was going to let [A.H.] stay at his wife's 

house for a couple days." N.T. 06/28/2016 at 182. After a few days at the Appellant's home, 

A.H. was picked up from the residence and driven back to a hotel by both Cromwell and the 

Appellant. N.T. 06/28/2016 at 184. At that time, the Appellant did not tell A.H. to stop 

performing work as a prostitute. Id at 195. There was direct testimony from witness T.W. that 

after the Appellant brought her back to the hotel that she continued working as a prostitute for 

the organization lead by the Appellant. N.T. 6/29/2016 at 22. Thus, the first element required 

53 
for proving trafficking is sufficiently through the Appellant's recruitment and enticing of A.H. 

through offering her narcotics, offering her a place to stay knowing that she was homeless and 

would accept his offer. 

The second element requires the Commonwealth to demonstrate that the Appellant knew 

the person would be subject to forced labor. Forced labor is defined as services that are 

performed or provided by another person which are obtained or maintained when a person: ( 1) 

attempts to cause, causes or by threat of physical menace puts another person in fear of bodily 

injury. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3001. A.H. testified at trial that she was "afraid" of the Appellant 

because he was more intimidating than Cromwell or the others because "he was more violent 

towards the girls that worked for him." N .T. 6/28/2016 at 180. The Appellant was found to be 

the leader of the prostitution organization that included Eddie Mendez, Dwayne Thomas and 

Elton Cromwell. Even if the Appellant himself did not commit acts of violence upon A.H., the 

statute only requires that the Appellant have trafficked the minor knowing that she would be 

subject to forced labor. A.H. never received money back from the sexual services she provided. 

Id at 166. A.H. was the victim of violence at the hands of Cromwell. Id at 171- 72. A.H. further 

testified that if she did not feel like doing a "date" on a certain day, she could not refuse and 

knew there would be consequences for such a refusal. Id at 1 71. The second requiring that the 

Appellant have knowledge A.H. would be subjected to forced labor is satisfied because the 

Appellant, as head of the organization, knew the methods employed by those working for him 

to gain compliance by victims through force and engaged in such conduct himself. 

Here, the trial court heard extensive testimony about how the Appellant recruited, enticed 

and transported girls. This meets the first requirement that the Appellant traffic the victim. The 

trial court then heard testimony about how the Appellant ran his organization through both 

54 
threats of violence and acts of violence. A.H. was frightened of the Appellant, and was 

subjected to forced labor at the Appellant's hands and the acts of others in the organization. 

There are numerous instances in the record which support both the Appellant trafficking the 

minor and trafficking her with knowledge that she would be subject to forced labor. Despite the 

Appellant's assertion in his post-trial motion, there is no requirement that the Commonwealth 

present evidence of profits for conviction under the statute. Because there is ample support in 

the record to support the conviction, the verdict does not "shock one's sense of justice." 

Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the verdict was not against 

the weight of the evidence. 

b. Corrupt Organizations 

The Appellant next contends that his conviction for Corrupt Organizations was against 

the weight of the evidence. However, there was ample support in the record presented to 

demonstrate that the Appellant was properly convicted of section 911 (b )( 1) of the Corrupt 

Organizations Act and his conviction does not "shock one's sense of justice." In his postsentence motion, the Appellant argues his conviction for Corrupt Organizations was against the 

"weight of the evidence because there were no details of necessary conspiracy, profits, and so 

forth necessary to establish such a conviction." Def. Post-Sent'g Mot. 4. For reasons that follow, 

the Appellant's conviction for Corrupt Organizations was not against the weight of the evidence. 

As an initial matter, the Appellant claims in his post-sentence motion that his conviction 

for Corrupt Organizations was against the weight of the evidence because there were no details 

of a necessary conspiracy. After close reading of the subsection under which the Appellant was 

convicted, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 911 (b )(1 ), the trial court does not believe the Commonwealth was 

required to prove a conspiracy as an element for conviction under 91 l(b)(l). Rather, the Corrupt 

55 
Organizations Act lists the conspiracy to commit any offense set forth in subparagraphs (i), (ii), 

and (v) of§ 91 l(h) as "racketeering activity" within the meaning of the Corrupt Organizations 

Act. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 91 l(h)(l)(iii). Thus, conspiracy is only one possible offense that may be 

considered in determining whether a defendant engaged in "racketeering activity." This alone 

does not make it an element of the crime. The Corrupt Organizations Act, in one element of the 

crime, requires the finding beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant engaged in a "pattern of 

racketeering activity." As discussed at length previously, a "pattern of racketeering activity" is 

two or more offenses laid out in§ 91 l(h)(l). The two offenses under§ 91 l(h)(l) through which 

the trial court found the Appellant to have engaged in a "pattern of racketeering activity" are the 

trafficking of persons(§ 91 l(h)(l)(i)) and the possession with intent to distribute a controlled 

substance (§ 911 (h)(l )(ii)). Therefore, despite the Appellant having been convicted of 

conspiracy, the Commonwealth was not required to prove the existence of a conspiracy for the 

Corrupt Organizations charge. 

The trial court disagrees with the Appellant that there was no discussion of profits 

throughout his trial. Again recalling that one of the underlying "racketeering activities'' is the 

trafficking of persons, here, the trial court will solely explore the trafficking of persons above the 

age of 18 ( despite the Appellant having been convicted of trafficking both adults and a minor). 

There was a network of victims that the Appellant trafficked and forced into labor. The trial 

court heard testimony that there were perhaps as many as eight victims working for the 

Appellant. N.T. 6/29/2016 at 215. The trial court heard testimony from two victims, that were 

adults at the time they were trafficked by the Appellant, that stated they each earned upwards of 

$1,000 per day from performing dates. N.T. 6/28/2016 at 69; N.T. 6/29/2016 at 19. The victims 

also unequivocally stated that they attempted to leave multiple times, were found and brought 

56 
back after physical assaults by the Appellant. N.T. 6/28/2016 at 96; N.T. 6/29/2016 at 28. 

Detective Derrick Stigerts, the Commonwealth expert, testified that trafficking victims never 

keep the money earned from their services. N.T. 6/282016 at 37. 

The other avenue through which the Appellant drew a profit was from his distribution of 

narcotics. The Appellant stated that around the time of the charged events he sold both crack 

cocaine and heroin. N.T. 06/29/2018 at 184. The Appellant admitted that he "started picking 

[narcotics] up in large quantities so that it would be cheaper." Id. The Appellant then testified he 

would purchase approximately $500 worth of heroin at a time, break it down and sell to the girls 

and make a profit. Id at 185-86. The Appellant also testified that he would purchase 

approximately $100 of crack cocaine for distribution amongst the girls he had in his employ. Id 

at 186. However, there is a contradiction in the Appellant's testimony because he later testified 

that he sold M.S. $500, and not the $100 amount previously stated, worth of crack cocaine per 

day. Id at 191. The trial court believes that the Appellant's own admission to making a profit 

through the "racketeering activity" of distributing a controlled substance negates any inference 

that profits were never discussed during the trial. 

Last, the trial court heard testimony from an expert witness about the structure of such 

organizations. The Commonwealth's expert witness, Detective Stigerts, explained that traffickers 

command obedience through force and that there is a family structure within the organization. 

N.T. 6/28/2016 at 31, 38. The trial court heard testimony from the investigating officer that the 

Appellant was the principal of the organization involving Elton Cromwell, Eddie Mendez and 

Dwayne Thomas. N.T. 6/292016 at 101-103. The trial court heard testimony from victims that 

Mendez, Thomas and Cromwell, all members of the organization, took orders from the 

Appellant. N.T. 6/28/2016 at 71, 196; N.T. 6/29/2016 at 56. There was testimony that these 

57 
members of the organization would collect the money from the victims. N.T. 6/28/2016 at 79-80. 

There was also extensive testimony that members of the organization, and the conspiracy, were 

receiving narcotics from the Appellant for distribution and "all the money is filtering back in." Id 

at 73. This testimony indicates that there was an "enterprise" as required within the statute. 

Here, the trial court heard extensive testimony how: (1) the Appellant received income 

from a "pattern of racketeering activity; (2) the existence of an "enterprise" within the meaning 

of the Corrupt Organizations Act; and (3) the Appellant used the income received from the 

"pattern of racketeering" in the establishment or operation of the enterprise. The trial court's 

decision had more than sufficient support within the record. The evidence presented at trial, and 

the Appellant's conviction for Corrupt Organizations, does not shock one's sense of justice. 

Therefore, the trial court did not err in finding the verdict was not against the weight of the 

evidence. 

III. Unreasonable Sentence Claim -The trial court did not err in denying the 

Appellant's Motion to Reconsider Sentence and gave a reasonable sentence. 

The Appellant was found guilty on eleven counts and sentenced to a total term of 37 to 

74 years confinement. For his conviction of Possession of with Intent to Deliver (35 Pa.C.S.A. § 

780-113(a)(30)), the Appellant was sentenced to one to two years confinement. For his 

conviction on Corrupt Organization (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 91 l(b)(l)), a felony of the first degree, the 

Appellant was sentenced to three years and six months to seven years confinement. For his 

conviction of Criminal Conspiracy (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 903), a felony of the first degree, the 

Appellant was sentenced to nine years to eighteen years confinement. For his conviction of 

Sexual Exploitation of Children (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6320), a felony of the second degree, the 

Appellant was sentenced to five years to ten years incarceration. For his conviction of Criminal 

Use of a Communication Facility (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 7512(a)), a felony of the third degree, the 

58 
Appellant was sentenced one year to two years confinement. For his conviction of Promoting 

Prostitution (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5902(b)(l)), a felony of the third degree, the Appellant was 

sentenced to one year and six months to three years confinement. For his conviction of 

Corruption of Minors (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 630l(a)(l)(i)), a misdemeanor of the first degree, the 

Appellant was sentenced to one year to two years confinement. For his conviction of Simple 

Assault (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2701(a)), a misdemeanor of the second degree, the Appellant received a 

sentence of one to two years confinement. For his conviction on Trafficking of Persons - Minor 

(18 Pa.C.S.A. §3002), a felony of the first degree, the Appellant was sentenced to nine years and 

six months to nineteen years confinement. For his conviction of Trafficking of Persons (18 

Pa.C.S.A. § 3002), a felony of the second degree, the Appellant received a sentence of five to ten 

years confinement. For his conviction of Unlawful Contact with a Minor (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 

63 l 8(a)(5)), a felony of the third degree, the Appellant was sentenced to a term of two years and 

six months to 5 years confinement. The sentencing court ordered all sentences run consecutively 

with the exception of the PWID sentence; Simple Assault sentence; Corruption of Minors 

sentence; and Criminal Use of a Communication Facility sentence, which were all to run 

concurrently with the first degree felony Trafficking of Persons-Minor (9.5 to 18 years) 

sentence. 

Through the Sentencing Code, the General Assembly enacted the process by which 

defendants are to be sentenced. In making a determination of the appropriate sentence for a 

defendant, the Sentencing Code offers general standards which require the trial court to impose a 

sentence that is "consistent with the protection of the public, the gravity of the offense as it 

relates to the impact on the life of the victim and on the community, and the rehabilitative needs 

of the defendant." 42. Pa.C.S. § 972l(b). The appellate court shall vacate the sentence and 

59 
remand the case to the sentencing court with instructions if it finds: "the sentencing court 

sentenced outside the sentencing guidelines and the sentence is unreasonable. In all other cases 

the appellate court shall affirm the sentence imposed by the sentencing court." Commonwealth v. 

Walls, 926 A.2d 957, 963 (Pa. Super. 2007). The sentencing court "is in the best position to 

determine the proper penalty for a particular offense based upon an evaluation of the individual 

circumstances before it." Commonwealth v. Jones, 613 A.2d 1242, 1243 (Pa. 1990). The 

sentencing court enjoys an institutional advantage to appellate review "bringing to its decisions 

an expertise, experience, and judgment that should not be lightly disturbed." See Walls, 926 A.2d 

at 961. 

In reviewing Appellant's sentencing claim, this court has determined that the sentence 

was sound, reasonable, and within the proper legal discretion of the court. In making an inquiry 

into the "unreasonableness" of a sentence, the General Assembly has set forth factors that an 

appellate court is to consider: (1) The nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and 

characteristics of the defendants; (2) the opportunity of the sentencing court to observe the 

defendant, including any presentence investigation; (3) the findings upon which the sentence was 

based; and (4) the guidelines promulgated by the commission. Commonwealth v. Walls, 926 

A.2d 957, 963 (Pa. Super. 2007). When reviewing these factors, the court will not be found to 

have abused its discretion unless the record can show the judgment imposed was "manifestly 

unreasonable" or the result of prejudice, bias, or ill-will. Commonwealth v. Hermanson, 674 

A.2d 281 (Pa. 1996). 

Also, in evaluating a claim of this type, an appellate court must remember that the 

sentencing guidelines are merely advisory, and the sentencing court may sentence a defendant 

outside of the guidelines so long as it places its reasons for the deviation on the record. See 

60 
Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 805 A.2d 566, 575 (Pa. Super. 200,2). Our Supreme Court has 

indicated that "if the sentencing court proffers reasons indicating that its decision to depart from 

the guidelines is not unreasonable, we must affirm a sentence that falls outside those 

guidelines." Commonwealth v. Davis, 737 A.2d 792, 798 (Pa. Super. 1999). The sentencing court 

"is not required to parrot the words of the Sentencing Code, stating every factor that must be 

considered under Section 972l(b)." Commonwealth v. Feucht, 955 A.2d 377, 383 (Pa. Super. 

2008). Here, the sentencing court stated on the record the reasons for its departure from the 

guidelines. The sentencing court noted how the Appellant preyed upon, and essentially held 

captive, the most vulnerable in our society. The sentencing court also stated: 

Before I sentence you, I want to put on the record, as the law requires me to do, 

why I'm going to impose upon you an aggravated sentence ... I find you have 

been the head of that organization, which ran over several years . . where you 

preyed upon what I would call "damaged young women" who had drug 

addictions, who were runaways . . The fact that one victim was actually a minor 

just aggravates the circumstances even more, but the women I heard testify, you 

could hear the pain in their voice, and they will never be the same again . . Your 

prior record, the fact I find you to be a danger to the community, the fact you fled 

and was a fugitive for four years. When I look at this case, I find absolutely 

nothing to mitigate, but everything to aggravate your sentence that I'm going to 

impose upon you. 

N.T. 5/4/2017 at 28-29. The sentencing court stated specifically on the record its reasons for 

aggravating the Appellant's sentence. Additionally, with respect to consecutive versus 

concurrent sentences, long standing precedent of our appellate courts recognizes that 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9271 "affords the sentencing court discretion to impose its sentence concurrently or 

consecutively to other sentences being imposed at the same time or to sentences already 

imposed." See Commonwealth v. Gonzalez-Dejusus, 994 A.2d 595, 598 (Pa. Super. 2010). It 

should also be noted that the defendant is not entitled to a "volume discount" for his or her 

crimes. See Commonwealth v. Hoag, 665 A.2d 1212, 1215 (Pa. Super. 1995). Therefore, with 

61 
sufficient reasons for departure from the guidelines placed on the record, the sentencing court did 

not abuse its discretion in its departure from the guidelines or imposition of consecutive 

sentences for the Appellant. 

The Appellant contends that the sentencing court erred in failing to address the norms of 

sentencing, deviates from the guidelines, imposes multiple statutory maximum sentences, and is 

an effective life sentence without proper justification on the record. More specifically, in his 

post-sentence motion, the Appellant states the sentencing court did not justify its sentence 

because a lower/guideline sentence or concurrent sentence would protect the public and would 

serve the Appellant's needs. The Appellant presented at sentencing with a prior record score of 

5; the Appellant had prior convictions for felony possession of crack cocaine; hindering 

apprehension or prosecution; felony drug possession (cocaine); unlawful possession of a 

handgun; and a prostitution charge. In the instant case, given the plethora of charges of which the 

Appellant was convicted, and the offense gravity scores of those offenses which ranged from 4 

(Corruption of a Minor) through 12 (Trafficking of Persons - Minor and Criminal Conspiracy to 

Traffic Persons - Minor), the sentences imposed by this court were reasonable. 

The sentencing court disagrees with the defense contention that the court did not address 

the norms of sentencing. The court specifically stated that the sentences requested by the 

Commonwealth were "well beyond even the aggravated range of the guidelines. So, I want you 

to give me some clarity on why you think the guidelines call for almost ten years, you asked for 

twenty on some of these charges." N.T. 5/04/2017 at 14. The sentencing court stated on the 

record an acknowledgement of the sentencing norms through the guidelines and requested 

further statements from the Commonwealth on why the sentences should be aggravated. 

62 
A sentencing court has broad latitude to inquire into the personal character and 

circumstances of the defendant. Commonwealth v. Riggins, 453 A.2d 140 (Pa. 1977). In 

particular, a sentencing court may properly consider a defendant's potential for rehabilitation. 

Commonwealth v. Kostka, 379 A.2d 884 (Pa. 1977). One factor in gauging a defendant's 

potential for rehabilitation is his or her manifestation of social conscience and responsibility 

through contrition, repentance and cooperation with law enforcement agencies. Roberts v. United 

States, 445 U.S. 552 (1980); Commonwealth v. Gallagher, 442 A.2d 820 (Pa. 1982). The 

sentencing court found the Appellant lacked personal characteristics that would make him 

suitable for rehabilitation. For instance, the court was forced to admonish the Appellant for 

laughing during the testimony of one Commonwealth witness. The trial court had to interrupt 

testimony and state "Counsel, I would direct your client not to laugh during the course of 

testimony." N.T. 6/28/2016 104. The simple fact that the Appellant found anything elicited 

during testimony as humorous resonates as nothing short of chilling. 

Speaking to the sentencing court's needs to protect the public, the sentencing court does 

not believe a lower or guideline sentence or concurrent sentences would sufficiently protect the 

public. One reason the Appellant fails to make a suitable candidate for rehabilitation and remains 

a threat to community safety is due to his flight from justice after becoming aware of the charges 

stemming from this case. The Appellant alleges that he became aware of these charges at some 

point during 2012. N.T. 6/29/2016 at 204. After he became aware of these charges, the Appellant 

actively avoided the police and moved throughout different jurisdictions including Philadelphia, 

New York City and New Jersey. Id at 205. The Appellant then admits, upon his return to 

Philadelphia, in order to support himself he "sold drugs" and once again worked as a pimp. Id at 

206. Here, the court was presented with a defendant who became a fugitive from justice for four 

63 
years, moved throughout multiple jurisdictions-and then engages in the same conduct that 

produced these charges. The sentencing court reasonably believed that the Appellant was beyond 

rehabilitation and posed a continued threat to community safety. 

One of the enumerated factors in § 9721 (b) to be considered during sentencing is "the 

gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact on the life of the victim and on the community." 

42. Pa.C.S. § 972l(b). The sentencing court heard extensive testimony about the impact of the 

offense as it relates to the impact on the victims and on the community. Perhaps the most notable 

aspect of the Appellant's offenses is his predation upon those who are most vulnerable within 

our community. The sentencing court was afforded a presentence report and also underwent an 

evaluation to consider whether the Appellant was a Sexually Violent Predator ("SVP"). When a 

sentencing judge had the benefit of a presentence report, it will be presumed that he was aware of 

relevant information regarding defendant's character and weighed those considerations along 

with mitigating statutory factors. See Commonwealth v. Widmer, 667 A.2d 215 (Pa. Super. 

1995). Although the SVP analysis did not conclude the Appellant qualified as a sexually violent 

predator, it did reinforce the extreme level of dangerousness that the Appellant posed. This is 

reflected in two ways: first, through the manner in which he treated his victims; and second, how 

he exploited victims and the risk to the community through these methods. 

The sentencing court would be remiss if it did not at least consider the nature of the 

offense itself. Although not the only factor considered in crafting his sentence, the egregious 

nature of the conduct also reflects upon the Appellant's potential for rehabilitation. The 

Appellant preyed upon, what the court at sentencing described as, "damaged young women, who 

had drug addictions, who were runaways, [and] lured them into what they believed was . . 

somebody was trying to help them." N.T. 5/4/2017 at 29. The Appellant "locked them in hotel 

64 
rooms, fed them drugs, had lines out the door for men to come in and have sex with them. They 

were not allowed to leave. They were threatened that if they left, that you were going to inflict 

bodily injury upon them." Id. The Appellant had full knowledge that many of the victims had 

substance abuse problems and exploited this knowledge through limiting their access and supply 

to narcotics. The victims did not feel safe during their time under the Appellant and were 

exposed to physical assaults and rape. The sentencing court found that "the abuse [the Appellant] 

inflicted upon these women was just beyond [] imagination." Id at 28. The sentencing court 

determined that the Appellant forever changed the lives of his victims and posed a continuing 

threat to society at large. Id at 29. 

Therefore, there is sufficient evidence in the record to support that the sentencing court 

provided an individualized sentencing that took into account the rehabilitative needs of the 

defendant. Accordingly, the sentence imposed was fair, impartial, and absent of any bias. This 

judgment was made in accordance with the applicable guidelines and with careful consideration 

of all the factors to be considered under Pennsylvania law. 

IV. Witness Testimony -The trial court properly admitted evidence from the 

investigating officer that was rationally based upon his perception. 

The Appellant next asserts the trial court erred in permitting the investigating officer to 

testify to his opinion that the Appellant was the head of a corrupt organization and thereby 

deprived the Appellant of a fair trial. The admission of evidence is within the sound discretion of 

the trial court and will be reversed only upon a showing that the trial court clearly abused its 

discretion. See Commonwealth v. Tyson, 119 A.3d 353, 357 (Pa. Super. 2015). Accordingly, a 

ruling admitting evidence "will not be disturbed on appeal unless that ruling reflects manifest 

65 
unreasonableness, or partiality, bias, or ill-will, or such lack of support to be clearly erroneous." 

Commonwealth v. Huggins, 68 A.3d 962, 966 (Pa. Super. 2013). 

Relevance is the threshold for admissibility of evidence. Commonwealth v. Cook, 952 

A.2d 594, 612 (Pa. 2008). Evidence is considered relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a 

fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of 

consequence in determining the action. Pa.R.E. 401; Commonwealth v. Drumheller, 808 A.2d 

893, 904 (Pa. 2002). The Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence state that any evidence that is not 

relevant is not admissible. Pa.RE. 402. In addition, the court may exclude relevant evidence if 

its "probative value is outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, 

confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting 

cumulative evidence." Pa.RE. 403. 

Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 701 addresses the admission of opinion testimony by lay 

witnesses and provides: 

If a witness is not testifying as an expert, testimony in the form of an opinion is 

limited to one that is: 

(a) rationally based on the witness's perception; 

(b) helpful to clearly understanding the witness's testimony or to 

determining a fact in issue; and 

(c) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge 

within the scope of Rule 702. 

Pa.R.E. 701. Generally, lay witnesses may express personal opinions related to their observations 

on a range of subject areas based on their personal experiences that are helpful to the factfinder. 

See Commonwealth v. Davies, 811 A.2d 600, 602 (Pa. Super. 2002). Further, pursuant to 

Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 104(a), the trial court exercises its discretion to determine 

whether such a lay opinion is helpful to the factfinder, which is the touchstone of its 

admissibility. See Pa.R.E. 104(a); Lewis v. Mellor, 393 A.2d 941, 948-49 (Pa. Super. 1978). 

66 
Lay witnesses are permitted to give testimony in the form of their opinions or inferences 

that are rationally based on their perception. For example, in Commonwealth v. Blessitt, 852 

A.2d 1215 (Pa. Super. 2004 ), a Pennsylvania State Police trooper performed an undercover drug 

purchase from a defendant and handed the defendant a marked twenty-dollar bill. The 

undercover trooper radioed ahead to a marked patrol vehicle which subsequently stopped the 

defendant and, upon arrival on the scene, the undercover trooper was not able to locate the 

marked bill used in the transaction. On cross-examination, defense counsel raised questions 

about whether suspects always have the marked bill on their person at the time of arrest. On 

redirect examination, the prosecutor asked the trooper his opinion as to what happened to the 

marked $20 bill, to which the trooper offered that it was probably handed off to another 

individual. The Superior Court found the trial court had not abused its discretion in permitting 

the admission of this testimony because the trooper's testimony was limited to expressing an 

opinion that was rationally based upon his perception. See Blessitt, 852 A.2d at 1218. 

Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the investigating officer to 

testify to his opinion that the Appellant was the head of a corrupt organization. The 

Commonwealth stated that the trooper was "not being offered as an expert." N.T. 06/29/2016 at 

99. Similar to the officer in Blessitt, Trooper Peterson expressed only an opinion that was 

rationally based on his perception. Having investigated this case for "years," the trooper was 

uniquely qualified to offer his rational perception about the case. Id at 68. Trooper Peterson's 

testimony about the Appellant's position within the organization did not prejudice the Appellant. 

Under Rule 401, the evidence being offered - whether the Appellant was the head of the 

conspiracy - offered the tendency to make the fact more or less probable and the fact is of 

consequence in determining the action. Under the Rule 403 balancing test, the trial court does 

67 
not believe unfair prejudice to the Appellant outweighed the probative value of the relevant 

evidence. 

Courts are not required to sanitize the trial to eliminate all unpleasant facts from a factfinder's consideration when those facts are relevant to the issues at hand and form part of the 

history and natural development of the events and offenses for which the defendant is charged. 

See Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 84 A.3d 736 (Pa. Super. 2014). Rather, the testimony of 

Trooper Peterson shed light upon the history and natural development of the events and offenses 

for which the Appellant was charged - trafficking of persons, conspiracy, sexual exploitation of 

children and corrupt organizations among several others. Therefore, the trial court properly 

admitted the testimony of Trooper Peterson in giving his opinion that was rationally based upon 

his perception. 

V. Witness Testimony - The trial court properly admitted evidence involving an 

alleged threat Elton Cromwell because a connective link to the Appellant was 

established. 

The Appellant next asserts the trial court erred in allowing testimony elicited by the 

Commonwealth involving an alleged threat by Elton Cromwell against a witness testifying 

against the Appellant without establishing any connective link to the Appellant. The standard of 

review relative to the admission of evidence is for an abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. 

Cain, 29 A.3d 3 (Pa. Super. 2011). For reasons that follow, the trial court did not err in allowing 

testimony involving an alleged threat by Elton Cromwell against a witness. 

Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 801(c) defines hearsay as a statement, other than one 

made by a declarant while testifying at a trial or hearing, offered to prove the matter asserted in 

the statement. Statement is further defined by this Rule as either an oral or written assertion. 

Pa.R.E. 801(a). Thus, a statement is hearsay when it is a "statement, other than one made by the 

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declarant while testifying at trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter 

asserted." See Commonwealth v. Gray, 867 A.2d 560 (Pa. Super. 2005). However, statements 

which are not admitted for the truth of the matter asserted, but for some other purpose, do not 

qualify as hearsay and are freely admissible. Commonwealth v. Cassidy, 462 A.2d 270, 272 (Pa. 

Super. 1983). The admission of extrajudicial statements to demonstrate the existence of a 

conspiracy is one such non-hearsay purpose. See Cassidy, 462 A.2d at 272. 

There are also several exceptions to the hearsay rule. For instance, Pa.R.E. 803(25)(e) 

permits the use of statements of co-conspirators which were made during the course of the 

conspiracy as an admission of that party. Because Pa.R.E. 803(25)(e) is based upon the 

principles of agency, a statement of one co-conspirator is considered as an admission made by all 

conspirators. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 838 A.2d 663, 675 (Pa. 2003). The Pennsylvania 

Superior Court has articulated the requisite standard for admitting a co-conspirator's hearsay 

statement as follows: 

To lay a foundation for the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule, the 

Commonwealth must prove that: (1) a conspiracy existed between declarant and 

the person against whom the evidence is offered and (2) the statement sought to 

be admitted was made during the course of the conspiracy. In addition, there must 

be evidence other than the statement of the co-conspirator to prove that a 

conspiracy existed. Commonwealth v. Basile, 458 A.2d 587 (1983). 

The order of proof is within the discretion of the lower court, which may, upon 

only slight evidence of the conspiracy, admit such statements subject to later 

proof of the conspiracy. Commonwealth v. Plusquellic, 449 A.2d 47 (Pa. Super. 

1982). 

Commonwealth v. Kersten, 482 A.2d 600, 603 (Pa. Super. 1984 ). The trial court need only slight 

evidence of a conspiracy's existence for such testimony to become admissible. Given the 

extensive prior discussion finding a conspiracy existed between the Appellant and Elton 

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Cromwell, the only question factor remaining which permits the admission of such testimony is 

whether the statement was made during the course of the conspiracy. 

Our Supreme Court affirmed its approval of the use of evidence of a co-conspirator's 

attempt to conceal evidence after the commission of a crime, finding that such acts "c[a]me 

within the scope of the conspiracy to commit the crime." Commonwealth v. Evans, 413 A.2d 

1025, l 028 (Pa. 1980). In doing so, the Evans court directed the following test be followed: 

The duration of a conspiracy depends upon the facts of the particular case, that is, 

it depends upon the scope of the agreement entered into by its members. 

Generally, the conspiracy ends when its principal objective is accomplished 

because no agreement to retain secrecy after the achievement of the unlawful end 

can be shown or implied by mere "acts of covering up." Thus in Grunewald v. 

United States, 353 U.S. 391 at 402, the Supreme Court stated, "Acts of covering 

up, even though done in the context of a mutually understood need for secrecy, 

cannot themselves constitute proof that concealment of the crime after its 

commission was part of the initial agreement among the conspirators." But the 

fact that the "central objective" of the conspiracy has been nominally attained 

does not preclude the continuance of the conspiracy. Where there is evidence that 

the conspirators originally agreed to take certain steps after the principal objective 

of the conspiracy was reached, or evidence from which such agreement may 

reasonably be inferred, the conspiracy may be found to continue. Atkins v. United 

States, 307 F.2d 937, 940 (9th Cir. 1962). 

Evans, 412 A.2d at 1028-29. The duration of the conspiracy, and whether the conspiracy endured 

at the time statements were made depend upon the specific facts of the case. Other statutory 

factors that may be considered in weighing the duration of the conspiracy include whether the 

crime or crimes which are its object are committed or there is abandonment by the conspirators. 

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 903(g). 

Presently, the testimony in dispute arises from answers given by witness A.H. about 

threats made Elton Cromwell. A.H. states that Cromwell attempted to contact her through her 

parents. N.T. 6/28/2016 at 207. A.H. further testified that Cromwell showed up to her parents' 

home located in Bucks County. Id at 145, 207. A.H. was not present at her parents' home when 

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Cromwell attempted to visit, but A.H. testified that she was "scared" when she found out 

Cromwell had showed up at parents' home and that she did not "know why he would do that." Id 

at 207. Mr. Cromwell had never previously spoken with A.H.'s parents. Id at 208. A.H. also 

further testified that Cromwell had a cellular phone while jailed in Baltimore, Maryland and 

would call her cell phone from his cell phone while in jail. Id. 

Here, the Appellant made several statements that could impute the conspiracy still existed 

with Cromwell even after the Appellant was arrested. He was charged in the present case in 

2010. The Appellant testified that he became aware of the charges from this case sometime in 

2012. N.T. 6/29/2016 at 204. However, the Appellant admitted that after he became aware of the 

charges, the Appellant still had spoken with Cromwell first on the phone and then received him 

as a visitor into his home in the months before his 2014 arrest. Id. The Appellant then further 

admitted that after fleeing the jurisdiction upon learning of the charges in 2012, that he returned 

to Philadelphia and supported himself by "sell[ing] drugs" and was once again "working as a 

pimp" and had "somebody working with [him]." Id at 206. The Commonwealth diligently sought 

confirmation asking "Working with you or for you?" to which the Appellant asserted "With me." 

Id. Further, the Appellant admitted that while incarcerated awaiting resolution of these charges, 

he spoke with victim M.S. on the prison telephone and suggested she seek out Cromwell to help 

her with problems she was having in renting a room. Id at 210. The record supports the 

conclusion that the Appellant was still operating a prostitution ring with a partner after the 

charges were filed, had been in contact with Cromwell before his arrest, and suggested M.S. 

resolve a problem using Cromwell while incarcerated. 

There is no evidence to suggest the conspiracy formed between the Appellant and Mr. 

Cromwell had ever ceased. The scope of the original conspiracy was formed with the intention of 

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running a prostitution ring in the Philadelphia area. Although a conspiracy ends when its 

principal objective is achieved, there is no evidence in the record to support the Appellant's 

conspiracy achieved its principal objective, thereby terminating the conspiracy. Rather, his 

conduct of continuing a prostitution ring with an unnamed partner suggests the contrary. The 

Appellant engaged in conduct that went beyond "mere acts of covering up." There was a 

systematic method engaged by members of the conspiracy to avoid detection and allow the 

conspiracy to endure. Such acts included telling the girls working for them to tell police they 

worked by themselves if ever arrested. 

In the alternative, the out-of-court statements made by Cromwell were not hearsay. When 

an extrajudicial statement is offered for a purpose apart from proving the truth of its contents, it 

is not hearsay and is not excluded under the hearsay rule. Commonwealth v. Darden, 457 A.2d 

549, 551 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983). The testimony elicited by the Commonwealth involving an 

alleged threat by Elton Cromwell was not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, but 

rather as circumstantial evidence of the existence of a conspiracy. "[O]ut-of-court statements of 

conspirators are often admitted as circumstantial evidence of their participation in a conspiracy." 

See Commonwealth v. Cassidy, 462 A.2d 270, 272 (Pa. Super. 1983) citing David F. Binder, The 

Hearsay Handbook§ 5.2 (1982). The testimony concerning the alleged threat by Cromwell is not 

being made to prove the truth of the matter asserted. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

the admission of such testimony regarding alleged threats made by Cromwell. Additionally, the 

Appellant did not suffer any prejudice from such admission because: (1) the testimony to prove 

the existence of a conspiracy was cumulative in nature because other sufficient evidence was 

admitted to establish such a conspiracy; and (2) all other properly admitted evidence of the 

conspiracy was so overwhelming that the admission of this testimony regarding the threat by 

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Cromwell could not have contributed to the verdict. Therefore, the trial court did not err in 

permitting the testimony regarding a threat made by the Appellant's co-conspirator, Cromwell, 

against a victim. 

VI. Witness Testimony - The trial court properly admitted testimony from 

Commonwealth witnesses M.S. and A.H. 

In his final points of appeal, the Appellant contends that the trial court erred in the 

admission of testimony from Commonwealth witnesses regarding uncharged conduct without 

providing defense counsel prior Notice of Intent to Admit Prior Bad Acts pursuant to 

Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 404(b ). The Appellant makes this similar claim regarding the 

testimony from two Commonwealth witnesses; although for differing reasons for each witness. 

In the interest of judicial economy, the trial court will address both claims in one section. For 

reasons that follow, the Commonwealth was not required to provide notice under Pa.R.E. 404(b). 

The standard of review for claims of admissibility is within the sound discretion of the 

trial court and will be reversed only upon a showing that the trial court clearly abused its 

discretion. Commonwealth v. Drumheller, 808 A.2d 893, 904 (Pa. 2002). Admissibility depends 

on relevance and probative value. Evidence is relevant if it logically tends to establish a material 

fact in the case, tends to make a fact at issue more or less probable or supports a reasonable 

inference or presumption regarding a material fact. Id. The accused is entitled to relief for an 

erroneous ruling unless the court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the error is harmless. See 

Commonwealth v. Story, 3 83 A.2d 155 (Pa. 1978). The "harmless error doctrine, as adopted in 

Pennsylvania, reflects the reality that the accused is entitled to a fair trial, not a perfect trial." 

Commonwealth v. Drummond, 775 A.2d 849, 853 (Pa. Super. 2001. However, 

It is well established that an error is harmless only if we are convinced beyond a 

reasonable doubt that there is no reasonable possibility that the error could have 

contributed to the verdict. The Commonwealth bears the burden of establishing 

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the harmlessness of the error. This burden is satisfied when the Commonwealth is 

able to show that: (1) the error did not prejudice the defendant or the prejudice 

was de minimis,· or (2) the erroneously admitted evidence was merely cumulative 

of other untainted evidence which was substantially similar to the erroneously 

admitted evidence; or (3) the properly admitted and uncontradicted evidence of 

guilt was so overwhelming and the prejudicial [ e ]ffect of the error so insignificant 

by comparison that the error could not have contributed to the verdict. 

Commonwealth v. Laich, 777 A.2d 1057, 1062-63 (Pa. 2001 ). A court sitting as trier of fact is 

presumed to disregard inadmissible evidence and consider only relevant and competent evidence. 

Commonwealth v. Moss, 852 A.2d 374 (Pa. Super. 2004). The Appellant was not harmed through 

the admission of the testimony; however, even if such testimony were admitted in error, the 

admission was harmless error and does not entitle the Appellant to relief. 

As an initial matter, the Appellant argues that the testimony from M.S. regarding an anal 

rape, breaking of ribs and a beating by four persons constituted prior bad acts which required 

notice under Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 404(b). N.T. 6//28/2016 at 141-42. The trial court 

disagrees. Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 404(b) prohibits admission of evidence of a "crime, 

wrong, or other act . . to prove a person's character in order to show that on a particular 

occasion the person acted in accordance with the character." Pa.RE. 404(b)(l). Further, 

Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 404(b)(4) states that in criminal cases, the prosecution shall 

"provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice 

on good cause shown, of the general nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial." 

Pa.R.E. 404(b)(4). The purpose of this rule "is to prevent unfair surprise, and to give the 

defendant reasonable time to prepare an objection to, or ready a rebuttal for, such evidence." 

Pa.R.E. 404(b ), cmt. However, there is no requirement that the "notice" must be formally given 

or be in writing in order for the evidence to be admissible. See Commonwealth v. Mawhinney, 

915 A.2d 107, 110 (Pa. Super. 2006). 

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Review of the summary of the statement given by M.S. to the FBI on July 8, 2009 states 

that M.S. "came back to [the Appellant]. Cromwell, B.O., and Dre held her down while [the 

Appellant] beat her up. [The Appellant] messed up her face. Cromwell gave B.O. the okay to 

rape [M.S.J." Def. D-1 at 5. This statement specifically references a beating by four persons and 

a rape. A defendant has reasonable notice under Rule 404(b) when the Commonwealth has 

provided the defendant with discovery containing evidence of the prior bad acts. See 

Commonwealth v. Stallworth, 781 A.2d 110, 118, n.2 (Pa. 2001 ). The discovery containing the 

evidence of prior bad acts, if such conduct is considered prior bad acts, was furnished to the 

Appellant. Accordingly, the Appellant would be hard pressed to contend such material was never 

provided during discovery because the FBI statement being referenced was submitted into 

evidence by the defense itself N.T. 6/28/2016 at 140. Any inconsistencies between the submitted 

FBI statement and the testimony of M.S. should have been borne out and addressed during crossexamination. Therefore, a blanket statement that the Commonwealth failed to provide notice 

regarding M.S. 's testimony is not persuasive. 

The Appellant contends the trial court erred in the admission of testimony from both M.S. 

and A.H. as to uncharged conduct without prior Notice of Intent to Admit Prior Bad Acts 

pursuant to Rule of Evidence 404(b) and thereby deprived the Appellant of a fair trial. The 

trial court does not believe that the testimony of M.S. regarding her anal rape and beatings by the 

Appellant to qualify as "prior bad acts" within the meaning of Pa.R.E. 404(b )(2). Likewise, the 

trial court does not believe that the Commonwealth was under a burden to produce such a notice 

regarding the uncharged conduct of the rape because the conduct was not considered a "prior bad 

act." When it became apparent to defense counsel that previous statements differed from the 

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testimony presented at trial, regarding both M.S. and A.H, the proper remedy is to address such 

deficiencies during cross-examination. 

Pennsylvania courts have long permitted non-party witnesses, such as M.S. and A.H., to 

be cross-examined on prior statements they have made when those statements contradict their incourt testimony. These statements, known as prior inconsistent statements, are admissible for 

impeachment purposes. Commonwealth v. Brady, 507 A.2d 66, 68 (Pa. 1986); Pa.R.E. 613(a). 

Further, a prior inconsistent statement may be offered not only to impeach a witness, but also as 

substantive evidence if the statement meets additional requirements of reliability. 

Commonwealth v. Lively, 610 A.2d 7, 9-10 (Pa. 1992); Pa.RE. 803 .1. This test it a two-party 

inquiry: (1) whether the statement is given under reliable circumstances; and (2) whether the 

declarant is available for cross-examination. Commonwealth v. Brewington, 740 A.2d 247, 254 

(Pa. Super. 1999). With respect to the first prong, that the statement is given under reliable 

circumstances, our Supreme Court has deemed reliable only certain statements; a prior judicial 

proceeding is one such circumstance. With respect to the second prong, the inconsistent 

statement itself must be the subject of the cross-examination in order to satisfy the test. 

Commonwealth v. Romero, 722 A.2d 1014, 1017 (Pa. 1999). 

Regarding the first witness, M.H., the first prong of the test for reliability has been met. 

M.H. gave a statement to the Federal Bureau oflnvestigation on July 8, 2009. This statement 

was reduced to writing and effectively adopted by M.S. The FBI statement that was reduced to 

writing did, in fact, actually mention a beating by four individuals and a rape. During trial, M.S. 

testified about an anal rape that occurred, beating by four persons and injuries that she sustained. 

The defense was provided the opportunity to cross-examine the witness about the inconsistencies 

and did so during cross-examination. The inconsistent statement itself was the subject of cross76 
examination when defense counsel asked whether M.S. "testified that [the Appellant] and four 

other individuals punched you and broke your ribs, right?" and also "then [M.S.] testified that 

my client forcibly anally raped you, right?" N.T. 6/28/2016 at 102. Therefore, both prongs of the 

test were met and the Appellant had chance to cross-examine on prior statements. 

Regarding the second witness, A.H., the first prong of the test for reliability has been met. 

A.H. gave sworn testimony at the Appellant's preliminary hearing on October 21, 2014 in 

Philadelphia Municipal Court. During trial, when defense counsel raised an objection to the 

statement regarding sexual intercourse with his client stating that "this is the first time that this 

has been mentioned." N. T. 6/28/2016 at 153. The Commonwealth explained that if defense 

counsel "thinks that this particular witness didn't testify to this on the other occasions, or he 

thinks that she didn't relay this during her previous statements, then those [are] questions that he 

can ask her during cross-examination." Id. The trial court agreed with the Commonwealth and 

overruled the objection. Id. However, despite a statement on the record advising defense counsel 

to raise such questions during cross-examination, the defense failed to raise any questions to 

A.H. about the sexual intercourse between her and the Appellant. The failure by defense counsel, 

despite on-the-record direction on how to proceed, to raise such questions should not diminish 

the reliability of the statement itself The failure to exercise the right to confrontation and 

deprivation from the right to confrontation are two entirely distinguishable entities. Therefore, 

the statement by A.H. should be considered reliable and considered as substantive evidence. 

Finally, it is well established that to sustain a conviction the Commonwealth is required 

to prove each element of a crime by relevant evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. See 

Commonwealth v. Walzack, 360 A.2d 914 (Pa. 1976). Here, the Appellant was charged with two 

counts of trafficking of persons - one first degree felony for trafficking a minor; the other a 

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second degree felony for trafficking an adult. The previous statute, under which the Appellant is 

charged, made it an offense for any person to traffic or knowingly attempts to traffic another 

person, knowing that the other person will be subjected to forced labor or services. 18 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 3002. Forced labor, in relevant part under this Section, defines forced labor as labor or services 

that are performed or provided by another person which are obtained or maintained when a 

person: (1) attempts to cause, causes or by threat of physical menace puts another person in fear 

of bodily injury; (2) physically restrains or threatens to physically restrain another person 

unlawfully." 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3001. The statute, by definition, as one of its elements has a 

requirement that a person will be subjected to forced labor; which forced labor may come 

through actual or threatened bodily injury. The trial court believes that such force, for instances 

of trafficking in persons, is not limited to singular instances which would force debate 

concerning whether conduct was within the scope of the offense. Rather all acts 

contemporaneous to the Trafficking of Persons charge should be included under this umbrella 

and not considered "prior bad acts." 

The trial court does not believe the admitted testimony qualifies as prior bad acts that 

would require such notice under 404(b)(3). Although not binding, this court believes Federal 

Rule of Evidence 404(b) is instructive because Federal Rule 404(b) "does not extend to evidence 

of acts which are 'intrinsic' to the charged offense." United States v. Cross, 308 F.3d 308, 320 

(3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Advisory Committee Notes to Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)). When evidence is 

intrinsic to proof of the crimes charged, "there is no other wrongful conduct at issue; the 

evidence is admissible as part and parcel of the charged offense." Green, 617 F.3d at 245 

(internal quotation marks omitted). Evidence is intrinsic if it directly proves the charged crime, 

or if it is concerned with contemporaneous acts which facilitated the commission of a charged 

78 
offense. See Green, 617 F.3d at 248-49. Therefore, under the Federal rules, conduct that is 

contemporaneous to the charged crime should not be excluded under Rule 404(b ). 

The trial court heard extensive testimony about the details of human trafficking through 

Detective Derrick Stigerts, a Commonwealth witness. Detective Stigerts was asked about how 

prostitutes are controlled by their traffickers, to which he stated that "the most prevalent 

[method] that we see is the force, the fear, the violence to control the girls, to put some type of 

fear in them to keep them working, to obey the pimp's rules, to keep doing what she's doing." 

N.T. 6/28/2016 at 39. Detective Stigerts described how traffickers cultivate, or groom, the 

victims of trafficking through developing a relationship with the victims in order to affect their 

control. Simply stated, these acts, be it through violence or other means, to groom the victims of 

trafficking are not isolated incidents limited in time or scope. These cumulative acts of violence 

are designed to have the singular effect of controlling the behavior of trafficked girls. Like a 

constellation in the starry skies, the many stars are brought together to form one singular 

element. Here, the trial court believes the many separate acts of violence also constitute one 

singular element: labor or services obtained through actual or threatened bodily injury. 

Therefore, the trial court correctly held that such actions were not "prior bad acts" that required 

notice under 404(b)(3). 

The Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in permitting the admission of testimony 

from Commonwealth witnesses M.S. and A.H. The admission of such testimony was not in error 

because the uncharged conduct went to proving an element of the offense charged. The 

Appellant was provided the necessary documents to prepare any rebuttal to such testimony at 

trial. Further, the Appellant had full opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses about perceived 

inconsistencies from the in-court testimony compared to previous statements. Likewise, if any 

79 
error had occurred in the admission of such testimony, the Commonwealth more than adequately 

demonstrate such error was harmless because the Appellant was not prejudiced through such 

evidence and proved the elements of the charged crimes beyond a reasonable doubt with the 

other cumulative evidence. Therefore, the trial court did not err in the admission of such 

testimony and the Appellant is not due relief from its admission. 

CONCLUSION 

The evidence presented at trial was sufficient to prove each element of every crime 

charged by the Commonwealth beyond a reasonable doubt. Although there were numerous 

charges, the pattern of conduct engaged by the Appellant made simple the task of recognizing the 

required elements for each offense. Next, having waived his weight of the evidence claims for all 

but two offenses, the trial court finds that the verdicts were not against the weight of the 

evidence. The sentencing court did not abuse its discretion in imposing its sentence against 

Appellant. The factual reasons for departure from the sentencing guidelines were placed on the 

record and took into account all permissible factors. The trial court properly admitted the 

testimony of the investigating officer regarding the Appellant's position within the organization 

because it was rationally based upon his perception. The trial court properly permitted evidence 

of a threat made by Elton Cromwell, a member of the conspiracy and corrupt organization. 

Finally, the trial court properly admitted the testimony of two Commonwealth witnesses because 

the defendant had prior notice of such conduct, had opportunity to cross-examine both witnesses 

about such inconsistencies and the conduct was not considered "prior bad acts" that would 

80 
require such prior notice. Accordingly, the Trial Court respectfully requests that the sentence 

imposed be affirmed on appeal. 

SEAN F. KENNEDY, J. 

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