alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
```

[Congressional Bills 111th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 474 Introduced in House (IH)]

111th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 474

 To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to permanently extend the 
 Indian employment credit and the depreciation rules for property used 
              predominantly within an Indian reservation.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            January 13, 2009

Mr. Boren (for himself and Mr. Sullivan) introduced the following bill; 
         which was referred to the Committee on Ways and Means

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to permanently extend the 
 Indian employment credit and the depreciation rules for property used 
              predominantly within an Indian reservation.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. PERMANENT EXTENSION OF INDIAN EMPLOYMENT CREDIT AND 
              DEPRECIATION RULES FOR PROPERTY ON INDIAN RESERVATIONS.

    (a) Employment Credit.--Section 45A of the Internal Revenue Code of 
1986 (relating to Indian employment credit) is amended by striking 
subsection (f).
    (b) Depreciation Rules.--Subsection (j) of section 168 of such Code 
(relating to property on Indian reservations) is amended by striking 
paragraph (8).
                                 <all>
```
I 

111TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 4928 

To amend the Federal Deposit Insurance Act to permanently extend the 

Transaction Amount Guarantee Program. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MARCH 24, 2010 

Mr. GUTIERREZ introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on Financial Services 

A BILL 

To amend the Federal Deposit Insurance Act to permanently 

extend the Transaction Amount Guarantee Program. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. PERMANENT EXTENSION OF THE TRANS4 ACTION AMOUNT GUARANTEE PROGRAM. 

5 (a) TAGP EXTENSION.—Section 11(a)(1) of the 

6 Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 1821(a)(1)) is 

7 amended— 

8 (1) in subparagraph (B)— 

9 (A) by striking ‘‘The net amount’’ and in10 serting the following: 


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2 

•HR 4928 IH

1 ‘‘(i) IN GENERAL.—Subject to clause 

2 (ii), the net amount’’; and 

3 (B) by adding at the end the following new 

4 clauses: 

5 ‘‘(ii) INSURANCE FOR NONINTEREST6 BEARING TRANSACTION ACCOUNTS.—Not7 withstanding clause (i), the Corporation 

8 shall fully insure the net amount that any 

9 depositor at an insured depository institu10 tion maintains in a noninterest-bearing 

11 transaction account. Such amount shall 

12 not be taken into account when computing 

13 the net amount due to such depositor 

14 under clause (i). 

15 ‘‘(iii) NONINTEREST-BEARING TRANS16 ACTION ACCOUNT DEFINED.—For purposes 

17 of this subparagraph, the term ‘non18 interest-bearing transaction account’ 

19 means a deposit or account maintained at 

20 an insured depository institution— 

21 ‘‘(I) with respect to which inter22 est is neither accrued nor paid; 

23 ‘‘(II) on which the depositor or 

24 account holder is permitted to make 

25 withdrawals by negotiable or transferVerDate Nov 24 2008 01:19 Mar 25, 2010 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H4928.IH H4928

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3 

•HR 4928 IH

1 able instrument, payment orders of 

2 withdrawal, telephone or other elec3 tronic media transfers, or other simi4 lar items for the purpose of making 

5 payments or transfers to third parties 

6 or others; and 

7 ‘‘(III) on which the insured de8 pository institution does not reserve 

9 the right to require advance notice of 

10 an intended withdrawal.’’; and 

11 (2) in subparagraph (C), by striking ‘‘subpara12 graph (B)’’ and inserting ‘‘subparagraph (B)(i)’’. 

13 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by 

14 subsection (a) shall take effect on July 1, 2010. 

Æ 


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#### Stephen TORTOLANI v. John J. STARADUMSKY.

No. 89-310-A.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

March 1, 1990.

*672Peter Bouchard, Woonsocket, for plaintiff.

John J. Staradumsky, pro se.

Before FAY, C.J., and WEISBERGER and SHEA, JJ.

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

This case came before a hearing panel of this court for oral argument on February 20, 1990, pursuant to an order directing the parties to appear and show cause why the issues raised by this appeal should not be summarily decided. The facts of the case insofar as pertinent to this appeal are as follows.

The plaintiff landlord brought a trespass and ejectment action against defendant in the District Court. A judge of that court rendered a judgment in favor of plaintiff. The defendant then was allowed to appeal in forma pauperis to the Superior Court by the District Court. During the pendency of this appeal plaintiff moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that defendant did not pay a sum for use and occupancy equivalent to rent as required by G.L.1956 (1984 Reenactment) § 34-18-52, as amended by P.L.1986, ch. 200, § 2.

After hearing on June 14, 1989, a justice of the Superior Court found as a fact that defendant had not paid the sum required by the statute on the date when his rent would ordinarily have been due and payable. He therefore dismissed the appeal pursuant to § 34-18-53, as amended by P.L.1986, ch. 200, § 2 and entered judgment and an order for the issuance of execution. The execution was thereafter duly served.

After hearing argument by counsel for the plaintiff and hearing the defendant’s argument on his own behalf, we are of the opinion that the trial justice was correct in dismissing the defendant’s appeal as the statute required him to do.

Consequently the appeal of the defendant is denied and dismissed. The judgment entered in the Superior Court is hereby affirmed. The papers in the case may be remanded to the Superior Court.

KELLEHER and MURRAY, JJ., did not participate.
#### Wanda Lee COOPER, Plaintiff, v. CHAIRMAN OF the BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF the FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, Defendant.

Civ. No. 88-2015 HL.

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

June 21, 1989.

*15José Ramón Franco Rivera, San Juan, P.R., for plaintiff.

Robert S. Cessar, Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., Washington, D.C., and Fidel A. Sevil-lano del Rio, Asst. U.S. Atty., Hato Rey, P.R., for defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

LAFFITTE, District Judge.

Pending before the Court is defendant’s unopposed motion to dismiss or motion for summary judgment. We grant grant the motion and dismiss this action.

Plaintiff Wanda Lee Cooper, a former employee of defendant, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, seeks money damages against defendant for alleged acts of sexual discrimination. Defendant argues that the statute of limitations for asserting this action has expired and that plaintiff has failed to timely file an administrative complaint.

Plaintiff received her “right to sue” letter from the Office of Equal Employment Opportunity on May 2, 1988. The letter clearly states the applicable time period— 30 days — in which to file a discrimination claim in federal court. She filed her original complaint, Civ. No. 88-933 (JP) on June 2, 1988, however, thirty-one days after receiving the notice. Then, since plaintiff had failed to serve the United States within 120 days of the filing of the complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.Proc. 4(j), the Court entered judgment dismissing the complaint without prejudice on October 26, 1988. Plaintiff then filed the instant action on December 12, 1988, 224 days *after*receiving the notice and 47 days *after*dismissal of the first complaint.

We find that the complaint was not filed within the thirty day statutory filing period of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. sec. 2000e-16(c). This complaint was filed 224 days after plaintiff received her right to sue letter. The dismissal of the first complaint without prejudice did not toll the statutory period; in the absence of a statute to the contrary, a dismissal without prejudice leaves the parties in the same position as if the suit had never been filed. *HILBUN v. GOLDBERG,*823 F.2d 881 (5th Cir.1987), *cert. denied,*— U.S.—, 108 S.Ct. 1228, 99 L.Ed.2d 427 (1988); *WILSON v. GRUMMAN OHIO CORP.,*815 F.2d 26 (6th Cir. 1987); 5 Moore’s Federal Practice, para. 41.05[2]. In other words, an action that is dismissed without prejudice usually does not affect a statute of limitations period.

In addition, we note that the original action could not have tolled the thirty day statutory period because that action was also untimely filed. Plaintiff had commenced the first action thirty-one days after receipt of the right to sue letter, that is one day late. Since the first suit was untimely filed, any other suit filed subsequently would also be prescribed. Accordingly, plaintiff’s claim against defendant had run out a long time ago.

WHEREFORE, defendant’s motion to dismiss or for summary judgment is hereby GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
STATE v. Teon Jamell WILLIAMS

107P17-2

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

August 14, 2018

Thomas O. Lawton, III, Assistant Attorney General, Sarah Kirkman, District Attorney, for State of North Carolina.

Teon Jamell Williams, Defendant-Appellant, for Williams, Teon Jamell.

The following order has been entered on the motion filed on the 10th of July 2018 by Defendant to Dismiss and/or Squash, Set Aside, Vacate the Indictments for Habitual Felon and Resentence, or Consolidate, or Run Concurrent:

"Motion Dismissed by order of the Court in conference, this the 14th of August 2018."
EXHIBIT 32

                              SOLPOWER CORPORATION

                                CERTIFICATION OF
                           CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND
                          PRINCIPAL ACCOUNTING OFFICER
                       PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                       AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906
                        OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

     I, James H.  Hirst,  solely for the  purpose  of  complying  with 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350, as adopted  pursuant to Section 906 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of
2002,  hereby  certify that the Annual  Report of Solpower  Corporation  on Form
10-KSB  for the  fiscal  year  ended  March 31,  2003  fully  complies  with the
requirements  of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the  Securities  Exchange Act of 1934
and that  information  contained  in such Annual  Report on Form  10-KSB  fairly
presents  in all  material  respects  the  financial  condition  and  results of
operations of Solpower Corporation.

Date: May 31, 2005


By: /s/ James H. Hirst
   --------------------------------------
   James H. Hirst
   Chief Executive Officer and Principal Accounting Officer
[Federal Register Volume 70, Number 194 (Friday, October 7, 2005)]
[Notices]
[Pages 58732-58733]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 05-20289]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Federal Emergency Management Agency

[FEMA-1607-DR]


Louisiana; Amendment No. 4 to Notice of a Major Disaster 
Declaration

AGENCY: Federal Emergency Management Agency, Emergency Preparedness and 
Response Directorate, Department of Homeland Security.

ACTION: Notice.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: This notice amends the notice of a major disaster declaration 
for the State of Louisiana (FEMA-1607-DR), dated September 24, 2005, 
and related determinations.

EFFECTIVE DATE: September 29, 2005.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Magda Ruiz, Recovery Division, Federal 
Emergency Management Agency, Washington, DC 20472, (202) 646-2705.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The notice of a major disaster declaration 
for the State of Louisiana is hereby amended to include the following 
areas among those areas determined to have been adversely affected by 
the catastrophe declared a major disaster by the President in his 
declaration of September 24, 2005:

    The parishes of Ascension, St. Martin, Vernon, and West Baton 
Rouge for Individual Assistance (already designated for debris 
removal and emergency protective measures [Categories A and B] under 
the Public Assistance program, including direct Federal assistance.)

(The following Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance Numbers (CFDA) 
are to be used for reporting and drawing funds: 97.030, Community 
Disaster Loans; 97.031, Cora Brown Fund Program; 97.032, Crisis 
Counseling; 97.033, Disaster Legal Services Program; 97.034, 
Disaster Unemployment Assistance (DUA); 97.046, Fire Management 
Assistance; 97.048, Individuals and Households Housing; 97.049, 
Individuals and Households Disaster Housing Operations; 97.050, 
Individuals and Households Program--Other Needs; 97.036, Public

[[Page 58733]]

Assistance Grants; 97.039, Hazard Mitigation Grant Program.)

R. David Paulison,
Acting Under Secretary, Emergency Preparedness and Response, Department 
of Homeland Security.
[FR Doc. 05-20289 Filed 10-6-05; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 9110-10-P
[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 20-12498

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 8:19-cr-00540-JSM-AAS-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 versus

MICHAEL PRIME, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

________________________

(September 30, 2021)

Before JORDAN, BRANCH, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

USCA11 Case: 20-12498 Date Filed: 09/30/2021 Page: 1 of 2
2

Rosemary Cakmis, counsel for Michael Prime in this direct criminal appeal, 

has moved to withdraw from further representation of the appellant and filed a brief 

pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Our independent review of 

the entire record reveals that counsel’s assessment of the relative merit of the appeal 

is correct. Because independent examination of the entire record reveals no arguable 

issues of merit, counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED, and Prime’s

convictions and sentences are AFFIRMED.

USCA11 Case: 20-12498 Date Filed: 09/30/2021 Page: 2 of 2
FI L ED U.S. COURT OF APPEAL S EL EVENTHCI RCUI T OCTOB ER 31, 2011 J OHN L EY CL ERK [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE U

NITED STATE S COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELE VENTH CIRCUIT

__ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ No. 1 0- 14 72 8 Non -Arg um en t Ca le nd ar

__ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ D.C. Dock etNo. 1 :9 1- cr-0 06 55 -FAM- 1 UNITED STAT ES OF AMERIC A, ll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll Plai nt iff -Ap pe ll ee,
vers us CHARLES CLARK, a.k .a. Bu nky

Bro wn, ll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll Defen da nt -Ap pe ll an t.

__ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ App eal fro m

th e Uni te d S ta te s Di st ric t Co urt forth e So ut he rnDis tri ctof F lo rid a

__ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ (Oct ob er 3 1, 2 01 1) Befo re EDMONDSON, BARKETT andKRAVITCH, Cir cu itJu dg es . PER CURI AM: Ch arl es Clark , a fed eral pri so ne r pr oc eed in g p ro se, app eal s fr om th e d is tri ctco urt’s d en ia l o f hi s m ot io n t o c om pe l t he go ve rn m en t t o fi le a m ot io n fo r a
se nt en ci ng reduc ti on onhi s b eh al f, pu rs ua ntto Fed . R. Cri m . P. 35 (b ). Cla rk arg ue d t ha t, d es pi te ren de rin g s ub st an ti al ass is ta nc e to th e g ov ern m en t, the go ve rn m en t re fu se d t o fi le a Ru le 35 (b ) m ot io n a s p un is hm en t fo r hi s ea rli er de ci si on to pro ceedto tri al
. W e rev ie w de n ov o wh ethe r th e d is tri ctco urt ca n c om pe l the go ve rn m en t t o fil e a s ub st an ti al ass is ta nc e m ot io n. Se e Uni te d S ta te s v . Forne y , 9 F.3 d 1 49 2, 14 98 (11 th Cir . 19 93 ). Gene ral ly, th e g ov ern m en t h as th e p owe r, bu t n otth e dut y , to fil e a m ot io n t o re du ce s en te nc e whe n ade fen da ntha s p ro vi de d s ub st an ti al
as si st an ce t o t he go ve rn m en t. Wade v . Uni te d S ta te s, 5 04 U.S. 18 1, 1 85 (19 92 ); Uni te d S ta te s v . McNee se , 54 7 F .3d13 07 , 13 09 (11 th Cir . 20 08 ). The go ve rn m en t’s re fu sa l t o fi le a Ru le 35 (b ) m ot io n c anbe rev ie wedby the di st ric t
co urt, an d t he di st ric t co urt ca n g ran t re li ef, o nl y if i t fi nd s tha t t he go ve rn m en t’s refu sa l was ba se d o n a n u nc on st itut io na l m ot iv e, su ch as r ace o r rel ig io n. Wade, 50 4 U.S. at18 5- 86
. Inth is cas e, th e d is tri ctco urt p ro pe rly den ie d C la rk ’s m ot io n t o c om pe l t he go ve rn m en t t o fi le a Ru le 35 (b ) m ot io n. Th is is so be cau se , eve n a ss um in g t ha t W ad e p ro hi bi ts th e g ov ern m en t fr om ret al ia ti ng ag ai ns t d efen da nt s wh o e xe rci se th ei r co ns ti tu ti on al rig htto pro ceedto tri al , Cla rkfai le d t o m ak e a “ subs ta nt ia l
2sh owi ng ” th atth e g ov ern m en t h arb or edsu ch a m ot iv e. See Un it edSta te s v .

Dor se y , 55 4 F .3d95 8, 9 61 (11 th Cir . 20 09 ). Acco rd in gl y , we affi rm . AFFIRMED.

3
#### Russell C. BOWERS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 2D02-4185.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

July 23, 2003.

James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and Richard T. McKendrick, Special Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.

Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Robert J. Krauss, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Bureau Chief, Tampa Criminal Appeals, Tampa, for Ap-pellee.

PER CURIAM.

In this *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), appeal, Mr. Bowers challenges his convictions for grand theft, a second-degree felony requiring a theft of more than $20,000, *see*§ 812.014(1), (2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2000); and burglary of an unoccupied structure, a third-degree felony, *see*§ 812.02(4)(a), Fla. Stat. (2000); and his consecutive sentences of fifteen and five years’ imprisonment. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the only issue of arguable merit is whether Mr. Bowers’ trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in a manner that can be conclusively determined from the face of the record. *See, e.g., Forget v. State,*782 So.2d 410 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). Although we question trial counsel’s decision to elicit testimony from Mr. Bowers regarding the details of his prior convictions, we conclude that any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is more appropriately raised in a postconviction motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. We therefore affirm the judgments and sentences without prejudice to Mr. Bowers’ right to raise this issue in a properly filed motion for post-conviction relief, if appropriate.

ALTENBERND, C.J., and FULMER and WALLACE, JJ., Concur.
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 23.3

CONSENT OF BRUCE E. WALDMAN

     I consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements
on Form S-8 (File No. 333-31076) and Form S-3 (File No. 333-40936) of Private
Media Group, Inc. of my report dated March 17, 2003, with respect to the
financial statements of Private North America Ltd. at December 31, 2002 and for
the years ended December 31, 2002, and December 31, 2001, which report is
included in this Annual Report (Form 10-K) for the fiscal year ended December
31, 2002.


Sherman Oaks, California

March 27, 2003


/s/ Bruce E. Waldman, C.P.A.
---------------------------
Bruce E. Waldman, C.P.A.

<PAGE>

To the Shareholders and Board of Directors

Private North America Ltd.

         I have audited the accompanying balance sheet of Private North America
Ltd. as of December 31, 2001 and December 31, 2002 and the related statements of
income and retained earnings and cash flows for each of the two years then
ended. These financial statements are the responsibility of the Company's
management. My responsibility is to express an opinion on these financial
statements based on my audit.

         I conducted my audit in accordance with auditing standards generally
accepted in the United States of America. Those standards require that I plan
and perform the audit to obtain reasonable assurance about whether the financial
statements are free of material misstatement. An audit includes examining, on a
test basis, evidence supporting the amounts and disclosures in the financial
statements. An audit also includes assessing the accounting principles used and
significant estimates made by management, as well as evaluating the overall
financial statement presentation. I believe that my audit provides a reasonable
basis for my opinion.

         In my opinion, based on my audit, the consolidated financial statements
referred to above present fairly, in all material respects, the financial
position of Private North America Ltd. at December 31, 2001 and December 31,
2002 and the results of its operations and its cash flows for each of the two
years ended December 31, 2002, in conformity with generally accepted accounting
principles in the United States of America.

/s/ Bruce E. Waldman
---------------------------
Bruce E. Waldman,

Certified Public Accountant
Sherman Oaks, California

March 17, 2003
<PAGE>   1
                                                                   EXHIBIT 23(a)


                        Consent of Independent Auditors'
                        --------------------------------


The Board of Directors
Insilco Holding Co.:

We consent to incorporation by reference in the registration statement Nos.
333-61809 and 333-61811 on Form S-8, and registration No. 333-63563 on Form S-3
of Insilco Holding Co. of our report dated February 10, 1999, except as to the
fourth paragraph of Note 7, which is as of March 26, 1999, relating to the
consolidated balance sheets of Insilco Holding Co. and subsidiaries as of
December 31, 1998, and 1997, and the related consolidated statements of
operations, stockholders' equity (deficit), and cash flows for each of the years
in the three-year period ended December 31, 1998, and the related schedule,
which report appears in the December 31, 1998, annual report on Form 10-K of
Insilco Holding Co.

KPMG LLP


Columbus, Ohio
March 30, 1999
EXHIBIT 31.2

CERTIFICATION

I,
J.Paul Whitehead III, certify that:

1.     I
have reviewed this report on Form 10-K/A of CompuCredit Corporation;

2.     Based
on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in
light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report; and

3.     Based
on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition,
results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report.

4.     The
registrant's other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act
Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and we have:



5.     The
registrant's other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant's
auditors and the audit committee of registrant's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent function):



|Date: November 3, 2003 |  |                                                                      
|---------------------- |  | ---------------------------------------------------------------------
|                       |  | /s/J.PAUL WHITEHEAD, IIIJ.Paul Whitehead, III Chief
Financial Officer

---

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