United States Department of Labor

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

__________________________________________

A.B., Appellant

and

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, DEFENSE 

CONTRACT MANAGEMENT AGENCY, 

Smyrna, GA, Employer

__________________________________________

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Docket No. 18-0635

Issued: August 14, 2020

Appearances: Case Submitted on the Record

Appellant, pro se

Office of Solicitor, for the Director

DECISION AND ORDER

Before:

JANICE B. ASKIN, Judge

PATRICIA H. FITZGERALD, Alternate Judge

VALERIE D. EVANS-HARRELL, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION

On February 1, 2018 appellant filed a timely appeal from an August 9, 2017 merit decision 

of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). Pursuant to the Federal Employees’

Compensation Act1(FECA) and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the Board has jurisdiction to 

consider the merits of this case.2

 

1 5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.

2 The Board notes that, following the issuance of the August 9, 2017 decision, OWCP received additional evidence.

However, the Board’s Rules of Procedure provides: “The Board’s review of a case is limited to the evidence in the 

case record that was before OWCP at the time of its final decision. Evidence not before OWCP will not be considered 

by the Board for the first time on appeal.” 20 C.F.R. § 501.2(c)(1). Thus, the Board is precluded from reviewing this 

additional evidence for the first time on appeal. Id.
2

ISSUE

The issue is whether appellant has met her burden of proof to establish an emotional 

condition in the performance of duty, as alleged.

FACTUAL HISTORY

On May 15, 2015 appellant, then a 54-year-old contract termination specialist, filed an 

occupational disease claim (Form CA-2) alleging that she developed symptoms of nausea, 

headaches, light-headedness, and major depression causally related to factors of her federal 

employment. She noted that she first became aware of her claimed conditions on January 5, 2014 

and their relationship to her federal employment on June 1, 2014. On the reverse side of the claim 

form, J.L., appellant’s supervisor, challenged the claim. He noted that a return-to-work letter was 

issued to her on May 11, 2015 and that she had not returned. 

Appellant subsequently submitted a May 11, 2015 statement in which she attributed her 

claimed emotional conditions to the “foul and pungent body odor” and appearance of a coworker. 

She claimed that in May 2014, during J.L.’s first visit to her worksite, he noticed that coworker’s

poor hygiene. J.L. remarked that this was an unacceptable situation, and appellant informed him

that she had an ad hoc telework schedule to avoid being around the coworker. In September 2013 

appellant’s former supervisor, K.A., had approved her request for a four-day-per-week telework 

schedule. K.A. had a conversation with the coworker about his poor hygiene and his condition 

immediately improved. During the improvement period appellant converted to a three-day-perweek telework schedule. However, as the problem worsened K.A. granted her request for an ad 

hoc telework day on a weekly basis, usually on Wednesdays. J.L. told her that she could continue 

her ad hoc telework schedule and that he would speak to him about his hygiene. He also offered 

appellant the option of relocating or sharing a desk with R.I., a coworker, but she declined his 

offer. J.L. denied her request for a four-day-per-week telework as a reasonable accommodation. 

Appellant claimed that J.L. thereafter became hostile towards her with no sympathy or concern for 

her health even after he had promised to handle the situation. J.L. later informed her that he would 

no longer approve more than three days of telework. Appellant became ill in the office and 

requested leave. She noted that J.L. never requested that she submit supportive medical 

documentation. Appellant contended that he did not notify her about filing OWCP forms, 

available compensation or leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) and he did not

complete the necessary forms. She filed an Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) complaint 

alleging an unhealthy work environment. Appellant noted that J.L. denied her requests for 

reasonable accommodation in May, July, and September 2014, and January 2015. In 

September 2014 J.L. was instructed to relocate her desk away from her peers, to utilize R.I.’s desk 

when she was absent from work, or move to the desk of another coworker, S.C., in the next aisle

to avoid exposure to the coworker. Appellant refused to move because he had not been asked to 

relocate to another work area. In October 2014 U.B., an employee, informed her that she had 

instructed the coworker how to perform his daily hygiene routine and wash his clothes, to refrain 

from wearing untidy clothes to work, and where to buy his clothes. He later had at least five or 

six relapses during that month. J.L. continued to deny appellant’s request for a reasonable 

accommodation. She stopped working in the office and requested leave on Wednesdays and 

Fridays. Mediation between appellant and V.H., a manager, was held from January 9 to 15, 2015, 

regarding the denial of her requests for a reasonable accommodation and other related matters, but 
3

V.H. called an impasse. Also, in January 2015, J.L. denied appellant’s requests for an ad hoc

telework schedule. He also denied her requests for annual leave until she submitted a physician’s 

slip. Appellant filed a FMLA request.

Appellant also attributed her emotional conditions to several other work factors. She 

claimed that the EEO process was poorly managed as her husband was not allowed to participate 

in the mediation process held from January 9 to 16, 2015. Appellant contended that she was 

treated differently and discriminated against based on her sex, race, and disability in the abovenoted incidents. She claimed that while her request for a four-day telework schedule was denied,

other employees were currently worked on this same schedule. Additionally, appellant noted that 

the coworker was never relocated and she believed that her relocation was not a proper solution 

because he could walk down the aisle to talk to his peers.

OWCP thereafter received additional medical evidence and a copy of appellant’s May 20, 

2015 request for a reasonable accommodation. 

In a development letter dated May 26, 2015, OWCP informed appellant that the evidence 

submitted was insufficient to establish her claim. It advised her of the type of factual and medical 

evidence necessary to establish her claim and attached a questionnaire for her completion. In a 

separate development letter of even date, OWCP requested that the employing establishment 

provide additional information, including comments from a knowledgeable supervisor and an 

explanation of appellant’s work activities. It afforded both parties 30 days to submit the necessary 

evidence.

In a June 3, 2015 statement, J.L. recounted that on June 17, 2014 appellant approached him

and complained about the coworker’s poor hygiene. He immediately offered to move her to an 

empty cubicle which was located in a different aisle than the coworker while management 

investigated the issue. Appellant rejected the offer and requested an ad hoc telework schedule. 

J.L. noted that she was already approved for regular telework three days per week. He granted 

appellant’s request for an additional ad hoc telework day until January 2015. J.L. addressed the 

issue directly with the coworker and management continued to explore possible accommodations/

solutions. Additionally, he offered appellant a workspace on a different floor in the building as a 

reasonable accommodation, but she rejected the offer. Meanwhile, employees informed 

management that the coworker’s personal hygiene had tremendously improved. On November 6, 

2014 J.L. provided this update to appellant and warned her that he would not continue to grant her 

an ad hoc telework schedule because her complaint had been resolved. He noted that, although 

she had barely physically reported to the office for months at that point, she insisted that the 

coworker’s situation could not have possibly improved. J.L. granted appellant’s request for leave 

on the days she was to report to work in the office through January 2015 because justification for 

ad hoc telework no longer existed. He claimed that he was never notified that she had a medical 

condition that might require special accommodation. In January 2015 appellant notified J.L. about 

her request for leave under FMLA. He was first notified about her medical condition in 

February 2015 after she had already begun her FMLA leave. J.L. indicated that appellant had not 

teleworked or reported for duty since January 23, 2015. Appellant’s FMLA leave was approved 

and 480 hours were exhausted in April 2015. J.L. issued a letter directing appellant to return to 

work on May 13, 2015, but she did not return. Instead, one week later, appellant submitted new 
4

medical documentation concerning her diagnosis and requested a reasonable accommodation to 

be relocated to the first floor in the building.

OWCP received additional medical evidence.

In an undated statement, appellant continued to claim that her requests for a four-day-perweek telework schedule and a one-day-per week ad hoc telework schedule were denied. She noted 

the amount of leave she used from May 2014 to December 2014. 

E-mails dated November 22 and 24 and December 8 and 10, 2014, from S.H., appellant’s 

coworker; an undated witness statement by R.I., a coworker; and a December 1, 2014 witness 

statement from a concerned employee corroborated appellant’s account of the coworker’s personal 

hygiene. 

Witness statements from appellant’s husband described her symptoms and what he 

believed to be was unfair treatment by the employing establishment following her exposure to the 

coworker’s poor hygiene.

Additional medical evidence was also received.

In a July 9, 2015 letter, J.L. responded to OWCP’s May 26, 2015 development letter. He 

reiterated his account of appellant’s exposure to the coworker’s body odor, the approval of her 

telework requests, and when he became aware of her resulting medical condition. J.L. described 

her work duties as a terminating contracting officer and submitted an official copy of the position 

description. He noted that the termination group in which appellant was assigned had not been 

fully staffed to effectively carry out its mission due to budget constraints and employees’

retirement. J.L. related, however, that the workload was fairly distributed and constantly 

reassessed. He contended that appellant never raised any concerns about her workload. Appellant

achieved a fully successful performance rating in 2014. She had some performance issues towards

the end of 2014 related to issues with contractors and business partners. Appellant also displayed 

unprofessional behavior in some of her communications with J.L. over management’s handling of 

her complaint pertaining to the coworker.

In an August 12, 2015 statement, appellant responded to J.L.’s July 9, 2015 statement. She 

claimed that he required her to become sick before she could request an ad hoc telework schedule. 

Appellant asserted that she did not receive a return-to-work letter and that she was not released to 

return to work and was not medically able to return to work until June 29, 2015. She referenced 

accompanying documents that indicated that she was forced to use annual/sick/credit hours every 

Wednesday and Friday to mitigate her exposure to the odor in the office and becoming ill. 

Appellant contended that her workload averaged about 25 to 30 dockets any given month. Her 

position required substantial hours of overtime that were also considered to be credit hours. 

Appellant performed at least 15 to 20 hours of overtime/credit hours, although employees were 

only allowed to work 6 hours of overtime/credit per pay period. She notified J.L. and Director 

P.S. that she was concerned about her reduced work schedule since she took off work on 

Wednesdays and Fridays. Appellant noted that even on the days she was on leave from May 2014

to October 2014, she worked because she did not want to disappoint her customers. Eventually, 

she stopped work on her days off due to stress and the denial of her requests for a reasonable 
5

accommodation. Although J.L. approved her request for an ad hoc telework schedule, he would 

later inconsistently approve or disapprove her request. Appellant indicated that he did not provide 

reasonable accommodation until 13 months later from May 2014 to June 2015. She contended 

that she had no performance problems while adapting to a reduced work schedule. 

In an undated statement, appellant responded to J.L.’s June 3, 2015 letter. She contended 

that while he granted her ad hoc telework on Wednesdays and Fridays, she had to first come into 

the office and subject herself to the coworker’s body odor and become sick before he did so.

Appellant submitted e-mails dated August 1, 2014 to July 29, 2015 between herself, J.L., 

and S.P., and other correspondence and documents regarding her requests for an ad hoc telework

schedule, leave, and workers’ compensation. 

Appellant also submitted additional medical evidence.

By decision dated August 31, 2015, OWCP accepted that appellant was subjected to an 

unhealthy work environment due to her coworker’s poor hygiene, but denied her claim for an 

emotional condition, finding that she had not established that it “arose during the course of 

employment and within the scope of compensable work factors as defined by FECA.”

OWCP subsequently received additional medical evidence. 

On April 20, 2016 appellant requested reconsideration regarding the August 31, 2015 

decision. 

Appellant submitted numerous time and leave records. She also continued to submit 

medical evidence.

In a May 26, 2016 letter, J.L. responded to appellant’s request for reconsideration

contending that her claim should be denied. He asserted that on the rare occasions he did not 

approve her ad hoc telework requests, she requested leave for the days she was scheduled to work 

in the office. J.L. again noted that he granted appellant’s request for 480 hours of FMLA leave in 

April 2015. On April 30, 2015 he issued a return-to-work order to her because her FMLA leave 

had expired on April 21, 2015. On May 20, 2015 appellant submitted a request for a reasonable 

accommodation for, among other things, a five-day-a-week telework schedule and a relocation to

the first floor in the building. J.L. immediately contacted G.C., disability program manager, and 

appellant’s request for workspace on the first floor in the building was immediately made ready 

and available to her. On June 5, 2015 he approved her reasonable accommodation request for a 

four-day-per-week telework schedule along with one day in the office, on the first floor, on 

Fridays. On June 17, 2015 J.L. modified his approval of appellant’s request for reasonable 

accommodation and approved a five-day-per-week medical telework schedule beginning June 29 

through September 30, 2015 based on his review of a letter from appellant’s physician. He noted 

that, when she returned to work on June 29, 2015, there was a meaningful change in the manner 

and tone she communicated with him. Appellant’s e-mails were obviously inflammatory and 

contained disrespectful language and an unprofessional tone. Her response to work matters slowed 

considerably. In September 2015 appellant was issued a one-day suspension for misconduct. On 

September 24, 2015 she notified Director P.S. that she would be unable to return to work in the 

office even one day per week because she had a relapse of her depression and her somatic therapy 
6

had been suspended. J.L. again granted appellant a five-day-per-week medical telework schedule 

through December 31, 2015. He twice directed her to provide updated medical documentation 

addressing her work capacity, but she did not submit the requested information. J.L. related that 

it could not be determined whether appellant had, in fact, undergone specific therapy previously 

recommended by her physician. Also, her medical providers were not consistent. As a result, on 

January 8, 2016 J.L. issued a return-to-work notice to appellant. Appellant requested leave for the 

week of January 1 through 15, 2016. Following her absence from work, she was again suspended 

through the end of January 2016 due to additional acts of misconduct. On February 1, 2016 

appellant notified Director P.S. of another purported relapse of her depression due to continued 

stress/anxiety and a hostile work environment. She again invoked FLMA leave, requested a 

reasonable accommodation, and filed a workers’ compensation claim. On April 23, 2016 

appellant’s second FMLA leave expired and she still had not submitted the requested medical 

documentation. Accordingly, J.L. issued another return-to-work letter to her, but she did not 

comply. He noted that appellant had been absent without leave since May 2, 2016 and was subject 

to disciplinary action, including removal from federal service. J.L. related that she offered no

explanation for her continued failure to provide medical documentation regarding her absence 

from work.

In a June 27, 2016 letter, appellant responded to J.L.’s May 26, 2016 letter. She asserted 

that J.L. lied and erred in failing to remedy the situation involving the coworker. Appellant 

claimed that he did not grant her a three-day-per-week telework schedule because time and 

attendance records from January 2014 through May 2014 clearly indicated that she was already on 

this schedule. She also claimed that he did not grant her an ad hoc telework schedule. Appellant 

contended that J.L. did not provide her with a reasonable accommodation work schedule until 

November 2014.

Appellant submitted additional medical evidence.

An undated statement from the coworker indicated that he was counseled by J.L. and K.A. 

regarding his poor hygiene and appearance.

Witness statements from Director P.S., K.A., and other coworkers corroborated the 

coworker’s poor hygiene and unkempt physical appearance.

Appellant submitted numerous e-mails dated September 5, 2013 to February 16, 2016

regarding her request for a reasonable accommodation for a telework schedule and leave. 

Appellant also submitted a union agreement indicating that employees had a right to 

decline to perform an assigned task in an unsafe work area and the employing establishment’s 

reasonable accommodation procedures.

An undated declaration by G.C., disability program manager, indicated that appellant 

requested a reasonable accommodation because she could not work in the office due to her physical 

and mental limitations. He noted that she could perform her work duties at home.

OWCP, by decision dated August 31, 2016, denied modification of its August 31, 2015 

decision, finding that appellant had not established a compensable factor of her federal
7

employment. It determined that the evidence of record was insufficient to demonstrate error or 

abuse on the part of the employing establishment with respect to several administrative matters.

On June 14, 2017 appellant requested reconsideration and submitted additional evidence. 

In an accompanying letter dated May 30, 2017, she contended that the employing establishment 

failed to provide reasonable accommodation for her disability under the Americans with 

Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA).3

Appellant submitted Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) decisions dated 

May 1, 2017. An MSPB administrative judge reversed appellant’s 14-day suspension from work 

for the period May 30 through July 22, 2016 and her removal from her contract termination 

position, effective July 22, 2016. He found that the employing establishment erred in rejecting her 

medical documentation as administratively unacceptable and that her request for a five-day-perweek telework schedule would not have unduly burdened its operations. The administrative judge

explained that it violated the ADAAA by failing to accommodate appellant, a qualified disabled 

employee, due to her major depression and other psychosomatic conditions which substantially 

limited her brain function, with a five-day-per-week telework schedule. He further explained that 

the employing establishment suspended her without providing due process. In the suspension 

decision, the administrative judge noted that appellant was constructively suspended during the 

period May 30 through July 22, 2016. In the removal decision, he found that she failed to establish 

that she was removed from her position as reprisal for her prior EEO activity. The administrative 

judge ordered the employing establishment to retroactively restore her to her prior position, 

effective July 22, 2016, with back pay and interest.

Appellant submitted additional medical evidence.

In a July 18, 2017 letter, J.L. responded to appellant’s request for reconsideration. He 

contended that her reconsideration request did not meet OWCP’s requirements and that the May 1, 

2017 MSPB decision was not relevant to OWCP’s determination as it was issued long after her 

claimed issues and removal.

By decision dated August 9, 2017, OWCP denied modification of the August 31, 2016 

decision.

LEGAL PRECEDENT

To establish an emotional condition causally related to factors of a claimant’s federal

employment, he or she must submit: (1) factual evidence identifying and supporting employment

factors or incidents alleged to have caused or contributed to the condition; (2) rationalized medical

evidence establishing an emotional condition or psychiatric disorder; and (3) rationalized medical

 

3 29 C.F.R. Part 1630; 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.; Pub.L. 110-325.
8

opinion evidence establishing that the emotional condition is causally related to the identified

compensable employment factors.4

Workers’ compensation law does not apply to each and every injury or illness that is

somehow related to a claimant’s employment. There are situations where an injury or illness has

some connection with the employment, but nevertheless does not come within the purview of

workers’ compensation. When disability results from an emotional reaction to regular or specially

assigned work duties or a requirement imposed by the employment, the disability is deemed

compensable.5 However, disability is not compensable when it results from factors such as an

employee’s fear of a reduction-in-force, or frustration from not being permitted to work in a

particular environment, or to hold a particular position.6

To the extent that disputes and incidents alleged as constituting harassment by coworkers 

are established as occurring and arising from a claimant’s performance of his or her regular duties, 

these could constitute employment factors.7 However, for harassment to give rise to a 

compensable disability under FECA there must be evidence that harassment did, in fact, occur.

Mere perceptions of harassment are not compensable under FECA.8 Additionally, verbal 

altercations and difficult relationships with supervisors, when sufficiently detailed by the claimant 

and supported by the record, may constitute factors of employment. This does not imply, however, 

that every statement uttered in the workplace will give rise to coverage under FECA.9

An employee’s emotional reaction to administrative or personnel matters generally falls

outside of FECA’s scope.10 Although related to the employment, administrative and personnel

matters are functions of the employer rather than the regular or specially assigned duties of the

employee.11 However, to the extent the evidence demonstrates that the employing establishment

 

4 See S.K., Docket No. 18-1648 (issued March 14, 2019); C.M., Docket No. 17-1076 (issued November 14, 2018);

Debbie J. Hobbs, 43 ECAB 135 (1991); Donna Faye Cardwell, 41 ECAB 730 (1990).

5 A.C., Docket No. 18-0507 (issued November 26, 2018); Pamela D. Casey, 57 ECAB 260, 263 (2005); Lillian

Cutler, 28 ECAB 125, 129 (1976).

6 Cutler, id.

7 See B.S., Docket No. 19-0378 (issued July 10, 2019); M.R., Docket No. 18-0304 (issued November 13, 2018); 

David W. Shirey, 42 ECAB 783, 795-96 (1991); Kathleen D. Walker, 42 ECAB 603, 608 (1991).

8 A.E., Docket No. 18-1587 (issued March 13, 2019); Jack Hopkins, Jr., 42 ECAB 818, 827 (1991).

9 Y.B., Docket No. 16-0193 (issued July 23, 2018); Marguerite J. Toland, 52 ECAB 294 (2001).

10 G.R., Docket No. 18-0893 (issued November 21, 2018); Andrew J. Sheppard, 53 ECAB 170, 171 (2001); 

Matilda R. Wyatt, 52 ECAB 421, 423 (2001); Thomas D. McEuen, 41 ECAB 387 (1990); reaff’d on recon., 42 ECAB 

566 (1991).

11 David C. Lindsey, Jr., 56 ECAB 263, 268 (2005); McEuen, id.
9

either erred or acted abusively in discharging its administrative or personnel responsibilities, such

action will be considered a compensable employment factor.12

Perceptions and feelings, alone, are not compensable. To establish entitlement to benefits,

a claimant must establish a basis in fact for the claim by supporting his or her allegations with

probative and reliable evidence.13 When the matter asserted is a compensable factor of

employment and the evidence of record establishes the truth of the matter asserted, OWCP must

base its decision on an analysis of the medical evidence.14

ANALYSIS

The Board finds that this case is not in posture for decision.

As to appellant’s allegations that she was improperly terminated from her position effective 

July 22, 2016 and improperly suspended from work for 14 days from May 30 through July 22, 

2016, the Board finds that appellant has established error and abuse by the employing 

establishment in the handling of these administrative/personnel matters.

Specifically, appellant contended that her supervisor, J.L., continually denied her requests 

for a reasonable accommodation consisting of a five-day-per-week ad hoc telework schedule due 

to her physical and emotional conditions resulting from her exposure to a coworker who had poor 

personal hygiene. She further contends that she was improperly suspended for 14 days from 

May 30 through July 22, 2016 and removed from employment effective July 22, 2016. The Board 

finds that the May 1, 2017 MSPB decisions establish that the employing establishment committed 

error in suspending and removing appellant. The decisions reversed the suspension and removal,

and ordered the employing establishment to restore appellant’s position and pay. The decisions 

were based on the finding that the employing establishment constructively suspended and removed 

appellant without providing the procedural protections to which she was entitled. The employing 

establishment conceded that appellant had been constructively suspended for 14 days. The Board 

finds that the MSPB decisions are sufficient to establish that the constructive suspension between 

May 30 and July 22, 2016 and removal effective July 22, 2016, due to management’s failure to 

provide proper procedural protections, constitutes a compensable factor of employment.15

Appellant has also attributed her emotional condition to overwork based upon her regular 

and specially assigned job duties under Cutler.

16

 The Board has held that overwork is a 

compensable factor of employment if appellant submits sufficient evidence to substantiate this 

 

12 Id.

13 G.R., supra note 10; Roger Williams, 52 ECAB 468 (2001).

14 See C.M., supra note 4; Norma L. Blank, 43 ECAB 384, 389-90 (1992). Unless a claimant establishes a

compensable factor of employment, it is unnecessary to address the medical evidence of record. T.G., Docket No. 

19-0071 (issued May 28, 2019); Garry M. Carlo, 47 ECAB 299, 305 (1996).

15 C.M., supra note 4; R.V., Docket Nos. 07-818 and 07-2285 (issued September 25, 2008).

16 Supra note 4.
10

allegation.17 Appellant noted that she handled an average of approximately 25 to 30 dockets per 

month. She was required to work a substantial number of hours of overtime/credit time, at least 

15 to 20 hours while employees were only allowed 6 hours per pay period. Appellant became 

concerned about performing her work duties with a reduced work schedule as she was off work on 

Wednesday and Friday to avoid being exposed to the coworker’s poor hygiene and remain healthy. 

She noted, nonetheless, that she continued to work until she stopped due to stress and the denial 

of her request for a reasonable accommodation. The Board finds that appellant has submitted no 

evidence supporting her allegation of overwork. While J.L. acknowledged that appellant’s

termination group had been unable to carry out its mission due to budget constraints and a staff 

shortage, he noted that the workload was fairly distributed and constantly reassessed. Moreover, 

he related that she never raised any concerns about her workload. Additionally, J.L. indicated that 

appellant received a fully successful performance rating in 2014. He further indicated that her 

only performance issues were related to stale negotiations with contractors and business partners 

and unprofessional behavior she directed towards him regarding her complaint of the coworker’s 

poor hygiene. It is appellant’s burden to submit the requisite factual evidence supporting her 

allegation that she was overworked, which she failed to provide.18 Thus, the Board finds that she 

has not established overwork as a compensable factor of employment. 

Appellant made other allegations that relate to administrative and personnel actions, which 

are not compensable absent a showing of error or abuse on the part of the employing 

establishment.19 She filed an EEO complaint regarding the denial of her requests for a reasonable 

accommodation and other related matters. Appellant asserted that her husband was not allowed to 

participate in the EEO mediation session held from January 9 to 16, 2015 regarding her complaint. 

She also asserted that V.H., management’s representative, declared an impasse in the mediation. 

The Board finds that the filing of grievances and EEOC complaints20 and a mediation session21

are administrative or personnel matters which, although generally related to the employee’s 

employment, are administrative functions of the employer rather than the regular or specially 

assigned work duties of the employee and is not covered under FECA.22 Appellant has not 

submitted corroborating evidence of error or abuse in these administrative matter, and thus, has 

not established a compensable employment.23

 

17 D.T., Docket No. 19-1270 (issued February 4, 2020); W.F., Docket No. 18-1526 (issued November 26, 2019); 

J.E., Docket No. 17-1799 (issued March 7, 2018); Bobbie D. Daly, 53 ECAB 691 (2002).

18 D.T., id.; A.J., Docket No. 18-1116 (issued January 23, 2019); Gary J. Watling, 52 ECAB 278 (2001).

19 See A.C., Docket No. 18-0507 (issued November 26, 2018); Janet I. Jones, 47 ECAB 345, 347 (1996), Jimmy 

Gilbreath, 44 ECAB 555, 558 (1993); Apple Gate, 41 ECAB 581, 588 (1990); Joseph C. DeDonato, 39 ECAB 1260, 

1266-67 (1988).

20 W.F., Docket No. 18-1526; B.O., Docket No. 17-1986 (issued January 18, 2019); James E. Norris, 52 ECAB 

93 (2000).

21 M.Z., Docket No. 13-0023 (issued April 15, 2013).

22 T.L., Docket No. 18-0100 (issued June 20, 2019); Matilda R. Wyatt, 52 ECAB 421 (2001); McEuen, supra

note 10.

23 R.B., Docket No. 19-0343 (issued February 14, 2020); R.V., Docket No. 18-0268 (issued October 17, 2018).
11

Appellant contended that she was treated differently and discriminated against based on 

her sex, race, and disability in the claimed incidents at work. For harassment or discrimination to 

give rise to a compensable disability under FECA, there must be probative and reliable evidence 

that harassment or discrimination did in fact occur.24 Mere perceptions of harassment, retaliation, 

or discrimination are not compensable under FECA.25 Appellant claimed that her coworkers 

currently had a four-day telework schedule while her request for the same schedule was denied. 

Additionally, she claimed that she was offered relocation to avoid being exposed to the coworker’s 

poor hygiene, but he was never relocated to a different workspace. Appellant has not submitted 

any corroborative evidence to establish a factual basis for her allegations. The Board notes that 

both J.L., K.A., appellant’s former supervisor, and U.B., an employee, had conversations with the 

coworker about his poor hygiene and his condition improved. The employee acknowledged that 

J.L. and K.A. spoke to him about his hygiene. Based on the evidence of record, the Board finds 

that appellant has not established, with corroborating evidence, that she was discriminated against 

by the employing establishment.

As noted above, the Board finds that appellant has established a compensable employment 

factor with regard to her claim of being improperly suspended and removed from the employing 

establishment during the period May 30 through July 22, 2016. Accordingly, OWCP must analyze 

the medical evidence to determine whether she sustained an emotional condition as a result of this 

compensable employment factor. The case will therefore be remanded to OWCP. After this and 

other such further development as deemed necessary, OWCP shall issue a de novo decision.

CONCLUSION

The Board finds that this case is not in posture for decision. 

 

24 T.G., Docket No. 19-0071 (issued May 28, 2019); Marlon Vera, 54 ECAB 834 (2003).

25 Id.; see also Kim Nguyen, 53 ECAB 127 (2001).
12

ORDER

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the August 9, 2017 decision of the Office of 

Workers’ Compensation Programs is set aside and the case is remanded for further proceedings 

consistent with this decision of the Board.

Issued: August 14, 2020

Washington, DC

Janice B. Askin, Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Patricia H. Fitzgerald, Alternate Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Valerie D. Evans-Harrell, Alternate Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board