[Cite as Patel v. Bellaire, 2012-Ohio-4348.]

STATE OF OHIO, BELMONT COUNTY 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

SEVENTH DISTRICT 

ARVIND PATEL, ET AL., 

 PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS, 

V. 

VILLAGE OF BELLAIRE, 

 DEFENDANT-APPELLEE. 

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 CASE NO. 10 BE 27 

OPINION 

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS: Civil Appeal from Court of Common 

Pleas of Belmont County, Ohio 

Case No. 08CV412 

JUDGMENT: Affirmed 

APPEARANCES: 

For Plaintiffs-Appellants Atty. David L. Delk 

1226 Chapline St., P.O. Box 351 

Wheeling, WV 26003 

Arvind Patel, Pro-se 

16 Renaissance Way 

Wheeling, WV 26003 

For Defendant-Appellee Atty. Mel L. Lute, Jr. 

400 South Main St. 

North Canton, Ohio 44720 

JUDGES: 

Hon. Gene Donofrio 

Hon. Joseph J. Vukovich 

Hon. Mary DeGenaro 

 

 

 Dated: September 24, 2012 
[Cite as Patel v. Bellaire, 2012-Ohio-4348.]

DONOFRIO, J. 

{¶1} Plaintiffs-appellants, Arvind Patel and Anu & Amu, Inc., appeal from a 

Belmont County Common Pleas Court judgment granting summary judgment in favor 

of defendant-appellee, the Village of Bellaire (Bellaire), and dismissing their 

complaint. 

{¶2} Patel is the president of Anu & Amu, Inc. (Anu). Anu did business as 

the 7-Inn Motel located in Bellaire, Ohio (the motel). 

{¶3} Bellaire contracted with Neff’s Fire Department to conduct all code 

enforcement inspections. Captain Dennis VanKirk of the Neff’s Fire Department 

conducted an initial inspection of the motel on September 6, 2006. Patel 

characterizes this inspection as a “raid,” and notes that eight to ten Bellaire officials 

were present. Captain VanKirk cited appellants for numerous safety and fire code 

violations. The next day, Bellaire obtained a temporary restraining order closing the 

motel. Bellaire Law Director Michael Shaheen also sought a permanent injunction to 

close the motel subject to the complete repair in accordance with the state fire code 

requirements. 

{¶4} On September 20, 2006, Officers Richard Vance and Richard Mansfield 

from the Ohio Department of Commerce, State Fire Marshal’s Division conducted an 

inspection of the motel to determine whether there were any remaining fire code 

violations. They discovered 183 violations of the state fire code and issued Patel 

another citation. Patel filed a request for a hearing with the Board of Building 

Appeals, which upheld the State Fire Marshal’s citations. Patel did not appeal this 

decision. 

{¶5} In July 2007, Bellaire dismissed its lawsuit against appellants for a 

permanent injunction since the motel was no longer in operation and Patel’s 

hotel/motel operator’s license had expired. 

{¶6} On August 29, 2008, appellants filed a complaint against Bellaire 

raising claims of conspiracy, negligence, and tortious interference with economic 

advantage. 

{¶7} On December 4, 2008, Bellaire filed a motion for summary judgment. It 
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asserted that appellants’ claims failed because it was protected by political 

subdivision immunity, because appellants failed to allege an illegal act to support 

their civil conspiracy claim, and because appellants’ claims were barred by the 

doctrine of res judicata. In support of its motion, Bellaire attached the affidavits of 

Captain VanKirk and Atty. Shaheen. Patel filed a pro se memorandum in opposition 

shortly thereafter. 

{¶8} Patel next filed a motion requesting that the trial judge recuse herself 

from this case. He then filed a motion to compel Bellaire to respond to his first set of 

interrogatories and request for production of documents. 

{¶9} Bellaire filed a brief opposing the motion to compel stating that it had 

answered Patel’s interrogatories and attached a copy of the notice of service of 

responses to discovery requests filed February 27, 2009. The court thereafter denied 

Patel’s motion to compel. 

{¶10} On March 18, 2009, the trial court put on an entry stating that it had 

held a pretrial hearing and that a trial was scheduled for January 21, 2010. It further 

set deadlines for discovery completion and dispositive motions. 

{¶11} On April 10, 2009, counsel filed a notice of appearance on behalf of 

appellants. 

{¶12} On July 8, 2009, the trial court put on an order directing appellants’ 

counsel to review all of Patel’s pro se motions for which it had yet to file a ruling and 

determine which, if any motions, were meritorious and to file those motions under 

counsel’s name. It stated that any motion not refiled under counsel’s name would be 

deemed overruled. 

{¶13} On April 20, 2010, the court put on an entry stating that it had held a 

pretrial hearing and trial was set for November 9, 2010. It once again set deadlines 

for discovery completion and dispositive motions. 

{¶14} On July 21, 2010, Bellaire filed a supplemental brief in support of 

summary judgment. 

{¶15} On October 26, 2010, appellants’ counsel withdrew from the case. 
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{¶16} On November 4, 2010, the trial court granted Bellaire’s summary 

judgment motion. It found that appellants failed to introduce evidence in opposition 

to the evidence produced by Bellaire and that there was no evidence to create a 

genuine issue of material fact. 

{¶17} Appellants filed a timely notice of appeal on November 30, 2010. 

{¶18} Appellants are represented by counsel in this case and counsel has 

filed a brief raising one assignment of error. Patel has also filed a pro se brief in 

which he raises six additional assignments of error. The assignment of error raised 

by counsel states: 

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR WHEN IT DENIED 

APPELLANTS[’] REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL DISCOVERY 

PURSUANT TO RULE 56(F) OF THE OHIO RULES OF CIVIL 

PROCEDURE. 

{¶19} Appellants argue that the trial court should not have granted summary 

judgment to Bellaire without first addressing appellants’ request for additional 

discovery. They contend that Bellaire’s summary judgment motion, filed just four 

months after they filed their complaint, got lost in the shuffle of the litigation. For 

support, appellants point out that the trial court filed several judgment entries setting 

trial dates and deadlines without mentioning Bellaire’s summary judgment motion or 

appellants’ pro se request for additional discovery. Appellants contend that the trial 

court should have denied Bellaire’s summary judgment motion, granted their motion 

for additional discovery, and set a deadline for them to produce evidence in 

opposition to the summary judgment motion. 

{¶20} Appellants seem confused here about what actually occurred in the trial 

court. Bellaire filed its summary judgment motion in December 2008. Patel then filed 

a pro se brief in opposition. Patel also filed a motion to compel, which apparently is 

the request for additional discovery that appellants’ address in this assignment of 

error, requesting that the court compel Bellaire to answer its first set of interrogatories 
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and request for documents. Bellaire then filed a brief in opposition to the motion to 

compel. As support, Bellaire filed with the court a notice that it had answered Patel’s 

requests and attached a copy of the notice of service of responses to discovery 

requests filed February 27, 2009. 

{¶21} Thus, Bellaire did provide appellants with the requested discovery. 

{¶22} Furthermore, appellants contend that Bellaire’s summary judgment 

motion, filed just four months after appellants filed their complaint, got “lost in the 

shuffle” and the trial court decided on its own to grant it after almost two years. But 

this also is not accurate. Bellaire did file its summary judgment motion in December 

2008. However, in July 2010, it filed a supplemental brief in support of summary 

judgment and filed Patel’s deposition in further support of its motion. Thus, even if 

the court had lost track of Bellaire’s original summary judgment motion, Bellaire 

brought it to the court’s attention in July 2010, and provided additional evidence in 

support of its motion. Appellants failed to respond to the supplemental brief. 

Consequently, the trial court did not simply resurrect Bellaire’s motion after forgetting 

about it for two years as appellants suggest. 

{¶23} Accordingly, appellants’ assignment of error raised by counsel is 

without merit. 

{¶24} Patel has raised the remaining six assignments of error in his pro se 

brief. His first assignment of error states: 

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETIONARY POWER BY 

GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT WHEN APPELLEE FAILED TO 

PROVE THAT THERE ARE NO GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL 

FACT WITH RESPECT TO EVERY ESSENTIAL COUNT OF THE 

COMPLAINT. 

{¶25} Patel argues here that summary judgment was inappropriate. He 

asserts the court failed to address the raid on his hotel without probable cause. He 

further contends that in granting summary judgment, the trial court relied on the 
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affidavits that he alleged were “false, fraudulent and manufactured.” Finally, he 

asserts that Bellaire failed to address his allegation that appellee wrongfully 

continued its prosecution despite the fact that he corrected the violations at his hotel. 

{¶26} In reviewing a trial court's decision on a summary judgment motion, 

appellate courts apply a de novo standard of review. Cole v. Am. Industries & 

Resources Corp., 128 Ohio App.3d 546, 552, 715 N.E.2d 1179 (1998). Thus, we 

shall apply the same test as the trial court in determining whether summary judgment 

was proper. Civ.R. 56(C) provides that the trial court shall render summary judgment 

if no genuine issue of material fact exists and when construing the evidence most 

strongly in favor of the nonmoving party, reasonable minds can only conclude that 

the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. State ex rel. Parsons v. 

Flemming, 68 Ohio St.3d 509, 511, 628 N.E.2d 1377 (1994). A “material fact” 

depends on the substantive law of the claim being litigated. Hoyt, Inc. v. Gordon & 

Assoc., Inc., 104 Ohio App.3d 598, 603, 662 N.E.2d 1088 (1995), citing Anderson v. 

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). 

{¶27} Whether a political subdivision is entitled to immunity is analyzed using 

a three-tiered process. Green Cty. Agricultural Soc. v. Liming, 89 Ohio St.3d 551, 

556, 733 N.E.2d 1141 (2000). Under the first tier, R.C. 2744.02(A)(1) sets out the 

general rule that political subdivisions are not liable in damages. Id. at 556-57. 

Under the second tier, the court must determine whether any of the exceptions to 

immunity set out in R.C. 2744.02(B) apply. Id. at 557. Finally, under the third tier, if 

the court finds that any of R.C. 2744.02(B)'s exceptions apply, it must consider R.C. 

2744.03, which provides defenses and immunities to liability. Id. 

{¶28} Thus, in this case, we must begin our analysis under the first tier with 

the premise that Bellaire is not liable in damages here. 

{¶29} Under the second tier, we must look at whether any of the R.C. 

2744.02(B) exceptions apply. Those exceptions are: 

(1) Except as otherwise provided in this division, political subdivisions 

are liable for injury, death, or loss to person or property caused by the 
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negligent operation of any motor vehicle by their employees when the 

employees are engaged within the scope of their employment and 

authority. * * * 

* * * 

(2) Except as otherwise provided in sections 3314.07 and 3746.24 of 

the Revised Code, political subdivisions are liable for injury, death, or 

loss to person or property caused by the negligent performance of acts 

by their employees with respect to proprietary functions of the political 

subdivisions. 

(3) Except as otherwise provided in section 3746.24 of the Revised 

Code, political subdivisions are liable for injury, death, or loss to person 

or property caused by their negligent failure to keep public roads in 

repair and other negligent failure to remove obstructions from public 

roads, * * *. 

(4) Except as otherwise provided in section 3746.24 of the Revised 

Code, political subdivisions are liable for injury, death, or loss to person 

or property that is caused by the negligence of their employees and that 

occurs within or on the grounds of, and is due to physical defects within 

or on the grounds of, buildings that are used in connection with the 

performance of a governmental function, including, but not limited to, 

office buildings and courthouses, but not including jails, places of 

juvenile detention, workhouses, or any other detention facility * * *. 

(5) In addition to the circumstances described in divisions (B)(1) to (4) 

of this section, a political subdivision is liable for injury, death, or loss to 

person or property when civil liability is expressly imposed upon the 

political subdivision by a section of the Revised Code, * * * .” 

{¶30} Appellants did not raise any of these exceptions to immunity. 

{¶31} The only argument Patel raised in his memorandum of law in opposition 

to defendant’s motion for summary judgment was that Bellaire’s agents (specifically 
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Captain VanKirk and Atty. Shaheen) were acting outside of the scope of their 

employment when they issued the citations to him and filed for an injunction to close 

the motel. The problem with this argument is that Patel did not name Captain 

VanKirk or Atty. Shaheen as defendants in this case. And if in fact they were acting 

outside the scope of their employment, this would only be further support for finding 

that Bellaire was not liable to appellants. 

{¶32} In contrast, Bellaire presented Captain VanKirk’s affidavit. He averred 

to the following. Bellaire contracted with Neff’s Fire Department to conduct all code 

enforcement inspections. (VanKirk Aff. ¶1). He conducted an initial inspection on 

September 6, 2006. (VanKirk Aff. ¶2). He was required by law to enforce the 

applicable codes as pertaining to places of public accommodation. (VanKirk Aff. ¶3). 

He found over 100 individual violations of the fire code at the motel. (VanKirk Aff. 

¶7). On September 20, 2006, State Fire Marshal Officers Vance and Mansfield 

inspected the motel, found 183 violations of the state fire code, and issued Patel a 

citation for the violations. (VanKirk Aff. ¶9). 

{¶33} Bellaire also offered Atty. Shaheen’s affidavit. Shaheen averred that as 

Bellaire’s law director, he requested temporary and permanent injunctive relief to 

evacuate and close the motel subject to the complete and appropriate repair in 

accordance with state fire code requirements. (Shaheen Aff. ¶2-3). 

{¶34} Thus, we are left only with the presumption that Bellaire is protected by 

governmental immunity. Captain VanKirk’s and Atty. Shaheen’s affidavits are 

undisputed that they were acting within the scope of their employment with and as 

agents of Bellaire. And there is no evidence that they are “false, fraudulent and 

manufactured” as Patel alleges. As such, summary judgment was proper. 

{¶35} Accordingly, Patel’s first pro se assignment of error is without merit. 

{¶36} Patel’s second pro se assignment of error states: 

THE LOWER COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETIONARY POWER IN 

NOT CONSTRUING THE FACTS IN THE LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE 

TO THE NONMOVING PARTY. 
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{¶37} Here Patel contends that the trial court failed to construe the facts in the 

light most favorable to him, the non-moving party, because of the court’s “bias, 

prejudiced, bigoted and retaliatory attitude” towards him. He further asserts that the 

court failed to address his conspiracy, negligence, and tortious interference with 

economic advantage claims. Appellant goes on to allege that even though he 

corrected the violations he had been cited for by the state fire marshal, the court 

allowed Atty. Shaheen to prosecute the motel based upon the violations. 

Additionally, Patel asserts that Bellaire illegally raided the motel and this was part of 

the conspiracy to shut it down. 

{¶38} Appellant addresses part of his argument here to accusing the trial 

court judge of being biased and prejudiced against him, having a bigoted attitude, 

and wanting to retaliate against him for filing a motion seeking her recusal. As we will 

address in detail in Patel’s third pro se assignment of error, this is not the proper 

forum to raise this argument. 

{¶39} Appellant bases the remainder of his argument asserting that Bellaire 

conducted a “raid” on the motel and that he corrected the violations for which he was 

cited. However, as discussed above, Bellaire enjoys political subdivision immunity in 

this case. And as Bellaire points out, Patel did not present any evidence to dispute 

Captain VanKirk’s affidavit regarding the numerous fire code violations at the motel. 

{¶40} Accordingly, Patel’s second pro se assignment of error is without merit. 

{¶41} Patel’s third pro se assignment of error states: 

THE LOWER COURT WILLFULLY ABUSED ITS DISCRETIONARY 

POWER AND VIOLATED APPELLANT ARVIND PATEL’S DUE 

PROCESS RIGHTS BY OVERRULING THE MOTION TO RECUSE 

FILED AGAINST IT. 

{¶42} Patel contends here that the trial court judge should have recused 

herself from this case based on his motion. He asserts that after he filed a motion 

with the trial court judge accusing her of bigotry and racism, there was no way she 
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could proceed with the case in an impartial manner. 

{¶43} “The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Ohio, or his designee, has 

exclusive jurisdiction to determine a claim that a common pleas judge is biased or 

prejudiced.” Jones v. Billingham, 105 Ohio App.3d 8, 11, 663 N.E.2d 657 (1995), 

citing Section 5(C), Article IV, Ohio Constitution; Adkins v. Adkins, 43 Ohio App.3d 

95, 539 N.E.2d 686 (1988). R.C. 2701.03 provides the exclusive means by which a 

litigant can assert that a common pleas judge is biased or prejudiced. Id. R.C. 

2701.03(A) provides: 

If a judge of the court of common pleas allegedly is interested in a 

proceeding pending before the court, allegedly is related to or has a 

bias or prejudice for or against a party to a proceeding pending before 

the court or a party's counsel, or allegedly otherwise is disqualified to 

preside in a proceeding pending before the court, any party to the 

proceeding or the party's counsel may file an affidavit of disqualification 

with the clerk of the supreme court in accordance with division (B) of 

this section. 

{¶44} An appellate court lacks the authority to pass upon the disqualification 

of a common pleas court judge or to void the judgment of a trial court on that basis. 

State v. Ramos, 88 Ohio App.3d 394, 398, 623 N.E.2d 1336 (1993). 

{¶45} Thus, we are without the authority to determine whether the trial court 

judge should have recused herself in this case. If Patel thought the trial court judge 

should have recused herself, his remedy was to file an affidavit of disqualification with 

the clerk of the Ohio Supreme Court. 

{¶46} Accordingly, Patel’s third pro se assignment of error is without merit. 

{¶47} Patel’s fourth pro se assignment of error states: 

THE TRIAL COURT WILLFULLY ABUSED ITS DISCRETIONARY 

POWER AND GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST 
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APPELLANT BASED ON FALSE, FRAUDULENT AND 

EXAGGERATED AFFIDAVITS AND TESTIMONY. 

{¶48} In this assignment of error, Patel asserts that Captain VanKirk falsely 

and fraudulently manufactured over 100 violations and exaggerated them as 

“extremely dangerous” in his affidavit in order to support appellee in securing a 

restraining order against the motel. He argues that the missing light globe and lack 

of GFCI receptacles that Captain VanKirk cited were not cited by the state fire 

marshal and the motel had always been given 30 days to correct such violations. 

Patel further asserts that Captain VanKirk contradicted and perjured himself when he 

averred that the motel had exposed wiring, deplorable conditions, flammable 

materials, and lack of adequate or working fire extinguishers. Patel relies on his own 

deposition testimony for support. 

{¶49} Patel’s own testimony that Captain VanKirk and the police chief tell 

“lies” (Patel dep. 30-32, 42-43) does not create a genuine issue of material fact as to 

his civil conspiracy claim. Moreover, as to a civil conspiracy, an underlying unlawful 

act is required before a civil conspiracy claim can succeed. Williams v. Aetna 

Financial Co., 83 Ohio St.3d 464, 475, 700 N.E.2d 859 (1998). Appellant has not 

alleged an unlawful act here. Thus, his civil conspiracy claim must fail. 

{¶50} Accordingly, Patel’s fourth pro se assignment of error is without merit. 

{¶51} Patel’s fifth pro se assignment of error states: 

THE LOWER COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETIONARY POWER BY 

SUMMARILY JUDGING THE CASE WHEN APPELLANTS WERE 

WITHOUT LEGAL REPRESENTATION AND WITHOUT GRANTING 

APPELLANTS THE OPPORTUNITY TO RETAIN COUNSEL. 

{¶52} Patel argues that the trial court should have continued the case to allow 

appellants the chance to retain new counsel after their counsel withdrew. He claims 

that the trial court erred in ruling on the summary judgment motion while appellants 
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were without counsel. 

{¶53} Appellants filed their complaint on August 29, 2008. Bellaire filed its 

motion for summary judgment on December 4, 2008. Patel filed a pro se 

memorandum in opposition shortly thereafter. Patel next filed a motion requesting 

that the trial judge recuse herself. He then filed a motion to compel Bellaire to 

respond to his discovery requests. Bellaire filed a brief opposing the motion to 

compel and attached a copy of the notice of service of responses to discovery 

requests filed February 27, 2009. 

{¶54} On March 18, 2009, the trial court put on an entry stating that it had 

held a pretrial hearing and a trial was scheduled for January 21, 2010. Up until this 

time, Patel had proceeded pro se. On April 10, 2009, counsel filed a notice of 

appearance on behalf of appellants. On July 8, 2009, the trial court put on an order 

directing appellants’ counsel to review all of Patel’s pro se motions for which it had 

yet to file a ruling and determine which, if any motions, were meritorious and to file 

those motions under counsel’s name. It stated that any motion not re-filed under 

counsel’s name would be deemed overruled. 

{¶55} No action whatsoever was taken in this case from July 8, 2009, until 

March 10, 2010, when the court scheduled a pretrial for April 15. 

{¶56} On April 20, 2010, the court put on an entry stating that it had held a 

pretrial hearing and trial was set for November 9. Bellaire filed a supplemental brief 

in support of summary judgment on July 21. 

{¶57} On October 26, 2010, appellants’ counsel withdrew from the case. The 

trial court granted Bellaire’s summary judgment motion on November 4. 

{¶58} The decision to grant a continuance is within the trial court’s sound 

discretion, and thus will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Nationwide 

Mut. Fire Ins. v. Barrett, 7th Dist. No. 08 MA 130, 2008-Ohio-6588, ¶19, citing State 

v. Unger, 67 Ohio St.2d 65, 67, 423 N.E.2d 1078 (1981). An abuse of discretion 

connotes more than an error in law or judgment; it implies that the trial court's 

decision was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 
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Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983). 

{¶59} Appellants did not request a continuance in this case after their counsel 

withdrew. Moreover, for the first seven-and-a-half months after filing the instant 

lawsuit, appellants proceeded pro se. 

{¶60} Courts are not required to issue continuances sua sponte. ClementzMcBeth v. Craft, 3d Dist. No. 2-11-16, 2012-Ohio-985, ¶20, citing Gannon v. Gannon, 

6th Dist. No. WD-07-078, 2008-Ohio-4484, ¶43. It is not the court’s responsibility to 

make sure parties are prepared or to grant a continuance where neither party has 

requested one. Id. “Though some leeway is often given to pro se litigants, ‘ordinary 

civil litigants proceeding pro se * * * are not entitled to special treatment.’” Id., 

quoting McKinnie v. Roadway Express, 341 F.3d 554, 558 (6th Cir.2003). 

{¶61} Given the timeline set out above, the fact that appellants had appeared 

pro se for a substantial period of this lawsuit, and most importantly because 

appellants did not request a continuance, we cannot conclude that the trial court 

abused its discretion in failing to sua sponte order a continuance in this case so that 

appellants could retain new counsel. 

{¶62} Accordingly, Patel’s fifth pro se assignment of error is without merit. 

{¶63} Patel’s sixth pro se assignment of error states: 

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING DENNIS VANKIRK’S 

OPINIONS AS THOSE OF AN EXPERT AND ISSUING SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT THEREUPON. 

{¶64} Finally, Patel argues that the trial court erred by considering Captain 

VanKirk’s opinions as those of an expert and issuing summary judgment based on 

those opinions. 

{¶65} A witness may testify as an expert if he is “qualified as an expert by 

specialized knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education regarding the subject 

matter of the testimony.” Evid.R. 702(B). Additionally, a witness may testify as an 

expert if his testimony “relates to matters beyond the knowledge or experience 
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possessed by lay persons.” Evid.R. 702(A). Whether a witness is qualified to testify 

as an expert is a matter within the trial court's discretion. State v. Awkal, 76 Ohio 

St.3d 324, 331, 667 N.E.2d 960 (1996). 

{¶66} Captain VanKirk is a certified fire safety inspector. (VanKirk dep. ¶2). 

He has obtained the rank of captain. (VanKirk dep. ¶1). He is also the fire safety 

inspector for Bellaire. (VanKirk dep. ¶2). He performed his inspection of the motel 

pursuant to his duties as a certified fire safety inspector. (VanKirk dep. ¶3). 

{¶67} Given Captain VanKirk’s qualifications, he was qualified to give his 

expert opinion on the safety violations he found at the motel. Additionally, Patel 

failed to offer a competing expert’s opinion to dispute Captain Van Kirk’s findings. 

{¶68} Accordingly, Patel’s sixth pro se assignment of error is without merit. 

{¶69} For the reasons set out above, the trial court’s judgment is hereby 

affirmed. 

Vukovich, J., concurs. 

DeGenaro, J., concurs.