UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ ANDREW JOHN YELLOWBEAR, JR., Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. EDWARD L. NEWELL, II, Fremont County and Pros ecuting Attorney; TIMOTHY W. GIST, Deputy Fremont County and Pros ecuting Attorney; KATHLEEN T. KAVANAUGH, Deputy Fremont County and Pr osecuting Attorney; CHARLES FENTON CARR, Detective, Riverton Police Department, individually, and in their official capacities, Defendants - Appellees. No. 14-8073 (D.C. No. 2:14-CV-00059-ABJ) (D. Wyo.)

________________ _________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

________________ _________________ Before KELLY , LUCERO , and McHUGH , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ Andrew Yellowbear appeals th e district court’s dismi ssal with prejudice of his 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986 civil ri ghts complaint. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not ma terially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctr ines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive valu e consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### July 17, 2015
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court-2- I Yellowbear, who proceeds pro se, is an enrolled member of the Northern Arapaho Tribe and is serving a life sentence in Wyoming state prison. 1 Because the facts underlying his conviction are thoroug hly described in Yellowbear’s numerous prior appeals, 2 we briefly summarize only those facts relevant to this action. On July 7, 2004, the Shoshone and Ar apaho Tribal Court issued an order authorizing the extradition of Yellowbear by Fremont County, Wyom ing, authorities. Yellowbear later requested decl aratory relief relating to th at order. On March 29, 2006, the Tribal Court issu ed a declaratory judgment voi ding its extradition order because Fremont County offici als failed to app ear for a hearing. Yellowbear raised the declaratory judgment as grounds for post- conviction relief in state court, but his motion was denied on December 6, 2011. During his criminal trial, Yellowbear moved to compel law enforcement officers to preserve their ha ndwritten notes. On June 16, 2005, the trial court orally granted his motion. It subsequently en tered a written order memorializing this

1 We construe Yellowbear’s pro se filings liberally. See Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). We rej ect Yellowbear’s contention that we should apply a heightened standard of review b ecause he was subject to the death penalty during his state criminal pr oceeding. This civil laws uit is not a capital case.

2 See Yellowbear v. Ashe, No. 14-8069, 2015 WL 2353005 ( 10th Cir. May 18, 2015) (unpublished); Yellowbear v. Michae l, 570 F. App’x 798 (10th Cir. 2014) (unpublished); Yellowbear v. Lampert, 741 F.3d 48 (10th Cir. 2014); Yellowbear v. Att’y Gen. of Wyo., 440 F. App’x 677 (10th Cir. 2011) (unpublished); Yellowbear v. Att’y Gen. of Wyo., 380 F. App’x 740 (10th Cir. 2010) (unpublished); Yellowbear v. Wyo. Att’y Gen., 525 F.3d 921 (10th Cir. 2008); Yellowbear v. Wyo. Att’y Gen., 130 F. App’x 276 (10th Cir. 2005) (unpublis hed); Yellowbear v. State, 174 P.3d 1270 (Wyo. 2008).-3- decision on August 23, 2005. At a February 9, 2006, hearing, the prosecutor revealed that certain notes had been destroyed. Between November 2012 and January 2014, Yellowbear sent letters to and/or filed complaints about the destruction of the notes with several state and federa l agencies. He alleged th at the prosecution’s conduct was part of a pattern or practice of an imus-driven discrimi nation against Native Americans. Yellowbear sued various officials for violating his civil rights by destroying the handwritten notes on Marc h 19, 2014. He amende d his complaint shortly thereafter to add claims about his extradi tion. Concluding th at the claims were untimely, the district cour t dismissed his complaint with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). Judgment was ente red on April 4, 2014. Yellowbear filed a Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 59(e) motion to alte r or amend judgment. He filed a notice of appeal before the court disposed of that motion. We abated the appeal until the district court denied the Rule 59(e) mo tion on December 16, 2014. Yellowbear now appeals the district court’s dismissal of his complaint and its order denying his motion to alter or amend judgment. 3
II We review the applicability of a statut e of limitations de novo. Fulghum v. Embarq Corp., 785 F.3d 395, 413 (10th Cir. 2015). The limitations period for claims

3 Although Yellowbear did not file a second notice of a ppeal after the district court denied his Rule 59(e) motion as require d by Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(B)(ii), we construe a “Status Report” Yellowbear filed on December 30, 2014, as the “functional equivalent” of a notice of appeal . See Fleming v. Evans, 481 F.3d 1249, 1253 (10th Cir. 2007) ( quotation omitted).-4- brought under 42 U.S.C. § 198 3 is the applicable state statute of limitations for personal injury suits, which is four years in Wyoming. Gee v. Pacheco, 627 F.3d 1178, 1189-90 (10th Cir. 2010) (citing Wyo. St at. § 1-3-105(a)(iv)(C)). However, federal law governs when § 1983 claims acc rue. Kripp v. Luton, 466 F.3d 1171, 1175 (10th Cir. 2006). “A ci vil rights action accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis for the action.” Price v. Philpot, 420 F.3d 1158, 1162 (10th Cir. 2005) (quotations omitted). On March 29, 2006, the Tribal Court issued the declaratory judgment voiding Yellowbear’s extradition order. Because the order indicates Yellowbear appeared telephonically, he was aware of his allege d injury that day. His March 2014 complaint was thus filed well outside the four-year limita tions period. We reject Yellowbear’s argument that hi s claim did not accrue until he exhausted state-court remedies. The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires exhaustion only for “actions . . . brought with respect to prison conditio ns.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 525 (2002) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)). Yellowbear’s extradition claim does not concern prison conditions. See Gulas v. Bern alillo Cnty. Sheriff, 247 F. App’x 127, 130 (10th Cir. 2007) (unpublished) (indicating exhaus tion is unnecessary for § 1983 suit concerning allegedly illegal extradition) . Nor is Yellowbear seeking habeas relief, which would also require exhausti on. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). Yellowbear also contends that his extradition claim is timely under the “continuing wrong” doctrine. However, “the continuing wrong doctrine cannot be employed where the plaintiff’s injury is definite and disc overable and nothing-5- prevented plaintiff from coming forward to seek redress.” Ute Distrib. Corp. v. Sec’y of the Interior, 584 F.3d 1275, 1283 (10th Cir. 2009) (quot ations omitted). Any injury Yellowbear may have suffered from his allegedly illegal extradition is definite and was discoverable when the Tr ibal Court voided its extradition order. Nothing prevented Yellowbear from coming fo rward to seek redr ess from his injury at an earlier date. His extrad ition claim is thus untimely. We reach the same conclusion with respect to Yello wbear’s evidencedestruction claim. Yellowb ear’s attorney learned on Fe bruary 9, 2006, that law enforcement officers had dest royed some handwritten notes. 4 His contention that this claim did not accrue until after he “exhauste d” other remedies by sending letters and complaints to various offici als fails because, as describe d supra, exhaustion is not required for claims unless they relate to prison conditions, see Porter, 534 U.S. at 525, or seek habeas relie f, see § 2254(b)(1)(A). Be cause his claim accrued in February 2006, Yellowbear’s Ma rch 2014 complaint was untimely. 5

4 The record does not indicate whethe r Yellowbear was present for this hearing. But we presume that claims ba sed on official conduct toward a criminal suspect accrue when the c onduct occurs. See Johnson v. Johnson Cnty. Comm’n Bd., 925 F.2d 1299, 1301 (10th Cir. 1991). Yellowbear has not alleged that he learned about the destruction of the notes at a later date.

5 On appeal, Yellowbear squarely challe nges only the district court’s dismissal of his § 1983 claims. However, liberally c onstruing references in his brief to § 1985 and § 1986, we conclude that t hose claims are also untimely. Like § 1983 claims, the governing statut e of limitations for § 1985 claims in Wyoming is four years. See Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42, 48-49 (1984), overruled on other grounds by Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985); Bailey v. Casper Coll., No. 98-8047, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 3208, at *3-4 (10th Cir. Mar. 1, 1999) (unpublished). Section 1985 claims accrue on the date of the la st overt act in-6- III
We AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of Yellowbear’s claims. We GRANT Yellowbear’s motion to proceed in fo rma pauperis, but we remind him of his obligation to continue making partial pa yments until the entire filing fee has been paid in full.

Entered for the Court

Carlos F. Lucero Circuit Judge

______________ ________________ furtherance of the conspiracy . See O’Connor v. St. John ’s Coll., 290 F. App’x 137, 141 (10th Cir. 2008) (unpublished). The only overt acts Yellowbear alleges are the incidents underlying his § 198 3 claims. For the same reasons those claims are untimely, his § 1985 cl aims are time-barred. Congress set a one-year statute of limi tations for § 1986 claims. Burnett, 468 U.S. at 48 & n.12. Yellowbear’s § 1986 cl aims are untimely un der that shorter limitations period.