[Cite as State v. Battles, 2021-Ohio-310.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO, : 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, : No. 109265 

 

 v. : 

 

LA’SHA BATTLES, : 

 

 Defendant-Appellant. : 

 

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED 

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: February 4, 2021 

 

Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas 

Case No. CR-18-634883-A 

 

Appearances: 

Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting 

Attorney, and Ashley Gilkerson, Assistant Prosecuting 

Attorney, for appellee. 

Paul W. Flowers Co., L.P.A., and Louis E. Grube, for 

appellant. 

SEAN C. GALLAGHER, P.J.: 

Defendant-appellant La’Sha Battles (“Battles”) appeals her 

conviction for felonious assault and aggravated menacing. Upon review, we affirm. 
Background 

On December 7, 2018, Battles was indicted for felonious assault in 

violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1), a felony of the second degree, and aggravated 

menacing in violation of R.C. 2903.21(A), a misdemeanor of the first degree. The 

charges arose from events occurring on or about June 24, 2017, during which Battles 

was alleged to have “knowingly caused serious physical harm to [the victim]” and to 

have “knowingly [caused the victim] to believe that [Battles would] cause serious 

physical harm to [the victim] or the property of [the victim].” Battles entered a plea 

of not guilty, and following discovery, the case proceeded to a jury trial. 

The testimony revealed that on the date of the incident, Battles was 

attempting to cash a check at a liquor store. The victim, who was the cashier and 

the store manager, doubted the validity of the check. After some discussion, the 

victim informed Battles that he could not cash the check. Battles took the check 

back, cursed at the victim, and struck the victim in the face with a pen, which left a 

mark under the victim’s left eye. 

Next, Battles began to run out of the store, the victim gave chase, 

Battles fell, and the two engaged in a scuffle, during which Battles shouted “I will 

show you,” cursed at the victim, and kicked him with her leg. The victim testified 

that Battles then threatened “I will send my men to finish with you” and left the 

scene. 

Five to seven minutes later, Battles’s brother and another man in a 

blue hoodie entered the store. The victim tried to explain what happened and 
showed the men the video footage of his encounter with Battles. As this was 

occurring, the man in the blue hoodie punched the victim in his face, the victim fell 

and hit his head on a shelf, and the victim blacked out and lost consciousness. When 

the victim regained consciousness, he was on the floor, his head and mouth were 

hurting, and he could not stand up. His coworkers helped him off the ground and 

onto a chair. He testified that he was “totally out of balance” and almost fell off the 

chair. The incident was captured on surveillance video, and the video was played at 

trial. 

The victim did not call the police or seek medical attention right away, 

and he finished working his shift. When a police officer entered the store, the victim 

explained what happened and the officer instructed him to make a medical report. 

The victim explained he did not understand how he could do that because he did not 

have medical insurance and was relatively new to the United States. 

The victim went to the hospital two days after the incident. The victim 

reported to the nurses that he was experiencing issues with balance and had a 

headache. The victim was diagnosed with a concussion and received discharge 

instructions. The victim testified that he was unable to drive for about eight to nine 

months, that he constantly had a light headache, and that he continued to have 

issues with balance and vision. He testified that he continued to work because he 

has a low income, and that he did not seek follow-up medical care because he did 

not have medical insurance. 
At the time of trial, the victim testified that his vision was still 

impacted, that he has a continuous light headache, and that if he moves quickly from 

side to side he loses his balance. The victim also pointed to a residual mark under 

his left eye where he was struck by the pen. The victim testified that Battles came 

back to the store two months after the incident occurred and told him “you didn’t 

learn.” 

The state proceeded against Battles on a theory of complicity on 

Count 1 for felonious assault. The jury returned a verdict of guilty on both counts. 

The trial court sentenced Battles to one and one-half years of community control on 

each count and advised Battles of the three years of mandatory postrelease control. 

The court ordered no contact with the victim and stated a violation could result in 

more restrictive sanctions or a prison term of two years. The court also ordered 

Battles to perform 50 hours of community service. Battles timely filed this appeal. 

While this appeal was pending, Battles’s probation was terminated. 

However, the appeal is not moot and Battles need not present evidence that she will 

suffer some collateral disability. See State v. Golston, 71 Ohio St.3d 224, 227, 643 

N.E.2d 109 (1994). As the Supreme Court of Ohio has recognized, “[t]he collateral 

legal consequences associated with a felony conviction are severe and obvious.” Id. 
Law and Analysis 

Battles raises three assignments of error for our review. Under her 

first assignment of error, Battles claims the trial court erred by failing to grant her 

motion for judgment of acquittal for the offense of felonious assault. 

A Crim.R. 29 motion for judgment of acquittal is governed by the 

same standard as the one for determining whether a verdict is supported by 

sufficient evidence. State v. Tenace, 109 Ohio St.3d 255, 2006-Ohio-2417, 847 

N.E.2d 386, ¶ 37. “The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a 

light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found 

the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. 

Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus. A 

challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence presents a question of law. See State v. 

Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). 

Battles was found guilty of felonious assault in violation of R.C. 

2903.11(A)(1) under a complicity theory. For felonious assault, R.C. 2903.11(A)(1) 

provides that “[n]o person shall knowingly * * * [c]ause serious physical harm to 

another * * *[.]” R.C. 2901.01(A)(5) defines “serious physical harm to persons” to 

include “(c) [a]ny physical harm that involves some permanent incapacity, whether 

partial or total, or that involves some temporary, substantial incapacity,” and “(e) 

[a]ny physical harm that involves acute pain of such duration as to result in 

substantial suffering or that involves any degree of prolonged or intractable pain.” 
Battles argues that the evidence at trial was not sufficient to sustain 

the jury’s finding that the victim suffered serious physical harm when he was 

assaulted by the man in the blue hoodie. Battles maintains that the mild concussion 

and physical symptoms experienced by the victim do not constitute serious physical 

harm and references selective evidence in the case. She states that the victim did 

not seek immediate medical attention and that evidence in the record demonstrates 

the victim was “well” and in “stable condition,” he was able to leave the hospital 

within mere hours, he was given over-the-counter medication, and he did not miss 

any work. However, upon our review of the entire record in this case, we find the 

state presented sufficient evidence to prove serious physical harm. 

The testimony and evidence showed that after the victim informed 

Battles he could not cash her check, Battles struck the victim in the face with a pen, 

cursed at the victim, and threatened the victim, stating she would “send my men to 

finish with you.” Within minutes, two men entered the store. While the victim was 

trying to clear up the matter by showing them the surveillance video, one of the men 

punched the victim in the face. The victim blacked out and lost consciousness; he 

was unable to get off the floor without assistance and was “totally out of balance”; 

he went to the hospital two days later; and he was diagnosed with a concussion. He 

testified that he experienced headaches and issues with balance; that he was unable 

to drive for eight or nine months; and that he was still having issues with headaches, 

eyesight, and balance at the time of trial. 
In State v. Clopton, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 95297, 2011-Ohio-2392, 

this court recognized that seeking medical treatment alone is not dispositive of 

serious physical harm. Id. at ¶ 16. Although “serious physical harm” may involve 

an injury or condition of such gravity as would normally require hospitalization, the 

facts must establish one of the factors in R.C. 2901.01(A)(5)(a)-(e), such as 

permanent incapacity, temporary substantial incapacity, acute pain of such duration 

as to result in substantial suffering, or any harm that results in prolonged pain. Id. 

at ¶ 12-14, citing R.C. 2901.01(A)(5)(c) and (e). 

Sufficient evidence of serious physical harm has been found under 

circumstances where the victim was knocked temporarily unconscious, the victim’s 

injuries were serious enough to cause the victim to seek medical treatment, and the 

victim suffered from persistent pain for months. See State v. Redman, 3d Dist. Allen 

No. 1-15-54, 2016-Ohio-860, ¶ 25-28. In State v. Davis, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 

81170, 2002-Ohio-7068, this court found the state presented sufficient evidence of 

serious physical harm where the victim suffered multiple punches and kicks to his 

head and face, his head hit a steel post, he suffered a concussion as well as scrapes 

and cuts, he sought medical treatment and remained at the hospital for several 

hours, and he had fits of vomiting and experienced headaches for several days. Id. 

at ¶ 6-8 and ¶ 22-23; see also State v. Rogers, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 105879, 2018-

Ohio-3495, ¶ 41-46 (finding sufficient evidence of serious physical harm where the 

victim sustained a concussion, headaches, and head trauma as a result of a blow to 

his head, and the victim testified that he received medical treatment for his injuries); 
In re E.B., 3d Dist. Auglaize No. 2-17-21, 2018-Ohio-1683, ¶ 22-23 (finding sufficient 

evidence of serious physical harm where the victim suffered prolonged periorbital 

pain and headaches, as well as a concussion); State v. Littlejohn, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga 

No. 95380, 2011-Ohio-2035, ¶ 22-23 (finding sufficient evidence of serious physical 

harm where a victim, who was punched and kicked by the defendant, became 

disoriented and experienced blurred vision, sought medical treatment, and suffered 

prolonged headaches). 

Although Battles argues that the victim in this case did not seek 

immediate medical attention, as determined by the First District Court of Appeals, 

“the fact that the victim does not seek medical treatment after an assault does not 

preclude a finding that the victim suffered serious physical harm.” Ohio v. Craig, 

1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-160816, 2020-Ohio-3103, ¶ 30 (finding the state presented 

sufficient evidence of serious physical harm where the victim was “knocked out” 

after being repeatedly head-butted, suffered a temporary loss of consciousness, and 

had a knot on her forehead that lasted for months); see also State v. Simpson, 8th 

Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107407, 2019-Ohio-2912 (finding sufficient evidence of serious 

physical harm where the victim, who did not seek immediate medical attention, had 

sustained a minor concussion, a minor neck sprain, and a back contusion). 

We also decline to draw a distinction in this matter as advocated by 

Battles.1 As this court has recognized, the degree of harm that constitutes “serious” 

 1 We do not find persuasive Battles’s arguments pertaining to Rogers and State v. 

Wyland, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 94463, 2011-Ohio-455. Neither case is inconsistent with 

the decision rendered herein. 
physical harm is not an exact science. State v. Mason, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 

109176, 2020-Ohio-4998, ¶ 11, citing State v. Montgomery, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 

102043, 2015-Ohio-2158, ¶ 11. The testimony and evidence in each case must be 

considered to determine whether sufficient evidence exists. 

The state was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 

Battles knowingly caused serious physical harm to another as that term is statutorily 

defined. Included in the statutory definition of “serious physical harm” is any 

physical harm that involves “some temporary, substantial incapacity,” R.C. 

2901.01(A)(5)(c), or that involves “acute pain of such duration [that results] in 

substantial suffering or that involves any degree of prolonged * * * pain.” R.C. 

2901.01(A)(5)(e). The Supreme Court of Ohio has determined that R.C. 

2901.01(A)(5)(e) provides “a precisely worded definition of ‘serious physical harm 

to persons’ * * *.” State v. McKnight, 107 Ohio St.3d 101, 2005-Ohio-6046, 837 

N.E.2d 315, ¶ 239. 

Upon our review, we find that the state presented sufficient evidence 

to prove that the victim suffered serious physical harm. Moreover, viewing the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could 

have found the essential elements of felonious assault proven beyond a reasonable 

doubt. We also find sufficient evidence was presented from which the jury could 

infer Battles was complicit in the felonious assault. The first assignment of error is 

overruled. 
Under her second assignment of error, Battles claims the verdict is 

against the manifest weight of the evidence on both counts. When reviewing a claim 

challenging the manifest weight of the evidence, the court, reviewing the entire 

record, must weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the 

credibility of witnesses, and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the 

evidence, the trier of fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage 

of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered. Thompkins, 

78 Ohio St.3d at 387, 678 N.E.2d 541, citing State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 

175, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist.1983). When a court of appeals concludes that a verdict 

is against the weight of the evidence, “the appellate court sits as the ‘thirteenth juror’ 

and disagrees with the factfinder’s resolution of the conflicting testimony.” Id. at 

388. “An appellate court’s disagreement with the jurors’ weighing of the evidence 

does not require the special deference accorded verdicts of acquittal.” Id. A 

judgment of conviction should be reversed as against the manifest weight of the 

evidence only in the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against 

the conviction. Id. at 387, citing Martin at 175. 

First, Battles claims that the weight of the evidence proves that the 

victim did not suffer “serious” physical harm and that the victim’s conduct in waiting 

to seek any medical testing, his treatment with over-the-counter medication, and his 

discharge papers reflect that the degree of his injuries was not serious within the 

meaning of R.C. 2901.01(A)(5). Our review of the entire record in this case reflects 

evidence establishing serious physical harm. After being punched, the victim 
blacked out and was unconscious. The victim testified that he experienced 

headaches and a loss of balance. He went to the hospital and was diagnosed with a 

concussion. He further testified that he was unable to drive for months and that he 

was still experiencing symptoms at the time of trial. This evidence demonstrates 

that the victim suffered serious physical harm under R.C. 2901.01(A)(5)(c) and/or 

(e), and we do not find the conviction for felonious assault to be against the manifest 

weight of the evidence. 

Second, Battles claims her conviction for complicity in the crime of 

felonious assault is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Battles argues the 

evidence suggests she was only angry with the victim when she left the store, she did 

not share the criminal intent of the principal offender, and the principal offender 

formed his intent while she was not present. In support of her argument, Battles 

states the man in the blue hoodie did not assault the victim immediately upon 

entering the store, the encounter started as a discussion, and the man did not act to 

harm the victim until he saw the surveillance video. “[An] accomplice’s criminal 

intent may be inferred, by direct or circumstantial evidence, and from the presence, 

companionship, and conduct of the accomplice both before and after the offense is 

committed.” State v. Shropshire, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 85063, 2005-Ohio-3588, 

¶ 15, citing State v. Nievas, 121 Ohio App.3d 451, 456-457, 700 N.E.2d 339 (8th 

Dist.1997). Our review of the entire record reflects the jury heard evidence that 

Battles struck the victim with a pen, cursed at the victim, kicked at the victim, and 

threatened, “Okay, I will show you. I will send my men to finish with you.” Within 
minutes, the appellant’s brother and the other man entered the store. The victim 

was struck while he was showing the surveillance video. The victim testified that a 

couple of months after the incident, Battles came back to the store and said to him 

“you didn’t learn.” Upon this evidence, the jury could infer that the men entered the 

store with the criminal intent to “knowingly” cause serious physical harm to the 

victim and that Battles shared the criminal intent. 

Third, Battles claims the state failed to prove the crime of aggravated 

menacing under R.C. 2903.21(A), which provides: “No person shall knowingly cause 

another to believe that the offender will cause serious physical harm to the person 

or the property of the other person * * *.” Pursuant to R.C. 2901.22(B), “[a] person 

acts knowingly, regardless of his purpose, when he is aware that his conduct will 

probably cause a certain result or will probably be of a certain nature.” Although the 

state is not required to show that the offender intended to carry out the threat to 

prove aggravated menacing, the state is required to show that the victim had a 

subjective belief of serious physical harm, which can be proven with circumstantial 

evidence. State v. Clemmons, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2020-01-004, 2020-Ohio5394, ¶ 33, citing State v. Landrum, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-150718, 2016-Ohio5666, ¶ 9. 

We recognize that the offense of aggravated menacing was alleged to 

have occurred on or about June 24, 2017, which is the date the victim refused to cash 

the check for Battles. Battles claims that the victim did not believe she would “cause 

serious physical harm” to him and did not take the threat seriously. She points to 
evidence showing the victim chased her out of his store, did not call the police, and 

returned to work. We are not persuaded by this argument. Our review shows that 

at the time of the threat, Battles had already struck the victim in the face with a pen, 

cursed at the victim, and kicked at the victim. The victim testified that Battles 

threatened that she would send her men to “finish” with him as she left the scene. 

Within minutes, two men associated with the victim entered the store. The victim 

attempted to explain what happened and to defend himself by showing the men the 

video footage of the encounter with Battles. When the surrounding circumstances 

are considered, the record supports a determination that Battles knowingly 

threatened to cause serious physical harm to the victim. Also, it can be reasonably 

inferred from the circumstances that the victim took the threat seriously, was 

concerned for his safety, and believed Battles would cause him serious physical 

harm. There is no indication in the case before us that the jury lost its way, and we 

do not find the conviction for aggravated menacing to be against the manifest weight 

of the evidence. 

The second assignment of error is overruled. 

Under her third assignment of error, Battles claims the trial court 

committed plain error and confused the jury by giving an incorrect and misleading 

jury instruction on the definition of complicity by including a conspiracy instruction. 

R.C. 2923.03(A), complicity, provides: 

No person, acting with the kind or culpability required for the 

commission of an offense shall do any of the following: 
(1) Solicit or procure another to commit the offense; 

(2) Aid or abet another in committing the offense; 

(3) Conspire with another to commit the offense in violation of section 

2923.01 of the Revised Code; 

(4) Cause an innocent or irresponsible person to commit the offense. 

Because felonious assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1) is not 

among the crimes enumerated in the conspiracy statute, R.C. 2923.01(A), Battles 

argues it was plain error to give an instruction on conspiracy. The jury instructions 

provided by the trial court provided in part: 

Complicity. The State of Ohio has presented a theory that the 

defendant acted in complicity with a principal offender in the 

commission of the felonious assault. A person who is complicit with 

another in the commission of a criminal offense is regarded as guilty as 

if she personally performed every act constituting the offense. This is 

true even if she did not personally perform every act constituting the 

offense or was not physically present at the time the offense was 

committed. 

Before you can find the defendant guilty of complicity in the 

commission of a felonious assault, you must find beyond a reasonable 

doubt that * * * the defendant solicited or procured another to commit 

the offense of felonious assault, or aided or abetted another in 

committing the offense of felonious assault, or conspired with another 

to commit the offense of felonious assault. 

The instructions proceeded to define “solicit,” “procure,” “aided or 

abetted,” and “conspiracy.” Battles made no objection to these jury instructions or 

to the inclusion of the instruction on conspiracy. “When a defendant fails to object 

to the jury instructions, she waives all but plain error.” State v. Owens, Slip Opinion 
No. 2020-Ohio-4616, ¶ 7, citing State v. Diar, 120 Ohio St.3d 460, 2008-Ohio-6266, 

900 N.E.2d 565, ¶ 127. 

Under Crim.R. 52(B), “plain errors or defects affecting substantial 

rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the court.” 

The Supreme Court of Ohio has recognized that a “plain error” is “‘an obvious defect 

in the trial proceedings,’” and that to qualify as “plain error,” the defect “‘must have 

affected “substantial rights,”’ which has been interpreted to mean that the error 

“‘must have affected the outcome of the trial.’” State v. Kirkland, 160 Ohio St.3d 

389, 2020-Ohio-4079, 157 N.E.3d 716, ¶ 72, quoting State v. Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d 

21, 27, 2002-Ohio-68, 759 N.E.2d 1240; see also State v. Hundley, Slip Opinion No. 

2020-Ohio-3775, ¶ 116.2 Further, “a defendant must ‘demonstrate a reasonable 

probability that the error resulted in prejudice.’” Kirkland at ¶ 72, quoting State v. 

Rogers, 143 Ohio St.3d 385, 2015-Ohio-2459, 38 N.E.3d 860, ¶ 22. 

We find that even if there was error in providing the instruction, it did 

not affect the substantial rights of Battles. Although the state concedes the 

conspiracy instruction does not apply in this case, it argues that the jury could have 

found Battles complicit in the felonious assault under other theories of complicity. 

A jury instruction is not to be judged in artificial isolation but must be viewed in the 

context of the overall charge. See State v. Price, 60 Ohio St.2d 136, 398 N.E.2d 772 

 2 We note that Battles takes issue with whether State v. Long, 53 Ohio St.2d 91, 

372 N.E.2d 804 (1978), continues to be good law in Ohio. We need not make that 

determination and apply the standard of plain error as recently pronounced by the 

Supreme Court of Ohio. 
(1979), paragraph four of the syllabus. In this case, the definition of conspiracy was 

read to the jury as part of the overall instruction on complicity, which encompasses 

several different theories, and the trial court also instructed the jury on the actual 

charge in the indictment for felonious assault. Under the facts presented at trial, it 

cannot be said that including the instruction on conspiracy affected the outcome of 

the case. Further, Battles has not demonstrated any reasonable probability that 

including the conspiracy language confused the jury or that this formed the basis of 

the jury’s decision on complicity. Accordingly, reversal is not warranted under the 

plain error standard of review. See Shropshire, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 85063, 

2005-Ohio-3588, at ¶ 27-31. The third assignment of error is overruled. 

Judgment affirmed. 

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed. 

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the 

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s 

conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case 

remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence. 
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

 

SEAN C. GALLAGHER, PRESIDING JUDGE 

ANITA LASTER MAYS, J., and 

EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR