NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JUAN MANUEL LLAMAS

- LOPEZ,

Petitioner,

v. WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General,

Respondent. No. 17

- 70292 Agency No. A024

- 101

- 784

MEMORANDUM *

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted October 8, 2020 * * Pasadena, California Before: M. SMITH and LEE, Circuit Judges, and CARDONE, ** * District Judge.
Petitioner asks this c ourt to reverse a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) final removal order and remand for further proceedings. The parties are familiar with the facts, so we do not recite them here. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*** The Honorable Kathleen Cardone, United States District Ju dge for the Western District of Texas, sitting by designation. 

# FILED

OCT 15 2020
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2

§ 1252.
1. Petitioner first argues that the I mmigration and N aturalization A ct (“INA”) violates the Fifth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause to the extent that the statute sets out different grounds for deportation and inadmissibility determinations

. To prevail, Petitioner must est ablish that deportable and inadmissible individuals are similarly situated. Lopez v. Sessions , 901 F.3d 1071, 1078 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing Cleburne v. Cleburne Living C tr. , 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985)) . In addition, Petitioner

must show that the challenged statutory classification is irrational and must negate every conceivable basis that might support the relevant distinction. See Aguilera

Montero v. Mukasey , 548 F.3d 1248, 1252 (9th Cir. 2008) (citi ng de Martinez v. Ashcroft , 374 F.3d 759, 764 (9th Cir. 2004)).
A liens in deportation proceedings are located with in the territorial jurisdiction
of the United States. See Alvarez

- Garcia v. Ashcroft , 378 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Zadvydas v. Davis , 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001)) . In contrast, although

non - citizens who apply for admission may be physically allowed into the country , in the eyes of the law, they are detained at the border and have n ot yet “entered” the
United States

. See i d

. (citing Barrera

- Echavarria v. Rison , 44 F.3d 1441, 1450 (9th Cir. 1995) (en banc)). B ecause deportable aliens and non

- citizens seeking admission are not similarly situated, the immigration laws may treat them differently without violating the Constitut ion. I d

. (citing Servin

- Espinoza v. Ashcroft , 309 F.3d 1193,3

1198 (9th Cir. 2002) ). As such , Petitioner’s Equal Protection Clause argument fails.
In addition , this c ourt has articulated a rational basis for immigration laws that
treat aliens in deporta tion proceedings differently from non - citizens who apply for
entry. See Abebe v. Mukasey , 554 F.3d 1203, 1206 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (per curiam) . Congress could have restricted eligibility for immigration relief to aliens
who seek admission from abroad to incent deportable non

- citizens to leave the
country. See i d

. And “[b]y encouraging such self

- deportation, the government could save resources it would otherwise devote to arresting and deporting these aliens.”
Id

. As a result , Petitioner’s Equal Protection Clause challenge to his final removal
order is meritless. See id

. 2. Petitioner also calls this c ourt’s attention to a 1991 plea deal that maintained his eligibility to apply for relief under the former INA § 212(c) during immigration proceedings implicating th at conviction. Petitioner seem ingly contend s that this agreement preserved his right to freely depart from, and return to, the United States , thus precluding entry of a final removal order in his immigration case

. B ut the

I mmigration J udge (“IJ”) allowed Petitioner to request INA § 212(c) relief. Therefore, the terms of Petitioner’s plea deal w ere complied with. And the fact a plea deal preserves an individual’s right to seek INA § 212(c) relief does not require immigration judges to grant such applications. For the se reasons , Petitioner’s 1991 plea deal cannot justify reversal of the B IA

.4

3. Last ly , Petitioner insists that the IJ and B IA wrongly ignored the multi

- factor

test set o ut in Matter of Marin , 16 I. & N. Dec. 581 , 584 (BIA 1978) , in denying hi m discretionary immigration relief

. Accordingly, Petitioner asks this c ourt to reverse
that decision on the merits. Here , this c ourt must decide if Petitioner raises a colorable legal challenge to that refusal to grant discretionary relief. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(a)(2)(B)

– (D). L egal challenges to denial of discretionary immigration relief are colorable only if they possess “some po ssible validity.” Mendez

- Castro v. Mukasey , 552 F.3d 975, 978 (9th Cir. 2009) ( quoting Martinez

- Rosas v. Gonzales , 424 F.3d 926, 930 (9th Cir. 2005))

. Otherwise , this c ourt does not have jurisdiction
to review the merits of such decisions. See id

. T h e IJ cited Matter of Marin ’s test in addressing Petitioner’s entitlement to discretionary relief. I n a n eight

- page analysis, the IJ ex amined whether the Matter of Marin factors favored Petitioner and concluded that they did not. Furthe r , the
B IA referred to the Matter of Marin test in upholding the IJ ’s reject ion of Petitioner ’s application for discretionary relief. Because Petitioner ’s legal attack on the denial
of his request for discretionary relief lack s “some possible validity , ” this c ourt does
not have jurisdiction to review the merits of th at decision

. Se e Mendez

- Castro , 552
F.3d at 9 78

. For the foregoing reasons, the BIA is AFFIRMED

.