FOR THE RESPONDENT		FOR THE INDIANA SUPREME COURT

							DISCIPLINARY COMMISSION

Thomas Anthony Durkin			Donald R. Lundberg, Executive Secretary

53 West Jackson Blvd.			115 West Washington Street, Ste. 1060	

Chicago, IL 60604				Indianapolis, IN  46204

______________________________________________________________

	IN THE

	SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA

IN THE MATTER OF			)

						)  Case No. 45S00-9701-DI-006

LLOYD B. FISHER			)

______________________________________________________________

	DISCIPLINARY ACTION

_______________________________________________________________

Per Curiam

	The respondent, Lloyd B. Fisher,  and the Disciplinary Commission have submitted

for our approval a Statement of Circumstances and Conditional Agreement for Discipline wherein they agree that the respondent violated the Rules of Professional Conduct for Attorneys at Law by virtue of his federal criminal convictions of money laundering.  In final resolution of this action, we accept the tendered agreement and impose sanction in

accordance therewith.  The facts and circumstances of this case are more fully set forth

herein.  

	The respondent was admitted to the bar of this state in 1974 and, during all relevant

times, was engaged in the practice of law in Gary, Indiana.   This Court suspended him pendente lite on February 17, 1997, based on his criminal conviction.  The parties agree that on November 2, 1994, the respondent was charged by indictment in the United States District

Court for the Northern District of Indiana, Hammond Division, with one count of conspiracy

to engage in money laundering,1 one count of engaging in monetary transactions in property derived from unlawful activity,2 and three counts of laundering monetary instruments.3   On November 8, 1995, after trial by jury, the respondent was found guilty of all counts.4  On December 11, 1996, the Honorable James T. Moody, Judge of the United States District

Court for the Northern District of Indiana, entered a judgment of conviction against the

respondent of all charges, each a felony.  The respondent was sentenced to an 18-month term

of imprisonment on each of the five counts, the sentences to run concurrently.  After release,

the respondent was placed on supervised release for two years. 

	We now find that the respondent violated Ind.Professional Conduct Rule 8.4(b) by

engaging in criminal acts which reflect adversely on his honesty, trustworthiness and fitness as a lawyer. 

	In the parties’ agreement, it is stipulated that a suspension from the practice of law

for a period of three years and six months is appropriate in this instance.5  After that period, in the event the respondent desires to seek reinstatement to the bar, the parties further

stipulate that the respondent be required to petition for reinstatement.  at the conclusion of that period, Standing alone, with no factors in

mitigation, we would be more inclined to conclude that the severity of the respondent’s

actions and the criminal scienter underlying them call for permanent disbarment from the

practice of law.  However, our attention is directed to the federal sentencing memorandum

of Judge Moody.  It indicates that the federal court heard testimony of 14 witnesses relative

to its decision to depart from the federal sentencing guidelines applicable to the respondent’s

criminal acts.  The court found that the respondent’s case “[fell] squarely within the

Guidelines’ policy statement on diminished capacity.”  Specifically, Judge Moody found that

the record contained an undisputed, expert opinion that the respondent was suffering from

clinical mental disorders (i.e., depression) at the time of his crimes, which significantly

reduced his ability to reason and make sound judgments.  The respondent’s diminished

mental state had its genesis in the death of his son and other personal tragedies soon before

the

time

hhe committed the criminal acts.  

	The circumstances recounted in the sentencing memorandum are compelling and they, along with our interest in fostering agreed resolution of attorney disciplinary cases, persuade

us to accept the proffered sanction, that being a three and one-half year suspension from the

practice of law, instead of permanent disbarment.  We note, however, that the severity of the

respondent’s acts place on him a very strong implication of unfitness and a correspondingly

great burden of proof to demonstrate subsequent fitness sufficient for reinstatement, should

he ever choose to seek it.  See In re Gutman, 599 N.E.2d 604, 608 (Ind. 1992).  Given the severity of the misconduct and our willingness to impose a suspension instead of disbarment,

we conclude further that the suggestion that the period of suspension be retroactive to the

date of the  respondent’s pendente lite suspension should be rejected. 

	It is, therefore, ordered that the respondent, Lloyd B. Fisher, is suspended from the

practice of law for a period of three (3) years and six (6) months, effective _______________immediately.  At

the conclusion of that period, he may petition this Court for reinstatement to the practice of

law, provided he can satisfy the requirements of Ind.Admission and Discipline Rule 23(4)

and pays the costs of this proceeding. 	

	The Clerk of this Court is directed to provide notice of this order in accordance with

Admis.Disc.R. 23(3)(d) and to provide the clerk of the United States Court of Appeals for

the Seventh Circuit, the clerk of each of the Federal District Courts in this state, and the clerk

of the United States Bankruptcy Court in this state with the last known address of respondent

as reflected in the records of the Clerk.

Shepard, C.J., and Sullivan, Selby and Boehm, JJ., concur. 

Dickson, J., dissents, believing disbarment is warranted.