alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

In re: KENNY G ENTERPRISES, LLC, 

Debtor. 

______________________________ 

KENNETH GHARIB, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

THOMAS H. CASEY, Chapter 7 Trustee, 

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 17-55270 

D.C. No. 8:16-cv-00848-GW 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

George H. Wu, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted December 18, 2017**

Before: WALLACE, SILVERMAN, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.

Kenneth Gharib appeals pro se from the district court’s order dismissing his 

bankruptcy appeal for failure to prosecute. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

DEC 26 2017

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 17-55270 

§§ 158(d) and 1291. We review for an abuse of discretion. Morrissey v. Stuteville 

(In re Morrissey), 349 F.3d 1187, 1190 (9th Cir. 2003). We affirm.

The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Gharib’s appeal 

because, despite being required by the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure to

take certain actions within 14 days of filing the appeal, Gharib failed to do so more 

than six months after appealing. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8003(a)(2) (an appellant’s 

failure to take steps to prosecute a bankruptcy appeal may be grounds for 

dismissal); In re Morrissey, 349 F.3d at 1190-91 (dismissal for noncompliance 

with procedural rules is proper, without explicit consideration of alternative

sanctions, where procedural defects are egregious); Fitzsimmons v. Nolden (In re 

Fitzsimmons), 920 F.2d 1468, 1473-75 (9th Cir. 1990) (affirming dismissal for 

failure to prosecute where appellant did not timely serve the designation of record, 

failed to take prompt steps to have reporter’s transcripts prepared, and failed to 

post the necessary fees or contact reporter until after the filing of the motion to 

dismiss).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Gharib’s motion for 

rehearing because Gharib did not identify any error in the district court’s order

dismissing his appeal. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8022(a)(2); United States v. Fowler 

(In re Fowler), 394 F.3d 1208, 1214-15 (9th Cir. 2005) (setting forth standard of 

review and requiring a motion for rehearing to state with particularity each point of 
3 17-55270 

law or fact a court overlooked).

Because we affirm the district court’s order dismissing the appeal, we do not 

consider Gharib’s challenges to the bankruptcy court’s decisions or the district 

court’s order denying Gharib’s request for release. See In re Morrissey, 349 F.3d 

at 1190; Al-Torki v. Kaempen, 78 F.3d 1381, 1386 (9th Cir. 1996).

Gharib’s requests for judicial notice (Docket Entry Nos. 8, 19) are denied.

AFFIRMED.
Christopher D. BROWN, Executor of the Estate of Vanuila W. Archible, Plaintiff v. NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, Defendant.

No. COA17-1220

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Filed: October 16, 2018

AFFIRMED.
EXHIBIT 32

                    CERTIFICATIONS OF CEO AND CFO PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the report of Ridgewood Energy K Fund, LLC (the "Fund") on
Form 10-Q for the period ended September 30, 2006 as filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), each of the
undersigned hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 1350, as adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of
their knowledge:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Fund.

Dated:   February 23, 2007                        RIDGEWOOD ENERGY K FUND, LLC

                                       By:   /s/  ROBERT E. SWANSON
                                           Name:  Robert E. Swanson
                                          Title:  President and Chief Executive
                                                  Officer
                                                  (Principal Executive Officer)

Dated:   February 23, 2007
                                       By:   /s/  KATHLEEN P. MCSHERRY
                                           Name:  Kathleen P. McSherry
                                          Title:  Senior Vice President and
                                                  Chief Financial Officer
                                                  (Principal Financial and
                                                  Accounting Officer)


A signed original of this written statement or other document authenticating,
acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed form
within the electronic version of this written statement has been provided to
Ridgewood Energy K Fund, LLC and will be retained by Ridgewood Energy K Fund,
LLC and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon
request. The foregoing certification is being furnished solely pursuant to 18
U.S.C. Section 1350 and is not being filed as part of this report or as a
separate disclosure document.
I 

111TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 4878 

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to reduce the rate of tax 

on corporations that make certain education contributions. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MARCH 18, 2010 

Mr. YOUNG of Alaska introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on Ways and Means 

A BILL 

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to reduce 

the rate of tax on corporations that make certain education contributions. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Tax Cut Job Creation 

5 Act of 2010’’. 

6 SEC. 2. CORPORATE INCOME TAX RATE REDUCTION. 

7 (a) IN GENERAL.—Section 11 of the Internal Rev8 enue Code of 1986 is amended by adding at the end the 

9 following new subsection: 

10 ‘‘(e) REDUCTION FOR CERTAIN CONTRIBUTIONS.— 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 4878 IH

1 ‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—In the case of a qualified 

2 corporation, the amount of tax imposed by sub3 section (a) for the taxable year (determined without 

4 regard to this subsection) shall be reduced by an 

5 amount equal to 5 percent of so much of the taxable 

6 income of the corporation for such taxable year as 

7 exceeds $75,000. 

8 ‘‘(2) QUALIFYING CORPORATION.—For pur9 poses of this subsection— 

10 ‘‘(A) QUALIFIED CORPORATION.—The 

11 term ‘qualifying corporation’ means a corpora12 tion the aggregate amount of specified contribu13 tions of which for the taxable year are not less 

14 than an amount equal to 20 percent of an 

15 amount equal to 5 percent of so much of the 

16 taxable income of the corporation for the tax17 able year as exceeds $75,000. 

18 ‘‘(3) SPECIFIED CONTRIBUTIONS.—The term 

19 ‘specified contributions’ means— 

20 ‘‘(A) the charitable contributions (as de21 fined in section 170(c)) of the corporation for 

22 the taxable year to organizations described in 

23 section 170(b)(1)(A)(ii), and 

24 ‘‘(B) the wages (as defined in section 

25 3121(a)) paid by the corporation to interns as 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with BILLS
3 

•HR 4878 IH

1 part of a vocational educational course of such 

2 an organization.’’. 

3 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by 

4 this section shall apply to taxable years beginning after 

5 December 31, 2010. 

Æ 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with BILLS
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 98-1071
GAIL W. GODWIN, Plaintiff - Appellant, versus JUMBO SPORT, formerly known as Richmond Sports, Defendant - Appellee.Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Richmond. James R. Spencer, District Judge. (CA-97-669-3) Submitted: March 26, 1998 Decided: April 9, 1998 Before WIDENER and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Gail W. Godwin, Appellant Pro Se. Curtis McKinley Hairston, Jr., WILLIAMS, MULLEN, CHRISTIAN & DOBBINS, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: Appellant appeals the district court's order dismissing her claims of harassment and religious discrimination. We have reviewed the record and the district court's opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court. Godwin v. Jumbo Sport , No. CA-97-669-3 (E.D. Va. Dec. 18, 1997). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
# Third District Court of Appeal

State of Florida

Opinion filed January 17, 2018

. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________

No. 3D17-1344

Lower Tribunal No. 97-29656

________________



### Herby Luma a/k/a Ronet Bastien

,

Appellant,

vs.



### The State of Florida

, Appellee.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Daryl E.

Trawick, Judge.

Herby Luma a/k/a Ronet Bastien, in proper person

.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General

, and Jeffrey R. Geldens, Assistant

Attorney General, for appellee.

Before SALTER, EMAS and FERNANDEZ, JJ.

FERNANDEZ, J.

Herby Luma, a/k/a Ronet Bastien, appeals the trial court’s rejection of his

motion to correct illegal sentence mailed to the clerk of the Eleventh JudicialCircuit on May 25, 2017. We treat this appeal as a petition for a writ of

mandamus. The record in this case, at page 70, reflects a memorandum written by

a deputy clerk of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit explaining as follows:

The Record on Appeal will be prepared without the Motion to Correct

Sentence mailed to this office on May 25, 2017. A diligent search of

the court file was conducted and it could not be located because it was

returned to the defendant pursuant to the Order Prohibiting dated

September 13, 2016.

Although an order to show cause why the appellant should not be precluded

from further pro se filings was entered by the trial court, no order actually

precluding pro se filings was ever entered. The September 13, 2016 order simply

refers to a non-existent order that purportedly prohibited further pro se filings.

Thus, it appears that the clerk of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit erroneously rejected

the appellant’s motion.

On remand, the trial court shall consider and rule upon the appellant’s

motion, should he wish to re-transmit it to the trial court. We express no view as

to the merits of the motion. The trial court is not precluded from again entering an

order to show cause, if appropriate, and acting upon it based on the appellant’s

response, or lack thereof, by either entering an order prohibiting appellant from

filing any additional pleadings in the trial court unless signed by a member of the

2Florida Bar in good standing, or by discharging the show cause order. See State v.

Spencer

, 751 So. 2d 47 (Fla. 1999).

Petition granted.

3
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1998
<CASH>                                           7,404
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   77,749
<ALLOWANCES>                                   (2,780)
<INVENTORY>                                     64,565
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               166,687
<PP&E>                                         195,310
<DEPRECIATION>                                  80,554
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 327,274
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          100,111
<BONDS>                                        193,191
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                     34,094
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                   (236,323)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   327,274
<SALES>                                        535,629
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               535,629
<CGS>                                          399,542
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  399,542
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                 1,460
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              32,894
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (13,396)
<INCOME-TAX>                                     1,253
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (12,143)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                (5,888)
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (18,031)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (6.35)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (6.35)
        

</TABLE>
#### Franklyn GLINTON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 2D03-230.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

July 18, 2003.

FULMER, Judge.

FranHyn Glinton appeals the summary denial of his motion for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. In his motion, Glin-ton alleged that his nolo contendere plea to robbery was involuntary because he was not informed of the deportation consequences of the conviction. His claim is facially insufficient because he has not affirmatively alleged nor demonstrated that he is threatened with deportation as a result of the robbery conviction. *See Mendez v. State,*805 So.2d 905 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001); *Bellevue v. State,*794 So.2d 730 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001). Therefore, we affirm without prejudice to whatever right Glin-ton may have to file a facially sufficient rule 3.850 motion if he can establish that his robbery conviction has resulted in a threat of deportation. Any such motion filed within sixty days of the issuance of this mandate shall be deemed timely filed and shall not be denied as successive.

Affirmed.

STRINGER and CANADY, JJ., Concur.
GARY REED AKA DAVID PHILLIPS

, Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA

, Appellee

. IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

CASE NO. 1D 16

- 4236

_____________________________/

Opinion filed April 6 , 2017.

An appeal from the Circuit Court for Bay County

. Brantley S. Clark

, Judge

.

Pro Se , for Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Sharon Traxler, Assistant Attorney General , for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

DISMISSED

.

WETHERELL
, MAKAR

, and KELSEY

, J J

. , CONCUR.
<PAGE>   1
 
                                                                      EXHIBIT 12
 
                         PENNZOIL-QUAKER STATE COMPANY
               COMPUTATION OF RATIO OF EARNINGS TO FIXED CHARGES
 
<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                                   FOR THE TWELVE MONTHS ENDED DECEMBER 31,
                                              --------------------------------------------------
                                                1994       1995      1996      1997       1998
                                              --------   --------   -------   -------   --------
                                                   (DOLLAR AMOUNTS EXPRESSED IN THOUSANDS)
<S>                                           <C>        <C>        <C>       <C>       <C>
Income from continuing operations before
  income from equity investees..............  $(15,031)  $(46,772)  $ 4,980   $(4,948)  $(78,755)
Distribution of income from equity
  investees.................................        --         --        --     4,359     32,888
Amortization of capitalized interest........       482        337       575     1,292      1,904
Income tax provision........................    (1,462)   (24,043)   (1,103)    6,245    (38,338)
Interest charges............................    46,627     79,632    73,468    80,167     90,552
Income before income tax provision and
  interest charges..........................  $ 30,616   $  9,154   $77,920   $87,115   $  8,251
                                              ========   ========   =======   =======   ========
Fixed charges...............................  $ 47,750   $ 82,677   $83,571   $87,608   $ 90,807
                                              ========   ========   =======   =======   ========
Amount by which fixed charges exceed
  earnings..................................  $ 17,134   $ 73,523   $ 5,651   $   493   $ 82,556
                                              ========   ========   =======   =======   ========
 
                        DETAIL OF INTEREST AND FIXED CHARGES
 
Interest charges per Consolidated Statement
  of Income which includes amortization of
  debt discount, expense and premium........  $ 31,091   $ 63,861   $65,174   $69,221   $ 70,198
Add: portion of rental expense
  representative of interest factor(1)......    16,659     18,816    18,397    18,387     20,609
                                              --------   --------   -------   -------   --------
          Total fixed charges...............  $ 47,750   $ 82,677   $83,571   $87,608   $ 90,807
Less: interest capitalized per Consolidated
  Statement of Income.......................     1,123      3,045    10,103     7,441        255
                                              --------   --------   -------   -------   --------
          Total interest charges............  $ 46,627   $ 79,632   $73,468   $80,167   $ 90,552
                                              ========   ========   =======   =======   ========
</TABLE>
 
-------------------------
 
(1) Interest factor based on management's estimates and approximates one-third
    of rental expense.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

WILLIAM WELLER

, §

§

Appellee

- Claimant Below

, § No. 200 , 201 8

Appellant, §

§ Court Below: Superior Court

v. § of the State of Delaware

§

MORRIS JAMES LLP

, § C.A. No. N17A

- 08

- 005 FWW

§

Appellant

- Employer Below

, §

Appellee

. §

Submitted: October 31 , 2018

Decided: November 1 , 2018

Before STRINE , Chief Justice; VAUGHN and TRAYNOR

, Justices

.

O R D E R

This 1 st day of November 2018

, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court

on the basis of its opinion dated March 29

, 201 8

. 1

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior

Court is hereby AFFIRMED.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Leo E. Strine, Jr.

Chief Justice

1 Morris James LLP v. Weller , 2018 WL 1611267 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 29, 2018).
**Exhibit
        32.1**
 
 **CERTIFICATION
        PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**
 **SECTION
        906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**
 
 In
        connection with the Quarterly Report of NanoSensors, Inc. (the “Company”) on
        Form 10-QSB for the period ended February 28, 2006, as filed with the Securities
        and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Ted Wong, Chief
        Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant
        to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
        that:
  (1)
        The
        Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
        the
        Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
 
 (2)
        The
        information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
        the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
 
 By: /s/
        Ted
        Wong
 Ted
        Wong,
        Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer
 (Principal
        Executive Officer and Principal Financial Officer)
 April
        19,
        2006
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 03-7953

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

ALFONSO ORTIZ,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

Maryland, at Greenbelt. Alexander Williams, Jr., District Judge.

(CR-01-98-AW; CA-03-1176-AW)

Submitted: August 13, 2004 Decided: October 8, 2004

Before NIEMEYER and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior

Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Alfonso Ortiz, Appellant Pro Se. James Marton Trusty, OFFICE OF

THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
- 2 -

PER CURIAM:

Alfonso Ortiz seeks to appeal the district court’s order

denying relief on his motion filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000).

This order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge

issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)

(2000). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner satisfies this standard by

demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that his

constitutional claims are debatable and that any dispositive

procedural rulings by the district court are also debatable or

wrong. See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003);

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); Rose v. Lee, 252 F.3d

676, 683 (4th Cir. 2001). We have independently reviewed the

record and conclude that Ortiz has not made the requisite showing.

Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the

appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the

court and argument would not aid the decisional process. 

 DISMISSED
#### A & B BOLT & SUPPLY, INC. v. David S. DAWES, et al.

No. 2003-CC-2411.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Sept. 5, 2003.

In re A *&*B Bolt & Supply, Inc.;—Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. J, No. 2003-3999; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 03-01073.

Denied.

CALOGERO, C.J., recused.