* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, e xcept under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and col lateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Filed 8/14/96 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

ANTHONY J. LUCERO,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v. JOHN SHANKS, Warden of Central New Mexico Correctional Facility; ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO,

Respondents-Appellees. No. 95-2220 (D.C. No. CIV 90-981-JC) (D.N.M.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before ANDERSON, LOGAN, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materiallyassist the determination of-2-

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The c ase is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. Appellant Anthony J. Lucero appeals from an order o f the district court that denied his motion to enforce order, for order to sh ow cause and for sanctions, and found that appellant’s release-from-parole date is October 18, 1996. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2253, and we affirm. This is a dispute about good time credits arising o ut of appellant’s petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. On a previous appeal, a panel of this court remanded for a determination of appel lant’s entitlement to credit for time served, thinking “the State [of New Mexico] su rely has access to records which will easily resolve the matter.” Lucero v. K erby , 7 F.3d 1520, 1523 (10th Cir. 1993). Apparently it was not that simple. Th e Bernalillo County Detention Center’s records on appellant were missing, R. Doc. 48 aff. 1 at 4-5, and appellant had been in the custody of the New Mexico Department of Corrections (DOC) for only forty-three days, see id. aff. 1 at 6. After some more wrangling, however, the parties stipulated that appellant shou ld be given credit for ninety-six additional days, plus good time credits against that time. Id. Doc. 40 at 1. Based on their stipulation, the magistrate judge entered an order which read, in part: “[T]he New Mexico Department of Corrections shall r ecalculate Petitioner Lucero’s discharge date on [his original sentence] to reflect the additional 96 days-3-

served, and any credits awarded by the Department o n those 96 days.” Id. Doc. 41 at 1. Neither the stipulation, nor the magistrate judge’s order based on it, specified how much good time credit that would be. The DOC submitted its recalculation of appellant’s sentence to the court, which accepted it and dismissed appellant’s habeas petition with prejudice. See id. Doc. 43. Appellant then filed his motion to enforce order, f or order to show cause, and for sanctions, urging the district court to hol d the State in civil contempt for failing to comply with the stipulation and order wi th respect to appellant’s good time credits. The State found while preparing its response to this motion that although it had determined that appellant was entit led to twenty-seven days’ good time credit for the forty-three days he had spent i n DOC custody, it had inadvertently failed to transfer those twenty-sevendays from one worksheet to another, and so had not included them in its calcul ation of appellant’s release-from-prison date. Unfortunately, appellanthad already been released from prison by that time, so the State responded to its mistake by changing appellant’s release-from-parole date from November 16 to October 18, 1996. The magistrate judge recommended that the motion to enf orce order be held moot and that sanctions be denied because the State’s mistak e was bona fide. The district court adopted that recommendation.-4-

On appeal, appellant argues that: (1) the districtcourt abused it discretion in denying his motion for sanctions, see Reliance Ins. Co. v. Mast Constr. Co. , 84 F.3d 372, 375 (10th Cir. 1996)(adjudication of civi l contempt reviewed for abuse of discretion); and, as a result, (2) the magistrat e judge erred in finding that his release-from-parole date is October 18, 1996. We find no error or abuse of discretion. The purpo se of a motion for civil contempt is to coerce compliance with a court’s ord er and to compensate the moving party for losses caused by noncompliance. N LRB v. Monfort, Inc. , 29 F.3d 525, 528 (10th Cir. 1994). Under state law, t he DOC can award good time credits only against time spent in DOC custody. St ate v. Aqui , 721 P.2d 771, 775 (N.M.), cert. denied , 479 U.S. 917 (1986). For this reason, appellant’ s argument that the State stipulated that he is entitled to fo rty-eight days’ good time credit against forty-three days’ actual custody is unpersu asive. Therefore, once the State found its twenty-seven day mistake in calculating appellant’s good time credits and adjusted appellant’s release-from-parol e date accordingly, the motion was mooted. In addition, the record supports the d istrict court’s finding that the State’s mistake was bona fide. See Robin Woods Inc. v. Woods , 28 F.3d 396, 399 (3d Cir. 1994)(holding inadvertent violation of cou rt order will not support finding of civil contempt). Appellant did not demo nstrate actual damages warranting compensation from his inadvertently prol onged incarceration. See-5-

Reliance Ins. Co. , 84 F.3d at 377. It follows that the magistrate d id not err in determining that appellant’s release-from-parole date is October 18, 1996. The judgment of the United States District Court fo r the District of New Mexico is AFFIRMED.

Entered for the Court

Stephen H. Anderson Circuit Judge