UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

v. 

RICHARD M. ARNOLD SR., 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

No. 16-6152 

(D.C. No. 5:14-CR-00347-D-1) 

(W.D. Okla.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

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Before HARTZ, MATHESON, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

Richard Arnold Sr. appeals the district court’s restitution award arising from a 

scheme involving vehicle-financing rebates. Arnold argues that the district court 

erred in awarding restitution to certain lenders and in calculating the amount of 

restitution owed. Finding no reversible error, we affirm. 

 *

 This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines 

of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. But it may be cited for its 

persuasive value. See Fed. R. App. P. 32.1; 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit 

July 3, 2017

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court
2 

I 

Arnold pleaded guilty to one count each of wire fraud and conspiracy to 

commit wire fraud. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343, 1349. According to the indictment, 

Arnold—along with his wife Robyn and his sons Ricky and Robert (collectively, the 

Arnolds)—concocted a scheme to defraud individuals out of the financing-incentive 

rebates those individuals received when they purchased new vehicles. Specifically, 

the Arnolds represented to their victims that if they relinquished their rebates to the 

Arnolds, a charitable trust would then pay off their car loans. But while the Arnolds 

made some payments on the loans, they eventually stopped making payments and 

instead used the remaining rebate funds for their own personal expenses. Eventually, 

the individual victims either took over the loan payments or relinquished the vehicles 

to the lenders. The lenders then resold the vehicles for less than the remaining 

balance on each loan. 

After sentencing, the district court ordered Arnold to pay restitution to, inter 

alia, those lenders who repossessed vehicles and resold them at deficiencies. This 

included both so-called “captive” lenders, Aplt. Br. 11—i.e, financing units owned 

and operated by the automobile companies—and their successors—i.e., lenders that 

assumed the financial interests of the original lenders. While not entirely clear from 

either the record or the parties’ briefing, it appears that the district court calculated 

the restitution due to the captive lenders as the amount of principal remaining on the 

loans after the repossession and sale of the vehicles. 
3 

The district court ultimately ordered Arnold to pay $280,075.15 in restitution. 

Arnold appeals. 

II 

On appeal, Arnold argues that the district court erred in (1) finding that the 

captive and successor lenders were victims entitled to mandatory restitution under the 

Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA) of 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 3663A, and (2) 

failing to credit Arnold with interest that he paid prior to repossession and resale of 

the vehicles. In evaluating these arguments, we review the district court’s application 

of the MVRA de novo and its factual findings for clear error. See United States v. 

Shengyang Zhou, 717 F.3d 1139, 1152 (10th Cir. 2013).

A 

Arnold first argues the district court erred when it concluded that the captive 

lenders constitute victims for purposes of the MVRA. 

The MVRA defines the term “victim” to mean, in relevant part, “a person 

directly and proximately harmed as a result of the commission of an offense.” § 

3663A(a)(2). A victim is “proximately harmed as a result of” a defendant’s crime,

id., “if either there are no intervening causes, or, if there are any such causes, [they] 

are directly related to the defendant’s offense,” United States v. Speakman, 594 F.3d 

1165, 1172 (10th Cir. 2010). 

Arnold argues that the government failed to meet its burden to show that he 

“was the proximate cause of the losses claimed by the [captive] lenders” because the 

government failed to prove that the employees of the captive lenders—and therefore 
4 

the captive lenders themselves—weren’t involved in the Arnolds’ fraudulent scheme. 

Aplt. Br. 9. 

For this proposition, Arnold relies on Speakman, 594 F.3d 1165. There, Merrill 

Lynch financial consultant Larry Speakman illegally transferred money from the 

Merrill Lynch account of his wife, Carolyn Speakman. Id. at 1166-67. Unrelated to 

the criminal case the government subsequently brought against Larry, Carolyn also 

initiated an arbitration suit against Merrill Lynch. Id. at 1168. The arbitration panel 

found some liability on Merrill Lynch’s part and, as a result, ordered it to pay 

Carolyn $1,225,000. Id. 

Larry ultimately pleaded guilty to wire fraud, and the district court ordered 

him to pay $1,225,000 in restitution to Merrill Lynch, finding that Merrill Lynch was 

a “victim” under the MVRA. Id. at 1168, 1170. The district court based this decision 

on the facts contained in Larry’s presentence investigation report, which explained 

the amount of—but not the basis for—Merrill Lynch’s liability to Carolyn. Id. at 

1168. 

On appeal, we reversed and remanded for the district court to determine the 

basis for the arbitration panel’s finding of Merrill Lynch’s liability. Id. at 1172-73. In 

doing so, we noted that Merrill Lynch was only a “victim” of Larry’s fraud under the 

MVRA if, inter alia, Larry’s fraud proximately caused Merrill Lynch’s loss. See id. at 

1171. And we explained that intervening causes break the chain of proximate cause 

unless they are directly related to the offensive conduct. See id. at 1172. Finally, we 

determined that two such potential intervening causes existed. Id. 
5 

First, Carolyn’s initiation of the arbitration action was an intervening cause of 

Merrill Lynch’s harm. But because the initiation of that action was directly related to 

Larry’s fraud, we held that it didn’t break the chain of causation for purposes of 

determining whether Merrill Lynch was a victim. Id. 

Second, we noted that Merrill Lynch’s own wrongdoing, if any, might 

constitute an intervening cause. See id. at 1172. And we reasoned that if the basis of 

Merrill Lynch’s liability to Carolyn was its own intentional acts, those acts would 

indeed break the chain of causation between Larry’s fraud and Merrill Lynch’s loss. 

See id. at 1173-74. But that wouldn’t be the case if the basis of Merrill Lynch’s 

liability to Carolyn instead sounded in respondeat superior or negligence. Id. at 1173. 

Thus, we remanded for the district court to determine whether Merrill Lynch’s 

liability to Carolyn was based on respondeat superior, its own negligence, or its own 

intentional involvement in Larry’s fraud. Id. at 1172-74. 

Here, Arnold argues that the government failed to show by a preponderance of 

the evidence that he proximately caused harm to the captive lenders because the 

government didn’t show that the captive lenders weren’t complicit in the Arnolds’ 

fraud. Arnold suggests that Speakman requires as much. In other words, he suggests 

that Speakman required the government to disprove the existence of any possible 

intervening causes in order to satisfy its burden of showing that the captive lenders in 

this case are victims under the MVRA. 

We disagree. In Speakman, the arbitration award constituted evidence that at 

least arguably suggested an intervening cause may have broken the chain of 
6 

proximate causation. See 594 F.3d at 1172-73. Thus, Speakman doesn’t stand for the 

proposition that the government must disprove any and all potential intervening 

causes before the district court can characterize an entity as a victim under the 

MVRA. Instead, Speakman merely establishes that the government must address 

potential intervening causes when at least some evidence suggests those intervening 

causes might break the chain of proximate causation. 

Arnold points to no such evidence here. That is, he doesn’t identify any 

evidence that would even hint that the captive lenders or their employees 

intentionally participated in Arnold’s fraud. And in the absence of such evidence, the 

district court didn’t err in finding that the captive lenders and their successors were 

victims—even though the government didn’t disprove the possibility of their 

involvement in Arnold’s fraud. 

 Finally, in passing, Arnold cites United States v. Washington, 634 F.3d 1180 

(10th Cir. 2011), and asserts that the government failed to prove that “successor 

lenders were a standard practice within the automobile sales and distribution system.” 

Aplt. Br. 14. But Arnold provides no context, argument, or explanation for this 

assertion. Accordingly, any argument that Arnold might be attempting to advance 

here is inadequately briefed, and we decline to consider it. See Fed. R. App. P. 

28(a)(8)(A) (requiring argument section of appellant’s brief to contain “appellant’s 

contentions and the reasons for them”); Bronson v. Swensen, 500 F.3d 1099, 1104 

(10th Cir. 2007) (explaining that court routinely declines to consider inadequately 

briefed arguments). 
7 

B 

Next, Arnold challenges the district court’s method of calculating restitution. 

At the outset, we note that Arnold makes no effort to explain how, precisely, 

the district court actually determined the amount of restitution owed to each lender. 

Nor is the district court’s method entirely clear from its restitution order. True, that 

order notes that the amount of restitution owed is the amount of the loan deficiency 

remaining after the lenders applied any proceeds from the sale of each repossessed 

vehicle. But the order doesn’t specify whether the final amount owed consists solely 

of the remaining undischarged principal after subtracting the sale proceeds from the 

principal due, or whether it instead includes other components, such as additional 

accumulated interest. Based on our review of the record, however, it appears that the 

amount the district court ultimately relied on in imposing restitution was simply the 

outstanding principal remaining on the loans after the lenders resold each vehicle and 

applied the proceeds. That is, while the lenders’ records do note additional 

accumulated interest, it doesn’t appear that the district court added that amount to the 

remaining principal after applying the resale proceeds. 

Arnold suggests that the district court erred in simply subtracting the sale 

proceeds from the remaining principal balance on each loan. Instead, he appears to 

assert, the district court should have also subtracted from the remaining principal 

balance any interest paid prior to repossession. Failure to do so, Arnold complains, 

“would allow [each] lender to collect the interest twice.” Aplt. Br. 16. 

Arnold makes no attempt to explain how the district court’s failure to subtract 
8 

from the principal balance any interest paid over the life of each loan would allow the 

lenders to “collect . . . interest twice.” Id. Instead, as we see it, Arnold’s proposed 

method of calculating restitution—i.e., his suggestion that the district court should 

have subtracted from the principal balance owed the amount of interest already 

paid—would deprive the lenders of the opportunity to collect interest at all. 

We decline to adopt this approach. First, Arnold cites no authority suggesting 

that the lenders aren’t entitled to interest under the MVRA. We could reject his 

argument on this basis alone. See Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8)(A); Bronson, 500 F.3d at 

1104. 

Second, as the government points out, our cases indicate that the lenders are 

entitled to interest as a component of restitution. Cf. United States v. Williams, 292 

F.3d 681, 687, 689 (10th Cir. 2002) (“The car was not sold at auction until July 9, 

1997. Accrued interest at the contract rate of 9.5 percent during the intervening time 

period as well as credit union expenses and fees incurred in the repossession and sale 

of the Jaguar reasonably account for [amount of restitution that district court imposed 

under MVRA].”); United States v. Patty, 992 F.2d 1045, 1050 (10th Cir 1993) 

(approving prejudgment interest as a component of restitution under Victim Witness 

Protection Act because it reflects victim’s “inability to use the money for a 

productive purpose, and is therefore necessary to make the victim whole”—

particularly when “victim is a financial institution”). Thus, we reject Arnold’s 

assertion that the restitution order somehow overcompensates the lender-victims by 

failing to subtract from the restitution owed any interest those lenders previously 
9 

collected. 

As a final matter, Arnold complains that “some of the claims” for which the 

district court imposed restitution also “included costs associated with repossession 

and processing.” Aplt. Br. 16. But because the argument section of his brief doesn’t 

contain any citations to the record that might support this factual assertion, Arnold 

has waived any challenge to the district court’s alleged inclusion of such costs. See 

Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8)(A); Bronson, 500 F.3d at 1104. 

* * * 

Arnold fails to demonstrate that the district court erred in (1) concluding that 

the captive lenders and their successors constitute “victims” for purposes of the 

MVRA or (2) calculating the amount of restitution owed. Accordingly, we affirm. 

Entered for the Court 

Nancy L. Moritz 

Circuit Judge