1

Filed 1/20/21 P. v. Robledo CA1/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified 

for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for 

publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE, 

Plaintiff and Respondent, 

v.

BO ROBLEDO

Defendant and Appellant.

 

 A158002 

 (Contra Costa County

 Super. Ct. No. 51817816)

Defendant Bo Robledo, while driving under the influence of 

alcohol, caused a head-on collision that killed the other driver 

(“decedent”) and resulted in permanent serious injuries to the 

passenger in decedent’s car. A jury found defendant guilty of seconddegree murder (Pen. Code, §187, subd. (a)) and gross vehicular 

manslaughter while intoxicated (Pen. Code, § 191.5, subd. (a)), together 

with a true finding of two prior convictions for driving under the 

influence (Pen. Code, § 191.5, subd. (d)); driving under the influence

(DUI) and driving with a .08 per cent blood alcohol level, causing injury 

within 10 years of another DUI conviction (Veh. Code, §§ 23153, subds. 

(a), (b), 23560), together with true findings of great bodily injury 

causing brain injury and paralysis (Pen. Code, § 12022.7, subd. (b)); 
2

and driving when privilege suspended or revoked for a DUI conviction 

(Veh. Code, § 14601.2, subd. (a)). He was sentenced to an aggregate 

term of 22 years to life. 

On appeal, defendant contends the trial court made prejudicial 

errors by: (1) excluding evidence of decedent’s acute cocaine 

intoxication; and (2) admitting evidence of the underlying facts of 

defendant’s prior DUI convictions. We affirm.

Factual and Procedural Background

There were no witnesses to the November 2017 collision 

(collision) that killed decedent and caused her passenger permanent 

serious injuries. Consequently, the People presented their case 

through the expert testimony of the Sheriff’s crime lab criminalist 

concerning defendant’s alcohol intoxication, a police officer qualified as 

a traffic reconstruction expert, other police officers and transportation 

witnesses who evaluated the collision scene, and the testimony of the 

driver of a third car that collided with the cars involved in the primary 

collision (secondary collision). The traffic reconstruction expert 

(hereinafter “the expert”) based his opinions regarding how the collision 

happened on the physical evidence at the site (shown to the jury in a 

myriad of photographs and 3D laser scanner images), the electronic 

data retrieved from the air bag module control in defendant’s car, and 

the statements made by the driver involved in the secondary collision.

The People’s theory, as presented through the experts and other 

witnesses, was that the cars were traveling in opposite directions on an 

unlit rural two-lane (north/south) road at almost midnight on a cold 

and cloudy night. The lanes were separated by “box dots” simulating a 

double-yellow line and there was a posted speed limit of 45 miles per 
3

hour for both lanes. Just south of the collision site, the northbound 

lane veered slightly so that a northbound driver who did not follow the 

curve of the road would cross over the double-yellow line into the 

opposing southbound lane. The alcohol-impaired defendant was 

driving at an excessive speed in the northbound lane when he crossed 

over the double-yellow line and struck decedent’s vehicle virtually 

head-on; at that time, decedent was driving at or below the speed limit 

and entirely in the southbound lane. Seconds before the impact, 

defendant turned his car’s steering wheel sharply to the right and hit 

the brakes but was unable to avoid the high-speed collision. Decedent’s 

car did not have a similar diagnostic air bag module control, but it was 

estimated her car was traveling at a speed no greater, and likely less, 

than 45.9 miles per hour and she had not been driving in any fashion 

that contributed to the collision. 

After the collision both vehicles were “completely destroyed” and 

they came to rest entirely in the southbound lane, with car debris 

strewn in both lanes. The secondary collision occurred when the driver 

of a third vehicle traveling in the southbound lane came upon the 

wreckage but was unable to stop before striking both cars. There was 

no evidence that the secondary collision contributed to decedent’s death 

or passenger’s injuries. 

Defendant did not testify or present any evidence.
4

DISCUSSION

I. Exclusion of Evidence of Decedent’s Acute Cocaine 

Intoxication 

a. Relevant Facts

The People filed motions in limine under Evidence Code sections 

350 and 3521 to exclude evidence that decedent was driving under the 

influence of cocaine (described in the autopsy report as an acute cocaine 

intoxication). Defendant opposed, arguing that the collision necessarily 

called into question decedent’s driving skills and acute cocaine 

intoxication would adversely affect her ability to drive. Defendant did 

not seek to present its own expert, but instead asked to question the 

prosecution’s criminalist from the Sheriff’s crime lab as well as the 

traffic reconstruction expert. In response, the prosecutor informed the 

court that no criminalist was prepared to testify as to the probable 

effects of decedent’s acute cocaine intoxication on her driving skills and 

no prosecution witness was prepared to testify that decedent had done 

anything other than drive at or below the speed limit within her own 

traffic lane. 

The trial court tentatively ruled it would exclude evidence of 

decedent’s acute cocaine intoxication as not relevant and prejudicial. 

However, the court was amenable to a section 402 hearing at which 

time it would consider any proposed testimony regarding the effect of 

1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Evidence 

Code. Section 350 reads: “No evidence is admissible except relevant 

evidence.” Section 352 reads: “The court in its discretion may exclude 

evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the 

probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of 

time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing 

the issues, or of misleading the jury.”
5

decedent’s acute cocaine intoxication on her driving skills and the 

extent to which it may have contributed to the collision. Thereafter, at 

the joint request of the parties, the trial court held a section 402 

hearing at which the sole witness was the prosecution’s traffic 

reconstruction expert, Police Officer Lee Lawrence. The officer opined 

that decedent’s driving had not contributed in any way to the collision. 

When asked to explain, the witness stated decedent was “driving like 

she should have,” and if her vehicle was in her traffic lane then it 

would not have any causal effect on a collision due to defendant’s 

vehicle crossing into the oncoming traffic lane. 

At the conclusion of the section 402 hearing, defendant renewed 

his request to admit the evidence of decedent’s acute cocaine 

intoxication. The trial court again tentatively refused to admit the 

evidence, stating, “Without there being some connection between the 

cocaine that was detected in [the victim’s] system and the cause of this 

collision, I do not believe that the fact that cocaine was detected is 

relevant to the issues in this case.” The court also found the evidence 

would be “highly prejudicial” as it would impugn decedent’s character 

without having any bearing on what caused the collision. Nonetheless, 

the court stated it would reconsider its ruling “if there’s some other 

evidence that you learn of or have an expert or witness who will provide 

relevant testimony to that issue, I would allow you to ask for a further 

hearing on the issue.” (Italics added.) Defense counsel made no further 

effort to renew his request to admit evidence of decedent’s acute cocaine 

intoxication and did not later ask for another section 402 hearing.
6

b. Analysis

Defendant challenges the trial court’s in limine rulings excluding 

evidence of the decedent’s acute cocaine intoxication on two grounds: 

(1) the trial court erred when it excluded the evidence on the basis that 

the defense would not be calling an expert, asserting that no expert 

testimony is needed to establish the “rather elementary” and 

“irrefutable” proposition that “being under the influence of cocaine 

adversely affects a person’s driving skills;” and (2) defense counsel 

made an adequate offer of proof that “fully satisfied any requirement to 

use expert testimony,” by proposing to call as his witness the 

prosecution’s designated criminalist from the Sheriff’s crime lab and 

question her concerning the probable impact of decedent’s acute cocaine 

intoxication on her driving skills. Neither contention warrants 

reversal. 

First, we reject defendant’s contention that the evidence of 

decedent’s acute cocaine intoxication was admissible in the absence of 

expert testimony that would explain the probable impact of acute 

cocaine intoxication on decedent’s driving skills at the time of the 

collision. While “ingestion of intoxicating substances is generally 

known to alter a person[’s] perception and behavior to some degree[,] 

the precise degree of alteration, or the precise effects that are likely to 

be associated with a particular amount of cocaine, however, is not 

something that is generally known and would require expert 

testimony.” (Lopez v. Banuelos (2014 E.D. Cal.) 2014 U.S. Dist. Lexis 

46420 at p.*9; see People v. Balderas (1985) 41 Cal.3d 144, 191 

[“[e]vidence of habitual narcotics or alcohol use is not admissible to 

impeach perception or memory unless there is expert testimony on the 
7

probable effect of such use on those facilities”]; Hernandez v. County of 

Los Angeles (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1599, 1614 [“[w]here the complexity 

of the causation issue is beyond common experience, expert testimony 

is required to establish causation,” and “ ‘[t]he probable effect of 

intoxicants other than alcohol is a topic “sufficiently beyond [the] 

common experience” of most jurors that expert testimony is required’ ”]; 

People v. Cox (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 980, 989 (Cox) [expert testimony is 

required to determine the potential impact of methamphetamine on 

defendant’s conduct; “[i]t is indeed possible that there are those in our 

society who know full well the effects of the use of various drugs on the 

human system,” but . . . “the ordinary juror probably does not have 

such knowledge”].) Accordingly, we see no reason to reverse based on 

this claim of error. In the absence of expert testimony connecting 

decedent’s acute cocaine intoxication with her driving skills, “ ‘[t]he 

inference[s] which defendant [sought] to have drawn from the [evidence 

would have been] clearly speculative, and evidence which produces only 

speculative inferences is irrelevant evidence,’ ” inadmissible under 

section 350. (People v. Babbitt (1988) 45 Cal.3d 660, 682, italics in 

original; see Cox, supra, 221 Cal.App.3d at pp. 989-990 [“[b]ased on the 

lack of expert testimony in this case, it would have been pure 

speculation for the jurors to determine what impact the ingestion of an 

undermined amount of methamphetamine might have had on [the 

defendant’s] mental capabilities”]; see also People v. Kelly (1992) 1 

Cal.4th 495, 523 [trial court properly disallowed, as irrelevant, 

proposed testimony of autopsy pathologist regarding the amount of 

alcohol or cocaine in the victims’ systems; trial court is “not required to 

admit evidence that merely makes the victim of a crime look bad;” and 
8

evidence of victims’ “substance abuse, without more, would be 

meaningless to a jury’s consideration of the victims’ conduct”].) 

Second, we reject defendant’s argument that the trial court 

erroneously precluded him from presenting expert testimony on the 

topic of decedent’s acute cocaine intoxication. The record shows that, at 

the in limine hearing, the court made it quite clear to defense counsel 

that the defense did not have to call its own expert but could call and 

question the prosecution’s criminalist on the probable impact of acute 

cocaine intoxication on decedent’s driving skills on the night of 

collision. The court’s only limitation was that the proposed testimony 

would first have to be presented for the court’s consideration at a 

section 402 hearing outside the presence of the jury, to which defense 

counsel lodged no objection. At the conclusion of the section 402 

hearing, the court again informed defense counsel that its in limine 

ruling excluding the evidence would be reconsidered, “of course,” if 

defense counsel proposed any additional expert or witness who was 

prepared to give relevant testimony. 

We see nothing in the court’s comments to dissuade defense 

counsel from asking the court to conduct another section 402 hearing 

when the prosecution called its criminalist at trial. Because defense 

counsel did not do so, defendant has forfeited any contention that the 

court’s in limine ruling was in error on that basis. (See People v. Smith

(2003) 30 Cal.4th 581, 632 [because defendant failed to renew request 

to admit certain evidence for specific reasons, he “may not now argue 

on that basis that its exclusion was error,” citing § 354]; see also People 

v. Morris (1991) 53 Cal.3d 152, 190 [a pretrial or in limine motion 

preserves an evidentiary issue only if, among other things, “the motion 
9

is made at a time before or during the trial when the trial judge can 

determine the evidentiary question in its appropriate context”].)

II. Admission of Underlying Facts of Defendant’s Prior DUI 

Convictions 

a. Relevant Facts

The People moved in limine to admit, and defendant moved in 

limine to exclude, evidence of defendant’s two prior DUI convictions

including the facts leading to his arrests in 2006 (at the age of 21) and 

2012 (at the age of 28). The court ruled the testimony concerning the 

prior DUI convictions including the underlying facts would be allowed 

as the evidence was relevant to prove the elements of intent and 

knowledge necessary to support a vehicular second-degree murder 

charge under People v. Watson (1981) 30 Cal.3d 290 (Watson) and 

People v. Ortiz (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 104 (Ortiz), and the evidence 

would not be otherwise unduly prejudicial. 

Police Officer Christopher Anaya testified regarding defendant’s 

2006 DUI arrest following a one-car collision. When the police arrived 

at the scene, defendant’s car was lying on its side after striking three 

trees lining a road. Defendant’s car was “completely total[ed]” with 

“really extensive damage” mostly to the passenger side of the car that 

struck the trees; and the front bumper and parts of the molding and 

paneling had also fallen off the car. Without objection, the officer 

testified he was not able to estimate the speed of defendant’s car, but 

opined that defendant was driving at a “high rate of speed”. Defendant 

was found sitting on the street curb. His eyes were red, bloodshot, and 

watery; there was a strong smell of alcohol, and when he stood up he 

was unsteady on his feet. After defendant was only able to partially 
10

perform field sobriety tests due to his intoxication, the officer 

terminated the tests and arrested him. The jury also heard evidence 

that following the 2006 arrest defendant was convicted of driving under 

the influence of alcohol.

Police Officer Romey Alvarez testified concerning the 2012 DUI 

arrest. In response to a dispatch report, the officer arrived at the scene 

and found defendant sitting in the driver’s seat of a car stopped in a 

road; the car engine was on and the keys were in the ignition. 

Defendant looked like he was “passed out” – his head was tilted to his 

shoulder and eyes were “really droopy” and “half closed.” The officer 

verbally woke defendant and asked him if he was okay. After a while 

defendant said he was waiting for the car (actually a truck) in front of 

him to move past the stop sign. Defendant denied drinking, but he 

smelled of alcohol, was slurring his words, and his eyes were bloodshot. 

Based on defendant’s performance of field sobriety tests, the officer 

concluded defendant was under the influence (“[h]e was drunk”) and 

arrested him. At the police station, defendant consented to breath 

tests; his first breath test registered .29 and .27, and his second breath 

test registered .28 and .29, with the tests showing an alcohol level over 

the legal limit of .08. The jury also heard evidence that following the 

2012 arrest defendant was convicted of driving with a blood alcohol 

level greater than 0.08. 

b. Analysis

Defendant does not challenge the trial court’s ruling allowing the 

jury to hear evidence that he had sustained prior DUI convictions, but 

contends the court abused its discretion in allowing introduction of the 

underlying facts. We see no merit to this claim of error. 
11

The law governing the admission of prior convictions, including 

the underlying facts, is well settled. “Evidence that a person committed 

a crime . . . may be admitted, . . . not to prove a person’s predisposition 

to commit such an act, but rather to prove some other material fact, 

such as that person’s intent or [knowledge].” (People v. Harris (2013) 57 

Cal.4th 804, 841 (Harris), citing § 1101, subd. (b).) The evidence of the 

prior crimes “must be relevant to prove a fact at issue (Evid. Code, 

§ 210), and its admission must not be unduly prejudicial, confusing, or 

time consuming (Evid. Code, § 352).” (People v. Leon (2015) 61 Cal.4th 

569, 597-598.) Reviewing the trial court's admission of the underlying 

facts of the two prior DUI convictions for an abuse of discretion (Harris, 

supra, at p. 841), we see none. 

Relying on Watson, supra, 30 Cal.3d. 290, and Ortiz, supra, 109 

Cal.App.4th 104, the trial court reasonably found that the underlying 

facts of the prior DUI convictions were highly probative as the evidence 

would tend to support the prosecution’s theory that defendant 

possessed the requisite implied malice mental state and knowledge 

elements necessary to sustain a vehicular second-degree murder 

charge. As the Ortiz court explained, since Watson was decided in 

1981, the courts “have recognized repeatedly that a motor vehicle 

driver’s previous encounters with the consequences of recklessness on 

the highway – whether provoked by the use of alcohol, of another 

intoxicant, by rage, or some other motivator – sensitizes him to the 

dangerousness of such life-threatening conduct.” (Ortiz, supra, at p. 

112.) And, from such prior recklessness, “through a series of 

inferences, a jury could conclude that, at the time of the charged

misconduct, the defendant possessed a ‘wanton disregard for life, and . . 
12

. a subjective awareness of the risk created,’ from which ‘malice may be

implied,’ ” to support a vehicular second-degree murder conviction. (Id.

at p. 113, italics in original, quoting, in part, Watson, supra, at p. 298.) 

In challenging the trial court’s ruling, defendant argues the 

nature of the 2006 and 2012 arrests did not show his subjective 

knowledge of the dangers created by drunk driving. As to the 2006 

arrest, defendant complains the jury should not have heard testimony 

that he was speeding because his car would have been badly damaged 

if it struck three trees “at almost any speed.” As to the 2012 arrest, 

defendant complains that the fact that he fell asleep and was passed 

out behind the wheel shows that he was not conscious; therefore, he 

could not have been aware of anything, including the dangers of drunk 

driving. We find these arguments unavailing. 

It is well settled that a person “ ‘who wilfully consumes alcoholic 

beverages to the point of intoxication, knowing that he thereafter must 

operate a motor vehicle, thereby combining sharply impaired physical 

and mental faculties with a vehicle capable of great force and speed, 

reasonably may be held to exhibit a conscious disregard of the safety of 

others.’ ” (Watson, supra, 30 Cal.3d at pp. 300-301, quoting Taylor v. 

Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 897; People v. Brogna (1988) 202 

Cal.App.3d 700, 709 (Brogna) [“[o]ne who drives a vehicle while under 

the influence after having been convicted of that offense knows better 

than most that his conduct is not only illegal, but entails a substantial 

risk of harm to himself and others”]; see Ortiz, supra, 109 Cal.App.4th 

at p. 115 [“[a] jury is entitled to infer that regardless of the mental 

state or condition that accompanies an instance of reckless driving—

whether intoxication, rage, or willful irresponsibility—the driver’s
13

subsequent apprehension and prosecution for that conduct must impart 

a knowledge and understanding of the personal and social 

consequences of such behavior”].) 

Despite defendant’s arguments to the contrary, his “requisite 

mental state” – “one supporting a subsequent finding of an awareness 

of the dangers of [drunk driving] – was not formed [at the time of his 

arrests] so much as before and after the resulting traffic incident[s].” 

(Ortiz, supra, 109 Cal.App.4th at p. 113; italics added.) In 2006, 

defendant drank, drove, and struck three trees with such force that his 

car flipped over. In 2012, he again drove while intoxicated and was 

found asleep at the wheel of his running car behind another vehicle at a 

stop sign. These incidents provide ample evidence from which the jury 

could reasonably infer that defendant was subjectively aware of what 

can happen when one drives drunk and showed a conscious disregard 

for the safety of himself and others. Accordingly, we find no abuse of 

discretion in the trial court’s ruling that the underlying facts of the 

prior DUI convictions were admissible as the evidence did possess 

“substantial relevance on the issues of knowledge and conscious 

disregard raised by the charge of second degree murder.” (Brogna, 

supra, 202 Cal.App.3d at p. 710.) 

Lastly, we see no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s ruling 

that the probative value of the underlying facts of the prior DUI 

convictions was not outweighed by the substantial danger of undue 

prejudice under section 352. The factual circumstances clearly tended 

to demonstrate defendant was subjectively aware of the consequences 

of drunk driving and showed a conscious disregard for the safety of 

himself and others. Weighed against the high probative value of the 
14

evidence, any prejudice was minimal. Indeed, the testimony 

concerning the arrests was far less inflammatory “ ‘than the testimony 

concerning the charged offenses,’ ” making it “ ‘unlikely . . . that the 

jury’s passions were inflamed’ ” by the challenged evidence. (Ortiz, 

supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at p. 118, quoting People v. Ewoldt (1994) 7 

Cal.4th 380, 405.) “Moreover, defendant had been punished – via 

convictions – for the prior [DUI arrests] introduced before the jury,” 

thereby minimizing the chance that the jury “ ‘would punish [him] for 

the prior offense[s], for which he had already been punished.’ ” (Ortiz, 

supra, at p. 118, quoting People v. Kelley (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 568, 

579.) 

III. No Cumulative Error 

Defendant contends reversal is required because the “cumulative 

prejudice” of the purported evidentiary errors violated his due process 

rights to a fair trial under the 5th and 14th Amendments. “Because 

defendant has failed to demonstrate any error, there is no prejudicial 

cumulative effect.” (People v. Covarrubias (2016) 1 Cal.5th 838, 910.) 

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.
15

_________________________

Petrou, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________

Fujisaki, Acting P.J.

_________________________

Jackson, J.

People v. Robledo/A158002