[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

___________________

 No. 12-15064

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D.C. Docket No. 2:11-cv-14375-KMM

MAZELLA SMITH,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

CITY OF FORT PIERCE, FLORIDA,

Defendant-Appellee.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

___________________

 (April 30, 2014)

Before ANDERSON and GILMAN,

∗ Circuit Judges, and JOHNSON,∗∗ District 

Judge.

 ∗

 Honorable Ronald Lee Gilman, United States Circuit Judge for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by 

designation.

∗∗ Honorable Inge Prytz Johnson, United States District Judge for the Northern District of 

Alabama, sitting by designation.

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PER CURIAM:

Mazella Smith appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment

against her employment-discrimination claims. Smith worked for the City of Fort 

Pierce from 1989 until her termination on June 14, 2010. In 1995, Smith was 

promoted to Director of Administrative Services. On January 12 and February 24 

of 2009, Smith gave deposition testimony in two federal discrimination cases filed 

by four City employees and the Department of Justice. Fort Pierce settled the 

lawsuit in October 2009, and Smith claims that her relationship with City Manager 

David Recor thereafter soured as a result of her deposition testimony, which was 

adverse to the city. Smith claims that between January 2010 and March 2010, 

Recor accused Smith of not being a team player, slammed a door in her face, 

blamed her for failed union negotiations, asked her whether she had thought about 

retirement, and glared at her during a department-head meeting. 

On May 3, 2010, Smith approached Tom Perona, a city commissioner whose 

position was being challenged through a lawsuit. Perona claims that Smith 

attempted to bribe him, offering to make the lawsuit against him go away if he got 

rid of Recor. As a result of the lawsuit, Perona was ousted from his position and 

claims that Smith then told him that he should have taken the deal. Perona 

informed Recor of Smith’s attempt to bribe him. Recor met with Smith and claims 

that Smith admitted to the bribe, attributing it to a lapse in judgment. Smith claims 

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that she never admitted to the bribe. Fort Pierce issued a press release stating that 

Smith was under investigation for an alleged bribe and had been put on 

administrative leave without pay. Smith sought legal representation and, on May 

25, 2010, Smith’s counsel notified Fort Pierce through email of the representation. 

Smith filed an EEOC Charge of Discrimination on June 7, 2010, and Recor

terminated her employment on June 14. Following Smith’s termination, Fort Pierce 

sent a letter to the Unemployment Compensation Appeals Office contesting 

Smith’s entitlement to benefits, but noted that it would not appeal the decision. 

Smith filed a lawsuit alleging unlawful retaliation under Title VII of the 

Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3; the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 

U.S.C. §§1981 and 1983; and the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, Fla. Stat. § 

760.10(7). The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Fort Pierce. 

For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the district court’s judgment.

I. DISCUSSION

We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, “viewing 

all evidence and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving 

party.” Chapter 7 Tr. v. Gate Gourmet, Inc., 683 F.3d 1249, 1254 (11th Cir. 2012).

Summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine dispute of material fact exists

and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 

As the district court properly concluded, because § 1981 provides no implicit cause 

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of action, § 1983 is the exclusive federal remedy for violations of rights guaranteed 

by § 1981. Bryant v. Jones, 575 F.3d 1281, 1288 n.1 (11th Cir. 2009). Moreover, 

although Smith filed claims under Title VII, the FCRA, § 1981(a), and § 1983, the 

parties stipulated, and this court agrees, that Title VII’s anti-retaliation framework 

applies to all of Smith’s retaliation claims. See Wilbur v. Corr. Servs. Corp., 393 

F.3d 1192, 1195 n. 1 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding that Title VII law is applicable in 

construing the Florida Civil Rights Act); Crawford v. Carroll, 529 F.3d 961, 970 

(11th Cir. 2008) (analyzing plaintiff’s § 1983 claims under McDonnell-Douglas’s 

burden-shifting framework). To make out a prima facie case of retaliation, Smith 

must establish that (1) she engaged in statutorily protected activity, (2) she suffered 

a materially adverse action, and (3) there exists a causal link between the two. See 

Chapter 7 Tr., 683 F.3d at 1258 (quoting Howard v. Walgreen Co., 605 F.3d 1239, 

1244 (11th Cir. 2010)). If a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden 

shifts to the employer to proffer a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the adverse 

employment action. Crawford, 529 F.3d at 976. If an employer provides a 

legitimate non-discriminatory reason, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that 

the employer’s given reason is a pretext designed to mask retaliation. Id.

A. Protected Activity

Smith argues that the district court improperly found that the following acts 

did not constitute protected activity: (1) Smith’s filing an EEOC Charge of 

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Discrimination, and (2) an email from Smith’s counsel notifying Fort Pierce that 

Smith had retained her services. Under Title VII, an employee has engaged in 

protected activity if she has: (1) opposed an unlawful employment practice, or (2) 

“made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an 

investigation, proceeding, or hearing” under Title VII’s retaliation provision. 

EEOC v. Total Sys. Servs., Inc., 221 F.3d 1171, 1174 (11th Cir. 2000) (quoting 42 

U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)).

On May 25, 2010, Cathleen Scott sent Fort Pierce an email, which stated: 

I wanted to let you know that I represent Mazella Smith. Please let 

Mr. Recor and the City Attorney to contact my office directly [sic].

The City’s press release suggests that Mazella is the target of some 

FBI investigation, this is news to her. For a number of reasons, we 

feel strongly about Ms. Smith’s position and her claims against the 

City. If your client wants to discuss resolving this, let me know.

Nothing in the email opposed Fort Pierce’s allegedly unlawful employment 

practices. Rather, the email specifically addressed the veracity of the City’s press 

release. Further, the email does not indicate that Smith’s “claims against the City” 

were in any way discrimination claims. Moreover, Smith’s attorney’s email was in 

no way related to any investigation or proceeding. Smith did not file her Charge of 

Discrimination until June 7, 2010 and presents no evidence that she informed Fort 

Pierce of her intention to file a discrimination charge. Thus, the email could not 

have been sent in conjunction with or after Smith’s EEOC Charge. Additionally, 

Fort Pierce settled the discrimination case in which Smith testified on October 31, 

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2009, and the email gives no indication that “claims against the City” referenced 

the settled case. Accordingly, because the email did not oppose any unlawful 

employment practice and was not sent in conjunction with or after the filing of any 

discrimination claims, the email did not constitute protected activity.

The district court, however, erred in determining that Smith’s EEOC Charge

did not constitute protected activity. Although Smith had already been placed on 

administrative leave at the time she filed her EEOC Charge, Recor did not 

terminate her employment until after she filed the Charge. Thus, Smith’s EEOC 

Charge constituted protected activity. Nonetheless, because we find that Smith 

cannot establish a causal link between her filing of the EEOC Charge and any 

alleged adverse actions, see infra Part I.C, Smith still cannot make out a prima 

facie case of retaliation. See Wilchombe v. TeeVee Toons, Inc., 555 F.3d 949, 960 

(11th Cir. 2009) (“We may uphold a grant of summary judgment on any basis 

supported by the record.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

B. Adverse Action

Materially adverse actions are those that “might have dissuaded a reasonable 

worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” Ch. 7 Tr., 683 F.3d 

at 1259 (quoting Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 

(2006)). As an initial matter, glaring, slamming a door in an employee’s face, 

inquiring into retirement plans, commenting that an employee is not a team player, 

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blaming an employee for failed union negotiations, or harboring concerns over an 

employee’s dependability and trustworthiness are not actions that would dissuade a

reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination. See 

Burlington, 547 U.S. at 68 (“We speak of material adversity because we believe it 

is important to separate significant from trivial harms. Title VII, we have said, does 

not set forth a general civility code for the American workplace.”) (citation and 

quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original). Additionally, Smith’s claims that 

Recor threatened to terminate her employment arise from the April 16, 2010 report 

of the Fort Pierce Citizen’s Budget Advisory Committee, where the evidence 

suggests that Recor discussed consolidating Fort Pierce Departments. But Recor

ultimately made no such consolidations. Further, the Consent Decree gave Human 

Resources the responsibility of disseminating Fort Pierce’s revised policies and 

procedures. Smith Depo. p. 227. Smith testified that outside counsel was 

responsible for drafting Fort Pierce’s revised policies and procedures. Id. Smith 

presented no evidence that she was prohibited from distributing updated policies 

and procedures. Thus, Smith suffered no loss of privilege to work on the Consent 

Decree. 

Finally, no evidence suggests that Fort Pierce’s post-termination challenge 

to Smith’s unemployment benefits was unfounded or affected Smith’s benefits. 

Thus, Fort Pierce’s alleged actions, including Recor’s behavior, taken together or 

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separately did not constitute materially adverse actions. Accordingly, the district 

court did not err in finding that Smith failed to establish that she suffered 

materially adverse employment actions.

C. Causation

A plaintiff establishes a causal connection by showing that the relevant 

decision-maker was “aware of the protected conduct, and that the protected activity 

and the adverse actions were not wholly unrelated.” Shannon v. Bellsouth 

Telecomm., Inc., 292 F.3d 712, 716 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting Gupta v. Fla. Bd. of 

Regents, 212 F.3d 571, 590 (11th Cir. 2000)). Yet under University of Texas 

Southwest Medical Center v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2533 (2013), “Title VII 

retaliation claims must be proved according to traditional principles of but-for 

causation, not the lessened causation test stated in § 2000e-2(m). This requires 

proof that the unlawful retaliation would not have occurred in the absence of the 

alleged wrongful action or action of the employer.” Id. In other words, a plaintiff 

making a Title VII retaliation claim “must establish that his or her protected 

activity was a but-for cause of the alleged adverse action by the employer.” Id. at 

2534. But see Ramirez v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., No. 12-14679, _F. App’x_, slip op. 

at 3 n.2 (11th Cir. 2013) (“However, the Court did not clarify the role of ‘but for’ 

causation in a plaintiff’s prima facie case.”). Thus, the plaintiff always has the 

burden of persuasion “to proffer evidence sufficient to permit a reasonable fact 

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finder to conclude that discriminatory animus was the ‘but-for’ cause of the 

adverse employment action.” Sims v. MVM, Inc., 704 F.3d 1327, 1332 (11th Cir. 

2013) (reconciling “but-for” causation and the McDonnell Douglas framework in 

ADEA case, and affirming summary judgment where appellant could not establish 

that discriminatory animus was the but-for cause of his termination).

We have found that Smith’s attorney’s email did not constitute protected 

activity and that Recor’s alleged poor behavior did not constitute materially 

adverse actions. Thus, we need determine only whether Recor’s decision to place 

Smith on administrative leave, and subsequently terminate her, was caused by her 

giving deposition testimony in 2009 or filing the EEOC Charge in 2010. First, 

Smith cannot establish a causal relation between her giving deposition testimony in 

January and February of 2009 and her being placed on administrative leave and 

subsequently terminated in June of 2010. Smith simply cannot establish temporal 

proximity between the protected activity and the alleged adverse actions. 

Moreover, we find unavailing Smith’s argument that the district court should have 

focused its proximity analysis on October 29, 2009, the date Fort Pierce’s motion 

for summary judgment was denied. Even starting the causation clock on October 

29, 2009, there were seven months between the denial of Fort Pierce’s motion and 

Smith’s administrative leave. Seven months is too long a timeframe to establish 

temporal proximity supporting an inference of causation. 

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Alternatively, Smith argues that the district court should have considered 

Recor’s actions as a “series of adverse employment actions” that establish 

causation under Wideman v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 141 F.3d 1453 (11th Cir. 

1998). Bet we have found that Recor’s actions did not constitute materially adverse 

employment actions, and they, therefore, do not constitute a series of adverse 

actions.

Second, Smith cannot establish a causal relation between the filing of her 

EEOC Charge and her being placed on administrative leave and subsequently 

terminated. Smith had already been placed on administrative leave by the time she 

filed her EEOC Charge in June of 2010. Accordingly, Smith cannot establish 

temporal proximity or a causal inference between her filing an EEOC Charge and 

Recor’s earlier decision to place her on administrative leave. Moreover, Smith 

provides no evidence that Recor knew about Smith’s EEOC Charge prior to 

terminating her employment. And even assuming that Recor had knowledge of 

Smith’s EEOC Charge, Smith cannot establish causation because Recor had 

already contemplated disciplining Smith before she filed her Charge. See Clark 

Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 272 (2001) (“Employers . . . proceeding 

along lines previously contemplated, though not yet definitely determined, is no 

evidence whatever of causality.”).

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Finally, even assuming that Smith could establish a prima facie case, the 

district court did not err in granting summary judgment because Smith cannot 

establish that her alleged protected activity was the but-for cause of Fort Pierce’s

alleged unlawful retaliation. Recor testified that he terminated Smith because she 

attempted to bribe Perona. DE 50-15, p. 19. That Smith disputes that she bribed 

Perona is of no consequence. Rather, the key inquiry is whether Recor took the 

adverse action based on a retaliatory reason. See Nix v. Radio/Rahall Commc’ns, 

738 F.2d 1181, 1187 (11th Cir. 1984) (“The employer may fire an employee for a 

good reason, a bad reason, a reason based on erroneous facts, or for no reason at 

all, as long as its action is not for a discriminatory reason.”). Thus, Smith’s 

retaliation claim still fails because she cannot establish that her alleged protected 

activity was the but-for cause of her termination.

II. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.

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