* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, e xcept under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and col lateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### NOV 8 1999 

### PATRICK FISHER Clerk UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

PETER JAMES ROBINSON,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. GARY GIBSON, Warden Of Oklahoma State Penitentiary; RON WARD, Warden of Prison-OSP; JOHN EAST; BESSIE GREENWAY; NEAMYRA RIDDLE; JAMES SOCKEY, Unit Manager of the East Cellhouse; BRENT FATKIN; DELORES RAMSEY,

Defendants-Appellees. Nos. 98-7145, 98-7149, 98-7193 99-7028 & 99-7030 (D.C. No. 96-CV-676-B) (E.D. Okla.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before ANDERSON , BARRETT , and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.1 We initially questioned whether this court had juri sdiction over Robinson’s

appeal because it appeared that his motion for reco nsideration was not timely filed so as to the toll the time to appeal under Fe d. R. App. P. 4(a)(4). The district court dismissed Robinson’s complaint on Se ptember 11, 1998. Robinson’s motion for reconsideration was filed on September 29, 1998; however, it contains a certificate of service indic ating that Robinson mailed it on September 25, 1998. Under Fed. R. App. P. 25(a)(2) (C), which was in effect at the time the motion was filed, the motion is consid ered a timely filing because Robinson, an inmate, deposited it in his prison mai l system prior to the expiration of the filing deadline. Thus, the time to appeal t he district court’s September 11 order was tolled pending disposition of the motion for reconsideration under Rule 4(a)(4). The district court denied the motionfor reconsideration in an order entered on October 13, 1998, and Robinson filed tim ely notices of appeal on October 19 and October 22.

-2- After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materiallyassist the determination of these appeals. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). T he cases are therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. In these consolidated appeals, Peter James Robinson , an inmate at Cimarron Correctional Facility in Cushing, Oklahoma, appearing pro se , appeals the district court’s dismissal of his federal civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 1 Robinson alleges violations of his Eighth Amendmentrights based on the conditions of his confinement while he was incarcer ated in the East Cell House (ECH) of the Oklahoma State Penitentiary in McAlest er, Oklahoma. After providing factual information in a Martinez report, see Martinez v. Aaron , 570 F.2d 317 (10th Cir. 1978), the defendants filed a m otion to dismiss or, in the-3-

alternative, a motion for summary judgment. The di strict court dismissed Robinson’s claims as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C . § 1915(e)(2)(B) (requiring dismissal of frivolous in forma pauperis claims); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c) (authorizing dismissal of frivolous prisoner civil rights suits concerning prison conditions). We review the district court’s dismis sal of the complaint as frivolous under § 1915 for abuse of discretion, see McWilliams v. Colorado , 121 F.3d 573, 574-75 (10th Cir. 1997), and we affirm. Robinson alleges that from August 28, 1996 to Novem ber 25, 1996, he was housed under hazardous conditions in the East Cell House. He complains that the roof leaked, portions of the ceiling were beginning to cave in, raw sewage flowed through the area, the electrical wiring was dangero us, and the food was not hot and sometimes contained insects. Robinson also complains that inmates were denied access to the law library and that he was fo rced to work without pay, while other inmates were paid for their work.
In Craig v. Eberly , 164 F.3d 490 (10th Cir. 1998), we summarized the applicable standards for constitutional challenges to prison conditions: [J]ail officials [must] provide . . . humane condit ions of confinement by ensuring inmates receive the basic necessities o f adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care and by taking r easonable measures to guarantee the inmates’ safety. To hold a jailerpersonally liable for violating an inmate’s right to humane condition s of confinement, a plaintiff must satisfy two requirements, consisti ng of an objective and subjective component.-4-

The objective component requires that the alleged d eprivation be sufficiently serious. . . . [J]ail conditions may be restrictive and even harsh without violating constitutional rights. Ind eed, only those deprivations denying the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities are sufficiently grave to form the basi s of an Eighth Amendment violation. This inquiry turns not only on the severity of the alleged deprivations, but also on their duratio n. * * * The subjective component requires the jail official to have a sufficiently culpable state of mind. In the context of prison-conditions claims, the required state of min d is one of deliberate indifference to inmate health and safety . In other words, the jailer is liable only if he or she knows of anddisregards an excessive risk to inmate health and safety; the off icial must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be dr awn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he mus t also draw the inference. It is not enough to establish that the official should have known of the risk of harm. Id . at 495-96 (quotations and citations omitted). Applying these standards, we agree with the distric t court’s conclusion that Robinson has failed to allege facts demonstrating e ither the objective or subjective components of a valid claim. Giving the allegations their most liberal construction because Robinson is appearing pro se , see Haines v. Kerner , 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972), we agree with the districtcourt that Robinson’s allegations are vague and conclusory. In order to state a bona fide claim, even pro se plaintiffs must support their allegations wi th sufficient facts. “This is so because a pro se plaintiff requires no special lega l training to recount the facts surrounding his alleged injury, and he must provide such facts if the court is to-5-

determine whether he makes out a claim on which relief can be granted.” Hall v. Bellmon , 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). This Robin son has failed to do. His allegations are insufficiently specific to indi cate either the severity or duration of any alleged deprivations, and none of h is allegations establish that he was denied “the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities,” or that a responsible official acted with “deliberate indiffe rence” to his health and safety. Craig , 164 F.3d at 495

. Robinson asserts that the district court erred by n ot holding an evidentiary hearing to resolve material issues of facts and by not giving adequate reasons for its dismissal. Contrary to Robinson’s contention, the district court did not resolve any factual dispute between the allegations in his complaint and the Martinez report, but rather dismissed Robinson’s complaint a s frivolous because his allegations are vague and conclusory. Thus, the di strict court was not required to hold an evidentiary hearing. See § 1915(e)(2) (requiring a court to dismiss sua sponte any in forma pauperis action that is frivolous). The district court thoroughly discussed Robinson’s claims in its order dismissing this action and gave adequate legal and factual reasons for its decision to dismiss the complaint. We find no reversible error in that order. Therefore, we DISMISS this appeal as frivolous under § 1915(e) (2)(B) for substantially the reasons stated by the district court in its order o f September 11, 1998. We-6-

consider the district court’s disposition as one “p rior occasion” and our dismissal of the frivolous appeal as a second “prior occasion ” for purposes of the three-strikes provision set out in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). See Jennings v. Natrona County Detention Ctr. Med. Facility , 175 F.3d 775, 780 (10th Cir. 1999). We remind Robinson that he remains obligated to pay al l installments of the deferred appellate filing fee until it is paid in full. No exception is made for dismissed appeals. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2) ; Jennings , 175 F.3d at 781. Robinson’s February 26, 1999 Motion Requesting ThatOrder Be Sent regarding the duties of the attorney hired to assis t inmates at Cimarron Correctional Facility is denied. We construe Robin son’s Objections to the Appellees’ Response filed May 27, 1999, as a reply brief. Appellees’ Motion to Strike Appellant’s Brief is denied as moot since itrequests that they be allowed to file one consolidated brief, which they did on May 17, 1999. The mandate shall issue forthwith.

Entered for the Court

James E. Barrett Senior Circuit Judge