United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Argued October 5, 2016

Decided October 20, 2016

Before

WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge

JOEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge

MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

No. 16-1030

IV’LEANIA PARKER,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN,

Acting Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Northern District of Indiana, 

Hammond Division.

No. 2:14cv10

Robert L. Miller, Jr.,

Judge.

ORDER

Iv’Leania Parker applied for Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental 

Security Income claiming disability based on her history of breast cancer, fibromyalgia, 

carpal tunnel syndrome, and glaucoma. An administrative law judge denied benefits, 

and the Appeals Council and district court upheld that decision. Because the ALJ’s 

decision is supported by substantial evidence, we affirm the decision.

Parker applied for benefits in May 2012, when she was 49 years old, and alleges 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
an onset date in May 2011. Her date last insured was in June 2014. Parker asserted that 

she is unable to work because of a history of breast cancer, fibromyalgia, carpal tunnel 

syndrome, and glaucoma. Parker has a Master’s in Business Administration and worked 

for more than 15 years in the banking industry, mainly as a loan specialist. In applying 

for loan benefits, Parker alleged that in 2007 she was fired because of unidentified 

“problems with [her] hand and neck,” but she did not say how those problems were

affecting her work or what her employer said about them. The Social Security 

Administration denied Parker’s applications initially in August 2012 and again on 

reconsideration in October 2012. Her hearing before the ALJ was in June 2013. 

After being diagnosed with breast cancer, Parker underwent a double 

mastectomy in January 2012 and afterward several reconstructive surgeries. At Parker’s

latest follow-up in January 2013, the doctor found her to be “doing well” and had “no 

major concerns.” None of Parker’s doctors opined that her surgeries imposed any 

limit—not even a minor one—on her ability to work.

Parker reported a previous diagnosis of fibromyalgia to a primary-care physician

in April 2013. But her medical records do not show who made the original diagnosis, 

when it was made, or what treatment Parker received, other than (according to what 

Parker told the doctor) Cymbalta that she had been given for nerve pain. Her doctor 

ordered refill medication for her current prescriptions—a cholesterol drug, a diuretic, 

and a potassium chloride supplement—but did not identify any functional limitations.

Parker also sought treatment for carpal tunnel pain. In April 2012, shortly before 

she applied for benefits, Parker had been examined by neurologist George Abu-Aita for 

numbness in her hands and pain in her hands and neck. Parker told Dr. Abu-Aita that 

she had had carpal tunnel surgery in 2008. Dr. Abu-Aita found decreased sensation in 

the nerves of her hands. He did not prescribe treatment or impose work limitations, but 

he did order a MRI of Parker’s neck and an EMG of her hands and arms. The MRI 

showed only commonplace “cervical spondylosis,”1 and the EMG ruled out

“electrodiagnostic evidence of ... carpal tunnel syndrome.” 

Parker also had received periodic treatment for glaucoma. In December 2011 she

was seen by an ophthalmologist after experiencing blurriness in her eyes. She told the 

doctor that she had undergone laser surgery for glaucoma ten years earlier. At each 

 

1 “Cervical spondylosis is a general term for age-related wear and tear affecting 

the spinal disks in your neck.” It is very common, and most people do not experience

symptoms. See Cervical Spondylosis, MAYO CLINIC, http://www.mayoclinic.org/

diseases-conditions/cervical-spondylosis/basics/definition/con-20027408 (visited 

October 17, 2016).
No. 16-1030 Page 3

follow-up visit the doctor found her to have normal vision and prescribed eye drops. In 

May 2013 Parker returned to the ophthalmologist for a check-up and reported headaches 

but no visual complaints. The doctor diagnosed her with early primary open-angle 

glaucoma.2 She underwent laser treatment in May and June 2013. The record of Parker’s 

final eye treatment in June 2013 shows normal visual acuity; Parker had complained of 

some blurriness and irritation but not headaches. 

In July 2012 state-agency physician M. Siddiqui performed a consultative exam.

He noted generalized muscle tenderness and limited range of motion in Parker’s back 

but also concluded that her gait was normal and her vision, 20/20. Dr. Siddiqui also 

noted that Parker reported pain in her hands, yet her muscle and grip strength were 

normal and she could pick up and grip coins with each hand. He did not identify any 

functional limitation or impose any work restriction. 

In August 2012, Dr. Abu-Aita recommended physical therapy for Parker’s neck 

pain. The therapist’s progress notes from Parker’s final session, in September 2012, 

report decreased neck and back pain and increased range of motion “to 90%.”

In August and October 2012, different state-agency physicians reviewed Parker’s

medical records, and both doctors concluded that those records do not evidence any 

severe impairment. 

In April 2013, Dr. Abu-Aita ordered a brain MRI, seemingly as a precaution

because Parker’s complaints of neck pain, headache, and blurry vision could have been 

symptoms of multiple sclerosis.3 A radiologist noted that the MRI showed a 

“nonspecific finding” which might have been “demyelinating plaques” or possibly

 

2 Glaucoma cannot be reversed, but treatments that lower pressure in the eye can 

“slow or prevent vision loss.” Lasers can be used to open clogged channels for patients 

with open-angle glaucoma. See Glaucoma: Treatments and Drugs, MAYO CLINIC,

http://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/glaucoma/basics/treatment/

con-20024042 (visited October 17, 2016).

3 See Multiple Sclerosis: Symptoms and Causes, MAYO CLINIC, 

http://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/multiple-sclerosis/symptoms-causes/

dxc-20131884 (visited October 17, 2016).
No. 16-1030 Page 4

“sequela of chronic small vessel ischemic disease.”4 The MRI also showed one other area 

of possible abnormality, so the radiologist recommended a CT scan for further 

evaluation. That CT scan eliminated the radiologist’s concern about the second possible 

abnormality; she concluded that the MRI likely was showing prominent cortical veins in 

that area. Parker did not submit further medical records from Dr. Abu-Aita, so the 

conclusion he drew from these scans and the follow-up care he recommended, if any, is 

unknown.

At the hearing before the ALJ in June 2013, Parker testified to limited activities of 

daily living due to generalized pain and weakness. She said that she wakes feeling 

“totally debilitated” and at times can’t get out of bed at all or needs three hours to get 

going. She lives alone and cares for herself but does only minimal cleaning and cooking. 

Parker said that she can lift or carry only a couple of pounds, can walk only a couple of 

blocks, can stand for only a couple of minutes, and can sit for only 30 to 40 minutes. She 

explained that she can use her hands to grip, feel, and manipulate objects but not 

without pain. Parker said that she drives to the grocery store and reads Bible passages 

(but uses glasses to read because of her blurred vision). She attends church but has no 

hobbies or other social life. Parker reported that at the time of the hearing her ongoing 

medical treatments were limited to taking Fiorinal with codeine, ibuprofen, and 

diazepam (all prescribed for pain management after her reconstructive surgeries); a

cholesterol drug; and vitamins and supplements. 

A vocational expert also testified. He opined that Parker could perform her past 

work as a loan specialist given the residual functional capacity described by the ALJ: 

able to lift and carry 10 pounds occasionally and less weight frequently; able to stand 

and walk for up to 2 hours and sit for up to 6 hours in an 8-hour workday; occasionally 

able to balance, stoop, crouch, and climb ramps and stairs; unable to kneel, crawl, or 

 

4 “A demyelinating disease is any condition that results in damage to the 

protective covering (myelin sheath) that surrounds nerve fibers in your brain and spinal 

cord.” See Demyelinating disease: What causes it?, MAYO CLINIC, http://www.mayoclinic.

org/diseases-conditions/multiple-sclerosis/expert-answers/demyelinating-disease/faq-20

058521 (visited October 17, 2016). Small vessel disease “refers to a group of pathological 

processes with various aetiologies that affect the small arteries, arterioles, venules, and 

capillaries of the brain.” It can lead to dementia. See John G. Baker, et al., Cerebral Small 

Vessel Disease: Cognition, Mood, Daily Functioning, and Imaging Findings from a Small Pilot 

Sample, 2(1) DEMENT. GERIATR. COGN. DIS. EXTRA. 169, 169–79 (Jan–Dec 2012), 

http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3347879/ (visited October 17, 2016).
No. 16-1030 Page 5

climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; and unable to work around concentrated exposure to

hazards or slippery, uneven surfaces. The VE also opined that Parker could find other 

work with those restrictions, such as working as an information clerk or telephone 

solicitor. 

The ALJ applied the 5-step analysis for assessing disability, see 20 C.F.R. 

§§ 404.1520(a), 416.920(a), and concluded that Parker was not disabled. At Step 1 the ALJ 

determined that Parker had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since her alleged 

onset in May 2011. At Step 2 the ALJ identified Parker’s severe impairments as

“status-post bilateral mastectomy and reconstruction; degenerative disc disease of the 

cervical spine; and fibromyalgia.” At Step 3 the ALJ concluded that these impairments, 

individually or in combination, do not satisfy a listing for presumptive disability.

At Step 4, in determining Parker’s RFC, the ALJ partially rejected her account of 

disabling limitations. The ALJ noted that neither Parker’s own doctors nor the 

state-agency consultants had found that Parker’s conditions limit her ability to work 

whatsoever. Nevertheless, the ALJ (with little explanation) imposed the limitations

identified to the VE. The ALJ, however, did not fully credit Parker’s testimony about the 

extent of the limitations she attributed to pain. The ALJ pointed to the opinions of 

Parker’s physicians that she was doing well, the limited treatment prescribed by those 

doctors, and Parker’s testimony about her activities of daily living. The ALJ decided that 

Parker could perform her past relevant work as a loan specialist and correspondence 

review clerk, as well as other jobs including telephone solicitor and receptionist.

Because the Appeals Council denied review, this court evaluates the ALJ’s 

decision as the final word of the Commissioner. Scrogham v. Colvin, 765 F.3d 685, 695 

(7th Cir. 2014). In this court Parker makes a number of arguments, but most of them take 

aim at the ALJ’s assessment of her RFC. Parker contends that the ALJ ignored the MRI 

and CT scan of her brain, failed to consider her other impairments that aren’t severe, and 

did not explain his credibility assessment.

We conclude that substantial evidence supports the RFC assessment. First, the 

ALJ permissibly omitted reference to the MRI and CT scan of Parker’s brain because they 

do not undercut his conclusion. An ALJ is not obligated to summarize every piece of 

evidence, so long as he does not analyze only the evidence supporting his ultimate 

conclusion while ignoring the evidence that undermines it. See Moore v. Colvin, 743 F.3d 

1118, 1123 (7th Cir. 2014); Terry v. Astrue, 580 F.3d 471, 477 (7th Cir. 2009); Myles v. Astrue, 

582 F.3d 672, 678 (7th Cir. 2009). In his brief, Parker’s lawyer asserts that the radiologist, 

after interpreting the MRI and CT scan, “diagnosed Ms. Parker with multiple sclerosis.” 
No. 16-1030 Page 6

That representation is inaccurate. In making it Parker’s lawyer cites only the radiology 

reports, which do not give a “diagnosis” but instead include a “clinical indication” of 

MS. The “clinical indication” is the condition that prompted a treating physician to order 

the diagnostic; it is not the radiologist’s conclusion after reviewing the test. Instead, the 

“impression” section of the radiology report gives the radiologist’s views,5 and those 

sections identify one “non-specific finding” but otherwise normal results. No other 

document in the record mentions MS. As far as this record shows, Dr. Abu-Aita, the 

neurologist who requested the MRI and CT scan, did not diagnose or prescribe medical 

treatment for any condition, let alone MS, after seeing the results. Nor does the record 

show that any of Parker’s doctors interpreted these scans to impose functional 

limitations. Because the scans were taken long after Parker had applied for benefits and 

secured counsel, one would think that any new diagnosis or treatment resulting from 

these scans would be included in the record. And ALJs are not meant to “play doctor” by 

making their own independent medical findings rather than relying on expert opinion,

see Moon v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 718, 722 (7th Cir. 2014); Blakes ex rel. Wolfe v. Barnhart, 

331 F.3d 565, 570 (7th Cir. 2003), though that is what Parker’s lawyer appears to do by 

asserting that she was diagnosed with MS.

Second, the ALJ adequately considered all of Parker’s impairments and 

supported his credibility determination with specific evidence from the record. Contrary 

to Parker’s assertion, the ALJ did consider impairments not found to be severe in 

determining Parker’s RFC, as required. See Thomas v. Colvin, 745 F.3d 802, 807 (7th Cir. 

2014); Arnett v. Astrue, 676 F.3d 586, 591 (7th Cir. 2012). Parker’s real complaint, it seems, 

is that the ALJ did not fully credit her testimony about the extent of the limitations these 

conditions impose. As for carpal tunnel syndrome, the ALJ noted that the EMG did not 

corroborate the purported diagnosis, her doctor did not order any treatment for that 

condition or impose functional limitations, and, as the consultative examiner found and 

Parker herself testified, she can grip and manipulate objects. Regarding her glaucoma, 

the ALJ relied on the ophthalmologist’s repeated findings that Parker’s vision was 

normal, the absence of any functional limitation after her most recent laser treatment, 

and Parker’s continuing ability to drive and read. Parker’s lawyer argues that the ALJ’s 

“mentioning of [her] visual acuity demonstrates that the ALJ does not understand 

 

5 See Rourke Stay, An insider’s guide to reading your radiology report, KEVINMD, 

http://www.kevinmd.com/blog/2014/09/insider-guide-reading-radiology-report.html

(visited September 8, 2016); How to Read Your Radiology Report, RADIOLOGY INFO, 

http://www.radiologyinfo.org/en/info.cfm?pg=article-read-radiology-report (visited 

October 17, 2016).
No. 16-1030 Page 7

glaucoma ... [because it] does not affect visual acuity.” This does not follow. The danger 

of glaucoma is that it can lead to blindness,6 but thus far Parker’s treatments have 

successfully preserved her vision. In sum, we cannot say that the ALJ’s credibility 

determination is “patently wrong,” especially considering that he imposed a litany of 

functional limitations, not a single one of them recommended by a doctor involved in 

the case. See Curvin v. Colvin, 778 F.3d 645, 651 (7th Cir. 2015); see also Schmidt v. Astrue, 

496 F.3d 833, 843–44 (7th Cir. 2007) (upholding credibility decision concerning 

claimant’s subjective complaints of pain when ALJ considered testimony, normal 

examination findings, and daily activities in addition to objective medical tests);

Sienkiewicz v. Barnhart, 409 F.3d 798, 803–04 (7th Cir. 2005) (upholding credibility 

decision when ALJ considered conservative treatment, failure to report certain 

symptoms to doctors, and inconsistency of reports of extreme pain with examiner’s 

findings in addition to lack of objective medical test findings).

Parker has one final argument that lacks merit. She contends that the ALJ erred at 

Step 2 in finding that her carpal tunnel syndrome and glaucoma are not severe. We

recently emphasized that “[t]he Step 2 determination is ‘a de minimis screening for 

groundless claims’ intended to exclude slight abnormalities that only minimally impact 

a claimant’s basic activities,” O'Connor-Spinner v. Colvin, 2016 WL 4197915, at *6 (7th Cir. 

Aug. 9, 2016) (quoting Thomas v. Colvin, 826 F.3d 953, 960 (7th Cir. 2016)); see also Meuser 

v. Colvin, No. 16-1052, slip op. at 9–10 (7th Cir. October 3, 2016). But in this case Parker’s 

only evidence that either glaucoma or carpal tunnel syndrome affect her basic activities 

is her testimony that sometimes she experiences blurred vision and pain in her hands.

Parker did not explain how either would impede her daily activities or her ability to 

work. And as we have concluded already, the ALJ’s determination that her testimony 

was not fully credible is supported by substantial evidence. Thus the ALJ did not err in 

finding these impairments to be nonsevere. See Stepp v. Colvin, 795 F.3d 711, 719–20 

(7th Cir. 2015) (concluding that carpal tunnel syndrome was not severe impairment since

no evidence established that condition imposed functional limitations); Carmickle v. 

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 533 F.3d 1155, 1164–65 (9th Cir. 2008) (same); Ukolov v. Barnhart, 

420 F.3d 1002, 1004–06 (9th Cir. 2005) (glaucoma not severe impairment); Arles v. Astrue,

438 Fed. App’x. 735, 737–40 (10th Cir. 2011) (same); Bryan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 383 Fed. 

App’x. 140, 146 (3d Cir. 2010) (concluding that glaucoma was not severe impairment 

since functional limitations did not result).

 

6 See Glaucoma: Treatments and Drugs, MAYO CLINIC, 

http://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/glaucoma/basics/treatment/con-2002404

2 (visited October 17, 2016).
No. 16-1030 Page 8

Accordingly, because the ALJ did not ignore any line of evidence and substantial 

evidence supports his decision, we affirm.