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# United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit

No. 15-1241
J O S E P H H E ALY

, et al. , Plaintiffs-Appellants ,

v.

M E TR O P OL I TAN P I E R and E XPO S I T I O N A UT H ORI T

Y , Defen dant-Appellee.
Appe al f ro m the Uni ted S tates Distri ct Co urt fo r the Nor thern Distri ct o f Il l i noi s, Eastern Di v i sio n. No. 11 C 8 89 2 — Mat the w F. Ke nne lly, Judg e.
A RGU E D S E PT E MB E R 18, 2015

— D E C I D E D O C T OB E R 23, 2015

Before B AU E R

, K AN N E, and R OVN E R

, Circ uit Judges.
B AU E R , Cir cui t Judge

. Plainti ffs -appellants, Josep h Healy , T om O’Drisc oll, Alan P or ter , James Howland, Kar l Di ede, Ji m Ti mothy , and John R

y an (collecti v ely “Plain ti ff s ” ) , a re electric al

w or ker s. They clai m that their respecti v e employ ers, Fr eeman Electric al, Inc. (“Freeman”) and Global Experience Speci ali sts, Inc. (“GES”) wrongfully ter minat e d t he m, in violati on of the relev ant collecti v e bargaining ag reement (the “CBA”) and2 No. 15-1241 appli cable federal labor law

. Speci fi cally

, Plaintiff s clai m that collus i on betw een Fr eeman, GES, and defendant-appell ee Me tr op ol i tan P i e r and Exposi ti on Au th or i ty ( “ MP E A” ) s p u rr e d Plainti ffs ’ ter minati ons. Plainti ffs also clai m that their uni o n, Inter nati onal Brot herhoo d of Electric al W or ker s, Local Uni on No. 134 (the “U nio n”), fai led to adequately repr esent them i n Plainti ffs ’ CBA-mandated gr i ev ance process. Plainti ffs, on behalf of themselv es and a putativ e clas s of si mi larly-si tuated el e ct ric al w or ker s, brought a si x-count laws ui t again st Fr eeman, GES, MPEA, and the Uni on ( collecti v ely “Defendan ts”), seeki ng damages and decl arat or y j udgments. All Defendan t s mov ed to di smi ss the counts particu lar to them. The di stric t c ourt deni ed the motions to di smi ss four of the counts, but di smi ssed a declarator y jud g me nt motion again st MPEA, Fr eeman, and GES, and t he clai m o f stat e l aw tor tious i nterfer ence wi th contracts again st MPEA. In gr anti ng MPEA’s motion to di smi ss the tor tious interfer ence clai m, the d ist ric t court held that Section 301 of the Labor Managemen t Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (“§ 301”) preempts Plainti ffs ’ state law tor t clai m. Plainti ffs hav e appealed only the di smi ssal of the tor tious interfer ence clai m again st MPEA. For the re asons s tate d below , w e affi rm the di stric t court ’s ruling. I. BACKGRO UND Plainti ffs allege that defendants i llegally ci rcumv ented the hi ring process det a ile d in the CBA. At the motion to di smi ss stage, w e accept the allegations wi thi n Plainti ffs ’ complaint as tr ue and draw all permi ss ibl e inferences in Plainti ffs ’ fav or

. E.g., Fortr

es Grand Corp. v
. W

arner Bros. Entm’t Inc. , 76 3 F .3d 696, 700 (7th Ci r . 2014).No. 15-1241 3
A. The CBA Referral Process The Uni on has a longst a nd ing CBA wi th the Electric al Co nt r a ctor s’ Associ ation of Chi cago. Fr eeman and GES are members of the Electric al Contr actor s’ Associ ation of Chi cago; M PE A i s also a party to the CBA. Art i cle IV of t he C B A

— entitled “Refe rr a l P ro c e d u re ”

— d e s cribes a reg i mented process for hi ring Uni on electric al w o r ker s. Speci fi cally , Art i cle IV states that the Uni on “shall be the sole and exclusi v e source of refer ral of appli cants for employment.” T o do thi s, t he Uni on maintai ns a “pool” of w or ker s fr om whi ch a giv en employ er wi ll be sent w or k e r s for a particu lar jo b. Wi thi n the ov erall pool, the Uni on strat i fi es w or ker s int o four priori ty gr oups based on their exper i ence, certifi cati ons, and ski lls. The Uni on then selects w or ker s wi thi n each priori ty gr oup based on when the w or ker s reg i stered for employment. An employ er may only deviate from thi s “pool hi ring” process in tw o si tuations: to meet ag e quotas that the CBA mandates or when the employ er “states bona fi de requirements for speci al ski lls and abi li ties i n his request for appli cants.” If a n e mploy er lays off

w or ker s, i t mus t do so in rev erse or der of that establi shed by the pr io r it y gr oup; that i s, the employ er mus t ter minate
w or ker s wh o ar e low er o n the priority li st fi rst. B. The McCormick Pl ace Cal l List Normally

, the Uni on uses tw o separate “cal l li sts” for refer ring w or ker s to potent i al employ ers, the “short call ” and the “long call.” The short call i s for jo bs demanding less than ten days’ labor

, whi le the long call i s for jo bs requiring at least ten days ’ labor

. How ev er , in refer ring w or ker s to the McCor mi ck Plac e conv ention center , the Uni on u ses a thi rd call4 No. 15-1241
li st—the “McCor mi ck C a l l .” All w or ker s sent to McCor mi ck Plac e begi n as short-te rm w or ker s; that is, fo r less than ten days ’ w or k. MPEA, whi ch oper ates McCor mi ck Plac e, may later conv ert any selected w or ker s from shor t -t erm to longter m w or k. MPEA has not defined t he process for conv ert ing
w or ker s or establi shed standards for how w or ker s quali fy for
conv ersi on. Instead, Plainti ffs claim that conv ersi on occurs “i nformally and wi thout t ransparency .” C. The 2010 Amendment to the Metropolitan Pier and Exposition Authority Act In 2 0 0 9 , McCor mi ck Plac e began losing conv entions and exhib i tions to competi tor conv ention cent e r s. T o help McCor mi ck Plac e remain competi tiv e, the Illi noi s legis lature amended the Met ro poli tan Pi er and Exposi tion Author i ty Act i n 2010 (t he “ Amendment”). Centr al to the legis lativ e acti on
w as the finding that, among othe r co sts, the “mark-up” on uni on labor w or k had “sub stanti ally increased exhib i tor and show or gani zer costs,” and had made McCor mi ck Plac e a less attr acti v e v enue than other conv ention centers. 70 ILCS 201/5.4 (a)( 13). T

o address thi s problem, the Amendment forbade MPEA from serving “as the exclusi v e p ro vider of electric al services,” a nd demanded that MPEA “make ev ery effort to sub stanti ally reduce exhib i tor ’s costs.” 70 ILCS 210 / 5.4(f ). The Amendment allow ed MPEA tw o choi ces: to ret ai n an outsi de electric al contracto r or offer i ts own electric al services at cost. In 2011, to compor t wi th the Amendment’s demands, MPEA contracted wi th Fr eeman and GES to prov i de electric al services at McCor mi ck Plac e. Fr eeman and GES then hi redNo. 15-1241 5

w or ker s for McCor mi ck Plac e electric al w or k from the Uni on’s McCor mi ck Call li st, pursuant to the CBA. Plaintiff s w e re among tho se w or ker s hi red. D. The Side Agreements and T ermination of Plaint iffs On June 29, 2011, the Uni on enter ed int o “Inter pret i v e Side Lette r” agr eements wi th Fr eeman and GES. These agr eements—made wi thout Plainti ffs ’ knowledge—allow ed Fr eeman and GES to hi re electric al w or ker s o ut si de of the establi shed CBA r e fe rr al process. T o conti nue w or kin g at Mc C or m i ck Plac e, Fr eeman and GES had to hi re electric a l l ab or prov ide d by MPEA i tself, instead of from the establi shed McCor mi ck Call li st. After maki ng the “Inter pret i v e Side Lette r” agr eements wi th the Uni on, Fr eeman and GES enter ed i nto agr eements wi th MPEA called the “McCo r mi ck Plac e Utili ty Ser vic es Agr eements” (“MPUSAs”) on June 30, 2011. Thes e MP US As e s ta

b l i s he d thei r own refer ral process, separate from the r eferr al process detai led in the CBA. On August 15, 2011, Fr eeman and GES ter mina te d P l a in ti ff s and all other Uni on employ ees. S ince t hat tim e, Fr eeman and GES hav e used only in-hous e M cC o rmi ck Plac e electric i ans that MPEA prov i des for ele ct r ica l w or k at the si te. Plainti ffs clai m that their ter minati on and Fr e e m a n ’s a n d G E S’ re s p e cti v e use of in-hous e electric i ans contraven es both the C B A hir ing process and the demands of the Amendment. Plainti ffs further clai m to hav e “fi led numero us g riev ances ” wi th the Uni on again st their respecti v e employ e rs, but such gr i ev ances w ere “to no av ai l.” Furt her

, after fi ling their gr ie v a nces, Plainti ffs receiv ed copi es of the “Inter pret i v e Side Lette r” agr eements on October 4, 201 1

. Th i s w as the fi rst tim e that the Plainti ffs6 No. 15-1241
became aw are of the si de agr eements betw een the Uni on, Fr eeman, and G ES. E. Procedural Hi story On Nov ember 30, 2011, Plainti ffs fi led an internal char g e again st their local Uni on offi cers wi th t he Inter nati onal B r other hood of Electric al W or ker s’ reg i onal Vi ce Presi dent. T w o w eeks later

, on December 14, 2011, Plainti ffs fi led the present laws ui t. The fi rst complaint allege d fou r counts again st the U nio n, Fr eeman, and MPEA. Count I, again st the Uni on, alleged breach of duty of fai r repr esentation i mpli ci t in the Labor -Management Relations Act (“LMRA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(b) and 159(a) . Count II , also again st the Uni on, al leged breach of duty of fai r repr esentation i mpli ci t in § 301. Count III , again st Fr eeman and MPEA, alleged violati ons of a collecti v e bargainin g agr eement under § 301. Count IV , again st the Uni on, alleged fai lure to permi t inspec tion in viol a t i on of 29 U.S.C. §§ 414 and 431. Plainti ffs later amended their complaint, a d d ing GES as a defendant and adding tw o requests for declarator y judgment. Notably , Plainti ffs also conv ert ed their count again st MPEA from a § 301 violati on of the CBA to a state law tor tious i nterfer ence cl ai m. The amend ed complaint alleges si x causes of acti ons. Counts I and II, again st the Uni on, sti ll allege breach of duty of fai r r epresentat i on. Count I II, agai nst Fr eeman and GE S , alleges violati on of a collecti v e bargaining agr eement under § 301. Count IV

, again st MPEA, alleges a state common law clai m for intentional interfer ence wi th c ontr acts. Count V i s a request for declarator y judgm e nt : that the di stric t court d e c l a re the MP US As betw een MPEA, Fr eeman, and GES i llegalNo. 15-1241 7
and unenforceable. Count VI is a l so a request for declarator y j udg ment, speci fi cally that the di stric t court declare the “Inter p r e t iv e Side Lette r” agr eements betw een the Uni on, Fr eeman, and G ES ill egal and unenforceable. All Defendan ts mov ed to di smi ss the respecti v e co unts again st them. On April 14, 2015, the di stric t court deni ed di smi ssal of Counts I, II, III , and VI. How ev er , the di stric t court di smi ssed Count V for lack of standing. It also d ism iss ed Count IV

, the state law tor tious interfer ence clai m again st MP E A, as preempted by § 301. It noted the long-standing precedent that § 301 preem p t s any state law clai m whose resolution requires i nterpr e tation of the relev ant collecti v e bargaining agr eement. E.g., All i s -Chambers Corp. v
. Lue ck , 471 U.S. 202, 220 (1985); Lin gle v

. Nor ge Div

. of Magic Chef, Inc. , 486 U.S. 399, 413 (1988). It reasoned that analysi s of Plainti ffs ’ state law tor tious i nterfer ence wi th co ntracts clai m w ould require i nterpr etat i on of the CBA. Accor d ing ly , the di stric t court conclu ded that § 301 preempts the tor tious interfer ence clai m. Plainti ffs then appealed only the di smissa l o f the tor tious i nterfer ence cl ai m agai nst MPEA. II. DISCUSSION MPEA i s a poli tic al sub di vis i on that i s i mmu ne from § 301 clai ms. Here, § 301 preempts the state law tor tious interfer ence clai m and conv ert s i t into a § 3 0 1 claim

. As a result, MPEA’s i mmu ni ty to § 301 clai ms ext ingui shes Plainti ffs ’ clai m again st i t.8 No. 15-1241
A. Standard of Review The di stric t court di d not speci fy wh e t he r i ts di smi ssal of Plainti ffs ’ tor tious i nterfer ence clai m w a s a Feder al Rule of Ci vil Procedure 12(b) (1) di smi ssal for lack of jurisdi cti on or a 12(b) (6) di smi ssal for fai lure to state a clai m. How ev er , w e deem a dism iss a l of preempted state law clai ms a 12(b) (6) di smi ssal for fai lure to state a clai m, a di smi ssal on the merits. S e e T urek v
. Gen’l Mills, Inc. , 662 F .3d 423, 425 (7th Ci r
. 2011) (holding that a court should di smi ss clai m wi thout any basi s in federal law on t he me rits and that certain preempted clai ms hav e no basis in federal law). Thus, the di stric t court’s di smi ssal w as a 12(b)(6) dis mi ssal for fai lure to state a clai m. W e rev i ew such a di smi ssal de n ov o

. Firestone Fin

. Corp. v
. Meyer , 796 F .3d 822, 825 (7th Ci r . 2015). B. MPEA’s Immunity Fro m § 301 Claims Pi v otally , the di stric t court not ed that becau se MPEA i s a poli tic al sub di vis i on, i t i s i mmu ne from federal clai ms ari sing under § 301. Section 301(a) gr ants federal courts jurisdi ct io n ov er “[s] ui ts for violati on of contracts betw een an employ er and a labor or gani zation repr esenti ng employ ees in an indus

tr y affec tin g commerce.” 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). That i s, the prov i si on gr ants federal courts jurisdi cti on ov er contro v ersi es surroundi ng labor or gani zat io ns and, by ext ensi on, the violati on of collecti v e bargaining agr eements. T extile W orkers Union of America v
. Lin coln Mills of Al a. , 353 U.S. 448, 450–51 (1957). How ev er

, the LMRA defini ti on of “ e m p l oye r” e xp re s s l y excludes “any St ate or poli tic al sub di vis i on there of.” 29 U.S.C. § 152(2). So , ev en though a state o r poli tic al sub di vis i on may si gn and be a party to a collecti v e bargaining agr eement, i tNo. 15-1241 9
remain s immu ne from federal laws ui ts aris ing under the collecti v e bargaining agr eement and relev ant federal law

. He r e , MPEA i s a poli tic al sub di vis i on. 70 ILCS 210/ 3 (“There i s hereby created a poli tical subdivisi on , uni t of local government wi th only t hose pow ers author i zed by law , body poli tic a nd mu ni ci pal corpor ation by the name and style of Met ro poli tan Pi er and Exposi tion Author i ty in the metro poli

tan area.”) (emphas i s added). As a poli tic a l s ubdi vis i on, MPEA i s not an “employ er” under LMRA. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2). Becaus e the MPEA i s no t a n e mp l oy er , i t cannot be sued under § 301. See 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). C. Secti on 301 Preemption of State Law T ortious Interference Clai m Se c ti on 3 0 1 preempts not only clai ms “founded di rectly ” on the collecti v e bargaining agr eement, but also state law clai ms that i ndi rect l y impli cate a collecti v e bargaining agr eement. Caterpillar

, Inc. v
. W

illiams , 482 U.S. 386, 394 (1987). Speci fi cally , § 301 preempts state tor t laws that “do not exis t independently of priv a t e agr eements” and that “purpor t[] to define the meaning of the co nt r a ct relat i onshi p.” Lue ck , 471 U.S. at 213

. Thus, § 301 preempts a state law tor t c lai m i f resolution of the clai m “requires the interpr etat i on of a collecti v e-bargain ing agr eement.” Lin gle, 486 U.S. at 413. A state law clai m “requires the i nterpr etat i on of a collecti v e bargaining agr eement” when an elemen t of the clai m “r equi res a court t o in ter pretany ter m10 No. 15-1241
of a collecti v e-bargain ing agr eement.” See Lin g l e , 4 8 6 U.S

. at 407. U nder Illi noi s law

, interpr etat i on of the relev ant contrac t 1 i s necess ary to resolv e the tor tious interfer ence clai m. T o state
a clai m under Illi noi s law for tor tious inter fe r e nce wi th contracts, a plai nti ff m ust demonstrate: (1) the exi stence of a v ali d and enforceable c ontr act betw een the plainti ff and another ; (2) the defendant’s aw areness of thi s contractual relat i on; (3) the defendant’s i ntentional and unjusti fi ed induc ement
o f a breach of the contract; (4) a sub sequent breach by the other

, caus ed by the defenda nt ’s wrongful conduc t; and (5) dam ages. HPI Health C are Servs., Inc. v . Mt. V ernon Hosp., Inc. , 131 Ill. 2d 14 5 , 154–55, 545 N.E.2d 672, 676 (1989) (quotations and ci tations omi tte d). Thus, to adjudi cate a tor tious interfer ence

The tor tio us i nterfer ence cl aim arises under Il l i noi s l aw. The di stric t cour t 1 has 28 U.S .C. § 13 67 (a) suppl emental juri sdi cti on over the tor tio us i nterfer ence cl aim b ecause the state l aw cl aim sha res a commo n nucle us of ope rative facts with the fed eral cl aims. E.g ., Bailey v. City of Chicag o , 77 9 F.3d 68 9, 69 6 (7 th Ci r. 20 15 ). He r e , al l si x counts i n the l aws uit are causes of
a c tion de s ign ed t o a dd ress the all eged col l usio n b etween Defendant s, which ulti matel y l ed to Plai ntif fs’ t ermi nati on. Spec i fi call y, Plai ntif fs all ege tha t Defendants entered i nto v ario us sid e agreements with each other and then termi nat ed Plaintiffs, th er eby c i rcumv enting the CBA

. Because Il l i noi s i s the fo rum state, an d because no party has raised ach oi ce of law issue, Ill i noi s l aw go v erns

. S ee McCoy v. Iberdrola Rene wables, Inc. , 76 0 F.3d 674, 68 4 (7 th Ci r. 20 14 ) (hol di ng when neither party raises a choi ce of l aw i ssue, fed eral
cour ts hearin g state l aw cl aims under suppl emental juri sdi cti on “may simpl y apply the fo rum state’s sub stan tive l aw”).No. 15-1241 11
clai m, a court mus t deter mine if a breach of the relev ant contract has actually occurred. See V oelker v
. Porsche Cars North America, Inc. , 353 F .3d 516, 527–28 (7th Ci r
. 2003). Under Illi noi s law , thi s deter minati on i s on e o f fact, in whi ch the factfinder
mu st i nterpr et the relev ant contract ter ms and analyze t he acti ons of the p a rt y accu sed of breaching vis -à-vi s these contract ter ms. See Moha nty v
. St. John Heart Clin ic, S.C. , 225 Ill. 2 d 5 2 , 72, 886 N.E.2d 85, 96 (2006). Therefore , to adjudi cate a tor tious i nterfer ence clai m under Illi noi s law , a court mus t i nterpr et t he relev ant contr act. Lin gle, 486 U.S

. at 407. Speci fi cally

, to deter mine i f MPEA tor tious ly interfer ed wit h t he CBA, a factfinder w ould hav e to deter mine whether Fr eeman and GES di d in fact breach the ter ms of the CBA by ter minati ng Plainti ffs

. See HPI Health Care, 131 Ill. 2d at 154–55, 545 N.E.2d at 676. The di stric t court w ould hav e to rev i ew the refer ral process outlin ed in Art i cle IV of the CBA, and analyze

wh e ther Fr eeman and GES contraven ed thi s refer ra l p ro c e s s b y sig ning their r especti v e si de agr eements with bot h t he Uni o n and MPEA and by then termin atin g Plainti ffs

. Becaus e Plaintiffs’ tor tious interfer ence clai m requires i nterpr etat i on of the CBA, § 301 preempts the clai m and
conv ert s i t i nto a § 301 clai m. See Granite Rock Co. v
. Int’l Bhd. of T eamsters , 561 U

. S

. 287, 309–14 (2010) (denying employ er’s tor tious i nterfer ence clai m again st thi rd-part y uni on); Kimbro
v
. Pepsico, Inc

. , 2 1 5 F .3d 723, 727 (7th Ci r
. 2000) (notin g that § 301 “i s not a tor t statute” and holdi ng that deter mining plainti ff’s tor tious i nterfer ence clai m w ould require interpr etation of re l e v a n t c ol l e c tiv e bargaining agr eement, thus preempti ng the clai m). MPEA’s i mmu ni ty gui llo t ines Plainti ffs ’ clai m again st i t. See 29 U.S.C. § § 152(2) and 185(a) (excluding12 No. 15-1241 “poli tic al sub di vis i on” from the “employ er” defini tion under § 301); 70 ILCS 210/3 (establi shing MPEA a s a “poli tic al sub di vis i on”). D. Plaint iffs’ Arguments Plainti ffs arg ue that the preemptiv e prin ci ple undergirding § 301 jurisprudenc e does not apply in thi s case. Thei r arg ument has three facets. First, they arg ue that our deci si ons in Brazinski

v
. Amoco Petroleum Additives Co. , 6 F .3d 1176 (7th Ci r
. 1993), and Kimbro v
. Pepsico, Inc. , 215 F .3d 723 (7th Ci r
. 2000), carv e a jurisdi cti onal pathw ay aro und the gener al preemption of state law clai ms under § 301. Plainti ffs arg ue that they hav e properly fo l low ed thi s path, and that the di stric t court can there fore hear their clai m. Second, Plainti ffs arg ue that the di stric t court, in resolv i ng Pl a int i ffs ’ clai m again st the Uni on, Fr eeman, and GES, w as already i nterpr eting the CBA, and that thi s interpr etation effecti v ely negates any § 3 0 1 preemption. Fin ally , Plainti ffs arg ue that prev entin g them from pursuing the tor tious i nterfer ence clai m wi ll leav e them wi thout a remedy again st a wrongdo ing thi rd party , MPEA. Ho w ev er

, no exception to the Lue ck-Lingle bri ght-li ne ru l e , detailed abov e, appli es i n thi s case, and Plainti ffs cannot state a clai m again st MPEA under state o r federal cont ract o r t or t law

. 1. Brazin skiand Kimbro Are Not Applic able Plainti ffs arg ue that thi s case prese nt s a n exception to § 301’s gener al preemption of state law clai ms requiring i nterpr etat i on of a collecti v e bargaining a g reement. Speci fi

cally , Plainti ffs ci te thi s court’s suggesti ons aro und preemption di scu ssed in Brazinskiand Kimbro

.No. 15-1241 13
Plainti ffs ’ relianc e on Brazinski and Kimbro i s mi splac ed. In Brazinski and Kimbro , thi s court held that becau se resolution of the respective t or t clai ms required interpr etat i on of the collecti v e bargaining agr eements at i ssu e, § 301 preempted the plainti ffs ’ respec tiv e state law tor t c lai ms. See Brazinski, 6 F .3d at 1179 (holding that § 301 preempted plainti ffs -employ ees’ i nv asi on of priv acy tor t clai m, be caus e defendant-emp loy ers had “a nonfri v olous arg ument that the surv ei llance of whi ch the plaintiff s co mplain i s authorized, albei t i mpli ci tly , by the management-ri ghts clause of the agr eement, so that the plainti ffs ’ clai m that the surv ei llance inv aded their priv acy cannot be r esolv ed wi thout an interpr etat i on of the agr eement”); Kimbro , 215 F .3d at 727 (holding that § 301 preempted plainti ff- employ ee’s tor t i ous interfer ence clai m becau se resolution of clai m w o ul d require deter mining whether plainti ff eating food i nv entor y w as a proper basi s for ter mination un der collectiv e bargaining agr eement). Despi te the preemption of the state law tor t clai ms, w e held that the plaint i ffs i n Brazinski and Kimbro could sti ll hav e brought a § 301 clai m in the di stric t court i f they had follow ed
a particu lar procedure. First, the plainti ff-e mp loy ee mus t gr i ev e the di spute using the gr i ev ance process outlin ed in the relev ant co llecti v e bargaining agr eement. Brazinski, 6 F .3d at 1179. Second, i f the gr i ev ance process “d o e s not produce a sati sfac tor y result” for the employ ee, he can then sub mi t the di spute to arbi tr ation. Id. In both proceedings, the uni on w ould be the employ ee’s repr esentativ e. Id. Fin ally , i f uns atis fi ed wi th the arbi tr ator ’s de cis io n, the employ ee could then bring the clai m i n federal court. Id. ; see also Kimbro , 21 5 F

. 3d at 727 (referenci ng the Brazinski suggesti on by not ing that t hi s court14 No. 15-1241 “ha[s ] suggested that a possi ble w ay to preserve [§ 301] caus es of acti on” w ould be to r efer suchi ssu es to ar bi tr ation). How ev er

, i n both Brazinski and Kimbro , ne i ther plainti ff

w ent thro ugh thi s gr i ev ance-arbi tr ation-d i stric t court process, a nd t hus w ai v ed any such ar gument. Brazinski, 6 F .3d at 1 1 7 9 (notin g that plainti ffs’ fa i lure to fi le gr i ev ance by deadline outlin ed i n collecti v e bar gain ing agr eement precluded their clai m i n federal court); Kimbro , 215 F .3d a t 727 (holding that “th e plainti ff has not pi cked up on thi s suggesti on in our Brazins ki d e cis i on” by not fi ling gr i ev ance, and thus w ai v ed arg ument). Becaus e the plainti ffs in Brazinski and Kimbro fai led t o follow the suggested procedure, the respecti v e di strict courts proper ly di s mi ssed their clai ms. Brazinski, 6 F .3d at 1179; Kimbro , 215 F .3d at 727. By contrast, Plainti ffs in thi s case arg ue tha t t he y hav e proper ly follow ed the Brazinski-Kimbro path to the di stric t court. Plainti ffs fi led “numerous” g r i ev ances, y et the Uni on nev er sub mi tte d the gr i ev ances to arbi tr ation. Under the CBA, Plainti ffs could not pursue arbi tr ation on their own; only the Uni on could do so on their behalf. But Plainti ffs arg ue that they
ov ercame the i nabi li ty to arbi tr ate by fi ling a “hybrid” § 301 sui t again st their respecti v e employ ers and the Uni on. See V aca
v
. Sipes , 386 U.S. 171, 186 (1967) (allo wing employ ee uni on members to fi le si multaneous laws ui ts again st their employ er for breach of a collecti v e bargaining agr eement and their uni on for breach of duty of fai r repr esentation); United Parcel Serv ., Inc. v
. Mitchell , 451 U.S. 56, 66 (1981) (expli ci tly refer ring to thi s t y p e of sui t as a “hybrid” sui t). Plainti ffs there fore arg ue t hat by fi ling the gr i ev ances and the sub se q ue nt hybrid sui t, they hav e comport ed wi th the procedural requirements of BrazinskiNo. 15-1241 15
and Kimbro , and can sue MPEA for state law tor tious interfer

ence in federal court. Plainti ffs mi sinterpr et the i mpli cati ons of Brazinski and Kimbro and ignore MPEA’s i mmun it y from § 301 sui ts. Plaintiffs misrepresent the clai ms allow ed by Brazinski and Kimbro as state law tor t clai ms
. I n those cases, whi le the plainti ffs
or i gin ally brought state law tor t clai ms, those clai ms required i nterpr etat i on of the relev ant collecti v e bargaining agr eement. Therefore , t he tor t clai ms w ere preempted and tr ansf or med i nto § 301 contract clai ms. Brazinski, 6 F .3d at 1179; Kimbro , 215 F .3d at 727

. S e e also Lin gle, 486 U.S

. at 407; Lue ck , 471 U.S. at 213; Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 394. Repeatedly and expr essly , thi s court i n Brazinski and Kimbro held that § 301 does not create tor t r ig hts. See Brazinski, 6 F .3d at 1180 (holding that the i nterpr etiv e law stemming from § 301 “i s a co mmon law of contracts, not a so ur ce of independent rights, let alone tor t rights”); Kimbro , 215 F .3d at 726–27 (di sagreeing wi th federal courts that hav e held that § 301 creates a tor t ri ght and noting that “section 301 c reat es a ri ght o nly for br each o f a collecti v e bargaining agr eement; it is not a tort stat ute ”) (emphas i s added). As a result, the plainti ffs in Brazinski and Kimbro could not hav e brought a state l a w tor t clai m; t hey could o nly hav e brough t a § 301 clai m for breach of collecti v e bargaining agr eement. How ev er

, be caus e they di d not follow the gr i ev ance-arbi tr ation-d i str ict court procedure, the plainti ffs

w ai v ed their opport uni ty t o bring these clai ms. Here, ev en assu ming that Pl ainti ffs proper ly f ollow ed thi s Brazinski- K i m bro procedure, they w ould only be able to bring a § 301 clai m a g ai nst the proper parties. But MPEA i s not a proper party ; i t i s i mmu ne fr o m § 301 clai ms. Thus, ev en16 No. 15-1241 though MPEA i s a pa r t y t o the CBA and, ev en i f w e assu me that Plainti ffs follow ed appropr i ate pr ocedural steps t o bring their sui t again st MPEA into di stric t court, § 301 preemption and MPEA’s i mmu ni ty still extin gui sh the clai m. 2. Interpretin g the CBA Does Not Create Jurisdi cti on Plainti ffs also arg ue that by interpr eting the CBA to deter mine the m erits of Plainti ffs ’ case again st Fr eeman, GES, and the Uni on, the di stric t court has opened the do o r to i nterpr eting the CBA to deter mine the merits of Plainti ffs ’ case again st MPEA. But thi s arg ument does not giv e ris e to a co g niz a ble caus e of acti on that a federal di stric t court could resolv e. Sinc e § 301 preemp t i on and MPEA’s i mmu ni ty hav e ext i ngui shed Plainti ffs ’ state law clai m, the di stric t court cannot resurr ect i t. Feder al courts are courts of l imi ted jurisdi cti on. E.g., Ne. Rural Elec . Membership Corp. v. W aba sh V alley Power Ass’n, Inc. , 707 F .3d 883, 890 (7th Ci r . 2013). W e cannot create j uri sdi cti on where w e ha ve none. See Ever green Square of Cudahy v
. W isc. Hous. and Econ. Dev

. Auth. , 77 6 F .3d 463, 468 (7th Ci r
. 2015) ( n otin g th a t “ federal courts possess only that pow er auth or i z e d by Constituti on and statute” and that consi derat i ons of judi ci al economy do not alone create jurisdi cti on) (ci tations omi tte d). Regar ding i mmu ni ty speci fi cally , where a state or poli tic al sub div i si on has been gr anted i mmu ni ty , “absent w ai v er or
v ali d abrog ation, fe d eral courts may not enter tain a priv ate person’s su it again st a St ate.” V ir ginia Off. for Protection and Advocacy v. Stewart, 563 U.S. 247, 131 S . Ct. 1632, 1637 (2011). Here, Plaintiff s are priv ate ci tizens who hav e brought a clai m again st an i mmu ne poli tic al sub di vis i on. MPEA has notNo. 15-1241 17

w ai v ed i ts i mmu ni ty to § 301 sui ts, nor has any other authority abrog ated this i mmu ni ty

. See S tewart

, 131 S. Ct . at 1638. Furt her , the di stric t c ourt ’s interpr etat i on of the CBA i s no abrog ation of thi s i mmu ni ty , particu larly when the precedent
on federal court jurisdi cti on ov er § 301 sui ts i s pa t e nt ly clear

. See 29 U.S.C. § 185(a); Lin coln Mills , 353 U.S. at 450–51. Feder al di stric t courts may i nterpr et labor contracts. Lue ck , 471 U.S. at 220; Lin gle, 486 U.S. at 411. Indeed, thi s i s the v ery mandate of § 3 0 1 and i ts relat ed case law

. Local 175, T

eamsters, Chauffeu rs, W arehousemen , and Helpers of America v
. Luc as Flour, 369 U.S. 95, 103–04 (1962). But no court or statute ha s a l l ow ed federal courts to hear § 301 sui ts again st i mmu ne entiti es. Accordi ngly , the di stric t courtcannot hear Plainti ffs ’ clai m. 3. The “Remedial G ap” Fin ally , Plainti ffs arg ue that § 301’s g e ne ral preemption rules a nd MPEA’s i mmu ni ty from § 301 clai ms leav e them wi thout a remedy a g a inst a thi rd-part y li ke MPEA. W e can only acknowledge that thi s “remedia l g a p ” exis ts, and hold that w e cannot create a rem e d y wher e precedent forbid s us from doin g so. See Braz inski, 6 F .3d at 1179–80 (i denti fyi ng the “remedialgap” that§ 301 preemption creates). Supreme Court precedent and § 301 jurisprudenc e sev er all remedial av enues av ai lable to Plainti ffs

. First, Plainti ffs cannot pursue a federal § 301 clai m again st MPEA becau se MPEA i s i mmu ne from § 301 sui ts. Second, Plainti ffs cannot pursue a state law breach of collecti v e bargaining agr e e me nt clai m again st M PE A , because federal law preempts such state law
caus es of acti on. See L ucas Fl our, 369 U.S. at 103–04.18 No. 15-1241
Fin ally , the Supreme Court ’s ruli ng in Gra nite Rock prev ents Plainti ffs from pursuing any federal tor t clai m again st MPEA. 561 U.S. at 309–14. Though the facts of Gr an i te Rock are not preci sely the same as thi s case, both present the same l e g a l problem: a thi rd-part y to a labor di spute insu lated from remedy by § 301 p r eempti on. In Granite Rock , a concrete and bui lding company e mploy ed members of the local chapter of the Inte rnational Brot herhoo d of T eamsters (“IBT”) u ni on. Id. at 292

. Th e employ er and the local uni on began negot i ations about a new collecti v e bargaining agr eeme nt

. Id. When negot i ations stalled, t he employ ee-uni on members ini tiated a strike. Id. Becaus e the current collecti v e bargaining agr eement had a “no-strike” claus e, the empl oy er sued to enjo in the strike. Id. at 294. The employ er al so sued the local chapter of the uni on under § 301 for breach of the collecti v e bargaining agr eement and sued th e p arent, IBT , for state law tor tious i nterfer ence. Id. at 294–95. The di stric t court allow ed the § 301 di spute t o go to the jury , but g r a nt ed IBT’s mot i on to di smi ss t he tor tious i nterfer ence clai m as preempted by § 301. Id. at 295. The employ er’s arg um e nt on appeal mi rr or s Plainti ffs ’ arg ume nt in thi s case. IBT , li ke MPEA in thi s case, w as an untouchab le thi rd party that the employ er argu e d u n d e rm in e d
a labo r di spute, y et escaped puni shm ent. The employ er speci fi cally clai med that IBT “ no t only insti gate d th[e] strike; i t supp or ted and di rected i t.” Id. at 293. But the employ er could do nothin g to remedy IBT’s alleg ed acti ons. Id. a t 310 (notin g the employ er’s arg ument that “potent i al av enues for deter ring and redr essing [IBT’s] conduc t are ei ther unav ai lable or insuffi ci ent”). Y

et, becau se the employ er could not show tha tNo. 15-1241 19
IBT ei ther si gned the relev ant collecti v e bargaining agr eement
or w as in a prin ci pal-agent relat i onshi p wi th the local chapter whi ch had si gned the collecti v e bargaining agr eement, IB T was not a signator y to the agr eement. Id. at 310 (notin g that the employ e r conceded that “internat i onal uni ons str ucture their relat i onshi ps wi th local uni ons in a w ay that makes agency or alter ego di ffi cult to establi sh”)

. Thus, the em ploy er could not
sue IBT under § 301 for breach of the agr eement. Id. Unable to pursue a § 3 0 1 cl a im, the employ er then requested that the Supreme Court prov i de a r e medy by “recog ni z[ing] a new federal caus e of acti on under § 301(a).” Id. at 292. The S upreme Court unani mously denied this request and upheld the di smi ssal of the state law tor tious interfer ence clai m. Id. at 313–14; see also id. at 314 (Sot omay or , J., concu rr ing and di ssen tin g) (joining major i ty’ s holdi ng to affi rm di smi ssal of the tor tious interfer ence cla im whi le di ssen tin g on other gr ounds)

. Noting the “host of poli cy” choi ces at w or k in § 301 jurisprudenc e, the Su p re me Court reiterat ed that § 301 enabled federal courts to create a federal common l a w of contract i nterpr etat i on, n ot of tor ts. Id. at 311 (quoti ng Brazinski, 6 F .3d at 1180 (federal common law created under § 301 i s “not a source of ind ependent rights, let alone tor t rights”))

. Thus, to prot ect the “carefully calib rat ed” balanc e struck by § 301 and it s r e l ated statutes, the Supreme Court refused to create a federal common law tor t caus e of acti on under § 301. Id. at 311. Accordi ngly

, no such federal tor t caus e of acti on i s av ai lable to Plainti ffs i n thi s cas e.20 No. 15-1241
III. CONCLUSION For the for ego i ng reasons, w e AFF IRM the deci si on of the di stric t court

.