J-A19001-19

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

TONY TILLMAN 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 926 EDA 2018

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence November 7, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0006940-2016

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

TONY TILLMAN 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 927 EDA 2018

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence November 7, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0006941-2016

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., KUNSELMAN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.: FILED DECEMBER 06, 2019

In this consolidated case, Tony Tillman appeals from his judgments of 

sentence, entered by the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, for 

first-degree murder, carrying a firearm without a license, and possession of 

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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an instrument of a crime (“PIC”) under Docket No. CP-51-CR-0006940-2016 

and for aggravated assault and retaliation against a witness under Docket No. 

CP-51-CR-0006941-2016.1

Appellant shot and killed Aaron Walker in Philadelphia on the evening of 

September 18, 2015. Following the murder, Appellant told Roger Pickens, one 

of Appellant’s associates with whom he sold drugs, that Appellant had “f***ed 

up” because he had dropped his hat at the scene of the shooting. N.T. Trial, 

11/2/17, at 55.2 Police recovered a red fedora from the scene of the shooting. 

Appellant had been seen wearing a red fedora on the day of the shooting and 

subsequent DNA testing confirmed that the fedora contained DNA matching 

Appellant’s.

Five days after the shooting, another one of Appellant’s associates, 

Kevin Rideout, was taken into custody for drug-related offenses. At that time, 

Rideout gave the police information implicating Appellant in the murder of 

Walker. Rideout was released from custody that same day, and told Pickens 

that he had given the police information on the shooting. The next day, 

Appellant met with Pickens, told him he knew about Rideout’s statement to 

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1 Appellant’s separate appeals were consolidated by this Court’s order dated 

May 31, 2019.

2 The record contains two separate transcriptions of Pickens’ testimony at

Appellant’s trial on November 2, 2017, both of which reference the same 

docket number. It appears that the only distinction between the two 

transcriptions is that they are paginated differently. This opinion cites to the 

page numbers in the transcription that coordinate with the page numbers used 

by the trial court. 
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the police implicating him in the murder, and said that Rideout “had to go.”

Id., at 62.

On October 8, 2015, Pickens was on the same block as Rideout when 

Appellant told Pickens to “clear the block” for his safety. Id., at 64. Afterwards, 

three men turned the corner onto the block and opened fire on Rideout. 

Although Rideout sustained six gunshot wounds, he survived. Appellant later 

told Pickens that Rideout was supposed to be killed.

Pickens was subsequently arrested on drug charges. At that time, he

gave a videotaped statement to police implicating Appellant in the Walker 

murder and agreed to cooperate with police on the matter.

On March 15, 2016, Appellant was arrested for the murder of Walker as 

well as for attempted murder, aggravated assault and related offenses for the 

shooting of Rideout. The cases were consolidated. 

Four months later, Pickens testified against Appellant at Appellant’s 

preliminary hearing. Following Pickens’ release from prison on the unrelated 

drug charges, he feared for his safety after testifying against Appellant. As a 

result, the Commonwealth relocated Pickens. 

On July 15, 2017, Appellant’s and Pickens’ drug supplier, Edward 

Raymond, approached Pickens in the front yard of his relocated residence and 

told him “I know where you been at ... I could have reached out and touched 

you, but I didn’t. I waited. I wanted to give you a chance to make this sh** 

right.” Id., at 88-89. Raymond also told Pickens that he had been to prison to 

see Appellant, and that Appellant had “told him everything.” Id., at 89.
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Specifically, Raymond informed Pickens that Appellant told him he knew 

Pickens had testified against him at his preliminary hearing. Id., at 89.

Raymond then retrieved a gun from his vehicle, put it under his shirt, and 

asked Pickens if he was going to make it right. Pickens fled into his house and 

heard Raymond tell him “I know where you’re at.” Id., at 90. Pickens reported 

this incident, made a statement to the police, and was once again relocated.

Appellant’s consolidated jury trial began on October 31, 2017. Prior to 

trial, Appellant filed a motion in limine seeking to bar Pickens from testifying 

about Raymond’s alleged witness intimidation. Following a hearing, the trial 

court denied the motion and Pickens was allowed to testify at trial about 

Raymond’s efforts to intimidate him into changing his testimony. 

Ultimately, the jury convicted Appellant of first-degree murder, PIC and 

carrying a firearm without a license in connection with the Walker murder. The 

jury also convicted Appellant of aggravated assault and retaliation against a 

witness in connection with the Rideout shooting. The court then sentenced 

Appellant to an aggregate term of life imprisonment without parole.

Appellant devotes the entire argument section of his brief to his claim 

that the trial court erred by denying his motion in limine and allowing Pickens

to testify about Raymond’s efforts to intimidate him. This claim is without 

merit.

We review a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a 

motion in limine with the same standard of review as 

admission of evidence at trial. With regard to the 

admission of evidence, we give the trial court broad 

discretion, and we will only reverse a trial court’s 
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decision to admit or deny evidence on a showing that 

the trial court clearly abused its discretion.

Commonwealth v. Flamer, 53 A.3d 82, 86 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citations 

omitted).

First, Appellant contends the trial court erred in finding that Pickens’

testimony was admissible as evidence of Appellant’s consciousness of his guilt. 

Any attempt by a defendant to interfere with a witness’s testimony is 

admissible to show a defendant’s consciousness of guilt. See 

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 838 A.2d 663, 680 (Pa. 2003). Generally,

threats by third persons against witnesses are only admissible to show a 

defendant’s consciousness of guilt if the defendant is linked in some way to 

the making of the threats. See Commonwealth v. Bryant, 462 A.2d 785, 

788 (Pa. Super. 1983) (citation omitted).

Here, Appellant asserts that there was no evidence linking him to the 

threats Raymond, a third party, made to Pickens. Instead, Appellant 

maintains, the Commonwealth merely established that Appellant had a 

relationship with Raymond and that Raymond had spoken to Pickens, which is 

insufficient grounds to find a connection between Appellant and Raymond’s 

attempt to intimidate Pickens. We disagree.

As the trial court stated in its opinion below, the Commonwealth did in 

fact produce evidence that Appellant was involved in Raymond’s efforts to 

intimidate Pickens into recanting his testimony. Specifically, Pickens testified 

that Raymond informed him that Raymond had visited Appellant in prison. 

See N.T., 11/2/17, at 87-89. During that visit, Appellant advised Raymond 
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that Pickens had testified against him at the preliminary hearing. See id., at 

89. Further, the Commonwealth produced prison visitor logs corroborating the 

fact that Raymond had visited Appellant in prison three times, with the last 

visit occurring after Pickens’ preliminary hearing testimony. See N.T., 

11/3/17, at 70.

Appellant asserts that the trial court improperly relied upon Pickens’ 

testimony at trial when justifying its earlier decision to deny Appellant’s 

motion in limine. Appellant highlights the fact that Pickens did not testify about 

what Raymond told him until after the court had already ruled the testimony 

admissible.

It is true that Pickens did not testify before the court ruled on Appellant’s 

motion in limine. However, Appellant did not request that Pickens testify. 

Rather, both Appellant and the Commonwealth presented argument based 

upon the Commonwealth’s proffer. See N.T. Trial, 10/30/17, at 29-39. In this 

proffer, the Commonwealth noted that Pickens would testify that Raymond 

visited Appellant in prison and tells Pickens that Appellant “told him 

everything.” Id., at 29. As the Commonwealth noted in its argument to the 

trial court, this phrasing clearly implied that Appellant informed Raymond 

about Pickens’ testimony at Appellant’s preliminary hearing.

Appellant also takes issue with the trial court’s reliance on the Rideout 

shooting as support for its finding that Raymond’s threats were traceable to 

Appellant. According to Appellant, the trial court erred in relying on the 

Rideout shooting in its opinion because there “is no connection whatsoever” 
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between that shooting and Raymond’s visit to Pickens. Appellant’s Brief, at 

37. 

Contrary to Appellant’s contention, there was a clear connection 

between the two. At Appellant’s preliminary hearing, Pickens implicated 

Appellant in both the Walker murder as well as in the Rideout shooting and it 

was this testimony that Raymond, after visiting Appellant in prison, warned 

Pickens to “make right.” 

To the extent that Appellant argues that the Rideout shooting was an 

inadmissible prior bad act, despite the fact that it was one of the two crimes 

he was on trial for at his consolidated trial, the shooting was clearly part of 

the history of the case. See Commonwealth v. Ivy, 146 A.3d 241, 251 (Pa. 

Super. 2016) (evidence of prior bad act admissible if it is part of the history 

of case and forms part of the natural development of the facts). In any event, 

even without the reference to the Rideout shooting, there was a sufficient 

basis for the trial court to find that Appellant was connected to the threats and 

therefore deny Appellant’s motion in limine. 

We see no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s conclusion that there 

was sufficient evidence linking Appellant to Raymond’s efforts to intimidate 

Pickens and therefore, that Pickens’ testimony about those efforts was 

admissible. Compare Commonwealth v. King, 689 A.2d 918, 923 n.6 (Pa. 

Super. 1997) (alleged instance of third party’s act of intimidation against 

witness was inadmissible when there was no evidence linking that act to the 

defendant other than his friendship with the third party and no evidence that 
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the act of intimidation actually occurred). Moreover, the trial court specifically 

instructed the jury that it could only consider the witness intimidation 

testimony for the limited purpose of establishing Appellant’s consciousness of 

guilt. Appellant’s first issue on appeal merits no relief.

Next, Appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by 

denying the motion in limine to bar Pickens’ testimony about the threats 

Raymond made to him because such testimony constituted inadmissible 

hearsay. This claim also fails.

There is no dispute that Raymond’s statements were being offered for 

the truth of the matter asserted and are therefore hearsay. See

Commonwealth v. Puksar, 740 A.2d 219, 225 (Pa. 1999) (hearsay is an 

out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the 

statement). Hearsay is generally not admissible unless it falls within one of 

the exceptions to the hearsay rule listed in the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence.

See Commonwealth v. Savage, 157 A.3d 519, 524 (Pa. Super. 2017). One 

of those exceptions is the co-conspirator exception, which permits the out-ofcourt declarations of one co-conspirator to be admitted against another coconspirator if the declarations were made during and in furtherance of the 

conspiracy. See Commonwealth v. Coccioletti, 425 A.2d 387, 391 (Pa. 

1981). 

The trial court below found, and we agree, that there was ample 

evidence to conclude that a conspiracy existed between Raymond and 

Appellant to intimidate Pickens. The court stated:
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Here, as discussed [in Appellant’s first claim], there 

was ample evidence for the Court to conclude that a 

conspiracy existed between Raymond and [Appellant] 

to intimidate Pickens and obstruct justice. According 

to Pickens, Raymond said that he had visited

[Appellant] in prison and that [Appellant] told him 

“everything” about [Pickens’] preliminary hearing 

testimony against [Appellant]. Furthermore, the 

Commonwealth corroborated [Pickens’] testimony by 

providing the prison’s visitor logs which established 

that Raymond did indeed visit [Appellant] on three 

occasions. Additionally, the statements were made in 

the course of, and in furtherance of the conspiracy, as 

Raymond made the statements during his attempt to 

convince Pickens to recant.

Trial Court Opinion, at 8-9.

In asserting that the trial court erred in reaching this conclusion, 

Appellant merely recycles many of the meritless arguments that he made 

when presenting his first claim. No relief is due.

Judgments of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/6/19