United States Department of Labor

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

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C.M., Appellant

and

U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, POST OFFICE, 

Charlotte, NC, Employer

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Docket No. 18-1166

Issued: July 9, 2019

Appearances: Case Submitted on the Record

Appellant, pro se

Office of Solicitor, for the Director

DECISION AND ORDER

Before:

CHRISTOPHER J. GODFREY, Chief Judge

JANICE B. ASKIN, Judge

VALERIE D. EVANS-HARRELL, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION

On May 22, 2018 appellant filed a timely appeal from a March 20, 2018 merit decision of 

the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). Pursuant to the Federal Employees’

Compensation Act1(FECA) and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the Board has jurisdiction over 

the merits of this case.

ISSUE

The issue is whether appellant met her burden of proof to establish that her emotional 

condition is causally related to the accepted August 31, 2017 employment incident.

FACTUAL HISTORY

On September 6, 2017 appellant, then a 47-year-old mail carrier, filed a traumatic injury 

claim (Form CA-1) alleging that on August 31, 2017 she sustained an emotional condition post-

 

1 5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.
2

traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) as a result of hearing her coworker being shot while she was on 

the telephone with him while in the performance of duty. She stopped work on September 2, 2017. 

In a handwritten statement, appellant described that on August 31, 2017 she was on the 

telephone with E.M., a mail carrier, when the conversation stopped and she heard a scuffle and a 

loud noise. She related that a few seconds later, E.M. told her that he had been shot and that he 

needed help. Appellant noted that she hung up the telephone and tried to get help for him. She 

explained that she did not know what was happening and began to think that someone was shooting 

mail carriers. Appellant reported that she was afraid to come out of her house because she feared

being shot. 

Appellant submitted a September 6, 2017 work excuse from Dr. Claire A. Presswood, a 

Board-certified internist. The note indicated that appellant had been seen that day and was excused 

from work for the period September 2 to 16, 2017.

In a letter dated September 8, 2017, the employing establishment controverted appellant’s 

claim. It provided a September 6, 2017 e-mail from Y.S., a customer service supervisor, who 

explained that appellant handed her a Form CA-1 saying she wanted to file a claim for stress

brought on by the August 31, 2017 accident concerning E.M. Y.S. controverted appellant’s claim 

noting that she should not have been on the telephone. She also noted that appellant continued her 

normal duties the day of the incident, and a portion of the following day. Lastly, Y.S. noted that 

the medical report submitted was not from a mental healthcare provider. 

In a development letter dated September 15, 2017, OWCP acknowledged receipt of 

appellant’s claim and informed her that additional evidence was needed to establish her claim. It 

requested that she respond to an attached factual questionnaire in order to substantiate that the 

August 31, 2017 employment incident occurred as alleged. OWCP also advised appellant to 

provide medical evidence to establish a diagnosed condition causally related to the alleged 

incident. It afforded her 30 days to submit additional evidence. No additional evidence was 

received. 

By decision dated October 23, 2017, OWCP denied appellant’s claim because the factual 

component of fact of injury had not been met. It found that the evidence of record failed to 

establish that the August 31, 2017 incident occurred as alleged. OWCP noted that appellant failed 

to respond to the factual questionnaire sent to her on September 15, 2017. It also determined that 

there was insufficient medical evidence to establish a diagnosed condition causally related to the 

alleged incident. OWCP concluded, therefore, that the requirements had not been met to establish 

an injury as defined by FECA.

On November 3, 2017 appellant requested reconsideration.

Appellant received treatment from Latasha Baird, a licensed professional counselor

(LPC/S). In a September 14, 2017 intake assessment, Ms. Baird indicated that appellant sought 

counseling services due to having paranoia, disturbances, fatigue, poor concentration, panic 

attacks, and feelings of hopelessness and guilt. She reported that the precipitating factor was when 

her coworker and friend was speaking to her on the telephone and was shot. Ms. Baird related that 

appellant had two other traumas when her fiancée passed away in 2002 and when a man held a 
3

gun to her head in 1994. She reported that examination of appellant’s mental status showed good 

insight, depressed/flat affect and mood, good judgment, and intact cognitive ability. Ms. Baird

diagnosed acute stress disorder. She continued to treat appellant and provided progress notes dated 

September 21 to October 24, 2017. Ms. Baird noted that appellant still had symptoms related to 

the August 31, 2017 traumatic event, including panic attacks, hypervigilance, sleep disturbance, 

and intrusive thoughts.

A September 20, 2017 Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory -- III (MCMI -- III) revealed 

possible diagnoses of paranoid personality disorder, major depression, and generalized anxiety 

disorder.

In a September 21, 2017 letter from Dr. Presswood, who related that she was appellant’s 

primary care provider and was working in conjunction with appellant’s psychiatrist. 

Dr. Presswood noted that appellant was diagnosed with adjustment disorder, disturbance of 

emotions and conduct, personal history of trauma, and anxiety. She recommended that appellant 

remain out of work for the next two weeks.

OWCP also received additional progress notes from Ms. Baird dated September 21 and 28, 

and October 19 and 24, 2017. 

In a November 1, 2017 letter, Dr. Presswood indicated that she continued to treat appellant 

for PTSD, anxiety, and insomnia all related to the employment incident that occurred with a 

colleague’s shooting. She recommended that appellant continue with her leave of absence for that 

month and then transition to a position that did not require mail delivery. 

By decision dated January 9, 2018, OWCP denied modification of the October 23, 2017 

decision. It noted that appellant had still not responded to the September 15, 2017 development 

questionnaire and, accordingly, the evidence of record failed to establish that the August 31, 2017 

employment incident occurred as alleged. 

On January 29, 2018 appellant again requested reconsideration. She provided her response 

to OWCP’s questions. Appellant explained that on August 31, 2017 she was out on her route 

delivering mail and was on the telephone with E.M. She related that she heard a scuffle and then 

a very loud noise. Appellant indicated that she kept asking E.M. what was that noise and he would 

not answer. She reported that E.M. finally told her that he had been shot. Appellant related that 

she asked him where he was, but she could not understand what he said. She noted that she hung 

up the telephone and tried to get help. Appellant explained that she was already being treated with 

medication because of an incident that happened to her on November 3, 2016 with a customer who 

had assaulted her in the mail truck. She indicated that the medication was helping with her anxiety 

at work until the August 31, 2017 incident with E.M. occurred. 

Appellant also submitted a September 2, 2017 news article captioned: “Mailman Shot on 

the Job Making Deliveries.” It addressed the August 31, 2017 shooting of E.M.

In a November 27, 2017 letter, Dr. Presswood indicated that appellant remained unable to 

carry out her duties as a mail carrier due to her medical condition.
4

Dr. Presswood also completed a Medical Information and Restriction Assessment form 

dated January 2, 2018. She related that appellant had PTSD with recurring panic attacks that 

developed after a coworker was injured on the job. Dr. Presswood noted that appellant was unable 

to work delivering mail and provided work restrictions.

By decision dated March 20, 2018, OWCP modified the January 9, 2018 decision. It 

accepted that the August 31, 2017 incident occurred as alleged and that medical diagnoses were 

established (anxiety, panic attacks, PTSD, adjustment disorder, and major depression), but denied 

appellant’s claim because the medical evidence of record was insufficient to establish that her 

emotional condition was causally related to the accepted employment incident.

LEGAL PRECEDENT

To establish an emotional condition in the performance of duty, a claimant must submit 

the following: (1) medical evidence establishing that he or she has an emotional condition or 

psychiatric disorder; (2) factual evidence identifying employment factors or incidents alleged to 

have caused or contributed to the condition; and (3) rationalized medical opinion evidence 

establishing that his or her emotional condition is causally related to the identified compensable 

employment factors.2

When the matter asserted is a compensable factor of employment and the evidence of 

record establishes the truth of the matter, OWCP must base its decision on an analysis of the 

medical evidence.3

Causal relationship is a medical question that generally requires rationalized medical 

opinion evidence to resolve the issue.4 A physician’s opinion on whether there is a causal 

relationship between the diagnosed condition and the implicated employment factor(s) must be 

based on a complete factual and medical background.5 Additionally, the physician’s opinion must 

be expressed in terms of a reasonable degree of medical certainty, and must be supported by 

medical rationale, explaining the nature of the relationship between the diagnosed condition and 

appellant’s specific employment factor(s).6

 

2 F.B., Docket No. 18-1462 (issued May 9, 2019); G.R., Docket No. 18-0893 (issued November 21, 2018); 

George H. Clark, 56 ECAB 162 (2004).

3 See Norma L. Blank, 43 ECAB 384, 389-90 (1992). Unless a claimant establishes a compensable factor of 

employment, it is unnecessary to address the medical evidence of record. Garry M. Carlo, 47 ECAB 299, 305 (1996).

4 E.M., Docket No. 18-1599 (issued March 7, 2019); Robert G. Morris, 48 ECAB 238 (1996). 

5 M.V., Docket No. 18-0884 (issued December 28, 2018); Victor J. Woodhams, 41 ECAB 345, 352 (1989).

6

Id.
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ANALYSIS

The Board finds that appellant has not met her burden of proof to establish causal 

relationship between her diagnosed emotional condition and the accepted August 31, 2017 

employment incident. 

Appellant received medical treatment from Dr. Presswood. In letters dated September 21 

and November 27, 2017, Dr. Presswood noted that appellant was under her care and diagnosed 

adjustment disorder, disturbance of emotions and conduct, personal history of trauma, and anxiety. 

She recommended that appellant remain out of work and then transition to a position that did not 

require her to deliver mail. In a January 2, 2018 Medical Information and Restriction Assessment 

form, Dr. Presswood reported that appellant had PTSD with recurring panic attacks that developed 

after a coworker was injured on the job.

Although Dr. Presswood noted that appellant’s PTSD developed after a coworker was 

injured on the job, such generalized statements do not establish causal relationship.7 Her reports 

do not contain adequate medical rationale explaining how the accepted employment incident had

caused or aggravated her emotional condition.8 Because Dr. Presswood did not provide a reasoned 

opinion explaining how the August 31, 2017 employment incident caused or contributed to her 

PTSD condition, her reports are insufficient to establish appellant’s claim. 

Appellant also submitted September and October 2017 treatment notes from Ms. Baird, a 

licensed professional counselor. A licensed professional counselor is not a clinical psychologist, 

and therefore, does not satisfy the definition of “physician” under FECA.9 Because a licensed 

professional counselor is not considered a physician as defined under FECA, Ms. Baird’s treatment 

records are of no probative value with respect to establishing entitlement to FECA benefits.10

Because appellant has not provided medical evidence demonstrating that her emotional 

condition is causally related to the accepted August 31, 2017 employment incident, she has not 

met her burden of proof to establish her traumatic injury claim.

Appellant may submit new evidence or argument with a written request for reconsideration 

to OWCP within one year of this merit decision, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 8128(a) and 20 C.F.R. 

§§ 10.605 through 10.607.

CONCLUSION

The Board finds that appellant has not met her burden of proof to establish that her 

emotional condition is causally related to the accepted August 31, 2017 employment incident.

 

7 See L.M., Docket No. 16-0188 (issued March 24, 2016).

8 K.W., Docket No. 10-0098 (issued September 10, 2010).

9 5 U.S.C. § 8101(2); see Jaqueline E. Brown, 54 ECAB 583, 585-86 (2003).

10 Id.
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ORDER

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the March 20, 2018 decision of the Office of 

Workers’ Compensation Programs is affirmed.

Issued: July 9, 2019

Washington, DC

Christopher J. Godfrey, Chief Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Janice B. Askin, Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Valerie D. Evans-Harrell, Alternate Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board