IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-20169

MICHAEL GEORGE LAHOOD, 

 Petitioner - Appellee

v.

LORIE DAVIS, DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL 

JUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS DIVISION, 

 Respondent - Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:13-CV-1874

Before DENNIS, ELROD, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges.

JAMES E. GRAVES, JR., Circuit Judge:*

This is a federal habeas corpus case brought by a state prisoner, Michael 

George LaHood. The district court found that confidence in the outcome of the 

trial was undermined because of the evidence supporting at least a strong 

suspicion that LaHood was incompetent. The district court entered final 

judgment granting conditional habeas relief in the event that the state of Texas 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

June 21, 2016

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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did not retry LaHood within sixty days. The district court stayed the order 

pending completion of all appeals or the expiration of time for seeking any 

appeal. We REVERSE. 

I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

LaHood was charged by indictment in Harris County, Texas with the 

first-degree felony offenses of aggravated kidnapping and aggravated sexual 

assault. LaHood pleaded not guilty, but a jury found him guilty as charged of 

both offenses. On the question of punishment, the jury found the state of 

Texas’s enhancement allegation to be true and sentenced LaHood to thirty 

years of imprisonment on each conviction to be served concurrently. 

On direct appeal in Texas, LaHood claimed that the trial court erred 

under Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966) in failing to sua sponte conduct an 

inquiry into LaHood’s legal competency. See LaHood v. State, 171 S.W.3d 613, 

618 (Tex. Ct. App. 2005). The Fourteenth Court of Appeals of Texas, however,

affirmed his convictions by written opinion. Id. Subsequently, LaHood filed 

applications for a state writ of habeas corpus challenging his convictions. The 

state habeas trial court entered written findings of fact and recommended that 

relief be denied. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (the “TCCA”) remanded 

the matter to the state habeas trial court for further findings of fact after 

LaHood provided the affidavits of two medical experts who concluded that 

there was evidence in the record showing that LaHood was incompetent to 

stand trial.

Nevertheless, the TCCA ultimately denied his applications on June 26, 

2013. See Ex parte LaHood, 401 S.W.3d 45 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 2013). The 

TCCA found that LaHood’s trial counsel was deficient for failing to investigate 

LaHood’s mental-health history. Id. at 52−57. Nevertheless, the TCCA found 

that LaHood still failed to prove prejudice under Strickland v. Washington, 466 

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U.S. 668 (1984) because he had not shown a reasonable probability that the 

fact finder would have found him incompetent to stand trial. Id.

Thereafter, on June 26, 2013, LaHood filed a federal petition for a writ 

of habeas corpus. LaHood’s present federal habeas petition argues: (1) that 

trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate his severe ongoing illness 

and clear indicators of incompetency; and (2) that the trial court denied him 

his due process right to a fair trial by failing to sua sponte inquire into his 

competency. The district court conditionally granted LaHood’s petition after 

finding him entitled to relief on both claims. 

A. LAHOOD’S COMPETENCE AT TRIAL

LaHood points to several statements and actions at trial which he argues 

should have alerted his attorney and the court to his incompetence. When 

questioned by his attorney regarding his decision to testify, he indicated that 

he felt coerced. He then noted that his attorney advised him not to take the 

stand, but he wanted to give his “side of the story.” Ultimately, LaHood 

testified and explained his relationship with the victim along with their prior 

drug use and sexual history. He contradicted the victim’s assertion that she 

had been kidnapped by testifying that the victim drove the car the entire way 

to Houston and noted that they stopped in multiple populated areas where

theoretically she could have alerted someone if she felt endangered. He also 

testified that the purpose of the trip was to purchase materials for making 

methamphetamine and that the victim purchased ammonia for its 

manufacture. 

Following LaHood’s direct testimony, the court conducted an on-therecord conference regarding the State’s intent to impeach LaHood with his

prior convictions. LaHood interrupted the State’s attorney by calling a prior 

conviction “incorrect.” The trial court stated, “Mr. LaHood, I don’t want to hear 

from you anymore.” The parties continued their discussion and LaHood again 

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interrupted by stating, “I need my medicine.” The trial court called the jury 

into the courtroom and the State began LaHood’s cross-examination. In 

response to the prosecutor’s first question, LaHood stated, “I’m not sure I 

understand the question. I didn’t get my psych meds today. I’m having trouble 

understanding things, sir.” LaHood then said that he was “[v]ery nervous 

again.” The State resumed questioning and LaHood stated, “I need my 

medication. This is ridiculous. I am so uncomfortable. I’m seeing the lights 

blink. I take medication for manic depression, schizophrenia.” The trial court 

then removed the jury from the courtroom. Outside of the jury’s presence, 

LaHood continued, “I haven’t had it. This is not right.” The trial court then 

conducted an off-the-record conference. The following day the court conducted 

an on-the-record conference in which LaHood again attempted to speak to the 

court directly. LaHood accused the judge of wanting to find him in contempt.

LaHood’s trial counsel, Leah Borg, conducted a re-direct examination 

during which she addressed his behavior at trial the previous day. He told the 

jury that he had trouble testifying because he is “manic depressive schizoaffective” and takes medication. When asked if he had received his medication 

on that day he stated, “Not for four days in a row. Twice I take it. I only received 

part of it.” He testified that he did not receive his medication on the first day 

of trial and only received part of his medication on the second. When asked 

how he reacts when he doesn’t take his medication, he stated, “I get very 

stressed out, shaky and I hallucinate. Sometime auditory . . .” He noted that 

the day before he had not received his medication, nor during the prior evening. 

He then testified that the morning of the present testimony he was given only 

some of his medications. He added that a prison employee had given him “triple 

doses” the night before, so he was “a lot calmer.” Borg continued questioning 

LaHood regarding the offense, the prosecutor conducted a re-cross and then 

the jury was removed. 

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Outside of the jury’s presence, the trial court began a hearing to 

determine the admissibility of certain evidence. LaHood made several out-ofturn remarks regarding the falsity of the State’s information and his 

innocence. The jury deliberated and returned a guilty verdict. The court’s 

docket sheet noted that LaHood had attempted suicide while the jury was 

deliberating punishment. 

During the penalty phase of the trial, LaHood blurted out “Shelley is 

using drugs right now.” During the prosecution’s questioning of a witness, he 

interrupted again with several outbursts. LaHood then took the stand as a 

punishment witness for the defense and testified regarding his mental illness, 

his medications, and his drug addictions. 

During the defense’s closing argument at punishment, his attorney cited 

his mental illness and addictive personality. She cited his suicide attempt, past 

hospitalizations, and outbursts at trial. LaHood later told the court, “Your 

Honor, I wasn’t mentally competent. I mean, when it happened and during the 

trial, and for that matter, right now. I mean, I’m still not getting my medication 

right. . . . I really would like an evaluation through the state hospital.”

B. DIRECT APPEAL

On direct appeal, LaHood claimed that the trial court erred by failing to 

sua sponte conduct a competency hearing despite LaHood’s statements and 

behavior at trial, which LaHood asserts entitled him to a competency hearing. 

LaHood v. State, 171 S.W.3d 613, 617–18 (Tex. Ct. App. 2005). The Fourteenth 

Court of Appeals of Texas explained that under Texas Code of Criminal 

Procedure, a defendant is presumed competent to stand trial unless proven 

incompetent by a preponderance of the evidence, and incompetence is proven 

by showing that the defendant “does not have (1) sufficient present ability to 

consult with his attorney with a reasonable degree of rational understanding, 

or (2) rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against 

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him.” Id. at 618. See also Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (test 

for incompetency is whether the defendant has “sufficient present ability to 

consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding—

and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the 

proceedings against him”); Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 170 (2008) 

(same).

The Fourteenth Court of Appeals of Texas concluded that LaHood’s

evidence was not sufficient to show the trial court abused its discretion by not 

sua sponte holding a competency hearing for the following reasons:

The fact that appellant made outbursts during trial is not evidence 

of an inability to communicate with counsel or to appreciate the 

proceedings against him. [Moore v. State, 999 S.W.2d 385, 395 

(Tex. Crim. App. 1999)).] Although inappropriate, the outbursts 

were immediate and logical responses to statements made or 

questions asked during trial. Id. If such actions were enough to 

demonstrate incompetency, a defendant could easily avoid 

prosecution through immature behavior. Id. Similarly, the fact 

that he may have been on psychiatric medication during trial and 

had a history of mental problems did not mandate a competency 

inquiry absent evidence of a present inability to communicate or 

understand the proceedings. See id. at 395–96.

The only time during trial that there was any indication appellant 

was having difficulty understanding the proceedings was on his 

second day of testimony when he stated that he was uncomfortable 

and seeing the lights blink and had not had his medication. The 

judge immediately recessed the proceedings. The next day, 

appellant continued testifying without any apparent difficulty, 

and he explained that he was doing much better because he had 

received his medication the night before. Because it appears from 

the record that the trial court acted appropriately in dealing with 

appellant’s difficulty in testifying on the second day, and there is 

no indication in the record that appellant did not understand the 

proceedings or had trouble communicating during any other 

portion of the trial, we find that the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in failing to sua sponte inquire into appellant’s 

competency to stand trial.

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LaHood, 171 S.W.3d at 619. The court also noted that the trial court “was in a 

much better position . . . to assess appellant’s demeanor both during his alleged 

period of confusion and during the rest of the trial,” and “beyond his own 

testimony, appellant cites no other evidence regarding incompetency.” Id. at 

619 n.2.

C. STATE HABEAS PROCEEDINGS

During the state habeas proceeding, LaHood submitted his mental 

health, medical, and medication records from the Harris County Jail as well as 

affidavits from mental health experts. LaHood’s inmate medical records reflect 

that he had been diagnosed with bipolar and schizoaffective disorder. A 

notation in LaHood’s prison medical records shows that he was “somehow 

missing” his evening medications and becoming “manic.” LaHood’s father 

submitted an affidavit, averring that LaHood suffered from mental illness and 

complained to him during trial that he was not properly receiving his 

medication. LaHood’s former fiancée, Elizabeth Patterson, submitted an 

affidavit stating that she had informed trial counsel that she had important 

information regarding LaHood’s mental health. LaHood provided the affidavits 

of two medical experts who each concluded he was incompetent to stand trial.

According to the experts, that conclusion was supported by evidence in the trial 

transcripts and medical records. 

The state habeas trial court initially found that the record left 

unresolved issues as to trial counsel’s assistance and ordered trial counsel, 

Leah Borg, to submit a responsive affidavit. She described her client as having 

a “misogynistic attitude with a need to dominate and exercise control over 

women. . . .” She also stated that LaHood is a malingerer and “engaged in . . .

antics designed to create the illusion of incompetency, but which appeared to 

be nothing more than an act.” To support her assertions, she cited to pages of 

cogent notes written by LaHood during trial, although she could no longer 

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locate the notes in question. Borg admitted that LaHood was on medications 

for his mental illness and that, without his medication, he could become 

incompetent. Nevertheless, LaHood’s attorney maintained that the fact that 

he was taking medication was further support for her conclusion that he was 

legally competent.

Borg stated in her affidavit that LaHood was able to make an informed, 

knowing, and intelligent decision to testify and that they were able to 

thoroughly discuss trial procedures. She noted that he knew the difference 

between “no contest” and “not guilty” and asserted that at trial. She indicated 

that they discussed the potential for impeachment. She also averred that his 

suicide attempt after the verdict was designed to manipulate because he “made 

a big show of it” and did it in a public setting rather than waiting until he 

returned to jail. The state habeas trial court recommended that the TCCA deny 

relief. 

The TCCA considered LaHood’s behavior during the trial. Ex parte 

Lahood, 401 S.W.3d at 54−55. The TCCA noted that during the first day of 

trial, LaHood testified for about an hour “with no problems”—LaHood “was 

able to shift back and forth to different time periods in his story,” “relayed a 

detailed account of his version of events in a constant effort to undermine the 

victim’s testimony,” and, at one point, even stated that he did not want to 

incriminate himself when asked about his involvement with 

methamphetamine production. Id. On the second day, LaHood’s behavior 

changed. Id. LaHood stated that the lights were blinking. Id. at 56. He asked 

for medication. Id. However, between those “outbursts,” LaHood rationally 

advised the court that he wanted certain medical records subpoenaed as part 

of his defense. Id. After LaHood stated that his medication had been withheld, 

the trial court recessed for the day. Id. On the third day, LaHood continued to 

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interrupt the trial with comments, according to the TCCA, intended to 

introduce reasonable doubt. Id. at 56 n.9. 

The TCCA considered LaHood’s expert’s testimony that LaHood’s lack of 

medication while in jail, as well as the increase in dosage at the time of trial, 

caused LaHood to mentally decompensate such that LaHood’s decision to 

testify on his own behalf was not made with a reasonable degree of rational 

understanding. Id. at 54. The TCCA also considered the sworn affidavit of 

LaHood’s defense counsel. Id. at 54–55. She said that LaHood had decided to 

testify prior to the trial and while he was properly medicated. Id. The TCCA 

also reviewed the trial court record to see if LaHood showed signs of a lack of 

rational understanding when he took the stand. Id. At trial, defense counsel 

asked LaHood about whether he had previously stated that he intended to 

testify on his own behalf, to which LaHood responded on the stand that he only 

intended to do so as “a last result (sic)” after hearing all the evidence. Id. at 55. 

LaHood explained that after hearing the evidence, if he thought the defense 

had not established reasonable doubt, then he wanted to testify on his own 

behalf. Id. He stated that he otherwise did not want to testify because the 

prosecutor was going to cross-examine him. Id. The TCCA explained that 

LaHood’s testimony at trial showed that he “engaged in a reasoned choice of 

legal strategies and options,” as he understood he faced a “risky choice of 

testifying in his own defense if counsel could not establish reasonable doubt”

and “acknowledged that he understood the adversarial nature of the 

proceedings, when he stated that he knew he would be exposed to crossexamination if he testified.” Id.

The TCCA noted that LaHood’s experts testified that his behavior was 

consistent with the mis-administration of psychoactive medications. See id. at 

56. Even so, the TCCA explained that the record evidence indicated that 

LaHood “was competent during his testimony because (1) he was able to 

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disclose pertinent facts and events of the case, (2) he understood the 

adversarial nature of the proceedings, and (3) he put on a defense with a 

competing theory of the events that would have resulted in a not guilty verdict 

if the jury believed him.” Id. The TCCA emphasized that even if a person is 

“suffering from a severe mental disease or defect or . . . [is] highly medicated, 

. . . he will be competent to stand trial if he still has the ability to meaningfully 

consult with his attorney and he has a rational as well as factual 

understanding of the charged offense and trial proceedings.” Id. at 56 (internal 

quotation marks omitted). 

The TCCA agreed with the habeas trial court, which found that LaHood’s 

“direct examination showed considerable clarity of thought,”1 that his 

“outbursts regarding medication and lack of comprehension began only on 

cross-examination,” and that “the only opportunity for the victim’s testimony 

to be rebutted was by [LaHood],” such that his decision to testify made sense. 

Id. at 56–57. The TCCA stated: “Even if [LaHood] failed to receive some of his 

medication, there is nothing in the record that leads us to believe [LaHood] lost 

the ability to understand the proceedings or rationally confer with his 

counsel.”2 Id. at 56.

The TCCA concluded that LaHood’s counsel rendered deficient 

representation, but that LaHood had not shown Strickland prejudice. Id. at 51, 

 

1 The TCCA explained: “He testified that the victim drove the car to Houston (directly 

contradicting her assertion that she had been kidnapped), that they stopped in multiple 

populated areas where the victim could have alerted someone if she was in trouble, and that 

the victim packed for the trip (directly contradicting her assertion that the fact she had a 

hairbrush, clothes, and a toothbrush was merely coincidental).” Ex parte LaHood, 401 

S.W.3d at 57.

2 The TCCA also noted that its conclusion did not ignore LaHood’s expert’s opinion 

that it is common for individuals with severe mental illness to appear lucid for portions of 

proceedings, yet be incompetent during other portions of the proceeding. Id. at 57. The TCCA 

explained that “neither habeas counsel nor [LaHood]’s experts have provided specific 

examples of [LaHood]’s [allegedly incompetent] behavior sufficient to meet [LaHood]’s burden 

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57. The TCCA explained that the “focus of the prejudice inquiry here is 

whether an applicant can show that there was a reasonable probability that he 

would have been found incompetent to stand trial if the issue of competency 

had been raised and fully considered,” as “[a]nything less than a finding of 

incompetence would not have changed the outcome.” Id. at 54. In a thorough 

opinion discussing the record evidence, the TCCA concluded that LaHood had 

not met his burden of proof for Strickland prejudice—i.e., LaHood had not 

presented evidence to establish a “reasonable probability that a fact-finder 

would have found him incompetent to stand trial.” Id. at 54–57.

II. JURISDICTION

This is a federal habeas corpus case brought by a state prisoner pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2254. This court has jurisdiction over this appeal 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A federal petition for habeas relief is governed by the applicable 

provisions of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). 

“In reviewing a grant of the writ of habeas corpus, we review the district court’s 

findings of fact for clear error.” Valdez v. Cockrell, 274 F.3d 941, 946 (5th Cir. 

2001). “This court reviews the district court’s legal determinations and 

application of AEDPA de novo.” Buntion v. Quarterman, 524 F.3d 664, 670 (5th 

Cir. 2008) (citing Foster v. Quarterman, 466 F.3d 359, 368 (5th Cir. 2006)). “We 

review de novo the district court’s disposition of pure issues of law and mixed 

issues of law and fact.” Valdez, 274 F.3d at 946 (citing Barrientes v. Johnson, 

221 F.3d 741, 750 (5th Cir. 2000); Bledsue v. Johnson, 188 F.3d 250, 254 (5th 

Cir. 1999)).

 

of proof that he failed to understand the proceedings or that he had an inability to rationally 

communicate with his counsel.” Id. 

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The AEDPA provision that guides this court’s review is 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(d). It provides:

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person 

in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be 

granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the 

merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the 

claim-

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, 

as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in 

the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see also Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 97–98 (2011). 

As this section is applied, questions of law and mixed questions of law and fact 

are reviewed under subsection (d)(1) of § 2254. Kitchens v. Johnson, 190 F.3d 

698, 700 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 F.3d 751, 767−68 (5th 

Cir. 1996)).

A state court’s application of clearly established federal law is 

“unreasonable” under subsection (d)(1) if the state court “identifies the correct 

governing principle from Supreme Court precedent, but applies that principle 

to the case in an objectively unreasonable manner.” Nelson v. Quarterman, 472 

F.3d 287, 292 (5th Cir. 2006) (en banc). “[S]o long as ‘fairminded jurists could 

disagree’ on the correctness of the state court’s decision,” the decision is not an 

unreasonable application of federal law. Harrington, 562 U.S. at 101. The 

“unreasonable application” standard under § (d)(1) of AEDPA is meant to be 

“difficult to meet” such that “even a strong case for relief does not mean the 

state court’s contrary conclusion was unreasonable.” Id. at 102. This 

deferential standard applies because “[s]ection 2254(d) . . . is a ‘guard against 

extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems,’ not a substitute 

for ordinary error correction through appeal.” Id. at 102–03. “The question 

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under AEDPA is not whether a federal court believes the state court’s 

determination was incorrect but whether that determination was 

unreasonable—a substantially higher threshold.” Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 

U.S. 465, 473 (2007). When reviewing a state court’s legal determination under 

the “unreasonable application” prong, a federal court may issue habeas relief 

only “where there is no possibility fairminded jurists could disagree that the 

state court’s decision” was an unreasonable application of clearly established 

Supreme Court precedent. Harrington, 562 U.S. at 102 (emphasis added). 

Under subsection (d)(2), a factual determination made by a state court is 

“‘presumed to be correct’ unless the habeas petitioner rebuts the presumption 

through ‘clear and convincing evidence.’” Nelson, 472 F.3d at 292 (quoting 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)). “[F]ederal habeas courts must make as the starting point 

of their analysis the state courts’ determinations of fact, including that aspect 

of a ‘mixed question’ that rests on a finding of fact.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 

U.S. 362, 386, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 1509, 146 L. Ed. 2d 389 (2000). The Supreme 

Court added that “AEDPA plainly sought to ensure a level of ‘deference to the 

determinations of state courts,’ provided those determinations did not conflict 

with federal law or apply federal law in an unreasonable way.” Id. (citing H.R. 

Conf. Rep. No. 104–518, p. 111 (1996)). 

IV. ANALYSIS

A. STRICKLAND CLAIM

LaHood argues that his defense counsel rendered deficient performance 

by failing to investigate his mental health and that her failures caused him 

prejudice. The Supreme Court has elucidated the following standard for 

defective assistance claims:

First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was 

deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so 

serious that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel”

guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the 

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defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced 

the defense. This requires showing that counsel’s errors were so 

serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose 

result is reliable. Unless a defendant makes both showings, it 

cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence resulted from 

a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result 

unreliable.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.

The Supreme Court has clarified the interaction between Strickland and 

habeas claims. The Court stated that the “standards created by Strickland and 

§ 2254(d) are both highly deferential, and when the two apply in tandem, 

review is doubly so.” Premo v. Moore, 562 U.S. 115, 122 (2011) (internal 

citations and quotations omitted). Moreover, “[t]he Strickland standard is a 

general one, so the range of reasonable applications is substantial.” Id. at 

122−23 (citation omitted). 

Both the TCCA and the district court found that LaHood’s counsel was 

ineffective3―but this alone is not enough for LaHood to succeed. The TCCA

concluded that LaHood had not met his burden of proof for Strickland 

prejudice—i.e., LaHood had not presented evidence to establish a “reasonable 

probability that a fact-finder would have found him incompetent to stand trial.” 

Ex parte Lahood, 401 S.W.3d at 54–57. In order to meet this burden, “[t]he 

defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 

different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine 

confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.

 

3 “Trial counsel provides deficient performance if he fails to investigate a defendant’s 

medical history when he has reason to believe that the defendant suffers from mental health 

problems.” Roberts v. Dretke, 381 F.3d 491, 498 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing Bouchillon v. Collins, 

907 F.2d 589, 597 (5th Cir. 1990)). 

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The district court, however, disagreed with the TCCA’s conclusion 

regarding prejudice and focused on LaHood’s expert testimony. The district 

court determined that habeas relief was warranted because there was “strong 

evidence before the state habeas court that LaHood was, at best, intermittently 

competent.” The district court asserted that the TCCA’s determination was “in 

complete disregard of expert opinion.” The TCCA, however, considered expert 

opinions proffered by LaHood, but found that a review of all of the evidence 

revealed that he was competent. The TCCA noted LaHood’s ability to actively 

participate in his defense and his understanding of the adversarial nature of 

the proceedings. This is a reasonable conclusion that is neither contrary to nor 

an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent. 

Here, the district court based its grant of habeas relief on its assertion 

that the TCCA’s conclusion was “an unreasonable determination of the facts

in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” As noted 

above, § 2254(d)(1) applies to conclusions of law, which includes mixed 

questions of law and fact. Section (d)(2) only applies to a “determination of the 

facts.” The TCCA was not making a “determination of the facts” but, rather, 

was making a legal conclusion—whether LaHood’s evidence showed a 

reasonable probability that he would have established that he was incompetent 

to stand trial. The TCCA did not determine that, in fact, LaHood was 

competent, or that LaHood’s counsel’s testimony was true—the TCCA was not 

making factual findings; it was making a legal conclusion about prejudice. The 

TCCA’s conclusion is well supported by the record and is not in error.

B. DUE PROCESS CLAIM

LaHood also contends that the federal district court correctly determined 

that he satisfied his burden regarding his due process violation claim. LaHood 

claims that the trial court erred under Pate, in failing to sua sponte conduct a 

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competency hearing. LaHood argues that his statements and behavior at trial 

entitled him to a competency hearing. 

“We start from the proposition that the conviction of a legally 

incompetent defendant violates constitutional due process.” Mata v. Johnson, 

210 F.3d 324, 329 (5th Cir. 2000). “It has long been accepted that a person 

whose mental condition is such that he lacks the capacity to understand the 

nature and object of the proceedings against him, to consult with counsel, and

to assist in preparing his defense may not be subjected to a trial.” Drope v. 

Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975). “[I]f the defendant has presented evidence 

to the trial court, before or during trial, that raises a ‘bona fide doubt,’ of his 

competence, Pate, 383 U.S. at 385, 86 S.Ct. at 842, 15 L.Ed.2d at 822, the trial 

court’s failure to make further inquiry denies that defendant his constitutional 

right to a fair trial.” Davis v. Alabama, 545 F.2d 460, 464 (5th Cir. 1977). 

The test for incompetency is whether a defendant “‘has sufficient present 

ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational 

understanding . . . [and] a rational as well as factual understanding of the 

proceedings against him.’” Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 354 (1996) 

(quoting Dusky, 362 U.S. at 402). Mental illness and incompetence, however,

are not necessarily coexistent conditions. See generally McCoy v. Lynaugh, 874 

F.2d 954, 960―61 (5th Cir. 1989); United States v. Williams, 819 F.2d 605, 608 

(5th Cir. 1987).

The Fourteenth Court of Appeals of Texas resolved LaHood’s Pate claim 

on state-law grounds—applying Texas standards for competency hearing 

procedures that are not contrary to clearly established U.S. Supreme Court 

precedent. The district court, despite acknowledging that “it is not this federal 

habeas court’s role to question a state court’s interpretation of state law,”

nevertheless overruled the state court’s determination that LaHood was not 

entitled to a competency hearing under Texas law. We are not persuaded that 

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No. 15-20169

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that there was no possibility that reasonable jurists could disagree that the 

state court’s rejection of LaHood’s Pate claim was an unreasonable application 

of U.S. Supreme Court precedent. Harrington, 562 U.S. at 102. The district 

court gave no deference to the state court’s view that there was no evidence 

that LaHood was unable to rationally communicate with his counsel or 

understand the proceedings rationally and factually, which is the standard for 

incompetence under both Texas law and U.S. Supreme Court precedent. See 

Turner v. State, 422 S.W.3d 676, 689 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Drope, 420 U.S. 

at 171. 

The record supports the state court’s finding that during the entire trial, 

LaHood was able to rationally communicate with his counsel and understand 

the proceedings rationally and factually― the evidence showed that he 

understood the charges against him, the adversarial process, the government’s 

burden to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, and the risk of testifying 

on his own behalf. The trial court was able to observe LaHood and address 

LaHood’s demeanor. Further, his own attorney asserted that he understood

legal strategy along with the risks of testifying. The district court improperly 

substituted its judgment for that of the state court. 

V. CONCLUSION

The district court has no authority under AEDPA to issue a writ of 

habeas corpus where the state courts’ decisions were neither contrary to nor 

an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent nor based on 

unreasonable factual determinations. The Supreme Court instructs that as a 

condition for procurement of habeas corpus relief from a federal court, “a state 

prisoner must show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented 

in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well 

understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for 

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No. 15-20169

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fairminded disagreement.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 103. This is not such a case.

The judgment of the district court is REVERSED. 

 Case: 15-20169 Document: 00513556582 Page: 18 Date Filed: 06/21/2016