### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON SE PT E MB E R 1 8, 200 6 S es sio n
OPA L JEA N WO ODR UF F, by and t hrough t he Gu ardian of HerEstate, Nat io na l Ba nk

of Co m m erce v. W . C. SUTTON, J R., ET AL 

### .
Direc t Appeal from the Chancer y Court for Shelby Cou nty No. CH-02-2281- 3 D. J. Alissand ratos, Chancellor

No. W2006-00434-C OA-R3-C V - F iled Dece m ber 20, 2006

I n 1997, an Arka nsas state court adjudg ed the plaintiff/war d to be incapa citated a nd appointed a bank to be the conse rvator of

her e state. The c onservator bank, a cting on the behalf of t he inca pacitate d plaintiff/war d, filed a c omplaint in 2002 against the defendants. The plaintiff soug ht to se t aside a quit claim deed f

or prope rty

located in Shelby County , Tenne ssee. The plaintiff/war d had executed the dee d in 1996 and transf err ed title for t h e p ro p erty to the defe ndants. The c o-def endant ba nk, which had obta ined an inter est in the property throug h the defendants in 2002 but was not named a s a def endant in the c omplaint, answere d th e co mplaint in 2003 and moved for a dismiss al. The plaintiff soug ht to amend the complaint and name the bank a s a co- defe ndant. The c o-def endant bank moved to strike the amende d complaint. The orig inally named de fendants filed an answ er later in 2003, and in 2004 they moved for dismissal based upon the statute of limitations. I n 2005, the defe ndants moved for

a dismissal based upon their origina l defe nses and f or the plaintiff’ s failure to p ro se c ute the c omp la int . T he plaint if f s e t a trial dat e in the c ha nc e ry c ou rt , a ndthe de fe nd a nts
mov e d to strike the tr ia l date

. Th e tr ia l c ou rt he ld a he ari ng on the de fe nd a nts ’ m oti on s to dis mis s and g rante d the def

endants’ motion for dismi ssal with prejudice for f ailure to prose cute. The plaintiff moved for

rec onsideration of the judgmen t , and the tria l court denie d the motion. The plaint if f f ile d a ti me ly

no tic e of app e a l to thi s Co urt. We re ve rs e a ndre ma ndfo r f urthe r p ro c e e din g s.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 ; A ppe al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt of t he Cha nc e r y C our t R e ve r se d and Rem anded

A L AN E. H I G H ERS , J. , d e li v e r e d th e o p in io n o f th e c o u r t, in w h ic h W. F RAN K C RAW FORD , P.J ., W.S ., and D AVI D R. F ARMER , J ., joined.

Brian F. Walhart, of West Memphis, Arkansas, Steven M. Ma rkowitz, of Memphis, T ennesse e, and Rob e rt C. B a nk s, Jr., of

Wes t Me mph is, Ar

ka ns a s, fo r the Ap pe lla nt.

L awr ence W. Kelly , of Atlanta, G eorg ia, for the Appellee , J

. P. Morg an Chase Bank, Trustee , and L ee S. Saunder s, Somerville, TN, for A ppellee W. C. Sutt on, J r.A t t he t i me of M r

. W oo dru f

f ’ s deat h, hi s ne phew W

. C

. Sut t on, Jr

. an d Sut t on ’ s w i fe St ephan i e, 1
A pp el l ees , ha d been re nt i ng t he propert y

. Af t er t he Sut t ons r ece i ved t he propert y , t hey obt ai ned a l i ne of cr edi t i n M ay
o f 1 9 9 7 w ith E n te rp rise N a tio n a l B a n k (“E n te rp rise ” ) th a t wa s se c u re d b y a d e e d o f t ru st o n the p ro p e rty.

T hi s co m p l ai nt was app arent l y t he re- f i l i ng of a p revi o us co m p l ai nt whi c h h a d be en f i l ed i n t he 2
ch a n c e r y c o u r t o f

t he H o no rab l e W alt er L

. E va ns in 1 9 9 8 ag ainst t he S utt o ns an d E nterp ris e. T his pre vio us ca se i nv ol ved di f

fer ent at t orn ey s t han t hos e i nv ol ved i n t he pres ent cas e, wi t h t he exc ept i on of M r

. Saun ders , wh o cont i nu es t o re pres ent t he Sut t ons

. T he r ecor d of t hi s prev i ous cas e i s not before t hi s Co ur t on appeal , howev er , t he procedur al devel op ment s f

r om t hat cas e a pp ear t o be s t i pul at ed by t he part i es as fol l ows: Chanc el l or Evan s en t er ed an order d ism issin g the a c tio n fo r fa ilure to p ro se c u te o n D e c e m b e r 7 , 2 0 0 1 ; o n S e p te m b e r 1 9 , 2 0 0 2 , A p p e llan t’s ne w a tto rn e ys M r. Jackson and M r. M arkow i t z f i l ed a m o t i o n t o s et asi d e t he judgm ent ; and o n D ecem b er 3, 2 0 0 2 , C hancell o r E vans
e n te re d a c o n se n t o rd e r w h ic h m o d ifi e d the 2 0 0 1 o rd e r to re flec t t h a t t h e d ism issa l wa s w itho u t p re ju d ic e

. -2- OP IN ION

I. F ACT S AND P R OC EDU R A L H I S T ORY

This is an appea l from the dismissal, for fa ilure to prosec ute, of an action to set aside a deed fo r r e a l pr op e rty

in S he lby

Cou nty , T e nn e ssee, whe re the plaint if f s e t a tr ia l date , a

pp e are d at a hearing f or the de fendants’ motion to di smiss, and claimed to be re ady for tria l at the time of dismiss al. The unde rly ing pr ocedur al fa cts of this case are leng thy , but integr al to our re view on appea l. Plainti ff Opa l J ean Woodruff (“A ppellant” or “Mrs. W oodruff ”), a reside nt of Crittenden C o u n t y, A rk a n s a s , w a s a d j u d g e d t o b e i n c ap a c i t a t e d b y t h e P r o b a t e C o u r to f C r i t t e n d e n C o u n t y, Arka nsas on J anuary

22, 1997. That court appointed the Bank of West Memphis as the g uardia n of Appe l l an t ’s es t at e, an d co -p l ai n t i ff Na t i o n al Ba n k

o f C o m m er ce (“ Ap p el l an t ”) b ec am e t h e s u ccessor to this guar dianship.

Def endants W.C. Sut ton, J r., and St ephanie Sutton (“Appellee s” or “ the Suttons”) obtained

rea l p r o p e r ty lo c a te d in Sh e lb y Co u n ty , T e n n e s s e e , f r o m M r s

. Wo o d ru f

f b y q u it c laim d e e d on September 18, 1996, prior to the adjudication of incapa city

. At the time of transfe r, Mrs. Woodruff had bee n the s ole owner of t his property as t he surviving t enant by the entire ty

since he r husband, Billy J

. Woodruff (“ Mr. Woodruff” ), died in 1995. I n Marc h of 2002, the Suttons secure d a loan 1 fr om B art le tt M ortg a g e , Inc . w itha de e d o f t ru st o n th e pr op e rt y , w ho the n ass ig ne d the int e re st t o the c o- de fe nd a nt J.P. Mo rg a n Ch a se B a nk (“ J.P. M or g a n” or

c oll e c tiv e ly , w ith the Sut ton s, “Appe llees”)

. Appellant filed a

complaint ag ains t the Suttons on Decembe r 5, 2002, see king to se t aside the qu it claim d e e d f

ro m Mr s. Woo dr

uf f t o th e Sut ton s, a nda lte rn a tiv e ly se e kin g mon e y

da ma g e s. 2 Appellant alleg ed that Mrs. W oodruff had been i ncapa citated at the t ime of ex ecution of the deed,

a ndthat th e Sutto ns had been a wa re of thi s f a c t a ndus e d it

to the ir a dv a nta g e in f

ra ud ule ntl y obtaining the property

from her. The complaint also alleg ed that any further interest conve y ed by the Suttons on t he prope rty was void or voidable . Appar ently , sever al month s p as s ed bef ore Appellant obtained suc cessf ul service up on the Suttons. However, on May 8, 2003, J .P. Morgan filed an a nswer t o t h e complaint, despite its not having be en name d as a de fendant. On May 23,T h i s me t h od of s et t i n g t r i al i s pe r mi t t ed by l oca l Rul e 13, Rul es of t h e Cha n ce r y Cour t of Sh el by 3
C o u n ty.
-3- Ap pe lla nt f

ile d a n a me nd e d c omp la int a dd ing J.P. M or g a n a s a

de fe nd a nt. On J un e 6, 20 03 , J.P. Mo rg a n f ile d a mot ionto s tr ike th e ame nd ed c omp la int be c a us e Ap pe lla nt h a d n ot o btaine d it s
c o n s e n t o r

le a v e o f th e tria l c o urt. On J u n e 1 7 , Appellant filed a motion in response, stating that beca use ser vice ha d still not been a chieve d with reg ard to the Suttons, it had been fre e to amend the complaint without leave of the trial court . Alternatively , Appellant re quested that the amended complaint be treated as a motion to amend the origina l complaint. I n its response Appe llant further

re qu e ste d a

c on tin ua nc e of

the he ari ng date se t by

J.P. M or g a n. Ap pa

re ntl y , n e ith e r p art y

re se t th e se motions for hearing, and they wer e neve r ruled upon by the trial court.

On Octobe r 17, 2003, the Suttons finally filed an a nswer to the c omplaint. On May 21, 2004, the Suttons filed a mot ion to dismiss and supporting m emora ndum on the basis of t he running of the applicable statute of li mitations. P laintiff filed a response on J uly

7, disputing the Suttons’ assertions of wh ic h s ta tut e of li mi tat io ns ap pli e d, a ndfu rthe r a rg uin g that Mr s. Woo dr

uf fs ’s inc apa c ity

e ff e c tiv e ly tol le d a ny

su c h ti me re stric tio ns . O n Au gust 1, 2 00 5, J.P. M or g a n f ile d a mot ionto dismiss Appellant’s a ction for f ailure to state a

claim, running of the statute of l i m i t at ions, and failure to prosecute , and the Suttons filed a simil ar moti on. On Aug ust 3, Appellant filed a r esponse, decla ring itself rea dy for trial and reque sting a trial setting. The rec ord ref lects that d ef

en d ant S t ep h an i e S u t t o n d i ed o n Au gu s t1 6 , 2 0 0 5

. On S ep t em b er1 6 , J

. P

. M o rga n fi l ed a n o t i ce o f h ea ri n g, to be held on Nove mber 4, 2005, on the pending motions to dismiss

. There afte r, Appellant set the

case for tria l on November 28, 2005, by putting it on the “Te n Day Rule” Doc ket, and the c ourt cler k notified the attorne y s for a ll parties of this trial date. J .P. Morgan and W.C. S utton, J r., (“ Sutton”) 3 filed a motion to strike the t rial date “on the g rounds t hat t he case [ was] not rea dy for tria l,” citing the pe nd ing 20 03 mot ion s re la te d to App e lla nt’ s ame nd e d co mpl a int a ndJ.P. M or g a n’ s mo tio n to strike said complaint. J.P . Morg an filed a notice of hearing for the motion to st rike the tria l date for November

18, 2005. Appellant filed a response , once a g ain dec laring itself rea dy for tria l.

On No ve mbe r 1 8, 20 05 , th e Ho no ra ble D. J. Al iss a nd ratos helda he ari ng on Ap pe lle e s’ motion to dismiss for failure to prosec ute. The court g rante d Appellee s’ m otion in an order filed on Dec emb e r

2 , 2 0 0 5 , f

in d in g “ th a t th e Pl a in ti f

f [h a d ] n o t d il ig e n tl y

p r o s e c u te d th is c a s e a n d that De fe nd a nts [ha d] be e n pr e jud ic e d by the Pla int if

f’ s failu re .” Th e c ou rt or de r state d th a t th e c la ims of Appe llant were there by dismiss ed with pre

judice. Appe llant arg ued a motion to rec onsider and to alter or va cate this judgment on January 6, 2006, which the t ri al court denied in an or der on J anuary 25. Appellant filed a

no tice of a

ppeal to this Court on Febr uary 13, 2006. On Marc h 31, 20 06 , th e tr ia l c ou rt

he ld a hear ing on Ap pe lle e Sut ton ’s mot ionto s up ple me nt the re c or d w ith d o c u me n ts a n d tr a n s c r ip ts f r o m th e f ir s t c a s e th a t h a d b e e n d is mi s s e d w ith o u t p r e ju d ic e in 2002 (Case N o. CH 98-0617-1, he reina fter “first case”) , but denied the motion in an orde r on May 1, 2006.-4- II. I SS U E P R ESENTED
On appe al, Appellant pr esents the f ollowing issue f

or re view:

Whether the trial c ourt abused its discretion in dismiss ing the action for failure to prosecute pursuant to Tennesse e Rule of Civil Procedure 41.02.

For the following rea sons, we re verse and re mand for f urther pr ocee dings.

III

. S TA N D A R D O F R EVIEW

We review a trial c ourt’s dec ision to di smiss fo r fa ilure to prosec ute under an abuse of discretion standa

rd. Townsend S ci. Trust v. Food Tech. I nvestors, L.P. , No. W2005-00835-COA-R3-CV, 2006 T enn. App. L EXI S 17, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 11, 2006) (c i t i n g Gen. Transp. Servs. v. Wilson , 1985 Tenn. App. L EXI S 3395, at *16 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar

. 22, 1985). “A trial court a buses its discretion only when it ‘applies an incorre ct leg al standar d, or

re a c he s a de c isi on wh ic h is a g a ins t lo g ic or re a so nin g that caus es an injus tic e to the pa rt y complaining .’” E l

d ridge v. Eldrige
, 4 2 S

. W

. 3 d 8 2 , 8 5 (T en n

. 2 0 0 1 ) ( q u o t i n g State v. Shirley , 6 S.W .3d 243, 247 (Tenn. 1999) ). The abuse of discretion st andar d does not permit the appe llate court to merely substitut e its judgme nt for that of the trial court. See id.
Finding s of fa ct made by a court sitti ng without a jury are revie wed unde r a de novo standard of re view upon the record with a pre sumption of corre ctness for those finding s. Dennis Josli n Co., LLC v. Johnson
, 1 3 8 S

. W

. 3 d 1 9 7 , 2 0 0 (T en n

. C t

. Ap p

. 2 0 0 3 ) ( ci t i n g T EN N

. R. A PP

. P. 13(d))

. Conclusions of law made by the trial court a re re v i ew ed de novo upon the re cord w ith no presumption of cor

rec tness. Id. (c i t i n g Union Carbide Corp. v . Hu d d les ton , 854 S.W .2d 87, 91 (Tenn. 1993) ).

IV. D I S CUS S I ON

The Te nnessee Rules of Civil P roce dure provide: “F or failure of the pla intiff to prosecute or to comply with these rules or

any order of the c ourt, a de fendant may move for dismissal of an a ction or of any claim ag ainst the defe ndant.” T EN N

. R. C IV

. P. 41.02 (1) ( 2006). A dismissal for fa ilure t o p ro s ec u t e o p er at es as an ad j u d i ca t i o n u p o n t h e m erits. T ho mps on v. Dickerson , No. 02A01-9702- C V- 0 0 0 3 4 , 1 9 9 7 T en n

. Ap p

. LE XIS 5 4 7 , at * 5 (c i t i n g T EN N

. R. C IV

. P. 41 .0 2 ( 3) ). “ Tria l c ou rt s po sse ss i nh e re nt, c omm on -l a w auth ority to co ntr ol the ir do c ke ts andthe pr oc e e din g s in the ir c ou rt s. Th e ir auth ority is qu it e br oa d andinc lud e s th e e xpre ss a uth ority to d ism iss c a se s f

or failu re to prosec ute or to comply

with the Tenne ssee Rules of Civil Procedure or the orde rs of the c ourt.” Hod ge s v . T e nn. A tto rne

y Ge n. , 43 S.W .3d 918, 921 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000). B eca use a tria l court’s decision to dismiss for failure to prosecute is discre tionary , we r eview suc h a dec ision to determine whether the trial court “ac ted unre asonably , arbitra rily , or unconsc ionably .” Id.A t t he N ovemb er 18, 200 5 hea r i ng on A pp el l ees ’ mo t i on t o di s mi s s , couns el for App el l ant r epre s ent ed 4

t o t he t r i al cour t t hat J. P

. M o rgan’ s pendi ng mo t i on t o s t r i ke t he amended com pl ai nt was s et t o be hea r d on t hat dat e. T hi s set t i ng i s no t ref

l ect ed i n t he t echni cal record

. A d d i t i o nal l y , t he t ri a l c o u rt d id not rul e o n t hat m o t i o n at t he N o v e m b e r 1 8 he a rin g

. -5- After Appellee s filed a motion to dism iss for fa ilure to prosec ute in Aug ust of 2005, Ap pe lla nt r e sp on de d s ta tin g its re a din e ss fo r tr ia l and re qu e sti ng a tr ia l date . A pp e lla nt l a te r s e t a trial date on the “Te n Day Rule” Docke t f or November 28, 2005, pursuant to local r ules. Appellee s filed a motion to strike the trial date beca use they believed that the case was not ready for tria l, citing the unre solved motion reg arding the 2003 amendme nt to App el lant’s complaint. I n their brief on appea l, A ppellees contend that the case was not “ proce durally ” rea dy for trial at this ti me. Howeve r thi s a pp a rent pro cedur a l is su e re la te d to J.P. M or g a n’ s mo tio n to strike the a me nd e d c omp la int , which appa

rently had neve r bee n rese t for hea ring in two y ear s by

either pa rty , could likely

have 4 be e n d e a lt w ithby

the tr ia l c ou rt

a t e ith e r the No ve mber 1 8, 20 05 he ari ng or on the tr ia l date
orig ina lly se t f or No ve mbe r 2 8, 20 05 . We se e no re a so n why J.P. M or g a n’ s p e rc e pti on that th e c a se
wa s n ot p ro c e du ra lly

re a dy fo r tria l shou ld be a ttribu te d to App e lla nt an d ef fe c tiv e ly us e d a s a ba sis for dismissing its complaint with prejudice . I f J.P . Morg an had truly wished to r ece ive a ruling on the 20 03 mot ion , it

c ou ld h a ve re sc he du le d th e he ari ng s a ft e r A pp e lla nt a sk e d f or a c on tin ua nc e in J une of 2003. Appellant was not obligated t o set these mot ions for J .P. Morg an, particularly since it arg ued in its response that it believe d leave o f court had not been ne cessa ry to file the ame nded complaint naming J .P. Morgan as a pa rty

.
We furth e r

c o n c lu d e th a t at th e d is mi s s a l h e ar in g o n N o v e mb e r 1 8 , 2 0 0 5 , th e tria l c ourt place d improper e mphasis on the earlier dismissal of Appellant’s fir st case, w hich had be en modified throug h a conse nt order in 2002 by Chance llor Evans to be without prejudice . At the J anuary 6, 20 06 he ari ng , co un se l for bo th Sutt on a nd J.P. Mor g a n r e fe rr e d n ume ro us tim e s to the fi rs t c a se in support of their c ontention that Appellant had not dilige ntly prosec uted this case. In its ruling from the bench, the court denied Appellant’s motion to rec onsider the dismiss al for failure to prosecute , statin g :

The Court finds that this matter, when y ou g et down to it, including

t he other c ase b e c au s e t h i s i s m e r e l y t h e r e

- f i l i n g o f a p r i o r c a se , is exceeding ly

old and has not bee n diligently prosec uted. The Court finds that there h as b een g ross neg lige nce by the conse rvator on behalf o f th e w ar d inth is matt e r

to d il ig e n tl y

p r o s e c u te th is matt e r. The Court finds as a

result of that that ther e has be en a subst antial prejudice to both of these defenda nts as t hey have articulate d and the Court understands a nd ag ree s.

We do not believe that it was a ppropriate for the trial court to conside r the a ctions that may or may not have be en take n by

a diffe rent attorney

in the previous ca se, which w as ultimately dismiss ed wi tho ut p re

jud ic e , inits de te rm inatio n of the su ff ic ie nc y of e ff

orts e xerte d b y

pr e se nt c ou ns e l in thi s
case

.-6-

Furthermore , the trial court focused he avily on supposed pre

jud i ce suffe red by

Appellee s t h ro u gh Ap p el l an t ’s fa i l u re t o s et an ea rl i er tri al d at e. W e di s agr ee wi t h t h e tr i al c o u r t ’ s fi n d i n gs reg arding any prejudice Appellee s may have suffe red in the ir discovery beca use of a ny

fault on the behalf of Appe llant. Mrs. Sutt on died i n Aug ust of 2005, but it is unclea r whe ther she w as a material witness to Appellees’ defe nse of the c laims ag ainst them. I n addition, both parties ha ve stipulated that Appellant took Mrs. Sutton’s deposition in 1999 during the first case

. Although it is corr ect that counsel for

J .P. Morgan was ne ither pre sent at that deposition, nor eve n a party to litig ation at that tim e , Mrs . Sutto n’ s death did no t occ ur un til ov e r two y e ars a ft e r J.P. Mo rg a n h a d f ile d a re sp on se to Appellant’s re-f

i l ed compl aint in 2002. The tec hnical re cord r efle cts this finding, but the trial court found othe rwise at the J anuary 6, 2006 hearing on A ppellant’s motion to reconsider :

But I do know that one of

the def endants is dea d, that one of the de fe nd an ts ha s no t ha d a n o

pp or tun ity be c au se the

y we re brou gh t in after the death of that defendant to defend this litigat ion , that one of the def endants, J.P . Morg an, has be en broug ht into thi s liti g ation as

a re sult of frankly

what wa s not a properly

prosec uted initial case.
Gentlemen, I

hate it, but I ’ve just g ot to call it the way I see it. And there fore , I

do fi n d t h at there has bee n a substantial pre judice that cannot be undone.
(empha sis added). O ur re view of the technica l rec ord pre ponderates ag ainst this finding by the trial court. J.P . Morg an had an opportunity , had they wi s h ed t o do so, to depose Mrs. Sutton from the time they filed an answer to the c omplaint in May of 2003 to Mrs. Sutton’s death in Aug ust of 2005. We find th a t a n y in it ia l d e lay b y A p p e ll a n t in s e tt in g a tria l d a te d u r in g th is p e r iod w as not prejudicia l to Appellees, but, a s Appellant maintains, in f act provided Appellee s an ample period of t i m e i n w h i c h t o c o n d u c tt h e i r o w n d i s c o v e r y.

Th e c a se s c ite d b y

Ap pe lle e s in su pp ort of the jud g me nt be low are dis tin g uis ha ble fr om this

case . I n Os ag ie v . P

e ak loa d T e mp. Se rv s. , 91 S.W .3d 326 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002), the pro se plaintiff appea red at court on the date set for trial and a sked for

a continuanc e. Os ag ie , 91 S.W .3d at 328. The trial c ourt denied the continuance and re quired the plaintiff to proc eed w ith his case or suf fer a dismissal. Id. The plainti ff refuse d to proce ed, and the trial court dismissed his claims. Id. On appea l, the Middle Section of the Te nnessee Court of Appeals aff irmed, finding t hat t he trial c ourt d idn o t a b u s e it s d is c r e ti on. Id. at 329. I n Hod ge s v . T e nn. A tto rne

y Ge n. , 43 S.W .3d 918, 921 (T e nn

. Ct. Ap p. 20 00 ), the tr ia l c ou rt dis mis se d a pr o se plaint if f’ s c omp la int fo r failu re to p ro se c ute when the pla intiff failed to provide summonses and copies of the complaints to the cler k and master for se rvice on the def

endants within eleve n months of fi l i n g t h e co m plaint. When the plaintiff offe red no e x cuse for the delay on appea l, the appellate court simil arly aff irmed the dismiss al by

the trial court. Id. at 921.

I n the ca se at ba

r, Appellant was not allowe d the opportunity to proce ed to trial on Nove mber 28 , 2 00 5. Th e he ari ng a t wh ic h the tr ia l c ou rt de c ide d to dis mis s the c la ims fo r f a ilu re to p ro se c ute-7-

occur red on N ovember

18, 2005, ten d ay s b ef o re the trial date se t by

Appellant. Appe llant repe atedly

st at ed i t s re adiness to proc eed at this t ime, and in fa ct, Appellee s were the parties who claimed that the case was not r eady for trial. Appellant filed timely response s to the motions fil ed by J.P. M or g a n a nd

the Sut ton s, a nd wa s in full c omp lia nc e wi th any or de rs iss ue d b y

the tr ia l c ou rt

. W e t h er efor e disag ree with Appellees’ contentions that the ca se law r equire s us to affirm the judgme nt of the court below.

V. C ONCL US I ON The judg ment of the trial c ourt is reve rsed, a nd the ca se is rema nded to the trial c ourt for fu rthe r p ro c e e din g s. Cos ts a re a sse sse d a g a ins t A pp e lle e s, J.P. M or g a n Ch a se B a nk a ndW.C. Sutton, J r., for

which execution may

issue if nec essary

.

___________________________________ ALAN E. HI GHERS, J UDGE