United States Department of Labor

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

__________________________________________

J.W., Appellant

and

U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, MAIN POST OFFICE, 

Greensboro, NC, Employer

__________________________________________

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Docket No. 19-0237

Issued: July 1, 2019

Appearances: Case Submitted on the Record

Joanne Marie Wright, for the appellant1

Office of Solicitor, for the Director

DECISION AND ORDER

Before:

PATRICIA H. FITZGERALD, Deputy Chief Judge

ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Alternate Judge

VALERIE D. EVANS-HARRELL, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION

On November 10, 2018 appellant, through her representative, filed a timely appeal from a 

June 13, 2018 merit decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). 

Pursuant to the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act2(FECA) and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 

501.3, the Board has jurisdiction over the merits of this case.

 

1

In all cases in which a representative has been authorized in a matter before the Board, no claim for a fee for legal 

or other service performed on appeal before the Board is valid unless approved by the Board. 20 C.F.R. § 501.9(e). 

No contract for a stipulated fee or on a contingent fee basis will be approved by the Board. Id. An attorney or 

representative’s collection of a fee without the Board’s approval may constitute a misdemeanor, subject to fine or 

imprisonment for up to one year or both. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 292. Demands for payment of fees to a 

representative, prior to approval by the Board, may be reported to appropriate authorities for investigation.

2 5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.
2

ISSUE

The issue is whether appellant has met her burden of proof to establish an emotional 

condition causally related to the accepted compensable factor of her federal employment.

FACTUAL HISTORY

On May 18, 2015 appellant, then a 53-year-old letter carrier, filed a traumatic injury claim 

(Form CA-1) alleging that on May 12, 2015 she developed stress and anxiety due to harassment 

by management. Specifically, she alleged that she was forced to sit in a wheelchair for eight hours 

with no duties, denied union representation, ordered to stay in an office with two supervisors, and 

forced to leave the building. On the reverse side of the claim form, the employing establishment 

noted that appellant stopped work on May 18, 2015.3

In a development letter dated May 21, 2015, OWCP informed appellant that the evidence 

of record was insufficient to establish her claim. It advised of the type of factual and medical

evidence required to support her claim. OWCP afforded appellant 30 days to provide the requested 

information. 

Following OWCP’s request for additional information it received statements from 

appellant and witnesses detailing the alleged events and medical evidence.

The employing establishment, on May 19, 2015, completed an authorization for 

examination and/or treatment (Form CA-16). In Part B of the Form CA-16, attending physician’s 

report, dated May 25, 2015, Dr. Rupinder Kaur, a Board-certified psychiatrist, noted appellant’s

history of previously witnessing a coworker murder another coworker. He also noted her alleged 

current history of harassment at work. Dr. Kaur related appellant’s symptoms of anxiety, 

flashbacks, nightmares, and disturbed sleep. His diagnosis included post-traumatic stress disorder 

(PTSD) and adjustment disorder. Dr. Kaur checked a box marked “yes” indicating that the 

diagnosed conditions were caused or aggravated by the described employment incident.

Dr. Kaur, in a May 19, 2015 duty status report (Form CA-17) noted an injury date of 

May 18, 2015 and diagnosed adjustment disorder, which he attributed to the employment injury. 

He also reported other disabling conditions of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and panic 

attacks. 

In a May 25, 2015 report, Dr. Kaur noted that appellant has been his patient since 

April 2014 when she was diagnosed with PTSD and major depression. On May 19, 2015 appellant 

was seen for flashbacks of witnessing a coworker murdering a young woman at work and beating 

 

3 The employing establishment listed May 18, 2015 as the date of injury and noted that appellant refused to sign a 

job offer (2499) from the employing establishment. The record contains evidence that appellant had been off work 

due to a knee injury and work restrictions had been provided by her treating physician. A May 20, 2015 memorandum

to file noted that appellant had two prior claims, OWCP File Nos. xxxxxx221 and xxxxxx344. Under OWCP File 

No. xxxxxx344, OWCP accepted the conditions of bilateral knee chondromalacia, bilateral knee contusion, and 

bilateral knee sprain due to an accepted March 2, 2015 traumatic injury. Under OWCP File No. xxxxxx221, it denied 

her emotional condition claim, finding she failed to establish any compensable factors with respect to her allegation 

of witnessing a coworker murder one coworker and assault another. 
3

another person up very badly. Dr. Kumar noted that appellant had a history of depression and 

anxiety since the age of 18. Currently, he related that appellant was off work as the result of an 

orthopedic condition. Dr. Kaur opined that appellant was very anxious from harassment and 

bullying at work by coworkers and work events that had occurred over the past year.

By decision dated July 1, 2015, OWCP denied appellant’s claim, finding that the 

requirements had not been met to establish that she sustained an emotional condition “that arose 

during the course of employment and within the scope of compensable work factors” as defined 

by FECA. 

On June 23, 2016 appellant requested reconsideration. She submitted a September 11, 

2015 step B grievance decision, which found that management violated a section of the employing 

establishment handbook when it forced her to sit in a wheelchair for eight hours in the middle of 

the workroom floor on May 12, 2015. It found that this behavior constituted harassment as it 

meant to embarrass and demean appellant. The decision also noted that on May 12, 2015 managers 

requested that appellant come into a conference room so they could give her an employing 

establishment PS Form 2499 (offer of modified assignment [limited duty]) and she felt threatened 

when they denied her union representation. 

By decision dated September 16, 2016, OWCP modified the prior decision, finding that

the evidence of record established a compensable factor of employment with respect to 

harassment. It found management’s requiring appellant to sit in a wheelchair in the middle of the 

workroom floor in front of coworkers constituted harassment. However, OWCP denied her claim,

finding the medical evidence failed to establish that her preexisting stress condition had been 

caused or aggravated by the accepted employment factor. 

In a September 2, 2017 report, Dr. Kaur related that since June 2014 he had provided 

appellant with psychiatric care for her PTSD, severe anxiety disorder, and panic disorder. He 

attributed her PTSD to a prior work incident involving a coworker assaulting one coworker and 

murdering another. On May 14, 2017 appellant was seen for a follow-up visit when she related 

that she had been forced to sit in the middle of a room in a wheelchair with no work to perform. 

She related feeling distressed and distraught from sitting in the wheelchair and being ridiculed and 

demeaned while in the wheelchair. Dr. Kumar opined that this incident exacerbated appellant’s 

preexisting PTSD and her incapacitating and disabling anxiety. 

On September 7, 2017 appellant requested reconsideration.

On March 23, 2018 appellant again requested reconsideration, noting her prior request of 

September 7, 2017. 

By decision dated June 13, 2018, OWCP denied modification, finding that Dr. Kaur’s 

September 2, 2017 opinion failed to explain how the accepted May 12, 2015 compensable factor

caused or aggravated her diagnosed medical condition. 

LEGAL PRECEDENT

Workers’ compensation law does not apply to each and every injury or illness that is 

somehow related to an employee’s employment. There are situations where an injury or an illness 
4

has some connection with the employment, but nevertheless does not come within the concept or 

coverage of workers’ compensation. Where the disability results from an employee’s emotional 

reaction to his or her regular or specially assigned duties or to a requirement imposed by the 

employment, the disability comes within the coverage of FECA.4 On the other hand, the disability 

is not covered where it results from such factors as an employee’s fear of a reduction-in-force or 

his or her frustration from not being permitted to work in a particular environment or to hold a 

particular position.5

A claimant has the burden of proof to establish by the weight of the reliable, probative, and 

substantial evidence that the condition for which he or she claims compensation was caused or 

adversely affected by employment factors.6 This burden includes the submission of a detailed 

description of the employment factors or conditions which he or she believes caused or adversely 

affected a condition for which compensation is claimed, and a rationalized medical opinion 

relating the claimed condition to compensable employment factors.7

In cases involving emotional conditions, the Board has held that, when working conditions 

are alleged as factors in causing a condition or disability, OWCP, as part of its adjudicatory 

function, must make findings of fact regarding which working conditions are deemed compensable 

factors of employment and are to be considered by a physician when providing an opinion on 

causal relationship and which working conditions are not deemed factors of employment and may 

not be considered.8 If a claimant does implicate a factor of employment, OWCP should then 

determine whether the evidence of record substantiates that factor. When the matter asserted is a 

compensable factor of employment and the evidence of record establishes the truth of the matter 

asserted, OWCP must base its decision on an analysis of the medical evidence.9

The medical evidence required to establish causal relationship is rationalized medical 

opinion evidence. The opinion of the physician must be based on a complete factual and medical 

background of the employee, must be one of reasonable certainty, and must be supported by 

medical rationale explaining the nature of the relationship between the diagnosed condition and 

the specific employment factors identified by the employee.

10

 

4 See J.W., Docket No. 17-0999 (issued September 4, 2018); Trudy A. Scott, 52 ECAB 309 (2001); Lillian Cutler,

28 ECAB 125 (1976).

5 See J.W., id.; J.F., 59 ECAB 331 (2008); Gregorio E. Conde, 52 ECAB 410 (2001).

6 T.G., Docket No. 18-1718 (issued May 9, 2019); Pamela R. Rice, 38 ECAB 838, 841 (1987). 

7 See A.A., Docket No. 17-0127 (issued June 18, 2018); Effie O. Morris, 44 ECAB 470, 473-74 (1993).

8 D.L., 58 ECAB 217 (2006); Jerald R. Gray, 57 ECAB 611 (2006); Norma L. Blank, 43 ECAB 384, 389-

90 (1992). 

9 See J.W., supra note 4; Robert Breeden, 57 ECAB 622 (2006). 

10 D.R., Docket No. 18-1592 (issued February 25, 2019).
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ANALYSIS

The Board finds that appellant has not met her burden of proof to establish that her 

emotional condition was causally related to the accepted compensable factor of her federal 

employment.11

The Board finds that the medical evidence of record does not establish a causal relationship

between the accepted compensable employment factor of management requiring her to sit in a 

wheelchair for eight hours and her diagnosed emotional conditions.

In a Form CA-17 dated May 19, 2015, Dr. Kaur diagnosed anxiety and stress, which he 

attributed to a “May 18, 2015” employment incident. The Board finds that Dr. Kaur’s Form 

CA-17 report is of no probative value as he did not relate the diagnosed emotional condition to the 

accepted May 12, 2015 compensable employment factor.12 Thus, this report is insufficient to meet 

appellant’s burden of proof.

Dr. Kaur provided reports dated May 25, 2015 and September 2, 2017 diagnosing PTSD, 

anxiety, and major depression. He opined that appellant’s PTSD, anxiety, and major depression

had been aggravated by being ridiculed by coworkers when she was forced to sit in the middle of 

a room in a wheelchair. Dr. Kaur noted that appellant had a history of depression and anxiety 

since she was 18, he also noted a history of PTSD from witnessing a coworker murder one person 

and badly beat another coworker. In the May 25, 2015 report, he attributed her anxiety to 

harassment and bullying at work in addition to work events that had occurred during the past year. 

In his September 2, 2017 report, Dr. Kaur opined that appellant’s accepted May 12, 2015 

compensable factor of being forced to sit in a wheelchair by management and being ridiculed 

aggravated her preexisting PTSD and anxiety. However, he did not offer a medical explanation 

as to how appellant’s emotional condition was caused by the accepted employment factor.13 

Although Dr. Kaur generally supported causal relationship in his reports, he did not provide 

sufficient medical rationale explaining how the accepted May 12, 2015 compensable factor

aggravated her preexisting PTSD, anxiety or depression. A mere conclusion without the necessary 

rationale explaining how the accepted work factors could result in the diagnosed condition is 

insufficient to meet the employee’s burden of proof.14 Furthermore, the Board has held that reports 

which lack rationale are insufficient to meet appellant’s burden of proof.15

In a May 25, 2015 attending physician’s portion of a Form CA-16, Dr. Kaur noted 

appellant’s symptoms including nightmares, sleep disturbance, and flashbacks. He checked the 

box marked “yes” indicating that the condition was caused or aggravated by the accepted 

compensable employment factor. The Board has held that an opinion consisting of a checkmark 

 

11 See K.T., Docket No. 17-1717 (issued March 27, 2018): William P. George, 43 ECAB 1159 (1992).

12 See A.E., Docket No. 18-1587 (issued March 13, 2019); L.C., Docket No. 08-1655 (issued April 2, 2009).

13 See K.T., supra note 11; A.B., Docket No. 08-2508 (issued July 10, 2009).

14 A.E., supra note 12; P.B. Docket No. 17-1912 (issued December 28, 2018).

15 K.T., supra note 11.
6

notation supporting causation, without more by the way of supporting medical rationale, is of 

limited probative value and insufficient to establish causal relationship.16

As appellant has not submitted reasoned medical evidence explaining how her diagnosed 

emotional conditions were causally related to her accepted compensable employment factor, she 

has not met her burden of proof.17

On appeal appellant’s representative contends that appellant has met her burden of proof 

with Dr. Kaur’s reports, which she stated were based on an accurate history and conclusion that 

her emotional conditions had been aggravated by the accepted May 12, 2015 compensable factor. 

However, for the reasons set forth above, the Board found that Dr. Kaur failed to provide medical 

rationale explaining how the accepted May 12, 2015 compensable factor caused or aggravated 

appellant’s diagnosed emotional conditions. Thus, his reports were insufficient to establish an 

emotional condition caused by the accepted May 12, 2015 compensable factor.

18

Appellant may submit new evidence or argument with a written request for reconsideration 

to OWCP within one year of this merit decision, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 8128(a) and 20 C.F.R. 

§§ 10.605 through 10.607.

CONCLUSION

The Board finds that appellant has not met her burden of proof to establish an emotional 

condition causally related to the accepted compensable factor of her federal employment.

 

16 See A.J., Docket No. 18-1116 (issued January 23, 2019); E.C., Docket No. 17-0902 (issued March 9, 2018).

17 Id.

18 Where an employing establishment properly executes a Form CA-16 authorizing medical treatment related to a 

claim for a work injury, the form creates a contractual obligation, which does not involve the employee directly, to 

pay for the cost of the examination/treatment regardless of the action taken on the claim. See Tracy P. Spillane, 54 

ECAB 608 (2003). The period for which treatment is authorized by a Form CA-16 is limited to 60 days from the date 

of issuance, unless terminated earlier by OWCP. See 20 C.F.R. § 10.300(c).
7

ORDER

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the June 13, 2018 decision of the Office of Workers’

Compensation Programs is affirmed.

Issued: July 1, 2019

Washington, DC

Patricia H. Fitzgerald, Deputy Chief Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Alec J. Koromilas, Alternate Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Valerie D. Evans-Harrell, Alternate Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board