United States Department of Labor

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

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G.M., Appellant

and

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, BUREAU OF 

DIPLOMATIC SECURITY, Washington, DC, 

Employer

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Docket No. 18-0768

Issued: October 4, 2018

Appearances: Case Submitted on the Record

Appellant, pro se

Office of Solicitor, for the Director

DECISION AND ORDER

Before:

CHRISTOPHER J. GODFREY, Chief Judge

PATRICIA H. FITZGERALD, Deputy Chief Judge

VALERIE D. EVANS-HARRELL, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION

On February 26, 2018 appellant filed a timely appeal from a January 8, 2018 merit decision 

of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). Pursuant to the Federal Employees’

Compensation Act1(FECA) and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the Board has jurisdiction over 

the merits of this case.2

ISSUE

The issue is whether appellant’s emotional condition claim is barred by the applicable time 

limitation provisions of 5 U.S.C. § 8122(a).

 

1 5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.

2 The case record provided to the Board includes evidence received after OWCP issued its January 8, 2018 decision. 

Appellant also provided additional evidence with his appeal. The Board’s jurisdiction is limited to the evidence that 

was before OWCP at the time of its final decision. Therefore, the Board is precluded from reviewing this additional 

evidence for the first time on appeal. 20 C.F.R. § 501.2(c)(1).
2

FACTUAL HISTORY

On December 1, 2016 appellant, then a 68-year-old former special agent/security officer, 

filed an occupational disease claim (Form CA-2) alleging that he sustained post-traumatic stress 

disorder (PTSD) due to his work. He indicated that he first became aware of his claimed condition 

on May 8, 1992 and first realized on June 12, 1993 that it was caused or aggravated by factors of 

his federal employment. Appellant asserted that his job required him to protect and stop the 

assassination of guests of the U.S. Department of State.

3

 On the reverse side of the claim form, a 

supervisory human resources specialist for the employing establishment indicated that appellant 

last worked for the employing establishment on August 22, 1992. The portion of the form for 

listing the date appellant reported his claimed condition to his supervisor was left blank.

Appellant submitted a May 8, 1992 report in which Dr. Edito C. Galvez, an occupational 

medicine physician for the employing establishment, indicated that appellant had reported reactive 

depression secondary to legal and marital problems. Dr. Galvez noted that appellant underwent 

therapy and indicated that the depression had completely resolved three months prior. 

In a September 18, 2016 report, Dr. Renz J. Juaneza, an attending Board-certified 

psychiatrist, noted that he had treated appellant since September 2016 and advised that appellant 

had a provisional diagnosis of PTSD, as well as unspecified anxiety and depressive disorder. He

indicated that appellant would require a prolonged period of treatment.

In a March 7, 2017 letter, an employing establishment official noted that appellant’s former 

supervisor no longer worked for the employing establishment and, therefore, the reverse side of 

the Form CA-2 was completed by a supervisory human resources specialist. The official noted 

that, although appellant advised on the Form CA-2 that he did not report his claimed condition to 

the employing establishment in 1993 because he had been reassigned to the U.S. Embassy in Paris, 

the actual date of appellant’s reassignment to U.S. Embassy in Paris was 1981. The official 

indicated that the date appellant stopped work, i.e., August 22, 1992, was the date he was 

terminated from the employing establishment due to legal issues.

In a March 15, 2017 development letter, OWCP requested that appellant submit additional 

evidence in support of his claim, including a physician’s opinion supported by a medical 

explanation as to how the reported work incidents caused or aggravated a medical condition. It 

requested that he complete and return an attached questionnaire which posed various questions 

regarding the work incidents that he believed caused or aggravated his claimed condition. On 

March 15, 2017 OWCP also requested additional information from the employing establishment. 

It afforded appellant 30 days to submit a response.4

Appellant submitted a September 14, 2016 report from Dr. Juaneza who noted that 

appellant presented with a main complaint of PTSD. He reported that he had numerous flashbacks 

 

3 Regarding why he did not file a Form CA-2 within 30 days of the date he realized his claimed condition was work 

related, i.e., June 12, 1993, he noted, “I was reassigned to the U.S. Embassy in Paris, France, as [an assistant] security 

officer.”

4 Appellant did not complete and return the questionnaire and the employing establishment did not provide a 

response prior to the August 31, 2017 OWCP decision.
3

to terrorist attacks that occurred while he was working for the employing establishment. 

Dr. Juaneza recommended that appellant be treated with various medications.

In a January 24, 2017 report, Dr. Robert Toney, an attending Board-certified occupational 

medicine physician, diagnosed chronic PTSD and major depressive disorder.

In a March 16, 2017 report, Dr. Juaneza noted that he produced the report as additional 

support for appellant who had filed a claim after suffering a psychiatric injury in response to 

multiple traumatic events occurring prior to 1992, which in turn lead to PTSD. He diagnosed 

PTSD and mild-to-moderate major depressive disorder (recurrent) which he indicated had been 

severe since 1992. Dr. Juaneza noted that some of the events/duties that contributed to appellant’s 

PTSD included protecting the U.S. Ambassador to Egypt from assassination, protecting a Turkish 

diplomat from assassination in New York City, attempting to find an explosive device in Paris,

and speaking with a colleague on the telephone when a bomb was detonated, and receiving news 

that several close friends, including the U.S. Ambassador to Israel, had been killed in terrorist 

attacks. He indicated that appellant would require a prolonged period of treatment for his PTSD. 

In a March 24, 2017 report, Dr. Juaneza indicated that he produced the report as additional 

support for appellant who had filed a claim after suffering a psychiatric injury in response to 

multiple traumatic events occurring prior to 1992, which in turn led to PTSD. He discussed 

appellant’s PTSD symptoms, including poor sleep and hypervigilance, and diagnosed prolonged 

PTSD and major depressive disorder.

Appellant submitted a number of other documents, including a March 4, 1996 employing 

establishment document showing that he was terminated in August 1992, a February 10, 2016 

disciplinary action regarding his employment in 2016 with the Baltimore City Department of 

Social Services, August 2 and September 15, 2016 letters from his congressional representative, a 

November 18, 2016 letter and other documents from the Baltimore City Department of Social 

Services regarding his request for reasonable accommodation and his requests for leave, 

January 12 and March 23, 2017 letters concerning a discrimination claim filed with the Maryland 

Commission on Civil Rights, administrative documents concerning his medical treatment in 2016, 

a personal résumé detailing his service as a security officer for the employing establishment in 

France, Costa Rica, and Jamaica in the 1980s, and letters from the mid-1990s sent by several 

individuals to President Clinton in connection with a petition for a presidential pardon.5

Appellant also submitted an undated document in which he provided reasons for his 

requesting counseling and treatment.6 He noted that he had PTSD and anxiety, and he mentioned 

several incidents which he felt caused stress while working for the employing establishment, 

 

5 The record contains a U.S. District Court criminal docket showing that in January 1992 appellant was sentenced 

to 27 months imprisonment for conviction on Count 2 and Count 5 of an indictment. The document does not 

specifically identify the counts for which appellant was convicted, although it does refer to several “offenses charged”

including making false statements for the acquisition of firearms, violations of the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, 

and failure to report transportation of monetary instruments in excess of $10,000.00.

6 Appellant did not indicate from whom he was requesting counseling and treatment.
4

including an incident when he was the first person on the scene after the assassination of an 

American Colonel from the U.S. Embassy in Paris.

By decision dated August 31, 2017, OWCP denied appellant’s emotional condition claim 

as untimely filed. It found that he failed to file his claim for an emotional condition within three 

years of the date of injury, or show that his immediate supervisor had actual knowledge within 30 

days of the date of injury. OWCP indicated that the time for filing a claim does not begin to run 

until the employee was aware, or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have been aware

of the causal relationship of the compensable disability to the employment. It noted that appellant 

had such awareness in the early-1990s, but did not file his compensation claim until 2016. 

On October 17, 2017 appellant requested reconsideration of OWCP’s August 31, 2017 

decision. He submitted copies of performance evaluations from the 1970s through the 1990s 

related to security jobs he performed in the Dominican Republic, Costa Rica, and Washington, 

DC, for the employing establishment, earnings and leave statements from the early-1990s, 

additional letters supporting his petition for a presidential pardon, excerpts from periodicals and 

other documents regarding terrorist threats and attacks at U.S. embassies in the 1970s through the 

1990s, position descriptions for employing establishment jobs in the Dominican Republic and 

Costa Rica from the 1980s and 1990s, and a July 28, 2016 letter from the Department of Veterans 

Affairs denying his claim for a service-related PTSD condition.

In an October 25, 2017 report, Dr. Juaneza indicated that he produced the report as 

additional support for appellant who had filed a claim after suffering a psychiatric injury in 

response to multiple traumatic events occurring prior to 1992, which in turn lead to PTSD. He 

concluded that appellant developed PTSD due to exposure to traumatic events while working for 

the employing establishment. 

By decision dated January 8, 2018, OWCP denied modification of its August 31, 2017 

decision. It found that the additional evidence submitted by appellant did not show that it 

improperly denied his compensation claim as untimely filed.

LEGAL PRECEDENT

The issue of whether a claim was timely filed is a preliminary jurisdictional issue that 

precedes any determination on the merits of the claim.7 In cases of injury on or after September 7, 

1974, section 8122(a) of FECA provides that an original claim for compensation for disability or 

death must be filed within three years after the injury or death. Compensation for disability or 

death, including medical care in disability cases, may not be allowed if a claim is not filed within 

that time unless:

“(1) the immediate superior had actual knowledge of the injury or death within 30 

days. The knowledge must be such as to put the immediate superior reasonably on 

notice of an on-the-job injury or death; or

 

7 Charles Walker, 55 ECAB 238 (2004); see Charles W. Bishop, 6 ECAB 571 (1954).
5

“(2) written notice of injury or death as specified in section 8119 was given within 

30 days.”

8

Section 8119 of FECA provides that a notice of injury or death shall be given within 30 

days after the injury or death; be given to the immediate superior of the employee by personal 

delivery or by depositing it in the mail properly stamped and addressed; be in writing; state the 

name and address of the employee; state the year, month, day and hour when and the particular 

locality where the injury or death occurred; state the cause and nature of the injury (or in the case 

of death the employment factors believed to be the cause); and be signed by and contain the address 

of the individual giving the notice.9 Actual knowledge and written notice of injury under section 

8119 serve to satisfy the statutory period for filing an original claim for compensation.10

In a case of occupational disease, the time for filing a claim begins to run when the 

employee first becomes aware, or reasonably should have been aware, of a possible relationship 

between his or her claimed condition and their federal employment. Such awareness is competent 

to start the limitation period even though the employee does not know the precise nature of the 

impairment or whether the ultimate result of such affect would be temporary or permanent.11 

Where the employee continues in the same employment after he or she reasonably should have 

been aware that he or she has a condition which has been adversely affected by factors of federal 

employment, the time limitation begins to run on the date of the last exposure to the implicated 

factors.12 Section 8122(b) of FECA provides that the time for filing in latent disability cases does 

not begin to run until the claimant is aware or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have 

been aware, of the causal relationship between the employment and the compensable disability.13 

The requirement to file a claim within three years is the claimant’s burden and not that of the 

employing establishment.14

ANALYSIS

The Board finds that the evidence of record establishes that appellant was aware, or by the 

exercise of reasonable diligence should have been aware, of the possible causal relationship 

between his federal employment and the compensable disability as early as June 12, 1993. In the

occupational disease claim form he filed on December 1, 2016, appellant alleged that he sustained 

PTSD due to his former job as a special agent/security officer which required him to protect 

 

8 5 U.S.C. § 8122(a).

9

Id. at § 8119; Larry E. Young, 52 ECAB 264 (2001).

10 Laura L. Harrison, 52 ECAB 515 (2001).

11 Larry E. Young, supra note 9.

12 Id.

13 5 U.S.C. § 8122(b); see Luther Williams, Jr., 52 ECAB 360 (2001). The Board has found that the statute of 

limitations begins to run on the date that the employee actually knows of the possible relationship between the 

employee’s condition and his or her federal employment, or reasonably should have known of the possible 

relationship. William A. West, 36 ECAB 525, 528-29 (1985).

14 Debra Young Bruce, 52 ECAB 315 (2001).
6

individuals from assassination and other harm. On this form, he indicated that he first became 

aware of his claimed condition on May 8, 1992 and first realized on June 12, 1993 that it was 

caused or aggravated by his federal employment. Appellant’s explicit linking of work duties with 

his development of an emotional condition shows that he knew as early as June 12, 1993 of the 

possible relationship between these aspects of his employment and his claimed medical 

condition.

15

The medical evidence of record also supports a finding that appellant was aware in the 

early-1990s of a possible relationship between his work and his claimed emotional condition, 

including PTSD. In several reports dated in 2016 and 2017, appellant reported to Dr. Juaneza that 

he believed that his emotional condition was caused by incidents which occurred while working 

for the employing establishment. As appellant last worked for the employing establishment on 

August 22, 1992, these incidents would have occurred by that date. For example, in a March 16, 

2017 report, Dr. Juaneza noted that he produced the report as additional support for appellant who 

had filed a claim after suffering a psychiatric injury in response to multiple traumatic events 

occurring prior to 1992, which in turn lead to PTSD. Dr. Juaneza diagnosed PTSD and mild-tomoderate major depressive disorder (recurrent) which he indicated had been severe since 1992. 

He discussed events and duties that occurred or were performed prior to appellant’s last day of 

work for the employing establishment, i.e., August 22, 1992, and he posited that they contributed 

to appellant’s PTSD. These events and duties included protecting the U.S. Ambassador to Egypt 

from assassination, protecting a Turkish diplomat from assassination in New York City, attempting 

to find an explosive device in Paris and speaking with a colleague on the telephone when a bomb 

was detonated, and receiving news that several close friends, including the U.S. Ambassador to 

Israel, had been killed in terrorist attacks. 

The totality of the factual circumstances of record establish that appellant was aware or 

should have been aware as early as June 12, 1993 that his claimed injury was possibly due to 

employment factors. Appellant, however, did not file his claim for an employment-related 

condition until December 1, 2016 and he therefore did not file his claim within the requisite three 

years of his awareness of the possible relationship between the implicated employment incidents 

and the claimed medical conditions.16 Appellant submitted numerous factual documents in support 

of his claim, but these documents do not show that he timely filed his compensation claim. 

Appellant’s last possible exposure to the implicated employment factors occurred no later 

than August 22, 1992, his last day of work with the employing establishment. As noted above, if 

an employee continues to be exposed to injurious working conditions after such awareness, the 

time limitation begins to run on the last date of this exposure.17 In the present case, the time 

limitation actually began to run after appellant’s last date of exposure (August 22, 1992) because 

appellant, by his own admission, was not aware of the relationship between his claimed condition 

 

15 See supra notes 12 through 14. 

16 See supra notes 8 and 9.

17 See supra note 13.
7

and employment factors until June 12, 1993. As noted, since appellant did not file a claim until 

December 1, 2016, his claim was not filed within the three-year period of limitation.

Appellant’s claim would still be regarded as timely under section 8122(a)(1) of FECA if 

his immediate superior had actual knowledge of the injury within 30 days or under section 

8122(a)(2) if written notice of injury was given to his immediate superior within 30 days as 

specified in section 8119.18 He has not made any claim that he has satisfied either of these 

provisions, nor does the record support a finding that he has satisfied either of them. 

Appellant may submit new evidence or argument with a written request for reconsideration 

to OWCP within one year of this merit decision, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 8128(a) and 20 C.F.R. 

§§ 10.605 through 10.607. 

CONCLUSION

The Board finds that appellant’s emotional condition claim is barred by the applicable time 

limitation provision of 5 U.S.C. § 8122(a).

ORDER

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the January 8, 2018 decision of the Office of 

Workers’ Compensation Programs is affirmed.

Issued: October 4, 2018

Washington, DC

Christopher J. Godfrey, Chief Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Patricia H. Fitzgerald, Deputy Chief Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Valerie D. Evans-Harrell, Alternate Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

 

18 See supra notes 9 through 11. There is no indication in the record that appellant provided a statement to his 

immediate superior such that he satisfied the provisions of sections 8119 and 8122(a) of FECA.