alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

OF TEXAS

NO. WR-31,511-05

EX PARTE PAULO TREVINO JR., Applicant

ON APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

CAUSE NO. 14-CR-1274-F IN THE 214TH DISTRICT COURT

FROM NUECES COUNTY

Per curiam.

O R D E R

Pursuant to the provisions of Article 11.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, the

clerk of the trial court transmitted to this Court this application for a writ of habeas corpus. Ex parte

Young, 418 S.W.2d 824, 826 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967). Applicant was convicted of aggravated

robbery, and he was sentenced to forty-five years in prison. The Thirteenth Court of Appeals

affirmed his conviction in an unpublished opinion. Trevino v. State, No. 13-15-00010-CR (Tex.

App.—Edinburg del. Dec. 29, 2016).

Applicant raises several claims in his habeas application, including claims of ineffective

assistance of trial counsel. He has alleged facts that, if true, might entitle him to relief. Strickland

v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); Ex parte Patterson, 993 S.W.2d 114, 115 (Tex. Crim. App.
-2-

1999). There is no response from trial counsel in the record provided to this Court, and there are no

findings from the trial court. In these circumstances, additional facts are needed. As we held in Ex

parte Rodriguez, 334 S.W.2d 294, 294 (Tex. Crim. App. 1960), the trial court is the appropriate

forum for findings of fact. 

The trial court shall order trial counsel to respond to Applicant’s claims of ineffective

assistance by explaining counsel’s representation of Applicant, including applicable strategy and

tactical decisions. To obtain the response, the trial court may use any means set out in TEX. CODE

CRIM. PROC. art. 11.07, § 3(d). If the trial court elects to hold a hearing, it shall determine whether

Applicant is indigent. If Applicant is indigent and wishes to be represented by counsel, the trial court

shall appoint an attorney to represent Applicant at the hearing. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 26.04. 

The trial court shall make findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding the claims raised

in the habeas application. The trial court may also make any other findings of fact and conclusions

of law it deems relevant and appropriate to the disposition of Applicant’s claims for habeas corpus

relief.

This application will be held in abeyance until the trial court has resolved the fact issues. The

issues shall be resolved within 90 days of this order. A supplemental transcript containing all

affidavits and interrogatories or the transcription of the court reporter’s notes from any hearing or

deposition, along with the trial court’s supplemental findings of fact and conclusions of law, shall

be forwarded to this Court within 120 days of the date of this order. Any extensions of time shall be

obtained from this Court.

Filed: September 26, 2018

Do not publish
Exhibit
10.17




February
17, 2005
 
 Mr.
Matthew W. Milne
 
 
 Dear
Matt,
 
 I
am pleased to present you with this new offer to act as the interim President of
ViewSonic Americas, in addition to your current role of Senior Vice President,
Business Development and Strategy, reporting to James Chu, our Chief Executive
Officer, at our Walnut, California headquarters. Included in this new offer of
employment are some changes to your compensation as follows:
 
 ·
    Base
      compensation increase to $11,953.85 paid bi-weekly less payroll deductions
      and all required withholdings, (an additional $900 monthly or $310,800
      annualized, less payroll deductions and all required
      withholdings).
 ·
    If
      ViewSonic chose to dismiss you from the company, for any reason other than
      a gross performance/misconduct issue, we will guarantee to pay salary
      continuance for a minimum of 3 (three) months in excess of our standard
      guidelines in effect at the time of your dismissal to assist with your
      career transition to a new company. This in no way will change your
      at-will status with the company, but just guarantee a payment should the
      need arise to dismiss your services, under the at-will
    rules.
 ·
    In
      addition we will be reviewing your stock options and making an additional
      stock grant recommendation, when we review all key employees subsequent to
      the settlement of the stock re-pricing
issue.
 ·
    All
      other compensation, benefits and other terms and conditions at the time of
      hire will not be changed.
 
 
 I
look forward to your continued success with the company.
 
 Sincerely,
 
 
 /s/
James Chu
 James
Chu
 Chairman,
CEO and President
 
 
 
 I
accept the above offer
 
 
 /s/ Matthew W. Milne         2/22/2005          Date
 
 Cc: Employee
File
EXHIBIT 10.38

                              CONSULTING AGREEMENT


      This Consulting Agreement, made and entered into this 28th day of March
2005 by Albert J. Detz (the "Consultant") and theglobe.com, Inc. (the
"Company"), governs the terms of financial and accounting services performed by
the Consultant for the Company, effective February 2, 2005. Consultant will work
on projects/tasks assigned by Edward Cespedes, President of the Company, or
Michael Egan, CEO of the Company, and will be compensated by the Company at a
net rate of $80/per hour (normal billing rate at $125 per hour less a discount
equal to $45 per hour). Consultant will prepare and submit invoices to the
Company on a weekly basis.

      In consideration for Consultant agreeing to provide services to the
Company on a discounted basis, the Company agrees to the following:

      1.    With respect to the 200,000 options to purchase Company common stock
            granted to the Consultant on June 3, 2004,

            a)    the Company agrees to vest additional shares so that as of the
                  effective date of this Consulting Agreement (February 2,
                  2005), a total of 130,000 shares will be vested.

            b)    the Company agrees to vest the remaining 70,000 shares in the
                  event that the Consultant continuously performs services under
                  the Consulting Agreement for at least 6 months from the
                  effective date.

            c)    the Company agrees to give the Consultant the right to
                  exercise all vested shares until February 2, 2006.

      2.    Provided that the Consultant either, (a) performs valuable services
            which assist the Company in raising cash proceeds from either sales
            of stock or sales of businesses or assets; or, (b) continuously
            performs services under the Consulting Agreement for at least 6
            months from the effective date, the Consultant will be eligible for
            a cash bonus in an amount to be determined solely in the discretion
            of the Company.

      This Consulting Agreement may be terminated at any time by either the
Consultant or the Company.



                                            Agreed to by:



/s/ Albert J. Detz                          /s/ Robin S. Lebowitz, VP Finance
-----------------------------------         -----------------------------------
the "Consultant"                            the "Company"
EXHIBIT 31.1

                                  CERTIFICATION


  I, James H. Hirst, certify that:

  1. I have reviewed this Annual Report on Form 10-KSB of Solpower
  Corporation. (the "small business issuer");

  2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue
  statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary
  to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which
  such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period
  covered by this report;

  3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
  information included in this report, fairly present in all material
  respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows
  of the small business issuer as of, and for, the periods presented in
  this report;

  4. I am responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure
  controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and
  15d-15(e)) for the small business issuer and have:

  (a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such
  disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under my supervision,
  to ensure that material information relating to the small business
  issuer, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by
  others within those entities, particularly during the period in which
  this report is being prepared;

  (b) [Paragraph omitted in accordance with SEC transition instructions
  contained in SEC Release 34-47986]; and

  5. I have disclosed, based on my most recent evaluation of internal
  control over financial reporting, to the small business issuer's
  auditors and the audit committee of the small business issuer's board
  of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

  (a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design
  or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are
  reasonably likely to adversely affect the small business issuer's
  ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information;
  and

  (b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or
  other employees who have a significant role in the small business
  issuer's internal control over financial reporting.


  Date: May 29, 2007                   By: /s/ James H. Hirst
                                       ----------------------
                                       James H. Hirst
                                       Chief Executive Officer, President,
                                       Director and Principal Accounting Officer
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 99-20122

Summary Calendar

 

ERIC CANTRELL HOLMES,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

HARRIS COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT,

TOMMY B. THOMAS; J.G. SHANNON, Sergeant;

T.W. BELL, Deputy; R.G. STANLEY, Deputy;

HARRIS COUNTY JAIL, Dietician; DY ORLANDO,

Defendants-Appellees.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. H-96-CV-4504

--------------------

June 16, 2000

Before GARWOOD, DeMOSS, and PARKER, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM:*

Eric Cantrell Holmes, Texas prisoner # 786465, appeals the

district court’s order granting the motion for summary judgment

filed by defendants Thomas, Bell, and Stanley. Defendant Shannon

did not join in this motion. The other parties were not served.

When an action involves multiple parties or multiple claims,

any decision that adjudicates the liability of fewer than all the

parties or disposes of fewer than all the claims does not
No. 99-20122

-2-

terminate the litigation and is not appealable unless certified

under FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b). See Thompson v. Betts, 754 F.2d

1243, 1245 (5th Cir. 1985). The district court’s judgment is not

final as to all parties.

This court lacks jurisdiction to review the order because

the order was not certified for appeal under Rule 54(b) and

nothing in the record indicates the district court’s unmistakable

intent to enter a partial final judgment under Rule 54(b). See

Briargrove Shopping Ctr. Joint Venture v. Pilgrim Enters., Inc.,

170 F.3d 536, 538-41 (5th Cir. 1999); Kelly v. Lee’s Old

Fashioned Hamburgers, Inc., 908 F.2d 1218, 1220 (5th Cir.

1990)(en banc). Further, the order cannot be appealed under the

collateral order doctrine because it is reviewable on appeal

after the final judgment disposing of all claims in the suit. 

See Thompson v. Betts, 754 F.2d 1243, 1246 (5th Cir. 1985). 

Accordingly, the appeal is DISMISSED. See 5TH CIR. R. 42.2. 

APPEAL DISMISSED.
```

[Congressional Bills 111th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 4972 Introduced in House (IH)]

111th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 4972

       To repeal the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             March 25, 2010

 Mr. King of Iowa (for himself, Mr. Aderholt, Mr. Akin, Mrs. Bachmann, 
  Mr. Barrett of South Carolina, Mr. Bishop of Utah, Mr. Bonner, Mr. 
Burton of Indiana, Mr. Buyer, Mr. Campbell, Mr. Carter, Mr. Coble, Mr. 
  Duncan, Mr. Fleming, Mr. Gohmert, Mr. Goodlatte, Mr. Griffith, Mr. 
 Hensarling, Mr. Inglis, Mr. Issa, Mr. Johnson of Illinois, Mr. Jones, 
 Mr. Kingston, Mr. Lamborn, Mr. Latta, Mr. Marchant, Mr. McHenry, Mr. 
 Gary G. Miller of California, Mr. Neugebauer, Mr. Pence, Mr. Smith of 
 New Jersey, Mr. Smith of Texas, Mr. Souder, Mr. Tiahrt, Mr. Wamp, Mr. 
Westmoreland, Mr. Rogers of Alabama, Mr. Olson, Ms. Jenkins, Mr. Broun 
 of Georgia, and Mrs. Lummis) introduced the following bill; which was 
 referred to the Committee on Energy and Commerce, and in addition to 
 the Committees on Ways and Means, Education and Labor, the Judiciary, 
Natural Resources, Rules, House Administration, and Appropriations, for 
a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for 
consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the 
                          committee concerned

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
       To repeal the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. REPEAL OF PPACA.

    Effective as of the enactment of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act, such Act is repealed, and the provisions of law 
amended or repealed by such Act are restored or revived as if such Act 
had not been enacted.
                                 <all>
```
#### STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. DAVID ALDRIDGE, JR.

No. 7319SC817

(Filed 9 January 1974)

Appeal by defendant from *Exum, Judge,*6 August 1973 Session, Superior Court, Cabarrus County.

Defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle on a public street or highway while his operator’s license was suspended. In district court he waived, in writing, his right to assigned counsel. He entered a plea of guilty and appealed to the superior court from the judgment entered. In superior court he entered a plea of not guilty, was found guilty by the jury, and appealed from the judgment entered on the verdict. He was represented in superior court by court-appointed counsel, appointed upon a determination of defendant’s indigency.

*Attorney General Morgan, by Associate Attorney Kramer, for the State.*

*Grant and Grant, by Adam C. Grant, Jr., for defendant appellant.*

MORRIS, Judge.

Defendant’s counsel requests this Court to review the record to determine whether prejudicial error was committed at defendant’s trial. After a careful examination of the record, we are unable to find error in the proceedings in the trial court. Defendant was convicted by a jury upon a plea of not guilty. The warrant was proper in form, and the evidence for the State was more than sufficient to support the jury’s verdict. The suspended sentence imposed is within the statutory limits.

It is clear from the record that defendant received a fair trial, free from prejudicial error.

No error.

Chief Judge Brock and Judge Carson concur.
In the MATTER OF James L. BELL, Petitioner.

Appellate Case No. 2018-000941

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

February 20, 2019

**572ORDER

By opinion dated December 20, 2017, this Court suspended petitioner from the practice of law for nine months, retroactive **573to the date of his interim suspension. *In re Bell* , 421 S.C. 520, 809 S.E.2d 54 (2017).1 Petitioner filed a petition for reinstatement pursuant to Rule 33, RLDE, Rule 413, SCACR. After referral to the Committee on Character and Fitness (the Committee), the Committee has filed a report and recommendation recommending the Court reinstate petitioner to the practice of law. We find petitioner has met the requirements of Rule 33(f), RLDE, Rule 413, SCACR. Accordingly, we grant the petition for reinstatement.

*/s/ Donald W. Beatty*, C.J.

*/s/ John W. Kittredge*, J.

*/s/ Kaye G. Hearn*, J.

*/s/ John Cannon Few*, J.

*/s/ George C. James, Jr.*, J.

1

Petitioner was placed on interim suspension on November 18, 2016. *In re Bell* , 418 S.C. 398, 793 S.E.2d 314 (2016).
##### 



Exhibit 32.1 Certification Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 In connection with the Amendment No. 1 to the annual report of MetroCorp
Bancshares, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-K/A for the period ending December
31, 2003 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date
hereof (the Report), I, George M. Lee, Chief Executive
Officer of the Company, certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley act of 2002, that:  1.
    
    The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and2.
    
    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and operating results of the
Company. /s/ George Lee  
 August 27, 2004
Court of Appeals

of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA,____________________

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order:

A18A0485. DAMIAN IBEKILO v. THE STATE.

Damian Ibekilo was found guilty of trafficking in heroin, and we affirmed his

conviction on appeal. Ibekilo v. State, 277 Ga. App. 384 (626 SE2d 592) (2006). 

Ibekilo later filed a motion to set aside his conviction, challenging the legality of the

search leading to the discovery of the heroin he was convicted of trafficking. He also

filed a motion for copies of documents and records related to his case. In an order

entered on May 31, 2017, the trial court denied both motions, and on July 20, 2017,

Ibekilo filed a notice of appeal to this Court. We, however, lack jurisdiction.

First, Ibekilo’s notice of appeal was not timely filed. A notice of appeal must

be filed within 30 days of entry of the order sought to be appealed. OCGA § 5-6-38

(a). Ibekilo, however, filed his notice of appeal 50 days after entry of the trial court’s

order denying his motions. The proper and timely filing of a notice of appeal is an

absolute requirement to confer jurisdiction on this Court. Rowland v. State, 264 Ga.

872, 872 (1) (452 SE2d 756) (1995).

Second, even if Ibekilo had filed a timely notice of appeal, the trial court’s

order is not directly appealable. With respect to Ibekilo’s motion to set aside his

conviction, a motion to vacate or set aside a judgment of conviction “is not an

appropriate remedy in a criminal case.” Harper v. State, 286 Ga. 216, 218 (1) (686

SE2d 786) (2009). Any appeal from an order denying or dismissing such a motion

must be dismissed. See Roberts v. State, 286 Ga. 532, 532 (690 SE2d 150) (2010);

Harper, 286 Ga. at 218 (2). 

With respect to Ibekilo’srequest for documents and records, “if no petition for

habeas corpus is pending at the time an indigent prisoner makes any application for

November 06, 2017
[records] for purposes of collateral attack upon his conviction or sentence, that

application will be treated as a separate civil action subject to the procedures and

requirements of the Prison Litigation ReformAct of 1996. Specifically, appealsfrom

the denial of any such applications for free [records] for post-conviction collateral

attack must comply with the discretionary appeal procedures of OCGA § 5-6-35.” 

Coles v. State, 223 Ga. App. 491, 492 (1) (477 SE2d 897) (1996); see OCGA § 42-

12-8. As nothing in the record indicates Ibekilo has any currently pending collateral

attack on his conviction or sentence, he was required to file an application for

discretionary appeal to obtain review of the denial of his request.

For these reasons, this appeal is hereby DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.

Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

Clerk’s Office, Atlanta,____________________

I certify that the above is a true extract from

the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of said court

hereto affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk.

11/06/2017
* P ursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4.

1 IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 01-50604

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

ANTONIO PEREGRINO-LUJAN,

Defendant-Appellant.

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. EP-01-CR-141-ALL-H

-------------------- January 8, 2002

Before DeMOSS, PARKER, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges:

PER CURIAM: *

Antonio Peregrino-Lujan appeals his 120 month sentence

following his plea of g uilty to a charge of being found in the

United States after deportation, a violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326.

Peregrino contends that the district court erred in applying a twolevel increase to his base offense level for obstruction of justice

pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 and in denying him a reduction in his2

base offe nse level for acceptance of responsibility pursuant to

U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1. He also contends that the aggravated-felony

conviction that resulted in his increased sentence under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1326(b)(2) was an element of the offense that should have been

charged in the indictment.

The incre ase for obstruction of justice stemmed from false

information that was provided in support of a motion for downward

departure following preparation of the presentence report. The

district court’s finding that Peregrino willfully obstructed

justice in connection with the motion is plausible in light of the

record as a whole and is not clearly erroneous. United States v.

Powers

, 168 F.3d 741, 752 (5th Cir.), c ert. denied

, 528 U.S. 945

( 1999). Further, Peregrino fails to demonstrate extraordinary

circumstances warranting credit for acceptance of responsibility in

light of the district c ourt’s finding of obstruction of justice.

United States v. Lujan-Sauceda

, 187 F.3d 451, 451-52 (5th Cir.

1999); § 3E1.1, comment. (n.4).

Peregrino acknowledges that his second argument is foreclosed

by the Supreme Court’s dec ision in A lmendarez-Torres v. United

States

, 523 U.S. 224 (1998), but he seeks to preserve the issue for

Supreme Court review in light of the dec ision in A pprendi v. New

Jersey

, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). A pprendi did not overrule AlmendarezTorres. See Apprendi, 1 20 S.Ct. at 2362; United States v. Dabeit

,

231 F.3d 979, 984 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied , 121 S.Ct. 12143

(2001); United States v. Doggett

, 230 F.3d 160, 166 (5th Cir.

2000), cert. denied , 121 S.Ct. 1152 (2001). Peregrino’s argument

is foreclosed.

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
COURT OF APPEALS

EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

EL PASO, TEXAS

DEVORIS NEWSON,

Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

Appellee

. §

§

§

§

§ No. 08

- 24

- 00062

- CR

Appeal from the

120th Judicial District Court

of El Paso County, Texas

(TC#20190D02039)

J U D G M E N T

The Court has considered this cause on the record and concludes the appeal should be

dismissed for want of jurisdiction. We therefore dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. We

further order t his decision be certified below for observance.

IT IS SO ORDERED THIS 12TH DAY OF APRIL 2024.

LISA J. SOTO, J ustice

Before Alley, C.J., Palafox and Soto, JJ.