alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<PAGE>   1
                                                                      EXHIBIT 21

SUBSIDIARIES OF REGISTRANT
------------------------------------

Star Publishing Company
Pulitzer Technologies, Inc.
News Information, Inc.
WEJ Investment Company
Pulitzer Ventures, Inc.
Pulitzer Community Newspapers, Inc.
PCN Service Co.
Hanford Sentinel, Inc.
Pulitzer Missouri Newspapers, Inc.
Napa Valley Publishing Co.
Flagstaff Publishing Co.
Santa Maria Times, Inc.
Troy Daily News, Inc.
Sonoma-Marin Publishing Co.
Kauai Publishing Co.
Northern Lakes Publishing Co.
Northern Illinois Publishing Co.
Southwestern Oregon Publishing Co.
Pantagraph Publishing Co.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-4215

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

CHRISTOPHER D. TAVENNER,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Claude M. Hilton, Senior 

District Judge. (1:09-cr-00530-CMH-1)

Submitted: October 6, 2010 Decided: November 16, 2010

Before KING, AGEE, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Michael S. Nachmanoff, Federal Public Defender, Frances H. 

Pratt, Brian L. Mizer, Assistant Federal Public Defenders, 

Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Neil H. MacBride, United 

States Attorney, Jason H. Poole, Special Assistant United States 

Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Christopher D. Tavenner appeals his conviction for one 

count of possession of marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 

§ 844 (2006). He claims the magistrate judge erred in denying 

his motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to a search as 

an incident to a lawful arrest. Finding no error, we affirm. 

This court reviews the factual findings underlying the 

denial of a motion to suppress for clear error and the legal 

conclusions de novo. United States v. Johnson, 400 F.3d 187, 

193 (4th Cir. 2005). The evidence is construed in the light 

most favorable to the prevailing party below. United States v. 

Seidman, 156 F.3d 542, 547 (4th Cir. 1998). Probable cause to 

arrest is defined as: 

facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge 

that are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or 

one of reasonable caution, in believing, in the 

circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed, 

is committing, or is about to commit an offense. The 

evidence needed to establish probable cause is more 

than a mere suspicion, rumor, or strong reason to 

suspect but less than evidence sufficient to convict. 

United States v. Williams, 10 F.3d 1070, 1073-74 (4th Cir. 1994) 

(internal quotations and citations omitted). “[T]he district 

court is entitled to respect the inferences drawn by officers 

from their ‘own experience in deciding whether probable cause 

exists.’” United States v. White, 549 F.3d 946, 951 (4th Cir. 
3

2008) (quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 700 

(1996)).

We conclude that the facts, as found by the magistrate 

judge and affirmed by the district court, support the finding 

that there was probable cause for the arrest. Accordingly, we 

affirm the judgment because the search was a lawful search as an 

incident to the arrest. We dispense with oral argument because 

the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the 

materials before the court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process.

AFFIRMED
#### Susie V. Hollender, as Administratrix with the Will Annexed of John A. Goodenough, Deceased, Appellant, *v.*Frederick H. Wallace, as Administrator of Christopher D. Wallace, Deceased, Respondent.

Reported below, 180 App. Div. 393.

(Argued September 30, 1918;

decided October 8, 1918.)

Motion to dismiss an appeal from a judgment of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the first *603judicial department, entered December 29, 1917, modifying and *unanimously*affirming as modified a judgment in favor of defendant entered upon a dismissal of the complaint by the court at a Trial Term in an action to establish a lost will.

The motion was made upon the ground that the Court of Appeals was without jurisdiction to entertain the appeal.

*John M. Scoble*for motion.

*John H. Hazelton*opposed.

Motion denied, with ten dollars costs and necessary printing disbursements.
<PAGE>   1
                                                                      EXHIBIT 24


                                POWER OF ATTORNEY


KNOW ALL PERSONS BY THESE PRESENTS, that the persons whose signatures appear
below, constitute and appoint Robert L. Smialek, Kenneth H. Koch, David A. Kauer
and Michael R. Elia, and each of them as their true and lawful attorneys-in-fact
and agents, with full power of substitution and resubstitution, for them and in
their names, places, and steads, in any and all capacities, to sign the Insilco
Holding Co. Annual Report on Form 10-K, pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, for the fiscal year ended December
31, 1998, and to file the same, with all exhibits thereto, and the other
documents in connection therewith, with the Securities and Exchange Commission,
granting unto said attorneys-in-fact and agents and each of them, full power and
authority to do and perform each and every act and thing requisite and necessary
to be done in connection therewith, as fully to all intents and purposes as they
might or could do in person, hereby ratifying and confirming all that said
attorneys-in-fact and agents, or any of them, or their or his or her substitute
or substitutes, may lawfully do or cause to be done by virtue hereof.


DATED: January 26, 1999


----------------------------                       ----------------------------
Robert L. Smialek                                  Thompson Dean


----------------------------                       ----------------------------
William F. Dawson                                  David Y. Howe


----------------------------                       ----------------------------
Randall E. Curran                                  Keith Palumbo


----------------------------                       ----------------------------
John F. Fort III                                   David A. Kauer
**Exhibit 31.1**
**CERTIFICATION**
     I, William H. Roj, certify that:
 1.  I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of ERICO International Corporation;  2.  Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a materialfact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light ofthe circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to theperiod covered by this report;  3.  Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial informationincluded in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition,results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periodspresented in this report;  4.  The registrant’s other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing andmaintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e)and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:
 a)  Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosurecontrols and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that materialinformation relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, ismade known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period inwhich this report is being prepared;  b)  Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls andprocedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of thedisclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this reportbased on such evaluation; and  c)  Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal control overfinancial reporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarterthat has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, theregistrant’s internal control over financial reporting; and
 5.  The registrant’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our mostrecent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’sauditors and the audit committee of the registrant’s board of directors (or personsperforming the equivalent functions):
 a)  All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design oroperation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely toadversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and reportfinancial information; and  b)  Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or otheremployees who have a significant role in the registrant’s internal control overfinancial reporting.
Date: May 12, 2005         By:  /s/ William H. Roj   Name:  William H. Roj   Title:  Chairman, Chief Executive Officer and Director
#### EDWARD HOMER WATTS v. FORREST E. TODD

No. 7426DC636

(Filed 20 November 1974)

Evidence § 45 — opinion testimony as to value — exclusion erroneous

In an action to recover on a note a sum due from sale of a business where defendant claimed that plaintiff had taken possession of col*738lateral without applying the proceeds therefrom toward the debt, the trial court erred in not admitting defendant’s testimony placing a value on the collateral.

Appeal by defendant from *Johnson, Judge,*18 February 1974 Session of Mecklenburg County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals on 15 October 1974.

Plaintiff sued to recover on a note wherein the defendant, as maker of the note, was obligated to pay plaintiff $3000.00. This sum represented the balance due plaintiff from the sale of a business to defendant. Contemporaneous with the note, an agreement was executed granting plaintiff a security interest in various items of equipment located at the business premises. Defendant answered the complaint alleging in part that plaintiff had taken possession of the collateral without applying the proceeds therefrom toward the debt as provided in the security agreement.

*Peter L. Reynolds, for plaintiff appellee.*

*Robertson & Brwnley, by Richard H. Robertson, for defendant appellant.*

MARTIN, Judge.

The undisputed evidence shows that plaintiff had taken possession of the collateral after defendant’s default on the note. Defendant contends the trial court erred in not admitting into evidence defendant’s testimony placing a value on the collateral. The testimony by defendant shows he was familiar with the collateral and has such knowledge and experience as to enable him to intelligently place a value on the collateral. “It is not necessary that a witness be an expert in order to give his opinion as to value.” *State v. Cotten,*2 N.C. App. 305, 163 S.E. 2d 100 (1968). “[I]t is enough that he is familiar with the thing upon which he professes to put a value and has such knowledge and experience as to enable him intelligently to place a value on it.” 1 Stansbury, N. C. Evidence, Brandis’ Revision, § 128, p. 408. This assignment of -error is sustained and a new trial is ordered.

Discussion of defendant’s other assignments of error is unnecessary since the asserted errors to which they relate may not recur at the next trial.

*739New trial.

Chief Judge Brock and Judge Parker concur.
**EXHIBIT
      31.2**





**CERTIFICATION**





I,
      Mark
      Joseph Corrao, Chief Financial Officer, certify that:





1.
      I have
      reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-QSB of StrikeForce Technologies,
      Inc.;





2.
      Based
      on my knowledge, this quarterly report does not contain any untrue statement
      of
      a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the
      statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements
      were
      made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this quarterly
      report;





3.
      Based
      on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information
      included in this quarterly report, fairly present in all material respects
      the
      financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant
      as
      of, and for, the periods presented in this quarterly report;





4.
      I am
      responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures
      (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant
      and we have:





a)
      designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure
      controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that
      material information relating to the registrant is made known to us by others
      within the Corporation, particularly during the period in which this quarterly
      report is being prepared;





b)
      evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and
      procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness
      of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered
      by this report based on such evaluation; and





c)
      disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal control over
      financial reporting that occurred during the registrant's most recent fiscal
      quarter that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially
      affect, the registrant's internal control over financial reporting; and





5.
      I have
      disclosed, based on my most recent evaluation of internal control over financial
      reporting, to the registrant's auditors and the audit committee of registrant's
      board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent function):





a)
      all
      significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation
      of
      internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to
      adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process, summarize and
      report financial information; and





b)
      any
      fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees
      who
      have a significant role in the registrant's internal control over financial
      reporting.






*/s/
      Mark Joseph Corrao*





*Mark
      Joseph Corrao*


*Chief
      Financial Officer*




*November
      20, 2006*
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 04-6163
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, versus LORI D. BLAKELY, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Charleston. David C. Norton, District Judge. (CR-00-927; CA-02-4185-2-18) Submitted: April 26, 2004 Decided: May 28, 2004 Before NIEMEYER, TRAXLER, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges. Remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion. Lori D. Blakely, Appellant Pro Se. Michael Rhett DeHart, Assistant United States Attorney, Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).*This court has given Blakely the benefit of Houston v. Lack , 487 U.S. 266 (1988), regarding the filing dates of her documents. - 2 - PER CURIAM: Lori D. Blakely seeks to appeal the dismissal of her 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000) motion entered on August 20, 2003. Blakely, however, did not file her notice of appeal until January 12, 2004, * which is outside the sixty day appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(B). Blakely’s “Motion to Extend Time to File Out-of-Time Appeal” was filed on December 15, 2003, beyond the thirty-day period allowed under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5). Thus, the district court’s order granting the motion could not extend the appeal period. Shah v. Hutto , 722 F.2d 1167, 1168 (4th Cir. 1983). The appeal period is “mandatory and jurisdictional.” Browder v. Director, Dep’t of Corrections , 434 U.S. 257, 264 (1978) (quoting United States v. Robinson , 361 U.S. 220, 229 (1960)). Blakely’s pro se motion to extend and notice of appeal, in which she alleged that she did not timely receive notice of her action being dismissed, may be properly construed as a motion to reopen the time to note an appeal under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6). United States v. Feuver , 236 F.3d 725, 729 & n.7 (D.C. Cir. 2001). Accordingly, we remand the case to the district court for it to determine whether Blakely can satisfy the requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6). Ogden v. San Juan County , 32 F.3d 452, 454 (10th Cir. 1994). We express no opinion as to whether Blakely has met- 3 - the requirements of Rule 4(a)(6). The record, as supplemented, will then be returned to this court for further consideration.

REMANDED
STATE v. George Lee NOBLES

34PA14-2

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

December 28, 2018

Anne M. Gomez, Assistant Appellate Defender, for Nobles, George Lee

Kathleen N. Bolton, Assistant Attorney General, Amy Kunstling Irene, Special Deputy Attorney General, Michael Bonfoey, District Attorney, for State of N.C.

The following order has been entered on the Motion for Extension of Time to File Brief filed on the 28th of December 2018 by Defendant:

"Motion Allowed by order of the Court in conference, this the 28th of December 2018."

Defendant shall have up to and including the 4th day of February 2019 to file and serve his/her brief with this Court.
**Exhibit 23**

 

CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM 

 

We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statement on Form S-8 filed on or about March 2, 2001 of First Place Financial Corp. of our reportdated August 12, 2004, related to the consolidated balance sheets of First Place Financial Corp. as of June 30, 2004 and 2003 and the related consolidated statements of income, changes in shareholders’ equity and cash flows for each of thethree years in the period ended June 30, 2004, which report is included in this Form 10-K. 

 

Crowe Chizek and Company LLC 

 

Columbus, Ohio 

September 9, 2004
#### STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ARTHUR ADCOCK

No. 7528SC30

(Filed 2 April 1975)

Appeal by defendant from *Martin (Harry C.), Judge.*Judgment entered 4 November 1974 in Superior Court, Buncombe County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 13 March 1975.

*324
      *Attorney General Edmisten by Assistant Attorney General Myron C. Banks for the State.*

*Robert L. Harrell, - Assistant Public Defender, for defendant appellant.*

PARKER, HEDRICK, and CLARK, Judges.

No error.
<PAGE>   1

Page 1                                                              EXHIBIT 12.1

                         THE J.H. HEAFNER COMPANY, INC.
     Statement Regarding: Computation of Ratio of Earnings to Fixed Charges
                          and Preferred Stock Dividends
                  (Amounts in thousands, except ratio amounts)


<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                                    Twelve months   Twelve months    Twelve months    Twelve months
                                                       Ended           Ended            Ended           Ended
                                                    December 31,     December 31,    December 31,     December 31,
                                                       1998            1997             1996            1995
                                                    (unaudited)     (unaudited)      (unaudited)     (unaudited)
                                                    -------------   -------------    -------------   --------------
<S>                                                     <C>               <C>           <C>             <C>

Consolidated pretax income (loss) from
           continuing operations                        (2,219)           (253)         1,051           690
Interest                                                13,460           4,842          1,465         1,308
Interest portion of rent expense                         6,474           2,985            795           661
Amortization of Deferred Debt Issuance
           Costs and Deferred Financing Costs              733             291           --            --
Preferred stock dividend requirements of
           majority-owned subsidiaries                    --              --             --            --
                                                       -------          ------          -----         -----

EARNINGS                                                18,448           7,865          3,311         2,659
                                                       =======          ======          =====         =====



Interest                                                13,460           4,842          1,465         1,308
Interest portion of rent expense                         6,474           2,985            795           661
Amortization of Deferred Debt Issuance
           Costs and Deferred Financing Costs              733             291           --            --
Preferred stock dividend requirements of
           majority-owned subsidiaries                    --              --             --            --
                                                       -------          ------          -----         -----

FIXED CHARGES                                           20,667           8,118          2,260         1,969
                                                       =======          ======          =====         =====


RATIO OF EARNINGS TO FIXED CHARGES                        --              --             1.47          1.35
                                                       =======          ======          =====         =====
</TABLE>