60206 Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 199 / Monday, October 17, 2005 / Rules and Regulations 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation 

safety, Safety. 

Adoption of the Amendment 

■ Accordingly, pursuant to the authority 

delegated to me by the Administrator, 

the Federal Aviation Administration 

amends part 39 of the Federal Aviation 

Regulations (14 CFR part 39) as follows: 

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS 

DIRECTIVES 

■ 1. The authority citation for part 39 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701. 

§ 39.13 [Amended] 

■ 2. Section 39.13 is amended by adding 

a new airworthiness directive to read as 

follows: 

2005–21–04 Bell Helicopter Textron (Bell) 

and Coastal Helicopters, Inc. (CHI) 

(formerly Continental Copters, Inc.; and 

Tom-Cat Helicopters, Inc.): Docket No. 

FAA–2005–21725; Amendment No. 39–

14342; Directorate Identifier 2004–SW–

45–AD. 

Applicability: The following helicopter 

models with the referenced Texas Helicopter 

Co., Inc. (THC) scissors assembly part 

number (P/N) or weld assembly scissors 

bracket P/N installed as a Parts Manufacturer 

Approval (PMA) replacement part or as part 

of the modification in accordance with 

Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) No. 

SH2772SW, certificated in any category. 

Model With scissors assembly P/N Or weld assembly scissors bracket P/N 

(1) Bell Model 47D1, 47G, 47G–2, 47G–2A, 

47G–2A–1, 47G–3, 47G–3B, 47G–3B–1, 

47G–3B–2, 47G–3B–2A, 47G–4, 47G–4A, 

47G–5, 47G–5A; and 

74–150–949–9 or 74–150–949–5 or 74–150– 

249–5M.

74–150–117–13M. 

(2) CHI OH–13H (Tomcat Mark 5A, 6B, or 6C).

Compliance: Required as indicated, unless 

accomplished previously. 

To prevent using a scissors assembly or 

weld assembly scissors bracket past it’s life 

limit, which could result in failure of the part 

and subsequent loss of control of the 

helicopter, accomplish the following: 

(a) Within 60 days, determine and record 

on the service record or equivalent record the 

total hours time-in-service (TIS) of each 

affected part. If the TIS hours cannot be 

determined, replace the part with an 

airworthy part with known hours TIS before 

further flight. 

(b) Thereafter, replace each affected part 

before it accumulates 5,000 hours TIS. 

Note: Texas Helicopter Co., Inc. Service 

Bulletin No. SB 003, dated December 1, 2002, 

pertains to the subject of this AD. 

(c) This AD establishes a life limit of 5,000 

hours TIS for each affected PMA-produced 

scissors assembly and each affected PMAproduced weld assembly scissors bracket. 

(d) To request a different method of 

compliance or a different compliance time 

for this AD, follow the procedures in 14 CFR 

39.19. Contact the Rotorcraft Certification 

Office, Rotorcraft Directorate, FAA, for 

information about previously approved 

alternative methods of compliance. 

(e) This amendment becomes effective on 

November 21, 2005. 

Issued in Fort Worth, Texas, on October 7, 

2005. 

David A. Downey, 

Manager, Rotorcraft Directorate, Aircraft 

Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 05–20680 Filed 10–14–05; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. 2004–SW–13–AD; Amendment 

39–14340; AD 2005–21–02] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; MD 

Helicopters, Inc. Model 369D, 369E, 

369F, 369FF, 500N, and 600N 

Helicopters 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration, DOT. 

ACTION: Final rule; request for 

comments. 

SUMMARY: This amendment supersedes 

an existing airworthiness directive (AD) 

for the MD Helicopters, Inc. (MDHI) 

Model 369A, H, HE, HM, HS, D, and E 

helicopters with a certain partnumbered main rotor blade (blade) and 

modified with a Helicopter Technology 

Company, LLC (HTC), Supplemental 

Type Certificate (STC) No. SR09172RC, 

SR09074RC, or SR09184RC. That AD 

currently requires recording on the 

component history card or equivalent 

record (record) each torque event (TE) 

on each blade, inspecting both surfaces 

of the blade, and replacing any cracked 

blade with an airworthy blade. Also, 

that AD establishes life limits for certain 

part-numbered blades. This amendment 

revises the model applicability, adds 

MDHI part-numbered blades, removes 

any reference to the life limits of the 

blades, changes the requirements for 

inspecting the blades, and revises the 

STC applicability. This amendment also 

provides that compliance with portions 

of certain documents constitutes 

alternative methods of compliance with 

portions of this AD, contains editorial 

changes for clarification, and makes 

some corrections. This amendment is 

prompted by additional reports of 

cracked blades and by the comments 

received in response to AD 2003–24–01. 

The actions specified in this AD are 

intended to detect fatigue cracking of 

the blade to prevent blade failure and 

subsequent loss of control of the 

helicopter. 

DATES: Effective November 1, 2005. 

Comments for inclusion in the Rules 

Docket must be received on or before 

December 16, 2005. 

ADDRESSES: Submit comments in 

triplicate to the Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), Office of the 

Regional Counsel, Southwest Region, 

Attention: Rules Docket No. 2004–SW–

13–AD, 2601 Meacham Blvd., Room 

663, Fort Worth, Texas 76137. You may 

also send comments electronically to 

the Rules Docket at the following 

address: 9-asw-adcomments@faa.gov. 

The service information referenced in 

this AD may be obtained from the 

following addresses: MD Helicopters 

Inc., Attn: Customer Support Division, 

4555 E. McDowell Rd., Mail Stop M615, 

Mesa, Arizona 85215–9734, telephone 

1–800–388–3378, fax 480–346–6813, or 

on the Web at http:// 

www.mdhelicopters.com and Helicopter 

Technology Company, LLC, 12902 

South Broadway, Los Angeles, CA 

90061, telephone 310–523–2750, fax 

310–523–2745. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: John 

Cecil, Aviation Safety Engineer, FAA, 

Los Angeles Aircraft Certification 

Office, Airframe Branch, 3960 

Paramount Blvd., Lakewood, California 

90712–4137, telephone (562) 627–5228, 

fax (562) 627–5210. 

Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 199 / Monday, October 17, 2005 / Rules and Regulations 60207 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On 

November 17, 2003, the FAA issued AD 

2003–24–01, Amendment 39–13370 (68 

FR 66004, November 25, 2003), to 

require recording TE and inspecting 

certain blades with 13,720 TEs and 750 

hours TIS. The AD also requires 

replacing any cracked blade with an 

airworthy blade. Also, the AD revises 

the Limitations and Conditions of HTC, 

LLC, STC Nos. SR09172RC, SR09074RC, 

and SR09184RC by establishing life 

limits for certain part-numbered blades. 

The AD was prompted by reports of 

certain blades cracking due to a higher 

number of TEs per hour than originally 

calculated. This condition, if not 

corrected, could result in fatigue 

cracking of the blade, blade failure, and 

subsequent loss of control of the 

helicopter. 

Interested persons were afforded an 

opportunity to participate in the making 

of AD 2003–24–01. The FAA received 

several comments from 10 commenters. 

We have given due consideration to the 

comments received. 

One commenter, the manufacturer 

(MDHI), states the scope of the AD 

should be expanded to add the OH–6A 

designation immediately after the model 

to read ‘‘Model 369A (OH–6A), H, etc.’’

The FAA disagrees that we should 

add the Model OH–6A. We included 

STC No. SR09184RC and the Model 

369A (OH–6A), H, HE, HM, and HS 

helicopters to AD 2003–24–01 in error. 

We have reviewed reports, summaries 

about rates of use, incident reports, 

certification data, weight limits, and 

other information from the 

manufacturer. These models may have 

the affected part-numbered blades 

installed. However, the data shows that 

even with a higher than expected 

number of TEs, these models have 

approved operating limitations that 

assume operations at maximum gross 

weight and are conservative enough to 

compensate for the higher TEs. We have 

received no reports of these blades 

cracking in the areas affected by this 

AD. These blades should reach their 

retirement lives based on hours TIS 

before the number of TEs results in 

cracks in the affected area. Also, we 

have determined that we should have 

included STC No. SR01050LA and the 

Model 369F, FF, 500N, and 600N 

helicopters in the AD applicability. Our 

data shows the unsafe condition 

addressed by this AD correlates to a 

flight profile with a higher number of 

TEs than expected during certification 

(six TEs per hour). The Model 369D, E, 

F, FF, 500N and 600N helicopters, with 

a higher gross weight limit, fit that 

profile. Therefore, we have determined 

that this AD should apply only to the 

Model 369D, E, F, FF, 500N and 600N 

helicopters. 

Five commenters state the new 

definition of a TE in AD 2003–24–01 is 

inconsistent with the definition given in 

other ADs and in a service letter. One 

commenter, MDHI, states the new 

definition is likely to cause confusion. 

The FAA agrees. The definition 

introduced in AD 2003–24–01 is 

inconsistent with previously issued ADs 

and could unnecessarily burden and 

confuse the operators. Therefore, we 

have changed the definition to make it 

consistent with the definition of a TE as 

that term is defined in AD 98–15–26, 

Amendment 39–10675, Docket 98–SW–

22–AD. The TE definition in AD 98–15–

26 is also consistent with the definition 

in MDHI Service Letter SL369H–132R1, 

SL369D–111R1, SL369E–063R1, 

SL369F–056R1, SL500N–008R1, and 

SL600N–005R1, dated May 15, 2001. 

One commenter asks that the word 

‘‘reliably’’ be added to the AD paragraph 

requiring operators to determine the 

number of TEs. The commenter states 

that FAA approved service information 

reads, ‘‘operators who cannot reliably 

determine the actual number of TEs for 

a blade * * *.’’

The FAA does not agree. The word 

‘‘reliably’’ is subjective and does not 

assist operators in determining 

accumulated TEs. The requirement is 

that operators determine actual TEs or 

assume 13,720 accumulated TEs. 

One commenter, MDHI, states the 

actions in the AD do not prevent cracks 

but mandate a 35-hour repetitive 

inspection to detect cracks before blade 

failure. 

The FAA agrees. The AD wording is 

revised to read: ‘‘The actions specified 

in this AD are intended to detect fatigue 

cracking to prevent * * *’’

Four commenters do not agree with 

the blade inspection requirements. One 

commenter states the inspection is 

unnecessary. The four commenters state 

the use of a 10X or higher magnifying 

glass is unnecessary and that cracks 

have been found without the use of a 

magnifying glass. Three commenters ask 

if pilots can do the inspections instead 

of a mechanic. 

The FAA disagrees and has 

determined the inspection is necessary 

because the affected blades on these 

model helicopters continue to crack. 

The manufacturer has not identified a 

permanent modification but has 

identified TE counting or replacing the 

blade as a corrective measure. The FAA 

has also determined that a 10X or higher 

magnifying glass is necessary to detect 

a chord-wise crack protruding from 

under the root fitting and doubler on the 

bottom-side of the blade to prevent 

blade failure because these cracks may 

not be detectable without a 10X 

magnifying glass until they are near 

failure. Current FAA policy does not 

allow pilots to do these inspections. 

Pilots may only perform simple visual 

checks authorized by the AD. Pilots may 

perform checks that do not require the 

use of tools, precision measuring 

equipment, training, pilot logbook 

endorsements, or the use of or reference 

to technical data not contained in the 

body of the AD. The inspection in the 

AD requires the use of a 10X or higher 

magnifying glass, which is not 

considered a simple visual check. 

One commenter states that an eddy 

current inspection is effective in 

detecting cracks in the ‘‘C’’ channel of 

certain blades. The commenter states 

the FAA may want to consider having 

the manufacturer incorporate an eddy 

current inspection into the maintenance 

instructions for all blades. 

The FAA does not agree that an eddy 

current inspection is necessary to detect 

a crack in the blade in the areas 

specified in this AD. We have 

determined the cracks can be detected 

in the specified areas by inspecting the 

blades using a 10X or higher magnifying 

glass. 

Two commenters suggest the service 

bulletins and their amendments, created 

by MDHI and HTC, are adequate to 

address the unsafe condition. One of 

those commenters states that normally 

an AD is coordinated with the 

manufacturer who produces a service 

bulletin (SB) and the FAA backs it up 

with an AD stating the operators must 

comply. That commenter further states 

that the idea of an AD should be to 

address an issue the manufacturer is 

either unaware of or has not addressed. 

The FAA is responsible for 

determining which portions, if any, of 

an SB to incorporate in an AD and any 

additional requirements necessary to 

correct the unsafe condition. Even 

though an SB may address an unsafe 

condition, an AD mandates compliance 

with the actions specified in the SB by 

all affected operators. While we 

generally seek technical information 

from the manufacturer, we neither 

solicit the manufacturer’s assistance in 

drafting an AD nor its consent before 

issuing an AD. However, we do note in 

this AD that complying with certain 

portions of certain documents 

constitutes an approved alternative 

method of compliance for certain parts 

of this AD. 

One commenter states that only a few 

companies consistently have cracked 

blades. That commenter suggests that 

we should look at those companies. The 

same commenter states an AD is not 

60208 Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 199 / Monday, October 17, 2005 / Rules and Regulations 

needed because the maintenance 

manual criteria are sufficient to detect a 

cracked blade. 

The FAA partially concurs with the 

commenter. The commenter is correct in 

that most cracked blades do appear to 

occur as a result of the operations of a 

relatively few operators. However, the 

affected blades from these relatively few 

operators may be placed on any of the 

affected model helicopters regardless of 

their previous use. Thus, the AD must 

include all affected model helicopters. 

Although we agree that the maintenance 

manual criteria are sufficient to detect a 

cracked blade, we do not agree that the 

AD is not needed. The AD requires 

determining and recording the number 

of TEs accumulated on each blade and 

provides the required time intervals to 

perform the inspections. We have 

determined the affected blades must be 

inspected to determine if a crack exists 

at the required TEs or hours TIS. 

One commenter, MDHI, states that it 

disagrees that specific blade station 

inspections are any more meaningful 

than the area described as ‘‘* * * 

around the root fitting, doubler and skin 

* * *.’’

The FAA, upon reconsideration, 

agrees and no longer refers to the six 

blade stations because the reference is 

not necessary to identify the required 

inspection area. 

One commenter, the blade 

manufacturer, HTC, states the 

instructions in paragraph (b)(2) of AD 

2003–24–01 ‘‘(parallel to the blade) from 

the center of the root fitting and lead lag 

attach bolt-holes closest to the trailing 

edge,’’ are confusing. The commenter 

asks if the direction is perhaps ‘‘span 

wise’’ and states that the trailing edge of 

the blade is not relevant. The 

commenter also states the instructions 

will cause many operators to perform 

the inspection in the wrong areas. 

The FAA included the specific 

measurements, reference points, and 

directions in paragraph (b)(2) of AD 

2003–24–01 to provide the mechanic 

the location of the specific blade 

stations stated in HTC SB No. 2100–

3R2. To simplify these instructions, we 

have decided to remove the specific 

locations from the AD and include a 

figure that depicts the blade inspection 

area. 

Six commenters commented on the 

cost analysis stating the AD poses an 

economic burden on operators. One 

commenter states it will cause a 

hardship on the industry. Another 

commenter states it will not be 

economically feasible. Another 

commenter states the AD will put 

operators out of work and force them to 

switch to other aircraft types. Another 

commenter states the AD will cause an 

increase in paperwork. Another 

commenter asks what is the basis for the 

cost of the blades and the number of 

additional inspections. Another 

commenter states the economic impact 

should be redone using realistic blade 

rejections due to fatigue cracks. 

While the FAA must consider the 

economic burdens caused by issuing an 

AD, the primary purpose of an AD is to 

correct an unsafe condition. We did, 

however, reassess the cost analysis as a 

result of the comments. Therefore, we 

are assuming a total of 9000 TE 

inspections and blade replacements will 

be required for 10 percent of the fleet. 

Also, we have determined the 

paperwork costs will be negligible. 

A commenter, HTC, states the AD 

establishes life limits for certain blades 

that already have published service 

lives, the action is FAA approved, and 

the life limits are contained in 

Maintenance Manual HTCM–001. 

The FAA agrees with the commenters 

statements. When the life limits were 

originally issued, they were 

inadvertently omitted from the 

Limitations and Conditions of HTC, 

LLC, STC Nos. SR09172RC, SR01050LA, 

and SR09184RC. The STCs were 

amended and now include the life 

limits. However, the life limits can only 

be established in an AD because a 

change to a life limit appearing only in 

a manual or on type certificate data 

sheets, even if FAA-approved, does not 

require compliance by the pilot or 

operator. To be legally required, the 

change must be made through an AD. 

We are addressing the issue of 

establishing life limits in another AD. 

Therefore, the paragraph establishing 

life limits is excluded from this AD. 

A commenter, HTC, notes the AD 

states that this proposal is prompted by 

several reports. The commenter states 

there are two known reports, both from 

the same Canadian operator, and they 

received only one of those two reports. 

The FAA agrees there were two 

reports when AD 2003–24–01 was 

issued, and we also note that we 

inadvertently called the ‘‘action’’

required by the AD a ‘‘proposal’’. 

However, since the AD was issued, we 

have received additional reports. We 

have reviewed a total of five reports in 

making our decision to issue this AD. 

Three commenters question the 

statement in AD 2003–24–01, paragraph 

(a)(2), about recording the total number 

of TEs. One commenter asks whether 

the AD intent is to require that the pilots 

land or record the 100 TEs by taking 

their hands off the controls. Another 

commenter wants to know the basis for 

the 100 external lifts. Another 

commenter states that requiring the 

operator to record TEs after 100 external 

lifts will add a burden and a penalty to 

the operator in having to land and 

record the TEs. That same commenter 

suggests that they be allowed to record 

TE at the end of daily operations. 

The FAA partially agrees with the 

comments. The AD does not dictate the 

flight profile of the helicopter when 

recording TEs. It’s up to the operator to 

record the TEs. The time required to 

record the number of TEs is a negligible 

burden. The basis for our initial 

assessment was that in any given day 

there would be 100 external lift 

operations. We have since determined 

the use of 100 external lift operations is 

not realistic given that some operators 

often exceed that number before a single 

day of operation. Therefore, after 

additional analysis, we have determined 

that recording the TEs at the end of each 

day’s operation or on or before 

accumulating an additional 200 TEs, 

whichever occurs first, is sufficient. 

One commenter states that AD 98–15–

26 requires recording unknown TEs 

using a formula to determine TE against 

TIS. In AD 2003–24–01, the operator 

must assume a penalty of 13,720 TEs for 

blades with unknown TEs. The 

commenter expresses concern that at 

some future date, the FAA will decide 

that these HTC blades must be retired at 

a similar TE as the MD blades now have. 

The commenter further states that this 

could cost operators about $44,000,000. 

The FAA has determined that because 

of the critical nature of the unsafe 

condition, the formula for TEs as 

required in AD 98–15–26 would not 

adequately address the unsafe 

condition. While we cannot rule out 

further AD action related to this unsafe 

condition, any such action would 

require justification and consideration 

of the financial impact of that action. 

One commenter states the paragraph 

in the preamble of the AD that begins 

with the statement, ‘‘This unsafe 

condition is likely to exist or develop on 

other helicopters * * *’’ seems to 

indicate that only HTC-built blades 

could cause the condition. 

The FAA issues an AD when it 

believes there is an unsafe condition in 

a product and that an unsafe condition 

is likely to exist or develop in other 

products of the same type design. In AD 

2003–24–01, the unsafe condition was 

identified as fatigue cracking of the partnumbered blades listed in the 

‘‘applicability’’ section and installed as 

part of the three listed STCs. These 

helicopter models, listed in the 

‘‘applicability section’’ with the affected 

blades installed, are susceptible to 

fatigue cracking of the blades. These 

Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 199 / Monday, October 17, 2005 / Rules and Regulations 60209 

blades include both MDHI and HTC 

blades. Therefore, this AD retains 

similar wording for the revised model 

helicopters and STCs for helicopters 

with blades installed, which are 

susceptible to fatigue cracking. 

One commenter, HTC, states the 

comment period for an NPRM is 1 year. 

The commenter asks why is this AD so 

urgent when the FAA was so 

unconcerned before. The same 

commenter also states that they 

requested an NPRM more than 16 

months ago. 

The FAA comment period for an 

NPRM is usually 60 days. We issued AD 

2003–24–01 as a final rule; request for 

comments with a typical 60-day 

comment period. Since the original 

incident, we have been evaluating the 

reports and data as it becomes available 

to determine the necessary corrective 

action. In addition to the reports of 

cracked blades that prompted the AD, 

we have received additional reports of 

cracked blades. We have determined 

that this critical unsafe condition and 

the short compliance time to correct it 

require an immediate AD. 

Two commenters suggest the January 

26, 2003, date for receipt of comments 

for inclusion in the rules docket may be 

a typographical error. 

The FAA agrees the date was a 

typographical error and should have 

been January 26, 2004. 

Finally, two commenters state the 

FAA should include and cross-reference 

the blades specified in the HTC and 

MDHI SBs so that operators understand 

that the new AD affects both HTC and 

MDHI part number (P/N) blades. 

The FAA agrees. In this AD, we 

include both MDHI and HTC partnumbered blades and cross-reference 

the part numbers and the STCs to 

clearly show the affected helicopters, 

blades, and STC’s. 

Since issuing AD 2003–24–01, the 

FAA has reviewed MDHI SB369H–

245R2, SB369E–095R2, SB500N–023R2, 

SB369D–201R2, SB369F–079R2, 

SB600N–031R2, dated February 4, 2004. 

The SB contains information about the 

blade TEs and determining an 

inspection interval. Also, the SB lists 

certain MDHI helicopter models and 

HTC and MDHI blade part numbers. 

HTC superseded Mandatory Notice 

No. 2100–3R2, dated December 20, 

2002, with Notice No. 2100–3R3, dated 

January 5, 2004. Notice No. 2100–3R3 

contains information about blade TE 

inspections and determining an 

inspection interval. The notice 

references the information contained in 

MDHI CSP–HMI–2, Section 62–10–00, 

Main Rotor Blade Torque Event 

Inspection. Also, Notice No. 2100–3R3 

‘‘revises the model effectivity and the 

scope of the additional inspection with 

a 10X glass.’’

Also since issuing AD 2003–24–01, 

the FAA determined that STC 

SR09184RC approves the installation of 

blades, P/N 500P2100–301 and –303, 

only, on the MDHI 369A, H, HE, HM, 

and HS model helicopters. Based on our 

determination, this AD will not apply to 

these five model helicopters. Likewise, 

the AD will not apply to STC 

SR09184RC and blades, P/N 500P2100–

301 and –303. However, we will 

establish life limits for these blades in 

a subsequent AD. 

Also, after further review of the 

service information, the FAA has 

determined that helicopters modified 

under STC SR01050LA, STC 

SR09172RC, and STC SR09074RC may 

have the affected blades installed. 

Therefore, they are included in the 

applicability of this AD. 

In addition, since issuing AD 2003–

24–01, the FAA has received three 

additional reports of incidents of 

cracked blades in 2004 and 2005. A 

preliminary evaluation of the cracked 

blades continues to indicate that the 

cracking is related to a high number of 

TEs accumulated by the blades. None of 

the blades identified in incident reports 

that caused the FAA to publish AD 

2003–24–01 or this final rule involved 

helicopters modified with STC 

SR09184RC. Therefore, exclusion of 

STC SR09184RC is appropriate because 

none of the blades used in that 

modification, based on a review of 

technical data and accident records, 

should be affected by this AD. 

An unsafe condition is likely to exist 

or develop on other Model 369D, 369E, 

369F, 369FF, 500N, and 600N 

helicopters of these same type designs 

modified with an HTC STC No. 

SR09172RC, SR09074RC, or 

SR01050LA. Therefore, this AD 

supersedes AD 2003–24–01 to require: 

• On or before the next 50-hours 

time-in-service (TIS), unless 

accomplished previously, determine 

and record the number of TEs 

accumulated on each blade. A TE is the 

transition to a hover from forward flight 

or any external lift operation. Each 

transition to a hover from forward flight 

is recorded as a TE, and any external lift 

operation is recorded as two TEs. 

Forward flight is considered to be flight 

at any airspeed (or direction) after 

attaining translational lift. If you cannot 

determine the number of TEs, assume 

13,720. Continue to record the number 

of TEs accumulated (actual usage) 

throughout the life of the blades and the 

hours TIS. On or before accumulating an 

additional 200 TEs or at the end of each 

day’s operation, whichever occurs first, 

record and update the accumulated TEs 

total. 

• For each blade that has 

accumulated 13,720 or more TEs and 

750 or more hours TIS, before further 

flight, unless accomplished previously, 

and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 

200 TEs or 35 hours TIS, whichever 

occurs first, perform a main rotor blade 

torque event inspection. 

• If a crack is found, replace the blade 

with an airworthy blade before further 

flight. 

The short compliance time involved 

is required because the previously 

described critical unsafe condition can 

adversely affect the controllability and 

structural integrity of the helicopter. 

Some operators not affected by AD 

2003–24–01 may have already exceeded 

the 13,720 TEs and 750 hours TIS. 

Therefore, based on the high usage rate 

of some of these model helicopters, the 

35-hour TIS or 200 TE inspections may 

occur in a short time span, and this AD 

must be issued immediately. 

Since a situation exists that requires 

the immediate adoption of this 

regulation, it is found that notice and 

opportunity for prior public comment 

hereon are impracticable, and that good 

cause exists for making this amendment 

effective in less than 30 days. 

The FAA estimates that this AD will: 

• Affect 886 helicopters of U.S. 

registry; 

• Take about 1 work hour per 

helicopter for inspecting blades, 

assuming 9000 TE inspections for 10 

percent of the fleet, at an average labor 

rate of $65 per work hour; 

• Cost about $50,000 for one set of 

blades (on condition), assuming 10 

percent of the fleet has blades that are 

replaced; and 

• Have paperwork costs that are 

negligible. 

Based on these figures, we estimate 

the total cost impact of the AD on U.S. 

operators is $56,261,000, assuming 10 

percent of the fleet is affected. 

Comments Invited 

Although this action is in the form of 

a final rule that involves requirements 

affecting flight safety and, thus, was not 

preceded by notice and an opportunity 

for public comment, comments are 

invited on this rule. Interested persons 

are invited to comment on this rule by 

submitting such written data, views, or 

arguments as they may desire. 

Communications should identify the 

Rules Docket number and be submitted 

in triplicate to the FAA, Office of the 

Regional Counsel, Southwest Region, 

2601 Meacham Blvd., Room 663, Fort 

Worth, Texas. All communications 

60210 Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 199 / Monday, October 17, 2005 / Rules and Regulations 

received on or before the closing date 

for comments will be considered, and 

this rule may be amended in light of the 

comments received. Factual information 

that supports the commenter’s ideas and 

suggestions is extremely helpful in 

evaluating the effectiveness of the AD 

action and determining whether 

additional rulemaking action would be 

needed. 

Comments are specifically invited on 

the overall regulatory, economic, 

environmental, and energy aspects of 

the rule that might suggest a need to 

modify the rule. All comments 

submitted will be available in the Rules 

Docket for examination by interested 

persons. A report that summarizes each 

FAA-public contact concerned with the 

substance of this AD will be filed in the 

Rules Docket. 

Commenters wishing the FAA to 

acknowledge receipt of their mailed 

comments submitted in response to this 

rule must submit a self-addressed, 

stamped postcard on which the 

following statement is made: 

‘‘Comments to Docket No. 2004–SW–

13–AD.’’ The postcard will be date 

stamped and returned to the 

commenter. 

Regulatory Findings 

The regulations adopted herein will 

not have a substantial direct effect on 

the States, on the relationship between 

the national Government and the States, 

or on the distribution of power and 

responsibilities among the various 

levels of government. Therefore, it is 

determined that this final rule does not 

have federalism implications under 

Executive Order 13132. 

The FAA has determined that this 

regulation is an emergency regulation 

that must be issued immediately to 

correct an unsafe condition in aircraft, 

and that it is not a ‘‘significant 

regulatory action’’ under Executive 

Order 12866. It has been determined 

further that this action involves an 

emergency regulation under DOT 

Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 

FR 11034, February 26, 1979). If it is 

determined that this emergency 

regulation otherwise would be 

significant under DOT Regulatory 

Policies and Procedures, a final 

regulatory evaluation will be prepared 

and placed in the Rules Docket. A copy 

of it, if filed, may be obtained from the 

Rules Docket at the location provided 

under the caption ADDRESSES. 

Authority for This Rulemaking 

Title 49 of the United States Code 

specifies the FAA’s authority to issue 

rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, 

section 106, describes the authority of 

the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII, 

Aviation Programs, describes in more 

detail the scope of the Agency’s 

authority. 

We are issuing this rulemaking under 

the authority described in subtitle VII, 

part A, subpart III, section 44701, 

‘‘General requirements.’’ Under that 

section, Congress charges the FAA with 

promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in 

air commerce by prescribing regulations 

for practices, methods, and procedures 

the Administrator finds necessary for 

safety in air commerce. This regulation 

is within the scope of that authority 

because it addresses an unsafe condition 

that is likely to exist or develop on 

products identified in this rulemaking 

action. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation 

safety, Safety. 

Adoption of the Amendment 

■ Accordingly, pursuant to the authority 

delegated to me by the Administrator, 

the Federal Aviation Administration 

amends part 39 of the Federal Aviation 

Regulations (14 CFR part 39) as follows: 

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS 

DIRECTIVES 

■ 1. The authority citation for part 39 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701. 

§ 39.13 [Amended] 

■ 2. Section 39.13 is amended by 

removing Amendment 39–13370 (68 FR 

66004, November 25, 2003), and by 

adding a new airworthiness directive 

(AD), Amendment 39–14340, to read as 

follows: 

2005–21–02 MD Helicopters, Inc.: 

Amendment 39–14340. Docket No. 

2004–SW–13–AD. Supersedes AD 2003–

24–01, Amendment 39–13770, Docket 

No. 2003–SW–16–AD. 

Applicability: Models 369D, 369E, 369F, 

369FF, 500N, or 600N with either an MD 

Helicopter, Inc. (MDHI) main rotor blade 

(blade) installed or modified with Helicopter 

Technology Company, LLC (HTC), 

Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) No. 

SR09172RC, SR09074RC, or SR01050LA with 

an HTC blade installed as listed in the 

following table, certificated in any category: 

Helicopter model MDHI blade part No. (P/N) HTC blade P/N HTC STC Nos. 

369D ........................................................................ 369D21100 Basic, –516, –517, –523 500P2100–BSC, –BSC–1 SR09172RC 

369E ......................................................................... 369D21120–501, –503 500P2100–101, –103 SR09074RC 

369F, FF .................................................................. 369D21102 Basic, –503, –517, –523 500P2300–501, –503 SR01050LA 

369D21121–501, –503 

500N ........................................................................ 369D21102–503, –517, –523 500P2300–501, –503 SR01050LA 

369D21121–501, –503 

600N ........................................................................ 369D21102–517, –523 500P2300–501, –503 SR01050LA 

369D21121–501, –503 

Note 1: The terms ‘‘BSC’’ and ‘‘Basic’’ are 

interchangeable when identifying blades 

produced by MDHI and HTC. 

Compliance: Required as indicated. 

To detect fatigue cracking of the blade to 

prevent blade failure and subsequent loss of 

control of the helicopter, accomplish the 

following: 

(a) On or before the next 50 hours time-inservice (TIS), unless accomplished 

previously: 

(1) Determine and record the number of 

torque events accumulated on each blade. A 

torque event (TE) is the transition to a hover 

from forward flight or any external lift 

operation. Each transition to a hover from 

forward flight is recorded as a TE, and any 

external lift operation is recorded as two TEs. 

Forward flight is considered to be flight at 

any airspeed (or direction) after attaining 

translational lift. If you cannot determine the 

number of TEs, use 13,720 TEs. 

(2) Continue to record the number of TEs 

accumulated (actual usage) throughout the 

life of the blades along with hours TIS. On 

or before accumulating an additional 200 TEs 

or at the end of each day’s operations, 

whichever occurs first, record and update the 

accumulated TEs total. 

(b) For each blade that has accumulated 

13,720 or more TEs and 750 or more hours 

TIS, before further flight, unless 

accomplished previously, and thereafter at 

intervals not to exceed 200 TEs or 35 hours 

TIS, whichever occurs first, perform a main 

rotor blade torque event inspection. 

Note 2: MD Helicopters, Inc. Maintenance 

Manual CSP–HMI–2, Revision 36, section 

62–10–00, paragraph 8, Main Rotor Blade 

Torque Event Inspection, pertains to the 

subject of this AD. 

(c) If a crack is found, replace the blade 

with an airworthy blade before further flight. 

Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 199 / Monday, October 17, 2005 / Rules and Regulations 60211 

Note 3: MDHI Maintenance Manual CSP–

HMI–2, Section 20–30–00 Main Rotor Blade 

Painting pertains to the subject of this AD. 

This section of the maintenance manual 

recommends painting the inboard 24 inches 

(not to be exceeded) of the blade gloss white 

to aid in detecting a crack; and if this is done, 

painting all blades alike and rebalancing 

them. 

Note 4: TEs are used only to establish an 

additional inspection interval and not to 

establish an alternative retirement life. 

(d) To request a different method of 

compliance or a different compliance time 

for this AD, follow the procedures in 14 CFR 

39.19. Contact the Los Angeles Aircraft 

Certification Office, Transport Airplane 

Directorate, for information about previously 

approved alternative methods of compliance. 

Note 5: Complying with the inspection 

procedures in the Accomplishment 

Instructions, paragraphs 2.B.(2). and 2.B.(3)., 

of MD Helicopter Inc. Service Bulletin (SB) 

SB369H–245R2, SB369E–095R2, SB500N–

023R2, SB369D–201R2, SB369F–079R2, 

SB600N–031R2, dated February 4, 2004, 

constitutes an approved alternative method 

of conducting the inspection required by 

paragraph (b) of this AD. 

Note 6: Complying with the Inspection 

Instructions procedures in paragraphs 2 and 

3 of HTC Mandatory SB, Notice No. 2100–

3R3, dated January 5, 2004, constitutes an 

approved alternative method of conducting 

the inspection required by paragraph (b) of 

this AD. 

(e) This amendment becomes effective on 

November 1, 2005. 

Issued in Fort Worth, Texas, on October 7, 

2005. 

David A. Downey, 

Manager, Rotorcraft Directorate, Aircraft 

Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 05–20678 Filed 10–14–05; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. 96–ANE–35–AD; Amendment 

39–14339; AD 2005–21–01] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; Pratt & 

Whitney JT8D–200 Series Turbofan 

Engines 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: This amendment supersedes 

an existing airworthiness directive (AD) 

that applies to Pratt & Whitney (PW) 

JT8D–200 series turbofan engines. That 

AD currently requires installing and 

periodically inspecting individual or 

sets of certain part number (P/N) 

temperature indicators on the No. 4 and 

5 bearing compartment scavenge oil 

tube and performance of any necessary 

corrective action. This AD requires 

installing and periodically inspecting 

two temperature indicators on all PW 

JT8D–200 series turbofan engines, 

including those incorporating high 

pressure turbine (HPT) containment 

hardware. This AD results from five 

uncontained HPT shaft failures. We are 

issuing this AD to prevent oil fires and 

the resulting fracture of the HPT shaft 

which can result in uncontained release 

of engine fragments; engine fire; inflight engine shutdown; and possible 

airplane damage. 

DATES: This AD becomes effective 

November 21, 2005. The Director of the 

Federal Register approved the 

incorporation by reference of certain 

publications listed in the regulations as 

of November 21, 2005. 

ADDRESSES: You can get the service 

information identified in this AD from 

Pratt & Whitney, 400 Main St., East 

Hartford, CT 06108; telephone (860) 

565–7700, fax (860) 565–1605. 

You may examine the AD docket at 

the FAA, New England Region, Office of 

the Regional Counsel, 12 New England 

Executive Park, Burlington, MA. You 

may examine the service information, at 

the FAA, New England Region, Office of 

the Regional Counsel, 12 New England 

Executive Park, Burlington, MA. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Keith Lardie, Aerospace Engineer, 

Engine Certification Office, FAA, Engine 

and Propeller Directorate, 12 New 

England Executive Park, Burlington, MA 

01803–5299; telephone (781) 238–7189, 

fax (781) 238–7199. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The FAA 

proposed to amend 14 CFR part 39 by 

superseding AD 97–19–13, Amendment 

39–10134 (62 FR 49135, September 19, 

1997). The proposed AD applies to PW 

JT8D–200 series turbofan engines. We 

published the proposed AD in the 

Federal Register on September 29, 2004 

(69 FR 58099). That action proposed to 

require installing and periodically 

inspecting two P/N 810486 temperature 

indicators on all PW JT8D–200 series 

turbofan engines, including those 

incorporating HPT containment 

hardware. Thirteen HPT shaft fractures 

resulted in five uncontained HPT shaft 

failures. The HPT shafts fractured 

through the No. 41⁄2 oil return holes due 

to oil fires within the No. 4 and 5 

bearing compartment. 

Examining the AD Docket 

You may examine the AD Docket 

(including any comments and service 

information), by appointment, between 

8 a.m. and 4:30 p.m., Monday through 

Friday, except Federal holidays. See 

ADDRESSES for the location. 

Comments 

We provided the public the 

opportunity to participate in the 

development of this AD. We have 

considered the comments received. 

Concerns Over Considering the Engine 

Unserviceable 

Four commenters state that an engine 

should not be considered unserviceable 

and the engine removed from service if 

both temperature indicators are missing. 

The commenters state that we should 

allow installing new temperature 

indicators followed by a ground 

diagnostic test before further flight. 

One of those commenters states that 

considering the engine unserviceable 

imposes an undue hardship on 

operators. If one of the indicators is 

missing, PW Alert Service Bulletin 

(ASB) No. JT8D A5944 requires that the 

engine be tested using specific 

instructions to determine its 

serviceability and the engine be 

dispositioned accordingly. The theory 

used for one indicator missing is that 

the serviceability of the engine is now 

questionable and the engine must be 

proven serviceable before it can be 

returned to service. The commenter 

further states that any time engine 

serviceability is in question, it must be 

proven and cannot be assumed. 

Requiring operators to remove the 

engine from service, simply because 

both of the indicators are missing, forces 

operators into a position without 

recourse. The commenter further states 

that this is the same condition already 

covered when one indicator is missing. 

The procedure to determine 

serviceability for both indicators 

missing should follow the procedure for 

one indicator missing but with minor 

changes. 

We agree. We have changed the 

compliance section of the AD to allow 

a ground diagnostic test before further 

flight if both temperature indicators are 

missing. 

AD Instructions Not Clear 

One commenter states that the AD 

instructions for a missing indicator are 

not clear. The instructions for one 

indicator missing assume that the 

missing indicator has a red window that 

has turned black. The commenter asks 

if the yellow window of the missing 

indicator should be assumed to be 

normal color or black. The condition of 

the remaining indicator would make a 

difference as to whether a diagnostic