J-S20006-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

v.

LEEANN SANTIAGO

Appellant No. 2551 EDA 2015

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence July 31, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0000981-2012

BEFORE: BOWES, J., OTT, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED MAY 23, 2017

Leeann Santiago appeals from the judgment of sentence of five years 

probation that was imposed after a jury convicted her of endangering the 

welfare of a child (“EWOC”). We reject her challenge to the sufficiency of 

the evidence supporting her conviction and affirm. 

Appellant and her co-defendant Jason Virgile were convicted of 

endangering the welfare of Appellant’s son by a previous relationship, I.V. 

At the time of the pertinent events, I.V. was living with his sister, Appellant, 

and Virgile. Virgile’s two sons, who were one year old and four years old, 

respectively, came twice a month to stay at the home. 

The Commonwealth’s proof was as follows. Aracely Thornton, 

Appellant’s mother, testified that on May 2, 2011, she was babysitting the 
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then two-year-old I.V. at her home in Philadelphia. She noticed bruises on 

his face between his forehead and his nose and on the front and back of his 

ear. Since the bruising “was in multiple areas,” Ms. Thornton became 

alarmed. N.T. Trial, 5/26/15, at 81. She went to the police station to report 

the injuries, and, when Appellant retrieved I.V., Ms. Thornton discussed the 

injuries with her. Appellant asked I.V. who inflicted the wounds, and he 

responded, “Jason did it.” Id. at 105, 106. Ms. Thornton testified that I.V. 

referred to Virgile as Jason and that there was no one else involved in I.V.’s 

life, other than Virgile, whose name was Jason. Id. at 107. 

Appellant took I.V. to the hospital, where he was x-rayed, and she 

called his biological father, Valerie V., who went to the emergency room and 

observed bruises on I.V.’s head and ear area. Prior to May 2, 2011, Valerie 

had never observed those types of injuries on his son’s face. Valerie asked 

I.V. how he was hurt, but never received a “clear response.” Id. at 199. 

The next time that Valerie was called to the hospital for I.V. was 

October 25, 2011. At that time, I.V.’s injuries were much more extensive. 

I.V. had a laceration on the top of his head that required staples, “bruises on 

the both sides of his head near his ears,” a “mark, like a patch on his 

stomach, miscellaneous marks on his thighs, an open sore on his leg,” and 

also a rib fracture. N.T. Trial, 2/27/15, at 51. I.V. again refused to tell his 

father how he sustained the wounds. 
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Due to the nature of I.V.’s harm on October 25, 2011, hospital 

personnel immediately suspected that I.V. was the victim of child abuse and 

called police. Philadelphia Detective Manuel Gonzalez of the Special Victims 

Child Abuse Unit responded. At the hospital, Detective Gonzalez asked 

Appellant what had happened, and she replied that I.V. hit a glass table with 

his head. On October 25, 2011, I.V. was removed from the care of 

Appellant and Virgile and taken to Ms. Thornton’s home. On November 4, 

2011, Detective Gonzalez interviewed Appellant about the matter. 

Appellant represented that I.V. hit his head on a glass table while he 

was playing with his sister and Virgile’s two sons, but Appellant was unable 

to explain how I.V. incurred the remainder of his wounds. She informed 

Detective Gonzalez that I.V. never came home from his day care center with 

injuries and stated that she took care of her two children when they were at 

home. On November 4, 2011, Philadelphia Detective Edward Enriquez 

interviewed Virgile, who indicated that he did not know how I.V. was hurt. 

Melissa Hampton, who worked in Child Protective Services at the 

Philadelphia Department of Human Services, was assigned to investigate the 

matter. On October 26, 2011, she went to see I.V. at Ms. Thornton’s home. 

Ms. Hampton interviewed the child and asked how he had sustained his 

wounds. Initially, I.V. merely shrugged. When asked about the large head 

laceration, “he said mom did it.” N.T. Trial, 5/26/15, at 53. 
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Ms. Hampton next interviewed Appellant and Virgile. Appellant 

maintained that I.V. sustained the head injury by hitting “his head on the 

table” in the dining room while he was playing with the three other children 

and while she was cooking in the kitchen. Id. at 55. Appellant also 

represented that his facial bruising occurred when “she was pulling a T-shirt 

down over his head.” Id. at 56. She indicated that she did not know how 

the leg sore was caused but said that it must have been from a fall. 

Appellant maintained that the mark on his stomach was a result of the boy 

scratching himself with a toy. At the time, Appellant appeared “somewhat 

angry, defensive and somewhat nonchalant about the child’s injuries.” Id. 

at 57. 

When Ms. Hampton discussed the matter with Virgile, he told her that 

I.V. was injured while he was retrieving his children from their mother’s 

home. Virgile represented that, when he returned with his two boys, 

Appellant “ran up to him to tell him or show him [I.V.’s] injury, and that he 

told her to take the child to the hospital.” Id. at 59. Ms. Hampton noted 

the discrepancy in Appellant’s and Virgile’s versions of events in that 

Appellant said that Virgile’s two children were present when I.V. lacerated 

his head while Virgile stated that the injury in question occurred while he 

was retrieving his children from their mother’s home. 

On October 28, 2011, there was a hearing to determine if I.V. and his 

sister should remain in protective care, and Virgile told Ms. Hampton that he 
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and Appellant were the only adults with “access to [I.V.] in reference to his 

injuries.” Id. at 65. 

Doctor Maria McColgan testified as an expert medical witness on behalf 

of the Commonwealth. She saw pictures taken by emergency room 

physicians of the injuries that I.V. sustained on May 2, 2011. He had 

“bruises to the right side of his forehead, head, his ear, the bridge of his 

nose, under his nose, . . . the side of his face, and his cheek.” Id. at 148. 

Dr. McColgan testified to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that the 

described wounds were “inflicted injuries and not consistent with accidental 

injury.” Id. at 149. 

Dr. McColgan also reviewed the medical records from the October 25, 

2011 incident and stated that I.V. had a laceration to his scalp, a healing rib 

fracture, “linear scars on the back of his legs,” and bruising around the ears 

on both sides of his face and the back of his head. There was no innocent 

explanation for all these injuries, particularly the rib fracture. She explained 

that bruising to the ear was not typical in either accidental or self-inflicted 

injury and was indicative of child abuse. Dr. McColgan concluded to a 

reasonable degree of medical certainty that the multiple wounds suffered by 

I.V. on October 25, 2011, was the result of physical abuse. Id. at 154. 

Based on this evidence, Appellant and Virgile were convicted of EWOC. 

This appeal followed imposition of the above-described judgment of 
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sentence. Appellant presents one issue for our review: “Was the evidence 

insufficient to sustain the conviction for EWOC?” Appellant’s brief at 3. 

In addressing the merits of Appellant’s sufficiency challenge, we 

employ this standard:

In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we must determine 

whether the evidence admitted at trial, and all reasonable 

inferences drawn from that evidence, when viewed in the light 

most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, was 

sufficient to enable the fact finder to conclude that the 

Commonwealth established all of the elements of the offense 

beyond a reasonable doubt. The Commonwealth may sustain its 

burden by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Further, the 

trier of fact is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Sunealitis, 153 A.3d 414, 419 (Pa.Super. 2016) 

(citation omitted). 

The offense of EWOC is defined, in pertinent part, as follows: "(1) A 

parent, guardian or other person supervising the welfare of a child under 18 

years of age . . . commits an offense if he knowingly endangers the welfare 

of the child by violating a duty of care, protection or support.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 

4304(a)(1) (emphases added). Our Supreme Court has noted that, while 

the crime in question is a specific intent crime, the “EWOC statute is 

necessarily drawn broadly to capture conduct that endangers the welfare of 

a child.” Commonwealth v. Lynn, 114 A.3d 796, 819 (Pa. 2015). EWOC 

is committed when: 

(1) the accused is aware of his/her duty to protect the child; (2) 

the accused is aware that the child is in circumstances that could 
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threaten the child's physical or psychological welfare; and (3) 

the accused has either failed to act or has taken action so lame 

or meager that such actions cannot reasonably be expected to 

protect the child's welfare. 

Id. at 819. 

Herein, Appellant acknowledged to Ms. Hampton that she cared for 

I.V. and thus had a duty of care. The second and third elements of EWOC 

are present because Appellant created the circumstances that threatened 

I.V. by inflicting injuries on him on October 25, 2011. Appellant’s argument 

is that the Commonwealth failed to prove how I.V.’s October 25, 2011 

injuries occurred and that they could have been accidentally sustained. She 

posits that the head laceration was caused when the child ran into a table. 

We disagree with her position. 

I.V. was interviewed by Ms. Hampton of Child Protective Services, and 

the child told her that his mother inflicted the laceration to his head. N.T. 

Trial, 5/26/15, at 53. Moreover, while Appellant claimed that the head 

injury was caused when the child ran into a glass table while playing, the 

factfinder was free to reject her testimony. Sunealitis, supra. It is clear 

that the jury believed Dr. McColgan’s testimony that the injuries that I.V. 

displayed on October 25, 2011, were not the result of an accident but from

physical abuse. Thus, Appellant’s EWOC conviction was based on sufficient 

evidence since it established that she inflicted a wound to the two-year-old’s 

head that required metal staples. Commonwealth v. Passarelli, 789 A.2d 
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708, 716 (Pa.Super. 2001), aff'd per curiam, 825 A.2d 628 (Pa. 2003) 

(holding that evidence was sufficient to support EWOC conviction where 

Commonwealth presented expert witness who opined that injuries sustained 

by child were intentionally inflicted and not the result of an accident). 

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/23/2017