UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

VANESSA HILL, : 

 : 

Plaintiff, : Civil Action No.: 23-2685 (RC)

 : 

 v. : Re Document Nos.: 5, 7, 14 

 : 

XTREME SOLUTIONS, INC., : 

 : 

Defendant. : 

MEMORANDUM OPINION

GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Vanessa Hill worked for Defendant Xtreme Solutions, Inc. (“XSI”) from May to 

October 2022. In September 2022, Hill requested medical leave until January 2023. XSI instead 

terminated her employment, citing chronic absences and tardiness. Hill then filed this lawsuit, 

claiming that the dismissal violated the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), the Americans 

with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), and her contract of employment. XSI moves to dismiss Hill’s 

Complaint, and the Court grants that motion. 

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Because Hill is proceeding pro se and the Complaint itself contains few factual 

allegations, the Court draws these facts “from the complaint and from additional materials 

submitted by” Hill. Atherton v. D.C. Off. of Mayor, 567 F.3d 672, 677 (D.C. Cir. 2009); see also

Greenhill v. Spellings, 482 F.3d 569, 572 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (noting that the D.C. Circuit has 

“permitted courts to consider supplemental material filed by a pro se litigant in order to clarify 

the precise claims being urged”); Stewart v. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, 471 F.3d 169, 173 (D.C. Cir.

2006) (“In determining whether a complaint states a claim, the court may consider the facts 
2 

alleged in the complaint, documents attached thereto or incorporated therein, and matters of 

which it may take judicial notice.”).

Plaintiff Vanessa Hill began working for Defendant XSI on May 31, 2022, see Offer

Letter, Ex. 1 to Pl.’s Opp’n Mot. Dismiss (“Pl.’s Opp’n”), ECF No. 10-1, where she supported

the company’s contract at the D.C. Passport Office, see Compl., Ex. 1 to Notice of Removal at 2, 

ECF No. 1-1. Her signed offer letter states that her “employment with XSI constitutes 

employment-at-will for an unspecified duration and may be terminated at any time by either 

[her], XSI and/or [the] Client.” Offer Letter at 3. On a post-job-offer medical questionnaire, Hill 

stated that she did not have any disabilities that “might affect [her] attendance at work or ability 

to do this job[.]” Ex. 2 to Pl.’s Mot. Expedite at 4–6, ECF No. 14-1. 

Hill attaches the company’s employee handbook, which states that FMLA leave may be 

available “[w]hen the employee is unable to work because of a serious health condition,” but that 

the employee must meet “certain eligibility factors,” including having “worked at Xtreme 

Solutions at least 12 months prior to the date leave commences or is requested to commence.” 

Ex. 5to Pl.’s Opp’n at 9, ECF No. 10-1. The handbook additionally lays out the requirements for 

non-FMLA leave, stating that “[t]he decision to grant such an unpaid leave of absence is within 

the sole discretion of the Company.” Id.

Hill contends that various incidents occurred from May to September 2022, including an 

accusation that she stole a check, after which the company moved her “upstairs.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 

3. There were also issues with “[f]iles being stolen or misplaced and resurfacing,” and she 

asserts that the company “accused” her of violating the company’s dress code. Id. at 2–3. She 

additionally attaches an email dated August 30, 2022, stating that “[m]y attendance has not been 

up to par, which I’m in agreement with.” Hill Email, Ex. 2 to Pl.’s Sur-reply at 2, ECF No. 12-1. 
3 

Hill added “it [is] a possibility I’m not a good fit” for the role. Id. She also claimed issues with 

the company’s communications reaching her email account. Id. Hill nonetheless asserts that the 

month of September was her “best ever,” and that her supervisor praised her performance. Pl.’s 

Opp’n at 3. 

On September 28, 2022, Hill’s counselor signed a letter stating that he had seen her 

“starting on September 16th due to stress related to work.” Ex. 1 to Pl.’s Mot. Expedite at 1, 

ECF No. 14-1. The letter continued, “Ms. Hill is experiencing significant stress and anxiety 

related to a toxic work environment. Please let this letter serve as notice to allow her to have 

excused sick leave from work September 14th, 15th and 16th 2022.” Id. An attached “Short 

Term Disability Claim Form” stated that the counselor had advised Hill not to return to work, 

with an “[e]xpected return to work date” of January 15, 2023. Id. at 2. Hill asserts that these 

“emails and documentation were sent” to XSI “in a timely manner.” Mot. Expedite at 1. 

On October 4, 2022, XSI terminated Hill. Termination Letter, Ex. 1 to Pl.’s Sur-reply, 

ECF No. 12-1. XSI explained that it fired her because she was “[o]ut of office 22 days of the last 

60 days and arrived late/left early 27 days out of the last 60 days with a total of 200+ hours of 

missed eligible work, which has interfered with the department’s operation.” Id. The 

termination letter additionally cited XSI’s “immediate contractual need for the position to be 

filled” and Hill’s “[u]nsatisfactory performance due to excessive time away.” Id. Hill attaches a 

“Notice of Scheduled Interview” with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission for 

February 6, 2023, but she provides no further information on her interactions with that agency. 

Ex. 6 to Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 10-1. 

On June 14, 2023, Hill filed her Complaint in the Superior Court of the District of 

Columbia. Compl. at 1–2, ECF No. 1-1. Hill asserted that XSI “denied [her] the ADA and 
4 

FMLA act” because she was “[t]erminated while under physician care” and “denied [return to 

work] on Jan 2023.” Id. She additionally claims that she was “[d]enied NONFMLA with 

physician statement” and fired based on “attendance and performance” as a pretext to “deny 

NONFMLA and [return to work] date.” Id. She asks the Court to “[g]rant [return to work] with 

back pay and medical bills paid,” or a “payout” for a “5 [year] contractual agreement.” Id. 

XSI removed the case to this Court on September 14, 2023, after the company was 

served. Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1. XSI then moved to dismiss the case. ECF No. 7. Hill 

opposed the motion, ECF No. 10, and the parties replied and sur-replied, ECF Nos. 11, 12. Hill 

has additionally filed a Motion for Hearing, ECF No. 5, as well as a Motion to Expedite, ECF 

No. 14. 

III. LEGAL STANDARD

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that a complaint contain “a short and plain 

statement of the claim” in order to give the defendant fair notice of the claim and the grounds 

upon which it rests. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); accord Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) 

(per curiam). A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) “tests the legal sufficiency of a 

complaint” under that standard; it asks whether the plaintiff has properly stated a claim. 

Browning v. Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C. Cir. 2002). A court considering such a motion 

presumes that the complaint’s factual allegations are true and construes them liberally in the 

plaintiff’s favor. See, e.g., United States v. Philip Morris, Inc., 116 F. Supp. 2d 131, 135 (D.D.C. 

2000). It is not necessary for the plaintiff to plead all elements of her prima facie case in the 

complaint. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 511–14 (2002); Bryant v. Pepco, 

730 F. Supp. 2d 25, 28–29 (D.D.C. 2010). 
5 

Nevertheless, “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient 

factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft 

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 

(2007)). This means that a plaintiff’s factual allegations “must be enough to raise a right to relief 

above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true 

(even if doubtful in fact).” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555–56 (citations omitted). “Threadbare 

recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,” are 

therefore insufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A court need not 

accept a plaintiff’s legal conclusions as true, see id., nor must a court presume the veracity of 

legal conclusions that are couched as factual allegations. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. 

Finally, because Hill is proceeding pro se, the Court will construe the Complaint liberally 

and hold it “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson, 551 

U.S. at 94 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). Thus, the Court may “examine 

other pleadings to understand the nature and basis of [the plaintiff’s] pro se claims” as alleged in 

her complaint. Gray v. Poole, 275 F.3d 1113, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 2002)). Nevertheless, even a pro 

se plaintiff is not excused from adhering to the applicable procedural rules and must “plead 

‘factual matter’ that permits the court to infer ‘more than the mere possibility of misconduct.’” 

Atherton, 567 F.3d at 681–82 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). Therefore, despite the liberality 

afforded pro se complaints, the Court “need not accept inferences unsupported by the facts 

alleged in the complaint or ‘legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations.’” 

Kaemmerling v. Lappin, 553 F.3d 669, 677 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting Henthorn v. Dep’t of Navy, 

29 F.3d 682, 684 (D.C. Cir. 1994)). 
6 

IV. ANALYSIS

The Court first briefly reviews its jurisdiction over this matter before considering whether 

Hill has stated a claim under any relevant theory. The Court construes the Complaint to raise 

claims under the FMLA, the ADA, and D.C. common law regulating contracts. 

1. Jurisdiction

Federal courts have an “independent obligation to ensure that they do not exceed the 

scope of their jurisdiction.” Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 434 (2011). XSI removed the 

case to this Court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction, which is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1332. 

Xtreme Solutions is a Georgia corporation with its principal place of business in Georgia. Notice 

of Removal at 2; Compl. at 1–2. Vanessa Hill is a citizen of Washington, D.C., and claims up to 

$212,376 in damages. Notice of Removal at 2; Compl. at 1. Because the parties are “citizens of 

different States” and “the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000,” the Court 

finds that it has diversity jurisdiction over this dispute under § 1332. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. 

2. FMLA Claim

Hill claims that XSI “denied” her “FMLA/NONFMLA” leave. Compl. at 1. XSI asserts 

that she was not eligible for FMLA leave and that she fails to state a claim for FMLA

interference or retaliation. Def.’s Mot. Dismiss at 9–15. The Court agrees that Hill fails to state 

a claim under the FMLA.

The Court construes Hill’s Complaint liberally to claim both interference with rights 

under the FMLA and retaliation for exercising protected FMLA activity. Under the FMLA, an 

“eligible employee” is entitled to “a total of 12 workweeks of leave during any 12-month period 

for,” among other reasons, “a serious health condition that makes the employee unable to 

perform the functions of the position of such employee.” 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1). The law 
7 

defines “eligible employee” as “an employee who has been employed (i) for at least 12 months 

by the employer . . . and (ii) for at least 1,250 hours of service with such employer.” Id.

§ 2611(2)(A). To prevail on an FMLA-interference claim, Hill must prove, among other things, 

that “she was eligible for the FMLA’s protections.” Elzeneiny v. District of Columbia, 195 F. 

Supp. 3d 207, 217 (D.D.C. 2016). To state a case of FMLA retaliation, a plaintiff must show 

“the exercise of protected FMLA activity.” Waggel v. George Washington Univ., 957 F.3d 1364, 

1375 (D.C. Cir. 2020); see also Gordon v. U.S. Capitol Police, 778 F.3d 158, 161 (D.C. Cir. 

2015).

The facts contained in the Complaint and documents attached to Hill’s subsequent filings 

show that she was not an “eligible employee” at the time she sought leave or at the time she was 

dismissed. Hill began working for XSI in May 2022.1

 See Offer Letter. This means that she 

would not become eligible for FMLA leave until May 2023 at the earliest, after “at least 12 

months” of employment at XSI. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)(A). Yet the relevant events here occurred 

in September 2022 when she sought leave, see Ex. 1 to Pl.’s Mot. Expedite, and October 2022, 

when XSI terminated her, see Ex. 1 to Pl.’s Sur-reply. Plaintiff thus cannot show that she was an 

“eligible employee” under the terms of the FMLA and does not state a claim for relief under the 

statute.2 See Hill v. Walker, 737 F.3d 1209, 1215 (8th Cir. 2013) (holding that a plaintiff 

employed “fewer than twelve months . . . had no FMLA rights when she was terminated”). Hill 

1 Hill asserts in her opposition that XSI actually hired her in March 2022, when the 

company initiated her background check. Pl.’s Opp’n Mot. Dismiss at 2. The difference 

between May 2022 and March 2022 would not affect the Court’s reasoning or conclusions. 

2 Hill cannot state a claim under District of Columbia law for the same reason. See D.C. 

Code § 32-501(1)(A)(i) (limiting coverage to individuals “employed by the same employer for at 

least 12 consecutive or non-consecutive months . . . in the 7 years immediately preceding the 

date on which the period of family or medical leave is to commence”). Hill’s filings contain no 

indication that she worked for XSI for any period prior to May 2022. 
8 

additionally asserts that XSI denied her “NONFMLA” leave, Compl. at 1, which the Court 

construes as a breach of contract claim and addresses below.

Because Hill was not an eligible employee under the FMLA, she cannot sustain an 

FMLA retaliation claim, either. “[C]ourts have generally recognized that, aside from very 

limited circumstances, eligibility under the FMLA is a prerequisite to make an FMLA retaliation 

claim.” Dougherty v. Cable News Network, 396 F. Supp. 3d 84, 112 (D.D.C. 2019); see also

Humenny v. Genex Corp., 390 F.3d 901, 906 (6th Cir. 2004) (“This Court finds that the FMLA’s 

‘eligible employee’ requirement applies in all FMLA cases, including retaliation cases.”); 

Walker v. Elmore Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 379 F.3d 1249, 1253 (11th Cir. 2004) (rejecting retaliation 

claim because “[t]here can be no doubt that the request—made by an ineligible employee for 

leave that would begin when she would still have been ineligible—is not protected by the 

FMLA.”). The limited exceptions include employees who announce an intent to take FMLA 

leave in the future once they become eligible under the statute. See Pereda v. Brookdale Senior 

Living Communities, Inc., 666 F.3d 1269, 1276 (11th Cir. 2012). Here, however, Hill would not 

have become eligible for FMLA leave during the approximately four months she requested, 

meaning she does not fit into this exception. Hill thus cannot sustain a claim under the FMLA. 

3. ADA Claim

Hill refers to the ADA in passing in her Complaint, so the Court will address whether the 

facts she alleges state a claim under that statute, as well. See Compl. at 1. XSI construes Hill’s 

claim as a failure-to-accommodate claim and argues that she does not allege facts showing that 

she had a disability, that XSI knew of any disability, that she requested accommodations from 

XSI that were refused, or that she could perform the essential functions of her position with a 
9 

reasonable accommodation. Def.’s Reply at 3–5, ECF No. 11. The Court agrees that Hill’s 

complaint fails to state a claim under the ADA.

Under the ADA, a covered employer is required to “mak[e] reasonable accommodations 

to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a 

disability.” Minter v. District of Columbia, 809 F.3d 66, 69 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). 

To state a claim for failure to accommodate, the plaintiff must demonstrate that “(1) he was a 

qualified individual with a disability; (2) his employer had notice of his disability; and (3) his 

employer denied his request for a reasonable accommodation.” Badwal v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of 

D.C., 139 F. Supp. 3d 295, 312 (D.D.C. 2015) (citing Ward v. McDonald, 762 F.3d 24, 31 (D.C. 

Cir. 2014)). “An underlying assumption of any reasonable accommodation claim is that the 

plaintiff-employee has requested an accommodation which the defendant-employer has denied.” 

Flemmings v. Howard Univ., 198 F.3d 857, 861 (D.C. Cir. 1999).3

 To succeed on a retaliation 

claim, a plaintiff needs to show “that she engaged in protected activity, that she suffered an 

adverse employment action, and that there was a causal link between the former and the latter.” 

Allen v. Johnson, 795 F.3d 34, 39 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 

The Court concludes that Hill does not state a failure-to-accommodate claim or a 

retaliation claim under the ADA because the facts alleged indicate that she requested FMLA 

leave—a nearly 16-week leave of absence—and not an accommodation to continue working. In 

Waggel, the D.C. Circuit held that there is no direct “equivalency” between “requests for FMLA 

leave” and “requests for an ADA accommodation.” 957 F.3d at 1373. There, the plaintiff 

“never expressly requested an ADA accommodation.” Id. at 1371. The court concluded that the 

3

 D.C. Human Rights Act disability discrimination claims are analyzed under the same 

framework as those under the ADA. Dougherty, 396 F. Supp. 3d at 101. Failure to state a claim 

under the ADA would thus foreclose a claim under D.C. law, as well.
10 

plaintiff “chose to seek leave under the FMLA rather than request accommodation under the 

ADA” through the defendant employer’s “established channels,” precluding her ADA claim. Id.

at 1373. Instead of requesting a reasonable accommodation to continue working, “[b]y invoking 

FMLA, [Hill] was asking not to work for some period of time.” LaRochelle v. Lynott, No. 22-

cv-0115, 2023 WL 6215365, at *7 (D.D.C. Sept. 25, 2023); see also Badwal, 139 F. Supp. 3d at

314 (“A request to be absent from work for a period of time, even if this request is for medical 

reasons, does not equal a request for a reasonable accommodation.”). Hill includes no facts here 

indicating that she requested a disability accommodation in addition to medical leave, and she 

therefore does not state a claim under the ADA.

Hill additionally does not plead facts indicating that she is a “qualified individual” as the 

ADA requires. The statute defines “qualified individual” as one “who, with or without 

reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position.” 42 

U.S.C. § 12111(8). Recalling that her leave request arose from “significant stress and anxiety 

related to a toxic work environment,” Ex. 1 to Pl.’s Mot. Expedite at 1, Hill does not explain how 

the four months of leave would have rendered it more likely that she could perform the essential 

functions of her job at XSI. The attachments to her filings indicate that she had not attended 

work regularly within the two months before she was terminated. See Termination Letter 

(stating that Hill had missed 22 of the previous 60 days and had arrived late or left early 27 out 

of the previous 60 days). Although Hill asserts that her “[a]ttendance became the ‘Narrative’” 

for her dismissal, Pl.’s Opp’n Mot. Dismiss at 3, she contradicts this in an email attached to her 

sur-reply, in which she admits that her “attendance has not been up to par” and that “it [is] a 

possibility I’m not a good fit.” Hill Email, Ex. 2 to Pl.’s Sur-reply. Furthermore, by seeking 

FMLA leave, Hill in effect asserted that she was “unable to perform the functions of [her] 
11 

position.” 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D); see also Ex. 5 to Pl.’s Opp’n at 9 (explaining, in the 

employee handbook, that the leave was available for an employee who is “unable to work 

because of a serious health condition”). The D.C. Circuit has additionally explained that 

“coming to work regularly”—at least in the context of roles that must be performed on site—is 

an “essential function” of employment. Carr v. Reno, 23 F.3d 525, 529 (D.C. Cir. 1994); 

Tyndall v. Nat’l Educ. Centers, Inc. of California, 31 F.3d 209, 213 (4th Cir. 1994) (“An 

employee who cannot meet the attendance requirements of the job at issue cannot be considered 

a ‘qualified’ individual protected by the ADA.”). The Court thus concludes that the facts alleged 

in Hill’s filings do not establish that she was a qualified individual under the ADA. 

In sum, Hill fails to state a claim under the ADA because the alleged facts indicate that

she sought FMLA leave rather than an accommodation and do not establish that she was a 

qualified individual. Her ADA claim must therefore be dismissed.

4. Breach-of-Contract Claim

 The Court finally addresses Hill’s breach-of-contract claims. Hill asserts that XSI 

breached a five-year contractual agreement by terminating her in violation of the company’s 

“employee handbook guidelines” and therefore owes her $212,376. Compl. at 1. The Court 

additionally construes Hill’s reference to “NONFMLA” leave to constitute a contract claim 

arising out of the employee handbook. Id. XSI contends that Hill’s offer letter and the employee 

handbook she attaches to her filings demonstrate that she lacked an employment contract. Def.’s 

Reply at 12. The company additionally argues that the employee handbook did not create an 

implied contract under which Hill was entitled to non-FMLA leave. Id. at 9–11. The Court 

again agrees with XSI.
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To prevail on a breach-of-contract claim under D.C. law, a plaintiff must prove (1) a 

valid contract between the parties, (2) an obligation or duty arising from that contract, (3) a 

breach of that obligation or duty, and (4) damages caused by that breach. Tsintolas Realty Co. v. 

Mendez, 984 A.2d 181, 187 (D.C. 2009). A disclaimer in an employer’s personnel or policy 

manual can serve to negate any implied contractual rights arising from the document. See 

Futrell v. Dep’t of Lab. Fed. Credit Union, 816 A.2d 793, 806 (D.C. 2003); Grove v. Loomis 

Sayles & Co., L.P., 810 F. Supp. 2d 146, 149 (D.D.C. 2011). In addition, “[i]t has long been 

settled in the District of Columbia that an employer may discharge an at-will employee at any 

time and for any reason, or for no reason at all.” Alibalogun v. First Coast Sec. Sols., Inc., 67 F. 

Supp. 3d 211, 216 (D.D.C. 2014) (quoting Adams v. George W. Cochran & Co., 597 A.2d 28, 30 

(D.C. 1991)). “[A] plaintiff bears the burden of alleging facts sufficient to show that ‘the parties 

intended that termination be subject to specific preconditions.’” Daisley v. Riggs Bank, N.A., 

372 F. Supp. 2d 61, 70 (D.D.C. 2005) (quoting Wilson v. Prudential Fin., 332 F. Supp. 2d 83, 91 

(D.D.C. 2004)). 

First, it is apparent that XSI’s employee handbook does not create a contractual 

relationship between Hill and the company. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals has 

explained that an employee handbook does not create an implied contract when it both states that 

it “is not a contract” and “contain[s] language clearly reserving the employer’s right to terminate 

at will.” Boulton v. Inst. of Int’l Educ., 808 A.2d 499, 505 (D.C. 2002) (quoting Sisco v. GSA 

Nat’l Capital Fed. Credit Union, 689 A.2d 52, 55 (D.C. 1997)); see also Phillips v. Spencer, 390 

F. Supp. 3d 136, 168 (D.D.C. 2019). Here, the employee handbook says that it “is not intended 

to create, nor is it to be construed as to or constitute a contract between Xtreme Solutions and 

any or all of its employees.” Ex. 4 to Pl.’s Opp’n at 8. The handbook additionally states that 
13 

“[e]mployment at the Company is employment at-will and may be terminated at the will of either 

the Company or the employee.” Id. The handbook thus contains both requirements articulated 

in Boulton and does not create any enforceable contract under District of Columbia law. 

Hill may assert that a five-year contract arose from the agreement to initiate the security 

clearance process. In her opposition, she states that a “contract and obligation were signed” and 

that she “went through the vigorous process of a background in-depth investigation for a Secret 

Clearance.” Pl.’s Opp’n Def.’s Mot. Dismiss at 2. She attaches a copy of the instructions for the 

SF-85, which is a questionnaire for public trust positions. Ex. 2 to Pl.’s Opp’n Def.’s Mot. 

Dismiss, ECF No. 10-1. The Court surmises that Hill has confused the length of time a public 

trust clearance remains valid with the length of time XSI had promised to employ her. Yet 

neither the SF-85, nor the State Department’s decision to grant Hill a clearance, can be 

reasonably construed as creating an employment contract with XSI. The Court finds no other 

facts alleged in the Complaint, subsequent filings, or any of the attached documents 

demonstrating that the parties had agreed to an employment contract in another form. 

Hill does not state a claim for relief based on denial of non-FMLA leave. The claim by 

definition cannot be based on violation of the FMLA. As discussed above, the parties do not 

have a separate contract guaranteeing Hill non-FMLA leave as a condition of employment. Even 

if the employee handbook did create an implied contract, the document provides that the decision 

whether to provide non-FMLA leaves of absence lies “within the sole discretion of the 

Company.” Ex. 4 to Pl.’s Opp’n at 9. XSI thus would not breach an agreement by denying Hill 

non-FMLA leave.

Finally, Hill does not state a breach-of-contract claim arising from her dismissal. In 

addition to the disclaimer language in the handbook, Hill attaches a signed offer letter stating that 
14 

her “employment with XSI constitutes employment-at-will for an unspecified duration and may 

be terminated at any time.” Offer Letter at 3. The facts alleged indicate that Hill was an at-will 

employee who—as far as contract law is concerned—“can be terminated from employment for 

any reason or no reason at all, with or without cause or justification.” Morris v. Carter Glob. 

Lee, Inc., 997 F. Supp. 2d 27, 44 (D.D.C. 2013) (citing Adams, 597 A.2d at 30). The only 

exception to this rule arises when the sole reason for discharge is the employee’s refusal to 

violate the law, see Byrd v. VOCA Corp. of Washington, D.C., 962 A.2d 927, 932 (D.C. 2008), a 

claim that would not be supported by the facts here. As a result, Hill’s breach-of-contract claim 

must be dismissed as well.

B. Conclusion 

For the foregoing reasons, XSI’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED; and it is 

FURTHER ORDERED that Hill’s motion for a hearing is DENIED AS MOOT; and it 

is 

FURTHER ORDERED that Hill’s motion to expedite is DENIED AS MOOT. 

An order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is separately and contemporaneously 

issued. 

Dated: September 6, 2024 RUDOLPH CONTRERAS

United States District Judge