IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-60156

GEORGIOS Y. LAZAROU, Ph.D.,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

MISSISSIPPI STATE UNIVERSITY; BOARD OF TRUSTEES, 

INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER LEARNING,

Defendants-Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Mississippi

USDC No. 1:07-CV-60

Before KING, BENAVIDES, and DENNIS, Circuit Judge.

PER CURIAM:*

Georgios Y. Lazarou (“Lazarou”), a native of Cyprus, brought suit 

against Mississippi State University (“MSU”) and Institutions of Higher 

Learning’s Board of Trustees (“IHL”), asserting national-origin discrimination 

in violation of Title VII and in connection with his unsuccessful tenure 

application in MSU’s Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering. 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

December 17, 2013

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 

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The district court granted summary judgment in favor of MSU and IHL, and 

Lazarou appealed. For the reasons that follow, we AFFIRM.

BACKGROUND

Lazarou joined MSU as a tenure-track, assistant professor in the 

university’s Electrical and Computer Engineering Department in August 2000, 

working under a series of one-year employment contracts. As a tenure-track 

faculty member, Lazarou underwent annual reviews, which included 

discussion of his research record. Beginning with his first annual review, in 

2001, and continuing until his last annual review, in 2004, prior to submitting 

his tenure application, Lazarou’s supervisors repeatedly highlighted concerns 

regarding his research, including with respect to external sources of funding 

and his lack of scholarly publications. Lazarou’s performance in this area was 

described by one evaluator as “not consistent with successful tenure and 

promotion.”

In 2005, Lazarou submitted a tenure application. A tenure application 

is reviewed with respect to the applicant’s achievements in teaching, research, 

and service. To be eligible for tenure, the applicant must demonstrate 

satisfactory performance in all three areas and excellence in at least one area. 

In evaluating a tenure applicant’s performance in research, the reviewers 

consider “dissemination of original research results in peer reviewed 

publications and the receipt of funding through competitive grants offered by 

outside organizations.” Once an applicant submits his or her application, the 

tenure review process begins and consists of multiple levels of review, 

including submissions by external evaluators and independent 

recommendations by a department committee, the department chair, a college 

committee, the college dean, the university provost, and the university 

president. The ultimate decision whether to grant tenure belongs to the 

president.

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If the president declines to grant tenure, the applicant may submit a 

request to the provost to have his appeal reviewed by the University 

Committee on Promotion and Tenure. The Committee holds a hearing, 

interviews the applicant and the parties involved in the tenure review process, 

and issues a recommendation to the provost regarding whether the applicant 

should have been granted tenure. The provost then undertakes his or her own 

review of the Committee’s recommendation and makes a second 

recommendation to the president. If the president declines to reverse his or 

her earlier decision, the decision becomes final unless the applicant appeals to 

IHL. Upon a final decision to deny tenure, MSU typically provides the 

unsuccessful candidate with a terminal, one-year employment contract.

The department committee reviewed Lazarou’s application and 

recommended denying him tenure. Thereafter, the department head, the 

college committee, the college dean, and the provost successively reviewed 

Lazarou’s application and, at each stage, recommended denying him tenure. 

At each stage, the reviewers determined that Lazarou had demonstrated 

satisfactory achievement in teaching and service. However, the reviewers also 

concluded that Lazarou had failed to demonstrate even satisfactory 

achievement in research and that, consequently, he was not qualified for 

tenure. The university president concurred in the denial of Lazarou’s tenure 

application.

After being informed of the president’s decision, Lazarou appealed to the 

University Committee on Promotion and Tenure. The Committee conducted 

an investigation and interviewed Lazarou and others involved in the tenure 

review process. The Committee declined to reverse the decision to deny 

Lazarou tenure. The provost, upon a second review of Lazarou’s tenure 

application, again declined to recommend Lazarou for tenure, and the 

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president agreed. Lazarou did not appeal to IHL.1 Instead, he signed a oneyear, nonrenewable contract for the 2006–2007 school year. He resigned from 

the university in January 2007.

Lazarou subsequently filed a charge with the Equal Employment 

Opportunity Commission (“the EEOC”), claiming that he had been denied 

tenure because of his national origin. On receiving his right-to-sue letter from 

the EEOC, he brought suit against MSU and IHL, claiming that he had been 

unlawfully denied tenure and discriminated against in violation of Title VII. 

MSU and IHL moved for summary judgment, which the district court granted, 

and Lazarou filed a timely notice of appeal.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“We review a district court’s summary judgment de novo, applying the 

same standard as the district court.” Tagore v. United States, No. 12-20214, 

2013 WL 6008901, at *3 (5th Cir. Nov. 13, 2013). “Summary judgment is 

warranted if, viewing all evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the record demonstrates that there is no genuine issue of 

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 

law.” Id.; see FED. R. CIV. P. 56. “A fact is material if it ‘might affect the 

outcome of the suit under the governing law,’ and a dispute is genuine if ‘the 

evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the 

nonmoving party.’” Tagore, 2013 WL 6008901, at *3 (quoting Anderson v. 

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).

“We construe all facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the 

nonmoving party when reviewing grants of motions for summary judgment.” 

Hernandez v. Yellow Transp., Inc., 670 F.3d 644, 650 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting 

1 Consequently, IHL did not participate at any stage in the review or denial of 

Lazarou’s application and is therefore entitled to summary judgment.

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Murray v. Earle, 405 F.3d 278, 284 (5th Cir. 2005)) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). “[A] party seeking summary judgment . . . bears the initial 

responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and 

identifying those portions of [the record] which it believes demonstrate the 

absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 

317, 323 (1986). The burden then shifts to “the nonmoving party to go beyond 

the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers to 

interrogatories, and admissions on file,’ designate ‘specific facts showing that 

there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Id. at 324.

DISCUSSION

I.

Under Title VII, it is unlawful “for an employer[] . . . to fail or refuse to 

hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any 

individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 

employment, because of such individual’s race, color, . . . or national origin.” 

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). The analytical framework for addressing a Title VII 

claim depends on whether the plaintiff has presented direct or circumstantial 

evidence of discrimination. See Jones v. Robinson Property Grp., L.P., 427 F.3d 

987, 992 (5th Cir. 2005). “Direct evidence is evidence which, if believed, proves 

the fact without inference or presumption.” Id. “In a Title VII context, direct 

evidence includes any statement or document which shows on its face that an 

improper criterion served as a basis—not necessarily the sole basis, but a 

basis—for the adverse employment action.” Fabela v. Socorro Indep. Sch. 

Dist., 329 F.3d 409, 415 (5th Cir. 2003), abrogated on other grounds by Gross 

v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 177 (2009).

If an employee presents credible direct evidence that 

discriminatory animus at least in part motivated, or was a 

substantial factor in the adverse employment action, then it 

becomes the employer’s burden to prove by a preponderance of the 

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evidence that the same decision would have been made regardless 

of the discriminatory animus.

Jones, 427 F.3d at 992; see also Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 

U.S. 111, 121 (1985) (“[T]he McDonnell Douglas test is inapplicable where the 

plaintiff presents direct evidence of discrimination.”). 

“Where[] . . . the plaintiff does not produce any direct evidence of 

discrimination, we apply the well-known McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting 

framework as modified and restated by this court.” Burrell v. Dr. 

Pepper/Seven Up Bottling Grp., Inc., 482 F.3d 408, 411 (5th Cir. 2007); see 

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Under that 

framework,

the plaintiff must first demonstrate a prima facie case of 

discrimination; the defendant then must articulate a legitimate, 

non-discriminatory reason for its [adverse] decision . . . ; and, if the 

defendant meets its burden of production, the plaintiff must then 

offer sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact 

that either (1) the employer’s reason is a pretext or (2) that the 

employer’s reason, while true, is only one of the reasons for its 

conduct, and another “motivating factor” is the plaintiff’s protected 

characteristic.

Burrell, 482 F.3d at 411-12.2

“To establish a prima facie case in the context of a denial of tenure, the 

plaintiff must show that: (1) he belongs to a protected group, (2) he was 

qualified for tenure, and (3) he was denied tenure in circumstances permitting 

an [inference] of discrimination.” Tanik v. S. Methodist Univ., 116 F.3d 775, 

775-76 (5th Cir. 1997). “Other circuits have recognized that tenure decisions 

2 Lazarou asserts that the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework is 

inapplicable in mixed-motive cases. Mixed-motive cases are governed by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(m). This circuit has adopted a “modified McDonnell Douglas approach” in mixed-motive 

cases, incorporating § 2000e-2(m) into McDonnell Douglas’s third step, as accurately recited 

in Burrell. See Keelan v. Majesco Software, Inc., 407 F.3d 332, 341 (5th Cir. 2005) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). Lazarou’s argument to the contrary is therefore without merit.

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in colleges and universities involve considerations that set them apart from 

other kinds of employment decisions.” Id. at 776 (citing Kumar v. Univ. of 

Mass., 774 F.2d 1, 11 (1st Cir.1985); Zahorik v. Cornell Univ., 729 F.2d 85, 92 

(2d Cir.1984)). “Those factors are: (1) tenure contracts require unusual 

commitments as to time and collegial relationships, (2) academic tenure 

decisions are often non-competitive, (3) tenure decisions are usually highly 

decentralized, (4) the number of factors considered in tenure decisions is quite 

extensive, and (5) tenure decisions are a source of unusually great 

disagreement.” Id. (citing Zahorik, 729 F.2d at 92). “Tenure decisions are not, 

however, exempt from judicial scrutiny under Title VII.” Id. “To prove a prima 

facie case, a plaintiff may be able to show ‘departures from procedural 

regularity’, ‘conventional evidence of bias on the part of individuals involved’, 

or that the plaintiff is found to be qualified for tenure by ‘some significant 

portion of the departmental faculty, referrants or other scholars in the 

particular field’.” Id. (quoting Zahorik, 729 F.2d at 93-94). 

Once the plaintiff has met his burden of demonstrating a prima facie 

case of discrimination, and if the employer satisfies its burden of producing a 

legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse decision, “then the 

presumption raised by the plaintiff’s prima facie case essentially disappears, 

and the plaintiff is left with the ultimate burden, which has never left him: 

that of proving that the defendant intentionally discriminated against him.” 

Id.

II.

We first consider whether Lazarou has presented direct evidence of 

discrimination. During his deposition, Lazarou recalled a conversation he had 

had with James Harden (“Harden”), the head of Lazarou’s department, 

regarding a potential faculty member. According to Lazarou, Harden, 

allegedly in the context of criticizing Lazarou’s ability and willingness to work 

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with others in the department, suggested that “maybe . . . [Lazarou] ha[d] 

character issues because of [his] background.”3

In Krystek v. University of Southern Mississippi, which also involved an 

unsuccessful tenure applicant asserting discrimination in violation of Title VII, 

we explained that

in order for comments in the workplace to provide sufficient 

evidence of discrimination, they must be “1) related [to the 

protected class of persons of which the plaintiff is a member]; 2) 

proximate in time to the terminations; 3) made by an individual 

with authority over the employment decision at issue; and 4) 

related to the employment decision at issue.”

164 F.3d 251, 256 (5th Cir. 1999) (alteration in original) (quoting Brown v. CSC 

Logic, Inc., 82 F.3d 651, 655 (5th Cir. 1996)). The Krystek court concluded that 

the interim dean’s alleged comment to the plaintiff—“There are different 

standards for males and females”—was not direct evidence of gender 

discrimination because there was no dispute that the alleged comment was 

made two years prior to and in a context unrelated to the plaintiff’s tenure 

application. See id. Similarly, it is undisputed that Harden’s alleged comment 

was made at least ten months in advance of Lazarou’s tenure application. 

Further, the alleged comment was made in the context of Lazarou declining to 

offer feedback on a potential faculty member. Finally, the comment—

regarding Lazarou’s “character issues because of [his] background”—is too 

ambiguous. We cannot say whether it related to Lazarou’s national origin. 

Compare Jones, 427 F.3d at 992 (“Direct evidence is evidence which, if believed, 

proves the fact without inference or presumption.”). We therefore conclude 

that Lazarou has not presented direct evidence of discrimination. See Krystek, 

164 F.3d at 256.

3 When deposed, Harden denied making the statement or any words to that effect.

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III.

Because Lazarou has failed to produce any direct evidence of 

discrimination, he must satisfy the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting 

framework instead. See Burrell, 482 F.3d at 411. Our first step is to consider 

whether Lazarou has demonstrated a prima facie case of discrimination. MSU 

argues that he was not qualified for tenure, a necessary component of the 

prima facie case in the tenure-application context. See Tanik, 116 F.3d at 776.

When he applied for tenure, Lazarou had a satisfactory record in 

teaching and service; however, the reviewers unanimously agreed that he had 

failed to demonstrate satisfactory achievement in the area of research because 

of a dearth of scholarly publications. For example, when Lazarou submitted 

his application, he had published only two refereed journal articles (a third was 

scheduled for publication at the time). Both articles were co-authored, and one 

was published in a journal considered “low tier” because it utilized a five-day 

submission-to-publication timeframe and required a publication fee. 

Moreover, Lazarou’s annual reviews included repeated notations concerning 

the need to buttress his record with respect to publishing. Nevertheless, for 

his first four-and-a-half years at the university, Lazarou had no refereed 

publications.

The reviewers also raised concerns related to the accuracy of Lazarou’s 

research. Lazarou’s application listed two awards whose amounts were 

inflated, a large proposal that had not in fact been awarded, and a submitted 

proposal for which the university had no records. The application also listed a 

$450,000 National Science Foundation grant. However, the university later 

determined that Lazarou had not been listed as a principal investigator on the 

grant application, had not been involved in obtaining the grant, and had not 

been identified on the grant application in any capacity. Instead, Lazarou had 

been substituted, after the grant had been awarded and funding had been 

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received, as the principal investigator because the grant recipient had taken a 

sabbatical. Although Lazarou acknowledged this in his application, he also 

answered “100%” in response to a question asking him to list the percentage 

for which he was responsible for the grant. Under these circumstances, 

Lazarou has not satisfied his burden of demonstrating that he was qualified 

for tenure. Compare Krystek, 164 F.3d at 257 (“Krystek argues that he was 

qualified for tenure, but the evidence clearly indicates that Krystek failed to 

meet an established [university] tenure requirement: publishing scholarly 

work in ‘reputable journals, scholarly presses, and publishing houses that 

accept works only after rigorous professional review.’”).

Nor has Lazarou shown that he was treated differently from a similarly 

situated tenure applicant. Lazarou asserts that J.W. Bruce (“Bruce”), an 

American professor who received tenure one year prior to the submission of 

Lazarou’s tenure application, was given more favorable treatment.4 However, 

Lazarou has failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact that he was 

as or better qualified than Bruce. Focusing on research—the area in which 

Lazarou failed to achieve satisfactory performance—Bruce’s record included 

eight peer-reviewed, refereed journal publications and twelve refereed, 

published conference papers. By contrast, Lazarou’s record included only two 

peer-reviewed, refereed journal publications and ten refereed conference 

papers. Although Lazarou asserts that his qualifications vis-à-vis Bruce are 

genuinely contested, his only record support is a chart, prepared by Lazarou 

4 Lazarou also claims that he was as or better qualified than seven other American 

professors who had been granted tenure: Lori Bruce, Patrick Donohue, Randy Follet, Bryant 

Jones, Roger King, Robert J. Moorhead, and Bob Reese. Nevertheless, Lazarou fails to 

support his arguments with respect to Lori Bruce, Jones, or King and his remaining 

arguments involve irrelevant comparisons or conclusory assertions, insufficient to create a 

genuine issue of material fact on this point.

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himself, purportedly comparing Lazarou with Bruce. The chart states that 

Bruce had only two peer-reviewed, refereed journal publications, even though 

Bruce’s CV lists eight. Additionally, the chart conclusorily suggests that one 

of Bruce’s publications should not have been counted as “significant” because 

it was based on “very low quality research work” and published in a journal 

with “a very high acceptance rate” according to Lazarou. Lastly, the chart 

purports to criticize those who reviewed Bruce’s tenure application because 

they supposedly credited him with research he conducted before joining the 

faculty at MSU. By contrast, Lazarou’s reviewers faulted him for having 

conducted no research until the year he submitted his tenure application. No 

reasonable jury could conclude, based on this chart, that Lazarou and Bruce 

were similarly situated. Accordingly, because Lazarou has failed to 

demonstrate that he was treated differently from a similarly situated tenure 

applicant, he has failed to carry his burden with respect to the prima facie case. 

Cf. Celestine v. Petroleos de Venezuella SA, 266 F.3d 343, 357 (5th Cir. 2001) 

(noting that “the bar is set high for . . . evidence [of the plaintiff’s superior 

qualification] because differences in qualifications are generally not probative 

evidence of discrimination unless those disparities are ‘of such weight and 

significance that no reasonable person, in the exercise of impartial judgment, 

could have chosen the candidate selected over the plaintiff for the job in 

question.’” (quoting Deines v. Tex. Dep’t of Prot. & Regulatory Servs., 164 F.3d 

277, 280-81 (5th Cir. 1999))); compare Krystek, 164 F.3d at 257 (“[T]here is no 

evidence that Krystek was treated differently from female tenure-track 

assistant professors. Krystek cannot point to a single similarly situated 

assistant professor who was awarded tenure despite not publishing scholarly 

work.”).

Finally, Lazarou argues that when a university avoids its own 

procedures, thereby failing to investigate complaints of discrimination in the 

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tenure process, that is itself evidence of discrimination. MSU prohibits 

discrimination on a number of grounds, including race, ethnicity, and national 

origin. The university’s nondiscrimination policy further provides that “[a]ny 

administrator . . . who knows of, or receives, a complaint of discrimination . . . 

must promptly report the information or complaint to [the Office of Human 

Resources Management].”

Lazarou, through an attorney, sent a letter to the college dean. The 

letter appears to have been sent after the department committee and 

department chair had reviewed his tenure application but before anyone else 

had done so. In the letter, Lazarou asserts that the department chair’s decision 

not to recommend him for tenure was discriminatory and made on the basis of 

Lazarou’s “ethnic heritage.”5

Lazarou asserts that, despite his letter, the college dean never reported 

his claims to the Office of Human Resources Management and argues that his 

complaints were otherwise never investigated by the university. We disagree. 

Lazarou ignores an important caveat to the university’s nondiscrimination 

policy. Under “Application,” the university’s nondiscrimination policy 

expressly provides that “[t]his policy is not intended to address differences in 

opinion regarding the validity of employment decisions such as . . . promotion 

and tenure decisions.” Accordingly, the policy that Lazarou contends went 

unfollowed exempts from its ambit tenure decisions. 

Lazarou further ignores that the university did investigate—and found 

meritless—his allegations of discrimination when he appealed the denial of 

tenure to the University Committee on Tenure and Promotion, the committee 

5 Additionally, Lazarou submitted his “objections . . . to actions taken by MSU, its 

employees[,] and/or agents.” However, it is not clear to whom Lazarou submitted these 

objections. Finally, Lazarou’s mentor, Joseph Picone, sent an email to the university 

president vaguely alleging that Lazarou had been discriminated against.

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independently charged with reviewing whether a tenure decision was 

“prejudiced, arbitrary, or capricious.” The committee reviewed all of the

tenure-application materials and interviewed the people involved, including 

the reviewers and Lazarou. Moreover, as part of this process, Lazarou 

submitted a twenty-eight-page letter and participated in the committee’s 

hearing. Nonetheless, the committee unanimously determined that the 

decision to deny Lazarou tenure was not prejudicial, arbitrary, or capricious 

and therefore recommended to the provost that the decision be affirmed. The 

provost’s recommendation remained unchanged, and the president denied 

Lazarou’s appeal.

Lazarou has therefore failed to point to any record evidence that the 

university did not investigate his allegations of discrimination or otherwise 

failed to abide by its own nondiscrimination policies. Accordingly, we conclude 

that Lazarou has failed to carry his burden of demonstrating a genuine issue 

of material fact regarding whether he was qualified for tenure, a necessary 

component of his prima facie case of discrimination under the McDonnell 

Douglas burden-shifting framework. See Tanik, 116 F.3d at 776. Under these 

circumstances, MSU was entitled to summary judgment.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

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