J-S01005-19

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

ANUPAMA KOORAPATI 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1365 MDA 2018

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 18, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-06-SA-0000020-2018

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., MURRAY, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.: FILED JULY 03, 2019

Appellant, Anupama Koorapati, appeals pro se from the judgment of 

sentence entered in the Berks County Court of Common Pleas, following her 

summary conviction for defiant trespass.1 We affirm. 

The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows. 

Custom Processing Services (“CPS”) is a business owned by Jeffrey Klinger 

and Gregg Shemanski. Appellant hired CPS to run a product trial for her 

business in 2015. Afterward, CPS and Appellant discussed the possibility of 

conducting other product trials. However, CPS ultimately declined to engage 

in a further business relationship with Appellant. 

____________________________________________

 Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3503(b)(1)(i). 
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Appellant continued to pursue a relationship with the company, and was 

repeatedly rebuffed. Klinger emailed Appellant and again advised her that CPS 

was not interested in maintaining a business relationship with her company. 

He later informed Appellant she was not permitted to visit the CPS office, that 

any such visit would constitute a trespass on their private property, and that 

CPS would involve the police if Appellant visited the office. Appellant 

responded to this email by asking Klinger to finalize a deal with her company, 

and attempting to arrange a meeting at the CPS office. CPS retained the 

services of a law firm, who sent Appellant a cease and desist letter requesting 

that she discontinue her efforts to contact CPS. 

Several days later, Appellant arrived at the CPS premises, accompanied 

by a man she described as her security detail. Appellant asked to speak with 

Klinger and Shemanski. The receptionist recognized Appellant, and called 

Shemanski. Shemanski advised the receptionist to tell Appellant that she could 

either speak with CPS’s lawyer on the phone, or leave the premises. Appellant 

chose to leave. CPS later informed the police of Appellant’s visit, and Appellant 

was cited for defiant trespass. 

Appellant filed a summary appeal, and retained counsel. The trial court 

conducted a bench trial, at which Klinger and CPS’s receptionist testified. The 

Commonwealth also introduced the emails between Appellant, Klinger, and 
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CPS’s counsel into evidence. The trial court found Appellant guilty of defiant 

trespass following actual communication to the actor.

2

Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. The trial court ordered her to 

file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). While Appellant did file a statement in response to the

order, it consisted of several paragraphs recounting the facts of the case, 

including an irrelevant dispute with the responding police officer’s description 

of Appellant in his report. The trial court interpreted this winding statement to 

challenge the sufficiency of the evidence sustaining her conviction, and the

alleged violation of Appellant’s rights under the Constitutions of Pennsylvania 

and United States. This appeal is now properly before us.

Appellant presents the following statement of questions involved for our 

review: 

Whether the Lower Court erred to understand from 

Commonwealth:

(a) the history and scope of the business relationship between the

accused and the accuser;

(b) accuracy of the facts recorded on the Citation #R1339085-6

regarding actual time of trespassing; ethnicity of [Appellant] and, 

number of people;

(c) proof of necessary criminal intent beyond a reasonable doubt;

[(]d) disrespect for civil rights[.]

Appellant’s Brief, at 5. 

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2 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3503(b)(1)(i). 
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Appellant’s disjointed argument section, in which she attempts to flesh 

out the above issues, is not divided into subparts. Further, much of the 

argument section is devoted to a recapitulation of the facts favorable to 

Appellant. See Appellant’s Brief, at 12-16. 

We understand these arguments to dispute the sufficiency of the 

evidence sustaining her conviction for trespass, and to claim statutory 

defenses to trespass under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3503(c)(2)-(3). See Appellant’s 

Brief, at 16-20.

This Court has discretion to quash or dismiss an appeal where a party’s 

brief fails to conform to the requirements set forth by our Rules of Appellate 

Procedure. See Commonwealth v. Adams, 882 A.2d 496, 498 (Pa. Super. 

2005); Pa.R.A.P. 2101. 

Although this Court is willing to liberally construe materials filed 

by a pro se litigant, pro se status confers no special benefit upon 

the appellant. To the contrary, any person choosing to represent 

himself in a legal proceeding must, to a reasonable extent, 

assume that his lack of expertise and legal training will be his 

undoing.

Commonwealth v. Vurimindi, 200 A.3d 1031, 1037 (Pa. Super. 2018) 

(citation omitted). 

“The Rules of Appellate Procedure state unequivocally that each 

question an appellant raises is to be supported by discussion and analysis of 

pertinent authority[.]” Commonwealth v. Richard, 150 A.3d 504, 513 (Pa. 

Super. 2016) (citation omitted). “[W]hen issues are not properly raised and 

developed in briefs, when the briefs are wholly inadequate to present specific 
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issues for review, a court will not consider the merits thereof.” 

Commonwealth v. Tchirkow, 160 A.3d 798, 804 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation 

omitted). 

Appellant’s brief fails to comply with our Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

Nevertheless, these defects do not wholly prevent us from conducting 

meaningful review. To the extent we are able to understand her arguments, 

we will evaluate these – namely, her contentions regarding the sufficiency of 

the evidence and relevant statutory defenses. 

As for Appellant’s attempts to contest the accuracy of the facts recorded 

in the responding police officer’s citation, Appellant conceded at trial and 

maintains in her brief that she was present at the CPS office on July 25, 2017. 

We cannot see how any recorded discrepancies in the precise timing of the 

incident on that day, Appellant’s ethnicity, or presence of Appellant’s 

bodyguard present an appealable issue in challenging her conviction. Further, 

Appellant’s inclusion of inapplicable extracts from both the Pennsylvania and 

United States Constitutions in her argument section, including entitlement to 

bail and the right to a grand jury in cases involving capital crimes, does not 

present any cognizable question for our review. Thus, we will not address

these claims.

We begin with Appellant’s sufficiency claim. “The determination of 

whether sufficient evidence exists to support the verdict is a question of law; 

accordingly, our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is 

plenary.” Commonwealth v. Edwards, 177 A.3d 963, 969 (Pa. Super. 2018)
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(citation omitted). The reviewing court evaluates “whether viewing all the 

evidence admitted at trial [] in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, 

there is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of 

the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Commonwealth v. Stiles, 143 A.3d 

968, 981 (Pa. Super. 2016) (brackets in original; citation omitted). This Court 

may not substitute its own judgment for that of the fact-finder. See id. 

A person commits the offense of criminal trespass if, “knowing that he 

is not licensed or privileged to do so, he enters or remains in any place as to 

which notice against trespass is given by ... actual communication to the 

actor[.]” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3503(b)(1)(i). Evidence that an appellant was

informed multiple times that he was unwelcome on private property and 

thereafter intruded on the property is sufficient to sustain a conviction for 

defiant trespass. See Commonwealth v. Bennett, 124 A.3d 327, 331 (Pa. 

Super. 2015). Further, a person once welcome on private property may have 

that access rescinded and become subject to a defiant trespass charge if he 

continues to intrude. See Commonwealth v. Downing, 511 A.2d 792, 795 

(Pa. 1986). 

Here, the Commonwealth presented evidence to show that Appellant 

received an email from Klinger, an owner of CPS, telling her that she was 

unwelcome on CPS premises. See Commonwealth’s Exhibit 1. The email was 

dated June 27, 2016. In it, Klinger informed Appellant that any intrusion on

CPS property would be considered criminal trespass, and implored Appellant 

not to come to the building. Klinger stated that he would call the police to 
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escort Appellant off the property if she chose to come. Klinger asked Appellant 

to respond to the email and confirm that she would not trespass. 

Appellant responded to the email the same day, but made no mention 

of Klinger’s warning. Instead, she harangued Klinger about his attitude toward 

her. Incredibly, Appellant followed this email with a second email on June 28, 

proposing a meeting with Klinger on CPS premises the next day. Klinger did 

not respond. 

On July 17, 2016, an attorney retained by CPS emailed Appellant at the 

same email address Appellant used to correspond with Klinger. See

Commonwealth’s Exhibit 2. The attorney’s email instructed Appellant to cease 

and desist all attempts to communicate with CPS. Appellant did not reply. The 

very next day, the attorney again emailed Appellant to request that she stop 

sending packages to CPS, and to cease all efforts to contact CPS. The attorney 

reminded Appellant that any entry onto CPS property would constitute 

trespass, and she informed Appellant that CPS would contact the authorities 

in the event of a trespass. Again, Appellant did not reply. 

Appellant entered the CPS offices on July 25, 2017, requesting a 

meeting with Klinger and Shemanski. Appellant had a man she referred to as 

her “security” in tow. CPS’s receptionist called Shemanski, who instructed her 

to call CPS’s attorney. The receptionist did so, and informed Appellant that 

she could either speak with CPS’s attorney or leave. Appellant left. CPS later

contacted police, who issued a citation to Appellant for defiant trespass. 
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Based on the foregoing, the Commonwealth presented sufficient 

evidence to sustain Appellant’s conviction for defiant trespass. Appellant was 

repeatedly, personally informed that she was unwelcome on CPS property. 

Nevertheless, she came to the CPS offices after this warning. 

Appellant’s contention that she did not receive the email from CPS’s 

attorney and was thus unaware of this notice is unavailing. Even if Appellant 

had not seen the attorney’s email, which was sent to Appellant’s personal 

email address, she received and replied to Klinger’s email. Klinger’s email 

expressly informed Appellant that she was not permitted on CPS property. 

Therefore, Appellant’s decision to enter the premises despite this warning 

constituted defiant trespass. 

Appellant’s attempt to raise statutory defenses to this crime also cannot 

succeed. Appellant contends the CPS office was open to members of the public 

under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3503(c)(2). At trial, Klinger testified that he and 

Shemanski own CPS, and that the CPS offices are a private facility controlled 

by himself and Shemanski. N.T. Trial, 7/18/18, at 4-7. The court found the 

CPS offices were “clearly private property.” Trial Court Opinion, filed 9/18/18,

at 4. Though Appellant may have lawfully been on the premises in the years 

before this incident, her earlier entry was the result of a then-ongoing business 

relationship. Appellant’s earlier entry did not render the building public 

property under section 3503(c)(2). See Commonwealth v. Downing, 511 

A.2d 792, 795 (finding section 3503(c)(2) inapplicable where defendant was 

clearly aware his license to use library had been revoked).
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Appellant also contends she reasonably believed she had permission 

from Shemanski to be on the property under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3503(c)(3), as 

only Klinger had rescinded her invitation to CPS offices. This assertion is 

unpersuasive. Shemanski was copied on the email Klinger sent to Appellant, 

informing her that she would be trespassing if she came to the office. 

Appellant presented no evidence that Shemanski disagreed with Klinger’s 

email. Instead, Appellant ignored the email informing her that she was 

unwelcome, and thereafter arrived at CPS offices. We cannot find Appellant’s 

alleged belief that Shemanski would have permitted her to enter the premises 

reasonable under section 3503(c)(3). Appellant is therefore due no relief on 

this claim. Accordingly, we affirm her conviction.

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/3/2019