United States Department of Labor

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

__________________________________________

C.C., Appellant

and

U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, POST OFFICE, 

Plainfield, IL, Employer

__________________________________________

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Docket No. 19-1031

Issued: December 3, 2019

Appearances: Case Submitted on the Record

Alan J. Shapiro, Esq., for the appellant1

Office of Solicitor, for the Director

DECISION AND ORDER

Before:

CHRISTOPHER J. GODFREY, Chief Judge

JANICE B. ASKIN, Judge

VALERIE D. EVANS-HARRELL, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION

On April 10, 2019 appellant, through counsel, filed a timely appeal from a March 15, 2019 

merit decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). Pursuant to the 

Federal Employees’ Compensation Act2(FECA) and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the Board 

has jurisdiction over the merits of this case.3

 

1

In all cases in which a representative has been authorized in a matter before the Board, no claim for a fee for legal 

or other service performed on appeal before the Board is valid unless approved by the Board. 20 C.F.R. § 501.9(e). 

No contract for a stipulated fee or on a contingent fee basis will be approved by the Board. Id. An attorney or 

representative’s collection of a fee without the Board’s approval may constitute a misdemeanor, subject to fine or 

imprisonment for up to one year or both. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 292. Demands for payment of fees to a 

representative, prior to approval by the Board, may be reported to appropriate authorities for investigation.

2 5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.

3 The Board notes that following the March 15, 2019 decision, OWCP received additional evidence. However, the 

Board’s Rules of Procedure provides: “The Board’s review of a case is limited to the evidence in the case record that 

was before OWCP at the time of its final decision. Evidence not before OWCP will not be considered by the Board 

for the first time on appeal.” 20 C.F.R. § 501.2(c)(1). Thus, the Board is precluded from reviewing this additional 

evidence for the first time on appeal. Id.
2

ISSUE

The issue is whether appellant has met her burden of proof to establish that she was disabled

from employment for the period January 7 through February 2, 2018 causally related to her 

November 22, 2017 employment injury. 

FACTUAL HISTORY

On November 30, 2017 appellant, then a 50-year-old city carrier assistant, filed a traumatic 

injury claim (Form CA-1) alleging that on November 22, 2017 she injured her left leg stepping 

down from the back of her truck when delivering a package while in the performance of duty. She 

stopped work on November 22, 2017. OWCP accepted the claim for left leg gastrocnemius muscle

strain.

On November 30, 2017 appellant came under the treatment of Dr. Rueben Nair, a Boardcertified orthopedist, for a left calf injury occurring on November 22, 2017. Dr. Nair diagnosed 

left medial gastrocnemius myotendinous sprain and advised that appellant could work light duty 

only for the next three weeks. He also recommended physical therapy. In a December 7, 2017 

duty status report (Form CA-17), Dr. Nair reiterated that, effective November 30, 2017, appellant 

was able to work full-time light-duty work. He also noted appellant’s physical restrictions.

In a December 26, 2017 follow-up report, Dr. Nair continued to diagnose left medial 

gastrocnemius myotendinous sprain. He noted findings on examination of the left lower extremity 

of minimal tenderness to palpation over the gastrocnemius muscle belly and musculotendinous 

junction, no defect along the Achilles, and distally neurovascularly intact. Dr. Nair emphasized 

the importance of physical therapy, noting that appellant had only gone twice. He also advised 

her to return for follow up in four weeks.

In a December 27, 2017 duty status report (Form CA-17), Dr. Nair indicated that appellant 

was totally disabled from work.

In a report dated January 30, 2018, Dr. Nair noted that appellant finished physical therapy 

with improvement in her left calf injury. He noted no tenderness with palpation of the gastroc 

muscle belly, no defect along the Achilles, and distally neurovascularly intact. Dr. Nair diagnosed 

left medial gastrocnemius myotendinous sprain. He opined that appellant was doing well and 

could return to work full duty and he would see her on an as-needed basis. In a return to work slip 

dated January 30, 2018, Dr. Nair returned appellant to work without restrictions on 

February 1, 2018. Similarly, in a duty status report (Form CA-17) dated January 31, 2018, he 

diagnosed a muscle strain of the calf and opined that she could return to her regular work effective 

February 1, 2018.

On March 2, 2018 appellant filed a wage-loss compensation claim (Form CA-7) disability 

benefits from January 7 to February 2, 2018. 

In a letter dated March 16, 2018, OWCP requested that appellant provide additional factual 

information to establish disability for work during the period January 7 through February 2, 2018. 

It afforded her 30 days to submit the requested information. No response was received.
3

By decision dated September 13, 2018, OWCP denied appellant’s claim for wage-loss 

compensation for the period January 7 through February 2, 2018. It found that the medical 

evidence of record was insufficient to establish that appellant was disabled due to her employment 

injury.

On October 10, 2018 appellant requested an oral hearing before a representative of 

OWCP’s Branch of Hearings and Review, which was held on February 12, 2019. 

By decision dated March 15, 2019, OWCP’s hearing representative affirmed the 

September 13, 2018 decision. 

LEGAL PRECEDENT

An employee seeking benefits under FECA has the burden of proof to establish the 

essential elements of his or her claim by the preponderance of the evidence.4 For each period of 

disability claimed, the employee has the burden of proof to establish that she was disabled from 

work as a result of the accepted employment injury.5 Whether a particular injury causes an 

employee to become disabled from work, and the duration of that disability, are medical issues 

that must be proven by a preponderance of probative and reliable medical opinion evidence.6

Under FECA the term “disability” means the incapacity, because of an employment injury, 

to earn the wages that the employee was receiving at the time of injury.7 Disability is thus not 

synonymous with physical impairment, which may or may not result in an incapacity to earn 

wages. An employee who has a physical impairment causally related to a federal employment 

injury, but who nevertheless has the capacity to earn the wages he or she was receiving at the time 

of injury, has no disability as that term is used in FECA.8

The Board will not require OWCP to pay compensation for disability in the absence of 

medical evidence directly addressing the specific dates of disability for which compensation is 

claimed. To do so, would essentially allow an employee to self-certify their disability and 

entitlement to compensation.9

ANALYSIS

The Board finds that appellant has not met her burden of proof to establish that she was 

disabled from employment for the period January 7 through February 2, 2018 causally related to 

her November 22, 2017 employment injury. 

 

4 See B.O., Docket No. 19-0392 (issued July 12, 2019); D.W., Docket No. 18-0644 (issued November 15, 2018).

5

Id.

6 20 C.F.R. § 10.5(f); B.O., supra note 4; N.M., Docket No. 18-0939 (issued December 6, 2018).

7 20 C.F.R. § 10.5(f); see B.K., Docket No. 18-0386 (issued September 14, 2018).

8

Id.

9 A.W., Docket No. 18-0589 (issued May 14, 2019).
4

Dr. Nair initially found appellant able to perform full-time, light-duty work effective 

November 30, 2017. However, in a December 27, 2017 Form CA-17, he reported that she was 

totally disabled due to her left calf injury and advised that she continue with physical therapy.

Dr. Nair did not provide medical rationale for his opinion that appellant was totally disabled or 

explain what had changed since his November 30, 2017 opinion that she could perform full-time 

light-duty work. A medical report must include rationale explaining how the physician reached 

his conclusion regarding disability.10 The Board has found that medical opinions unsupported by 

rationale regarding the period of disability claimed are of little probative value.11

Similarly, in a January 30, 2018 report, Dr. Nair diagnosed left medial gastrocnemius 

myotendinous sprain and returned appellant to work full duty. In a return to work slip dated 

January 30, 2018 and Form CA-17 dated January 31, 2018, he indicated that she could return to 

full duty on February 1, 2018. However, Dr. Nair, did not explain how appellant’s accepted 

employment injury changed from November 30, 2017 when he returned her to full-time light duty, 

to December 27, 2017 when he opined that she was totally disabled, to January 30, 2018 when he 

returned her to work regular duty.12 Therefore, these reports are insufficient to meet appellant’s 

burden of proof.

The issue of whether a claimant’s disability from work is related to an accepted condition 

must be established by a physician who, on the basis of a complete and accurate factual and 

medical history, concludes that the disability is causally related to the employment injury and 

supports that conclusion with sound medical reasoning.13 The Board finds that appellant has not 

submitted a medical report from Dr. Nair which provides a medical explanation as to why she was 

incapable of working for the claimed period when she was previously found capable of working 

following her accepted employment injury. Without such rationalized medical evidence, appellant 

has not met her burden of proof.14

Appellant may submit new evidence or argument with a written request for reconsideration 

to OWCP within one year of this merit decision, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 8128 and 20 C.F.R. 

§§ 10.605 through 10.607.

CONCLUSION

The Board finds that appellant has not met her burden of proof to establish that she was 

disabled from employment for the period January 7 to February 2, 2018 causally related to her

November 22, 2017 employment injury. 

 

10 T.J., Docket No. 18-0619 (issued October 22, 2018).

11 C.R., Docket No. 17-0648 (issued August 15, 2018).

12 P.M., Docket No. 17-1131 (issued January 29, 2018).

13 See G.B., Docket No. 16-1033 (issued December 5, 2016).

14 See K.A., Docket No. 17-1718 (issued February 12, 2018).
5

ORDER

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the March 15, 2019 decision of the Office of 

Workers’ Compensation Programs is affirmed.

Issued: December 3, 2019

Washington, DC

Christopher J. Godfrey, Chief Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Janice B. Askin, Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Valerie D. Evans-Harrell, Alternate Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board