UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-5319

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

LEONARDO HECTOR ROSADO,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle 

District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. William L. Osteen, 

Jr., District Judge. (1:10-cr-00011-WO-1)

Submitted: October 27, 2011 Decided: November 4, 2011

Before SHEDD, AGEE, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Louis C. Allen, III, Federal Public Defender, Eric D. Placke, 

Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greensboro, North Carolina, 

for Appellant. Ripley Rand, United States Attorney, Michael F. 

Joseph, Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North 

Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Leonardo Hector Rosado was charged with possession 

with intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 

§ 841(a)(1) (2006). Following a jury trial, Rosado was found 

guilty and the district court sentenced him to 121 months’ 

imprisonment. Rosado timely appealed. We affirm.

On appeal, Rosado makes three claims: (1) the district 

court erred in giving the jury an Allen*

This Court reviews a district court’s decision to give 

an 

charge instead of 

declaring a mistrial; (2) the district court erred in applying a 

two-level sentencing enhancement for obstruction of justice; and 

(3) Rosado’s sentence is substantively unreasonable because it 

is greater than necessary to accomplish the goals of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a) (2006).

Allen charge and its content for abuse of discretion. United 

States v. Hylton, 349 F.3d 781, 788 (4th Cir. 2003). An Allen

charge is generally given to a deadlocked jury to inform jurors

that there is no reason to believe another jury would be better 

able to decide the case, that it is important that a unanimous 

verdict be reached, and that all jurors should consider the 

opinions of jurors who favor a different result. United States 

v. Burgos

 * Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896).

, 55 F.3d 933, 935-36 (4th Cir. 1995). Rosado does not 
3

challenge the content of the district court’s Allen

We accord great deference to the trial judge’s 

decision in such matters because the judge “is in the best 

position to assess . . . whether the jury will be able to reach 

a just verdict if it continues to deliberate.” 

charge; only 

the court’s decision to issue the charge rather than to declare 

a mistrial.

Renico v. Lett, 

130 S. Ct. 1855, 1863 (2010). Here, the district court 

carefully explained its exercise of that discretion, noting that 

the jury had not spent many hours deliberating before declaring 

its impasse, that it was “still early in the process,” and that 

“further deliberations . . . w[ould] be appropriate.” Because 

we perceive no abuse of discretion in the district court’s wellreasoned decision to issue an Allen

Next, Rosado contends that the obstruction of justice 

sentencing enhancement was inappropriate because the evidence 

did not support such an enhancement. When reviewing the 

district court’s application of the Sentencing Guidelines, we 

review findings of fact for clear error and questions of law de 

novo. United States v. Llamas, 599 F.3d 381, 387 (4th Cir. 

2010). A two-level enhancement under § 3C1.1 is warranted if a 

defendant “willfully obstructed or impeded” the prosecution of 

the offense of conviction with conduct relevant to that offense. 

charge rather than to 

declare a mistrial, we reject Rosado’s argument.
4

U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. Commission of perjury constitutes such an 

obstruction. Id. at cmt. n.4(b). Application of the 

obstruction enhancement based upon perjurious trial testimony 

requires a finding by the sentencing court that the defendant, 

while under oath, “(1) gave false testimony; (2) concerning a 

material matter; (3) with the willful intent to deceive (rather 

than as a result of confusion, mistake, or faulty memory).” 

United States v. Jones, 308 F.3d 425, 428 n.2 (4th Cir. 2002). 

“The sentencing court also must specifically identify the 

perjurious statements and make a finding either as to each 

element of perjury or that encompasses all of the factual 

predicates for a finding of perjury.” Id. (internal quotation 

marks omitted). Our review of the record leads us to conclude 

that the district court did not err in finding certain portions 

of Rosado’s trial testimony constituted obstruction of justice 

under these standards.

Lastly, Rosado contends that his sentence is

substantively unreasonable. We review a district court’s 

sentence for reasonableness under an abuse-of-discretion 

standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007); see 

also United States v. Pauley, 511 F.3d 468, 473-74 (4th Cir. 

2007). Upon ensuring that the sentencing court made no 

significant procedural errors, we consider the substantive 

reasonableness of the sentence imposed, taking into account the 
5

totality of the circumstances. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. We 

presume that a sentence within a properly-calculated Guidelines 

range is reasonable. United States v. Allen, 491 F.3d 178, 193 

(4th Cir. 2007). That presumption may be rebutted by a showing 

“that the sentence is unreasonable when measured against the 

§ 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Montes-Pineda

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district 

court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before the Court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process.

, 445 F.3d 

375, 379 (4th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

After a thorough review of the record, we conclude Rosado has

failed to rebut the presumption that his sentence within the 

Guidelines range — indeed, at the bottom end of that range — is

substantively reasonable.

AFFIRMED