DA 07-0483

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

2008 MT 392N

STATE OF MONTANA,

 Plaintiff and Appellee,

 v.

DANIEL JACOB DAFFERN,

 Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District,

In and For the County of Missoula, Cause No. DC 2006-388

Honorable Ed McLean, Presiding Judge

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

For Appellant:

Jim Wheelis, Chief Appellate Defender, Roberta R. Zenker, Assistant

Appellate Defender, Helena, Montana

For Appellee:

Hon. Mike McGrath, Montana Attorney General, Mark W. Mattioli,

Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana

Fred R. Van Valkenburg, Missoula County Attorney, Kirsten Pabst,

Deputy County Attorney, Missoula, Montana

Submitted on Briefs: August 6, 2008

 Decided: November 20, 2008 

Filed:

__________________________________________

Clerk

November 20 2008
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Justice Patricia O. Cotter delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1 Pursuant to Section 1, Paragraph 3(d)(v), Montana Supreme Court 1996 Internal 

Operating Rules, as amended in 2003, the following memorandum decision shall not be 

cited as precedent. Its case title, Supreme Court cause number and disposition shall be 

included in this Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific 

Reporter and Montana Reports.

¶2 At 1:30 a.m. on August 9, 2006, Daniel Jacob Daffern (Daffern) broke into the 

apartment of his former girlfriend Kari Chisom (Chisom), assaulted her with a frying pan 

while she was asleep, and threatened to kill her. Chisom attempted to escape but was 

caught by Daffern, forcibly returned to her apartment, and then threatened by Daffern 

with a knife. Chisom later convinced Daffern to take her to an emergency room at a local 

hospital. Once there, Chisom was able to covertly communicate to hospital staff that she 

was in distress. Hospital staff then contacted police who came to the hospital and 

arrested Daffern for violating an order of protection which Chisom had previously 

obtained against him. 

¶3 On May 31, 2007, Daffern was convicted in the Fourth Judicial District, Missoula 

County of felony aggravated burglary, felony assault with a weapon, misdemeanor 

violation of an order of protection, and felony aggravated kidnapping. On June 20, 2007, 

Daffern was sentenced to sixty years and six months for these convictions, with forty 

years suspended. The District Court imposed nineteen conditions to apply to Daffern 

during his probation. Condition No. 12 prohibited Daffern from possessing or consuming 

intoxicants or alcohol and from entering any place where intoxicants are the chief item of 
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sale. It also required him to submit to routine breath and blood testing for alcohol. 

Condition No. 13 required Daffern to participate in any counseling, including mental 

health counseling, as recommended by his probation/parole officer.

¶4 Daffern does not appeal his conviction. However, he does appeal the imposition 

of Condition No. 12. Daffern objected to the imposition of this condition before the 

District Court on the grounds that his offenses did not involve the use of alcohol. On 

appeal, Daffern argues that the District Court abused its discretion in imposing this 

condition because no nexus exists between his conviction and the alcohol restriction in 

sentencing Condition No. 12. 

¶5 “[B]ecause sentencing statutes authorize sentencing judges to impose conditions 

on deferred or suspended sentences that constitute reasonable restrictions or conditions 

considered necessary for rehabilitation or for the protection of the victim or society, the 

reasonableness of such conditions will be reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” State v. 

Ashby, 2008 MT 83, ¶ 9, 342 Mont. 187, ¶ 9, 179 P.3d 1164, ¶ 9 (quotation omitted). In 

Ashby we recently clarified our review of sentencing conditions as follows:

In imposing conditions of sentence, a sentencing judge may impose a 

particular condition of probation so long as the condition has a nexus to 

either the offense for which the offender is being sentenced, or to the 

offender himself or herself. By way of example, if a defendant has a 

history or pattern of alcohol or drug abuse but this pattern was unrelated to 

the offense for which he is being sentenced, the sentencing court may 

nonetheless consider this defendant’s history with alcohol and drugs, and 

impose an alcohol or drug-related probation condition that the court in its 

discretion determines will assist in this particular defendant’s alcohol or 

drug rehabilitation. We caution, however, that courts may impose 

offender-related conditions only in those cases in which the history or 

pattern of conduct to be restricted is recent, and significant or chronic. A 

passing, isolated, or stale instance of behavior or conduct will be 
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insufficient to support a restrictive probation condition imposed in the 

name of offender rehabilitation.

Ashby, ¶ 15 (emphasis added).

¶6 The presentence investigation (PSI) stated that Daffern has a history of drug and 

alcohol abuse, as well as serious mental health and emotional issues which make Daffern 

a danger to himself and others. The PSI noted that Daffern had a prior felony conviction 

for sexual assault and sexual intercourse without consent, a misdemeanor conviction for 

partner/family member assault, and a previous probation violation. The PSI also noted 

that Daffern’s only explanation for the state of mind leading to the crimes he committed 

against Chisom was that he was “very depressed.” Prior to these crimes, Daffern was 

working with both a sex offender treatment counselor and a probation/parole officer to 

address his depression, but reported that “[t]here was nothing they could do for me.” 

Consequently, Daffern’s probation/parole officer recommended that Daffern “shall 

participate in any counseling as deemed appropriate by probation officer or any medical 

or mental health professional treating the defendant, to include chemical dependency, 

mental health, or Anger Management.”

¶7 Although Daffern claims that his offenses did not involve the use of alcohol, he 

does not challenge the accuracy or validity of the PSI. Given Daffern’s past history of 

drug and alcohol abuse, his mental health and emotional issues, and his history of violent 

crimes against others, Condition No. 12 was reasonable under Ashby because it clearly 

had a nexus to Daffern himself and was reasonably related to his rehabilitation and the 

protection of the victim and society. Requiring Daffern to abstain from alcohol helps to 
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ensure that he successfully completes any mental health, chemical dependency, or anger 

management programs which his probation/parole officer may deem necessary for his 

rehabilitation based on his offenses in this case and his past history of drug and alcohol 

abuse. 

¶8 Although the District Court could not rely on Ashby when it sentenced Daffern 

because the case had not yet been decided, we conclude that Condition No. 12 was a 

reasonable probation condition under Ashby and did not constitute an abuse of discretion. 

Thus we affirm the District Court’s decision, because it ultimately reached the correct 

result. See Wells Fargo Bank v. Talmage, 2007 MT 45, ¶ 23, 336 Mont. 125, ¶ 23, 152 

P.3d 1275, ¶ 23 (stating that we will affirm a district court’s decision even if it reaches 

the right result for the wrong reason).

¶9 Affirmed.

/S/ PATRICIA COTTER

We concur: 

/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART

/S/ JOHN WARNER

/S/ JIM RICE

Justice James C. Nelson, specially concurring.

¶10 I specially concur in the Court’s decision because State v. Stiles, 2008 MT 390, 

___ Mont. ___, ___ P.3d ___, is the law of the land as to the sentencing issue presented 

by Daffern. That said, I continue to maintain that the sentencing issue in Stiles was 
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wrongly decided and that the distinction drawn in that case between “legality” and “abuse 

of discretion,” for purposes of reviewing sentencing conditions, is legally incorrect under 

the applicable statutes. See Stiles, ¶¶ 19-50 (Nelson, J., dissenting).

/S/ JAMES C. NELSON