NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOSEPH R. MARIDON Sr.,

Petitioner,

v.

FEDERAL AVIATION 

ADMINISTRATION,

Respondent.

No. 23-1047

FAA No. 2020-0949

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Federal Aviation Administration

Submitted August 20, 2024**

Portland, Oregon

Before: CHRISTEN and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges, and EZRA, District Judge.

***

Joseph Maridon petitions for review of an order issued by the Federal 

Aviation Administration’s (FAA) chief administrative judge (CAJ) reversing an 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*** The Honorable David A. Ezra, United States District Judge for the

District of Hawaii, sitting by designation.

FILED

AUG 23 2024

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 23-1047

administrative law judge’s (ALJ) order awarding Maridon attorneys’ fees and costs

after the ALJ dismissed the enforcement action the FAA brought against him. We 

assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts and recite them only as necessary. 

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2), and we review the agency’s 

fee decision for substantial evidence. Id.; see also Blaylock Elec. v. NLRB, 121 

F.3d 1230, 1233 (9th Cir. 1997). We deny the petition. 

A private party who prevails in an agency adjudication is entitled to 

attorney’s fees unless the agency was “substantially justified” in its position. 5 

U.S.C. § 504(a)(1). The agency bears the burden to show that its position was 

substantially justified, which requires the agency to “prove that its position had a 

reasonable basis in both fact and law.” Mendenhall v. Nat’l Transp. Safety Bd., 92 

F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 1996). “The agency’s ‘position’ refers to the agency’s 

decision to initiate the underlying action, as well as the agency’s subsequent 

litigation positions.” Id.

Substantial evidence supports the CAJ’s decision to reverse the ALJ’s fee 

award on the ground that the FAA’s position was substantially justified. Maridon 

argues that the agency was not substantially justified in its decision to initiate an 

enforcement action against him after he parked his truck in a taxi lane at the North 

Las Vegas Airport to prevent an aircraft from taxiing. Maridon contends that 14 

C.F.R. § 91.11, which states that “[n]o person may . . . interfere with a 
3 23-1047

crewmember in the performance of the crewmember’s duties aboard an aircraft 

being operated,” does not apply to persons who are not aboard an aircraft. The 

record supports the CAJ’s conclusion that the agency had a reasonable legal basis 

for its contrary interpretation of § 91.11 and a reasonable factual basis to charge 

Maridon under that section. See Medina Tovar v. Zuchowski, 41 F.4th 1085, 1089 

(9th Cir. 2022) (holding that the district court did not err by finding the 

government’s position substantially justified where the “case posed a novel legal 

question of statutory interpretation”). 

We reject Maridon’s unsupported argument that the FAA’s position was not 

substantially justified because it lacked jurisdiction over the taxi lane he blocked. 

Congress broadly tasked the FAA with “maintaining[] and enhancing safety and 

security . . . in air commerce,” 49 U.S.C. § 40101(d)(1), which includes regulation 

of actions that are “preparatory to flight.” Daily v. Bond, 623 F.2d 624, 626 (9th 

Cir. 1980) (per curiam). Maridon’s remaining arguments based on estoppel, lawof-the-case doctrine, and Auer deference are similarly misplaced. Because we 

conclude that substantial evidence supported the CAJ’s fee decision, we do not 

reach Maridon’s arguments concerning the appropriate hourly rate. 

PETITION DENIED.