NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

CLARK BARNELLA, Petitioner Employee,

v.

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF ARIZONA, Respondent,

ISLAND TIME POOL SVC, Respondent Employer,

WESCO INSURANCE CO, Respondent Carrier.

No. 1 CA-IC 20-0011 

Special Action - Industrial Commission

ICA Claim No. 20180-950445

Carrier Claim No. 2546393-1

The Honorable J. Matthew Powell, Administrative Law Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Clark Barnella, Surprise

Petitioner Employee

FILED 12-1-2020
2

Industrial Commission of Arizona, Phoenix

By Gaetano J. Testini

Counsel for Respondent

Broening Oberg Woods & Wilson, PC, Phoenix

By Jerry T. Collen, Alicyn M. Freeman

Counsel for Respondent Employer and Carrier

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Paul J. McMurdie delivered the Court’s decision, in which Presiding 

Judge James B. Morse, Jr. and Judge Maria Elena Cruz joined.

M c M U R D I E, Judge:

¶1 Clark Barnella filed this statutory special action to obtain a 

review of an award finding that his work-related injury is stationary and 

no longer needs active treatment. We find no error by the administrative 

law judge (“ALJ”) and, therefore, affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 In 2017, while installing a swimming pool filter as an 

employee of Island Time Pool Svc., Barnella injured his left knee. His 

workers’ compensation claim was accepted by Wesco Insurance Co. 

(“Wesco”), and he received benefits. Shortly after the injury, Barnella had 

surgery to repair a torn meniscus in the knee.

¶3 In December 2017, Dr. Eric Feldman, who was treating 

Barnella, diagnosed him with chronic regional pain syndrome (“CRPS”). In 

May 2018, Wesco then sent Barnella to an IME conducted by Leon Ensalada,

M.D., a pain management specialist with expertise in CRPS. Dr. Ensalada

found that Barnella had chronic pain syndrome, complicated by disusing

his left leg, but not CRPS. Dr. Ensalada also found that Barnella had reached 

maximum medical improvement for his knee injury.1 Barnella had another 

IME in November 2018 by a neurologist who found lower extremity 

1 In his May 18 report, Dr. Ensalada wrote that Barnella had not 

reached maximum medical improvement, but in a July letter to the carrier’s 

lawyers he stated Barnella had reached maximum medical improvement.
BARNELLA v. ISLAND/WESCO

Decision of the Court

3

atrophy but did not recommend neurological treatment. In November 2018, 

a third IME was performed by an orthopedic surgeon who found that 

Barnella had reached maximum medical improvement with his knee. He 

rated Barnella with a permanent impairment of one percent of the whole 

person and three percent of the lower left extremity. He agreed that Barnella 

did not have CRPS.

¶4 In January 2019, Wesco discontinued temporary benefits and 

assessed Barnella with a three percent permanent disability of his lower left 

extremity. Barnella challenged that determination, claiming he had not 

reached maximum medical improvement.

¶5 The ALJ held a hearing at which Dr. Feldman testified about 

Barnella’s condition and recommended further treatment. He testified 

Barnella had CRPS, needed supportive care, and required work restrictions 

relating to his knee injury. He would not give an opinion regarding a 

permanent rating for Barnella’s knee impairment because he was “not 

trained in it” and did not “understand the whole system of grading 

disabilities.” Upon further questioning, he admitted that in December 2018, 

he had noted that Barnella had reached maximum medical improvement.

He explained that statement as follows:

I do not feel he’s going to see any further improvement at this 

time without -- I do feel there is further intervention that 

could help him, but I don’t necessarily see he’s going to get 

any better without any other treatment.

Finally, he also testified that he “did not formally grade [Barnella’s] CRPS.”

¶6 The ALJ also heard testimony from Dr. Ensalada. He 

explained his reasons for concluding that Barnella did not have CRPS. He 

testified Barnella did not need any further active or supportive treatment 

for pain management, nor did he have any work restrictions. He stated that 

a better description of Barnella’s knee condition was “disuse atrophy.”

¶7 The ALJ issued an award finding Dr. Ensalada’s opinion to be 

more credible than Dr. Feldman’s. Accordingly, he issued an award finding 

that Barnella’s condition was stationary and closed the claim with a 

permanent impairment. This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

¶8 In reviewing workers’ compensation awards, we defer to the

ALJ’s factual findings but independently review legal conclusions. Young v. 
BARNELLA v. ISLAND/WESCO

Decision of the Court

4

Indus. Comm’n, 204 Ariz. 267, 270, ¶ 14 (App. 2003). We will affirm an award 

if the evidence reasonably supports it after reviewing the evidence in a 

“light most favorable to sustaining the award.” Lovitch v. Indus. Comm’n, 

202 Ariz. 102, 105, ¶ 16 (App. 2002). An ALJ has the primary responsibility 

to resolve conflicts in medical opinion evidence. Carousel Snack Bar v. Indus. 

Comm’n, 156 Ariz. 43, 46 (1988); Kaibab Indus. v. Indus. Comm’n, 196 Ariz. 

601, 609, ¶ 25 (App. 2000). We defer to the ALJ’s resolution of conflicting 

evidence and affirm the findings if any reasonable theory of the evidence 

supports them. Perry v. Indus. Comm’n, 112 Ariz. 397, 398–99 (1975).

¶9 We see nothing in the record that would lead us to conclude 

the ALJ’s decision to give Dr. Ensalada’s opinion more weight than Dr. 

Feldman’s was unreasonable. Dr. Ensalada is a qualified expert, he

explained his conclusions, and he described the information he used to 

arrive at them. Barnella’s dissatisfaction and disagreement with the ALJ’s 

decision to follow the IME physician’s opinion over a treating physician are

not grounds to reverse an award. As noted, we defer to an ALJ’s resolution 

of conflicting evidence unless it is unreasonable. Carousel Snack Bar, 156 

Ariz. at 46 (“Many factors enter into a resolution of conflicting evidence, 

including whether or not the testimony is speculative, consideration of the 

diagnostic method used, qualifications in backgrounds of the expert 

witnesses and their experience in diagnosing the type of injury incurred.”).

CONCLUSION

¶10 We affirm the award.