THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Supreme Court 

The State, Petitioner, 

v. 

Arthur M. Field, Respondent. 

Appellate Case No. 2018-001042 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS 

Appeal from Pickens County 

J. Cordell Maddox Jr., Circuit Court Judge 

Opinion No. 27952 

Heard January 15, 2020 – Filed March 11, 2020 

AFFIRMED 

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Senior Assistant 

Deputy Attorney General Samuel Creighton Waters, and 

Senior Assistant Attorney General Brian T. Petrano, of 

Columbia, for Petitioner. 

James Todd Rutherford, The Rutherford Law Firm, LLC, 

of Columbia, for Respondent. 

PER CURIAM: The State indicted Arthur M. Field for multiple counts of securities 

fraud, forgery, and criminal conspiracy for defrauding investors out of almost $3 

million. The State stressed in the indictment and in subsequent hearings that Field's 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

crimes deprived hard-working men and women of savings for their children's 

education and their own retirement. "It is the kind of crime," the State told the 

sentencing court, "that spans generations, that has lasting effects -- not just on the 

688 [investors] -- but on their children, their grandchildren, and their greatgrandchildren." 

Field pled guilty to all charges pursuant to a plea agreement under which the State 

promised not to argue for any specific sentence. The sentencing court sentenced him 

to ten years in prison, but suspended the sentence on the service of twenty-six 

months, with restitution to be paid during five years of probation. The court 

specifically provided Field should receive sixteen months of credit for time served. 

Eight days later, after applying the sentencing court's credit for time served order, 

the department of corrections released Field from prison.1 The same day, the State 

filed a motion to reconsider, which the sentencing court later denied. 

The State now appeals the decision of the sentencing court to grant Field credit for 

approximately ten months of post-indictment time when Field was not in jail and— 

the State argues—not "under monitored house arrest." Section 24-13-40 of the South 

Carolina Code (Supp. 2019) permits a sentencing court to award credit against a 

sentence of incarceration for pretrial time not served in jail but on "monitored house 

arrest" as a condition of bond. S.C. Code Ann. § 24-13-40 (Supp. 2019) ("In every 

case in computing the time served by a prisoner, full credit against the sentence must 

be given for time served prior to trial and sentencing, and may be given for any time 

spent under monitored house arrest." (emphasis added)). The court of appeals 

affirmed. State v. Field, Op. No. 2017-UP-455 (S.C. Ct. App. withdrawn, 

substituted, and refiled Apr. 4, 2018). We granted the State's petition for a writ of 

certiorari. 

The State presents a strong argument on the merits. After Field served a month in 

jail, the bond court amended his original bond order to permit him to leave jail on 

house arrest. Approximately five months later, however, Field's attorney asked the 

bond court to "take him off house arrest." The bond court stated on the record "I'll 

take the house arrest off so he can go, but I'll leave the [electronic monitor] on." The 

bond court wrote in the bond modification order "motion to amend bond as to house 

arrest is granted." Field spent approximately ten months under this arrangement 

1 The sentencing court granted Field's request to not be taken into custody 

immediately and permitted him to report to prison three days later. Thus, Field 

served only five of the eight days. 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

before pleading guilty and being sentenced. At a subsequent hearing, the sentencing 

court agreed with the State's argument that "being on a monitor is not house arrest." 

Nevertheless, we decline to reach the merits of the State's appeal. At the time Field's 

sentence was imposed, the State knew the bond court removed the house arrest 

restriction approximately ten months earlier. Thus, the State knew Field was entitled 

to credit only for the one month he spent in jail, but also knew Field could ask for 

credit for the five months he actually spent on house arrest. Field specifically asked 

the sentencing court to "give him credit for the fifteen months that he's served on 

house arrest." When the sentencing court announced on the record it was giving 

credit for the one month in jail "and for the fifteen months," the State did not object. 

The sentencing sheets clearly show credit for "33 days + 15 months house arrest." 

We are inclined to agree that the sentencing court did not have the authority to give 

Field credit for the entire fifteen months. We agree with Field, however, that the 

State did not preserve the issue for appeal. We focus not on the lack of any objection 

at the sentencing hearing, but on the position the State took in its motion to 

reconsider the sentence. When the State filed the motion, the State did not argue the 

sentencing court committed error. Instead, the State merely asserted "pursuant to 

the plea agreement any sentence is in the discretion of the court, so the State has 

simply filed this motion to reconsider to preserve jurisdiction in case the sentencing 

result is inconsistent with [the] court's intent." At the hearing on the motion, the 

State again did not argue the court committed error, stating, "I wanted to file a 

motion to preserve jurisdiction so your honor could -- or not, whatever your honor 

decides -- correct that, um, matter if your honor decides." 

The State's careful choice of its words is important here. Pursuant to the plea 

agreement, the State was not permitted to argue for a specific sentence. Similarly, 

the State was not permitted to argue on reconsideration that the sentence was too 

lenient. It is abundantly clear the sentencing court did not mistakenly give Field a 

sentence that would require him to serve only a few more days. The court stated, "I 

will tell you [the sentence], to me, is unbelievably lenient. I will take any criticism 

that I get on that. Any questions?" The court was clear its intent was not to keep 

Field in prison, but to seek restitution. The court stated, "The main thing I want here, 

and I know that it is never going to happen, but there is a shred of hope that at some 

point some of these victims might get their money back. . . . I am hoping that [the 

five years probation] will . . . allow them to continue to investigate where the money 

is." The sentencing court later stated, "Ultimately, what I want to come out of here 

with is an order that is clear and requires Mr. Field to pay money or he's going to 

prison." (emphasis added). 
 

 

 

 

 

 

The State was well aware that if it pushed too hard arguing the sentencing court 

committed error as to credit for time served, the court could simply reduce the 

amount of active time from twenty-six months to something that would accomplish 

the same goal: get Field out now so he could start working on restitution. With this 

concern in mind, the State chose its words carefully, arguing only that the sentencing 

court could do "whatever your honor decides." This is what the sentencing court 

referred to when it stated, "We're all dancing on the head of a pin." On appeal, 

however, the State squarely argues the sentencing court committed error in giving 

the disputed ten months of credit. As we have repeatedly held, "A party need not 

use the exact name of a legal doctrine in order to preserve it, but it must be clear that 

the argument has been presented on that ground. A party may not argue one ground 

at trial and an alternate ground on appeal." State v. Dunbar, 356 S.C. 138, 142, 587 

S.E.2d 691, 694 (2003) (citations omitted). 

For these reasons, we decline to address the merits of the State's appeal. 

AFFIRMED. 

BEATTY, C.J., KITTREDGE, HEARN, FEW and JAMES, JJ., concur.