Supreme Court

No. 2020-166-Appeal.

(KM 18-756)

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision 

before publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers 

are requested to notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme 

Court of Rhode Island, 250 Benefit Street, Providence, 

Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone (401) 222-3258 or 

Email opinionanalyst@courts.ri.gov, of any typographical 

or other formal errors in order that corrections may be 

made before the opinion is published.

Rhode Island Housing and Mortgage 

Finance Corporation

:

v. :

Edward Gordon. :

June 6, 2022
- 1 -

Supreme Court

No. 2020-166-Appeal.

(KM 18-756)

Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Lynch Prata, and Long, JJ. 

O P I N I O N

Chief Justice Suttell, for the Court. The pro se respondent, Ann Gordon, 

appeals from a Superior Court decree foreclosing her rights of redemption in 

property purchased by the petitioner, Rhode Island Housing and Mortgage Finance 

Corporation (RIHMFC), through exercise of its right of first refusal. This case came 

before the Supreme Court pursuant to an order directing the parties to appear and 

show cause why the issues raised in this appeal should not be summarily decided. 

After considering the parties’ written and oral submissions and reviewing the record, 

we conclude that cause has not been shown and that this case may be decided without 

further briefing or argument. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the

decree of the Superior Court. 

Rhode Island Housing and Mortgage 

Finance Corporation

:

v. :

Edward Gordon. :
- 2 -

I

Facts and Travel

The pertinent facts have been gleaned from the Superior Court record, as well 

as the statements, supplemental statements, and attached exhibits filed on behalf of 

the parties pursuant to Article I, Rule 12A of the Supreme Court Rules of Appellate 

Procedure. 

In her submissions before this Court, Gordon asserts that the property in 

question, located at 54 Bayberry Lane in East Greenwich, Rhode Island (the 

property), was acquired by her father, Edward Gordon, who designed and built a 

house on the property in 1957. Gordon states that she has lived in the home all her 

life; she lived there as a child and, after her father’s death in 1998 and her mother’s 

death in 2002, she and her sister continued living in the home. 

In 2013, a tax lien was placed on the house as a result of nonpayment of taxes

owed to the Town of East Greenwich. Because the property was a qualifying 

owner-occupied residential property, RIHMFC then exercised its preemptive right 

to purchase the property in May 2013. See G.L. 1956 § 44-9-8.3(a). At the time of 

the sale, the statutory five-year period allowing Gordon to exercise her rights of 

redemption began. See § 44-9-25(c). 

On July 10, 2018, a little more than five years after it purchased the property, 

RIHMFC filed a petition in Superior Court to foreclose any existing rights of 
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redemption in the property. In October 2018, the title examiner’s report, which 

showed only Edward Gordon and RIHMFC as having interests in the property, was 

filed; early in 2019, the report was approved by the Superior Court. 

In June 2019, a citation issued, which was then mailed by certified mail to the 

property in July 2019. The mailed citation was addressed: “TO ALL WHOM IT 

MAY CONCERN, and Edward Gordon and if any of the above are deceased 

persons, then to their spouses, heirs, and/or devisees.” The citation instructed the 

recipient, if they “desire[d] to make any objection or defense to the petition[,]” to 

“file a written appearance and an answer, under oath, setting forth clearly and 

specifically your objections or defense to each part of the petition[.]” The cover 

letter enclosed with the citation indicated that the recipient had until July 10, 2019, 

or until twenty days from receipt of the letter, whichever was later, to answer. 

Gordon received the citation on July 22, 2019. 

In her submissions before this Court, Gordon contends that after receiving the 

citation she attempted to find assistance in responding to the citation. She alleges

that she first called RIHMFC and spoke to an employee who told her to call back in 

several weeks; when Gordon told the employee that she had only a small amount of 

time to respond to the citation, the employee told her “[d]on’t worry about that[.]”

Gordon also claims that she attempted to get help from Rhode Island Legal Services, 

but she was told that the only lawyer that handled foreclosure of redemption cases 
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was away. Finally, Gordon alleges that she attempted to locate a company for a 

reverse mortgage. She ultimately was able to do so; however, her sister, who was 

over age sixty-two, passed away in September 2019, before the reverse-mortgage 

process was complete. Gordon, at age sixty, was not eligible for a reverse mortgage. 

On September 20, 2019, RIHMFC filed an affidavit in support of an entry of 

default, alleging that more than twenty days had elapsed since service of process, 

that no respondent had defended against the citation, and thus that default was 

appropriate. Accordingly, default entered on November 7, 2019. 

On November 14, 2019, Gordon moved for enlargement of time. On 

November 15, 2019, RIHMFC responded to Gordon’s motion, consenting to the 

enlargement of time and requesting another citation to issue, in order to serve 

Gordon again and give her a further twenty days from receipt of the second citation

to properly respond. However, Gordon alleges that no second citation was issued, 

and, although in its submissions before this Court petitioner has referenced a second 

citation, the Superior Court record does not indicate that a second citation was ever

issued. 

Subsequently, on December 9, 2019, a hearing on the motion to enlarge time 

was held. At this hearing, RIHMFC agreed to extend the time available to Gordon 

for redemption of the property to February 9, 2020. Gordon contested the 

redemption amount, stating that what she really owed was “much less” than what 
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RIHMFC claimed was due, and RIHMFC stated that it would file a motion that 

would “give Ms. Gordon the opportunity to see the numbers we’re saying are owed.” 

RIHMFC then filed a motion to establish the amount and terms of redemption 

on December 12, 2019. In this motion, RIHMFC correctly indicated that under 

§ 44-9-29, the court “‘may in its discretion make a finding allowing the party to 

redeem, within a time fixed by the court[.]’” The motion also stated that the amount 

necessary to redeem the property was $51,177.94. Additionally, RIHMFC requested 

that the court enter an order stating that Gordon had to pay that amount, no later than 

February 9, 2020, to redeem the property, or otherwise RIHMFC would be entitled 

to apply for a decree to foreclose all rights of redemption. Although she had 

contested the amount owed at the hearing on the motion to enlarge time, Gordon did 

not file an objection to RIHMFC’s motion to establish the amount and terms of 

redemption. 

On December 23, 2019, an order entered establishing the redemption amount 

as $51,177.94 and the due date as February 9, 2020, and stating that if no redemption 

were made, RIHMFC would be entitled to apply for a final decree foreclosing all 

rights of redemption. Again, Gordon did not file any motions or otherwise contest 

this order establishing the redemption amount and terms. 

On February 3, 2020, there was a second hearing, which centered on a consent 

order between Gordon and RIHMFC. The consent order, signed by both the attorney 
- 6 -

for RIHMFC and Gordon, stated that Gordon was the only party with an interest in 

the property. It also set the redemption amount at $51,177.94 and changed the due 

date to March 5, 2020. The consent order also provided that, if the redemption 

payment was not made and if RIHMFC submitted an affidavit of noncompliance, a 

final decree would enter. 

At the hearing, the hearing justice asked Gordon if she had read the consent 

order, if she understood that she had one month to pay the redemption amount, and 

if she understood that if she failed to pay the redemption amount at that time she 

would lose ownership of the property. Gordon answered all questions affirmatively. 

The hearing justice then approved the consent order, which entered the same day. 

In her statements to this Court, Gordon alleges that she spoke with counsel for 

RIHMFC in the courthouse on February 3, 2020, before the hearing. Gordon claims 

that she had understood that the hearing was meant to establish the amount owed. 

Gordon alleges that before the hearing took place, RIHMFC’s counsel met her 

outside the courtroom and told her she “had to sign the paper”—the consent order.

Gordon contends that she told RIHMFC that the amount was incorrect, however, 

RIHMFC’s counsel told her that if she “brought anything before the judge, 

[RIHMFC] would take back the extension to March 5, and demand payment” 

immediately. Gordon claims that she also told RIHMFC’s counsel that she did not 

have the money yet, but RIHMFC responded that that meant she had to sign the 
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document. Thus, Gordon contends that she signed the consent order “under duress” 

because she was “threatened and intimidated into signing the consent order and not 

bring[ing] anything before the judge” because otherwise she would “[lose] the 

extension [until] March 5[.]” 

According to Gordon, on March 4, 2020, the day before the redemption 

amount was due, she again reached out to RIHMFC. Gordon claims that she spoke 

to a “Mr. Russo” who indicated that RIHMFC would give Gordon more time to 

redeem. However, Gordon alleges that RIHMFC never contacted her to do so. 

Gordon states that it is her belief that RIHMFC gives loans and payment plans, and 

that she asked Russo for either, but that she was told that those options were not 

available to her. 

It is undisputed that Gordon did not make the redemption payment on or 

before March 5, 2020. On March 9, 2020, RIHMFC filed an affidavit of 

noncompliance indicating that Gordon had not redeemed the property as allowed for 

in the consent order, and therefore that pursuant to the consent order, RIHMFC was 

entitled to a final decree foreclosing Gordon’s right of redemption upon the filing of 

an affidavit of noncompliance. A final decree foreclosing the rights of redemption 
- 8 -

entered on March 18, 2020. Gordon timely filed a notice of appeal on May 29, 

2020.1 

II

Discussion

A

Consent Order

On appeal, Gordon takes issue with various aspects of the procedure in the 

Superior Court. Gordon contends that there was error in the proceeding because her 

father’s name was used for the initial petition, and thus for the case name, although 

he was deceased. Gordon further avers that she was not properly notified of the 

proceedings because of the delay between the beginning of the case and her receipt 

of the citation, and because no second citation ever issued, depriving her of a second 

chance to respond. Additionally, Gordon asserts that her property was exempt from 

taxation for religious reasons, and that she and her sister were exempt from paying 

taxes because of their low income and disabilities, and therefore that the taxes for 

which the property was sold are not actually owed. 

1 Although the general rule requires civil appeals to be filed within twenty days of a 

final decree, see Article I, Rule 4(a) of the Supreme Court Rules of Appellate 

Procedure, Gordon’s appeal was timely under an Executive Order of this Court 

which extended any filing deadlines that would have expired between March 17, 

2020 and May 17, 2020 to May 29, 2020. See Supreme Court Executive Order No. 

2020-09. 
- 9 -

Assuming arguendo that at least some of these claims have merit, they are 

nonetheless not reviewable because Gordon entered into a consent order establishing 

the amount owed and setting the terms of redemption. Once a consent order is 

entered into “relative to an evidentiary fact or an element of a claim, [it] is conclusive 

upon the parties and removes the issue from the controversy” such that the issue “is 

no longer a question for consideration by the tribunal.” McCulloch v. McCulloch, 69 

A.3d 810, 824 (R.I. 2013) (quoting In re McBurney Law Services, Inc., 798 A.2d 

877, 881-82 (R.I. 2002)). 

Gordon argues, however, that the consent order is invalid because she was 

“threatened and intimidated” into signing the consent order. It is true that we have 

previously held that “fraud, mutual mistake, actual lack of consent to [the] order, or 

some other extraordinary circumstance” are proper bases for setting aside a consent 

order. Richardson v. Smith, 691 A.2d 543, 546 (R.I. 1997). However, here, the 

evidence shows that Gordon actually consented to the order, demonstrated by her 

signature on the order, her indication to the hearing justice that she read and 

understood what she was signing, and her failure to raise an issue with the consent 

order before the hearing justice. 

There are no facts here that suggest coercion or duress that would obviate 

Gordon’s apparent consent. Gordon claims that, before the February 3 hearing, 

RIHMFC’s attorney told her that she “had to sign the paper,” and that if she “brought 
- 10 -

anything before the judge, they would take back the extension to March 5, and 

demand payment then[.]” However, at the time of the February 3 hearing, an order 

had already entered in December 2019 establishing the amount owed and setting a 

due date of February 9, and no further extension had been granted. Thus, in stating 

that if the consent order was not signed, there would be no extension until March, 

RIHMFC was threatening to do no more than what it was already legally entitled to 

do—demand payment on February 9. “It is neither coercion nor duress to threaten 

or to do what one has a right to do.” Dispeau v. First National Bank of Pawtucket, 

24 R.I. 508, 510, 53 A. 868, 868 (1902).

B

Recusal

Gordon also contends that the hearing justice erred by not recusing himself. 

Gordon claims that the hearing justice had previously held various government 

positions, that he had previously served on RIHMFC’s board of commissioners, and 

that he was involved with real estate companies for over forty years. Therefore, 

Gordon asserts, the hearing justice should have recused himself. 

However, Gordon concedes that she did not raise this issue below; thus, she 

is precluded by our well-established raise-or-waive rule from raising it here. See 

Decathlon Investments v. Medeiros, 252 A.3d 268, 270 (R.I. 2021) (“According to 

this Court’s well settled raise-or-waive rule, issues not properly presented before the 
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trial court may not be raised for the first time on appeal.”) (quoting Federal National 

Mortgage Association v. Malinou, 101 A.3d 860, 865 (R.I. 2014)). This rule is not 

affected by respondent’s claim that she did not learn more about the hearing justice 

until she began her research for this appeal or by her pro se status. See Pelumi v. City 

of Woonsocket, 180 A.3d 840, 841 (R.I. 2018) (mem.) (stating that this Court 

“cannot and will not entirely overlook established rules of procedure” even for pro 

se parties) (quoting Jacksonbay Builders, Inc. v. Azarmi, 869 A.2d 580, 585 (R.I. 

2005)). 

Additionally, even if we considered Gordon’s argument about recusal, she has 

not met her burden to show that the hearing justice should have recused himself in 

the instant case. In another case involving a pro se party, we stated that “[a] party 

seeking recusal must establish that the justice has a ‘personal bias or prejudice * * * 

calculated to impair his or her impartiality seriously and to sway his or her 

judgment.’” Ryan v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Providence, 941 A.2d 174, 185 (R.I. 

2008) (brackets omitted) (quoting Kelly v. Rhode Island Public Transit Authority, 

740 A.2d 1243, 1246 (R.I. 1999)). Gordon’s claims about the hearing justice’s prior 

positions and real estate involvements, even if taken as true, do not establish a bias 
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or prejudice that would have seriously impaired the hearing justice from acting 

impartially in this case.2 Therefore, Gordon’s arguments as to recusal are unavailing. 

C

Duty

Gordon also asserts that she is entitled to relief from judgment because 

RIHMFC had a statutory duty under the Madeline Walker Act “to assist * * * 

owner[s] to discharge lien[s,]” for which she cites to § 44-9-8.3. “This Court reviews 

questions of statutory construction and interpretation de novo.” Shorr v. Harris, as 

Trustee of Trust of Anna H. Blankstein, 248 A.3d 633, 637 (R.I. 2021) (quoting 

Miller v. Saunders, 80 A.3d 44, 50 (R.I. 2013)). “When statutory language is clear 

and unambiguous, we give the words their plain and ordinary meaning.” Id.

(alteration omitted) (quoting Miller, 80 A.3d at 50). 

Here, the statute to which Gordon cites does not state that RIHMFC has such 

a duty to assist owners to discharge liens; rather, it states that for properties where it 

has a statutory right of first refusal, RIHMFC “may assist the owner to discharge the 

lien or take title and acquire the property in its own name pursuant to regulations to 

be developed by the corporation, consistent with its purposes.” Section 44-9-8.3(a)

(emphasis added). Thus, according to the clear and unambiguous language of the 

2 We also note that, at oral argument before this Court, Gordon conceded that the 

hearing justice was “more than fair” to her in the proceedings below.
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statute, RIHMFC has discretion to choose whether to initially assist the owner in 

discharging the lien or to take title directly, and therefore has no duty to always assist 

an owner. See id.; see also Polaski v. O’Reilly, 559 A.2d 646, 647 (R.I. 1989) 

(holding that a statute that used the word “may” “speaks in permissive rather than 

mandatory terms[,]” and thus that it did not create a statutory duty). Accordingly, 

Gordon is not entitled to relief from judgment because RIHMFC did not owe her a 

statutory duty.

3

3 Although we are unable to conclude that RIHMFC owed Gordon a duty based on 

the clear language of the statute, we do note the salutary purposes of the Madeline 

Walker Act, as codified in G.L. 1956 § 44-9-8.3. 

According to RIHMFC’s website, “[t]he Madeline Walker Act is a state law 

designed to help homeowners who have fallen behind on their taxes * * * to avoid 

the loss of their home at tax sale.” RI Housing, Madeline Walker Frequently Asked 

Questions, www.rihousing.com/wp-content/uploads/MW_FAQs_ENGLISH.pdf

(last visited June 3, 2022) (emphasis added). Therefore, the intent of the law is to 

avoid situations such as the one Gordon now finds herself in, where a homeowner 

loses their primary residence due to nonpayment of taxes.

Additionally, in its online materials about the Madeline Walker Act, RIHMFC 

indicates that it communicates directly with homeowners and provides assistance 

with the goal of helping homeowners keep their homes: “Once [RIHMFC] purchases 

your lien at tax sale, our staff reach out to you to determine how to get back on track 

with your tax payments. This may include developing a payment plan or connecting 

you with other resources that may be of assistance.” Id.

Here, however, the record is devoid of any interactions between RIHMFC and 

Gordon before the foreclosure petition was filed in 2018. And when questioned at 

oral argument as to what assistance was given by RIHMFC to Gordon after the tax 

sale to aid Gordon in keeping her home, counsel for RIHMFC was unable to point 

to any communications between the two parties within that time frame. 
- 14 -

D

Other Issues

Lastly, Gordon asserts that the hearing justice erred in not dismissing the case 

pursuant to Rule 38 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure and various 

sections of chapter 9 of title 44 of the general laws, and asks this Court to grant her 

relief from the judgment pursuant to various sections of chapter 9 of title 44 and G.L. 

1956 § 9-21-2.4 

However, Gordon does not further articulate her reasons for relying on these 

sections and rules. Accordingly, we deem these issues waived. “[S]imply stating 

an issue for appellate review, without a meaningful discussion thereof or legal 

briefing of the issues, does not assist the Court in focusing on the legal questions 

raised, and therefore constitutes a waiver of that issue.” Dunn’s Corners Fire District 

v. Westerly Ambulance Corps, 184 A.3d 230, 235 (R.I. 2018) (quoting Giddings v. 

Arpin, 160 A.3d 314, 316 (R.I. 2017) (mem.)).

4 Specifically, Gordon cites to §§ 44-9-8.3, 44-9-24, 44-9-25(a), 44-9-28, and 

44-9-35. 
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III

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm the decree of the Superior Court. 

The record shall be returned to the Superior Court. 

Justice Robinson did not participate.
SU-CMS-02A (revised June 2020)

STATE OF RHODE ISLAND 

SUPREME COURT– CLERK’S OFFICE

Licht Judicial Complex

250 Benefit Street

Providence, RI 02903

OPINION COVER SHEET

Title of Case Rhode Island Housing and Mortgage Finance 

Corporation v. Edward Gordon.

Case Number No. 2020-166-Appeal.

(KM 18-756)

Date Opinion Filed June 6, 2022

Justices Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Lynch Prata, and Long, JJ.

Written By Chief Justice Paul A. Suttell

Source of Appeal Kent County Superior Court 

Judicial Officer from Lower Court Associate Justice Richard A. Licht

Attorney(s) on Appeal

For Petitioner:

Nicole J. Benjamin, Esq.

For Respondent:

Ann Gordon, Pro Se