AFFIRM; and Opinion Filed January 21, 2015.

S

In The

Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05-14-00204-CR

JIMMY ALBERT JOHNSON, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 59th Judicial District Court

Grayson County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 044441

OPINION

Before Chief Justice Wright, Justice Bridges, and Justice Fillmore

Opinion by Justice Fillmore

Jimmy Albert Johnson appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to dismiss for 

violation of his right to a speedy trial. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Procedural History

Johnson was arrested on May 8, 19971 and charged with aggravated sexual assault of 

M.W., the fourteen-year-old daughter of Johnson’s girlfriend. M.W. was pregnant and had 

reported Johnson was the father of the child. Jason Butscher was appointed to represent 

Johnson. Johnson posted a $5,000 bond on May 23, 1997 and was released from jail. On June 4, 

 1 The record is not clear as to the date of Johnson’s arrest. Johnson relies on an order of the justice of the peace court setting conditions of 

bail to argue he was arrested on November 15, 1996. The State relies on the trial court’s docket sheet to contend Johnson was arrested on May 

16, 1997. However, the trial court’s judgment gives Johnson credit for an incarceration period beginning May 8, 1997. Although we have relied 

on the May 8, 1997 date in this opinion, we note the analysis would not change if Johnson was arrested on November 15, 1996.
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1997, Johnson was indicted for aggravated sexual assault of a child. The trial court subsequently 

placed the case on the July 31, 1997 “first setting” docket.

Jack McGowen was appointed to represent Johnson on July 7, 1997.

2 The State 

forwarded “all discoverable material in the County Attorney’s file” to McGowen on July 14, 

1997. At the first setting on July 31, 1997, Johnson pleaded not guilty to the charge and the case 

was reset for announcements on August 28, 1997. Both Johnson and McGowen signed the 

“Notice of Agreed Setting.”

On August 28, 1997, the case was reset for announcements on September 18, 1997. 

McGowen, but not Johnson, signed the “Notice of Agreed Setting.” A handwritten note on the 

notice states “need plea offer.” On September 18, 1997, the case was reset for announcements 

on October 23, 1997. Again, McGowen, but not Johnson, signed the “Notice of Agreed Setting.”

A-American Bail Bond Company, the surety on Johnson’s bail bond, filed a motion on 

September 29, 1997 seeking to be released from the bond because Johnson had failed to pay the 

bond fee, failed to keep A-American apprised of his whereabouts, and otherwise failed to abide 

by the bonding agreement. A-American represented that Johnson’s last known address was in 

Houston, Texas and requested a warrant be issued for Johnson’s arrest. The trial court issued the 

capias on October 1, 1997, and Johnson was arrested on January 30, 1998.

The trial court signed a scheduling order on February 9, 1998, setting the case for a 

pretrial hearing on March 5, 1998 and for trial on April 6, 1998. On February 20, 1998, Johnson 

posted a $5,000 bond and was released from jail. The record does not reflect why the case was 

not tried on April 6, 1998 but, on June 3, 1998, the trial court signed a scheduling order setting 

the case for a pretrial hearing on July 2, 1998 and for trial on August 3, 1998. 

 2

 Johnson testified during the punishment phase that he was told Butscher had accepted employment with the FBI and could no longer 

represent him. 
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City Hall Bail Bonds, the surety on Johnson’s second bail bond, filed an affidavit to 

surrender principal on June 10, 1998. The affidavit stated Johnson had failed to make contact on 

an agreed date to pay the bond or on any date for the requested “call in time” and had failed to 

respond to City Hall’s attempts to contact him. City Hall represented that Johnson’s last known 

address was in Houston and requested a warrant be issued for his arrest. The trial court issued a 

capias that day, and Johnson was arrested on April 26, 2001. On May 5, 2001, Johnson again 

posted a $5,000 bond and was released from jail. The trial court signed a scheduling order on 

June 6, 2001 setting the case for a pretrial hearing on July 12, 2001 and for trial on August 27, 

2001.

On July 25, 2001, Johnson wrote a letter to the trial court complaining about McGowen 

and requesting new counsel. McGowen filed a motion to withdraw from the representation on 

August 15, 2001. On August 27, 2001, the trial court granted McGowen’s motion, appointed 

Butscher to again represent Johnson, and set the case for trial on October 1, 2001. Although the 

record does not reflect why the case was not tried on October 1, 2001, on December 12, 2001, 

the case was set for trial on February 25, 2002.

Butscher filed a number of motions and an election of punishment prior to the trial 

setting. However, Johnson did not appear for trial on February 25, 2002. On May 14, 2002, 

Liberty Bail Bonds, the surety on Johnson’s third bail bond, filed a motion to be released from 

the bond because Johnson had failed to keep Liberty apprised of his whereabouts and had failed 

to otherwise abide by the bonding agreement. Liberty represented that Johnson’s last known 

address was in North Carolina and requested that a warrant be issued for his arrest. On May 14, 

2002, the trial court issued a capias for Johnson’s arrest. In a June 7, 2002 scheduling order, the 

trial court set the case for trial on July 29, 2002. 
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The case was next set on the July 13, 2006 plea docket. However, the notice of the 

setting mailed to Johnson in North Carolina was returned as undelivered by the postal service

because there was “no such number/street.” Johnson did not appear at the July 13, 2006 plea

docket. On July 21, 2006, the trial court issued a capias for Johnson’s arrest. Johnson was 

arrested on February 15, 2012 and, on February 21, 2012, Mike Dunn was appointed to represent 

him.

The State filed a motion for high bond, citing to Johnson’s repeated failures to appear in 

court. On March 8, 2012, the trial court granted the motion and set Johnson’s bond at $150,000. 

The trial court also appointed Joe Neal Smith to represent Johnson. The case was set for 

arraignment on March 22, 2012. At the arraignment, both Johnson and his counsel signed a 

“Notice of Agreed Setting” placing the case on the April 26, 2012 plea docket.3

 On April 26, 

2012, both Johnson and his counsel signed another “Notice of Agreed Setting” resetting the case 

for the May 24, 2012 plea docket.

Johnson wrote a letter to the trial court on July 3, 2012 requesting that he be allowed to 

fire Smith. A note on the letter states “Def. has an atty. Should be filed through atty.” On 

August 22, 2012, Johnson filed a pro se motion for speedy trial. On October 3, 2012, Johnson 

wrote to Smith stating that Smith was fired and that Johnson no longer wanted Smith to represent 

him. 

M.W.’s child, A.W., died in an automobile accident in 2000. The State obtained A.W.’s 

toothbrush and clothes from M.W. and, on November 13, 2012, submitted the items, along with 

DNA samples from Johnson, to a lab for testing. The lab was unable to obtain a DNA sample 

for A.W. from the items and, on March 20, 2013, the State obtained a subpoena to exhume 

A.W.’s body to obtain samples of her DNA. A.W.’s body was exhumed on March 21, 2013. 

 3 Johnson disputes that he actually agreed to reset the case.
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Also on March 21, 2013, the trial court granted Smith’s March 5, 2013 motion to withdraw and 

appointed Robert Earl Richardson, Jr. to represent Johnson. On May 9, 2013, the lab issued a 

forensic DNA report stating Johnson could not be excluded as A.W.’s father and that at least 

99.995% of the male population was excluded from the possibility of being A.W.’s father.

On May 28, 2013, Johnson wrote a letter to the trial court requesting that his case move 

forward. The trial court set the case on the June 20, 2013 plea docket. On June 20, 2013, 

Johnson’s counsel signed a “Notice of Agreed Setting,” placing the case on the June 27, 2013 

plea docket. On June 27, 2013, the case was set for trial on December 16, 2013.

Johnson, through his counsel, filed a motion to dismiss on November 12, 2013 based on a 

violation of his right to a speedy trial. In support of the motion, Johnson requested the trial court 

take judicial notice of the entire file and attached a register of the actions taken in the case, 

Johnson’s pro se motion for speedy trial filed in August 2012, portions of an investigative report 

relating to exhuming A.W.’s body, and the forensic DNA report. Without conducting a hearing, 

the trial court denied the motion on December 11, 2013. Johnson pleaded guilty on December 

16, 2013, and the trial court subsequently sentenced him to forty years’ imprisonment. The trial 

court certified that Johnson had the right to appeal the denial of the motion to dismiss. 

Analysis

Focusing on the time period between his February 15, 2012 arrest and December 16, 

2013 plea, Johnson argues the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss based on a 

violation of his right to a speedy trial. The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution, 

made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that “[i]n all criminal 

prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial[.]” U.S. CONST. VI;

see also Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 222–23 (1967); Gonzales v. State, 435 S.W.3d 

801, 808 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). Courts determine a speedy trial claim on an “ad hoc basis” by 
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analyzing and weighing four factors: (1) the length of the delay, (2) the State’s reason for the 

delay, (3) the defendant’s assertion of his right to a speedy trial, and (4) prejudice to the 

defendant because of the length of delay. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972); Gonzales, 

435 S.W.3d at 808. The State has the burden of justifying the length of the delay, while the 

defendant has the burden of proving the assertion of the right and showing prejudice. Cantu v. 

State, 253 S.W.3d 273, 280 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). The defendant’s burden on the latter two 

factors “varies inversely” with the State’s degree of culpability for the delay. Id. “Thus, the 

greater the State’s bad faith or official negligence and the longer its actions delay a trial, the less 

a defendant must show actual prejudice or prove diligence in asserting his right to a speedy 

trial.” Id. at 280–81. In conducting the balancing test, no single factor is determinative, and the 

conduct of both the prosecutor and the defendant must be weighed. Barker, 407 U.S. at 530, 

533; State v. Munoz, 991 S.W.2d 818, 821 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). 

To trigger a speedy trial analysis, the defendant must make an initial showing that “the 

interval between accusation and trial has crossed the threshold dividing ordinary from 

‘presumptively prejudicial’ delay.” Gonzales, 435 S.W.3d at 808 (quoting Doggett v. United 

States, 505 U.S. 647, 651–52 (1992)). Presumptive prejudice “simply marks the point at which 

courts deem the delay unreasonable enough to trigger [further] enquiry.” Id. (quoting Munoz, 

991 S.W.2d at 821–22). If the State prosecuted the defendant with “customary promptness,” the 

defendant has failed to meet the threshold burden. Id. If the defendant can make a threshold 

showing of presumptive prejudice, a court must then proceed to consider and weigh each of the 

remaining Barker factors. Id. (citing Munoz, 991 S.W.2d at 821–22); see also State v. Jones, 168 

S.W.3d 339, 347 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, pet. ref’d) (unless delay is “presumptively 

prejudicial,” courts need not inquire into other Barker factors). 
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If the right to a speedy trial has been violated, the remedy is dismissal of the charging 

instrument with prejudice. Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 281. Because this is a radical remedy, “courts 

must apply the Barker balancing test with common sense and sensitivity to ensure that charges 

are dismissed only when the evidence shows that a defendant’s actual and asserted interest in a 

speedy trial has been infringed.” Id. “The constitutional right is that of a speedy trial, not 

dismissal of the charges.” Id.

In reviewing the trial court's ruling on a speedy trial claim, we apply a bifurcated 

standard of review. Gonzales, 435 S.W.3d at 808. We give almost total deference to historical 

findings of fact of the trial court that the record supports and draw reasonable inferences from 

those facts necessary to support the trial court’s findings. Id. at 808–09. As legal questions, we 

review de novo whether there was sufficient presumptive prejudice to proceed to a Barker

analysis and the weighing of the Barker factors. Id. at 809. We do not consider evidence that 

was not before the trial court when it made its ruling. Id. at 809. Because the trial court denied 

Johnson’s motion to dismiss, we must presume the trial court resolved any disputed fact issues in 

the State’s favor, and we must defer to the implied fact findings that the record supports. Cantu, 

253 S.W.3d at 282 (citing Zamorano v. State, 84 S.W.3d 643, 648 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)). We 

must uphold the trial court’s ruling if it is supported by the record and is correct under the 

applicable law. Shaw v. State, 117 S.W.3d 883, 889 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).

Length of the Delay

The first Barker factor, length of the delay, is measured from the time the accused is 

arrested or formally accused. Gonzalez, 439 S.W.3d at 809 (citing United States v. Marion, 404 

U.S. 307, 313 (1971)). Johnson was first arrested on May 8, 1997 and pleaded guilty on 

December 16, 2013, resulting in a delay of over sixteen years. Although there is no “set time 

element,” in general, delay approaching one year is sufficient to trigger a speedy trial inquiry. 
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Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 281; Shaw, 117 S.W.3d at 889. The delay in this case is sufficient to 

trigger analysis of the other the Barker factors. See Zamorano, 84 S.W.3d at 649 (four year 

delay between arrest and plea hearing clearly triggered analysis of other Barker factors).

When, as in this case, the length of delay stretches well beyond the bare minimum needed 

to trigger a full Barker analysis, the length of the delay weighs heavily against the State. Shaw, 

117 S.W.3d at 889; Zamorano, 84 S.W.3d at 649. Further, because “the presumption that 

pretrial delay has prejudiced the accused intensifies over time,” the longer the delay, the more 

the defendant’s prejudice is compounded. Gonzales, 435 S.W.3d at 809 (quoting Zamorano, 84 

S.W.3d at 649); see also Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652. Accordingly, this factor weighs heavily in 

favor of finding a speedy trial violation.

Reason for the Delay

With respect to the second Barker factor, the reason for the delay, once it has been 

determined that a presumptively prejudicial delay has occurred, the State bears the initial burden 

of providing a justification for the delay. Emery v. State, 881 S.W.2d 702, 708 (Tex. Crim. App. 

1994). Different reasons for the delay are assigned different weights: an intentional delay for 

tactical reasons is weighed heavily against the State; a neutral reason, such as overcrowded 

courts or negligence, is weighed less heavily against the State; a valid reason is not weighed 

against the State at all; and delay attributable in whole or in part to the defendant may constitute 

a waiver of the speedy trial claim. Munoz, 991 S.W.2d at 822 (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 528–30

and Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 48 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring)).

In this case, the delay from May 8, 1997 through February 15, 2012 was largely 

attributable to Johnson. See Cockrell v. State, 632 S.W.2d 664, 666 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 

1982, pet. ref’d) (defendant not entitled to dismissal of case based on delays in which was a 

willing participant). He agreed to reset the case three times, requested to be allowed to fire his 
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attorney shortly before a trial setting on August 27, 2001, failed to appear at a trial setting on 

February 25, 2002, and absconded three times for a total time of over fourteen years. Ignoring

this conduct, Johnson relies on the delay between his arrest on February 15, 2012 and his guilty 

plea on December 16, 2103 to argue his right to a speedy trial was violated. Although much of 

this almost two-year delay was unexplained, the record reflects that, during this time period, the 

case was set for arraignment or on a plea docket five times. See Munoz, 991 S.W.2d at 824 

(delay caused by good faith plea negotiation should not be weighed against State). Further, 

during that time period, the State, after unsuccessfully attempting to obtain a DNA sample from 

A.W.’s toothbrush and clothes, obtained a search warrant, exhumed A.W.’s body in order to 

obtain a DNA sample, and conducted forensic testing on those samples and samples of Johnson’s 

DNA. See Shaw, 117 S.W.3d at 889–90 (reasonable period of time in which to develop its case 

is not held against State). There is, however, no explanation in the record of why this process 

was not started earlier or why it took so long. Although the unexplained time gaps in the almost 

two-year delay following Johnson’s final arrest weighs against the State, we cannot conclude 

they excuse Johnson’s conduct during the previous fifteen years the case was pending. See 

Burton v. State, 805 S.W.2d 564, 572, 574 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1991, pet. ref’d) (weighing 

unexplained eight-month period of delay against State, but not finding it dispositive of speedy 

trial claim when defendant absconded for four years). Considering all the reasons for delay in 

this case, we conclude they weigh against a finding of a violation of Johnson’s right to a speedy 

trial. See Blaylock v. State, 259 S.W.3d 202, 209–10 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2008, pet. ref’d) 

(delay due to defendant absconding from supervision “is a valid reason for the delay, or in some 

circumstances a waiver of the speedy trial claim”); Burgett v. State, 865 S.W.2d 594, 597 (Tex. 

App.—Fort Worth 1993, pet. ref’d) (denying speedy trial claim when defendant evaded justice 
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for nearly five years even though State took six months to bring case to trial after re-arresting 

defendant) (citing Dickey, 398 U.S. at 48 (Brennan, J., concurring)).

Assertion of the Right

Regarding the third Barker factor, the defendant bears the responsibility to assert his right 

to a speedy trial. Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 282. Whether and how a defendant chooses to assert his 

right “is closely related to the other three factors because the strength of his efforts will be 

shaped by them.” Id. at 282–83. “The more serious the deprivation, the more likely a defendant 

is to complain.” Id. at 283 (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 531); see also Shaw, 117 S.W.3d 890 

(noting that the longer delay becomes, the more likely it is that defendant who really wanted 

speedy trial would take some action to obtain one). The defendant’s assertion of his right to a 

speedy trial, or the failure to assert the right, “is entitled to strong evidentiary weight in 

determining whether the defendant is being deprived of the right.” Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 282. 

A defendant’s failure to timely seek a speedy trial does not amount to a waiver of the 

right. Shaw, 117 S.W.3d at 890 (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 532). However, a defendant’s failure

to timely demand a speedy trial makes it difficult for the defendant to prevail on a speedy trial 

claim because the failure to timely demand a speedy trial indicates strongly that he did not really 

want a speedy trial and was not prejudiced by not having one. Shaw, 117 S.W.3d at 890; see 

also Barker, 407 U.S. at 536 (“[B]arring extraordinary circumstances, we would be reluctant 

indeed to rule that a defendant was denied this constitutional right on a record that strongly 

indicates . . . that the defendant did not want a speedy trial.”); Harris v. State, 827 S.W.2d 949, 

957 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (“[A]ppellant’s lack of a timely demand for a speedy trial indicates 

strongly that he did not really want a speedy trial.”). The longer the delay becomes, the more 

heavily a defendant’s inaction weighs against him. Shaw, 117 S.W.3d at 890. Further, this
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Barker factor is weighed against a defendant who knew of an indictment and fled the jurisdiction 

to avoid prosecution. See Doggett, 505 U.S. at 653; Burgett, 865 S.W.2d at 598.

Johnson absconded three different times throughout the course of this case and was 

absent for a total of over fourteen years. He also delayed the trial of this case by agreeing to 

have the case reset a number of times, successfully seeking to fire his attorney shortly before a 

trial setting on August 27, 2001, and failing to appear at a trial setting on February 25, 2002. He

did not assert a right to a speedy trial until over sixteen years after his initial arrest. At that point, 

he sought the dismissal of the claims against him, not a trial.4

 See Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 283 

(“Filing for a dismissal instead of a speedy trial will generally weaken a speedy-trial claim 

because it shows a desire to have no trial instead of a speedy one.”). The case went to trial one 

month after Johnson filed his motion to dismiss. See Kelly v. State, 163 S.W.3d 722, 729 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2005) (third factor did not weigh in defendant’s favor when defendant waited over a 

year to file a motion to dismiss based on failure to receive speedy trial, made assertion only once, 

and trial occurred within two months of motion being filed). Johnson’s conduct throughout this 

case indicates he did not really want this case to proceed to trial. See Shaw, 117 S.W.3d at 890. 

This factor weighs heavily in the State’s favor.

Prejudice

We finally turn to the fourth Barker factor, the prejudice to Johnson from the delay. 

“Because ‘pretrial delay is often both inevitable and wholly justifiable,’” this factor “examines 

whether and to what extent the delay has prejudiced the defendant.” Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 285 

(quoting Doggett, 505 U.S. at 656). The prejudice must be assessed in light of the interests that 

the speedy trial right is designed to protect: (1) preventing oppressive pretrial incarceration, (2) 

 4 Although Johnson filed a pro se motion for speedy trial in August 2012, he was represented by an attorney, and the trial court was free to 

disregard that motion. See Robinson v. State, 240 S.W.3d 919, 922 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (because defendant has no right to hybrid 

representation, trial court is free to disregard any pro se motion presented by defendant who is represented by counsel).
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minimizing anxiety and concern of the accused, and (3) limiting the possibility that the defense 

will be impaired. Id.; see also Barker, 407 U.S. at 532). Of these three interests, the possibility 

the defense will be impaired by dimming memories and the loss of exculpatory evidence is the 

most serious “because the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the 

fairness of the entire system.” Barker, 407 U.S. at 532; see also Doggett, 505 U.S. at 654; 

Gonzales, 435 S.W.3d at 812. 

Affirmative evidence of particularized prejudice is not essential to every speedy trial 

claim because excessive delay presumptively compromises the reliability of a trial in ways that 

neither party can prove or even identify. Doggett, 505 U.S. at 655; Gonzales, 453 S.W.3d at 

812. Further, the presumption of prejudice intensifies over time. Doggett, 505 U.S. at 656. 

However, the presumption of prejudice to the defendant’s ability to defend himself can be 

“extenuated . . . by the defendant’s acquiescence” in the delay. Id. at 658; see also Gonzales, 

435 S.W.3d at 815. 

In this case, prior to his final arrest in February 2012, Johnson was incarcerated on three 

occasions for a total time of approximately six weeks. After each of his first three arrests, 

Johnson was released after posting a $5,000 bond. After his arrest in February 2012, Johnson 

was held on a $150,000 bond because he had repeatedly absconded when released on a lower 

bond. Johnson failed to post the required bond and was incarcerated until he pleaded guilty on 

December 16, 2013. However, Johnson presented no evidence in connection with his motion to 

dismiss that the incarceration beginning in 2012 caused him any unusual anxiety or concern 

beyond the level normally associated with being charged with aggravated sexual assault of a 

child. See Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 286.

Most importantly, Johnson presented no evidence in connection with the motion to 

dismiss that his defense was impaired or hampered due to the loss of exculpatory evidence or 
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dimming memories during the delay. Rather, Johnson contends he was prejudiced because, 

before the State obtained the DNA test results, its case was based solely on M.W.’s testimony 

which he could have impeached by showing M.W. was addicted to crack cocaine when she was 

fourteen years old, was a ninth-grade school dropout, had bad relationships with men and, 

although unmarried, had three children. However, the case was fifteen years’ old at the time of 

Johnson’s final arrest in February 2012, and it was reasonable to provide the State with an 

opportunity to prepare for trial by obtaining the results of the DNA testing, particularly when that 

evidence could have been favorable to Johnson. See Shaw, 117 S.W.3d at 889–90. Further, 

allowing the State to obtain evidence to develop its case is not the type of prejudice, such as loss 

of exculpatory evidence and dimming memories, that the right to speedy trial is intended to 

protect.5

 Overall, we conclude this factor does not weigh in favor of finding a violation of 

Johnson’s right to a speedy trial.

Balancing of Factors

Balancing the Barker factors, we conclude Johnson’s right to a speedy trial was not 

violated. Although the length of the delay weighs in favor of finding a violation of Johnson’s 

right to a speedy trial, much of the delay was due to Johnson’s conduct and there were valid 

reasons for other delays in trying the case. Further, Johnson failed to assert his right until over 

sixteen years after he was first arrested; once he asserted his right, he sought a dismissal rather 

than a trial; the case proceeded to trial shortly after he filed his motion to dismiss; and he failed 

to demonstrate any prejudice that the right to a speedy trial is intended to prevent. The record in 

 5 See Rhone v. State, No. 05-07-00729-CR, 2008 WL 2579681, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 30, 2008, pet. ref’d) (not designated for 

publication) (delay in trial to allow State to obtain DNA evidence that incriminated defendant “is not the kind of impairment, such as loss of 

exculpatory evidence and dimming memories discussed in Barker”); Aimufua v. State, No. 10-00-00223-CR, 2003 WL 22996901, at *3 & n.1

(Tex. App.—Waco Dec. 19, 2003, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (Although State may not detain a defendant indefinitely 

without sufficient evidence to justify the detention, “we expressly reject any contention that a defendant suffers actionable ‘prejudice’ for 

purposes of a speedy trial claim because the delay has permitted the State to obtain additional incriminating evidence.”).
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this case supports a conclusion that Johnson did not really want a speedy trial; he wanted only a 

dismissal of the charges. See Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 286; Shaw, 117 S.W.3d at 890.

We resolve Johnson’s sole issue against him and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Do Not Publish

TEX. R. APP. P. 47

140204F.U05

/Robert M. Fillmore/

ROBERT M. FILLMORE

JUSTICE
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Court of Appeals

S

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

JUDGMENT

JIMMY ALBERT JOHNSON, Appellant

No. 05-14-00204-CR V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 59th Judicial District 

Court, Grayson County, Texas,

Trial Court Cause No. 044441.

Opinion delivered by Justice Fillmore, 

Chief Justice Wright and Justice Bridges 

participating.

Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.

Judgment entered this 21st day of January, 2015.