Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-DR-2561 | July 17, 2020 Page 1 of 7

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Mark J. Crandley

Barnes & Thornburg LLP

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Darryn L. Duchon

Indianapolis, Indiana

Monty K. Woolsey

Cross Glazier & Burroughs, P.C.

Carmel, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Ashley E. Shelton,

Appellant-Respondent,

v.

Jeffrey M. Shelton,

Appellee-Petitioner.

July 17, 2020

Court of Appeals Case No.

19A-DR-2561

Appeal from the Hamilton 

Superior Court

The Honorable J. Richard 

Campbell, Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

29D04-1504-DR-3068

Najam, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-DR-2561 | July 17, 2020 Page 2 of 7

Statement of the Case

[1] Following the dissolution court’s entry of the final dissolution decree, Jeffrey 

Shelton (“Husband”) filed a motion to enforce the decree and to correct a 

clerical mistake. The dissolution court granted the motion and clarified that, 

under the decree, Husband was awarded ownership of an S corporation owned 

by the parties during their marriage. Ashley Shelton (“Wife”) appeals the 

court’s order and presents two issues for our review with respect to ownership 

of the S corporation. However, before the court’s order was entered, Wife 

agreed in writing to transfer all of her interest in the S corporation to Husband. 

Thus, her appeal is moot.

[2] We dismiss.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Husband and Wife married in 1994. Husband filed a petition for dissolution of 

the marriage in April 2015. During their marriage, the parties owned 

businesses, including Shelton Properties Indiana, Inc. (“SPIN”), an S 

corporation with Husband and Wife as the only two shareholders. SPIN 

owned several parcels of real estate in Indiana and Arizona.

[4] Following an evidentiary hearing, the dissolution court divided the marital 

estate unequally, awarding 59% of the estate to Wife. Both parties filed 

motions to correct error, which the court granted in part. In its order, the 

dissolution court modified the decree and awarded 52% of the estate to Wife 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-DR-2561 | July 17, 2020 Page 3 of 7

and 48% to Husband. Neither party appealed from the court’s grant, in part, of 

their motions to correct error.

[5] In the final division of the marital estate, the dissolution court divided the real 

properties owned by SPIN in the same manner as it had done in the original 

decree. The court awarded a property at 8028 Vista Canyon to Wife, in full, 

but it divided the remaining SPIN properties equally between the parties. The 

court also ordered each party to share the cost, equally, of income taxes from 

the sale of the Vista Canyon property.

[6] In its Exhibit 1, which sets out the distribution of the marital estate, the 

dissolution court listed the parties’ four businesses and their respective values. 

The court awarded to Husband as his separate property Shelton Properties, 

Inc., which is distinct from SPIN. And the court awarded to Husband Ashley 

Evans, Inc., valued at $1,298,000, and Indy Focus, Inc., valued at $0. With 

respect to SPIN, Exhibit 1 does not make reference to an award to either party 

but lists its value at $0.

[7] Thereafter, Husband asked Wife to transfer her shares in SPIN to him. Wife 

refused. Husband then filed his motion with the dissolution court to enforce the 

decree and to “make a clerical correction to the decree.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 

2 at 62. In particular, Husband asked that “the Court clarify the Decree 

pursuant to Trial Rule 60(A)” to “specifically award SPIN to Husband to effect 

the terms of the decree[.]” Id. at 63. Husband also asked that the dissolution 

court “award [a] shareholder loan [in the amount of $416,690.15] and offsetting 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-DR-2561 | July 17, 2020 Page 4 of 7

liability [for the same amount] to Husband[.]” Id. at 64. In short, Husband 

asked that the court clarify that the decree awarded SPIN to him and valued 

SPIN at $0.

[8] On September 27, 2019, Wife filed a response to the motion and asserted in 

relevant part that the decree does not “specifically state whether [Wife] or 

[Husband] was awarded” SPIN. Id. at 73. Accordingly, Wife maintained that 

she was not required under the decree to assign her interest in SPIN to 

Husband. 

[9] However, on October 3, before the dissolution court had ruled on Husband’s 

motion, Wife filed with the court a notice that she had executed a transfer 

agreement, “transferring all [of Wife’s] interest in [SPIN]” to Husband. 

Appellee’s App. Vol. 2 at 73. That transfer agreement stated in relevant part 

that Wife transferred “any and all shares” in SPIN to Husband “for no 

consideration” and “[p]ursuant to the Decree of Dissolution[.]” Id. at 74.

[10] On October 4, the dissolution court issued its order granting Husband’s motion

under Trial Rule 60(A). The court awarded ownership of SPIN “and all of its 

assets and liabilities with the exception of the net sale proceeds and tax payment 

specifically awarded to Wife under the Decree” and ordered that “the 

Shareholder Loan owed from [SPIN to Husband and Wife] is awarded to 

Husband at zero value.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 44. This appeal ensued.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-DR-2561 | July 17, 2020 Page 5 of 7

Discussion and Decision

[11] Wife contends that the dissolution court erred when it granted Husband’s 

motion to correct the decree under Trial Rule 60(A). In particular, Wife asserts 

that, when it awarded SPIN to Husband, the court made a substantive change 

to the decree, which is not permitted under Trial Rule 60(A). In the alternative, 

Wife maintains that the court’s award of SPIN to Husband was erroneous 

because it did not take into account “the effect of that action [on the] division of 

the marital estate.” Appellant’s Br. at 8.

[12] We do not reach the merits of Wife’s appeal. As this Court has observed:

The long-standing rule in Indiana has been that a case is deemed 

moot when no effective relief can be rendered to the parties 

before the court. A.D. v. State, 736 N.E.2d 1274, 1276 (Ind. Ct.

App. 2000). When a dispositive issue in a case has been resolved in 

such a way as to render it unnecessary to decide the question involved, the 

case will be dismissed. Id. The existence of an actual controversy is 

an essential requisite to appellate jurisdiction. Bremen Public 

Schools v. Varab, 496 N.E.2d 125, 126 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986).

DeSalle v. Gentry, 818 N.E.2d 40, 48-49 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (emphasis added).

[13] Here, before the dissolution court had issued the order from which Wife now 

appeals, Wife assigned to Husband all of her interest in SPIN “[p]ursuant to the 

Decree of Dissolution” for no consideration. Appellee’s App. Vol. 2 at 74. 

Nevertheless, Wife contends in her reply brief that she tendered only “a proposed

transfer agreement,” which was “not signed by [Husband] at the time[,]” and

she maintains that this “form of an agreement” did not “concede that the trial 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-DR-2561 | July 17, 2020 Page 6 of 7

court had already awarded SPIN to [Husband]” but was made to ensure “that 

[Husband] could not bring a contempt or similar motion against [Wife]” for her 

having not complied with the decree. Reply Br. at 8 (emphasis added). We are 

not persuaded by Wife’s suggestion that the transfer agreement was not what it 

appears to be on its face but was instead a mere feint with no legal force or 

effect and that its plain meaning should be disregarded. Whatever Wife’s 

subjective intent may have been, the transfer agreement transferred her interest 

in SPIN to Husband without any reservation or qualification and states that it 

was executed pursuant to the dissolution decree.

[14] It is well settled that “‘all parties who sign [a contract] are bound by it unless it 

affirmatively appears that they did not intend to be bound unless others also 

signed.’” Downs v. Radentz, 132 N.E.3d 58, 63 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (quoting 

Kruse Classic Auction, Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 511 N.E.2d 326, 328 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 1987), trans. denied). Wife’s transfer agreement does not indicate that

Wife did not intend to be bound unless Husband also signed. Accordingly, 

Wife is bound by the transfer agreement.

[15] Because Wife no longer has any interest in SPIN, it is unnecessary for us to 

resolve the issues Wife raises on appeal.1

 See DeSalle, 818 N.E.2d at 49. 

Accordingly, we dismiss Wife’s appeal as moot.

1

 We note that Wife asserts in her brief on appeal that “SPIN had outstanding loans of over $400,000.” 

Appellant’s Br. at 12. But Wife does not support that assertion with a citation to the record. In any event,

neither party appealed from the final decree, in which the dissolution court valued SPIN at $0. Wife cannot 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-DR-2561 | July 17, 2020 Page 7 of 7

[16] Dismissed.

Kirsch, J., and Brown, J., concur.

now be heard on that issue. For the same reason, Wife cannot now complain that the dissolution court 

erroneously disregarded her tax liability from SPIN.