alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### James HASKIN et al., Appellants, v. Henry R. MORTON, etc., et al., Appellees.

No. 71-2034.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Feb. 17, 1972.

Rehearing Denied March 10, 1972.

Burton Marks, of Marks, Sherman & Schwartz, Beverly Hills, Cal., for appellants.

Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., Arnold O. Overoye, Daniel J. Kremer, Deputy Attys. Gen., Sacramento, Cal., Sahdell, Hill & Young, McCormick, Barstow, Sheppard, Coyle & Best, Parichan, Krebs, Renberg & Eldridge; Robert M. Wash, County Counsel for Fresno City, Fresno, Cal., for appellees.

Before ELY, WRIGHT and CHOY, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

This appeal is from the District Court’s dismissal of a complaint. In the complaint the appellants generally alleged that certain material had been seized from their place of business and that they had been unlawfully subjected to state prosecution upon the charge that the seized material was obscene. In their complaint they prayed for damages, an injunction against the state court criminal proceedings, and a declaratory judgment that certain California Penal Code provisions are unconstitutional. After certain preliminary proceedings, the District Court dismissed the complaint upon its finding that the same failed to state a claim upon which it might grant relief. In dismissing the complaint, however, the District Court at the same time granted the plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint and prescribed a period of sixty days within which they might do so. No amendment was presented, and the appeal followed.

Ordinarily, an appeal may not be taken from an Order dismissing a complaint only, rather than the action. Jackson v. Nelson, 405 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1968). It is especially important *1072that this rule be applied when one whose complaint is dismissed is granted leave to file an amended complaint. Epton v. Hogan, 355 F.2d 203 (2d Cir. 1966).

We recognize that there are unusual cases in which an appeal has been allowed from an Order dismissing a complaint. *See e. g.,*Marshall v. Sawyer, 301 F.2d 639 (9th Cir. 1962). In the circumstances of the instant case, however, we see no reason to depart from the ordinary principle applicable to the appealability, *vel non,*of an Order dismissing a complaint but allowing for the amendment thereof. Accordingly, the appeal herein is

Dismissed.
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 23.1

                         CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT AUDITORS

We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statement (Form
S-8 No. 333-78707) pertaining to the 1998 Stock Option Plan and the
Post-Effective Amendment to Registration Statement (Form S-8 No. 333-31422)
pertaining to the 1999 Stock Incentive Plan of U.S. Laboratories Inc. and
Subsidiaries of our report dated February 22, 2002, with respect to the
consolidated financial statements of U.S. Laboratories Inc. and Subsidiaries
included in the Form 10-KSB for the year ended December 31, 2001.

                                                            /s/Ernst & Young LLP

San Diego, California
March 29, 2002
#### Debra L. BRITT v. SHELBY COUNTY HEALTH CARE AUTHORITY d/b/a Shelby Medical Center.

2991083.

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.

Jan. 17, 2003.

James M. Patton of Patton *&*Veigas, P.C., Birmingham, for appellant.

Mark W. Lee and Dorothy A. Powell of Parsons, Lee *&*Juliano, P.C., Birmingham; and Michael J. Cohan of Webb & Eley, P.C., Montgomery, for appellee.

*On Remand from the Supreme Court*

CRAWLEY, Judge.

Debra L. Britt, a respiratory technician employed by Shelby County Health Care Authority d/b/a Shelby Medical Center (“the Hospital”), was seriously injured in an automobile accident when she fell asleep at the wheel of her vehicle while driving home after working two 16-hour shifts in a 40-hour period. She sued the Hospital, asserting tort claims based on negligence and wantonness and a workers’ compensation claim. On the negligence claims, the circuit court entered a summary judgment for the Hospital. On the workers’ compensation claim, the circuit court, after a bench trial, entered a judgment for the Hospital.

On April 13, 2001, this court affirmed the judgment on the workers’ compensation claim; it reversed the judgment on the negligence claims and remanded the cause for further proceedings. The Hospital petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari to review the decision. The supreme court granted the writ to decide the following question of first impression: “whether an employee who falls asleep and is injured in an automobile accident while driving her personal vehicle home after having worked two 16-hour shifts with an 8-hour break between shifts can sustain a workers’ compensation claim or negligence and wantonness claims against her employer.” *See Ex parte Shel*
      *344
      *by County Health Care Auth.,*850 So.2d 332, 335 (Ala.2002).

The supreme court affirmed that part of this court’s judgment that affirmed the circuit court’s judgment on the workers’ compensation’s claim. However, the supreme court reversed this court’s judgment “insofar as it reverse[d] the trial court’s summary judgment in favor of the Hospital on Britt’s negligence and wantonness claims.” *See Ex parte Shelby County Health Care Auth.,*850 So.2d at 340. Therefore, in compliance with the supreme court’s opinion, the judgment of the Shelby Circuit Court is affirmed in its entirety.

AFFIRMED.

YATES, P.J., and THOMPSON, PITTMAN, and MURDOCK, JJ„ concur.
## In The Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

No s . 07 - 18 - 00206 - CV 07 - 18 - 00 297 - CV IN THE INTEREST OF P .L.G. AND H.M.G., CH ILDREN

On Appeal from the 100th District Court Childress County, Texas Trial Court No. 10,713, Honorable Stuart Messer, Presiding



### August 1 , 2018 ORDER OF SEVERANCE Before CAMPBELL and PIRTLE and P ARKER , JJ. The parents of P.L.G. and H.M.G. each timely filed notices of appeal from the trial court’s order terminating their parental rights. The children ’s mother, T.G. , has filed a brief on the merits. The children ’s father, D.Z.G. , was appointed an attorney who has filed a brief in accordance with Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 18 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1967). Because the nature of our review of Anders cases is substantially different than the nature of our review of a brief on the merits, we believe that it is appropriate to sever the appeals. Thus, by order of this Court, D.Z.G. ’s appeal is severed into cause number2

07 - 18 - 00 297 - CV. To effectuate this severance, D.Z.G.’s brief and all related filings as well as a cop y of the appellate record will be refiled in cause number 07 - 18 - 00 297 - CV by the C lerk of this Court. Per Curiam
#### Nathaniel NIXON, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Dr. George J. BETO, Director, Texas Department of Corrections, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 71-3474

Summary Calendar.*

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

March 9, 1972.

*1066Thomas M. Sewell, Jr., Houston, Tex. (Court-appointed), for petitioner-appellant.

Crawford Martin, Atty. Gen., Lonny F. Zwiener, Asst. Atty. Gen., Nola White, First Asst. Atty. Gen., Alfred Walker, Executive Asst. Atty. Gen., Robert C. Flowers, Asst. Atty. Gen., Austin, Tex., for respondent-appellee.

Before THORNBERRY, COLEMAN and INGRAHAM, Circuit Judges.

*

  Rule 18, 5th Cir.; See Isbell Enterprises, Inc. v. Citizens Casualty Co. of New York et al., 5 Cir., 1970, 431 F.2d 409, Part I.

PER CURIAM:

Upon conviction of a second assault to commit murder, Nathaniel Nixon was sentenced to prison for twenty-five years. The sole ground for the writ of habeas corpus was that in the state court Nixon had not received effective assistance from his court-appointed counsel. Upon a complete evidentiary hearing, in which Nixon was represented by counsel and testified, the District Court denied relief. The District Judge found that Nixon was not a credible witness and “is not worthy of belief”, that he had received adequate representation, and that his contentions to the contrary were frivolous.

Upon a review of the record and briefs we perceive no basis for overturning these findings. They are far from clearly erroneous.

The judgment of the District Court denying the writ is

Affirmed.
I N T H E S U P R EM E C O U R T

STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA

2024 ND 136

Dondarro Jimmell Watts, Petitioner and Appellant

v.

State of North Dakota, Respondent and Appellee

No. 20240011

Appeal from the District Court of Burleigh County, South Central Judicial District, the 

Honorable Bonnie L. Storbakken, Judge.

AFFIRMED.

Per Curiam.

Rina Morales-Holmes, Minot, ND, for petitioner and appellant; submitted on brief.

Dennis H. Ingold, Bismarck, ND, for respondent and appellee; submitted on brief.
1

Watts v. State

No. 20240011

Per Curiam.

[¶1] Dondarro Watts appeals from a district court order denying his application for 

postconviction relief. A jury convicted Watts of indecent exposure. Watts appealed his 

conviction, and this Court affirmed. State v. Watts, 2023 ND 47, 988 N.W.2d 254. Watts 

filed an application for postconviction relief, asserting he received ineffective assistance of 

trial counsel. After a hearing, the court held Watts did not demonstrate his trial counsel’s 

representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. The court further held 

Watts did not demonstrate his trial counsel’s representation prejudiced him in any way.

[¶2] Findings of fact made in a postconviction relief proceeding are subject to the clearly 

erroneous standard of review. Urrabazo v. State, 2024 ND 67, ¶ 6, 5 N.W.3d 521. After a 

full review of the record, we conclude the district court’s findings of facts are not clearly 

erroneous and the court did not err in determining Watts failed to establish ineffective 

assistance of counsel. We summarily affirm under N.D.R.App.P. 35.1(a)(2).

[¶3] Jon J. Jensen, C.J. 

Daniel J. Crothers 

Lisa Fair McEvers

Jerod E. Tufte

Douglas A. Bahr
**Exhibit 23.1**

 

**CONSENT OF ERNST & YOUNG LLP, INDEPENDENT AUDITORS**

 

We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements on Forms S-8 (File Nos. 333-104108, 333-84904, 333-57486,333-44794, 333-38078 and 333-93423) pertaining to the 2000 International Stock Option Plan, the 2000 Non-Officer Stock Option Plan, the 1997 Stock Option Plan, the 1999 Employee Stock Purchase Plan and the 1999 Nonemployee Directors Stock OptionPlan of Maxygen, Inc., of our report dated January 30, 2004, with respect to the consolidated financial statements of Maxygen, Inc. included in this Annual Report (Form 10-K) for the year ended December 31, 2003. 

 

/s/ ERNST & YOUNG LLP 

 

Palo Alto, California 

March 10, 2004
## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 98-2624

___________ Robert David Raine, * * Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the Western * District of Missouri. Dave Dormire, Superintendent; Jeremiah * (Jay) Nixon, Attorney General of the * [UNPUBLISHED] State of Missouri, * * Appellees. *

_____________ Submitted: February 12, 1999

Filed: February 18, 1999

_____________ Before BOWMAN, Chief Judge, and FAGG and HANSEN, Circuit Judges.

_____________ PER CURIAM. RobertDavid Raine appeals the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition. For several reasons, we affirm. We first reject Raine’s claim that he is actually innocent of the crime of rape. Raine has failed to show the allegedly new facts unquestionably establish his innocence, see Cornell v. Nix , 119 F.3d 1329, 1334 (8th Cir. 1997), and thus his freestanding actual innocence claim is not a proper groun d for federal habeas relief, see Herrerav. Collins , 506 U.S. 390, 404-05 (1993); Meadows v. Delo , 99 F.3d 280, 283 (8th Cir. 1996). Similarly, Raine’s claim that the trial court erroneously excluded lay testimony by Raine’s family and friends is a-2-

matter of state law that is not reviewable in this federal habeas proceeding. See Estelle v. McGuire , 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991). We also reject Raine’s assertion that his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial was violated. Raine caused most of the delay before both of his trials, did not request a speedy trial until almost two years after his arrest, and has not shown the legitimate delays prejudiced him. See Reynol ds v. Leapley , 52 F.3d 762, 763 (8th Cir. 1995). Last, we deny Raine’s claim for sanctions.
Acco rdingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of Raine’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. A true copy.
Attest: CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
**UN PUBLISHED** 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 13**  **- 6219** 

JAMES E. TASKER , Petitioner

- Appellant ,

v.
STATE OF MARYLAND; OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MARYLAND , Respondents

- Appellees

.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland , at Greenbelt

. Alexander Williams, Jr. , District Judge. ( 8:11

- cv - 01869

- AW )

Submitted : March 28, 2013 Decided: April 4, 2013

Before GREGORY, SHEDD, and WYNN , Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by un published per curiam opinion

.
James E. Tasker, Appellant Pro Se. Mary Ann Rapp Ince, Assistant Attorney General, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM:

James E. Tasker appeals the district court’s order denying his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2006) petition as untimely. Although the district court granted a certificate of appealability on the issue of whether the petition was timely filed, we confine our review on appe al to the issues raised in
Tasker’s informal brief. See 4th Cir. R. 34(b). Because Tasker’s informal brief does not challenge the basis for the district court’s disposition, he has waived appellate review of the court’s order. Accordingly, we deny Taske r’s motion for appointment of counsel and affirm the district court’s order.
Tasker v. M aryland , No. 8 : 11

- cv - 01869

- AW (D. Md. Jan. 31, 2013). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately prese nted in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent *

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision **

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

NICOLAY ROMANOVICH

VASILCHUK,

 Petitioner,

 v.

ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General,

 Respondent.

No. 08-74823

Agency No. A076-076-428

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted June 15, 2011** 

Before: CANBY, O’SCANNLAIN, and FISHER, Circuit Judges.

Nicolay Romanovich Vasilchuk, a native and citizen of Moldova, petitions

pro se for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing

his appeal from an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying his application for

asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against

FILED

JUN 22 2011

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 08-74823

Torture (“CAT”). Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for

substantial evidence, Zehatye v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 1182, 1184-85 (9th Cir. 2006),

and we dismiss in part and deny in part the petition for review.

Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s finding that the discrimination

Vasilchuk suffered in Soviet Moldova and later in Transnistria, did not rise to the

level of persecution. See Nagoulko v. INS, 333 F.3d 1012, 1016-17 (9th Cir. 2003)

(“two occasions where [petitioner] was ‘pushed’ while attending church services

interrupted by government officials does not compare to the severity of physical

abuse that in other cases we have deemed persuasive to show persecution”). 

Substantial evidence also supports the IJ’s finding that Vasilchuk did not

establish a well-founded fear of future persecution based on his Pentecostal

religion. See Molina-Estrada v. INS, 293 F.3d 1089, 1096 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he

IJ and the BIA are entitled to rely on all relevant evidence in the record, including

a State Department report, in considering whether the petitioner has demonstrated

that there is good reason to fear future persecution.”). We lack jurisdiction to

review Vasilchuk’s claim based on incidents related to his family’s emigration to

the United States because he did not raise it before the BIA. See VelascoCervantes v. Holder, 593 F.3d 975, 978 n.3 (9th Cir. 2010). Accordingly,

Vasilchuk’s asylum claim fails.
3 08-74823

Because Vasilchuk did not establish eligibility for asylum, it necessarily

follows that he did not satisfy the more stringent standard for withholding of

removal. See Zehatye, 453 F.3d at 1190.

Finally, substantial evidence supports the IJ’s denial of Vasilchuk’s claim

for CAT relief because he failed to show it is more likely than not he will be

tortured if returned to Transnistria. See Wakkary v. Holder, 558 F.3d 1049, 1067-

68 (9th Cir. 2009). 

 PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED, in part; DISMISSED, in part.
**Exhibit 32.3****CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO****18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO****SECTION 906 OF THE****SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**In connection with the Quarterly Report of New Century FinancialCorporation (the “Company”) onForm 10-Q for theperiod ending June 30, 2006 as filed with the Securitiesand Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the“Report”), I, Brad A. Morrice, President andChief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to§ 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to myknowledge:(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements ofsection 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of1934; and(2) The information contained in the Report fairlypresents, in all material respects, the financial condition andresults of operations of the Company.     /s/ Brad A. Morrice       Brad A. Morrice     President and Chief Executive Officer     August 9, 2006A signed original of this written statement required bySection 906 has been provided to the Company and will beretained by the Company and furnished to the Securities andExchange Commission or its staff upon request.The foregoing certification is being furnished with theCompany’sForm 10-Q for theperiod ending June 30, 2006 pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 1350. It is not being filed for purposes ofSection 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, asamended, and it is not to be incorporated by reference into anyfiling of the Company, whether made before or after the datehereof, regardless of any general incorporation language in suchfiling.
```

[Federal Register Volume 70, Number 203 (Friday, October 21, 2005)]
[Notices]
[Pages 61261-61262]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 05-21068]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Department of the Army

Availability for Non-Exclusive, Exclusive, or Partially Exclusive 
Licensing of U.S. Patents and Patent Applications Concerning Bacterial 
Superantigen Vaccines

AGENCY: Department of the Army, DoD.

ACTION: Notice.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: In accordance with 37 CFR 404.6 and 404.7, announcement is 
made

[[Page 61262]]

of the availability for licensing of U.S. Patent No. 6,399,332 entitled 
``Bacterial Superantigen Vaccines,'' issued June 4, 2002; U.S. Patent 
No. 6,713,284 entitled ``Bacterial Superantigen Vaccines,'' issued 
March 30, 2004; U.S. Patent Application No. 10/757,687 entitled 
``Bacterial Superantigen Vaccines,'' filed January 29, 2004, which is a 
divisional of U.S. Patent No. 6,713,284; and U.S. Patent Application 
No. 10/002,784 entitled ``Bacterial Superantigen Vaccines,'' filed 
November 26, 2001, which is a continuation in part of U.S. Patent No. 
6,713,284. Foreign rights are also available (PCT/US98/16766 and PCT/
US01/46540). The United States Government, as represented by the 
Secretary of the Army, has rights in this invention.

ADDRESSES: Commander, U.S. Army Medical Research and Material Command, 
ATTN: Command Judge Advocate, MCMR-JA, 504 Scott Street, Fort Detrick, 
Frederick, MD 21702-5012.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For patent issues, Ms. Elizabeth 
Arwine, Patent Attorney, (301) 619-7808. For licensing issues, Dr. Paul 
Mele, Office of Research & Technology Assessment, (301) 619-6664, both 
at telefax (301) 619-5034.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The present invention relates to genetically 
attenuated superantigen toxin vaccines altered such that superantigen 
attributes are absent, however the superantigen is effectively 
recognized and an appropriate immune response is produced. The 
attenuated superantigen toxins are shown to protect animals against 
challenge with wild type toxin. Methods of producing and using the 
altered superantigen toxins are described.

Brenda S. Bowen,
Army Federal Register Liaison Officer.
[FR Doc. 05-21068 Filed 10-20-05; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3710-08-M
```
CERTIFICATIONS



I, Jamie Kerr, certify that:



1.

I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-QSB of Global-e Investments, Inc.;



2.

Based on my knowledge, this quarterly report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this quarterly report;



3.

Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this quarterly report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this quarterly report;



4.

The registrant's other certifying officers and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-14 and 15d-14) for the registrant and have:



a)

designed such disclosure controls and procedures to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this quarterly report is being prepared;

b)

evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and procedures as of a date within 90 days prior to the filing date of this quarterly report (the "Evaluation Date"); and

presented in this quarterly report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures based on our evaluation as of the Evaluation Date;



5.

The registrant's other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation, to the registrant's auditors and the audit committee of registrant's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):



a)

all significant deficiencies in the design or operation of internal controls which could adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process, summarize and report financial data and have identified for the registrant's auditors any material weaknesses in internal controls; and

b)

any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal controls; and



6.

The registrant's other certifying officers and I have indicated in this quarterly report whether there were significant changes in internal controls or in other factors that could significantly affect internal controls subsequent to the date of our most recent evaluation, including any corrective actions with regard to significant deficiencies and material weaknesses.



Date:  May 10, 2005

/s/ Jamie Kerr

President