NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

CHRISTOPHER SCOTT BARKSDALE, AND 

on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellee.

______________________ 

2014-5108

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Federal 

Claims in No. 1:14-cv-00066-TCW, Judge Thomas C.

Wheeler. 

______________________ 

Decided: November 10, 2014

______________________ 

CHRISTOPHER SCOTT BARKSDALE, of Cleveland, Ohio, 

pro se. 

BENJAMIN MARK MOSS, Trial Attorney, Commercial 

Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, of Washington, DC, for defendantappellee. With him on the brief were STUART F. DELERY, 

Assistant Attorney General, ROBERT E. KIRSCHMAN, JR.,

Director, and KIRK T. MANHARDT, Assistant Director. 
2 BARKSDALE v. US

_____________________ 

Before PROST, Chief Judge, NEWMAN, and LINN, Circuit 

Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Christopher Scott Barksdale (“Barksdale”) appeals 

the decisions of the United States Court of Federal Claims 

(“Claims Court”) dismissing his complaint for lack of 

jurisdiction and denying his motion for sanctions. See 

Barksdale v. United States, No. 14-66C, 2014 WL 1910577 

(Fed. Cl. May 12, 2014); Barksdale, No. 14-66C (Fed. Cl. 

May 13, 2014). Because the Claims Court correctly 

determined that it lacked jurisdiction on the merits and 

because it did not abuse its discretion in the denial of 

sanctions we affirm the Claims Court’s decisions. 

I. BACKGROUND

Barksdale filed a complaint in the Claims Court seeking to overturn the Sixth Circuit’s dismissal of his case. 

In his complaint, Barksdale sought $32,300,000 in damages, as well as injunctive relief compelling the Sixth 

Circuit and the District Court for the Northern District of 

Ohio to change its policies, procedures, and training. 

Barksdale raised tort claims, claims of government criminal activity, constitutional claims, and other claims 

relating to the state of Ohio’s statutory and constitutional 

provisions. The Claims Court dismissed Barksdale’s case 

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. It noted that some 

of Barksdale’s claims were based in tort and criminal law, 

over which the Claims Court has no jurisdiction. It also 

found that Barksdale’s remaining claims were based on 

constitutional provisions that are not money-mandating

or other authorities, over which, again, the Claims Court 

lacks jurisdiction. 

Barksdale also sought sanctions pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1927 and Rule 11 of the Claims Court. The 
BARKSDALE v. US 3

Claims Court denied the motion for sanctions, because 

Barksdale’s allegations related to government actions in 

separate matters. Barksdale appealed to this court. We 

have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3).

II. DISCUSSION

Barksdale argues that the Claims Court erred in dismissing his complaint for lack of jurisdiction, requests 

that we “[d]eclare 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) violates Art. 1 sec. 

10 clause 1 as Bill of Attainder ex post facto law,” and

seeks a remand for further “Default Proceedings.” Brief 

for Appellant at Form 12, No. 6. The government responds that the Claims Court properly dismissed Barksdale’s complaint for lack of jurisdiction. 

“The Court of Federal Claims’ decision to grant the 

Government’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction is 

a matter of law, which this court reviews de novo.” Keener 

v. United States, 551 F.3d 1358, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2009).

Jurisdiction in the Claims Court “requires a money mandating act to confirm jurisdiction.” Joshua v. United 

States, 17 F.3d 378, 379 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (citing 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1491). In the section of his appeal brief titled “Basis of 

US Court of Federal Claims Jurisdiction,” Barksdale 

mentions the First, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth 

Amendments to the Constitution, the Full Faith and 

Credit clause, state law, and fraud. Appellant Brief at 3–

10. Barksdale’s brief does nothing to refute the Claims 

Court’s well-reasoned decision that none of Barksdale’s 

sources of law are money-mandating. As noted by the 

Claims Court, Barksdale’s Fifth Amendment claims are 

based on the Due Process Clause, which is not moneymandating. See LeBlanc v. United States, 50 F.3d 1025, 

1028 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding the Fifth Amendment’s Due 

Process Clause is not “a sufficient basis for jurisdiction”). 

Barksdale’s repackaged First and Fourteenth Amendment 

claims—claiming the government has acted “impermissibl[y] . . . by taking African American pro se litigants[’] 
4 BARKSDALE v. US

first and fourteenth amendment rights,” Appellant Brief 

at 11 (emphasis in original)—fair no better. Despite the 

use of the word “taking,” which could be moneymandating under the Fifth Amendment, these are claims 

under the First and Fourteenth Amendment, which the 

Claims Court properly ruled was outside its jurisdiction. 

See LeBlanc, 50 F.3d at 1028 (stating that that the First 

Amendment, the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment’s Due 

Process Clause, and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal 

Protection Clauses are not “a sufficient basis for jurisdiction”). 

Because Barksdale “has the burden of establishing . . .

jurisdiction,” Rocovich v. United States, 933 F.2d 991, 993 

(Fed. Cir. 1991) (citing KVOS, Inc. v. Associated Press, 

299 U.S. 269, 278 (1936)), and failed to do so, we affirm 

the Claims Court’s dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. As it 

was “without jurisdiction,” the Claims Court could not 

“proceed at all in any cause,” including addressing the 

constitutionality of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). Ruhrgas AG v. 

Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999). 

Barksdale also requests sanctions, asserting that U.S. 

Attorneys committed fraud, perjury and prosecutorial 

misconduct by “with[holding] evidence” and by the “U.S. 

Department of Justice[’s] failure of duty.” Brief for Appellant at Form 12, No. 6.; Brief for Appellant at 21. The 

government responds that the Claims Court properly 

denied sanctions because Barksdale failed to show any 

sanctionable conduct. Appellate courts “apply an abuseof-discretion standard in reviewing all aspects of a district 

court’s Rule 11 determination.” Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405 (1990); see Judin v. United 

States, 110 F.3d 780, 784 (1997) (applying Cooter to Rule 

11 of the Claims Court). The Claims Court denied Barksdale’s motion for sanctions because these parties were not

involved Barksdale’s matters. Barksdale’s brief again 

does nothing to refute the Claims Court’s decision. Thus, 
BARKSDALE v. US 5

the Claims Court did not abuse its discretion in denying

Barksdale’s motion for sanctions.

III. CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the Claims Court’s decision that it 

lacked jurisdiction over Barksdale’s complaint and its 

denial of Barksdale’s request for sanctions are affirmed.

AFFIRMED

COSTS

Each party shall bear its own costs.