IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 11–1919

Filed June 1, 2012

IOWA SUPREME COURT ATTORNEY

DISCIPLINARY BOARD,

Complainant,

vs.

G. BRAD DENTON II,

Respondent.

On review of the report of the Grievance Commission of the 

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Grievance commission recommends public reprimand for an 

attorney. ATTORNEY REPRIMANDED.

Charles L. Harrington and Teresa A. Vens, Des Moines, for 

complainant.

G. Brad Denton II, Boulder, Colorado, pro se.
2

HECHT, Justice.

This matter comes before the court on the report of a division of 

the Grievance Commission of the Supreme Court of Iowa. See Iowa Ct.

R. 35.10.1 The Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board alleged 

an attorney violated ethical rules governing the use of trust accounts and 

lawyer advertising in Iowa. The grievance commission found the attorney 

committed various violations and recommended a public reprimand. 

Upon our review of the record and our consideration of the commission’s 

findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendation, we also find 

the attorney violated rules, and we publicly reprimand him.

I. Factual and Procedural Background. 

G. Brad Denton II is an attorney licensed to practice law in 

Colorado since 1994. Practicing primarily in immigration law, Denton 

decided to test the market for his legal services in Iowa.2 He entered an 

agreement allowing him to use, “as needed,” office space and the services 

of a receptionist in West Des Moines, Iowa. Denton also placed 

advertisements for his immigration-related services in Iowa 

publications.3 Soon thereafter, and before Denton opened a trust 

account for retainer fees received from clients, Manuel Castillo-Vargas 

 

1On February 20, 2012, portions of chapters 32, 35, 36 and 45 of the Iowa 

Court Rules were amended. We will refer to the rules as they existed at the time of 

Denton’s hearing. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Marks, 814 N.W.2d 

532, 542 n.1 (Iowa 2012).

2The Board’s complaint conceded that Denton, although not admitted to practice 

law in the courts of this state, “is allowed to practice as an immigration attorney in the 

State of Iowa under Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:5.5(d)(2).” See Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 

32:5.5(d)(2) (allowing lawyer admitted in another United States jurisdiction to provide 

legal services in this jurisdiction that the lawyer is authorized by federal law to provide).

3The advertisements, which appeared several times per month in three Iowa 

newspapers between May 2009 and May 2010, described Denton as an immigration 

“specialist” with more than twenty years of experience. 
3

requested legal representation in connection with an immigration 

matter.4 Castillo-Vargas signed an agreement calling for payment of an 

attorney fee of $1500 to Denton and providing that if the attorney–client 

relationship with Denton were to be “discontinued prior to completion of 

the case,” the attorney fee would be calculated at the rate of $200 per 

hour and any unearned amount would be refunded to Castillo-Vargas.

Denton received a total of $1500 in two installments for his 

representation of Castillo-Vargas but did not deposit the funds in a trust 

account. Denton provided legal services for the client from October 20, 

2009, through February 6, 2010, including written correspondence with 

Castillo-Vargas and immigration authorities, telephone communications 

with Castillo-Vargas and his brother, and three in-person consultations 

with Castillo-Vargas in Marshalltown, Iowa. When the attorney–client 

relationship broke down, Denton mailed to Castillo-Vargas a bill for his 

professional services and a copy of the case file. The bill itemized 10.85 

hours of professional services at the rate of $200 per hour and 

documented Denton’s claim that no refund of the retainer for attorney 

fees was owed to the client. 

The Board received a complaint alleging Denton had violated 

ethical rules governing the conduct of lawyers practicing law in Iowa. 

Following an investigation, the Board filed a complaint alleging Denton 

had violated several of the Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct, including: 

32:1.15(a) (requiring lawyers to hold a client’s funds in an account

separate from the lawyer’s own property); 32:1.15(c) (requiring lawyers to 

deposit advance fees paid by clients in a trust account and allowing 

 

4Castillo-Vargas requested representation to challenge a deportation order 

issued by United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement authorities.
4

withdrawals only as fees are earned); 32:1.15(f) (providing client trust 

accounts are governed by chapter 45 of the Iowa Court Rules which in 

relevant part requires lawyers to deposit “flat fees” in a trust account and 

allows withdrawals from the account only as fees are earned and upon 

notice to the client); 32:7.4(e) (establishing prerequisites for publicly 

communicating that a lawyer practices in or limits his or her practice to 

certain fields of law); 32:7.4(d) (regulating lawyers’ claims of certification 

as specialists in particular fields of law); and 32:7.1(a) (prohibiting false 

or misleading communications about lawyers or their services). Denton 

accepted service of the complaint in Colorado on May 6, 2011, but he 

failed to file a timely answer. 

The Board filed a motion on June 21, 2011, requesting invocation 

of Iowa Court Rule 36.7 (providing if the respondent fails to file a written 

answer within twenty days after completed service of a notice of a 

complaint, the allegations made in the Board’s complaint shall be 

considered admitted). Denton did not file a resistance to the motion. 

The commission entered an order on July 14, 2011, establishing that the 

allegations within the Board’s complaint were deemed admitted and 

limiting the purpose of the hearing to the determination of an 

appropriate sanction. After hearing Denton’s testimony and reviewing 

the exhibits offered by the parties, the commission found Denton violated 

the rules cited above and recommended a public reprimand as the 

appropriate sanction in this case.

II. Scope and Standards of Review.

We review attorney disciplinary proceedings de novo. Iowa 

Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Bernard, 653 N.W.2d 373, 

375 (Iowa 2002). Although we give respectful consideration to the 

commission’s findings and recommendation, we are not bound by them. 
5

Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Casey, 761 N.W.2d 53, 55 

(Iowa 2009). It is the Board’s burden to prove ethical violations by a 

convincing preponderance of the evidence. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y 

Disciplinary Bd. v. Lickiss, 786 N.W.2d 860, 864 (Iowa 2010). Upon proof 

of misconduct, we may impose a lesser or greater sanction than that 

recommended by the commission. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary 

Bd. v. Conrad, 723 N.W.2d 791, 792 (Iowa 2006).

III. Discussion.

In his response to the Board’s inquiry, Denton described the fee 

received from Castillo as a “flat fee.” We have characterized such fees as 

“special retainers.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. 

Apland, 577 N.W.2d 50, 55 (Iowa 1998). Our ethical standards require 

attorneys to deposit special retainers in a trust account. Iowa Supreme 

Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Piazza, 756 N.W.2d 690, 696 (Iowa 2008). We 

find the Board proved by a convincing preponderance of the evidence 

that Denton violated rules 32:1.15(a), (c), and (f) by failing to deposit the 

fees received from Castillo-Vargas in a trust account and violated rules 

45.7(3) and (4) by failing to withdraw such fees from the trust account 

only as they were earned and upon written notice to the client together 

with a complete accounting. We choose not to address the Board’s claim 

that Denton violated our rules pertaining to lawyer advertising because 

even if we were to find that he did, we would not impose a greater 

sanction than is required for Denton’s trust account infractions detailed 

above. 

IV. Sanction.

In other cases presenting an isolated violation of our ethical rules 

pertaining to the proper use of attorney trust accounts, we have imposed 

a public reprimand. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Sobel, 
6

779 N.W.2d 782, 789–90 (Iowa 2010) (citing cases in which we have 

imposed public reprimands for trust account violations of the type 

established in this case). Our determination of the appropriate sanction 

for Denton’s violations of ethical rules requiring the use of trust accounts 

is influenced by mitigating circumstances. Denton cooperated with the 

Board in this case and forthrightly acknowledged his failure to deposit 

the Castillo-Vargas fee in a trust account. The record evidences no 

history of prior ethical lapses by Denton who represents that he has 

established a trust account to avoid future infractions in the 

representation of Iowa clients in immigration matters. Under the 

circumstances, we agree with the commission’s recommendation that a 

public reprimand is the appropriate sanction for Denton’s violation of our 

rules pertaining to trust accounts.

V. Conclusion. 

We publicly reprimand Denton. The costs of this action shall be 

taxed to Denton as provided in rule 35.26(1).

ATTORNEY REPRIMANDED.