alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Franklin Delano FLOYD, Petitioner-Appellant, v. J. D. HENDERSON, Warden, United States Penitentiary, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 72-1124

Summary Calendar.*

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

March 17, 1972.

*1118Franklin Delano Floyd, pro se.

John W. Stokes, U. S. Atty., Anthony M. Arnold, Atlanta, Ga., for respondent-appellee.

Before BELL, DYER and CLARK, Circuit Judges.

*

  Rule 18, 5 Cir., Isbell Enterprises, Inc. v. Citizens Casualty Company of New York et al., 5 Cir., 1970, 431 F.2d 409, Part I.

PER CURIAM:

For the reasons stated in the opinion of the district court appended, the order appealed from is affirmed.

APPENDIX

United States District Court Northern District of Georgia Atlanta Division

Franklin Delano Floyd

Civil Action Number 15960

versus

J. D. Henderson, Warden United States Penitentiary Filed: Dec. 9, 1971

Petitioner, a federal prisoner in Atlanta, seeks habeas corpus relief. Specifically, he contends that when the At*1119torney General transferred him to a state prison for concurrent service of state and federal sentences, the federal government waived its jurisdiction over him and, therefore, although time remains to be served on his federal sentence, he should be set free since the state has now released him on parole.

The petition is meritless. Under 18 U.S.C. § 4082, the Attorney General has the power to designate the place of a federal prisoner’s confinement in a state or federal prison, and this authority is sufficient to permit the transfer of petitioner from one institution to another prison. See Lipscomb v. Stevens, 349 F.2d 997, 1000-1001 (6th Cir. 1965). Since he was serving both his state and federal sentences at the state prison, the federal government has never lost jurisdiction over petitioner. Furthermore even if the federal government had lost jurisdiction over petitioner when he was transferred to the state prison, he could not complain about being returned to federal prison, because the question of jurisdiction and custody over a prisoner is one of comity between governments and not a personal right of the prisoner. See Jones v. Taylor, 327 F.2d 493 (10th Cir. 1964).

Petitioner contends that certain Bureau of Prisons policies were not followed during the transfer. These policy statements are rules of practice and do not rise to the status of law. Thus, a transfer that was otherwise lawful would not become unlawful merely because a prison policy was not strictly followed.

There is no evidence that the transfer of petitioner to state prison was arbitrary or capricious. Although he has tried to convince the Court that he was harmed by the transfer, it appears that the transfer worked to petitioner’s advantage since it converted what would have otherwise been consecutive sentences into concurrent sentences.

Accordingly, the petition is denied.

Let the petition be filed in forma pau-peris,

jt is so ordered,

Thig thg 0th day of December) 1971.

(Signed) SIDNEY O. SMITH, JR.,

Sidney O. Smith, Jr.

United States District Judge
EXHIBIT 99(a)
                                                                   -------------


                               INSILCO HOLDING CO.
                 SCHEDULE II - VALUATION AND QUALIFYING ACCOUNTS
                                 (In thousands)
<TABLE><CAPTION>
                                                                    (2)
                                                        (1)       Charged
                                         Balance at  Charged to   to other               Changes due to   Charged  Balance at
                                         beginning   costs and    accounts   Deductions   acquisitions       to      end of
     Description                         of period   expenses    (describe)  (describe)  or dispositions    APIC     period
     -----------                         ----------  ----------  ----------  ----------  ---------------  -------  ----------
<S>                                      <C>         <C>         <C>         <C>         <C>              <C>      <C>
For the year ended December 31, 1999
 Allowances deducted from assets
  Accounts receivable (for doubtful
   receivables)                          $      975         931          --     (261) (a)       131  (c)      --      1,776
  Inventory (primarily for obsolescence)      1,641         879          --     (328) (b)     1,196  (c)      --      3,388
  Income Tax expense valuation allowance    (36,506)        988       1,952       --            204          263    (33,099)

For the year ended December 31, 2000
 Allowances deducted from assets
  Accounts receivable (for doubtful
   receivables)                          $    1,776       1,464          --   (1,393) (a)        12  (d)      --      1,859
  Inventory (primarily for obsolescence)      3,388         797          --   (1,011) (b)      (820) (d)      --      2,354
  Income Tax expense valuation allowance    (33,099)      6,452          --       --             --        3,882    (22,765)

For the year ended December 31, 2001
 Allowances deducted from assets
  Accounts receivable (for doubtful
   receivables)                          $    1,859       1,148          --     (518) (a)        96  (e)      --      2,585
  Inventory (primarily for obsolescence)      2,354       3,788          --     (401) (b)       402  (e)      --      6,143
  Income Tax expense valuation allowance    (22,765)    (11,317)         --       --             --           --    (34,082)
</TABLE>

  (a)  Primarily accounts written off, net of recoveries
  (b)  Primarily obsolete parts written off
  (c)  Primarily due to the purchase of EFI, the sale of Romac and the
       shutdown of McKenica.
  (d)  Primarily due to the purchase of TAT, PCM and the transfer of
       McKenica balances with the sale of the  "Automotive Businesses"
  (e)  Primarily due to the purchase of InNet.
<PAGE>   1
                                                                      Exhibit 23



June 25, 1999

The Board of Directors
American Energy Services, Inc.

In connection with our audits of the financial statements of American Energy
Services, Inc. as of February 28, 1999, 1998, and 1997, and for each of the
three years in the period ended February 28, 1999, which financial statements
are included in the Form 10-KSB, we have also audited the financial statement
schedules listed in Item 14 herein.

In our opinion, these financial statement schedules, when considered in relation
to the basic financial statements taken as a whole, present fairly, in all
material respects, the information required to be included therein.


/s/  Simonton, Kutac, & Barnidge, L.L.P.

Simonton, Kutac, & Barnidge, L.L.P.
<PAGE>

                         AMERICAN ENERGY SERVICES, INC.

                                   EXHIBIT 23




To the Board of Directors
American Energy Services, Inc.

In connection with our audits of the financial statements of American Energy
Services, Inc. as of February 28, 2001 and February 29, 2000, and for each of
the two years then ended, which financial statements are included in the Form
10-KSB, we have also audited the financial statement schedules listed in Item 14
herein.

In our opinion, these financial statement schedules, when considered in relation
to the basic financial statements taken as a whole, present fairly, in all
material respects, the information required to be included therein.



Simonton, Kutac & Barnidge, L.L.P.
Houston, Texas


May 25, 2001

<PAGE>

                         AMERICAN ENERGY SERVICES, INC.

                 SCHEDULE II - VALUATION OF QUALIFYING ACCOUNTS

<TABLE>
<CAPTION>

                                            BALANCE      ACQUISITIONS      CHARGE        CHARGED                       BALANCE AT
                                          AT BEGINNING       AND             TO          TO OTHER                        END OF
                                           OF PERIOD     DISPOSITIONS    OPERATIONS      ACCOUNTS     DEDUCTIONS         PERIOD
                                         -------------  --------------  ------------   ------------  -------------   --------------
<S>                                         <C>             <C>            <C>            <C>            <C>            <C>
Year ended February 28, 2001
    Allowance for doubtful accounts         $20,000         $  --          $39,493        $  --          $  --          $59,493
                                            =======         ======         =======        =======        =======        =======
Year ended February 29, 2000
    Allowance for doubtful accounts         $20,000         $  --          $  --          $  --          $  --          $20,000
                                            =======         ======         =======        =======        =======        =======
</TABLE>


             See accompanying notes to these financial statements.
Jian SHEN, Plaintiff, v. Charles Hugh MCGOWAN, III, Defendant.

No. COA18-263

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Filed: November 6, 2018

AFFIRMED.
STATE of North Carolina v. Howard Earl BATES

No. 324P18

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

December 5, 2018

James R. Parish, Attorney at Law, Fayetteville, Bruce T. Cunningham, Jr., Attorney at Law, Southern Pines, for Bates, Howard Earl.

Sandra Wallace-Smith, Special Deputy Attorney General, Ted Bell, District Attorney, for State of North Carolina.

***ORDER***

Upon consideration of the petition filed on the 25th of September 2018 by Defendant in this matter for discretionary review of the decision of the North Carolina Court of Appeals pursuant to G.S. 7A-31, the following order was entered and is hereby certified to the North Carolina Court of Appeals:

"Denied by order of the Court in conference, this the 5th of December 2018."

Upon consideration of the petition filed by Defendant on the 25th of September 2018 in this matter for a writ of certiorari to review the order of the Superior Court, Rutherford County, the following order was entered and is hereby certified to the Superior Court of that County:

"Denied by order of the Court in conference, this the 5th of December 2018."
Exhibit 32.2

 

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO**

**18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**

**SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

The undersigned, Gary Bishop, the Chief Financial officer and a director of Environmental Control Corp., hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1)           the quarterly report on Form 10-QSB of Environmental Control Corp. for the three months ended December 31, 2006 (the "Report") fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)           the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Environmental Control Corp.

Dated  February 15, 2007.

/s/ Gary Bishop                                                              

Gary Bishop

Chief Financial Officer and Director

(Principal Accounting Officer and Principal Financial

Officer)
Leonardo Vasquez TDCJ-CID #1908818 BetoUnit 1391 FM 3328 Tennessee Colony, TX 75880 Abel Acosta, Clerk Court of Criminal Appeals P.O. Box 12308

- capitol Station Austin, TX 78711 RE: WR-83,329-01 To whom it may concern; July 24,-2015


## RECEIVEDIN COURTOF

### CRI~~INALAPPEALS 

# JUL29

# 2015

On 5/20/15 you filed- ·my original app1Tcaf16fl.-·for wri·t-of"-mandamus-**-in~-** the above-numbered cause. In doing so you cited on the "white card" that my trial court number was "12072452." My trial court number, and the•one I used to file the above-mentioned writ, is "2012..-DCR-2913-B," (The State of Texas v.·Leonardo Vasquez; !38th Judicial District, Cameron County, Texas). Both the application and the rehearingrequest were denied using your interpretation of the trial court number. can you explain to me why you used a different trial court number.instead of the actual one I was convicted under? If. you would timely address my concern; I would appreciate your time, effort, and consideration. Sincerely yours,

# ~ue}L~~

c.c. file/lv
STATE of North Carolina v. Efrain Gonzalez OCEGUEDA

No. COA18-414

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Filed: November 6, 2018

NO ERROR.
<PAGE>

                                  EXHIBIT 16.1

                LETTER REGARDING CHANGE IN CERTIFYING ACCOUNTANT


March 25, 1999

Securities and Exchange Commission
450 Fifth Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20549

Gentlemen:

We have read Item 9 of Form 10-K dated March 25, 1999, of American Commercial 
Lines LLC and are in agreement with the statements contained in paragraph two 
therein. We have no basis to agree or disagree with the other statements of 
the registrant contained therein.

                                       Very truly yours,

                                       /s/ Ernst & Young LLP
                                       ---------------------
                                       Ernst & Young LLP



                                       99
**Exhibit 31.2**
**CERTIFICATIONS**
I, Lance K. Bradford, Chief Financial Officer of Vestin Group, Inc.,certify that:
1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-KSB/A (this“Form 10-KSB/A”)of Vestin Group, Inc.; 2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statementof a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make thestatements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statementswere made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by thisreport; 3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financialinformation included in this report, fairly present in all materialrespects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows ofVestin Group, Inc. as of, and for, the periods presented in this report; 4. Vestin Group, Inc.’s other certifying officers and I are responsible forestablishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (asdefined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for Vestin Group,Inc. and have:
(a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or causedsuch disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under oursupervision, to ensure that material information relating to VestinGroup, Inc., including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made knownto us by others within those entities, particularly during theperiod in which this report is being prepared; (b) Paragraph omitted pursuant to SEC Release Nos. 33-82377 and34-47986; (c) Evaluated the effectiveness of Vestin Group, Inc.’sdisclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report ourconclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls andprocedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report basedon such evaluations; and (d) Disclosed in this report any changes in Vestin Group, Inc.’sinternal control over financial reporting that occurred duringVestin Group, Inc.’s most recent fiscal quarter that has materiallyaffected or is reasonably likely to materially affect Vestin Group,Inc.’s internal control over financial reporting; and
5. Vestin Group, Inc.’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, basedon our most recent evaluation of internal control over financialreporting, to Vestin Group, Inc.’s auditors and the audit committee ofVestin Group, Inc.’s board of directors (or persons performing theequivalent function):
(a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in thedesign or operation of internal controls over financial reportingwhich are reasonably likely to adversely affect Vestin Group, Inc.’sability to record, process, summarize and report financialinformation; and (c) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves managementor other employees who have a significant role in Vestin Group,Inc.’s internal control over financial reporting.
/s/ Lance K. BradfordLance K. BradfordChief Financial Officer
Dated: April 14, 2004
#### Dedorise Daniel DOYAL, Petitioner-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 72-1076

Summary Calendar.*

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

March 21, 1972.

Dedorise Daniel Doyal, pro se.

William S. Sessions, U. S. Atty., Jeremiah Handy, Asst. U. S. Atty., San Antonio, Tex., for respondent-appellee.

Before BELL, DYER and CLARK, Circuit Judges.

*

  Rulo 18, 5 Cir.; See Isbell Enterprises, Inc. v. Citizens Casualty Co. of New York et al., 5 Cir. 1970, 431 F.2d 409, Part I.

PER CURIAM:

This is an appeal from an order of the district court denying the motion of Doyal to vacate sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255. We affirm.

Doyal was convicted upon trial by jury on a four-count indictment charging him with illegal importation of 750 grams of cocaine and with assault of federal customs officers. This Court affirmed the conviction in United States v. Doyal, 5 Cir., 1971, 437 F.2d 271. In his motion to vacate sentence Doyal alleges that the record of the proceedings in the trial court was incomplete.

Doyal was represented at his trial by two privately retained attorneys. *1293The record and transcript were prepared at Doyal’s expense. The responsibility for directing whether the entire record was to be prepared rested with Doyal’s counsel. In addition, Doyal did not allege what was omitted from the transcript or how he was prejudiced by any omission. He has wholly failed to allege upon what grounds relief could be granted. Smith v. United States, 5 Cir. 1971, 449 F.2d 176. Instead, he contends that a complete record should be prepared at Government expense to allow him to determine what was omitted and to further determine whether he was prejudiced thereby. An indigent has no absolute right to a free copy of his transcript merely to search for possible defects. Colbert v. Beto, 5 Cir. 1971, 439 F.2d 1130; Bennett v. United States, 5 Cir. 1971, 437 F.2d 1210; Skinner v. United States, 5 Cir. 1970, 434 F.2d 1036. The judgment is Affirmed.
#### Brian O. SHARP, Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent.

No. ED 81684.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, Division Three.

July 22, 2003.

Raymund J. Capelovitch, Columbia, MO, for appellant.

Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Attorney General, Adriane Dixon Crouse, Jefferson City, MO, for respondent.

Before CLIFFORD H. AHRENS, P.J., WILLIAM H. CRANDALL JR., J., and LAWRENCE E. MOONEY, J.

*863
      *ORDER*

PER CURIAM.

Brian Sharp (“movant”) appeals the judgment of the motion court denying his motion for post-conviction relief without an evidentiary hearing pursuant to Missouri Supreme Court Rule 29.15. In his motion, movant claims he was denied effective assistance of appellate counsel because his counsel failed to raise on appeal that the trial court erred in failing to sever various claims. Movant also claims he was denied effective assistance of counsel because his counsel failed to call a witness who might have testified to movant’s innocence.

We have reviewed the briefs of the parties and the record on appeal and find no error of law. No jurisprudential purpose would be served by a written opinion. However, the parties have been furnished with a memorandum opinion for their information only, setting forth the facts and reasons for this order.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed in accordance with Rule 84.16(b).
Exhibit 10.4


 


April 4, 2013


 


E. HaEzrachi


Tel Aviv, Israel


 


Re:  Investment in Bluesphere Corp.


 


Dear Mr. HaEzrachi:


 


This will confirm
the terms on which you will loan Bluesphere Corp (“Bluesphere”) $150,000. Within three days of the date hereof, you
will transfer to our subsidiary, Eastern Sphere Ltd, an aggregate of $150,000 in freely available funds in accordance with instructions
to be provided separately. Eastern Sphere hereby commits to pay you 5% interest thereon, such interest to accrue annually, and
to repay 100% of the principal and accrued, but unpaid interest, on or before December 31, 2013. Every day that the we are late
in paying you the outstanding principal and accrued, but unpaid, interest, we will pay you $100 as a penalty. Each of the guarantors
who have signed below hereby guarantees prompt payment of 100% of the outstanding principal amount of the loan plus all accrued,
but unpaid, interest. We also agree to issue you 3,000,000 shares of our common stock. These shares will be restricted and may
only be offered or sold pursuant to a registration statement under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, or an exemption therefrom.
Please indicate your acceptance of such terms by counter-signing where indicated below.


 


Yours truly,


 


Shlomi Palas, CEO


 


	Agreed and accepted:	 
	 	 
	Eitan HaEzrachi	 
	 	 
	 	 
	 	 
	Jelton Finance Corp., as guarantor	 
	 	 
	 	 
	 	 
	Dr. Bornstein Ltd., as guarantor
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 32.2

                           CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                 SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of Northfield Laboratories Inc. on Form
10-K for the period ended May 31, 2005 as filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Jack J. Kogut, Chief Financial
Officer of Northfield Laboratories Inc., certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section
1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 that:

          (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a)
     or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

          (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
     material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of
     Northfield Laboratories Inc.

/s/ Jack J. Kogut
---------------------------------------------------------
Jack J. Kogut
Chief Financial Officer

Date: August 15, 2005