In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________

No. 04-2728

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

LELAND D. MARTIN,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Indiana, New Albany Division.

No. NA 02-23-CR-01 B-F—Sarah Evans Barker, Judge.

____________

ARGUED JANUARY 12, 2005—DECIDED MARCH 4, 2005

____________

Before FLAUM, Chief Judge, and EASTERBROOK and WOOD,

Circuit Judges.

EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. State and federal agents

got wind of the possibility that Leland Martin had acquired

guns and dynamite in preparation for robbing a bank. They

arrested him on a warrant for an unrelated offense; once

the agents appeared with warrant in hand, both Martin and

his wife consented to a search of their home, where the

agents found a gun and ammunition. A jury convicted him

of possessing these, which someone with Martin’s criminal

record may not do. 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1). His multiple priors

led to a 210-month sentence under the Armed Career

Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. §924(e). Because a recidivism

enhancement comes within Almendarez-Torres v. United
2 No. 04-2728

States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998), Martin has no complaint about

the sentence. But he does contend that the judge should

have suppressed the damning evidence. Consents are

invalid, he insists, because the officers should not have been

in his home to request them. Although the warrant was

valid when issued, Martin says, it was stale when executed.

Martin had been charged with a misdemeanor in 1998 but

failed to appear for trial. A state judge issued a bench

warrant for his arrest. This the police failed to execute,

because Martin had furnished a bogus address. About six

months later the judge renewed the warrant with the

notation: “Reissued 35-33-2-4.” The reason for this procedure appears in the citation. Indiana Code §35-33-2-4

provides that an arrest warrant for a misdemeanor expires

180 days after issuance, but that “[a] warrant of arrest for

a felony and a rearrest warrant for any offense do not

expire.” The statute does not define “rearrest warrant”. The

local prosecutor’s office had told the police that a reissued

warrant is a “rearrest warrant”, which meant that this

warrant was valid in 2002 when they set out to find Martin.

The federal judge, however, concluded that the reissued

misdemeanor warrant was not a “rearrest warrant” and had

expired, but that the good-faith exception to the

exclusionary rule applied to these circumstances. See

Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 10-16 (1995); United States v.

Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). Thus Martin’s motion to suppress the evidence on the ground that a wrongful arrest

entry had tainted the consents was denied. 2004 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 3655 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 27, 2004).

In this court the parties debate how, if at all, the goodfaith exception applies to a violation of Ind. Code §35-33-2-

4. But the answer does not matter. There is no need

to explore the scope of exceptions to the exclusionary

rule, when it does not apply in the first place. Let us

assume that the police did not have a “rearrest warrant.”

(This is not at all clear. Martin had been arrested and
No. 04-2728 3

directed to appear at trial; a bench warrant to pick him up

again following his skip sensibly may be described as a

“rearrest warrant.”) Any shortcoming is one of state law

only. The fourth amendment’s rules for warrants do

not include time limits. “[N]o Warrants shall issue, but

upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and

particularly describing the place to be searched, and the

persons or things to be seized.” Martin does not deny that

all of these requirements have been satisfied. Indiana is

free to add additional restrictions, but state officials’ failure

to comply with state law does not lead to the exclusion of

evidence in federal court. “In determining whether there

has been an unreasonable search and seizure by state

officers, a federal court must make an independent inquiry

. . . . The test is one of federal law, neither enlarged by what

one state court may have countenanced, nor diminished by

what another may have colorably suppressed.” Elkins v.

United States, 364 U.S. 206, 223-24 (1960).

Elkins restricts the exclusionary rule to violations of

the fourth amendment. This requires a court to assume that

the state has authorized its agents to act exactly as they

did, and then ask whether the Constitution countermands

that decision. See Gordon v. Degelmann, 29 F.3d 295, 300-

01 (7th Cir. 1994). Martin does not contend that the fourth

amendment (or any other part of the Constitution) limits

the time available to execute arrest warrants; indeed,

Martin concedes that if this warrant is a “rearrest warrant”

in Indiana practice, then his arrest and consent are valid.

Probable cause for a warrant is not necessarily enough.

After all, the fourth amendment requires searches and

seizures to be “reasonable.” Passage of time could affect

reasonableness, especially for search warrants that authorize the police to hunt for items that are portable

(or consumable). An arrest might be thought unreasonable after the statute of limitations for the offense has

lapsed. But see Pickens v. Hollowell, 59 F.3d 1203, 1206-
4 No. 04-2728

08 (11th Cir. 1995) (arrest proper even after period of

limitations has expired). Delay in executing an arrest

warrant also increases the likelihood that the suspect

has turned himself in or been arrested on another charge

during the interim. A misdemeanor charge might be

cleared, and the penalty exacted, before the warrant had

been executed, and such an arrest could be thought unreasonable. Police guarded against that risk, however, by

checking to see whether the charge remained unresolved. It

was, so Martin was still a fugitive at the time of his arrest.

See United States v. Towne, 870 F.2d 880, 884 (1st Cir.

1989). The warrant was constitutionally valid and its

execution reasonable, so the consents were untainted.

AFFIRMED

A true Copy:

Teste: 

 ________________________________

Clerk of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 

USCA-02-C-0072—3-4-05