Court of Appeals, State of Michigan 

ORDER 

In re Forfeiture of Bail Bond (People of Stanford) 

Docket No. 328784 

LC No. 14-020293-FH 

Amy Ronayne Krause 

Presiding Judge 

Peter D. O'Connell 

Elizabeth L. Gleicher 

Judges 

On the Court's own motion, the Court orders that the November 22, 2016 opinion is 

hereby VACA TED, and a new opinion is attached. 

A true copy entered and certified by Jerome W. Zimmer Jr., Chief Clerk, on 

DEC 15 2016 

Dale 
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STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

In re FORFEITURE OF BAIL BOND, 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

FOR PUBLICATION 

December 15, 2016 

9:05 a.m. 

v No. 328784 

Eaton Circuit Court 

ANTOINE J. STANFORD, LC No. 14-020293-FH 

 Defendant, 

and 

LEO’S BAIL BONDS AGENCY COMPANY, 

INC., as Agent in Fact of ROCHE SURETY AND 

CASUALTY COMPANY, INC., 

 Appellant. 

Before: RONAYNE KRAUSE, P.J., and O’CONNELL and GLEICHER, JJ. 

PER CURIAM. 

 Appellant, the agent for the surety on a bail bond provided for defendant in a criminal 

matter, appeals as of right the circuit court’s decision denying its motion to vacate forfeiture of 

bond. The court concluded that appellant had received timely notice of defendant’s default, and 

also concluded that a late penalty assessed against appellant for failure to timely pay the 

judgment was proper. We conclude that the notice was not timely, so we reverse and remand for 

further proceedings. 

I. BACKGROUND FACTS 

 Defendant Antoine Stanford was charged with uttering and publishing, MCL 750.249, 

and operating with a suspended license, MCL 257.904. Appellant, as agent for Roche Surety 

and Casualty Company, Inc. (“Roche”), became defendant’s surety on a bail bond for this matter 

in the amount of $10,000. On or about January 14, 2015, defendant defaulted on his bond 

obligation when he failed to appear at a pretrial hearing. On January 20, 2015, the circuit court 

issued an order revoking defendant’s release and forfeiting the bond. It served notice to 
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appellant via first-class mail. The certificate of mailing attached to the order stated that it was 

served on appellant on January 21, 2015, seven days after defendant’s default, as required by 

MCL 765.28(1)1

. However, appellant asserted that the notice was postmarked January 22, 2015, 

which was eight days after defendant’s default, in violation of the statute. Moreover, appellant 

asserted that it was without “actual notice” of defendant’s default and entry of the order until it 

received the notice in the mail on January 23, 2015. 

 Appellant failed to appear at a show cause hearing held on February 20, 2015. On 

February 24, 2015, the circuit court entered judgment against appellant for $10,000, the full 

amount of bail. Appellant was later notified that a 20 percent late fee had been added to its 

obligation as a result of its failure to timely pay the judgment, raising appellant’s obligation to 

$12,000. 

 Appellant filed a motion to vacate the judgment of bond forfeiture, arguing that notice 

was not provided within seven days of defendant’s default as required by MCL 765.28(1), so it 

was untimely. The court denied the motion on the grounds that notice was timely pursuant to 

MCR 3.604(I)(2)2, and that the date of service of notice was January 21, 2015, as stated on the 

judgment’s certificate of mailing, rather than January 22, 2015, the date that the notice was 

postmarked. The court also concluded that there was a conflict between MCR 3.604(I)(2) and 

MCL 765.28(1) as to “the procedural requirements for service,” and that the court rule was 

controlling over the statute. The court’s decision was based in part on a memorandum from the 

State Court Administrator’s Office (SCAO), in which the SCAO concluded that the court rule 

controlled because the subject of the conflict was procedural in nature, citing Donkers v Kovach, 

277 Mich App 366, 373; 745 NW2d 154 (2007). The court also concluded that the 20 percent 

late fee on the judgment was proper under MCL 600.4803(1) because the penalty was “separate” 

from the judgment, so the judgment was not for more than the “full amount of the surety bond” 

in violation MCL 765.28(1). 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

 

1

 MCL 765.28(1) provides in relevant part: “If default is made in any recognizance in a court of 

record, the default shall be entered on the record by the clerk of the court. After the default is 

entered, the court shall give each surety immediate notice not to exceed 7 days after the date of 

the failure to appear. The notice shall be served upon each surety in person or left at the surety’s 

last known business address. Each surety shall be given an opportunity to appear before the 

court on a day certain and show cause why judgment should not be entered against the surety for 

the full amount of the bail or surety bond. If good cause is not shown for the defendant’s failure 

to appear, the court shall enter judgment against the surety on the recognizance for an amount 

determined appropriate by the court but not more than the full amount of the bail, or if a surety 

bond has been posted the full amount of the surety bond.” 

2

 MCR 3.604(I)(2) provides: “Notice of the hearing on the motion for judgment must be given 

to the surety or the owner of the security in the manner prescribed in MCR 2.107. The notice 

may be mailed to the address stated in the bond or stated when the security was furnished unless 

the surety or owner has given notice of a change of address.” 
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 Questions of statutory interpretation are questions of law that are reviewed de novo. In re 

McEvoy, 267 Mich App 55, 59; 704 NW2d 78 (2005). Questions relating to the proper 

interpretation of court rules are also questions of law that are reviewed de novo. Marketos v 

American Employers Insurance Co, 465 Mich 407, 412; 633 NW2d 371 (2001). In interpreting a 

statute, we apply the rule of ordinary usage and common sense. People v Kelly, 186 Mich App 

524, 528; 465 NW2d 569 (1990). 

III. STATUTE AND COURT RULE DO NOT CONFLICT 

 MCL 765.28(1) and MCR 3.604(I)(2) do not conflict. MCL 765.28(1) is the procedure 

for providing a surety notice of a default. MCR 3.604(I)(2), on the other hand, is the procedure 

to provide notice of a hearing on a motion for judgment. These are two separate and distinct 

events. A default must be entered prior to a hearing to enter judgment on the default. In any 

event, the court rule itself would resolve any conflict, if such a conflict otherwise exists. MCR 

3.604(A) states that the “rule applies to bonds given under the Michigan Court Rules and the 

Revised Judicature Act, unless a rule or statute clearly indicates that a different procedure is to 

be followed” (emphases added). Therefore, even if MCL 765.28(1) set forth a procedure that 

affected the same event or subject addressed by the court rule, by the court rule’s own terms the 

statute would still control. 

II. NOTICE OF DEFAULT WAS INEFFECTIVE 

 Service was not timely under MCL 765.28(1) or MCR 3.604(I)(2)3. Under MCL 

765.28(1), a surety must receive immediate notice, “not to exceed seven days after the date of the 

failure to appear.” See also MCR 6.106(I)(2) (stating that if a defendant has failed to comply 

with the conditions of release, the court may order a surety bond forfeited and that the court must 

immediately mail notice of the forfeiture to anyone who posted bond). However, the trial court 

did not even mail the notice until the eighth day. Therefore, the notice was not timely. 

 In contrast, notice of the hearing on the motion to enter judgment against the surety was 

timely pursuant to MCR 3.604(I)(2). A notice of hearing was mailed by the court on January 22, 

2015, for a hearing scheduled for February 20, 2015, which complies with the requirements in 

MCR 3.604(I)(2) and MCR 2.107(3). Nevertheless, although the surety clearly had proper 

notice of the motion to enter judgment, that does not obviate the fact the surety did not receive 

proper notice of the default itself. 

 A similar issue was addressed In re Forfeiture of Bail Bond, 496 Mich 320; 852 NW2d 

747 (2014). There, our Supreme Court found that MCL 765.28’s purpose was to protect public 

interest, as well as the rights of third persons. Moreover, the difficulty that a surety might face in 

apprehending a defendant when the court fails to provide timely notice of the defendant's default 

increases with time. See Forfeiture of Bail Bond, 496 Mich at 334. As a remedy for this failure 

this court held: 

 When a public entity does not perform its statutory obligations in a timely 

manner, and fails to respect the statutory preconditions to its exercise of authority, 

it lacks the authority to proceed as if it had. In this case, the consequence is that 

the court cannot require the surety to pay the surety bond because the court failed 
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to provide the surety notice within seven days of defendant’s failure to appear, as 

the statute clearly requires. Any other interpretation of the statute would render 

the seven-day notice requirement entirely nugatory. [Id. at 336] 

 Here, the court failed to give the surety immediate notice within seven days, therefore, 

the court cannot require the surety to pay the surety bond. We therefore reverse the trial court 

and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction. 

/s/ Amy Ronayne Krause 

/s/ Peter D. O’Connell 

/s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher