BLD-078 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________ No. 14-4355

___________ MEL M. MARIN, PERSONALLY AND AS HEIR OF THE ESTATE OF MILIVOJ AND EVA MARINKOVIC, Mel M. Marvin, Appellant

v. LA PALOMA HEALTHCARE CENTER AND ITS ALTER EGOS; ITALIAN MAPLE HOLDINGS, LLC; PLUM HEALTHCARE GROUP;

MARK BALLIF; PAUL HUBBARD; ORVILLE LLOYD MARLETT; GRUPO TELEVISIA A FOREIGN CORP ORATION, AND ITS ALTER EGOS, doing business as XETV SA N DIEGO 6 TELEVISION; JEANE LENORE MARLETT TRUST; EMILIO AZCARRAGA JEAN; GUSTAVO CISNEROS; ALFANSO DE ANGOITIA; BERNARDO GOMEZ MARTINEZ; MICHAEL RICHTER JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY

___________________ _________________ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil No. 11-cv-00230) District Judge: Honorable David S. Cercone

___________________ _________________ Submitted for Possible Dismissal Purs uant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or Summary Action Pursuant to Th ird Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 December 10, 2015 Before: FUENTES, KRAUSE and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges (Opinion filed: January 8, 2016)

_________2 OPINION *

_________ PER CURIAM Mel M. Marin appeals from an order of the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylva nia, which dismissed his comp laint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). We will affirm the District Court’s judgment. In October 2011, Marin submitted to th e District Court a lengthy complaint including “causes of action for conversion, fra ud and deceit, assault and battery, section 1983 civil rights, interference with business, intentional infliction of emotional distress, defamation, invasion of privacy, and wrongful death.” Dist. Ct. Mem. Op. at 1. Along with his complaint, Marin filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). The docket does not reflect any activity until Se ptember 29, 2014, when the Court granted Marin’s IFP motion, but also dismissed the complaint “pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for lack of jurisdiction, forum non-conveniens , and as otherwise based on fanciful allegations and indisputably meritle ss legal theory.” Dist. Ct. Order at 1-2.

The Court also stated that it found “that the action is vexatious and was filed for

vindictive and obstructive purposes.” Id. at 2. Marin timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we exer cise plenary review of a district court decision dismissing a complaint as frivolous or for failure to state a claim.

* This disposition is not an op inion of the full Court and pu rsuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent.3 Roman v. Jeffes, 904 F.2d 192, 194 (3d Cir. 1990); Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000). A complaint fails to stat e a claim if, accepting all well-pled factual allegations as true, the allegati ons do not “plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 365 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009)). We may affirm a district court for any reason supported by the record. Brightwell v. Lehman, 63 7 F.3d 187, 191 (3d Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). 1 We agree with the District Court that Marin’s complaint “fai ls to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,” because th e District Court “lacks jurisdiction over the defendants.” Dist. Ct. Mem. Op. at 9. 2 Marin argues that, at least as to the libel claim, his complaint states a claim upon which relief coul d be granted. But ev en if we credit the allegations of his complaint, those allegati ons are insufficient to demonstrate that the nonresident Defendants “maintained systematic and continuous contac ts with the forum state,” Kehm Oil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 53 7 F.3d 290, 300 (3d Cir. 2008) (discussing general personal jurisdiction), or that they “p urposefully directed [t heir] activities at a

1 As explained below, we agree that the Dist rict Court lacked pers onal jurisdiction over the Defendants. We note, however, that to the extent the District Court sought to dismiss the complaint for failure to pr osecute, the dismissal would have been premature, as the complaint was not due to be served until the Court ruled on Marin’s application to proceed IFP. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3) (i f plaintiff is granted privilege of proceeding IFP, District Court must enter an order “that service be made by a United States marshal or deputy marshal or by a person specially appointed by the court”); see also Roman v. Jeffes, 904 F.2d 192, 195 (3d Cir. 1990) (“th e appropriate time to make a decision to dismiss a case pursuant to § 1915(d) [now § 19 15(e)] is before serv ice of a complaint”).4 resident of the forum,” Gen. Elec. Co. v. Deutz AG, 270 F.3d 144, 150 (3d Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted) (describin g requirements for establishing specific personal jurisdiction). The complaint st ates that the Defendants, who are not Pennsylvania residents, publis hed the allegedly defamatory statements in California and

does not indicate that the Defendants were in any way involved in re-publishing the

information in Pennsylvania. 3 Given the lack of a connection between the Defendants and Pennsylvania, apparent fro m the face of the complaint, the District Court properly dismissed the complaint for l ack of personal jurisdiction. 4 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.

2 Given our holding, we have not examined Marin’s othe r litigation to determine whether his current complaint is suffi ciently repetitive and vexatious to warrant dismissal on that basis. 3 Marin does not explain how any of hi s other counts have a connection with Pennsylvania. 4 While a district court generally must give the plaintiff an op portunity to amend a complaint before dismissing it for failure to state a claim, opportunity to amend is not required if, as here, amendment would be fu tile. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002).