United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 04-3852

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Malik Abdul Shabazz, also known *

as Vonnie Lynn Moore, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Eastern District of Arkansas

Arkansas Department of Correction; *

Charles Freyder, Chaplain, Varner * [UNPUBLISHED]

Unit, ADC; Don Yancy, Administrator *

of Religious Services, Arkansas *

Department of Correction; Agin *

Muhammad, Sr., Islamic Coordinator, *

Arkansas Department of Correction; *

Ray Hobbs, Deputy Director, Arkansas *

Department of Correction, *

*

Appellees. *

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Submitted: October 28, 2005

 Filed: November 17, 2005

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Before BYE, McMILLIAN, and RILEY, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM.

In this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action brought by Arkansas inmate Malik Abdul

Shabazz, a/k/a Vonnie Lynn Moore, against the Arkansas Department of Correction
1

The Honorable James M. Moody, United States District Judge for the Eastern

District of Arkansas. 

2

The Honorable Jerry W. Cavaneau, United States Magistrate Judge for the

Eastern District of Arkansas.

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(ADC) and numerous ADC officials (collectively defendants), Shabazz appeals from

an interlocutory order entered in the District Court1

 for the Eastern District of

Arkansas partially granting his motion for a preliminary injunction on his claim under

the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000cc-1, and denying his motion for class certification. For reversal, Shabazz

argues that the district court erred in (1) limiting the injunctive relief and (2) denying

class certification. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the grant of the

preliminary injunction, and we cannot review the denial of class certification.

Shabazz’s complaint alleged that defendants were violating the Constitution

and RLUIPA by prohibiting Muslim inmates from performing the “Khutba” sermon

during the “Jumu’a” weekly prayer service at all ADC units. Following a hearing, a

magistrate judge2

 issued proposed findings and recommendations, which the district

court adopted in their entirety. Accordingly, the district court found that defendants

were placing a substantial burden on Shabazz’s ability to exercise his religion; that

defendants have a compelling governmental interest in avoiding the elevation of one

inmate to a position of religious leadership over others; that defendants were not

using the least restrictive means of furthering their compelling governmental interest;

and that the use of video-recorded Khutbas is a viable alternative to the performance

of live Khutbas. The district court partially granted Shabazz’s motion for a

preliminary injunction by ordering defendants to provide to each ADC unit a videorecorded Khutba, performed by a qualified individual of defendants’ choice, each

Friday on which there is no qualified individual available to perform the Khutba live.

Defendants were ordered to comply with the preliminary injunction within 60 days
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of the date of the district court’s order. The district court denied Shabazz’s motion

for class certification. 

Shabazz timely filed a notice of interlocutory appeal challenging the

“limitations and modifications” of the preliminary injunction, the denial of class

certification, and the allowance of 60 days for defendants to comply with the district

court’s order. In support of his argument that inmates should be permitted to perform

the Khutba, he cites two unpublished opinions indicating that inmates elsewhere are

allowed to perform Khutbas under certain restrictions. See Doyle v. Prewitt, 39 Fed.

Appx. 344, 347 (7th Cir. Apr. 22, 2002) (unpublished order) (affirming summary

judgment for Illinois prison officials on Muslim inmate’s claim that his First

Amendment rights were being violated because he could not deviate from text of preapproved Khutba); Wilson v. Moore, No. 4:01cv158-RV, 2003 U.S. Dist. Lexis

25648, at *13 (N.D. Fla. 2003) (unpublished magistrate judge’s report and

recommendation) (in case involving Florida inmate’s challenge to restrictions on

Native American religious practices, noting in background information that Muslim

inmates perform Khutbas under direct supervision of chaplain).

To begin, we need not address the district court’s allowance of 60 days for

defendants to comply with its order as that issue is now moot. As to the challenged

denial of class certification, we lack interlocutory appellate jurisdiction. See

Reinholdson v. Minnesota, 346 F.3d 847, 849 (8th Cir. 2003) (interlocutory appeal

of denial of class certification not proper where plaintiffs did not invoke any of

recognized exceptions to final-judgment rule); cf. In re BankAmerica Corp. Sec.

Litig., 263 F.3d 795, 804 (8th Cir. 2001) (court lacks interlocutory appellate

jurisdiction to consider challenge to class notice approved by district court, which is

separate from injunction), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 970 (2002). 

We have interlocutory appellate jurisdiction to review the preliminary

injunction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). A district court has broad discretion
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in ruling on a motion for a preliminary injunction, and this court will reverse such a

ruling only for a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an error of law, or an abuse of

discretion. See Safety-Kleen Sys., Inc. v. Hennekens, 301 F.3d 931, 935 (8th Cir.

2002). Upon review, we hold that the district court used the proper legal standard set

forth in RLUIPA, did not clearly err in its findings of fact, and did not abuse its broad

discretion in formulating the preliminary injunction. Finally, we note that the cases

cited by Shabazz are not persuasive authority supporting his position. In Doyle, 39

Fed. Appx. at 347, the restriction at issue was upheld upon recognition that prison

security may be jeopardized if an inmate is put in a position of religious leadership

over other inmates, or if an inmate has the opportunity to use religious services to

engage in disruptive communications. Moreover, Wilson, 2003 U.S. Dist. Lexis

25648, at *13, is irrelevant because the alleged supervised performance of Khutbas

by inmates was not an issue in the case.

Accordingly, the preliminary injunction is affirmed.

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