NUMBER 13-15-00347-CR

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

EX PARTE DIMAS SALAS RODRIGUEZ

On appeal from the 275th District Court

of Hidalgo County, Texas.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Rodriguez and Benavides

Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Valdez

By one issue, appellant Dimas Salas Rodriguez appeals the trial court's order 

denying his application for pretrial writ of habeas corpus. We affirm. 

I. Background

Rodriguez was arrested for driving while intoxicated (DWI). See TEX. PENAL CODE 

ANN. § 49.04 (West, Westlaw through 2015 R.S.). The arresting officer searched 

Rodriguez incident to his arrest and found cocaine. The State charged Rodriguez with 

(1) misdemeanor DWI, see id., and (2) felony possession of cocaine with the intent to 
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deliver. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.112(d) (West, Westlaw through 

2015 R.S.). Thereafter, the State dismissed the DWI charge but kept the cocaine charge. 

After the State dismissed the DWI charge, Rodriguez filed a motion to suppress 

the cocaine. However, before the trial court could hear or rule on Rodriguez’s motion to 

suppress, Rodriguez filed a pretrial writ of habeas corpus requesting that the hearing on 

his motion to suppress be stayed and that the cocaine charge instead be summarily 

dismissed. Rodriguez asserted that the cocaine charge should be dismissed because 

the State allegedly “admitted” that the arresting officer lacked probable cause to arrest 

Rodriguez for DWI, as evidenced by the fact that it dismissed the DWI charge.1 Rodriguez

further asserted that the State lost its “right” to contest his motion to suppress when it 

dismissed the DWI charge. The trial court denied Rodriguez’s pretrial writ of habeas 

corpus. This interlocutory appeal followed.2 

II. Discussion

“Pretrial habeas, followed by an interlocutory appeal, is an extraordinary remedy.” 

Ex parte Paxton, 493 S.W.3d 292, 297 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2016, pet. ref'd) (citing Ex 

parte Perry, 483 S.W.3d 884, 895 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016)). This remedy is reserved “for 

situations in which the protection of the applicant's substantive rights or the conservation 

of judicial resources would be better served by interlocutory review.” Ex parte Perry, 483 

S.W.3d at 895. Thus, before the merits of Rodriguez’s habeas claim may be resolved, 

we must first determine whether the claim itself is cognizable on a pretrial writ of habeas 

corpus. See Ex parte Paxton, 493 S.W.3d at 297. 

 

1 The State’s reason for dismissing the DWI charge is not apparent from the record. 

2 The trial court has not yet heard or ruled on Rodriguez’s motion to suppress. 
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As we construe his habeas claim, Rodriguez asserts that the State must “admit” a 

Fourth Amendment violation in connection with the cocaine charge because it arises from 

the DWI, which the State dismissed. In other words, Rodriguez argues that the State is 

estopped to defend the legality of the search in this case because the search was made 

incident to an illegal arrest for DWI. We understand Rodriguez to be raising a claim of 

collateral estoppel. See Ex parte Watkins, 73 S.W.3d 264, 268 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) 

(providing that under doctrine of collateral estoppel, “when an issue of ultimate fact has 

once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated 

between the same parties in any future lawsuit”). However, a pretrial application for writ 

of habeas corpus is not the appropriate procedural vehicle for raising a claim of collateral 

estoppel unless it is based upon federal constitutional double jeopardy principles. See 

id. at 273. 

When is a collateral estoppel claim based on double jeopardy principles? 

When [1] the State could, but declines to, join two offenses which arise out 

of a single transaction and [2] a final verdict or specific factual finding 

favorable to the defendant in the first prosecution would bar relitigation of 

the same fact in a second proceeding.

Id. Rodriguez makes no assertion that a prosecution on the cocaine charge implicates 

double jeopardy principles under the standard articulated above. Having reviewed the 

record and Rodriguez’s argument on appeal, we conclude that his claim runs contrary to

a finding of cognizability. See Headrick v. State, 988 S.W.2d 226, 227 (Tex. Crim. App. 

1999) (holding that applicant’s collateral estoppel claim was not cognizable on a pretrial 

writ of habeas corpus because it did not present a double jeopardy question). We 

therefore overrule Rodriguez’s sole issue. 

We note that Rodriguez is not without legal recourse with respect to his claim. 

Rodriguez may litigate the claim through the motion to suppress, which he filed and which 
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remains pending in the trial court. See id. Additionally, Rodriguez may raise the denial 

of his motion to suppress on direct appeal, if convicted. See Ex parte Weise, 55 S.W.3d 

617, 619 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (observing that reviewing courts should not “entertain an 

application for writ of habeas corpus when there is an adequate remedy by appeal”). 

III. Conclusion

We affirm the trial court’s order denying Rodriguez’s pretrial writ of habeas corpus. 

 /s/ Rogelio Valdez___________

ROGELIO VALDEZ

Chief Justice

Do not publish.

TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

Delivered and filed the

15th day of December, 2016.