NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Respondent,

v.

ANDREI LELE, Petitioner.

No. 1 CA-CR 19-0039 PRPC

FILED 2-20-2020

Petition for Review from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR2013-003607-001

The Honorable John R. Doody, Judge Pro Tempore

REVIEW GRANTED; RELIEF GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN 

PART

COUNSEL

Maricopa County Attorney’s Office, Phoenix

By Adena J. Astrowsky

Counsel for Respondent

Maricopa County Office of the Legal Advocate, Phoenix

By Colin F. Stearns

Counsel for Petitioner
STATE v. LELE

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Chief Judge Peter B. Swann delivered the decision of the court, in which 

Presiding Judge Paul J. McMurdie and Judge Samuel A. Thumma joined.

S W A N N, Chief Judge:

¶1 In late 2013, Andrei Lele pled guilty to two counts of 

attempted sexual abuse against adult victims. The plea agreement 

provided that “[p]ursuant to A.R.S. § 13-3821, imposition of sex offender 

registration is within the discretion of the Court.” The superior court 

imposed a ten-year probation term without a registration condition.

¶2 In 2016, the state filed a petition to revoke Lele’s probation. 

Lele admitted that he had violated a condition of probation. The superior 

court revoked his probation and imposed prison terms. The court also 

required Lele to register as a sex offender under § 13-3821, which provides:

A. A person who has been convicted of . . . a violation or 

attempted violation of any of the following offenses . . . within 

ten days after the conviction . . . , shall register with the sheriff 

of that county:

. . .

3. Sexual abuse pursuant to § 13-1404 if the victim is under 

eighteen years of age.

...

C. Notwithstanding subsection A of this section, the judge 

who sentences a defendant for any violation of chapter 14 or 

35.1 of this title[ ] or for an offense for which there was a 

finding of sexual motivation pursuant to § 13-118 may require 

the person who committed the offense to register pursuant to 

this section.

(Emphases added.)

¶3 Lele pursued post-conviction relief, contending that the 

superior court erred by ordering registration under § 13-3821, and that his 

appointed lawyer’s failure to object to the registration order constituted
STATE v. LELE

Decision of the Court

3

ineffective assistance of counsel. The court summarily denied relief, 

concluding that Lele’s convictions subjected him to the court’s discretionary 

authority to order registration under § 13-3821(C). Lele petitions this court 

for review. We grant review, and we grant relief in part.

¶4 As an initial matter, Lele was not subject to mandatory 

registration under § 13-3821(A) because his victims were adults. See A.R.S. 

§ 13-3821(A)(3). Further, the court lacked discretion to order registration 

under § 13-3821(C). Section 13-3821(C) permits such an order in two 

circumstances: (1) when the defendant is sentenced for a violation of an 

offense set forth in chapters 14 or 35.1 of Title 13 of the Arizona Revised 

Statutes; or (2) when there was a finding of sexual motivation under § 13-

118. Here, though Lele initially was charged with sexual abuse, a chapter14 offense, he ultimately pled guilty to and was sentenced for attempted 

sexual abuse, a chapter-10 offense. See A.R.S. § 13-1001. Section 13-3821(C) 

does not authorize a registration order when the defendant is sentenced for 

an attempted violation of chapter 14. See State v. Peek, 219 Ariz. 182, 184–

85, ¶¶ 12–20 (2008). The court therefore lacked discretion to order 

registration based on the nature of the offense. Further, the court lacked 

discretion to order registration based on sexual motivation. Sexual 

motivation is not an element of the attempted offense, State v. Holle, 240 

Ariz. 300, 307, ¶ 34 (2016), and the court made no finding of sexual 

motivation under § 13-118. Notwithstanding the language of the plea 

agreement, the registration order was contrary to law and void. See Coy v. 

Fields, 200 Ariz. 442, 444–46, ¶¶ 4–14 (App. 2001). We therefore grant relief 

in part by vacating the registration order.
STATE v. LELE

Decision of the Court

4

¶5 Lele has not, however, demonstrated ineffective assistance of 

counsel. To state a colorable claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, a 

petitioner must show that his or her counsel’s performance fell below 

objectively reasonable standards and that the deficient performance 

prejudiced him. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–88 (1984); State 

v. Nash, 143 Ariz. 392, 397 (1985). “[T]he [petitioner’s] showing must be that 

of a provable reality, not mere speculation.” State v. Rosario, 195 Ariz. 264, 

268, ¶ 23 (App. 1999). Lele provides nothing, other than the fact of the 

unlawful registration requirement, to substantiate his assertion of 

ineffective assistance of counsel. We therefore detect no error in the 

superior court’s summary denial of relief on that claim, and we deny relief 

with respect to that portion of the superior court’s ruling.