J-S13012-16 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA 

 Appellee 

v. 

ROBERT REAGAN 

 Appellant No. 529 WDA 2015 

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence March 12, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Cambria County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-11-CR-0002403-2013 

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., STABILE, J., and FITZGERALD, J.

*

 

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 23, 2016 

 Robert Reagan appeals from the judgment of sentence entered in the 

Court of Common Pleas of Cambria County after a jury convicted him of one 

count each of delivery of a controlled substance1 and possession of a 

controlled substance.2 Upon careful review, we affirm. 

 The trial court set forth the facts of this case as follows: 

On January 17, 2012, the Cambria County Drug Task Force 

executed a controlled buy after receiving information that 

[Reagan] illegally distributed bath salts. An undercover police 

officer, Detective Lia DeMarco, and an undercover police 

informant testified regarding their participation in the controlled 

____________________________________________ 

*

 Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. 

1

 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30). 

2

 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16). 
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buy. The informant testified he called [Reagan] to arrange a 

deal to buy bath salts for $150.00. Detective DeMarco drove the 

informant to meet [Reagan] at his home and then to a pull-off to 

purchase the bath salts. At the pull-off, the informant and 

[Reagan] exchanged cash for two vials, which were submitted 

into evidence without objection. 

At trial, Detective Kevin Price, Drug Task Force Field Supervisor, 

testified that a controlled buy includes photocopying the official 

funds to be used; strip searching the informant before and after 

the buy; activating a video device on the informant; and 

conducting surveillance of the buy. Detective Price confirmed 

that the Drug Task Force properly implemented these techniques 

during the controlled buy from [Reagan]. 

Douglas Samber, a forensic scientist for the Pennsylvania State 

Police Greensburg Regional Laboratory, testified as an expert in 

laboratory analysis, laboratory procedures, and analysis of 

controlled substances. Mr. Samber tested the contents of the 

vials purchased from [Reagan] and concluded they contained 

Pyrovalerone, a Schedule V controlled substance. 

Trial Court Opinion, 5/18/15, at 1-2 (internal citations to record and footnote 

omitted). 

 On January 21, 2014, the Commonwealth filed an information in which 

it alleged that Reagan possessed and delivered “Bath Salts, a Schedule I 

Controlled Substance.” Information, 1/21/14. Just prior to the 

commencement of jury selection on October 2, 2014, the Commonwealth 

moved for a continuance to enable it to amend its information to properly 

classify the drug involved – pyrovalerone – as a Class V controlled 

substance. The court granted the continuance and the information was 

amended to reflect the proper classification of the drug, which the 

Commonwealth continued to refer to as “bath salts.” 
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A jury trial was held on December 11 and 12, 2014. At the conclusion 

of the Commonwealth’s case, Reagan moved for judgment of acquittal, 

arguing that the Commonwealth did not prove he possessed or delivered 

“bath salts.” The motion was denied and Reagan was found guilty of the 

above offenses. On March 12, 2015, the court sentenced Reagan to 6 to 12 

months’ imprisonment, to run consecutively to another sentence he is 

currently serving. Reagan filed a timely notice of appeal, followed by a 

court-ordered concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant 

to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). On appeal, Reagan asserts that the Commonwealth 

failed to present sufficient evidence to convict him of possession and delivery 

of “bath salts,” as alleged in the information, where the actual substance 

contained pyrovalerone. 

As a general matter, our standard of review of sufficiency claims 

requires that we evaluate the record in the light most favorable 

to the verdict winner giving the prosecution the benefit of all 

reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. Evidence 

will be deemed sufficient to support the verdict when it 

establishes each material element of the crime charged and the 

commission thereof by the accused, beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Nevertheless, the Commonwealth need not establish guilt to a 

mathematical certainty. The facts and circumstances established 

by the Commonwealth need not be absolutely incompatible with 

the defendant’s innocence. Any doubt about the defendant’s 

guilt is to be resolved by the fact finder unless the evidence is so 

weak and inconclusive that, as a matter of law, no probability of 

fact can be drawn from the combined circumstances. 

Commonwealth v. Mauz, 122 A.3d 1039, 1040-41 (Pa. Super. 2015) 

(citation omitted). 
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 The purpose of an information is to provide the accused with sufficient 

notice to prepare a defense, and to ensure that he will not be tried twice for 

the same act. Commonwealth v. Alston, 651 A.2d 1092, 1095 (Pa. 1994) 

(citations omitted). An information is sufficient if it sets forth the elements 

of the offense intended to be charged with sufficient detail that the 

defendant is apprised of what he must be prepared to meet, and may plead 

double jeopardy in a future prosecution based on the same set of events. 

Id. 

At an earlier stage of legal development, indictments were strictly and 

technically construed, and the slightest imprecision in wording was often 

considered incurable error. Commonwealth v. Pope, 317 A.2d 887, 890 

(Pa. 1974). Today, however, such arguments are unpersuasive. Id. 

Indictments must be read in a common-sense manner, and are not to be 

construed in an overly technical sense. Id. 

Here, Reagan concedes that he had sufficient notice of the crimes of 

which he was accused. Instead, he asserts that “the Commonwealth did not 

prove what it had set out to prove in its information.” Brief of Appellant, at 

17. Reagan claims that the Commonwealth did not present sufficient 

evidence to prove that “bath salts” is the street name for pyrovalerone, the 

drug he sold to the informant. 

In Commonwealth v. Kelly, 409 A.2d 21 (Pa. 1979), our Supreme 

Court was presented with the defendant’s claim that judgment should have 

been arrested because the complaint charged that he was in possession of 
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heroin, but the proof at trial showed the controlled substance to have been 

methamphetamines. The Court rejected the argument, concluding that 

“[v]ariations between allegations and proof at trial are not fatal unless a 

defendant could be misled at trial, prejudicially surprised in efforts to 

prepare a defense, precluded from anticipating the prosecution’s proof, or 

otherwise impaired with respect to a substantial right.” Id. at 23. 

In his brief, Reagan acknowledges that “Kelly appears to remain good 

law, as the Supreme Court has cited to both cases in addressing claims by 

defendants that are based on variances in proof.” Brief of Appellant, at 20. 

However, Reagan cites the age of the case, as well as the fact that this 

Court has not applied it to a drug case in over thirty years, and essentially 

asks us to disregard its holding. 

 In support of his claim, Reagan also cites to the decision of the U.S. 

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in United States v. Tucker, 703 F.3d 

205 (3d Cir. 2012). There, the Third Circuit addressed whether the 

defendant’s previous Pennsylvania conviction for possession with intent to 

deliver qualified as a “serious drug offense” under the Armed Career 

Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (“ACCA”). However, Tucker is not only not 

binding on this Court, but also inapposite. Specifically, Tucker does not 

concern itself with the propriety of the underlying state conviction, i.e., 

whether the Commonwealth’s evidence was sufficient to convict him of the 

state charges. Indeed, the Third Circuit did not hold that Tucker was 

improperly convicted under Pennsylvania law. Rather, it concluded only that 
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Tucker’s Pennsylvania convictions did not satisfy the requirements necessary 

for the imposition of an enhanced sentence under the ACCA. Accordingly, 

Tucker provides no guidance here. 

 The amended information charged Reagan with possessing and 

distributing a Schedule V controlled substance. Although that substance was 

described by the street name “bath salts,” we find that the amended 

information provided Reagan with adequate notice of the charges against 

him to enable him to prepare his defense. Alston, supra; Kelly, supra. 

Moreover, the evidence adduced at trial was sufficient to enable the jury to 

infer that the street name for pyrovalerone in Cambria County is “bath 

salts.” See Mauz, supra (in sufficiency claim, prosecution receives benefit 

of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from evidence adduced at trial). 

Specifically, Detective DeMarco testified that the informant spoke with 

Reagan and made arrangements to buy a drug called “blizzard,” which she 

testified is also known locally as “bath salts.” N.T. Trial, 12/11/14, at 29-30. 

In addition, the informant, Donald Forshey, testified that after speaking with 

Reagan on the telephone, he understood he would be purchasing bath salts 

and that it would cost a total of $150. See id. at 76. Forshey further stated 

that he met Reagan in Reagan’s garage and discussed obtaining bath salts. 

Id. at 78. Based on this testimony, it is clear that Reagan understood that 

Forshey wanted to purchase bath salts and provided him with the drug 

known by that name. Accordingly, Reagan is entitled to no relief. 

 Judgment of sentence affirmed. 
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Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 2/23/2016