### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON A pr il 19, 200 4 S es sio n ANNA MILLE R v. EDUARDO MI LLE R

Direc t Appeal from the Chancer y Court for Madison Coun ty

No. 59526 Joe C. M orris, Chancellor

No. W2003-00851-C OA-R3-C V - F iled Jun e 14, 2004

This appea l arises fr om a divorce action. We af firm in part, re verse in part, and r emand. Tenn. R. App . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Chancer y Court Affi rm ed in p art; Reve rsed in part; and Rem anded

D AVI D R. F ARMER , J ., delivere d the opi nion of t he court, in which A L AN E. H I G H ERS , J ., and H O LLY M. K I RBY , J ., joined.

J eff Mueller, Jackson, Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellant, Eduar do Miller.

L inda Sesson Tay lor, J ackson, Te nnessee , for the a ppellee, A nna Miller.
OP IN ION Anna Miller ( Ms. Mill er) and Edua rdo M i ller (Mr. Miller) wer e mar ried in Oc tober 2000, in Atlanta, Geor g ia. They have one minor child, Arianna , born in Febr uary 2000. The pa

rties moved to Tenn es s ee in Ma

rch 2001, a nd separ ated in Mar ch 2002, at whic h time Ms. Mil ler filed f or di vo rce. I n h e r c omp la int , M s. Mil le r c ite s a s g ro un ds ir re c on c ila ble dif fe re nc e s, ina

pp ro pria te marital conduc t, and adultery . Mr. Miller answe red and counter -complaine d in May 2002.

The matter

was he ard in the Chance ry Court of Madison Countyin J anuary 2003. By

order of Mar ch 7, 2003, the tria l court g rante d Ms. Mill er an absolute di vorce based on g round of a dultery
a ndir re c on c ila ble dif fe re nc e s. Th e c ou rt

na me d Ms. Mil le r p ri mary re sid e nti a l pa

re nt andse t c hil d
su pp ort pu rs ua nt t o th e c hil d sup po rt g uid e lin e s. Th e c ou rt app ro ve d Ms. Mill e r’ s pla ns to r e loc a te to Nashville to secur e employ ment, and aw arde d Mr. Miller libera l visitation. The c ourt order ed Mr. M i l l e r t o m a i n t a i n a

l i f e i n s u r a n c e p o l i c y i n t h e a m o u n to f $ 3 0 0 , 0 0 0 n a m i n g A r i a n n a a s b e n e f i c i ar y, a ndfu rthe r a wa

rd e d A ri a nn a

Mr. Mi ll er’s U. S. Sa vin g s B on ds . T he c ou rt div ide d th e pa

rt ie s’ pr op e rt y , a wa

rd e d Ms. Mill e r al imo ny in sol ido to p a y fo r h e r m ov ing e xpe ns e s, a nda wa rd e d M s. Miller $7,500 as alim ony in solido to pay for her attorney ’s fees. M r. Miller filed a notice of a

ppeal to this C ourt on April 4, 2003.T h e sta tute p ro v id e s tha t t h e trial c o u rt m u st c o n sid e r: 1

(1 ) T h e lo v e , affe c tio n a n d e m o tio n a l t ie s e x isting b e tw e e n the p a re n ts a n d c h ild ; ( 2) T he di s po s i t i on of

t he parents to p ro vide t he chi l d wi t h f oo d, cl ot hi ng , medi cal ca r e, ed ucat i o n and o t her necessar y care and t he d egree t o whi ch a p arent has b een t he p ri m ary caregi ver;

( 3) T he i mp ort anc e of

cont i nu i t y i n t he chi l d' s l i fe a nd t he l eng t h of t i me t he chi l d has l i ved in a sta b le , sa tisf a c to ry e n v iro n m e n t;

... (c o n tinu e d ...)
-2- Issues Presented

Mr . M ill e r r a ise s th e fo llo wi ng iss ue s, a s w e re state the m, f or re vie w b y

thi s Co urt: (1) Whether the trial court e rre d by desig nating Wife as re sidential pare nt of the pa rt ie s’ min or

c hil d a ndor de ri ng Hu sb a ndto p a y c hil d s up po rt ; ( 2 ) W h e t h e r

t h e tr i a l c o u r te rr e d i n i t s d i v i s i o n o f p r o p e r t y; (3) Whether

the trial court erre d in awar ding w ife a l i m o n y i n solido and
a tto rn e y ’s fe e s.
Sta nda rd of Re v ie w
T o t h e e x t en tt h e i s s u es o n ap p ea l i n v o l v e q u es t i o n s o f f ac t , o u r r ev i ew o f t h e t ri al co u rt 's
ru lin g is de novo wi th a pr e su mpt ion of c or re c tne ss. Te nn . R. Ap p. P. 1 3( d) ; Sullivan v. Sullivan , 1 0 7 S

. W

. 3 d 5 0 7 , 5 0 9 (T en n
. C t

. Ap p
. 2 0 0 2 ). W e m ay n o t re v er s e t h e tri al co u rt 's fa ct u al fi n d i n gs unless they

are contra

ry to the prepondera nce of the evidence. Id. at 510. With respect to the trial
c ou rt ' s le g a l c on c lus ion s, ho we ve r, ou r r e vie w i s de novo with no pr esumption of corr ectne ss. Id.
Chil d Cus tod y and Supp or t
We review the trial court’s determination of child custod y u n d er an ab use of discretion standard, a ffor ding the trial court g reat defe renc e. He rre ra v . H e rre ra , 944 S.W .2d 379, 385 (Tenn. Ct. Ap p. 19 96 ). Th is C ou rt wi ll n ot i nte rf

e re wi th the tr ia l c ou rt ’s de te rm inatio n a bs e nt a pa lpa ble abuse of discretion or unle ss the judgme n t i s aga i n s t t he g reat weig ht of the evide nce. Id. at 386. Th is d e fe re nti a l r e vie w i s p re mis e d o n th e a ssu mpt ion that th e tr ial c ou rt fi rs t c on sid e re d th e be st interests of the c hild in making the c ustody determination and did not act ar bitrarily

. Id.

Th e we lf a re a nd ne e ds of the c hil d a re the pa ramou nt c on c e rn s in the de te rm inatio n o f c hil d custody

. Id. The true test for the a war d of custody is to arrive at the point of deciding w ith whom t o p l ac e the child in preparation for a c aring and produc tive adult life. Id. I n ma k in g a c u s tody de te rm inatio n, the tr ia l cou rt mus t eng a g e in a co mpa rativ e fi tne ss ana ly sis of

the pa re nts

. Ga sk ill v. G aski ll , 9 3 6 S. W. 2 d 6 2 6 , 6 3 0 ( T e n n
. Ct

. A p p
. 1 9 9 6 )

. I n s o d o in g , it mu s t c o n s id e r

th e f a c to rs outlined by

the leg islature as c odified at Tenn. Code A nn. § 36-6-106. Id . Custodydeterminations 1(

. . . con t i n u ed) 1 (4 ) T h e sta b ili ty o f t h e fam ily u n it o f t h e p a re n ts;
(5 ) T h e m e n ta l an d p h ysic a l he a lth o f t h e p a re n ts; (6 ) T h e ho m e , sc h o o l an d c o m m u n ity re c o rd o f t h e c h ild ; (7 ) T h e re a so n a b le p re fer e n c e o f t h e c h ild if twe lve (1 2 ) ye a rs o f ag e o r o ld e r. . .
. ( 8) Evi dence of

phy s i cal or emo t i onal abus e t o t he chi l d, t o t he ot her pare nt or t o any ot her p e rs o n ; .
. .

( 9) T h e ch ar ac t er a n d be h av i or of an y ot h er per s on wh o re s i des i n or f r equ en t s t h e h ome of
a par en t a n d s u ch pe r s on ' s i n t er ac t i on s w i t h t h e ch i l d; a n d

(1 0 ) E ac h p are nt' s p ast and p o t en t i al fo r future p erfo rm an ce o f p are nti ng resp o nsib i l i t i es, i ncl ud i ng t he wi l l i ngness and ab i l i t y of each o f t he p arent s t o f aci l i t ate a n d e nco urage a cl o se and
co nti nu i ng p are nt- ch i l d relati o nship b etwe en t he c hil d a nd the o t he r p are nt, c o nsist en t w i t h the b est inte re st o f t h e c h ild

.
T enn. C o d e A nn. § 3 6

- 6

- 1 0 6 (20 0 1 ).

-3- are thus based on a

combination of subtle fa ctors, and r equire a fa ctually based inquiry

. Id. The trial court is in the best position to weigh the fac ts presente d to it, and to assess the cr edibi lityof the parties. Id. at 631. Having re v i ew ed the re cord, w e af firm the trial c ourt’s dec ision to designate Ms. Mill er re sid e nti a l pa

re nt. Al tho ug h th e pa

rt ie s a lte rn a te d c hil d c are du ri ng the pe nd e nc y of the div or c e , it is not disput ed that Ms. Miller stopped working befor e Arianna’ s birth and was he r p ri m ar y car eg ive r. Al tho ug h M r. Mil le r’ s si ste r, a pedia tr ici an, test if

ie d th a t sh e wo ulda g re e to r e loc a te to Tenne ssee to assist him in caring for Arianna should he be a war ded re sidential custody , she further te sti fi e d th a t sh e int e nd e d to wo rk a ndwa s c on fi de nt s he couldfi nde mpl oyme nt h e re . T hu s, Arianna would be in day car e re g ardle ss of whethe r she lives primarily with Mr

. Miller or Ms. Mill er. Further, Mr. Miller’ s sister testified that she c urre ntly lives with her father, ha s not lived in d e p e n d e n tl y

s in c e h e r m e d ic a l r e s id e n c y 1 2 y e ar s a g o , a n d th a t s h e h a s n e v e r h a d c h il d r e n
. We fi ndno abu se of

dis c re tio n in the tr ia l c ou rt ’s de te rm inatio n to na me Ms. Mil le r r e sid e nti a l pa re nt,
a nda c c or din g ly

a ff ir m on thi s is su e . M r. Mil le r d oe s n ot a sse rt that th e tr ial court

e rr e d inits de te rm inatio n o f the a mou nt o f c hil d s up po rt pu rs ua nt t o the g uid e lin e s, thu s w e a ff ir m th e c hil d support awa

rd.
Classi fication of Property

Mr. Miller ra ises sever al points of err or re garding the tria l court' s classification and distribution of the parties' property

. Be fore dividing marital property , the court must first classify the parties’ prope rty

as sepa rate or marital. Batson v. Batson , 769 S.W .2d 849, 856 (Tenn. Ct. App. 19 88 ); Te nn . Co de An n. § 36 -4 -1 21 (a )( 20 01 ). Se pa rate pr op e rt y re ma ins the pr op e rt y of the sp ou se who owns it, while the court must di vide m ar ital property equitably

. Sullivan v. Sullivan , 107 S.W .3d 507, 511 (Tenn. Ct. App . 2002). An e quitable division of property must reflec t
c on sid e ratio n o f the fa c tor s e nu me rate d in the Te nn e sse e Cod e , in c lud ing the va lue of the se pa rate pr op e rt y he ld b y e a c h s po us e . T e nn . Co de An n. § 3 6- 4- 12 1( c )( 6)(2001 ). F a ult is e xpre ssl y

no t to-4-

be re g arde d in the division of pr operty . Tenn.Code Ann. § 36- 4-121(a )(1) (2001). Trial courts ar e ve ste d w ith a

g re a t de a l of

dis c re tio n w hen cla ss if

y ing a nddiv idi ng the ma ri ta l e state , a ndthe ir decisions ar e entitled to g reat weig ht on appea l. Sullivan , 107 S.W. 3da t 51 2. Ac c or din g ly , u nle ss the court's de cision is contrary to the preponde ranc e of the evidenc e or is ba sed on an er ror of law, we will not interfe re w ith the decision on appe al. Id.

We first addre ss the classification issues raised in this appeal. Mr. Miller submits the trial
c ou rt e rr e d in a wa

rd ing Ms. Mil le r one -h a lf of the va lue of his 40 1( k) a c c ou nt w ith Ge ne ra l E le c tr ic (“G E”) sinc e 1999 and one -half of the equity

in the marital home. He further asserts it was err or for the court to awar d his U.S. S aving s Bonds to the pa rties’ minor child. We ag re e wi th Mr . Mille r that sav ing s bon ds a c qu ir e d pri or to the pa rt ie s’ marria g e are his separ ate pr operty

under Te nnessee Code Annotated § 36- 4-121(b) (2)( A). F urther, an incre ase in the
va lue of se pa

rate pr op e rt y is mari ta l pr op e rt y on ly wh e re the sp ou se ha s c on tr ibu te d s ub stanti a lly to its preservation and appre ciation. Langschmidt v . Langschmidt , 81 S.W .3d 741, 746 (Tenn. 2002)

. There must be some link betwee n the contribution of the spouse and the incre ase in the va lue of the asset in orde r for the appreciation to be marital property

. Id. We acc ording ly reve rse the a war d to the parties’ child of the saving s bonds purcha sed by Mr. Miller prior to the pa rties’ mar riag e and held solely

in his name.

Mr . M ill e r f

urthe r a rg ue s tha t the tr ia l cou rt e rr e d by a wa rd ing Ms. Mil le r a

on e -h a lf int e re st ($ 27 ,5 00 ) in the e qu ity of the pa rt ie s’ mari ta l ho me wh e re the $5 3, 00 0 d ow n- pay me nt f or the ho me was de rived fr om the sale of Mr . Miller’s sepa rate ly owned home in Atlanta

and ther e had been a $7,000 incre ase in e quity since the initial purcha se. Mr. Miller c ont en d s t hat in light of the short duration of this marriag e, he should be returne d to the s ame economic posi tion he held prior to the marria g e. He further co n t en d s t h at he should be re quired to pay Ms. Mill er only

one-ha lf of the incre ase in the e quity

g ained during the marria g e. M r. M i l l er’ s arg ument in his brief and at oral arg ument, as we understand it, is that the marital home was purc hased w ith separate funds and that the amount of the dow n-payment should, theref ore, be classified as separ ate property . We disag ree
. Separate prope rty

can be come pa

rt of the marital es t at e due to the parties' treatment of the that pr op e rt y
. Th e do c tr ine s of trans mut a tio n an d co mmi ng lin g pr ov ide a n av e nu e wh e re se pa rate property can be come marital property

. Batson, 769 S.W .2d at 858. Transmutation

occur s when sepa

rate propert y i s t re at ed in such a way as to g ive evidenc e of an int e nti on that it be c ome ma ri ta l pr op e rt y . O ne me tho d o f c a us ing tr a ns mut a tio n is to pu rc ha se pr op e rt y wi th se pa rate fu nd s b ut t o ta

ke tit le in j oin t te na nc y . T his ma y a lso be do ne by

pla c ing se pa

rate pr op e rt y

in the n a me s o f b othsp ou se s. Th e ratio na le
un de rl y ing bo th the se do c tr ine s is that de a lin g wi th pr op e rt y in the se way s c re a te s a re bu tta ble pr e su mpt ion of a g if

t to the mari ta l est a te . T his pr e su mpt ionis b a se d a lso upon the provision in many marital prope rty

statutes that property

acquir ed during the marriag e is presume d marital. The pre sumption can be re butted by evidenc e of-5-

c ir c ums ta nc e s o r c ommun ic a tio ns c learly in dic a tin g a n in te nt that th e pr op e rt y rema in separate.
Id. (quoting 2 H. Clark, The Law o f D om e sti c Re lat ion s in th e Un ite d S tat e s § 16.2, at 185 (1987))

. W e a f f i r mt h e tr i a l c o u r t ’ s d e t e r m i n a t i o n t h a tt h e m ar i t a l h o m e w a s m ar i t a l p r o p e r t y.
We next turn to Mr. Miller’s 401(k) acc ount w hich he established while employ ed by GE and which wa s valued at approxim ately $107,000. Mr. Miller worke d for GEprior to the mar riag e and for a pproxi mately

thee a nd one-half months after the parties were marrie d. Thus, the 401(k) w as funded in pa

rt, albeit small part, with marital f unds.

S ep ar at e pr o p er t y al s o ca n b ec o m e ma ri t al p ro p er t y t h ro u gh t h e do ct ri n e o f c o m m i n gl i n g. Co mm in g li n g o c c u r s w h e n th e s e p ar a te p r o p e r ty is “ in e xtric ab ly mi n g le d w ith ma

r it a l p r o p e r ty [. ]” Langschmidt, 81 S.W .3d at 747. Howeve r, wher e the separ ate pr operty “continues to be seg reg ated or can be tra ced into its product, comming ling doe s not occur[.]” Id. I n a re tirement ac count such as Mr. Miller’s 401( k) ac count, if sepa rate funds and the g ains as s o ci at ed with t hem ca n be
se g re g a te d f

ro m con tr ibu tio ns ma de wi th mari ta l fun ds a nd g a ins , tha t pro pe rt y is n ot i ne xtri c ably commingle d and does not become marital prope rty

. See Sm ith v . S mi th , 93 S.W .3d 871, 879 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002).

In t h i s c a s e , M r
. M i l l e r ’ s 4 0 1 ( k ) w i t h G E w a s f u n d e d p r i m ari l y w i t h p r e
- m ar i t a l p r o p e r t y. Contributions to the acc ount made after the marria g e, and any g ains associated with them, are marital property and must be equitably

divided. Howeve r, if Mr. Miller c an s egr egate pre- marital
c on tr ibu tio ns a ndg a ins , th e n th os e a mou nts re ma in h is s e pa rate pr op e rt y . We re ma ndthi s is su e to the trial court to de termine whether funds in the 401(k) are inext rica bly commi n gl ed an d for
c la ssi fi c a tio n o f the pr op e rt y in a c c or da nc e wi th i ts f ind ing . I f the pr op e rt y

is i ne xtri c ably commingle d, then it is marital property and subjec t to equitable division. I f i t is not commingled, then only the contributions made with marital funds and their associate d g ains are to be consider ed i n d e t e r m i n i n g a n e q u i t ab l e d i s tr i b u t i o n o f p r o p e r t y.
Distribu tion of Mari tal Property Mr. Miller additionally

asserts th e t ri al court erre d in its di vision of the parties’ debts and pe rs on a l pr op e rt y . H e c on te nd s th a t the di vi sio n o f p e rs on a l pr op e rt y wa s c on tr ary

to the pa rt ie s’
a g re e me nt a nd that tr ia l e xhibi t six a c c ur a te ly re pr e se nte d th e ir

de sir e d p e rs on a l pr op e rt y a g re e me nt. As an initial matter, we note that trial exhibit six i s not in the recor d befor e us. Thus we cannot de termine what ag ree ment, if any , the parties rea ched w ith respec t to the divisi on of marital persona l property

. We additionally note that Mr. Miller has f ailed to comply

with Rule 7 of the Rul e s o f C ou rt s o f A pp e a l of Te nn e sse e , w hic h p ro vid e s: (a) I n domestic relations appea ls wher e the issues involve the amount or the dispositi on of the marital property , the appellant’s brief shall contain in the statement-6-

of fa cts or in an a p p en dix , an orde rly tabulation of all marital pr operty in a form
su bs ta nti a lly lik e the fo rm a tta c he d he re to. Al l e ntrie s in the ta ble a s to va lue a ndto whom the prope rty

was a war ded shall be ac co mpanied by a citation to the re cord wher e the information may be found. (b) I f the a

ppeal involves issues about the se parate prope rty of either party or the a llo c a tio n of the mari ta l de bts , the app e lla nt’ s brie f s ha ll c on ta in a se pa rate ta ble in the same form showing the pertinent information for that disputed issue.

The trial court a war ded Ms. Miller furniture purcha sed while the divorc e ac tion was pending and seve ral spec ified items of persona l pr operty which she enumer ated in he r pray er f or re lief. Mr. Miller was awarde d all rema ining personal property

. There is nothing in the re cord to indicate the value of this property . The trial c ourt assig ned the parties’ joint debt to Mr. Miller a nd determined Ms. Mil le r w ou ld b e ob lig a te d f or he r e du c a tio na l de bt. Th e re is n oth ing in this re c or d o n w hic h to ba se a c on c lus ion that th e e vid e nc e pr e po nd e rate s a g a ins t th e tr ia l c ou rt ’s fi nd ing s.
Howeve r, whe n making an equitable division of marital property , the trial court must t ake into account the va lue of the pa rties’ sepa

rate property . I n light of our determination reg arding the trial court’ s classification and division of Mr. Mill er’ s 401(k) with GE, we must remand for
rec onsideration of w hether the division of property

is equitable.
Alim ony
Mr. Miller asserts the trial court e rre d in awar ding Ms. Miller $6,000 a s alimony in solido to p a y fo r m ov ing e xpe ns e s. Th e app ro pria te ne ss of a n a wa rd of a lim on y is d e pe nd e nt o n th e fa c ts and cir cumstance s of ea ch ca se. Sullivan v. Sullivan , 107 S.W .3d 507, 510 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002). T h e p r i m ar y c o n s i d e r a t i o n i s t h e n e e d o f t h e r e c i p i e n ts p o u s e , f o l l o w e d b y t h e o b l i g o r ' s ab i l i t y t o p a y. Id. I n ma

k in g it s d e te r mi n a ti o n o f a n a li mo n y a w ar d , th e c o u r t mu s t b a lan c e s e v e r a l sta tutory fac tors including those enumer ated in sec tion 36-5-101(d)( 1) of the Tenne ssee Code. Id. The trial court has broad discretion in determining the type, amount, and dur ation of alimony based upon the particula r fa cts of ea ch ca se. Id. a t 51 1. Th is C ou rt re vie ws a n aw ard of a lim on y un de r an abu se of discre tion standard. Id.

An awa rd of attorney ’s fe es constitutes alimony in solido. Koj a v . Ko

ja , 42 S.W .3d 94, 98 (T e nn . Ct . A pp . 2 00 0) . A n a wa rdof a tto rn e y ’s fe e s “ is co nd iti on e d u po n a la c k o f r e so ur c e s to prosec ute or de fend a suit in g ood faith.

. . . I f a spouse does not have separ ate pr operty of her own which is ade quate to def

ray the expenses of the suit, ce rtainly she should not be denied a cce ss to the courts bec ause she unable to proc ure c ounsel.” Langschmidt v. Langschmidt , 81 S.W .3d 741, 751 (T en n
. 2 0 0 2 ) ( q u o t i n g Fox v . Fox , 6 57 S.W. 2d747, 74 9 (T e nn . 1 98 3) ). A s po us e wi th a de qu a te property and income is not entitl ed to an a war d of alimony to pay attorney ’s fe es and e x penses. Id. Th e de te rm inatio n o f w he the r an a wa rdof a tto rn e y ’s fe e s is a

pp ro pria te in a

div or c e a c tio n is wi thi n the wide discr etion of the trial c ourt, and we will not dis turb this de termination absent c lear evidenc e of an a buse of discr etion. Id.-7-

I n this ca s e, the parties do not dispute that Ms. Mill er le ft her e mploy ment to car e for the parties’ child or that Mr. M iller was the parties’ sole income-e arne r, ea rning a sala

ry in excess of $95,000 plus an annua l bonus and retire ment benef its. The parties a lso do not disput e that they reloc ated to Te nnessee to further Mr. Miller’s ca

ree r, or that Ms. Miller is reloc ating from Jackson to Nashville in order

to max imiz e her

employ ment opportunities. Howeve r, in light of our holding reg arding the classific ation and distribution of the parties’ property , we must re mand the issues of alimony and attorne y ’s fe es to the trial court to determine whe ther a n awa rd is appropriate.

Conc lusion
We affirm the determination of t he trial court that Ms. Miller shall be the r esidential par ent
o f th e p ar ti e s ’ mi n o r

c h il d a n d th e a w ar d o f

c h il d s u p p o r t b a s e d o n th e c h il d s u p p o r t g u id e li n e s
. We also aff irm classifica t i o n o f the marital home a s marital prope rty . We reve rse the a war d of Mr. Miller’s saving s bonds to the parties’ minor child. We rema nd this cause to the trial court for (1) a fi n d i n g of whe ther Mr. Miller’ s 401(k) a ccount is marital pr operty by virtue of the doc trine of
c omm ing lin g ; ( 2) a n e qu ita ble div isi on of mari ta l pr op e rt y ; (3 ) d e te rm inatio n o f the app ro pria te ne ss of an a war d of alimony

in solido; (4) de termination of the a ppropriate ness of a n awa

rd of attorney ’s fe e s. Cos ts of thi s a

pp e a l a re ta xedon e -h a lf

to A nn a Mil le r andon e -h a lf

to E du ard o M ill e r, a ndhis surety , for whic h execution may issue if nec essary
.

___________________________________

DAVID R. FARMER, J UDGE