NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 08a0461n.06 F iled: August 1, 2008 No. 05-3408 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
UNI TED STATES OF AMERI CA, Plaintiff-Appellee , v. PATRI CK J AMES PUTTI CK, De fe nd ant- Ap pe lla

nt. )

) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEALFROM THE U NI TED STATES DI STRI CT COURT FOR THE N O R T H E R

N D IS T R IC T O F O H IO

Be for e : D AU G HTREY , G ILM AN , a nd R OG ER S, C ir c uitJudg e s. Roger s, Circuit Judge. T h i s case is part of a consolidated a

ppeal involving thirteen defe ndants who we re me mbers o f t h e Outlaw Motorcy cle Club (“O MC”), an inter national motorcy cle c lub with chapter s acr oss the country and around the world. In 1997, the Fe dera l Bure au of Investig ation and state la w enf orce ment ag encie s beg an an inve stigation into the Gre en re g ion of t h e O M C , w h i c h c o n s i s t s o f c h a p t e r s i nD ayt o n , O h i o ; F o rt W ayn e , In d i an a ; L o u i s v i l l e , K e n tu c ky; I ndianapolis, I ndiana; and O klahoma C ity , Oklahoma. As a result of t he investi g ation, a gra nd jury in t he No rt he rn Di str ic t of

Oh io r e tur

ne d a 40 -c ount i nd ic tme nt in 2 00 3 c ha rg ingthe de fe nd ants wi th various off

enses, includingRacke teer I nfluenc ed and Corr

upt Org anizations A ct (“RI CO”), dr ug t r a f f i c k i n g , an d

f i r e ar m s o f f e n s e s . T h e d e f

e n d an t s w e r e t r i e d

b e f o r e anan o n ym o u s j u r

y.No. 05-3408

United States v. Puttick

- 2 - Def endant Patric k J . Putti ck was the boss of the “G ree n Reg ion” of the O MC. The indictm en t leveled f

our cha rg es ag ainst him: (1) substantive RI CO in violation of 18 U.S.C . § 19 62 (c ); (2 ) R I CO c on sp ir a c y in v iol a tio n o f 1 8 U .S. C. § 19 62 (d) ; (3) na rc oti c s c on sp ir a c y

in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) ; and (4) use of a c ommunication fac ility to commit a felony

under the Controlled Substances Ac t in viol at i o n o f 21 U.S .C. § 843(b) and 18 U .S.C. § 2. Under the RI CO c on sp ir a c y

c ount, the ind ic tme nt a lle g e d s e ve ral ov ert act s. Put tic k c la ims that th e se
a lle g a tio ns c on sti tut e a

bil l of pa rt ic ula rs . B e c a us e the Go ve rnme nt c on c e ded thi s p oin t at tr ia l, Put tic k’ s c la im i s a c c e pte d b y thi s c ourt
. At tr ia l, t he Go ve rnme nt pr esen ted e vid e nc e that Pu tti c k h a d s up pli e d c oc a ine to O MC member G ary

Hohn, and that Puttic k had par ticipated in making drugdistribution pol icies for the O M C
. N e v e rt h e l e s s , P u t t i c k w a s a c qu i t t e d

o na l l c h ar g e s e x c e p tR IC O c o n s p i r a c y.
At the sentenc ing he aring , the di strict court determined P uttick’s base offense level to be 36, pr e su ma bly ba se d o n th e re c omm e nd a tio n in the pr e se nte nc e re po rt

that Pu tti c k b e fo un d r e sp on s ibl e fo r 1 44 kil og ra

ms o f c oc a ine . H ow ever , it is n ot e nti re ly c le ar h owthe dis tr ic t c ourt c a me to t his
c on c lus ion . A ft e r e sta

bli sh ing the ba se of

fe ns e le ve l, the dis tr ic t c ourt e nh anc e d Putti c k’ s o ff

e ns e level by three levels base d on his leader ship role in the OMC. That left Putti ck with an of fense level of 39, which pr ov i ded a Guidelines rang e of 292 to 365 months in prison. Despite this rang e, the district court ultimately

sentenc ed Puttick to 20 y ear s beca use t h a t i s th e statutory

maxi mum sentence for RI CO conspirac y . Unlike with respe ct to most of the other defe ndants in this ca se, howe ver, theNo. 05-3408

United States v. Puttick

Putti ck also a dopts the two arguments fr om co-de fenda nt J ohn P. W alker : (1) that the 1 admission of post-arr est statements made by co-de fenda

nts Fowler

and Carlisle wa s a violation of the Con fr on tatio n Cl a

us e ; and (2 ) that the e mpa ne lin g of an ano ny

mou s jur y wa s unc on sti tut ion a l. The fir st argument is discussed in United States v. W alker , No. 04-4478, __ W L__ (6th Cir. 2008), and the entire di scussion need not be repeated here. Any violation of the Confrontation Clause wa s rende red ha

rmless by the fa ct that the evide nce ag ainst Putti ck wa s so strong that he would have been convicted e ven if the state ments had not been admitted. L ikewise, any err or cause d by the district court’s f ailure to g ive a limit ing instruction w ith r espec t to F owler’ s and Carlisle’s state ments was also render ed h ar m l ess by the over whelming evidenc e of Puttick’s g uilt. The second a dopted argument is unavailing as we ll. I t was fully d iscussed in the compa nion case of United States v. Lawson , __ F.3d __ ( 6th Cir. 2008), and that discussion need not be repe ated he re. Putti ck also makes the argument that this court should modify the holding of United States v. Book er , 54 3 U. S. 220 (2005), in order to pr ohibit judi cial fa ct-findingfor the pur poses of de te rm ini ng a de fe nd ant’ s Gu ide lin e s ra ng e . Th e re is no ne e d to a dd re ss thi s argume nt be c a

us e thi s c ourt c le arl y c ann ot m od if

y a ho ldi ngof

the Un ite d St a te s Su

pr e me Court
. - 3 - dis tr ic t c ourt

did no t im po se an a lte rn a tiv e se nte nc e un de r an a dv iso ry Gu ide lin e s r e g ime . In f

a c t, the district court e x presse d reg ret at its l ack of discretion to impose a lesse r sentenc e.
Putti ck now argues t hat hi s conviction s hould be vacated be cause his rights we re violate d by
a var iance betwee n the bill of particulars and the evidenc e pre sented at trial, and bec ause the district
c ourt e rr on e ou sly

a dmi tte d a

n a udio tap ed c on ve rs a tio n a lle g e dly inv olv ingPuttic k w ith ou t f ir st requiringthat a witness identify Putti ck’s voice . Putti ck al s o ar gues that his sentenc e should be
vacated bec ause the district court applied the SentencingGuidelines as mandatory , and bec ause the dis tr ic t c ourt

e rr on e ou sly

c a lc ulated his Se nte nc ingGu ide lin e s o ff e ns e le ve l. B e c a

us e Puttic k is 1
c or re c t th a t th e dis tr ic t c ourt

se nte nc e d h im und e r a

mand a tor y Gu ide lin e s re g ime , his se nte nc e mus t be vac ated a

nd the ca se re manded f

or re sentenc ing. H is conviction, howeve r, is sound.No. 05-3408

United States v. Puttick

- 4 - As a pre liminary

matter, ther e is no rea l dispute that Put tick’s s entenc e mus t be vacated. T he Gover nment conce des t hat t he dis trict court treated the Sentencing Guidelines as mandatory , and the
re c or d ma ke s it c le ar t hat th is co nc e ssi on

is c or re c t. T he tr ans c ri pt o f t

he se nte nc inghe ari ngpla inl y shows that the district court wa s under the impre ssion that it h ad n o d i scre tion to im pose a le sser sentenc e on Puttick. There fore , this court’s dec ision in Un ite d S tates v . B ar

ne tt , 398 F.3d 516, 527- 28 (6th Cir. 2005), re quires that Puttick’s sentence b e vacated a nd the ca se be r emande d for
re s en t en ci n g.
B e c a us e Pu t t i c k ’ s s e n t e n c e m u s tb e v a c a t e d , w e d o n o ta d dr e s s t h e ar g u m e n tt h a this Guidelines off

ense le vel was c alculate d incorre ctly . On re mand, howeve r, we note that it would be helpful for the district c ourt to c larify the basis for its finding that Putti ck wa s responsible for 144 kilogr ams of coc aine.
Al tho ug h Putti c k’ s se nte nc e is d e fe c tiv e , th e re are no fl aws in his c on vic tio n. F ir st, his ri g hts
wer e not violated by

a var iance betwee n the bill of particular s and the e vidence prese nted by the Go ve rnme nt at tr ia l. P utt ic k ar g ue s to the c on tr ary and po int s to the te sti mony of Tr a c y Ti pto n in
su pp or t. T ipt on te sti fi e d th a t Pu tti c k s up pli e d T ipt on ’s bo y fr ie nd , OMC m e mbe r G ary Ho hn , w ith
coca ine in the amount of thre e to six kilogr ams per month for four y ear s . Be cause the ac ts about which Tipton te stified wer e not mentioned amongthe over t acts alleg ed in the indictment, Puttick
asser ts that Tipton’s testimony amounts to a variance from the bill of particulars. P uttick conce des that the plain er

ror standa rd applies to this claim beca use t here was no c ontemporane ous objection on this ground at trial. Aside from the pl ain error standard, P uttick’s argument fails bec ause the reNo. 05-3408

United States v. Puttick

- 5 - do e s n ot a

pp e ar t o h a ve be e n a

va ri anc e . A nd

e ve n if th e adm iss ion

of Ti pto n’ s te sti mony

did amount to a var iance , Putti ck has not satisfied the high hurdle of plain err or re view bec ause he has not show n that he was prejudice d by it. See United States v. W illiams , 962 F.2d 1218, 1226 ( 6th Cir. 1 9 9 2 ) ( ci t i n g United States v. Hask ins , 3 45 F .2 d 1 11 , 1 14 (6 th C ir . 1 96 5) (h old ingthat va ri anc e is not gr ounds for re versa l unless it causes pre judice))
. Th e re a pp e ars to have be e n no va

ri anc e he re be c a

us e Ti pto n’ s te sti mony did no t pr ov e “ fa c ts materia lly differ ent from those a lleg ed in the indictment.” United States v. Flowal , 163 F.3d 956, 9 6 2 (6 t h C i r. 1 9 9 8 ) ( qu o t i n g United States v. Barrow , 1 18 F.3 d 4 82 , 4 88 (6t h C ir . 1 99 7)) . By incorpora ting the rele vant parts of t he subst antive R I CO char g e, the RI CO conspirac y char g e alleg es that na rc oti c s d istri bu tio n w a s o ne of the c ri min a l a c tiv iti e s o f t he RI CO c on sp ir a c y . I n li g ht o f t his alleg ation, Tipton’s testimony did not present a si t u ati on in which fa cts materia lly differ ent from t h o s e a l l ege d

i nt h e i n d i ct m en twe re p re s en t edat t ri al
. T o t h e c o n t ra ry , t h e f ac t s p re s en t edt h ro u gh Ti tpt on ’s te sti mony

we re dir e c tly

in l ine wi th t

ho se a lle g e d in

the ind ic tme nt.
Even if ther e we re a

varia nce, how ever , Putti ck has not demonstrate d that it rises to the level of plain er

ror. The plain err or standard require s the appellant to pr ove that there is: (1) an err or that is plain, i.e., obvious or clea r; (2) that the err or af

fec ted his substantial rights; and ( 3) that the e rror ’s adver se impact ser iously aff ecte d the f

ai rn es s , integ rity , or public re putation of the judicial proce eding s. Se e Un ite d S tates v . H igh ga te , 5 2 1 F. 3 d

5 9 0 , 5 9 5 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 8 ) ( qu o t i n g United Sta te s v . D av is , 397 F.3d 340, 346 (6th Cir. 2005)). This standard is not met her e bec ause Puttick has not convincing ly

shown that the district court made an err or, much less a plain e rror . AssumingNo. 05-3408

United States v. Puttick

- 6 - su c h ane r

r o r , h o w e v e r , Putt ic k

h a s f a il e d to s h o w th a t i t a f

f e c te d h is s u b s ta n ti a l r ig h ts
. T he purported va

rianc e did not, as he a

rg ues, depr ive him of his f undamental and substantial r ight to be apprised of

the cha rg es ag ainst him. P uttick had ample notification of the char g es ag ainst him. He hardly went into the trial with no idea that the Government might try to prove that he wa s involved in na rcotics distribution, when both the substantive RI CO and RI CO conspirac y counts alleg ed that drugdistribution was one of the a ctivities of the RI CO enter prise, and when Puttick was also cha rg ed wi th o ne c ount o f n arc oti c s c on sp ir a c y . I t may be tr ue that he did

no t kn owwh a t T ipt on

wo uld testify to — or eve n that she would testify at all — but he wa s not entitled to know that information. As this court said in Un ite d S tates v . S ali sb ur y , 983 F.2d 1369 ( 6th Cir. 1993), “a de fenda nt is not entitled to discover all the overt acts that might be proven at trial.” Id. at 1 3 7 5 (c i t i n g United States

v . Ki lra in , 566 F.2d 979, 985 ( 5th Cir. 1978)). Thus, any varia nce did not a ffe ct Puttick’s substantial rig hts. Additionally , ag ain assuming a var iance , Putti ck h as n o t met the burde n of demonstrating that th e va

ri anc e a ff e c te d th e fa ir

ne ss, int e g ri ty , o r p ub lic re pu tatio n o f t he jud ic ia l pr oc e e din g s.
Finall y , th e r e w a s n o e r

r o r in th e d is tr ic t c o u rt’ s a dmi s s io no f ana u d io ta p e d c o n v e rsation alleg edly involvin g P u ttick. The audiotape in question contains a re cordingof an O MC reg ional meeting held in Kittanning, Pennsy lvania, in Aug ust of 2002. At t rial, the Gove rnment alleg ed that Putti ck could be hear d on the tape. Puttick ar g ues that the tape was inad m i s s i b l e beca use the Gover nment did not present a w itness to testify that it was P u t t i ck’s voice on the tape. I nstead of having a witness identify the voice, the district judge — at a sideba r conf ere nce — ide ntified Putti ck’s voice himself and dete rmined that the tape shoul d b e admitt ed into evidenc e. PuttickNo. 05-3408

United States v. Puttick

- 7 - argues that a w itness, rather t h an t h e judge , should have identified his voice . To the contra ry , we fi nd no thi ngwr on g wi th t

he pr oc e dure us e d b y

the dis tr ic t c ourt
. Rule 901(a) of the F eder al Rules of Evidenc e re quires that an audiotape be authe nticated, but it does not require that it be authenticated by a witness. See U

nited States v. Sliker , 751 F.2d 477, 49 9- 50 0 ( 2d

Cir . 1 98 4) . I t is pe rm iss ibl e fo r the jud g e to m a ke a pr e lim ina

ry de te rm inatio n a s to authentication, admit the evidence conditionally under Rule 104( b), and the n allow the jurors to be the final a

rbiters of whether

it was ac tually

authenticated. S

e e id . I n Sliker , th e Se c on d Ci rc uit aff irmed the ve ry

same proc edure used by

the district court in this case . I n the fa ce of an objec tion
on the g round that the voices on the audiotape had not be en identified by a witness, the district court
a dmi tte d th e ta

pe ba se d o n th e c ourt ’s ow n f ind ing— ma de a t a

sid e ba r c on feren ce — th at “ it i s clea r t hat i t is [t he def

endant’ s] voi ce.” See id. at 497. The Sec ond Circuit affir med the admission of the e vid e nc e on

the ba sis that th e dis tr ic t c ourt c an a dmi t th e e vid e nc e c on dit ion a lly un de r R ule 104(b) without witness authentica tion and leave it to the jury to de termine whether the evidenc e had been tr uly authenticated. See id. at 499-500. The Four th Circ uit ha s adopted a simil ar approa ch as well, noting that “the ultimate resolution of authenticity is a question for the jur

y .” See U nited States v. Branch , 97 0 F .2 d 13 68 , 13 71 (4 th Cir
. 19 92 ). Th e re a so nin g of the Se c on d a

nd F ourt h Ci rc uit s is compelling an d co m p o rts with the lang uag e of Rule 901( a). The method of identification used by the district court wa s appropr iate.
As in Sliker , any

potential problem posed by the proc edure used by

the district court is rooted in the fac t that the district court did not specific ally instruct the j urors that they wer e the f

inal judge sNo. 05-3408

United States v. Puttick

- 8 - of whether the voice on the t ape was t hat of the def endant. See Slike r , 7 5 1 F. 2 d at 5 0 0
. Al t h o u gh not require d to do so, it is prefe rable for the district c ourt to instruct the jurors that they are the final arbiter s of the authe ntication of any evidenc e that wa s admitted p re l i m i narily under Rule 104( b). Se e id . Th e q u est ion of whethe r to g ive this kind of specific instruc tion ge nera lly “lies in the discretion of the trial judg e.” Id . In th is c a se , it c ann ot b e sa id t

hat th e di st ri ct cou rt a

bu se d it s discretion b y fa i l i n g to provide a spe cific instruc tion since counsel f ailed to re quest one, a

nd the dis tr ic t c ourt

de liv e re d a

g e ne ra l ins tr

uc tio n to the e ff

e c t that the jur

y wa s the so le jud g e of

the fa c ts. Se e id
. For

the fore g oing r easons, Puttick’s conviction is AFF I RMED, his sentence is VACATED,
an d t h e c as e i s R E M AN DE D f o r r es en t en ci n g.