1 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 38626

STATE OF IDAHO , Plaintiff-Respondent ,

v.

KEITH DEAN CLARK , Defendant-Appellant

. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) 2012 Unpublished Opinion No. 492

Filed: May 24, 2012
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

TH IS IS AN UNPUBLISHED OPINION AND SHALL NOT BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada County. Hon. Ronald J. Wilper , District Judge.
Judgment of conviction for possession of a controlled substance, affirmed

. Sara B. Thomas, State Appellate Public Defender; Diane M. Walker, Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Nicole L. Schafer, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.

________________________________________________ GUTIERREZ, Judge
K eith Dean Clark appeals from the judgment of conviction entered upon his con ditional guilty plea to possession of a controlled substance . Specifically, he challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress. We affirm.
I.
FACTS AND PROCEDURE A Garden City police officer observed Clark riding his bicycle at night and determined
that although Clark had a flash light emitting light in front of his bike , he may have been merely holding the flashlight. The officer stopped Clark for failing to have a light attached to his person or bicycle while riding at night as required by statute . A subsequent search of Clark’s person led to discovery of a knife, methamphetamine, and drug paraphernalia. Clark was charged with possession of a controlled sub stance, Idaho Code § 37

- 2732(c); concealing a dangerous weapon, Idaho Code § 18

- 3302(7); and possession of drug paraphernalia, Idaho Code § 37

- 2734A. Clark2 moved to suppress all evidence seized after the stop on the basis the officer had no reasonable
,

ar ticulable suspicion to initiate a stop because Clark was complying with the statute by holding the flashlight. Following a hearing, the district court denied the motion. Clark entered a conditional guilty plea to possession of a controlled substance, res erving his right to challenge the denial of his motion to suppress. The State dismissed the two remaining charges. Clark now appeals the denial of his motion to suppress.
II.
ANALYSIS Clark contends the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress because the officer did not possess reasonable articulable suspicion for the stop where Clark was carrying a flashlight illuminating the road
, which was not in contravention of the statute. The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurc ated. When a decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court’s findings of fact supported by substantial evidence, but we freely review the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found. State v. Atkinson
, 128 I daho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996). At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual
inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez

- Molina , 1 27 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. Schevers , 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d 659, 662 (Ct. App. 1999). The Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement applies to b rief investigatory
detentions. Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968); Sta te v. Bishop , 146 Idaho 804, 811, 203 P.3d 1203, 1210 (2009)

. Typically, seizures must be based on probable cause to be reasonable. Florida v. Royer , 460 U.S. 491, 499

- 500 (1983) ; Bishop , 146 Idaho at 811, 203 P.3d at 1210. However, limited investigatory detentions, based on less than probable cause, are permissible when justified by an officer’s reasonable
, articulable suspicion that a person has committed, or is about to commit, a crime. Royer , 460 U.S. at 498; Bishop , 146 Idaho at 811, 203 P.3d at 121 0. Reasonable suspicion must be based on specific, articulable facts and the rational inferences that
can be drawn from those facts. Bishop , 146 Idaho at 811, 203 P.3d at 1210 ; State v. Sheldon
, 139 Idaho 980, 983, 88 P.3d 1220, 1223 (Ct. App. 2003). The quantity and quality of information necessary to establish reasonable suspicion is less than that necessary to establish probable cause. Alabama v. White , 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990); Bishop , 146 Idaho at 811, 203 P.3d at 1210. Still, reasonable suspicion requires more than a mere hunch or “ inchoate and3 unparticularized suspicion.” White , 496 U.S. at 329; Bishop , 146 Idaho at 811, 203 P.3d at 1210. Whether an officer possessed reasonable suspicion is evaluated based on the totality of the
circum stances known to the officer at or before the time of the stop. Bishop , 146 Idaho at 811,
203 P.3d at 1210 ; Sheldon , 139 Idaho at 983, 88 P.3d at 1223.
The statute
, which the officer testified he suspected Clark of violating because the officer
believed C lark was merely holding the flashlight
, requir es : Every bicycle in use [from sunset to sunrise ] shall be operated with a light emitting device visible from a distance of at least five hundred (500) feet to the front, attached to the bicycle or the rider , a nd with a reflector clearly visible from the rear of the bicycle.

I.C. § 49

- 723 (emphasis added). In his motion to suppress, Clark contended he was holding a flashli ght at the time of the stop and a “ hand

- held light

- emitting device sufficient ly abide s by [the statute] as said device is attached to the cyclist’s hand while being held.” The district court denied the motion, reasoning that holding the flashlight was not the same as having it attached to the rider as required by the

statute

. T he cou rt found the officer’s testimony
, that the officer believed Clark w as merely holding the flash light and the flashlight was not attached to Clark in any manner
, was credible

. T herefore, the court surmised, the officer had reasonable articulable suspicion to stop Cl ark to investigate the situation. The court further pointed out that e ven if it turned out the flash light was actually a ttache d to Clark by a string, as Clark had testified it was, as long as the o fficer had

“ a good

- faith belief” that Clark was merely hol ding the flashlight
, the officer possessed

re asonable, articulable suspicion that Clark was acting in contravention of the statute. On appeal
, Clark contends the flashlight was “ attached” to him by virtue of his holding the flashlight in his hand and
, t herefore
, the officer did not have reaso nable
, articulable suspicion
that Clark was violating the statute. This Court exercises free review over the application and
construction of statutes. State v. Patterson , 140 Idaho 612, 614, 97 P.3d 479, 481 (Ct. A pp. 2004) ; State v. Schumacher , 131 Idaho 484, 485, 959 P.2d 465, 466 (Ct. App. 1998). Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, this Court must give effect to the statute as written, without engaging in statutory construction. State v. R hode , 133 Idaho 459, 462, 988 P.2d 685, 688 (1999); State v. Burnight , 132 Idaho 654, 659, 978 P.2d 214, 219 (1999);
Patterson , 140 Idaho at 614, 97 P.3d at 481. The language of the statute is to be given its plain,4 obvious, and rational meaning. Burnight , 132 Idaho at 659, 978 P.2d at 219; Patterson , 140 Idaho at 614, 97 P.3d at 481. If the language is clear and unambiguous, there is no occasion for the court to resort to legislative history or rules of statutory interpretation. Patterson , 140 I daho at 614, 97 P.3d at 481

. When this Court must engage in statutory construction, it has the duty to ascertain the legislative intent and give effect to that intent. Rhode , 133 Idaho at 462, 988 P.2d at 688; Patterson , 140 Idaho at 614, 97 P.3d at 481. To ascertain the intent of the legislature, not only must the literal words of the statute be examined, but also the context of those words, the public policy behind the statute, and its legislative history. Rhode , 133 Idaho at 462, 988 P.2d at 688; Pat terson , 140 Idaho at 614, 97 P.3d at 481. It is incumbent upon a court to give a statute

an interpretation that will not render it a nullity. Patterson , 140 Idaho at 614, 97 P.3d at 481;
State v. Beard , 135 Idaho 641, 646, 22 P.3d 116, 121 (Ct. App. 2001 ). We agree with the district court that merely holding a flashlight does not comply with the statute’s requirement that the light source be “ attached” to the bicycle or rider. In c ommon parlance
, “ attached” implies a more permanent connection than what Clark argues occurred here.

“ Attached” is defined as “ permanently fixed
, ” W EBSTER ’ S T HIRD N EW I NTERNATIONAL
D ICTIONARY 140 ( 1993 ) (emphasis added)
, and “ joined; connected ; bound,” Definition of

“ attached
, ” D ICTIONARY

. COM , http://dictionary.reference.com/ browse/attached (last visited May 7, 2012). See also B LACK ’ S L AW D ICTIONARY 136 ( 8 th ed. 2004 ) (defining “ attach” as

“ [t]o annex, bind, or fasten”). In addition, it is clear from the context of this statute within the larger scheme of statutes governing bicycles that there is a distinction between a light source merely being held and being “ attached.” Idaho Code § 49

- 719 provides: “ Carrying articles. No person operating a bicycle shall carry any package, bundle or article which prevents the operator
fr om using at least one (1) hand in the control and operation of the bicycle.” ( E mphasis added

. ) Had the legislature intended carrying a light source to be sufficient under section 49

- 723, it could have stated as much; instead, it utilized the word “ attach ed
, ” to which we must give effect. Accordingly, where Clark does not dispute the district court’s finding that the officer reasonably believed Clark was merely carrying the flashlight, we affirm the court’s finding of reasonable
,5 articulable suspicion to effect the stop. 1 Clark’s judgment of conviction for possession of a
controlled substance is affirmed. Chief Judge GRATTON and Judge LANSING CONCUR.

1 Clark argues that if this Court finds the statute is ambiguous because both the district court’s and Clark’s interpretations of the statute are reasonable, the rule of lenity requires the statute to be interpreted in Clark’s favor. Since we have not found Clark’s interpretation to be reasonable, we need not reach this issue.