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Filed 6/4/15 P. v. Dollar CA3 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED 

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT 

(Butte) 

---- 

THE PEOPLE, 

 Plaintiff and Respondent, 

 v. 

MICHAEL LESLIE DOLLAR, 

 Defendant and Appellant. 

C076426 

(Super. Ct. No. CM038932) 

 Defendant Michael Leslie Dollar pleaded no contest to voluntary manslaughter of 

his 16-month-old son (Pen. Code, § 192, subd. (a))1 and was sentenced to 11 years in 

state prison. At the time of sentencing, the trial court issued a criminal protective order 

pursuant to section 136.2 prohibiting defendant from contacting the victim’s mother and 

half siblings for a period of 10 years. 

 

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. 
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 Defendant’s sole contention on appeal is that the trial court lacked authority to 

impose the protective order. The People concede the error. We agree that the protective 

order was issued in error as the court lacked authority to impose it. Accordingly, we will 

order the protective order stricken. 

BACKGROUND 

 On November 11, 2010, Oroville Police officers were dispatched to the Oroville 

Medical Center regarding Deagan Jackson, a 16-month-old toddler who had sustained 

“severe head trauma,” including “multiple skull fractures, subdural hematoma, and brain 

swelling.” Upon arrival, officers encountered Deagan’s mother, Sabrina, who was 

visibly upset and concerned for her child. Sabrina explained that she had full custody of 

her son, but the child had been visiting his father, defendant, at the time he was injured. 

 Officers also met with defendant, who was “calm and relaxed” and had an “odor 

of marijuana emit[ing] from [his] person.” Officers observed defendant talking on the 

phone in the hospital waiting room and “laughing several times during the conversation.” 

 Deagan was transported by life flight to the UC Davis Medical Center, where he 

died. An autopsy determined that Deagan died from “craniocerebral injuries, due to 

massive blunt force trauma to the head.” 

 On August 7, 2013, an information was filed charging defendant with one count of 

assault on a child causing death. (§ 273ab, subd. (a); count 1.) On January 22, 2014, the 

information was amended to add one count of voluntary manslaughter. (§ 192, subd. (a); 

count 2.) That same day, defendant entered a plea of no contest to count 2, and count 1 

was dismissed on the People’s motion. 

 On March 26, 2014, the trial court denied probation and sentenced defendant to 

state prison for the upper term of 11 years. At the time of sentencing, the trial court also 

imposed a protective order prohibiting defendant from having any contact with Deagan’s 

mother, Sabrina, and his two half siblings, M. and K., for a period of 10 years. The 

protective order was made pursuant to Judicial Council form CR-160 (rev. Jan. 1, 2009), 
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which refers to sections 136.2, 1203.097, subd. (a)(2), 273.5, subd. (i), and 646.9, 

subd. (k) in its title. The trial court did not mark any of the boxes indicating the statutory 

authority for the order. However, the trial court’s minute order of the sentencing hearing, 

and the trial judge’s comments from the bench, indicate that the protective order was 

entered pursuant to section 136.2. 

 Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. 

DISCUSSION 

 On appeal, defendant contends, and the People concede, that the protective order 

was unauthorized and must be stricken. We agree with the parties. 

 Section 136.2 primarily authorizes trial courts to issue prejudgment restraining 

orders to protect victims and witnesses during the pendency of the criminal action in 

which they are issued. (People v. Ponce (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 378, 383; People v. 

Stone (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 153, 159.) Effective January 1, 2012, however, a new 

subdivision, subdivision (i), was added to section 136.2. In 2014, when defendant was 

sentenced, section 136.2 required trial courts to consider the issuance of postjudgment

protective orders “[i]n all cases in which a criminal defendant has been convicted of a 

crime of domestic violence as defined in Section 13700 . . . .” (§ 136.2, subd. (i)(1).) 

“Domestic violence” is defined in section 13700 as “abuse committed against . . . a 

spouse, former spouse, cohabitant, former cohabitant, or person with whom the suspect 

has had a child or is having or has had a dating or engagement relationship.” (§ 13700, 

subd. (b).) “Abuse” is defined as “intentionally or recklessly causing or attempting to 

cause bodily injury, or placing another person in reasonable apprehension of imminent 

serious bodily injury to himself or herself, or another.” (§ 13700, subd. (a).) 

 Here, defendant was convicted by plea of voluntary manslaughter of 16-month-old 

Deagan Jackson. Deagan was defendant’s son, not “a spouse, former spouse, cohabitant, 

former cohabitant, or person with whom [defendant] has had a child or is having or has 

had a dating or engagement relationship.” Therefore, defendant was not convicted of a 
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crime of domestic violence within the meaning of section 13700, and the protective order 

pursuant to section 136.2, subdivision (i)(1) was unauthorized. 

DISPOSITION 

The judgment is modified to strike the protective order; as modified, the judgment 

is affirmed. The trial court shall prepare an amended abstract of judgment reflecting this 

modification and forward a certified copy of the amended abstract to the Department of 

Corrections and Rehabilitation. 

 RAYE , P. J. 

We concur: 

 DUARTE , J. 

 HOCH , J.