If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

TERESA KARSNEY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

UNPUBLISHED

December 21, 2023

v No. 364511

Genesee Circuit Court

CITY OF BURTON, PAULA ZELENKO, and SUE

WARREN,

LC No. 17-110278-NO

Defendants-Appellees.

Before: BORRELLO, P.J., and SWARTZLE and PATEL, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiff appeals as of right the circuit court’s opinion and order granting summary 

disposition to defendants under MCR 2.116(C)(10) on plaintiff’s claim for retaliatory discharge 

under the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act (WPA), MCL 15.369 et seq. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Defendant city of Burton (the City) hired plaintiff as city clerk in October 2013. As part

of her job duties, plaintiff was required to notarize certain documents. Plaintiff admitted that she 

knew that she was not to notarize documents unless the persons signing the documents did so in 

front of her. Further, plaintiff attested in her notary application that she had read the notary laws 

of Michigan.

In the first several years of her employment, plaintiff did not receive any formal written 

discipline. But those initial years were not entirely free from conflict. For example, plaintiff had 

“some issues” with another employee and defendant Sue Warren, the human resources director,

spoke to plaintiff about it “a couple times.”

Plaintiff also had multiple clashes with the City’s mayor, defendant Paula Zelenko. In late 

2014, plaintiff reported to several city council members that defendant Zelenko was 

misappropriating funds by paying another employee from the funds of various department rather 

than directly from the mayor’s office. Plaintiff told defendant Zelenko that it was not appropriate

to spread funds across the departments. In response, defendant Zelenko “seemed unhappy” with 
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plaintiff. In 2014 and 2016, plaintiff told defendant Zelenko that defendant Zelenko was signing 

contracts in violation of the City Charter because the contracts did not have the required signatures. 

Defendant Zelenko denied that the contracts were in violation of the law or indicated she could do 

what she wanted with them, but did not discipline plaintiff. Defendant Zelenko, again, appeared

“displeased” with plaintiff. In May 2016, when plaintiff told defendant Zelenko that she intended 

to testify at a budget meeting, defendant Zelenko expressed displeasure and scheduled the meeting 

on a date that she knew plaintiff could not attend. Sometime in 2016 or 2017, plaintiff told 

defendant Zelenko that she thought it was wrong that defendant Zelenko postdated official 

documents. Plaintiff was not reprimanded; however, defendant Zelenko “seemed mad” at plaintiff. 

Finally, sometime in 2016, plaintiff expressed to defendant Zelenko that plaintiff thought it was 

wrong for defendant Zelenko to carry a handgun without a concealed carry permit. In response, 

defendant Zelenko “seemed displeased” with plaintiff.

In October 2016, plaintiff received her first formal written discipline after she sent an 

accusatory e-mail to defendant Zelenko and the entire city council regarding updates to the

retirement plan. Plaintiff “requested something in writing” regarding the changes, indicating she 

had been unable to get answers and asked why the plan was backdated.

1

 Ten days later, plaintiff 

was issued a written “employee warning notice” for “inappropriate behavior,” “insubordination,” 

and “violation of . . . procedures.” The warning indicated that plaintiff had sent an e-mail that 

“bypassed the chain of command, misstated the truth and was unprofessional and disrespectful.” 

The warning further stated, “[plaintiff’s] actions demonstrated insolence and insubordination.” 

The warning cited several city policies that plaintiff violated. 

Approximately nine months later, in July 2017, the Michigan State Police opened an 

investigation into defendant Zelenko. The investigation was prompted by a complaint filed by a 

city council member alleging that defendant Zelenko forged and submitted an altered teamsters’

union contract and violated her oath of office by not accepting the city council’s amendments to 

the budget. Michigan State Police Detective Sergeant Brian Reece was assigned to the 

investigation. As part of his investigation, Sergeant Reece visited the city clerk’s office on August 

8, 2017, where he spoke with plaintiff and made a Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), MCL 

15.231 et seq., request to plaintiff for the teamsters’ union contract. Plaintiff provided the 

requested document and informed Sergeant Reece that defendant Zelenko’s office had initially 

 

1 The full text of plaintiff’s e-mail provided:

Paula & City Council:

I would like something in writing from the City of Burton about my retirement. I 

want to know when the change is taking affect, what the changes are, have I lost 

my defined benefit completely. I want everything spelled out. I was told that Paula 

and Mr. Hefner were going to seat [sic] down with me and that didn’t happen. I 

can’t get any answers from MERS because they tell me to talk to my employer. 

Yesterday I was at lunch, I found out that Rachel was asked to sign the contract to 

set up the Defined contribution plan that was back dated to August 4, 2016. It 

wasn’t even signed until 10/3/2016. Why was it back dated? I have been very 

patient but I need answers.
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retained the document in the mayor’s office. Afterwards, plaintiff notified defendant Zelenko via 

e-mail of the FOIA request. Defendant Zelenko became “very upset” and verbally reprimanded 

plaintiff for not speaking with defendant Zelenko before responding to the request.

Approximately a month later, on September 20, 2017, a city resident, Michael Domanski, 

filed a complaint with the Burton Police Department, alleging fraud and forgery with regards to a 

quitclaim deed (hereinafter, the Domanski investigation). Domanski told Lieutenant Michael 

Odette that he had entered into a land contract with plaintiff’s coemployee, deputy clerk Racheal 

Boggs, for the sale of property for $1,500. Boggs paid a total of $1,000 to Domanski. When 

Domanski could not secure the remaining $500 from Boggs, he discovered that Boggs had paid 

the taxes on the property. He also learned that his signature was forged on a quitclaim deed 

conveying the property to Boggs, and the deed was filed with the Genesee County Register of 

Deeds. The signatures on the deed were notarized by plaintiff. Domanski was adamant that he 

never signed the quit claim deed and that he never appeared at the city clerk’s office to have 

plaintiff notarize the deed. 

Two days later, on September 22, 2017, Lieutenant Odette interviewed Boggs. Boggs 

maintained that the agreed upon price for the land contract was $1,000, which she stated she had 

paid in full. She asserted that Domanski signed the quitclaim deed the same day that he signed the 

land contract. Boggs admitted that she had never seen Domanski at city hall. But Boggs could 

not explain how plaintiff notarized the signatures on the deed when Domanski had never been to 

city hall. Boggs, who is also a notary, admitted that it was improper to notarize a document if all 

parties do not sign the document before the notary. During her second interview on September 

26, 2017, Boggs admitted that she brought the quitclaim deed to plaintiff, who stamped it and 

notarized it without all of the parties present. Boggs also admitted that it was common practice in 

the city’s clerk’s office to notarize documents without the persons signing the documents in the 

presence of the notary. She stated that she and plaintiff had notarized documents for each other 

without following the proper procedures and requirements under the Michigan Notary Public Act, 

MCL 55.561 et seq.

Lieutenant Odette interviewed plaintiff on September 22, 2017. Plaintiff verified that a 

notary has to positively identify each person signing a document and each person has to sign the 

document in the notary’s presence. When Lieutenant Odette asked if that process was followed in 

this matter, plaintiff responded, “As far as I know, I don’t see why it wouldn’t because that’s how 

we do it.” When confronted with the fact that Domanski had never been to the clerk’s office, 

plaintiff maintained that she would “never notarize anything without someone in front of [her].” 

Plaintiff confirmed that all three parties were present in her office and signed the deed in front of 

her. Upon further questioning, plaintiff backtracked and stated, “I don’t know, I honestly don’t 

know what happened.” When asked whether this could be one of those instances in which plaintiff 

notarized a document without all parties present, plaintiff said, “It could be . . . I might have done 

it as a favor, I don’t know.” Plaintiff initially denied ever signing any documents improperly as a 

favor to anyone, but then admitted that this was the first and only time she had ever improperly 

notarized a document as a favor.

Defendants suspended plaintiff’s employment with pay the same day as her interview. 

Plaintiff was informed of the suspension by a letter signed by defendant Warren. The letter stated 

that the paid suspension was “[d]ue to a discovery of possible charges of misconduct as discussed 
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with you earlier today with Lt. Michael Odette . . . .” The letter indicated that the suspension 

would be “until further notice pending a further investigation into this matter.”

Approximately two months later, defendants directed plaintiff to appear at city hall for an 

investigative meeting, also known as a Garrity2hearing. The November 15, 2017 letter, which 

was signed by defendant Warren, informed plaintiff that “[d]iscipline could be issued based on the 

totality of the evidence available to the City following this meeting[,]” and further “[if] you refuse 

to answer questions or otherwise decline to cooperate with the City’s investigation discipline may 

be issued.”

Plaintiff participated in the Garrity hearing on November 28, 2017. Defendant Warren and 

the city labor attorney were present. At the outset of the hearing, plaintiff was given a 

memorandum detailing the nature of the investigation as employment-related only. Plaintiff 

checked boxes on the memorandum indicating that she understood that her “refusal to answer . . .

[a] direct question put to [her] in this meeting will result in [her] discharge,” and that plaintiff was 

“required to tell the truth and [her] failure to do so will result in discipline up to and including 

termination.” Plaintiff declined to answer some of the questions at the hearing. Instead, she simply 

stated “no comment.”

Approximately a week after the Garrity hearing, defendants informed plaintiff that her 

employment was suspended without pay. The December 6, 2017 letter, which was signed by 

defendant Warren, stated in pertinent part:

The city has decided to place you on unpaid leave status because its investigation 

into the allegations against you confirms you engaged in the alleged misconduct. 

This conclusion has been made after a review of all available evidence. This 

includes, but is by no means limited to, the admittedly common knowledge that a 

notary’s chief responsibility is to ensure the authenticity of signatures. Your claim 

to have been unaware of this is not worthy of credence and the City finds you were 

not truthful during your investigatory interview on November 28, 2017.

Indeed, the application to become a notary contains a statement affirming, under 

penalty of perjury, that you have carefully read the notary laws of the State of 

Michigan. Michigan law requires the same. . . .

Additionally, the City has filed a complaint with the Secretary of State regarding 

your misconduct and breach of the public’s trust. As a result of your misconduct, 

your notary certification will likely be revoked. You may also be subject to a civil 

fine of up to $1,000.00 and [be] required to reimburse the Secretary of State for the 

cost of any required investigation.

 

2 Garrity v New Jersey, 385 US 493, 500; 87 S Ct 616; 17 L Ed 2d 562 (1967). “[A] Garrity

hearing allows the interviewee to answer questions with the knowledge that any statements elicited 

therein will not be used against him in criminal proceedings.” People v Brown, 279 Mich App 

116, 142; 755 NW2d 664 (2008) (cleaned up).
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Your misconduct in office could have serious ramifications for the City. . . . 

Moreover, you were expressly warned that your failure to be truthful during your 

investigatory interview would be independent grounds for termination.

Although the city believes immediate discharge is appropriate, a final 

determination as to your continued employment will be made after all relevant 

information can be reviewed. This includes, for instance, any criminal charges, 

civil penalties, and/or FOIA’d records as of yet outstanding.

During plaintiff’s unpaid suspension, several city employees and Lieutenant Odette 

allegedly pressured the prosecutor to bring charges against plaintiff.3 In June 2018, the prosecutor 

filed a criminal charge against plaintiff for violation of the Notary Public Act.

Thereafter, defendant City informed plaintiff that her employment with defendant City was 

terminated. The June 13, 2018 letter, signed by defendant Warren, stated in pertinent part:

As you are aware, the Office of the Great Seal has determined you violated the 

notary act and has suspended your notary license. As a direct result and in 

accordance with the official Charter of the City of Burton . . . , the position of City 

Clerk has been automatically vacated. Therefore, effective immediately, your 

employment with the City of Burton has ended.

You are also facing felony charges regarding this same issue and have been ordered 

by the court to cease any contact with the Clerk’s Office. In the event any criminal 

conviction results from these charges, your employment would also be 

automatically terminated by operation of . . . [the] Charter . . . .

[4]

Four months after the termination of her employment, plaintiff pleaded nolo contendere to the 

criminal charges in October 2018.

Plaintiff filed a complaint against defendants alleging violations of the WPA. Plaintiff 

alleged that she engaged in various protected activities and that she suffered adverse employment 

events, including an unpaid suspension and ultimately her termination, because she engaged in 

these protected activities.5

 

3 The city employees who allegedly engaged in this behavior are not parties in this case.

4 Plaintiff disputed that the Office of the Great Seal determined that she had violated the notary 

act. Instead, plaintiff testified in her deposition that she requested the Office of the Great Seal to 

suspend her notary license because one of her notary stamps was missing when she received her 

personal items from defendants.

5 Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint that included a claim for wrongful discharge in violation 

of public policy, but she voluntarily withdrew that claim after defendants moved for summary 

disposition.
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Defendants moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), arguing that 

plaintiff could not establish a prima facie violation of the WPA. Defendants asserted they had 

legitimate, nondiscriminatory business reasons for the adverse employment decisions, and plaintiff 

could not establish that these reasons were pretext for retaliation. Plaintiff countered that pretext 

was not relevant because direct evidence of retaliation required that the matter be submitted to a 

jury. Plaintiff asserted that the direct evidence included that defendant Zelenko knew of the 

protected activity, the adverse employment decision occurred within weeks, and defendant 

Zelenko expressed displeasure. Plaintiff added, nonetheless, that defendants’ alleged legitimate 

business reasons were pretext because Boggs was treated differently for the same behavior.

After a hearing on the motion, the trial court granted summary disposition to defendants 

under MCR 2.116(C)(10). In its analysis, the court presumed that plaintiff had established a prima 

facie case of retaliation, but concluded that plaintiff could not prevail because she could not 

establish pretext. With respect to plaintiff’s termination, the court found that defendants’ decision 

was justified and had a basis in fact, and plaintiff had not presented any countervailing evidence. 

For the same reasons, the court found that plaintiff could not establish pretext for the earlier 

suspension without pay. The court found that “Burton’s reasons have a basis in fact, they clearly 

were the actual reasons for suspension, and outright forgery of a deed being tolerated by the Clerk 

of the City of Burton to benefit a friend and fellow employee in a disputed real estate transaction 

loudly falls short of being insufficient to terminate. No reasonable juror would find otherwise on 

these points.” Plaintiff now appeals.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“We review de novo a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition.” ElKhalil v Oakwood Healthcare, Inc, 504 Mich 152, 159; 934 NW2d 665 (2019). When reviewing 

a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), a trial court must consider the 

evidence submitted by the parties in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and may 

only grant the motion if there is no genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 160. “A genuine issue of 

material fact exists when the record leaves open an issue upon which reasonable minds might 

differ.” Id. (cleaned up). But “[t]he court is not permitted to assess credibility, or to determine 

facts” in analyzing whether a genuine issue of material fact exists. Skinner v Square D Co, 445 

Mich 153, 161; 516 NW2d 475 (1994). “Instead, the court’s task is to review the record evidence, 

and all reasonable inferences therefrom, and decide whether a genuine issue of any material fact 

exists to warrant a trial.” Id.

III. ANALYSIS

An action for retaliatory discharge in violation of the WPA is governed by MCL 15.362:

An employer shall not discharge, threaten, or otherwise discriminate against 

an employee regarding the employee’s compensation, terms, conditions, location, 

or privileges of employment because the employee, or a person acting on behalf of 

the employee, reports or is about to report, verbally or in writing, a violation or a 

suspected violation of a law or regulation or rule promulgated pursuant to law of 

this state, a political subdivision of this state, or the United States to a public body, 

unless the employee knows that the report is false, or because an employee is 
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requested by a public body to participate in an investigation, hearing, or inquiry 

held by that public body, or a court action.

Under this provision, a plaintiff may establish a prima facie violation of the WPA “by 

showing that (1) the plaintiff was engaged in protected activity as defined by the act, (2) the 

defendant took an adverse employment action against the plaintiff, and (3) a causal connection 

exists between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.” Debano-Griffin v Lake 

Co, 493 Mich 167, 175; 828 NW2d 634 (2013) (cleaned up). “The plain language of the statute 

provides protection for two types of ‘whistleblowers’: (1) those who report, or are about to report, 

violations of law, regulation, or rule to a public body, and (2) those who are requested by a public 

body to participate in an investigation held by that public body or in a court action.” Henry v 

Detroit, 234 Mich App 405, 409; 594 NW2d 107 (1999). As this Court explained:

On the basis of the plain language of the WPA, we interpret a type 1 whistleblower 

to be one who, on his own initiative, takes it upon himself to communicate the 

employer’s wrongful conduct to a public body in an attempt to bring the, as yet 

hidden, violation to light to remedy the situation or harm done by the violation. In 

other words, we see type 1 whistleblowers as initiators, as opposed to type 2 

whistleblowers who participate in a previously initiated investigation or hearing at 

the behest of a public body. If a plaintiff falls under either category, then that 

plaintiff is engaged in a “protected activity” for purposes of presenting a prima facie 

case. [Id. at 410.]

With respect to causation, “[s]omething more than a temporal connection between protected 

conduct and an adverse employment action is required to show causation[.]” West v Gen Motors 

Corp, 469 Mich 177, 186; 665 NW2d 468 (2003).

A plaintiff may rely on direct or indirect evidence to establish a prima facie violation of 

the WPA. Debano-Griffin, 493 Mich at 176. “Direct evidence” is “evidence which, if believed, 

requires the conclusion that unlawful discrimination was at least a motivating factor in the 

employer’s actions.” Hazle v Ford Motor Co, 464 Mich 456, 462; 628 NW2d 515 (2001). “Absent 

direct evidence of retaliation, a plaintiff must rely on indirect evidence of his or her employer’s 

unlawful motivations to show that a causal link exists between the whistleblowing act and the 

employer’s adverse employment action.” Debano-Griffin, 493 Mich at 176. When a plaintiff 

relies on indirect evidence, the burden-shifting analysis of McDonnell Douglas6applies. Hazle, 

464 Mich 462-463. “A plaintiff may present a rebuttable prima facie case on the basis of proofs 

from which a factfinder could infer that the plaintiff was the victim of unlawful retaliation.” 

Debano-Griffin, 493 Mich at 176 (cleaned up). Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case

under this standard, a presumption of retaliation arises. Id. The burden then shifts to the employer 

to rebut this presumption by offering “a legitimate reason for its action . . . .” Id. If the employer 

offers such a reason, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to “show that a reasonable fact-finder 

could still conclude that the plaintiff’s protected activity was a ‘motivating factor’ for the 

employer’s adverse action” in order to avoid summary disposition. Id. 

 

6 McDonnell Douglas Corp v Green, 411 US 792; 93 S Ct 1817; 36 L Ed 2d 668 (1973).
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“[A] plaintiff must not merely raise a triable issue that the employer’s proffered reason was 

pretextual, but that it was a pretext for [unlawful retaliation].” Id. (cleaned up). A plaintiff can 

establish that the employer’s articulated reasons are pretexts “(1) by showing the reasons had no 

basis in fact, (2) if they have a basis in fact, by showing that they were not the actual factors 

motivating the decision, or (3) if they were factors, by showing that they were jointly insufficient 

to justify the decision.” McNeill-Marks v MidMich Med Ctr-Gratiot, 316 Mich App 1, 18; 891 

NW2d 528 (2016). But “[t]he fact that a plaintiff engages in a “protected activity” under the 

Whistleblowers’ Protection Act does not immunize him from an otherwise legitimate, or unrelated, 

adverse job action.” West, 469 Mich at 187.

A. DIRECT EVIDENCE

Plaintiff first argues that the trial court erred by applying the burden-shifting framework of 

McDonnell Douglas because direct evidence supports that plaintiff’s engagement in protected 

activities caused defendants’ adverse employment decisions. We disagree.

Plaintiff maintains that an alleged admission in defendants’ summary disposition brief is 

direct evidence of causation. Specifically, plaintiff quotes the following statement: “Defendants 

placed Plaintiff on an unpaid suspension BECAUSE OF her failure to provide truthful [Plaintiff 

Karsney denies this] and accurate information during the investigatory interview with Ms. Warren 

and the City’s labor attorney.” (Emphasis and alterations added by plaintiff.)

Plaintiff misconstrues this statement. “Direct evidence” is “evidence which, if believed, 

requires the conclusion that unlawful discrimination was at least a motivating factor in the 

employer’s actions.” Hazle, 464 Mich at 462. Applying that principle here, it cannot be reasonably 

concluded that defendants suspended plaintiff without pay after the Garrity hearing because she 

participated in the hearing or because she reported a violation of law at the hearing. Rather, 

defendants put plaintiff on unpaid suspension because defendants believed that plaintiff was 

untruthful in her statements at the Garrity hearing. The statement does not provide direct evidence 

that plaintiff was suspended without pay because she engaged in protected activity. Accordingly, 

we conclude that the trial court did not err by applying the burden-shifting framework of 

McDonnell Douglas.

7

B. PRETEXT

Plaintiff further asserts that the trial court erred by concluding that she failed to establish 

that defendants’ alleged legitimate business reasons for its adverse employment actions were 

pretext. We disagree.

 

7 Plaintiff argues for the first time on appeal that a reprimand on the same day as the protected 

activity is direct evidence of causation. Because plaintiff did not raise these facts as direct evidence 

in the trial court, this claim is waived. See Tolas Oil & Gas Exploration Co v Bach Servs & Mfg, 

LLC, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___NW2d___ (2023) (Docket No. 359090); slip op at 3 (holding 

that a party waives a claim of error that the party did not properly preserve by bringing the issue 

to the trial court’s attention).
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Plaintiff first asserts that defendant’s adverse employment decisions have no basis in fact 

because, accepting the evidence in a light most favorable to plaintiff, Boggs forged plaintiff’s 

notarization on the deed. Plaintiff’s position disregards her own admissions and testimony. 

Plaintiff told Lieutenant Odette that she stamped the deed as a favor. And in her deposition 

testimony, plaintiff admitted that she notarized the deed, stating, “I never said I didn’t notarize it.” 

On appeal, plaintiff references her affidavit, but she does not attest in her affidavit that she did not 

stamp the deed. Plaintiff further argues that no one saw plaintiff notarize the deed and Boggs had 

a motive to notarize the deed. But it cannot be reasonably inferred from these facts that plaintiff 

did not stamp the deed herself. Such an inference is speculative and insufficient to create a genuine 

issue of material fact. See Kaminski v Grand Trunk Western R Co, 347 Mich 417, 422; 79 NW2d 

899 (1956) (indicating evidence is speculative when it merely provides an explanation consistent 

with known facts and does not provide a reasonable factual basis from which to make logical 

inferences). 

We find that the record establishes a factual basis to support defendants’ business decision. 

Defendants suspended plaintiff with pay based on suspected misconduct that was factually 

supported by the police investigation. Defendants suspended plaintiff without pay because she

violated the notary laws and her claim that she did not know the presence of all signors was 

required was not credible. And defendants terminated plaintiff’s employment because she had 

been charged with a felony and the Office of the Great Seal had revoked her notary license. 

Accordingly, we conclude that plaintiff failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact that 

defendants’ adverse employment decisions had “no basis in fact.”

Plaintiff further argues that pretext exists because even if defendants’ legitimate business 

reasons were true, the grounds were not enough to terminate plaintiff’s employment. In support, 

plaintiff asserts that defendant Zelenko often ordered plaintiff to notarize documents in the absence 

of signors and that Boggs engaged in the same behavior, but was not fired. However, the forged 

deed at issue that led to plaintiff’s paid suspension, unpaid suspension, and ultimate termination 

was not a document that defendant Zelenko asked plaintiff to notarize; it was a document allegedly 

signed by a private citizen that plaintiff notarized as a favor for a fellow employee, not defendant 

Zelenko. Further, the complaint related to the forged deed that led to defendant’s adverse 

employment decisions was not initiated by defendants; it originated with a private citizen. 

Plaintiff’s act of notarizing the deed against protocol in this instance led to criminal charges and 

revocation of her notary license, unlike the instances in which defendant Zelenko requested 

plaintiff to notarize documents against protocol. Even assuming Boggs engaged in the same 

behavior as plaintiff, Boggs’ situation was otherwise dissimilar to plaintiff’s. Indeed, Boggs was 

not charged with any crime related to her conduct and her employment was not terminated. But 

Boggs suffered adverse employment actions. Boggs was initially suspended with pay and then 

she was suspended without pay for her conduct related to the Domanski investigation. Unlike 

plaintiff, Boggs was a union employee, so a union representative ultimately negotiated Boggs’ 

reinstatement. Boggs’ dissimilar treatment does not suggest that plaintiff’s termination was not 

justified.

Finally, plaintiff asserts that the highly unusual circumstances of this case, in which 

multiple city employees pressured the prosecutor to bring criminal charges against plaintiff, 

demonstrates pretext and requires submission of this matter to a jury. The most that can be inferred 

from these circumstances is that these employees wanted plaintiff to be charged with a crime. 
-10-

These motivations cannot reasonably be attributed to defendants without some other indication on 

the record. Moreover, plaintiff has not cited any authority that such “unusual activity” from 

employees not involved in reprimanding plaintiff is sufficient to demonstrate pretext.8

We find that plaintiff has failed to establish that a genuine issue of material fact exists that 

defendants’ legitimate business reasons for its adverse employment decisions were pretexts. 

Accordingly, the trial court did not err by granting summary disposition in favor of defendants.9

Affirmed.

/s/ Stephen L. Borrello 

/s/ Brock A. Swartzle 

/s/ Sima G. Patel 

 

8 Relatedly, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by adopting the federal “honest belief rule,” 

wherein “[a]s long as the employer held an honest belief in its proffered reason, the employee 

cannot establish pretext even if the employer’s reason is ultimately found to be mistaken, foolish, 

trivial, or baseless.” Seeger v Cincinnati Bell Tel Co, 681 F3d 274, 285-286 (CA 6, 2012) (cleaned 

up). Thus, the falsity of an employer’s proffered legitimate business reason cannot establish 

pretext as a matter of law. Id. at 285. But plaintiff fails to identify any portion of the trial court’s 

opinion that reflects that it adopted this principle. In fact, there is no federal authority cited in the 

trial court’s opinion, nor was the honest belief rule discussed by the trial court. 

9 Because our analysis necessarily presumes that plaintiff established a prima facie case of

retaliation, it is not necessary for us to consider the remainder of plaintiff’s arguments.