alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
COUNTY OF DURHAM v. BURNETTE

404A18-1

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

March 27, 2019

Mary McCullers Reece, Attorney at Law, Smithfield, for Burnette, Robert.

Geri Ruzage, Senior Assistant County Attorney, for County of Durham, by and through Durham DSS, ex rel: Sharon L. Wilson and Tiffany A. King.

*399The following order has been entered on the motion filed on the 8th of February 2019 by Plaintiff to Amend Table of Cases and Authorities:

"Motion Allowed by order of the Court in conference, this the 27th of March 2019."
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

IN RE: REAPPOINTMENT TO THE

PENNSYLVANIA INTEREST ON

LAWYERS TRUST ACCOUNT

BOARD 

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 137

DISCIPLINARY RULES DOCKET

 O R D E R

PER CURIAM:

AND NOW, this 11th day of August, 2015, Ourania Papademetriou, 

Esquire, Philadelphia, is hereby reappointed as a member of the Pennsylvania Interest 

on Lawyers Trust Account Board for a term of three years commencing September 1, 

2015.
I 

111TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 475 

To amend the Internal Revenue Code to qualify formerly homeless youth 

who are students for purposes of low income housing tax credit. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JANUARY 13, 2009 

Mr. ELLISON (for himself, Mr. WALZ, Mr. OBERSTAR, and Ms. MCCOLLUM) 

introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on 

Ways and Means 

A BILL 

To amend the Internal Revenue Code to qualify formerly 

homeless youth who are students for purposes of low 

income housing tax credit. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. FORMERLY HOMELESS YOUTH WHO ARE STU4 DENTS QUALIFIED FOR PURPOSES OF LOW 

5 INCOME HOUSING TAX CREDIT. 

6 (a) IN GENERAL.—Clause (i) of section 42(i)(3)(D) 

7 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by re8 designating subclauses (II) and (III) as subclauses (III) 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with BILLS
2 

•HR 475 IH

1 and (IV), respectively, and by inserting after subclause (I) 

2 the following new subclause: 

3 ‘‘(II) a student who previously 

4 was a homeless child or youth (as de5 fined by section 725 of the McKinney6 Vento Homeless Assistance Act),’’. 

7 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by 

8 subsection (a) shall apply to determinations made before, 

9 on, or after the date of the enactment of this Act. 

Æ 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with BILLS
Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

Clerk's Office, Atlanta, December 31, 2021.

I certify that the above is a true extract from the minutes 

of the Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of said court hereto 

affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk.

Court of Appeals 

of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA, December 31, 2021

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order

A22D0164. IN THE INTEREST OF N. E. K., A CHILD (MOTHER) .

Upon consideration of the Application for Discretionary Appeal, it is ordered that it be 

hereby GRANTED. The Appellant may file a Notice of Appeal within 10 days of the date of 

this order. The Clerk of Juvenile Court is directed to include a copy of this order in the record 

transmitted to the Court of Appeals.

LC NUMBERS:

21JV21
EXHIBIT 32.2




CERTIFICATION
OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER




ANSWERS
CORPORATION




FORM 10-Q
FOR THE QUARTER ENDED JUNE 30, 2010




PURSUANT
TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED




PURSUANT
TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002




I am the Chief
Financial Officer of Answers Corporation, a Delaware corporation (the
“Company”). I am delivering this certificate in connection with the
Form 10-Q of the Company for the quarter ended June 30, 2010 and filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission (“Form 10-Q”).




Pursuant to 18
U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, I hereby certify that, to the best of my knowledge,
the Form 10-Q fully complies with the requirements of
Section 13(a) or Section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 and that the information contained in the Form 10-Q fairly
presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of
operations of the Company.










Date: August
      11, 2010
            /s/ Steven
      SteinbergSteven
      SteinbergChief
      Financial Officer(Principal
      Financial Officer)
IN RE ESTATE OF Jacqueline GLADSTONE.

In re Estate of Jacqueline Gladstone.

A16A1682 A16A1683

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

September 6, 2018

Craig Smith Oakes, Suwanee, for Appellant in A16A1682.

John Richard Neville, Cumming, for Appellee in A16A1682 and A16A1683.

William Randal Bryant, Timothy Jerome Burson, Atlanta, for Appellant in A16A1683.

Reese, Judge.

*244This case is before us on remand from the Supreme Court of Georgia. The Forsyth County Probate Court found that Emanuel Gladstone ("Gladstone") breached his fiduciary duty as conservator for his incapacitated wife, Jacqueline Gladstone. The court entered a judgment against Gladstone and his surety, Ohio Casualty Insurance Company ("Ohio Casualty"), for $167,000 "on the settlement of accounts and as damages" and $150,000 in punitive damages. Both Gladstone and Ohio Casualty appealed (Case Numbers A16A1682 and A16A1683, respectively), and we affirmed the judgment.1

The Supreme Court of Georgia granted the petition for certiorari filed by Ohio Casualty to determine:

> (1) Did the Court of Appeals err in holding that a conservator's bond covers punitive damages even though such damages are not expressly provided for under OCGA § 29-5-40 et seq. or under the provisions of the bond itself?

> *245(2) If a conservator's bond does cover punitive damages, did the Court of Appeals err in holding that because the probate court complied with OCGA § 29-5-92 (b) (4) in imposing sanctions against the petitioner, compliance with the procedures for imposing punitive damages under OCGA § 51-12-5.1 was not required?2

The Supreme Court reversed our decision, holding that "a conservator's bond pursuant to OCGA § 29-5-40 et seq. does not cover punitive damages."3 The Supreme Court thus "answer[ed] the first question in the affirmative, rendering the second question moot."4

The Supreme Court's opinion addresses Divisions 6 and 7 of *Gladstone I* .5 The Supreme *72Court neither addressed nor considered the portions of our opinion addressing Gladstone's appeal, Divisions 1 through 5. Divisions 1 through 5 thus remain binding on the parties, and we do not address them further.6

Thus, we reverse the probate court's judgment to the extent it awarded punitive damages against Ohio Casualty and remand with direction that the trial court enter judgment against Ohio Casualty only for that portion of the award which did not constitute punitive damages, i.e., $167,000. We affirm in all other respects.

*Judgment affirmed in Case No. A16A1682. Judgment in Case No. A16A1683 affirmed in part and reversed in part, and case remanded with direction.*

Dillard, C. J., and Bethel, J., concur.

1

*In re Estate of Jacqueline Gladstone* , 341 Ga. App. 72, 798 S.E.2d 660 (2017) (*Gladstone I* ).

2

*In re Estate of Jacqueline Gladstone* , 303 Ga. 547, 814 S.E.2d 1 (2018) (*Gladstone II* ).

3

Id. at 550, 814 S.E.2d 1.

4

Id. at 547, 814 S.E.2d 1.

5

See *Gladstone II* , 303 Ga. at 548, n. 2, 814 S.E.2d 1 ; *Gladstone I* , 341 Ga. App. at 78-80 (6), 80 (7), 798 S.E.2d 660.

6

See *Shadix v. Carroll County* , 274 Ga. 560, 562-564 (1), 554 S.E.2d 465 (2001).
<PAGE>   1
                                                                     EXHIBIT 11


                 STATEMENT RE COMPUTATION OF PER SHARE EARNINGS
                    (DOLLARS IN MILLIONS, EXCEPT PER SHARE)

<TABLE>
<CAPTION>

                                                                             YEARS ENDED DECEMBER 31
                                               ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                   1998            1997            1996            1995         1994(1)
                                               ------------    ------------    ------------    ------------    ------------
<S>                                            <C>             <C>             <C>             <C>             <C>        
Net Income                                     $        450    $      1,097    $        863    $        575    $        422

Average number of Class A and Class B 
common shares (excluding Treasury 
Stock)--Basic..............................     628,201,356     628,199,268     628,199,268     628,199,268     628,199,268

Shares assumed to be issued due 
to stock options...........................       8,526,061       8,541,632       8,541,632       8,541,632       8,541,632
                                               ------------    ------------    ------------    ------------    ------------

Adjusted average number of Class A 
and Class B common shares and share
equivalents-Diluted........................     636,727,417     636,740,900     636,740,900     636,740,900     636,740,900

Earnings per share:
    - Diluted..............................    $        .71    $       1.72    $       1.36    $        .90    $        .66
                                                                                                 
    - Basic................................    $        .72    $       1.75    $       1.37    $        .92    $        .67
</TABLE>

(1)   Unaudited
Exhibit 23



CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM



We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements on Form S-3 (Nos. 333-85978 and 333-106837) of Fox Entertainment Group, Inc. of our report
dated August 11, 2004, with respect to the consolidated financial statements of Fox Entertainment Group, Inc. included in this Annual Report (Form 10-K) for the year ended June 30, 2004.



|                                          
|------------------------------------------
|                                          
|/s/ ERNST & YOUNG LLP                     
|ERNST & YOUNG LLP                         
|                                          
|Los Angeles, California September 10, 2004
**Exhibit
      32.1**












**PLY
      GEM HOLDINGS, INC.**






**CERTIFICATION
      PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C.
      SECTION 1350,**


**AS
      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906**


**OF
      THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT
      OF 2002**








In
      connection with the Quarterly Report of Ply Gem Holdings, Inc. (the Company)
      on
      Form 10-Q for the period ended October 1, 2005 as filed with the Securities
      and
      Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Lee D. Meyer, President
      and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
      Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
      of
      2002, that:








(1)
      The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
      Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and








(2)
      The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
      the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.













Date:
      November 14, 2005




/s/
                Lee D. Meyer**Lee
                D. Meyer****President
                and Chief Executive Officer**
# Fourth Court of Appeals **San Antonio, Texas**

MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04

- 23

- 01050

- CV

IN RE Brandon LATIKER and Builders First S ource - South Texas, L.P.

Original Proceeding 1

PER CURIAM

Sitting: Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice Irene Rios , Justice Lori I. Valenzuela , Justice

Delivered and Filed: December 20, 2023

PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS DISMISSED AS MOOT

On December 5 , 2023, relators filed a petition for writ of mandamus

. On December 6,

2023 , relators filed a motio n to dismiss this mandamus proceeding pu rsuant to a Rule 11 agreement
with real party in interest resolving the dispute

. Accordingly, we grant the motion to dismiss and

dismiss the mandamus proceeding as moot

.
PER CURIAM

1 This proceeding arises out of Cause No. 2022CI00737 , styled Jerome T. Johnson v

. Brandon Latiker and Builders First S

ource

- Texas Group, L.P. d/b/a Builders First S

ource, Builders First S

ource

– South Texas, L.P. , pending in the 57th Judicial District Court
, B exar County, Texas, the Honorable Antonia Arteaga presiding. Respondent, the Honorable Rosie Alvarado, however, signed the order at issue in this mandamus.
#### Mark JENNINGS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 1D02-551.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

July 24, 2003.

Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender; Anne H. Dunlap, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.

*629Charlie Crist, Attorney General; Karen M. Holland, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED. *See Watson v. State,*842 So.2d 275 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003); *State v. Franklin,*836 So.2d 1112 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003).

KAHN, WEBSTER and DAVIS, JJ., concur.
**EXHIBIT 32**

 

**CERTIFICATION OF CEO AND CFO PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Wilshire Bancorp, Inc. (the “Company”) for the quarterly period ended March 31, 2011 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), J.W. Yoo, as Chief Executive Officer of the Company, and Alex Ko, as Chief Financial Officer of the Company, each hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of his knowledge:

 

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 
|                     | WILSHIRE   BANCORP, INC. |
|--------------------------|-------------------------------|
|                     |                          |
|                     |                          |
| Date: May 9,   2011 | By:                           | /s/ J.W. Yoo |
|                     |                          | J.W. Yoo |
|                     |                          | Chief Executive   Officer |
|                     |                          |
|                     |                          |
| Date: May 9,   2011 | By:                           | /s/ Alex Ko |
|                     |                          | Alex Ko |
|                     |                          | Chief Financial   Officer |

 

----
**Exhibit 32.2**

**CERTIFICATE OF**

**PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL OFFICER**

**OF**

**NITRO PETROLEUM INCORPORATED**

I, Shane Broesky, Chief Financial Officer of Nitro Petroleum Incorporated (the “Company”), hereby certifies that, to the best of my knowledge, the quarterly report of the Company on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended July 31, 2009 (the “Report”):

|   | a. | complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and |
|--------|----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | b. | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition of the Company at July 31, 2009, and the results of the Company’s operations for the quarter ended July 31, 2009. |
|--------|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

 

| Date:  September 18, 2009 |   | /s/Shane Broesky        |
|---------------------------|--------|-------------------------|
|                      |   | Shane Broesky           |
|                      |   | Chief Financial Officer |
|                      |   |                    |
STATE EX REL. UTILITIES COMMISSION v. ATTORNEY GENERAL

401A18-1

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

March 18, 2019

Jennifer T. Harrod, Attorney at Law, Raleigh, Matthew W. Sawchak, Solicitor General, Teresa L. Townsend, Assistant Attorney General, Margaret A. Force, Assistant Attorney General, James W. Doggett, Deputy Solicitor General, for Stein, Josh (Attorney General).

Kiran H. Mehta, Attorney at Law, Charlotte, Christopher G. Browning, Jr., Attorney at Law, Raleigh, Molly McIntosh Jagannathan, Attorney at Law, Charlotte, for Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC.

Matthew D. Quinn, Attorney at Law, Raleigh, for Sierra Club.

Peter H. Ledford, Attorney at Law, Benjamin Smith, Regulatory Counsel, for N.C. Sustainable Energy Association.

Gudrun Thompson, Attorney at Law, David L. Neal, Attorney at Law, for N.C. Justice Center, et al.

David T. Drooz, Staff Attorney, Lucy E. Edmondson, Staff Attorney, for N.C. Utilities Commission-Public Staff.

***Amended****884The following order has been entered on the Motion for Extension of Time to File Appellant Briefs filed on the 14th of March 2019 by Attorney General:

"Motion Allowed by order of the Court in conference, this the 18th of March 2019."

Attorney General shall have up to and including the 26th day of April 2019 to file and serve his/her brief with this Court.
Exhibit 32.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

SECTION 1350, CHAPTER 63 OF TITLE 18, UNITED STATES CODE,

AS ADOPTED
PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

Pursuant to Section 1350, Chapter 63 of Title 18, United States Code, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the undersigned, as principal financial officer of
Xerium Technologies, Inc. (the Company), does hereby certify that, to his knowledge:

1) the Companys Form 10-Q for the
period ended September 30, 2010, fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

2) the information contained in the Companys Form 10-Q for the period ended September 30, 2010, fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of
the Company.



/s/ Brian J. FoxBrian J. FoxInterim Chief Financial Officer and Chief Accounting Officer(Principal Financial Officer)


November 5, 2010
#### STATE OF NORTH CAROLONA v. GERALD M. SHAFFER

No. 7230SC818

(Filed 20 December 1972)

Appeal by defendant from *Falls, Judge,*24 July 1972 Session of Superior Court held in Cherokee County.

Defendant appeals from a judgment of imprisonment imposed upon his plea of guilty of possessing, with intent to distribute, a controlled drug, Diphylets (Dextro Amphetamine Sulfate).

*Attorney General Robert Morgan by Deputy Attorney General James F. Bullock for the State.*

*McKeever, Edwards, Davis & Hays by W. Arthur Hays, Jr., for defendant appellant.*

CAMPBELL, Judge.

Upon a proper bill of indictment charging him with possession of a controlled drug, with intent to distribute, the defendant entered a plea of guilty.

The record supports the trial judge’s adjudication that defendant’s plea of guilty was freely, understandingly and voluntarily made. No error appears in the record. We find and hold that defendant had a fair trial free from prejudicial error.

No error.

Judges Brock and Graham concur.
#### STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ARTHUR SILAS CASE

No. 7128SC270

(Filed 28 April 1971)

Criminal Law § 99 — questioning of State’s witness by trial court — harmless error

It was not prejudicial error that the trial court questioned the State’s witness 34 times during a trial that lasted less than a day.

On *certiorari*to review trial before *Hasty, Judge of Superior Court,*24 September 1970 Session, Buncombe Superior Court.

*204Defendant was charged in a two-count bill of indictment, proper in form, with felonious breaking or entering and with felonious larceny. Defendant was represented at his trial and on this appeal by the same counsel. Defendant entered pleas of not guilty to each of the charges.

State’s evidence tended to show that during the night of 15 June 1970 or the early morning hours of 16 June 1970, defendant broke and entered the B & V Grocery store operated by one Jack Warren; and that he stole therefrom a quantity of money.

From verdicts of guilty as charged in both counts, and judgment of confinement entered thereon, defendant appealed.

*Attorney General Morgan by Trial Attorney Cole for the State.*

*Riddle & Shackelford by John E. Shackelford for the defendant.*

BROCK, Judge.

Defendant’s sole contention upon this appeal is that the trial judge committed prejudicial error in interrupting the State’s witnesses to have them repeat what they had said. Defendant concedes that the trial judge may properly question a witness to clarify the testimony or to obtain a proper understanding of what the witness said. However, defendant contends that in this trial, which lasted less than a day, it was error for the trial judge to interrupt and question the State’s witnesses thirty-four times. During oral argument counsel conceded that no one of the interruptions and questions by the trial judge constitutes error, but that the prejudice to defendant arises from the number of occasions, within a short period of time, that the judge interrupted and questioned the witness.

We might concede that it is desirable that no occasion arise which would prompt the trial judge to ask questions of a witness for clarification and understanding of the testimony. However, so long as we are dealing with human beings as witnesses, solicitors and defense counsel, and so long as we undertake to communicate by a spoken language, we are going to have need for clarification and understanding of what has been said. The frequency for the need to question for clarifica*205tion and understanding will decrease or increase with the capability of counsel in propounding clear questions, the capability of the witness to under stand, and to respond to the question which was asked, and the capability of the witness1 to express himself in such a way that his answer is clear. Wé cannot say, as a matter of law, that thirty-four interruptions by the trial judge to ask proper questions of witnesses constitutes prejudicial error. Of course, at no time may the trial judge ask questions of a witness which tend to impeach him or east doubt upon his credibility.

No error.

Judges Morris and Hedrick concur.