PUBLISH
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee,

v. AARON WILKIE MURPHY, Defendant - Appellant. No. 17-5118

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma (D.C. No. 4:17-CR -00005-CVE-1)
Submitted on the briefs:  Virginia L. Grady, Federal Pub lic Defender, and O. Dean Sanderf ord, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Office of the Fed eral Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant - Appellant. R. Trent Shores, United States Attorney, and Richard M. Cella, Assistant United States Attorney, Tulsa, Oklahoma , for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Before TYMKOVICH , Chief Judge, O’BRIEN , and MATHESON , Circuit Judges.

 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel ha s determined unanimously that oral argument wo uld not materially assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R . 34.1(G). The case is ther efore submitted without oral argument. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### August 24, 2018
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court- 2 - O’BRIEN , Circuit Judge.
Aaron Wilkie Murphy is a convicted drug dealer and admitted ad dict. He used his home for drug-related activity. The only issue is whether that use of his home was enough to warrant an enhancemen t to his sentence under USSG § 2 D1.1(b)(12), which increases guideline sentences whe n drug-related activities are one of the home’s primary, as opposed to incidental, uses . The district judge properly ap plied the enhancement. We affirm.
I. Background In late 2015, local law enforcement officers targeted Murphy i n an investigation involving the sale of stolen pr operty. They executed a search warrant at his residence in Broken Arrow, Oklahoma, on Nove mber 3, 2015. He was not home a t the time of the search, which uncovered multiple stolen items as well as 32.5 g rams of heroin, $2,391 in cash, digital scales, and a handg un. Officers obtained a warra nt for Murphy’s arrest. Several weeks later, on Novemb er 25, 2015, officers found and arrested Murphy at his residence, which they again searched pursuant to a warrant. In a safe, they found 42.15 grams of heroin and $33,900 in cash, comprised solely of $50 and $100 bills. They also seized 28.55 grams of metha mphetamine and multiple stolen items. The state court released Murphy on bond on November 27, 2015. In January 2016, officers received information from an individ ual who had been in Murphy’s residence that approxim ately one pound of methamphetam ine would be found- 3 - there. On a separate occasion, t hey observed Murphy selling me thamphetamine to an individual in the parking lot of a local gym. They later learn ed that Murphy had sold methamphetamine to the same indiv idual on at least ten prior oc casions; two of those sales occurred at Murphy’s residence. A search of the trash fr om the residence revealed four plastic baggies containi ng methamphetamine residue. 1 On February 18, 20 16, officers traveled to Murphy’s residence to execute a search

warrant. 2 On the way, they found Murphy in his vehicle and arrested him . Inside the vehicle was 118 grams of metham phetamine and his cellular telep hone. The telephone contained text messages of drug transactions. The search of hi s residence revealed, among other things, heroin residu e, a bullet proof vest, digita l scales with residue, drug paraphernalia, and keys to a st orage unit rented by Murphy in w hich a rifle was later found. Curiously, the state court again released Murphy on bon d on March 29, 2016. On November 22, 2016, officers, with a warrant in hand, search ed Murphy’s residence a fourth time. As th ey approached the residence, the y observed surveillance cameras. Their search of the home revealed a baggie, which tur ned out to contain heroin,

1 The relevant facts come from the Presentence Investigation Rep ort (PSR), which does not indicate when the parking lot sale or search of the tr ash occurred. From context, it appears those events too k place in early 2016.
2 The PSR indicates the February 2016 search occurred pursuant t o a federal warrant. It does not indicate whe ther the other search warrant s in this case were issued by a federal or state court. Moreover, it is unclear why the F ebruary 2016 search warrant was federal in nature. The PSR does not reveal when federal la w enforcement became involved. We do know , however, that Murphy never challenged an y of the officers’ actions (whether local or federal) in this case.- 4 - floating in the bathroom toilet . They also found: (1) a baggie of methamphetamine, syringes, and other drug parapher nalia throughout the bathroom, (2) a shotgun in a bedroom closet, and (3) digital scales, baggies, drug residue, and more surveillance cameras in the office. Murphy wa s arrested and admitted respon sibility for the heroin and methamphetamine found in his home. He also admitted “he ha d been distributing methamphetamine and heroin for some time and that, in the past, he had received pound quantities of methamphetamine and several ounces of heroin at a time.” (Supp. R. Vol. 2 at 6.) He was charged in Oklahoma state court with various drug and fi rearm offenses, which were dismissed when he finally faced federal charges. 3 Murphy was indicted for two cou nts of possession with intent t o distribute heroin (Counts 2 and 5), two counts o f possession with intent to distr ibute methamphetamine (Counts 4 and 6), two counts o f being a felon in possession of a firearm (Counts 1 and 7), and one count of possession of a fi rearm in furtherance of a dr ug-trafficking crime (Count 3). He pled guilty to all counts except Count 3, which the gov ernment dismissed in exchange for h is guilty plea. 4 The Presentence Investigation Re port (PSR), which was based up on the 2016 version of the United States Sen tencing Guidelines Manual, conc luded the offense

3 Although Murphy was arrested thr ee times between November 2015 and November 2016, he faced no substa ntial consequences for his act ions until the federal government stepped in.
4 Dismissal of Count 3 allowed Mur phy to avoid a consecutive fiv e-year term of imprisonment. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i).- 5 - involved at least 354.37 grams o f heroin and 146.55 grams of me thamphetamine, resulting in a base offense level of 26. 5 See USSG § 2D1.1(c)(7) & comment. (n.8(B), (D)). Two levels were added beca use Murphy possessed a dangero us weapon. See USSG § 2D1.1(b)(1). T wo more levels were added because Murphy maintained a premises, his residence, for the purpose of manufacturing or di stributing a controlled substance. See USSG § 2D1.1(b)(12). After a t hree-level downward adjustment for acceptance of re sponsibility, see USSG § 3E1.1, the total o ffense level was 27. That, coupled with a Criminal Histor y Category of IV, set the advisor y guideline range at 100 to 120 months imprisonment for Counts 1 and 7 and 100 to 125 mo nths imprisonment for Counts 2, 4, 5, and 6. 6 Murphy objected to the § 2D1.1(b )(12) premises enhancement. T he commentary to that guideline requires the ma nufacturing or distribution of drugs be a primary or principal use of the premises, not merely an incidental or coll ateral one. He claimed he

5 Although the searches of Murphy’ s residence uncovered 74.65 gr ams of heroin, the PSR concluded he was responsi ble for 354.37 grams of heroin because between June 2015 and November 2015 (25 week s), he sold a 1⁄2 ounce of heroin per week, for a total of 12.5 ounces or 354 .7 grams. The amount of methamphetamine a ttributed to Murphy (146.55 grams) deriv ed from the November 3 , 2015 search of his residence (28.55 grams) and the February 18 , 2016 vehicle search (118 grams ). Murphy d id not object to these quantities. Because mor e than one drug was involved, the PSR c onverted the heroin and methamphetamine amounts into their marijuana equivalencies; tha t conversion resulted in a total of 647.47 kilograms of m arijuana and a base offense lev el of 26. See USSG § 2D1.1(c)(7) & comment. (n.8(B), (D)).
6 The guideline range m aximum was lower for the felon in possess ion counts (Counts 1 and 7) than for the d rug counts (Counts 2, 4, 5, and 6) because the statutory maximum term for the former cou nts is 10 years (120 months). See 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2).- 6 - primarily used the premises as hi s home, having slept and eaten there on a daily basis for over 10 years. His drug-relate d activities, on the other hand, were a mere incidental use because, with the exception of two drug sales, the trafficking occurred outside his home. The district judge would have none of it: In this case, the defendant dis tributed methamphetamine from h is home on at least two occasions. He also used his home for storage of l arge quantities of methamphetamine and heroin, pro ceeds obtained from illegal acti vities, and distribution materials, includi ng digital scales and baggies on at least four occasions when his home was sea rched by law enforcement. Further, law enforcement obser ved the defendant traveling dire ctly from his residence to complete drug trans actions also implying ongoing s torage at his residence. [T]he defendant cites two cases i n which the court determined that the enhancement was not proper. In United States vs. Job , 851 F.3d, 889, 909, Ninth Circuit, 2017, there was no evid ence that the defendant had eve r distributed methamphetamine out of his home. And in U.S. vs. Ortiz , 807 F.Supp.2d, 746, Northern District of Illinois, 2011, the use of the residence to receive a single shipment of drugs was found insufficient to suppo rt the enhancement. The court finds that the actions by the defendant in the insta nt offense go beyond the actions of the defendants in both Job and Ortiz ; therefore, the court finds that the defendant’s reside nce was used by the defendant for substantial drug trafficking purposes on an ongoin g basis and drug trafficking w as a primary use for the premises. (Supp. R. Vol. 1 at 19-20.) She d id decide, however, that a fo ur-level downward departure was appropriate, 7 resulting in a total offense level of 23 and an advisory guideline range of 70-87 months. In toto, she sentenced Murphy to 70 months

7 The government had moved for a t wo-level downward departure.- 7 - imprisonment. Interestingly, t he sentence imposed falls within the applicable guideline range (57-71 months) if the § 2D1 .1(b)(12) enhancement is not c onsidered.
II. Discussion USSG § 2D1.1(b)(12) calls for a two-level enhancement to the b ase offense level if “the defendant maintained a premises for the purpose of manu facturing or distributing a controlled substance.” This includes “storage of a controlle d substance for the purpose of distribution.” U SSG § 2D1.1(b)(12 ), comment. (n.17). Murphy does not quarrel about whe ther he “maintained” the prem ises. Instead, he argues his “maintenance” of it wa s not “for the purpose of manu facturing or distributing a controlled substance.” Because h e does not dispute the underly ing facts found by the district judge for purposes of this appeal, our review is de no vo. See United States v. Cherry , 572 F.3d 829, 831 (10th Cir. 2009) (“We re view de novo whethe r the facts found by the court support the appli cation of the guideline it select ed.”). A. Interpretation of the Guideline The commentary to § 2D1.1(b)(1 2), which is authoritative, addr esses when a premises is maintained “for the purpose of manufacturing or dis tributing drugs”: Manufacturing or distributing a controlled substance need not b e the sole purpose for which the premises was main tained, but must be one of the d efendant’s primary or principal uses for the premises, rather than one of the defendant’s incidental or collateral uses fo r the premises. In making this determination, the court should consider how frequen tly the premises was used by t he defendant for manufacturing or distributing a controlled substance and how fr equently the premises was used by the de fendant for lawful purposes.- 8 - USSG § 2D1.1, comment. (n .17) (emphasis added); see also Stinson v. United States , 508 U.S. 36, 38 (1993) (“[C]ommentar y in the Guidelines Manual that interprets or explains a guideline is authoritative unless it violates the Constitution or a federal statute, or is inconsistent with, or a plainly e rroneous reading of, that guid eline.”). The enhancement clearly contemplates a premises with more than one primary use. Therefore, as Murphy concede s, a multiple use approach is applicable to cases, like this one, where the premises at i ssue is the defendant’s home. See United States v.
Henderson , 604 F. App’x 655 , 658-59 (10th Cir. 2 015) (unpublished) (appl ying enhancement where defendant used his home to distribute methamp hetamine); see also
United States v. Bell , 766 F.3d 634, 638 (6th Cir. 2014 ) (“Living in a residence and cooking drugs in it can both be relevant purposes under the gui deline. . . . [P]recedents under the guideline do not carve o ut residences as safe havens from being drugproduction premises.”); United States v. Miller , 698 F.3d 699, 707 (8th Cir. 2012) (“§ 2D1.1(b)(12) applies when a def endant uses the premises for the purpose of substantial drug-trafficking activities, even if the premises was also her family home at the times in question.”). Murphy proposes that when the subject premises is the defendant’s home, the enhancement applies “only wh en the defendant pervasively an d persistently used his home to further a drug business. ” (Appellant’s Op. Br. at 6.) His proposal finds no support in either the gui deline or case law. The commentary to the guideli ne requires drug-related activity to be one of the defendant’s primary uses of the premises. It admits to no exce ption because the premises- 9 - is the defendant’s home. It requi res consideration of “how fre quently the premises was used by the defendant for manufac turing or distributing a contr olled substance and how frequently the premises was used by the defendant for lawful pu rposes.” USSG § 2D1.1, comment. (n.17). Some circuits hav e concluded that when the pr emises at issue is the defendant’s home, simply compari ng the frequency of unlawful ac tivity with the frequency of lawful ac tivity is impractical. United States v. Contreras , 874 F.3d 280, 284 (7th Cir. 2017); Miller , 698 F.3d at 707. Acco rding to them, such comparison “would immunize every family home that is also used for drug distribut ion from being deemed an illegal maintained premises,” Contreras , 874 F.3d at 284 (quo tation marks omitted), because “[w]hen the premises in question [is] the defendant’s f amily home, by definition it [is] used for that lawful p urpose 100% of the time.” Miller , 698 F.3d at 707. Such could not have been the intent of the guideline. Id . (“Congress . . . in directing the [United States Sentencing] Co mmission to adopt § 2D1.1(b)(12) s urely intended to deter the manufacture and distribution of illegal drugs in ‘crack hou ses’ where children are being raised.”). We agree in p rinciple and offer an observatio n. Most people do not occu py their home 100% of the time; they sp end much time at work, on vacation, running errand s, pursuing social activities, etc. While a home may not be occupied 100% of the time, i t is considered to be a home 100 % of the time in that it is always available to the owner (o r renter), it contains most of the owner’s possessions, and it is a safe haven. That same reasoning is apt in multiple use situations. Actual drug dealing may not be a constant i n a home, but the home may well serve as a safe place to- 10 - store drugs, cash derived from drug sales (thereby shielding it from official notice), and tools of the trade (such as equi pment related to selling drugs and firearms), as well as serve as a headquarters for dru g-related operations. With that in mind, one may use his home (in the broad sense of the word) for lawful purposes 100% of the time and also use it (in the same broad sense of the word) fo r unlawful drug acti vity 100% of the time. In other words, both simultaneous uses may well be primary. The commentary does not requir e a comparison of the frequency of lawful and unlawful activity at the premises . It requires only that a cou rt “consider” such frequency in deciding whether dr ug-related activities were a primary, rat her than incidental, use of the premises. 8 While it requires considerati on of the frequency of unlawful and lawful activity at the premises, it does not foreclose consideration o f other factors. Our case law, and that of other circuits, i nstructs that for drug-relate d activity to constitute a primary use of the residence, it must not only be frequent but also substantial.
Henderson , 604 F. App’x at 659 (“[A]lthoug h the premises was used as a r esidence, the drug trafficking activities were frequent and substantial enoug h to warrant the enhancement.”); see also Contreras , 874 F.3d at 284 (“Instea d of merely weighing the amount of legal activity against the illegal activity, the sent encing court should focus on both the frequency and significan ce of the illicit activities . . . .”); Bell , 766 F.3d at 637

8 But see Henderson , 604 F. App’x at 658 (“[T]h e commentary to [USSG § 2D1.1(b)(12)] explicitly directs courts to compare the frequency of licit and illicit uses of the property.” (emphasis added)).- 11 - (“We assess the primary or princ ipal use of the home . . . by c omparing the frequency of lawful to unlawful use. At botto m, the question is whether Bel l’s home played a significant part in distributing drugs.” (quotation marks omitt ed)); Miller , 698 F.3d at 707 (“§ 2D1.1(b)(12) applies when a d efendant uses the premises for the purpose of
substantial drug-trafficking activities, eve n if the premises was also her family home at the times in question.” (emphasi s added)). The analysis comes down to a “totality of the circumstances” evaluation, somet hing trial judges are well equi pped for and regularly perform. And the frequent/substan tial metric is a reciprocal s liding scale. A substantial drug distribution that regularly a nd quickly passe s through the home (two or three days) on a bi-monthly or tri-monthly ba sis may qualify as a primary u se of the premises for drug-related purposes much the same as an exquisitely frequent, but relatively paltry, operation. A totality of the circumstances assessment includes: (1) the f requency and number of drugs sales occurring at the home; (2) the quantities of dru gs bought, sold, manufactured, or stored in the hom e; (3) whether drug proceeds, employees, customers, and tools of the drug trade (fi rearms, digital scales, laborato ry equipment, and packaging materials) are present in the home, and (4) the significance of the premises to the drug

venture. See Henderson , 604 F. App’x at 658; United States v. Verners , 53 F.3d 291, 296-97 (10th Cir. 1995); 9 see also Contreras , 874 F.3d at 284-85; United States v.

9 Verners addressed § 2D1.1(b)(12)’s statu tory equivalent, 21 U.S.C. § 8 56(a)(1). That statute, referred to as the “crack-house statute,” prohibi ts “knowingly . . .- 12 - George , 872 F.3d 1197, 120 6 (11th Cir. 2017); Bell, 766 F.3d at 637; United States v.
Johnson , 737 F.3d 444, 447-48 (6th Cir. 2013); Miller , 698 F.3d at 706-07. Murphy objects, proposing his “p ervasive and persistent” test is necessary because anything less “could lead to . . . application [of the enhancem ent] in nearly all cases under § 2D1.1.” (Appellant’s Op. B r. at 11.) As he explains it: Drug dealers and manufacturers i nvariably maintai n a supply of drugs. And even those who do not always keep dru gs in their own home will likel y do so at least sometimes. To construe the [enha ncement] to apply to episodic use of a home for drug-related purposes would effe ctively transform the provision from [one] intended to apply only in cases w ith a certain aggravating feat ure into a provision that elevates the offense leve l in nearly all § 2D1.1 cases. ( Id .) But looking to both the size a nd the scope of the drug-rela ted use of the home alleviates this concern. It ens ures the enhanc ement will not a pply when that use is truly “incidental.” That said and as we will now expl ain, Murphy’s global concern is unwarranted here. His drug-related use of his home was chronic, not merely episodic, and even seemingly paltry amounts 10 gain significance over time.
B. Application of the Guideline

maintain[ing] any place, wheth er permanently or temporarily, fo r the purpose of manufacturing, distributing, or u sing any controlled substance. ” Because we have interpreted the statute sim ilar to the guideline, we find Verner ’s discussion of § 856(a)(1) instructive.
10 Murphy’s drug distribution could hardly be called paltry (elev en sales to one buyer, two of which occ urred in his home). See supra p. 3.- 13 - Murphy argues the enhancement wa s unwarranted here because the evidence showed only that he “sometimes u sed his house for drug-related activities.” (Appellant’s Op. Br. at 13.) We beg to differ. M urphy’s use of his home fo r occasional sales, as a safe haven, a warehouse, and a headquarters for drug distributi on put him well past the “frequent and substant ial” use threshold. Murphy admitted to having rece ived and distribut ed pound quant ities of methamphetamine and several ounce s of heroin at one time. Cons istent with his admissions, distribution quantitie s of heroin and methamphetami ne were found in his home in November 2015 and one pou nd of methamphetamine was pres ent in his home in January 2016. In Febru ary 2016, he was fou nd in his vehicle “n ear his home” with a large quantity of methamphetami ne, and in early 2016, he was ob served selling methamphetamine in the parking lot of a “local” gym. (Supp. R. Vol. 2 at 5-6.) A reasonable inference from this e vidence is that the methampheta mine found in his vehicle and sold in the parking lot wa s initially stored in and passed through his home, with his vehicle being the means by whi ch he distributed drugs. Moreove r, one or more tools of the drug trade (firearms, digital scales, bullet proof vest, ba ggies, and surveillance cameras) were found in all but one search of his residence. On two of those occasions, a large amount of cash was also foun d. Murphy also conducted at least two drug sales in his home. Any totality of the circumstances evaluation admits to, perhaps demands, reasonable inferences if drawn fro m known facts or common sense . Based on the amount- 14 - ($36,291 total), the cash found in Murphy’s home was probably d rug proceeds. Other items found in the hom e are also damning. 11 In addition, Murphy’s circumstances during the relevant time are relevant . He had no leg itimate employmen t or other identifiable and legitimate source of income. Dr ug-trafficking (and theft) seem to be his main, if not sole, source of funds (and a substan tial one, at that). Add to that the four searches, each of which revealed eviden ce of drug-trafficking and most of which o ccurred while he was on bond in a criminal case. That reveals a committed course of cr iminal conduct relevant to the issue at hand. Citing no legal authority, Murphy claims we cannot rely on his admissions, the one pound of methamphetamine in his home in January 2016, or th e surveillance cameras because the judge did not rely on them. But the judge found Mu rphy “used his home for storage of large quantitie s of methamphetamine . . . . on at least four occasions .” (Supp. R. Vol. 1 at 8-9 (emphasis adde d).) This finding does not prec lude consideration of the one pound of methamphetamine in his home in January 2016. Neve rtheless, the judge’s failure to explicitly mention any of these items does not precl ude us from relying on them. See United States v. Pulham , --- F. App’x ---, No. 16-8019, 2018 WL 2374704, at *7-8 (10th Cir. May 24, 2018) (u npublished) (rejecting defendan t’s argument that we are legally precluded from considerin g certain facts in the sentenc ing record because the judge did not make specific fi ndings adopting those facts in ap plying an enhancement);

11 The judge reasonably inferred th e cash was drug proceeds and e xplicitly considered the items found in his home.- 15 - see also United States v. Underwood , 938 F.2d 1086, 1 091 (10th Cir. 19 91) (although “at a minimum, [a] court must make a finding that the requirements for [a guideline] adjustment [such as §2D1.1(b)(1 )] have been satisfied,” “our ca ses clearly do not require the . . . court to make particul arized findings”). Moreover, a ll of these findings were contained in the PSR and Murphy did not object to them. 12 They are therefore deemed admitted. See United States v. Walters , 269 F.3d 1207, 1213 (10th Cir. 2001) (“[U]nder the law of this circuit,” when a defendant does “not challenge the accuracy of the relevant facts contained in the PSR . . . t hey are deemed admitted as tr ue.”). 13

12 At the sentencing hearing, it a ppears Murphy did attempt to or ally contest the PSR’s allegation concerning the one pound of methamphetamine. But the judge did not consider it a contested fact beca use he did not include it in h is written objections; Murphy did not press the matter further.
13 Murphy also suggests we cannot c onsider the one pound of metham phetamine in his home in Janua ry 2016 because the PSR did not include it in its drug quantity calculations and it is unreliable. But the PSR’s drug quantiti es were the minimum amounts for which Murphy was re sponsible. (Supp. R. Vol. 2 at 6 (“In total, Murphy is accountable for the possess ion and distribution of at least . . . 146.55 grams of methamphetamine.”) (emphasis a dded).) Notably, the PSR also di d not include the 74.65 ounces of heroin found in the N ovember 2015 searches of his res idence. Moreover, Murphy neve r objected in the district court to the r eliability of the source of the information concer ning the one pound of methamphe tamine. Our review is for plain error. Murphy’s failure to request plain error revie w on appeal, either in his opening or reply brief, “‘surely marks the end of the road for an argument for reversal not first presented to the district court.’” United States v. Lamirand , 669 F.3d 1091, 1098 n.7 (10th Cir. 2012) (quoting Richison v. Ernest Grp., Inc. , 634 F.3d 1123, 1131 (10th Cir. 2011)); cf. United States v. Courtney , 816 F.3d 681, 684 (1 0th Cir. 2016) (reviewing argument for plain error in crim inal appeal where appellant “ar gued plain error fully in his reply brief”). In any event, “ in determining the relevant facts, sentencing judges are not restricted to information th at would be admissible at trial . Any information may be considered, so long as it has su fficient indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy.” See USSG § 6A1.3 comment. “Corrobora ting evidence is often key to determining whether a statement is sufficiently reliable.” United States v. Ruby , 706 F.3d- 16 - Murphy nevertheless tells us th at his admissions are not helpf ul because he never admitted to dealing drugs from hi s residence. Similarly, he sa ys the drugs found in his vehicle are irrelevant because they were found in his vehicle, not in his home. But the enhancement applies not only to a defendant’s use of a premises for the distribution of a controlled substance, but also to the use of a premises for the “storage of a controlled substance for the purpose of distr ibution.” USSG § 2D1.1(b)(12 ), comment. (n.17). In that regard, his admissions and t he drugs found in his vehicle are telling. Those items, considered in combination with t he drugs, proceeds, and tools o f the drug trade found in his home, lead to much more than a reasonable inference that he used his home to store drugs for distribution outside his home. Murphy conveniently admits to be ing a methamphetamine addict a nd offers his addiction as an explanation for m any of the drugs and associate d paraphernalia uncovered in his home or otherwise under hi s control. He also claims the evidence shows only that he stored drugs at his house fo r a short period of time. After all, he tells us, only two of the four searches of his residenc e (the November 3 and November 25, 2015 searches) uncovered distribution quantities of drugs or si gnificant amoun ts of cash. And those searches occurred within weeks of each other. The next two sea rches turned up “only piddling amounts.” (Appellant’s Reply Br. at 7.) But this arg ument ignores both his

1221, 1229 (10th Cir. 2013). The one pound of methamphetamine officers learned to be in his home is consistent with h is admissions that he distribut ed methamphetamine and would receive it in one pound quantities.- 17 - admissions and the large quantity of methamphetamine found in h is vehicle in February 2016. Again, a reasonable inferen ce from the evidence is that the drugs in his car and those he admitted to distributi ng were originally stored in his home. Moreover, the heroin residue and the baggie of heroin found in the third and fourth searches are significant. Although they were not typical distribution quant ities, they were not for personal use; Murphy admitted at sentenci ng that he did not per sonally use heroin, only methamphetamine. Murphy’s stora ge of drugs occurred for over a year, from November 3, 2015, to November 22, 2016. He offers innocent explanatio ns for the presence of digital sc ales, baggies, and surveillance cameras f ound in his residence. He claims digital scales can be used for personal use and he a dmitted he was a drug user. Similarly, em pty baggies have legitimate purposes. And “just because [he] sometimes used bag gies for drugs does not mean that the empty ones . . . wer e also intended to be used fo r drugs. [E]ven if they were, the [PSR] does not reveal how many empty baggies were fou nd. Only a lot of baggies would be indicative of d rug dealing.” (Appellant’s Rep ly Br. at 6.) Finally, he tells us surveillance cameras are not necessarily tools of the drug trade. He says “[m]ethamphetamine users are oft en paranoid, and Mr. Murphy had been using [methamphetamine] on a daily bas is.” (Appellant’s Op. Br. at 1 3.) The Supreme Court has rejected s uch “divide-and-conquer” appro ach in evaluating the totality o f the circumstances. See United States v. Arvizu , 534 U.S. 266, 274 (2002) (whether reasonable su spicion exists to support a tr affic stop must be based- 18 - on the totality of the circumstan ces; rejecting appellate court ’s evaluation of disparate facts in isolation from each oth er in deciding whether reasonab le suspicion existed). The relevant question is not whethe r each fact taken in isolation m ay have an innocent explanation; rather we look to th e facts as a whole to decide w hether they support the enhancement. Taken t ogether, digital scales, baggies, and surv eillance cameras are “tools of the trade.” Bell , 766 F.3d at 637; see also United States v. Taylor , 813 F.3d 1139, 1144 (8th Cir. 2016). So too are firearms, two of which were p resent in the residence but which Murphy fails to mention. Taylor , 813 F.3d at 1144. And, w hile all of these items have legitimate purposes, “when [they] are found together in th e house of [an admitted] drug dealer, they take on a diffe rent hue, providing strong cir cumstantial ev idence that he used the home” for dr ug-related activity. Bell , 766 F.3d at 637. The facts here, taken as a whole, reveal the purpose to w hich Murphy put t hese items—ill egal drug activity. Finally, Murphy argues many o f the facts we and other circuits have found to support the enhancement are not p resent here. For instance, in Henderson , police officers surveilled the defendant’s hous e for 5-6 months and observed mu ltiple parties entering and exiting his residence in a m anner they believed to be consi stent with drug-trafficking activity. 604 F. App’x at 656, 658. And a confidential inform ant made several controlled drug purchases from th e defendant at or near his res idence. Id . In United States v. Winfield , an informant bought drugs from the defendant at his residence four times in a twelve week period; each time the info rmant observed drugs and drug paraphernalia in the home. 846 F.3d 241, 243 (7th Cir. 2018). A subsequent search of- 19 - the residence revealed distri bution quantities of drugs; the de fendant was living off drug proceeds. 14 Id

. But “[w]hat is sufficient is not always necessary. That court s have found some facts sufficient to establish [that drug-relate d activity was a primary use of a premise] does not mean that those facts necessarily must be shown in every case.” Bell , 766 F.3d at 637-38 (quotation marks omit ted). So too here. The enhance ment was warranted in
Henderson and Winfield due to the frequent a nd substantial drug sales and storage occurring in the defendants’ resi dences. The enha ncement in th is case was warranted because Murphy’s use of his home to store drugs for the purpose of distribution was both frequent and substantial.
AFFIRMED

.

14 Murphy has not had a job since 2014. So a reasonable inferenc e is that he too was also living off drug proceeds.