FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS

OF THE STATE OF HAWAI#I

–––O0O–––

LUKELA S. MEYERS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v.

CHRISTINA K. MEYERS, Defendant-Appellee

NO. CAAP-18-0000743

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT

(FC-D NO. 15-1-0251)

AUGUST 25, 2022

GINOZA, C.J., AND LEONARD AND WADSWORTH, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT BY WADSWORTH, J.

This appeal arises out of post-judgment proceedings in

a divorce case between self-represented Plaintiff-Appellant

Lukela S. Meyers (Lukela) and Defendant-Appellee Christina K.

Meyers (Christina). Following settlement conferences in April

2017, Lukela and Christina signed, and the Family Court of the

Second Circuit (Family Court) entered, a July 21, 2017 Stipulated

Decree Granting Divorce (Stipulated Divorce Decree).1/ Almost a

year later, on July 20, 2018, Lukela filed a "Motion for Relief

from Judgment/Settlement Pursuant to [Hawai#i Family Court Rules

1/ The Honorable Lloyd A. Poelman presided over the April 10 and 12,

2017 settlement conferences, as well as the July 21, 2017 hearing on, and

entry of, the Stipulated Divorce Decree.

Electronically Filed

Intermediate Court of Appeals

CAAP-18-0000743

25-AUG-2022

08:22 AM

Dkt. 71 OP
FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

(HFCR)] Rule 60(b)" (Rule 60(b) Motion). Lukela argued that

events on the morning of July 21, 2017, including statements by

the Family Court on the issue of Lukela's inheritance,

constituted "surprise" warranting relief under HFCR Rule

60(b)(1), and undue influence and coercion warranting relief

under HFCR Rule 60(b)(6).2/

Lukela appeals from the September 4, 2018 "Findings of

Facts, Conclusions of Laws, and Order Denying [Lukela's] [HFCR]

Rule 60(b) Motion for Relief from Judgment Filed July 20, 2018"

(FOFs/COLs/Order), entered by the Family Court.3/ Lukela contends

that the Family Court erred: (1) "when it found arguments from

[Lukela's] briefs untimely"; and (2) "when it found that [Lukela]

has not met the burden of establishing that . . . surprise . . .

had occurred, justifying the setting aside of the Stipulated

Divorce Decree." Lukela also challenges several FOFs and COLs

for failing to include certain statements or for other asserted

errors.4/ 

2/ HFCR Rule 60(b) states, in relevant part: 

b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly

discovered evidence; fraud. On motion and upon such terms

as are just, the court may relieve a party or a party's

legal representative from any or all of the provisions of a

final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following

reasons: 

(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable 

neglect;

. . . .

(6) any other reason justifying relief from the

operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a

reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) not more

than one year after the judgment, order, or proceedings was

entered or taken. For reasons (1) and (3) the averments in

the motion shall be made in compliance with Rule 9(b) of

these rules. A motion under this subdivision (b) does not

affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation.

This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain

an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment,

order, or proceeding, or to set aside a judgment for fraud

upon the court.

3/ The Honorable Adrianne N. Heely presided. 

4/ Lukela's opening brief presents ten points of error regarding the

Family Court's FOFs and COLs; however, Lukela's argument section does not

contain "the contentions of the appellant on the[se] points . . . and the

reasons therefor, with citations to the authorities, statutes and parts of the

(continued...)

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 We hold that the Family Court erred in finding that

the Rule 60(b) Motion was untimely on the issue of Lukela's

inheritance due to the motion not being filed within one year of

the April 2017 settlement conferences. However, the error was

harmless as to Lukela's arguments based on HFCR Rule 60(b)(1). 

The Family Court ruled on the merits of the Rule 60(b)(1)

arguments and did not abuse its discretion in concluding that

Lukela had not established "surprise" justifying the setting

aside of the Stipulated Divorce Decree. The Family Court did

not, however, separately analyze Lukela's undue influence and

coercion arguments based on HFCR Rule 60(b)(6) or set forth the

basis for rejecting those arguments. It is therefore unclear

whether the Family Court concluded that Lukela's Rule 60(b)(6)

arguments were untimely, and the record on appeal is insufficient

for us to determine whether the Family Court abused its

discretion in denying the requested relief. Accordingly, we

affirm in part and vacate in part the FOFs/COLs/Order, and remand

this case to the Family Court with instructions.

I. Background

On June 30, 2015, Lukela filed a Complaint for Divorce

in the Family Court. 

On April 10, 2017, the Family Court conducted a

settlement conference with the parties and their respective

attorneys, which continued on April 12, 2017. The parties were

unable to reach agreement, and trial was set for July 21, 2017. 

Following a hearing on July 21, 2017, the parties and

their respective attorneys signed, and the Family Court entered,

the Stipulated Divorce Decree.5/ The Stipulated Divorce Decree: 

(1) dissolved the marriage of Lukela and Christina; (2)

4/ (...continued)

record relied on[,]" as required by Hawai#i Rules of Appellate Procedure

(HRAP) Rule 28(b)(7). Under HRAP Rule 28(b)(7), "[p]oints not argued may be

deemed waived."

Christina did not file an answering brief.

5/ Lukela and Christina were each represented by counsel during the

settlement conferences and the July 21, 2017 hearing. Both parties agreed to

waive any conflicts of interest that might result from the same judge

presiding over both the settlement conferences and potential trial.

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acknowledged that Lukela and Christina had no minor children at

that time; (3) awarded no spousal support; and (4) divided and

distributed Lukela and Christina's assets and debts. The

signature page of the Stipulated Divorce Decree included the

following paragraph:

ATTORNEY REPRESENTATION/VOLUNTARY EXECUTION

Husband has been represented in this matter by

Elizabeth Melehan. Wife has been represented by Cain &

Herren, ALC. Both Husband and Wife acknowledge that they

have carefully read this Stipulated Decree of Divorce and

all the other supporting financial and other documentation

pertinent to this matter. They both confirm that all said

documents are current and accurate, and that they are

completely aware of and in agreement with the contents of

same. This document is the complete and final expression of

all agreements made by the parties to this divorce. There

are no other express or implied promises, or agreements,

which are not set forth herein. Each party acknowledges

that he or she has knowingly, intelligently, voluntarily and

unconditionally executed this Decree, with sufficient

knowledge of the facts, the parties' respective finances and

the applicable law. Each party further acknowledges that

this Decree is fair and reasonable, and as such they both

agree to be bound by this Decree and by their

representations as contained herein.

No party appealed from the Stipulated Divorce Decree.

On July 20, 2018, Lukela, self-represented, filed the

Rule 60(b) Motion. On August 13, 2018, Lukela filed a "Brief In

Support of [Lukela's] Rule 60(b) Motion for Relief From Judgment"

(Brief in Support of Rule 60(b) Motion). Lukela's brief cited

HFCR Rule 60(b)(1) and (6) as bases for relief from the

Stipulated Divorce Decree. He asserted that during the April 10

and 12, 2017 settlement conferences, "the parties were instructed

that [Lukela] would receive full credit for his inheritance of

$110,139.38 received during their marriage as a Category 3

Capital Contribution." Lukela further asserted that on July 21,

2017, the morning of the scheduled trial: (1) he was told by his

attorney that Judge Poelman had changed his mind and Lukela would

not receive full credit for his inheritance; and (2) Judge

Poelman "confirm[ed] he had changed his mind and had already made

his decision, [and] encouraged [Lukela] to settle the case, that

trial was not necessary." Lukela argued that these events

constituted "surprise" warranting relief under HFCR Rule

60(b)(1), and undue influence and coercion warranting relief

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under HFCR Rule 60(b)(6). 

On August 20, 2018, the Family Court held a hearing on

the Rule 60(b) Motion and took the matter under advisement.6/ On

September 4, 2018, the Family Court entered the FOFs/COLs/Order

denying the Rule 60(b) motion. The Family Court concluded in

paragraph 2 of its Order: 

Although [Lukela] filed his [Rule 60(b) Motion] on July 20,

2018, one day before the expiration of [the] one year

deadline from the date the Stipulated Divorce Decree was

entered on July 21, 2017, this court finds that [Lukela] has

not met the burden of establishing that mistake[,]

inadvertence, surprise, excusable neglect, or newly

discovered evidence had occurred, justifying the setting

aside of the Stipulated Divorce Decree.

The FOFs/COLs/Order did not separately analyze Lukela's undue

influence and coercion arguments based on HFCR Rule 60(b)(6) or

articulate the basis for rejecting those arguments.

II. Standards of Review

A. HFCR Rule 60(b)

We review the grant or denial of an HFCR Rule 60(b)

motion for abuse of discretion. De Mello v. De Mello, 3 Haw.

App. 165, 169, 646 P.2d 409, 412 (1982).

Under the abuse of discretion standard of review, the

appellate court is not authorized to disturb the family

court's decision unless (1) the family court disregarded

rules or principles of law or practice to the substantial

detriment of a party litigant; (2) the family court failed

to exercise its equitable discretion; or (3) the family

court's decision clearly exceeds the bounds of reason.

Wong v. Wong, 87 Hawai#i 475, 486, 960 P.2d 145, 156 (App. 1998)

(brackets omitted) (quoting Bennett v. Bennett, 8 Haw. App. 415,

426, 807 P.2d 597, 603 (1991)). 

The Hawai#i Supreme Court has recently reiterated: 

The trial court has a very large measure of discretion in

passing upon motions under [HFCR] Rule 60(b) and its order

will not be set aside unless we are persuaded that under the

circumstances of the particular case, the court's refusal to

set aside its order was an abuse of discretion.

PennyMac Corp. v. Godinez, 148 Hawai#i 323, 327, 474 P.3d 264,

6/ Lukela and Christina, both self-represented, attended, with

Christina attending via telephone. 

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268 (2020) (brackets omitted) (quoting Hawai#i Hous. Auth. v.

Uyehara, 77 Hawai#i 144, 147, 883 P.2d 65, 68 (1994)) (construing

substantially similar Hawai#i Rules of Civil Procedure (HRCP)

Rule 60(b)). "The burden of establishing abuse of discretion in

denying an [HFCR] Rule 60(b) motion is on the appellant, and a

strong showing is required to establish it." Id. (original

brackets omitted) (quoting Ditto v. McCurdy, 103 Hawai#i 153,

162, 80 P.3d 974, 983 (2003)).

"The timeliness of a motion brought pursuant to HFCR

Rule 60(b) implicates the jurisdiction of the family court." 

Child Support Enf't Agency v. Doe, 98 Hawai#i 499, 503, 51 P.3d

366, 370 (2002). "The existence of jurisdiction is a question of

law that we review de novo under the right/wrong standard." 

Wagner v. World Botanical Gardens, Inc., 126 Hawai#i 190, 194,

268 P.3d 443, 447 (App. 2011) (brackets omitted) (quoting Captain

Andy's Sailing, Inc. v. Dep't of Land & Natural Res., 113 Hawai#i

184, 192, 150 P.3d 833, 841 (2006)).

B. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

The family court's findings of fact are reviewed under

the clearly erroneous standard and will not be overruled unless:

(1) the record lacks substantial evidence to support the

finding, or (2) despite substantial evidence in support of

the finding, the appellate court is nonetheless left with a

definite and firm conviction that a mistake had been made.

"Substantial evidence" is credible evidence which is of

sufficient quality and probative value to enable a person of

reasonable caution to support a conclusion.

LC v. MG, 143 Hawai#i 302, 310, 430 P.3d 400, 408 (2018) (quoting

Fisher v. Fisher, 111 Hawai#i 41, 46, 137 P.3d 355, 360 (2006)).

The family court's conclusions of law are ordinarily

reviewed de novo under the right/wrong standard. Fisher, 111

Hawai#i at 46, 137 P.3d at 360. "[A conclusion of law] that is

supported by the trial court's [findings of fact] and that

reflects an application of the correct rule of law will not be

overturned." Estate of Klink ex rel. Klink v. State, 113 Hawai#i

332, 351, 152 P.3d 504, 523 (2007) (original brackets omitted)

(quoting AIG Hawaii Ins. Co., v. Estate of Caraang, 74 Haw. 620,

628-29, 851 P.2d 321, 326 (1993)). "However, a [conclusion of

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law] that presents mixed questions of fact and law is reviewed

under the clearly erroneous standard because the court's

conclusions are dependent upon the facts and circumstances of

each individual case." Id. (quoting Estate of Caraang, 74 Haw.

at 629, 851 P.2d at 326).

III. Discussion

A. Timeliness of Rule 60(b) Motion

A motion seeking relief from judgment under HFCR Rule

60(b) must be filed "within a reasonable time" and, when based on

Rule 60(b)(1), (2) or (3), "not more than one year after the

judgment . . . was entered . . . ." HFCR Rule 60(b). "What

constitutes a 'reasonable time' is determined in the light of all

attendant circumstances, intervening rights, loss of evidence,

prejudice to the adverse party, the commanding equities of the

case, and the general policy that judgments be final." Hayashi

v. Hayashi, 4 Haw. App. 286, 290-91, 666 P.2d 171, 175 (1983)

(quoting 7 Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 60.27[3] (2d ed. 1982); 11

Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure: Civil § 2866

(1973)). 

Lukela contends that the Family Court erred in finding

that certain arguments he made were untimely. Specifically,

Lukela challenges footnote 9 in the FOFs/COLs/Order, which

states:

[Lukela's] briefs makes [sic] arguments that during the

April 10th and 12th, 2017 Settlement Conferences with the

judge there were things discussed and inclinations given,

that [Lukela] argues was [sic] wrong, and arguably violated

his Due Process. This court finds that these arguments are

untimely, pursuant to H.F.C.R. Rule 60(b), requiring said

Motion for Relief to be filed within a reasonable time, but

not more than one year after the "judgment, order, or

proceedings was entered or taken", finding that the April 10

and 12, 2017 settlement conference proceedings happened more

than one year ago.

(Internal cross-reference omitted.)

This footnote is ambiguous as to which arguments the

Family Court found untimely, but it appears that the court may

have misapprehended, at least in part, the arguments made in

Lukela's Brief in Support of Rule 60(b) Motion. Although Lukela

claimed the parties were told during the April 10 and 12, 2017

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settlement conferences that he would receive full credit for his

inheritance, Lukela argued that he was surprised and coerced on

the morning of July 21, 2017, when he allegedly learned that

Judge Poelman had changed his mind and the judge encouraged him

to settle the case, resulting in entry of the Stipulated Divorce

Decree. The July 20, 2018 Rule 60(b) Motion was filed within a

year of the July 21, 2017 hearing and "not more than one year

after the [Stipulated Divorce Decree] . . . was entered . . . ." 

HFCR Rule 60(b). Accordingly, footnote 9, which presents mixed

determinations of fact and law, is clearly erroneous to the

extent it found the Rule 60(b) Motion untimely on the issue of

Lukela's inheritance due to the motion not being filed within one

year of the April 2017 settlement conferences.

Nevertheless, in paragraph 2 of the Order (quoted

supra), the Family Court recognized that Lukela filed the Rule

60(b) Motion "one day before the expiration of [the] one year

deadline . . . ." The court also ruled on the merits of the

motion, at least as to Lukela's Rule 60(b)(1) arguments, in

concluding that he "ha[d] not met the burden of establishing that

. . . surprise . . . had occurred, justifying the setting aside

of the Stipulated Divorce Decree." We thus conclude that the

error as to timeliness in footnote 9 was harmless as to Lukela's

arguments based on HFCR Rule 60(b)(1).

 Given the ambiguity of footnote 9, however, and the

fact that the Family Court did not articulate the basis for

rejecting Lukela's Rule 60(b)(6) arguments, we cannot say that

the court's error regarding timeliness was harmless as to the

determination of the Rule 60(b)(6) issues. We further address

below the insufficiencies of the COLs and Order as to those

issues, and vacate the concluding order denying the Rule 60(b)

Motion, to the extent the motion sought relief under Rule

60(b)(6). 

B. Denial of Rule 60(b) Motion

Lukela contends that the Family Court erred in

concluding that he did not meet his burden for establishing

"surprise" justifying relief from the Stipulated Divorce Decree,

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pursuant to HFCR Rule 60(b)(1). Lukela points to Judge Poelman's

"sudden disclosure of his changed decision about the inheritance.

. . ." Lukela argues that "the sudden urging for new settlement

and the sudden appearance of the Judge to confirm it had the

effect of a surprise attack." 

Neither HFCR Rule 60(b)(1) nor its counterpart, HRCP

Rule 60(b)(1), defines "surprise" for the purpose of granting

relief from a final judgment. It appears that Hawai#i case law

is similarly silent on what constitutes "surprise" under either

rule. Cf. Chen v. Hoeflinger, 127 Hawai#i 346, 357, 279 P.3d 11,

22 (App. 2012) (stating that, for the purpose of enforcing a preor post-nuptial marital agreement, "[u]nfair surprise means 'that

one party did not have full and adequate knowledge of the other

party's financial condition when the [marital] agreement was

executed.'" (quoting Prell v. Silverstein, 114 Hawai#i 286, 298,

162 P.3d 2, 14 (App. 2007))).

Blacks Law Dictionary defines surprise as:

An occurrence for which there is no adequate warning or that

affects someone in an unexpected way. In a trial, the

procedural rules are designed to limit surprise — or trial

by ambush — as much as possible. For example, the parties in

a civil case are permitted to conduct discovery, to

determine the essential facts of the case and the identities

of possible witnesses, and to inspect relevant documents. 

At trial, if a party calls a witness who has not been

previously identified, the witness's testimony may be

excluded if it would unfairly surprise and prejudice the

other party. And if a party has diligently prepared the

case and is nevertheless taken by surprise on a material

point at trial, that fact can sometimes be grounds for a new

trial or for relief from the judgment under Rules 59 and 60

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure [(FRCP)].

Black's Law Dictionary 1745 (11th ed. 2019) (emphasis added); see

also Kingdom Fresh Produce, Inc. v. Delta Produce, LP, 528 B.R.

289, 295–96 (W.D. Tex. 2015) ("Although there is no clear

definition of surprise in the federal rules, the Fifth Circuit

has 'limited reversible error from unfair surprise' in the

appellate context 'to situations where a completely new issue is

suddenly raised or a previously unidentified expert witness is

suddenly called to testify.'") (quoting Genmoora Corp. v. Moore

Business Forms, Inc., 939 F.2d 1149, 1156 (5th Cir. 1991)));

White v. New Hampshire Dep't of Employment Sec., 679 F.2d 283,

286 (1st Cir. 1982) (concluding that the trial court did not

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abuse its discretion in denying an FRCP Rule 60(b)(1) motion to

vacate a consent decree on the ground that the plaintiff's motion

for attorneys' fees constituted "surprise"; the trial court's

conclusion that the plaintiff did not waive his right to seek

fees rebutted the movant's claim of unfair surprise and "the

court could reasonably have concluded that such surprise as there

might have been did not rise to a level which would justify

vacating the decree itself"). 

Here, the record reflects that the inheritance credit

for Lukela's category three capital contribution was a primary

source of contention from the outset of the case. In addition,

prior to settlement discussions on April 10 and 12, 2017, Judge

Poelman informed Lukela and Christina, who were both represented

by counsel, that "all discussions during settlement discussions

are protected and privileged from being considered at the time of

trial," and explained the distinction between statements made

during settlement discussions and evidence presented at trial. 

Judge Poelman also informed Lukela and Christina that he would

likely be the trial judge if settlement discussions were

unsuccessful. After taking a recess to further discuss the

matter with his attorney,7/ Lukela waived any conflicts of

interest that might arise by having the same judge preside over

settlement discussions and trial. Thus, even if Judge Poelman

later "changed [his] decision about the inheritance," the record

shows that Lukela was made aware that statements made during

settlement discussions would not be considered at the time of

trial. Contrary to Lukela's contention, the circumstances here

did not constitute "[a]n occurrence for which there [was] no

adequate warning," and the Family Court could reasonably have

concluded that any change in Lukela's expectations did not rise

to a level that would justify vacating the Stipulated Divorce

Decree. Black's Law Dictionary at 1745; see White, 679 F.2d at

286. Accordingly, Lukela has not made the strong showing

required to establish that the Family Court abused its discretion

in denying the Rule 60(b) Motion to the extent it sought relief

7/ Lukela has not asserted that his trial counsel engaged in conduct

justifying relief under HRCP Rule 60(b).

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under HFCR Rule 60(b)(1). See PennyMac Corp., 148 Hawai#i at

327, 474 P.3d at 268.

Lukela also contends that the Family Court erred in

denying the Rule 60(b) Motion as to Lukela's arguments based on

HFCR Rule 60(b)(6). He argues that he sought relief under HFCR

Rule 60(b)(6) based on alleged undue influence and coercion by

Judge Poelman. He further argues that Judge Poelman, by

disclosing he had made a decision regarding the inheritance

credit and by confirming "he had decided the entire case,"

"chill[ed]" Lukela's desire to go to trial. Lukela points out

that his Rule 60(b)(6) arguments "did not get ruled upon in the

[FOFs/COLs/Order][.]" 

"A party seeking relief under [HFCR] Rule 60(b)(6)

after the time for appeal has run must establish the existence of

'extraordinary circumstances' that prevented or rendered them

unable to prosecute an appeal." PennyMac Corp., 148 Hawai#i at

331, 474 P.3d at 272 (quoting Uyehara, 77 Hawai#i at 148–49, 883

P.2d at 69–70). "This is because [HFCR] Rule 60(b)(6) 'is not

for the purpose of relieving a party from free, calculated and

deliberate choices they have made." Id. (original brackets

omitted) (quoting Uyehara, 77 Hawai#i at 149, 883 P.2d at 70). 

Here, the FOFs/COLs/Order did not separately analyze

Lukela's undue influence and coercion arguments based on HFCR

Rule 60(b)(6) or set forth the basis for rejecting those

arguments. Moreover, given the ambiguity of footnote 9, we

cannot determine whether the Family Court concluded that Lukela's

Rule 60(b)(6) arguments were untimely. See supra. We thus

vacate the FOFs/COLs/Order as to the denial of the Rule 60(b)

Motion, to the extent the motion sought relief under Rule

60(b)(6). See Herrmann v. Herrmann, 138 Hawai#i 144, 155, 378

P.3d 860, 871 (2016) (remanding in part because "the family court

did not specify the legal theory upon which its conclusions were

based"); see also Schefke v. Reliable Collection Agency, Ltd., 96

Hawai#i 408, 459, 32 P.3d 52, 103 (2001) (vacating and remanding

an order as to costs claimed where the trial court "denied the

requested costs without any explanation" and "its reasons for

doing so [were] not readily discernible"). On remand, the Family

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Court is instructed to consider and expressly determine: (1)

whether the Rule 60(b) Motion was filed "within a reasonable

time" for purposes of Lukela's arguments based on Rule 60(b)(6);

and (2) if so, whether Lukela met his burden of establishing the

requisites for relief under Rule 60(b)(6). 

C. FOFs and COLs

Lukela contends that the Family Court erred by not

including certain statements in the FOFs – primarily statements

allegedly made by Judge Poelman during settlement discussions and

on the morning of the scheduled trial. 

This court has explained: "The trial judge is required

to 'only make brief, definite, pertinent findings and conclusions

upon the contested matters; there is no necessity for

over-elaboration of detail or particularization of facts.'" Doe

v. Roe, 5 Haw. App. 558, 565, 705 P.2d 535, 542 (1985) (quoting

Tugaeff v. Tugaeff, 42 Haw. 455, 467 (1958)). "All that is

required are brief, definite and pertinent findings, not

elaborate findings nor negative findings of fact." Id. (citing 9

Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure: Civil § 2579

(1971)). Relatedly, this court has found the trial court's

findings of fact sufficient as long as they allowed the parties

and this court to ascertain the basis for the decision under

review. See Sussman v. Sussman, No. 30407, 2013 WL 6472277, at

*6 (Haw. App. Dec. 10, 2013) (SDO) ("Although not extensive, the

Family Court's FOFs were sufficient to enable the parties and

this Court to ascertain the basis of its decision because the

court laid out its findings and conclusions in a logical manner

that was supported by the record.").

Here, the FOFs, considered with the record, are

sufficient to enable the parties and this court to understand the

basis for the Family Court's decision to deny the Rule 60(b)

Motion, at least as to Lukela's Rule 60(b)(1) arguments. Lukela

makes no discernible argument as to how any of the purported

omissions affected that decision. More detailed findings

regarding the statements allegedly made by Judge Poelman, which

are included in the record, were unnecessary in these

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circumstances.8/ Accordingly, the Family Court did not clearly

err in omitting these alleged statements from the FOFs.9/

Lukela also contends that COLs 2 through 5 were

erroneous, primarily because they quoted or paraphrased legal

standards that did not apply to the Rule 60(b) Motion. 

COL 2 states the purpose of an "independent action"

under HFCR Rule 60(b), as set forth in Hayashi, 4 Haw. App. at

292, 666 P.2d at 175-76. It is apparent, however, based on the

FOFs/COLs/Order as a whole, including paragraph 2 of the Order,

that the Family Court analyzed the Rule 60(b) Motion not as an

independent action, but as a motion in the underlying case, and

denied it as such. Lukela makes no discernible argument as to

how any alleged error in COL 2 affected the Family Court's

adjudication of the motion. See Amfac, Inc. v. Waikiki

Beachcomber Inv. Co., 74 Haw. 85, 124-25, 839 P.2d 10, 30-31

(1992) ("Therefore, although we hold that the trial court erred

in applying the assumption of risk defense to the present case,

the error was harmless because it was irrelevant to the

adjudication of Amfac's liability to WBIC arising out of Amfac's

breach of the Indemnification Agreement."). We thus conclude

that any error in COL 2, based on the statement of the

"independent action" standard, was harmless.

It appears that in COLs 3 through 5, the Family Court

quoted HRS § 580-56(d) and cases construing its interplay with

HFCR Rule 60(b) in determining the court's jurisdiction to

consider the Rule 60(b) Motion. However, HRS § 580-56(d) did not

8/ Lukela's Brief in Support of Rule 60(b) Motion set forth the

alleged statements of Judge Poelman under the heading "Arguments." The brief

contains an undifferentiated mass of factual assertions and legal argument,

and ends with the statement, "I . . . declare under penalty of law that the

foregoing is true and correct." It was the province of the Family Court to

determine the credibility of Lukela's factual assertions in this context. See

In re AA, 150 Hawai#i 270, 286, 500 P.3d 455, 471 (2021). It appears the

court made no express credibility determination.

9/ For similar reasons, we conclude that the Family Court did not

clearly err in not stating in FOF 12 that the parties "showed up to court the

morning of July 21, 2017 for a trial[,]" and in not stating that Lukela's

April 10, 2018 Request for Divorce Decree To Be Set Aside and for New Judge

(Request) was denied "because [Lukela] didn't cite Rules or Laws and to

reframe it better under Rule 60." We further conclude that the Family Court's

error in FOF 20, stating that the Request was heard on July 10, 2018, when it

was actually heard on July 16, 2018, was harmless. See HFCR Rule 61.

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limit the Family Court's jurisdiction to consider the Rule 60(b)

Motion in these circumstances. See Riethbrock v. Lange, 128

Hawai#i 1, 14-15, 282 P.3d 543, 556-57 (2012) (ruling that HRS

§ 580-56(d) applies solely in the context of a spouse's right to

dower or curtesy after a divorce); Carstensen v. Carstensen, No.

28920, 2012 WL 4006349, at *6 (Haw. App. Sept. 12, 2012) (Mem.)

(concluding that the family court erred in determining that

husband's HFCR Rule 60(b) motion was untimely based in part on

Greene v. Greene, 8 Haw. App. 559, 815 P.2d 28 (1991)). It is

therefore unclear why the Family Court quoted HRS § 580-56(d) and

cited pre-Riethbrock case law in COLs 3 through 5. Applying such

standards to the Rule 60(b) Motion was error.

Nevertheless, in paragraph 1 of the Order, the Family

Court concluded that it "ha[d] continuing jurisdiction pursuant

to the Stipulated Divorce Decree, and H.R.S. § 580-56[,]" and in

paragraph 2 of the Order, the court ruled on the merits of

Lukela's Rule 60(b)(1) arguments. Further, Lukela makes no

discernible argument as to how any alleged errors in COLs 3

through 5 affected the Family Court's adjudication of his

60(b)(1) arguments. See Amfac, 74 Haw. at 124-25, 839 P.2d at

30-31. We thus conclude that the asserted errors in COLs 3

through 5 were harmless as to Lukela's Rule 60(b)(1) arguments.

However, given that the Family Court did not address

Lukela's Rule 60(b)(6) arguments, the record on appeal is

insufficient for us to determine whether the Family Court abused

its discretion in denying such relief. Relatedly, we cannot say

that the court's errors in stating inapplicable legal standards

in COLs 3 through 5 were harmless as to the Rule 60(b)(6)

arguments. Accordingly, we vacate COLs 3 through 5. 

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons discussed above, we vacate in part the

September 4, 2018 "Findings of Facts, Conclusions of Laws, and

Order Denying [Lukela's] Rule 60(b) Motion for Relief from

Judgment Filed July 20, 2018," entered in the Family Court of the

Second Circuit, as to COLs 3 through 5, and the concluding order

denying the July 20, 2018 "Motion for Relief from Judgment/

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Settlement Pursuant to [HFCR] Rule 60(b)," to the extent the

motion sought relief under HFCR Rule 60(b)(6). We affirm in all

other respects and remand this matter to the Family Court for

further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. Lukela's

motion for retention of oral argument is hereby denied.

On the briefs:

/s/ Lisa M. Ginoza

Lukela S. Meyers, Chief Judge

Self-represented 

Plaintiff-Appellant

/s/ Katherine G. Leonard

Associate Judge

/s/ Clyde J. Wadsworth

Associate Judge

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