VIRGINIA:

In the Supreme Court of Virginia held at the Supreme Court Building in the 

City of Richmond on Wednesday the 29th day of August, 2018.

PRESENT: Lemons, C.J., Goodwyn, McClanahan, Powell, Kelsey, and McCullough, JJ. 

Milari Madison, Petitioner,

against Record No. 170934 

Board of Supervisors of Loudoun County, Respondent. 

Upon a Rule to Show Cause 

 

I. Facts and Proceedings

 Invoking this Court’s original jurisdiction, on July 14, 2017, Milari Madison (“Madison” 

or “Petitioner”), signed and filed a Petition for Writs of Mandamus and Prohibition against the 

Board of Supervisors of Loudoun County (“Loudoun County”). Loudoun County filed a motion 

to dismiss her petition, and in its motion asked this Court to award sanctions against Madison 

pursuant to Code § 8.01-271.1, arguing that Madison’s petition “is not founded in facts or law, 

lacks merit, is frivolous,” and raised the same arguments that had been resolved against Madison 

in prior litigation. This Court dismissed Madison’s petition on February 27, 2018. By separate 

order on the same day, we issued a Rule to Show Cause against Madison, directing her to show 

cause why this Court should not impose sanctions against her pursuant to Code § 8.01-271.1. 

The underlying case is only the latest in a string of frivolous lawsuits initiated by 

Madison as a pro se litigant. Madison has filed 22 lawsuits in the Circuit Court of Loudoun 

County against the Board of Supervisors or other divisions or departments of the County. She 

has also filed four petitions for appeal in this Court and two petitions invoking this Court’s 

original jurisdiction. Madison’s lawsuits all generally relate to her challenges to Loudoun 

County’s authority over the property of the former Town of Waterford.

 In 2013, the General Assembly passed HB 1983 (2013 Acts of Assembly Ch. 753), which 

was enacted “to vest title to real property of the former Town of Waterford to the County of 

Loudoun.” HB 1983 provided that: 
2

title to all real property held in the name of the former Town of 

Waterford, whose charter was repealed by Chapter 280 of the Acts 

of Assembly of 1936, vested in the Commonwealth of Virginia 

without any further act or deed as of the date the charter was 

repealed to the extent such title did not otherwise vest in another[.] 

The Act further provided that: 

the Department of General Services ... is hereby authorized to 

convey by quitclaim deed, without warranty of any kind, to the 

County of Loudoun, all of the Commonwealth’s right, title, and 

interest, if any, in and to, and to release any claim upon, said real 

property held in the name of the former Town of Waterford, less 

and except those lands that now comprise any part of the systems 

of state highways.

The Act also allowed that: 

[t]he Board of Supervisors of Loudoun County shall have and may 

exercise the powers to alter or vacate the streets, alleys, and other 

public rights-of-way as laid out in accordance with the survey and 

plan of the former town made pursuant to Chapter 161 of the Acts 

of Assembly of 1874-75, and to authorize encroachments 

thereon... 

Despite this legislation, Madison continues to assert that Waterford is still an incorporated 

municipal entity, and to challenge Loudoun County’s authority over this property.

 Madison’s most recent petition for writs of mandamus and prohibition is her second 

materially indistinguishable, unsuccessful attempt to advance this theory by invoking this 

Court’s original jurisdiction. This is in addition to her recent appeal to this Court from an 

adverse judgment of the Circuit Court of Loudoun County also rejecting this same theory.

II. Sanctions 

 Code § 8.01-271.1 provides that: 

[t]he signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by 

him that (i) he has read the pleading, motion, or other paper, (ii) to 

the best of his knowledge, information and belief, formed after 

reasonable inquiry, it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by 

existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, 

modification, or reversal of existing law, and (iii) it is not 

interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause 

unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.
3

The statute further states:

[i]f a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed or made in 

violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own 

initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed the paper or 

made the motion, a represented party, or both, an appropriate 

sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other party or 

parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of 

the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper or making of the 

motion, including a reasonable attorney's fee. 

 Considering the passage of HB 1983, and the multiple times that the factual and legal 

assertions in Madison’s petition have been rejected by the circuit court and by this Court, it is 

clear that Madison’s Petition for Writs of Mandamus and Prohibition was not “well grounded in 

fact” or “warranted by existing law.” Her petition also does not contain “good faith argument[s] 

for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.” Despite her repeated and failed 

attacks on Loudoun County since the bill’s passage, Madison continues to file actions against the 

County in the circuit court and in this Court with the sole purpose of harassing the County and 

forcing the citizens of Loudoun County to cover the costs of defending against frivolous 

lawsuits.

 Code § 8.01-271.1 makes clear if this rule is violated, the court “shall impose” an 

appropriate sanction. Having found that Madison’s petition was filed in violation of Code 

§ 8.01-271.1, we are therefore required to impose sanctions against her. See N. Va. Real Estate, 

Inc. v. Martins, 283 Va. 86, 105, 720 S.E.2d 121, 130 (2012). Such sanctions may include 

reasonable attorney’s fees and costs. Code § 8.01-271.1. 

 Loudoun County has submitted an affidavit to this Court, setting forth the attorney’s fees 

and costs it has incurred in defending against this action. The total amount incurred by Loudoun 

County in defending against this petition is $4,377.35. 

 We find that Madison filed her Petition for Writs of Mandamus and Prohibition against 

Loudoun County in violation of Code § 8.01-271.1, and we hold that an appropriate sanction 

against Madison is the costs and attorney’s fees incurred by Loudoun County. 

III. Pre-filing Injunction

 The sanctions issued in this order will reimburse Loudoun County for the expenses 

incurred in defending against this petition. However, this Court must also protect its jurisdiction 
4

from repetitious and harassing conduct that abuses the judicial process. See In re Sindram, 498 

U.S. 177 (1991). As the United States Supreme Court has noted, “[e]very paper filed with the 

Clerk of this court, no matter how repetitious or frivolous, requires some portion of the 

institution’s limited resources. A part of the Court’s responsibility is to see that these resources 

are allocated in a way that promotes the interests of justice.” In re McDonald, 489 U.S. 180, 184 

(1989). 

In Switzer v. Switzer, 273 Va. 326, 641 S.E.2d 80 (2007), we discussed “various 

restrictive measures [available] in dealing with litigants who have filed repeated frivolous 

appeals.” We observed the widely-recognized practice in other jurisdictions of a “leave of court” 

requirement in which litigants are required to obtain permission from the court before filing other 

cases or appeals.

Such “leave of court” requirements have been widely approved on 

appellate review because they do not automatically preclude a 

litigant from filing any type of appeal but merely subject the 

appeal to pre-filing scrutiny to ensure that the appeal is not 

frivolous or filed for the purpose of harassing the opposing party or 

court. 

273 Va. at 332-33, 641 S.E.2d at 83-84. 

In Cromer v. Kraft Foods N. Am., Inc., 390 F.3d 812, 817 (4th Cir. 2004), the United 

States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit set forth four factors that courts should consider 

prior to issuing a pre-filing injunction. 

In determining whether a pre-filing injunction is substantively 

warranted, a court must weigh all the relevant circumstances, 

including (1) the party’s history of litigation, in particular whether 

he has filed vexatious, harassing, or duplicative lawsuits; (2) 

whether the party had a good faith basis for pursuing the litigation 

or simply intended to harass; (3) the extent of the burden on the 

courts and other parties resulting from the party’s filings; and (4) 

the adequacy of alternative sanctions. 

Cromer, 390 F.3d at 818. 

 Although not binding on this Court, we consider the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning as 

persuasive authority. Toghill v. Commonwealth, 289 Va. 220, 227, 768 S.E.2d 674, 677 (2015). 

Applying the Cromer test to this case, we find that Madison has a history of (1) filing 

duplicative, vexatious lawsuits, (2) without any objective good faith basis, and (3) at the expense 
5

of the court system and opposing parties. With respect to the fourth factor, the adequacy of 

alternative sanctions, although we have ordered monetary sanctions pursuant to Code § 8.01-

271.1 in order to compensate Loudoun County for expenses incurred in this case, those sanctions 

will not necessarily prevent Madison from filing future pleadings. The Court’s objective is to 

protect Loudoun County from the harassment and expense of unfounded litigation, and to 

preserve valuable judicial resources. For these reasons, imposing a pre-filing injunction appears 

to be an appropriate sanction in addition to the monetary sanctions already ordered.

In Cromer, the court also cautioned that even if the above factors are met and pre-filing 

injunction is merited, the injunction must be narrowly tailored to fit the specific circumstances at 

issue. Cromer, 390 F.3d at 818. Because Madison’s history of vexatious litigation appears to 

only target Loudoun County and its various departments, we will limit the pre-filing injunction 

to actions filed by Madison against Loudoun County. Accordingly, Madison shall be prohibited 

from filing in this Court any petition for appeal, motion, pleading, or other filing against the 

Board of Supervisors of Loudoun County or any of its divisions or departments without (1) 

obtaining the services of a practicing Virginia attorney, whose filings would be subject to Code 

§ 8.01-271.1, or (2) obtaining leave of Court to file any pro se pleading. The Circuit Court of 

Loudoun County may impose its own pre-filing injunction if it deems it appropriate.

IV. Conclusion 

 For the reasons stated, judgment is entered for Loudoun County in the amount of 

$4,377.35. We also instruct the Clerk to comply with this order as it pertains to future filings by 

Madison. The suspension of the Court’s February 27, 2018 order dismissing the Petition for 

Writs of Mandamus and Prohibition is hereby lifted.

This order shall be published in the Virginia Reports and certified to the Circuit Court of 

Loudoun County. 

 A Copy,

 Teste:

 

 Patricia L. Harrington, Clerk