NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except 

in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

2022 IL App (3d) 200219-U

Order filed March 28, 2022

____________________________________________________________________________ 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

2022 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF )

ILLINOIS, ) 

 ) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

 ) 

 v. ) 

 ) 

DAISHA C. FERNANDO, ) 

 ) 

Defendant-Appellant. ) 

Appeal from the Circuit Court

of the 10th Judicial Circuit, 

Peoria County, Illinois, 

Appeal No. 3-20-0219 

Circuit No. 18-CF-519 

Honorable 

Paul P. Gilfillan, 

Judge, Presiding. 

____________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE LYTTON delivered the judgment of the court. 

Justices Daugherity and Schmidt concurred in the judgment. 

____________________________________________________________________________

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: Evidence presented at trial was sufficient to prove defendant guilty beyond a 

reasonable doubt.

¶ 2 Defendant, Daisha C. Fernando, appeals from her conviction for aggravated discharge of a 

firearm. Defendant contends that the State failed to prove her guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, 

arguing that the basis for her conviction rested on an incredible eyewitness’s testimony. We affirm.

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND
2 

¶ 4 The State charged defendant with aggravated discharge of a firearm (720 ILCS 5/24-

1.2(a)(2) (West 2018)). The charges stem from a July 27, 2018, incident where gunshots were fired 

at an occupied vehicle operated by Giavanni Pates. Defendant’s case proceeded to a bench trial. 

¶ 5 Officer Brett Lawrence of the Peoria Police Department testified that at approximately 7:11 

a.m. on July 27, 2018, he was dispatched to West Starr Street on two ShotSpotter alerts. He 

explained that ShotSpotter was a program that detects gunfire. Lawrence discovered two shell 

casings in front of 3008 West Starr Street. There was no one in the immediate area to speak with 

regarding the shooting. He relocated to the victim’s residence where he spoke to Pates and

observed the vehicle that she had been driving that morning. The front driver’s side window was 

shattered and there were bullet holes in the rear driver’s side door.

¶ 6 Pates testified that on July 27, 2018, she had an argument with her boyfriend, Darryl Keller, 

via text messages. At approximately 7 a.m., Pates left her residence to buy cigarettes, and 

attempted to locate Keller. 

¶ 7 While stopped at a stop sign, Pates observed Keller walking on Starr Street with defendant. 

Pates knew of defendant prior to that morning. Pates had argued with defendant over Facebook

messenger regarding Keller in May or June 2018. Pates did not provide proof of this argument to 

detectives since they indicated they had already found proof of it. Pates had seen defendant around 

town on two occasions but had never met her in person. To Pates’s knowledge, defendant had three 

Facebook accounts.

¶ 8 After seeing Keller on Starr Street, Pates stopped her car on the left side of the street where 

Keller and defendant were standing. Pates remained seated in her vehicle with the driver’s side 

window rolled halfway down. Pates identified defendant in open court as the individual she saw 

with Keller. Defendant was standing to the side of Keller but a couple of inches or feet behind him 
3 

and positioned diagonally from him. Defendant wore a black jogging suit with a hooded jacket 

and white T-shirt underneath. Defendant was not wearing makeup. Pates could not remember how 

defendant wore her hair but thought that defendant had her hood up. She observed an object

hanging out of defendant’s jacket and stated defendant “had her hand in her pocket like this,” 

referencing the position of defendant’s right hand. When asked how she recognized defendant, 

Pates answered, “because they was together.” Pates stated, “I could see her face and I knew what 

she looked like,” indicating that familiarity resulted from her “studying [defendant’s] Facebook 

photos.” 

¶ 9 As Pates and Keller argued, defendant muttered something to the effect of “what the fuck

you looking at.” As the argument ended, Pates indicated that she was leaving and told Keller to 

call her or come by her house. While waiting for Keller to answer her question, defendant again 

said: “what the fuck you looking at[?]” Defendant pointed what Pates described as a silver barreled 

gun with possibly a black handle at Pates and fired it. Pates believed she entered a state of shock. 

She said, “I just remember her pointing it at me, and that was the last thing I saw and remember.” 

¶ 10 The first gunshot broke the driver’s side window of Pates’s vehicle. She then heard two 

more gunshots. She attempted to turn her vehicle around to return home to call 911. Pates had 

trouble remembering facts about how she maneuvered her vehicle, calling 911, and when officers

arrived at her residence. Pates testified that when she arrived home, an officer was at her residence; 

however, she also testified that she called 911 from another phone at her residence. She explained

that she could not remember if she called 911 or if officers were waiting when she returned home. 

¶ 11 Pates testified regarding an incident with defendant the day prior to the shooting. On that 

day, both Pates and Keller were at the Starr Street residence and defendant wrote a message on 

Pates’s vehicle that said, “Bitch you not done with me.” Defendant posted photographs of the 
4 

vandalism on her Snapchat and Facebook page. Pates viewed the photographs on Facebook. A 

photograph of defendant’s post was entered into evidence. On cross-examination, Pates testified 

that Keller often borrowed her vehicle. She specified that he never drove the vehicle out of town. 

¶ 12 Pates spoke with Detective Scott Hulse at the Peoria Police Department regarding the 

shooting. Initially, she did not disclose to Hulse that she had been looking for Keller that morning. 

Pates identified defendant as the shooter by showing Hulse defendant’s Facebook account. Pates

was unable to select defendant from a photographic lineup. She explained that she had primarily

seen defendant on her Facebook accounts where her appearance would frequently change, and that 

defendant did not look like the lineup photograph in real life.

¶ 13 Officer John Foster of the Peoria Police Department testified that he gathered evidence at 

the scene on July 27, 2018. He photographed and collected two 9-millimeter shell casings from 

the sidewalk in front of 3008 West Starr Street. He then collected evidence from Pates’s vehicle. 

He observed two bullet holes in the driver’s door and an interior bullet hole in the driver’s side

rear passenger door. It appeared that one bullet had entered the driver’s door, fragmented, and 

exited the driver’s side rear passenger door. He cut open the driver’s seat and retrieved a bullet. 

He also recovered a bullet that had fallen onto the roadway when the driver’s side rear vehicle 

door was opened prior to his arrival. Photographs of the damage and collected items were admitted 

into evidence.

¶ 14 The parties presented two verbal stipulations. Detective David Dailey of the Decatur Police 

Department would testify that he used a program to unlock defendant’s password protected phone. 

Detective Stevie Hughes of the Peoria Police Department would testify that he downloaded the 

contents from defendant’s unlocked phone. 
5 

¶ 15 Hulse testified that after he responded to the scene, he met with Pates. She showed him two 

of defendant’s Facebook accounts and identified defendant as the shooter. Hulse found a 

photograph of defendant’s driver’s license and was able to identify defendant. Hulse secured a 

search warrant for defendant’s cell phone. Various exhibits from the phone were admitted into 

evidence. The court reviewed a series of photographs depicting defendant holding a handgun but 

declined to admit them into evidence. A video of defendant’s interrogation was admitted into 

evidence. Hulse testified that defendant told him that she had been out of town the night of July 

26, 2018, and had arrived at her mother’s house the morning of the shooting. A video from 

defendant’s cell phone showed that she was in Peoria at the time she told the detective that she 

was out of town. 

¶ 16 Hulse testified that he found no evidence on defendant’s cell phone of any arguments or 

altercations between defendant and Pates. He also testified that the date range for the records 

requested by the warrant were for a “very tight window” of time, yielding limited amounts of data. 

There was no other evidence provided to Hulse of any argument between Pates and defendant. 

¶ 17 Defendant testified that she did not know Pates until she was questioned by the police 

regarding the shooting. When asked about the vandalism to Pates’s vehicle, she admitted to leaving 

the message, but she believed that the vehicle belonged to Keller. Defendant frequently saw Keller 

driving the vehicle, and they had gone out of town overnight in it in June 2018. Defendant intended 

the message for Keller.

¶ 18 Defendant explained that she misstated the date when she told Hulse she was out of town 

on the night of July 26, 2018, when it was July 25, 2018, and she returned the morning of the 

vandalism to Pates’s vehicle. Defendant was supposed to meet Keller at the Starr Street house, and 

he failed to answer the door or his phone when she arrived. She knocked on the door of the house 
6 

and honked her horn repeatedly for an hour with no answer. She wrote the message on Pates’s 

vehicle, intending it for Keller. Defendant’s mother testified that she saw Keller driving Pates’s 

vehicle every day. 

¶ 19 In rebuttal, Pates testified that she only owned one vehicle and while she let Keller borrow 

it sometimes, it was not every day. She testified that she did not remember if she loaned it to Keller 

for two days in June 2018. When asked again about the vandalism, Pates testified that she left her 

vehicle there overnight as she had been drinking and went back in the morning to retrieve it. It was 

at that time she first saw the message. She saw the Facebook posting later that day. 

¶ 20 After arguments were heard, the court found defendant guilty. It reasoned that the wording 

on the message written on Pates’s vehicle indicated that defendant intended it for Pates, not Keller.

The court found it strained credibility that defendant stayed at the house on Starr Street knocking 

and honking for that length of time and no one answered, especially if Keller knew she was 

coming. The court also found that, while it would have been more convincing if Pates had 

identified defendant in the photographic lineup, it was not necessary “given her clarity in 

identifying the defendant in—in another credible way.” Regarding the testimony of Pates, the court 

stated: “the testimony of the victim at the scene of the occurrence and the inconsistencies, if you 

want to call them that, are understandable knowing that she acknowledges and it’s believable that 

she was in a state of shock after the first round was fired off.” Defendant was subsequently 

sentenced to five years’ imprisonment. Defendant appeals.

¶ 21 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 22 Defendant argues that the State failed to prove her guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of 

aggravated discharge of a firearm where the State’s case was reliant on the testimony of one 

incredible eyewitness. Defendant contends that Pates’s inability to positively identify defendant 
7 

and the fact that Pates’s testimony contained numerous contradictions, inconsistencies, and 

impeachments rendered the evidence insufficient to sustain her conviction. 

¶ 23 When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, the relevant inquiry is “ ‘whether, after 

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could 

have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (Emphasis in 

original.) People v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237, 261 (1985) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 

307, 319 (1979)). In conducting this inquiry, it is not the function of the reviewing court to retry 

defendant. People v. Smith, 185 Ill. 2d 532, 541 (1999). The reviewing court must examine the 

record while bearing in mind that it was the trier of fact who saw and heard the witness. Id.

Testimony of a single witness is sufficient to convict if the testimony is positive and the witness is 

credible. Id. Such testimony may be found insufficient only where the record compels the 

conclusion that no reasonable person could accept it beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. at 545; 

People v. Schott, 145 Ill. 2d 188, 206-07 (1991).While vague or doubtful identifications are 

insufficient to support a conviction, identification of the accused by a single eyewitness can 

support a conviction where that witness viewed the accused under circumstances allowing a 

positive identification. People v. Lewis, 165 Ill. 2d 305, 356 (1995). 

“[C]ircumstances to be considered in evaluating an identification include: (1) the 

opportunity the victim had to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the 

witness’ degree of attention; (3) the accuracy of the witness’ prior description of 

the criminal; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the victim at the 

identification confrontation; and (5) the length of time between the crime and the 

identification confrontation.” People v. Slim, 127 Ill. 2d 302, 307-08 (1989).
8 

¶ 24 Defendant was charged with aggravated discharge of a firearm (720 ILCS 5/24-1.2(a)(2) 

(West 2018)). To prove the violation as charged, the State must present sufficient evidence that 

defendant knowingly discharged a firearm in the direction of a motor vehicle she knew or 

reasonably should have known to be occupied by a person. Id. The only element at issue in this 

appeal is whether the evidence established beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was the 

person who knowingly discharged a firearm at Pates. We begin by evaluating the sufficiency of 

Pates’s identification by applying the Slim factors.

¶ 25 First, we consider the opportunity Pates had to view the criminal. When considering this 

factor, we consider “whether the witness was close enough to the accused for a sufficient period 

of time under conditions adequate for observation.” People v. Carlton, 78 Ill. App. 3d 1098, 1105

(1979). This interaction occurred during the daytime when Pates’s view would not be limited by 

the ambient lighting. Pates stopped her vehicle close to defendant and Keller and began to argue 

with Keller. Defendant stood near Keller for the duration of the argument providing ample 

opportunity for Pates to observe defendant. 

¶ 26 Second, the record establishes that Pates exhibited a significant degree of attention. Before 

the shooting, Pates sat in her vehicle near defendant for several minutes. Pates testified to 

numerous details concerning defendant’s appearance, demeanor, and mannerisms prior to the 

shooting. Pates’s testimony described where defendant was standing, how she was holding her 

hand, the object hanging from her hooded jacket, her comments to Pates, what defendant was 

wearing, and the fact that she was not wearing makeup that morning. 

¶ 27 Third, although Pates was unable to select defendant from the photographic lineup on the 

day of the shooting, she reasonably explained that the lineup photograph looked different from 

defendant’s Facebook photographs and did not resemble defendant’s normal appearance. 
9 

Additionally, shortly after the shooting, Pates identified defendant by showing detectives

defendant’s Facebook account and indicating that defendant was the shooter. 

¶ 28 Fourth, Pates exhibited a high level of certainty in her identification of defendant as the 

shooter. At trial, Pates unequivocally identified defendant as the shooter, stating that she knew it 

was defendant who fired the gunshots as she could see defendant’s face and knew what defendant 

looked like. Pates also testified that she had seen defendant prior to the shooting both in person 

and on Facebook. Pates’s trial identifications were consistent with the identification that she 

provided to the police after the shooting. Shortly after the shooting, Pates confirmed her 

identification by providing the police with photographs of defendant from defendant’s Facebook 

account. The only time that Pates’s identification wavered, was when the police provided her with 

a photographic lineup, and she was unable to identify defendant. However, as we noted with regard 

to the third element, this did little to undercut her other consistent and repeated identifications. 

¶ 29 Fifth, the record establishes that minimal time passed between the shooting and Pates’s 

identification of defendant as the shooter. Specifically, Pates identified defendant as the shooter 

on the day of the shooting, shortly after the shooting occurred. 

¶ 30 We conclude Pates viewed the shooter under circumstances permitting a positive 

identification. Thus, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, a reasonable trier of fact 

could have found Pates’s identification of defendant as the shooter to be credible and prove beyond 

a reasonable doubt that defendant committed aggravated discharge of a firearm. See Lewis, 165 

Ill. 2d at 356.

¶ 31 In reaching the above conclusion, we reject defendant’s argument that Pates’s testimony 

was so rife with inconsistencies that “nothing Ms. Pates testified to can be relied upon as fact.” In 

this argument, defendant points to contradictory statements made by Pates, including but not 
10 

limited to: (1) she could not recall exactly how she turned her vehicle around after the shooting, 

(2) she heard three gunshots where the physical evidence showed only two, (3) she could not 

remember if or when she called 911, (4) she could not remember if police were waiting for her at 

her residence when she arrived home, and (5) she claimed that she argued with defendant online 

when no such evidence was provided to or located by detectives on defendant’s cell phone. These 

inconsistencies were relevant mainly to the facts surrounding the offense. They do not undermine 

Pates’s consistent and repeated identification of defendant as the shooter. 

¶ 32 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 33 The judgment of the circuit court of Peoria County is affirmed. 

¶ 34 Affirmed.