United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit ____________

No. 22-50434

____________

Sammy Tawakkol, 

Plaintiff—Appellee/Cross-Appellant, 

versus

Manager Sheila Vasquez, in her official capacity as Manager of the 

Texas Department of Public Safety-Sex Offender Registration Bureau; 

Director Steven McCraw, in his official capacity as Director of the 

Texas Department of Public Safety, 

Defendants—Appellants/Cross-Appellees. 

______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 1:19-CV-513

______________________________

Before Haynes and Engelhardt, Circuit Judges, and deGravelles, 

District Judge.*

Haynes, Circuit Judge: 

Sammy Tawakkol sued two Texas state officials, asserting that they 

violated his right to procedural due process when they notified him that he 

_____________________

* United States District Judge for the Middle District of Louisiana, sitting by 

designation.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

August 24, 2023

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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was required to register as a sex offender under Texas law. After a bench 

trial, the district court entered judgment in Tawakkol’s favor. Because we 

conclude that Tawakkol’s suit is barred by sovereign immunity, we 

VACATE and REMAND with instructions to dismiss for lack of 

jurisdiction.

I. Background

This case implicates both the federal and Texas sex offender 

registration systems, so we begin with a brief overview of each. At the federal 

level, the Sex Offender Registry and Notification Act (“SORNA”) sets out 

a “comprehensive national system” for sex offender registration. 34 U.S.C. 

§ 20901. SORNA requires any individual convicted of a qualifying “sex 

offense” to register as a “sex offender.” Id. §§ 20913(a), 20914. Qualifying 

“sex offenses” include, inter alia, certain “military offense[s] specified by 

the [United States] Secretary of Defense.” Id. § 20911(5)(A)(iv). 

Although SORNA applies only at the federal level, Congress grants

federal funds to state jurisdictions that agree to maintain their own parallel 

sex-offender registration and community-notification laws. See id.

§§ 20912(a), 20927. Relevant here is Texas’s SORNA-compliant sex 

offender registration system, Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 62.

Under that system, an individual must register as an “extrajurisdictional”

registrant in Texas if he would be “required to register as a sex offender 

under . . . federal law or the Uniform Code of Military Justice.” TEX. CODE 

CRIM. PROC. art. 62.001(10)(A)(ii).

We turn now to the facts of this case, which are straightforward and 

undisputed. When he was a cadet at the United States Air Force Academy, 

Tawakkol was caught sneaking into women’s restrooms and recording videos 

of female cadets while they were using the toilet. Tawakkol pleaded guilty to 

violating Article 120c(a)(2) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. The 

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Secretary of Defense has designated Article 120c(a)(2) as a SORNAqualifying “sex offense.” So, as a result of this conviction, Tawakkol was 

required to register as a sex offender under SORNA.

Tawakkol later disenrolled from the Academy and moved to Houston, 

Texas. Once there, state officials determined that Tawakkol would be 

required to register as a sex offender under Texas’s system as well. They 

concluded that Tawakkol’s status as a “sex offender” under federal law

rendered him an extrajurisdictional sex offender under state law—in other 

words, his duty to register in Texas hinged solely on his duty to register under 

SORNA.

When state officials notified Tawakkol of their determination,

Tawakkol filed this suit against two Texas Department of Public Safety 

employees1 (the “State Defendants”) under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988. In 

his complaint, Tawakkol asserted that he had not committed a registrable sex 

offense—therefore, he alleged that the State Defendants’ registration 

determination violated his procedural due process rights under the 

Fourteenth Amendment. 

After a bench trial, the district court issued findings of fact and 

conclusions of law determining that Tawakkol was entitled to injunctive 

relief. Rather than address the procedural due process arguments as pleaded

in Tawakkol’s complaint, the district court’s conclusions instead hinged on 

its interpretation of federal law. The district court first analyzed the language 

of Congress’s delegation of authority to the Secretary of Defense to designate

certain crimes as SORNA-qualifying “sex offenses.” It then concluded that 

_____________________

1 Specifically, Tawakkol sued Sheila Vasquez, the Manager of the Texas 

Department of Public Safety’s Sex Offender Registration Bureau, and Steven McCraw, the 

Director of the Texas Department of Public Safety, in their official capacities.

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the Secretary of Defense had exceeded the scope of that authority in

designating Article 120c(a)(2) as a “sex offense.” The court thus reasoned 

that Tawakkol had no duty to register under federal law—therefore the State 

Defendants lacked any basis to classify him as an extrajurisdictional offender

under state law. 

Based on these conclusions, the district court issued a final judgment 

(1) declaring that Tawakkol was “not required to register as a sex offender 

under federal or military law,” and, accordingly, (2) permanently enjoining

the State Defendants from requiring Tawakkol to register in Texas. The 

State Defendants appealed, and Tawakkol cross-appealed. 

II. Discussion

Tawakkol invoked federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1331 and jurisdiction over the claims for declaratory and injunctive relief 

under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 1343(a), respectively. On appeal, however, the 

State Defendants contend that the district court lacked subject matter 

jurisdiction because Tawakkol’s claims are barred by sovereign immunity. 

Accordingly, our analysis begins and ends with that threshold issue.

We examine jurisdictional issues, such as sovereign immunity, de 

novo. City of Austin v. Paxton, 943 F.3d 993, 997 (5th Cir. 2019). Sovereign 

immunity under the Eleventh Amendment precludes suits by private citizens 

against states in federal court. Id. This bar extends not only to the state itself, 

but also to claims against “state officials” in their official capacity when the 

state is the real party in interest. Id. Here, Tawakkol is suing state officials 

who have not waived sovereign immunity.

2 Accordingly, his claims are 

barred in federal court unless an exception to sovereign immunity applies.

_____________________

2 The State Defendants concede that they raise sovereign immunity for the first 

time on appeal. Ordinarily, a failure to raise an issue below would constitute waiver, but 

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Tawakkol asks the court to apply the exception to sovereign immunity 

carved out by the Supreme Court in Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). 

This exception permits a plaintiff to seek an injunction “in federal court [to] 

prevent[] state executive officials from enforcing state laws that are contrary 

to federal law.” Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 142 S. Ct. 522, 532 (2021) 

(citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 159–60). A plaintiff seeking to invoke the 

exception generally must satisfy two prongs. See City of Austin, 943 F.3d at 

998. First, he must demonstrate that he is seeking proper relief—declaratory 

or injunctive relief to prevent an ongoing violation of federal law. See id. 

Second, his suit must name the proper defendant—generally the individual 

tasked with enforcing the challenged act. See id. Tawakkol argues that his 

suit satisfies both requirements because he is seeking (1) injunctive and 

declaratory relief (2) against the individuals tasked with enforcing Texas’s 

sex offender registration requirements. 

Before we address the merits of Tawakkol’s argument, we begin by 

explaining Ex parte Young’s legal foundations. Ex parte Young is an exception 

to sovereign immunity that comes into play when private litigants seek to 

prevent state officials from enforcing an unconstitutional state law. See 209 

U.S. at 159–68. It is rooted in the legal fiction that, in such circumstances, 

the defendant-official is “stripped of his official or representative character 

and is subjected in his person to the consequences of his individual conduct.”

Id. at 160; see also Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 272–73 

_____________________

“[s]overeign immunity is jurisdictional,” and “[a] lack of subject matter jurisdiction may 

be raised at any time.” Cozzo v. Tangipahoa Par. Council–President Gov’t, 279 F.3d 273, 

280 (5th Cir. 2002) (quotation omitted) (second alteration in original). 

Of course, state sovereign immunity is waivable, see Meyers ex rel. Benzing v. Texas, 

410 F.3d 236, 241 (5th Cir. 2005), but there’s no indication that the State Defendants 

waived sovereign immunity here, see id. (recognizing that a state must make a “‘clear 

declaration’ that it intends to submit itself to federal court jurisdiction”). 

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(1997) (citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 159–60). In other words, the official 

“is ‘not the State for sovereign-immunity purposes’ when ‘a federal court 

commands [him or her] to do nothing more than refrain from violating federal 

law.’” Williams ex rel. J.E. v. Reeves, 954 F.3d 729, 736 (5th Cir. 2020) 

(alteration in original) (quoting Va. Off. for Prot. & Advoc. v. Stewart, 563 U.S. 

247, 255 (2011)).

This fiction, the Supreme Court has said, is “necessary to permit the 

federal courts to vindicate federal rights and hold state officials responsible 

to ‘the supreme authority of the United States.’” Pennhurst State Sch. & 

Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 105 (1984) (quoting Ex parte Young, 209 

U.S. at 160); see also Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985). But the 

Supreme Court has also instructed that the exception must be “narrowly 

construed” to serve only that original purpose. See, e.g., Pennhurst, 465 U.S. 

at 114 n.25 (observing that “it is a very narrow exception that will allow suit 

only under the[se] standards”); Va. Off. for Prot. & Advoc., 563 U.S. at 255 

(noting that “[t]he doctrine is limited to that precise situation”); Papasan v. 

Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 277 (1986) (stating that the exception is “tailored to 

conform as precisely as possible to those specific situations”). Accordingly, 

the Court has repeatedly declined to interpret the exception 

“expansive[ly].” See, e.g., Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 106 (declining to extend 

where violation was based on state law); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 678 

(1974) (declining to extend where plaintiff sought retroactive relief); Green, 

474 U.S. at 71 (declining to extend where the federal law violation was no 

longer “ongoing”).

Ex parte Young’s foundations and the Supreme Court’s subsequent 

precedent lead us to conclude that it is inapplicable in this case—the relief 

requested (1) falls outside the exception’s narrow confines, (2) does not 

serve the purpose of the exception, and (3) is unsupported by any caselaw.

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To start, unlike Ex parte Young, the injunctive relief that the district 

court ordered did not enjoin the State Defendants from enforcing a state law 

that violated federal law. To be sure, the district court ultimately did conclude 

that the State Defendants could not require Tawakkol to register as a sex 

offender under Texas law—but that conclusion was not based on a 

determination that the state registration system was unconstitutional. 

Rather, recall that Tawakkol was only required to register under Texas law

because he was required to register under a federal law, SORNA.3

 

Accordingly, the relief issued by the district court (1) invalidated only federal 

law and (2) prohibited the State Defendants from enforcing a state law merely

because it was consistent with that federal law. Such novel relief falls squarely 

outside the narrow parameters articulated by Ex parte Young and its progeny.

See, e.g., 209 U.S. at 159–68; Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 114 n.25; Va. Off. for Prot. 

& Advoc., 563 U.S. at 255. 

What’s more, applying the exception to Tawakkol’s suit would not

serve Ex parte Young’s purpose. Because the district court’s order 

invalidated a federal statute—instead of affirming it—invoking the exception 

here would not advance Ex parte Young’s aim of “promot[ing] the vindication 

of federal rights.” Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 105. Rather, applying the exception

here would “stretch [Ex parte Young] too far” and “upset the balance of 

federal and state intereststhat [the exception] embodies.” Papasan, 478 U.S. 

at 277.

_____________________

3As noted above, the district court determined that the Secretary of Defense lacked 

authority to designate the crime Tawakkol was convicted of as a sex offense under SORNA. 

(Because we decide this case on jurisdiction, we do not address the merits of that 

determination). So, it reasoned that, because Tawakkol had no duty to register as a sex 

offender under federal law, the State Defendants lacked any basis to classify him as an 

extrajurisdictional registrant under state law. 

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Finally, it is telling that Tawakkol fails to direct us to any authority—

from this court or elsewhere—applying Ex parte Young in a similar way. 

Given the Supreme Court’s repeated insistence on the exception’s narrow 

application and admonishments against broadening its reach, we decline to 

extend Ex parte Young here. Accordingly, in the absence of any other 

applicable exception, we conclude that sovereign immunity bars Tawakkol’s 

claims against the State Defendants.

III. Conclusion

For the reasons discussed above, we VACATE the decision and 

REMAND the case to the district court with instructions to dismiss for lack 

of jurisdiction.

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