United States Department of Labor

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

__________________________________________

W.F., Appellant

and

U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, NORTH TEXAS 

PROCESSING & DISTRIBUTION CENTER, 

Coppell, TX, Employer

__________________________________________

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Docket No. 18-1526

Issued: November 26, 2019

Appearances: Case Submitted on the Record

Appellant, pro se

Office of Solicitor, for the Director

DECISION AND ORDER

Before:

PATRICIA H. FITZGERALD, Deputy Chief Judge

JANICE B. ASKIN, Judge

VALERIE D. EVANS-HARRELL, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION

On August 6, 2018 appellant filed a timely appeal from a February 7, 2018 merit decision 

of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). Pursuant to the Federal Employees’

Compensation Act1(FECA) and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the Board has jurisdiction over 

the merits of this case.

ISSUE

The issue is whether appellant has met her burden of proof to establish an emotional 

condition while in the performance of duty, as alleged.

FACTUAL HISTORY

On April 9, 2015 appellant, then a 55-year-old supervisor of distribution operations, filed 

an occupational disease claim (Form CA-2) for an acute reaction to stress resulting from a hostile 

 

1 5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.
2

work environment that included harassment, bullying, and intimidation, and working conditions 

hazardous to her health. She alleged that she first became aware of her claimed condition on 

April 1, 2015 and its relationship to her federal employment on July 1, 2012. On the reverse side 

of the claim form, A.C., an acting manager of distribution operations, controverted the claim, 

contending that appellant failed to establish fact of injury and causal relationship. He noted that 

medical documents received from her did not support the claimed condition. A.C. further noted 

that appellant stopped work on April 7, 2015 and has not returned.

OWCP subsequently received medical evidence.

In a letter dated April 18, 2014, A.C. further challenged appellant’s claim. He noted that 

appellant had been a supervisor since 2000 and that she had transferred from California to North 

Texas. A.C. further noted that during her tenure in North Texas appellant had filed claims for five 

work accidents and had no sick or annual leave. Appellant had poor work performance and l7 

unscheduled absences since December 1, 2014 under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). 

She filed a claim for an injury or an Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) complaint against 

upper management when facing discipline. A.C. claimed that appellant filed the April 9, 2015 

Form CA-2 claim after being off work for several weeks under FMLA status. He denied that she

was subjected to a hostile work environment in which she was bullied and intimidated by S.H., a 

supervisory manager of distribution operations (SMDO), and as a result developed stress and 

anxiety. Appellant’s physician placed her off work for one month and advised that she may return

to work with no restrictions on May 5, 2015. A.C. noted that appellant contended that she 

experienced stress on March 9, 2015 after SMDO S.H. slammed a door as she walked away from 

appellant. SMDO S.H. had asked her what obstacles she was experiencing and what solutions she 

had in mind to address those obstacles. A.C. controverted appellant’s claim based on the fact that 

she did not have any restrictions from her physician, she received training on how to deal with 

stressful situations, and she should have requested additional FMLA leave based on her condition. 

He concluded that she was using every possible avenue to be in a paid status since she had no 

available leave. A.C. further concluded that appellant was a difficult individual.

OWCP, by development letter dated May 20, 2015, informed appellant of the deficiencies 

of her claim and requested that she submit additional factual and medical evidence, including a 

detailed description of the implicated work factors and a well-rationalized report from her 

physician regarding the cause of her emotional condition. On even date, a development letter was 

sent to the employing establishment requesting a response to appellant’s allegations. Both parties 

were afforded 30 days to respond.

OWCP received additional medical evidence.

By decision dated June 24, 2015, OWCP denied appellant’s claim for an employmentrelated emotional condition, finding that she failed to establish the factual component of fact of 

injury. It concluded, therefore, that the requirements had not been met to establish an injury as 

defined by FECA.

On July 27, 2015 appellant requested a review of the written record by a representative of 

OWCP’s Branch of Hearings and Review.
3

In a detailed undated narrative statement, appellant alleged various incidents during the 

period February 26, 2005 to June 4, 2015 by her supervisors. They included: being denied

requested reasonable accommodations to include reassignment from appellant’s tour 1 evening 

shift to the tour 2 morning shift due to her job-related stress, sleep disorder, depression, and other 

medical issues; being terminated from employment on December 15, 2007 while she was off work 

receiving care for her job-related stress; being physically assaulted on July 10, 2008 when T.G., 

assistant manager of distribution operations (AMDO), pushed a door injuring her right hand; being 

required to work eight days straight and subsequently six days straight despite being restricted to 

working five days in a row; being assigned to continue to work under T.G. despite fearing what 

she may do; injuring her back and right thigh as a result of tripping over a platform at work on 

July 11, 2008;2 being without pay after continuation of pay (COP) payments had ceased; being 

involved in mediation with plant manager M.T. and a union representative regarding the alleged 

physical assault by T.G.; receiving a July 10, 2010 letter of warning; being told, in a rude, abrupt, 

and hostile manner by T.J., an employee, that the documents appellant had submitted in support 

of her claims for wage-loss compensation (Form CA-7) were incomplete as T.J. hung up the 

telephone; being requested to submit medical documentation regarding her work restrictions; being 

instructed to go home on September 16, 2009 by AMDO E.J because MDO B.D. was mad that she 

went to the supervisors’ room for a short break; being instructed to start arriving at work at 2:00 

a.m. by MDO B.D. and AMDO E.J. on September 25, 2009; the falsification of her time records 

as appellant submitted leave requests forms (PS Form 3971) daily from September 5, 2009 to

January 14, 2010 for four hours a day due to her start time of 2:00 a.m. and her time records were

changed to reflect that she worked three eight-hour days one week and two eight-hour days the

next week; being denied Saturdays and Sundays off work despite appellant’s seniority and instead

being scheduled off work on Sundays and Mondays by MDO B.D.; a January 14, 2010 settlement

agreement in which the employing establishment agreed to allow her to work on the primary

operation and to be off work on Saturdays and Sundays; the unavailability of overtime work for

clerks in the primary operation after appellant became their supervisor; receiving a March 16, 2011

letter from Department of Labor indicating that the employing establishment had not agreed to 

allow her to buy back leave; a dispute regarding the amount of the leave buy back appellant owed

the employing establishment which resulted in a May 30, 2012 settlement agreement; the firing of

her daughter from the employing establishment; a deduction of an incorrect amount from 

appellant’s paycheck in repayment of her leave buy back which violated the May 30, 2012 

settlement agreement; being falsely accused of talking to S.S., a clerk, using derogatory and 

profane language which resulted in being reassigned to tour 1 with Wednesdays and Thursdays off 

work by SMDO S.H.; being harassed by SMDO S.H. who used a harsh tone of voice and 

intimidated and bullied appellant because she had written a letter to the “VP” regarding S.S.’s 

allegation; being placed on absence without leave (AWOL) status despite submitting medical 

documentation concerning her absence from work; being denied requested release to customer 

service by SMDO S.H.; receiving additional letters of warning for unsatisfactory attendance and

failing to follow instructions and letter of suspension for seven days for failing to follow 

instructions while other supervisors did not receive such letters for failing to correct errors 

 

2 Appellant indicated that she filed a traumatic injury claim (Form CA-1) for her July 11, 2008 injuries and later 

filed a notice of recurrence (Form CA-2a) alleging that she sustained a recurrence of disability on August 28, 2009

due to her July 11, 2008 employment injuries. She stated that the employing establishment converted the Form CA2a to a new claim. P. 3
4

regarding pay locations of clock rings; being required to perform additional work duties by SMDO 

S.H. which included submitting hourly clock ring reports while no other supervisor was required 

to do so; filing complaints with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleging

hostile work environment which included retaliation for filing prior EEOC complaints and being 

disabled, subjection to investigative interviews for corrective action, issuance of four letters of 

warning, assignment of additional responsibilities; being instructed to cease all communication 

with R.F., an employee, and threatened with corrective action if appellant failed to do so by plant 

manager L.W. due to her response to R.F.’s use of an inappropriate quote in an e-mail; being told 

by plant manager L.W. to watch how she spoke to him during their discussion of the incident 

involving R.F.; being denied computer access due to insubordination and failure to follow 

instructions; a change in work hours by acting manager of distribution operations (AMDO) R.Y.

in retaliation for a civil lawsuit filed by appellant’s daughter for wrongful termination; being 

physically assaulted on March 12, 2013 by SMDO S.H. who slammed her office door on appellant 

after asking what obstacles she had and how she planned to resolve them; being removed from a

position by SMDO S.H. who then gave the position to a 204B employee; being micromanaged by 

MDO A.C. who rushed appellant to complete her work duties, and changed his attitude towards 

her, stopped speaking to her, and when he did speak to her he did so in a rude and hostile manner; 

being instructed by SMDO S.H. to leave her name off any e-mails despite previously instructing 

appellant to e-mail hourly clock rings errors and productivity; and having AWOL status changed 

to annual leave by MDO A.C.

Appellant listed various emotional conditions she developed, medical treatment she 

received, and dates she did not work as a result of the above-noted work incidents. 

Appellant also continued to submit medical evidence.

By decision dated December 7, 2015, an OWCP hearing representative set aside OWCP’s 

June 24, 2015 decision and remanded the case for further development of the factual evidence as 

appellant had submitted a detailed statement describing the work factors, which she believed 

contributed to her emotional condition. She directed OWCP to refer appellant’s factual statement 

to the employing establishment for review and comment. 

Following remand, OWCP, by letter dated December 15, 2015, requested that the 

employing establishment respond to appellant’s allegations. It was afforded 30 days to respond. 

No response was received. 

OWCP received additional medical evidence.

By decision dated January 28, 2016, OWCP again denied appellant’s claim for an 

employment-related emotional condition because the evidence was insufficient to establish the 

factual component of fact of injury. It noted that she failed to provide documenting evidence, such 

as witness statements, to establish the alleged incidents.

On February 10, 2016 appellant again requested a review of the written record by a 

representative of OWCP’s Branch of Hearings and Review. She submitted additional medical 

evidence.
5

By decision dated July 1, 2016, a second OWCP hearing representative affirmed the 

January 28, 2016 decision, as modified. She found that appellant had established the factual 

component of fact of injury and a medical condition, but that her claim remained denied because 

she had not established a compensable employment factor.

OWCP continued to receive medical evidence.

By decision dated July 26, 2016, OWCP denied appellant’s claim for an emotional 

condition, finding that she did not establish the factual component of fact of injury.3 It concluded, 

therefore, that the requirements had not been met to establish an injury as defined by FECA.

OWCP subsequently received additional medical evidence.

On July 28, 2017 appellant requested reconsideration of the July 26, 2016 decision. In 

letters and additional statements dated July 22, 2017, she essentially reiterated her prior 

allegations. Appellant also alleged that she was not given a proper account of her work 

performance. She denied being a difficult employee. 

Appellant submitted correspondence between herself and the employing establishment,

and forms and records regarding her work schedule, leave record, requests for overtime work, 

leave, reasonable accommodation, and transfer, repayment of leave buy back, the January 13, 2010

settlement agreement, disciplinary matters, the alleged assaults, racial discrimination, disparate 

treatment, and harassment by her supervisors, requests for medical documentation, incident 

involving R.F., repayment of leave buy back, restoration of computer access, leave matters, EEO 

complaints, and wage earnings. She also submitted a witness statement dated September 28, 2010 

in which A.V., an employee, who claimed that MDO B.D. refused to send G.S., an employee, to 

assist her as usual since appellant had become a supervisor in her work area and alleged harassment 

by another employee. In an October 4, 2010 e-mail, C.W., an employee, noted that G.S. was sent 

to help A.V. He related that when he worked in that area, G.S. did not work there. In a letter dated 

February 7, 2007, the employing establishment denied appellant’s request for accommodation 

because she did not have a disability as defined under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).

Appellant also submitted additional medical evidence. 

By decision dated August 28, 2017, OWCP denied appellant’s July 28, 2017 request for 

reconsideration, finding that it was untimely filed and failed to demonstrate clear evidence of error

in its July 26, 2016 decision.

 

3 The Board notes that the record does not clearly indicate the reason why OWCP issued a decision on July 26, 

2016 denying appellant’s emotional condition claim on the same basis that an OWCP hearing representative found 

established in her July 1, 2016 decision. 
6

On September 8, 2017 appellant requested reconsideration of the July 26, 2016 merit 

decision.

4

 She continued to submit documents in support of her allegations and medical evidence. 

By decision dated February 7, 2018, OWCP denied modification of its July 26, 2016 

decision, finding that the additional evidence submitted failed to establish a compensable factor of 

employment.5

LEGAL PRECEDENT

To establish an emotional condition causally related to factors of a claimant’s federal

employment, he or she must submit: (1) factual evidence identifying and supporting employment

factors or incidents alleged to have caused or contributed to the condition; (2) rationalized medical

evidence establishing an emotional condition or psychiatric disorder; and (3) rationalized medical

opinion evidence establishing that the emotional condition is causally related to the identified

compensable employment factors.6

Workers’ compensation law does not apply to each and every injury or illness that is

somehow related to a claimant’s employment. There are situations where an injury or illness has

some connection with the employment, but nevertheless does not come within the purview of

workers’ compensation. When disability results from an emotional reaction to regular or specially

assigned work duties or a requirement imposed by the employment, the disability is deemed

compensable.7 However, disability is not compensable when it results from factors such as an

employee’s fear of a reduction-in-force, or frustration from not being permitted to work in a

particular environment, or to hold a particular position.8

To the extent that disputes and incidents alleged as constituting harassment by coworkers 

are established as occurring and arising from a claimant’s performance of his or her regular duties, 

these could constitute employment factors.9 However, for harassment to give rise to a 

compensable disability under FECA there must be evidence that harassment did, in fact, occur. 

 

4 Appellant indicated in her appeal request form that she was requesting reconsideration of a July 26, 2017 OWCP 

decision. The Board notes, however, that the record does not contain an adverse final decision issued by OWCP on 

that date. The record does contain a final adverse decision issued by OWCP on July 26, 2016. 

5 Although appellant’s September 8, 2017 request for reconsideration was not timely filed as it was not filed within 

one year of OWCP’s July 26, 2016 decision, OWCP conducted a merit review. 20 C.F.R. § 10.607; see also Alan G. 

Williams, 52 ECAB 180 (2000). OWCP is not prohibited from reviewing an untimely application for reconsideration 

under the less stringent standards set forth at 20 C.F.R. § 10.606(b)(3), but such a review is on OWCP’s own motion 

pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 10.610. See S.H., Docket No. 06-0455 (issued August 25, 2006); John W. Graves, 52 ECAB 

160 (2000).

6 C.M., Docket No. 17-1076 (issued November 14, 2018); Kathleen D. Walker, 42 ECAB 603 (1991).

7 A.C., Docket No. 18-0507 (issued November 26, 2018); Pamela D. Casey, 57 ECAB 260, 263 (2005); Lillian

Cutler, 28 ECAB 125, 129 (1976).

8 Cutler, id.

9 See B.S., Docket No. 19-0378 (issued July 10, 2019); M.R., Docket No. 18-0304 (issued November 13, 2018); 

David W. Shirey, 42 ECAB 783, 795-96 (1991); Kathleen D. Walker, supra note 6 at 608.
7

Mere perceptions of harassment are not compensable under FECA.10 Additionally, verbal 

altercations and difficult relationships with supervisors, when sufficiently detailed by the claimant 

and supported by the record, may constitute factors of employment. This does not imply, however, 

that every statement uttered in the workplace will give rise to coverage under FECA.11

An employee’s emotional reaction to administrative or personnel matters generally falls

outside of FECA’s scope.12 Although related to the employment, administrative and personnel

matters are functions of the employer rather than the regular or specially assigned duties of the

employee.13 However, to the extent the evidence demonstrates that the employing establishment

either erred or acted abusively in discharging its administrative or personnel responsibilities, such

action will be considered a compensable employment factor.14

ANALYSIS

The Board finds that appellant has not met her burden of proof to establish an emotional 

condition while in the performance of duty, as alleged.

Appellant has attributed her emotional condition in part to Cutler15 factors. She has alleged 

that she was overworked. Appellant noted that SMDO S.H. required her to perform additional 

work duties, which included submitting hourly clock ring reports, while no other supervisor was 

required to do so. She also noted that her staff had to perform additional work while overtime was 

denied to facilitate the completion of the extra work. The Board has held that overwork is a 

compensable factor of employment if appellant submits sufficient evidence to substantiate this 

allegation.16 While A.V. claimed that MDO B.D. refused to send G.S. to assist her as usual after 

appellant became her supervisor, C.W. related that G.S. never provided assistance when he worked 

in that area. Thus, the Board finds that appellant failed to establish overwork as a compensable 

factor of employment.

Appellant has further alleged that plant manager L.W. threatened her with corrective action 

if she did not cease all communication with R.F. based on appellant’s reaction to an inappropriate 

quote used by R.F. in an e-mail sent to her. She has also alleged that SMDO S.H. instructed her 

to leave her name off on any e-mails. Appellant noted, however, that her request was contrary to 

her previous instruction to e-mail hourly clock ring reports to her. The Board has held that

 

10 A.E., Docket No. 18-1587 (issued March 13, 2019); Jack Hopkins, Jr., 42 ECAB 818, 827 (1991).

11 Y.B., Docket No. 16-0193 (issued July 23, 2018); Marguerite J. Toland, 52 ECAB 294 (2001).

12 G.R., Docket No. 18-0893 (issued November 21, 2018); Andrew J. Sheppard, 53 ECAB 170, 171 (2001); 

Matilda R. Wyatt, 52 ECAB 421, 423 (2001); Thomas D. McEuen, 41 ECAB 387 (1990), reaff’d on recon., 42 ECAB 

566 (1991).

13 C.M., supra note 6; David C. Lindsey, Jr., 56 ECAB 263, 268 (2005); Thomas D. McEuen, id.

14 Id.

15 Supra note 7.

16 J.E., Docket No. 17-1799 (issued March 7, 2018); Bobbie D. Daly, 53 ECAB 691 (2002).
8

reactions to a supervisor’s instructions in and of itself would not be compensable under Cutler.

17

 

Appellant did not sufficiently substantiate the work instructions regarding communication with 

R.F. and SMDO S.H. which must be evaluated under Thomas D. McEuen.

18

Appellant’s allegations regarding the denial of her requests for reasonable 

accommodation,

19 termination of her federal service,20 and overtime work,21 the assignment of 

work and modification of work schedule,

22 the handling of pay matters,23 leave requests and 

attendance matters,

24 the filing of grievances and EEOC complaints,25 disciplinary matters,26

requests for medical documentation,

27 and being required to work outside of her restrictions,28

relate to administrative or personnel management actions. Administrative and personnel matters, 

although generally related to employment, are administrative functions of the employer rather than 

the regular or specially-assigned work duties of the employee. For an administrative or personnel 

matter to be considered a compensable factor of employment, the evidence must establish error or 

abuse on the part of the employer.29 Appellant did not submit any such evidence. 

In a February 7, 2007 letter, the employing establishment informed appellant that her 

request for reasonable accommodation was denied because she did not have a disability as defined 

under the ADA. Further, A.C., in an April 18, 2014 letter, noted that appellant had poor work 

performance and excessive unscheduled absences approved under FMLA. He further noted that 

she filed grievances whenever she faced disciplinary action. A.C. that appellant had no work 

restrictions from her physician and that she should have requested additional FMLA leave due to 

her claimed condition. The Board notes that although there was a January 13, 2010 settlement

 

17 Robert Knoke, 51 ECAB 319 (2000).

18 Y.B., Docket No. 16-0194 (issued July 24, 2018); Kim Nguyen, 53 ECAB 127 (2001). See McEuen, supra

note 12.

19 James P. Guinan, 51 ECAB 604, 607 (2000); John Polito, 50 ECAB 347, 349 (1999).

20 P.M., Docket No. 14-0188 (issued April 21, 2014); C.T., Docket No. 09-1557 (issued August 12, 2010).

21 B.Y., Docket No. 17-1822 (issued January 18, 2019).

22 V.M., Docket No. 15-1080 (issued May 11, 2017); Donney T. Drennon-Gala, 56 ECAB 469 (2005).

23 L.H., Docket No. 13-0923 (issued September 22, 2014); T.M., Docket No. 07-2284 (issued May 2, 2008).

24 B.O., Docket No. 17-1986 (issued January 18, 2019); Lori A. Facey, 55 ECAB 217 (2004); Judy L. Kahn, 53 

ECAB 321 (2002).

25 B.O., id.; James E. Norris, 52 ECAB 93 (2000).

26 E.M., Docket No. 19-0156 (issued May 23, 2019); B.Y., supra note 21; C.T., Docket No. 08-2160 (issued 

May 7, 2009).

27 D.W., Docket No. 19-0449 (issued September 24, 2019); W.M., Docket No. 15-1080 (issued May 11, 2017); 

Guinan, supra note 19; Polito, supra note 19.

28 J.W., Docket No. 17-0999 (issued September 4, 2018).

29 McEuen, supra note 12.
9

agreement submitted with regard to appellant’s complaint to have Saturdays and Sundays off work, 

this settlement agreement specifically noted that it was without prejudice. The Board has 

previously explained that, absent an admission of fault, a settlement agreement does not establish 

error or abuse on the part of the employing establishment.30 Appellant did not submit any evidence 

that A.C. erred or acted abusively in the handling of these administrative matters.31 Thus, the 

Board finds that she has failed to establish a compensable employment factor.

Appellant alleged that she was harassed, discriminated against, yelled at, bullied, 

threatened, and physically assaulted by her supervisors. To the extent that incidents alleged as 

constituting harassment or a hostile environment by a manager are established as occurring and 

arising from appellant’s performance of her regular duties, these could constitute employment 

factors.32 However, for harassment to give rise to a compensable disability under FECA, there 

must be evidence that harassment did in fact occur. Mere perceptions of harassment are not 

compensable under FECA.33 General allegations of harassment are insufficient34 and in this case 

she has not submitted sufficient evidence to establish harassment, discrimination, and verbal and 

physical abuse by her supervisors. Although appellant alleged that her supervisors engaged in 

actions which she believed constituted harassment, discrimination, verbal abuse, and physical 

assault, she provided no corroborating evidence, such as witness statements, to establish her 

allegations.35 A.C. denied appellant’s assertions of harassment and noted that she had been trained 

to handle stressful situations. The Board finds, therefore, that appellant has not established a 

compensable employment factor with regard to her allegations of harassment, discrimination, and 

verbal abuse, and physical assault. Consequently, appellant has not established an emotional 

condition in the performance of duty as she has not attributed her claimed condition to 

compensable employment factors.36

On appeal appellant contends that she has submitted sufficient evidence to establish that 

she sustained an employment-related emotional condition. For the reasons stated above, appellant 

has not submitted sufficient factual evidence to establish an emotional condition in the 

performance of duty, as alleged.

 

30 B.Y., supra note 21; Nguyen, supra note 18; see also R.G., Docket No. 13-0818 (issued August 1, 2014); G.C., 

Docket No. 13-704 (issued April 4, 2014).

31 L.H., Docket No. 17-1295 (issued November 22, 2017).

32 F.C., Docket No. 18-0625 (issued November 15, 2018); Walker, supra note 6.

33 Jack Hopkins, Jr., 42 ECAB 818, 827 (1991). See Joel Parker, Sr., 43 ECAB 220, 225 (1991) (finding that a 

claimant must substantiate allegations of harassment or discrimination with probative and reliable evidence). See also

M.G., Docket No. 16-1453 (issued May 12, 2017) (vague or general allegations of perceived harassment, abuse, or 

difficulty arising in the employment are insufficient to give rise to compensability under FECA).

34 See F.C., supra note 32; Paul Trotman-Hall, 45 ECAB 229 (1993) (Alternate Member Groom, concurring).

35 See William P. George, 43 ECAB 1159, 1167 (1992) (claimed employment incidents not established where 

appellant did not submit evidence substantiating that such incidents actually occurred).

36 As appellant has failed to establish a compensable employment factor, the Board need not address the medical 

evidence of record. See Margaret S. Krzycki, 43 ECAB 496 (1992).
10

Appellant may submit new evidence or argument with a written request for reconsideration 

to OWCP within one year of this merit decision, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 8128(a) and 20 C.F.R. 

§§ 10.605 through 10.607.

CONCLUSION

The Board finds that appellant has not met her burden of proof to establish an emotional 

condition while in the performance of duty, as alleged.

ORDER

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the February 7, 2018 decision of the Office of 

Workers’ Compensation Programs is affirmed.

Issued: November 26, 2019

Washington, DC

Patricia H. Fitzgerald, Deputy Chief Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Janice B. Askin, Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Valerie D. Evans-Harrell, Alternate Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board