UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-5086

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

ERIC LAMONT EVANS,

Defendant – Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of North Carolina, at Greenville. Malcolm J. Howard, 

Senior District Judge. (5:09-cr-00111-H-1)

Submitted: November 5, 2010 Decided: November 23, 2010

Before WILKINSON, GREGORY, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

J. Rafael Rodriguez, Miami, Florida, for Appellant. Jennifer P. 

May-Parker, Assistant United States Attorney, Raleigh, North 

Carolina, for Appellee. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Eric Lamont Evans pled guilty, pursuant to a written 

plea agreement, to distribution of fifty grams or more of 

cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2006). The 

district court sentenced him to the mandatory minimum sentence 

of 120 months. On appeal, Evans’ counsel has filed a brief 

pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), in which 

he examines Evans’ Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 hearing and questions 

whether the district court complied with Fed. R. Crim. P. 32. 

Counsel concludes, however, that there are no meritorious issues 

for appeal. Evans has filed pro se briefs in which he contests 

his sentence.*

Evans did not move in the district court to withdraw 

his guilty plea; accordingly, any error in the plea hearing is 

 The Government has not filed a response. We 

affirm. 

 * In his pro se filings, Evans seeks the benefit on appeal 

of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (FSA), Pub. L. No. 111-220, 

124 Stat. 2372, which increased the amounts of crack cocaine 

that trigger statutory mandatory minimum sentences in 21 

U.S.C.A. § 841(b) (West 2000 & Supp. 2010). We conclude that

the FSA does not apply to Evans’ case. See United States v. 

Gomes, __ F.3d __, __, 2010 WL 3810872, at *2 (11th Cir. Oct. 1, 

2010) (No. 10-11225); United States v. Carradine, __ F.3d __, 

__, 2010 WL 3619799, at *4-*5 (6th Cir. Sept. 20, 2010) (No. 08-

3220). To the extent Evans also argues that the sentencing 

disparity between powder and crack cocaine offenses violates the 

Equal Protection or Due Process Clause, we find his claim to be 

without merit.
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reviewed for plain error. United States v. Martinez, 277 F.3d 

517, 525 (4th Cir. 2002). Counsel has identified no error in 

the plea colloquy, and our review of the record reveals that the 

district court substantially complied with the requirements of 

Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 in accepting Evans’ guilty plea. 

Accordingly, we affirm Evans’ conviction.

We review sentences for procedural and substantive 

reasonableness under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. 

United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). Here, the record 

indicates that the district court followed the necessary 

procedural steps in sentencing Evans, and Evans’ sentence, which 

is the lowest the court could statutorily impose, is plainly 

substantively reasonable. Thus, we conclude that the district 

court did not abuse its discretion in imposing Evans’ sentence.

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire 

record and found no meritorious issues for appeal. Accordingly, 

we affirm the district court’s judgment. This court requires 

that counsel inform his client, in writing, of his right to 

petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further 

review. If the client requests that a petition be filed, but 

counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then 

counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from 

representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof 

was served on the client. We dispense with oral argument 
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because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented 

in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process.

AFFIRMED