T h e pan el u n an i mou s l y c on cl u des t h at t h i s c as e i s s u i t abl e f or de ci s i on * wi t ho ut oral argument. Fed

. R

. A p p
. P

. 34 (a)( 2 ).

F OR P UB LIC AT ION


### U N I TED STA TES C O U R T O F A PPEA LS F O R T H E N IN T H C IR C U IT

U NI TED S T A T ES O F A M ERI CA ,

Plaintif f-Appellee ,

v.
M AURI CE L ER OM E S MI TH ,

Defendant-

Appellant

. No. 11-50549

D.C. No. 3:11-cr- 00471- BEN -1
OPI NI ON

Appea l from the United States District Court fo r t he Southe rn

Di str ic t of

Ca lif or nia Roge r T. B enitez, District J udg e, Presiding
Submit ted Fe bruar

y 7, 2013 * Pa sa de na , Ca lif

or nia Filed June 26, 2013
Be fore : Consuelo M. Callahan, Sandra S. Ikuta,
and An dr e w D . H ur

wi tz, C ir c uit

Judg e s. Op ini on by Judg e I kutaU NI TED S T A T ES V

. S MI TH 2

T hi s s ummary cons t i t ut es no part o f the o pi ni on of

t he cour t

. I t ha s ** b een p repa red b y co urt s t af f f o r t he co nveni ence o f

t he read er. SUMMAR

Y **

Crim inal L aw
Th e pa n e l a ff ir me d a se nte nc e imp os e d in

c onne c tio n w ith a convic tion for sex traffickingof childre n by forc e, fr aud, or
coer cion under

18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1) and (b) (1). The pa nel re jected the defe ndant’s contention that an enhanc ement for

exerting undue influence on a minor under U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3(b)(2) (B ) wa s impermissib le doublec ounti ng , whe re the dis tr ict co ur t c a lc ulate d a

ba se of fe ns e level under

U.S.S.G

. § 2G3.1(a )(1) for the de fenda nt’s violation of § 1591(b)(1) , which ha s an element that the defe ndant used “ forc e, fr aud, or c oerc ion.” The pa nel also re

jected the defe ndant’s chal l eng e to the district court’s im p o s i tion of an enha nceme nt for an org anizing role u n d er U.S .S.G. § 3B1.1(c ). The pa nel
rea son e d th at a w o ma nw h o kn o w in g ly

a b e tt e d the de fe nd ant’ s c hil d s e x tra ff ic kin gof fe ns e qu a lif

ie d a s a “par ticipant” under § 3B1.1, a nd the def endant wa s theref

ore responsible for

“org anizing” h er fo r the purpose of ca rry ing
out th at c ri min a l a c t.U NI TED S T A T ES V

. S MI TH 3
CO UN SEL
JohnL ana

ha n, San D ie g o, Ca lif

or nia , f or De fe nd antAp pe lla nt.
L aura E. Duff y , United States Attorney ; Bruc e R. Cas tetter and Al e ssa nd ra P. Se ra no , As sis tant Un ite d State s A tto rn e y s, San Dieg o, California, for Plaintiff-Appellee

.

OP IN ION
I KUTA, Circ uit J udg e:
Maurice L erome S mith appeals seve ral sente ncing
e nh anc e me nts that he re c e ive d in c onnecti on

wi th h is conviction for se x traff

ick ing of children by

forc e, fr aud, or
c oe rc ion un de r 1 8 U .S. C. § 15 91 (a) a nd (b )( 1) . We a ff

ir m.
I
Smit h wa s the owner

of a San D ieg o-ar ea w indow washingcompany . But for man y y ear s, he had a lso been involved in a much dar

ker business: ru n n ing a

prostitution ri ng . In Oct obe r 2 00 9, a 17 -ye ar- old

g ir l na me d M .S.
co n ta c te d Sm it

h b y e ma il , lo o k in g f

o r a jo b

. M

. S. was homeless and livingin a tent behind a m o torcycle junkyard wher e she w orked. M.S. knew Smit h owned a window
wa sh ingc omp any , but sus pe c te d that he wa s a lso inv olv e d in
so me kin d

o f “ hu s t l e , ” s u c ha s s e l l i n gdr u g s o r f ak e p ur s e s. M.S. w an te d

to p arti c ip ate in

Sm it h ’ s hu s tl e , an d

a f te r me e tin g Smit

h fo r c of fe e se ve ra l ti me s, be g an w or kin gfo r h is window washing c ompany . M.S. tol d Smit h she wa s 17 be c a us e he ne e de d to kn owhe r a g e to g e t a wo rk pe rm it.U NI TED S T A T ES V

. S MI TH 4
Se ve ra l mo nth s late r, in Janua ry 20 10 , M .S. mov e d in wi th S mith a

nd be g an h avin gse xua l relatio ns wi th h im. Sho rt ly the re a ft e r, Smith br ou g ht a wo man name d M iche lle ba c k to the ho us e , who a sk e d a bo ut M .S. ’s a g e , p oint edly
c omm e nti ng on ho w y oung sh e loo ke d. In re a c ti on to M i ch ell e’s que stion, S mith punched Michelle in the f ace , knocking her unconscious. M.S. then l ear ned that S mith was a pimp. Smit h told M.S ., “B itch, Iown you,” and i m m ed i at el y

fo rc edh er

t o wo rkas a p ro s t i tu t e i nh i s ri n g.
Smit h had Miche ll e t ra i n and ac company M.S. on her initial assignments to San Dieg o hotels, telli n g M

. S . that Mic he lle ’s “ g ot thi s, she’ ll s ho w you , s he ’s be e n d oin git a
re a lly lon gtim e .” Mic he lle su

bs e qu e ntl y a c c omp anie d M .S. to hotels and posted some interne t ads for h er. Sm ith had
sever al other w omen workingas prostitutes fo r hi m at that t i m e , b u tM i c h e l l e w a s h i s “ b o t t o mb i t c h , ” d e f i n e d b y a g overnme nt expert as the pimp’s most t ru s ted prostitute,
re sp on sib le fo r r e c ru iti ng , c oll e c tin g mo ne y , a nd po ssi bly dis c ipl ini ngoth e r p ro sti tut e s.
Smit h regularly

beat a nd threatened M.S. from F ebrua ry 20 10 onwa

rd , a nd M. S. tri e d to l eav e him

fi ve or six tim e s. Whenever

M.S. tried to leave, Smith’s ta ctics var ied betwe en cajolingher t o stay , using state ments like “no, baby , Ilove y ou , d on ’t

le ave , you

do n’ t ne e d to le ave , w e c an w or k th is out, it ’s n o t that big of

a dea l,” to threateningher, using state me nts lik e “ bit c h, y ou a in ’t going no wh e re .” I f M .S. pushed the issue, “ there wer e phy sical altercations.” Although Smith did let M.S . g o in J uly 2010, the re prieve was short-lived. In September 2010, Smith saw M.S. walking on the str e e t and de mand e d that she g e t into h is c ar o r s he wo uld be “ in p ie c e s in th e trunk. ” Sho rt ly a ft e r S mith f

or c e d M .S. to r e sume wo rk inga s a

pr os ti tu te fo r h im, ho we ve r, M. S.U NI TED S T A T ES V

. S MI TH 5

1 8 U. S

. C. § 1 5 9 1 ( a ) p r o v i d e s t h a t “ [ w ] h o e v e r k n o w i n g l y

– ( 1 ) i n or 1 af f ect i ng i nt er s t at e c om merc e .
. . r ecr ui t s , en t i ces , ha r bo r s , t r ans po r t s, p ro vid es, o b t ains, or m aintains b y any m ea ns a p erso n; o r (2 ) b en efi t s, f i nanci al l y or b y recei vi ng any t hi ng of val ue, f rom pa rt i ci p at i o n i n a v en t u r e wh i ch h as e n g aged i n a n a ct de s cr i bed i n v i ol at i on of pa r ag r aph ( 1), k n ow i n g , or i n r e c k l e s s di s r e g a r d o f t h e f a c t , t h a t me a n s of

f or c e, thr e a ts o f f

o rc e , f ra u d , co e rc io n
. . . o r a n y c o m b ina tio n o f suc h m e a n s w ill b e used t o cause t he p ers o n t o engage i n a co m m erci al s ex act , or t hat t he p ers o n has no t a t t ai ned the age o f 1 8 years a nd w i l l b e caused to engage in a c o m m e rc ia l se x a c t, sh a ll b e p u n ish e d a s p ro v id e d in su b se c tio n (b ).”

1 8 U .S .C . § 1 5 9 1 (b ) p ro vid es that “[t ]he p un i shm en t f o r an o f f en se un der s ubs ect i on ( a) i s – ( 1) i f t he of f ens e was ef

f ect ed by means of

f orce , t hr eat s of

f orce , f r aud, or coer ci on .
. . o r b y a ny comb i nat i on of s uch
m eans .
. . by a f

i ne und er t hi s t i t l e and i m p ri sonm ent f o r any t erm of y ears no t le ss tha n 1 5 or f

o r l i f e; or (2) i f

t he o f f ense was no t s o ef

f ect ed , and t he pers on r ecr ui t ed, en t i ced, ha r bo r ed, t r ans po r t ed, provi ded, or ob t ai ned ha d a ttai ned t he age o f 14 y ears b ut had not at t ai ned t he age o f 18 y ears at t h e t i me of

s u ch of f en s e, by a f

i n e u n der t h i s t i t l e an d i mpr i s on men t f or n o t l e ss th a n 1 0 ye a rs o r fo r lif e .”

Smi t h was al s o c h ar g ed an d c on v i ct ed f or be i n g a f

el on i n pos s es s i on 2
o f a fire a rm , w h ic h is no t re le v a n t t o this a p p e a l. sta rt e d a no isy di sp ut e wi th a

c lie nt i n h op e s th at he wo uld call the police . The c lient did so, and once the police ar rived, M.S. tol d them she had be en for ced to wor k for Smith.
After his arre st, indictment and trial, Smit h was c onvicted by a jury of sex traffic king of

children by

forc e, fr aud, or
coer cion, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a) a nd (b)( 1). In

1
answe ringa spec ial interrog atory on the ver dict form, the jury fo un d th at Smi th “ kn e w that for c e , f ra ud , o r c oe rc ion

wo uld be used to c ause the person to en gage in a commer cial sex
a c t,” and that he “ kn e w, or

wa s in re c kle ss d isr egard, that

a person who ha d not at t ai ned the a g e of 18 year s would be
cause d to eng ag e in a c ommercia l sex act.” 2U NI TED S T A T ES V

. S MI TH 6

U

. S.S. G

. § 2 G 1

. 3 (a)( 1 ) p rovides f o r a base off

ense l evel of 3 4 “ i f

t he 3 d e fen d a n t wa s c o n v ic te d un d e r 1 8 U .S .C . § 1 5 9 1 (b )( 1 ).”

T her e i s “ an i nt r aci r cui t co nf l i ct as t o whet her t he s t andar d of r evi ew 4 f or a ppl i ca t i on of

t h e G u i del i n es t o t h e f ac t s i s d e no vo or a bu s e of Th e pr e-s e nte nc e re po rt

ide nti fi e d Sm ith ’s ba se of fe ns e level as 34, as presc ribed by § 2G1.3(a )(1) of the Sentencing Guidelines for violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(b)( 1). I t a lso 3
rec ommended a two- level enha nceme nt under U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3(b)( 2)(B ) for

exe rting undue influenc e on a minor, and re comm en d ed a two-level e nhance ment under U .S.S.G. § 3B 1. 1( c ) f

or an o rg anizi ngro le . Sm ithc on te ste d b oth proposed se ntencingenh ancements, arguing that the § 2G1.3(b)( 2)(B ) enha

nceme nt was duplicative of the elements of his c onviction, and t hat t here was no ba sis for the § 3B1.1( c) e nhance ment beca use he did not supe rv ise or org anize anyone but M .S. The dist rict cour t rejec ted Smith’s ob je c ti o n s , s tati n g th at “ [t ]h e r e is n o qu e s ti o n th at y ou used undue influenc e. I

hear d the victim testify

. An d t h ere is no question about y our role in this offe nse. I t is pretty o b vious th at , s i r, y o uh av e b ee ni n v o l v edi nth i s ac t i v i ty fo r al o n g, lon gtim e .” Th e c ourt

se nte nc e d Sm it h to 3 60 months ’ imprisonment, followed by five year s’ s upervised r elea se. Smit h timely

appea led.

II
In deter mining whe ther th e dis trict court c ommitt ed proce dural e rror , we r eview the district court’s interpr etation
o f t h e S en t en ci n g Gu i d el i n es d e n o v o an d i t s fa ctu al fi n d i n gs for c lear err or. See United States v. Swank, 676 F.3d 919, 921 (9th Cir. 2012). 4U NI TED S T A T ES V

. S MI TH 7

di s cr et i on, ” s ee Swank , 6 7 6 F .3 d a t 9 2 1

– 2 2 , b u t t h is sta n d a rd o f re v ie w is not at i s s ue her e. A We beg in with Sm ith’s challeng e to t he enha nceme nt for undue influenc e under

§ 2 G1

. 3 (b)( 2)(B ). This section provides for

a two-le vel upward adjustment if a pa rticipant “unduly influence d a mino r t o eng ag e in prohibited sexual conduct.” Id. S m i th argues that this two-level incr ease for
un du e inf lue nc e un de r § 2G 1. 3( b) (2 )( B ) w a s im pe rm iss ibl e do ub le -c ounting be c a

us e the c ourt

c a lc ulate d a

ba se of fe ns e level of 34 under § 2 G1.3(a)(1) f or his violation of § 1591(b)( 1), which has as an element that the def endant use d “for ce, f raud, or coerci o n
. ” B eca

use a pe rson using “for ce, fra ud, or coe rcion” ag ainst a minor would neces s arily have “unduly influenced” the minor, Smith asserts, the § 2 G1 .3 (b )( 2) (B ) enha

nc e me nt i mpe rm iss ibl y

punis he d h im fo r c on du c t a lr e a dy

inc lud e d in

the ba se of

fe ns e le ve l. As a g ener al rule, it i s appropr iate for a cour t to consider all applicable Guidelines provisions in calculating the g uidelines rang e for

an off ense. In particula

r, the Sentenc ing Gu ide lin e s c on te mpl ate that c ourt s w il l a pp ly a ll a pp lic a ble sp e c if ic of fe ns e c ha ra c te ri sti c s to e nh anc e the ba se of fe ns e level. See § 1 B 1. 1( a )( 2) ; see also United States v. W illiams , 693 F.3d 1067, 1074 (9th Cir. 2012)

. Indeed, the Guidelines instructions direct a c ourt to apply provisi ons even f

rom differ ent cha

pters of the Guidelines Manua l in calculatingthe points applicable t o a sing le offe nse, bec ause “ [a] bsent an ins tr uction to the contra

ry , enhanc ements under

Chapter Tw o, adjustments under Chapter Three , and dete rminati ons under Chapter F our ar e to be a

pplied cumulatively ,” and “ may be tr iggered b y

th e sam e con du ct. ” § 1 B1.1 cmt . 4 (B)

.U NI TED S T A T ES V

. S MI TH 8
In acc ord wit h these instructions, we ha ve longheld that “the Sentenc ing Commission understands doubl e counting and ‘e x pressly

forbids it where it is notin t en d ed .’” United States v. Rosas , 615 F.3d 1058, 1065 ( 9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Un ite d S tates v . R e ese , 2 F .3 d 87 0, 89 4 ( 9th Cir . 1 99 3) ); see a l s o U n i t e d S ta t es v

. Vi

zc ar ra , 668 F.3d 516, 518 ( 7th Cir. 2012) (unde r § 1B1.1 cmt. 4(B ), double c ounting is the “def ault rule” ). As the Guidelines Manual demonstrates, the Commis sio n h a s in f

act do ne thi s. With in a ny of fe ns e g uid e lin e , f

or ex ample , if

a sin g le sp e c if

ic of fe ns e char acte ristic subsection lists alter native adjustments, district courts ar e to pick “o n l y the one that be st describe s the conduct.” § 1 B 1. 1 c mt. 4( B ). Th e Gui deli ne s Ma nu a l a lso spells out numerous ins tance s in which a particula r provision should not be appli ed to the same conduct a s another provision. Se e Vi

zc arra , 668 F.3d at 521.
We have a lso inferre d that the Commiss ion would not int e nd c ourt s to a

pp ly a Gu ide lin e s p rovisio n th at w ou ld “incr ease a def

endant’ s punishment on ac count of a kind of harm that ha s alrea dy

been f ully acc ounted for by

application
o f an o th e r p art o f th e G u id e li n e s.” Un ite d S tates v . H

olt , 510 F.3d 1007, 1011 ( 9th Cir. 2007). Howe ver, “ when e ach invocation of the behavior serve s a unique purpose under the Gu i delines,” w e conc lude that the Commissi on “author ized
and int e nd e d” the c umu lativ e a pp lic atio n o f b oth

pr ov isi on s. Id .; see, e .g. , United States v. Stoterau , 5 2 4 F

. 3 d 9 8 8 , 1 001 (9th Cir. 2008) (a

pplying two e nhance ments to same conduc t permissible beca

use t hey acc ount for “ differ ent aspe ct of the ha rm s” c a us e d b y the de fe nd ant’ s c on du c t) ; United States v. Thornton , 511 F.3d 1221, 1228 ( 9th Cir. 2008) (applying two enhanc ements to same conduc t permissible beca use ea ch “stemmed fr om separa

te conc erns” ).U NI TED S T A T ES V

. S MI TH 9

See , e

. g. , Wi l l i a ms , 6 9 3 F .3 d a t 1 0 7 4 ; Uni t ed St at es v

. Ly nn , 636 F. 3d 5 1 1 2 7 , 1 1 3 8 (9 th C ir. 2 0 1 1 ); Uni t ed St at es v. Li nd s ey , 634 F. 3d 541, 556 (9 th C ir. 2 0 1 1 ), cer t

. d en i ed , 1 3 1 S . C t. 2 4 7 5 , (2 0 1 1 ); Uni t ed St at es v. Al br i t t on , 6 2 2 F .3 d 1 1 0 4 , 1 1 0 8 n.4 (9 th C ir. 2 0 1 0 ); Uni t ed St at es v. G al l egos , 6 1 3 F .3 d 1 2 1 1 , 1 2 1 6 ( 9 th C ir. 2 0 1 0 ); Un ited S ta te s v . L a u rie n ti , 6 1 1 F .3 d 5 3 0 , 5 5 4 (9 th C ir. 2 0 1 0 ); Uni t ed St at es v

. Pham , 545 F. 3d 712, 7 1 8 (9t h C i r. 20 0 8 ); St ot er au , 5 2 4 F .3 d a t 1 0 0 1 ; H o lt , 510 F. 3d a t 1011; Thor nt on , 5 1 1 F .3 d a t 1 2 2 8 ; Uni t ed St at es v. Cabacc ang , 481 F. 3d 1176, 1 1 8 6 (9 th C ir. 2 0 0 7 ); Uni t ed St at es v

. Wr ight , 3 7 3 F.3d 93 5 , 94 4 (9t h C i r. 2 0 0 4 ). We have r outinely

conclude d that two Guidel ines provisions serve unique purp o s es whe n applied
c u mu l at i v e l y. In United States v. W right , for instanc e, we 5
con s id e r e d w h e th e r it w a s p e r mi s s ib le to a

p p ly b o th an adjustment for a vulnera

ble vi ctim under 12 y ear s old and an
e nh anc e me nt f

or the same vic tim ’s e xtre me y outh an d s ma ll phy sical s iz e
. 3 7 3 F

. 3 d 9 3 5 , 9 4 2

–4 3 ( 9 th

Ci r
. 2 0 0 4 ). Be cause the enhanceme nt for the victim’s ext reme y outh and small phy s i cal size addre ssed cha rac teristics such as a

n inability to communicate, an inability to walk, and incr ease d pain upon sexual penetration that “corr elate with ag e, but are not nece ssarily

related to ag e,” w e conc luded t h at the two pr ov isi on s se rv e d uniq

ue purp os e s, and

the re fo re bo th c ou ld be a pp lie d to a de fe nd ant who se vic timwa s h is 1 1- month o ld
son. Id. at 94 3; se e als o H olt , 5 1 0 F.3d at 1011 (citing W right , 373 F.3d at 943–44). S imilarly , in W illiams , we c on sid e re d whe the r a

ba se of fe nse lev e l th at de a ls w ith “off enses of extorti on by forc e, threat of forc e, or s er i ous damag e” was duplicative of an enha nceme nt for a c rime that

“ i n v o l v e d ane x p r e s s o r i mp l i e d th r e at o f d e ath , b o d i l y i n j ur y, or kid na pp ing .” 69 3 F .3 d at 10 74 . Because it w a s p os sib le to eng ag e in a crime involvingforc e, such a s a cr ime resulting in damag e to prope rty , wi t h o ut beingsubject to the enhanc ement, we held that applying both pr ovisions wasU NI TED S T A T ES V

. S MI TH 10 permissible. Id. ; se e als o Uni te d States v . La ur ie nti , 611 F.3d 530, 555 (9th Cir. 2010) (be cause base of fense level did not “nec essar ily

incl u de” the conduct f or which de fenda

nt re c e ive d an e nh anc e me nt, the re wa s n o im pe rm iss ibl e do ub le countin g )

. A s th e s e c a s e s il lu s tr ate , w e ma y in f e r th at two provisions do not serve uniqu e purpose s under the Gu ide lin e s, and

tha t th e Commis sio n d id n ot i nte nd the m to be applied c umulatively , on l y when the pr ovisions are c oextensive or one provision entire ly subsumes the other. This prec edent squa

rely fore closes Smith’s claim that the d i s tri ctco urten g a gedi ni mp erm i s s i b l e d o u b l e c o un t i n g. Be ca u s e h av in g“ un d

u e in f lu e n c e ” o na

v ic ti m u

nder § 2 G1 .3 (b )( 2) (B ) m ay

invol ve a c ts that do no t c on sti tut e “for ce, f raud, or coer cion” encompa ssed in § 2G1.3(a )(1) , the two provisions serve unique purposes u nder the Guidelines and may both be applied to the sa m e conduct. Here , the dis tr ic t c ourt c ou ld re a so na bly de te rm ine that Smi th “ un du ly influence d a minor to eng ag e in prohibited sexual conduct,” § 2 G1 .3 (b )( 2) , b y

pr e yingon

M. S.’ s vulner a

bil ity . Sm ith took steps aimed at makingM.S. dependent on him: knowing she wa s homeless and lac king f amily support or financial
resour ces, he invited her to move in with him, ga ve her a job, and beg an a se x ual re lationship wi t h her. The se pre datory
a c ts c omp ro mis e d th e vo lu nt arine ss o f h e r a bil ity to r e sis t Smit h’s demands that s h e wo rk as a prostitute for him. See United States v. Brook

s , 610 F.3d 1186, 1199 (9th Cir. 2010); see also § 2G1.3 cmt. 3(B ) (“Undue influenc e” is de fined a s activity that “compr omise[s ] the vol untariness of the minor’s behavior ”). Y et, t h es e acts do not amount to “for ce” orU NI TED S T A T ES V

. S MI TH 11

B ec au se § 1 5 9 1 d o es no t d efi ne “fo rce ” an d “f rau d ,” we rely o n tho se 6 te rm s’ o rd ina ry d ic tio n a ry m e a n ing

. I n r e Rom an Cat hol i c Ar chbi s hop of Por t l and i n O r egon , 66 1 F.3d 41 7 , 43 2 (9t h C i r. 20 1 1 ). “fr aud.” See Webster’s Third New International Dictionary

6 887, 904 (2002) ( defining “for ce” as “violence or such threat or display

of phy sical ag g ression towar d a p erson as rea sonably

inspires fea

r of pain, bodily

harm, or de ath,” a

nd de fi nin g“ fr a

ud ” a s “ an in sta

nc e or an a c t of

tr ic ke ry or de c e it esp[ecially ] when involvi n g m isrepre sentation.”). N or do such ac ts amount to “coer ci o n ” as def ined in § 1591. See 18 U.S

. C. § 1591(e)( 2) (de fining “coe rcion” to mean “( A) threats of serious har

m to or phy sical re s t raint ag ainst any person; (B ) any

scheme , plan, or p at tern intende d to cause a pe rs on to be lie ve that fa ilure to pe rf or m an a c t wou ld re su lt in serious harm to or phy sical re straint ag ainst any person; or (C ) t h e abuse or thre atene d abuse of law or the leg al proce ss”).
Acc ording ly , we c onclude that t h e district cour t did not
err in ap p l y ing a

two-point enhanc ement for “undue influence ” under

§ 2G1.3(b)( 2) whe n calc ulating Smith’s g uidelines rang e.
B
We now turn to Smi th’s claim that the district c ourt err ed in imposi ngan enha

nceme nt under § 3B1. 1 (c) . Under § 3B1.1( c), a two-leve l upwar d adjustment is war rante d if the de fe nd ant i s a

n “ or g a nize r, le a de r, mana g e r, or su pe rv iso r i n any criminal ac tivity .” The notes to § 3B1.1( c) pr ovide that a def endant musthave ove rsee n “one or more other participa nts” to qua lify for the upwar dadjus tment, see § 3 B 1. 1 c mt. 2, and

de fi ne “ pa

rt ic ipa nt” a s “ a pe rs on wh o isU NI TED S T A T ES V

. S MI TH 12 criminally responsible for the commission of the offe nse, but need not have bee n convicted.” Id. S m ith argues that imposing this enhanc ement was improper be cause there wer e no participa

nts in the particular cr iminal activity at issue, sex tr a f f ic k in g o f c h il dr e n
. A c c o r d in g to Sm it h , M

. S. c o u ld

not be a pa rticipant, bec ause his conviction was based on the g ov er n m ent’s theor

y that M.S. was the sole victim of the underly i n g§ 1591 offe nse, and a victim cannot also be a pa rt ic ipa nt. Smith a lso c on te nd s th at any pa rt ic ipa nt w ou ld have to be a minor, g iven the natur e of t h e underlying offe nse.
We have he ld that “[a] court may impose this [ § 3B1.1( c)] enhanc ement if there is evidenc e that the defendant e x erc ised some control over

others involved in the com m ission of the offe nse or wa s responsible for o rga nizi ngothers for the purpose of

car rying out the c rime.” United States v. W hitney , 673 F.3d 965, 975 ( 9th Cir. 2012) (interna l q u o t ation marks omitted). Any

person who know ingly

abe t s the def

endant’ s conduct qua lifies as a “ participa nt.” S ee United States v. Cy ph e rs , 130 F .3 d 1 36 1, 13 63 (9 th C ir . 1 99 7) ; se eals o United States v. Bisong , 645 F.3d 384, 397–98 ( D. C

. Cir. 2011).
There was ample evidenc e bef ore the district court that Mic he lle kn ow ing ly

a be tte d Sm ith ’s § 1 59 1 o ffense . It is
c le ar t hat Smi th a ssi g ne d M ic hell e, his “ bo tto m bi tc h, ” to g room M.S. for her

prostitution responsibil ities, and that Michelle unde rtook a number of steps in doing so. Under Cy ph e rs , it is immate ri a l that Mic he lle did no t he rs e lf

c omm it the same un de rl yingof

fe ns e as Smi th, so lon ga s sh e wa s a knowingacc essory

to his c ri me. 130 F.3d a t 1363–64. Nor
wa s it ne c e ssa ry fo r t he go ve rnme nt t o p ro ve that Mi c he lle
was a lso coerced b y Smit h, so long a s she “kne w andU NI TED S T A T ES V

. S MI TH 13

W e al so reject Sm i t h’ s argum ent t hat t he d i st ri ct co urt err ed i n ref usi ng 7 to ho ld a n e v id e n tiar y he a rin g to re so lve S m ith’s c h a llen g e s to M .S .’s t es t i mo ny i ncl uded i n t he pre- s ent enc e r eport

. T he di s t r i ct cour t r evi ewed and a ckno wl ed ged thes e f act ual o b ject i o ns d uri ng t he sent enci ng heari ng, and cl earl y reject ed t hem b y rul i ng t hat M

. S.’ s t est i m o ny was “tru thful and hones t , ” t hu s f

ul f i l l i ng i t s ob l i gat i ons un der Federa l Rul e of Cri mi nal P ro c e d u re 3 2 (i)( 3 )( B ). L ike w ise , t h e d is tr ic t co u rt c o m p lied w ith R u le 3 2 (i)( 3 )( B ) b y ru ling tha t the c h a llen g e d sta te m e n ts o f o n e o f S m ith’s p ro stitute s w h o sp o k e a t the se n te n c ing he a rin g b u t no t un d e r o a th w o u ld have no ef

f ect on hi s sent enci ng de ci si o n. participated in the [ i l l egal] prac tices at the dire ction of the defe ndant,” id. at 1363, which wa s easily established by M.S.’s testimony . Be cause Michelle knowing ly abetted Smith’ s c hil d s e x tra ffi c kin gof fe ns e , s he qu a lif

ie d a s a “par ticipant” u nder § 3B 1.1, and ther efor e Smith was “re sponsible for org anizi n g [ Michelle] for the pur pose of
car rying out” that cr i m i n al act. W hitney , 673 F.3d at 975. Acc ording ly , the d i strict court did not err in imposi ngthe two-leve l adjustment under § 3B 1.1(c)

. 7

AF F IRMED.