alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-19-00200-CR

Fred Douglas HARRIS,

Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas,

Appellee

From the County Court at Law No. 6, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 599480

Honorable Wayne A. Christian, Judge Presiding

PER CURIAM

Sitting: Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice

Irene Rios Justice

Beth Watkins, Justice

Delivered and Filed: May 22, 2019

DISMISSED

Fred Douglas Harris entered into a plea bargain with the State, pursuant to which he pled 

nolo contendere to possession of marijuana. The trial court imposed sentence and signed a 

certificate stating this “is a plea-bargain case, and the defendant has NO right of appeal.” See TEX.

R. APP. P. 25.2(a)(2). Harris timely filed a notice of appeal. The clerk’s record, which includes the 

trial court’s rule 25.2(a)(2) certification and a record of the plea hearing, has been filed. See TEX.

R. APP. P. 25.2(d). 
04-19-00200-CR

- 2 -

The clerk’s record establishes the punishment assessed by the court does not exceed the 

punishment recommended by the prosecutor and agreed to by the defendant and does not indicate 

the trial court gave Harris permission to appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(a)(2). Having reviewed 

the clerk’s record, we conclude the trial court’s certification accurately states that this is a plea 

bargain case and Harris does not have a right to appeal. See Dears v. State, 154 S.W.3d 610 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2005) (holding that court of appeals should review clerk’s record to determine whether 

trial court’s certification is accurate). This court must dismiss an appeal “if a certification that 

shows the defendant has the right of appeal has not been made part of the record.” TEX. R. APP. P.

25.2(d).

On April 8, 2019, we gave Harris notice that the appeal would be dismissed unless he filed 

a written response establishing he has a right of appeal or caused an amended trial court 

certification stating he has the right to appeal to be made part of the appellate record by April 25, 

2019. See TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(d); 37.1; Daniels v. State, 110 S.W.3d 174 (Tex. App.–San Antonio 

2003, order), disp. on merits, No. 04-03-00176-CR, 2003 WL 21508347 (July 2, 2003, pet. ref’d) 

(not designated for publication). Harris did not file a response to our order and an amended 

certification showing he has the right to appeal has not been filed. We therefore dismiss this appeal. 

See TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(d).

PER CURIAM

Do not publish
CABARRUS COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION v. DEPARTMENT OF STATE TREASURER, RETIREMENT SYSTEMS DIVISION ; Dale R. Folwell, State Treasurer (in official capacity only); Steven C. Toole, Director, Retirement Systems Division (in official capacity only)

No. 369PA18

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

March 27, 2019

Blake W. Thomas, Deputy General Counsel, Matthew W. Sawchak, Solicitor General, Ryan Y. Park, Deputy Solicitor General, Joseph A. Newsome, Attorney at Law, Raleigh, for Department of State Treasurer, et al.

Michael Crowell, Attorney at Law, Deborah R. Stagner, Attorney at Law, Raleigh, for Cabarrus County Board of Education.

Elizabeth L. Troutman, Attorney at Law, Jill R. Wilson, Attorney at Law, Greensboro, Allison B. Schafer, Legal Counsel/Director of Policy, for N.C. School Boards Association.

***ORDER***

Upon consideration of the petition filed on the 23rd of October 2018 by Respondents in this matter for discretionary review of the decision of the North Carolina Court of Appeals pursuant to G.S. 7A-31, the following order was entered and is hereby certified to the North Carolina Court of Appeals:

"Allowed by order of the Court in conference, this the 27th of March 2019."

Therefore the case is docketed as of the date of this order's certification. Briefs of the respective parties shall be submitted to this Court within the times allowed and in the manner provided by Appellate Rule 15(g)(2).
STATE of North Carolina v. Montise A. MITCHELL

No. 66P19

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

March 27, 2019

Richard J. Costanza, Attorney at Law, Southern Pines, Montise A. Mitchell, for Mitchell, Montise A.

Sandra Wallace-Smith, Special Deputy Attorney General, Jon David, District Attorney, for State of North Carolina *407***ORDER***

Upon consideration of the petition filed on the 20th of February 2019 by Defendant in this matter for discretionary review of the decision of the North Carolina Court of Appeals pursuant to G.S. 7A-31, the following order was entered and is hereby certified to the North Carolina Court of Appeals:

"Dismissed by order of the Court in conference, this the 27th of March 2019."

The following order has been entered on the motion filed on the 20th of February 2019 by Defendant to Proceed In Forma Pauperis:

"Motion Allowed by order of the Court in conference, this the 27th of March 2019."
UN PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 16
- 2448

OSCAR ANOTNIO MARTINEZ

- GARCIA; FRANCISCO MARTINEZ

- GARCIA , Petitioners ,

v. JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General , Respondent

.

No. 17
- 1675

OSCAR ANOTNIO MARTINEZ

- GARCIA; FRANCISCO MARTINEZ

- GARCIA , Petitioners ,

v. JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General , Respondent

.

On Pe tition for Review of Orders of the Board of Immigration Appeals

.

Submitted : December 22, 2017 Decided: January 11, 20182 Before WILKINSON, KING, and DUNCAN , Circuit Judges.

Denied in part; dismissed in part by un published per curiam opinion

.
Evelyn R.G. Smallwood, HATCH ROCKERS IMMIGRATION, Durham, North Carolina, for Petitioners. Chad A. Readler, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Keith I. McManus, Assistant Director, Juria L. Jones, Office of Immigration Litigation, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.3 PER CURIAM:
Oscar A. Martinez

- Garcia and Francisco Martinez

- Garcia, brothers and natives and citizens of El Salvador, petition for review of o rders of the Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) dismissing their appeal of the Immigration Judge’s decision denying their requests for asylum and withholding of removal, * and denying their motion to
reconsider. With respect to the Board’s order dismiss ing the appeal, w e have thoroughly reviewed the record, including the transcript of the merits hearing and all supporting evidence. We conclude that the record evidence does not compel a ruling contrary to any of the agency’s factual findings, see 8 U.S.C . § 1252(b)(4)(B) (2012), and that substantial evidence supports the Board’s decision, INS v. Elias

- Zacarias , 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992). Accordingly, we deny the petition for review in part for the reasons stated by the Board.
See In re Martinez

- Garcia (B.I.A. Dec. 12, 2016 ). As no arguments have been raised on appeal with respect to the denial of the motion to reconsider, we dismiss the petition for
review in part as to that order

. See In re Martinez

- Garcia (B.I.A. May 8, 2017); Suarez

- Valenzuela v. Holder , 714 F.3d 241, 248

- 49 (4th Cir. 2013) (absent a miscarriage of justice, arguments not raised in opening brief are waived). Accordingly, we deny in part , and dismiss in part , the petition for review. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately

* On appeal, petitioners do not challenge the agency’s denial of protection under the Convention Against Torture.4 presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process. DENIED IN PART; DISMISSED IN PART
#### Olin M. Alexander, *Plaintiff in Error,*v. R. E. Ballard, *Defendant in Error.*

Division B.

Opinion Filed May 17, 1928.

*Altman & Morrow,*Attorneys for Plaintiff in Error;

*Peacock & Parker,*Attorneys for Defendant in Error.

Buford, J.

In this case the declaration was in four counts, as follows:

“1. For money lent by the plaintiff to the defendánt.

*“2.*For money paid by the plaintiff for the defendant at his request.

“3. For money received by the defendant for the use of the plaintiff.

*951“4. For money found to be due from the defendant to the plaintiff on accounts stated between them. ’ ’

There was one plea of general issue, “That the defendant was never indebted as alleged.” Upon the trial there was a judgment for plaintiff and writ of error was sued out.

The aspect of the proof most favorable to the plaintiff is to the effect that plaintiff was a real estate broker and that defendant procured his services to trade a piece of land at a trade-in value of $250,000.00 as a binder on another piece of land, which the defendant proposed to purchase, and that the defendant, prior to the consummation of the trade, agreed to pay the plaintiff 5% commission based on the trade-in value of the land. That plaintiff consummated the trade by which the defendant conveyed his lands which were located in the State of Alabama at the agreed value of $250,000.00 as a binder on the Florida lands which the defendant proposed to purchase and that the defendant failed and refused to pay plaintiff the commission for his services. There is no evidence to support either count of the declaration. There is no evidence that the defendant ever agreed after the service was rendered to pay the plaintiff any sum. There is no evidence that the defendant ever admitted after the closing of the deal that he was indebted to plaintiff in any particular sum. There is no evidence that a statement of account was ever rendered to the defendant which he admitted was correct. There is no evidence that the defendant received from the plaintiff, or from anyone else, any money in connection with the transaction.

In Ingram-Dekle Lumber Company, a corporation, v. Geiger, 71 Fla. 390, 71 Sou. 552, this Court say:

“The *allegata*and *probata*must meet and correspond, the issues being made by the pleadings to which the proofs must be confined. There can be no recovery upon a cause *952of action, however meritorious it may be, that is in substance variant from that which is pleaded by the plaintiff. ’ ’

In this case the *allegata*and *probata*do not correspond. Therefore, judgment should be reversed and it is so ordered.

Reversed.

Whitfield, P. J., and Terrell, J., concur.

Ellis, C. J., and Strum and Brown, J. J., concur in the opinion and judgment.
_________________________________________ 

 

 

Order Michigan Supreme Court 

Lansing, Michigan 

January 31, 2007 Clifford W. Taylor,

 Chief Justice 

132243 Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 

Marilyn Kelly 

Maura D. Corrigan 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Stephen J. Markman,

 Justices 

v SC: 132243 

 COA: 260499 

Allegan CC: 04-013769-FH 

RONALD BARNETT JONES,

Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/ 

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the August 22, 2006 

judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not 

persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. 

p0124 

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

January 31, 2007 

Clerk
#### STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ALONZO McDOWELL

No. 7425SC897

(Filed 5 February 1975)

Appeal by defendant from *Thornburg, Judge,*15 July 1974 Criminal Session of Superior Court held in Catawba County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 13 January 1975.

Defendant was charged with felonious escape from the North Carolina Department of Correction in violation of G.S. 148-45. Upon his plea of not guilty, the jury returned a verdict of guilty as charged. From judgment sentencing him to imprisonment for a term of two years to begin at the expiration of sentences which the defendant is now serving, defendant appealed.

*Attorney General Edmisten, by Assistant Attorney General Banks, for the State.*

*Cagle and Houck, by William J. Houck, for defendant appellant.*

MORRIS, Judge.

Counsel for the defendant candidly concedes that his review of the record on appeal reveals no error in the trial of this matter but asks that we review the record to determine whether the trial court committed error. We have examined the record proper, including the organization of the court, the warrant and indictment, the arraignment and plea, the verdict and the judgment. Defendant received a fair trial free from prejudicial error.

No error.

Judges Britt and Clark concur.
#### Margie T. SIMMONS, Dorothy Kathryn Mormon, Glenda R. Mercer, William Frank Crate, and Shirley Bishop, Appellants, v. DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, Appellee.

No. 2D03-262.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

July 9, 2003.

*416J. Christy Wilson, III, of Wilson, Garber & Small, P.A., Orlando, for Appellants.

Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, and Robert I. Scanlan, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

STRINGER, Judge.

This is an eminent domain case wherein the appellants, Margie T. Simmons, Dorothy Kathryn Mormon, Glenda R. Mercer, William Frank Crate, and Shirley Bishop, the owners of parcel 42217000000, challenge the entry of an order of taking. The appellants argue that the trial court erred in entering the order of taking because the Department of Environmental Protection (“the Department”) failed to comply with presuit negotiation requirements and failed to present a good faith estimate of value based on a valid appraisal. We affirm the order in its entirety. We write only to express our views on the Department’s duty to negotiate in good faith with the fee owners prior to bringing an eminent domain proceeding.

The Department’s duty to negotiate in good faith prior to bringing an eminent domain proceeding is set forth in section 73.015(1), Florida Statutes (2001). That section requires that the Department “must attempt to negotiate in good faith with the fee owner of the parcel to be acquired ... and must attempt to reach an agreement regarding the amount of compensation to be paid for the parcel.” § 73.015(1). In this case, it is undisputed that the Department sent out, and the appellants received, two written offers that complied with section 73.015. The appellants neglected to respond to the offers, and the Department filed suit after waiting the requisite thirty days under the statute. *See*§ 73.015(l)(b). We reject the appellants’ argument that the Department’s duty to negotiate extended beyond its duty to send the written offers and await a response in this case. To the contrary, the appellants’ failure to respond to the offers ended the negotiations.

Affirmed.

SILBERMAN, J., and THREADGILL, EDWARD F., Senior Judge, concur.
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

CHARLES BARLOW,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

No. 4D17-129

[February 22, 2018]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, 

Broward County; Michael A. Robinson, Judge; L.T. Case No. 12-015659 

CF10A.

Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Kai Li Aloe Fouts, Special 

Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Luke R. 

Napodano, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

GERBER, C.J., GROSS and KUNTZ, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
##### 



Exhibit 31.1
 CERTIFICATION OF PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICER  PURSUANT TO SECTION 302  OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
  1.
    
    I have reviewed this Form 10-Q of General Nutrition Centers, Inc.;2.
    
    Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact
or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period
covered by this report;3.
    
    Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in
this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of
operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this
report;4.
    
    The registrants other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for establishing and
maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and
15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:
 (a)
    
    Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure
controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material
information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is
made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in
which this report is being prepared;(b)
    
    Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure controls and
procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the
disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report
based on such evaluation; and(c)
    
    Disclosed in this report any change in the registrants internal control over
financial reporting that occurred during the registrants most recent fiscal quarter
(the registrants fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has
materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrants
internal control over financial reporting; and
 5.
    
    The registrants other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our most recent
evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrants auditors and the
audit committee of the registrants board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent
functions):
 (a)
    
    All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation
of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely
affect the registrants ability to record, process, summarize, and report financial
information; and(b)
    
    Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees
who have a significant role in the registrants internal control over financial
reporting.
 August 4, 2006
    
    /s/ Joseph M. FortunatoJoseph M. FortunatoChief Executive Officer
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 9
<LEGEND>
THE FINANCIAL DATA SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED
FROM METROCORP BANCSHARES AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1999
<CASH>                                          29,945
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                               0
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                                 6,471
<TRADING-ASSETS>                                     0
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                     74,959
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                          35,106
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                            34,385
<LOANS>                                        488,132
<ALLOWANCE>                                      7,537
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 660,589
<DEPOSITS>                                     544,436
<SHORT-TERM>                                    32,636
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                              3,638
<LONG-TERM>                                     35,000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                         7,122
<OTHER-SE>                                      45,458
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>                 660,589
<INTEREST-LOAN>                                 45,322
<INTEREST-INVEST>                                7,715
<INTEREST-OTHER>                                   631
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                                53,668
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                              18,091
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              21,026
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                           32,642
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                    5,550
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                                 (14)
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                                 22,412
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 10,768
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                      10,768
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     7,130
<EPS-BASIC>                                       1.00
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     1.00
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                                   15.40
<LOANS-NON>                                      6,552
<LOANS-PAST>                                         0
<LOANS-TROUBLED>                                     0
<LOANS-PROBLEM>                                      0
<ALLOWANCE-OPEN>                                 6,119
<CHARGE-OFFS>                                    4,402
<RECOVERIES>                                       270
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                                7,537
<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                             5,410
<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                                  0
<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                          2,127


</TABLE>
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MICHAEL SAMMONS,

Plaintiff

- Appellant,

v.
RINO INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION,

Defendant

- Appellee. No. 15

- 15275

D.C. No. 2:14

- cv
- 00574

- GMN

VCF

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Nevada Gloria M. Navarro, Chief Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 16, 2016 **

Before: LEAVY, BERZON, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.
Michael Sammons appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
dismissing for lack of subject matter jurisdiction his diversity action seeking the
appointment of a receiver. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

NOV 21 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLER K U.S. COURT OF APPEAL S2 15

- 15275

review de novo, Naffe v. Frey , 789 F.3d 1030, 1035 (9th Cir. 2015), and we

reverse and remand.
The district court dismissed Sammons’s action for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction because it concluded that Sammons did not plead an amount in
controversy over $75,000. However, Sammons ’s proposed First Amended
Complaint alleges that Rino International Corporation holds ownership interests in
foreign companies, previously valued at $258 million, which makes his
shareholder interest worth more than $75,000. Based on those allegations, i t
cannot be determined to a legal certainty that Sammons failed to meet the amount
in controversy requirement. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) ; Naffe , 789 F.3d at 1039

- 40
(setting forth elements of diversity jurisdiction and explaining that the “legal
certainty” test requires a “ district court [to] accept the amount in controversy
claimed by the plaintiff unless it can declare to a legal certainty that the case is

worth les s”); see also Geographic Expeditions, Inc. v. Estate of Lhotka ex rel.

Lhotka , 599 F.3d 1102 , 1106 (9th Cir. 2010) (under the legal certainty test, “ a
federal court has subj ect matter jurisdiction unless upon the face of the complaint,
it is obvious that the suit cannot involve the necessary amount ” (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted) ). Accordingly, we reverse the judgment and3 15

- 15275

remand for further proceedings.
Sammons’s motion to submit the case on the briefs, filed on February 21,
2015, and his motion to submit the case to a screening panel, filed on February 24,
2015, are granted.

REVERSED and REMANDED.