### In the 

# United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit

____________________ Nos. 19-1441 & 19-1547

G ERALD W INFIELD , Petitioner-Appellee, Cross-Appellant,

v.

S TEPHANIE D ORETHY, Warden, Respondent-Appellant, Cross-Appellee

.

____________________ Appeals from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. No. 1:10-cv-04878 — Sharon Johnson Coleman, Judge

.

____________________
A RGUED J ANUARY 7, 2020

— D ECIDED A PRIL 13, 2020

____________________

Before B RENNAN , S CUDDER , and S T

. E VE , Circuit Judges

. S T

. E VE , Circuit Judge . Gerald Win fi eld confessed to police that he shot Jarlon Garre tt . Based on that confession, a judge on the Circuit Court of Cook County convicted Win fi eld of

a tt empted murder. Win fi eld was also accused of killingDominick Stovall in the same shooting, but the trial judge acqui tt ed him of that charge because no credible witness had placed Win fi eld at the scene of the crime and his confession did not mention Stovall. The judge rejected Win fi eld’s2 Nos. 19-1441 & 19-1547

argument that his confession had been coerced, as well as his half-hearted alibi defense, and sentenced him to thirty years’ imprisonment. In his direct appeal, Win fi eld’s new counsel raised one unsuccessful argument—that the judge had abused his discretion at sentencing. These appeals require us to consider the performance of Win fi eld’s trial and appellate counsel. The Illinois state courts, on post-conviction review, concluded that trial counsel’s presentation of Win fi eld’s alibi was not so de fi cient that it violated the Constitution, but they did not address the performance of appellate counsel to any meaningful degree. The district court, therefore, applied the stringent and deferential standard of the Antiterrorism and E ff ective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), to Win fi eld’s claim that he received ine ff ective assistance of trial counsel and denied that part of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. On the ma tt er of appellate counsel, the district court concluded that AEDPA did not apply because the claim had not been “adjudicated on the merits in State court,” id. , but had instead been overlooked. It considered the clai m without any deference to the state courts’ denial of relief. Through that lens, and althoughit believed it to be a close case, the court found appellate counsel had rendered ine ff ective assistance by omi tt ing an argument that there was insu ffi cient evidence to convict because Win fi eld’s confession was uncorroborated.Both parties have appealed. The state argues that the district court erred in granting re lief on the appellate counsel claim; Win fi eld contends that the court erred in denying relief on the trial counsel claim. We a ffi rm the judgment in part and reverse it in part, as we conclude that Win fi eld is not entitled to habeas corpus relief under either theory.Nos. 19-1441 & 19-1547 3

I. Background A. Trial and Direct Appeal On the afternoon of October 17, 1998, Garre ttand Stovallwere walking on West Huron Street, in Chicago, when someone shot at them. Stovall was killed and Garre tt, injured, though who shot them—or even how many people shot them—was not immediately clear. Police arrested Win fi eld asthe primary suspect. He ultimately was indicted for the murder of Stovall, the a tt empted murder of Garre tt, and lesser included o ff enses. He proceeded to a bench trial.

The state’s fi rst eyewitness—and “[t]he only real credible witness” according to the trial judge—was Lonnie Hartman. Hartman had been si tt ing in his car, facing north, when he saw a black SUV traveling southbound on North Central Park Avenue. The SUV stopped at the corner of Huron, and a man exited the vehicle’s passenger side. The man shot at Stovall and Garre ttbefore reentering the car and driving o ff . Hartman could not identify the shoot er, though he described him as at least six feet tall and about 25 years old. Win fi eld was only 5 ʹ 7 ʺ and 19 at the time of the shooting. Consistent with that di ff erence, Hartman denied that Win fi eld was the shooter he had seen, though he declined to rule out the possibility that there were other shooters he could not see.

In contrast to his assessment of Hartman, the trial judge described the testimony of the state’s second witness, Lorenzo Curry, as “worthless.” Curry said he knew Win fi eld, Garre tt, and Stovall from playing dice wi th the three of them about a month before the shooting. At that dice game, Win fi eld’s brother, Terrance, had bumped into Stovall’s arm, causing him to drop the dice into a bad roll and leading to a fi ght. On4 Nos. 19-1441 & 19-1547

the day of the shooting, Curry was si tt ing on a porch near the intersection of Huron and Central Park. He, too, testi fi ed that he saw a black SUV stop at the corner, but he saw at least two shooters exit: Win fi eld and another man. Both men returned to the car after the shooting. Few details of this testimony matched what Curry had told police or the grand jury, so the trial judge noted his “extensive impeachment,” among other credibility problems. The trial judge described the testimony of the last witness, Garre tt, the surviving victim, as “not much be tt er” than Curry’s. Garre ttspoke about the dice game in terms likeCurry’s, and said he also saw a black SUV pull up at the corner of Huron and Central Park before Win fi eld emerged, began shooting, and hit Garre tttwice, in the hip and arm. The trial judge did not credit Garre tt ’s identi fi cation largely because he had told police after the shooting that he did not know the shooter, who he said had returned to the car. Weeks after the crime, Garre ttand Curry both identi fi ed Win fi eld through a photo array and line-up conducted by a detective. The detective testi fi ed to these identi fi cations, as well as a custodial statement that Win fi eld gave. An Assistant State’s A tt orney had wri tt en down the statement, Win fi eld had signed it, and at trial, the de tective read it into the record. In the statement, Win fi eld explained that Terrance had bumped into Stovall at the dice game, leading to a fi ght. Winfi eld thought he and Stovall had mended their relationship until a few weeks later, when members of Garre ttand Stovall’s gang beat Terrance. By the day of the shooting, he had started carrying a gun because Garre tthad shot at him recently. When members of his gang o ff ered him a ride in a black SUV, Win fi eld joined them as they drove southboundNos. 19-1441 & 19-1547 5

on Central Park until the car st opped at the corner of Huron. There, Win fi eld spo tt ed Garre ttand Stovall. He said that he then exited the vehicle an d started shooting at Garre tt(without mentioning Stovall) while another person fi red in the same direction. Contrary to all witnesses’ testimony, though, he stated that the car drove o ff without him, so he had to fl ee on foot.

Win fi eld’s statement also asserted he had voluntarily given it based on no promises, and that the detective and ASA had treated him well. He testi fi ed otherwise at trial and said he had been abused and the ASA had promised that they would release him if he signed some papers (which he did without reading them). The de tective and ASA denied these assertions.

When his trial counsel asked him where he was on the day of the shooting, Win fi eld responded, “I probably say I was at home,” and denied being involved in a shooting. Counsel did not follow up on this testimony and no other evidence was introduced to support it. Win fi eld otherwise con fi rmed through his testimony that he and Terrance had argued with Stovall at the dice game. As the trial judge summed the evidence up, “no credible witness” placed Win fi eld at the scene. Given this gap and the open question of how many sh ooters there were, the judge had doubts that Win fi eld was responsible for Stovall’s murder, either as the killer or on an accountability theory. So, he acqui tt ed Win fi eld of all charges relating to Stovall.

Garre tt ’s a tt empted murder was di ff erent, however, and the di ff erence was Win fi eld’s confession. As the judge put it, the lack of a credible witness was not a problem because he6 Nos. 19-1441 & 19-1547

had Win fi eld’s “assurance he was present.” The judge declined to fi nd that law enforcement had coerced his confession, reasoning that Win fi eld was too intelligent to believe that police would let him go just for signing papers. The judge framed the remainin g question as whether there was enough evidence to convict based on the statement, “or stated di ff erently, whether the State has proven the corpus delicti of any crimes that th is statement confesses.” The corpus delicti of an o ff ense is simply proof apart from a confession that a crime occurred. See United States v. Kerley, 838 F.2d 932, 939 (7th Cir. 1988). Under common law, proof of the corpus delicti was required for conviction based on a confession, but that rule no longer holds weight in federal courts or those of many states. Id. at 940. In Illinois, however, the common law rule maintains its vitality. See People v. Lara , 983 N.E.2d 959, 964 (Ill. 2012), as modi fi ed on denial of reh ʹ g(2013).The trial judge understood the corpus delicti rule to require that the elements of a tt empted fi rst-degree murder— that Win fi eld “intended unjusti fi ably to take a life”—beproved with evidence “outside of the confession of the defendant or aliunde the defendant’s confession.” The judge saw this proof in the mere fact that Garre tthad been shottwice. The judge continued, however, and found the necessary intent also in the statement itself, which described Winfi eld’s con fl ict with Garre ttthat led him to carry a gun. From these admissions, the judge said , “no other conclusion can be drawn but that he intended to kill him.” Accordingly, the judge convicted Win fi eld of a tt empted murder. At sentencing a few months late r, the trial judge opined at length about sentencing theories and described rehabilitationNos. 19-1441 & 19-1547 7

as “almost a joke.” Still, he emphasized, he was “fully aware”that he had “to take into consideration the rehabilitative potential of the defendant.” The judge, however, thought thispotential rested “somewhere between nil and zero” and sentenced Win fi eld to 30 years’ imprisonment.

Win fi eld obtained new appellate counsel, who challenged only the judge’s sentencing de cision. He contended that the judge had not weighed Win fi eld’s potential for rehabilitation. The Illinois Appellate Court reje cted this argument, pointing to the judge’s express statements that he had considered Winfi eld’s rehabilitative potential and simply found it lacking. The Illinois Supreme Court denied leave to appeal.

B. State Post-Conviction Review

Win fi eld soon fi led a petition for post-conviction review, alleging he had been deprived of the e ff ective assistance of appellate counsel in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. In particular, he cr iticized counsel for not raising an argument based on the su ffi ciency of the evidence or the corpus delicti. After some procedural hiccups (including a mistaken dismissal), Win fi eld fi led an amended petition raising three new claims relating to both his trial and appellate counsel. He alleged trial counsel was ine ff ective for notmoving to quash his arrest warrant and suppress his confession, and for failing to interview, investigate, or call alibi witnesses—his family. Regarding appellate counsel, his amended petition claimed counsel had overlooked “obvious and signi fi cant issues ... such as, su ffi ciency of evidence.”

Win fi eld a tt ached to this amended petition a ffi davits from his family members, a tt esting that on the date of the shooting Win fi eld was sleeping at their shared home. He also a tt ached8 Nos. 19-1441 & 19-1547

his own a ffi davits, though neither related to his alibi. One attested to the truth of the contents of his fi rst petition (which, again, addressed only appellate counsel), and the other said that he had told trial counsel his confession had been coerced. The Circuit Court of Cook County held an evidentiaryhearing solely on the claim that trial counsel failed to investigate alibi witnesses. Win fi eld himself did not testify at the hearing, but his family members did. His aunt recalled the day of the shooting because itwas Sweetest Day. She had spent the day preparing her daughter for a homecoming dance and saw Win fi eld sleeping in his room until she left for the dance that evening. She told the court that she had given Win fi eld’s trial counsel this information (though she could not recall when), but counsel had not asked her to testify. Win fi eld’s mother o ff ered a similar story. She was helping her niece get ready for the dance and saw Win fi eld asleep at the time of the shooting. She testi fi ed that she told this to trialcounsel shortly after retaining him, but counsel “didn’t respond well with it” and told her “he was going to do it the way he wanted to.”

The court next heard from Win fi eld’s trial counsel. As this hearing took place about seven years after the trial, counsel could not remember many details about his preparation for the case. When the stat e asked counsel if Win fi eld had ever told him of an alibi, counsel responded that Win fi eld had always denied he did the shooting: “the problem was he did mention an alibi”—a di ff erent one. Win fi eld had thought he might have been at a store at the time of the shooting. Counsel investigated that story but found it wanting. Win fi eld’s family had produced a receipt with a printed time that did not line up with the shooting. Counsel could not recall if he spokeNos. 19-1441 & 19-1547 9

with Win fi eld’s aunt, but he “speci fi cally” did not remember speaking with Win fi eld’s mother. Had he been made aware of a veri fi able alibi, he explained, he would have pursued it, even post-trial.

The Circuit Court denied Win fi eld’s petition for post-conviction relief. Applying the two-pronged analysis of Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the court concluded that Win fi eld had not demonstrated de fi cient performance of trial counsel and did not reach the second prong, whether he was prejudiced. The court found that neither Win fi eld nor his family had told counsel of his home alibi, and so counsel could not have been ine ff ective for failing to present witnesses to support that story. Even assuming counsel had been aware of Win fi eld’s alibi and the witnesses, the court continued, itnonetheless would have found that the decision not to call impeachable family members was reasonable.Moving on to appellate counsel, the Circuit Court mistakenly framed Win fi eld’s claim to be “that appellate counsel was ine ff ective for not raising the issue of trial counsel’s own incompetence.” The omission of this argument was neither de fi cient nor prejudicial, the court said, because “the underlying claims of ine ff ectiveness lack support.” The court did not mention su ffi ciency of the evidence or any other appellate argument independent of trial counsel.

Win fi eld appealed the post-conviction decision raising what he identi fi ed as a single issue: whether the Circuit Court had erred in fi nding trial counsel was not ine ff ective. Nevertheless, he maintained that a ppellate counsel had overlooked “signi fi cant issues, such as, su ffi ciency of evidence.”10 Nos. 19-1441 & 19-1547

The Illinois Appellate Court upheld the Circuit Court’s fi ndings that Win fi eld had simply never informed trial counsel he was at home at the time of the shooting, and that, even if he had, it was reasonable no t to call family members as witnesses. It further found no prejudice in light of “the overwhelming evidence” of Win fi eld’s guilt, namely “his inculpatory statement, and the two eyewitness identi fi cations of him as the shooter.” On the issue ofappellate counsel, the Appellate Court treated Win fi eld’s claim as wholly derivative of the claim regarding trial counsel, just as the Circuit Court had. Thus, both arguments failed to gether. The Illinois Supreme Court again denied leave to appeal. C. District Court and Prior Appeal At this point, Win fi eld proceeded to federal court seeking a writ of habeas corpus. His petition continued his two real claims: fi rst, trial counsel was ine ff ective for failing to present alibi witnesses, and second, appellate counsel was ine ff ective for failing to challenge the su ffi ciency of the evidence. The state answered the petiti on and asserted that, although deference was owed to the state court’s resolution of the fi rst claim under AEDPA, the second had neither been adjudicated on the merits in state court, nor procedurally defaulted, and so the district court was tasked with reviewing that claim de novo. Accepting this concession, the court permi tt ed discovery, including a deposition of appellate counsel.Appellate counsel, like trial counsel before him, had limited memory of his case preparation, which, at that point, wasnearly a decade and a half ago. He based most of his recollection on what he had wri tt en in the brief itself, as he thought it accurately re fl ected what was in his mind at the time. HeNos. 19-1441 & 19-1547 11

suspected that an argument based on the su ffi ciency of the evidence would have failed considering the trial judge’s fi nding that the confession was voluntary. Moreover, he noted that there was “physical evidence supporting the confession because Mr. Garre tt... was, in fact, shot.” And though the witnesses disagreed on the details, counsel thought there was some corroborating statements in that they all testi fi ed to seeing the crime occur. Altogether, he suspected he had believed at the time that there existed on ly a remote possibility of overturning the conviction based on su ffi ciency of the evidence.

Win fi eld thought otherwise and pr essed his claim that appellate counsel was ine ff ective for not challenging the su ffi

ciency of the evidence. The thru st of his argument was thatthe Illinois courts were searching in their review of convictions and would have acqui tt ed him on these facts, even if a federal court would not have. Win fi eld further contended that a reasonable a tt orney would have challenged the state’s proof of the corpus delicti. The record, in his view, did not contain evidence that anyone had intendedto kill Garre tt(as opposed to his merely being hit by two stray bullets). Moreover, he posited that his confession was uncorroborated, because no one had asked Garre ttabout the time he shot at Win fi eld, supposedly prompting Win fi eld to carry a gun.The district court concluded that appellate counsel was ine ff ective for not raising a corpus delicti argument, though not the same one Win fi eld pressed. It summarized Illinois’s corpus delicti rule as requiring the state to both establish that acrime occurred and corroborate the confession. The court accepted the trial judge’s logic, contrary to Win fi eld’s argument, that the mere fact that Garre ttwas shot twice was proof that

an a tt empted murder occurred. But, the court concluded, the12 Nos. 19-1441 & 19-1547

evidence did not corroborate the confession and connect Winfi eld to that a tt empt. Hartman—the sole credible witness— had testi fi ed that there was one shooter, not two; this shooter was not Win fi eld; and the shooter left the scene by car (not on foot, as Win fi eld said he had). Though the court accepted that “tangential components” of Win fi eld’s statement had been corroborated, it concluded there was a reasonable probability that this was not enough unde r Illinois law and granted the petition.

The state moved to amend the judgment, arguing that the district court had misconstrued Illinois’s corpus delicti rule, which it said requires proof on ly that a crime occurred beforethe state can use a confession to convict. The court acknowledged it was a close case, with no clear rule and authorities going each way, but was convinced its result was still right.

The state also tried to walkback its concession that AEDPA deference did not apply to the appellate counsel claim, but the district court deemed the argument waived. Onthe state’s appeal, we reversed that determination and remanded after concluding that the standard of review owed under AEDPA is not waivable. Win fi eld v. Dorethy( Win fi eld I), 871 F.3d 555, 560 (7th Cir. 2017). On remand, Win fi eld maintained that AEDPA did not apply to his appellate counsel claim. Regardless of the state’s earlier concession, he argued that both state courts had in fact overlooked his arguments about appellate counsel and notadjudicated them on the merits. He also revived his trial counsel claim, contending he was entitled to relief despite AEDPA. The district court denied the pe tition insofar as it sought a new trial based on ine ff ective assistance of trial counsel. TheNos. 19-1441 & 19-1547 13

court deferred to the Illinois courts’ fi nding that Win fi eld had never told counsel that he was home at the time of the shooting and that one factual fi nding defeated Win fi eld’s claim. Moving back to appellate counse l, the district court agreed that the state courts had not adjudicated the claim on the merits. It found that this was the rare case where a petitioner had rebu tt ed the strong presumption that state courts adjudicate all claims on their merits. Both state courts had “inadvertently overlooked” Win fi eld’s appellate counsel claim, and so the district court concluded it would still review the claim de novo. It reached the same result it had before and ordered the state to reopen Win fi eld’s appeal. The state appealed the grant of relief. The district court granted Win fi eld a certi fi cate of appealability on the denial of his trial counsel claim, and he cross-appealed.

II. Standard of Review We start by laying down some groundwork applicable to both appeals before diving into the speci fi cs of each one. We review de novo the district cour t’s decisions on a petition for writ of habeas corpus. Schmidt v. Foster , 911 F.3d 469, 476 (7th Cir. 2018) (en banc), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 96 (2019). Under AEDPA, a federal court can grant a petition for writ of habeas corpus after a state-co urt adjudication of the merits only if that adjudication “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the factsin light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)–(2); Schmidt, 911 F.3d at 476. This14 Nos. 19-1441 & 19-1547

is a high standard. Unreasonab le means more than incorrect. Rather, the state court’s ruling must be “so lacking in justi fi

cation that there was an error ... beyond any possibility of fairminded disagreement.” Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 12, 19–20 (2013) (alteration in original) (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011)). To be subject to that deference, though, the claims must have been “adjudicated on the merits” in state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Cone v. Bell , 556 U.S. 449, 472 (2009). Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668 (1984), provides the clearly established federal law for both of Win fi eld’s claims. A petitioner raising a Stricklandclaim is required to demonstrate two things. First, he must show that counsel provided constitutionally de fi cient performance, meaning counselmade errors so serious he “was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Id.at 687. In assessing counsel’s performance, courts are expected to “indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Id. at 689. Under AEDPA, a federal court must be “doubly deferential” and give a deferential look at counsel’s performance through the “deferential lens” of AEDPA. Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 190 (2011) (quoting Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 121 n.2 (2009)). Second, the petitioner must show that this de fi cient performance prejudiced his defense—meaning there is a “reas onable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional erro rs, the result of the proceeding would have been di ff erent.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Failing to prove either element defeats a petitioner’s claim. Id. at 697.Nos. 19-1441 & 19-1547 15

III. Win fi eld’s Appeal – Trial Counsel

We now turn to Win fi eld’s appeal. Win fi eld concedes that AEDPA applies to his claim of ine ff ective assistance of trial counsel. We conclude that he cannot overcome the double layer of deference we owe to the state court’s fi nding that counsel performed reasonably. Win fi eld fails to identify any basis to reject the state court’s presumptively valid factual fi nding that Win fi eld never told counsel that he was at home at the time of the shooting.

Win fi eld asserts that the state co urt’s decision was “based on an unreasonable determinat ion of the facts.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). We start with the pr esumption that a state court’s determination of a fact is corre ct. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). To rebut that presumption, a petitioner must show that the fi nding was unreasonable by clear and convincing evidence. Id. ; Janusiak v. Cooper , 937 F.3d 880, 888 (7th Cir. 2019). A fi nding cannot be unreasonable if “reasonable minds reviewing the record might disagree about the fi nding in question.” Brumfi eld v. Cain , 135 S. Ct. 2269, 2277 (2015).

The evidence before the Circ uit Court presented a classic credibility dispute, on whose resolution reasonable minds could di ff er and which we have “no license” to disturb. Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 434 (1983). Win fi eld’s aunt andmother said they told trial counsel they could testify regarding Win fi eld’s whereabouts at the ti me of the shooting. Counsel, however, “speci fi cally” denied any recollection of talking to Win fi eld’s mother and could no t remember if he spoke with Win fi eld’s aunt. Counsel also said that he would have presented a veri fi able alibi, had anyone made him aware of one. The Circuit Court evidently believed counsel over16 Nos. 19-1441 & 19-1547

Win fi eld’s family and inferred from the fact that counsel did not present the home alibi that he was not aware of it.

Win fi eld has pointed to no clear and convincing evidence that it was unreasonable to cr edit counsel’s testimony. When questioned whether Win fi eld told him of an alibi, counsel answered that “the problem was he did mention an alibi”—“the alibi” was that he was at a store. Counsel investigated this story with the help of Win fi eld’s family, and found it wanting. Counsel was further asked to con fi rm only that he had spoken to Win fi eld about his trial testimony before he gave it. From this, Win fi eld infers that counsel must have known of the alibi that he testi fi ed to at trial. Even assuming Win fi eld told counsel exactly what he was going to say at trial, what Win fi eld said during his trial testimony was inde fi nite: “I probably say I was at home.” Win fi eld himself never o ff ered anything more than this equivocal statement; he neither testi fi ed at the postconviction hearing nor submi tt ed an a ffi davit about his discussions with counsel. It was not unreasonable for the state courts to infer that, when counse l spoke of “the alibi” he investigated and “an alibi” that Win fi eld mentioned, he had investigated the only veri fi able alibi Win fi eld had o ff ered.

Win fi eld emphasizes that trial counsel admi tt ed to not remembering his trial preparatio n and “never claimed that Win fi eld de fi nitively ruled out being at home.” True, but that is far from enough to rebut AEDPA deference. At best, Winfi eld has identi fi ed a gap in the record. The absence of evidence, however, cannot overcome either of the layers of deference we owe to the state cour t’s adjudication of counsel’s performance under AEDPA and Strickland

. Titlow , 571 U.S. at 22–23. Without clear and convincing evidence otherwise, it was not unreasonable for the state courts to fi nd, as a ma tt erNos. 19-1441 & 19-1547 17

of fact, that Win fi eld never told counsel he was home at the time of the shooting and that counsel was unaware he had witnesses who could testify so.

From that fi nding, the state courts reasonably concluded that counsel’s failure to investigate or present Win fi eld’s alibi was not constitutionally de fi cient performance. The Supreme Court recognized in Stricklanditself that the scope of an a tt orney’s duty to investigate defenses is informed by the “information supplied by the defendant.” 466 U.S. at 691. If Winfi eld told counsel only that he was at a store, and counselchecked that alibi and found it wanting, then the Illinois Appellate Court could reasonably conclude that the Constitution mandates nothing more. Cf. Morris v. Bartow , 832 F.3d 705, 711 (7th Cir. 2016) (concluding Stricklandwas not applied unreasonably when state courts fo und defendant had not claimed his plea was coerced). Win fi eld does not argue otherwise.

We need not address the state court’s other fi ndings—that counsel properly refused to call familial witnesses (assuming he knew of them) and that Win fi eld was not prejudiced. We

a ffi rm the denial of relief on the trial counsel claim. IV. The State’s Appeal That brings us to the state’s appeal. The state contends that the district court erred in issuin g a writ of habeas corpus on Win fi eld’s claim that he received ine ff ective assistance of appellate counsel. It principally argues that the district court erred in reviewing the claim de novo and not with the deference provided by AEDPA. Alternat ively, it contends that even with plenary review, Win fi eld has not established the elements of a Stricklandclaim.18 Nos. 19-1441 & 19-1547

We agree with this la tt er argument. Even if we owe no deference to the state court’s determination of the claim, we would reverse the district cour t’s judgment granting habeas relief to Win fi eld. We start by brie fl y explaining why we are assuming without deciding that the state court is not owed AEDPA deference before addressi ng the claim on its merits.

A. AEDPA As in our previous appeal in this case, the primary dispute between the parties is whether the deferential view of AEDPA applies to this claim. See Win fi eld I, 871 F.3d at 560. That question depends, as we have noted, on whether the claim was “adjudicated on the merits.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The Supreme Court has instructed that “[w]hen a federal claim has been presented to a state court and the state courthas denied relief, it may be presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits in the absence of any indication or state-law procedural principles to the contrary.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 99. In Richter, the state court gave no reasonsfor denying relief, but the Court has extended this presumption to state courts that have addressed some but not all claims. See Johnson v. Williams , 568 U.S. 289, 300–01 (2013). The presumption is rebu tt able, if a petitioner provides “reason to think some other ex planation for the state court’s decision is more likely.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 99–100. One suchsituation is when “the evidence leads very clearly to the conclusion that a federal claim was inadvertently overlooked in state court.” Williams , 568 U.S. at 303; Sarfraz v. Smith , 885 F.3d 1029, 1036 (7th Cir. 2018). The district court determined that this is precisely what happened here. Though Win fi eld consistently asserted thatNos. 19-1441 & 19-1547 19

appellate counsel had failed to raise “signi fi cant issues, such

as, su ffi ciency of evidence,” the Illinois Appellate Court nevermentioned those issues or considered appellate counsel’s performance in any way separate from trial counsel’s. The state raises several reasons why the district court’s analysis was inconsistent withthe presumption that statecourts adjudicate claims on their merits. For our limited purposes here, we need address only its strongest. The Appellate Court found that overwhelming evidence eliminated anyprejudice from trial counsel’s failure to present alibi witnesses. Giving the “bene fi t of the doubt” to the state courts, as we are required, Brady v. P fi ster, 711 F.3d 818, 826 (7th Cir. 2013), we agree that this fi nding implicitly means the Illinois Appellate Court thought a su ffi ciency of the evidence argument would have been frivolous for appellate counsel to raise. 1 The logic is simple. If one belie ves it improbable that a factfi nder would acquit with new, favorable evidence, then, necessarily, one could not also belie ve it possible that the same fact fi nder was obligated to acquit withoutthat evidence. Moreover, counsel could neither have performed de fi ciently nor prejudiced Win fi eld by failing to raise a doomed argument. See McNary v. Lemke, 708 F.3d 905, 921 (7th Cir. 2013); see also Howard v. Gramley, 225 F.3d 784, 790 (7th Cir. 2000)

1 Win fi eld asserts that the state forfeited this argument in this court bywaiting until its reply brief to raise it (although it had raised it in the previous appeal and in the district court). We explained in the last appeal, however, that “the actions of the st ate courts essentially speak for themselves, rather than depend upon characterizations by the state ʹ s prosecuting arm.” Win fi eld I, 871 F.3d at 561. We defer to the state court’s adjudication, not to the state’s interpretation of that adjudication.20 Nos. 19-1441 & 19-1547

(recognizing overlap between the two Stricklandprongs in claims of ine ff ective appellate counsel). Thus, the Illinois Appellate Court’s fi nding that there was “overwhelming evidence” resolved both prongs of Win fi eld’sappellate counsel claim. Having found the state court’s “speci fi c reasons” for denying relief, the next question is whetherthat explanation was reasonable thereby requiring our deference. Wilson v. Sellers , 138 S. Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018). The Appellate Court pointed to Win fi eld’s “inculpatory statement and the two eyewitness identi fi cations of him as the shooter.” The trial judge, howeve r discredited both of those eyewitness identi fi cations and found that no witness placed Win fi eld at the scene of the crime. We are hesitant to say, in this case, that Win fi eld’s statement alone can reasonably be deemed “overwhelming”—as opposed to merely su ffi cient— evidence of guilt. Cf. Harris v. Thompson , 698 F.3d 609, 630–31 (7th Cir. 2012) (rejecting state’ s argument that confession is overwhelming evidence of guilt for harmless-error purposes). The state insists that the judge did not fully discredit Garre tt . We question that, considering the judge’s explicit comment that no evidence placed Win fi eld at the scene, but even the state agrees that Curry’s te stimony is out. Reducing the eyewitness identi fi cations from two to one might be enough to make the Appellate Court’s decision unreasonable. See Wiggins v. Smith , 539 U.S. 510, 528 (2003) (rec ognizing that partial reliance on an erroneous factual fi nding can be unreasonable); Ben-Yisrayl v. Buss , 540 F.3d 542, 550 (7th Cir. 2008) (same). Although we could remand agai n for the district court to decide these issues (and other criticisms Win fi eld has levied against the “overwhelming evidence” fi nding), we see li tt leNos. 19-1441 & 19-1547 21

point in doing so. Even if Win fi eld can get around the deference of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), he still must prove that he is “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States” under § 2254(a). See Mosley v. Atchison , 689 F.3d 838, 853 (7th Cir. 2012); Ben-Yisrayl , 540 F.3d at 550; see also Adorno v. Melvin , 876 F.3d 917, 919 (7th Cir. 2017) (denying habeas relief on de novo review, assuming petitioner could rebut Richterpresumption on remand). 2 We therefore accept, for the sa ke of argument, that the district court properly reviewed Win fi eld’s appellate counsel claim de novo. The court nevertheless erred in granting relief. B. Appellate CounselTo prove that he is entitled to a writ of habeas corpus, Winfi eld must show that his appellate counsel overlooked an argument that was both “’obvious and clearly stronger’ than issues that appellate counsel did raise.” Walker v. Gri ffi n , 835 F.3d 705, 709 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting Sanders v. Co tt on , 398 F.3d 572, 585 (7th Cir. 2005)); see also Smith v. Robbins , 528 U.S. 259, 285, 288 (2000) (describing this standard as an application of Strickland ). The issue that counsel overlooked can be onepurely of state law and we may still resolve the federal constitutional question whether co unsel’s omission was both defi cient and prejudicial under Strickland

. See Shaw v. Wilson , 721 F.3d 908, 914–15 (7th Cir. 2013).

2 We have said that a petitioner is not entitled to de novo review “simply because the state court’s rationale is unsound.” Whatley v. Zatecky, 833 F.3d 762, 775 (7th Cir. 2016) (citing Brady, 711 F.3d at 827). Instead, we defer to the state court’s judgment (notwithstanding its reasons). Id. We need not decide if or how this standard might apply here. Win fi eld is not entitled to relief even under de novo review.22 Nos. 19-1441 & 19-1547

Win fi eld identi fi es two arguments that, he says, meet this hurdle. First, he raises a “general” su ffi ciency argument—there was simply not enough evidence to convict him of attempted murder. Second, he asserts the corpus delicti argument—the evidence did not corroborate his confession. (We call the fi rst argument general because a corpus delicti argument is a type of su ffi ciency argument. See, e.g. , Lara , 983 N.E.2d at 969; People v. Harris , 776 N.E.2d 743, 752–54 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (explaining how the two arguments interact).)

1. General Su ffi ciency of the Evidence

Win fi eld continues to pursue the general su ffi ciency argument, though that is not the basi s on which he obtained relief. Under federal law and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, there is su ffi cient evidence to convict when “after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, anyrational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). We have described this Jackson standard as a “nearly insurmountable hurdle.” United States v. Torres-Chavez , 744 F.3d 988, 993 (7th Cir. 2014). Win fi eld recognizes that we would almost certainly uphold his conviction on direct appeal. See, e.g. , United States v. Curtis , 324 F.3d 501, 507 (7th Cir. 2003) (a ffi rming murder conviction based on defendant’s admissions and the victim’s “bullet-riddled body”). He insists, however, that Illi nois courts do not apply the same standards as federal courts , but instead a more generous one that would lead to acqui tt al here. In support of this argument, he relies on two decisions in which the Illinois Appellate Courts vacated convictions despite the defendants’Nos. 19-1441 & 19-1547 23

admissions: People v. Rivera , 962 N.E.2d 53 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011), and People v. Rodriguez , 728 N.E.2d 695 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000).

The fi rst and most obvious problem with this argument is that both cases cited Jackson as the governing standard. Rivera , 962 N.E.2d at 60; Rodriguez , 728 N.E.2d at 707. That makes sense, as the Illinois Supreme Court adopted Jackson in People v. Young, 538 N.E.2d 461, 473 (Ill. 1989), and continues to follow it, e.g. , People v. Drake, 131 N.E.3d 555, 561 (Ill. 2019). We have not found a single case in which an Illinois court has said its own review is more searching or defendant-friendly than Jackson requires.

All Win fi eld directs us to is language in Rivera , Rodriguez , and a great many Illinois decisions, that “[a] conviction will be reversed where the evidence is so unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory that ther e remains a reasonable doubt of defendant ʹ s guilt.” People v. Washington , 969 N.E.2d 349, 355 (Ill. 2012). Though the United States Supreme Court does not use this precise formulation, we do not see how it is anything more than a rephrasing of the holding in Jackson that “a properly instructed jury may occasionally convict even when it can be said that no rational trier of fact could fi nd guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” 443 U.S. at 317. That seems to be how the Illinois Supreme Court understands it—even when it relies on that language to vacate a conviction, it still cites Jackson as the governing standard. See People v. Smith , 708 N.E.2d 365, 369–70 (Ill. 1999). We have even said that this formulation was neither “contrary to” Jackson nor “meaningfully di ff erent” from it. Cabrera v. Hinsley, 324 F.3d 527, 533 (7th Cir. 2003). Courts sometimes vacate convictions despite the high hurdle of Jackson

. See, e.g. , United States v. Garcia , 919 F.3d 489,24 Nos. 19-1441 & 19-1547

496 (7th Cir. 2019). That they do so is no reason to believe that they were, in fact, applying a di ff erent, less onerous standard. Factually, Rivera and Rodriguez do nothing to demonstrate that a general su ffi ciency argument would succeed for Winfi eld. Rivera involved a unique situation in which a series of acqui tt als and conclusive DNA evid ence left the state with only a convoluted and improbable theory on which to sustainits conviction. 962 N.E.2d at 63. There is nothing so improbable about the state’s theory here. And although Rodriguez involved admissions, they were of facts that the state posited only the murderer would know, not a confession to the crime, like Win fi eld’s. 728 N.E.2d at 709. The district court was right to skip over the general su ffi

ciency argument. Win fi eld all but concedes there was not a reasonable probability the argument would succeed under the Jackson standard, and that is the standard the Illinois courts apply. It follows that counsel neither performed de fi

ciently nor prejudiced Win fi eld by omi tt ing this argument. 2. Corpus Delicti We next turn to the argument on which the district court granted relief: corpus delicti. As noted above, a corpus delicti argument is a type of su ffi ciency argument. E.g. , Lara , 983 N.E.2d at 969. The key di ff erence is that Illinois courts stringently (and intentionally) enforc e the corpus delicti rule to assess confession evidence more carefully than Jackson alone demands. See id. at 982 (Thomas, J., concurring) (recognizingthat the federal courts and several state courts have abandoned corpus delicti rule); People v. Sargent, 940 N.E.2d 1045, 1057 (Ill. 2010) (rejecting request to abandon rule).Nos. 19-1441 & 19-1547 25

The corpus delicti is, traditio nally, nothing more than the commission of a crime. See Kerley, 838 F.2d at 939; Lara , 983 N.E.2d at 964. It encompasses boththe existence of an injury and the fact that the injury had a criminal cause. People v. Furby, 563 N.E.2d 421, 425 (Ill. 1990); 1 Kenneth S. Broun et al.,McCormick on Evidence § 146 (8th ed. 2020). Under some formulations of the common law, a conviction based on a confession could not stand unless the corpus delicti had been proved through independent evidence. See David A. Moran, In Defense of the Corpus Delicti Rule, 64 Ohio St. L.J. 817, 817 (2003). This rule evolved out of a concern that the state might obtain a conviction based on a co nfession to a crime that never occurred. In perhaps the most d ramatic example of this error, three people were hanged for mu rder even though the victim was still alive. Perrys’ Case, 14 How. St. Tr. 1312 (Eng. 1661). In this traditional sense, it is indisputable that there was evidence of the corpus delicti here, and Win fi eld conceded as much at argument. Someone a tt empted to murder Garre tt; he was shot at between two and fi fteen times. (He was hit twice, and police found fi fteen shell casings.) Multiple shots permit a fact fi nder to infer an intent to ki ll, as the trial judge did here. E.g. , People v. Howery, 687 N.E.2d 836, 856 (Ill. 1997). The district court thought that the corpus delicti rule also extends to whether Win fi eld was the shooter and requires the state to corroborate the confession. The court candidly acknowledged, however, that some authorities supported this reading of the rule and others di d not, so it was a close case with no de fi nitive answer and no case directly on point. We need not decide the scope of the corpus delicti rule or whether the state met the requirements of it. See Crocke ttv. Butler, 807 F.3d 160, 168 (7th Cir. 2015) (explaining that habeas26 Nos. 19-1441 & 19-1547

review cannot correct perceived errors of state law). As the district court recognized, the issue before the federal courts is whether the argument that the state had notmet its burden was both obvious and clearly st ronger than the argument that appellate counsel raised on appeal. Only if both conditions are met can we say that appellate counsel’s performance fell below the constitutional minimum. See Makiel v. Butler , 782 F.3d 882, 898 (7th Cir. 2015). That the underlying corpus delicti argument is close and novel cuts against Win fi eld on both prongs. First, it impliesthat the argument is not all that strong, even if it could ultimately have prevailed. “[T]he comparative strength of two claims is usually debatable.” Shaw, 721 F.3d at 915. Reasonable minds can di ff er on the relative strength of an argument that ekes out a win compared to one that falls just short. Stricklandinstructs that we must be “highly deferential” to counsel’s choices to avoid the temptation of hindsight. Morris , 832 F.3d at 710

. Counsel is entitled to— expected to —“select[] the most promising issues for revi ew” and “focus[] on one central issue if possible.” Jones v. Barnes , 463 U.S. 745, 751–52 (1983). Win fi eld cannot succeed by proving only that the corpus delicti argument is not frivolous. Indeed, the Constitution doesnot obligate appellate counsel to raise every nonfrivolous argument. Id. at 751. Although the state court reje cted the sentencing argument raised on direct appeal, it was no t quite so weak as to be “the equivalent of fi ling no brief at all,” or “e ff ectively a substitute for a [no-merit] brief,” like the su ffi ciency argument in Shaw, 721 F.3d at 915. The Illinois Appellate Court has reversedwhen judges have failed to consider a defendant’s rehabilitative potential. E.g. , People v. Jeter , 616 N.E.2d 1256, 1264 (Ill.Nos. 19-1441 & 19-1547 27

App. Ct. 1993). The problem was that the trial judge did not ignore Win fi eld’s rehabilitative potential, he just found that he had none. Second, a close case makes the argument less obvious. “Stricklanddoes not guarantee perfec t representation, only a ‘reasonably competent a tt orney.’” Richter, 562 U.S. at 110. Themore precedents one must distinguish (and the more carefully one must do so) to reach a favorable result, the less unreasonable it likely is for an appellate lawyer not to spot the issue and brief it. This is especially true where, as here, the legal issue is still unclear twenty years later. See Loden v. McCarty, 778 F.3d 484, 501 (5th Cir. 2015) ( fi nding no de fi cient performance when law was unclear at time of appeal); cf. Shaw, 721 F.3d at 916–17 (discussin g circumstances in which counsel performs de fi ciently by not predicting change in the law). Counsel had Jeterto support his sentencing argument, even if it turned out not to be enough. Win fi eld, however, has still not identi fi ed any case that direct ly supports his corpus delicti argument—only general principles that could favor him if the court were to interpret them a certain way. These ambiguities in the law are not enough to carry his burden to prove that the corpus delicti argument was obvious such that any reasonable a tt orney would have raised it. Winfi eld faced two questions before he could prevail on a corpus delicti argument. One, was the state obligated to corroboratethe details of his confession? Two, did the state fail to corroborate them? His petition could potentially succeed only if a reasonable a tt orney would fi nd a basis to argue that both answers are yes. Although we, like the district court, see no defi nitive answer to these question s in the decisions of the Illinois Supreme Court, we think th e implied answer to both is28 Nos. 19-1441 & 19-1547

no. The state was likely not required to corroborate Win fi eld’s confession beyond proving the traditional corpus delicti, and even if it were, it likely succ eeded. We, thus, cannot say that counsel was not acting as counse l when he failed to argue otherwise. In assessing the obviousness of this argument, it is best to start with what the Illinois Supreme Court considers “the most precise explanation” of the corpus delicti rule. Lara , 983 N.E.2d at 967 (citing People v. Willingham , 432 N.E.2d 861, 864 (Ill. 1982)). This version was set out in People v. Perfecto :The rule is that an uncorroborated confession is insu ffi cient to convict, but the corpus delicti is not required to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt exclusively by evidence aliunde the confession or admissions of the accused, nor is it necessary that it be established by evidence other than that which te nds to connect the defendant with the crime. “ The true rule is that if there is evidence of corroborating circumstances which tend to prove the corpus delicti and correspond with the circumstances rela ted in the confession, both the circumstances and the confession may be considered in determining whether the corpus delicti is suffi ciently proved in a given case. ” 186 N.E.2d 258, 258–59 (1962) (citations omi tt ed) (emphasis added) (quoting People v. Gavurnik , 117 N.E.2d 782, 785 (Ill. 1954)).

Win fi eld and the district court read the emphasized sentence to mean that the evidence must always both “tend to prove the corpus delicti” and“correspond with theNos. 19-1441 & 19-1547 29

circumstances related in the co nfession,” i.e., corroborate the confession, to sustain a convic tion. The district court found that the state had met the fi rst prong but failed the second.

The state contends the evidence must meet on ly one prong because the rule is actually disjunctive. Under its reading of Perfecto , corroboration is necessary only before the confession “may be considered in determin ing whether the corpus delicti is su ffi ciently proved.” Though it is not “required” to provethe traditional corpus delicti exclusively with evidence independent of the confession, it may do so. And if it does (as we explained is true here), then the confession need not be corroborated more. Another way to phrase this reasoning is that the independent proof of the corpus delicti is itself su ffi cient corroboration. Cf. United States v. Fleming, 504 F.2d 1045, 1049(7th Cir. 1974) (Stevens, J.) (concluding that proof of traditional corpus delicti is su ffi cient but not necessary to corroborate confession under federal law). The Illinois Supreme Court’s frequent emphasis that the corpus delicti and the identity of the o ff ender are separate concepts supports the state’s argument. See, e.g. , Lara , 983 N.E.2d at 964; People v. Cloutier , 622 N.E.2d 774, 784 (Ill. 1993). 3 In People v. Holmes , 367 N.E.2d 663 (Ill. 1977), the court made explicit the disjunctive test the state advocates: “It is enough if the other evidence eithertends to show that a crime did in fact occur orto corroborate the confession.” Id. at 665 (emphasis added) (citations omi tt ed) (quoting People v.

3 The ordinary rule is that we re solve the performance prong based on the law at the time of the appeal (here 2001). See Shaw , 721 F.3d at 915. Nevertheless, we cite to Lara , a 2012 case, because both parties rely on it, neither contends that it represents a change in the law, and it cogently synthesizes preexisting caselaw. See Lara, 983 N.E.2d at 966–71.30 Nos. 19-1441 & 19-1547

Norcu tt, 255 N.E.2d 442, 446 (Ill. 1970)). That the victim wasshot and died was enough to prove the corpus delicti of murder. Id. More recently, the Illinois Appellate Court (relying on Holmes ) has said that “it is not a requirement of corpus delicti that evidence apart from the confession tend to connectdefendant to the crime charged.” People v. Valladares , 994 N.E.2d 938, 960 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013). It was a failure to connect Win fi eld to the crime—to prove identity—that led to relief here. We think the state’s reading likely re fl ects the proper interpretation of the corpus delic ti rule. The state could complywith the traditional rule by proving through independent evidence that a crime occurred. Alternatively, if there were insu ffi cient independent evidence th at the crime occurred, the state could follow Perfecto and corroborate the confession withevidence corresponding to the circumstances of the confession. Either independent evidence or the confession plus the corroborating evidence together could be used to establish that a crime occurred—the ultima te requirement of the corpus delicti rule. Willingham , 432 N.E.2d at 865. Once the state passed this legal hurdle, all that was left was to prove the other element, identity, as a factual ma tt er, and it could do that with the confession alone. See People v. Taylor, 317 N.E.2d 97, 102 (Ill. 1974). 4

4 It is notable that this interpretation of the corpus delicti rule appears to be the one under which everyone wa s operating until the district court’s order. The state trial judge, though bo lstering his conclusion with the confession, initially found the corpus delicti from the fact that Garre ttwasshot twice. Appellate counsel likewise pointed to this simple fact to explain why he did not bring a su ffi ciency argument. Indeed, even Win fi eld pressed in the district court a corpus delicti theory that there was noNos. 19-1441 & 19-1547 31

Although we doubt the state was required, as a ma tt er of law, to corroborate the confession to any degree more than to prove that someone a tt empted to murder Garre tt, we accept thedistrict court’s point that there might be room to argue otherwise. Some cases use “and” instead of Holmes ’s “or”; othersdiscuss corroboration, despite independent proof of the corpus delicti; many, in that discu ssion, further emphasize that this corroborating evidence proved a connection between the crime and the accused. ( Willingham , 432 N.E.2d at 864–66,does all three.) Even under this interpretation, though, the Illinois Appellate Court would not vacate the conviction unless the proof fell short of corroborating the confession. We think it far from obvious that it did. The Illinois Supreme Court has expressed just how low the bar is for corroboration. It requ ires “far less independent evidence to corroborate a defendant’s confession under the corpus delicti rule than to show guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Lara , 983 N.E.2d at 970; accord Furby, 563 N.E.2d at 426; Willingham , 432 N.E.2d at 864. Moreove r, “there is no requirement that the independent evidence and the details of the confession correspond in every particular.” Furby, 563 N.E.2d at 428. The law requires “only some ‘consistency’ ‘tending to

con fi rm and strengthen the confession.’” Lara , 983 N.E.2d at 970 (quoting Furby, 563 N.E.2d at 421).

The district court identi fi ed two inconsistencies between Hartman’s testimony and Win fi eld’s statement that it thought made it obvious that an Illinois Court might deem the

evidence anyone had a tt empted to murder Garre tt —i.e., that the traditional rule had not been met (and thus corroboration was necessary).32 Nos. 19-1441 & 19-1547

confession uncorroborated. The fi rst was the number of shooters, the second, Win fi eld’s exit. 5

The fi rst of these discrepancies—that Hartman saw only one shooter who was not Win fi eld—is immaterial. It is not even an inconsistency. Hartman declined to rule out the possibility that there might have been a second shooter he couldnot see. Even if he had not been so candid, the Illinois Supreme Court has held that eyewitness testimony that there were two robbers “did not necess arily create inconsistencies” with a confession that the de fendant was the third robber. Willingham , 432 N.E.2d at 866.

The second di ff erence is more substantial: all the witnesses (including Curry and Garre tt ) said the shooter(s) returned to the car and no one saw anyone fl eeing on foot, as Win fi eld said he did. This is an inconsistency, but again, Illinois law does not require perfect parity between the evidence and the confession. Furby, 563 N.E.2d at 428. All that is needed is a “loose[] ‘correspondence’”; “corroboration of only some of the circumstances related in a defendant’s confession is su ffi

cient.” Lara , 983 N.E.2d at 970–71. The independent evidence corresponded with Win fi eld’s statement in many critical respects. Hartman con fi rmed that a black SUV traveled south on Central Park and stopped at the corner of Huron when at least one shooter exited the

5 We, like the district court, accept that the trial judge discredited both Garre ttand Curry’s testimony. As we noted above, the state argues that the court partially credited Garre tt ’s testimony. We doubt that is true, but a state court might reasonably disagree. This possibility is just one more barrier in the way of a fi nding that a corpus delicti argument is both obvious and clearly stronger than counsel’s sentencing argument.Nos. 19-1441 & 19-1547 33

vehicle and began fi ring. Further, Win fi eld’s own testimonywas independent evidence that he and his brother had an argument with Stovall at a dice game weeks before the shooting, just as he stated to the detective. See Willingham , 432 N.E.2d at866 (relying on defendant’s trial testimony about events before crime as corroborating evid ence). An Illinois court would likely deem this enough to ensure that Win fi eld’s confession was “reasonably reliable,” allowing the trial judge to considerit in his “role in deciding credibility issues, weighing the evidence and drawing reasonable inferences, and resolving evidentiary con fl icts.” Lara , 983 N.E.2d at 971–72. Certainly, it was not unreasonable for Win fi eld’s counsel to conclude thatthese inconsistencies were for the trial judge, not the Appellate Court, to resolve and so a su ffi ciency argument had only a remote possibility of success, if that. The district court thought the Illinois courts might dismiss this independent evidence as con fi rming only tangential components of the statement, as in People v. Lambert, 472 N.E.2d 427 (Ill. 1984) (per curiam). One crucial di ff erence between this case and Lambertis that in the la tt er there was no independent evidence that a crime occurred at all. Idat 429. Thestate was, thus, undoubtedly obligated to corroborate the defendant’s confession to sexual assault of a child under any reading of the rule. The independent evidence, however, showed only that the alleged ch ild victim spent a single night in the defendant’s ordinary sl eeping quarters (a basement)and that a few weeks later, the child’s rectum appeared “pinkish and swollen.” Id. There was no evidence of a cause for this in fl ammation (criminal or othe rwise) and the child never complained of being assaul ted. All the evidence con fi rmed was the opportunity to commit a crime, which is to say that the defendant slept where his bed was.34 Nos. 19-1441 & 19-1547

Here, the independent evidence did not line up only with confessed facts of Win fi eld’s daily life but with details of howthe crime occurred: the car’s color, path of travel, and his underlying motive for the shooting. The corpus delicti rule does not require that the evidence an d confession “precisely align ... on each element of the charged o ff ense, or indeed to any particular element of the charged o ff ense.” Lara , 983 N.E.2d at 972. It is di ffi cult to see why a reasonable a tt orney would expect an Illinois court to deem these key facts tangential relative to Win fi eld’s purported escape method. The district court carved a careful path for Win fi eld to raise a nonfrivolous corpus delicti argument. Even if that path exists, though, it is not an obvi ous one. It is narrow and winds carefully around many barriers, bo th factual and legal. It is socomplex that we cannot say that all reasonably competent attorneys would spot it. Nor can we be sure the path had a favorable end. For our purposes, we need not be certain where it leads; it su ffi ces to say that counsel’s decision to take a different way was not constitutionally de fi cient. We therefore vacate the district court’s grant of habeas corpus relief.

V. Conclusion

Win fi eld argued that two of hi s lawyers mishandled his case. He said his trial counsel should have presented an alibi defense, but the state court re asonably found he was not constitutionally obligated to pres ent a defense of which he was simply not aware. Likewise, we conclude that the Constitution did not obligate Win fi eld’s appellate counsel to discover and present a complex and nove l legal argument that may or may not have succeeded. We a ffi rm the denial of relief and reverse the grant of relief, so that Win fi eld’s petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied in full.