Not for Publication in West's Federal Reporter 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the First Circuit 

No. 15-1227 

KARLA DANIELA GUERRA-CARRANZA, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

LORETTA E. LYNCH, 

Attorney General of the United States, 

Respondent. 

PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER OF 

THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS 

Before 

Lynch, Stahl, and Barron, 

Circuit Judges. 

 Ondine G. Sniffin and Mills and Born, Attorneys at Law, on 

brief for petitioner. 

 Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney 

General, Civil Division, John S. Hogan, Assistant Director, Office 

of Immigration Litigation, and Matthew A. Spurlock, Trial 

Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, on brief for 

respondent. 

May 23, 2016 
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BARRON, Circuit Judge. Karla Daniela Guerra-Carranza is 

a native and citizen of El Salvador. The Board of Immigration 

Appeals (BIA) dismissed her appeal of a decision by the Immigration 

Judge (IJ) denying her successive application for asylum and her 

petition for protection under the Convention Against Torture 

(CAT). She petitions for review. For the reasons that follow, we 

deny the petition. 

I. 

Guerra arrived in the United States in December 2006. 

She was apprehended at the Mexican border upon arrival and was 

placed in removal proceedings soon thereafter. Guerra conceded 

removability and submitted an application for asylum, withholding 

of removal, and CAT protection. With respect to her asylum 

application, she alleged that from the seventh grade until her 

graduation from high school in November 2006, she was repeatedly 

confronted by gang members who threated to sexually abuse and rape 

her if she failed to join the gang. 

After a hearing, the IJ granted Guerra's application for 

asylum. The IJ found that Guerra was "a member of a group of girls 

attending a Catholic school who are considered to be of intellect 

and ambition," that she had experienced past persecution by gangs 

in El Salvador on account of her membership in that group, and 

that she had a reasonable fear of future persecution. 
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The BIA reversed. The BIA held that "being a girl who 

attends Catholic school" was not a cognizable social group for the 

purposes of asylum. The BIA further held that Guerra had failed 

to establish eligibility for withholding of removal and remanded 

the case to the IJ to determine whether Guerra was subject to CAT 

protection. Guerra did not appeal the BIA's decision to this 

court. 

On remand, Guerra submitted a new application for 

asylum, along with supporting documentation. The IJ then held an 

evidentiary hearing on whether Guerra was eligible for CAT 

protection. At that hearing, Guerra testified that her parents, 

who lived in El Salvador, had passed away, that her sisters and 

husband had recently arrived in the United States, that there was 

"no one in [her] country that could protect [her]," and that the 

gangs in El Salvador were more active than when she first applied 

for relief from removal. 

The IJ denied Guerra's request for CAT protection. 

Regarding Guerra's new application for asylum, the IJ stated that 

Guerra "ha[d not] established either changed circumstances or 

changed country conditions such as to warrant a re-opening of her 

asylum claim in that the same basis remains for her eligibility 

for asylum as in the past." 

The BIA affirmed. The BIA held that Guerra had not 

demonstrated entitlement to CAT relief, and that the IJ "correctly 
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determined that [Guerra] did not establish either changed 

circumstances or changed country conditions to warrant a reopening 

of her asylum claim." 

Guerra petitions for review of the BIA's decision on her 

asylum petition.1

II. 

Both parties characterize Guerra's request to the IJ as 

one to file a successive application for asylum. As the parties 

agree on this point, we proceed on that understanding as well. 

The Immigration and Nationality Act provides that an 

alien may file an application for asylum "within 1 year after the 

date of the alien's arrival in the United States," as long as the 

alien has not "previously applied for asylum and had such 

application denied." 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C). 

However, 

[a]n application for asylum of an alien may be 

considered, notwithstanding [the time and 

number restrictions], if the alien 

demonstrates to the satisfaction of the 

Attorney General either the existence of 

changed circumstances which materially affect 

the applicant's eligibility for asylum or 

extraordinary circumstances relating to the 

delay in filing an application. 

 1 Guerra does not contend that she is eligible for protection 

under the CAT, and so any such argument is waived. See TolozaJiménez v. González, 457 F.3d 155, 159 n.9 (1st Cir. 2006). 
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Id. § 1158(a)(2)(D). The regulations define "changed 

circumstances" as including, among other things, "[c]hanges in 

conditions in the applicant's country of nationality" and 

"[c]hanges in the applicant's circumstances that materially affect 

the applicant's eligibility for asylum." 

8 C.F.R. § 1208.4(a)(4)(i)(A)-(B). 

Guerra argues to us that the BIA erred in concluding 

that she had not shown changed circumstances sufficient to warrant 

consideration of her successive asylum application. Where, as 

here, "the BIA adopts and affirms an IJ's decision, we review the 

IJ's decision 'to the extent of the adoption, and the BIA's 

decision as to [any] additional ground.'" Sunoto v. Gonzales, 504 

F.3d 56, 59-60 (1st Cir. 2007) (quoting Berrio-Barrera v. Gonzales, 

460 F.3d 163, 167 (1st Cir. 2006)) (alteration in original). 

We are limited, however, in our ability to review the 

BIA's decision that Guerra has not shown changed circumstances. 

We have jurisdiction over the petition for review only to the 

extent that Guerra "identifies a legal or constitutional defect in 

the decision." See El-Labaki v. Muaksey, 544 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 

2008) (citing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(a)(3), 1252(a)(2)(D)). Otherwise, 

we lack jurisdiction. Id. 

III. 

Guerra makes several arguments to us. She first contends 

that the IJ erred in concluding that "he lacked jurisdiction to 
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hear [her] successive application for asylum." But the IJ did not 

hold that he lacked jurisdiction to hear Guerra's successive 

application. Rather, after speculating that he might not have 

"the authority" to consider that application, the IJ in fact ruled 

on Guerra's successive application. And so that argument fails. 

Guerra next argues that she presented sufficient 

evidence to the IJ to warrant a finding of changed country 

conditions. But Guerra identifies no legal or constitutional error 

in the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's decision that she did not 

show changed country conditions. Rather, she contends that the 

BIA erred in not finding that, because the conditions in El 

Salvador had worsened for young women, the country conditions had 

changed. Her challenge, therefore, regards a factual 

determination, which we are without jurisdiction to review. See 

Mehilli v. Gonzales, 433 F.3d 86, 93 (1st Cir. 2005). 

Guerra also contends that the evidence she presented to 

the IJ warranted a finding of changed personal circumstances. She 

contends that she introduced evidence that since the filing of her 

first petition for asylum, she had married, both her parents had 

died, and her sister had arrived in the United States. And she 

contends that this evidence established that, were she required to 

return to El Salvador, she "would be a member of a particular 

social group defined as 'unaccompanied women returning to El 

Salvador after living in the United States' or 'women in El 
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Salvador lacking familial protection,' and therefore the target of 

[gangs]." 

The problem for Guerra is that she never presented her 

argument about the social groups to which she belongs to either 

the IJ or the BIA. We appreciate Guerra's argument that she never 

had the opportunity to provide the argument to the IJ because the 

IJ cut her off. Guerra did, however, have the opportunity to make 

the argument to the BIA in appealing the IJ's ruling. And although 

Guerra did summarize to the BIA the facts that she had presented 

to the IJ that suggested that she was not part of the same social 

group that the BIA had previously rejected -- "girls attending a 

Catholic school who are considered to be of intellect and 

ambition" -- she made no argument to the BIA as to how those new 

facts placed her in a cognizable social group for the purposes of 

asylum. Thus, we do not have jurisdiction to determine whether 

her purported membership in either of these two claimed social 

groups renders the denial of her asylum application erroneous. 

See Sunoto, 504 F.3d at 59. 

Finally, Guerra argues that she was denied due process 

when, at her evidentiary hearing, the IJ "cut-off [sic] further 

discussion about [her] request of renewed asylum." But a 

successful due process claim requires a showing of prejudice. See 

Lattab v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 8, 20 (1st Cir. 2004). And the only 

argument we can plausibly infer from Guerra's brief regarding 
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prejudice is the same argument we have explained was not presented 

to the BIA -- namely that, had the IJ not cut her off, she would 

have successfully explained that her new personal circumstances 

placed her in two new social groups for asylum purposes. And so 

here, too, her contention fails, as it depends on an argument that 

was never made to the BIA. Sunoto, 504 F.3d at 59.2 

IV. 

The petition for review is denied. 

 2 We note that the facts set forth in this petition suggest 

it may be appropriate for the Government to consider whether to 

exercise its prosecutorial discretion in this case.