United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit 

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No. 20-1535

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United States of America

 Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Logan Matthew Toomer

 Defendant - Appellant

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Iowa - Cedar Rapids

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Submitted: January 11, 2021

 Filed: February 22, 2021 

[Unpublished]

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Before LOKEN, GRASZ, and KOBES, Circuit Judges. 

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PER CURIAM.

Logan Matthew Toomer and two others burglarized a residence in Springville, 

Iowa, and stole numerous items, including roughly $50,000 in cash and multiple 

firearms. While in possession of the stolen firearms, Toomer unlawfully used 

methamphetamine. He pled guilty to possession of firearms by a drug user. See 18 
-2- 

U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(3), 924(a)(2). The district court1 imposed a sentence of 53 months 

of imprisonment. 

Toomer appeals, contending the district court improperly calculated his 

United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual (“Guidelines” or “U.S.S.G.”) range by 

double counting the same conduct when applying two separate enhancements. “We 

review the district court’s application of the . . . [G]uidelines, including the 

permissibility of double counting, de novo.” United States v. Kenney, 283 F.3d 934, 

936 (8th Cir. 2002). 

Here, the district court applied a two-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. 

§ 2K2.1(b)(4)(A) and a four-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. §2K2.1(b)(6)(B). 

The former applies when a defendant’s conduct involves a stolen firearm. The latter 

applies when a defendant “used or possessed any firearm or ammunition in 

connection with another felony offense[.]” According to Toomer, in this case, the 

enhancements overlap because the other felony offense for purposes of 

§ 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) was a state-law claim of burglary with theft as a necessary factual 

predicate. Having accounted for the theft under § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B), Toomer 

maintains it was improper to also enhance his sentence for theft of a firearm under 

§ 2K2.1(b)(4)(A).

This is not the first time this issue has come before this court, and our 

precedent forecloses Toomer’s argument. See United States v. Canamore, 916 F.3d 

718, 721 (8th Cir. 2019) (rejecting an argument that application of both 

enhancements constituted impermissible double counting because the issue was 

decided in Kenney, 283 F.3d at 937, and United States v. Hedger, 354 F.3d 792, 795 

(8th Cir. 2004)). Similar to this case, Kenney involved a felon-in-possession charge 

related to a home burglary and theft of guns. 283 F.3d at 935. In rejecting a 

1

The Honorable C.J. Williams, United States District Judge for the Northern 

District of Iowa.

 
-3- 

challenge to the propriety of applying both enhancements,2 we explained that 

“[d]ouble counting may be permissible . . . in situations where (1) the Sentencing 

Commission intended the result and (2) ‘each statutory section concerns 

conceptually separate notions relating to sentencing.’” Id. at 937 (quoting United 

States v. Rohwedder, 243 F.3d 423, 426–27 (8th Cir. 2001)). We determined the 

Commission intended both enhancements “be applied to firearms possession 

offenses involving an additional felony offense” such as burglary. Id. at 938. 

Further, we reasoned the two enhancements were “conceptually separate,” 

explaining § 2K2.1(b)(4) “punishes for mere possession,” while § 2K2.1(b)(6) 

“punishes for the participation in another felony offense.” Id. Having satisfied both 

prongs of the test, we held that application of both enhancements was not 

impermissible double counting. Id. at 939. 

Because Toomer fails to meaningfully distinguish Kenney and its progeny, we 

must reject his argument on appeal. See Hedger, 354 F.3d at 795 (“[O]ne panel of 

the court cannot reverse another panel.”) (quoting United States v. Perkins, 94 F.3d 

429, 437 (8th Cir. 1996)). Accordingly, we affirm Toomer’s sentence.

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2

Until 2006, the Guidelines placed § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B)’s enhancement at 

§ 2K2.1(b)(5). See Canamore, 916 F.3d at 721 n.3.