FILED

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

 SEPTEMBER 15, 2010

JOHN LEY

CLERK

[PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 09-14194

________________________

D. C. Docket No. 08-21747-CV-UU

MICCOSUKEE TRIBE OF INDIANS OF FLORIDA,

a federally-recognized Indian Tribe,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

UNITED STATES ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS,

SECRETARY OF THE ARMY,

John M. McHugh, in his official capacity,

LT. GEN. ROBERT L. VAN ANTWERP,

Chief of Engineers, U.S. Army Corps of

Engineers, in his official capacity,

BG. GENERAL JOSEPH SCHROEDEL,

Division Engineer, South Atlantic Division

Corps of Engineers, in his official capacity,

PAUL L. GROSSKRUGER,

District Engineer, Jacksonville District,

Corps of Engineers, in his official capacity,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendants-Appellees,

SOUTH FLORIDA WATER MANAGEMENT DISTRICT,

Intervenor-Appellee.
________________________

No. 09-14539

________________________

D. C. Docket No. 08-22966-CV-PAS

MICCOSUKEE TRIBE OF INDIANS OF FLORIDA,

a federally-recognized Indian Tribe,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS,

SECRETARY OF THE ARMY,

John M. McHugh, in his official capacity,

CHIEF OF ENGINEERS, U.S. ARMY CORPS

OF ENGINEERS,

Lt. General Robert Van Antwerp in his

official capacity,

DIVISION ENGINEER, SOUTH ATLANTIC

DIVISION CORPS OF ENGINEERS,

Bg. General Joseph Schroedel, in his

official capacity, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

________________________

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

_________________________

(September 15, 2010)

2
Before BLACK, WILSON and MARTIN, Circuit Judges.

WILSON, Circuit Judge:

The Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida (the Tribe) filed two lawsuits

challenging the federal government’s plans to replace a mile of the ground-level

Tamiami Trail (U.S. Highway 41) with a bridge, to increase the flow of water into

Everglades National Park. The district courts dismissed the Tribe’s claims for lack

of subject matter jurisdiction, and we have consolidated the Tribe’s appeals of

those decisions. The district courts concluded that language Congress inserted in a

spending bill partially repealed the environmental laws that the Tribe was

invoking. The Tribe challenges that interpretation, and asserts the rulings violate

the Constitution on several counts. For the following reasons, we conclude that the

act of Congress deprived the federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction over the

Tribe’s claims. Therefore, we affirm the judgments of the district courts.

I. Background

a. Historical Backdrop of the Litigation

1

The Miccosukee Indians have long resided in the Everglades. The

2

 While some of the introductory background in this subsection is not part of the record 1

on appeal, it is included to assist in understanding the historical precursor to this litigation. We

note that our analysis and decision of the legal issues in these appeals rest solely on the record.

 See Brent Richards Weisman, Unconquered People: Florida’s Seminole and 2

Miccosukee Indians 5–8 (Univ. Press of Fla. 1999). The Miccosukee Indians are descended

from the Creek Nation, an association of villages that stretched across what is now Alabama and

3
Miccosukees’ historical association with their neighbors the Seminole Indians was

tempered by the fact that the Miccosukees spoke their own language, Mikasuki.

The federal government formally recognized the Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of

Florida in 1962. Tribe members live and work on several reservations within the

Everglades.

Geologists estimate that the Everglades formed about 5,000 years ago. The

3

Indians called the place Pa-hay-okee, meaning “Grassy Water.” A British

cartographer labeled it the River Glades, and author Marjory Stoneman Douglas

suggested that later mapmakers substituted the word “Ever” for River. The name

4

Georgia, and it is suggested that their ancestors might have first reached the southeastern United

States as long as 10,000 years ago. See Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida, History, 

http://www.miccosukee.com/tribe_history1.htm (last visited Aug. 25, 2010). Under Eleventh

Circuit procedure, the Clerk of this Court maintains a downloaded copy of all the Internet

sources cited in this opinion.

 Patrick J. Gleason & Peter Stone, Age, Origin, and Landscape Evolution of the 3

Everglades Peatland, in Everglades: The Ecosystem and its Restoration 149, 150 (Steven M.

Davis & John C. Ogden eds., 1994).

 Marjory Stoneman Douglas, The Everglades: River of Grass 7 (Pineapple Press 1988) 4

(1947). Douglas described the beauty of the Everglades, as well as early reports of its dangers:

The miracle of the light pours over the green and brown expanse of saw grass and

of water, shining and slow-moving below, the grass and water that is the meaning

and the central fact of the Everglades of Florida. It is a river of grass.

. . . .

. . . ‘The Everglades’ was described as a series of vast, miasmic swamps,

poisonous lagoons, huge dismal marshes without outlet, a rotting, shallow, inland

sea, or labyrinths of dark trees hung and looped about with snakes and dripping

mosses, malignant with tropical fevers and malarias, evil to the white man.

Id. at 5–6.

4
Everglades appeared on American military maps during the Seminole Wars.

The Everglades covers much of the half of Florida south of Orlando.

Historically, water moved southward from the Kissimmee River to Lake

Okeechobee, then south and southwest into Florida Bay. From Lake Okeechobee

5

to the Gulf of Mexico, the land declines almost imperceptibly—on average only

three inches per mile—so that the water forms a shallow, thirty-mile wide river,

moving slowly southward.

6

In bad weather the water did not always move so gently. A hurricane in

September 1928 caused a breach of the Okeechobee levee, drowning upwards of

2,000 farm workers. The tragedy increased public awareness of the dangers of

7

uncontrolled Everglades waters. At the same time, the population of Florida was

 Appellee U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has posted animated maps of the historic, 5

present, and planned water flows of the Everglades at

http://www.evergladesplan.org/education/requested_downloads.aspx (click on “view and

compare”) (last visited Aug. 25, 2010).

 H. Fling et al., The Role of Flow in the Everglades Landscape 1–2 (Univ. of Fla. 6

Cooperative Extension Service, Dec. 2004), available at http://edis.ifas.ufl.edu/uw199.

 See Nat’l Weather Serv. Weather Forecast Office Miami, Memorial Web Page for the 7

1928 Okeechobee Hurricane (June 29, 2009), http://www.srh.noaa.gov/mfl/?n=okeechobee. 

While no precise count of the dead ever emerged, it has been suggested that the Okeechobee

hurricane was second only to the Galveston hurricane in 1900 as the deadliest natural disaster in

United States history. Id. Many of the dead were Caribbean migrant workers who were either

swept into the Everglades or buried in mass graves. Estimates of the death toll range from 1,700

to more than 2,500. Id. By comparison, Hurricane Katrina killed approximately 1,800 in 2005. 

Zora Neale Hurston described the Okeechobee hurricane in her 1937 novel Their Eyes Were

Watching God.

5
continuing to grow, and with it the demand for land, food, and water. In 1948,

Congress passed the Flood Control Act, Pub. L. No. 80-858, 62 Stat. 1171, 1176,

authorizing the Central and Southern Florida plan to control flooding in the

Everglades, and promote agriculture and water supply. The effect of the series of

levees and canals that followed was to shunt more water out through the east and

west coasts of Florida, and drastically reduce the southward flow through the

Everglades.

The Tamiami Trail (the Trail), also known as U.S. Highway 41, was the first

highway to cross the Everglades. Its name derives from the cities at its ends,

Tampa and Miami. Construction began during the First World War and took more

than a decade to complete. When workers were not battling the swamp, they were

using dynamite to break through the rock beds on the Naples side. While the

8

newer Interstate 75 to the north, called “Alligator Alley,” carries more vehicles

across the Everglades every day, the Trail remains a vital road and hurricane

evacuation route. Some of the east-west portion of the Trail runs along the

northern boundary of Everglades National Park.

9

 Carrie Scupholm, Connecting the East and West Coasts: The Tamiami Trail of the 8

Sunshine State, in Looking Beyond the Highway: Dixie Roads and Culture 73, 78 (Claudette

Stager & Martha Carver eds., 2006).

 In 1934, Congress passed legislation creating the Everglades National Park, 48 Stat. 9

816 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 410 et seq.), and declining to diminish “any existing rights of the

Seminole Indians which are not in conflict with the purposes for which the Everglades National

6
Although the Trail remains an impressive engineering achievement, it poses

a substantial environmental challenge. It acts as a dam to restrict water from

flowing south into Everglades National Park and greatly reduces the flow into the

Shark River Slough, the main water corridor of the Everglades. Moreover, to

preserve the roadbed from erosion, engineers found that they had to lower water

levels of the surrounding swamp. The restricted water flow was subsequently

blamed for vast losses of wading birds, fish, and native plants.

b. Efforts to Restore the Everglades’ Historic Flows

On the strength of renewed concerns about the health of the Everglades, in

1989 Congress enacted the Everglades National Park Protection and Expansion

Act, Pub. L. No. 101-229, 103 Stat. 1946, 16 U.S.C. § 410r-5 et seq. (ENPPEA).

The ENPPEA directed federal agencies to research ways to improve water flow in

the park, and describe them in a report titled “Modified Water Deliveries to

Everglades National Park.” In 2000, the President signed the Water Resources

Development Act, Pub. L. No. 106-541, § 601, 114 Stat. 2572, 2680 (WRDA),

outlining the thirty-year Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan (CERP) that

updated the original Central and Southern Florida plan for the Everglades. One

element of CERP called for improvement of water flow through the Trail.

Park is created.” 16 U.S.C. § 410b.

7
In June 2008, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) issued its Final

Limited Reevaluation Report and Environmental Assessment (LRR/EA)

concerning improvements to the Trail. It concluded that the most effective and

10

economical option of all the ones studied was “Alternative 3.2.2.a”—construction

of a mile-long bridge at the eastern end of the Trail. The bridge would replace the

current ground-level roadbed and would greatly increase the amount of water that

could flow southward into the Shark River Slough.

On June 18, 2008, the Tribe sued the Corps, claiming that the selection of

Alternative 3.2.2.a violated the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42

U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. (NEPA), the Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. app.

2 (FACA), and WRDA. For ease, we refer to this case as the NEPA case. The

11

Tribe claimed that the federal government failed to obey federal environmental

laws in planning the bridge, in part by failing to prepare adequate statements of

environmental impact. Moreover, the lawsuit alleged that higher water levels

 This final version of the LRR/EA is available at 10

http://www.saj.usace.army.mil/Divisions/Everglades/Branches/ProjectExe/Sections/LECSW/M

WD/DOCS/TamiamiTrail/Final/MWD-TTM_Final_LRR_MainDoc.pdf. The addendum, dated

July 28, 2008, is available at

http://www.saj.usace.army.mil/Divisions/Everglades/Branches/ProjectExe/Sections/LECSW/M

WD/DOCS/TamiamiTrail/20080728_TTM_LRR_EA_Addendum_Final.pdf.

 We note that two days earlier, on June 16, 2008, the Tribe sued the United States and 11

the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Transportation (the DOT case), claiming that the

Department of Transportation failed to conduct the required review of the bridge project. This

case, also before Judge Ungaro, led to a separate appeal to the Eleventh Circuit, which we

resolve with a separate opinion, No. 09-11891.

8
would flood tribal lands and tree islands. The Tribe asked for judicial review

under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq., and requested an

injunction to stop the construction.

c. Congress’s First Appropriations Bill

Congress in the meantime continued to legislate on Everglades restoration.

On September 30, 2008, Congress passed a continuing appropriations act, Pub. L.

No. 110-329, 122 Stat. 3574. Section 153 of the act spoke to the immediate

building of the bridge:

SEC. 153. Amounts provided by section 101 for implementation of

the Modified Water Deliveries to Everglades National Park shall be

made available to the Army Corps of Engineers, which shall

immediately carry out Alternative 3.2.2.a to U.S. Highway 41 (the

Tamiami Trail) as substantially described in the Limited Reevaluation

Report with Integrated Environmental Assessment and addendum,

approved August 2008 . . . .

122 Stat. at 3581 (emphasis added).

On October 24, 2008, the Tribe filed suit against the Corps and the U.S. Fish

and Wildlife Service, alleging violations of the Endangered Species Act of 1973,

16 U.S.C. § 1531 et seq. (ESA). We refer to this case as the ESA case. The

lawsuit alleged that a biological opinion issued by the Fish and Wildlife Service

failed to fully address the bridge’s threat to the continued survival of two

endangered bird species, the snail kite and the wood stork. There are two wood

9
stork colonies close to the planned bridge route. Like the NEPA suit, the ESA suit

sought a court order blocking construction of the bridge until the federal

government complied with the law.

Meanwhile, the Corps moved to dismiss the NEPA suit, citing § 153 of

Congress’s continuing appropriations act. On October 31, 2008, the NEPA court

denied the Corps’s motion to dismiss the Tribe’s suit for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction, holding that § 153 was not specific enough to exempt the Corps from

NEPA. Section 153 neither mentioned NEPA by name, nor included the key

phrase “notwithstanding any other provision of law,” which the court described as

“the language usually associated with an exemption or limited repeal.” D.E. 59 at

5. Shortly thereafter, on November 13, 2008, the NEPA court granted in part the

Tribe’s motion for a preliminary injunction to enjoin the Corps from building the

bridge until it complied with environmental procedures.

d. Congress’s Omnibus Appropriations Act of 2009

On March 11, 2009, Congress passed the Omnibus Appropriations Act,

2009, Pub. L. No. 111-8, 123 Stat. 524 (Omnibus Act). The Omnibus Act included

this passage:

CONSTRUCTION

(INCLUDING RESCISSION OF FUNDS)

For construction, improvements, repair or replacement of physical

facilities, including a portion of the expense for the modifications

10
authorized by section 104 of the Everglades National Park Protection

and Expansion Act of 1989, $233,158,000, to remain available until

expended:

Provided, That funds appropriated in this Act, or in any prior Act of

Congress, for the implementation of the Modified Water Deliveries to

Everglades National Park Project, shall be made available to the Army

Corps of Engineers which shall, notwithstanding any other provision

of law, immediately and without further delay construct or cause to be

constructed Alternative 3.2.2.a to U.S. Highway 41 (the Tamiami

Trail) consistent with the Limited Reevaluation Report with Integrated

Environmental Assessment and addendum, approved August 2008

. . . .

123 Stat. at 708 (emphases added). In the following discussion, we refer to the

phrase “notwithstanding any other provision of law” as the notwithstanding clause.

We call the phrase “immediately and without further delay” the immediacy clause.

On June 16, 2009, the NEPA court, in response to the Corps’s renewed

motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, held that the Omnibus Act

is an “explicit exemption” from NEPA and FACA that moves the bridge “from the

reach of such statutes.” D.E. 128 at 7. The court found it significant that Congress

added the same notwithstanding clause that the court had found lacking in the

earlier appropriations act. The NEPA court also rejected the Tribe’s constitutional

challenges to the Omnibus Act: vagueness, delegation, separation of powers, bill of

attainder, due process, and equal protection. The NEPA court dismissed the suit

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and dissolved the preliminary injunction that

11
it had earlier entered. The Tribe timely appealed.

The Corps filed a copy of the NEPA court’s dismissal with the ESA court.

On August 31, 2009, the ESA court adopted the reasoning of the NEPA court to

conclude it too lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the Tribe’s claims. The ESA

court also invoked the doctrine of collateral estoppel to bar the Tribe from

relitigating its constitutional challenges to the Omnibus Act because the NEPA

court had already rejected them. The ESA court granted the United States’ motion

to dismiss the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Tribe filed its notice

of appeal the next day.

II. Standard of Review

The district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction presents a legal question that we review de novo. Sinaltrainal v.

Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1260 (11th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). “In

construing a statute we must begin, and should often end . . . with the language of

the statute itself.” Kehoe v. Fid. Fed. Bank & Trust, 421 F.3d 1209, 1212 (11th

Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). We review the district court’s invocation of

collateral estoppel de novo. United States v. Weiss, 467 F.3d 1300, 1308 (11th Cir.

2006) (citation omitted).

III. Types of Repeal

12
The main question here is whether the Omnibus Act modifies the NEPA,

FACA, and ESA for purposes of the Tribe’s lawsuits, thereby depriving the federal

courts of subject matter jurisdiction to hear the Tribe’s claims. Besides being the

principal issue of this appeal, the question and the answer also control the outcome

in the related appeal No. 09-11891 (the DOT case). The focus is on the interaction

between the Omnibus Act and previous acts of Congress. The term for this

dynamic is repeal—whether and how a later act of Congress modifies an earlier

one. Another name for it is exemption.

The Tribe claims that the Omnibus Act effects no explicit repeal here

because it fails to mention any statute it is repealing. The Tribe also claims that the

Corps has failed to meet the high standard for showing that an appropriations act

effects an implied repeal. The Corps counters that the plain language of the

Omnibus Act, in particular Congress’s addition of the notwithstanding clause,

makes it clear that Congress intended to relax its existing environmental statutes in

order to get the bridge built as quickly as possible.

At oral argument, counsel for the Tribe said a repeal has to be either express

or implied. While that statement may be true, it does not necessarily follow, as

counsel claimed, that there are only two modes of repeal. Supreme Court and

Eleventh Circuit cases, and Sutherland Statutes and Statutory Construction, seem

13
to identify at least three: explicit repeals, general repealing clauses, and implied

repeals. We review the characteristics of each in turn.

12

a. Explicit Repeals

An explicit repeal occurs when the later statute explicitly identifies the

earlier statute it is repealing. 1A Sutherland Statutes and Statutory Construction

§ 23:7 (7th ed. 2010). Congress can accomplish this identification by citing the

earlier statute or referring to its subject matter, id., or even by giving the style and

case number of a lawsuit that is filed under the earlier statute, Robertson v. Seattle

Audubon Soc., 503 U.S. 429, 440, 112 S. Ct. 1407, 1414 (1992).

13

Congress walks a fine line in terms of what it may do here and still uphold

the separation of powers. Congress may not interfere in the judicial process. It

may not dictate the result for a particular case, or tell an Article III court how to

apply the law to specific facts. See Nichols v. Hopper, 173 F.3d 820, 823 (11th

Cir. 1999); Henderson v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 971 F.2d 1567, 1573 (11th Cir.

 Courts have noted that repeals go by various names, and moreover that the boundaries 12

between types of repeals are not written in stone. See, e.g., Bald Eagle Ridge Prot. Ass’n, Inc. v.

Mallory, 119 F. Supp. 2d 473, 480 (M.D. Pa. 2000) (noting that repeals can be called “repeal by

implication, exemption, suspension, or any other word or phrase which may be used to

characterize this action”).

 The repealing statute in Seattle Audubon Society also contained an explicit 13

jurisdiction-stripping provision. 503 U.S. at 435 n.2, 112 S. Ct. at 1411 n.2 (quoting Pub. L. No.

101-121, § 318(b)(6)(A), 103 Stat. 701, 747). The Tribe argues that because the Omnibus Act

lacked similar jurisdiction-stripping language, the district courts erred in dismissing the lawsuits. 

But neither Seattle Audubon nor any other case cited by the Tribe makes such language a

requirement for an explicit repeal.

14
1992).

But Congress is always free to amend the law, even if doing so has the effect

of extinguishing a pending case. See Seattle Audubon Society, 503 U.S. at 440,

112 S. Ct. at 1414; Scientific-Atlanta, 971 F.2d at 1573. And among the areas in

which Congress legislates is the jurisdiction of the federal courts. Congress often

exercises its power both to confer jurisdiction, and to deny it. See Landgraf v. USI

Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 274, 114 S. Ct. 1483, 1501 (1994). “[T]here is an

important difference between Congress telling this court how it should decide a

particular case (expressly prohibited by United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.)

128, 147 (1871)) and Congress withdrawing jurisdiction to decide a particular case

. . . .” Nat’l Coal. to Save Our Mall v. Norton, 161 F. Supp. 2d 14, 22 (D.D.C.

2001).

b. General Repealing Clauses

To effect an explicit repeal, a statute must identify the repealed statute. If it

does not, a statute may still sometimes effect a repeal through the use of a “general

repealing clause.” Sutherland § 23:8. One example of such a clause is

“[n]otwithstanding any other Federal law.” United States v. Novak, 476 F.3d 1041,

1046 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (quotation omitted). The Supreme Court has found

these phrases have the power to override other law:

15
As we have noted previously in construing statutes, the use of such a

“notwithstanding” clause clearly signals the drafter’s intention that the

provisions of the “notwithstanding” section override conflicting

provisions of any other section. Likewise, the Courts of Appeals

generally have interpreted similar “notwithstanding” language to

supersede all other laws, stating that [a] clearer statement is difficult

to imagine.

Cisneros v. Alpine Ridge Group, 508 U.S. 10, 18, 113 S. Ct. 1898, 1903 (1993)

(citations, omission, and quotations omitted) (interpreting the clause

“[n]otwithstanding any other provisions of this Contract” in a Section 8 landlord

contract).

Our Court has previously read these clauses the same way. In Castro v.

Sec’y of Homeland Sec., 472 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (citing

Cisneros), our Court held that the same general repealing clause at issue here,

“notwithstanding any other provision of law,” worked an exemption to an earlier

statute concerning hiring standards for TSA screeners.

14

In Castro, the plaintiff sued the Department of Homeland Security (DHS),

claiming that it violated the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 by citing his history of

seizures as a reason not to hire him. The district court granted DHS’s motion to

dismiss for failure to state a claim, finding that the Aviation and Transportation

 In the interest of precision, we note that the repealing statute at issue in Castro 14

contained two general repealing clauses: “Notwithstanding any other provision of law,” 49

U.S.C. § 44935 note, and “Notwithstanding any provision of law,” 49 U.S.C. § 44935(e)(2)(A),

(f)(1). See Castro, 472 F.3d at 1336–37. We do not dwell on the slight difference. 

16
Security Act (ATSA) that Congress passed after the 9/11 terrorist attacks exempted

DHS from the nondiscrimination provisions of the Rehabilitation Act.

This Court affirmed, holding that the “notwithstanding” clause was

“Congress’s indication that the statute containing that language is intended to take

precedence over any preexisting or subsequently-enacted legislation [on the same

subject].” Id. (omission and citation omitted). While this plain language alone was

enough to effect a repeal, this Court also noted that ATSA specified physical

requirements for security screeners—“color perception, visual and aural acuity,

physical coordination, and motor skills,” 49 U.S.C. § 44935(f)(1)(B)—that on their

face were “inconsistent” with the Rehabilitation Act’s prohibition of discrimination

on the basis of physical disabilities, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). 472 F.3d at 1337–38.

Castro directs our inquiry here both for its evaluation of the notwithstanding

clause, and its plain-language approach to statutory construction.

The Ninth Circuit has read this phrase the same way. In doing so, that court

emphasized the importance of statutory context. Hearing an appeal to an

environmental lawsuit, Consejo de Desarrollo Economico de Mexicali, A.C. v.

United States, 482 F.3d 1157, 1169 (9th Cir. 2007), the Ninth Circuit held that the

phrase “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law” in an omnibus tax bill

exempted the United States from NEPA and ESA for purposes of lining the All

17
American Canal “without delay.”

The Ninth Circuit noted that the notwithstanding clause is not always

applied in blanket fashion. “We have repeatedly held that the phrase

‘notwithstanding any other provision of law’ is not always construed literally.

Rather, when the phrase is used, we have determined its reach by ‘taking into

account the whole of the statutory context in which it appears.’” Id. at 1168

(internal quotations and citations omitted).

15

Further complicating matters is the question of whether a general repealing

clause requires the finding of a conflict between the newer and older statutes.

Some courts base their finding of repeal via a general repealing clause on an

“irreconcilable conflict.” See, e.g., Norton, 161 F. Supp. 2d at 21; Sutherland

§ 23:8 (noting that a general repealing clause “has sometimes been held to repeal

 Commentators likewise have noted the difficulty of interpreting the notwithstanding 15

clause. The clause “notwithstanding any other provision of law” is “the statutory equivalent of a

parent telling a child ‘I’m serious,’ or ‘I really mean it.’ Despite the admonition, courts and

administrators still must determine what the underlying directive means. And, ordinarily, there

will still be other provisions of law that apply; the trick is to determine which ones.” Yule Kim,

Cong. Research Serv., Statutory Interpretation: General Principles and Recent Trends 35

(2008), available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/97-589_20080831.pdf: 

In this sense, the statutory phrase is analogous to a parent telling a child “don’t

under any circumstances leave the house until I return.” The parent doesn’t really

mean for the child to remain under any and all circumstances, but instead assumes

that the child will try to get out if the house catches on fire or some other

emergency occurs.

Id. n.200.

18
because an act conflicts”). In Castro, our Court noted that the two statutes were

“inconsistent,” but said the plain language of the notwithstanding clause was by

itself sufficient to support a repeal. 472 F.3d at 1337.

We acknowledge that an open-ended general repealing clause carries the

potential to create confusion about precisely which laws, if any, it is repealing. A

16

general repealing clause operates in the twilight between the clearer extremes of

explicit and implied repeals. A general repealing clause is explicit only in the

sense that it is announcing a repeal of “all law” or “any law” or “federal laws”—its

actual reach depends on an analysis of the statutory language relevant to it.

Without that careful analysis, a general repealing clause is a blunt tool prone to

repeal too little or too much.

c. Implied Repeals

A statute effecting an implied repeal, also known as a repeal by implication

or implicit repeal, does not identify the statute it is repealing. Nor does it have a

17

 For example, courts and commentators have long noted that a general repealing clause 16

that repeals all “inconsistent law” is basically a logical nullity, because the doctrine of implied

repeals (see “Implied Repeals,” Part III.c, infra) already neutralizes any inconsistent earlier law

in favor of the newer repealing law. See Sutherland § 23:8 (“An express general repealing

clause to the effect that all inconsistent enactments are repealed should legally be a nullity.”);

Great N. Ry. Co. v. United States, 155 F. 945, 947 (8th Cir. 1907) (Van Devanter, J.) (citations

omitted) (“[T]he general repealing clause in section 10, ‘All laws and parts of laws in conflict

with the provisions of this act are hereby repealed,’ . . . repeals nothing which would not be

repealed equally without it.”).

 As stated before, courts do not use consistent terms to describe these repeals. For 17

example, a Pennsylvania district court found a repeal by implication of NEPA when a federal

19
general repealing clause, like the notwithstanding clause at issue here. What is key

is the legislature’s demonstration of intent to repeal a pre-existing law. Sutherland

§ 23:9. Congress’s intent to effect an implied repeal can be inferred when a later

statute conflicts with or is repugnant to an earlier statute; or when a newer statute

covers the whole subject of the earlier one, and clearly is intended as a substitute.

See United States v. Devall, 704 F.2d 1513, 1518 (11th Cir. 1983); see also Tug

Allie-B, Inc. v. United States, 273 F.3d 936, 951 (11th Cir. 2001) (Black, J.,

concurring) (listing cases requiring a “positive repugnancy” between two statutes

as a precondition for finding an implied repeal). Therefore for an implied repeal, a

conflict is a minimum requirement, rather than the helpful sign of legislative intent

supporting a general repealing clause.

The Eleventh Circuit has held that when two statutes conflict, the laterenacted statute controls to the extent it conflicts with the earlier-enacted statute.

Nguyen v. United States, 556 F.3d 1244, 1252–53 (11th Cir. 2009). Moreover, a

specific statutory provision trumps a general one. Id. at 1253. The conclusion that

two statutes conflict, however, is one that courts must not reach lightly. If any

interpretation permits both statutes to stand, the court must adopt that

interpretation, “absent a clearly expressed congressional intention to the contrary.”

highway statute used the general repealing clause “notwithstanding any other provision of law.” 

Mallory, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 484.

20
Garfield v. NDC Health Corp., 466 F.3d 1255, 1266 (11th Cir. 2006). Courts must

first “assiduously attempt” to try to construe two statutes in harmony before

concluding that one impliedly repeals the other. Tug Allie-B, 273 F.3d at 952.

Because a repeal by implication requires the most speculation about the

intent of Congress, there is a presumption against finding one. TVA v. Hill, 437

U.S. 153, 189, 98 S. Ct. 2279, 2299 (1978) (concluding that Congress’s repeated

appropriations bills funding construction of a dam did not impliedly repeal ESA

protection for a new species of fish endangered by the project); Patel v. Quality Inn

S., 846 F.2d 700, 704 (11th Cir. 1988) (“Only when Congress’ intent to repeal or

amend is clear and manifest will we conclude that a later act implicitly repeals or

amends an earlier one.”); see also Tug Allie-B, 273 F.3d at 959 (noting the

“principles of judicial restraint and separation of powers which underlie the

particularly high standard required for an implicit repeal”).

This presumption against repeal by implication applies with “even greater

force” to an appropriations bill, because legislators are entitled to assume that they

only appropriate money for lawful purposes. TVA, 437 U.S. at 190, 98 S. Ct. at

2300. Congress has the power to effect a repeal through an appropriations

bill—Congress just needs to be clear it is doing so. United States v. Will, 449 U.S.

200, 222, 101 S. Ct. 471, 484 (1980).

21
IV. Analysis

In this case, we hold that the notwithstanding clause of the Omnibus Act,

analyzed within its surrounding statutory language, repeals the relevant

environmental laws so as to deprive the federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction

over the Tribe’s suits. The district court’s finding that there was an “explicit

exemption” from the environmental laws, while yielding the correct result, blurred

the lines between the categories of repeal established in the cases. We believe it is

correct and clearer to identify as such the general repealing clause that is at work

here. Our analysis of the Omnibus Act proceeds in three parts. First, we measure

the effect of the notwithstanding clause. Second, we consider the immediacy

clause. Lastly, we examine the imperative “shall,” which deprives the Corps of

discretion and therefore strengthens the case against judicial review here.

a. Notwithstanding Clause

In the Omnibus Act, the notwithstanding clause splits the verb phrase “shall

. . . construct or cause to be constructed.” Therefore, the clause speaks directly to

any laws regulating the construction of the bridge. The environmental laws clearly

applied to such a bricks-and-mortar project. To the extent they did, the

notwithstanding clause repeals them.

We base our conclusion in the statutory language in which the

22
notwithstanding clause appears. As the Ninth Circuit noted in Consejo, a general

18

repealing clause must be read in the context of the entire statute. Indeed, this point

highlights the weakness in the Tribe’s argument that the notwithstanding clause

works only to repeal appropriations laws relating to the bridge. The Tribe argues

that the primary purpose of this bill is to appropriate money for improvements to

Everglades National Park, and that the only grammatical effect of the “Provided”

clauses that follow the main clause is to qualify the appropriation of money.

Therefore, the Tribe concludes, a notwithstanding clause located within a

“Provided” clause can only repeal appropriations laws.

While this argument has superficial appeal, its focus is fatally overbroad.

The more specific and grammatically relevant analysis of the notwithstanding

clause is that it speaks to the verb construct, rather than to the syntactically more

distant language of appropriating. The Tribe has no good rejoinder to this point.

Moreover, the Omnibus Act uses broad language here: “notwithstanding any

 The district court also based its finding of an exemption on the observation that 18

Congress included the notwithstanding clause in the Omnibus Act after the district court pointed

out the clause’s absence from Congress’s earlier-enacted § 153. Inclusion of the

notwithstanding clause the second time around “is not coincidental but rather underscores the

Court’s conclusion here regarding Congress’s clear intent.” D.E. 128 at 6. While we prefer to

ground our holding in the plain language of the statute, we acknowledge the common-sense

appeal of this argument. After all, amending statutes is one of Congress’s time-honored ways of

surmounting judicial interpretations with which it disagrees. See Scientific-Atlanta, 971 F.2d at

1571–72 & n.4. And if successive drafts of a statute provide fodder for proponents of legislative

history, see Sutherland § 45:6 & n.5, then successive statutes furnish better evidence still.

23
other provision of law.” 123 Stat. at 708 (emphasis added). Nothing about the

word “any” suggests that “law” should refer only to appropriation laws, rather than

“any” laws.

19

Our finding of a repeal squares with our precedent in Castro. If Castro were

to call our result an exemption rather than repeal via a general repealing clause, the

functional difference, if any, would be slight. At oral argument, counsel for the

Tribe sought to distinguish Castro by noting that both the statutes there spoke to

the same subject matter, whereas here a budget law would repeal environmental

laws. This objection is unavailing. Even if one grants the Tribe’s assumption that

the Rehabilitation Act and ATSA do address the same subject matter, there is

nothing in theory that prevents a budget bill from discussing a public works project

in great detail, as the Omnibus Act here well illustrates.

The Omnibus Act sufficiently specifies its subjects, and uses precise

language to identify the bridge. The cursory labels applied to a bill—“budget,”

“defense,” “health care”—do not dictate the repeal analysis. The notwithstanding

clause therefore repeals the environmental laws under which the Tribe filed suit.

 Further undercutting the Tribe’s argument is the fact that environmental laws, not 19

budgetary ones, were the legal sticking point for the bridge in the run up to Congress’s passage

of the Omnibus Act. There is accordingly no circumstantial case that the notwithstanding clause

was inserted solely to repeal appropriations laws. The Tribe asks us to consider the implications

of Congress repealing all laws potentially bearing on the bridge—for example the wage and hour

laws—but answering that question is not necessary for our decision here. Our Court in Castro

previously declined to answer the same broader question. 472 F.3d at 1337 n.1.

24
b. Immediacy Clause

In the Omnibus Act, Congress orders the Corps to build the bridge

“immediately and without further delay.” Like the notwithstanding clause, this

immediacy clause also splits the verb phrase “shall . . . construct.” Our cases

require us to read such simple English simply. “In the absence of a statutory

definition of a term, we look to the common usage of words for their meaning.”

CBS Inc. v. PrimeTime 24 Joint Venture, 245 F.3d 1217, 1222 (11th Cir. 2001)

(quotation omitted).

The simplest reading of this plain language is that Congress wanted the

bridge built now. Congress sought to facilitate this goal by repealing the

environmental laws that it had previously passed. Allowing further administrative

challenges to the bridge under those environmental laws, more than two decades

after Congress passed legislation seeking to improve water flows in the Everglades,

would further delay the speedy completion of the bridge and frustrate Congress’s

clear intent.

In this way, the immediacy clause creates a direct conflict with the timeconsuming administrative review mandated by the environmental laws, and

therefore the environmental laws must yield. This finding of a conflict cements

our conclusion that Congress effected a repeal here. We reach this conclusion

25
without deciding the issue of whether finding a conflict is necessary for the

operation of a general repealing clause.

c. Mandatory Language

In the Omnibus Act, Congress directs that the Corps shall build the bridge as

described in the June 2008 LRR/EA report. This command denies the Corps any

discretion in the matter. This lack of discretion is a third reason why the federal

courts have no subject matter jurisdiction over the Tribe’s suits. Claims brought

against an agency under NEPA, FACA, or the ESA proceed only when the agency

has choices in a matter—here, choices between alternatives that vary in their

environmental friendliness. Here, no discretion means no jurisdiction.

Procedural statutes like NEPA do not apply when an agency has no

discretion to act or not to act on a given matter. Dep’t of Transp. v. Public Citizen,

541 U.S. 752, 770, 124 S. Ct. 2204, 2217 (2004) (holding that NEPA does not

apply to an agency that lacks statutory authority to act in the relevant manner);

Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 669, 127 S.

Ct. 2518, 2536 (2007) (same holding under the ESA); Florida Key Deer v.

Paulison, 522 F.3d 1133, 1144 (11th Cir. 2008) (discussing Public Citizen) (“[A]n

agency cannot be held accountable for the effects of actions it has no discretion not

to take.”). Moreover, the tension between the Corps’s lack of discretion under the

26
“shall” of the Omnibus Act, and the environmental statutes’ presumption of agency

discretion, is an additional conflict between the statutes that we conclude supports

a finding of repeal here.

The Omnibus Act of course refers to the LRR/EA, which in turn contains

oblique references to NEPA and ESA. These stray mentions are descriptive

20

rather than prescriptive, and they are not to be mistaken for a grant of Article III

jurisdiction. Quite the opposite obtains. When a legislature writes a set of

21

administrative findings into law, the administrative findings become legislative

ones, and thus are no longer reviewable through the ordinary avenues of

administrative law. As one court put it, in this posture “the record of decision

became a legislative action and not an administrative action. In effect, there is no

longer an administrative action for us to review.” Mallory, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 481.

Mallory was a Pennsylvania district court decision that concluded that the

notwithstanding clause in a transportation bill incorporating the administrative

 The LRR/EA states that the environmental data on the bridge had been compiled “in 20

compliance with NEPA,” LRR/EA at 5-56, and moreover that the bridge “would comply” with

the ESA, LRR/EA at 5-55.

 Counsel for the Tribe conceded at oral argument that it had waived this argument on 21

appeal because it had failed to argue it to the district courts below. We generally do not consider

arguments raised for the first time on appeal. Harrison v. Benchmark Elecs. Huntsville, Inc., 593

F.3d 1206, 1215 n.8 (11th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). We note it now only because it falls

within the sweep of our plain-language analysis of the Omnibus Act. The Tribe conceded

moreover that it waived a second argument by failing to make it to the courts below: that any

repeal or exemption found within an appropriations bill can last only one year because of the

annual nature of the appropriations cycle. 

27
record of decision effected an implied repeal of NEPA and the Clean Water Act for

a federal interstate highway project. Mallory went on to state: “That is, by making

the administrative decision a legislative decision, Congress has barred plaintiffs

from seeking review of the administrative decision. Moreover, the action removes

from the administrative agencies any discretion they may have had: they now are

required by statute to act in a predetermined manner.” Id. at 482.

We believe the analysis in Mallory applies here. The lack of discretion in

Congress’s command to build the bridge precludes the applicability of statutes like

NEPA or the ESA, which presume agency discretion as a starting point. And, the

adoption of the administrative finding as a legislative finding bars judicial review

of agency action.

V. Conclusion

The NEPA court, clearly aware of the high legal standard for an implied

repeal of NEPA and FACA, concluded that the Omnibus Act effected an “explicit

exemption . . . from the reach of such statutes.” D.E. 128 at 7. It did this even

though the Omnibus Act does not explicitly mention any statute it is repealing.

The Tribe correctly points out that the Omnibus Act language does not meet the

generally understood test for an explicit repeal. For the reasons we have already

stated, we prefer to describe this repeal as one resulting from a general repealing

28
clause. Moreover, for the reasons stated by the district court in the NEPA case,

22

we find that the Tribe’s constitutional challenges to the Omnibus Act are without

merit. We therefore affirm the district courts’ dismissals for lack of subject

23

matter jurisdiction. Therefore, we affirm the judgments of the district courts.

AFFIRMED.

 We also reject the Tribe’s request for us to apply the rule of construction that 22

ambiguous statutes must be read in the Indians’ favor because the Omnibus Act is an

unambiguous statute. See, e.g., Fla. Paraplegic Ass’n, Inc. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of

Fla., 166 F.3d 1126, 1131 (11th Cir. 1999).

 Any possible error in the ESA court’s application of collateral estoppel to bar the 23

Tribe’s constitutional claims is harmless given this panel’s determination of the same

constitutional issues on the merits.

29