[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 11-15627

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 9:10-cv-80631-KMW

JENNIFER DUNLOP,

as legal Representative of CWS, a minor,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant-Appellee.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

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(May 2, 2013)

Before TJOFLAT, CARNES, and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

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Jennifer Dunlop, as legal representative of her minor daughter CWS, appeals 

the district court’s order affirming the Commissioner’s denial of CWS’s 

application for supplemental security income benefits. Dunlop contends that the 

administrative law judge erred by finding that CWS was not disabled within the 

meaning of the Social Security Act.

CWS was born with a missing middle finger on her right hand and had

mental impairments that were characterized as separation anxiety and an 

adjustment disorder. Dunlop applied for supplemental security income benefits on 

behalf of CWS, but the application was denied. Dunlop requested a hearing before 

an ALJ, who found that CWS was not disabled and was not entitled to benefits. 

She then filed a complaint in federal district court, where a magistrate judge 

recommended affirming the ALJ’s decision. The district court adopted the 

magistrate judge’s report and recommendation. This is Dunlop’s appeal.1

 1 Dunlop initially filed a pro se appeal on behalf of her minor daughter CWS. We sua 

sponte entered a stay and ordered the parties to show cause why Dunlop, a non-lawyer, could 

appear before us in a representative capacity. After receiving the parties’ responses to the order 

to show cause, a single judge of this Court ordered the following issue to be carried with the 

case: “Whether this Circuit should, in cases involving a minor child’s claim for Supplemental 

Social Security disability benefits, recognize an exception to the general rule that a non-attorney 

parent may not represent a minor child in federal court.” In that same order, however, the single 

judge appointed counsel to represent Dunlop. That made the issue of whether Dunlop may 

proceed without counsel moot, and we therefore do not address it. See Al Najjar v. Ashcroft, 

273 F.3d 1330, 1336 (11th Cir. 2001) (“Any decision on the merits of a moot case or issue would 

be an impermissible advisory opinion.”) (quotation marks omitted).

As appointed counsel, Eric M. Cohen of Miami has performed admirably and rendered a 

service to appellant and to this Court.

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“We review the ALJ’s decision to determine if it is supported by substantial 

evidence and based on proper legal standards.” Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 

363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 

1439 (11th Cir. 1997)). “Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla and is such 

relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion.” Id. (quoting Lewis, 125 F.3d at1439).

To determine whether a minor child is disabled, the ALJ must follow a 

three-step sequential process, considering whether the child: (1) is engaged in 

“substantial gainful activity”; (2) has a medically determinable “severe” 

impairment or combination of impairments; and (3) has an impairment or 

combination of impairments that meets, medically equals, or functionally equals 

the severity of an impairment listed in the Code of Federal Regulations. 20 C.F.R. 

§ 416.924. The ALJ applied that three-step process, concluding that CWS had not 

engaged in substantial gainful activity, her impairments were “severe,” but her 

combination of impairments did not meet, medically equal, or functionally equal 

the severity of a listed impairment.

Dunlop contends that the ALJ erred by finding that: (1) CWS’s mental 

impairment was not medically equal to a listed impairment; and (2) CWS’s 

combination of impairments was not functionally equal to a listed impairment. As 

to the first contention, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination that 

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CWS’s mental impairment was not medically equal to a listed impairment. 

Various medical reports noted that CWS behaved appropriately for her age and 

two physicians concluded that her impairments, although severe, did not meet or 

medically equal the severity of a listed impairment. Dunlop points to the report of 

a social worker and a physician who conducted a mental health evaluation of CWS 

in support of her contention that the ALJ’s conclusion was erroneous. But the 

existence of evidence that is arguably inconsistent with the ALJ’s conclusion is not 

grounds for reversal. See Crawford, 363 F.3d at 1158–59 (“Even if the evidence 

preponderates against the ALJ’s decision, we must affirm the decision so long as it 

is supported by substantial evidence.”) 

As to Dunlop’s second contention, to determine whether CWS’s 

impairments functionally equal a listed impairment the ALJ must assess how CWS

functions in six “domains”: (1) acquiring and using information; (2) attending and 

completing tasks; (3) interacting and relating with others; (4) moving about and 

manipulating objects; (5) caring for self; and (6) health and physical well-being. 

20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(b)(1). The ALJ evaluated the six domains and concluded 

that CWS had “no limitation” in four of them and “a less than marked limitation”

in two of them: (1) moving about and manipulating objects; and (2) health and 

physical well-being. 

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Dunlop contends that the ALJ erred by failing to conclude that CWS had 

“marked” or “extreme” limitations in four of the domains: (1) attending and 

completing tasks; (2) moving about and manipulating objects; (3) caring for self; 

and (4) health and physical well-being. In support of her contention, Dunlop 

points to statements in medical reports and assessments by CWS’s teachers that 

she claims suggest that CWS actually had significant limitations in those four 

domains. The ALJ’s conclusion, however, is supported by substantial evidence 

that showed that CWS’s mental impairments did not prevent her from functioning 

similarly to a normal child of her age and that despite the physical limitations of 

her right hand, she was able to use her left hand to perform most of the functions 

that an unimpaired child of her age is able to perform.2

Regardless of the evidence that might suggest that CWS’s impairments were 

more severe than the ALJ concluded, the record as a whole contains sufficient

evidence for a reasonable person to accept the ALJ’s conclusion that CWS’s 

impairments did not meet, medically equal, or functionally equal a listed 

 2 Dunlop also contends that CWS’s hand impairment functionally equals a listed 

impairment because it is a “condition that is disabling at the time of onset, requiring continuing 

surgical management within 12 months as a life-saving measure or for salvage or restoration of 

function, and such major function is not restored or is not expected to be restored within 12 

months after onset of this condition.” See 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(m)(2) (giving examples of 

impairments that functionally equal the listed impairments). That contention is not supported by 

the record because although CWS’s surgeries improved the function of her right hand, there is no 

evidence that surgery was required to restore function.

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impairment. Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision and 

we affirm. See Crawford, 363 F.3d at 1158–59.

AFFIRMED.

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