alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

1

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 01-50604

Summary Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

ANTONIO PEREGRINO-LUJAN,

Defendant-Appellant.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

 USDC No. EP-01-CR-141-ALL-H

--------------------

January 8, 2002

Before DeMOSS, PARKER, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges:

PER CURIAM:*

 Antonio Peregrino-Lujan appeals his 120 month sentence

following his plea of guilty to a charge of being found in the

United States after deportation, a violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326.

Peregrino contends that the district court erred in applying a twolevel increase to his base offense level for obstruction of justice

pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 and in denying him a reduction in his
2

base offense level for acceptance of responsibility pursuant to

U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1. He also contends that the aggravated-felony

conviction that resulted in his increased sentence under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1326(b)(2) was an element of the offense that should have been

charged in the indictment. 

The increase for obstruction of justice stemmed from false

information that was provided in support of a motion for downward

departure following preparation of the presentence report. The

district court’s finding that Peregrino willfully obstructed

justice in connection with the motion is plausible in light of the

record as a whole and is not clearly erroneous. United States v.

Powers, 168 F.3d 741, 752 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 945

(1999). Further, Peregrino fails to demonstrate extraordinary

circumstances warranting credit for acceptance of responsibility in

light of the district court’s finding of obstruction of justice.

United States v. Lujan-Sauceda, 187 F.3d 451, 451-52 (5th Cir.

1999); § 3E1.1, comment. (n.4). 

Peregrino acknowledges that his second argument is foreclosed

by the Supreme Court’s decision in Almendarez-Torres v. United

States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998), but he seeks to preserve the issue for

Supreme Court review in light of the decision in Apprendi v. New

Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). Apprendi did not overrule AlmendarezTorres. See Apprendi, 120 S.Ct. at 2362; United States v. Dabeit,

231 F.3d 979, 984 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S.Ct. 1214
3

(2001); United States v. Doggett, 230 F.3d 160, 166 (5th Cir.

2000), cert. denied, 121 S.Ct. 1152 (2001). Peregrino’s argument

is foreclosed.

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

November 1, 2022

No. 04-22-00652-CV

INTERNATIONAL MUSEUM CORPORATION d/b/a Southwest Museum of Art, Tony 

Webber, and John Schumacher,

Appellants

v.

Charles TROIS,

Appellee

From the 285th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2019-CI-07417

Honorable Aaron Haas, Judge Presiding

ORDER

On September 30, 2022, International Museum Corporation d/b/a Southwest Museum of 

Art, Tony Webber, and John Schumacher filed a notice of appeal challenging the trial court’s 

order signed on August 31, 2022. The clerk’s record shows the August 31, 2022 order grants a 

motion for partial summary judgment in favor of Charles Trois as to his claim for declaratory 

relief against Schumacher, severs the claim from the original cause, and assigns the claim a new 

cause number: 2022-CI-16882. However, the order does not dispose of any of Trois’s claims 

against International Museum Corporation and Webber. 

Generally, an appeal may be taken only from a final judgment. Lehmann v. Har-Con 

Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 196 (Tex. 2001). When, as here, “there has not been a conventional trial 

on the merits, an order or judgment is not final for purposes of appeal unless it actually disposes 

of every pending claim and party or unless it clearly and unequivocally states that it finally 

disposes of all claims and all parties.” Id. “Severance does not make an interlocutory judgment 

final and appealable if the judgment merely disposes of a subset of the claims between the 

parties.” Duke v. Am. W. Steel, LLC, 526 S.W.3d 814 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, no 

pet.). Because the August 31, 2022 order disposes of only Trois’s declaratory judgment action 

against Schumacher, it does not appear final as to International Museum Corporation and 

Webber. See id. (holding combination of partial summary judgment order and severance order 

does not automatically result in final and appealable judgment if it does not dispose of all claims 

against all parties in appeal). 
Accordingly, we order appellants to file a written response in this court on or before 

December 1, 2022, showing cause why this appeal should not be dismissed for want of 

jurisdiction. If appellants fail to satisfactorily respond within the time provided, the appeal will 

be dismissed. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(c). If a supplemental clerk’s record is required to 

establish this court’s jurisdiction, appellants must ask the trial court clerk to prepare one and 

must notify the clerk of this court that such a request was made. All deadlines in this matter are 

suspended until further order of the court.

_________________________________

Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 

court on this 1st day of November, 2022.

___________________________________

MICHAEL A. CRUZ, Clerk of Court
EXHIBIT 12.2 

 

CERTIFICATION OF JOHN ASTON PURSUANT TO SECTION 302 OF 

THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 

 

I, John Aston, certifythat: 

 

1.    I have reviewed this annualreport on Form 20-F of Cambridge Antibody Technology Group plc; 

 

2.    Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which suchstatements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report; 

 

3.    Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results ofoperations and cash flows of the company as of, and for, the periods presented in this report; 

 

4.    The company’s other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and15d-15(e)) for the company and have: 

 

(a)    Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the company, including itsconsolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared; 

 

(b)    Evaluated the effectiveness of the company’s disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report ourconclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and 

 

(c)    Disclosed in this report any change in the company’s internal control over financial reporting that occurred during theperiod covered by the annual report that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the company’s internal control over financial reporting; and 

 

5.    The company’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recentevaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the company’s auditors and the audit committee of the company’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent function): 

 

(a)    All significant deficiencies and materialweaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the company’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and 

(b)    Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or otheremployees who have a significant role in the company’s internal control over financial reporting. 

 

Date: December 4, 2003

/s/    John Aston

Name: John Aston

Title: Chief Financial Officer
Exhibit
32.1





CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350


AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In
connection with the Annual Report of NowAuto Group, Inc. (the "Company") on
Form 10-Q for the year ended September 30, 2009, as filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), the undersigned,
Scott Miller, Chief Executive Officer/ Financial Officer and Chief Operating
Officer of the Company, certify in my capacities as officer of the Company,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of our knowledge:





(1)
The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and





(2) The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the Company as of the dates
and for the periods expressed in the Report.





/s/ Scott MillerScott
      MillerChief
      Executive Officer





November
16, 2009





/s/ Faith ForbisFaith
      ForbisChief
      Financial Officer





November
16, 2009
December 3, 2013

JUDGMENT

The Fourteenth Court of Appeals

RALPH O. DOUGLAS, Appellant

NO. 14-12-00321-CV V.

MARISA A. MOFFETT AND KYLE A. THORNTON, Appellees

________________________________

Today the Court heard its own motion to dismiss the appeal from the order 

of dismissal signed by the court below on March 13, 2012. Having considered the 

motion and found it meritorious, we order the appeal DISMISSED.

We further order that all costs incurred by reason of this appeal be paid by 

appellant, Ralph O. Douglas.

We further order this decision certified below for observance.
Exhibit 32.2

Certification

I, Ingrid G. Safranek, certify, pursuant to Rule 13(a)-14(b) or Rule 15(d)-14(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and 18
U.S.C. Section 1350, that (i) the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of MMRGlobal, Inc. for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2012
fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and (ii) the information contained
in such Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q fairly presents in all material respects the financial condition and results of operations
of MMRGlobal, Inc.

|                      
|----------------------
|/s/ Ingrid G. Safranek
|Name:                 
|Title:                
|Date:                 

The foregoing certification is being furnished solely pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, and is not being "filed" as part of the Form 10-Q or as a separate disclosure document
for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the "Exchange Act"), or otherwise subject to liability
under that section. This certification shall not be deemed to be incorporated by reference into any filing under the Securities Act of
1933, as amended, or the Exchange Act except to the extent that this Exhibit 32.2 is expressly and specifically incorporated by
reference in any such filing.

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the
Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

---
#### J. C. Stapler and Ruth Stapler, his Wife, and J. B. Little and Jane A. Little, his Wife, *Appellants,*v. Chase *&*Company, a Corporation Organized and Existing Under the Laws of the State of Florida, *Appellees.*

Division B.

Decision Filed March 17, 1928.

*E. W. & B. C. Davis,*for Appellants;

*Hull, Landis & Whitehair,*for Appellee.

Per Curiam.

This cause having heretofore been submitted to the Court upon the transcript of the record of the *520decree herein, and briefs and argument of counsel for the respective parties, and the record having been seen and inspected, and the Court being now advised of its judgment to be given in the premises, it seems to the Court that there is no error in the said decree; it is, therefore, considered, ordered and adjudged *by the*Court that the said decree of the Circuit Court be, and the same is hereby affirmed.

Whitfield, P. J., and Terrell and Buford, J. J., concur.
#### Jean M. Catapano, Appellant, v Robert Hitchings et al., Respondents.

[719 NYS2d 868]

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by her brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Doyle, J.), dated March 22, 2000, as, upon re argument, granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that she did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d).

Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, upon reargument, the motion for summary judgment is denied and the complaint is reinstated.

The Supreme Court, upon reargument, improperly granted *599the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. The evidence submitted by the defendants in support of their motion was insufficient to demonstrate their entitlement to judgment as a matter of law *(see, Raso v Statewide Auto Auction,*262 AD2d 387; *Pietrocola v Battibulli,*238 AD2d 864; *Torres v Micheletti,*208 AD2d 519). O’Brien, J. P., Friedmann, Goldstein and Smith, JJ., concur.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Melvin Ginyard, Appellant.

[718 NYS2d 838]

—Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Ronald Zweibel, J.), rendered July 16, 1997, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of burglary in the second degree, and sentencing him, as a persistent violent felony offender, to a term of 20 years to life, unanimously affirmed.

The challenged portions of the prosecutor’s summation do not warrant reversal. While the prosecutor’s argument that defendant deliberately selected his victim was speculative and inappropriate, it was not so egregious as to deprive defendant of a fair trial, particularly when viewed in light of the overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt *(see, People v D’Alessandro,*184 AD2d 114, 118-119, *lv denied*81 NY2d 884). The balance of the challenged portions of the summation was fair comment on the evidence in response to credibility issues raised by the defense *(see, People v Overlee,*236 AD2d 133, *lv denied*91 NY2d 976; *People v DAlessandro, supra).*

We perceive no basis for reduction of sentence. Concur— *300Sullivan, P. J., Nardelli, Williams, Mazzarelli and Saxe, JJ.
#### In the Matter of Corey D., a Person Alleged to be a Juvenile Delinquent, Appellant. New York State Office of Children and Family Services, Respondent.

[719 NYS2d 612]

Crew III, J. P.

Appeal from an order of the Family Court of Broome County (Ray, J.), entered May 6, 1999, which granted petitioner’s application, in a proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 3, to extend respondent’s placement with petitioner.

In October 1996, respondent was adjudicated a juvenile delinquent and placed with petitioner. Respondent’s placement in this regard subsequently was extended to April 1999 and, prior thereto, petitioner applied for an additional six-month extension. Based upon the parties’ consent, Family Court again extended respondent’s placement with petitioner until October 1999. Respondent now appeals, contending that Family Court failed to make sufficient factual findings to justify the requested extension.

The record reflects that the order extending respondent’s *717placement expired in October 1999, and the Attorney General advises us that respondent was in fact released from petitioner’s custody at that time. That being the case, the instant appeal is moot *(see, Matter of Mark J.,*259 AD2d 40, 43).

Spain, Mugglin, Rose and Lahtinen, JJ., concur. Ordered that the appeal is dismissed, as moot, without costs.
EXHIBIT 23.1

CONSENT OF BDO AUDITORES S.L.

We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements on Form S-8 (File No. 333-31076), Form S-8 (File No. 333-122329),
Form S-3 (File No. 333-109607), Form S-3 (File No. 333-40936) and Form S-3 (File No. 333-147964) of Private Media Group, Inc. of our reports dated May 17, 2010, relating to the consolidated financial statements and financial statement
schedule II of Private Media Group, Inc. which appear in this Form 10-K. Our report contains an explanatory paragraph regarding the Companys ability to continue as a going concern.



|                      
|----------------------
|/s/ BDO Auditores S.L.
|BDO Auditores S.L.    
|                      
|Barcelona, Spain      
|May 21, 2010
EX-10.1



 Exhibit 10.1 

PEGASYSTEMS INC. 

DIRECTOR COMPENSATION PROGRAM 

(as amended July 16, 2014) 
 In
consideration for their service on the Company’s board of directors (the “Board”), non-employee Directors are paid an annual cash retainer of $55,000 and receive an annual equity grant (the “Annual Equity Grant”). The Annual
Equity Grant is in the form of shares of unrestricted common stock of the Company, typically issued on the date of the Company’s annual stockholders meeting. On July 16, 2014, the Company increased the value of the Annual Equity Grant from
$70,000 to $95,000 (and issued to each non-employee Director on such date $25,000 of unrestricted common stock to supplement the $70,000 issuance made to each of them on the date of the Company’s most recent annual stockholders meeting).
Accordingly, it is expected that in the future that on the date of each annual stockholders meeting the Company will issue to each non-employee Director a number of shares of unrestricted common stock equal to $95,000 divided by the fair market
value of a share of the Company’s common stock on such date. 
 Additionally, non-employee Directors receive an initial award of restricted stock units
(“RSUs”) when they are first elected to the Board, which are valued at approximately $75,000, based on the fair market value of the Company’s common stock on the grant date. The RSUs vest in three equal annual installments. 

For Board committee service, the Company pays an annual cash retainer (paid in quarterly installments) to non-employee Directors serving on the Audit and
Compensation Committees: $10,000 to each Audit Committee member and $20,000 to the Audit Committee Chair; and $6,000 to each Compensation Committee member and $8,000 to the Compensation Committee Chair. 

In addition to the above, the Company also offers to reimburse non-employee Directors for expenses incurred in attending Board, committee or other Company
meetings.
#### The Top Gin Company, a Corporation of Delaware, *Appellant,*v. C. O. Emry, *Appellee.*

Division B.

Decision Filed May 25, 1928.

Petition for Rehearing Denied June 30, 1928.-

*Touchton & Dinsmore,*for Appellant;

*Summerlin & Wimberly,*for Appellee.

Per Curiam.

This cause having heretofore been submitted to the Court upon the transcript of the record of the *973decree herein, and briefs and argument of counsel for the respective parties, and the record having been seen and inspected, and the Court being now advised of its judgment to be given in the premises, it seems to the Court that there is no error in the said decree; it is, therefore, considered, ordered and adjudged by the Court that the said decree of the Circuit Court be, and the same is hereby' affirmed.

Whitfield, P. J., and Terrell and Buford, J. J. concur.
COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-10-00434-CR

ZAVIER JOHNSON APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE

------------

FROM THE 367TH DISTRICT COURT OF DENTON COUNTY

------------

MEMORANDUM OPINION1

------------

Appellant Zavier Johnson attempts to appeal from his conviction on his 

plea of guilty to possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. The 

trial court’s certification states that this “is a plea-bargain case, and the defendant 

has NO right of appeal” and “the defendant has waived the right of appeal.” See

Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(a)(2). On October 6, 2010, we notified Johnson that the trial 

court’s certification of his right to appeal had been filed in this court and that the 

 

1See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
2

appeal would be dismissed unless he or any party desiring to continue the 

appeal filed a response on or before October 18, 2010, showing grounds for 

continuing the appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(d). We have received no 

response. Therefore, in accordance with the trial court’s certification, we dismiss 

the appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(d), 43.2(f).

PER CURIAM

PANEL: MEIER; J.; LIVINGSTON, C.J.; and DAUPHINOT, J.

DO NOT PUBLISH

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

DELIVERED: December 9, 2010
STATE of North Carolina v. Gregory MCLEOD

No. COA17-1029

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Filed: August 7, 2018

NO ERROR.
# Fourth Court of Appeals San Antonio, Texas December 7, 2022 No. 04-22-00264-CV IN THE INTEREST OF E.J.D.L.G. , a Child From the 150th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2020PA01970 Honorable Monique Diaz, Judge Presiding



### O R D E R Sitting: Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice

Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice Irene Rios, Justice Beth Watkins, Justice Liza A. Rodriguez, Justice Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice Appellees, the Attorney Ad Litem and E.B. and J.B., have filed motions for en banc reconsideration. A majority of the court hereby requests responses to appellees’ motions from appellant J.A.M. and from the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services. See T EX . R. A PP . P. 49.5. The responses must be filed in this court by December 21, 2022.

_________________________________ Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said court on this 7th day of December, 2022.

___________________________________ MICHAEL A. CRUZ, Clerk of Court
# In the Missouri Court of Appeals

Eastern District

MAY 27, 2014

THE FOLLOWING CASES WERE AFFIRMED IN ACCORDANCE WIT H RULE

84.16(b) OR RULE 30.25(b).

1. ED99975 CHARLES NULL, RES V ERIC SNYDER, APP

2. ED100113 JACOB JOHNSON, APP V STATE OF MISSOURI, RES

3. ED100297 ALLEN NORWOOD, APP V STATE OF MISSOURI, RES

4. ED100606 DEBORAH MORGAN, RES V. JAMES MORGAN, AP P
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI ʻ I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

NO. CAAP

- 17

- 0000815

IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS

OF THE STATE OF HAWAI ‘ I

BIG ISLAND FEDERAL CREDIT UNION , Plaintiff

- Appell ant , v.

WILFRED E. AGUIAR, JR. , Defendant

- Appell ee,

and COLORADO STATE UNIVERSITY, Garnishee

- Appellee

.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT

PUNA DIVISION

( CIVIL NO. 3RC16

- 1

- 0329 )

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERAT I O N

(By: Ginoza, Chief Judge, Nakaso ne and McCullen, JJ.)

Upon consideration of Plaintiff

- Appellant Big Island

Federal Credit Union's October 21, 2022 Motion for

Reconsideration, the papers in support, and the record, it

appears that this court did not overlook or misapprehend a point

of law or fact when it enter ed the October 12, 2022 Summary Electronically Filed

Intermediate Court of Appeals

CAAP-17-0000815

03-NOV-2022

08:28 AM

Dkt. 67 ODMRNOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI ʻ I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

2 Disposition Order. See Hawai ‘ i Rules of Appellate Procedure

Rule 40(b).

Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion for

Reconsideration is denied.

DATED: Honolulu, Hawai ‘ i, November 3 , 2022

.

/s/ Lisa M. Ginoza

Chief Judge

/s/ Karen T. Nakasone

Associate Judge

/s/ Sonja M.P. McCullen

Associate Judge