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In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

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NO. 09-12-00342-CV

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IN RE COMMITMENT OF LARRY DALE LANZONE

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On Appeal from the 435th District Court

Montgomery County, Texas

Trial Cause No. 11-12-12933-CV

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MEMORANDUM OPINION

The State of Texas filed a petition to commit appellant Larry Dale Lanzone 

as a sexually violent predator. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. §§ 841.001-

.151 (West 2010 & Supp. 2012). A jury found that Lanzone is a sexually violent 

predator, and the trial court signed a final judgment and an order of civil 

commitment. In his sole appellate issue,1 Lanzone challenges the trial court’s 

overruling of his objections to allegedly improper comments made by the State 

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Lanzone originally asserted an issue concerning the trial court’s denial of 

his requested jury questions, but he filed a letter brief in which he stated his desire 

to abandon that issue. 
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during closing argument. We affirm the trial court’s judgment and order of civil 

commitment.

In his sole issue, Lanzone argues that the trial court improperly overruled his 

objection to comments made by counsel for the State during closing argument. 

Lanzone complains specifically of the following portion of the State’s closing 

argument, and the trial court’s ruling thereon:

Why do so many doctors, forensic experts use those tests, because 

they have been tested through research and literature to help an expert 

understand a person’s risk. They told us that Mr. Lanzone given his 

age, given his sexual history, given all the information about his 

victims and the people . . . he sexually assaulted, he is a risk to 

commit future acts of sexual violence. But that’s not some number, 

that is a standard that these experts use based on research and 

literature.

[Defense counsel] asked you to get over it, to get pas[t] the 

offenses, and I find that quite offensive.

[Defense counsel]: I’m going to object to the criticism, Your 

Honor.

THE COURT: Overruled. She has a right to respond to your 

arguments. 

Attorneys have great latitude to indulge in “flights of oratory.” Sw. 

Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Dickson, 236 S.W.2d 115, 119 (Tex. 1951). However, 

counsel should “confine the argument strictly to the evidence and to the arguments 

of opposing counsel.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 269(e). Attorneys should not engage in 
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personal criticism of each other during jury argument. Id. To obtain a reversal 

based upon improper jury argument, Lanzone must show “(1) an error[,] (2) that 

was not invited or provoked, (3) that was preserved by the proper trial predicate, 

such as an objection, a motion to instruct, or a motion for mistrial, and (4) was not 

curable by an instruction, a prompt withdrawal of the statement, or a reprimand by 

the judge.” Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Reese, 584 S.W.2d 835, 839 (Tex. 1979). 

Viewing the complained-of portion of the State’s closing argument in 

context, it is clear that counsel for the State was not criticizing opposing counsel 

personally, but was instead criticizing counsel’s argument that encouraged the jury 

to look beyond Lanzone’s sexually violent offenses because Lanzone has changed. 

Lanzone has not shown that error occurred. See id.; see also Tex. R. Civ. P. 269(e).

Accordingly, we overrule Lanzone’s issue and affirm the trial court’s judgment

and order of civil commitment.

AFFIRMED.

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 STEVE McKEITHEN

Chief Justice

Submitted on June 20, 2013

Opinion Delivered July 11, 2013

Before McKeithen, C.J., Kreger and Horton, JJ.