alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Corey MILLER.

No. 2003-KK-2359.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Aug. 25, 2003.

In re State of Louisiana;—Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial *994Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. K, No. 02-0404; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 03-K-946.

Stay lifted. Writ Granted. We have examined thoroughly the transcript of the in camera hearing and of the proceedings in open court and conclude that, on the facts of this case, the evidence supports a serious concern for the safety of potential witnesses. Under the circumstances of this case, the delicate balance between defendant’s right to disclosure of Brady/Gig-lio matters and the concern for safety of witnesses will not be violated by a delayed disclosure of the material sought by defendant. Accordingly, it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to order immediate disclosure. We therefore reverse the ruling of the trial court ordering immediate disclosure and remand this case to the trial court to fashion an appropriate order directing disclosure, no earlier than three days prior to the commencement of trial, which period we find to be sufficient to protect the safety of the potential witnesses and at the same time safeguard the due process rights of the defendant.

CALOGERO, C.J., recused.

JOHNSON, J., would stay all proceedings and hold the matter for conference discussion.
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, e xcept under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and col lateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.

** The Honorable William F. Downes, District Judge, Un ited States District Court for the District of Wyoming, sitting by desig nation. 

## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### JUL 28 1997 

### PATRICK FISHER Clerk UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
GEANA J. DUNKIN,

Plaintiff,
v. LOUISIANA-PACIFIC CORPORATION; JAMES BELDIN; DOUGLAS EDDINS,

Defendants-Appellees.

______________________________ DAVID LEE SMITH,

Attorney-Appellant. No. 96-1411 (D.C. No. 92-N-243) (D. Colo.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before KELLY and HENRY, Circuit Judges, and DOWNES, ** District Judge.-2-

After examining appellant’s brief and the appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would notmaterially assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral ar gument. On receipt of this court’s mandate arising from ouraffirmance of the district court’s imposition of sanctions against Mr . Smith, see Dunkin v. Louisiana-Pacific Corp. , No. 95-1087 (10th Cir. June 12, 1996), cert. deni ed , 117 S. Ct. 435 (1996), the district court entered an or der establishing a date certain for payment of the sanctions. Mr. Smith appeals from t hat order, but does not raise any issues relating to that order per se. Instead, he raises arguments against the imposition of sanctions that he raised in the priorappeal. He also has moved for this court’s recusal from this matter and for en ba nc consideration of recusal. These motions were denied in orders filed on Novemb er 29 and December 27, 1996. Consideration of the remaining issues is bar red by law of the case. See Rohrbaugh v. Celotex Corp. , 53 F.3d 1181, 1183 (10th Cir. 1995). AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr. Circuit Judge
Exhibit 32.1




CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS




ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002




In connection with the Quarterly Report of U.S. Precious Metals, Inc. (the “ Company ”), on Form 10-Q for the fiscal quarter ended February 28, 2010, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “ Report ”), I, M. Jack Kugler, Principal Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge and belief:




1.          The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and




2.          The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





/s/ M. Jack KuglerM. Jack KuglerChief Executive Officer and Chairman of the Board(Principal Executive Officer)April 19, 2010
**EXHIBIT 32.1**

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

In connection with theQuarterly Report of Aventine Renewable Energy Holdings, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the periodending March 31, 2007 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the“Report”), I, Ronald H. Miller,Chief Executive Officer of Aventine Renewable Energy Holdings, Inc., certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge andbelief:

(1)           The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)           The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in allmaterial respects, the financial condition and results of operations of theCompany.

Asigned original of this written statement required by Section 906 has beenprovided to Aventine Renewable Energy Holdings, Inc. and will be retained by AventineRenewable Energy Holdings, Inc. andfurnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
|        | /s/ Ronald H. Miller    |
|--------|-------------------------|
|   | Ronald H. Miller        |
|   | Chief Executive Officer |
|   | May 9, 2007             |

 

----
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 00-6375

BILLY LEE LISENBY, JR., Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; GERALDINE MIRO; BETSY ALBRITTON, Captain;VERNSITE MOLE, Lieutenant; L. SMITH, Correctional Officer; MARK HOLMES, Correctional Officer; MCKINLY NEWTON, Captain; KENNETH GREENE, Sergeant; ERWIN HAY, Lieutenant; BOBBY SMOKE, Correctional Officer; TIMOTHY ANDERSON,Correctional Officer; DOUGLAS LAMBRIGHT, Lieutenant; RICKY GRIMES, Lieutenant; KEN LONG, Grievance Clerk; MICHAEL GINN, Captain; L. T. ADAMS, Correctional Officer; MCKITHER BODISON; L. J. ALLEN, Regional Director; W. D. CATOE, Director, Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Florence. David C. Norton, District Judge. (CA-99-362-4-18) Submitted: May 25, 2000 Decided: June 6, 2000 Before WILLIAMS, MICHAEL, and KING, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.2 Billy Lee Lisenby, Jr., Appellant Pro Se. William Ansel Collins, Jr., SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellees. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).* Generally, dismissals without prejudice are not appealable. See Domino Sugar Corp. v. Sugar Workers Local Union 392 , 10 F.3d 1064, 1066 (4th Cir. 1993). However, a dismissal without prejudice could be final if no amendment to the complaint could cure the defects in the plaintiff’s case. See id. at 1066-67. We find that the district court’s order is a final, appealable order because the defects in Lisenby’s complaint—failure to exhaust administrative remedies and failure to show that his disciplinary convictions had been invalidated—must be cured by something more than an amendment to the complaint. See id.
3 PER CURIAM: Billy Lee Lisenby, Jr., appeals the district court’s order dismissing without prejudice his 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West Supp. 1999) complaint, a portion of which the district court construed as a habeas corpus action under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 (West 1994 & Supp. 1999). * We have reviewed the record, the district court’s opinion accepting the magistrate judge’s recommendation, and Lisenby’s informal appellate brief. Because Lisenby failed to challenge the district court’s reasoning, he has not preserved any issue for our review. See 4th Cir. R. 34(b). Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court. See Lisenby v. South Carolina Dep’t of Corrections, No. CA-99-362-4-18 (D.S.C. Mar. 9, 2000). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
#### HOUSING AUTHORITY OF THE CITY OF RALEIGH v. RITA TRUESDALE

No. 7810DC564

(Filed 3 July 1979)

Ejectment § 3— failure to make rent payments on time

The trial court properly allowed plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment in an action for summary ejectment for failure to make rental payments on time.

APPEAL by defendant from *Winborne, Judge.*Judgment entered 21 February 1978 in District Court, WAKE County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 8 March 1979.

This appeal was dismissed 20 March 1979 with opinion reported in 40 N.C. App. 425, 253 S.E. 2d 47 (1979). The Supreme Court 12 June 1979 ordered the appeal reinstated. Pursuant to that order, the appeal is reinstated.

This is a civil action wherein plaintiff seeks summary ejectment against defendant for failure to make rental payments on time. Defendant answered and, after discovery, moved for summary judgment. Plaintiff made cross motion for summary judgment. The trial court entered judgment for plaintiff.

*Allen, Steed and Allen, by Noah H. Huffstetler III, for plaintiff appellee.*

*Wake County Legal Aid Society, by G. Nicholas Garin and Gregory C. Malhoit, for defendant appellant.*

MARTIN (Harry C.), Judge.

We have again carefully reviewed the record on appeal. No genuine issue as to any material fact is presented on plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. *Kessing v. Mortgage Corp.,*278 N.C. 523, 180 S.E. 2d 823 (1971).

We hold the trial court properly allowed plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.

Affirmed.

Judges VAUGHN and ERWIN concur.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA No. DA 23
- 037 1 STATE OF MONTANA,

Plaintiff and Appellee, v. WILLIAM JAMES PILLANS, Defendant and Appellant

**ORDER** Upon consideration of Appellant’s motion for extension of time, and good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellant is granted an extension of time to and including December 18 , 2023, within which to prepare, file, and serve Appellant’s opening brief on appeal.

Electronically signed by: Mike McGrath Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

November 9 2023

11/09/2023

Case Number: DA 23-0371
State of New York

Supreme Court, Appellate Division

Third Judicial Department

Decided and Entered: October 6, 2016 107177 

________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF

NEW YORK,

Respondent,

v MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

LEON SAMUEL,

Appellant.

________________________________

Calendar Date: September 13, 2016

Before: McCarthy, J.P., Garry, Devine, Clark and Mulvey, JJ.

__________

Keeley A. Maloney, Albany, for appellant.

P. David Soares, District Attorney, Albany (Brittany L.

Grome of counsel), for respondent.

__________

Clark, J.

Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Albany County

(Lynch, J.), rendered October 21, 2014, convicting defendant upon

his plea of guilty of the crime of robbery in the third degree.

Defendant waived indictment and was charged in a superior

court information with robbery in the third degree. He pleaded

guilty to this crime in satisfaction of another pending charge

and waived his right to appeal, both orally and in writing. In

accordance with the terms of the plea agreement, defendant was

sentenced, as a second felony offender, to 3 to 6 years in

prison. He now appeals.

Initially, the record discloses that defendant validly

waived his right to appeal, as County Court separately addressed
-2- 107177 

and distinguished this right from the other rights that defendant

was automatically forfeiting by pleading guilty, and defendant

communicated his understanding thereof and agreed to waive his

right to appeal (see People v Cota, 136 AD3d 1116, 1116-1117

[2016]; People v Butler, 134 AD3d 1349, 1349-1350 [2015], lvs

denied 27 NY3d 962, 963 [2016]). In addition, defendant executed

a written appeal waiver that both he and his counsel signed in

open court and presented to County Court (see People v Butler,

134 AD3d at 1349-1350; People v Rubio, 133 AD3d 1041, 1042

[2015]). Inasmuch as defendant knowingly, voluntarily and

intelligently waived his right to appeal, he is precluded from

challenging the severity of the sentence (see People v Butler,

134 AD3d at 1350; People v Almeida, 127 AD3d 1499, 1500 [2015],

lv denied 26 NY3d 1006 [2015]). Defendant further argues that

his counsel was ineffective in failing to bring certain

mitigating circumstances to County Court's attention and to

address the effect that his guilty plea may have upon his federal

probation. As this claim pertains to sentencing and does not

implicate the voluntariness of defendant's guilty plea, it is

also foreclosed by defendant's valid appeal waiver (see People v

Livziey, 117 AD3d 1341, 1342 [2014]; People v Coffey, 77 AD3d

1202, 1204 [2010], lv denied 18 NY3d 882 [2012]). 

McCarthy, J.P., Garry, Devine and Mulvey, JJ., concur.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.

ENTER:

Robert D. Mayberger

Clerk of the Court
#### In the Matter of the Estate of Charles H. Trent, Deceased.

Surrogate’s Court, Bronx County,

June 17, 1936.

*823
      *John H. Noll,*administrator in person.

*Paul Windels, Corporation Counsel [Paul E. Fusco*of counsel], for William Hodson, as commissioner of public welfare of the city of New York, creditor.

Henderson, S.

The contention that the decedent left no property, other than the sum of $189.38 paid by his committee to the accounting administrator, is untenable.

He was a pecuniary legatee under a will probated prior to his death. Some months after the issuance of letters herein, the administrator received the unpaid balance of the decedent’s legacy, as abated. He is now accounting for cash assets in excess of the money paid the decedent from January 1, 1931, to November 1, 1934, inclusive, as and for old age relief under article XIV-A of the Public Welfare Law.

A testamentary bequest gives the legatee thereof a chose in action (Dec. Est. Law, § 146) and a chose in action is personal property (Gen. Constr. Law, § 39; Surr. Ct. Act, § 202, subd. 8; § 314, subd. 12). The right to a legacy becomes vested upon the probate of the will in which it is bequeathed, although no proceeding or action therefor may be instituted for various periods of months after the issuance of letters testamentary. (Surr. Ct. Act, § 217; Dec. Est. Law, § 146.) Like any other chose in action, it is intangible and may have little or no practical value. Its face value may be decreased or extinguished by a deficiency in the testator’s estate or by statutory provisions for its application to other purposes. Nevertheless it remains the subject of ownership, transfer and levy, and is property (Civ. Prac. Act, § 916). The fact that the decedent was an incompetent at the time of his death and had no actual control of his assets is immaterial.

*824The further contention that the cost of such relief cannot be recovered in the absence of any demonstration of the decedent’s misrepresentation, concealment of assets or fraud is met by the language of the statute (Pub. Welfare Law, § 128) which expressly charges the recipient of such relief with a promise to pay therefor. *(Matter of Lang,*242 App. Div. 781.) Section 128 became effective on January 1, 1930 (Laws of 1929, chap. 565, § 167). Section 57 of the former Poor Law was repealed by section 166 of the cited act. The material difference between the old and the new statutes for the recovery of relief extended, is the provision in the last sentence of section 128 of the Public Welfare Law that the receipt of public relief constitutes an implied contract. Hence the decisions based, under the former law, upon the absence of any contract, expressed or implied, are not applicable to claims under the present statute.

The claim of the commissioner of public welfare of the city of New York is a valid debt of the decedent and is allowed as a general claim against his estate in the amount claimed.

Settle decree.
**Exhibit 31.2**

 

#### **CERTIFICATIONS**

#### ** **

I. John B. Wadsworth, certify that:

 

1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Blue RidgePaper Products Inc. (the “registrant”);

 

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untruestatement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to makethe statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statementswere made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

 

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financialinformation included in this report, fairly present in all material respectsthe financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrantas of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

 

4. The registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I are responsiblefor establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as definedin Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and we have:

 

(a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused suchdisclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, toensure that material information relating to the registrant, including itsconsolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities,particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;

 

(b) evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controlsand procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about theeffectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of theperiod covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

 

(c) disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internalcontrol over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recentfiscal quarter (the registrant’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annualreport) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materiallyaffect, the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting; and

 

5. The registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed,based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financialreporting, to the registrant’s auditors and the audit committee of registrant’sboard of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

 

(a) all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the designor operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonablylikely to adversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process,summarize and report financial information; and

 

(b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management orother employees who have a significant role in the registrant’s internalcontrol over financial reporting.

 
| Date:  May 16, 2005 |                          |
|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| ** **                    | **/S/ JOHN B. WADSWORTH**     | ** ** |
|                          | John B. Wadsworth             |   |
|                          | Chief Financial Officer       |   |
|                          | (Principal Financial Officer) |   |

 

----
#### STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. DAVID HAMILTON

No. 7313SC441

(Filed 11 July 1973)

Appeal from *Clark, Judge,*February 1973 Session of Superior Court, Bladen County.

Defendant was charged with first-degree murder. Upon the call of the case for trial, defendant, through his counsel, entered a plea of guilty to involuntary manslaughter. The court questioned defendant at length to determine whether his plea was being voluntarily, understandingly, and freely entered. The questioning by the court consumes four pages of the record. There then appears in the record the transcript of plea as signed by defendant and the adjudication by the court that the plea was entered freely, understandingly, and voluntarily, without *680undue influence, compulsion or duress, and without promise of leniency.

From judgment committing defendant to the State Prison for a term of not less than eight nor more than ten years, defendant appealed. He is represented on appeal by counsel furnished by the State.

*Attorney General Morgan, by Associate Attorney Speas, for the State.*

*Reuben L. Moore, Jr., for defendant appellant.*

MORRIS, Judge.

Defendant’s counsel requests this Court to review the record to determine whether prejudicial error was committed at defendant’s trial. We have carefully reviewed the record and find no error. The bill of indictment was proper in form; the record affirmatively shows that the plea of guilty was freely, understandingly and voluntarily made; and the sentence imposed is within statutory limits. The judgment is

Affirmed.

Judges Brock and Parker concur.
<PAGE>


                                                                    EXHIBIT 23.1



            CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM



     We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration
Statements on Form S-8 (Nos. 33-38340, 33-38339, 33-63025, 333-83028, 333-91420,
333-122357) of RTI International Metals, Inc. of our report dated May 6, 2005,
except for the restatement described in Note 22 to the consolidated financial
statements and the matter described in the penultimate paragraph of Management's
Report on Internal Control Over Financial Reporting, as to which the date is
December 15, 2005 relating to the financial statements, financial statement
schedule, management's assessment of the effectiveness of internal control over
financial reporting and the effectiveness of internal control over financial
reporting, which appears in this Form 10-K/A, Amendment No. 2.


/s/ PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP

PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP


Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania


December 15, 2005
##### 



Exhibit 32.1 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 In connection with the Quarterly Report of Collegiate Funding Services, Inc. (the Company)
on Form 10-Q for the period ended March 31, 2005, as filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, J. Barry Morrow, Chief Executive Officer of the
Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that: 1. The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and 2. The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the
financial condition and results of operations of the Company. Date: May 09, 2005 By: /s/ J. Barry Morrow
J. Barry Morrow
Chief Executive Officer and President