NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 

23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, 

as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties 

and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's 

decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire 

court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. 

A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 

2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted 

above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 

n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

21-P-626

K.W.

vs.

LAZ PARKING LIMITED, LLC, & others.1

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

Attorney Krzysztof G. Sobczak appeals from an order 

dismissing his notice of lien for attorney's fees. See G. L. 

c. 221, § 50. Sobczak argues that he represented the plaintiff 

in this matter, and that he had a viable right of recovery for 

attorney's fees. We affirm the order dismissing Sobczak's 

notice of lien.

In or around 2010, the plaintiff retained The Law Offices 

of David J. Hoey, P.C. (Hoey), to represent her in this matter, 

and she and Hoey entered into a written contingency fee 

agreement. Sobczak worked for Hoey, and in the course of his

employment entered a notice of appearance on the plaintiff's 

1 JPA IV Management Company, Inc., as trustee of the John 

Philopoulos Associates Trust; JPA I Management Company, Inc.;

and The Law Offices of David J. Hoey, P.C., intervener.
2

behalf. Sobczak was not a party to the Hoey contingency fee 

agreement, and he did not have his own contingency fee agreement 

with the plaintiff.2 In January 2017, Sobczak separated from his 

employment with Hoey but remained on the case, with the 

plaintiff's consent, until withdrawing his notice of appearance 

in March 2017.

In June 2019, Sobczak filed his notice of lien. The 

plaintiff moved to dismiss. On November 14, 2019, a judge of 

the Superior Court allowed the plaintiff's motion to dismiss in 

part but took no action on the motion to the extent Sobczak 

asserted a lien for the short period of time in early 2017 after

he stopped working for Hoey but remained on the case. The judge 

directed Sobczak to provide support for his claim that he added 

value to the case during early 2017. Sobczak did not provide 

any information showing that he added value to the case during 

that time, and his notice of lien was dismissed on February 28, 

2020.

General Laws c. 221, § 50, provides that an "attorney who 

appears for a client in [a] proceeding shall have a lien for his 

reasonable fees and expenses." However, "a mere appearance 

without a right to recover fees from the client directly does 

2 At a later point in time, The Keenan Law Firm, P.C. (Keenan), 

joined the case, and the plaintiff entered into a contingency 

fee agreement with Keenan. Sobczak was not a party to that 

agreement either.
3

not support a lien against the proceeds of the client's 

recovery"; "an attorney must establish a substantive contractual 

or quantum meruit basis to recover fees from the client as a 

prerequisite to filing a lien." Boswell v. Zephyr Lines, Inc., 

414 Mass. 241, 249 (1993). Moreover, if an associate works on a 

case while employed by someone else, the associate has no 

underlying right to recover fees against the client directly 

unless the client "authorized or ratified the employment of the 

associated lawyer," meaning that the circumstances of the case 

show "that the client expected that the associated lawyer would 

look to the client for payment." Id.

Sobczak argues that he had a right to a portion of the 

contingency fee because the plaintiff "authorized or ratified 

[his] employment . . . and the [contingency fee] agreement 

allow[ed] for payment of associated counsel."3 In particular, 

Sobczak relies on (1) the fact that the plaintiff permitted him 

to remain on the case after he stopped working for Hoey and 

(2) language in the Hoey contingency fee agreement stating that 

"[r]easonable compensation on the foregoing contingency is to be 

paid by the [plaintiff] to [Hoey], but such compensation 

including that of any associated counsel shall be the following 

3 Sobczak clarified at oral argument that he did not seek any 

additional money from the plaintiff directly, only a portion of 

the contingency fee.
4

percentage of the gross amount collected for the client[:] 

33.3% of the gross amount recovered" (emphasis added).4

The fundamental problem with Sobczak's argument is that, 

even if the plaintiff authorized or ratified his employment, he 

was not a party to the Hoey contingency fee agreement and had no 

enforceable rights under it. See Boswell, 414 Mass. at 249-250. 

The language on which Sobczak relies, emphasized in the 

paragraph above, does not alter our analysis. That language

specified that some of the contingency fee could be used to 

compensate associated counsel but did not give associated 

counsel any enforceable rights under the agreement.

Where Sobczak has clarified that he did not seek to recover 

any additional money from the plaintiff directly, we need not 

address whether he had a viable right of recovery on a quantum 

meruit basis for the short period of time in early 2017 after he

stopped working for Hoey but remained on the case. At that 

time, Sobczak was working directly for the plaintiff, not Hoey, 

and any recovery in quantum meruit therefore would have been 

4 The Keenan contingency fee agreement included substantially the 

same language. While Sobczak attached the Hoey and Keenan 

contingency fee agreements to his reply brief, neither was 

submitted to the motion judge and neither is properly before 

this court. See Mass. R. A. P. 8 (a), as appearing in 481 Mass. 

1611 (2019) ("The record on appeal shall consist of the 

documents and exhibits on file, the transcript of the 

proceedings, if any, and the docket entries"). Regardless, the 

quoted language does not alter our analysis for the reasons we 

explain.
5

against the plaintiff, which Sobczak does not seek. Regardless, 

Sobczak has not provided any support for the claim that he added 

value to the case during that time.

Hoey, which appears in this appeal as an intervener, has 

filed a motion for sanctions on the basis that Sobczak failed to 

disclose that he reached a settlement with the plaintiff over 

attorney's fees. See Mass. R. A. P. 29 (c), as appearing in 481 

Mass. 1660 (2019) ("In the event a case is settled or otherwise 

disposed of while an appeal is pending, it shall be the duty of 

the appellant to notify the clerk of the appellate court 

forthwith"). Under the settlement agreement, Sobczak 

acknowledged that the plaintiff fully satisfied her contractual 

obligations to pay attorney's fees on the case, and he 

represented that he would not seek any additional fees from her. 

Hoey argues that the settlement rendered this appeal wholly 

frivolous and that Sobczak's failure to disclose it constituted 

the obstruction of justice. However, the settlement is entirely 

consistent with Sobczak's position in this appeal that he did 

not seek to recover any additional money from the plaintiff 

directly and that he instead sought to recover a portion of the 

contingency fee already paid to Hoey. In these circumstances, 
6

we do not view the settlement as dispositive of this appeal, and 

we decline to award sanctions.5

Order dismissing lien 

affirmed.

By the Court (Wolohojian, 

Ditkoff & Walsh, JJ.6),

Clerk

Entered: March 31, 2023.

5 Hoey also made a request for attorney's fees in its appellate 

brief on the basis that Sobczak's appeal was frivolous or 

initiated in bad faith. That request is denied. "Although the 

. . . appeal is unsuccessful, it is not frivolous." Filbey v. 

Carr, 98 Mass. App. Ct. 455, 462 n.10 (2020), quoting Gianareles

v. Zegarowski, 467 Mass. 1012, 1015 n.4 (2014). Moreover, we do 

not view the appeal as having been initiated in bad faith. We 

likewise deny Sobczak's request, made in his reply brief, for an 

award of his appellate attorney's fees and costs.

6 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.