PUBLISH
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee,

v. JESSIE JESUS MARQUEZ, Defendant - Appellant. No. 17-2028

________________ _________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico (D.C. No. 2:13-CR-03367-RB-2)

________________ _________________ James L. Hankins, Edmond, Okla homa, for Defendant-Appellant. Sarah M. Davenport, Assistant Un ited States Attorney (James D. Tierney, Acting United States Attorney, with her on the brief), Las Cruces, New Mexico , for Plaintiff-Appellee.

________________ _________________ Before TYMKOVICH , Chief Judge, MORITZand EID , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ MORITZ , Circuit Judge.

________________ _________________ Jessie Marquez appeals his convic tions for six drug-related cri mes, including conspiracy to distribute 500 gram s of methamphetamine. Marquez raises three issues: he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting each o f his convictions, he asserts that the district cour t erred by questioning a witness, and he contends that the FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### August 7, 2018
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court2 district court shouldn’t have a dmitted certain testimony from two of the government’s witnesses. We reject each of Marquez’ arguments. F irst, we conclude that the evidence was sufficien t for a rational jury to find Ma rquez guilty of using a phone to facilitate a drug fel ony, participating in a conspirac y to distribute over 500 grams of methamphetamine, and possessing methamphetamine with t he intent to distribute it. Next, we hold thatthe district court didn’t errwhen it asked a witness one question to clarify a factual matter. Last, we find that th e district court didn’t abuse its discretion or plainly err when it admitted testimony from government witnesses. Accordingly, we affirm. Background In January 2013, law enforcement began investigating Robert Chr istner’s methamphetamine dealings in and around Alamogordo, New Mexico. Investigators conducted several controlled drug purchases from Christner and began attempting to identify his suppliers and distri butors. They also surveilled a nd interrupted two drug deals—one in March 2013 and one in June 2013—in which Christnerattempted to buy several pounds of methampheta mine from suppliers in Arizona

. During the course of this inves tigation, investigators obtained wiretaps on Christner’s phones, allowing them to intercept many of his call s and text messages. Then, when Christner set up mee tings over the phone, investigat ors sometimes surveilled those meetings. In one such instance, they identifie d Marquez as someone who had spoken to Christner on the phone about obtaining methamphetamine and had arranged to meet up with him. A nd after identifying Marquez, th ey obtained a3 wiretap for his phone as well. Hi ghly summarized, the intercept ed calls between Christner and Marquez suggested t hat (1) Marquez distributed me thamphetamine that he obtained from Christner and (2 ) when Christner’s methampheta mine supplier fell through, Marquez tried to f ind him a new supplier. The investigation as a whole resu lted in an indictment charging Marquez and 17 other individuals with conspir acy to distribute “500 grams a nd more” of methamphetamine. 1 R. vol. 1, 2. The indictment fur ther charged Marquez with two counts of possessing methamphetami ne with the intent to distrib ute and four counts of using a phone to fac ilitate a drug felony. Marquez proceeded to trial, and th e jury convicted him of consp iracy, all four phone counts, and one possession-with-inten t count. The distric t court sentenced him to 121 months in prison. Marquez appeals. Analysis I. Sufficiency of the Evidence Marquez first challenges the su fficiency of the evidence supporting each of his six convictions. We review suffi ciency questions de novo and lo ok at “the evidence in the light most favorable to the government to determine whet her any rational jury could have found guilt beyon d a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Dahda , 853 F.3d 1101, 1106 (10th Cir. 2017), aff’d on other grounds , 138 S. Ct. 1491 (2018).

1 Christner himself wasn’t charge d because he died of complicati ons from heart surgery a few months bef ore the government filed the indi ctment.4 A. Using a Phone to Fac ilitate a Drug Felony Marquez first maintains that the evidence wasn’t sufficient to support his convictions for using a phone to facilitate a drug felony becau se the government didn’t “produce any witness who claimed to be fam iliar with Marquez’[] voice in rea l life and who could then identif y it . . . as the voice on the c alls.” Aplt. Br. 27. As a result, Marquez assert s, a rational jury could not have conclud ed that the voice on the intercepted calls was his. But a s the record dem onstrates, the government presented substantial circumstantial ev idence of Marquez’ identity. DEA Case Agent Amy Billhymer and DEA Agent Conan Becknell testi fied about how they identified Marqu ez. Specifically, on April 19, 2 013, investigators intercepted a call from Christner to a phone number designated as “Target Telephone 7.” R. vol. 3, 129. In the call , Christner arranged to meet wit h an individual and accompany that individual to buy four ounces of methamphetamine for $3,200. Christner told this individual th at he’d “be on foot,” Supp. R. 89, and that the individual should pick him up so t hey could then go buy the dru gs. Christner then made a second intercepted call, i n which he arranged to meet St ephen Morales at a Pic Quick convenience store. Chr istner indicated to Morales tha t he wanted to pick up money from Morales for the drug purchase he planned to make with the individual on the first call. At the end of t he call with Morales, Christn er said, “[T]here’s my ride.” Id. at 91. He asked Morales to go to the Pic Quick “right now.” Id. At this time, Becknell was surve illing Christner, who was stand ing on a street corner. Becknell watched as a gol d Mitsubishi pulled up and Chr istner got into the5 passenger side of the vehicle. B ecknell then followed the Mitsu bishi as it drove to a Pic Quick and parked. Becknell fo llowed Christner and the Mitsu bishi’s driver into the Pic Quick, at one point pa ssing “within a couple of feet” o f the two men. R. vol. 3, 212. Becknell then watched Chr istner leave the Pic Quick, ge t into a green car for a few minutes, and then get b ack into the Mitsubishi. Later that day, Billhymer learnedthat Rose Marquez owned the M itsubishi and that Jessie Marquez was her s on. Billhymer showed Jessie Marque z’ driver’s license picture to Becknell, and Becknell identified him as the driver of the Mitsubishi. Becknell also identified Mar quez in court as the driver. The government presented additi onal evidence corroborating thatit was Marquez’ voice the agents inter cepted on Target Telephone 7. Fi rst, in another call to Target Telephone 7, the speaker w ho answered the phone said he was “at [his] house in town. Over here on Hoagland. ” Supp. R. 78. Investigators dis covered that Marquez had two residences, one of whic h had an address on Hoagland. Se cond, in another call to Target Telephone 7, the s peaker who answered the phone mentioned that he worked at or near a Chuck E. Ch eese at the mall, and investigat ors confirmed that Marquez worked there. Third, and perhaps most cr itically, in a call made by Target Telephone 7, the caller identified himself as “Jessie”—Marquez’ first name. Id. at 134. Marquez points out that Billhymertestified she’d never actuall y heard Marquez speak in person. Nor did the government present a witne ss familiar with Marquez’ voice to testify that Marquez was speaking on the Targ et Telephone 7 calls.6 But as we have outlined, the government presented strong circum stantial evidence that Marquez was the speaker on Target Telephone 7. And Marquez presents no other challenge to the suffi ciency of the eviden ce for these counts. Thus, viewed in the light most favorable to the govern ment, the evidence was suffic ient for a rational jury to conclude that Marquez, speaki ng on Target Telephone 7, used a phone to facilitate a drug felony. See Dahda , 853 F.3d at 1106. B. Conspiracy Marquez also challenges the su fficiency of the evidence support ing his conspiracy conviction. To convictMarquez on this count, the go vernment had to prove that (1) “two or more pers ons agreed to violate the law,” (2) Marquez “knew the essential objectives of the conspiracy,” (3) Marquez “knowi ngly and voluntarily participated in the conspiracy,” and (4) “the alleged co[]consp irators were interdependent.” Id. at 1107. Additionally, to establish the scope of the charged conspiracy, the government had t o prove that itinvolved “500 g rams and more” of methamphetamine. R. vol. 1, 2. Ma rquez challenges all but the f irst of these elements, and his overarching ar gument is that the government f ailed to prove that he participated in a broad, 18-pe rson conspiracy involving over 50 0 grams of methamphetamine. First, Marquez points out that th e evidence showed he interacte d only with Christner and not with any of the other 17 people charged in th is conspiracy. He argues that his separation from th e rest of the group means tha t he didn’t “kn[o]w the essential objectives of the conspiracy.” Dahda , 853 F.3d at 1107. But being separate7 from the remainder of the conspir acy isn’t determinative: “A co nspirator ‘need not know of the existence or identity of the other members of the c onspiracy or the full extent of the conspiracy.’” United States v. Evans , 970 F.2d 663, 669 (10th Cir. 1992) (quoting United States v. Metro. Enters., Inc. , 728 F.2d 444, 451 (10th Cir. 1984)). Instead, a conspirator mu st simply be generally aware o f the conspiracy’s scope and objective. Id. at 670. Here, contrary to Marquez’ argum ent, the government’s evidence showed that Marquez was generally aware of t he full scope and objective of the conspiracy, which was to distribute over 500 grams of methamphetamine. True, the evidence showed that Marquez himself distributed m ethamphetamine from Christneronly in ounce quantities, not in pounds. But sev eral of the intercepted phone calls showed that Marquez helped Christner locat e a new methamphetamine supplier— one who was willing to sell Christner two po unds of methamphetamine per wee k. Specifically, Marquez reported to Christner, “I got us two a week. We’re talk ing the p’s at least, not three, but I got us two.” S upp. R. 76. Law-enforcement offi cers testified that “p’s” means “pounds,” R. vol. 3, 332, that this conversation wa s about pounds of methamphetamine, and that there are “about 454 grams in a pound ,” id. at 322. So when Marquez reported that he “ got [them]” two pounds of metham phetamine per week, he was referring to an amo unt well over the 500 grams cha rged in the indictment. From these facts, viewed in th e light most favorable to the gov ernment, a reasonable jury could conclude both that (1) the essential obje ctive of the conspiracy8 was to distribute over 500 grams of methamphetamine and (2) Mar quez knew as much. That the evidence didn’t s how Marquez interacting with ot her charged coconspirators isn’t determinati ve: a conspiracy requires only “two or more” people, and the evidence showed Marqu ez conspired with Christner. Dahda , 853 F.3d at
1107. This same evidence supports the conclusion that Marquez “knowin gly and voluntarily participate d” in this conspiracy. Id. He both helped Christner find a new supplier and distributed metham phetamine that Christner provide d. In short, this evidence showed that Marquez play ed at least “a minor role in t he conspiracy [sufficient] to make hima co[]conspirator.” United States v. Pickel , 863 F.3d 1240, 1252 (10th Cir. 2017). Marquez challenges the interdepe ndence element as well, for whi ch “the evidence must show the ‘coconspi rators intend[ed] to act togeth er for their shared mutual benefit within the scope of the conspiracy charged.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Caldwell , 589 F.3d 1323, 1329 (10th Cir. 2009)). To determine whether the governme nt presented sufficient eviden ce of this element, we ask whether Marquez’ actions “ facilitated the endeavors of o ther alleged co[]conspirators or facilitate d the venture as a whole.” Id. at 1252–53 (quoting
United States v. Acosta-Gallardo , 656 F.3d 1109, 1124 (10th Cir. 2011)). Contrary to Marquez’ argument, t he government presented suffici ent evidence of interdependence. First, Marqu ez’ assistance in finding Chris tner a new methamphetamine supplier was undo ubtedly intended to facilitate the drug9 conspiracy. See id. at 1253 (“[A] single act can b e sufficient to demonstrate interdependence.” (quoting Caldwell , 589 F.3d at 1329)); Evans , 970 F.2d at 671 (“What is needed is proof that [the conspirators] intended to a ct together for their shared mutual benefitwithin the scope of the conspir acy charged.”). The government bolstered this conclusion by pres enting intercepted calls that Christner made to four of his other distributors immedi ately after learning that Marqu ez had reached a deal with the supplier for two pounds of methamphetamine a week. In these calls, Christner told his distributors that he obtained some “grocerie s,” which investigators testified meant methamphetamine . Supp. R. 82. He also told his distributors that he would be getting more methampheta mine in the future: “I think I found uh, uh, somebody with those groceries all the time.” Id. at 83. This was su fficient evidence from which the jury could conclude that Marquez’ actions “were necessary or advantageous to the success of t he activities of co[]conspirato rs,” satisfying the interdependence element of conspiracy. Pickel , 863 F.3d at 1253 (quoting United States v. Daily , 921 F.2d 994, 1007 (10th Cir. 1990), abrogated on other grounds by
United States v. Gaudin , 515 U.S. 506 (1995)). Marquez also frames his sufficie ncy argument in a different lig ht, insisting that a fatal variance occurred because the evidence at trial only pr oved that he participated in smaller, indivi dual conspiracies and not the la rge, 500-gram conspiracy charged in the indictment. See United States v. Carnagie , 533 F.3d 1231, 1237 (10th Cir. 2008) (“A varian ce arises when an indictment ch arges a single conspiracy but the evidence pres ented at trial proves only the existence of multiple10 conspiracies.”). But as we hav e outlined, the government’s evid ence was sufficient for a jury to conclude that Mar quez knew the conspiracy’s essen tial objective and knowingly and vol untarily participated in it because he helped Christner find a supplier of two pound s, or 908 grams, of methamphetamine per we ek. That conclusion dooms Marquez’ variance argument. See United States v. Griffin , 493 F.3d 856, 862 (7th Cir. 2007) (“W e treat a conspiracy variance claim as an attack on the sufficiency of th e evidence supporting the jury’s finding t hat each defendant was a member of the same conspiracy.”). Thus, we reject Marquez’ contenti on that a variance occurred in this case. See
United States v. Fishman , 645 F.3d 1175, 1191 (10th Ci r. 2011) (finding no variance because “record amply support[ed] the jury ’s determination thatthere was only a single conspiracy”). And because we find no variance, “we do no t reach the second question of whether [the] varia nce substantially prejudiced” Ma rquez. United States
v. Serrato , 742 F.3d 461, 468 (10th Cir. 2014).
C. Possession with I ntent to Distribute Marquez next argues that the gove rnment’s evidence was insuffic ient to prove that he possessed methamphetamine with the intent to distribute it. The indictment charged Marquez with possessing and intending to distribute met hamphetamine “[o]n or about March 16, 2013.” R. vol . 1, 18. The government’s only evidence for this count was one intercepted phone call between Marquez and Christ ner on March 16. It introduced no other evidence to s how that Marquez possessed dru gs on that date.11 In the call, Christner and Marq uez didn’t specifically use the words “drugs” or “methamphetamine.” But governmentwitnesses testif ied that they were discussing methamphetamine in coded langua ge. Essentially, the two discuss ed Marquez’ progress in distributing a prio r batch of low-quality methamphe tamine and a new batch of high-quality methamphe tamine. Marquez told Christner—i n reference to the low-quality batch—“I still have it.” Supp. R. 25. Christner rep lied that if people were complaining about the low qualit y, Marquez should sell the new, higher-quality batch. Marquez told Christner tha t people weren’t complaining. And about the highquality batch, Marquez said, “I hav en’t even got to that yet.” Id. Marquez contends that this inter cepted call wasn’t sufficient t o prove that he possessed methamphetamine on Ma rch 16. In support, he cites two cases from this Circuit, United States v. Hall , 473 F.3d 1295 (10th Cir. 2007), and United States v. Baggett , 890 F.2d 1095 (10th Cir. 1989); and one Second Circuit case, United States v. Bryce , 208 F.3d 346 (2d Cir. 1999). He then nakedly asserts, in an a rgument section spanning just over one p age, that these authorities sta nd for the proposition that “phone calls indicating meth [amphetamine] possession, stan ding alone” are

never sufficient to prove po ssession. Aplt. Br. 26.

As Marquez points out, in both Hall and Baggett , this court found intercepted phone calls to be insufficien t, standing alone , to support poss ession convictions. See
Hall , 473 F.3d at 1309; Baggett , 890 F.2d at 1096–97. But Marquez overstates the holdings of those cases, especia lly in light of critical factua l distinctions. For instance, the phone calls in both Hall and Baggett involved individua ls arranging to12 buy drugs. See Hall , 473 F.3d at 1307; Baggett , 890 F.2d at 1096. Standing alone, those calls established only thatthe defendants attempted to p urchase drugs, not that they ever actually possessed the m. As a result, the calls weren ’t sufficient, on their own, to establish a possession crime. See Hall , 473 F.3d at 1309; Baggett , 890 F.2d at 1096–97. Here, the call di dn’t show Marquez arranging to buy methamphetamine from Christner—on the contrary, M arquez specifically discussed distributing the methamphetamine he already possessed. The facts in Bryce are similarly distinguishable . In the phone calls at issue there, the defendant said that h e “possess[ed] a large quantity of powder cocaine, maintained that he had sold or o therwise distri buted several ki lograms to others, and agreed to sell one kilogram . . . for $22,500.” 208 F.3d at 353 . The Second Circuit determined that the defendant’s statements, standing alone, wer en’t sufficient to support a possession conviction because they “raise[d] question s as to whether or not [the defendant] actually possesse d or distributed cocaine on th e relevant dates.” Id. at 356. Specifically, alth ough the defendant appeared to agree to sell some drugs that he possessed, he then (1) became u navailable to the buyer, (2) bac ktracked on the amount he possessed, (3) only relu ctantly agreed to make the sa le, and (4) never met with the buyer as planned. See id. In light of such equivocal s tatements and behavior, the Second Circuit concluded th at a rational jury could not hav e found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant possesse d cocaine on the da te alleged. See id. In contrast, Marquez’ statements here were unequivocal. He plai nly told Christner that he possessed two batches of methamphetamine and that he had been13 distributing only the low-quality batch. And here, unlike in Bryce , there was no evidence to undercut Ma rquez’ straightforward assertion of poss ession. In short, we reject Marquez’ argument that Hall , Baggett , and Bryce stand for the proposition that phone calls a re never sufficient, standing alone, to support a possession conviction. In each of those cases, the government p resented only circumstantial evidence of po ssession, such as phone calls show ing a plan to purchase drugs or containing unre liable statements of possessio n. From such circumstantial evidence, a jury c ould only determine possession by inferring that the drug purchase actually took place or that some other evidence c orroborated the unreliable statement. Indeed, the Baggett court noted that “[i]f the prosecution is not going to present direct evidence of drug possession, its circum stantial evidence must include some testimony linking def endant to an observed substan ce that a jury can infer to be a narcotic.” 890 F.2d at 1097. But in this case, the government did present “direct evidence of drug possession.” Id. “Direct evidence is evidence [t hat], if believed, resolves a m atter in issue” without further inference. United States v. Cardinas Garcia , 596 F.3d 788, 796–97 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting 16 McCormick on Evidence § 185 (6th ed. 2006));
see also Evidence , Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (defining “direct evidence” as “[e]viden ce that is based on personal knowledge orobservation and that, if true, proves a fact without inference or presumption”) . If the jury believed Marquez’ statements that he “st ill” had the low-quality methamp hetamine and “ha[d]n’t even got[ten] to” the high-quality methamphetamine, n o further inference14 was necessary to conclude that he possessed methamphetamine. Su pp. R. 25; see also
United States v. Levario , 877 F.2d 1483, 1485 (10th Cir. 1989) (describing defendant’s statement about what he was transporting—“I didn’t think it was that [cocaine], I thought i t would be marijuana” —as “direct evidence ” of drug possession (alteration in original)), overruled on other grounds by Gozlon-Peretz v. United
States , 498 U.S. 395 (1991). Thus, Marqu ez’ statements on the interce pted call, viewed in the light most favorab le to the government, were suff icient for a jury to conclude beyond a reas onable doubt that on M arch 16, 2013, he p ossessed methamphetamine with in tent to distribute.
II. District Court’s Witness Examination Marquez next asserts that the di strict court erred when it ques tioned Agent Billhymer in front of the jury. A s Marquez acknowledges, he did not object to this questioning below, so we r eview for plain error. See United States v. Ibarra-Diaz , 805 F.3d 908, 916 (10th Cir. 2015). To obtain relief under the plain-error standard, Marquez must show (1) that error occurred, (2) tha t the error i s plain, (3) that the error affected his s ubstantial rights, and (4) that the error “ seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity, or public r eputation of judicial proceedin gs.” United States v.
Bustamante-Conchas , 850 F.3d 1130, 1137 (10th Ci r. 2017) (en banc) (quoting
United States v. Mike , 632 F.3d 686, 691–92 (10th Cir. 2011)). As we explain, Marquez cannot show that the district court erred. First, although Marquez insists that it was “unusual” for the d istrict court to question a witness, Aplt. Br. 10 , 30, a district court’s “autho rity to question witnesses15 is . . . beyond dispute,” United States v. Albers , 93 F.3d 1469, 1485 (10th Cir. 1996);
see also Fed. R. Evid. 614(b) (“The [dist rict] court may examine a witn ess regardless of who calls the witness.”). Here , the district court asked Bil lhymer one question. Billhymer testified, when discu ssing one of the intercepted cal ls, that Marquez’ reference to “four for 32,” was a reference to purchasing four ounces of methamphetamine for $3,200 as opp osed to four pounds for $32,00 0. R. vol. 3, 182. The district court asked her howshe reached that conclusion, i n light of earlier testimony that Christner previous ly purchased one pound for $8, 000, such that four pounds would have been $32,000. I n response, Billhymer admitted that the reference to “four for 32” could have been to four pounds but explained t hat the context indicated it was a reference to four ounces; Christner, who usu ally dealt in pounds, hadn’t seemed satisfi ed with the quantity. Marquez insists that the distric t court’s question was improperand prejudiced the jury against him. Specificall y, he contends that the questi on made it appear to the jury that the court thought Mar quez was dealing in pounds of me thamphetamine. Marquez is correct that judges can overstep the bounds of theirauthority in questioning witnesses. See, e.g. , United States v. Bland , 697 F.2d 262, 264–66 (8th Cir. 1983) (finding that judge’s questioning constituted revers ible error because court essentially took over cross-examin ation for government). For ex ample, when questioning witnesses, judges shou ld “take care not to create t he appearance that [they are] less than totally impartial.” Albers , 93 F.3d at 1485; see also Fed. R. Evid.16 614(b) advisory comm ittee’s note to 1972 pr oposed rules (noting that district court can’t “abandon[] [its] proper ro le and assume[] that of advocat e”). But contrary to Marquez’ asserti on, the district court’s questi on here didn’t create the appearance of impart iality; it merely clarified a fa ctual matter. See Albers , 93 F.3d at 1486 (“We have noted t he propriety of questioning by the court to clarify testimony . . . .”); cf. United States v. Campino , 890 F.2d 588, 592 (2d Cir. 1989) (finding no error in district court’s suggestion that governmen t call another witness because “[i]t is the very function of the trial court to establ ish the facts as clearly and completely as possible”; explaini ng that “[b]y seeking addition al evidence . . . the court in no way displayed a pr edisposition towards the governme nt’s position”). In fact, when Marquez’ counsel began his cross-examination of Bill hymer immediately following the district court’s que stion, he noted: “That’s actu ally one of the things I was going to ask you, too.” R. vol. 3, 183. Marquez doesn’t cite any cases fro m this Circuit to support his argument that the district court erred in ask ing this question, and the cases he does cite are easily distinguishable: each involved a district court going far beyon d asking a single question clarifying a factual matter. See Quercia v. United States , 289 U.S. 466, 468, 472 (1933) (reversing conviction because district court told ju ry that he believed witness lied); United States v. Ottaviano , 738 F.3d 586, 595–9 8 (3d Cir. 2013) (finding error in extensive and a ggressive questioning by court but declining to reverse because the questions o ccupied a fraction of record andthe evidence against defendant was overwhelming); United States v. Godwin , 272 F.3d 659, 674–75, 679–17 81 (4th Cir. 2001) (assuming dist rict court erred by extensivel y cross-examining testifying defendant, expressing doubt about defendant’s veraci ty, and rehabilitating government witnesses butfinding no prejudice); United States v. Beaty , 722 F.2d 1090, 1095–96 (3d Cir. 1983) (re versing one conviction because district court’s “overzealous examination” of ke y defense witness, including que stions unrelated to crimes charged or subs tance of witness’ testimony, gave impress ion that judge didn’t believe witness). Here, the district court’s ques tion did not advocate for the go vernment or create the impression of impar tiality. Rather, the question mer ely sought clarification of a factual matter—a factual ma tter that even defense counsel thought would benefit from such clarification. See Albers , 93 F.3d at 1486. Thus, w e conclude that the district court did not err. And because we find no error, we ne ed not consider the remaining steps of plain-error review. See United States v. Fabiano , 169 F.3d 1299, 1305 (10th Cir. 1999). III. The DEA Agents’ Testimony Marquez next challenges the ad mission of certain testimony from Agents Billhymer and Becknell. We consid er each of his challenges in turn. A. Christner’s Out-o f-Court Statements Marquez first suggests that som e of Billhymer’s t estimony viola ted the Confrontation Clause. 2 We review this issue de novo. United States v. Garcia , 793

2 Marquez’ opening brief include s a single sentence on this issu e and fails to explain why Billhymer’s testimo ny violated the Confrontation Cl ause. Nor does18 F.3d 1194, 1211 (10th Cir. 2015). The specific testimony at issue here involved a single question and a single answer. The prosecutor asked B illhymer what she learned during an interview that she conducted with Christner before his death. 3 Marquez’ counsel objected on Confrontation Clause grounds, a nd the district court ruled thatit would permit the government to “go a little bit down this path, but [it didn’t] know how far.” R. vol. 3, 243. The prosecutor then rephras ed her question and asked Billh ymer, “Did that conversation [with Christner] c onfirm generally what you believ ed you understood from the investigation about the structure of . . . Christner’s drug business?” Id. Billhymer said, “Yes.” Id. And then the prosecutor moved on. Later, on crossexamination, Marquez’ counsel e licited from Billhymer that Chri stner never implicated or named Marqu ez during the interview. The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment guarantees crim inal defendants the right to confrontthe witnesses against them. See U.S. Const. amend VI; Crawford v. Washington , 541 U.S. 36, 42 (2004). And th e primary concern of the Confrontation Clause is “testimo nial hearsay,” which includes o ut-of-court Marquez provide the appli cable standard of review. See Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8) (requiring argument to include “appellant’s contentions and the reasons for them” as well as “a concise statement of the applicable standard of revi ew”). As such, we could consider this argument wa ived and decline to consider it. See Bronson v. Swensen , 500 F.3d 1099, 1104 (10th Cir. 2007) (“[W]e routinely have de clined to consider arguments that . . . are inadequately presented[] in a n appellant’s opening brief.”). Nevertheless, we elec t to consider the argument on th e merits. See United States v. Pam , 867 F.3d 1191, 1200 n.7 (10th Cir. 2017) (noting that appella te court has discretion to consider merits of inadequately briefed argum ent). 3 Recall that, several months bef ore the government indicted Mar quez, Christner died from complicati ons following heart surgery.19 statements, offered for their truth, made during a police interrogation. Crawford , 541 U.S. at 53. Here, the government conceded at oral argument that Billhymer’s statement involved testimonial h earsay and violated the Confron tation Clause. But not all Confrontation Clause violations warrant relief; suc h errors can be harmless, as the government argue s is the case here. A Confront ation Clause violation is harmless if it’s clear beyond a reasonable doubt t hat “the properly admitted evidence of guilt is so overwhelming” that “the prejud icial effect of the improperly admitted evidence is . . . insignificant by comparis on.” United States v.
Edwards , 782 F.3d 554, 560–61 ( 10th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Becker , 230 F.3d 1224, 1230 ( 10th Cir. 2000)). Here, Billhymer’s limited testim ony about what Christner told h er was insignificant in the context of t he other evidence against Marq uez. See United States v. Chavez , 481 F.3d 1274, 1278 (10th Cir. 2007) (finding C onfrontation C lause violation harmless in part becau se the testimony “was relativel y unimportant to the government’s case” and “[t]he government provided ample evidenc e to support the conspiracy charge”). The governme nt presented 21 intercepted ph one calls and 11 text messages involving Marquez— calls and texts that, in contex t, show Marquez participating in conversations with Christner and others about buying and selling methamphetamine. Thus, as Marqu ez’ counsel argued to the jury i n closing and argues elsewhere in this appeal, the case against Marquez turne d largely on whether the jury believed it was Marqu ez’ voice on the calls. And Billh ymer’s brief description of the interview with Christner didn’t identify eit her Marquez or the20 substance of any of the interce pted calls. Further, Marquez’ co unsel elicited on crossexamination that Christner didn’ t name Marquez as a coconspirat or. Marquez asserts that Billhymer’s testimony about Christner’s in terview was “the lynchpin used by the [g]ove rnment and its law[-]enforcemen t witness to ‘confirm’ its theory of the cas e and speculations against Marqu ez.” Rep. Br. 16 (quoting R. vol. 3, 243). But the intercepted calls in which Ma rquez discussed buying and selling methamphetamine wer e far more essential to the gove rnment’s case and more damning to Marquez’ defense . And notably, in its closing a rgument, the government didn’t even mention B illhymer’s interview of Christn er. Instead, it replayed excerpts from t he intercepted calls. See Chavez , 481 F.3d at 127 8 (noting as part of harmlessness inquiry tha t neither party mentioned impro per testimony in closing). In sum, any prejudicial effect created by Billhymer’s testimony that Christner “confirm[ed] generally” the details of her investigat ion was insignificant when compared to the overwhelmi ng evidence against Marquez as r eflected in the intercepted calls. R. vol. 3, 243 . Thus, any error in the distr ict court’s decision to admit that testimony was harm less beyond a reasonable doubt. See Edwards , 782 F.3d at 560–61.21 B. Marquez’ Role in the Conspiracy Marquez next challenges the ad mission of Billhymer’s testimony about Marquez’ role in the conspiracy. 4 Billhymer twice testified specifically about Marquez’ role. First, early in th e trial, Billhymer testified t hat as of March 2013, based on intercepted calls and su rveillance, she believed that Marquez distributed methamphetamine he received from Christner. Billhymer later rep eated this assertion, testifying that as of June 2013, she believed that Marquez was one of Christner’s distributors. Because Marquez’ counsel objected below, we review the admissio n of this evidence for an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Brooks , 736 F.3d 921, 929 (10th Cir. 2013). A district cour t abuses its discretion when i ts decision is “arbitrary, capricious, whimsical[,] ormanifestly unreasonable.” United States v. Banks , 761 F.3d 1163, 1197 (10th Cir. 2014). Federal Rule of Evidence 701 gov erns lay opinion testimony, whi ch must be (1) “rationally based on the witn ess’s perception,” (2) “helpfu l to clearly understanding the witness’s tes timony or to determining a fact in issue,” and (3) “not based on scientific, technical, orother specialized knowledge. ” The purpose of Rule 701 is “to exclude testimony wher e the witness is no better sui ted than the jury to make the judgment at issue, provi ding assurance against the adm ission of opinions [that] merely tell the jury what result to reach.” Brooks , 736 F.3d at 931 n.2 (quoting

4 We note, again, that we elect t o consider the merits of Marque z’ argument despite his inadequate opening br ief, which does little more th an recite the testimony he purports to challenge. See Pam , 867 F.3d at 1200 n.7.22 United States v. Meises , 645 F.3d 5, 16 (1st Cir. 2011)). Relying on United States v. Williams , 827 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2016), Marquez asserts that because Bi llhymer had no personal knowledg e of Marquez’ role in the conspiracy, she couldn’t te stify about that role as a la y opinion witness. See Fed. R. Evid. 701(a) advisory co mmittee’s notes to 1972 propose d rules (noting “the familiar requirement of first-ha nd knowledge or observation”). In Williams , the D.C. Circuit concluded that certain lay opinion testimony wasn’t pro per because the witness didn’t disclose the “obj ective bases” for his opinions. See 827 F.3d at 1159. We’re not bound by the D.C. C ircuit’s objective-basis rule. See Jordan v.
Sosa , 654 F.3d 1012, 1034 (10th Cir . 2011) (noting that this court isn’t “bound by opinions handed down in ot her circuits” (quoting Hill v. Kan. Gas Serv. Co. , 323 F.3d 858, 869 (10th Cir. 2003))) . And even assuming we agreed t o follow that rule here, Marquez wouldn’t be entitl ed to relief. As the governmentpoints out, Billhymer had an objective basis for her c onclusions in this case: she te stified based on her own perception of Marquez’ role, whi ch she gleaned from personally listening to “[h]undreds of hours of [interc epted] calls.” R. vol. 3, 38; cf. Brooks , 736 F.3d at 934 (noting that “witness[ing] a c ontrolled drug purchase” would es tablish an officer’s “firsthand knowledge”). Specifically, one of the first calls the government played for the jury included Marquez and Christner discussing the distribution of methamphet amine that Marquez received from Christner. Shortly thereafter, on redirect examin ation, Billhymer testified that the intercepted calls up to this point led her t o believe that Marquez was23 a distributor for Christner. Li kewise, Billhymer’s second state ment about Marquez’ role was also based on an interce pted call. The government play ed a call in which Marquez asked Christner to save him an ounce and a half of meth amphetamine. Billhymer then explained that, bas ed on this call, she believed Marquez’ role was distributing methamphetamine forChristner. Thus, Billhymer’s l ay opinion testimony was based on her pers onal observations, and t he district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting it. 5 C. Billhymer’s Code-Word Testimony Marquez next challenges Billhym er’s testimony about the meaning of code words used in the intercepted calls. Because Marquez didn’t obj ect to this testimony during trial, we apply plain-error review. See Brooks , 736 F.3d at 929–30. Marquez argues that Billhymer’s c ode-word testimony was expert testimony improperly masquerading as lay t estimony. He insists that her e xplanation of codeword meanings was based on her ge neral law-enforcement experien ce rather than her

5 In his opening brief, Marquez al so argues that “[a]fter nearly every recording played, the prosecutor asked . . . Billhymer to tell the jury w hat it really meant.” Aplt. Br. 38. In support, he provides a string cite to various locati ons in the record where Billhymer made these additional a nd allegedly impermissible sta tements. But we need not consider this br oader argument. Marquez forfeit ed any challenge to the statements liste d in his string cite because h is counsel failed to object to them at trial. See Richison v. Ernest Grp., Inc. , 634 F.3d 1123, 1127 –28 (10th Cir. 2011). And although we can review forfeited arguments for plain error, Marquez “fail[ed] to argue for p lain error” on appeal. Id. at 1131. He therefore waived any argument that admitting these stat ements satisfied this standar d. See McKissick v. Yuen , 618 F.3d 1177, 1189 (10th Cir . 2010) (concludi ng that if appe llant forfeits an argument and then “fail[s] to e xplain in [his or] her opening appellate brief . . . how they survive the plain[-]error standard,” appellant thereby “wa ives the argument[] in this court”).24 personal knowledge and was theref ore inadmissible under Rule 70 1. See United States v. Yeley-Davis , 632 F.3d 673, 684 (10th Cir. 201 1) (noting that someone “may testify as a lay witness only if [her] opinions or inferences do not require any specialized knowledge and could be reached by any ordinary pers on” (emphasis added) (quoting Lifewise Master Funding v. Telebank , 374 F.3d 917, 929 (10th Cir. 2004))). But as just explained , Billhymer’s testimony about Mar quez’ role in the conspiracy was based on the pers onal knowledge she acquired fro m listening to “[h]undreds of hours of calls” wh ile overseeing this investigat ion. R. vol. 3, 38. It’s likewise reasonable to conclude t hat while listening to these c alls, Billhymer became personally familiar with the mean ing of the coded language thatMarquez and Christner used to disc uss methamphetamine. Contrary to Marquez’ assertion, t his was not a situation in whi ch Billhymer’s knowledge about the meaning of code d drug language was based on past investigations; her testimony wa s based on what she learned dur ing this investigation.
See United States v. Miranda , 248 F.3d 434, 441 (5th Cir . 2001) (noting that lawenforcement officer could tes tify as nonexpert about meaning of code words based on personal perception developed fro m his “extensive participation in the investigation of [the] conspiracy, i ncluding . . . the monitoring and transla ting of intercepted telephone conversations”). Moreover , even if we were to assume that the district court erred in admitting some p art of Billhymer’s testimony, we would decline to find that the error was plain. T o be plain, an e rror must viola te the well-settled law of the Supreme Court or this circuit. See Brooks , 736 F.3d at 930. And Marquez hasn’t25 pointed us to any Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit authority find ing error in testimony like this. Thus, we decline to fin d that the district court err ed, plainly or otherwise, in admitting Billhymer’s testimony about the meaning of the code w ords in this case. D. Agent Becknell’s Lay and Expert Testimony Marquez also challenges some o f Agent Becknell’s testimony, ass erting that it improperly conflated lay and e xpert testimony. Marquez again ac knowledges that he didn’t object to this testimony be low and urges us to find plai n error. See id. at 929–
30. Like Billhymer, Becknell testifie d about the meaning of certain code words in drug culture. But unlike Billhym er, Becknell testified as an ex pert under Federal Rule of Evidence 702. His particular e xpertise was “in organizationa l structure and the use of terminology in methamphetami ne organizations.” R. vol. 3, 30 7. A district court may permit expe rt testimony if “ the expert’s s cientific, technical, or other s pecialized knowledge will help the trier o f fact to understand the evidence or to determine a factin issue.” Fed. R. Evid. 702(a) . In drug cases, expert testimony is often admitted to hel p the jury understand drug te rminology. See United States v. Quintana , 70 F.3d 1167, 1171 (10th Cir. 1995) (“This [c]ourt has repeat edly held that in narcotics cases, e xpert testimony can assist the j ury in understanding transactions and terminology.”). Relying on United States v. Garcia , 752 F.3d 382 (4th Cir. 2014), Marquez complains that Becknell’s testim ony was both generalized from h is work as a lawenforcement officer with experi ence investigating methamphetami ne crimes and26 specifically derived from his s upervision of Billhymer’s invest igation in this particular case. In Garcia , the Fourth Circuit reversed t he defendant’s convictions because an expert who testified about the meaning of coded lang uage conflated that expert testimony with f act testimony based on her knowledge of the case. See id. at 391–92. But even if we assume that Beckne ll similarly conflated lay andexpert testimony, any error in admitti ng that testimony wasn’t plain. For an error to be plain and contrary to well-settled la w, either this court or the Supr eme Court must have addressed the issue. See Brooks , 736 F.3d at 930. Garcia , a Fourth Circuit case, doesn’t establish the well-settle d law of this circuit. In fact , we’ve expressly approved the admission of similar testimony. See Quintana , 70 F.3d at 1171 (finding district court didn’t abuse its discretion when it admitted exp ert testimony about “the meaning of the conversations rec orded on the wiretap tapes”). T hus, the district court did not plainly err in admit ting Becknell’s testimony. E. Overview Testimony Finally, Marquez also generally objects to “[n]early the entire ty of [Billhymer’s and Becknell’s] resp ective testimonies” as imprope r overview testimony. Rep. Br. 22. He didn’traise this objection below, s o plain-error review again applies. See Brooks , 736 F.3d at 929–30. Overview testimony is related t o opinion testim ony, but it’s “abroader category of evidence.” Id. at 930. It’s generally offered a t the beginning of a trial, “before there has been any evid ence admitted forthe witness to summarize.” Id.27 (quoting United States v. Griffin , 324 F.3d 330, 349 (5th Cir. 2003)). Overview testimony usually comes from a gove rnment witness who previews the government’s case by explaining how an investig ation began, which law-enforc ement agencies were involved, and which investig ative techniques they used. See id. We generally permit overview testimony, but it is subject to a buse, such as when an overview witness testifies based on hear say rather than on personal know ledge or when an overview witness offers an opi nion on the defendant’s guilt. Id. Marquez argues against the use of overview testimony generally, stating that its use is “a disturbing trend in these drug conspiracy cases.” Aplt. Br. 41. In support, he cites three cases from the F irst Circuit disapproving of suc h testimony. See
Meises , 645 F.3d 5; United States v. Flores-de-Jesús , 569 F.3d 8 (1s t Cir. 2009);
United States v. Casas , 356 F.3d 104 (1st Cir. 2004). For two reasons, we reject Marqu ez’ argument and reliance on th ese out-ofcircuit cases. First, as the government asserts, Marquez doesn’ t identify any particular testimony from eitherBillhymer or Becknell that qua lifies as overview testimony, let alone explain why that particular overview testi mony was improper. Cf. United States v. Kamahele , 748 F.3d 984, 1000 (10t h Cir. 2014) (rejecting Confrontation Clause challenge b ecause appellants “generally de scribe[d]” the witness’ testimony but didn’t “ide ntify the parts that involved the recitation of testimonial hearsay”). As such, we could treat this issue as in adequately briefed and decline to consider it. See Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8)(A) (r equiring appellant’s brief to contain “appellant’s contentions and the reasons for them, with citations to the . . .28 parts of the record on whi ch the appellant relies”); United States v. Gutierrez de Lopez , 761 F.3d 1123, 1137 n. 16 (10th Cir. 2014) (finding undevelope d argument waived). Second, any error in admitting a ny alleged overview testimony w asn’t plain because the First Circuit cases on which Marquez relies don’t e stablish the wellsettled law of this circuit. See Brooks , 736 F.3d at 930 (“[F]or a n error to be [plain and] contrary to well-settled l aw, either the Supreme Court or this court must have addressed the issue.” (quoting Thornburgh , 645 F.3d at 1208)). In Brooks , we referenced these three First Cir cuit cases, but we held that th e defendant couldn’t show plain error under Tenth Circ uit caselaw because “none of o ur prior cases have condemned unobjected-to overview testimony to the extent defend ants now request.”
Id. at 930–32, 931 n.2. Similarly, h ere, any error in admitting Bi llhymer’s testimony wasn’t plain under our prior c aselaw. Thus, we reject Marquez’ generalized assertion that Becknell’s or Billhymer’s t estimony constitu ted improper o verview testimony.
Conclusion To summarize, we rej ect each of Marquez’ challenges on appeal. The evidence was sufficient for a rational ju ry to conclude that Marquez use d a phone to facilitate a drug felony on four occasions; th at he was a member of a conspi racy to distribute over 500 grams of methamphetamine ; and that on March 16, he pos sessed methamphetamine with intent to distribute. And the district cou rt didn’t err when it asked a witness one que stion to clarify a f actual matter. Nor d id it abuse its discretion29 or plainly err in admitting te stimony from government agents. A ccordingly, we affirm.