NO. 12-09-00225-CV

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT

TYLER, TEXAS

BRADY W. CHAMBERS AND § APPEAL FROM THE 188TH

EVELYN B. CHAMBERS,

APPELLANTS

V. § JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

HUNT PETROLEUM CORPORATION,

APPELLEE § GREGG COUNTY, TEXAS

OPINION

This is an appeal from a judgment granting specific performance to Hunt Petroleum 

Corporation of an option to purchase, and awarding damages and attorney’s fees. In three issues, 

Brady W. Chambers and Evelyn Chambers contend that (1) the option had expired because Hunt 

failed to timely tender the $100.00 purchase money, (2) Hunt was not entitled to enforce the 

option because it was in default on the contract’s provisions, and (3) there was insufficient 

evidence to support the award of damages. We affirm the trial court’s order for specific 

performance, reverse and render the award of damages, render judgment awarding taxes paid by 

the Chamberses, and remand the cause for a redetermination of attorney’s fees.

BACKGROUND

The parties’ predecessors in interest, Sonat Exploration Company and First Church of the 

Nazarene, on August 7, 1992, entered into a lease with an option to purchase involving 3.94 

acres of a 7.94 acre tract in Longview, Gregg County, Texas. The term of the lease was fifteen 

years. Sonat paid $39,300.00 at the execution of the lease “as rent for the entire lease term.” 

The lease required Sonat to pay all ad valorem taxes and other costs during the term “as if it were 
the fee simple owner,” and provided that the church would have no ownership responsibilities. 

The lease granted Sonat the exclusive option to purchase the 3.94 acre tract “at any time prior to 

the end of the lease term.” The lease and the option were assignable. The option agreement 

contained the following provision:

The option shall be exercisable by giving written notice to the Lessor prior to the end of 

the lease and the purchase shall be completed by conveyance of the property by General Warranty 

Deed and payment of the purchase price within sixty (60) days from the delivery of the notice of 

the intent to exercise the option. The purchase price shall be one hundred dollars ($100) to be paid 

in cash at closing.

On November 22, 2004, the Chamberses bought the 7.94 acre tract that was subject to the 

lease for $50,000.00. Shortly thereafter, the Chamberses received notice from the City of 

Longview that excessive overgrowth on the tract was a violation of the municipal code. Brady 

Chambers contacted Hunt Petroleum Corporation, the successor in interest to Sonat, to notify it 

of the problem and its responsibility under the lease to clear the 3.94 acre tract to correct the 

code violations.

In May 2005, Hunt hired a contractor to clear and mow the 3.94 acres. The contractor 

“began clearing the approximately 8 acres, our half and as a favor to Mr. Chambers, his half 

also.” The cost for clearing and mowing the 7.94 acres was $17,353.00. The foreman’s memo 

noted that “there was a brush and dirt pile on Mr. Chambers[’s] half of the property that was 

buried in a pit that we dug. We put the excess dirt in a low area on his side to help it from 

collecting water.” The foreman’s memo also stated that “[w]e thought it would be in our best 

interest to help out Mr. Chambers by cleaning up his side.” Hunt mowed the entire tract in 2006 

and 2007. Only the $4,625.00 cost of the 2007 mowing was charged to this tract.

The Chamberses paid $1,698.00 in taxes attributable to Hunt’s 3.94 acres.

On July 16, 2007, Brad Russell, district landman for Hunt, sent the Chamberses formal 

notice of Hunt’s exercise of its option to purchase. Russell stated in the letter that Hunt would 

prepare a plat and general warranty deed for the Chamberses’ review. The Chamberses did not 

respond. Russell sent another letter to the Chamberses on September 8, 2007, once again 

informing them that Hunt was exercising the option in the lease and enclosing a general warranty 

deed. Russell asked the Chamberses to review the deed and sign it. In his letter, Russell stated 

that he would call the Chamberses and fix a time to meet with them to pay the $100.00 purchase 
price, pursuant to the lease terms. The Chamberses did not respond to this letter. On 

September 20, 2007, Russell sent a third letter to the Chamberses referring to the numerous 

occasions that Hunt had attempted without success to communicate with them by telephone 

despite Hunt’s leaving several messages for them on their voice mail. Another warranty deed 

was enclosed for the Chamberses to execute. The letter concluded by asking the Chamberses to 

call one of two numbers to schedule a time to close. The Chamberses did not respond to the 

third letter.

On October 8, 2007, Hunt received a letter from the Chamberses’ lawyer advising Hunt it 

was in default under the lease, and, as a result, was now holding over.

On November 5, 2007, the Chamberses filed a suit to quiet title to the 3.94 acre tract. 

They sought a declaration that the option to purchase was invalid on various grounds, and 

judgment awarding them the back taxes they had paid on the property.

Hunt counterclaimed seeking a declaration that the option was valid and a decree 

ordering its specific performance. It also sought an award of 50.6% of the land clearing and 

mowing costs under the theory of quantum meruit, and attorney’s fees.

The trial court found that Hunt had properly and timely exercised its option. The trial 

court ordered the Chamberses to execute a warranty deed, and, upon its delivery, that Hunt 

tender $100.00 to the Chamberses. The court also awarded Hunt $11,132.00 in damages (50.6% 

of the total clearing and mowing charges), and $29,289.91 in attorney’s fees.

DID THE OPTION EXPIRE BECAUSE OF HUNT’S FAILURE TO TENDER

THE $100.00 PURCHASE MONEY?

In their first issue, the Chamberses contend that the option to purchase expired because 

Hunt failed to meet its contractual obligation to tender the $100.00 purchase price within the 

sixty day period allowed for closing after its notice of exercise of the option. They maintain that 

there are no special circumstances that serve to excuse Hunt from strict compliance with the 

contract’s terms. The Chamberses argue that there is no evidence, or at least insufficient 

evidence, or findings to support the trial court’s conclusion that they were solely to blame for the 

failure to close.
Standard of Review

In an appeal from a bench trial, the trial court’s findings of fact have the same force and 

effect as a jury verdict and are reviewable for legal and factual sufficiency under the same

standards that are applied to the review of a jury verdict. Anderson v. City of Seven Points, 806 

S.W.2d 791, 794 (Tex. 1991).

When reviewing a finding for legal sufficiency, we must credit evidence favorable to the 

judgment if a reasonable fact finder could, disregard contrary evidence unless a reasonable fact 

finder could not, and reverse the fact finder’s determination only if the evidence presented in the 

trial court would not enable a reasonable and fair minded fact finder to reach the judgment under 

review. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 827 (Tex. 2005). The court should sustain an 

appellant’s legal sufficiency challenges if the record reveals (1) there is a complete absence of 

evidence of a vital fact; (2) the court is barred by rules of law or evidence from giving weight to 

the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact; (3) the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no 

more than a mere scintilla; or (4) that the evidence conclusively establishes the opposite of a vital 

fact. Id. More than a scintilla of evidence exists if the evidence rises to a level that would 

enable reasonable and fair minded people to differ in their conclusions. Ford Motor Co. v. 

Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d 598, 601 (Tex. 2004).

When considering a factual sufficiency challenge, we consider all of the evidence and set 

aside the judgment only if it so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence that it is 

clearly wrong and unjust. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986).

We review the trial court’s conclusions of law de novo. State v. Heal, 917 S.W.2d 6, 9 

(Tex. 1996).

Applicable Law

Strict compliance with the provisions of an option contract is required. See Jones v. 

Gibbs, 133 Tex. 627, 639-40, 130 S.W.2d 265, 271 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1939, opinion adopted). 

Exercise of an option must be unqualified and strictly in accordance with the terms of the 

agreement, unless equity requires otherwise. City of Brownsville v. Golden Spread Electric

Coop., 192 S.W.3d 876, 880 (Tex. App.–Dallas 2006, pet. denied). 

However, the failure of the optionee to comply strictly with the terms or conditions of the 

option will be excused when the failure is brought about by the conduct of the optionor. Jones,

133 Tex. at 640, 130 S.W.2d at 272. “It is thoroughly settled that where a defendant has openly 
and avowedly refused to perform his part of the contract or declared his intention not to perform 

it, the plaintiff need not make tender of payment of the consideration before bringing suit.” 

Burford v. Pounders, 145 Tex. 460, 466, 199 S.W.2d 141, 144 (Tex. 1947); Rus-Ann. Dev., 

Inc. v. ECGC, Inc., 222 S.W.3d 921, 927 (Tex. App.–Tyler 2007, no pet.). Formal tender is 

excused when tender “would be a useless and idle ceremony.” Burford, 145 Tex. at 467, 199 

S.W.2d at 145. A tender of consideration is excused where the optionor intentionally avoids 

giving the purchaser an opportunity of making it. 81 C.J.S. Specific Performance § 116 (1977).

Discussion

The trial court made the following findings of fact germane to this issue.

10. On July 16, 2007, prior to the expiration of the Lease with Option, Defendant gave Plaintiffs 

written notice of its election to exercise the option to purchase the 3.94 acres. Plaintiffs received 

this notice on or about July 25, 2007, but made no response to it.

11. Subsequent to July 25, 2007, Defendant made several attempts to contact Plaintiffs, both in 

writing and by telephone, in order to arrange a closing of the purchase of the 3.94 acres in 

accordance with the terms of the Lease with Option, but Plaintiffs ignored all of [Defendant’s] 

attempts to do so.

12. Defendant was at all material times ready, willing and able to close the purchase of the 3.94 

acres pursuant to the terms of the Lease with Option.

Based on these findings, the trial court concluded that “the failure to close was solely the fault of 

the [Chamberses].”

The Chamberses acknowledge that “[i]t is thoroughly settled that where a defendant has 

openly and avowedly refused to perform his part of the contract or declared his intention not to 

perform it, the plaintiff need not make tender of payment of the consideration before bringing 

suit.” See Burford, 145 Tex. at 466, 199 S.W.2d at 144; Rus-Ann Dev., 222 S.W.3d at 927. 

However, the Chamberses insist that their silence in response to Hunt’s attempts to communicate 

with them did not amount to an open refusal to perform the contract that might serve to excuse 

Hunt’s tender of the $100.00 consideration. The lease agreement required payment of the 

$100.00 consideration within sixty days of the notice of the exercise of the option. The 

Chamberses argue that because Hunt did not timely pay the consideration, its attempt to exercise 

the option was not “strictly in accordance with the terms of the agreement” and therefore 

ineffective. See Besteman v. Pitcock, 272 S.W.3d 777, 784 (Tex. App.–Texarkana 2008, no 

pet.).
We disagree. The trial court was justified in inferring that the Chamberses’ refusal to 

respond to Hunt’s repeated attempts to communicate with them during the critical sixty day 

period for closing was calculated to defeat Hunt’s exercise of its option. Almost immediately 

after the expiration of the lease and the sixty days provided for closing of Hunt’s exercise of its 

option, the Chamberses did communicate with Hunt giving it formal notice to vacate the 

premises. In our view, the Chamberses’ conduct was tantamount to a refusal to perform their 

part of the contract. A tender of consideration is excused where the optionor intentionally avoids 

giving the purchaser an opportunity of making it. See 81 C.J.S Specific Performance § 116. A 

tender of the nominal $100.00 consideration under these circumstances “would have been a vain 

and useless thing.” See Burford, 145 Tex. at 466, 199 S.W.2d at 144.

Ample evidence supports the trial court’s findings. The findings support its conclusion 

that the failure to close within sixty days following Hunt’s notice was solely the fault of the 

Chamberses. The Chamberses’ first issue is overruled.

IS A PARTY IN DEFAULT ON OTHER CONTRACT PROVISIONS

ENTITLED TO ENFORCE AN OPTION IN THAT CONTRACT?

Article III of the lease required the lessee, Hunt, to pay “all ad valorem taxes during the 

term of the lease” and to pay “all other costs associated with the property as if it were the fee 

simple owner.” In their second issue, the Chamberses maintain that Hunt is not entitled to the 

equitable remedy of specific performance of the option provided by Article V of the lease 

because it had breached the agreement by failing to pay the taxes on the 3.94 acres, and by 

allowing the tract to become overgrown in violation of the contract and the Longview municipal 

code. The question presented is whether Hunt’s breach of the covenant to pay the taxes and 

other costs associated with the property excuses the Chamberses’ performance of the contract’s 

option provision.

Applicable Law

“A prerequisite to the remedy of excuse of performance is that the covenants in a contract 

must be mutually dependent promises.” Hanks v. GAB Bus. Servs., Inc., 644 S.W.2d 707, 708 

(Tex. 1982). “[W]hen a covenant goes only to part of the consideration on both sides and a 

breach may be compensated for in damages, it is to be regarded as an independent covenant,

unless this is contrary to the expressed intent of the parties.” Id. A “condition precedent” in a 
contract is an event that must occur or an act that must be performed before a right can accrue to 

enforce an obligation.” Centex Corp. v. Dalton, 840 S.W.2d 952, 956 (Tex. 1992). Such terms 

as “if,” “provided that,” “on condition that,” or some similar phrase of conditional language are 

normally required to create a condition precedent. Criswell v. European Crossroads Shopping

Ctr., 792 S.W.2d 945, 948 (Tex. 1990). Courts will not construe a contract provision as a 

condition precedent unless they are compelled to do so by language that may be construed in no 

other way. See Reilly v. Ranger Mgmt., Inc., 727 S.W.2d 527, 530 (Tex. 1987). “If a contract 

contains a condition precedent, it must either have been met or excused before the other party’s 

obligation can be enforced.” Cal-Tex Lumber Co. v. Owens Handle Co., 989 S.W.2d 802, 809 

(Tex. App.–Tyler 1999, no pet.).

“A court may refuse to grant equitable relief [specific performance] to a [party] who has 

been guilty of unlawful or inequitable conduct regarding the issue in dispute.” Lazy M Ranch, 

Ltd. v. TXI Operations, LP, 978 S.W.2d 678, 683 (Tex. App.–Austin 1998, pet. denied).

Discussion

We conclude that the requirement found in Article III of the lease that the lessee pay 

taxes and other ownership costs associated with the 3.94 acre tract is a covenant independent of 

the option agreement found in Article V. It is not a dependent covenant or condition precedent 

whose nonperformance would render the option agreement unenforceable by Hunt.

A breach by Hunt of its obligations under Article III is readily compensable by damages. 

The lease contains no language from which it may be even inferred that the parties intended to 

condition the lessee’s enforcement of the option agreement upon its payment of taxes and other 

costs associated with the property. An examination of the entire agreement reveals no 

relationship between the taxes and other costs provision and the option provision. There is no 

conditional language indicating that the enforceability of the option is dependent upon Hunt’s 

performance of its obligations under Article III.

In Cook v. Young, 269 S.W.2d 457 (Tex. Civ. App.–Fort Worth 1954, no writ), the lessee 

sought specific performance of an option to purchase clause in the lease agreement. Id. at 458.

The lessor argued that the grant of summary judgment in the lessee’s favor was improper, 

because there was a fact issue regarding whether the lessee had complied with a term of the lease 

requiring that it pay all the utility bills for the leased property. Id. at 460. The court of appeals 

held that compliance with the terms of the lease was not a condition precedent to the lessee’s 
exercise of the option. Id. The court stated that “[w]hile we find such a provision in the lease 

contract, we do not find it in that part of the instrument containing the option to purchase. The 

option is unconditionally granted and there is no requirement creating any condition precedent or 

otherwise limiting the right to exercise the option.” Id.

In Giblin v. Sudduth, 300 S.W.2d 330 (Tex. Civ. App.–Austin 1957, writ ref’d n.r.e.), a 

contract for the sale of land also gave the buyer an option to buy an adjoining tract. The option 

provided as follows:

The seller agrees to give the purchaser an option on the acre tract joining the property they are 

buying from the seller on the east; this option will be for 5 years and the purchasers can take up 

their option at any time within 5 years from date by paying the seller $1500.00 in cash. The 

purchaser agrees to pay a yearly rental of $10.00.

Id. at 332. The court of appeals held that the purchaser’s failure to pay the rent did not bar the 

purchaser’s exercise of the option. “The option was not conditioned upon the payment of the 

annual rental, the option was for five years[,] and the purchasers were allowed to take up their 

option at any time within five years by paying the seller $1500.00 in cash.” Id. 

In a case cited by the Chamberses, Lazy M Ranch, Ltd. v. TXI Operations, LP, the 

contract required TXI to pay Lazy M $2,000.00 for the right to conduct subsurface tests for 

gravel on part of the Lazy M land – 1,669 acres specifically described by metes and bounds. 

Lazy M Ranch, 978 S.W.2d at 680. For the same consideration, the contract gave TXI the 

option to lease 300 acres out of the 1,669 acres to mine subsurface materials. To exercise the 

option, the contract required TXI (1) to give Lazy M written notice of its decision to exercise the 

option within six months of the execution of the contract and (2) tender $98,000.00 to Lazy M. 

TXI attempted to exercise the option by delivering written notice accompanied by a $98,000.00

bank check. Lazy M returned the check with a letter explaining that it would not lease the land,

because TXI had breached the contract by entering on and testing Lazy M’s land outside the 

1,669 acres specified in the contract. Id. The uncontradicted summary judgment evidence 

showed that, despite Lazy M’s repeated objections, TXI intentionally persisted in coring and 

testing outside of the area subject to the agreement. In conducting these tests, TXI stole valuable 

information about the subsurface potential of the ranch. Id. at 681.

The Austin Court of Appeals held that TXI’s conduct constituted a material breach of an 

implied covenant not to explore outside the area agreed upon. Id. Consistent with the other 
opinions cited, the court of appeals acknowledged that having decided that TXI’s conduct was a 

material breach of an implied covenant, it must determine whether the implied covenant was 

independent or dependent. Id. A breach of an independent covenant would give the 

nonbreaching party only a cause of action for damages resulting from the breach. Id. The 

breach of a dependent covenant gives the nonbreaching party the election to terminate the 

contract. Id. In that event TXI would have forfeited its option. “Forfeitures will be avoided 

unless [the] contract language admits of no other construction or results in a construction that is 

unreasonable, inequitable, or oppressive.” Id. (citing Reilly, 727 S.W.2d at 530). The court 

considered several factors in determining whether it would be inequitable and oppressive to 

characterize a party’s nonperformance as merely a breach of an independent covenant: (1) the 

extent to which the nonbreaching party will be deprived of the benefit it reasonably could have 

anticipated had the breach not occurred, (2) the extent to which the injured party can be 

adequately compensated for the part of the benefit lost, (3) the likelihood that the defaulting 

party will cure its failure, and (4) the extent to which the conduct of the party failing to perform 

comports with standards of good faith and fair dealing. Id. at 681-82 (citing RESTATEMENT OF 

CONTRACTS (SECOND) § 241(a) (1981)); Hernandez v. Gulf Group Lloyds, 875 S.W.2d 691, 693 

(Tex. 1994)).

The Chamberses stress that Hunt was unaware of the option to purchase until they 

informed Hunt that the 3.94 acres was overgrown and that the lease required Hunt to maintain 

the tract in compliance with the municipal code. The Chamberses speculate that but for their 

notice, Hunt would have remained ignorant of their option to purchase and probably would have 

failed to exercise it. The Chamberses paid the taxes on the entire tract. They claim they bought 

the entire tract without knowledge of the easement. The equities, the Chamberses contend, favor 

them and make it inequitable and oppressive to reward Hunt by enforcing the option.

We, on the contrary, believe the equities weigh in Hunt’s favor. The $100.00 to be paid 

at closing was nominal in that it bore no relationship to the value of property exchanged. The 

real price paid for the tract upon the option’s exercise was embraced within the $39,600.00

consideration already paid by the lessee at the execution of the lease in 1992. The lease was of 

record when the Chamberses bought the property. The Chamberses secured a title policy when 

they bought the property in 2004. The lease with option to purchase was pointed out in the 
policy as an exception to coverage. The Chamberses knew or should have known of the option 

to purchase when they bought the property.

Once informed that the 3.94 acres was overgrown, Hunt responded immediately by 

clearing the tract to cure the problem and comply with the contract and the municipal code. The 

Chamberses complain of Hunt’s failure to pay the ad valorem taxes on the 3.94 acres from 

November of 2004 when they bought the 7.96 acres until the time of trial. The Chamberses, as 

record owners, received the tax notices for the entire tract. They concede they never informed 

Hunt regarding the taxes or asked it to pay its pro rata share. Even if Hunt had neglected to pay 

the taxes after being told what was due, the injured party could have been adequately and easily 

compensated by damages. Hunt’s conduct deprived the Chamberses of no benefit it reasonably 

could have anticipated. Hunt’s conduct was fully consistent with standards of good faith and fair 

dealing.

We have weighed the equities using the criteria set out in Lazy M. Fairness does not 

require that we regard the covenants breached by Hunt as constructively dependent in order to 

avoid an inequitable or oppressive result. The covenants breached by Hunt were independent 

covenants whose nonperformance will not excuse the nonbreaching party’s performance. Hunt’s 

predecessor had already paid all but $100.00 of the actual consideration for the property. Hunt 

was never informed of the amount of taxes due nor was it asked to pay them. A forfeiture of 

Hunt’s option because of its breach of an independent covenant to pay those taxes would be 

genuinely inequitable and oppressive. The Chamberses’ second issue is overruled.

IS THE EVIDENCE SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE AWARD OF DAMAGES FOR CLEARING AND 

MOWING?

In their third issue, the Chamberses contend that the evidence is legally and factually 

insufficient to support the award to Hunt of $11,132.00 representing 50.6% of the clearing and

mowing charges Hunt incurred on the entire tract. The Chamberses’ share of the 7.96 acres 

equals 50.6%.

The foreman’s memo showing the cost for clearing and mowing the entire tract stated “on 

5-04-2005, M & J Construction began clearing approximately 8 acres (our half and as a favor to 

Mr. Chambers, his half also. . . .” The memo detailed how Mr. Chambers had met with him and 
stated, “We thought it would be in our best interest to help out Mr. Chambers by cleaning up his 

side.”

Brady Chambers testified that he walked around the tract with the foreman and the 

contractor. Chambers recalled that they told him that he was being so nice that they would clean 

up the brush piles he had on his side. He testified that he had never asked Hunt to mow his 

property. Chambers stated that, in fact, he had already had his part of the tract mowed for 

$200.00. In 2005, Hunt spent $17,353.28 on the property, but it charged only $4,625.00 to this 

property in 2007. Hunt never asked for payment for this work, the bulk of which was performed 

in May 2005, almost four years before trial in April 2009. Hunt sought to recover under the 

doctrine of quantum meruit.

Applicable Law

“To recover under the doctrine of quantum meruit, a plaintiff must establish that: (1) 

valuable services and/or materials were furnished, (2) to the party sought to be charged, (3) 

which were accepted by the party sought to be charged, and (4) under such circumstances as 

reasonably notified the recipient that the plaintiff, in performing, expected to be paid by the 

recipient.” Heldenfels Bros., Inc. v. City of Corpus Christi, 832 S.W.2d 39, 41 (Tex. 1992). 

The measure of damages for a claim in quantum meruit is the reasonable value of the work 

performed and the materials furnished. M.J. Sheridan & Son Co. v. Seminole Pipeline Co., 731 

S.W.2d 620, 625 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, no writ).

Discussion

Hunt proved the expense it incurred in clearing and mowing the 7.96 acres by the memos 

and invoices. Hunt’s own evidence shows that the work on the Chamberses’ half was done “as a 

favor to Mr. Chambers.” The same memo states, “We thought it would be in our best interest to 

help out Mr. Chambers by cleaning up his side.”

This is consistent with Chambers’s testimony that he was led to believe that Hunt buried 

the brush piles on his part of the tract as a favor for his cooperation. Brad Russell, Hunt’s 

landman who testified to the clearing and mowing costs, conceded that he had no reason to 

disbelieve Chambers’s testimony. Hunt, he told the court, had never previously asked the 

Chamberses to pay any part of the clearing and mowing costs, although most of the work had 

been done four years before. 
The party seeking to recover in quantum meruit must establish that the work done was 

accepted by the party to be charged “under such circumstances as reasonably notified the 

recipient that the plaintiff in performing expected to be paid by the recipient.” See Heldenfels

Bros., Inc., 832 S.W.2d at 41.

There is an absolute absence of any evidence in this record indicating that Hunt expected 

to be paid for the work done on the Chamberses’ part of the tract. The evidence, in fact, 

conclusively establishes the contrary. The Chamberses’ third issue is sustained.

CONCLUSION

That part of the judgment granting specific performance of the option to purchase the 

3.94 acres is affirmed. The award of damages to Hunt in the amount of $9,433.61 ($11,132.00 

clearing and mowing costs less $1,698.39 taxes paid by Chambers attributable to the 3.94 acres) 

is reversed and judgment rendered that Hunt take nothing on its claim for clearing and mowing 

costs. Judgment is rendered awarding the Chambers $1,698.39 for taxes they paid on the 3.94 

acres. The award of attorney’s fees to Hunt is reversed, and the cause is remanded to the trial 

court for reconsideration of the amount of attorney’s fees. 

 BILL BASS__ 

Justice

Opinion delivered August 25, 2010.

Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Griffith, J., and Bass, Retired Justice, Twelfth Court of Appeals, sitting by 

assignment.

(PUBLISH)