[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 16-16764

Non-Argument Calendar

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Agency No. A200-615-657

MAURICIO VILCHIZ-BELLO, 

 Petitioner,

 versus

U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL, 

 Respondent.

________________________

Petition for Review of a Decision of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

________________________

(September 25, 2017)

Before TJOFLAT, WILLIAM PRYOR, and JULIE CARNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

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Petitioner Mauricio Vilchiz-Bello, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions 

for review from the Board of Immigration Appeals’s (“BIA”) final order affirming 

the decision of the Immigration Judge (“IJ”). On appeal, Petitioner argues that his

conviction for criminal use of personal identification information under Florida 

Statute § 817.568(2)(a) does not categorically qualify as a crime involving moral 

turpitude. After careful review, we deny the petition for review. 

I. BACKGROUND

Petitioner first entered the United States without admission or inspection in 

1998. He departed the United States voluntarily in October 2010, but later reentered in January 2011, again illegally, without being admitted or paroled. In 

April 2011, Petitioner was convicted in Arizona of solicitation to commit 

smuggling. 

The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) subsequently issued 

Petitioner a notice to appear (“NTA”), charging him as removable (1) under 

8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), for being present in the United States without being 

admitted or paroled, and (2) under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), because he was 

convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. 

At a hearing before the IJ, Petitioner conceded removability as an alien 

present in the United States without admission or parole, but denied that he was 

removable for having committed a crime involving moral turpitude. Specifically, 

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he contended that solicitation to commit alien smuggling is not a crime of moral 

turpitude. Petitioner later filed an application for withholding of removal. He also 

filed an application for cancellation of removal, asserting that his removal would 

cause exceptional hardship to his child, who is a United States citizen. 

In June 2014, and citing a second conviction, the DHS filed an additional 

charge of removability, again alleging that Petitioner was inadmissible under 

8 U.S.C. § 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), as an alien who had committed a crime involving 

moral turpitude. In particular, the DHS alleged that Petitioner was convicted in 

November 2013 of criminal use of personal identification information, in violation 

of Florida Statute § 817.568(2), a third-degree felony. At a subsequent hearing 

before the IJ, Petitioner admitted that he was convicted of the above charge, but he 

contended that this conviction for criminal use of personal identification 

information was, like his other conviction, not a crime involving moral turpitude. 

Following the parties’ briefing on the issue, the IJ issued a written order 

sustaining the charge under § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), based on Petitioner’s conviction 

for a crime involving moral turpitude. First, the IJ determined that Petitioner’s 

Arizona conviction for solicitation to commit smuggling did not qualify as a crime 

involving moral turpitude. Focusing next on Petitioner’s conviction for criminal 

use of personal identification information, the IJ applied the categorical approach 

and determined that the least culpable conduct required to sustain a conviction 

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under § 817.568(2)(a) was possession with intent to fraudulently use another 

person’s identification information without the person’s authorization or prior 

consent. This conduct required a culpable mental state—the specific intent to 

“fraudulently use” the identification information—and was reprehensible because 

it involved possessing items with an accompanying intent to use them 

fraudulently—conduct that necessarily involves moral turpitude. Therefore, the IJ 

held that Petitioner’s conviction under § 817.568(2)(a) was a crime involving 

moral turpitude and sustained the charge under § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). 

In a separate oral decision, the IJ denied Petitioner’s application for 

cancellation for removal, concluding that he was statutorily ineligible based on his 

conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude. The IJ also denied Petitioner’s 

application for withholding of removal. 

Petitioner appealed to the BIA, arguing in relevant part that he was eligible 

for cancellation of removal because his conviction for criminal use of personal 

identification information was not a crime involving moral turpitude. He 

acknowledged that offenses involving fraud ordinarily qualified as crimes 

involving moral turpitude, but argued that the Florida statute required more of an

intent to deceive than an intent to defraud. He also challenged the denial of his 

application for withholding of removal. 

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The BIA dismissed Petitioner’s appeal and affirmed the IJ’s determination 

that Petitioner was removable under § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) and ineligible for 

cancellation of removal because his conviction for criminal use of personal 

identification information was a crime involving moral turpitude. The BIA 

explained that the Florida statute was not divisible and that the offense was

categorically a crime involving moral turpitude because the full range of conduct 

under the statute was inherently fraudulent. The BIA also denied Petitioner’s 

application for withholding of removal. 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

We review the BIA’s decision as the final judgment, except to the extent the

BIA expressly adopted the IJ’s decision. Lopez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 504 F.3d 1341, 

1344 (11th Cir. 2007). Where the BIA agrees with the IJ’s reasoning, we also 

review the decision of the IJ to the extent of that agreement. See Kazemzadeh v. 

U.S. Att’y Gen., 577 F.3d 1341, 1350 (11th Cir. 2009). We review de novo

whether an alien’s conviction qualifies as a crime involving moral turpitude.1

 

Gelin v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 837 F.3d 1236, 1240 (11th Cir. 2016). 

 1

 Our jurisdiction is limited to questions of law and constitutional claims when an alien, who 

was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, seeks review of his removal order. See 8 

U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C), (a)(2)(D). We retain jurisdiction over the legal question of whether 

Petitioner’s conviction qualifies as a crime involving moral turpitude. See Cano v. U.S. Att’y 

Gen., 709 F.3d 1052, 1053 (11th Cir. 2013). 

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B. Crime Involving Moral Turpitude

Petitioner argues here, as he did before the agency, that his conviction for 

criminal use of personal identification information under Florida Statute 

§ 817.568(2)(a) is not a crime involving moral turpitude. Because his conviction is

not a crime involving moral turpitude, he asserts that he is not statutorily barred 

from cancellation of removal. 

An alien convicted of an act which constitutes the essential elements of a 

crime involving moral turpitude is inadmissible. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). 

For cancellation of removal of nonpermanent residents, an alien is statutorily 

ineligible if he has been convicted of certain offenses, including a crime involving 

moral turpitude. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(C); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). 

The term “moral turpitude” is not defined by statute, but we have defined a 

crime involving moral turpitude to mean an “act of baseness, vileness, or depravity 

in the private and social duties which a man owes to his fellow men, or to society 

in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between 

man and man.” Cano v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 709 F.3d 1052, 1053 (11th Cir. 2013)

(quotation omitted). “Generally, a crime involving dishonesty or false statement is 

considered to be one involving moral turpitude.” Walker v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 783 

F.3d 1226, 1229 (11th Cir. 2015) (quotations and alteration omitted) (holding that 

uttering a forged instrument is a crime involving moral turpitude because it 

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involves deceit); Itani v. Ashcroft, 298 F.3d 1213, 1216 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding 

that misprision of a felony is a crime involving moral turpitude because it 

“necessarily involves an affirmative act of concealment or participation in a felony, 

behavior that runs contrary to accepted societal duties and involves dishonest or 

fraudulent activity”). 

To determine whether a conviction qualifies as a crime involving moral 

turpitude, we generally apply the categorical approach. Gelin, 837 F.3d at 1241. 

Under this approach, we consider only the statutory definition of the offense, not 

the specific facts underlying the conviction. Id. “In doing so, we ask ‘whether the 

least culpable conduct necessary to sustain a conviction under the statute meets the 

standard of a crime involving moral turpitude.’” Id. (quotation omitted).

The statute at issue here is the Florida criminal use of personal identification 

information statute, Florida Statute § 817.568(2)(a).2

 That statute provides that: 

“Any person who willfully and without authorization fraudulently uses, or 

possesses with intent to fraudulently use, personal identification information 

concerning another person without first obtaining that person’s consent, commits 

 2 To the extent Petitioner argues that it is not clear which subsection of § 817.568 he was 

convicted of, as the BIA noted, Petitioner did not challenge the IJ’s determination that he was 

convicted under subsection (2)(a). Further, Petitioner admitted that he was convicted of criminal 

use of personal identification information in the third degree, which corresponds to subsection 

(2)(a). See Fla. Stat. § 817.568(2)(a). 

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the offense of fraudulent use of personal identification information.” Fla. Stat. 

§ 817.568(2)(a). 

Here, we agree with the BIA’s and IJ’s determination that a conviction for 

criminal use of personal identification information under Florida Statute 

§ 817.568(2)(a) categorically qualifies as a crime involving moral turpitude. 

Applying the categorical approach, the least culpable conduct prohibited by 

§ 817.568(2)(a)—possession with intent to fraudulently use another person’s 

personal identification without that person’s consent—obviously meets the 

standard of a crime involving moral turpitude. See Gelin, 837 F.3d at 1241. 

Because the least culpable conduct under § 817.568(2)(a) involves the specific 

intent to possess personal information with intent to defraud, the BIA reasonably 

concluded that Petitioner’s offense involves moral turpitude. See Walker, 783 F.3d 

at 1229; Itani, 298 F.3d at 1216. 

We are not persuaded by Petitioner’s argument that the Florida statute is 

overbroad because the definition of fraud does not include detriment to the victim. 

Petitioner has not cited to, nor have we found, any precedent holding that an 

offense must have an element of detriment or pecuniary loss to the victim in order 

to constitute a crime involving moral turpitude. Further, the Florida jury 

instructions define the term “fraudulently” as “purposely or intentionally 

suppressing the truth or perpetrating a deception or both.” In re Standard Jury 

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Instructions in Criminal Cases—Report 2016–03, 202 So. 3d 830, 833 (Fla. 2016). 

Based on this definition, the statute includes, at the very least, dishonesty, which 

we have consistently held to involve moral turpitude. Fla. Stat. § 817.568(2)(a);

Walker, 783 F.3d at 1229. Therefore, the least culpable conduct necessary to 

sustain a conviction under § 817.568(2) meets the standard of moral turpitude. See 

Gelin, 837 F.3d at 1241. 

Accordingly, the BIA and IJ properly concluded that Petitioner’s conviction 

for criminal use of personal identification information categorically qualifies as a 

crime involving moral turpitude and renders him removable under 

§ 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) and statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal. 

PETITION DENIED.

3

 

 3 In his brief, Petitioner expressly states that he is not challenging the BIA’s denial of his 

application for withholding of removal. He has therefore abandoned this argument on appeal. 

See Sepulveda v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 401 F.3d 1226, 1228 n.2 (11th Cir. 2005) (explaining that 

issues not raised in an appellate brief are abandoned). 

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