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Filed 12/22/22 Smith-Bey v. Riviera Operating CA2/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

WILLIE-JAY SMITH-BEY III,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

RIVIERA OPERATING LLC et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

 B319802

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. 

 21STCV04912)

APPEAL from the judgment of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, Teresa A. Beaudet, Judge. Affirmed.

Willie-Jay Smith-Bey III, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and 

Appellant. 
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Buchalter, Mark T. Cramer and Efrat M. Cogan for 

Defendants and Respondents. 

* * * * * *

A person with a California mailing address sued a Texasbased corporate entity and three Texas residents for allegedly 

refusing to recognize his claims related to a parcel of land in 

rural Texas. The trial court dismissed the case on the ground 

that California lacked personal jurisdiction over the Texas-based 

defendants for this Texas-centered dispute. This is undeniably 

correct, so we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

I. Facts

A. The defendants

For many years, Riviera Resources, Inc. was an oil and gas 

producer; it was incorporated in Delaware, headquartered in 

Texas, and did business in Texas, Oklahoma and Louisiana.

Riviera Resources, Inc. did not have any offices in California, did 

not use California banks, and did not conduct business in 

California. Riviera Resources, Inc. is now defunct.

Riviera Operating, LLC (the LLC) was a subsidiary of 

Riviera Resources, Inc. and was dissolved at the same time as its 

parent company; all rights to the property in question were sold 

in 2020 to an outside LLC. The LLC was incorporated in 

Delaware, and headquartered in Texas. The LLC was formed in 

2018. Prior to that time, it operated as Linn Operating, LLC. 

Linn Operating, LLC did some business in California until 2017, 

but ceased business with California in 2017 and allowed its 

business registration in California to lapse in 2018. 

Darren Schluter and David Rottino were officers of the 

LLC. Holly Anderson was an officer of Riviera Resources, Inc.

and the LLC. 
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B. Plaintiff’s letters and emails

Starting in 2016,1 Willie-Jay Smith-Bey III (plaintiff) sent 

a stream of letters and emails to various employees at Riviera 

Resources, Inc. and the LLC/Linn Operating, LLC. In this 

correspondence, plaintiff asserted that he was a “direct 

descendent of the Ancient Canaanites/Moabites,” and that he has 

a “Birthright Claim of Right and Title” to a 3.25-acre parcel of 

land in Smith County, Texas, under “Divine Law,” “Nature’s 

Law,” “Universal Law,” “International Law,” and, “upon [his] 

Moorish Birthrights,” because the land had allegedly formerly 

belonged to plaintiff’s father. Most pertinent here, plaintiff sent 

(1) a letter to the LLC in early 2018 entitled “Writ in the Nature 

of Discovery and Disclosure,” in which he demanded that Riviera 

Resources, Inc., the LLC, or Linn Operation, LLC give him a copy 

of the contract that entitled them to the mineral rights on the 

land in Smith County, and (2) a letter to the LLC in July 2018 

entitled “Writ in the Nature of Default,” in which he declared

that the LLC’s failure to respond to his earlier letter meant that 

he was entitled to (a) all revenue generated by the land, and (b) 

to have the land “restored to its natural state.”

The letters plaintiff sent had a return address of “Los 

Angeles California Territory,” and the LLC—in seeking to

1 Although plaintiff in one of his filings asserted that Riviera 

Resources, Inc. first contacted him in 2014 and although plaintiff 

at oral argument asserted that someone affiliated with 

defendants first contacted him in 2013, he provided no evidence

to the trial court to substantiate that assertion. Accordingly, we 

do not consider it.
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respond to plaintiff’s letters by ascertaining whether he had any 

legally cognizable interest in the Smith County parcel—

repeatedly sent plaintiff responsive letters asking him to

corroborate his claimed ownership, although plaintiff steadfastly 

refused to provide the requested information. 

II. Procedural Background

A. Complaint

On February 5, 2021, plaintiff sued the LLC, Schluter, 

Rottino and Anderson (collectively, defendants).

2 Plaintiff alleges 

two causes of action—namely, (1) “Res Judicata: Unrefuted 

Affidavits,” and (2) “Unjust Enrichment.” As to both, plaintiff 

alleges that defendants’ failure to respond to his first Writ in the 

Nature of Discovery and Disclosure means that he is 

automatically entitled to $1 million in “real money” as well as 

restoration of the 3.25-acre Smith County parcel to its “natural 

state.” 

B. Motion to quash

The LLC, Schluter, Rottino and Anderson moved to quash 

plaintiff’s service of process on the ground that California did not 

have personal jurisdiction over them. In support of their motion, 

they submitted the above-described evidence as well as 

declarations from Schluter, Rottino and Anderson attesting that 

each resided in Texas and had no regular contacts with 

California. After receiving plaintiff’s opposition, a reply, an 

unauthorized surreply from plaintiff, as well as conducting a 

hearing, the court issued an order quashing service and 

dismissing the case. The court reasoned that defendants’ 

contacts with California were insufficient to confer general 

2 Plaintiff also sued Dan Furbee and Jim Few, but later 

voluntarily dismissed them. 
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jurisdiction, and insufficient to confer specific jurisdiction related 

to this dispute because defendants’ conduct in mailing letters 

back to plaintiff did not constitute “purposeful availment.”3

C. Appeal

Plaintiff filed a timely notice of appeal.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in denying his 

motion to quash. In reviewing such a denial, we review the trial 

court’s legal rulings de novo and its factual findings for 

substantial evidence. (Jacqueline B. v. Rawls Law Group, P.C.

(2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 243, 251 (Jacqueline B.).)

California courts have the power to assert personal 

jurisdiction to the same extent as allowed by the United States 

Constitution. (Code Civ. Proc., § 410.10; Jacqueline B., supra, 68 

Cal.App.5th at p. 251.) The federal constitution permits states to 

exercise personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant only 

when the defendant has “‘certain minimum contacts with [the 

State]’” such that the State’s exercise of jurisdiction “‘does not 

offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”’” 

(Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown (2011) 564 

U.S. 915, 923, quoting Internat. Shoe Co. v. Washington (1945) 

326 U.S. 310, 316.) “The primary focus of [the] personal 

jurisdiction inquiry is the” “relationship” between the defendant 

and the “forum [s]tate” (Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior 

3 The court also rejected plaintiff’s argument that 

defendants’ failure to request a hearing for their motion to quash 

within 30 days deprived the court of jurisdiction to hear the 

motion. Plaintiff does not contest that conclusion on appeal. It 

lacks merit anyway. (Olinick v. BMG Entertainment (2006) 138 

Cal.App.4th 1286, 1296.)
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Court (2017) 137 S.Ct. 1773, 1779 (Bristol-Myers)), and not the 

relationship “between the plaintiff and the defendant” (Vons

Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 458

(Vons)). 

There are two “flavors” of personal jurisdiction—namely, 

(1) general jurisdiction and (2) specific jurisdiction. (Daimler AG 

v. Bauman (2014) 571 U.S. 117, 122.) Plaintiff does not challenge 

the trial court’s finding of no general jurisdiction, so we focus on 

whether substantial evidence supports its finding of no specific 

jurisdiction. 

“Specific jurisdiction subjects an out-of-state defendant to 

suit in a forum state, but only as to a specific suit and only where 

“‘the suit’” itself “‘aris[es] out of or relat[es] to the defendant's 

contacts with the forum.’”” (Jacqueline B., supra, 68 Cal.App.5th 

at p. 252, quoting Bristol-Myers, supra, 137 S.Ct. at p. 

1780.) Specific jurisdiction thus “‘focuses on “the relationship 

among the [out-of-state] defendant, the forum, and the [current] 

litigation.”’” (Walden v. Fiore (2014) 571 U.S. 277, 284.) The 

existence of specific jurisdiction turns on the facts of each case. 

(Kulko v. Superior Court of Cal. (1978) 436 U.S. 84, 92.) The 

courts have nevertheless articulated the standard against which 

to measure those facts: Specific jurisdiction will be found over an 

out-of-state defendant only when (1) “‘the [out-of-state] defendant 

has purposefully availed himself or herself of forum benefits,’” (2) 

“‘the “controversy [giving rise to the present lawsuit] is related to 

or ‘arises out of’ [the] defendant's contacts with the forum,”’” and 

(3) “‘“the assertion of personal jurisdiction would comport with 

‘fair play and substantial justice.’”’” (Pavlovich v. Superior Court 

(2002) 29 Cal.4th 262, 269, quoting Vons, supra, 14 Cal.4th at pp. 

447-448.) The plaintiff asking the forum state to exert 
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jurisdiction over the out-of-state defendant bears the initial 

burden of establishing the first two elements by a preponderance 

of the evidence, and if the plaintiff does so, the out-of-state 

defendant then bears the burden of convincing the court why the 

exertion of personal jurisdiction would not comport with fair play 

and substantial justice. (Pavlovich, at p. 273; Vons, at p. 449; 

Bader v. Avon Products, Inc. (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 186, 192-193.)

Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that 

defendants did not purposefully avail themselves of the benefits 

of California as a forum. Defendants exist exclusively outside of 

California. Plaintiff initiated contact with defendants—while 

they were outside California—to obtain recompense for property 

located outside of California. Obtaining that recompense is the 

sole reason why plaintiff has sued defendants. The only 

connection defendants have with California is that they sent

their “snail mail” correspondence to plaintiff at a California 

address. Plaintiff does not even adduce any evidence that he is a 

California resident (after all, mail can be forwarded). 

Defendants’ conduct in merely responding to correspondence from

a person with a California mailing address does not constitute 

purposeful availment. (Shisler v. Sanfer Sports Cars, Inc. (2006) 

146 Cal.App.4th 1254, 1261-1262 [no personal jurisdiction exists 

in California when defendant merely exchanges files over the 

Internet]; cf. Hall v. Laronde (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1342, 1347 

[personal jurisdiction exists in California when California 

resident reaches out to New York resident and they proceed to 

engage in long-term project to develop software]; Gilmore Bank v. 

AsiaTrust New Zealand Ltd. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1558, 1572 

[personal jurisdiction exists in California when out-of-state 

defendant sent promotional materials to California resident, 
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drafted a trust contract and negotiated the terms with the 

resident, actively managed the resident’s retirement account, and 

accepted and transferred funds between defendant’s accounts and 

resident’s accounts at the direction of the resident].) 

Below, plaintiff asked the trial court to forestall ruling on 

defendants’ motion so he could conduct discovery aimed at 

jurisdictional issues. However, plaintiff made this request in two 

sentences in his opposition to the motion to quash, and at no time 

explained what discovery he sought or what facts he hoped to 

elicit. Because plaintiff did not make the necessary showing that 

discovery would “likely lead to the production of evidence of facts 

establishing jurisdiction” (In re Automobile Antitrust Cases I & II 

(2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 100, 127 ), the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in implicitly denying that request by ruling on 

defendants’ motion (ibid.; Thomson v. Anderson (2003) 113 

Cal.App.4th 258, 271-272 [affirming grant of motion to quash 

when plaintiff “did not identify what kind of discovery she 

wanted to take or what kind of jurisdictional facts she believed 

discovery would disclose”]).
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DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Defendants are entitled to their

costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

______________________, J.

HOFFSTADT

We concur:

_________________________, P. J.

LUI

_________________________, J.*

BENKE

* Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fourth 

Appellate District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to 

article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.