United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

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No. 14-1557

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United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Jessie Pettaway

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Western District of Missouri - Springfield

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 Submitted: May 12, 2015

Filed: August 12, 2015

[Published]

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Before LOKEN, BOWMAN, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM.

Shortly before Jessie Pettaway was due to be released from federal prison, the

United States filed a petition seeking his commitment under 18 U.S.C. § 4246 on the

grounds that he was mentally ill and dangerous. After a hearing, the district court

committed Pettaway to the custody of the Attorney General for hospitalization and

treatment in a suitable facility, upon finding by clear and convincing evidence that
commitment was appropriate. Pettaway appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the

evidence.

The statute permits indefinite hospitalization of a federal prisoner due for

release only if, after holding a hearing, “the court finds by clear and convincing

evidence that the person is presently suffering from a mental disease or defect as a

result of which his release would create a substantial risk of bodily injury to another

person or serious damage to property of another.” 18 U.S.C. § 4246(d). See United

States v. Williams, 299 F.3d 673, 676 (8th Cir. 2002) (“To warrant commitment

under 18 U.S.C. § 4246, the government must demonstrate, by clear and convincing

evidence: ‘(1) a mental disease or defect; (2) dangerousness if released; and (3) the

absence of suitable state placement.’”) (citations omitted). This court reviews the

factual determinations underlying the district court’s commitment decision for clear

error, see id. (discussing standard of review and government’s burden to warrant

commitment under § 4246); however, our review in this case is hindered by the

perfunctory nature of the court’s analysis. We express no opinion as to the

appropriateness of Pettaway’s commitment, but conclude that the commitment order

must do more than recite Pettaway’s mental diagnosis and the opinions of mental

health professionals that Pettaway’s unconditional release would create the relevant

risk of dangerousness. We also note that the district court heard contrary evidence

in the form of testimony from Pettaway. At the hearing, Pettaway testified that he

does not believe he suffers from a mental illness, that he takes his prescribed

medications and would continue to do so, and that if released, he would not be a

danger to any other persons or property because he had “stopped doing that.” The

court must give some indication as to what information in the record it relied upon–

such as Pettaway’s behavioral or psychological history; results of formalized

assessments; recent observations, treatment notes, orinterviewimpressions ofmental

health professionals; or its impressions of Pettaway’s own testimony – in reaching its

conclusion. 

 

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Given the passage of more than a year since the commitment hearing, and

because Pettaway’s custodians are under an ongoing obligation to prepare annual

reports concerning his mental condition and the need for his continued

hospitalization, see 18 U.S.C. § 4247(e)(1)(B), and to exert reasonable efforts

periodically to secure state placement, see 18 U.S.C. § 4246(d), we conclude that a

new hearing with current information is warranted.

Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the district court and remand for

further proceedings, and we deny counsel’s motion to withdraw.

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