NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. 

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL 

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE 

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

HENRY JOSEPH PASKINS, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 14-0790 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County 

No. CR2013-448616-001 

The Honorable Christopher T. Whitten, Judge 

AFFIRMED 

COUNSEL 

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix 

By Christopher DeRose 

Counsel for Appellee 

Maricopa County Public Defender’s Office, Phoenix 

By Mikel Steinfeld 

Counsel for Appellant
STATE v. PASKINS 

Decision of the Court 

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION 

Judge Kenton D. Jones delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Diane M. Johnsen and Judge Patricia A. Orozco joined. 

J O N E S, Judge: 

¶1 Henry Paskins was convicted on multiple counts but appeals 

only his conviction and sentence for one count of child abuse of his sevenyear-old daughter, asserting the trial court committed prejudicial error by 

admitting irrelevant evidence and allowing improper argument from the 

State. For the following reasons, we affirm. 

FACTS1 AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

¶2 In October 2013, Scottsdale police officers were dispatched to 

a church after receiving reports that individuals were trespassing on the 

property. The first officer to arrive observed four individuals, later 

identified as Paskins, his mother, his wife, and his daughter, S.P., 

(collectively, the family) sitting on a grassy area of the church property. The 

officer approached the family and asked them to leave. The family refused. 

¶3 Another officer arrived and issued a trespass warning to the 

family. The family again refused to leave, with Paskins announcing “it 

would be war” if the officers tried to make them leave. More officers 

arrived, and church officials advised the family they did not have 

permission to be on the property and asked them to leave. The family again 

refused to leave. 

¶4 The officers asked the family to leave one final time and 

warned that if they did not do so they would be arrested. The family still 

refused, and when two officers approached Paskins to arrest him, Paskins 

threw his arms back and knocked the officers into the side of the church 

building. During the ensuing scuffle, S.P., at her parents’ specific 

command, began hitting one of the officers. 

 

1 We view the facts in the light most favorable to upholding the verdict 

and resolve all reasonable inferences against the defendant. State v. Harm, 

236 Ariz. 402, 404 n.2, ¶ 2 (App. 2015) (citing State v. Valencia, 186 Ariz. 493, 

495 (App. 1996)). 
STATE v. PASKINS 

Decision of the Court 

3

¶5 Paskins continued to resist and officers eventually tased him. 

The tasing did not completely stop Paskins’ struggle, but officers ultimately 

brought him under control and arrested him. Even after he was subdued, 

Paskins continued yelling at S.P. to fight the officers. A recording of the 

event captured Paskins shouting, “fight now, [S.P.] fight . . . hit him now,”

“fight . . . in the name of Jehovah,” “punch him in the huevos,” and “hit him 

now.”

¶6 Paskins was indicted for child abuse, a class four felony, in 

violation of Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) section 13-3623(B)(1).2 

Consistent with the statute, the indictment alleged Paskins, “under 

circumstances other than those likely to produce death or serious physical 

injury intentionally or knowingly caused or permitted [S.P.’s] person or 

health to be injured or to be placed in a situation where her health was 

endangered.” Paskins was tried jointly with his wife and mother. 

¶7 At trial, the State argued Paskins placed S.P. in danger by 

commanding her to engage in an altercation with police officers. The State’s 

evidence included testimony from one of the officers S.P. attacked that, 

when in uniform, he carries pepper spray, a taser, and a firearm with a 

safety on the trigger, which is disengaged simply by pulling the trigger. 

When the prosecutor inquired as to what would have happened if S.P. had 

grabbed the officer’s gun, counsel for Paskins objected on relevance 

grounds. The objection was sustained. When the officer was later asked 

what he would do if anyone, a child or adult, grabbed one of his weapons, 

the officer answered, “my number one priority is to not let them be armed 

with my weapon.”

¶8 On redirect, the prosecutor again asked the officer what 

would happen if S.P. was told “to grab onto an officer and somehow she 

grabbed onto an officer’s gun,” and if that would create “a very dangerous 

situation.” Counsel for Paskins’ wife objected on speculation and relevance 

grounds, and the trial court again sustained the objection. The prosecutor 

rephrased the question, asking generally, “if a child grabs your gun or an 

officer’s gun or anything on them, can that be a very dangerous situation?” 

Again, counsel for Paskins’ wife objected on relevance grounds but was 

overruled, and the officer answered, “yes.”

¶9 A second officer who was also attacked by S.P. also testified. 

When questioned by the prosecutor what would happen if S.P. grabbed his 

 

2 Absent material changes from the relevant date, we cite a statute’s 

current version. 
STATE v. PASKINS 

Decision of the Court 

4

gun, the trial court again sustained Paskins’ counsel’s relevance objection. 

The State rephrased the question asking what the officer would do, 

generally, if someone grabbed his weapon. Counsel for Paskins and his 

mother both objected again, but the court overruled the objections, and the 

officer testified he “would not let that happen.”

¶10 During the State’s closing argument, the prosecutor stated: 

And if you start trying to move your arms around, you start 

trying to prevent that by using any type of force, the situation 

gets very dangerous very quickly. Why? Because these 

officers are carrying a loaded gun on the side of their hip. 

That gun comes out. A finger touches those triggers — a lot 

of them don’t have [a] safety. That gun goes off. Bad things 

can happen. 

Defense counsel did not object to this portion of the prosecutor’s argument. 

Later in his argument, the prosecutor added: 

These officers had no intent to hurt [S.P.]. But that’s not what 

we’re here for. We’re here for what the danger could have 

been. What this situation could have resulted in and how 

dangerous it was. These officers are carrying loaded 

weapons. 

Counsel for Paskins objected to the argument, but the trial court overruled 

the objection.

¶11 The jury found Paskins guilty of child abuse, as well as three 

counts of aggravated assault and one count of resisting arrest. He was 

sentenced to three years’ probation on each count with all sentences to run 

concurrently. Paskins timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction pursuant 

to A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, and -4033(A)(1). 

DISCUSSION 

I. Officer Testimony 

¶12 Paskins first argues the trial court erred in admitting the 

officers’ testimony recounted above. Absent an abuse of discretion, we will 

not disturb the court’s decision to admit evidence. State v. Stotts, 144 Ariz. 

72, 82 (1985) (citing State v. Robles, 135 Ariz. 92, 94 (1983)). 
STATE v. PASKINS 

Decision of the Court 

5

¶13 Under Arizona Rule of Evidence 401, relevant evidence is any 

evidence that “has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than 

it would be without the evidence; and . . . the fact is of consequence in 

determining the action.” In other words, “evidence is relevant if it ‘relates 

to a consequential fact’ that is placed in issue by ‘the pleadings and the 

substantive law’ and if it ‘alters the probability, not proves or disproves the 

existence, of a consequential fact.’” Yauch v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 198 Ariz. 

394, 401-02, ¶ 19 (App. 2000) (quoting Hawkins v. Allstate Ins., 152 Ariz. 490, 

496 (1987)). 

¶14 The indictment charged Paskins with intentional or knowing 

child abuse in violation of A.R.S. § 13-3623(B)(1), which states in relevant 

part: 

Under circumstances other than those likely to produce death 

or serious physical injury to a child[,] . . . any person who 

causes a child . . . to suffer physical injury or abuse or, having 

the care or custody of a child . . . who causes or permits the 

person or health of the child . . . to be injured or who causes 

or permits a child . . . to be placed in a situation where the 

person or health of the child . . . is endangered is guilty of an 

offense . . . [i]f done intentionally or knowingly. 

Paskins argues testimony about the “theoretical possibilities from a gun 

discharge that was never even threatened” was admitted erroneously 

because the State “rendered risks of death or serious physical injury 

irrelevant” by charging Paskins with child abuse “under circumstances 

other than those likely to produce death or serious physical injury.” See 

A.R.S. § 13-3623(B). We disagree. 

¶15 Under Rule 401, any evidence that tends to make it more 

probable that Paskins placed S.P. in a situation where her person or health 

was endangered would be relevant. Because “endangered” is not defined 

by the statute, we must construe it in accordance with its plain and ordinary 

meaning. See State v. Mahaney, 193 Ariz. 566, 568, ¶ 12 (App. 1999) (noting 

we refer to a widely used and established dictionary to determine a term’s 

plain and ordinary meaning) (citing State v. Korzep, 165 Ariz. 490, 493 (1990), 

and State v. Wise, 137 Ariz. 468, 470 n.3 (1983)). Endangerment is defined as 

“[t]he act or an instance of putting someone or something in danger; 

exposure to peril or harm.” Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). Thus, 

any evidence showing Paskins placed S.P. in a situation exposing her to 

danger, peril, or harm is relevant. 
STATE v. PASKINS 

Decision of the Court 

6

¶16 Paskins asserts the testimony at issue was about “loaded guns 

and the possibility they could be discharged” and cause loss of life. But, 

this mischaracterizes the evidence. The officers’ testimony was about the 

general dangers associated with fighting an officer and the potential for 

escalation given the officers’ need to protect themselves and prevent their 

attackers from arming themselves with the officers’ weapons. See supra 

¶¶ 7-9. The officers’ testimony was therefore relevant because it made it 

more probable that Paskins placed S.P. in a situation where she was 

endangered — a consequential fact — when he ordered her to attack the 

officers. Therefore, we conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in 

admitting the objected-to testimony. 

¶17 Furthermore, the officers’ testimony did not address the 

possibility that S.P. specifically could or would have been shot or otherwise 

injured by a weapon. Although such testimony may have been too 

speculative to assist the jury, and therefore inadmissible, see State v. Cruz, 

218 Ariz. 149, 160, ¶ 45 (2008), defense counsels’ objections to questions 

calling for such speculation were sustained. See supra ¶¶ 7-9. The jury was 

instructed to disregard questions to which objections were sustained, and 

we presume it did so. See State v. Lynch, 238 Ariz. 84, 93, ¶ 12 (2015) (citing 

State v. Manuel, 229 Ariz. 1, 6, ¶ 25 (2011)). 

II. Closing Argument 

¶18 Paskins next argues the trial court erred in allowing the 

portions of the prosecutor’s closing argument noted above. See supra ¶ 10. 

Because Paskins did not object to the first portion of the prosecutor’s 

argument at trial, we review only for fundamental error. See State v. Comer, 

165 Ariz. 413, 426 (1990) (“[F]ailure to object to a comment in closing 

argument constitutes waiver of the right to review unless the comment 

amounts to fundamental error.”) (citing State v. Thomas, 130 Ariz. 432, 435 

(1981)). We find none. 

¶19 As to the objected-to portion of the prosecutor’s closing 

argument, we conduct harmless error review. See State v. Dann, 220 Ariz. 

351, 373, ¶ 125 (2009) (noting alleged acts of prosecutorial misconduct are 

reviewed for harmless error) (citing State v. Velazquez, 216 Ariz. 300, 311, ¶ 

47 (2007)). Attorneys are given wide latitude during closing argument and 

may comment on the evidence as well as argue all reasonable inferences 

therefrom. See State v. Zaragoza, 135 Ariz. 63, 68 (1983) (citing State v. 

Mincey, 130 Ariz. 389, 409-10 (1981), and State v. Blazak, 114 Ariz. 199, 204 

(1977)). Here, the prosecutor’s mention that the police officers were 

carrying loaded weapons merely reiterates the testimony and draws the 
STATE v. PASKINS 

Decision of the Court 

7

reasonable inference that Paskins placed S.P. in danger by commanding her 

to fight the officers. 

¶20 The trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the 

State’s argument, and we need not consider Paskins’ argument that he was 

prejudiced. See State v. King, 158 Ariz. 419, 424 (1988) (holding that after 

determining that error occurred, a court must evaluate the prejudicial 

nature of the error) (citation omitted). 

CONCLUSION 

¶21 Paskins convictions and sentences are affirmed.