Supreme Court

In the Matter of Richard A. Pacia. No. 2014-104 M.P.

O R D E R

This matter is before the Court on a petition for reinstatement to the practice of 

law filed by Richard A. Pacia (petitioner). On March 24, 2009 the petitioner resigned 

from the practice of law in this state. He had been an active member of the bar for thirty 

years prior to that date, and had no prior disciplinary history. He was also a respected 

member of the bar, and at the time he resigned he was serving as President of the Rhode 

Island Bar Association, a position from which he also resigned.

Article III, Rule 23 of the Supreme Court Rules of Disciplinary Procedure, 

entitled “Resignation,” provides, in pertinent part: “If a resigned member desires 

reinstatement, he or she shall proceed as provided for in Rule 16.” Article III, Rule 16 of 

the Supreme Court Rules of Disciplinary Procedure, entitled “Reinstatement,” is the 

procedural rule applicable to reinstatement applications of suspended or disbarred 

attorneys. While the petitioner has never been suspended or disbarred, he must comply 

with the procedural requirements of Rule 16 to be reinstated. Those requirements include 

the payment of a $500 filing fee payable to the Clerk of the Court and submission of a 

completed reinstatement questionnaire to Disciplinary Counsel. The petitioner has met 

those requirements. Additionally, Rule 16(d) requires that any attorney who has been 

disbarred or suspended for more than one year must successfully pass the Multi-state 

Professional Responsibility Examination (M.P.R.E.) prior to filing a petition for 

reinstatement. The petitioner has not done so, under the belief that this provision is not 

applicable to his circumstances. We recognize that there may be some arguable 

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ambiguity as to whether this provision is applicable to a resigned rather than a suspended 

or disbarred attorney, and we note that we have not previously addressed this precise 

question in a formal opinion or order of this Court. We conclude that, based on the 

unique circumstances presented in this reinstatement application, the petitioner should be 

required to achieve a passing score on the M.P.R.E. as a condition of his full 

reinstatement to the practice of law, and we decline to set a precedential ruling on this 

issue at this time. However, we will not penalize the petitioner for his good faith 

interpretation of the rule, and we will provide him the opportunity to pass that exam as a 

condition subsequent to his reinstatement.

Pursuant to Rule 16(c), a petitioner for reinstatement, whether resigned, 

suspended, or disbarred, has the burden of demonstrating to this Court “by clear and 

convincing evidence that he or she has the moral qualifications, competency and learning 

in law required for admission to practice law in this state and that his or her resumption 

of the practice of law within the state will be neither detrimental to the integrity and 

standing of the Bar or the administration of justice nor subversive of the public interest.” 

Disciplinary Counsel has conducted an investigation of the petitioner as required by 

Article III, Rule 5(b)(4) of the Supreme Court Rules of Disciplinary Procedure, and he 

has submitted his report to the Court. Disciplinary Counsel has advised the Court that he 

has no objection to the granting of the petition for reinstatement, subject to the condition 

that he be reinstated under the supervision of a member of the bar of this state.

We directed the petitioner to appear before the Court at its conference on May 28, 

2014 to show cause why his petition should be granted. Having heard the representations 

of the petitioner, his counsel, and Disciplinary Counsel and having reviewed the record, it 

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is our opinion that the petitioner has met the requirements to resume the practice of law. 

However, we believe that the circumstances of this reinstatement application require that 

his resumption of the practice of law be monitored by a member of the bar.

We note that the petitioner has not been publicly disciplined by this Court. 

However, we would be remiss if we failed to address the circumstances of the petitioner’s 

seemingly-abrupt decision to resign from both the presidency of the Bar Association and 

his membership in the bar. At the time of his resignation, the petitioner was the subject 

of an investigation by Disciplinary Counsel. That investigation was not complete, but the 

petitioner recognized that he faced possible formal disciplinary charges and public 

opprobrium as a result of both his conduct and his position. He resigned to save both 

himself and the bar from embarrassment.

Disciplinary Counsel subsequently completed his investigation into allegations of 

misconduct by the petitioner. That investigation revealed substantial discrepancies in the 

petitioner’s client account, resulting in a shortfall of funds which he should have been 

retaining for clients and third parties. However, that shortfall was not the result of 

intentional misappropriation of funds on the part of the petitioner. Rather, the 

investigation revealed serious mismanagement and a lack of oversight of his accounts 

that bordered on recklessness. Additionally, the petitioner was also named as a defendant 

in several civil actions alleging legal malpractice. Those matters have been resolved, and 

there are no financial claims outstanding against petitioner.

The disciplinary board reviewed the petitioner’s conduct in those matters, and 

concluded that the imposition of private letters of reprimand was a sufficient sanction to 

impose. A major factor in the board’s decision was that the petitioner had been

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voluntarily removed from the practice of law for more than five years, a period in excess 

of any discipline that he may have received had formal charges been filed.

The petitioner has never been charged with criminal conduct and, as previously 

noted, has no prior disciplinary history. He was an active member of the bar association, 

serving in many capacities, including service as an officer and organizing many 

continuing legal education programs. We have received many letters of support from 

members of the bar attesting to his integrity and competence as an attorney. We believe 

that he can return to the practice of law as a productive member of the bar.

Accordingly, the petition for reinstatement is hereby granted. However, 

petitioner’s resumption of the practice of law shall be monitored for a period of two years 

by Anthony J. Gianfrancesco, Esquire. The petitioner shall fully cooperate with Attorney 

Gianfrancesco and Disciplinary Counsel regarding the monitoring of his practice, and 

Attorney Gianfrancesco shall submit written reports on a quarterly basis to Disciplinary 

Counsel regarding his review of the petitioner’s practice.

Additionally, this reinstatement is subject to the condition that the petitioner take 

the next-available Multi-state Professional Responsibility Examination, obtain a passing 

score, and submit a copy of his test result to the Clerk of the Court and to Disciplinary 

Counsel. Failure to obtain a passing score on that examination may result in the 

revocation of this order of reinstatement.

Entered as an Order of this Court this 11th Day of June, 2014.

By Order,

___________/s/________________

Clerk

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RHODE ISLAND SUPREME COURT CLERK’S OFFICE

Clerk’s Office Order/Opinion Cover Sheet

TITLE OF CASE: In the Matter of Richard A. Pacia.

 

CASE NO: No. 2014-104-M.P.

COURT: Supreme Court

DATE ORDER FILED: June 11, 2014

JUSTICES: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, Robinson, and Indeglia, JJ.

WRITTEN BY: N/A – Court Order

JUDGE FROM LOWER COURT:

 N/A – Court Order

ATTORNEYS ON APPEAL:

 For Petitioner: David Curtin, Esq.

 Chief Disciplinary Counsel

 

For Respondent: Anthony M. Traini, Esq.