alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. RALPH EDWARD ELLERBE

No. 7412SC767

(Filed 20 November 1974)

Robbery § 4— armed robbery — sufficiency of evidence

The State’s evidence was sufficient for the jury in a prosecution for armed robbery of a convenience store.

Appeal by defendant from *Smith, Judge,*22 June 1974 Session of Superior Court held in Cumberland County. Heard in the Court of Appeals on 21 October 1974.

This is a criminal prosecution wherein the defendant, Ralph Edward Ellerbee, was charged in a bill of indictment, proper in form, with armed robbery. The jury returned a verdict of guilty as charged, and the court sentenced the defendant to a prison term of thirty (30) years. Defendant appealed.

*Attorney General James H. Carson, Jr., by Assistant Attorney General George W. Boylan for the State.*

*Gadsden and Swindell by. Mitchel E. Gadsden for defendant appellant.*

HEDRICK, Judge.

The sole question for resolution on this appeal is whether the trial court erred in denying defendant’s timely motions for judgment as of nonsuit.

*709Ted 0. Rhodes appeared at the trial as a witness for the State and testified that on 7 July 1971 he was the president of J & C Sales, Inc., which operated a convenience store in Fayette-ville, N. C. At 9:45 p.m. that night, while Rhodes was working at the store, the defendant and another man came into the store, each carrying a pistol. The defendant ordered Rhodes to open the cash register and give him all the money in it. Rhodes had difficulty opening the cash register, and defendant said to him: “I am going to count to three; if you don’t have that cash register open by the time I count to three, I am going to kill you.” When Rhodes continued to have trouble in opening the cash register, the defendant moved to within a few inches of him and attempted to open the drawer. Rhodes finally succeeded in opening the cash register and gave the defendant $518.16 in cash. Defendant took the money, jerked the store telephone out of the wall, and ran out of the store.

Robbery at common law is the felonious taking of money or goods of any value from the person of another, or in his presence, against his will, by violence or putting him in fear. *State v. Lawrence,*262 N.C. 162, 163, 136 S.E. 2d 595, 597 (1964). Armed robbery adds the requirement that the robbery must be “with the use or threatened use of [a firearm] . . . whereby the life of a person is endangered or threatened *. ”*G.S. 14-87. Viewing the testimony of Rhodes in the light most favorable to the State, it is clear that the evidence is sufficient to require submission of the case to the jury and to support a conviction for robbery with a firearm.

In this trial, we find no error.

No error.

Judges Morris and Baley concur.
**Exhibit 32.2**

 

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO**

**18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350**

**AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**

**SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

Inconnection with the Quarterly Report of Trim Holding Group (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2012, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”),I, Nitin Amersey, herebycertify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to my knowledge:

 

|   | (1) | The Report fully complies  with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange  Act of 1934; and |
|--------|-----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

 

|   | (2) | The information contained  in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial  condition and results of operations of the Company as of the date and for the  periods expressed in the Report. |
|--------|-----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

 

| /s/ Nitin Amersey       |
|-------------------------|
| Nitin Amersey           |
| Chief Financial Officer |
|                    |
| August 20, 2012         |

 

 

 

The foregoing certification is being furnished solelypursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350 and is not being filed as part of the Reportor as a separate disclosure document.
STATE v. Michael Patrick RYAN

366A10-1

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

February 13, 2019

Marilyn G. Ozer, Attorney at Law, William F. Massengale, Attorney at Law, Chapel Hill, for Ryan, Michael Patrick.

Kelvin Atkinson, Assistant District Attorney, Joan M. Cunningham, Assistant Attorney General, Robert C. Montgomery, Special Deputy Attorney General, R. Locke Bell, Attorney at Law, Mary Carla Babb, Assistant Attorney General, Locke Bell, District Attorney, for State of N.C.

William Stevenson, Assistant District Attorney.

Dear Ms. Ozer:

The following order has been entered on the Motion for Extension of Time to File Brief filed on the 13th of February 2019 by Defendant:

"Motion Allowed by order of the Court in conference, this the 13th of February 2019."
```

[Congressional Bills 111th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 4967 Introduced in House (IH)]

111th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 4967

 To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to provide an exception to 
  the arbitrage rules for prepayments for electricity generated from 
                          renewable resources.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             March 25, 2010

Ms. Giffords (for herself, Mr. Thompson of California, Mrs. Bono Mack, 
 Mr. Grijalva, Mr. Lujan, Mr. Blumenauer, and Mr. Carnahan) introduced 
  the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Ways and 
                                 Means

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to provide an exception to 
  the arbitrage rules for prepayments for electricity generated from 
                          renewable resources.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. EXCEPTION TO ARBITRAGE RULES FOR PREPAYMENTS FOR ELECTRICITY 
              GENERATED FROM RENEWABLE RESOURCES.

    (a) In General.--Section 148(b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 
1986 is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
            ``(5) Exception for prepaid electricity generated from 
        renewable resources.--
                    ``(A) In general.--The term `investment-type 
                property' does not include a prepayment under a 
                qualified renewable electricity contract.
                    ``(B) Qualified renewable electricity contract.--
                For purposes of this paragraph, the term `qualified 
                renewable electricity contract' means any contract to 
                acquire electricity if--
                            ``(i) such electricity is used by the State 
                        or political subdivision thereof with respect 
                        to which the State or local bond is issued, and
                            ``(ii) in connection with such contract the 
                        supplier of such electricity places in service 
                        property which is capable of generating from 
                        qualified energy resources (as defined in 
                        section 45(c)) the amount of electricity 
                        purchased under the contract (and such property 
                        is not taken into account under this paragraph 
                        with respect to any other contract).''.
    (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by this section shall apply 
to obligations issued after the date of the enactment of this Act.
                                 <all>
```
I 

113TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 4558 

To clarify the authority of States to regulate private flood insurance coverage. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MAY 1, 2014 

Mr. ROSS (for himself and Mr. MURPHY of Florida) introduced the following 

bill; which was referred to the Committee on Financial Services 

A BILL 

To clarify the authority of States to regulate private flood 

insurance coverage. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Flood Insurance Mar5 ket Parity and Modernization Act of 2014’’. 

6 SEC. 2. AUTHORITY OF STATES TO REGULATE PRIVATE 

7 FLOOD INSURANCE. 

8 Paragraph (7) of section 102(b) of the Flood Dis9 aster Protection Act of 1973 (42 U.S.C. 4012a(b)(7)) is 

10 amended to read as follows: 


rfrederick on DSK6VPTVN1PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 4558 IH

1 ‘‘(7) PRIVATE FLOOD INSURANCE DEFINED.— 

2 In this subsection, the term ‘private flood insurance’ 

3 means an insurance policy that— 

4 ‘‘(A) provides flood insurance coverage; 

5 ‘‘(B) is issued by an insurance company 

6 that is— 

7 ‘‘(i) licensed, admitted, or otherwise 

8 approved to engage in the business of in9 surance in the State or jurisdiction in 

10 which the insured building is located, by 

11 the insurance regulator of that State or ju12 risdiction; or 

13 ‘‘(ii) eligible as a nonadmitted insurer 

14 to provide insurance in the State or juris15 diction where the property to be insured is 

16 located, in accordance with sections 521 

17 through 527 of the Dodd-Frank Wall 

18 Street Reform and Consumer Protection 

19 Act (15 U.S.C. 8201–6); and 

20 ‘‘(C) is issued by an insurance company 

21 that is not otherwise disapproved as a surplus 

22 lines insurer by the insurance regulator of the 

23 State or jurisdiction where the property to be 

24 insured is located’’. 

Æ 


rfrederick on DSK6VPTVN1PROD with BILLS
Justin LLOYD, Plaintiff, v. Daniel BAILEY, in his Official Capacity as Sheriff of Mecklenburg County, and Ohio Casualty Insurance Company, Defendants.

No. COA18-666

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Filed: February 5, 2019

Kennedy, Kennedy, Kennedy and Kennedy, LLP, Winston-Salem, by Harvey L. Kennedy and Harold L. Kennedy, III, for plaintiff-appellant.

Womble Bond Dickinson (US) LLP, Charlotte, by Sean F. Perrin, for defendants-appellees.

STROUD, Judge.

The background of this case can be found in this Court's prior opinion of *Lloyd v. Bailey* , 240 N.C. App. 602, 772 S.E.2d 874, *1 (Apr. 21, 2015) (COA14-935) (unpublished), *aff'd* , 368 N.C. 617, 781 S.E.2d 24 (2016). The prior appeal was filed in this same case and addressed the same claims and issues. Plaintiff Justin Lloyd was a deputy sheriff in the Mecklenburg County Sheriff's Department. *Id.* at *2. Defendant Daniel Bailey was elected as sheriff, and defendant Bailey then terminated plaintiff's employment. *See id.* Plaintiff filed this lawsuit alleging he had been terminated for unlawful reasons. *See id.* Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, and the trial court granted summary judgment in part and denied it in part. *Id.* at *3. Plaintiff appealed, and this Court reversed the trial court's judgment denying Defendants motion for summary judgment and remanded to the trial court to dismiss plaintiff's claim. *Id.* at *11. Plaintiff then petitioned the North Carolina Supreme Court for discretionary review, and the Supreme Court affirmed this Court's opinion in January of 2016. *See**Lloyd v. Bailey* , 368 N.C. 617, 781 S.E.2d 24 (2016).

In November of 2017, plaintiff filed a motion with the trial court under Rule 60(b)(6) for relief from judgment, arguing he was entitled to resurrect his claim based upon the United State Supreme Court's opinion in *Heffernan v. City of Patterson* , *N.J.* , 136 S. Ct. 1412, 194 L. Ed 2d 508 (2016), which was decided after the North Carolina Supreme Court had affirmed the dismissal of his claim. Plaintiff alleged *Heffernan* controls this case. On 16 February 2018, the trial court entered an order denying plaintiff's motion. Plaintiff appeals.

Plaintiff Lloyd's case is in the same procedural position, and his argument is the same as the plaintiff's argument in *McLaughlin v. Bailey* , --- N.C. App. ----, ---, S.E.2d ----, ---- (Feb. 5, 2019), which is filed simultaneously with this opinion. For the same reasons as stated in *McLaughlin* , we reject plaintiff's argument. Based upon *McLaughlin* , we affirm the trial court's 16 February 2018 order denying plaintiff's Rule 60 motion.

AFFIRMED.

Report per Rule 30(e).

Judges DIETZ and BERGER concur..
Exhibit
32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO THE SARBANES-OXLEY
ACT
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, Michael
Jack Kugler , Chief Executive Officer and Chairman of the Board of Directors of
U.S. Precious Metals, Inc. (the Company), do hereby certify, pursuant to
18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to my knowledge:

1.          This
Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the period ended August 31,
2008 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the Report),
fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934; and

2.          The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

Date: February
17, 2009

|                                    | 
|----------------------------------- | 
|/s/ M. Jack
 Kugler                 | 
|                                    | 
|M. Jack
 Kugler                     | 
|Chief
 Executive Officer and        | 
|Chairman of
 the Board of Directors | 
|(Principal Executive
 Officer)      | 

---
ex10-1.htm


Exhibit 10.1












BLUEFIRE EQUIPMENT CORPORATION


AMENDMENT TO


CONVERTIBLE PROMISSORY NOTE







April 1, 2013












WHEREAS, BlueFire Equipment Corporation, a Delaware corporation (the "Company") entered into a Convertible Promissory Note (the "Note") with Tyson Rohde (the "Lender") on April 1, 2011; and







WHEREAS, the Company received consideration of $100,000 and agreed to repay such principal amount and any accrued and unpaid interest on April 1, 2012; and







WHEREAS, simple interest on the Note shall accrue at an annual rate of fifteen percent (15%) and be paid monthly by the Company; and







WHEREAS, on March 31, 2012 the Company and the Lender amended the Note to grant the Lender a security interest in the Company's assets, to remove any conversion features of the Note, and to extend the maturity date to April 1, 2013; and







WHEREAS, on the Company and the Lender endeavor to extend the maturity date on the amended Note;







NOW THEREFORE, for good and valuable consideration the parties hereby agree to amend the Note as follows:







The Note is hereby amended such that the previous "Article II, Section 2.01" is deleted and replaced by the following revised "Article II, Section 2.01" and shall read as stated below.












ARTICLE II.


PRINCIPAL AND INTEREST PAYMENTS







Section 2.01      The entire principal amount of this Note together with accrued and unpaid interest thereon will be due and payable on October 1, 2013 (the "Repayment Date") unless this Note has been previously extended by the mutual consent of the parties.












IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Company has executed this Amendment to Promissory Note by its duly authorized officer as of the date and year first written above.


 




	
BlueFire Equipment Corporation

	  	
Lender


	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  
	
By:__________________________

	  	
By:  /s/Tyson Rohde

	  
	  	  	  	  
	
Name: William A. Blackwell

	  	
Name: Tyson Rohde


	  	  	  	  
	
Title: Director and CEO
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 97-6213

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

JOCK DECARLOS JONES,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

Maryland, at Baltimore. J. Frederick Motz, Chief District Judge.

(CR-92-424-JFM, CA-97-87-JFM)

Submitted: September 11, 1997 Decided: September 19, 1997

Before RUSSELL, MURNAGHAN, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Jock DeCarlos Jones, Appellant Pro Se. William Warren Hamel, OFFICE

OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Appellant seeks to appeal the district court's order denying

his motion filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West 1994 & Supp. 1997).

We have reviewed the record and the district court's opinion and

find no reversible error. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal on the reasoning of the district

court. United States v. Jones, Nos. CR-92-424-JFM; CA-97-87-JFM (D.

Md. Jan. 21, 1997). Additionally, we dismiss the § 2255 motion to

vacate sentence that the Appellant filed in this court. We dispense

with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument

would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
Exhibit 32.2

                CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
                       AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906
                        OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


I, Jack Wagenti, Secretary/Treasurer and CFO of U. S. Precious Metals, Inc. (the
"Company"), do hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to my
knowledge:

      1. This Quarterly Report on 10KSB of the Company for the period ended
      November 30, 2005 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission
      (the "report"), fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
      15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

      2. The information contained in the report fairly presents, in all
      material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of
      the Company.


Date: January 17, 2006.

/s/ Jack Wagenti
-----------------------
Jack Wagenti
(Secretary/Treasurer and CFO)
#### Christopher Napolitano, an Infant, by His Father and Natural Guardian, Fiore Napolitano, Jr., et al., Plaintiffs, v Mastic Bicycles & Fitness Co., Inc., Doing Business as Smith Point Bikes, Inc., et al., Defendants, and Bell Sports, Inc., Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff-Respondent. Kinesis Industrial Company, Ltd., Third-Party Defendant-Appellant.

[719 NYS2d 113]

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the third-party defendant, Kinesis Industrial Company, Ltd., appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Dunn, J.), dated December 21, 1999, which denied, with leave to renew, its motion, in effect, pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (8) to dismiss the third-party complaint, and granted the cross motion of the third-party plaintiff, Bell Sports, Inc., pursuant to CPLR 3211 (c) for leave to conduct discovery on the issue of personal jurisdiction and service of process.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The infant plaintiff Christopher Napolitano was allegedly *462injured when the frame of the bicycle he was riding broke in at least two places. The plaintiffs commenced an action against, among others, Mongoose Bicycle Company, Inc., a Division of Bell Sports, Inc., as the distributor of the bicycle. Bell Sports, Inc. (hereinafter Bell), subsequently commenced a third-party action against Kinesis Industrial Company, Inc. (hereinafter Kinesis), a Taiwanese corporation, as the alleged manufacturer of the bicycle frame in question. Before discovery, Kinesis moved to dismiss the third-party complaint on the ground of the lack of personal jurisdiction. Bell opposed, asserting that the long-arm jurisdiction afforded under CPLR 302 (a) (3) (ii) subjected Kinesis to the jurisdiction of the New York courts.

It is well settled that a nondomiciliary may be subjected to suit if, *inter alia,*the sale of one of its products arises from the efforts of the manufacturer or distributor to serve directly the market for its product in other countries or States, and its allegedly defective merchandise has been a source of injury *(see,*CPLR 302 [a] [3] [ii]; *World-wide Volkswagen Corp. v Woodson,*444 US 286; *LaMarca v Pak-Mor Mfg. Co.,*95 NY2d 210). The Supreme Court properly concluded that Bell submitted sufficient facts to demonstrate that Kinesis engaged in activities which made it at least foreseeable that its products would be marketed and found in New York, thereby possibly subjecting it to personal jurisdiction *(see, LaMarca v Pak-Mor Mfg. Co., supra; Peterson v Spartan Indus.,*33 NY2d 463; *Cordero v City of New York,*236 AD2d 577). Thus, Bell is entitled to discovery on the issue of personal jurisdiction and service of process with leave to Kinesis to renew its motion to dismiss upon the completion of discovery. Ritter, J. P., H. Miller, Feuerstein and Smith, JJ., concur.