# Eiropas Savienības C 158/2009

| | ISSN 1725-5201
  doi:10.3000/17255201.C_2009.158.lav |
| --- | --- |
| Eiropas Savienības
  Oficiālais Vēstnesis | C 158 |
| | |
| Izdevums latviešu valodā | Informācija un paziņojumi | 52. sējums2009. gada 11. jūlijs |

ISSN 1725-5201

doi:10.3000/17255201.C_2009.158.lav

Eiropas Savienības

Oficiālais Vēstnesis

C 158

Izdevums latviešu valodā

Informācija un paziņojumi

52. sējums2009. gada 11. jūlijs

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| Paziņojums Nr. | Saturs | Lappuse |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | II   Paziņojumi |
| | EIROPAS SAVIENĪBAS IESTĀŽU UN STRUKTŪRU SNIEGTI PAZIŅOJUMI |
| | Komisija |
| 2009/C 158/01 | Iebildumu necelšana pret paziņoto koncentrāciju (Lieta COMP/M.5403 – Lufthansa/BMI) (
  1
  ) | 1 |

Paziņojums Nr.

Saturs

Lappuse

II   Paziņojumi

EIROPAS SAVIENĪBAS IESTĀŽU UN STRUKTŪRU SNIEGTI PAZIŅOJUMI

Komisija

2009/C 158/01

Iebildumu necelšana pret paziņoto koncentrāciju (Lieta COMP/M.5403 – Lufthansa/BMI) (
  1
  )

1

1

| | IV   Informācija |
| --- | --- |
| | EIROPAS SAVIENĪBAS IESTĀŽU UN STRUKTŪRU SNIEGTA INFORMĀCIJA |
| | Komisija |
| 2009/C 158/02 | Euro maiņas kurss | 2 |
| | DALĪBVALSTU SNIEGTA INFORMĀCIJA |
| 2009/C 158/03 | Regulēto tirgu saraksts ar piezīmēm un valsts noteikumi, ar kuriem īsteno attiecīgās prasības, kas paredzētas IPD (Eiropas Parlamenta un Padomes Direktīva 2004/39/EK) | 3 |
| 2009/C 158/04 | Komisijas paziņojums saskaņā ar 16. panta 4. punktu Eiropas Parlamenta un Padomes Regulā (EK) Nr. 1008/2008 par kopīgiem noteikumiem gaisa pārvadājumu pakalpojumu sniegšanai Kopienā – Sabiedrisko pakalpojumu sniegšanas saistības attiecībā uz regulārajiem gaisa pārvadājumiem (
  1
  ) | 9 |

IV   Informācija

EIROPAS SAVIENĪBAS IESTĀŽU UN STRUKTŪRU SNIEGTA INFORMĀCIJA

Komisija

2009/C 158/02

Euro maiņas kurss

2

DALĪBVALSTU SNIEGTA INFORMĀCIJA

2009/C 158/03

Regulēto tirgu saraksts ar piezīmēm un valsts noteikumi, ar kuriem īsteno attiecīgās prasības, kas paredzētas IPD (Eiropas Parlamenta un Padomes Direktīva 2004/39/EK)

3

2009/C 158/04

Komisijas paziņojums saskaņā ar 16. panta 4. punktu Eiropas Parlamenta un Padomes Regulā (EK) Nr. 1008/2008 par kopīgiem noteikumiem gaisa pārvadājumu pakalpojumu sniegšanai Kopienā – Sabiedrisko pakalpojumu sniegšanas saistības attiecībā uz regulārajiem gaisa pārvadājumiem (
  1
  )

1

9

| | V   Atzinumi |
| --- | --- |
| | ADMINISTRATĪVAS PROCEDŪRAS |
| | Komisija |
| 2009/C 158/05 | Aicinājums iesniegt priekšlikumus – EACEA/11/2009 – Strukturālais atbalsts Eiropas sabiedrības politikas pētniecības organizācijām (ideju ģeneratoriem) un pilsoniskās sabiedrības organizācijām Eiropas mērogāi – Programma Eiropa pilsoņiem, 2. darbība, pirmais un otrais pasākums – 2010. gads | 10 |
| | PROCEDŪRAS, KAS SAISTĪTAS AR KONKURENCES POLITIKAS ĪSTENOŠANU |
| | Komisija |
| 2009/C 158/06 | Valsts Atbalsts – Nīderlande – Valsts Atbalsts C 10/2009 (ex N 138/2009) – ING – Uzaicinājums iesniegt apsvērumus saskaņā ar EK līguma 88. panta 2. punktu (
  1
  ) | 13 |
| | CITI AKTI |
| | Komisija |
| 2009/C 158/07 | Pieteikuma publikācija saskaņā ar 8. panta 2. punktu Padomes Regulā (EK) Nr. 509/2006 par lauksaimniecības produktiem un pārtikas produktiem kā garantētām tradicionālām īpatnībām | 24 |

V   Atzinumi

ADMINISTRATĪVAS PROCEDŪRAS

Komisija

2009/C 158/05

Aicinājums iesniegt priekšlikumus – EACEA/11/2009 – Strukturālais atbalsts Eiropas sabiedrības politikas pētniecības organizācijām (ideju ģeneratoriem) un pilsoniskās sabiedrības organizācijām Eiropas mērogāi – Programma Eiropa pilsoņiem, 2. darbība, pirmais un otrais pasākums – 2010. gads

10

PROCEDŪRAS, KAS SAISTĪTAS AR KONKURENCES POLITIKAS ĪSTENOŠANU

Komisija

2009/C 158/06

Valsts Atbalsts – Nīderlande – Valsts Atbalsts C 10/2009 (ex N 138/2009) – ING – Uzaicinājums iesniegt apsvērumus saskaņā ar EK līguma 88. panta 2. punktu (
  1
  )

1

13

CITI AKTI

Komisija

2009/C 158/07

Pieteikuma publikācija saskaņā ar 8. panta 2. punktu Padomes Regulā (EK) Nr. 509/2006 par lauksaimniecības produktiem un pārtikas produktiem kā garantētām tradicionālām īpatnībām

24

| | |
| --- | --- |
| | (1)   Dokuments attiecas uz EEZ |

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(1)   Dokuments attiecas uz EEZ

1

| LV | |
| --- | --- |

LV

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II Paziņojumi

EIROPAS SAVIENĪBAS IESTĀŽU UN STRUKTŪRU SNIEGTI PAZIŅOJUMI

Komisija

| 11.7.2009 | LV | Eiropas Savienības Oficiālais Vēstnesis | C 158/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.7.2009

LV

Eiropas Savienības Oficiālais Vēstnesis

C 158/1

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Iebildumu necelšana pret paziņoto koncentrāciju

(Lieta COMP/M.5403 – Lufthansa/BMI)

(Dokuments attiecas uz EEZ)

2009/C 158/01

Komisija 2009. gada 14. maijā nolēma neiebilst pret iepriekš minēto paziņoto koncentrāciju un atzīt to par saderīgu ar kopējo tirgu. Šis lēmums pamatots ar Padomes Regulas (EK) Nr. 139/2004 6. panta 1. punkta b) apakšpunktu. Pilns lēmuma teksts ir pieejams tikai angļu valodā, un to publicēs pēc tam, kad no teksta būs izņemta visa komercnoslēpumus saturošā informācija. Lēmums būs pieejams:

| — | Komisijas konkurences tīmekļa vietnes uzņēmumu apvienošanos sadaļā (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Šajā tīmekļa vietnē ir pieejamas dažādas individuālo apvienošanās lēmumu meklēšanas iespējas, tostarp meklēšana pēc sabiedrības nosaukuma, lietas numura, datuma un nozaru kodiem, |
| --- | --- |

—

Komisijas konkurences tīmekļa vietnes uzņēmumu apvienošanos sadaļā (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Šajā tīmekļa vietnē ir pieejamas dažādas individuālo apvienošanās lēmumu meklēšanas iespējas, tostarp meklēšana pēc sabiedrības nosaukuma, lietas numura, datuma un nozaru kodiem,

| — | elektroniskā veidā EUR-Lex tīmekļa vietnē (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/lv/index.htm) ar dokumenta numuru 32009M5403. EUR-Lex piedāvā tiešsaistes piekļuvi Eiropas Kopienu tiesību aktiem. |
| --- | --- |

—

elektroniskā veidā EUR-Lex tīmekļa vietnē (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/lv/index.htm) ar dokumenta numuru 32009M5403. EUR-Lex piedāvā tiešsaistes piekļuvi Eiropas Kopienu tiesību aktiem.

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IV Informācija

EIROPAS SAVIENĪBAS IESTĀŽU UN STRUKTŪRU SNIEGTA INFORMĀCIJA

Komisija

| 11.7.2009 | LV | Eiropas Savienības Oficiālais Vēstnesis | C 158/2 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.7.2009

LV

Eiropas Savienības Oficiālais Vēstnesis

C 158/2

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Euro maiņas kurss (1)

2009. gada 10. jūlijs

2009/C 158/02

1 euro =

| | Valūta | Maiņas kurss |
| --- | --- | --- |
| USD | ASV dolārs | 1,3901 |
| JPY | Japānas jēna | 128,21 |
| DKK | Dānijas krona | 7,4466 |
| GBP | Lielbritānijas mārciņa | 0,85800 |
| SEK | Zviedrijas krona | 11,0022 |
| CHF | Šveices franks | 1,5140 |
| ISK | Islandes krona | |
| NOK | Norvēģijas krona | 9,0840 |
| BGN | Bulgārijas Ieva | 1,9558 |
| CZK | Čehijas krona | 26,030 |
| EEK | Igaunijas krona | 15,6466 |
| HUF | Ungārijas forints | 277,50 |
| LTL | Lietuvas lits | 3,4528 |
| LVL | Latvijas lats | 0,6993 |
| PLN | Polijas zlots | 4,3740 |
| RON | Rumānijas leja | 4,2160 |
| TRY | Turcijas lira | 2,1636 |
| AUD | Austrālijas dolārs | 1,7940 |
| CAD | Kanādas dolārs | 1,6212 |
| HKD | Hongkongas dolārs | 10,7736 |
| NZD | Jaunzēlandes dolārs | 2,2250 |
| SGD | Singapūras dolārs | 2,0331 |
| KRW | Dienvidkorejas vons | 1 786,89 |
| ZAR | Dienvidāfrikas rands | 11,4023 |
| CNY | Ķīnas juaņa renminbi | 9,4983 |
| HRK | Horvātijas kuna | 7,3315 |
| IDR | Indonēzijas rūpija | 14 174,11 |
| MYR | Malaizijas ringits | 4,9731 |
| PHP | Filipīnu peso | 67,026 |
| RUB | Krievijas rublis | 45,4005 |
| THB | Taizemes bats | 47,382 |
| BRL | Brazīlijas reāls | 2,8084 |
| MXN | Meksikas peso | 19,0303 |
| INR | Indijas rūpija | 67,8230 |

Valūta

Maiņas kurss

USD

ASV dolārs

1,3901

JPY

Japānas jēna

128,21

DKK

Dānijas krona

7,4466

GBP

Lielbritānijas mārciņa

0,85800

SEK

Zviedrijas krona

11,0022

CHF

Šveices franks

1,5140

ISK

Islandes krona

NOK

Norvēģijas krona

9,0840

BGN

Bulgārijas Ieva

1,9558

CZK

Čehijas krona

26,030

EEK

Igaunijas krona

15,6466

HUF

Ungārijas forints

277,50

LTL

Lietuvas lits

3,4528

LVL

Latvijas lats

0,6993

PLN

Polijas zlots

4,3740

RON

Rumānijas leja

4,2160

TRY

Turcijas lira

2,1636

AUD

Austrālijas dolārs

1,7940

CAD

Kanādas dolārs

1,6212

HKD

Hongkongas dolārs

10,7736

NZD

Jaunzēlandes dolārs

2,2250

SGD

Singapūras dolārs

2,0331

KRW

Dienvidkorejas vons

1 786,89

ZAR

Dienvidāfrikas rands

11,4023

CNY

Ķīnas juaņa renminbi

9,4983

HRK

Horvātijas kuna

7,3315

IDR

Indonēzijas rūpija

14 174,11

MYR

Malaizijas ringits

4,9731

PHP

Filipīnu peso

67,026

RUB

Krievijas rublis

45,4005

THB

Taizemes bats

47,382

BRL

Brazīlijas reāls

2,8084

MXN

Meksikas peso

19,0303

INR

Indijas rūpija

67,8230

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(1)  Datu avots: atsauces maiņas kursu publicējusi ECB.

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DALĪBVALSTU SNIEGTA INFORMĀCIJA

| 11.7.2009 | LV | Eiropas Savienības Oficiālais Vēstnesis | C 158/3 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.7.2009

LV

Eiropas Savienības Oficiālais Vēstnesis

C 158/3

---

Regulēto tirgu saraksts ar piezīmēm un valsts noteikumi, ar kuriem īsteno attiecīgās prasības, kas paredzētas IPD (Eiropas Parlamenta un Padomes Direktīva 2004/39/EK)

2009/C 158/03

Saskaņā ar 47. pantu direktīvā, kas attiecas uz finanšu instrumentu tirgiem (Direktīva 2004/39/EK, OV L 145, 30.4.2004.), katra dalībvalsts var piešķirt “regulēta tirgus” statusu tirgiem, kas reģistrēti tās teritorijā un ir atbilstīgi tās noteikumiem.

Direktīvas 2004/39/EK 4. panta 1. punkta 14. apakšpunktā ir “regulēta tirgus” definīcija, un atbilstoši tai “regulēts tirgus” ir daudzpusēja sistēma, ko izmanto vai vada tirgus dalībnieks, kurš apvieno trešo personu pirkšanas un pārdošanas intereses attiecībā uz finanšu instrumentiem vai veicina šādu interešu apvienošanu – sistēmā un atbilstoši tās nediskrecionāriem noteikumiem – tā, ka rezultātā tiek noslēgts līgums attiecībā uz finanšu instrumentiem, kuru tirdzniecība ir atļauta saskaņā ar tā noteikumiem un/vai sistēmām, un kam ir piešķirta atļauja, un kas pastāvīgi darbojas saskaņā ar III sadaļas noteikumiem Direktīvā 2004/39/EK.

Direktīvas 2004/39/EK 47. pants nosaka, ka katrai dalībvalstij ir jāizveido un jāatjaunina saraksts, kurā uzskaitīti regulētie tirgi, kurus tā ir atļāvusi. Šī informācija ir jādara zināma pārējām dalībvalstīm un Eiropas Komisijai. Saskaņā ar minēto pantu (Direktīvas 2004/39/EK 47. pants) Komisijai reizi gadā ir jāpublicē Eiropas Savienības Oficiālajā Vēstnesī tai paziņoto regulēto tirgu saraksts. Pašreizējais saraksts ir sastādīts atbilstoši šai prasībai.

Pievienotajā sarakstā norādīti dažādu tirgu nosaukumi, kurus katras valsts kompetentās iestādes atzinušas par tādiem, kas atbilst regulēta tirgus definīcijai. Tajā norādīta arī iestāde, kas atbild par šo tirgu pārvaldību, kā arī kompetentā iestāde, kas atbild par tirgus darbības noteikumu pieņemšanu vai apstiprināšanu.

Tā kā piekļuves noteikumi vairs nav tik stingri, kā arī ņemot vērā to, ka specializēšanās pa tirdzniecības segmentiem kļūst arvien izteiktāka, regulēto tirgu sarakstā var būt arvien vairāk grozījumu, nekā tad, ja tiktu ievērota ieguldījumu pakalpojumu direktīva 93/22/EEK. Saskaņā ar 47. pantu direktīvā, kas attiecas uz finanšu instrumentu tirgiem, Eiropas Komisijai ir jāpublicē un jāatjaunina regulēto tirgu sarakstu savā tīmekļa vietnē. Tādēļ Eiropas Komisija ir nolēmusi, ka papildus tam, ka saraksts reizi gadā tiek publicēts OV, tā izveidos šā saraksta atjauninātu variantu, kas būs pieejams tās oficiālajā tīmekļa vietnē [http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/isd/mifid_en.htm]. Šis saraksts tiks regulāri atjaunināts, pamatojoties uz dalībvalstu iestāžu iesniegto informāciju. Tās ir aicinātas arī turpmāk informēt Komisiju par visiem papildinājumiem vai svītrojumiem sarakstā, kur uzskaitīti regulētie tirgi, kuriem tā ir izcelsmes dalībvalsts.

| Valsts | Regulētā tirgus nosaukums | Regulētā tirgus organizētājs | Kompetentā iestāde, kas atbildīga par tirgus apstiprināšanu un uzraudzību |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Austrija | 1. | Amtlicher Handel (regulēts tirgus) |

Valsts

Regulētā tirgus nosaukums

Regulētā tirgus organizētājs

Kompetentā iestāde, kas atbildīga par tirgus apstiprināšanu un uzraudzību

Austrija

1.

Amtlicher Handel (regulēts tirgus)

| 2. | Geregelter Freiverkehr (daļēji regulēts tirgus) |
| --- | --- |

2.

Geregelter Freiverkehr (daļēji regulēts tirgus)

| 1.-2. | Wiener Börse AG |
| --- | --- |

1.-2.

Wiener Börse AG

| 1.-2. | Finanzmarktaufsichtsbehörde (Finanšu tirgu uzraudzības iestāde) |
| --- | --- |

1.-2.

Finanzmarktaufsichtsbehörde (Finanšu tirgu uzraudzības iestāde)

Beļģija

| 1. | a) | Le marché «Euronext Brussels»/De «Euronext Brussels» markt, |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

a)

Le marché «Euronext Brussels»/De «Euronext Brussels» markt,

| b) | Le marché des instruments dérivés d'Euronext Brussels/De markt voor afgeleide producten van Euronext Brussels. |
| --- | --- |

b)

Le marché des instruments dérivés d'Euronext Brussels/De markt voor afgeleide producten van Euronext Brussels.

| 1. | Euronext Brussels SA/NV. |
| --- | --- |

1.

Euronext Brussels SA/NV.

| 1. | a) | Reconnaissance: Ministre des Finances sur avis de la Commission bancaire, financière et des assurances (CBFA).
  Erkenning: Minister van Financiën op advies van de Commissie voor het Bank-, Financie- en Assurantiewezen (CBFA) |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

a)

Reconnaissance: Ministre des Finances sur avis de la Commission bancaire, financière et des assurances (CBFA).

Erkenning: Minister van Financiën op advies van de Commissie voor het Bank-, Financie- en Assurantiewezen (CBFA)

| b) | Surveillance: CBFA.
  Toezicht: CBFA |
| --- | --- |

b)

Surveillance: CBFA.

Toezicht: CBFA

| 2. | Le marché réglementé hors bourse des obligations linéaires, des titres scindés et des certificats de trésorerie/De gereglementeerde buitenbeursmarkt van de lineaire obligaties, de gesplitste effecten en de schatkistcertificaten. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Le marché réglementé hors bourse des obligations linéaires, des titres scindés et des certificats de trésorerie/De gereglementeerde buitenbeursmarkt van de lineaire obligaties, de gesplitste effecten en de schatkistcertificaten.

| 2. | Fonds des rentes/Rentenfonds. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Fonds des rentes/Rentenfonds.

| 2. | a) | Reconnaissance: Législateur (art.144, §2 de la loi du 2.8.2002).
  Erkenning: Regelgever (art. 144, §2 van de wet van 2.8.2002). |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.

a)

Reconnaissance: Législateur (art.144, §2 de la loi du 2.8.2002).

Erkenning: Regelgever (art. 144, §2 van de wet van 2.8.2002).

| b) | Surveillance: Comité du Fonds des rentes, pour compte de la CBFA.
  Toezicht: Comité van het Rentenfonds, voor rekening van de CBFA |
| --- | --- |

b)

Surveillance: Comité du Fonds des rentes, pour compte de la CBFA.

Toezicht: Comité van het Rentenfonds, voor rekening van de CBFA

Bulgārija

| 1. | Официален пазар (regulēts tirgus) |
| --- | --- |

1.

Официален пазар (regulēts tirgus)

| 2. | Неофициален пазар (neregulēts tirgus) |
| --- | --- |

2.

Неофициален пазар (neregulēts tirgus)

Българска Фондова Борса – София АД (Bulgārijas birža – Sofia JSCo)

Комисия за финансов надзор (Finanšu uzraudzības komisija)

Kipra

Cyprus Stock Exchange (Kipras birža)

| 1. | Galvenais tirgus |
| --- | --- |

1.

Galvenais tirgus

| 2. | Paralēlais tirgus |
| --- | --- |

2.

Paralēlais tirgus

| 3. | Alternatīvais tirgus |
| --- | --- |

3.

Alternatīvais tirgus

| 4. | Obligāciju tirgus |
| --- | --- |

4.

Obligāciju tirgus

| 5 | Ieguldījumu uzņēmumu tirgi |
| --- | --- |

5

Ieguldījumu uzņēmumu tirgi

| 6. | Lielo projektu tirgus |
| --- | --- |

6.

Lielo projektu tirgus

| 7. | Okeāna kuģniecības tirgus |
| --- | --- |

7.

Okeāna kuģniecības tirgus

| 1.-7. | Kipras birža |
| --- | --- |

1.-7.

Kipras birža

| 1.-7. | (Cyprus Securities and Exchange Commission) Kipras vērtspapīru un biržas darījumu iestāde |
| --- | --- |

1.-7.

(Cyprus Securities and Exchange Commission) Kipras vērtspapīru un biržas darījumu iestāde

Čehija

| 1. | Galvenais tirgus (Hlavni trh) |
| --- | --- |

1.

Galvenais tirgus (Hlavni trh)

| 2. | Brīvais tirgus (Volny trh) |
| --- | --- |

2.

Brīvais tirgus (Volny trh)

| 3. | Oficiālais tirgus |
| --- | --- |

3.

Oficiālais tirgus

| 4. | Standartizētu nākotnes līgumu tirgus |
| --- | --- |

4.

Standartizētu nākotnes līgumu tirgus

| 5. | Aktuāltirgus |
| --- | --- |

5.

Aktuāltirgus

| 1.-2. | Prāgas birža
  (Burza cenných papírů Praha, a.s.) |
| --- | --- |

1.-2.

Prāgas birža

(Burza cenných papírů Praha, a.s.)

| 3. | RM -SYSTEM, Čehijas birža
  (RM-SYSTÉM, česká burza cenných papírů a.s. – regulēto tirgu organizētājs.) |
| --- | --- |

3.

RM -SYSTEM, Čehijas birža

(RM-SYSTÉM, česká burza cenných papírů a.s. – regulēto tirgu organizētājs.)

| 4.-5 | Prāgas enerģijas birža
  (Energetická burza Praha) |
| --- | --- |

4.-5

Prāgas enerģijas birža

(Energetická burza Praha)

| 1.-5 | Čehijas Valsts Banka |
| --- | --- |

1.-5

Čehijas Valsts Banka

Dānija

| 1. | NASDAQ OMX Copenhagen A/S






  — | akciju tirgus |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

NASDAQ OMX Copenhagen A/S

—

akciju tirgus

| — | obligāciju tirgus |
| --- | --- |

—

obligāciju tirgus

| — | atvasināto instrumentu tirgus |
| --- | --- |

—

atvasināto instrumentu tirgus

| 1. | Kopenhāgenas birža, AS |
| --- | --- |

1.

Kopenhāgenas birža, AS

Finanstilsynet (Dānijas finanšu uzraudzības iestāde)

| 2. | Dansk Autoriseret Markedsplads A/S (Dānijas apstiprinātais tirgus, SIA. (DAMP)) [apstiprināts tirgus = regulāra tirdzniecība ar vērtspapīriem, kas pieņemti tirdzniecībai, taču nav iekļauti sarakstā] |
| --- | --- |

2.

Dansk Autoriseret Markedsplads A/S (Dānijas apstiprinātais tirgus, SIA. (DAMP)) [apstiprināts tirgus = regulāra tirdzniecība ar vērtspapīriem, kas pieņemti tirdzniecībai, taču nav iekļauti sarakstā]

| 2. | Dānijas apstiprinātais tirgus, SIA. (DAMP) |
| --- | --- |

2.

Dānijas apstiprinātais tirgus, SIA. (DAMP)

Igaunija

| 1. | Väärtpaberibörs (Fondu birža)






  — | Põhinimekiri (galvenais saraksts) |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

Väärtpaberibörs (Fondu birža)

—

Põhinimekiri (galvenais saraksts)

| — | Võlakirjade nimekiri (obligāciju saraksts) |
| --- | --- |

—

Võlakirjade nimekiri (obligāciju saraksts)

| — | Fondiosakute nimekri (fondu saraksts) |
| --- | --- |

—

Fondiosakute nimekri (fondu saraksts)

NASDAQ OMX Tallinn AS

(NASDAQ OMX Tallinn Ltd.)

Finantsinspektsioon

(Igaunijas finanšu uzraudzības iestāde)

| 2. | Reguleeritud turg
  (regulēts tirgus)






  — | Lisanimekiri (otrais saraksts) |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.

Reguleeritud turg

(regulēts tirgus)

—

Lisanimekiri (otrais saraksts)

Somija

Arvopaperipörssi (Fondu birža)

| — | Pörssilista (oficiālais saraksts); |
| --- | --- |

—

Pörssilista (oficiālais saraksts);

| — | Pre-lista (pirmsbrokera saraksts) |
| --- | --- |

—

Pre-lista (pirmsbrokera saraksts)

| — | Muut arvopaperit -lista (citu vērtspapīru saraksts) |
| --- | --- |

—

Muut arvopaperit -lista (citu vērtspapīru saraksts)

NASDAQ OMX Helsinki Oy (NASDAQ OMX Helsinki Ltd.)

Apstiprināšana:

Finanšu ministrija

Uzraudzība:

| — | noteikumu apstiprināšana: Finanšu ministrija |
| --- | --- |

—

noteikumu apstiprināšana: Finanšu ministrija

| — | atbilstības uzraudzība:
  Finanssivalvonta, Somijas finanšu uzraudzības iestāde |
| --- | --- |

—

atbilstības uzraudzība:

Finanssivalvonta, Somijas finanšu uzraudzības iestāde

Francija

| 1. | Euronext Paris |
| --- | --- |

1.

Euronext Paris

| 2. | MATIF |
| --- | --- |

2.

MATIF

| 3. | MONEP |
| --- | --- |

3.

MONEP

Euronext Paris (1.-3.)

Proposition de l’Autorité des marchés financiers (AMF).

Reconnaissance par le ministre chargé de l’économie (cf. article L. 421-1 du code monétaire et financier).

Vācija

Börsenaufsichtsbehörden der Länder (federālo zemju biržas uzraudzības iestādes) un Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BaFin).

Valsts iestādes:

| 1. | Börse Berlin (Regulierter Markt) |
| --- | --- |

1.

Börse Berlin (Regulierter Markt)

| 1. | Börse Berlin AG. |
| --- | --- |

1.

Börse Berlin AG.

| 1. | Senatsverwaltung für Wirtschaft, Technologie und Frauen, Berlin |
| --- | --- |

1.

Senatsverwaltung für Wirtschaft, Technologie und Frauen, Berlin

| 2. | Düsseldorfer Börse (Regulierter Markt) |
| --- | --- |

2.

Düsseldorfer Börse (Regulierter Markt)

| 2. | Börse Düsseldorf AG. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Börse Düsseldorf AG.

| 2. | Finanzministerium des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen, Düsseldorf |
| --- | --- |

2.

Finanzministerium des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen, Düsseldorf

| 3. | Frankfurter Wertpapierbörse (Regulierter Markt); |
| --- | --- |

3.

Frankfurter Wertpapierbörse (Regulierter Markt);

| 3. | Deutsche Börse AG. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Deutsche Börse AG.

| 3 & 4. | Hessisches Ministerium für Wirtschaft, Verkehr und Landesentwicklung, Wiesbaden |
| --- | --- |

3 & 4.

Hessisches Ministerium für Wirtschaft, Verkehr und Landesentwicklung, Wiesbaden

| 4. | Eurex Deutschland |
| --- | --- |

4.

Eurex Deutschland

| 4. | Eurex Frankfurt AG |
| --- | --- |

4.

Eurex Frankfurt AG

| 5. | Hanseatische Wertpapierbörse Hamburg (Regulierter Markt, Startup market) |
| --- | --- |

5.

Hanseatische Wertpapierbörse Hamburg (Regulierter Markt, Startup market)

| 5. | BÖAG Börsen AG |
| --- | --- |

5.

BÖAG Börsen AG

| 5. | Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg, Behörde für Wirtschaft und Arbeit |
| --- | --- |

5.

Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg, Behörde für Wirtschaft und Arbeit

| 6. | Niedersächsische Börse zu Hannover (Regulierter Markt) |
| --- | --- |

6.

Niedersächsische Börse zu Hannover (Regulierter Markt)

| 6. | BÖAG Börsen AG |
| --- | --- |

6.

BÖAG Börsen AG

| 6. | Niedersächsisches Ministerium für Wirtschaft, Arbeit und Verkehr, Hannover |
| --- | --- |

6.

Niedersächsisches Ministerium für Wirtschaft, Arbeit und Verkehr, Hannover

| 7. | Börse München (Regulierter Markt) |
| --- | --- |

7.

Börse München (Regulierter Markt)

| 7. | Bayerische Börse AG |
| --- | --- |

7.

Bayerische Börse AG

| 7. | Bayerisches Staatsministerium für Wirtschaft, Infrastruktur, Verkehr und Technologie, München |
| --- | --- |

7.

Bayerisches Staatsministerium für Wirtschaft, Infrastruktur, Verkehr und Technologie, München

| 8. | Baden-Württembergische Wertpapierbörse (Regulierter Markt) |
| --- | --- |

8.

Baden-Württembergische Wertpapierbörse (Regulierter Markt)

| 8. | Börse-Stuttgart AG |
| --- | --- |

8.

Börse-Stuttgart AG

| 8. | Wirtschaftsministerium Baden-Württemberg, Stuttgart |
| --- | --- |

8.

Wirtschaftsministerium Baden-Württemberg, Stuttgart

| 9. | Risk Management Exchange Hannover (Regulierter Markt) |
| --- | --- |

9.

Risk Management Exchange Hannover (Regulierter Markt)

| 9. | RMX Hannover |
| --- | --- |

9.

RMX Hannover

| 9. | Niedersächsisches Ministerium für Wirtschaft, Arbeit und Verkehr, Hannover |
| --- | --- |

9.

Niedersächsisches Ministerium für Wirtschaft, Arbeit und Verkehr, Hannover

| 10. | European Energy Exchange |
| --- | --- |

10.

European Energy Exchange

| 10. | European Energy Exchange AG, Leipzig |
| --- | --- |

10.

European Energy Exchange AG, Leipzig

| 10. | Sächsisches Staatsministerium für Wirtschaft und Arbeit, Dresden |
| --- | --- |

10.

Sächsisches Staatsministerium für Wirtschaft und Arbeit, Dresden

Grieķija

| 1. | Atēnu birža






  — | Vērtspapīru tirgus |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

Atēnu birža

—

Vērtspapīru tirgus

| — | Atvasināto instrumentu tirgus |
| --- | --- |

—

Atvasināto instrumentu tirgus

| 1. | Atēnu birža |
| --- | --- |

1.

Atēnu birža

| 1. | Grieķijas kapitāla tirgus komisija (HCMC) |
| --- | --- |

1.

Grieķijas kapitāla tirgus komisija (HCMC)

| 2. | Sekundāro vērtspapīru elektroniskais tirgus (HDAT- parāda instrumentu tirgus) |
| --- | --- |

2.

Sekundāro vērtspapīru elektroniskais tirgus (HDAT- parāda instrumentu tirgus)

| 2. | Grieķijas Banka |
| --- | --- |

2.

Grieķijas Banka

| 2. | Grieķijas kapitāla tirgus komisija (HCMC) |
| --- | --- |

2.

Grieķijas kapitāla tirgus komisija (HCMC)

Ungārija

Budapesti Értéktőzsde Zrt. (Budapeštas birža)

| — | Részvényszekció (akciju nodaļa) |
| --- | --- |

—

Részvényszekció (akciju nodaļa)

| — | Hitelpapír szekció (parāda vērtspapīru nodaļa) |
| --- | --- |

—

Hitelpapír szekció (parāda vērtspapīru nodaļa)

| — | Származékos szekció (atvasināto instrumentu nodaļa) |
| --- | --- |

—

Származékos szekció (atvasināto instrumentu nodaļa)

| — | Áru szekció (preču nodaļa) |
| --- | --- |

—

Áru szekció (preču nodaļa)

Budapesti Értéktőzsde Zrt. (Budapeštas birža)

Pénzügyi Szervezetek Állami Felügyelete (Ungārijas finanšu uzraudzības iestāde)

Īrija

Īrijas Vērtspapīru biržas oficiālais saraksts

Īrijas Vērtspapīru birža

The Irish Financial Services Regulatory Authority (Īrijas Finanšu pakalpojumu regulēšanas iestāde) (“finanšu regulators”) apstiprina “regulētos tirgus” (izņemot noteikumus par iekļaušanu sarakstā) un uzrauga tirgus dalībnieka atbilstību direktīvas prasībām

Itālija

| 1. | Elektroniskais akciju tirgus (MTA) |
| --- | --- |

1.

Elektroniskais akciju tirgus (MTA)

| 2. | Elektroniskais obligāciju tirgus (MOT) |
| --- | --- |

2.

Elektroniskais obligāciju tirgus (MOT)

| 3. | Atklātie elektroniskie fondi un ETC tirgus (ETF-plus) |
| --- | --- |

3.

Atklātie elektroniskie fondi un ETC tirgus (ETF-plus)

| 4. | Atvasināto vērtspapīru elektroniskais tirgus (SeDeX) |
| --- | --- |

4.

Atvasināto vērtspapīru elektroniskais tirgus (SeDeX)

| 5. | Pēcsesijas tirgus (TAH) |
| --- | --- |

5.

Pēcsesijas tirgus (TAH)

| 6. | Itālijas atvasināto instrumentu tirgus tirdzniecībai ar tādiem finanšu instrumentiem, kas minēti Konsolidētā Finanšu likuma 1. panta 2. punkta f) apakšpunktā (IDEM) |
| --- | --- |

6.

Itālijas atvasināto instrumentu tirgus tirdzniecībai ar tādiem finanšu instrumentiem, kas minēti Konsolidētā Finanšu likuma 1. panta 2. punkta f) apakšpunktā (IDEM)

| 7. | Itālijas un ārvalstu valdības obligāciju tirdzniecības vairumtirgus (MTS) |
| --- | --- |

7.

Itālijas un ārvalstu valdības obligāciju tirdzniecības vairumtirgus (MTS)

| 8. | Tādu vērtspapīru, kuri nav valdības obligācijas, kā arī ar tādu vērtspapīru, kurus izdevušas starptautiskas organizācijas ar valdības līdzdalību, tirdzniecība vairumā (MTS Corporate) |
| --- | --- |

8.

Tādu vērtspapīru, kuri nav valdības obligācijas, kā arī ar tādu vērtspapīru, kurus izdevušas starptautiskas organizācijas ar valdības līdzdalību, tirdzniecība vairumā (MTS Corporate)

| 9. | Valdības oglibāciju vairumtirdzniecība tiešsaistē (BondVision) |
| --- | --- |

9.

Valdības oglibāciju vairumtirdzniecība tiešsaistē (BondVision)

| 10. | TLX tirgus |
| --- | --- |

10.

TLX tirgus

| 1.-6. | Borsa Italiana S.p.A. |
| --- | --- |

1.-6.

Borsa Italiana S.p.A.

| 7.-9. | Società per il Mercato dei Titoli di Stato - MTS S.p.A. |
| --- | --- |

7.-9.

Società per il Mercato dei Titoli di Stato - MTS S.p.A.

| 10. | TLX s.p.a. |
| --- | --- |

10.

TLX s.p.a.

CONSOB apstiprina sabiedrības, kas pārvalda tirgus, un apstiprina to statūtus un noteikumus.

Par valsts vērtspapīru vairumtirgu atbildīgajai iestādei atļauju izsniedz Ekonomikas un finanšu ministrija, ņemot vērā CONSOB un Banca d’Italia atzinumu

Latvija

Rīgas NASDAQ OMX

| — | Galvenais saraksts |
| --- | --- |

—

Galvenais saraksts

| — | Parāda vērtspapīru saraksts |
| --- | --- |

—

Parāda vērtspapīru saraksts

| — | Otrais saraksts |
| --- | --- |

—

Otrais saraksts

| — | Ieguldījumu fondu saraksts |
| --- | --- |

—

Ieguldījumu fondu saraksts

AS NASDAQ OMX Riga

Finanšu un kapitāla tirgus komisija

Lietuva

Viļņas Nasdaq OMX

| — | Viļņas Nasdaq OMX galvenais saraksts |
| --- | --- |

—

Viļņas Nasdaq OMX galvenais saraksts

| — | Viļņas Nasdaq OMX otrais saraksts |
| --- | --- |

—

Viļņas Nasdaq OMX otrais saraksts

| — | Viļņas Nasdaq OMX parāda vērtspapīru saraksts |
| --- | --- |

—

Viļņas Nasdaq OMX parāda vērtspapīru saraksts

| — | Viļņas Nasdaq OMX fondu saraksts |
| --- | --- |

—

Viļņas Nasdaq OMX fondu saraksts

Nasdaq OMX Vilnius

Lietuvas Vērtspapīru komisija

Luksemburga

Bourse de Luxembourg

Société de la Bourse de Luxembourg S.A.

Commission de surveillance du Secteur Financier

Malta

Maltas Fondu birža

Maltas Fondu birža

Maltas finanšu pakalpojumu iestāde

Nīderlande

| 1. | a) | Euronext Amsterdamas naudas tirgus






  — | Euronext Amsterdam |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

1.

a)

Euronext Amsterdamas naudas tirgus

—

Euronext Amsterdam

| b) | Euronext Amsterdam atvasināto instrumentu tirgus |
| --- | --- |

b)

Euronext Amsterdam atvasināto instrumentu tirgus

| 1. | NYSE Euronext (International) BV, NYSE Euronext (Holding) BV, Euronext NV, Euronext (Holdings) NV en Euronext Amsterdam NV |
| --- | --- |

1.

NYSE Euronext (International) BV, NYSE Euronext (Holding) BV, Euronext NV, Euronext (Holdings) NV en Euronext Amsterdam NV

| 1.-3. | Finanšu ministrs piešķir atļauju pēs apspriešanās ar Nīderlandes Finanšu tirgu pārvaldi.
  Uzraudzību veic Nīderlandes Finanšu tirgu pārvalde un Nīderlandes Finanšu ministrija |
| --- | --- |

1.-3.

Finanšu ministrs piešķir atļauju pēs apspriešanās ar Nīderlandes Finanšu tirgu pārvaldi.

Uzraudzību veic Nīderlandes Finanšu tirgu pārvalde un Nīderlandes Finanšu ministrija

| 2. | Endex |
| --- | --- |

2.

Endex

| 2. | ENDEX European Energy Derivatives Exchange N.V. |
| --- | --- |

2.

ENDEX European Energy Derivatives Exchange N.V.

| 3. | MTS Amsterdam |
| --- | --- |

3.

MTS Amsterdam

| 3. | MTS Amsterdam N.V. |
| --- | --- |

3.

MTS Amsterdam N.V.

Polija

| 1. | Rynek podstawowy (galvenais tirgus) |
| --- | --- |

1.

Rynek podstawowy (galvenais tirgus)

| 2. | Rynek równolegly (paralēlais tirgus) |
| --- | --- |

2.

Rynek równolegly (paralēlais tirgus)

| 3. | Rynek Papierów Wartosciowych CeTO (regulowany rynek pozagieldowy) (CeTO vērtspapīru regulētais ārpusbiržas tirgus) |
| --- | --- |

3.

Rynek Papierów Wartosciowych CeTO (regulowany rynek pozagieldowy) (CeTO vērtspapīru regulētais ārpusbiržas tirgus)

| 1 and 2 | Gielda Papierów Wartościowych w Warszawie (Warsaw Stock Exchange) |
| --- | --- |

1 and 2

Gielda Papierów Wartościowych w Warszawie (Warsaw Stock Exchange)

| 3. | MTS-CeTO S.A. |
| --- | --- |

3.

MTS-CeTO S.A.

Komisja Nadzoru Finansowego (Finanšu uzraudzības komisija)

Portugāle

| 1. | Eurolist by Euronext Lisbon (Oficiālā saraksta tirgus) |
| --- | --- |

1.

Eurolist by Euronext Lisbon (Oficiālā saraksta tirgus)

| 2. | Mercado de Futuros e Opções (standartizētu nākotnes līgumu un iespēju līgumu tirgus) |
| --- | --- |

2.

Mercado de Futuros e Opções (standartizētu nākotnes līgumu un iespēju līgumu tirgus)

| 3. | MEDIP – Mercado Especial de Dívida Pública (specializētais valsts parāda tirgus) |
| --- | --- |

3.

MEDIP – Mercado Especial de Dívida Pública (specializētais valsts parāda tirgus)

| 4. | MIBEL- Mercado Regulamentado de Derivados do MIBEL. |
| --- | --- |

4.

MIBEL- Mercado Regulamentado de Derivados do MIBEL.

(Enerģijas tirgus)

| 1. - 2: | Euronext Lisbon – Sociedade Gestora de Mercados Regulamentados, S.A. |
| --- | --- |

1. - 2:

Euronext Lisbon – Sociedade Gestora de Mercados Regulamentados, S.A.

| 3. | MTS Portugal – Sociedade Gestora do Mercado Especial de Dívida Pública, SGMR, S.A. |
| --- | --- |

3.

MTS Portugal – Sociedade Gestora do Mercado Especial de Dívida Pública, SGMR, S.A.

| 4. | OMIP – Operador do Mercado Ibérico de Energia (Pólo Português), Sociedade Gestora de Mercado Regulamentado, SA (OMIP). |
| --- | --- |

4.

OMIP – Operador do Mercado Ibérico de Energia (Pólo Português), Sociedade Gestora de Mercado Regulamentado, SA (OMIP).

Pēc Comissão do Mercado de Valores Mobiliários (CMVM, atbildīga par tirgus regulēšanu un uzraudzību) priekšlikuma Finanšu ministrija apstiprina tirgus

Rumānija

| 1. | Piața reglementată (Regulētais Spot tirgus – BVB) |
| --- | --- |

1.

Piața reglementată (Regulētais Spot tirgus – BVB)

| 2. | Piața reglementată la termen (Regulētais atvasināto instrumentu tirgus – BVB) |
| --- | --- |

2.

Piața reglementată la termen (Regulētais atvasināto instrumentu tirgus – BVB)

| 3. | Piața reglementată (Regulētais atvasināto instrumentu tirgus – BMFMS) |
| --- | --- |

3.

Piața reglementată (Regulētais atvasināto instrumentu tirgus – BMFMS)

| 1. un 2. | S.C. Bursa de Valori București S.A. (Bucharest Stock Exchange S.A.) |
| --- | --- |

1. un 2.

S.C. Bursa de Valori București S.A. (Bucharest Stock Exchange S.A.)

| 3. | S.C. Bursa Monetar Financiară și de Mărfuri S.A. Sibiu (Monetary – Financial and Commodities Exchange S.A. Sibiu) |
| --- | --- |

3.

S.C. Bursa Monetar Financiară și de Mărfuri S.A. Sibiu (Monetary – Financial and Commodities Exchange S.A. Sibiu)

Comisia Națională a Valorilor Mobiliare (Rumānijas valsts vērtspapīru komisija)

Comisia Națională a Valorilor Mobiliare (Rumānijas valsts vērtspapīru komisija)

Slovākija

| 1. | Sarakstā iekļauto vērtspapīru tirgus






  — | Galvenais tirgus |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

Sarakstā iekļauto vērtspapīru tirgus

—

Galvenais tirgus

| — | Paralēlais tirgus |
| --- | --- |

—

Paralēlais tirgus

| 2. | Regulēts brīvais tirgus |
| --- | --- |

2.

Regulēts brīvais tirgus

Bratislavas birža

Slovākijas Valsts Banka

Slovēnija

Ļubļanas fondu biržas regulēts tirgus (Borzni trg)

Ljubljanska borza (Ļubļanas birža)

Vērtspapīru tirgus aģentūra

(Agencija za trg vrednostnih papirjev)

Spānija

| A. | Bolsas de Valores (visos ietverts pirmais un otrais tirgus segments) |
| --- | --- |

A.

Bolsas de Valores (visos ietverts pirmais un otrais tirgus segments)

CNMV (Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores)

Banco de España ir atbildīga par valsts parāda tirgu

| 1. | Bolsa de Valores de Barcelona; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Bolsa de Valores de Barcelona;

| A1: | Sociedad Rectora de la Bolsa de Valores de Barcelona S.A. |
| --- | --- |

A1:

Sociedad Rectora de la Bolsa de Valores de Barcelona S.A.

| 2. | Bolsa de Valores de Bilbao; |
| --- | --- |

2.

Bolsa de Valores de Bilbao;

| A2: | Soc. Rectora de la Bolsa de Valores de Bilbao S.A. |
| --- | --- |

A2:

Soc. Rectora de la Bolsa de Valores de Bilbao S.A.

| 3. | Bolsa de Valores de Madrid; |
| --- | --- |

3.

Bolsa de Valores de Madrid;

| A3: | Soc. Rectora de la Bolsa de Valores de Madrid S.A. |
| --- | --- |

A3:

Soc. Rectora de la Bolsa de Valores de Madrid S.A.

| 4. | Bolsa de valores de Valencia. |
| --- | --- |

4.

Bolsa de valores de Valencia.

| A4: | Soc. Rectora de la Bolsa de Valores de Valencia. S.A. |
| --- | --- |

A4:

Soc. Rectora de la Bolsa de Valores de Valencia. S.A.

| B. | Mercados oficiales de Productos Financieros Derivados |
| --- | --- |

B.

Mercados oficiales de Productos Financieros Derivados

| 1. | MEFF Renta Fija; |
| --- | --- |

1.

MEFF Renta Fija;

| B1: | Soc. Rectora de Productos Financieros Derivados de RENTA Fija S.A. |
| --- | --- |

B1:

Soc. Rectora de Productos Financieros Derivados de RENTA Fija S.A.

| 2. | MEFF Renta Variable. |
| --- | --- |

2.

MEFF Renta Variable.

| B2: | Soc. Rectora de Productos Financieros Derivados de Renta Variable S.A. |
| --- | --- |

B2:

Soc. Rectora de Productos Financieros Derivados de Renta Variable S.A.

| C. | Mercado MFAO de Futuros del Aceite de Oliva |
| --- | --- |

C.

Mercado MFAO de Futuros del Aceite de Oliva

| C: | (MFAO) Sociedad rectora del Mercado de Futuros del Aceite de Oliva, S.A. |
| --- | --- |

C:

(MFAO) Sociedad rectora del Mercado de Futuros del Aceite de Oliva, S.A.

| D. | AIAF Mercado de Renta Fija |
| --- | --- |

D.

AIAF Mercado de Renta Fija

| D: | AIAF Mercado de Renta Fija |
| --- | --- |

D:

AIAF Mercado de Renta Fija

| E. | Mercados de Deuda Pública en Anotaciones |
| --- | --- |

E.

Mercados de Deuda Pública en Anotaciones

| E: | Banco de España |
| --- | --- |

E:

Banco de España

Zviedrija

Nasdaq OMX Stockholm AB

| — | akciju un tām līdzvērtīgu finanšu instrumentu regulētais tirgus |
| --- | --- |

—

akciju un tām līdzvērtīgu finanšu instrumentu regulētais tirgus

| — | atvasināto finanšu instrumentu regulētais tirgus |
| --- | --- |

—

atvasināto finanšu instrumentu regulētais tirgus

| — | obligāciju un tām līdzvērtīgu finanšu instrumentu regulētais tirgus |
| --- | --- |

—

obligāciju un tām līdzvērtīgu finanšu instrumentu regulētais tirgus

OMX Nordic Exchange Stockholm AB

Finansinspektionen (finanšu uzraudzības iestāde)

Apvienotā Karaliste

| 1. | EDX |
| --- | --- |

1.

EDX

| 1. | EDX London Limited |
| --- | --- |

1.

EDX London Limited

| 1.-6. | Finanšu pakalpojumu iestāde |
| --- | --- |

1.-6.

Finanšu pakalpojumu iestāde

| 2. | PLUS-Markets Group – PLUS-listed Market |
| --- | --- |

2.

PLUS-Markets Group – PLUS-listed Market

| 2. | PLUS Markets plc |
| --- | --- |

2.

PLUS Markets plc

| 3. | The London International Financial Futures and Options Exchanges (LIFFE) |
| --- | --- |

3.

The London International Financial Futures and Options Exchanges (LIFFE)

| 3. | LIFFE Administration and Management |
| --- | --- |

3.

LIFFE Administration and Management

| 4. | The London Metal Exchange (Londonas Metālu Birža) |
| --- | --- |

4.

The London Metal Exchange (Londonas Metālu Birža)

| 4. | The London Metal Exchange Limited |
| --- | --- |

4.

The London Metal Exchange Limited

| 5. | Intercontinental Exchange -ICE Futures Europe |
| --- | --- |

5.

Intercontinental Exchange -ICE Futures Europe

| 5. | ICE Futures Europe |
| --- | --- |

5.

ICE Futures Europe

| 6. | London Stock Exchange (Londonas birža– regulēts tirgus) |
| --- | --- |

6.

London Stock Exchange (Londonas birža– regulēts tirgus)

| 6. | London Stock Exchange plc |
| --- | --- |

6.

London Stock Exchange plc

Islande

OMX Nordic Exchange á Islandi (regulēts tirgus)

OMX Nordic Exchange

Fjármálaeftirlitið (Finanšu uzraudzības iestāde)

Lihtenšteina

N.A.

N.A.

N.A.

Norvēģija

| 1. | Oslo Fondu birža (oficiālais saraksts)






  — | Akciju tirgus |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

Oslo Fondu birža (oficiālais saraksts)

—

Akciju tirgus

| — | Atvasināto instrumentu (finanšu) tirgus |
| --- | --- |

—

Atvasināto instrumentu (finanšu) tirgus

| — | Obligāciju tirgus |
| --- | --- |

—

Obligāciju tirgus

| 1. | Oslo Børs ASA |
| --- | --- |

1.

Oslo Børs ASA

Kredittilsynet (Norvēģijas Finanšu uzraudzības iestāde)

| 2. | Oslo Axess






  — | Akciju tirgus |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.

Oslo Axess

—

Akciju tirgus

| 2. | Oslo Børs ASA |
| --- | --- |

2.

Oslo Børs ASA

| 3. | Nord Pool (oficiālais saraksts)






  — | Atvasināto instrumentu (preču) tirgus |
| --- | --- | --- |

3.

Nord Pool (oficiālais saraksts)

—

Atvasināto instrumentu (preču) tirgus

| 3. | Nord Pool ASA |
| --- | --- |

3.

Nord Pool ASA

| 4. | Imarex






  — | Atvasināto instrumentu (preču) tirgus |
| --- | --- | --- |

4.

Imarex

—

Atvasināto instrumentu (preču) tirgus

| 4. | Imarex ASA |
| --- | --- |

4.

Imarex ASA

| 5. | Fish Pool






  — | Atvasināto instrumentu (preču) tirgus |
| --- | --- | --- |

5.

Fish Pool

—

Atvasināto instrumentu (preču) tirgus

| 5. | Fish Pool ASA |
| --- | --- |

5.

Fish Pool ASA

---

| 11.7.2009 | LV | Eiropas Savienības Oficiālais Vēstnesis | C 158/9 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.7.2009

LV

Eiropas Savienības Oficiālais Vēstnesis

C 158/9

---

Komisijas paziņojums saskaņā ar 16. panta 4. punktu Eiropas Parlamenta un Padomes Regulā (EK) Nr. 1008/2008 par kopīgiem noteikumiem gaisa pārvadājumu pakalpojumu sniegšanai Kopienā

Sabiedrisko pakalpojumu sniegšanas saistības attiecībā uz regulārajiem gaisa pārvadājumiem

(Dokuments attiecas uz EEZ)

2009/C 158/04

| Dalībvalsts | Itālija |
| --- | --- |
| Attiecīgais maršruts | Bolzano – Roma Fiumicino, Roma Fiumicin o – Bolzano |
| Datums, kad stājas spēkā sabiedrisko pakalpojumu sniegšanas saistības | 2009. gada 1. decembris |
| Adrese, kurā var saņemt sabiedrisko pakalpojumu sniegšanas saistību tekstu un visu attiecīgo informāciju un/vai dokumentus | E.N.A.C. Ente nazionale dell’aviazione civile
  Direzione centrale regolazione economica





  Direzione trasporto aereo |
| Viale del Castro Pretorio, n. 118 |
| 00185 Roma |
| ITALIA |
| www.enac-italia.it |
| E-mail: trasporto.aereo@enac.gov.it |

Dalībvalsts

Itālija

Attiecīgais maršruts

Bolzano – Roma Fiumicino, Roma Fiumicin o – Bolzano

Datums, kad stājas spēkā sabiedrisko pakalpojumu sniegšanas saistības

2009. gada 1. decembris

Adrese, kurā var saņemt sabiedrisko pakalpojumu sniegšanas saistību tekstu un visu attiecīgo informāciju un/vai dokumentus

E.N.A.C. Ente nazionale dell’aviazione civile

Direzione centrale regolazione economica

Direzione trasporto aereo

Viale del Castro Pretorio, n. 118

00185 Roma

ITALIA

www.enac-italia.it

E-mail: trasporto.aereo@enac.gov.it

---

V Atzinumi

ADMINISTRATĪVAS PROCEDŪRAS

Komisija

| 11.7.2009 | LV | Eiropas Savienības Oficiālais Vēstnesis | C 158/10 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.7.2009

LV

Eiropas Savienības Oficiālais Vēstnesis

C 158/10

---

AICINĀJUMS IESNIEGT PRIEKŠLIKUMUS – EACEA/11/2009

Strukturālais atbalsts Eiropas sabiedrības politikas pētniecības organizācijām (ideju ģeneratoriem) un pilsoniskās sabiedrības organizācijām Eiropas mērogāi

Programma “Eiropa pilsoņiem”, 2. darbība, pirmais un otrais pasākums – 2010. gads

2009/C 158/05

1.   MĒRĶI UN APRAKSTS

Šis aicinājums iesniegt priekšlikumus EACEA/11/2009 ir pamatots ar Eiropas Parlamenta un Padomes Lēmumu, ar ko laikposmam no 2007. līdz 2013. gadam izveido programmu “Eiropas pilsoņiem”, lai sekmētu aktīvu Eiropas pilsoniskumu (1) (šeit turpmāk “Programma”).

Šim aicinājumam iesniegt priekšlikumus tiesisisko pamatu veido Programma, atsaucoties uz 2. darbību “Aktīva pilsoniskā sabiedrība Eiropā”, pirmais un otrais pasākums – “Strukturālais atbalsts Eiropas sabiedrības politikas pētniecības organizācijām (ideju ģeneratoriem)” un “Strukturālais atbalsts pilsoniskās sabiedrības organizācijām Eiropas mērogā”.

1.1.   Programmas vispārīgie mērķi

Programma paredzēta, lai veicinātu šādus vispārīgos mērķus:

| a) | dot pilsoņiem iespēju sadarboties un piedalīties arvien saliedētākas Eiropas izveidē, kas ir demokrātiska un orientēta uz pasauli un kuru vieno un bagātina kultūras daudzveidība, tādējādi attīstot Eiropas Savienības pilsonību; |
| --- | --- |

a)

dot pilsoņiem iespēju sadarboties un piedalīties arvien saliedētākas Eiropas izveidē, kas ir demokrātiska un orientēta uz pasauli un kuru vieno un bagātina kultūras daudzveidība, tādējādi attīstot Eiropas Savienības pilsonību;

| b) | izkopt Eiropas identitātes apziņu, kuras pamatā ir kopīgas vērtības, vēsture un kultūra; |
| --- | --- |

b)

izkopt Eiropas identitātes apziņu, kuras pamatā ir kopīgas vērtības, vēsture un kultūra;

| c) | veicināt pilsoņu piederības apziņu Eiropas Savienībai; |
| --- | --- |

c)

veicināt pilsoņu piederības apziņu Eiropas Savienībai;

| d) | stiprināt savstarpēju sapratni Eiropas pilsoņu vidū, cienot un veicinot kultūras un valodu daudzveidību, vienlaikus bagātinot starpkultūru dialogu. |
| --- | --- |

d)

stiprināt savstarpēju sapratni Eiropas pilsoņu vidū, cienot un veicinot kultūras un valodu daudzveidību, vienlaikus bagātinot starpkultūru dialogu.

1.2.   Aicinājuma īpašie mērķi

Šā aicinājuma iesniegt priekšlikumus īpašie mērķi ir:

| a) | Atbalstīt rīcību, pārrunas un atziņas saistībā ar Eiropas pilsoniskumu un demokrātiju, kopīgām vērtībām, vēsturi un kultūru, īstenojot ideju ģenerēšanas struktūru un Eiropas mēroga pilsoniskās sabiedrības organizāciju darbības un sadarbību; |
| --- | --- |

a)

Atbalstīt rīcību, pārrunas un atziņas saistībā ar Eiropas pilsoniskumu un demokrātiju, kopīgām vērtībām, vēsturi un kultūru, īstenojot ideju ģenerēšanas struktūru un Eiropas mēroga pilsoniskās sabiedrības organizāciju darbības un sadarbību;

| b) | veicināt mijiedarbību starp pilsoņiem un pilsoniskās sabiedrības organizācijām, sniedzot ieguldījumu starpkultūru dialogā un uzsverot gan Eiropas dažādību, gan vienotību. |
| --- | --- |

b)

veicināt mijiedarbību starp pilsoņiem un pilsoniskās sabiedrības organizācijām, sniedzot ieguldījumu starpkultūru dialogā un uzsverot gan Eiropas dažādību, gan vienotību.

1.3.   Tematiskās prioritātes

| — | Eiropas Savienības nākotne un tās pamatvērtības, |
| --- | --- |

—

Eiropas Savienības nākotne un tās pamatvērtības,

| — | Aktīvs Eiropas pilsoniskums, līdzdalība un demokrātija, |
| --- | --- |

—

Aktīvs Eiropas pilsoniskums, līdzdalība un demokrātija,

| — | Starpkultūru dialogs, |
| --- | --- |

—

Starpkultūru dialogs,

| — | ES politikas ietekme sabiedrībā, |
| --- | --- |

—

ES politikas ietekme sabiedrībā,

| — | Cilvēku labklājība Eiropā, nodarbinātība, sociālā kohēzija un ilgtspējīga attīstība. |
| --- | --- |

—

Cilvēku labklājība Eiropā, nodarbinātība, sociālā kohēzija un ilgtspējīga attīstība.

1.4.   Aicinājuma apraksts

Šis aicinājums iesniegt priekšlikumus attiecas uz strukturālo atbalstu, ko sauc par darbības dotāciju, tām organizācijām, kuras īsteno mērķi ar vispārēju Eiropas nozīmi. Darbības dotācijas ir finansiāls atbalsts, lai segtu ar izvēlētās organizācijas ikdienas un pastāvīgās darbības pienācīgu norisi saistītās izmaksas.

Šo atbalstu atkarībā no konkrētiem kritērijiem var piešķirt kā gada darbības dotāciju vai daudzgadu partnerību. Daudzgadu partnerība ir sadarbības mehānisms, kas izveidots starp kādu organizāciju un Izglītības, audiovizuālās jomas un kultūras izpildaģentūru (šeit turpmāk “Izpildaģentūra”) un kas dod iespēju saņemt īpašas dotācijas. Saistībā ar šo aicinājumu šādu partnerību varēs noslēgt uz trijiem gadiem.

2.   ATBILSTOŠIE PRETENDENTI

2.1.   Organizācijas

Lai iegūtu tiesības uz darbības dotāciju, organizācijai, kura īsteno mērķi ar vispārēju Eiropas nozīmi, jābūt:

| a) | bezpeļņas organizācijai, kura ir juridiska persona; tāda tīkla gadījumā, kam nav atsevišķas darbības struktūras, kurai ir pašai savs statuss, kandidatūru var iesniegt organizācija, kas ir šāda tīkla dalībniece un kas ir atbildīga par tīkla koordināciju; |
| --- | --- |

a)

bezpeļņas organizācijai, kura ir juridiska persona; tāda tīkla gadījumā, kam nav atsevišķas darbības struktūras, kurai ir pašai savs statuss, kandidatūru var iesniegt organizācija, kas ir šāda tīkla dalībniece un kas ir atbildīga par tīkla koordināciju;

| b) | organizācijai, kas darbojas Eiropas pilsonības jomā, kā noteikts tās statūtos vai misijas deklarācijā, un kas atbilst vienai no šādām organizāciju kategorijām: | pirmais pasākums:






  A. | sabiedrības politikas pētniecības organizācijas (think tanks – ideju ģeneratori). |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

b)

organizācijai, kas darbojas Eiropas pilsonības jomā, kā noteikts tās statūtos vai misijas deklarācijā, un kas atbilst vienai no šādām organizāciju kategorijām:

pirmais pasākums:

A.

sabiedrības politikas pētniecības organizācijas (think tanks – ideju ģeneratori).

| | otrais pasākums:






  B. | pilsoniskās sabiedrības organizācijas Eiropas mērogā,






  — | Eiropas centrālās organizācijas (platformas), |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

otrais pasākums:

B.

pilsoniskās sabiedrības organizācijas Eiropas mērogā,

—

Eiropas centrālās organizācijas (platformas),

| — | Eiropas tīkli |
| --- | --- |

—

Eiropas tīkli

| — | organizācijas, kas veic darbības, kurām ir liela ietekme Eiropas līmenī, |
| --- | --- |

—

organizācijas, kas veic darbības, kurām ir liela ietekme Eiropas līmenī,

| C. | pilsoniskās sabiedrības organizācijas, kas saistītas ar piemiņas pasākumiem Eiropā, |
| --- | --- |

C.

pilsoniskās sabiedrības organizācijas, kas saistītas ar piemiņas pasākumiem Eiropā,

| D. | Eiropas mēroga organizāciju platformas. |
| --- | --- |

D.

Eiropas mēroga organizāciju platformas.

| c) | lielākā daļa darbību jāveic valstīs, kurām ir tiesības piedalīties (skat. 2.2. punktu).

  Daudzgadu partnerības noslēgšanai organizācijām jābūt izveidotām kā juridiskām personām pirms vairāk nekā (4) četriem gadiem (2009. gada 15. oktobrī) vienā no atbilstīgajām valstīm un attiecībā uz turpmāk minētajām kategorijām tām jābūt šādam ģeogrāfiskajam aptvērumam:






  — | Eiropas centrālai organizācijai vai Eiropas tīklam jābūt locekļiem vismaz divpadsmit (12) atbilstīgajās valstīs; |
| --- | --- | --- |

c)

lielākā daļa darbību jāveic valstīs, kurām ir tiesības piedalīties (skat. 2.2. punktu).

Daudzgadu partnerības noslēgšanai organizācijām jābūt izveidotām kā juridiskām personām pirms vairāk nekā (4) četriem gadiem (2009. gada 15. oktobrī) vienā no atbilstīgajām valstīm un attiecībā uz turpmāk minētajām kategorijām tām jābūt šādam ģeogrāfiskajam aptvērumam:

—

Eiropas centrālai organizācijai vai Eiropas tīklam jābūt locekļiem vismaz divpadsmit (12) atbilstīgajās valstīs;

| — | organizācijai, kas veic darbības, kurām ir liela ietekme Eiropas līmenī, jādarbojas vismaz divpadsmit (12) atbilstīgajās valstīs; |
| --- | --- |

—

organizācijai, kas veic darbības, kurām ir liela ietekme Eiropas līmenī, jādarbojas vismaz divpadsmit (12) atbilstīgajās valstīs;

| — | Eiropas mēroga organizāciju platformai jābūt vismaz sešām (6) centrālajām organizācijām kā tās dalībniecēm un tai ar šo organizāciju starpniecību jānodrošina klātbūtne visās 27 dalībvalstīs. |
| --- | --- |

—

Eiropas mēroga organizāciju platformai jābūt vismaz sešām (6) centrālajām organizācijām kā tās dalībniecēm un tai ar šo organizāciju starpniecību jānodrošina klātbūtne visās 27 dalībvalstīs.

Gada darbības dotācijas saņemšanai organizācijām arī jābūt izveidotām kā juridiskām personām pirms vairāk nekā (1) viena gada (2009. gada 15. oktobrī) vienā no atbilstīgajām valstīm un attiecībā uz turpmāk minētajām kategorijām tām jābūt šādam ģeogrāfiskajam aptvērumam:

| — | Eiropas centrālai organizācijai vai Eiropas tīklam jābūt locekļiem vismaz astoņās (8) atbilstīgajās valstīs; |
| --- | --- |

—

Eiropas centrālai organizācijai vai Eiropas tīklam jābūt locekļiem vismaz astoņās (8) atbilstīgajās valstīs;

| — | organizācijai, kas veic darbības, kurām ir liela ietekme Eiropas līmenī, jādarbojas vismaz astoņās (8) atbilstīgajās valstīs. |
| --- | --- |

—

organizācijai, kas veic darbības, kurām ir liela ietekme Eiropas līmenī, jādarbojas vismaz astoņās (8) atbilstīgajās valstīs.

Eiropas mēroga organizāciju platformas var kandidēt tikai daudzgadu partnerības noslēgšanai.

Fiziskas personas un publiskas organizācijas šajā aicinājumā nevar piedalīties.

2.2.   Atbilstīgās valstis

| a) | Eiropas Savienības dalībvalstis: Apvienotā Karaliste, Austrija, Beļģija, Bulgārija, Čehija, Dānija, Francija, Grieķija, Igaunija, Itālija, Īrija, Kipra, Latvija, Lietuva, Luksemburga, Malta, Nīderlande, Polija, Portugāle, Rumānija, Slovākija, Slovēnija, Somija, Spānija, Ungārija, Vācija, Zviedrija, |
| --- | --- |

a)

Eiropas Savienības dalībvalstis: Apvienotā Karaliste, Austrija, Beļģija, Bulgārija, Čehija, Dānija, Francija, Grieķija, Igaunija, Itālija, Īrija, Kipra, Latvija, Lietuva, Luksemburga, Malta, Nīderlande, Polija, Portugāle, Rumānija, Slovākija, Slovēnija, Somija, Spānija, Ungārija, Vācija, Zviedrija,

| b) | Horvātija, |
| --- | --- |

b)

Horvātija,

| c) | Bijusī Dienvidslāvijas Maķedonijas Republika, |
| --- | --- |

c)

Bijusī Dienvidslāvijas Maķedonijas Republika,

| d) | Albānija. |
| --- | --- |

d)

Albānija.

3.   ATBILSTĪGĀS DARBĪBAS

Pretendējošās organizācijas darbībām ir uzskatāmā veidā jāveicina šī aicinājuma iesniegt priekšlikumu īpašo mērķu un tematisko prioritāšu attīstību un īstenošanu. Tām jāaptver vismaz viens no īpašajiem mērķiem un viena no tematiskajām prioritātēm, kas minētas 1. punktā.

Kandidējošās organizācijas 2010. gada darba programmai, kā arī trīs gadu stratēģiskajai programmai (daudzgadu partnerības gadījumā) ir jāaptver tās statūtos paredzētās darbības, tostarp konferences, seminārus, apaļos galdus un pārstāvības, saziņas un informēšanas darbības, kā arī tās pārējās regulārās Eiropas darbības.

Izdevumu atbilstības periods

Gan gada darbības dotācijas, gan daudzgadu partnerības gadījumā izdevumu atbilstības periodam jāatbilst pretendenta finanšu gadam, ko apliecina oficiāli apstiprināti organizācijas pārskati. Ja finanšu gads atbilst kalendārajam gadam, tad atbilstības periods ir no 2009. gada 1. janvāra līdz 2010 gada 31. decembrim.

Pretendentiem, kuru finanšu gads atšķiras no kalendārā gada, atbilstības periods ir 12 mēneši no attiecīgās organizācijas finanšu gada sākuma 2010. gadā.

4.   DOTĀCIJAS PIEŠĶIRŠANAS KRITĒRIJI

Atbilstības un izslēgšanas kritērijiem atbilstošos pretendentus, pamatojoties uz piešķiršanas kritērijiem novērtēs novērtēšanas komiteja, lai atlasītu tos, kuri varētu saņemt līdzfinansējumu.

Tiks piemēroti turpmāk minētie dotācijas piešķiršanas kritēriji. Kvalitatīvie un kvantitatīvie kritēriji atbilst attiecīgi 80 % un 20 % no piešķirtā novērtējuma. Daudzgadu partnerības gadījumā gan 12 mēnešu darba programmai, gan trīs gadu stratēģiskai programmai piešķirs vienādu svērumu.

4.1.   Kvalitatīvie kritēriji (80 %)

Novērtēs šādus aspektus:

| a) | atbilstība programmas “Eiropa pilsoņiem” mērķiem un prioritātēm (30 %); |
| --- | --- |

a)

atbilstība programmas “Eiropa pilsoņiem” mērķiem un prioritātēm (30 %);

| b) | darba programmas atbilstība, saskaņotība un pabeigtība (20 %); |
| --- | --- |

b)

darba programmas atbilstība, saskaņotība un pabeigtība (20 %);

| c) | darba programmas ietekme (10 %); |
| --- | --- |

c)

darba programmas ietekme (10 %);

| d) | Eiropas pievienotā vērtība (10 %); |
| --- | --- |

d)

Eiropas pievienotā vērtība (10 %);

| e) | darbību redzamība un rezultātu izplatīšana Eiropas pilsoņu un citu ieinteresēto pušu labā (10 %). |
| --- | --- |

e)

darbību redzamība un rezultātu izplatīšana Eiropas pilsoņu un citu ieinteresēto pušu labā (10 %).

4.2.   Kvantitatīvie kritēriji (20 %)

Novērtēs šādus aspektus:

| a) | atbilstīgo valstu skaits, kas iesaistītas darba programmas darbībās (10 %); |
| --- | --- |

a)

atbilstīgo valstu skaits, kas iesaistītas darba programmas darbībās (10 %);

| b) | tiešo potenciālo saņēmēju skaits (10 %). |
| --- | --- |

b)

tiešo potenciālo saņēmēju skaits (10 %).

5.   BUDŽETS

Kopējais darbības dotāciju līdzfinansēšanai paredzētais budžets 2010. gadam ir apmēram 8,2 miljoni EUR. Izpildaģentūra šā aicinājuma iesniegt priekšlikumus ietvaros paredz finansēt apmēram 55 organizācijas, tomēr tā patur tiesības, pamatojoties uz pretendentu kvalitāti, neizmantot visus pieejamos līdzekļus.

Indikatīvi var norādīt, ka daudzgadu partnerības dotācijas būs apmēram 85 % no pieejamā budžeta, bet gada darbības dotācijas – apmēram 15 %.

Šo atbalstu piešķirs saskaņā ar Eiropas Savienības vispārējā budžeta 15.06.66. pozīciju.

6.   PIETEIKUMU IESNIEGŠANAS TERMIŅŠ

Pretendentu pieteikumu iesniegšanas termiņš ir 2009. gada 15. oktobris.

Izpildaģentūra pašlaik strādā pie visu pretendentu pieteikumu elektroniskas iesniegšanas sistēmas ieviešanas.

Attiecībā uz šo aicinājumu iesniegt priekšlikumus pretendentiem savs pieteikums jānosūta, izmantojot elektronisku veidlapu, kas būs pieejama no 2009. gada 15. septembra. Šī versija (ieskaitot pielikumus) tiek uzskatīta par galveno versiju. Līdz minētajam datumam Izpildaģentūra piedāvā veidlapas PDF versiju, lai pretendenti varētu sākt gatavot savu pieteikumu.

Turklāt pretendenta pieteikums papīra formātā līdz minētā termiņa beigām jānosūta uz šādu adresi:

| Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency |
| --- |
| Unit P7 |
| Call for proposals EACEA/11/2009 |
| Avenue du Bourget 1 (BOUR 01/17) |
| 1140 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency

Unit P7

Call for proposals EACEA/11/2009

Avenue du Bourget 1 (BOUR 01/17)

1140 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

Pieņems tikai atbilstošā veidā noformētus, pareizi nokomplektētus un datētus pieteikumus, ko parakstījusi persona, kura ir pilnvarota uzņemties juridiski saistošas saistības tās organizācijas vārdā, kas iesniedz pieteikumu.

7.   PAPILDINFORMĀCIJA

Pretendentiem paredzētas sīki izstrādātas pamatnostādnes, kā arī pieteikuma veidlapas ir pieejamas šādā tīmekļa vietnē: http://eacea.ec.europa.eu/citizenship/index_en.htm

---

(1)  Eiropas Parlamenta un Padomes 2006. gada 12. decembra Lēmums Nr. 1904/2006/EK (OV L 378, 27.12.2006. 32. lpp), kas grozīts ar Eiropas Parlamenta un Padomes 2008. gada 16. decembra Lēmumu Nr. 1358/2008/EK (OV L 350, 30.12.2008.).

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PROCEDŪRAS, KAS SAISTĪTAS AR KONKURENCES POLITIKAS ĪSTENOŠANU

Komisija

| 11.7.2009 | LV | Eiropas Savienības Oficiālais Vēstnesis | C 158/13 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.7.2009

LV

Eiropas Savienības Oficiālais Vēstnesis

C 158/13

---

VALSTS ATBALSTS – NĪDERLANDE

Valsts Atbalsts C 10/2009 (ex N 138/2009) – ING

Uzaicinājums iesniegt apsvērumus saskaņā ar EK līguma 88. panta 2. punktu

(Dokuments attiecas uz EEZ)

2009/C 158/06

Ar 2009. gada 31. marta vēstuli, kas autentiskā valodā ir pievienota šim kopsavilkumam, Komisija paziņoja Nīderlandei savu lēmumu par EK līguma 88. panta 2. punktā paredzētās procedūras sākšanu attiecībā uz iepriekšminēto pasākumu.

Ieinteresētās personas var iesniegt apsvērumus par pasākumu, attiecībā uz kuru Komisija uzsāk procedūru, viena mēneša laikā pēc šā kopsavilkuma un tam pievienotās vēstules publicēšanas dienas, nosūtot tos uz šādu adresi:

| European Commission |
| --- |
| Directorate-General for Competition |
| State aid Greffe |
| Office: SPA3, 6/5 |
| 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |
| Fakss +32 22961242 |

European Commission

Directorate-General for Competition

State aid Greffe

Office: SPA3, 6/5

1049 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

Fakss +32 22961242

Šos apsvērumus paziņos Nīderlandei. Ieinteresētā persona, kas iesniedz apsvērumus, var rakstveidā pieprasīt, lai tās identitāte netiktu atklāta, norādot šādas prasības iemeslus.

KOPSAVILKUMS

PROCEDŪRA

Nīderlandes iestādes 2009. gada 4. martā paziņoja Komisijai par nelikvīdu aktīvu atbalsta mehānismu; no šā mehānisma iegūtu ING Support Holding (tiešs ING Group meitas uzņēmums).

FAKTI

ING, kuras galvenais birojs atrodas Nīderlandē un kuras kopsavilkuma bilance ir 1 332 miljardi EUR, ir viena no lielākajam pasaules finanšu iestādēm. Nīderlandes valsts un ING 2009. gada janvārī parakstīja noteikumu kopumu par risku nodošanu, kā arī par ING ASV ar mājokļu hipotēkām nodrošināto vērtspapīru (RMBS) portfeļa daļas atdošanu. Šis portfelis galvenokārt sastāv no Alt-A vērtspapīriem. ING portfeļa bilances atlikums ir 39 miljardi ASV dolāru (nominālvērtība 30 miljardi EUR).

Attiecīgais pasākums paredzēts kā naudas plūsmas mijmaiņas darījums starp Nīderlandes valsti un ING; ING pārskaita ieņēmumus – 80 % portfeļa nominālvērtības (procenti un pamatsummas atmaksa) pret garantētiem valsts maksājumiem par 72 % (t. i., 80 % no 90 %) no portfeļa nominālvērtības (tikai pamatsumma); tam pievieno maksu par finansējumu, ko valsts maksā ING 3,50 % apmērā par vērtspapīru ar noteikto likmi portfeļa proporcionālo daļu un viena mēneša USD LIBOR likmi + 50 bāzes punktus par mainīgas procentu likmes vērtspapīru portfeļa daļu.

Turklāt Nīderlandes valsts maksā ING arī administrēšanas maksu par atlikušo pamatsummu 25 bāzes punktu apmērā gadā. Savukārt ING par šo pasākumu norēķinās, maksājot Nīderlandes valstij gada maksu par garantiju 55 bāzes punktu apmērā no 80 % par atlikušo portfeļa summu.

NOVĒRTĒJUMS

Komisija novērtēja šo darījumu atbilstīgi tās paziņojumam par samazinātas vērtības aktīviem (SVA). Šajā posmā Komisija šaubās par vērtēšanu, īpaši par vērtēšanas metodi, kas izmantota, lai novērtētu reālo ekonomisko vērtību. Komisijai jāveic Nīderlandes valsts pausto pieņēmumu tālāka izmeklēšana, īpaši saistībā ar i) diskonta likmes izvēli, ii) mājokļu cenu pieņēmumiem, iii) kredīta kvalitātes uzlabošanas līmeni un iv) citiem vērtēšanas jautājumiem.

Līdz ar to Komisija arī šaubās par atbilstīgu apgrūtinājuma sadali starp valsti un ING. Ievērojot iepriekš minētās šaubas par novērtējuma vērtēšanu, Komisija arī nav pārliecināta, vai minētā banka patiešām sedz starpību starp portfeļa nominālo un reālo ekonomisko vērtību. Turklāt Komisija arī nav pārliecināta, ka iepriekš minētais naudas plūsmas mijmaiņas darījums valstij patiešām ir tik izdevīgs kā norādīts. Īpaši Komisija šaubās par portfeļa administrēšanas maksas atbilstību, jo šķiet, ka šī administrēšana neprasa pārlieku lielas pūles.

Tā kā minētais pasākums atbilst vairākiem noteikumiem paziņojumā par samazinātas vērtības aktīviem (SVA) un, ievērojot apsvērumus par finansiālas stabilitātes saglabāšanu, Komisija ir nolēmusi uz sešiem mēnešiem šo pasākumu apstiprināt. Tajā pašā laikā, ņemot vērā minētos apsvērumus, Komisija ir nolēmusi sākt EK līguma 88. panta 2. punktā paredzēto procedūru, lai pārbaudītu atbilstību SVA noteikumiem saistībā ar vērtēšanu (tostarp vērtēšanas metodi) un pasākuma apgrūtinājuma sadali.

VĒSTULES TEKSTS

“The Commission wishes to inform the Netherlands that, having examined the information supplied by your authorities on the measure referred to above, it has decided to approve the measure temporarily for six months and to initiate the procedure laid down in Article 88(2) of the EC Treaty since the Commission has doubts as to the compatibility of certain aspects of the measure when assessed in the light of the Commission's Communication on the treatment of impaired assets.

I.   PROCEDURE

| (1) | On 26 January 2009 the Dutch authorities informed the Commission of their intention to implement an illiquid assets back-up facility in favour of ING Support Holding (a direct subsidiary of ING Group) subject to Commission approval. On 30 January the Commission sent an information request to the Dutch authorities, which was partially answered with the notification. On 4 March the Dutch authorities notified the measure formally with the Commission. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

On 26 January 2009 the Dutch authorities informed the Commission of their intention to implement an illiquid assets back-up facility in favour of ING Support Holding (a direct subsidiary of ING Group) subject to Commission approval. On 30 January the Commission sent an information request to the Dutch authorities, which was partially answered with the notification. On 4 March the Dutch authorities notified the measure formally with the Commission.

| (2) | The measure notified is the second individual aid announced in favour of ING in the context of this financial crisis. ING has already received an emergency recapitalisation of EUR 10 billion from the Netherlands which the Commission approved on 13 November 2008. (1) Furthermore, ING has access to the Dutch Credit Guarantee scheme where the Dutch State granted a guarantee in the amount of USD 9 billion (of which ING has already used USD 8 billion through bond issuance) and an additional EUR 5 billion of granted guarantees of which ING has already used EUR 4 billion by issuing a bond. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

The measure notified is the second individual aid announced in favour of ING in the context of this financial crisis. ING has already received an emergency recapitalisation of EUR 10 billion from the Netherlands which the Commission approved on 13 November 2008. (1) Furthermore, ING has access to the Dutch Credit Guarantee scheme where the Dutch State granted a guarantee in the amount of USD 9 billion (of which ING has already used USD 8 billion through bond issuance) and an additional EUR 5 billion of granted guarantees of which ING has already used EUR 4 billion by issuing a bond.

| (3) | On 17, 23 and 26 March meetings between the Dutch authorities and the Commission services were held. In the meantime a great number of information exchanges via email and phone took place. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

On 17, 23 and 26 March meetings between the Dutch authorities and the Commission services were held. In the meantime a great number of information exchanges via email and phone took place.

| (4) | On 13 March, the Commission asked the Dutch authorities to waive the confidentiality requirements for allowing technical experts from the European Central Bank (ECB) to assist the Commission in the assessment of the ING US Residential Mortgage-Backed Security (RMBS) portfolio affected by the aid measure under the Impaired Assets Communication (IAC). Confirmation was provided on 19 March. Thereafter the Commission forwarded to the ECB designated expert all available information to which the technical experts from the ECB replied. |
| --- | --- |

(4)

On 13 March, the Commission asked the Dutch authorities to waive the confidentiality requirements for allowing technical experts from the European Central Bank (ECB) to assist the Commission in the assessment of the ING US Residential Mortgage-Backed Security (RMBS) portfolio affected by the aid measure under the Impaired Assets Communication (IAC). Confirmation was provided on 19 March. Thereafter the Commission forwarded to the ECB designated expert all available information to which the technical experts from the ECB replied.

II.   DESCRIPTION OF THE FACTS

1.   The beneficiary

| (5) | Based in Amsterdam, ING Group offers banking, insurance and asset management to over 85 million private, corporate and institutional clients in more than 50 countries. With a global workforce of about 130,000 people, ING comprises a broad spectrum of prominent companies that serve their clients under the ING brand. |
| --- | --- |

(5)

Based in Amsterdam, ING Group offers banking, insurance and asset management to over 85 million private, corporate and institutional clients in more than 50 countries. With a global workforce of about 130,000 people, ING comprises a broad spectrum of prominent companies that serve their clients under the ING brand.

| (6) | ING is composed of ING Groep N.V., the mother holding company that controls 100 % of ING Bank N.V. and ING Verzekeringen N.V., two sub-holding companies respectively controlling ING's banking and insurance subsidiaries. |
| --- | --- |

(6)

ING is composed of ING Groep N.V., the mother holding company that controls 100 % of ING Bank N.V. and ING Verzekeringen N.V., two sub-holding companies respectively controlling ING's banking and insurance subsidiaries.

| (7) | ING is the 19th biggest financial institution globally by market value (based on October 2008 values) with a total balance sheet of EUR 1,332 billion at the end of 2008 and total risk weighed assets of EUR 343 billion. In Q4 2008 the group made a total net loss of EUR 3,7 billion and a loss of EUR 0,7 billion for the full year 2008. The Tier-1 capital ratio of ING stands at 9,3 % at the end of 2008. These numbers do not take into account the new measure. |
| --- | --- |

(7)

ING is the 19th biggest financial institution globally by market value (based on October 2008 values) with a total balance sheet of EUR 1,332 billion at the end of 2008 and total risk weighed assets of EUR 343 billion. In Q4 2008 the group made a total net loss of EUR 3,7 billion and a loss of EUR 0,7 billion for the full year 2008. The Tier-1 capital ratio of ING stands at 9,3 % at the end of 2008. These numbers do not take into account the new measure.

2.   The US RMBS portfolio of ING

| (8) | On January 26, 2009 the Dutch State and ING signed a term sheet to transfer the risk and cash flows of a portion of ING’s US based RMBS portfolio (thereafter referred to as “the portfolio”). |
| --- | --- |

(8)

On January 26, 2009 the Dutch State and ING signed a term sheet to transfer the risk and cash flows of a portion of ING’s US based RMBS portfolio (thereafter referred to as “the portfolio”).

| (9) | [...] (2) |
| --- | --- |

(9)

[...] (2)

| (10) | The outstanding balance of the portfolio amounts to USD 38,7 billion (par value, EUR 30 billion) (3), of which most is held by ING Direct (USD 34,1 billion), a US subsidiary of ING. ING Insurance Americas has a portfolio of USD 4,5 billion US mortgage-backed securities divided over several insurance companies. |
| --- | --- |

(10)

The outstanding balance of the portfolio amounts to USD 38,7 billion (par value, EUR 30 billion) (3), of which most is held by ING Direct (USD 34,1 billion), a US subsidiary of ING. ING Insurance Americas has a portfolio of USD 4,5 billion US mortgage-backed securities divided over several insurance companies.

| (11) | About 2/3rds of the portfolio is composed of Alt-A residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS) and about 1/3rd in Prime RMBS. All securities in the portfolio are senior RMBS tranches and were originally rated triple A, according to ING. This implies a high level of loss protection. However, following the recent developments in the US mortgage markets, a significant proportion of these tranches were downgraded by rating agencies. Currently, about 29 % of the securities (weighted by outstanding amounts) carry still a triple A rating, with a negative outlook attached to 6 % of them. Depending on the rating agency used and according to information provided by the Dutch authorities, about 56 % are now rated sub-investment grade. So far the level of credit enhancement provided in the structures has been sufficient and explains why few actual impairments have been accounted for on the portfolio and no actual credit loss has occurred. |
| --- | --- |

(11)

About 2/3rds of the portfolio is composed of Alt-A residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS) and about 1/3rd in Prime RMBS. All securities in the portfolio are senior RMBS tranches and were originally rated triple A, according to ING. This implies a high level of loss protection. However, following the recent developments in the US mortgage markets, a significant proportion of these tranches were downgraded by rating agencies. Currently, about 29 % of the securities (weighted by outstanding amounts) carry still a triple A rating, with a negative outlook attached to 6 % of them. Depending on the rating agency used and according to information provided by the Dutch authorities, about 56 % are now rated sub-investment grade. So far the level of credit enhancement provided in the structures has been sufficient and explains why few actual impairments have been accounted for on the portfolio and no actual credit loss has occurred.

| (12) | The Dutch authorities state that the market for Alt-A loans has dried up and there are few if any buyers and sellers willing to transact at these low levels. |
| --- | --- |

(12)

The Dutch authorities state that the market for Alt-A loans has dried up and there are few if any buyers and sellers willing to transact at these low levels.

| (13) | Although the Alt-A portfolio is not large in terms of ING's total balance sheet, it is significant relative to its equity. This was already noted in the explanation of the events triggering the State recapitalisation measure of ING during 2008, when the Commission noted that the “perceived toxicity of the Alt-A portfolio of ING was a particular cause for concern.” (4) |
| --- | --- |

(13)

Although the Alt-A portfolio is not large in terms of ING's total balance sheet, it is significant relative to its equity. This was already noted in the explanation of the events triggering the State recapitalisation measure of ING during 2008, when the Commission noted that the “perceived toxicity of the Alt-A portfolio of ING was a particular cause for concern.” (4)

| (14) | The underlying mortgages of the portfolio are heavily concentrated in California (almost 39 % of all underlying mortgages) and another combined 5,5 % of mortgages were originated in Arizona and Nevada. A further 7,6 % were originated in Florida. In the portfolio, about 61 % of all mortgages were originated either in 2006 or in 2007. About 30 % of ING's total portfolio is currently made up of so-called Option adjustable rate mortgages (Option ARMS) (5) which are part of the almost 70 % of all mortgages which have adjustable interest rates. The remaining 30 % have fixed interest rates. |
| --- | --- |

(14)

The underlying mortgages of the portfolio are heavily concentrated in California (almost 39 % of all underlying mortgages) and another combined 5,5 % of mortgages were originated in Arizona and Nevada. A further 7,6 % were originated in Florida. In the portfolio, about 61 % of all mortgages were originated either in 2006 or in 2007. About 30 % of ING's total portfolio is currently made up of so-called Option adjustable rate mortgages (Option ARMS) (5) which are part of the almost 70 % of all mortgages which have adjustable interest rates. The remaining 30 % have fixed interest rates.

| (15) | The “fair value” of the portfolio — an available for sale asset — was alleged to be on the 31 December 2008 EUR 18,442 million that is 71,5 % of its book value (EUR 25,809 million). (6) The book value of the portfolio is for the most part based on a mark-to-model with valuation techniques not supported by observable market inputs. Due to this decline in valuation from the original value, the bank had to build a negative revaluation reserve of EUR 7 billion (pre-tax), which is subtracted from shareholder equity under IFRS (7). However, this negative revaluation reserve is not taken into account for regulatory capital calculations due to so-called prudential filters introduced by supervisors for mitigating the effects of fair value changes on regulatory capital. A valuation change in an “available for sales” asset is only reflected through the profits and loss account at the point when an asset against which there has been a negative revaluation reserve is “impaired”. (8) |
| --- | --- |

(15)

The “fair value” of the portfolio — an available for sale asset — was alleged to be on the 31 December 2008 EUR 18,442 million that is 71,5 % of its book value (EUR 25,809 million). (6) The book value of the portfolio is for the most part based on a mark-to-model with valuation techniques not supported by observable market inputs. Due to this decline in valuation from the original value, the bank had to build a negative revaluation reserve of EUR 7 billion (pre-tax), which is subtracted from shareholder equity under IFRS (7). However, this negative revaluation reserve is not taken into account for regulatory capital calculations due to so-called prudential filters introduced by supervisors for mitigating the effects of fair value changes on regulatory capital. A valuation change in an “available for sales” asset is only reflected through the profits and loss account at the point when an asset against which there has been a negative revaluation reserve is “impaired”. (8)

| (16) | The par value of the portfolio is USD 38,7 billion. Due mostly to USD 2,7 billion (EUR 2,1 billion) impairments on the portfolio, the cost basis from an accountant’s point of view under IFRS amounts to USD 36 billion as per 31 December 2008. The agreed base for the measure is 90 percent of the par value of the portfolio. |
| --- | --- |

(16)

The par value of the portfolio is USD 38,7 billion. Due mostly to USD 2,7 billion (EUR 2,1 billion) impairments on the portfolio, the cost basis from an accountant’s point of view under IFRS amounts to USD 36 billion as per 31 December 2008. The agreed base for the measure is 90 percent of the par value of the portfolio.

3.   The measure

| (17) | In order to avoid dealing with the various subsidiaries holding the securities (see above) it is proposed that the legal owners of the securities enter into a participation agreement with ING Support Holding (a direct subsidiary of ING Group) to transfer 80 % of the economic risk from that portfolio while retaining legal ownership. ING Support Holding then enters into a so-called illiquid asset back-up facility for transferring this risk and all respective incoming payments (interest and principal repayments) to the Dutch State. |
| --- | --- |

(17)

In order to avoid dealing with the various subsidiaries holding the securities (see above) it is proposed that the legal owners of the securities enter into a participation agreement with ING Support Holding (a direct subsidiary of ING Group) to transfer 80 % of the economic risk from that portfolio while retaining legal ownership. ING Support Holding then enters into a so-called illiquid asset back-up facility for transferring this risk and all respective incoming payments (interest and principal repayments) to the Dutch State.

| (18) | The transaction is constructed as a cash-flow swap in which both the Dutch State and ING agree to exchange different cash flows over the duration of the deal. During the deal, the portfolio will not be actively managed as it mostly be held until maturity, although there might be activity expected due to possible legislative change in the US. |
| --- | --- |

(18)

The transaction is constructed as a cash-flow swap in which both the Dutch State and ING agree to exchange different cash flows over the duration of the deal. During the deal, the portfolio will not be actively managed as it mostly be held until maturity, although there might be activity expected due to possible legislative change in the US.

| (19) | In the transaction 80 % of the incoming payment flows, i.e. repayment and prepayment of principal and interest (thereafter called: portfolio cash flow) from ING's portfolio is swapped against an over-time payment from the Dutch State of the guaranteed amount of USD 28 billion which together with an interest component constitutes the funding fee. This interest component paid by the Dutch State amounts to 350 bp on the outstanding fixed part of the portfolio (amounting to 57 % of the portfolio) and to one month USD Libor + 50 bp on the variable part of the portfolio (amounting to 43 % of the portfolio). |
| --- | --- |

(19)

In the transaction 80 % of the incoming payment flows, i.e. repayment and prepayment of principal and interest (thereafter called: portfolio cash flow) from ING's portfolio is swapped against an over-time payment from the Dutch State of the guaranteed amount of USD 28 billion which together with an interest component constitutes the funding fee. This interest component paid by the Dutch State amounts to 350 bp on the outstanding fixed part of the portfolio (amounting to 57 % of the portfolio) and to one month USD Libor + 50 bp on the variable part of the portfolio (amounting to 43 % of the portfolio).

| (20) | For evaluating the terms of this deal it is necessary to look at the expected net present value of the various cash flows. For arriving at a net present value of the above cash flows it is necessary to apply a discount rate. (9) The transaction foresees a discount rate of 3 % for all cash flows in the swap. This discount rate is applied to all cash flows, regardless of whether they come from the Dutch State, from ING or from the portfolio transiting via ING to the Dutch State. The reason why a 3 % discount rate is used is because the Dutch State estimates its cost of funding in USD to be around 3 % for a maturity of 5-7 years, corresponding to the weighted average life of the portfolio. The Dutch State has provided two supporting opinions on this from its primary dealers. |
| --- | --- |

(20)

For evaluating the terms of this deal it is necessary to look at the expected net present value of the various cash flows. For arriving at a net present value of the above cash flows it is necessary to apply a discount rate. (9) The transaction foresees a discount rate of 3 % for all cash flows in the swap. This discount rate is applied to all cash flows, regardless of whether they come from the Dutch State, from ING or from the portfolio transiting via ING to the Dutch State. The reason why a 3 % discount rate is used is because the Dutch State estimates its cost of funding in USD to be around 3 % for a maturity of 5-7 years, corresponding to the weighted average life of the portfolio. The Dutch State has provided two supporting opinions on this from its primary dealers.

(a)   Valuation: methodology, scenarios and discount rate

| (21) | The Dutch State commissioned Dynamic Credit Partners to analyse the portfolio of ING for determining the real economic value of the portfolio. The overall approach consists in projecting the probability of default and loss severities on a tranche per tranche basis for the whole portfolio in order to calculate the expected losses. |
| --- | --- |

(21)

The Dutch State commissioned Dynamic Credit Partners to analyse the portfolio of ING for determining the real economic value of the portfolio. The overall approach consists in projecting the probability of default and loss severities on a tranche per tranche basis for the whole portfolio in order to calculate the expected losses.

| (22) | Dynamic Credit performed a bottom up evaluation of the underlying mortgages in each securitization deal (from which ING bought a tranche) and was able to calculate the expected losses it estimated would arise on the underlying mortgage loans. Such calculations were based on — inter alia — factors such as the original ratio between the value of the house and the principal (loan to value), the type of loan, the type of lender, the location at postcode level and the estimated change in house prices at postcode level since the loan was granted. |
| --- | --- |

(22)

Dynamic Credit performed a bottom up evaluation of the underlying mortgages in each securitization deal (from which ING bought a tranche) and was able to calculate the expected losses it estimated would arise on the underlying mortgage loans. Such calculations were based on — inter alia — factors such as the original ratio between the value of the house and the principal (loan to value), the type of loan, the type of lender, the location at postcode level and the estimated change in house prices at postcode level since the loan was granted.

| (23) | As a second step, the so-called cash waterfall is considered, as for a given securitization deal, there are various tranches each with different levels of seniority (or “credit cushion”) and credit enhancement. In practice, this means that any incoming cash flow shortfalls are first to be taken by more subordinated tranches, while more senior tranches are still being serviced by remaining cash flows and reserves built-up during times when there had not been defaults. The Dutch authorities claim that ING's portfolio has only very secure senior tranches. |
| --- | --- |

(23)

As a second step, the so-called cash waterfall is considered, as for a given securitization deal, there are various tranches each with different levels of seniority (or “credit cushion”) and credit enhancement. In practice, this means that any incoming cash flow shortfalls are first to be taken by more subordinated tranches, while more senior tranches are still being serviced by remaining cash flows and reserves built-up during times when there had not been defaults. The Dutch authorities claim that ING's portfolio has only very secure senior tranches.

| (24) | Two scenarios are projected: a scenario deemed more likely by the Dutch State, the base case, and a less likely stress case scenario. According to the Dutch authorities, key assumptions in the base case are house price declines of about 35 % nationwide peak to trough (2006 to 2009) and up to 65 % in hardest hit areas such as California and a US unemployment rate of 8 % in 2009. An annual decline in US GDP is assumed by 6 % in the fourth quarter of 2008 and 3 % in the first quarter of 2009. The stress case scenario assumes US home price declines of 45 % peak-to-trough and a 70-75 % peak-to-trough decline in the most vulnerable areas and an increase of the US unemployment rate to 9,5 % in 2009. Both scenarios assume a voluntary prepayment rate of 5 % over the lifetime of the mortgages figure when compared with the pre-crisis period. The Dutch State points out that this is a prudent assumption. Both scenarios are then translated into different total expected losses on the portfolio. |
| --- | --- |

(24)

Two scenarios are projected: a scenario deemed more likely by the Dutch State, the base case, and a less likely stress case scenario. According to the Dutch authorities, key assumptions in the base case are house price declines of about 35 % nationwide peak to trough (2006 to 2009) and up to 65 % in hardest hit areas such as California and a US unemployment rate of 8 % in 2009. An annual decline in US GDP is assumed by 6 % in the fourth quarter of 2008 and 3 % in the first quarter of 2009. The stress case scenario assumes US home price declines of 45 % peak-to-trough and a 70-75 % peak-to-trough decline in the most vulnerable areas and an increase of the US unemployment rate to 9,5 % in 2009. Both scenarios assume a voluntary prepayment rate of 5 % over the lifetime of the mortgages figure when compared with the pre-crisis period. The Dutch State points out that this is a prudent assumption. Both scenarios are then translated into different total expected losses on the portfolio.

| (25) | After having determined the expected net cash flows (net of expected losses), they are discounted at a discount rate of 3 % for arriving at a net present value. Alternatively, this corresponds to a discount rate of 4,19 % if gross cash flows (assuming no losses) were considered, under a base case valuation. Based on these calculations the Dutch authorities arrive at a valuation of 97 % of par in the base case scenario. In the stress case scenario, the value of the portfolio would be 89 % of par. |
| --- | --- |

(25)

After having determined the expected net cash flows (net of expected losses), they are discounted at a discount rate of 3 % for arriving at a net present value. Alternatively, this corresponds to a discount rate of 4,19 % if gross cash flows (assuming no losses) were considered, under a base case valuation. Based on these calculations the Dutch authorities arrive at a valuation of 97 % of par in the base case scenario. In the stress case scenario, the value of the portfolio would be 89 % of par.

(b)   Effect on ING's capital ratio

| (26) | The replacement of the risky portfolio by a secure government receivable reduces the capital required to be held against the risky asset by the bank. In regulatory terms, the Dutch authorities state that this results in a capital relief of EUR 1,26 billion, (10) deriving from a reduction of 13 billion risk weighted asset (RWA) based on 31 December 2008. This capital relief of EUR 1,26 billion can be used for additional lending. |
| --- | --- |

(26)

The replacement of the risky portfolio by a secure government receivable reduces the capital required to be held against the risky asset by the bank. In regulatory terms, the Dutch authorities state that this results in a capital relief of EUR 1,26 billion, (10) deriving from a reduction of 13 billion risk weighted asset (RWA) based on 31 December 2008. This capital relief of EUR 1,26 billion can be used for additional lending.

| (27) | According to the Dutch authorities from an accounting point of view the IFRS equity capital relief is EUR 5,6 billion — 80 % of pre-tax of the total equity capital relief of EUR 7 billion — which translates into approximately EUR 5 billion post tax. This is caused by the release of the negative revaluation reserve that in turn resulted from a sharp deterioration in market prices of RMBS over the last two years. However, this EUR 5 billion cannot be used for additional lending without reducing the regulatory ratios. |
| --- | --- |

(27)

According to the Dutch authorities from an accounting point of view the IFRS equity capital relief is EUR 5,6 billion — 80 % of pre-tax of the total equity capital relief of EUR 7 billion — which translates into approximately EUR 5 billion post tax. This is caused by the release of the negative revaluation reserve that in turn resulted from a sharp deterioration in market prices of RMBS over the last two years. However, this EUR 5 billion cannot be used for additional lending without reducing the regulatory ratios.

(c)   Additional fees

| (28) | In addition ING will pay a guarantee fee to the State amounting to 55 bp p.a. on the outstanding value of the portfolio. The guarantee fee will decline in line with the declining amounts outstanding on the portfolio, the declining RWA relief and the declining risk for the State. As an illustrative example in the first five years the expected guarantee fee will be: USD 170 million, (2009), USD 146 million (2010), USD 127 million (2011), USD 109 million (2012), USD 94 million (2013). |
| --- | --- |

(28)

In addition ING will pay a guarantee fee to the State amounting to 55 bp p.a. on the outstanding value of the portfolio. The guarantee fee will decline in line with the declining amounts outstanding on the portfolio, the declining RWA relief and the declining risk for the State. As an illustrative example in the first five years the expected guarantee fee will be: USD 170 million, (2009), USD 146 million (2010), USD 127 million (2011), USD 109 million (2012), USD 94 million (2013).

| (29) | Furthermore, the State has to pay to ING a management fee amounting to 0,25 bp p.a. of the outstanding portfolio, expected to amount in the first five years, for instance, to USD 77 million, USD 66 million, USD 58 million, USD 50 million, USD 43 million. |
| --- | --- |

(29)

Furthermore, the State has to pay to ING a management fee amounting to 0,25 bp p.a. of the outstanding portfolio, expected to amount in the first five years, for instance, to USD 77 million, USD 66 million, USD 58 million, USD 50 million, USD 43 million.

(d)   Remuneration of the measure

| (30) | Given the above description of the measure the expected discounted cash flows are in the following table. This would imply according to the Dutch authorities that the state would make a gain in both scenarios. |
| --- | --- |

(30)

Given the above description of the measure the expected discounted cash flows are in the following table. This would imply according to the Dutch authorities that the state would make a gain in both scenarios.

Table 1: Projected net present value flows (11), in million USD

| | Base case | Stress case |
| --- | --- | --- |
| P & I payments to State (12) | 30,376 | 27,728 |
| Guarantee fee to State | 1,011 | 1,011 |
| (Guaranteed value to ING) (12) | (28,844) | (28,844) |
| Expected gain (loss) to state | 2,867 | 219 |

Base case

Stress case

P & I payments to State (12)

30,376

27,728

Guarantee fee to State

1,011

1,011

(Guaranteed value to ING) (12)

(28,844)

(28,844)

Expected gain (loss) to state

2,867

219

| (31) | The Dutch authorities state, however, that the management fee is an integral part of the deal and this has to be taken into account when looking at remuneration. Table 2 recalculates therefore the calculations with the management fee included. Based on this calculation, the remuneration for the State amounts to slightly more than USD 2 billion in the base case, but the remuneration is negative in the stress case. |
| --- | --- |

(31)

The Dutch authorities state, however, that the management fee is an integral part of the deal and this has to be taken into account when looking at remuneration. Table 2 recalculates therefore the calculations with the management fee included. Based on this calculation, the remuneration for the State amounts to slightly more than USD 2 billion in the base case, but the remuneration is negative in the stress case.

Table 2: Projected net present value flows (14), in million USD

| | Base case | Stress case |
| --- | --- | --- |
| P & I payments to State (15) | 30,376 | 27,728 |
| Guarantee fee to State | 1,011 | 1,011 |
| (Guaranteed value to ING) (16) | (28,844) | (28,844) |
| (Management fee to ING) | (460) | (460) |
| Expected gain (loss) to state | 2,083 | (564) |

Base case

Stress case

P & I payments to State (15)

30,376

27,728

Guarantee fee to State

1,011

1,011

(Guaranteed value to ING) (16)

(28,844)

(28,844)

(Management fee to ING)

(460)

(460)

Expected gain (loss) to state

2,083

(564)

(e)   Duration and end of the measure

| (32) | The agreement between the State and ING provides for an exit mechanism whereby the State and ING will meet every year to discuss whether the entire facility should be terminated. If both parties wish to terminate the facility the value will be determined using an exit mechanism commonly used in major financial transactions: |
| --- | --- |

(32)

The agreement between the State and ING provides for an exit mechanism whereby the State and ING will meet every year to discuss whether the entire facility should be terminated. If both parties wish to terminate the facility the value will be determined using an exit mechanism commonly used in major financial transactions:

| (33) | Each party will appoint an independent advisor to evaluate the outstanding portfolio. If there is little difference between these valuations the average of the two will be used as the basis for the transaction. If the valuations differ widely, the parties will jointly appoint a third independent advisor. The value will then be established as the average of the value as calculated by the third advisor and the value of whichever of the earlier valuations is closest to the third advisor's estimates. |
| --- | --- |

(33)

Each party will appoint an independent advisor to evaluate the outstanding portfolio. If there is little difference between these valuations the average of the two will be used as the basis for the transaction. If the valuations differ widely, the parties will jointly appoint a third independent advisor. The value will then be established as the average of the value as calculated by the third advisor and the value of whichever of the earlier valuations is closest to the third advisor's estimates.

| (34) | As an exit mechanism the State is entitled to compel ING to sell the underlying securities once they are being traded on the market again at the price which ING paid when it purchased them. |
| --- | --- |

(34)

As an exit mechanism the State is entitled to compel ING to sell the underlying securities once they are being traded on the market again at the price which ING paid when it purchased them.

| (35) | If neither the exit mechanism nor the exit incentives lead to the portfolio being run down, or the State being bought out entirely, the facility can in theory remain in operation until the last mortgage has been repaid. This could mean that there will be cash flows between the State and ING resulting from this transaction up until 2047. However, the estimated cash flows are such that majority of the portfolio will be redeemed within a few years (the weighed average life of this portfolio is about 6 years). |
| --- | --- |

(35)

If neither the exit mechanism nor the exit incentives lead to the portfolio being run down, or the State being bought out entirely, the facility can in theory remain in operation until the last mortgage has been repaid. This could mean that there will be cash flows between the State and ING resulting from this transaction up until 2047. However, the estimated cash flows are such that majority of the portfolio will be redeemed within a few years (the weighed average life of this portfolio is about 6 years).

III.   THE POSITION OF THE NETHERLANDS

| (36) | The Dutch authorities informed the Commission on 17 March that in case the Alt-A Transaction does not close before 31 March 2009 and the risk transfer would not be effected, they would have serious concerns that this would result in a [...] financial markets and the Dutch economy. A delay in closing would mean that the Alt-A Transaction would not have the intended positive effects on revaluation reserves, IFRS equity and capital adequacy ratios. In view of the volatility of the financial markets this might lead to substantial increase in uncertainty about the position of ING. Another issue that could increase the uncertainty about the position of ING is the accounting notion [...] (17) [...]. Both issues, i.e. a delay in closing or a significant change [...], could, in the view of the authorities, have a material adverse effect on the stability of ING and hence the [...] financial markets and economy. This is confirmed in a letter by the supervisory authority. |
| --- | --- |

(36)

The Dutch authorities informed the Commission on 17 March that in case the Alt-A Transaction does not close before 31 March 2009 and the risk transfer would not be effected, they would have serious concerns that this would result in a [...] financial markets and the Dutch economy. A delay in closing would mean that the Alt-A Transaction would not have the intended positive effects on revaluation reserves, IFRS equity and capital adequacy ratios. In view of the volatility of the financial markets this might lead to substantial increase in uncertainty about the position of ING. Another issue that could increase the uncertainty about the position of ING is the accounting notion [...] (17) [...]. Both issues, i.e. a delay in closing or a significant change [...], could, in the view of the authorities, have a material adverse effect on the stability of ING and hence the [...] financial markets and economy. This is confirmed in a letter by the supervisory authority.

| (37) | In addition, they note that, without Commission approval, ING's [...] with all the possible consequences this might have for confidence in the banking sector in general and ING in particular, but also for the Dutch and European economy in these times of uncertainty and recession. The Dutch authorities point to the Commission decision on the recapitalisation N 528/2008, where the Commission had already recognised the importance of ING for the Dutch economy. |
| --- | --- |

(37)

In addition, they note that, without Commission approval, ING's [...] with all the possible consequences this might have for confidence in the banking sector in general and ING in particular, but also for the Dutch and European economy in these times of uncertainty and recession. The Dutch authorities point to the Commission decision on the recapitalisation N 528/2008, where the Commission had already recognised the importance of ING for the Dutch economy.

| (38) | The Dutch authorities underline that ING is a sound financial institution with sufficient liquidity and solvency, but it is suffering from exceptional conditions worldwide. ING would therefore certainly not qualify as a firm in difficulties, as defined in the Community guidelines on state aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty. |
| --- | --- |

(38)

The Dutch authorities underline that ING is a sound financial institution with sufficient liquidity and solvency, but it is suffering from exceptional conditions worldwide. ING would therefore certainly not qualify as a firm in difficulties, as defined in the Community guidelines on state aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty.

| (39) | The Dutch authorities acknowledge that the measure constitutes state aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) EC, which is compatible with the Treaty pursuant to Article 87(3)(b) EC, for remedying a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State. In particular, the measure has been specially designed for the current exceptional circumstances in which, because of their illiquidity, certain assets have to be written down more than their economic value would warrant, for satisfying accounting requirements. They note that the measure was appropriate at such time for tackling the specific problems and at the same time is the least far-reaching and least risky way for the State to assist ING. |
| --- | --- |

(39)

The Dutch authorities acknowledge that the measure constitutes state aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) EC, which is compatible with the Treaty pursuant to Article 87(3)(b) EC, for remedying a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State. In particular, the measure has been specially designed for the current exceptional circumstances in which, because of their illiquidity, certain assets have to be written down more than their economic value would warrant, for satisfying accounting requirements. They note that the measure was appropriate at such time for tackling the specific problems and at the same time is the least far-reaching and least risky way for the State to assist ING.

| (40) | The Dutch authorities confirmed that they have reviewed whether there has been a full prior transparency by ING having disclosed all impairments and there were no indications to believe that this was not the case. In addition, the Dutch authorities note that the valuation of the portfolio is performed by independent experts under an appropriate methodology. The Dutch authorities are of the view that the valuation of ING’s portfolio was particularly complex as there was no active markets for these assets. The Dutch authorities have instructed Dynamic Credit who have undertaken an alternative valuation which they considered the best approximation of the true value of the portfolio. The valuation has been affirmed by the Dutch supervisory authority. |
| --- | --- |

(40)

The Dutch authorities confirmed that they have reviewed whether there has been a full prior transparency by ING having disclosed all impairments and there were no indications to believe that this was not the case. In addition, the Dutch authorities note that the valuation of the portfolio is performed by independent experts under an appropriate methodology. The Dutch authorities are of the view that the valuation of ING’s portfolio was particularly complex as there was no active markets for these assets. The Dutch authorities have instructed Dynamic Credit who have undertaken an alternative valuation which they considered the best approximation of the true value of the portfolio. The valuation has been affirmed by the Dutch supervisory authority.

| (41) | The authorities state that the total package provides an adequate remuneration for the risk taken over by the state. The authorities point to the more likely base case scenario which shows an overall gain for the Dutch State. The Dutch authorities state that the management fee is part of the overall remuneration package. The total package was considered appropriate at such time. There is also adequate burden sharing, due to the first loss already borne by the bank, and a future loss split in the relationship of 80 % for the State and 20 % for the bank. |
| --- | --- |

(41)

The authorities state that the total package provides an adequate remuneration for the risk taken over by the state. The authorities point to the more likely base case scenario which shows an overall gain for the Dutch State. The Dutch authorities state that the management fee is part of the overall remuneration package. The total package was considered appropriate at such time. There is also adequate burden sharing, due to the first loss already borne by the bank, and a future loss split in the relationship of 80 % for the State and 20 % for the bank.

| (42) | As regards to the management of the assets, the authorities explain that ING remains partly responsible for the portfolio, giving it the perfect incentive to continue to manage the portfolio as efficiently as possible. They underline with reference to point 46 IAC that the Securities are held solely by ING Support Holding and not by ING Groep and that for the duration of this agreement the State, ING Support Holding and ING Groep will establish an operating committee to discuss recent developments, market outlook, data and pricing in respect of the Securities. |
| --- | --- |

(42)

As regards to the management of the assets, the authorities explain that ING remains partly responsible for the portfolio, giving it the perfect incentive to continue to manage the portfolio as efficiently as possible. They underline with reference to point 46 IAC that the Securities are held solely by ING Support Holding and not by ING Groep and that for the duration of this agreement the State, ING Support Holding and ING Groep will establish an operating committee to discuss recent developments, market outlook, data and pricing in respect of the Securities.

| (43) | The Dutch authorities state that it would be admissible to use a single discount rate for all cash flows involved. The Dutch authorities state that a higher discount rate for cash flows from ING or for cash flows transiting from ING to the State, due to their higher perceived riskiness, would over-adjust for the flow's riskiness. They explain that the credit risk in the portfolio is more than offset by the positive net present value for the State under the swap transaction. |
| --- | --- |

(43)

The Dutch authorities state that it would be admissible to use a single discount rate for all cash flows involved. The Dutch authorities state that a higher discount rate for cash flows from ING or for cash flows transiting from ING to the State, due to their higher perceived riskiness, would over-adjust for the flow's riskiness. They explain that the credit risk in the portfolio is more than offset by the positive net present value for the State under the swap transaction.

| (44) | The Dutch government provides the following commitments: |
| --- | --- |

(44)

The Dutch government provides the following commitments:

| — | Presentation of a viability review in line with conditions set out in the IAC |
| --- | --- |

—

Presentation of a viability review in line with conditions set out in the IAC

| — | Presentation of a restructuring plan in line with conditions set out in the IAC |
| --- | --- |

—

Presentation of a restructuring plan in line with conditions set out in the IAC

| — | The Dutch State is willing to change the provisions of valuation and burden sharing by means of claw back, increase of the Guarantee fee under the illiquid assets back-up facilities or any other form of remuneration, without compensating ING via changes in the other cash flows ( i.e. the funding fee, the Alt A cash flows and management fee) if the Commission comes to the conclusion that the valuation at 26 January 2009 of the portfolio underlying the illiquid assets back-up facilities or its burden sharing proves to be materially in contradiction with EC State aid rules on impaired assets. |
| --- | --- |

—

The Dutch State is willing to change the provisions of valuation and burden sharing by means of claw back, increase of the Guarantee fee under the illiquid assets back-up facilities or any other form of remuneration, without compensating ING via changes in the other cash flows ( i.e. the funding fee, the Alt A cash flows and management fee) if the Commission comes to the conclusion that the valuation at 26 January 2009 of the portfolio underlying the illiquid assets back-up facilities or its burden sharing proves to be materially in contradiction with EC State aid rules on impaired assets.

IV.   CONSULTATION OF THE TECHNICAL EXPERTS FROM THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK

| (45) | As explained in point 4, the Commission has been consulting the technical experts from the ECB for assistance in assessing the valuation of the portfolio. The experts of the ECB reviewed the provided documents and concluded that they did not have all the information needed to properly assess the valuation of the impaired assets portfolio of ING. |
| --- | --- |

(45)

As explained in point 4, the Commission has been consulting the technical experts from the ECB for assistance in assessing the valuation of the portfolio. The experts of the ECB reviewed the provided documents and concluded that they did not have all the information needed to properly assess the valuation of the impaired assets portfolio of ING.

V.   ASSESSMENT OF THE AID

1.   Existence of aid

| (46) | The Commission first assesses whether the measures constitute state aid within the meaning of Article 87 (1) EC. According to this provision state aid is any aid granted by a Member State or through state resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition, by favouring certain undertakings, in so far as it affects trade between Member States. |
| --- | --- |

(46)

The Commission first assesses whether the measures constitute state aid within the meaning of Article 87 (1) EC. According to this provision state aid is any aid granted by a Member State or through state resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition, by favouring certain undertakings, in so far as it affects trade between Member States.

| (47) | The Commission finds that the measure reduces the amount of capital ING has to hold against these assets. Given that the market value of the portfolio is less than the price paid it is evident that no market operator would provide such a facility under similar conditions. |
| --- | --- |

(47)

The Commission finds that the measure reduces the amount of capital ING has to hold against these assets. Given that the market value of the portfolio is less than the price paid it is evident that no market operator would provide such a facility under similar conditions.

| (48) | As the measure is favouring only ING it is selective and leads to a distortion of competition and affects intra-Community trade because the banking sector operates internationally. Thus, the Commission concludes that the measure constitutes state aid. |
| --- | --- |

(48)

As the measure is favouring only ING it is selective and leads to a distortion of competition and affects intra-Community trade because the banking sector operates internationally. Thus, the Commission concludes that the measure constitutes state aid.

| (49) | The IAC states that the aid amount corresponds to the difference between the transfer value of the assets (based on their real economic value) and the market price. To this end the assets should be valued on the basis of their current market value, whenever possible. Given that the market for the assets in the portfolio has mostly dried up, as claimed by the Dutch authorities, this implies that there is no market price in the absence of a market as defined by the IAC. Therefore the calculated aid amount as regards the portfolio is the full net present value of all the sums provided to ING by the Dutch government. |
| --- | --- |

(49)

The IAC states that the aid amount corresponds to the difference between the transfer value of the assets (based on their real economic value) and the market price. To this end the assets should be valued on the basis of their current market value, whenever possible. Given that the market for the assets in the portfolio has mostly dried up, as claimed by the Dutch authorities, this implies that there is no market price in the absence of a market as defined by the IAC. Therefore the calculated aid amount as regards the portfolio is the full net present value of all the sums provided to ING by the Dutch government.

2.   Compatibility of the financial support measures

| (50) | The Netherlands intends to provide impaired asset relief in favour of ING. Given the present circumstances in the financial market, the Commission considers that this measure may be examined directly under the Treaty rules and in particular under Article 87(3)(b) EC. |
| --- | --- |

(50)

The Netherlands intends to provide impaired asset relief in favour of ING. Given the present circumstances in the financial market, the Commission considers that this measure may be examined directly under the Treaty rules and in particular under Article 87(3)(b) EC.

| (51) | Article 87(3)(b) EC empowers the Commission to declare aid compatible with the common market if it is intended “to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State”. The Commission would point out that the Court of First Instance has expressly stated that Article 87(3)(b) EC is to be applied restrictively so that the aid may not benefit only one firm or one sector of the economy, but must serve to remedy a disturbance in the whole economy of a Member State. (18) |
| --- | --- |

(51)

Article 87(3)(b) EC empowers the Commission to declare aid compatible with the common market if it is intended “to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State”. The Commission would point out that the Court of First Instance has expressly stated that Article 87(3)(b) EC is to be applied restrictively so that the aid may not benefit only one firm or one sector of the economy, but must serve to remedy a disturbance in the whole economy of a Member State. (18)

| (52) | The Commission considers that market conditions deteriorated all over the world in the last quarter of 2008 and certain assets classes are no longer frequently traded. This is problematic for financial institutions because accounting provisions (IFRS accounting standards) might require them to write down these illiquid assets (on the basis of their fair value) to a greater extent than is warranted by their economic value. The uncertainty in the market about the scale of the write-downs, the market value of these assets and the high leverage ratios have also had an impact on the financial institutions′ overall risk perceptions. The present measure is designed to address these problems. Therefore it finds that the scheme aims at remedying a serious disturbance in the Dutch economy. |
| --- | --- |

(52)

The Commission considers that market conditions deteriorated all over the world in the last quarter of 2008 and certain assets classes are no longer frequently traded. This is problematic for financial institutions because accounting provisions (IFRS accounting standards) might require them to write down these illiquid assets (on the basis of their fair value) to a greater extent than is warranted by their economic value. The uncertainty in the market about the scale of the write-downs, the market value of these assets and the high leverage ratios have also had an impact on the financial institutions′ overall risk perceptions. The present measure is designed to address these problems. Therefore it finds that the scheme aims at remedying a serious disturbance in the Dutch economy.

| (53) | The Commission has provided guidance on the treatment of asset relief measures by Member States under Article 87(3)(b) EC through the IAC. Impaired assets correspond to categories of assets on which banks are likely to incur losses (e.g. US sub-prime mortgage backed securities, Alt-A loans). The IAC complements and refines the Banking Communication (19) where the Commission set out the principles governing the application of the State aid rules to any support measure for banks in the context of the global financial crisis. The IAC sets out principles that must be followed by any asset relief measure. It should be noted that the Commission emphasises that a common European approach is needed to deal with the treatment of impaired assets, to make sure that foreseeable losses are disclosed, valued and accompanied by an adequate level in terms of burden sharing and remuneration. |
| --- | --- |

(53)

The Commission has provided guidance on the treatment of asset relief measures by Member States under Article 87(3)(b) EC through the IAC. Impaired assets correspond to categories of assets on which banks are likely to incur losses (e.g. US sub-prime mortgage backed securities, Alt-A loans). The IAC complements and refines the Banking Communication (19) where the Commission set out the principles governing the application of the State aid rules to any support measure for banks in the context of the global financial crisis. The IAC sets out principles that must be followed by any asset relief measure. It should be noted that the Commission emphasises that a common European approach is needed to deal with the treatment of impaired assets, to make sure that foreseeable losses are disclosed, valued and accompanied by an adequate level in terms of burden sharing and remuneration.

| (54) | The IAC leaves the methods and design for impaired asset relief measures to the Member Sates, but defines impaired asset relief as all measures whereby a bank is dispensed from the need for severe downward value adjustments of certain asset classes. This is also the case for the present measure. Therefore the present measure must fulfil the conditions for the compatibility of asset relieve as spelled out in the IAC. (20) |
| --- | --- |

(54)

The IAC leaves the methods and design for impaired asset relief measures to the Member Sates, but defines impaired asset relief as all measures whereby a bank is dispensed from the need for severe downward value adjustments of certain asset classes. This is also the case for the present measure. Therefore the present measure must fulfil the conditions for the compatibility of asset relieve as spelled out in the IAC. (20)

(a)   Eligibility of assets

| (55) | As regards the eligibility of the assets, the IAC indicates in section 5.4 that asset relief requires a clear identification of impaired assets (21) and that certain limits apply in relation to eligibility to ensure compatibility. US mortgage backed securities (i.e. RMBS) are mentioned as prime examples of impaired assets which can be included in relief operations without doubts as to their eligibility. The Commission notes in this respect that all assets in the portfolio are related to US RMBS. The impaired assets are therefore sufficiently identified and do not raise issues of eligibility. |
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(55)

As regards the eligibility of the assets, the IAC indicates in section 5.4 that asset relief requires a clear identification of impaired assets (21) and that certain limits apply in relation to eligibility to ensure compatibility. US mortgage backed securities (i.e. RMBS) are mentioned as prime examples of impaired assets which can be included in relief operations without doubts as to their eligibility. The Commission notes in this respect that all assets in the portfolio are related to US RMBS. The impaired assets are therefore sufficiently identified and do not raise issues of eligibility.

(b)   Transparency and disclosure

| (56) | As regards transparency and disclosure the Commission notes that the IAC demands in section 5.1 full ex-ante transparency and disclosure of impairments by eligible banks on the assets which will be covered by the relief measures, based on adequate valuation, certified by recognised independent experts and validated by the relevant supervisory authority. In other word the IAC requires that disclosure and valuation should take place prior to government intervention. Moreover, transparency needs to be based on appropriate valuation certified by an independent expert and validated by a letter of the head of the supervisory authority. |
| --- | --- |

(56)

As regards transparency and disclosure the Commission notes that the IAC demands in section 5.1 full ex-ante transparency and disclosure of impairments by eligible banks on the assets which will be covered by the relief measures, based on adequate valuation, certified by recognised independent experts and validated by the relevant supervisory authority. In other word the IAC requires that disclosure and valuation should take place prior to government intervention. Moreover, transparency needs to be based on appropriate valuation certified by an independent expert and validated by a letter of the head of the supervisory authority.

| (57) | The Commission notes first that the Dutch authorities have engaged an independent expert. Second, as indicated above in point 42 the Dutch authorities have pursuant to point 20 IAC produced the necessary documents from the supervisory authorities. |
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(57)

The Commission notes first that the Dutch authorities have engaged an independent expert. Second, as indicated above in point 42 the Dutch authorities have pursuant to point 20 IAC produced the necessary documents from the supervisory authorities.

| (58) | Finally, the Commission notes that the requirements concerning transparency and disclosure concerning the asset portfolio covered by the relief measure are met in principle, with the exception of the issue of proper valuation dealt with separately below. Full disclosure on the entirety of impaired assets on ING's balance sheet has not however been provided in the context of the notified measure and will have to be provided in the viability review. At this stage the provisions for transparency and disclosure are thus sufficiently complied with. |
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(58)

Finally, the Commission notes that the requirements concerning transparency and disclosure concerning the asset portfolio covered by the relief measure are met in principle, with the exception of the issue of proper valuation dealt with separately below. Full disclosure on the entirety of impaired assets on ING's balance sheet has not however been provided in the context of the notified measure and will have to be provided in the viability review. At this stage the provisions for transparency and disclosure are thus sufficiently complied with.

(c)   Management of assets

| (59) | As regards the management of assets, the IAC in section 5.6 stipulates the necessity of ensuring a clear functional and organisational separation between the beneficiary bank and its assets, notably as to their management, staff and clientele. The Communication states in that respect that this should allow the bank to focus on the restoration of viability and to prevent possible conflicts of interest. |
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(59)

As regards the management of assets, the IAC in section 5.6 stipulates the necessity of ensuring a clear functional and organisational separation between the beneficiary bank and its assets, notably as to their management, staff and clientele. The Communication states in that respect that this should allow the bank to focus on the restoration of viability and to prevent possible conflicts of interest.

| (60) | In that respect, the Commission notes that 80 % of the portfolio will be derecognised by ING. However ING remains the legal owner of all the assets. In order to achieve a functional and organisational separation, ING has appointed a special committee to deal with the portfolio as indicated above in point 42. In view of this arrangement the asset management is thus in line with the IAC. |
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(60)

In that respect, the Commission notes that 80 % of the portfolio will be derecognised by ING. However ING remains the legal owner of all the assets. In order to achieve a functional and organisational separation, ING has appointed a special committee to deal with the portfolio as indicated above in point 42. In view of this arrangement the asset management is thus in line with the IAC.

(d)   Valuation

| (61) | The IAC notes in section 5.5 that a correct and consistent approach to valuation is of key importance to prevent undue distortions of competition. The valuation of impaired assets should follow a general methodology established at the Community level, which should be closely co-ordinated ex-ante by the Commission and Member States. |
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(61)

The IAC notes in section 5.5 that a correct and consistent approach to valuation is of key importance to prevent undue distortions of competition. The valuation of impaired assets should follow a general methodology established at the Community level, which should be closely co-ordinated ex-ante by the Commission and Member States.

| (62) | The Commission has to carefully scrutinize the valuation and in particular the underlying general methodology in order to ensure a consistent approach at Community level. In this respect its assessment should build on the expertise of existing bodies organised at EU level in order to ensure the consistency of valuation methodologies. For that purpose the Commission has called on the technical assistance provided by the experts from the ECB. The Commission notes that the technical experts from the ECB consider more information is needed. |
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(62)

The Commission has to carefully scrutinize the valuation and in particular the underlying general methodology in order to ensure a consistent approach at Community level. In this respect its assessment should build on the expertise of existing bodies organised at EU level in order to ensure the consistency of valuation methodologies. For that purpose the Commission has called on the technical assistance provided by the experts from the ECB. The Commission notes that the technical experts from the ECB consider more information is needed.

| (63) | Valuation implies the determination first of the market value and second of the real economic value, the latter being defined in point 40 of the IAC as the long-term economic value on the basis of underlying cash flows and broader time horizons. The main aim of valuation is to establish the real economic value, given that this value represents the benchmark level in that a transfer of impaired assets and at this value indicates compatibility of aid ensuring the relief effect by exceeding current market value but keeping the aid amount to the minimum necessary. |
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(63)

Valuation implies the determination first of the market value and second of the real economic value, the latter being defined in point 40 of the IAC as the long-term economic value on the basis of underlying cash flows and broader time horizons. The main aim of valuation is to establish the real economic value, given that this value represents the benchmark level in that a transfer of impaired assets and at this value indicates compatibility of aid ensuring the relief effect by exceeding current market value but keeping the aid amount to the minimum necessary.

| (64) | The Commission notes that, based on an independent expert i.e. Dynamic Credit, the Dutch State has established a real economic value of 97 cents on the dollar under the base case which is above the value at which the portfolio has been transferred at (90 percent of the par). |
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(64)

The Commission notes that, based on an independent expert i.e. Dynamic Credit, the Dutch State has established a real economic value of 97 cents on the dollar under the base case which is above the value at which the portfolio has been transferred at (90 percent of the par).

| (65) | Although the Commission does not question the qualification of the independent expert and its general approach it has some doubts on the conclusion reached on the establishment of this real economic value, given that it did not have all the information needed to properly assess the valuation of the impaired assets portfolio of ING (see confirmation by the technical experts from the ECB above in point (45)) and because the valuation is based on a number of assumptions as regards to which the Commission has significant doubts, in particular but not exclusively as regards (i) the choice of the discount rate, (ii) house price assumptions, (iii) the levels of credit enhancement, and (iv) other valuation issues. |
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(65)

Although the Commission does not question the qualification of the independent expert and its general approach it has some doubts on the conclusion reached on the establishment of this real economic value, given that it did not have all the information needed to properly assess the valuation of the impaired assets portfolio of ING (see confirmation by the technical experts from the ECB above in point (45)) and because the valuation is based on a number of assumptions as regards to which the Commission has significant doubts, in particular but not exclusively as regards (i) the choice of the discount rate, (ii) house price assumptions, (iii) the levels of credit enhancement, and (iv) other valuation issues.

| (66) | The Commission is first concerned about the use of a 4,19 % discount rate to discount all the cash flows of the portfolio, which suggests a spread premium above the USD Dutch government risk-free rate of 119 bp only.






  — | Given the recent developments in the market and higher loss expectations and the significant drop in credit quality of these tranches as translated by the rating downgrades from triple A to an average of BBB/BB, the spread premium and the discount rate to be used should be significantly higher. |
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(66)

The Commission is first concerned about the use of a 4,19 % discount rate to discount all the cash flows of the portfolio, which suggests a spread premium above the USD Dutch government risk-free rate of 119 bp only.

—

Given the recent developments in the market and higher loss expectations and the significant drop in credit quality of these tranches as translated by the rating downgrades from triple A to an average of BBB/BB, the spread premium and the discount rate to be used should be significantly higher.

| — | The 4,19 % rate does not capture the downside risk (unexpected losses) of deviating from the base case expected losses, as the Dutch State itself accepted a certain degree of probability of seeing the stress scenario materialising. |
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—

The 4,19 % rate does not capture the downside risk (unexpected losses) of deviating from the base case expected losses, as the Dutch State itself accepted a certain degree of probability of seeing the stress scenario materialising.

| (67) | The Commission considers at this stage that it can not dispel its doubts that the approach taken by the independent expert appears to lead to an overvaluation of the portfolio and to an overestimation of the benefit to the Dutch State. |
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(67)

The Commission considers at this stage that it can not dispel its doubts that the approach taken by the independent expert appears to lead to an overvaluation of the portfolio and to an overestimation of the benefit to the Dutch State.

| (68) | In addition, the Commission questions whether the house price assumptions applied in the valuations are prudent enough. In particular, it notes that, based on the documents received, the house prices are assumed to decrease only in 2009, then to remain stable in 2010, and then from 2010 onwards to increase by 5,8 % each year. The doubts on this point are highly relevant for assessing the real economic value of the portfolio given the important role played by house prices in the model for the calculation of the real economic value. |
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(68)

In addition, the Commission questions whether the house price assumptions applied in the valuations are prudent enough. In particular, it notes that, based on the documents received, the house prices are assumed to decrease only in 2009, then to remain stable in 2010, and then from 2010 onwards to increase by 5,8 % each year. The doubts on this point are highly relevant for assessing the real economic value of the portfolio given the important role played by house prices in the model for the calculation of the real economic value.

| (69) | The Commission is also in doubt about the stated levels of subordination/credit enhancement. The levels described for the ING portfolio are significantly higher for both Alt-A and Option ARMs tranches than average levels calculated by assessments from other experts in the context of other cases as well as available subordination/credit enhancement figures for respective typical securities from various asset classes all related to the US housing market from the rating agency Moody’s. To this concern the Dutch State told the Commission that ING had only bought super senior AAA tranches, in structures with higher levels of subordination than other AAA tranches. However, when looking at another report provided by the Dutch authorities to the Commission (commissioned by ING), only 28,1 % of the tranches were qualified as “super senior”, with the remaining being “senior” and “senior support”. The Commission notes that this is relevant for assessing the real economic value of the portfolio as a lower level of subordination/credit enhancement would reduce the protection against losses if payments are not made. Also, the doubts of the Commission are deriving from the fact that a large part of the portfolio is based on mortgages originated during 2006 and 2007, vintages which have so far proven to be most vulnerable to default. |
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(69)

The Commission is also in doubt about the stated levels of subordination/credit enhancement. The levels described for the ING portfolio are significantly higher for both Alt-A and Option ARMs tranches than average levels calculated by assessments from other experts in the context of other cases as well as available subordination/credit enhancement figures for respective typical securities from various asset classes all related to the US housing market from the rating agency Moody’s. To this concern the Dutch State told the Commission that ING had only bought super senior AAA tranches, in structures with higher levels of subordination than other AAA tranches. However, when looking at another report provided by the Dutch authorities to the Commission (commissioned by ING), only 28,1 % of the tranches were qualified as “super senior”, with the remaining being “senior” and “senior support”. The Commission notes that this is relevant for assessing the real economic value of the portfolio as a lower level of subordination/credit enhancement would reduce the protection against losses if payments are not made. Also, the doubts of the Commission are deriving from the fact that a large part of the portfolio is based on mortgages originated during 2006 and 2007, vintages which have so far proven to be most vulnerable to default.

| (70) | Further doubts as to the appropriateness of valuation cannot be excluded at this stage in view of the fact that the Commission has not yet received full information both on the valuation methodology and on its application to the individual assets covered. A fully-fledged assessment of the Commission can only be carried out once the Commission is in possession of this information. |
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(70)

Further doubts as to the appropriateness of valuation cannot be excluded at this stage in view of the fact that the Commission has not yet received full information both on the valuation methodology and on its application to the individual assets covered. A fully-fledged assessment of the Commission can only be carried out once the Commission is in possession of this information.

| (71) | In sum, the Commission has doubts as to the valuation methodology and cannot exclude that the real economic value is lower than that calculated by the independent expert of the Dutch State and intends to assess this in-depth. |
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(71)

In sum, the Commission has doubts as to the valuation methodology and cannot exclude that the real economic value is lower than that calculated by the independent expert of the Dutch State and intends to assess this in-depth.

(e)   Burden sharing

| (72) | As regards burden sharing, the IAC states in section 5.2 the general principle that banks ought to bear the losses associated with impaired assets to the maximum extent. That implies first that the bank should bear the difference between the nominal value and the real economic value of the impaired assets. In fact the Dutch authorities submit that the transaction has the effect that ING will transfer the portfolio at 90 % of par. |
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(72)

As regards burden sharing, the IAC states in section 5.2 the general principle that banks ought to bear the losses associated with impaired assets to the maximum extent. That implies first that the bank should bear the difference between the nominal value and the real economic value of the impaired assets. In fact the Dutch authorities submit that the transaction has the effect that ING will transfer the portfolio at 90 % of par.

| (73) | However, given that the Commission has doubts as regards the correct valuation of the assets prior to government intervention of the State for the relief measure, there are also doubts as regards the necessary degree of burden sharing included in this measure. In other words should the real economic value be lower than assessed by the Dutch authorities, the theoretical losses absorbed by the beneficiary would be insufficient. |
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(73)

However, given that the Commission has doubts as regards the correct valuation of the assets prior to government intervention of the State for the relief measure, there are also doubts as regards the necessary degree of burden sharing included in this measure. In other words should the real economic value be lower than assessed by the Dutch authorities, the theoretical losses absorbed by the beneficiary would be insufficient.

| (74) | In that regard, the Commission does not see that the beneficiary is making up for additional possible losses if the real economic value would be lower than currently reported with the envisaged 80/20 division of the portfolio as this is a division pari passu and not a first loss attribution to the beneficiary. In other words, if the real economic value would be 80 instead of 90, the beneficiary would only take the first 10 % of losses from 100 to 90 while for the second part between 90 and 80 he would only take 2 % out of 10 while 8 would remain with the State; proper burden sharing would however require that the beneficiary takes all the losses until the real economic value, i.e. the full 20 %. |
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(74)

In that regard, the Commission does not see that the beneficiary is making up for additional possible losses if the real economic value would be lower than currently reported with the envisaged 80/20 division of the portfolio as this is a division pari passu and not a first loss attribution to the beneficiary. In other words, if the real economic value would be 80 instead of 90, the beneficiary would only take the first 10 % of losses from 100 to 90 while for the second part between 90 and 80 he would only take 2 % out of 10 while 8 would remain with the State; proper burden sharing would however require that the beneficiary takes all the losses until the real economic value, i.e. the full 20 %.

| (75) | Furthermore regarding the cash flow swap and its funding fee, the Commission doubts whether the respective assumptions as regards the net present value are acceptable. This concerns first the funding fee set at 3,5 % although the Dutch State’s own funding costs in USD are only an estimated 3 %. The Commission also doubts second whether the applied discount rate is appropriate. This is so because the applied discount rate is the same regardless whether cash flows are risky (coming from ING to the State) or are not risky (from the Dutch State to ING). In the view of the Commission, this approach attaches to a more uncertain dollar in the future the same value as to a certain dollar. It therefore leads to an overvaluation of the expected proceeds from the portfolio and to an overestimation of the benefit to the Dutch State. |
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(75)

Furthermore regarding the cash flow swap and its funding fee, the Commission doubts whether the respective assumptions as regards the net present value are acceptable. This concerns first the funding fee set at 3,5 % although the Dutch State’s own funding costs in USD are only an estimated 3 %. The Commission also doubts second whether the applied discount rate is appropriate. This is so because the applied discount rate is the same regardless whether cash flows are risky (coming from ING to the State) or are not risky (from the Dutch State to ING). In the view of the Commission, this approach attaches to a more uncertain dollar in the future the same value as to a certain dollar. It therefore leads to an overvaluation of the expected proceeds from the portfolio and to an overestimation of the benefit to the Dutch State.

| (76) | In addition, the Commission has also doubt that the cash flow swap adequately compensates for the risk stemming from the difference between the base case of the real economic value and the stress test. This follows from the clear language in Annex 4 IAC that the “pricing of asset relief must include remuneration for the state that adequately takes account of the risk of future losses exceeding those that are projected in the determination of the real economic value”. Therefore the Commission also requires an additional ex ante coverage of the difference between the real economic value in the base case and the stress case scenario. This is particular the case where the tail risk is significant. In this context the Commission recalls that according to Annex 4 of the IAC the valuation process should be based on rigorous stress-testing against a scenario of protracted global recession and reiterates its doubts on the valuation as set out above. |
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(76)

In addition, the Commission has also doubt that the cash flow swap adequately compensates for the risk stemming from the difference between the base case of the real economic value and the stress test. This follows from the clear language in Annex 4 IAC that the “pricing of asset relief must include remuneration for the state that adequately takes account of the risk of future losses exceeding those that are projected in the determination of the real economic value”. Therefore the Commission also requires an additional ex ante coverage of the difference between the real economic value in the base case and the stress case scenario. This is particular the case where the tail risk is significant. In this context the Commission recalls that according to Annex 4 of the IAC the valuation process should be based on rigorous stress-testing against a scenario of protracted global recession and reiterates its doubts on the valuation as set out above.

| (77) | Finally, the Commission has doubts about the appropriateness of the management fee charged by ING. It notes that such a fee is not contemplated by the IAC. The Commission acknowledges however the view of the Dutch authorities that the fee is essentially cost based but stresses that so far it has not obtained full information regarding the actual cost for ING to perform such services, such as costs and staff employed, cost for IT infrastructure, etc. The Commission observes moreover that the scope of work to be performed by ING is not clear given that an active management of an amortising portfolio appears unnecessary and because ING remains the legal owner of the entire portfolio and the economic owner of 20 %. To summarise, the Commission notes that if the fee is indeed covering the costs of ING, it would appear to the Commission that such a fee can be accepted on the condition of an adequate overall burden-sharing. |
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(77)

Finally, the Commission has doubts about the appropriateness of the management fee charged by ING. It notes that such a fee is not contemplated by the IAC. The Commission acknowledges however the view of the Dutch authorities that the fee is essentially cost based but stresses that so far it has not obtained full information regarding the actual cost for ING to perform such services, such as costs and staff employed, cost for IT infrastructure, etc. The Commission observes moreover that the scope of work to be performed by ING is not clear given that an active management of an amortising portfolio appears unnecessary and because ING remains the legal owner of the entire portfolio and the economic owner of 20 %. To summarise, the Commission notes that if the fee is indeed covering the costs of ING, it would appear to the Commission that such a fee can be accepted on the condition of an adequate overall burden-sharing.

| (78) | In sum, the Commission reserves its final view on the issue of burden sharing until it has come to a conclusion on valuation and recalls that shortcomings in the valuation leading to an inadequate burden-sharing can be counterbalanced by higher remuneration. (22) |
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(78)

In sum, the Commission reserves its final view on the issue of burden sharing until it has come to a conclusion on valuation and recalls that shortcomings in the valuation leading to an inadequate burden-sharing can be counterbalanced by higher remuneration. (22)

(f)   Guarantee fee

| (79) | Another element of a proper burden sharing is pursuant to point 21 IAC remuneration. It shall, as noted in Annex 4, ensure that “any pricing of asset relief must include remuneration for the State that adequately takes account of the risks of future losses exceeding those that are projected in the determination of the “real economic value””. |
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(79)

Another element of a proper burden sharing is pursuant to point 21 IAC remuneration. It shall, as noted in Annex 4, ensure that “any pricing of asset relief must include remuneration for the State that adequately takes account of the risks of future losses exceeding those that are projected in the determination of the “real economic value””.

| (80) | In order to assess the guarantee fee charged by the Dutch authorities it must be recalled that pursuant to the IAC the remuneration should be ‘inspired’ by the remuneration that would have been required for recapitalisation measures to the extent of the capital effect of the proposed asset relief. In principle such remuneration should amount to at least 10 %, in line with the first ING decision of November 2008. (23) |
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(80)

In order to assess the guarantee fee charged by the Dutch authorities it must be recalled that pursuant to the IAC the remuneration should be ‘inspired’ by the remuneration that would have been required for recapitalisation measures to the extent of the capital effect of the proposed asset relief. In principle such remuneration should amount to at least 10 %, in line with the first ING decision of November 2008. (23)

| (81) | Therefore, the adequate capital effect of the measure needs to be identified. This effect comprises the regulatory capital that was freed due to the transaction (around EUR 1,26 billion = 8 % (24) of 13 billion RWA). A 10 % yield on EUR 1,26 billion would amount to 55 bp on the outstanding value of the portfolio. The current guarantee fee appears to reflect this calculation. Therefore the Commission finds the guarantee fee compatible at this stage. |
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(81)

Therefore, the adequate capital effect of the measure needs to be identified. This effect comprises the regulatory capital that was freed due to the transaction (around EUR 1,26 billion = 8 % (24) of 13 billion RWA). A 10 % yield on EUR 1,26 billion would amount to 55 bp on the outstanding value of the portfolio. The current guarantee fee appears to reflect this calculation. Therefore the Commission finds the guarantee fee compatible at this stage.

(g)   Viability review and restructuring plan

| (82) | As regards the need for an assessment of the banks balance sheet and activities the IAC states that an application for aid by an individual bank should be followed by a full review of that bank's activities and balance sheet, with a view of assessing the bank's capital adequacy and its prospects for future viability (viability review). The Commission considers it therefore necessary that such a viability review is performed. It notes positively a commitment in that respect. |
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(82)

As regards the need for an assessment of the banks balance sheet and activities the IAC states that an application for aid by an individual bank should be followed by a full review of that bank's activities and balance sheet, with a view of assessing the bank's capital adequacy and its prospects for future viability (viability review). The Commission considers it therefore necessary that such a viability review is performed. It notes positively a commitment in that respect.

| (83) | Furthermore, the Commission notes that the Dutch authorities commit to present a Restructuring plan complying with the conditions set out in the IAC. Such a plan is in any event required under the first recapitalisation decision and is due by 12 May 2009. The Commission notes that this plan will also cover the present measure and be made on the basis of the IAC. Therefore, the Commission’s assessment of the restructuring plan will assess all aid measures granted to ING including the present one. The Dutch authorities have provided the necessary commitment in this respect. |
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(83)

Furthermore, the Commission notes that the Dutch authorities commit to present a Restructuring plan complying with the conditions set out in the IAC. Such a plan is in any event required under the first recapitalisation decision and is due by 12 May 2009. The Commission notes that this plan will also cover the present measure and be made on the basis of the IAC. Therefore, the Commission’s assessment of the restructuring plan will assess all aid measures granted to ING including the present one. The Dutch authorities have provided the necessary commitment in this respect.

(h)   Conclusion

| (84) | The Commission finds that the measure complies with the conditions on eligibility of assets, asset management arrangement, transparency and disclosure and a guarantee fee as stipulated in the IAC but cannot at present conclude that it complies with the conditions relating to valuation and burden sharing. |
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(84)

The Commission finds that the measure complies with the conditions on eligibility of assets, asset management arrangement, transparency and disclosure and a guarantee fee as stipulated in the IAC but cannot at present conclude that it complies with the conditions relating to valuation and burden sharing.

3.   Temporary authorisation of the measure for six months

| (85) | The Commission observes that if the transaction is not booked in the first quarter 2009 altering the level of valuation and remuneration would have as a likely consequence for ING [...] an additional loss of [...] in the 2008 annual result. This is due to the [...] accounting rules [...] (see above point 36). The Commission takes into consideration, as confirmed by the supervisory authority that the announcement effect would seriously threaten ING's reputation and thus financial stability. |
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(85)

The Commission observes that if the transaction is not booked in the first quarter 2009 altering the level of valuation and remuneration would have as a likely consequence for ING [...] an additional loss of [...] in the 2008 annual result. This is due to the [...] accounting rules [...] (see above point 36). The Commission takes into consideration, as confirmed by the supervisory authority that the announcement effect would seriously threaten ING's reputation and thus financial stability.

| (86) | In view of the fact that the measure complies with the criteria for eligibility of assets, asset management arrangements, transparency and disclosure and the guarantee fee, the Commission can consider approving the asset relief measure as a temporary measure for six months. (25) The Commission considers that any approval should in any event be limited to six months on the basis of Annex 5 of the IAC. |
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(86)

In view of the fact that the measure complies with the criteria for eligibility of assets, asset management arrangements, transparency and disclosure and the guarantee fee, the Commission can consider approving the asset relief measure as a temporary measure for six months. (25) The Commission considers that any approval should in any event be limited to six months on the basis of Annex 5 of the IAC.

| (87) | But according to Annex 5 this would normally require that all the conditions for compatibility as set out above are met. In the present case, the Commission finds that at this stage the conditions of the IAC on valuation and burden sharing are not fulfilled, and an in-depth investigation is needed. |
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(87)

But according to Annex 5 this would normally require that all the conditions for compatibility as set out above are met. In the present case, the Commission finds that at this stage the conditions of the IAC on valuation and burden sharing are not fulfilled, and an in-depth investigation is needed.

| (88) | However, the Commission notes that the specific circumstances of this case require a decision before the end of the first quarter of 2009, in order to avoid that legal uncertainty about the operation obliges important losses to be incurred on the Alt-A portfolio, and that it is not possible to complete the assessment of the portfolio valuation in the necessary time frame. The Commission further notes that financial stability may be at risk, would ING have to [...]. Finally, it can not be excluded that the valuation of the portfolio will be confirmed after a detailed assessment, even though doubts are present at this stage. |
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(88)

However, the Commission notes that the specific circumstances of this case require a decision before the end of the first quarter of 2009, in order to avoid that legal uncertainty about the operation obliges important losses to be incurred on the Alt-A portfolio, and that it is not possible to complete the assessment of the portfolio valuation in the necessary time frame. The Commission further notes that financial stability may be at risk, would ING have to [...]. Finally, it can not be excluded that the valuation of the portfolio will be confirmed after a detailed assessment, even though doubts are present at this stage.

| (89) | The Commission accepts the cash flow swap arrangement between the State and ING and its affiliates and will not request changes regarding the transfer of risk from ING to the state and the State's payment obligations in the context of the cash flow swap. This does not preclude the Commission from requesting changes in its final decision to the burden sharing of the measure by way of claw back, increase of the Guarantee fee under the illiquid assets back-up facilities or any other form of remuneration without compensating ING for it, if such change results from the Commission coming to the conclusion that the valuation at 26 January 2009 of the portfolio underlying the illiquid assets back-up facilities or its burden sharing proves to be materially in contradiction with the EC State aid rules on impaired assets. |
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(89)

The Commission accepts the cash flow swap arrangement between the State and ING and its affiliates and will not request changes regarding the transfer of risk from ING to the state and the State's payment obligations in the context of the cash flow swap. This does not preclude the Commission from requesting changes in its final decision to the burden sharing of the measure by way of claw back, increase of the Guarantee fee under the illiquid assets back-up facilities or any other form of remuneration without compensating ING for it, if such change results from the Commission coming to the conclusion that the valuation at 26 January 2009 of the portfolio underlying the illiquid assets back-up facilities or its burden sharing proves to be materially in contradiction with the EC State aid rules on impaired assets.

V.   CONCLUSION

| (90) | The measure in favour of ING constitutes State aid. The Commission finds that the measure complies with the conditions on eligibility of assets, asset management arrangement, transparency and disclosure and a guarantee fee as stipulated in the IAC and in view of the serious threat to financial stability approves the measure for six months. At the same time, the Commission doubts at this stage that the measure complies with the conditions relating to valuation and burden sharing and opens a detailed investigation. |
| --- | --- |

(90)

The measure in favour of ING constitutes State aid. The Commission finds that the measure complies with the conditions on eligibility of assets, asset management arrangement, transparency and disclosure and a guarantee fee as stipulated in the IAC and in view of the serious threat to financial stability approves the measure for six months. At the same time, the Commission doubts at this stage that the measure complies with the conditions relating to valuation and burden sharing and opens a detailed investigation.

VI.   DECISION

As it complies with a number of conditions of the IAC, and with due considerations for need to preserve financial stability, the Commission has decided to approve the measure for six months. In the light of the foregoing considerations, the Commission has also decided to initiate the procedure laid down in Article 88 (2) of the EC Treaty to verify the conditions of the IAC regarding valuation (including the valuation methodology) and burden sharing of the measure.

The Commission requires the Netherlands to provide in addition to all documents already received, information and data needed for the assessment of the compatibility of the aid, and in particular as regards the individual tranches of the portfolio, an updated schedule of all cash flows on a monthly basis, the justification of the discount rate used to value the portfolio, a certified letter from the consultant on valuation on a stand alone basis and a written methodology report.

The Netherlands are requested to forward a copy of this letter to the potential recipient of the aid immediately.

The Commission informs the Netherlands that it will inform interested parties by publishing this letter and a meaningful summary of it in the Official Journal of the European Communities. It will also inform interested parties in the EFTA countries which are signatories to the EEA Agreement, by publishing a notice in the EEA Supplement to the Official Journal of the European Communities, and will inform the EFTA Surveillance Authority by sending a copy of this letter. All such interested parties will be invited to submit their comments within one month of the date of such publication.”

---

(1)  State aid N 528/2008 — The Netherlands Aid to ING Groep N.V., 13 November 2008.

1

(2)  Confidential information.

2

(3)  Exchange rate about EUR/USD 1,3 assumed at the time of the deal announcement in January.

3

(4)  Commission Decision of 13.11.2008 in case State aid N 528/2008 — Aid to ING, point 8.

4

(5)  Where the borrower has the option to repay a very low amount in the first few years and these payments reset at a higher level thereafter.

5

(6)  At the time of purchase, Banks have to put their assets in four different baskets, with different consequences for accounting, the trading book, the available for sale category, the loans & receivables and hold-to-maturity. Following a legal change last October, it became easier to reclassify assets into the hold-to-maturity category.

6

(7)  IFRS accounting rules require to value assets booked in “available for sale” at fair value (i.e. profits and losses are directly affecting equity capital). For “fair valued”: banks can chose three categories based on the availability of valuation input data: “marked to market”, “marked to models with observable inputs” and “market to model with unobservable inputs”.

7

(8)  Under both IFRS and US GAAP a debt security is considered impaired if, based on currently available evidence, there is a reasonable expectation that not all due interest and principal will be recovered.

8

(9)  This is because a dollar today has not the same value as a dollar paid in the future.

9

(10)  This relates to 26 January 2009 as risk weights of the portfolio fluctuate.

10

(11)  3 % discount rate;

11

(12)  Principal and Interest payments (including pre-payments);

12

(13)  net present value of flows from the state to ING.

13

(14)  3 % discount rate;

14

(15)  Principal and Interest payments (including pre-payments);

15

(16)  net present value of flows from the state to ING.

16

(17)  [...]

17

(18)  See in principle Joined Cases T-132/96 and T-143/96 Freistaat Sachsen and Volkswagen AG v Commission [1999] ECR II-3663, paragraph 167. Confirmed in the Commission’s decisions in Case C 47/1996 Crédit Lyonnais (OJ L 221, 8.8.1998, p. 28, point 10.1), Case C 28/2002 Bankgesellschaft Berlin (OJ L 116, 4.5.2005, p. 1, paragraphs 153 et seq.) and Case C 50/2006 BAWAG, not yet published, paragraph 166. See Commission decision of 5 December 2007 in Case NN 70/2007 Northern Rock (OJ C 43, 16.2.2008, p. 1), Commission decision of 30 April 2008 in Case NN 25/2008 Rescue aid for WestLB (OJ C 189, 26.7.2008, p. 3), and Commission decision of 4 June 2008 in Case C 9/2008 Sachsen LB, not yet published.

18

Freistaat Sachsen and Volkswagen AG

Commission

Crédit Lyonnais

Bankgesellschaft Berlin

et seq

BAWAG

Northern Rock

Rescue aid for WestLB

Sachsen LB

(19)  Commission Communication on The application of State aid rules to measures taken in relation to financial institutions in the context of the current global financial crisis, OJ C 270 of 25.10.2008, p. 8.

19

(20)  For a first application: Cf Commission Decision of 13 March 2009 in case C 9/09 Dexia, not yet published.

20

Dexia

(21)  To be categorized in baskets in line with Annex 3 of the IAC.

21

(22)  Footnote 15 of the IAC.

22

(23)  IAC, Footnote 11.

23

(24)  8 % is equal to the minimum own capital requirements.

24

(25)  The Commission has taken similar decisions. For instance in Commission Decision of 13 March 2009 in case C 9/09 point 77, Dexia, not yet published, where it approved only some elements of compatibility. Similarly in Decision of 24.4.2007 in case NN 15/2006 (C13/2007), New Interline, OJ 2007 C 120/12, the Commission approved a rescue aid for six months and opened on the same rescuer aid thereafter.

25

Dexia

New Interline

---

CITI AKTI

Komisija

| 11.7.2009 | LV | Eiropas Savienības Oficiālais Vēstnesis | C 158/24 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.7.2009

LV

Eiropas Savienības Oficiālais Vēstnesis

C 158/24

---

Pieteikuma publikācija saskaņā ar 8. panta 2. punktu Padomes Regulā (EK) Nr. 509/2006 par lauksaimniecības produktiem un pārtikas produktiem kā garantētām tradicionālām īpatnībām

2009/C 158/07

Šī publikācija dod tiesības izteikt iebildumus pret pieteikumu atbilstīgi Padomes Regulas (EK) Nr. 509/2006 9. pantam. Komisijai jāsaņem paziņojumi par iebildumiem sešu mēnešu laikā no šīs publikācijas dienas.

PIETEIKUMS GTĪ REĢISTRĀCIJAI

PADOMES REGULA (EK) Nr. 509/2006

“KIEŁBASA JAŁOWCOWA”

EK Nr. PL-TSG-007-0047-05.12.2006

1.   Pieteikuma iesniedzējas grupas nosaukums un adrese:

Nosaukums: Związek „Polskie Mięso”

Adrese:

| ul. Chałubińskiego 8 |
| --- |
| 00-613 Warszawa |
| POLSKA/POLAND |

ul. Chałubińskiego 8

00-613 Warszawa

POLSKA/POLAND

Tālr. +48 228302657

Fakss +48 228301648

E-pasts: info@polskie-mieso.pl

2.   Dalībvalsts vai trešā valsts:

Polija

3.   Produkta specifikācija:

3.1.   Reģistrējamais(-ie) nosaukums(-i) (Komisijas Regulas (EK) Nr. 1216/2007 2. pants):

“Kiełbasa jałowcowa”

3.2.   Vai nosaukums:

 ir specifisks pats par sevi

Image

Nosaukums “Kiełbasa jałowcowa” izsaka produkta specifiskumu, kas vispirmām kārtām saistīts ar tā neatkārtojamo garšu un smaržu. Šīs īpašības iegūtas, ražošanas procesā izmantojot kadiķu (Juniperus) ogas, ko samaļ tieši pirms pievienošanas gaļai kā izejvielai, kā arī izmantojot kadiķu zariņus desu kūpināšanas laikā.

3.3.   Vai ir lūgta nosaukuma rezervēšana atbilstīgi Regulas (EK) Nr. 509/2006 13. panta 2. punktam:

 Reģistrācija ar nosaukuma rezervēšanu

Image

3.4.   Produkta veids:

| 1.2. grupa. | Gaļas produkti (termiski apstrādāti, sālīti, kūpināti u. c.) |
| --- | --- |

1.2. grupa.

Gaļas produkti (termiski apstrādāti, sālīti, kūpināti u. c.)

3.5.   Tā lauksaimniecības produkta vai pārtikas produkta apraksts, uz kuru attiecas nosaukums atbilstīgi 3.1. punktam (Komisijas Regulas (EK) Nr. 1216/2007 3. panta 1. punkts):

Pēc izskata “Kiełbasa jałowcowa” ir vienmērīgi krokots batoniņš vainaga veidā. Desai raksturīga apļveida forma, un tā visā garumā klāta dziļām gareniskām ielocēm. Desas līkumiem ir divi lielumi:

| — | mazais līkums dabiskās zarnas apvalkā ar diametru, kas pārsniedz 32 mm, un masu aptuveni 0,5 kg, |
| --- | --- |

—

mazais līkums dabiskās zarnas apvalkā ar diametru, kas pārsniedz 32 mm, un masu aptuveni 0,5 kg,

| — | lielais līkums olbaltumvielu šķiedru apvalkā, kura diametrs ir 36 mm un masu aptuveni 0,8 kg. |
| --- | --- |

—

lielais līkums olbaltumvielu šķiedru apvalkā, kura diametrs ir 36 mm un masu aptuveni 0,8 kg.

Pēc krāsas visa “Kiełbasa jałowcowa” desas virsma ir vienmērīgi tumšbrūna, kas raksturīgi stipri dūmotam produktam.

Pēc konsistences un “taustes iespaida” desas līkums ir gluds, sauss, bet maigs un ar vienmērīgi krokotu virsu, zarnas apvalks cieši pieguļ pildījumam.

Desas raksturīgā garša un maigums atkarīgs no izmantotajām izejvielām un garšvielām (it īpaši kadiķogām), kā arī no dabiskās kūpināšanas.

Ķīmiskais sastāvs:

| — | olbaltumvielas – ne mazāk par 15,0 %, |
| --- | --- |

—

olbaltumvielas – ne mazāk par 15,0 %,

| — | ūdens – ne vairāk par 60,0 %, |
| --- | --- |

—

ūdens – ne vairāk par 60,0 %,

| — | tauki – ne vairāk par 35,0 %, |
| --- | --- |

—

tauki – ne vairāk par 35,0 %,

| — | sāls – ne vairāk par 3,5 %, |
| --- | --- |

—

sāls – ne vairāk par 3,5 %,

| — | NaNO2 veidā izteikta trīsvērtīgā un piecvērtīgā slāpekļa savienojumi – ne vairāk par 0,0125 %. |
| --- | --- |

—

NaNO2 veidā izteikta trīsvērtīgā un piecvērtīgā slāpekļa savienojumi – ne vairāk par 0,0125 %.

Šāds produkta ķīmiskais sastāvs ir tā tradicionālās kvalitātes garantija. Gatavā produkta iznākums nedrīkst pārsniegt 75 % (+/– 3 %) no izmantotās gaļas kā izejvielas daudzuma.

3.6.   Tā lauksaimniecības produkta vai pārtikas produkta ražošanas metodes apraksts, uz kuru attiecas nosaukums atbilstīgi 3.1. punktam (Komisijas Regulas (EK) Nr. 1216/2007 3. panta 2. punkts):

Sastāvdaļas

| | Gaļa (100 kilogramiem izejvielu):






  — | I kategorijas cūkgaļa, kurā tauku saturs nepārsniedz 15 %, – 20 kg, |
| --- | --- | --- |

Gaļa (100 kilogramiem izejvielu):

—

I kategorijas cūkgaļa, kurā tauku saturs nepārsniedz 15 %, – 20 kg,

| — | IIA kategorijas cūkgaļa, kurā tauku saturs nepārsniedz 20 %, – 50 kg, |
| --- | --- |

—

IIA kategorijas cūkgaļa, kurā tauku saturs nepārsniedz 20 %, – 50 kg,

| — | III kategorijas cūkgaļa, kurā tauku saturs nepārsniedz 25 %, – 20 kg. |
| --- | --- |

—

III kategorijas cūkgaļa, kurā tauku saturs nepārsniedz 25 %, – 20 kg.

| — | smalkais cietais speķis – 10 kg. |
| --- | --- |

—

smalkais cietais speķis – 10 kg.

IIA kategorijas un III kategorijas cūkgaļu atļauts aizstāt ar liellopu gaļu, taču nepārsniedzot 50 %.

| | Garšvielu piedevas (uz 100 kg gaļas):






  — | dabīgie pipari – 0,17 kg. |
| --- | --- | --- |

Garšvielu piedevas (uz 100 kg gaļas):

—

dabīgie pipari – 0,17 kg.

| — | kadiķu ogas – 0,12 kg. |
| --- | --- |

—

kadiķu ogas – 0,12 kg.

| — | cukurs – 0,20 kg. |
| --- | --- |

—

cukurs – 0,20 kg.

| | Citas:






  — | sālījums, ko veido vārāmā sāls (NaCl) un nātrija nitrīta (NaNO2) maisījums – aptuveni 2 kg. |
| --- | --- | --- |

Citas:

—

sālījums, ko veido vārāmā sāls (NaCl) un nātrija nitrīta (NaNO2) maisījums – aptuveni 2 kg.

To cūku barošana, no kurām iegūto gaļu izmanto “Kiełbasa jałowcowa ražošanai”

Cūkas nobaro speķa un gaļas iegūšanai. Nobarošanas mērķis ir sasniegt līdz 120 kg dzīvsvara un iegūt cūkgaļu, kurā cauraugušā speķa daudzums pārsniedz 3 %.

| — | Nobarošanai izraugās lēnaudzīgu šķirņu cūkas, no kurām, tās pareizi nobarojot, var iegūt vēlamo cauraugušā speķa daudzumu. Nobarošanai izmantojamo šķirņu cūkām nav RN– gēna, bet gēna RYR 1T biežums cūku populācijā sasniedz 20 %. |
| --- | --- |

—

Nobarošanai izraugās lēnaudzīgu šķirņu cūkas, no kurām, tās pareizi nobarojot, var iegūt vēlamo cauraugušā speķa daudzumu. Nobarošanai izmantojamo šķirņu cūkām nav RN– gēna, bet gēna RYR 1T biežums cūku populācijā sasniedz 20 %.

| — | Nobarošanu jāveic trijos posmos: I posmā nobaro, līdz sasniedz aptuveni 60 kg dzīvsvara, II posmā – līdz aptuveni 90 kg un III posmā – līdz 120 kg. |
| --- | --- |

—

Nobarošanu jāveic trijos posmos: I posmā nobaro, līdz sasniedz aptuveni 60 kg dzīvsvara, II posmā – līdz aptuveni 90 kg un III posmā – līdz 120 kg.

| — | Nobarojot dzīvniekus līdz 90 kg dzīvsvara sasniegšanai, tiem izbaro divu veidu barības maisījumu. Barības maisījumos (devās) ietilpst |
| --- | --- |

—

Nobarojot dzīvniekus līdz 90 kg dzīvsvara sasniegšanai, tiem izbaro divu veidu barības maisījumu. Barības maisījumos (devās) ietilpst

| — | enerģētiskie komponenti: labības graudi – kvieši, mieži, rudzi, auzas, tritikāle vai kukurūza; kukurūzas graudu, kā arī kailgraudu šķirņu auzu daudzums barības maisījumos var būt līdz 30 %, |
| --- | --- |

—

enerģētiskie komponenti: labības graudi – kvieši, mieži, rudzi, auzas, tritikāle vai kukurūza; kukurūzas graudu, kā arī kailgraudu šķirņu auzu daudzums barības maisījumos var būt līdz 30 %,

| — | olbaltumvielu komponenti: lupīnas sēklas, lauka pupas, zirņi, sojas granulas, rapšu granulas, rapšu rauši, lopbarības raugs vai žāvēta zaļā lopbarība. |
| --- | --- |

—

olbaltumvielu komponenti: lupīnas sēklas, lauka pupas, zirņi, sojas granulas, rapšu granulas, rapšu rauši, lopbarības raugs vai žāvēta zaļā lopbarība.

| — | Barības maisījumos (devās) dzīvniekiem ar dzīvsvaru no 90 līdz 120 kg ietilpst |
| --- | --- |

—

Barības maisījumos (devās) dzīvniekiem ar dzīvsvaru no 90 līdz 120 kg ietilpst

| — | enerģētiskie komponenti: kviešu, miežu, rudzu un tritikāles graudi. Barības maisījumos (devās) nedrīkst būt kukurūzas graudu un kailgraudu šķirņu auzu, |
| --- | --- |

—

enerģētiskie komponenti: kviešu, miežu, rudzu un tritikāles graudi. Barības maisījumos (devās) nedrīkst būt kukurūzas graudu un kailgraudu šķirņu auzu,

| — | olbaltumvielu komponenti: tauriņziežu dzimtas augu sēklas (lupīna, lauku pupas, zirņi), sojas granulas, rapšu rauši vai rapšu granulas, kā arī žāvēta zaļā lopbarība. |
| --- | --- |

—

olbaltumvielu komponenti: tauriņziežu dzimtas augu sēklas (lupīna, lauku pupas, zirņi), sojas granulas, rapšu rauši vai rapšu granulas, kā arī žāvēta zaļā lopbarība.

| — | Visu nobarošanas laiku barības maisījumos un devās nedrīkst ietilpt augu eļļas un dzīvnieku izcelsmes lopbarība – piena pulveris, žāvētas sūkalas, zivju milti. |
| --- | --- |

—

Visu nobarošanas laiku barības maisījumos un devās nedrīkst ietilpt augu eļļas un dzīvnieku izcelsmes lopbarība – piena pulveris, žāvētas sūkalas, zivju milti.

| — | No barības maisījumu saņemtās metaboliskās enerģijas daudzums visos nobarošanas posmos ir 12 līdz 13 MJ [megadžouli] uz kilogramu barības maisījuma. I nobarošanas posmā izmantojamo barības maisījumu olbaltumvielu saturs ir aptuveni 16–18 % no barības maisījuma daudzuma, II posmā – 15 līdz 16 %, bet III posmā – aptuveni 14 % no barības maisījuma daudzuma. |
| --- | --- |

—

No barības maisījumu saņemtās metaboliskās enerģijas daudzums visos nobarošanas posmos ir 12 līdz 13 MJ [megadžouli] uz kilogramu barības maisījuma. I nobarošanas posmā izmantojamo barības maisījumu olbaltumvielu saturs ir aptuveni 16–18 % no barības maisījuma daudzuma, II posmā – 15 līdz 16 %, bet III posmā – aptuveni 14 % no barības maisījuma daudzuma.

| — | Barokļiem izbarojamās devas var veidot vai nu vienīgi no bagātināta barības maisījuma, vai arī no tā un no rupjās lopbarības – kartupeļiem un zaļbarības. |
| --- | --- |

—

Barokļiem izbarojamās devas var veidot vai nu vienīgi no bagātināta barības maisījuma, vai arī no tā un no rupjās lopbarības – kartupeļiem un zaļbarības.

“Kiełbasa jałowcowa” ražošanas posmi

| 1. posms | visu no gaļas iegūto izejvielu sakapāšana, iegūstot vienāda lieluma gaļas gabalus (līdz aptuveni 5 cm diametrā). |
| --- | --- |

1. posms

visu no gaļas iegūto izejvielu sakapāšana, iegūstot vienāda lieluma gaļas gabalus (līdz aptuveni 5 cm diametrā).

| 2. posms | sālīšana saskaņā ar tradīciju (pēc sausās metodes) aptuveni 48 stundas, izmantojot sagatavoto sāls maisījumu. |
| --- | --- |

2. posms

sālīšana saskaņā ar tradīciju (pēc sausās metodes) aptuveni 48 stundas, izmantojot sagatavoto sāls maisījumu.

| 3. posms | mehāniskā apstrāde. I kategorijas gaļas sakapāšana aptuveni 20 mm lielos gabalos, IIA kategorijas gaļas sakapāšana aptuveni 8 mm lielos gabalos, III kategorijas gaļas sakapāšana aptuveni 3 mm lielos gabalos, tad sasmalcināšana, pievienojot 5 kg ledus. |
| --- | --- |

3. posms

mehāniskā apstrāde. I kategorijas gaļas sakapāšana aptuveni 20 mm lielos gabalos, IIA kategorijas gaļas sakapāšana aptuveni 8 mm lielos gabalos, III kategorijas gaļas sakapāšana aptuveni 3 mm lielos gabalos, tad sasmalcināšana, pievienojot 5 kg ledus.

| 4. posms | visu gaļas izejvielu samaisīšana, pievienojot garšvielas: dabīgos piparus, cukuru, kadiķogas, ko samaļ tieši pirms pievienošanas desas masai. |
| --- | --- |

4. posms

visu gaļas izejvielu samaisīšana, pievienojot garšvielas: dabīgos piparus, cukuru, kadiķogas, ko samaļ tieši pirms pievienošanas desas masai.

| 5. posms | iepildīšana dabīgajos cūku zarnu apvalkos ar vidējo diametru, kas pārsniedz 32 mm, vai olbaltumvielu šķiedru apvalkos, kuru diametrs ir 36 mm; līkuma saliekšana un vainaga izveidošana. Desu ražošanā iespējami divu veidu apvalki:






  — | mazākajiem desas vainagiem, kuru masa ir 0,5 kg, izmanto cūku tievās zarnas apvalkus, |
| --- | --- | --- |

5. posms

iepildīšana dabīgajos cūku zarnu apvalkos ar vidējo diametru, kas pārsniedz 32 mm, vai olbaltumvielu šķiedru apvalkos, kuru diametrs ir 36 mm; līkuma saliekšana un vainaga izveidošana. Desu ražošanā iespējami divu veidu apvalki:

—

mazākajiem desas vainagiem, kuru masa ir 0,5 kg, izmanto cūku tievās zarnas apvalkus,

| — | lielākajiem desas līkumiem, kuru masa ir 0,8 kg, izmanto mākslīgos olbaltumvielu šķiedru apvalkus. |
| --- | --- |

—

lielākajiem desas līkumiem, kuru masa ir 0,8 kg, izmanto mākslīgos olbaltumvielu šķiedru apvalkus.

| 6. posms | divu stundu ilga atpūtināšana temperatūrā, kas nepārsniedz 30 °C. Virsas sākotnēja nosusināšana; sastāvdaļu “izvietošanās” desiņu iekšienē. |
| --- | --- |

6. posms

divu stundu ilga atpūtināšana temperatūrā, kas nepārsniedz 30 °C. Virsas sākotnēja nosusināšana; sastāvdaļu “izvietošanās” desiņu iekšienē.

| 7. posms | virsas nosusināšana un tradicionālā kūpināšana siltos dūmos (aptuveni 120 minūtes), līdz iegūst vēlamo krāsu, pēc tam cepšana cepeškrāsnī, līdz temperatūra desiņu iekšienē sasniedz 70 °C. |
| --- | --- |

7. posms

virsas nosusināšana un tradicionālā kūpināšana siltos dūmos (aptuveni 120 minūtes), līdz iegūst vēlamo krāsu, pēc tam cepšana cepeškrāsnī, līdz temperatūra desiņu iekšienē sasniedz 70 °C.

| 8. posms | turēšana vēsumā 24 stundas. |
| --- | --- |

8. posms

turēšana vēsumā 24 stundas.

| 9. posms | aukstā dūmošana, izmantojot dižskābarža skaidas un kadiķu zariņus (aptuveni 120 minūtes), pēc tam žāvēšana 14–18 °C temperatūrā 3 līdz 5 dienas, līdz iegūst 75 % (+/– 3 %) iznākumu. |
| --- | --- |

9. posms

aukstā dūmošana, izmantojot dižskābarža skaidas un kadiķu zariņus (aptuveni 120 minūtes), pēc tam žāvēšana 14–18 °C temperatūrā 3 līdz 5 dienas, līdz iegūst 75 % (+/– 3 %) iznākumu.

3.7.   Lauksaimniecības produkta vai pārtikas produkta specifiskums (Komisijas Regulas (EK) Nr. 1216/2007 3. panta 3. punkts):

“Kiełbasa jałowcowa” specifiskums atkarīgs no šādām konkrētām šā produkta īpašībām:

| — | gaļas maigums un sulīgums, |
| --- | --- |

—

gaļas maigums un sulīgums,

| — | īpašā garša un smarža, |
| --- | --- |

—

īpašā garša un smarža,

| — | viendabīgā forma. |
| --- | --- |

—

viendabīgā forma.

Gaļas maigums, sulīgums un īpatnības

Galvenā “Kiełbasa jałowcowa” sastāvdaļa, kas ietekmē tās specifiku, ir cūkgaļa, kuru iegūst no lēnaudzīgu šķirņu cūkām, kas nobarotas līdz aptuveni 120 kg dzīvsvara un kam piemīt 3.6. punktā aprakstītās ģenētiskās īpašības. Ievērojot šīs prasības, iegūst cūkgaļu, kurā cauraugušā speķa daudzums pārsniedz 3 %, tādējādi panākot, ka produktam ir vēlamās garšas un tehnoloģiskās īpašības, kas vajadzīgas “Kiełbasa jałowcowa” ražošanai. Šādas izejvielas izmantošana un tradicionālās izgatavošanas metodes, jo īpaši attiecīgo ražošanas posmu – smalcināšanas, sālīšanas un kūpināšanas – ievērošana piešķir produktam sevišķi maigu un sulīgu garšu.

Īpašā garša un smarža

“Kiełbasa jałowcowa” ir specifiska galvenokārt tāpēc, ka tai ir neatkārtojama garšu un smarža, ko tā iegūst, ražošanas procesā izmantojot kadiķu (Juniperus) ogas. Tas, ka kadiķogas samaļ tieši pirms ražošanas procesa, pastiprina desas raksturīgo garšu un ietekmē tās specifiskumu, kamēr dūmošana, sadedzinot kadiķu zarus, papildina desas garšas īpašības un pastiprina tā smaržu.

Viendabīgā forma

“Kiełbasa jałowcowa” atšķiras no citām desām ar savu formu. Šo desu pārdod tikai divās, ļoti līdzīgās formās, kā dēļ patērētājiem tā viegli atpazīstama. Pēc izskata “Kiełbasa jałowcowa” ir vienmērīgi krokots batoniņš, kas saliekts vainaga formā. Desai raksturīga apļveida forma, un tā visā garumā klāta dziļām gareniskām ielocēm.

3.8.   Lauksaimniecības produkta vai pārtikas produkta tradicionālais raksturs (Komisijas Regulas (EK) Nr. 1216/2007 3. panta 4. punkts):

Tradicionālās izejvielas

| 1) | Kadiķis (Juniperus)
  “Kadiķa koksni dedzinot, tā izdala ļoti patīkamu aromātisku smaržu” – tā ir viena no šā diezgan plaši pazīstamā puskrūma īpašībām, kurš gadsimtiem ilgi sastopams Polijas zemē; kadiķa īpašības aprakstītas 1903. gadā iznākušajā Lielajā ilustrētajā universālajā enciklopēdijā (Wielka Encyklopedia Powszechna Ilustrowana). Šajā izdevumā atrodama arī informācija, ka “kadiķa zari, skaidas un ogas ir pieprasīts degmateriāls (savdabīgs kvēpināšanas vai kūpināšanas vīraks) gaļas dūmošanai; kadiķa koka dūmi piešķir kūpinājumam smalku garšu un smaržu”. Dokumenti, kas datējami ar XIX gadsimta otro pusi, liecina, ka jau tolaik kadiķogas izmantoja par gaļas izstrādājumu garšvielu vai sastāvdaļu. 1863. gadā Varšavā izdotā “Universālā enciklopēdija” (Encyklopedyja Powszechna) raksta: “Kadiķu ogām ir vircota, saldeni rūgtena garša un patīkama smarža;” kā garšvielu piedeva (...) tās ir vispārpazīstamas. Vienotā desas ražošanas metode ar kadiķu ogu izmantošanu un kūpināšanu kadiķu koku dūmos Polijā parādījās XX gadsimta 40. un 50. gados, kā par to liecina raksts “Tiesību normas žāvētu gaļas izstrādājumu sortimentam tirgus apgādei” (Regulacja asortymentów wędlin na zaopatrzenie rynku), kas publicēts nozares žurnāla “Gospodarka Mięsna” (“Gaļas lopkopība”) 1954. gada 3. numurā. |
| --- | --- |

1)

Kadiķis (Juniperus)

“Kadiķa koksni dedzinot, tā izdala ļoti patīkamu aromātisku smaržu” – tā ir viena no šā diezgan plaši pazīstamā puskrūma īpašībām, kurš gadsimtiem ilgi sastopams Polijas zemē; kadiķa īpašības aprakstītas 1903. gadā iznākušajā Lielajā ilustrētajā universālajā enciklopēdijā (Wielka Encyklopedia Powszechna Ilustrowana). Šajā izdevumā atrodama arī informācija, ka “kadiķa zari, skaidas un ogas ir pieprasīts degmateriāls (savdabīgs kvēpināšanas vai kūpināšanas vīraks) gaļas dūmošanai; kadiķa koka dūmi piešķir kūpinājumam smalku garšu un smaržu”. Dokumenti, kas datējami ar XIX gadsimta otro pusi, liecina, ka jau tolaik kadiķogas izmantoja par gaļas izstrādājumu garšvielu vai sastāvdaļu. 1863. gadā Varšavā izdotā “Universālā enciklopēdija” (Encyklopedyja Powszechna) raksta: “Kadiķu ogām ir vircota, saldeni rūgtena garša un patīkama smarža;” kā garšvielu piedeva (...) tās ir vispārpazīstamas. Vienotā desas ražošanas metode ar kadiķu ogu izmantošanu un kūpināšanu kadiķu koku dūmos Polijā parādījās XX gadsimta 40. un 50. gados, kā par to liecina raksts “Tiesību normas žāvētu gaļas izstrādājumu sortimentam tirgus apgādei” (Regulacja asortymentów wędlin na zaopatrzenie rynku), kas publicēts nozares žurnāla “Gospodarka Mięsna” (“Gaļas lopkopība”) 1954. gada 3. numurā.

| 2) | Cūkgaļa
  Gaļai, kas iegūta no cūkām, kuras audzē “Kiełbasa jałowcowa ražošanai”, jābūt tādai, kurā ir vismaz 3 % caurauguša speķa, ko sauc par “marmorējumu” un kas piešķir produktam vēlamo maigumu un sulīgumu, kā arī lielisko garšu. Tādas gaļas izmantošana būtiski ietekmē galaprodukta kvalitāti un tā raksturīgās īpatnības un atbilst tradicionālo ražošanas metožu prasībām. |
| --- | --- |

2)

Cūkgaļa

Gaļai, kas iegūta no cūkām, kuras audzē “Kiełbasa jałowcowa ražošanai”, jābūt tādai, kurā ir vismaz 3 % caurauguša speķa, ko sauc par “marmorējumu” un kas piešķir produktam vēlamo maigumu un sulīgumu, kā arī lielisko garšu. Tādas gaļas izmantošana būtiski ietekmē galaprodukta kvalitāti un tā raksturīgās īpatnības un atbilst tradicionālo ražošanas metožu prasībām.

Tradicionālā ražošanas metode un tradicionālās sastāvdaļas

Žāvēšana ir gaļas konservācijas veids; un visizplatītākais žāvēšanas paņēmiens bija kūpināšana, dedzinot kadiķi. Par to cita starpā liecina senās Polijas manuskripti, piemēram, kāda anonīma muižas pārvaldnieka pieraksti XVIII gadsimta 80. gados, kuros atrodama žāvētu gaļas izstrādājumu pagatavošanas receptes (Rękopis – Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych (AGAD), Varšavā, Zbiór z Muzeum Narodowego (Nacionālā muzeja arhīvs), atsauce 1249). Par kadiķu dūmos žāvētu gaļas izstrādājumu popularitāti liecina apraksts, kas sniegts Ādama Mickēviča (Adam Mickiewicz)1834. gadā sarakstītajā tautas eposā “Pan Tadeusz” (“Pans Tadeušs”): “Visi smalkie žāvējumi, pašu mājās darināti, kadiķdūmos kūpināti”.

Tradīcijas, kas valdīja garšvielu izmantošanā un gaļas kūpināšanā kadiķu koku dūmos, ir saglabājušās dažādos vietēja un reģionāla mēroga variantos, kas atšķiras viens no otra tehnoloģisko paņēmienu ziņā, taču dažkārt arī pēc izmantojamās gaļas veida. Kā norāda V. Lengs (W. Łęg) darbā “No žāvētu gaļas izstrādājumu ražošanas pieredzes” (“Z doświadczeń przy produkcji wędlin”), kas publicēts žurnāla “Gospodarka Mięsna” 1953. gada 6. numurā, kadiķu dūmos kūpinātas desas ražošanā mēģināts izmantot arī medījumu gaļu (zaķa vai mežacūkas gaļu papildus cūkgaļai). Ja šādi pagatavotas desas atšķīrās pēc garšas, tad pagatavošanas recepte (desu masas iepildīšana un kūpināšana kadiķu dūmos) joprojām bija viena un tā pati. Tā par vietējo “jałowcowa” desas paveidu “Gospodarka Mięsna” 1950. gada 7.–8. numurā publicētajā darbā “Reģionālie lauku gaļas kūpinājumi” rakstīja kāds gaļas nozares speciālists, kas apceļoja Kurpiju (Kurpie): “Myszyniec” desa Kurpijā ir kadiķu koksnes dūmos kūpināta desa ar kadiķu ogu piedevu. “Tā ir sausā desa ar lieliskām smaržas un garšas īpašībām.”

Pēc 1945. gada saskaņā ar centrālās plānošanas sistēmu sāka veidot gaļas pārstrādes rūpniecību, ražojot konservētus gaļas izstrādājumus. Rūpes par gaļas izstrādājumu kvalitāti, jo īpaši par to garšas īpašībām, izpaudās tādu produktu standartu un tehnoloģisko normu ieviešanā, kurā tika ievērotas tradicionālās receptes. “Kiełbasa jałowcowa” kā produkta nosaukums pārtikas tiesību aktos parādījās 1947. un 1948. gadā. Vienotu standartu “Kiełbasa jałowcowa” desai ieviesa 1954. gadā, un turpmāk nostiprināja Centrālās gaļas rūpniecības standartā, ko publicēja 1964. gadā (izdevniecība Wydawnictwo Przemysłu Lekkiego i Spożywczego, Varšavā, 1964. gadā), uz ko balstās šis pieteikums.

Šos standartus ieviesa, lai “Kiełbasa jałowcowa” desai nodrošinātu iespējami labāku kvalitāti. Kaut arī standarts, uz ko pamatojas šis pieteikums, šodien vairs nav saistošs, tajā noteiktās prasības joprojām tiek ievērotas “Kiełbasa jałowcowa” ražošanā saskaņā ar visaugstākajiem standartiem.

3.9.   Prasību minimums un procedūras specifisko iezīmju pārbaudei (Komisijas Regulas (EK) Nr. 1216/2007 4. pants):

Ņemot vērā “Kiełbasa jałowcowa” specifiskumu, kontroles gaitā rūpīgi jāpārbauda turpmāk uzskaitītie rādītāji.

| 1. | Produkta ražošanai izmantojamo izejvielu (cūkgaļas, garšvielu) kvalitāte, tostarp:






  — | gaļas tehnoloģiskā piemērotība, |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

Produkta ražošanai izmantojamo izejvielu (cūkgaļas, garšvielu) kvalitāte, tostarp:

—

gaļas tehnoloģiskā piemērotība,

| — | nobarošanas veids, |
| --- | --- |

—

nobarošanas veids,

| — | sālīšanas ilgums, |
| --- | --- |

—

sālīšanas ilgums,

| — | “Kiełbasa jałowcowa” ražošanai izmantotās garšvielas un proporcijas, kādās tās izlieto. |
| --- | --- |

—

“Kiełbasa jałowcowa” ražošanai izmantotās garšvielas un proporcijas, kādās tās izlieto.

| 2. | “Kiełbasa jałowcowa” kūpināšanas process
  Kontrolē pārbauda,






  — | vai tiek ievērota temperatūra, kāda vajadzīga, kūpinot ar siltiem dūmiem pēc tradicionālā paņēmiena, |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.

“Kiełbasa jałowcowa” kūpināšanas process

Kontrolē pārbauda,

—

vai tiek ievērota temperatūra, kāda vajadzīga, kūpinot ar siltiem dūmiem pēc tradicionālā paņēmiena,

| — | vai tiek ievērots apstrādes ilgums un temperatūra, kāda noteikta, dūmojot saskaņā ar aukstās kūpināšanas paņēmienu, |
| --- | --- |

—

vai tiek ievērots apstrādes ilgums un temperatūra, kāda noteikta, dūmojot saskaņā ar aukstās kūpināšanas paņēmienu,

| — | vai aukstajā kūpināšanā tiek izmantotas dižskābarža koksnes skaidas un kadiķu ogas. |
| --- | --- |

—

vai aukstajā kūpināšanā tiek izmantotas dižskābarža koksnes skaidas un kadiķu ogas.

| 3. | Gatavā produkta kvalitāte:






  — | olbaltumvielu saturs, |
| --- | --- | --- |

3.

Gatavā produkta kvalitāte:

—

olbaltumvielu saturs,

| — | ūdens saturs, |
| --- | --- |

—

ūdens saturs,

| — | tauku saturs, |
| --- | --- |

—

tauku saturs,

| — | nātrija hlorīda saturs, |
| --- | --- |

—

nātrija hlorīda saturs,

| — | trīsvērtīgā un piecvērtīgā slāpekļa savienojumu saturs, |
| --- | --- |

—

trīsvērtīgā un piecvērtīgā slāpekļa savienojumu saturs,

| — | garša un smarža. |
| --- | --- |

—

garša un smarža.

| 4. | Produkta forma |
| --- | --- |

4.

Produkta forma

Kontroļu biežums

Iepriekš uzskaitītie ražošanas posmi jāpārbauda reizi divos mēnešos. Ja visi ražošanas posmi noritējuši pareizi, pārbaužu biežumu var samazināt līdz divām reizēm gadā.

Ja kādā no posmiem konstatē neatbilstību prasībām, tas jākontrolē biežāk (reizi divos mēnešos). Pārējos ražošanas posmus var pārbaudīt reizi pusgadā.

4.   Iestādes vai struktūras, kuras pārbauda atbilstību produkta specifikācijai:

4.1.   Nosaukums un adrese:

Nosaukums: Główny Inspektorat Jakości Handlowej Artykułów Rolno-Spożywczych

Adrese:

| ul. Wspólna 30 |
| --- |
| 00-930 Warsaw |
| POLSKA/POLAND |

ul. Wspólna 30

00-930 Warsaw

POLSKA/POLAND

Tālr. +48 226232901

Fakss +48 226232099

E-pasts: —

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4.2.   Iestādes vai institūcijas konkrētie uzdevumi:

Iepriekš minētās pārbaudes struktūras uzdevums ir uzraudzīt visu specifikācijā noteikto prasību ievērošanu.

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