United States Court of Appeals 

For the First Circuit 

No. 19-1216 

LIU JIN LIN, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

WILLIAM P. BARR, 

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 

Respondent. 

PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER OF 

THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS 

Before 

Torruella, Lipez, and Kayatta, 

Circuit Judges. 

Gary J. Yerman and The Yerman Group, LLC on brief, for 

petitioner. 

Sharon M. Clay, Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, 

Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice, Joseph H. Hunt, 

Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, and Nancy E. Friedman, 

Senior Litigation Counsel, on brief, for respondent. 

December 10, 2019 
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TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge. Liu Jin Lin ("Lin"), a native 

and citizen of China, petitions for review of a Board of 

Immigration Appeals ("BIA") order denying as untimely her motion 

to reopen her earlier removal proceedings because of the 

intersection between her recent conversion to Christianity and 

changed country conditions in China regarding religious 

persecution. Because the BIA did not abuse its discretion in 

denying Lin's motion, we deny her petition for review. 

I. 

Lin was born in Changle City, Fujian Province, China. 

She entered the United States on November 28, 2001 on a K-1 fiancée 

visa, which authorized her to remain in the country for ninety 

days. However, Lin overstayed her visa. 

In the fall of 2003, Lin met her husband Wenqiang Weng, 

whom she married on October 1, 2007, in Quincy, Massachusetts. 

They have two sons together, one born in 2006 and the other in 

2008. On December 22, 2013, Lin's husband converted to Christianity 

and subsequently brought his family to the Greater Boston Christ's 

Mandarin Church. Lin and her family moved to Sharon, Massachusetts, 

and have since regularly attended the Chinese Church of Metro South 

Boston. Through the church, Lin also participates in the 

Sisterhood Bible study every Tuesday and joins the priest's wife 

on Thursdays for prayer and Bible study. On November 12, 2017, 
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Lin was baptized in the Christian faith. She now preaches her 

faith to her sister at family meetings. 

According to Lin, she fears that she will face 

persecution if she were to return to China because she would only 

attend unregistered, or underground, Christian churches.

II. 

On December 3, 2007, the Department of Homeland Security 

("DHS") served Lin with a Notice to Appear charging her as 

removable under section 237(a)(1)(B) of the Immigration and 

Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1127(a)(1)(B). After receiving the 

Notice to Appear, Lin applied for asylum, withholding of removal, 

and protection under the Convention Against Torture ("CAT"), 

fearing persecution due to her violation of China's family planning 

policies. On March 25, 2011, the Immigration Judge ("IJ") found 

that Lin could be prevented from giving birth to future children 

due to China's family planning policies and granted her application 

for asylum. DHS appealed the IJ's decision to the BIA. 

On September 27, 2012, the BIA sustained DHS's appeal, 

vacated the IJ's decision, and ordered Lin removed to China. Lin 

filed a petition for review with this Court that was denied on 

July 23, 2013. See Liu Jin Lin v. Holder, 723 F.3d 300, 308 

(1st Cir. 2013). 
-4- 

Several years later, on May 4, 2018, Lin filed a motion 

to reopen with the BIA based on her view that allegedly changed 

country conditions in China would impact her given her recent 

conversion to Christianity. The BIA denied Lin's motion to 

reopen, finding that it was time-barred and that the evidence Lin 

had submitted of changed country conditions since her removal 

proceedings in 2011 did not support an exception to the time 

limits. The BIA found that the evidence reflected that "although 

there have been reports of the detention of some members, mostly 

leaders, of underground, or 'house,' churches and harassment of 

some church members," "China continues to allow the practice of 

Christianity." Furthermore, "the restrictions on unregistered 

religious groups differed in degree and varied significantly from 

region to region," and these restrictions had persisted for many 

years. The BIA also found that "the evidence indicates that 

government interference in unregistered churches and harassment of 

some underground church members has been a longstanding concern, 

including at the time of [Lin]'s 2011 proceedings." 

In addition, the BIA noted that Lin had the burden of 

proof to establish prima facie eligibility for the underlying 

substantive relief requested, yet she had failed to establish prima 

facie eligibility for asylum, withholding of removal, or 

protection under the CAT. With regards to her request for asylum 
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and withholding of removal, the BIA found that "the evidence of 

the repression of underground religious activities" was 

insufficient to demonstrate that Lin had a "well-founded fear of 

mistreatment amounting to persecution upon her return to China 

based on her practice of Christianity." The BIA further found 

that the evidence was also insufficient to demonstrate that "it 

[was] more likely than not that [Lin] w[ould] be tortured in China 

by, or with the acquiescence or willful blindness of, a public 

official or person acting in an official capacity upon her return" 

as required for eligibility under the CAT. Lin now petitions for 

review of the BIA's order. 

III. 

Motions to reopen removal proceedings are disfavored 

because they impinge upon "the compelling public interests in 

finality and the expeditious processing of proceedings." 

Guerrero-Santana v. Gonzales, 499 F.3d 90, 92 (1st Cir. 2007) 

(quoting Raza v. Gonzales, 484 F.3d 125, 127 (1st Cir. 2007)). 

Accordingly, "we review the BIA's denial of a motion to reopen 

under a highly deferential abuse-of-discretion standard," Pineda 

v. Whitaker, 908 F.3d 836, 840 (1st Cir. 2018), upholding the 

decision "unless the complaining party can show that the BIA 

committed an error of law or exercised its judgment in an 

arbitrary, capricious, or irrational way," Raza, 484 F.3d at 127. 
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In conducting this review, this Court "accept[s] the BIA's findings 

of fact, 'as long as they are supported by substantial evidence,' 

and . . . review[s] legal conclusions de novo." Marsadu v. 

Holder, 748 F.3d 55, 57-58 (1st Cir. 2014) (quoting Smith v. 

Holder, 627 F.3d 427, 433 (1st Cir. 2010)). "It is enough if the 

agency fairly considers the points raised by the complainant and 

articulates its decision in terms adequate to allow a reviewing 

court to conclude that the agency has thought about the evidence 

and the issues and reached a reasoned conclusion." Raza, 484 F.3d 

at 128. 

Generally, a petitioner may only file one motion to 

reopen, and that motion must be filed within ninety days of the 

date of entry of the final administrative order of removal. 

See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i). However, this limitation does 

not apply to a motion to reopen to apply or reapply for asylum or 

withholding of deportation "based on changed country conditions 

arising in the country of nationality or the country to which 

removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not 

available and would not have been discovered or presented at the 

previous hearing." Id. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii). In such a case, the 

motion to reopen must (1) "adduce material evidence, previously 

unavailable, showing changed country conditions" and (2) "make out 

a prima facie case of eligibility for the [underlying] substantive 
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relief." García-Aguilar v. Whitaker, 913 F.3d 215, 218 

(1st Cir. 2019). 

"To establish changed conditions, the evidence must 

demonstrate 'the intensification or deterioration of country 

conditions, not their mere continuation.'" Xin Qiang Liu v. 

Lynch, 802 F.3d 69, 76 (1st Cir. 2015) (quoting Tawadrous v. 

Holder, 565 F.3d 35, 38 (1st Cir. 2009)). To determine whether 

conditions have intensified or deteriorated, the BIA "compares the 

evidence of country conditions submitted with the motion to those 

that existed at the time of the merits hearing." Haizem Liu v. 

Holder, 727 F.3d 53, 57 (1st Cir. 2013) (alteration omitted) 

(quoting In re S-Y-G, 24 I. & N. Dec. 247, 253 (BIA 2007)). "Those 

changes, however, must be material to the underlying substantive 

relief . . . and the evidence tendered in support thereof must 

have been unavailable during the prior proceedings." Raza, 

484 F.3d at 127. Conclusory assertions are not sufficient: "the 

evidence proffered in support of the motion must, at a bare 

minimum, establish a prima facie case sufficient to ground a claim 

of eligibility for the underlying substantive relief." Id. 

IV. 

Lin argues that the BIA abused its discretion in 

concluding that she had failed to establish that country conditions 

in China had materially changed and thus denying her motion to 
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reopen.1 She contends that the evidence she submitted clearly 

establishes that conditions in China have materially deteriorated 

for underground Christians since 2011. In her view, the BIA 

reached the opposite conclusion because it merely performed a 

"cursory" review of the evidence, referred to the documents "in 

the aggregate," and "ignored" the Department of State 2009 Human 

Rights Report on China, even though that report was "vital" to the 

BIA's determination of changed conditions and had been cited in 

her motion to reopen.

The BIA did not abuse its discretion. Contrary to Lin's 

suggestions, "the BIA is under no obligation 'to parse an alien's 

submissions one by one and cite book and verse when rejecting the 

alien's conclusions.'" Nantume v. Barr, 931 F.3d 35, 40 

(1st Cir. 2019) (quoting García-Aguilar, 913 F.3d at 221). And 

here, the BIA did not perform a cursory review of the evidence. 

 

1 Although Lin does not argue that her recent conversion to 

Christianity constitutes a change in conditions for purposes of 

her motion to reopen, we clarify that such "change in personal 

circumstances alone does not meet the standard for the exception 

to the time bar for changed country conditions." Rei Feng Wang 

v. Lynch, 795 F.3d 283, 286-87 (1st Cir. 2015) ("Under the case 

law, a change typically will be categorized as a change in personal 

circumstances, as opposed to a change in country circumstances, if 

the change is self-induced. . . . This prevents aliens from 

repeatedly reopening their removal proceedings based on changes 

that are within their control." (alteration in original) (internal 

quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ming Chen v. Holder, 722 F.3d 

63, 66 (1st Cir. 2013))). 
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Instead, it explicitly identified and considered the evidence that 

Lin had submitted in support of her motion to reopen, referencing 

specific exhibits and pages in the record. It also took 

administrative notice of the Department of State 2009 Human Rights 

Report on China, which -- despite characterizing it as "vital" -- 

Lin had not included.

The evidence in the record, including several government 

reports and articles from 2009 to 2017 outlining the conditions in 

China and referencing the newly-enacted National Security Law and 

its amendments pointed to by Lin, supports the BIA's finding. The 

evidence shows that religious persecution has existed in China for 

many years, predating Lin's original hearing in 2011, and has not 

sufficiently increased since then to constitute a material change 

in country conditions. Specifically, each of the reports from 

2009 to 2017 reference the government's interference in 

underground Christian churches in China, including harassment 

against underground church members and the arrest, detention, and 

imprisonment of church leaders even before the enactment of the 

new National Security Law that Lin references in her brief. It 

is well settled that the persistence of negative conditions, 

regardless of how grave they are, is insufficient to establish 

changed country conditions and, thus, warrant reopening. 

See Fen Tjong Lie v. Holder, 729 F.3d 28, 30-31 (1st Cir. 2013); 
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see also Sánchez-Romero v. Sessions, 865 F.3d 43, 46 (1st Cir. 

2017) ("[G]rave conditions that remain grave do not equate to 

intensification of conditions."). 

Accordingly, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in 

finding that Lin's motion to reopen removal proceedings was 

time-barred.2

V. 

For the reasons stated above, Lin's petition for review 

is denied. 

 

2 Because Lin has failed to establish a material change in country 

conditions, there is no need "to reach the issue of whether she 

has made out a prima facie case for relief." Haizem Liu, 727 F.3d 

at 58.