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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 42128

CHARLES LYTLE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

JULIE LYTLE,

Defendant-Respondent.

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2015 Opinion No. 13

Filed: March 16, 2015

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District, State of Idaho, 

Bonneville County. Hon. Jon J. Shindurling, District Judge. Hon. Michelle R. 

Mallard, Magistrate.

Order of the district court, on intermediate appeal from the magistrate court, 

affirming order denying motion for relief from judgment, affirmed. 

Petersen, Moss, Hall & Olsen, Idaho Falls, for appellant. Nathan M. Olsen 

argued.

Denman & Reeves, Idaho Falls, for respondent. Reginald R. Reeves argued.

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SCHWARTZMAN, Judge Pro Tem

Charles Lytle appeals from the district court’s order on intermediate appeal, affirming the 

magistrate’s denial of his motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil 

Procedure 60(b)(4). For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

I.

FACTS AND PROCEDURE

On October 1, 1991, Charles Lytle filed for divorce from Julie Lytle. During the original 

divorce proceedings, Charles was a long-haul truck driver and did not have a permanent address. 

Julie filed an answer and counterclaim on October 17, 1991, in which she requested custody of,

and support for, their minor child and that Charles “should be required to pay her maintenance in 

the sum of $1,500 monthly.” Charles’s counsel subsequently filed a motion to withdraw, which 

was granted on May 19, 1992. In the order allowing Charles’s legal counsel to withdraw, 
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Charles was given twenty days to file a written appearance. The order further notified Charles 

that failure to file and serve a written appearance would be a sufficient ground for entry of 

default and default judgment against him without further notice. Charles did not respond. On 

September 14, 1992, the magistrate entered default judgment in favor of Julie and ordered 

Charles to pay Julie a monthly sum of $1,963 for spousal maintenance until her death or 

remarriage, together with child support. 

More than twenty years later, on December 17, 2012, Charles filed a motion for relief 

from judgment, asking the magistrate to set aside the judgment because it violated I.R.C.P. 54(c) 

and 60(b)(4) and was therefore void. Julie argued that the motion be denied for failure to file 

such within a reasonable time, as required by Rule 60(b). In its ruling, the magistrate considered

that Charles was the plaintiff in the action, that he admitted to knowing about the judgment 

“several years” after it was entered, claimed that his job and travel prevented him from pursuing 

the matter “for many years,” and that default was not entered until three months after withdrawal 

of his counsel. Finally, the magistrate explained that upholding finality of judgments was 

important in this case. Thereupon, the magistrate denied Charles’s motion for relief from 

judgment, explaining that “twenty years is not a reasonable time to set aside a Default Decree 

under almost any imaginable set of circumstance.”1

 Charles appealed to the district court, which 

affirmed. Charles again appeals.

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

For an appeal from the district court, sitting in its appellate capacity over a case from the 

magistrate division, this Court’s standard of review is the same as expressed by the Idaho 

Supreme Court. The Supreme Court reviews the magistrate record to determine whether there is 

substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate’s findings of fact and whether the 

magistrate’s conclusions of law follow from those findings. Pelayo v. Pelayo, 154 Idaho 855, 

858-59, 303 P.2d 214, 217-18 (2013). If those findings are so supported and the conclusions 

follow therefrom, and if the district court affirmed the magistrate’s decision, we affirm the 

district court’s decision as a matter of procedure. Id. Thus, the appellate courts do not review 

 1 The magistrate assumed that the default decree entered in 1992 exceeded the amount 

demanded in the complaint in violation of Rule 54(c) and that the default and judgment were 

improperly entered. For purposes of our ruling, we will likewise assume, arguendo, that the 

judgment is void. 
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the decision of the magistrate. Bailey v. Bailey, 153 Idaho 526, 529, 284 P.3d 970, 973 (2012). 

Rather, we are procedurally bound to affirm or reverse the decisions of the district court. Id. 

III.

ANALYSIS

A. Reasonable Time 

Charles raises a single issue on appeal--whether a void judgment can be challenged under 

Rule 60(b)(4) at any time or whether relief from judgment must be sought within a reasonable 

time. This is a question of law. Over questions of law, we exercise free review. Kawai Farms, 

Inc. v. Longstreet, 121 Idaho 610, 613, 826 P.2d 1322, 1325 (1992); Cole v. Kunzler, 115 Idaho 

552, 555, 768 P.2d 815, 818 (Ct. App. 1989). The rule at issue in this case, Rule 60(b), states:

On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party 

or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the 

following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) 

newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been 

discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether 

heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other 

misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has 

been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based 

has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the 

judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying 

relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a 

reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) not more than six (6) months 

after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under 

this subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its 

operation. Such motion does not require leave from the Supreme Court, or the 

district court, as the case may be, as though the judgment has been affirmed or 

settled upon appeal to that court. This rule does not limit the power of a court to: 

(i) entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or 

proceeding, or (ii) to set aside, as provided by law, within one (1) year after 

judgment was entered, a judgment obtained against a party who was not 

personally served with summons and complaint either in the state of Idaho or in 

any other jurisdiction, and who has failed to appear in said action, or (iii) to set 

aside a judgment for fraud upon the court.

Charles argues that, despite the “reasonable time” language in the rule, relief from a void 

judgment can be sought regardless of the amount of time that passed prior to requesting such 

relief. Charles has cited a number of cases from other jurisdictions regarding the treatment of 

void judgments generally and asks this Court to hold that a void judgment can be challenged at 

any time under Rule 60(b)(4), without requiring the challenge to be brought within a reasonable 
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time. Alternatively, Charles argues that any time is reasonable to challenge a void judgment. 

Charles claims no Idaho appellate court has directly addressed the issue. We disagree.

In McGrew v. McGrew, 139 Idaho 551, 82 P.3d 833 (2003), an ex-spouse filed a motion 

to set aside a specific provision of a default divorce decree--the award of retirement 

benefits--claiming the provision was void. Twenty-one months had elapsed before she brought 

her Rule 60(b) motion for relief. The Idaho Supreme Court held:

To obtain relief from a void judgment under Rule 60(b)(4) of the Idaho 

Rules of Civil Procedure, a party must bring a motion for such relief within a 

reasonable time. Where judgment is entered without the party’s knowledge, what 

constitutes a reasonable time is judged from the time that the party learned of the 

judgment.

McGrew, 139 Idaho at 559, 82 P.3d at 841 (citation omitted). The Court also discussed, in 

passing, that the question whether the twenty-one months was reasonable was left open. Id. 

Similarly, in Wright v. Wright, 130 Idaho 918, 922, 950 P.2d 1257, 1260 (1998), the Idaho 

Supreme Court stated:

The district court applied the proper standard in determining whether the Wrights 

had acted within a reasonable time, determining that they had acted promptly 

once they learned of the judgment.

These cases clearly indicate that relief must be sought within a reasonable time from when the 

party learns of a default judgment and that a reasonable amount of time to challenge a void 

judgment is something less than “any time.” 

Consistent with the Idaho Supreme Court’s cases addressing the issue, this Court has 

concluded that a Rule 60(b)(4) motion must be brought within a reasonable time and that what 

constitutes a reasonable time is based upon the facts of each case, stating:

We have reviewed the record and find no basis to conclude that the delay of five 

months was unreasonable under the facts and circumstances of this case for 

purpose of Rule 60(b)(4). . . . Therefore, we hold as a matter of law that [the 

party’s] Rule 60(b)(4) motion was brought within a reasonable time and remand 

of this issue to the district court is unnecessary.

Fischer Sys. Leasing, Inc. v. J & J Gunsmithing & Weaponry Design, Inc., 135 Idaho 624, 628-

29, 21 P.3d 946, 950-51 (Ct. App. 2001) (footnote omitted); see also Meyer v. Meyer, 135 Idaho 

460, 462, 19 P.3d 774, 776 (Ct. App. 2001). 

A plain reading of Rule 60(b), along with McGrew, Wright, Fischer and Meyer, all 

require that a Rule 60(b)(4) motion must be brought within a reasonable time. Further, were we 
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to hold that any amount of time is reasonable, as Charles claims, the “reasonable time” language 

in the rule would be rendered completely superfluous. 

In this case, the magistrate technically erred in finding that “twenty years is not a 

reasonable time to set aside a Default Decree under almost any imaginable set of circumstance.” 

The focus of reasonableness in the context of Rule 60(b)(4) should not have been the entire

twenty years that had elapsed since the judgment was entered, but the amount of time that 

transpired from when Charles first became aware of the judgment and the filing of his motion for 

relief under Rule 60(b)(4). According to Charles’s affidavit, he became aware of the default 

judgment “several years” after the judgment was entered. Charles also acknowledged that he did 

nothing about the default decree “for many years” because his “job and travel prevented [him] 

from truly being able to deal with this issue.” It appears from Charles’s own admission that he 

knew about the judgment many years before filing his motion to set it aside. Charles has not

provided any argument, justification, or authority justifying his years-long delay in seeking relief 

from the judgment. Because Charles has failed to show, or even argue, that his motion for relief 

was brought within a reasonable time, we affirm the district court.

B. Attorney Fees

Julie requests attorney fees on appeal. An award of attorney fees under I.C. § 12-121 and 

I.A.R. 41 is appropriate when the court is left with the abiding belief that the appeal has been 

brought or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation. Rendon v. Paskett, 126 

Idaho 944, 945, 894 P.2d 775, 776 (Ct. App. 1995). Julie’s request for attorney fees is granted 

because this Court is left with the abiding belief that Charles’s appeal has been brought

unreasonably and without legal foundation. 

IV.

CONCLUSION

Charles’s motion for relief from the judgment, pursuant to Rule 60(b)(4), was required to 

be made within a reasonable time from when he became aware of the judgment. Charles has 

failed to show or argue that his motion was brought within a reasonable time. Therefore, we 

affirm the district court’s order on intermediate appeal, affirming the magistrate’s denial of 

Charles’s motion for relief from judgment pursuant to I.R.C.P. 60(b)(4). Costs and attorney fees

are awarded to respondent, Julie Lytle, on appeal.

Judge LANSING and Judge GUTIERREZ, CONCUR.