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STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

UNPUBLISHED 

February 2, 2017 

v No. 328310 

Oakland Circuit Court 

COREY DEQUAN BROOME, LC No. 2015-253574-FC 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

Before: STEPHENS, P.J., and SAAD and METER, JJ. 

PER CURIAM. 

 Defendant appeals as of right his jury-trial convictions of assault with intent to do great 

bodily harm less than murder (AWIGBH), MCL 750.84; felon in possession of a firearm (felonin-possession), MCL 750.224f; carrying a concealed weapon (CCW), MCL 750.227; and two 

counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (felony-firearm), MCL 

750.227b. The trial court sentenced defendant, as a fourth-offense habitual offender, MCL 

769.12, to 25 to 50 years’ imprisonment for the AWIGBH conviction, 5 to 25 years’ 

imprisonment for the felon-in-possession conviction, 5 to 25 years’ imprisonment for the CCW 

conviction, and two years’ imprisonment for each of the felony-firearm convictions. We affirm 

defendant’s convictions and sentences but remand for the ministerial task of clarifying the 

judgment of sentence. 

 The facts of this case are disturbing. The prosecution presented evidence that defendant 

ran a red light with his car, crashed into the victim’s truck, and subsequently shot the victim after 

the victim offered to settle the matter without police involvement and was attempting to retrieve 

a cellular telephone in order to take down defendant’s personal information. 

 Defendant first argues that he is entitled to a remand for resentencing because his 25-year 

mandatory minimum sentence, imposed pursuant to MCL 769.12(1)(a) because defendant was a 

fourth-offense habitual offender, constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under both the United 

States and Michigan Constitutions. We disagree. 

 Defendant failed to preserve this issue by raising it in the lower court. People v Bowling, 

299 Mich App 552, 557; 830 NW2d 800 (2013). Unpreserved claims of unconstitutionality 

based on cruel or unusual punishment are reviewed using the standard for plain error. Id. For 

reversal to be warranted, an error must have been “clear or obvious,” and the error must have 
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affected defendant’s “substantial rights.” People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763; 597 NW2d 130 

(1999). Defendant must have been prejudiced by the error. Id. Further, “[r]eversal is warranted 

only when the plain, forfeited error resulted in the conviction of an actually innocent defendant 

or when an error seriously affected the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial 

proceedings independent of defendant’s innocence.” Id. at 763-764 (quotation marks, citation, 

and alteration omitted). This Court reviews de novo constitutional challenges to statutes. People 

v Benton, 294 Mich App 191, 203; 817 NW2d 599 (2011). 

 The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits the infliction of “cruel 

and unusual punishments[.]” US Const, Am VIII. Similarly, the Michigan Constitution 

prohibits the infliction of “cruel or unusual punishment[.]” Const 1963, art I, § 16 (emphasis 

added). This Court accepts the logical rule that “[i]f a punishment passes muster under the state 

constitution, then it necessarily passes muster under the federal constitution.” Benton, 294 Mich 

App at 204 (quotation marks and citation omitted). 

 Defendant’s argument that MCL 769.12(1)(a) unconstitutionally limited the sentencing 

judge’s discretion and ability to consider defendant’s circumstances or probability of 

rehabilitation is without merit. In Michigan, “the ultimate authority to provide penalties for 

criminal offenses is constitutionally vested in the Legislature.” People v Hegwood, 465 Mich 

432, 436; 636 NW2d 127 (2001). “[T]he Legislature may impose restrictions on a judge’s 

exercise of discretion in imposing sentence.” Id. at 440. In other words, the only discretion 

sentencing courts have is that which is given to them by the Legislature; courts do not, on their 

own, have discretion in imposing and administering sentences. See People v Conat, 238 Mich 

App 134, 147; 605 NW2d 49 (1999). MCL 769.12(1)(a) is not invalid, nor are the sentences 

imposed pursuant to it cruel or unusual, simply because the Legislature chose to limit the 

discretion available to the sentencing courts. See People v Garza, 469 Mich 431, 434; 670 

NW2d 662 (2003) (explaining that the Legislature holds the power to “delegate various amounts 

of sentencing discretion to the judiciary,” which includes the power to limit judicial discretion 

completely). 

 Typically, to determine whether a punishment is cruel or unusual under the Michigan 

Constitution, this Court employs a three-part test: (1) it examines “the severity of the sentence 

imposed and the gravity of the offense,” (2) it compares “the penalty to penalties for other crimes 

under Michigan law,” and (3) it compares “Michigan’s penalty and penalties imposed for the 

same offense in other states.” Benton, 294 Mich App at 204. Defendant has not attempted to 

demonstrate that his sentence is cruel or unusual in comparison to the penalties imposed for the 

same crimes in other states, and this Court need not do so for him. This Court has repeatedly 

stated that “an appellant may not simply announce his position or assert an error and then leave it 

up to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis for his claims, or unravel and elaborate for 

him his arguments, and then search for authority either to sustain or reject his position.” 

Bowling, 299 Mich App at 559-560 (quotation marks and citations omitted).1 Defendant does 

 

1

 In terms of comparing his penalty to the penalties for other crimes in this state, defendant refers 

to penalties for certain drug offenses, which we do not find apposite. 
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argue, however, that although the United States Supreme Court has upheld “similar” habitual 

offender statutes in “other jurisdictions,” MCL 769.12(1)(a) is distinguishable from each of those 

other statutes. Defendant has provided only one such statutory scheme for comparison— 

California’s “three strikes” law—and this Court need not search for others. Bowling, 299 Mich 

App at 559-560. 

 Defendant’s comparison of Michigan’s statute and California’s “three strikes” law is 

unpersuasive, because, firstly, the individual sentence itself is to be considered when a defendant 

claims cruel or unusual punishment. See, generally, Benton, 294 Mich App at 204-206. As 

noted infra, defendant’s sentence was appropriate under the circumstances presented. Also, 

while defendant correctly notes that California’s habitual offender policy differs from 

Michigan’s, providing protections such as requiring that at least one prior conviction be violent, 

defendant incorrectly implies that it was because of these protections that the United States 

Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of California’s sentencing scheme in Ewing v 

California, 538 US 11; 123 S Ct 1179; 155 L Ed 2d 108 (2003). Contrary to defendant’s 

argument, the Supreme Court in that case stated: 

Our traditional deference to legislative policy choices finds a corollary in the 

principle that the Constitution does not mandate adoption of any one penological 

theory. A sentence can have a variety of justifications, such as incapacitation, 

deterrence, retribution, or rehabilitation. Some or all of these justifications may 

play a role in a State’s sentencing scheme. Selecting the sentencing rationales is 

generally a policy choice to be made by state legislatures, not federal courts. 

 When the California Legislature enacted the three strikes law, it made a 

judgment that protecting the public safety requires incapacitating criminals who 

have already been convicted of at least one serious or violent crime. Nothing in 

the Eighth Amendment prohibits California from making that choice. To the 

contrary, our cases establish that States have a valid interest in deterring and 

segregating habitual criminals. . . . Recidivism has long been recognized as a 

legitimate basis for increased punishment. 

* * * 

 To be sure, California’s three strikes law has sparked controversy. Critics 

have doubted the law’s wisdom, cost-efficiency, and effectiveness in reaching its 

goals. This criticism is appropriately directed at the legislature, which has 

primary responsibility for making the difficult policy choices that underlie any 

criminal sentencing scheme. We do not sit as a “superlegislature” to secondguess these policy choices. It is enough that the State of California has a 

reasonable basis for believing that dramatically enhanced sentences for habitual 

felons advance[] the goals of [its] criminal justice system in any substantial way. 

[Id. at 25, 27-28 (quotations marks and citations omitted; emphasis added).] 

 Michigan’s habitual offender scheme has not been held unconstitutional, and it is the 

Legislature’s chosen scheme. Defendant was sentenced appropriately, pursuant to the 

Legislature’s prescribed guidelines. We note that defendant emphasizes his age of 23 years. As 
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the Michigan Supreme Court has recognized, however, courts are not required to consider a 

defendant’s age in determining whether a sentence is disproportionate. People v Lemons, 454 

Mich 234, 258-259; 562 NW2d 447 (1997). Here, defendant was convicted of a serious and 

violent crime, AWIGBH, and four separate firearms-related offenses. His presentence 

investigation report indicates that his adult criminal record includes multiple felonies and 

misdemeanors—including a conviction for driving without a license, a conviction for CCW, a 

conviction for attempting to resist arrest, a conviction for uttering counterfeit notes, and a 

conviction for felon-in-possession. Defendant’s criminal record, extensive given that defendant 

has not been an adult for long, establishes a pattern of disregard for others and the law. The 

evidence indicates that his instant crimes were committed against a complete stranger and that he 

shot the victim from the back as the victim was walking away. Defendant’s 27-year total 

minimum sentence allows for release when defendant is approximately 50 years old, and given 

the evidence supporting his conviction for the severe, violent crime of AWIGBH (which caused 

significant injury), this was appropriate. We find no plain error and no basis for a remand. 

 Next, defendant argues that he is entitled to a remand for resentencing because the trial 

court engaged in judicial fact-finding to arrive at his 25-year mandatory minimum sentence in 

violation of Alleyne v United States, 570 US ___; 133 S Ct 2151; 186 L Ed 2d 314 (2013), and 

People v Lockridge, 498 Mich 358; 870 NW2d 502 (2015). We disagree. 

 After Lockridge, this Court reviews a preserved claim of sentencing error based on 

allegedly impermissible judicial fact-finding to determine if it qualifies as harmless beyond a 

reasonable doubt. People v Terrell, 312 Mich App 450, 464; 879 NW2d 294 (2015); People v 

Stokes, 312 Mich App 181, 198; 877 NW2d 752 (2015). 

 Defendant argues that he is entitled to resentencing because the sentencing judge, rather 

than a jury, made “findings of fact” to increase his mandatory minimum sentence in violation of 

Alleyne and Lockridge. Specifically, defendant argues that the sentencing court increased his 

mandatory minimum sentence by relying on the existence of prior convictions. 

 In Alleyne, 570 US at ___; 133 S Ct at 2155, the United States Supreme Court held that 

any fact that increases the mandatory minimum sentence for a crime is an “element” that must 

“be submitted to the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt.” In Lockridge, 498 Mich at 364, 

the Michigan Supreme Court held that “the rule from Apprendi v New Jersey, 530 US 466; 120 S 

Ct 2348; 147 L Ed 2d 435 (2000), as extended by Alleyne, applies to Michigan’s sentencing 

guidelines and renders them constitutionally deficient” and in violation of the Sixth Amendment 

to the extent that they “require judicial fact-finding beyond facts admitted by the defendant or 

found by the jury to score offense variables (OVs) that mandatorily increase the floor of the 

guidelines minimum sentence range . . .” (citation omitted). 

 However, the existence of prior convictions is a well-recognized exception to the general 

requirement that any fact that increases the penalty for a crime must be either admitted by a 

defendant or found beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury. This exception was first articulated by 

the Supreme Court in Apprendi, 530 US at 490, wherein the Supreme Court explained that, 

“[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond 

the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable 
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doubt” (emphasis added). The Michigan Supreme Court specifically noted this exception in

Lockridge, 498 Mich at 370. 

 Defendant suggests that this Court eliminate the exception for prior convictions. 

According to defendant, because the exception, as articulated in Apprendi, was premised on the 

Supreme Court’s holding in an earlier case, Almendarez-Torres v United States, 523 US 224; 118 

S Ct 1219; 140 L Ed 2d 350 (1998), a case that defendant argues has been “eroded” by 

subsequent decisions “to the extent that it should no longer be considered binding precedent,” the 

exception itself should no longer be considered good law. Defendant supports this argument, in 

part, on the four-justice Almendarez-Torres dissent, which challenged the majority’s conclusion 

that prior convictions were not elements necessitating jury consideration. See id. at 257-258, 

261. Defendant also argues that the Supreme Court questioned the exception in Alleyne, 

declining to consider the issue only because it was not raised by the parties in that case. 

 Defendant’s arguments are unpersuasive. Indeed, defendant has failed to adequately 

explain how the exception, explicitly adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Apprendi

and by the Michigan Supreme Court in Lockridge, does not remain good law. We note that one 

of the justices that defendant mentions in support of his argument that a majority of the United 

States Supreme Court no longer supports the exception is no longer with the Court. Under the 

circumstances, we again find no basis for a remand. 

 Next, defendant argues that the trial court erred when it ordered defendant to serve two 

two-year sentences for the felony-firearm offenses concurrently with each other but 

consecutively to his other sentences because the felony-firearm sentences can only run 

consecutively to the sentences for their listed predicate felonies. 

 The proper interpretation of MCL 750.227b, the felony-firearm statute, and its rules 

regarding consecutive sentencing is a question of law that we review de novo. See, generally, 

People v Dimoski, 286 Mich App 474, 476; 780 NW2d 896 (2009). The proper application of 

MCR 6.435(A), which governs ministerial correction of clerical errors, is also a question of law 

reviewed de novo. People v Walters, 266 Mich App 341, 346; 700 NW2d 424 (2005). 

 Defendant was convicted of AWIGBH (Count 1), felon-in-possession (Count 3), and 

CCW (Count 5). Defendant was also convicted of two counts of felony-firearm—one count each 

for his use of a firearm during the commission of his crimes of AWIGBH (Count 2) and felon-inpossession (Count 4). Defendant was sentenced to 25 to 50 years’ imprisonment for AWIGBH, 

two terms of 5 to 25 years’ imprisonment for felon-in-possession and CCW, and two terms of 

two years’ imprisonment for felony-firearm. His judgment of sentence contains the following 

language, which defendant claims is improper: 

COUNTS 2, 4, & 5 ARE CONCURRENT TO EACH OTHER AND COUNTS 1, 

3 AND 5 ARE CONCURRENT TO EACH OTHER. COUNTS 1 AND 3 ARE 

CONSECUTIVE TO COUNTS 2 AND 4. 

 Defendant is correct that, had the trial court imposed defendant’s two-year felony-firearm 

sentences to be served consecutively to sentences for convictions other than their respective 
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predicate felonies, such an imposition would constitute error. As the Michigan Supreme Court 

has explained: 

 From the plain language of the felony-firearm statute, it is evident that the 

Legislature intended that a felony-firearm sentence be consecutive only to the 

sentence for a specific underlying felony. Subsection 2 [now 3] clearly states that 

the felony-firearm sentence “shall be served consecutively with and preceding any 

term of imprisonment imposed for the conviction of the felony or attempt to 

commit the felony.” It is evident that the emphasized language refers back to the 

predicate offense discussed in subsection 1, i.e., the offense during which the 

defendant possessed a firearm. No language in the statute permits consecutive 

sentencing with convictions other than the predicate offense. [People v Clark, 

463 Mich 459, 463-464; 619 NW2d 538 (2000).] 

However, we are not convinced that the sentencing judge intended to impose defendant’s felonyfirearm sentences to be served consecutively to the sentences for all three of his other offenses 

rather than, appropriately, to the sentences for their respective predicate felonies. 

 At sentencing, the trial judge made clear that the felony-firearm sentences were 

concurrent with each other. The trial court’s statements at sentencing, combined with the 

language of the judgment of sentence, support the inference that neither felony-firearm sentence 

was to run consecutively to the CCW sentence. Indeed, the sentences could not be both 

consecutive to and concurrent with the CCW sentence. The felony-firearm sentences were to run 

consecutively to the sentences for defendant’s AWIGBH and felon-in-possession convictions. 

 It is true that the language of the judgment of sentence is confusing and does not 

definitively pair the sentence for each felony-firearm conviction with its predicate felony, i.e., 

does not specify that the sentence for Count 2 is specifically consecutive to the sentence for 

Count 1, and that the sentence for Count 4 is specifically consecutive to the sentence for Count 3. 

However, it is a strained reading of the judgment of sentence, especially as a whole and in the 

context of the entire lower court file, that leads to any other conclusion. The felony information 

specified that defendant’s felony-firearm charges were to accompany the predicate felonies of 

assault with intent to murder (the higher charge for the AWIGBH conviction) and felon-inpossession, and the first page of the judgment of sentence at least implies that Count 2 depends 

on predicate felony Count 1 and Count 4 depends on predicate felony Count 3. Also, for all 

practical purposes, any confusion over whether the sentence for Count 2 or Count 4 is intended 

to run consecutively to the sentence for Count 1 makes no difference. Each sentence is two years 

long, and one of them, regardless of which one, must run consecutively to defendant’s 25-to-50-

year sentence for his AWIGBH conviction.2

 The other runs concurrently, as indicated by the 

judgment of sentence. 

 

2

 A sentence for felony-firearm is to precede the sentence for the predicate felony. MCL 

750.227b(3). 
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 It is apparent that the trial court did not intend to impose defendant’s two-year felonyfirearm sentences to run consecutively to sentences for convictions other than their respective 

predicate felonies. However, in light of the Clark Court’s call to literal specificity—“[n]o 

language in the [felony-firearm] statute permits consecutive sentencing with convictions other 

than the predicate offense”—see id. at 464, we conclude that defendant is entitled to clarification 

of the terms of his sentence. Where a judgment of sentence contains a mistake, a remand to 

allow the trial court to amend the judgment is appropriate. MCR 6.435(A); People v Katt, 248 

Mich App 282, 311-312; 639 NW2d 815 (2001). We remand to the trial court for the ministerial 

task of rewriting the “court recommendation” section of the judgment of sentence to clarify that 

the sentence for Count 2 is consecutive to the sentence for Count 1 and the sentence for Count 4 

is consecutive to the sentence for Count 3 and to otherwise ensure that the section contains 

appropriate wording. 

 Defendant argues that defense counsel’s affirmation of the trial court’s “consecutive 

sentencing” constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. Defendant’s argument is wholly 

without merit. Defendant has not argued that his consecutive sentences were erroneously 

imposed. Indeed, they were not, and defense counsel therefore could not have affirmed the 

propriety of any improper consecutive sentencing. Defense counsel raised the issue of 

consecutive sentencing at defendant’s sentencing hearing to ensure that the judgment of sentence 

accurately reflected the appropriate sentence. Defense counsel’s attempts did not fall below any 

objective standard of reasonableness. People v Riley (After Remand), 468 Mich 135, 140; 659 

NW2d 611 (2003). To the extent defendant suggests that defense counsel’s failure to object to 

the trial court’s ambiguous phraseology was unreasonable, his claim also fails. Defendant has 

suffered no prejudice. Id. 

 We affirm defendant’s convictions and sentences but remand for the ministerial tasks of 

correcting the judgment of sentence and transmitting the judgment to the Department of 

Corrections. We do not retain jurisdiction. 

/s/ Cynthia Diane Stephens 

/s/ Henry William Saad 

/s/ Patrick M. Meter