N OTE : This disposition is nonprecedential. 

# United States **Court of Appeals**  **for the Federal Circuit**

______________________
CHRISTOPHER SCOTT BA RKSDALE , AND

on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated , Plaintiff

- Appellant

,

v.

UNITED STATES, Defendant

- Appellee

.

______________________

2014

- 5108

______________________ Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims in No. 1:14

- cv

- 00066

- TCW, Judge Thomas C. Wheeler.

______________________

Decided: November 10, 2014

______________________

C HRISTOPHER S COTT B ARKSDALE , of Cleveland, Ohio,

pro se.

B ENJAMIN M ARK M OSS , Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Depar tment of Justice, of Washington, DC, for defendant

appellee. With him on the brief were S TUART F. D ELERY , Assistant Attorney General, R OBERT E. K IRSCHMAN , J R ., Director, and K IRK T. M ANHARDT , Assistant Director.BARKSDALE v. US 2

_____________________

Before P ROST , Chief Judge, N EWMAN , and L INN , Circuit Judges.

P ER C URIAM

. Christopher Scott Barksdale (“Barksdale”) appeals the decision s of the United States Court of Federal Claims (“Claims Court”) dismissing his complaint for lack of jurisdiction and denying his motion for sancti ons. See Barksdale v. United States , No. 14

- 66C, 2014 WL 1910577 (Fed. Cl. May 12, 2014) ; Barksdale , No. 14

- 66C (Fed. Cl. May 13, 2014) . Because the Claims Court correctly determined that it lacked jurisdiction on the merits and because it did not abuse its discre tion in the denial of sanctions we affirm the Claims Court’s decision s.
I. B ACKGROUND

Barksdale filed a complaint in the Claims Court see king to overturn the Sixth Circuit’s dismissal of his case. In his complaint, Barksdale sought $32,300,000 i n da mages, as well as injunctive relief compelling the Sixth Circuit and the District Court for the Northern District of Ohio to change its policies, procedures, and training. Barksdale raised tort claims, claims of government crim inal activity, constitut ional claims, and other claims relating to the state of Ohio’s statutory and constitutional provisions. The Claims Court dismissed Barksdale’s case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. It noted that some of Barksdale’s claims were based in tort and c riminal law, over which the Claims Court has no jurisdiction. It also found that Barksdale’s remaining claims were based on constitutional provisions that are not money

- mandating or other authorities , over which, again, the Claims Court lacks jurisdic tion.
Barksdale also sought sanctions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and Rule 11 of the Claims Court. TheBARKSDALE v. US 3

Claims Court denied the motion for sanctions , because Barksdale’s allegations related to government actions in separate matters. Barksdale appealed t o this court. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3).

II. D ISCUSSION Barksdale argues that the Claims Court erred in di smissing his com plaint for lack of jurisdiction, requests that we “[d]eclare 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) violates Art. 1 sec. 10 clau se 1 as Bill of Attainder e x post facto law, ” and seeks a remand for further “Default Proceedings.” Brief for Appel lant at Form 12, No. 6. The government r esponds that the Claims Court properly dismissed Bark sdale’s complaint for lack of jurisdiction

. “The Court of Federal Claims’ decision to grant the Government’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction is a matter of law, which this court reviews de novo .” Keener v. United States , 551 F.3d 1358, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2009). Jurisdiction in t he Claims Co urt “requires a money ma ndating act to confirm jurisdiction.” Joshua v. United States

, 17 F.3d 378 , 379 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1491 ). In the section of his appeal brief titled “Basis of US Court of Federal Claims Jurisdiction ,” Barksdale mentions the First

, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendment s to the Constitution

, the Full Faith and Credit clause, state law, and fraud. Appellant Brief at 3

– 10

. Barksdale’s brief does nothing to refute the Claims Court’s well- reasoned decisio n that none of Barksdale’s

sources of law are money- mandating. As noted by the Claims Court, Barksdale’s Fifth Amendment claims are based o n the Due Process Clause, which is not moneymandating

. See LeBlanc v. United States

, 50 F.3d 1025

, 1028 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause is not “a sufficient basis for jurisdiction”)

. Barksdale’s repackag ed First and Fourteenth Amendment claims

— claiming the government has acted “impermi ssibl[y] . . . by taking African American pro se litigants[ ’ ]BARKSDALE v. US 4

first and fourteenth amendment rights

, ” Appellant Brief at 11 (emphasis in original)

— fair no better

. Despite the use of the word “taking,” which could be money

mandating under the Fifth Amendment, these are claim s

un der the First and F ourteenth A mendment, which the Claims Court properly ruled was outside its jurisdiction. See LeBlanc

, 50 F.3d at 1028 ( stating that that the First Amendment

, the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, and the Fourteenth Am endment’s Equal Protection Clauses are not “a sufficient basis for jurisdi ction” ).

Because Barksdale “has the burden of establishing

. . . jurisdiction, ” Rocovich v. United States , 933 F.2d 991, 993 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (citing KVOS, Inc. v. Associated Press

, 299 U.S. 269, 278 (1936)) , and failed to do so, we affirm the Claims Court’s dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. As it was “without jurisdiction, ” the Claims Court could not “proceed at all in any cause,” including addressing the constitutionality of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co.

, 526 U.S. 574, 583 ( 1999 ).

Barksdale also requests sanctions, asse rting that U.S. Attorneys committed fraud

, perjury and prosecutorial misconduct by “with[holding] evidence” and by the “U.S. Department of J ustice[’s] failure of duty.” Brief for Appe llant at Form 12, No. 6.; Brief for Appellant at 21. The government responds that the Claims Court properly denied sanctions because Barksdale failed to show any sanctionable conduct. Appellate courts “apply an abuse

of- discretion standard in reviewing all aspects of a distric t court’s Rule 11 determination.” Cooter & Gell v. Har tmarx Corp.

, 496 U.S. 384, 405 (1990); see Judin v. United States , 110 F.3d 780, 784 (1997) (applying Cooter to Rule 11 of the Claims Court). The Claims Court denied Bark sdale’s motion for sanctions because these parties were not involved Barksdale’s matters. Barksdale’s brief again does nothing to refute the Claims Court’s decision. Thus,BARKSDALE v. US 5

the Claims Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Barksdale’s motion for sanctions.

I II . C ONCLUSION

For the se reasons, the Claims Court’s decision that it lacked jurisdiction over Barksdale’s complaint and its denial of Barksdale’s req uest for sanct ions are affirmed.

AFFIRMED

C OSTS Each party shall bear its own costs.